[Congressional Record Volume 160, Number 150 (Wednesday, December 10, 2014)]
[House]
[Pages H8951-H8962]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2014 AND 2015
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and
concur in the Senate amendment to the bill (H.R. 4681) to authorize
appropriations for fiscal years 2014 and 2015 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the Senate amendment is as follows:
Senate amendment:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015''.
[[Page H8952]]
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
Sec. 3. Budgetary effects.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Subtitle A--General Matters
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. National intelligence strategy.
Sec. 304. Software licensing.
Sec. 305. Reporting of certain employment activities by former
intelligence officers and employees.
Sec. 306. Inclusion of Predominantly Black Institutions in intelligence
officer training program.
Sec. 307. Management and oversight of financial intelligence.
Sec. 308. Analysis of private sector policies and procedures for
countering insider threats.
Sec. 309. Procedures for the retention of incidentally acquired
communications.
Sec. 310. Clarification of limitation of review to retaliatory security
clearance or access determinations.
Sec. 311. Feasibility study on consolidating classified databases of
cyber threat indicators and malware samples.
Sec. 312. Sense of Congress on cybersecurity threat and cybercrime
cooperation with Ukraine.
Sec. 313. Replacement of locally employed staff serving at United
States diplomatic facilities in the Russian Federation.
Sec. 314. Inclusion of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities
in United States diplomatic facilities in the Russian
Federation and adjacent countries.
Subtitle B--Reporting
Sec. 321. Report on declassification process.
Sec. 322. Report on intelligence community efficient spending targets.
Sec. 323. Annual report on violations of law or executive order.
Sec. 324. Annual report on intelligence activities of the Department of
Homeland Security.
Sec. 325. Report on political prison camps in North Korea.
Sec. 326. Assessment of security of domestic oil refineries and related
rail transportation infrastructure.
Sec. 327. Enhanced contractor level assessments for the intelligence
community.
Sec. 328. Assessment of the efficacy of memoranda of understanding to
facilitate intelligence-sharing.
Sec. 329. Report on foreign man-made electromagnetic pulse weapons.
Sec. 330. Report on United States counterterrorism strategy to disrupt,
dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliated or
associated groups.
Sec. 331. Feasibility study on retraining veterans in cybersecurity.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)).
SEC. 3. BUDGETARY EFFECTS.
The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of
complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go-Act of 2010, shall
be determined by reference to the latest statement titled
``Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation'' for this Act,
submitted for printing in the Congressional Record by the
Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, provided that such
statement has been submitted prior to the vote on passage.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2015 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and,
subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as
of September 30, 2015, for the conduct of the intelligence
activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through
(16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill
H.R. 4681 of the One Hundred Thirteenth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--
(1) Availability.--The classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in subsection (a) shall be made
available to the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate,
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and to the President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of
the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate
portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.
3306(a));
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel
in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2015 by
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence
determines that such action is necessary to the performance
of important intelligence functions, except that the number
of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized
under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of
civilian personnel authorized under such Schedule for such
element.
(b) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern,
for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment
under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a),
including any exemption from such personnel levels, of
employment or assignment in--
(1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;
(2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or
(3) details, joint duty, or long term, full-time training.
(c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The
Director of National Intelligence shall notify the
congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15
days prior to each exercise of an authority described in
subsection (a).
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2015 the sum of $507,400,000. Within such amount, funds
identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2016.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of
National Intelligence are authorized 794 positions as of
September 30, 2015. Personnel serving in such elements may be
permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the
United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are
authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management
Account for fiscal year 2015 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for
advanced research and development shall remain available
until September 30, 2016.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30,
2015, there are authorized such additional personnel for the
Community Management Account as of that date as are specified
in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 102(a).
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2015 the sum of $514,000,000.
[[Page H8953]]
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Subtitle A--General Matters
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 303. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY.
(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3021 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 108 the following:
``SEC. 108A. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY.
``(a) In General.--Beginning in 2017, and once every 4
years thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence shall
develop a comprehensive national intelligence strategy to
meet national security objectives for the following 4-year
period, or a longer period, if appropriate.
``(b) Requirements.--Each national intelligence strategy
required by subsection (a) shall--
``(1) delineate a national intelligence strategy consistent
with--
``(A) the most recent national security strategy report
submitted pursuant to section 108;
``(B) the strategic plans of other relevant departments and
agencies of the United States; and
``(C) other relevant national-level plans;
``(2) address matters related to national and military
intelligence, including counterintelligence;
``(3) identify the major national security missions that
the intelligence community is currently pursuing and will
pursue in the future to meet the anticipated security
environment;
``(4) describe how the intelligence community will utilize
personnel, technology, partnerships, and other capabilities
to pursue the major national security missions identified in
paragraph (3);
``(5) assess current, emerging, and future threats to the
intelligence community, including threats from foreign
intelligence and security services and insider threats;
``(6) outline the organizational roles and missions of the
elements of the intelligence community as part of an
integrated enterprise to meet customer demands for
intelligence products, services, and support;
``(7) identify sources of strategic, institutional,
programmatic, fiscal, and technological risk; and
``(8) analyze factors that may affect the intelligence
community's performance in pursuing the major national
security missions identified in paragraph (3) during the
following 10-year period.
``(c) Submission to Congress.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report on each national intelligence strategy
required by subsection (a) not later than 45 days after the
date of the completion of such strategy.''.
(b) Table of Contents Amendments.--The table of contents in
the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 108
the following new item:
``Sec. 108A. National intelligence strategy.''.
SEC. 304. SOFTWARE LICENSING.
Section 109 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
3044) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(2), by striking ``usage; and'' and
inserting ``usage, including--
``(A) increasing the centralization of the management of
software licenses;
``(B) increasing the regular tracking and maintaining of
comprehensive inventories of software licenses using
automated discovery and inventory tools and metrics;
``(C) analyzing software license data to inform investment
decisions; and
``(D) providing appropriate personnel with sufficient
software licenses management training; and'';
(2) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``usage.'' and inserting
``usage, including--
``(A) increasing the centralization of the management of
software licenses;
``(B) increasing the regular tracking and maintaining of
comprehensive inventories of software licenses using
automated discovery and inventory tools and metrics;
``(C) analyzing software license data to inform investment
decisions; and
``(D) providing appropriate personnel with sufficient
software licenses management training; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) based on the assessment required under paragraph (2),
make such recommendations with respect to software
procurement and usage to the Director of National
Intelligence as the Chief Information Officer considers
appropriate.''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(d) Implementation of Recommendations.--Not later than
180 days after the date on which the Director of National
Intelligence receives recommendations from the Chief
Information Officer of the Intelligence Community in
accordance with subsection (b)(3), the Director of National
Intelligence shall, to the extent practicable, issue
guidelines for the intelligence community on software
procurement and usage based on such recommendations.''.
SEC. 305. REPORTING OF CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES BY
FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.
(a) Restriction.--Title III of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3071 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 303 the following new section:
``SEC. 304. REPORTING OF CERTAIN EMPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES BY
FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES.
``(a) In General.--The head of each element of the
intelligence community shall issue regulations requiring each
employee of such element occupying a covered position to sign
a written agreement requiring the regular reporting of
covered employment to the head of such element.
``(b) Agreement Elements.--The regulations required under
subsection (a) shall provide that an agreement contain
provisions requiring each employee occupying a covered
position to, during the two-year period beginning on the date
on which such employee ceases to occupy such covered
position--
``(1) report covered employment to the head of the element
of the intelligence community that employed such employee in
such covered position upon accepting such covered employment;
and
``(2) annually (or more frequently if the head of such
element considers it appropriate) report covered employment
to the head of such element.
``(c) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Covered employment.--The term `covered employment'
means direct employment by, representation of, or the
provision of advice relating to national security to the
government of a foreign country or any person whose
activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed,
controlled, financed, or subsidized, in whole or in major
part, by any government of a foreign country.
``(2) Covered position.--The term `covered position' means
a position within an element of the intelligence community
that, based on the level of access of a person occupying such
position to information regarding sensitive intelligence
sources or methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters,
the head of such element determines should be subject to the
requirements of this section.
``(3) Government of a foreign country.--The term
`government of a foreign country' has the meaning given the
term in section 1(e) of the Foreign Agents Registration Act
of 1938 (22 U.S.C. 611(e)).''.
(b) Regulations and Certification.--
(1) Regulations.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the head of each element of the
intelligence community shall issue the regulations required
under section 304 of the National Security Act of 1947, as
added by subsection (a) of this section.
(2) Certification.--Not later than 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees--
(A) a certification that each head of an element of the
intelligence community has prescribed the regulations
required under section 304 of the National Security Act of
1947, as added by subsection (a) of this section; or
(B) if the Director is unable to submit the certification
described under subparagraph (A), an explanation as to why
the Director is unable to submit such certification,
including a designation of which heads of an element of the
intelligence community have prescribed the regulations
required under such section 304 and which have not.
(c) Table of Contents Amendments.--The table of contents in
the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is
amended--
(1) by striking the second item relating to section 302
(Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries) and the items
relating to sections 304, 305, and 306; and
(2) by inserting after the item relating to section 303 the
following new item:
``Sec. 304. Reporting of certain employment activities by former
intelligence officers and employees.''.
SEC. 306. INCLUSION OF PREDOMINANTLY BLACK INSTITUTIONS IN
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM.
Section 1024 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3224) is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``and Predominantly
Black Institutions'' after ``universities''; and
(2) in subsection (g)--
(A) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
(B) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new
paragraph:
``(4) Predominantly black institution.--The term
`Predominantly Black Institution' has the meaning given the
term in section 318 of the Higher education Act of 1965 (20
U.S.C. 1059e).''.
SEC. 307. MANAGEMENT AND OVERSIGHT OF FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Requirement for Plan.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall prepare a plan for management of the
elements of the intelligence community that carry out
financial intelligence activities.
(b) Contents of Plan.--The plan required by subsection (a)
shall establish a governance framework, procedures for
sharing and harmonizing the acquisition and use of financial
analytic tools, standards for quality of analytic products,
procedures for oversight and evaluation of resource
allocations associated with the joint development of
information sharing efforts
[[Page H8954]]
and tools, and an education and training model for elements
of the intelligence community that carry out financial
intelligence activities.
(c) Briefing to Congress.--Not later than 180 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence shall brief the congressional
intelligence committees on the actions the Director proposes
to implement the plan required by subsection (a).
SEC. 308. ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE SECTOR POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
FOR COUNTERING INSIDER THREATS.
(a) Analysis.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the National
Counterintelligence Executive, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees an analysis of private
sector policies and procedures for countering insider
threats.
(b) Content.--The analysis required by subsection (a) shall
include--
(1) a review of whether and how the intelligence community
could utilize private sector hiring and human resources best
practices to screen, vet, and validate the credentials,
capabilities, and character of applicants for positions
involving trusted access to sensitive information;
(2) an analysis of private sector policies for holding
supervisors and subordinates accountable for violations of
established security protocols and whether the intelligence
community should adopt similar policies for positions of
trusted access to sensitive information;
(3) an assessment of the feasibility and advisability of
applying mandatory leave policies, similar to those endorsed
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the
Securities and Exchange Commission to identify fraud in the
financial services industry, to certain positions within the
intelligence community; and
(4) recommendations for how the intelligence community
could utilize private sector risk indices, such as credit
risk scores, to make determinations about employee access to
sensitive information.
SEC. 309. PROCEDURES FOR THE RETENTION OF INCIDENTALLY
ACQUIRED COMMUNICATIONS.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered communication.--The term ``covered
communication'' means any nonpublic telephone or electronic
communication acquired without the consent of a person who is
a party to the communication, including communications in
electronic storage.
(2) Head of an element of the intelligence community.--The
term ``head of an element of the intelligence community''
means, as appropriate--
(A) the head of an element of the intelligence community;
or
(B) the head of the department or agency containing such
element.
(3) United states person.--The term ``United States
person'' has the meaning given that term in section 101 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1801).
(b) Procedures for Covered Communications.--
(1) Requirement to adopt.--Not later than 2 years after the
date of the enactment of this Act each head of an element of
the intelligence community shall adopt procedures approved by
the Attorney General for such element that ensure compliance
with the requirements of paragraph (3).
(2) Coordination and approval.--The procedures required by
paragraph (1) shall be--
(A) prepared in coordination with the Director of National
Intelligence; and
(B) approved by the Attorney General prior to issuance.
(3) Procedures.--
(A) Application.--The procedures required by paragraph (1)
shall apply to any intelligence collection activity not
otherwise authorized by court order (including an order or
certification issued by a court established under subsection
(a) or (b) of section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803)), subpoena, or
similar legal process that is reasonably anticipated to
result in the acquisition of a covered communication to or
from a United States person and shall permit the acquisition,
retention, and dissemination of covered communications
subject to the limitation in subparagraph (B).
(B) Limitation on retention.--A covered communication shall
not be retained in excess of 5 years, unless--
(i) the communication has been affirmatively determined, in
whole or in part, to constitute foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence or is necessary to understand or assess
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence;
(ii) the communication is reasonably believed to constitute
evidence of a crime and is retained by a law enforcement
agency;
(iii) the communication is enciphered or reasonably
believed to have a secret meaning;
(iv) all parties to the communication are reasonably
believed to be non-United States persons;
(v) retention is necessary to protect against an imminent
threat to human life, in which case both the nature of the
threat and the information to be retained shall be reported
to the congressional intelligence committees not later than
30 days after the date such retention is extended under this
clause;
(vi) retention is necessary for technical assurance or
compliance purposes, including a court order or discovery
obligation, in which case access to information retained for
technical assurance or compliance purposes shall be reported
to the congressional intelligence committees on an annual
basis; or
(vii) retention for a period in excess of 5 years is
approved by the head of the element of the intelligence
community responsible for such retention, based on a
determination that retention is necessary to protect the
national security of the United States, in which case the
head of such element shall provide to the congressional
intelligence committees a written certification describing--
(I) the reasons extended retention is necessary to protect
the national security of the United States;
(II) the duration for which the head of the element is
authorizing retention;
(III) the particular information to be retained; and
(IV) the measures the element of the intelligence community
is taking to protect the privacy interests of United States
persons or persons located inside the United States.
SEC. 310. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION OF REVIEW TO
RETALIATORY SECURITY CLEARANCE OR ACCESS
DETERMINATIONS.
Section 3001(b)(7) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 3341(b)(7)) is amended--
(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking
``2014--'' and inserting ``2014, and consistent with
subsection (j)--'';
(2) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``to appeal a
determination to suspend or revoke a security clearance or
access to classified information'' and inserting ``alleging
reprisal for having made a protected disclosure (provided the
individual does not disclose classified information or other
information contrary to law) to appeal any action affecting
an employee's access to classified information''; and
(3) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``information,''
inserting ``information following a protected disclosure,''.
SEC. 311. FEASIBILITY STUDY ON CONSOLIDATING CLASSIFIED
DATABASES OF CYBER THREAT INDICATORS AND
MALWARE SAMPLES.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Director of the National Security Agency, the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, shall conduct a
feasibility study on consolidating classified databases of
cyber threat indicators and malware samples in the
intelligence community.
(b) Elements.--The feasibility study required by subsection
(a) shall include the following:
(1) An inventory of classified databases of cyber threat
indicators and malware samples in the intelligence community.
(2) An assessment of actions that could be carried out to
consolidate such databases to achieve the greatest possible
information sharing within the intelligence community and
cost savings for the Federal Government.
(3) An assessment of any impediments to such consolidation.
(4) An assessment of whether the Intelligence Community
Information Technology Enterprise can support such
consolidation.
(c) Report to Congress.--Not later than 30 days after the
date on which the Director of National Intelligence completes
the feasibility study required by subsection (a), the
Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a written report that summarizes the feasibility
study, including the information required under subsection
(b).
SEC. 312. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON CYBERSECURITY THREAT AND
CYBERCRIME COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) cooperation between the intelligence and law
enforcement agencies of the United States and Ukraine should
be increased to improve cybersecurity policies between these
two countries;
(2) the United States should pursue improved extradition
procedures among the Governments of the United States,
Ukraine, and other countries from which cybercriminals target
United States citizens and entities;
(3) the President should--
(A) initiate a round of formal United States-Ukraine
bilateral talks on cybersecurity threat and cybercrime
cooperation, with additional multilateral talks that include
other law enforcement partners such as Europol and Interpol;
and
(B) work to obtain a commitment from the Government of
Ukraine to end cybercrime directed at persons outside Ukraine
and to work with the United States and other allies to deter
and convict known cybercriminals;
(4) the President should establish a capacity building
program with the Government of Ukraine, which could include--
(A) a joint effort to improve cyber capacity building,
including intelligence and law enforcement services in
Ukraine;
(B) sending United States law enforcement agents to aid law
enforcement agencies in Ukraine in investigating cybercrimes;
and
(C) agreements to improve communications networks to
enhance law enforcement cooperation, such as a hotline
directly connecting law enforcement agencies in the United
States and Ukraine; and
(5) the President should establish and maintain an
intelligence and law enforcement cooperation scorecard with
metrics designed to measure the number of instances that
intelligence and law enforcement agencies in the United
States request assistance from intelligence and law
enforcement agencies in Ukraine and the number and type of
responses received to such requests.
SEC. 313. REPLACEMENT OF LOCALLY EMPLOYED STAFF SERVING AT
UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES IN THE
RUSSIAN FEDERATION.
(a) Employment Requirement.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall ensure that,
not later than one year after the
[[Page H8955]]
date of the enactment of this Act, every supervisory position
at a United States diplomatic facility in the Russian
Federation shall be occupied by a citizen of the United
States who has passed, and shall be subject to, a thorough
background check.
(2) Extension.--The Secretary of State may extend the
deadline under paragraph (1) for up to one year by providing
advance written notification and justification of such
extension to the appropriate congressional committees.
(3) Progress report.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report on progress made toward meeting the employment
requirement under paragraph (1).
(b) Plan for Reduced Use of Locally Employed Staff.--Not
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Secretary of State, in coordination with other
appropriate government agencies, shall submit to the
appropriate congressional committees a plan to further reduce
the reliance on locally employed staff in United States
diplomatic facilities in the Russian Federation. The plan
shall, at a minimum, include cost estimates, timelines, and
numbers of employees to be replaced.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed to infringe on the power of the President, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls.''
SEC. 314. INCLUSION OF SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION
FACILITIES IN UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC
FACILITIES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND
ADJACENT COUNTRIES.
(a) Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
Requirement.--Each United States diplomatic facility that,
after the date of the enactment of this Act, is constructed
in, or undergoes a construction upgrade in, the Russian
Federation, any country that shares a land border with the
Russian Federation, or any country that is a former member of
the Soviet Union shall be constructed to include a Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facility.
(b) National Security Waiver.--The Secretary of State may
waive the requirement under subsection (a) if the Secretary
determines that such waiver is in the national security
interest of the United States and submits a written
justification to the appropriate congressional committees not
later than 180 days before exercising such waiver.
(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the
House of Representatives.
Subtitle B--Reporting
SEC. 321. REPORT ON DECLASSIFICATION PROCESS.
Not later than December 31, 2016, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report describing--
(1) proposals to improve the declassification process
throughout the intelligence community; and
(2) steps the intelligence community could take, or
legislation that may be necessary, to enable the National
Declassification Center to better accomplish the missions
assigned to the Center by Executive Order No. 13526 (75 Fed.
Reg. 707).
SEC. 322. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY EFFICIENT SPENDING
TARGETS.
(a) In General.--Not later than April 1, 2016, and April 1,
2017, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a report on the
status and effectiveness of efforts to reduce administrative
costs for the intelligence community during the preceding
year.
(b) Elements.--Each report under subsection (a) shall
include for each element of the intelligence community the
following:
(1) A description of the status and effectiveness of
efforts to devise alternatives to government travel and
promote efficient travel spending, such as teleconferencing
and video conferencing.
(2) A description of the status and effectiveness of
efforts to limit costs related to hosting and attending
conferences.
(3) A description of the status and effectiveness of
efforts to assess information technology inventories and
usage, and establish controls, to reduce costs related to
underutilized information technology equipment, software, or
services.
(4) A description of the status and effectiveness of
efforts to limit the publication and printing of hard copy
documents.
(5) A description of the status and effectiveness of
efforts to improve the performance of Federal fleet motor
vehicles and limit executive transportation.
(6) A description of the status and effectiveness of
efforts to limit the purchase of extraneous promotional
items, such as plaques, clothing, and commemorative items.
(7) A description of the status and effectiveness of
efforts to consolidate and streamline workforce training
programs to focus on the highest priority workforce and
mission needs.
(8) Such other matters relating to efforts to reduce
intelligence community administrative costs as the Director
may specify for purposes of this section.
SEC. 323. ANNUAL REPORT ON VIOLATIONS OF LAW OR EXECUTIVE
ORDER.
(a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following:
``SEC. 511. ANNUAL REPORT ON VIOLATIONS OF LAW OR EXECUTIVE
ORDER.
``(a) Annual Reports Required.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall annually submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on violations of law or
executive order relating to intelligence activities by
personnel of an element of the intelligence community that
were identified during the previous calendar year.
``(b) Elements.--Each report submitted under subsection (a)
shall, consistent with the need to preserve ongoing criminal
investigations, include a description of, and any action
taken in response to, any violation of law or executive order
(including Executive Order No. 12333 (50 U.S.C. 3001 note))
relating to intelligence activities committed by personnel of
an element of the intelligence community in the course of the
employment of such personnel that, during the previous
calendar year, was--
``(1) determined by the director, head, or general counsel
of any element of the intelligence community to have
occurred;
``(2) referred to the Department of Justice for possible
criminal prosecution; or
``(3) substantiated by the inspector general of any element
of the intelligence community.''.
(b) Initial Report.--The first report required under
section 511 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by
subsection (a), shall be submitted not later than one year
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(c) Guidelines.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the head of each element
of the intelligence community, shall--
(1) issue guidelines to carry out section 511 of the
National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a);
and
(2) submit such guidelines to the congressional
intelligence committees.
(d) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of sections in
the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is
amended by adding after the item relating to section 510 the
following new item:
``Sec. 511. Annual report on violations of law or executive order.''.
(e) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section or the
amendments made by this section shall be construed to alter
any requirement existing on the date of the enactment of this
Act to submit a report under any provision of law.
SEC. 324. ANNUAL REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.
(a) In General.--For each fiscal year and along with the
budget materials submitted in support of the budget of the
Department of Homeland Security pursuant to section 1105(a)
of title 31, United States Code, the Under Secretary for
Intelligence and Analysis of the Department shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a report for such
fiscal year on each intelligence activity of each
intelligence component of the Department, as designated by
the Under Secretary, that includes the following:
(1) The amount of funding requested for each such
intelligence activity.
(2) The number of full-time employees funded to perform
each such intelligence activity.
(3) The number of full-time contractor employees (or the
equivalent of full-time in the case of part-time contractor
employees) funded to perform or in support of each such
intelligence activity.
(4) A determination as to whether each such intelligence
activity is predominantly in support of national intelligence
or departmental missions.
(5) The total number of analysts of the Intelligence
Enterprise of the Department that perform--
(A) strategic analysis; or
(B) operational analysis.
(b) Feasibility and Advisability Report.--Not later than
120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, acting through the Under
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report that--
(1) examines the feasibility and advisability of including
the budget request for all intelligence activities of each
intelligence component of the Department that predominantly
support departmental missions, as designated by the Under
Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis, in the Homeland
Security Intelligence Program; and
(2) includes a plan to enhance the coordination of
department-wide intelligence activities to achieve greater
efficiencies in the performance of the Department of Homeland
Security intelligence functions.
(c) Intelligence Component of the Department.--In this
section, the term ``intelligence component of the
Department'' has the meaning given that term in section 2 of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101).
SEC. 325. REPORT ON POLITICAL PRISON CAMPS IN NORTH KOREA.
(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate, and the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives a report on political
prison camps in North Korea.
[[Page H8956]]
(b) Elements.--The report required by subsection (a)
shall--
(1) describe the actions the United States is taking to
support implementation of the recommendations of the United
Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, including the eventual
establishment of a tribunal to hold individuals accountable
for abuses; and
(2) include, with respect to each political prison camp in
North Korea to the extent information is available--
(A) the estimated prisoner population of each such camp;
(B) the geographical coordinates of each such camp;
(C) the reasons for confinement of the prisoners at each
such camp;
(D) a description of the primary industries and products
made at each such camp, and the end users of any goods
produced in such camp;
(E) information regarding involvement of any non-North
Korean entity or individual involved in the operations of
each such camp, including as an end user or source of any
good or products used in, or produced by, in such camp;
(F) information identifying individuals and agencies
responsible for conditions in each such camp at all levels of
the Government of North Korea;
(G) a description of the conditions under which prisoners
are confined, with respect to the adequacy of food, shelter,
medical care, working conditions, and reports of ill-
treatment of prisoners, at each such camp; and
(H) unclassified imagery, including satellite imagery, of
each such camp.
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in an unclassified form and may include a
classified annex if necessary.
SEC. 326. ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY OF DOMESTIC OIL REFINERIES
AND RELATED RAIL TRANSPORTATION INFRASTRUCTURE.
(a) Assessment.--The Under Secretary of Homeland Security
for Intelligence and Analysis shall conduct an intelligence
assessment of the security of domestic oil refineries and
related rail transportation infrastructure.
(b) Submission.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence and Analysis shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees--
(1) the results of the assessment required under subsection
(a); and
(2) any recommendations with respect to intelligence
sharing or intelligence collection to improve the security of
domestic oil refineries and related rail transportation
infrastructure to protect the communities surrounding such
refineries or such infrastructure from potential harm that
the Under Secretary considers appropriate.
SEC. 327. ENHANCED CONTRACTOR LEVEL ASSESSMENTS FOR THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 506B(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 3098(c)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (11), by striking ``or contracted'';
(2) by redesignating paragraph (12) as paragraph (13); and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (11) the following:
``(12) The best estimate of the number of intelligence
collectors and analysts contracted by each element of the
intelligence community and a description of the functions
performed by such contractors.''.
SEC. 328. ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFICACY OF MEMORANDA OF
UNDERSTANDING TO FACILITATE INTELLIGENCE-
SHARING.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Under Secretary of Homeland Security for
Intelligence and Analysis, in consultation with the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Program
Manager of the Information Sharing Environment, shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate,
the Committee on Homeland Security of the House of
Representatives, the Committee on the Judiciary of the
Senate, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives an assessment of the efficacy of the
memoranda of understanding signed between Federal, State,
local, tribal, and territorial agencies to facilitate
intelligence-sharing within and separate from the Joint
Terrorism Task Force. Such assessment shall include--
(1) any language within such memoranda of understanding
that prohibited or may be construed to prohibit intelligence-
sharing between Federal, State, local, tribal, and
territorial agencies; and
(2) any recommendations for memoranda of understanding to
better facilitate intelligence-sharing between Federal,
State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies.
SEC. 329. REPORT ON FOREIGN MAN-MADE ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE
WEAPONS.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees,
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives a
report on the threat posed by man-made electromagnetic pulse
weapons to United States interests through 2025, including
threats from foreign countries and foreign non-State actors.
(b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
SEC. 330. REPORT ON UNITED STATES COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY
TO DISRUPT, DISMANTLE, AND DEFEAT AL-QAEDA AND
ITS AFFILIATED OR ASSOCIATED GROUPS.
(a) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress a comprehensive report on the United States
counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat
al-Qaeda and its affiliated or associated groups.
(2) Coordination.--The report required by paragraph (1)
shall be prepared in coordination with the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General,
and the Secretary of Defense, and the head of any other
department or agency of the United States Government that has
responsibility for activities directed at combating al-Qaeda
and its affiliated or associated groups.
(3) Elements.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall
include the following:
(A) A definition of--
(i) al-Qaeda core, including a list of which known
individuals constitute al-Qaeda core;
(ii) an affiliated group of al-Qaeda, including a list of
which known groups constitute an affiliate group of al-Qaeda;
(iii) an associated group of al-Qaeda, including a list of
which known groups constitute an associated group of al-
Qaeda; and
(iv) a group aligned with al-Qaeda, including a description
of what actions a group takes or statements it makes that
qualify it as a group aligned with al-Qaeda.
(B) A list of any other group, including the organization
that calls itself the Islamic State (also known as ``ISIS''
or ``ISIL''), that adheres to the core mission of al-Qaeda,
or who espouses the same violent jihad ideology as al-Qaeda.
(C) An assessment of the relationship between al-Qaeda core
and the groups referred to in subparagraph (B).
(D) An assessment of the strengthening or weakening of al-
Qaeda and the groups referred to in subparagraph (B) from
January 1, 2010, to the present, including a description of
the metrics that are used to assess strengthening or
weakening and an assessment of the relative increase or
decrease in violent attacks attributed to such entities.
(E) An assessment of whether or not an individual can be a
member of al-Qaeda core if such individual is not located in
Afghanistan or Pakistan.
(F) An assessment of whether or not an individual can be a
member of al-Qaeda core as well as a member of a group
referred to in subparagraph (B).
(G) A definition of defeat of core al-Qaeda.
(H) An assessment of the extent or coordination, command,
and control between core al-Qaeda and the groups referred to
in subparagraph (B), specifically addressing each such group.
(I) An assessment of the effectiveness of counterterrorism
operations against core al-Qaeda and the groups referred to
in subparagraph (B), and whether such operations have had a
sustained impact on the capabilities and effectiveness of
core al-Qaeda and such groups.
(4) Form.--The report required by paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(b) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Armed Services of the Senate; and
(3) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on
Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 331. FEASIBILITY STUDY ON RETRAINING VETERANS IN
CYBERSECURITY.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, and the Secretary of Homeland Security,
shall submit to Congress a feasibility study on retraining
veterans and retired members of elements of the intelligence
community in cybersecurity.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr.
Ruppersberger) each will control 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
General Leave
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all
Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks
and to include extraneous material on the bill, H.R. 4681.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Michigan?
There was no objection.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Speaker, I will enter into the Record at the end of my remarks
the Joint Explanatory Statement prepared by the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees.
Mr. Speaker, when Mr. Ruppersberger and I assumed the helm of the
committee, we committed to return to the practice of passing the annual
intelligence authorization bill, recognizing that it is one of the most
critical tools that Congress has to control the intelligence activities
of the
[[Page H8957]]
United States Government. I am proud today that we are bringing the
fifth such authorization bill to the floor since Mr. Ruppersberger
assumed the role of ranking member and I assumed the role of chairman 4
years ago.
As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified
programs, the bulk of the committee's direction is found in the
classified annex to the bill, which is very similar to the version
passed by the House earlier this year.
At an unclassified level, I can report that the classified annex
increases the President's budget request by less than 1 percent and is
consistent with the Bipartisan Budget Act funding caps. Key committee
funding initiatives, vital to national security, are preserved in this
bill. These funding initiatives are offset by reductions to unnecessary
programs and increased efficiencies.
The bill's modest net increase reflects the committee's concern that
the President's request does not properly fund a number of important
initiatives and leaves several unacceptable shortfalls when it comes to
the matters of national security. The bill also provides substantial
intelligence resources to help defeat Islamic State in Iraq and the
Levant.
Earlier this year, the House passed its version of this bill with
overwhelming bipartisan support. This bill contains all of the
provisions that were not previously enacted into law in the fiscal year
2014 bill, along with provisions added by the Senate. None of these
provisions are considered controversial, and we have worked through and
vetted to make sure that is accurate with both Republican and Democrat
staff and Members.
Mr. Speaker, we find ourselves in a very interesting time in history.
ISIL is attempting to build a state across the Middle East, from
Lebanon to Iraq, including Syria, Jordan, and Israel. The group already
controls a swath of land across Iraq and Syria about the size of the
State of Indiana, and it is growing. The goal of our counterterrorism
strategy is to deny safe haven from which terrorists can plot attacks
against the United States and/or our allies. Regrettably, we have not
prevented ISIL from establishing such a safe haven, and, as a result,
we face a growing threat from that region.
At the same time, state actors like Russia and China view this time
as an opportunity to expand their reach and expand their influence.
Uneven leadership in recent years has emboldened these adversaries to
change the international order, at the expense of U.S. interests.
We rightly demand that our intelligence agencies provide policymakers
with the best and most timely information possible on the threats we
face. We ask them to track terrorists wherever they train, plan, and
fundraise. We ask them to stop devastating cyber attacks that steal
American jobs through theft of intellectual property. We ask them to
track nuclear and missile threats. We demand they get it right every
time.
This bill will ensure that the dedicated men and women of our
intelligence community have the funding and authorities and support
that they need to meet their mission and to keep us safe.
I take this moment, Mr. Speaker, at a time when certainly voices both
around the country and around the world are seeking to condemn the very
courageous men and women who show up in the intelligence business to
provide the information to keep America safe. They are silent warriors.
They are faithful patriots. They don't ask for recognition. They don't
ask for time. You don't see their names in the front pages of the paper
or on TV. They really don't seek that recognition.
But they seek the very purpose of being the first to be able to
develop that one piece of information that might prevent further
conflict, it might prevent a terrorist attack, it might prevent a
nuclear launch, it might prevent one Nation from attacking another.
In the haze of what seems to be self-loathing these days, by
targeting that against these very courageous men and women who cannot
defend themselves in public, we are doing a disservice to their courage
and their commitment to keep America safe. We find that it is easy to,
at some point, go back and point fingers at what we believe may or may
not have happened in the work of keeping America safe. It is
realistically and holistically unfair that we would do that to these
very brave souls who risk their lives today.
But here is the good news for Americans. These folks that work in the
shadows understand that they have accepted these dangerous and quiet
roles, and they will get up this morning, like they have every other
morning, and understand it is between them and the United States when
it comes to any terrorist attack, or worse, bigger, broader conflict
somewhere in the world.
So they will do their job; they will do their duty; they will do
their mission. They will read the papers and fold them and put them on
their desk and go about their work, their important work. But it is
wrong that years later we ask these people to have to believe that they
might have to get a lawyer to do their job.
The next time that America asks them to do something hard and
difficult in defense of the United States, we shouldn't be giving them
lawyers and subpoenas and the United Nations condemning their actions
and looking for prosecutions in their effort to tear the United States
down one more level. We ought to be giving them ticker tape parades
when they come home from these places and say: Thank you for your
sacrifice, and thank you for your family's sacrifice. We can sleep
better at night knowing that you have had the courage to stand where no
other American was willing to stand in defense of the United States.
I hope they take this as certainly my final bill on this particular
floor to encourage them to do their good work, to know that Americans
who are kissing their kids and putting them on the bus this morning
understand that it takes their efforts to keep this country safe, that
somebody that shows up for work and is engaged in international
commerce understands that it takes their work to keep America safe.
Believe me, outside of this town, people across America understand the
value and importance and really the essential work that these people do
for the defense of America. We should not condemn them, we should be
proud of their work, and we should stand behind them. This bill I think
represents the work in a bipartisan way that allows them to continue
that work, to do the work that protects America.
I would be remiss if I didn't thank my good friend Dutch
Ruppersberger. Over the last 4 years, these five budgets could not have
happened without your work and your staff's work in making sure that we
had the best product available to make sure that the intelligence
community had the resources that they need, the policies that they
need, the support that they need, and, yes, every once in a while, the
kick in the can that they needed.
With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, when Dutch and I assumed the helm of the Committee, we
committed to return to the practice of passing the annual intelligence
authorization bill, recognizing that it is one of the most critical
tools Congress has to control the intelligence activities of the U.S.
Government. I am proud today that we are bringing the fifth such
authorization bill to the floor since I assumed the Chairmanship four
years ago.
As most of the intelligence budget involves highly classified
programs, the bulk of the Committee's direction is found in the
classified annex to the bill, which is very similar to the version
passed by the House earlier this year.
At an unclassified level, I can report that the classified annex
increases the President's budget request by less than one percent and
is consistent with the Bipartisan Budget Act funding caps. Key
Committee funding initiatives, vital to national security, are
preserved in this bill. These funding initiatives are offset by
reductions to unnecessary programs and increased efficiencies. The
bill's modest net increase reflects the Committee's concern that the
President's request does not properly fund a number of important
initiatives and leaves several unacceptable shortfalls. The bill also
provides substantial intelligence resources to help defeat ISIL.
Earlier this year the House passed its version of this bill by an
overwhelming bipartisan vote. This bill contains all of those
provisions that were not previously enacted into law in the FY 14 bill,
along with provisions added by the Senate. None of those provisions are
considered controversial.
Mr. Speaker, we find ourselves in a very interesting time in history.
ISIL is attempting to
[[Page H8958]]
build a state across the Middle East--from Lebanon to Iraq, including
Syria, Jordan, and Israel. The group already controls a swath of land
across Iraq and Syria. The goal of our counterterrorism strategy is to
deny safe haven from which terrorists can plot attacks against the
United States and our allies. Regrettably, we have not prevented ISIL
from establishing such a safe haven, and as a result we face a growing
threat from the region.
At the same time, state actors like Russia and China view this time
as an opportunity to expand their reach and influence. Uneven
leadership in recent years has emboldened these adversaries to change
the international order--at the expense of U.S. interests.
We rightly demand that our intelligence agencies provide policy
makers with the best and most timely information possible on the
threats we face. We ask them to track terrorists wherever they train,
plan, and fundraise. We ask them to stop devastating cyber attacks that
steal American jobs. We ask them to track nuclear and missile threats.
And we demand they get it right--every time.
This bill will ensure that the dedicated men and women of our
Intelligence Community have the funding and authorities--and support--
they need to meet their mission and to keep us safe.
Before closing, I want to take a moment to thank the men and women of
this country who serve in our Intelligence Community today. It has been
a distinct honor to get to know so many of them, and I am proud to have
played a role in contributing to their success.
I would also like to extend thanks to all of my dedicated staff on
the Committee who worked hard over the years to get us back on track in
passing the annual Authorization bill and in our daily oversight of the
Intelligence Community.
Thank you to my current committee staff: Darren Dick, Katie
Wheelbarger, Sarah Geffroy, Andy Keiser, Bryan Smith, Ashley Lowry,
Susan Phalen, Tom Corcoran, Michael Ellis, Chelsey Campbell, Geof Kahn,
Brooke Eisele, Randy Smith, Jim Hildebrand, Shannon Stuart, Rachel
Wilson, Lisa Major, Diane Rinaldo. Thank you, as well as to those who
are no longer with the staff but played an influential role in
committee activities during my tenure as Chairman: Michael Allen, Chris
Donesa, Jamil Jaffer, Nathan Hauser, Todd Jones, Frank Garcia, George
Pappas, Will Koella, Leah Scott, Fred Fleitz, and Stephanie Pelton.
Finally, a big thank you to our dedicated Security and Information
Technology staff who keep us up and running everyday: Brandon Smith,
Kristin Jepson and Kevin Klein.
JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT TO ACCOMPANY THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015
The following consists of the explanatory material to
accompany the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2015.
This joint explanatory statement shall have the same effect
with respect to the implementation of this Act as if it were
a joint explanatory statement of a committee of conference.
This explanatory statement is accompanied by a classified
annex that contains a classified Schedule of Authorizations.
The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated by
reference in the Act and has the legal status of public law.
The classified annex and classified Schedule of
Authorizations are the result of negotiations between the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence to reconcile
differences in their respective versions of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015. The congressionally
directed actions described in Senate Report No. 113-233, the
classified annex that accompanied Senate Report No. 113-233,
and the classified annex that accompanied House Report No.
113-463 should be carried out to the extent they are not
amended, altered, substituted, or otherwise specifically
addressed in either this Joint Explanatory Statement or in
the classified annex to this Statement.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation
The following is a section-by-section analysis and
explanation of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2015.
Title I--Intelligence Activities
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists the United States Government departments,
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities for Fiscal Year 2015.
Section 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations
Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities and the applicable personnel
levels by program for Fiscal Year 2015 are contained in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations and that the classified
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the
Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of
Representatives and to the President.
Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 is intended to provide additional flexibility
to the DNI in managing the civilian personnel of the
Intelligence Community (IC). Section 103 provides that the
DNI may authorize employment of civilian personnel in Fiscal
Year 2015 in excess of the number of authorized positions by
an amount not exceeding three percent of the total limit
applicable to each IC element under Section 102. The DNI may
do so only if necessary to the performance of important
intelligence functions.
Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 104 authorizes appropriations for the Intelligence
Community Management Account (ICMA) of the DNI and sets the
authorized personnel levels for the elements within the ICMA
for Fiscal Year 2015.
Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$514,000,000 for Fiscal Year 2015 for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
Title III--General Provisions
Subtitle A--General Matters
Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits
authorized by law
Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by the Act for salary, pay, retirement, and
other benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence
activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of
appropriations by the Act shall not be deemed to constitute
authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity that
is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or laws of
the United States.
Section 303. National intelligence strategy
Section 303 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
require the DNI to develop a comprehensive national
intelligence strategy every four years beginning in 2017.
Section 304. Software licensing
Section 304 amends Section 109 of the National Security Act
of 1947, which requires chief information officers within the
IC to prepare biennial inventories and assessments concerning
the use and procurement of software licenses, to make certain
enhancements to the biennial assessments required under
Section 109.
Section 305. Reporting of certain employment activities by
former intelligence officers and employees
Section 305 requires the head of each element of the IC to
issue regulations that require an employee occupying
positions with access to particularly sensitive information
within such element to sign a written agreement that requires
the regular reporting of any employment by, representation
of, or the provision of advice relating to national security
to the government of a foreign country, or any person whose
activities are supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or
subsidized by any government of a foreign country, for a two-
year period after the employee ceases employment with the IC
element.
Section 306. Inclusion of Predominantly Black Institutions in
intelligence officer training program
Section 306 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
include predominantly black institutions in the intelligence
officer training programs established under Section 1024 of
the Act.
Section 307. Management and oversight of financial
intelligence
Section 307 requires the DNI to prepare a plan for
management of the elements of the IC that carry out financial
intelligence activities.
Section 308. Analysis of private sector policies and
procedures for countering insider threats
Section 308 directs the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees an analysis of private sector
policies and procedures for countering insider threats.
Section 309. Procedures for the retention of incidentally
acquired communications
Section 309 requires the head of each element of the IC to
adopt Attorney General-approved procedures that govern the
retention of nonpublic telephone or electronic communications
acquired without consent of a person who is a party to the
communications, including communications in electronic
storage.
The procedures required under this section shall apply to
any intelligence activity that is reasonably anticipated to
result in the acquisition of such telephone or electronic
communications to or from a United States person not
otherwise authorized by court order, subpoena, or similar
legal process, regardless of the location where the
collection occurs. The procedures shall prohibit the
retention of such telephone or electronic communications for
a period in excess of five years, unless the communications
are determined to fall within one of several categories,
enumerated in subsection (b)(3)(B), for which retention in
excess of five years is authorized, to include communications
that have been affirmatively determined to constitute foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence, communications that are
reasonably
[[Page H8959]]
believed to constitute evidence of a crime and are retained
by a law enforcement agency, and communications that are
enciphered or reasonably believed to have a secret meaning.
Because it may be necessary in certain instances for IC
elements to retain communications covered by this section for
a period in excess of five years that do not fall into the
categories specifically enumerated in subsection (b)(3)(B),
subsection (b)(3)(B)(vii) provides flexibility for the head
of each element of the intelligence community to authorize
such extended retention where the head of the element
determines that it is necessary to protect the national
security of the United States. In the absence of such a
determination, Section 309 is intended to establish a default
rule for intelligence collection activities, not otherwise
authorized by legal process, that requires agencies to delete
communications covered by this section after five years,
unless a determination is made that the communications
constitute foreign intelligence or counterintelligence or
otherwise meet the retention requirements set forth in this
section.
Section 310. Clarification of limitation of review to
retaliatory security clearance or access determinations
Section 310 makes a technical amendment to Section
3001(b)(7) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 to clarify that the policies and
procedures prescribed by that section (to permit individuals
to appeal adverse security clearance or access
determinations) are only required to apply to adverse
security clearance or access determinations alleged to be in
reprisal for having made a protected whistleblower
disclosure.
Section 311. Feasibility study on consolidating classified
databases of cyber threat indicators and malware samples
Section 307 requires the DNI to conduct a feasibility study
on consolidating classified databases of cyber threat
indicators and malware samples in the IC and to provide a
report to the congressional intelligence committees
summarizing the feasibility study.
Section 312. Sense of Congress on cybersecurity threat and
cybercrime cooperation with Ukraine
Section 312 expresses the sense of Congress concerning
cybersecurity threat and cybercrime cooperation between the
United States and Ukraine.
Section 313. Replacement of locally employed staff serving at
United States diplomatic facilities in the Russian
Federation
Section 313 requires the Secretary of State to ensure that
every supervisory position at a U.S. diplomatic facility in
the Russian Federation is occupied by a citizen of the United
States who has passed a background check and to provide
Congress with a plan to further reduce reliance on locally
employed staff.
Section 314. Inclusion of Sensitive Compartmented Information
Facilities in United States diplomatic facilities in the
Russian Federation and adjacent countries
Section 314 requires that each U.S. diplomatic facility
that is constructed in, or undergoes a construction upgrade
in, the Russian Federation, any country that shares a land
border with the Russian Federation, or any country that is a
former member of the Soviet Union, shall be constructed to
include a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility. The
Secretary of State may waive the requirements of this section
upon a determination that it is in the national security
interest of the United States.
Subtitle B--Reporting
Section 321. Report on declassification process
Section 321 requires the DNI to submit a report to Congress
describing proposals to improve the declassification process
and steps the IC could take or legislation that may be
necessary, to enable the National Declassification Center to
better accomplish the missions assigned to the Center by
Executive Order 13526.
Section 322. Report on intelligence community efficient
spending targets
Section 322 requires the DNI to submit a report to the
congressional intelligence committees on the status and
effectiveness of efforts to reduce administrative costs for
the IC during the preceding year.
Section 323. Annual report on violations of law or executive
order
Section 323 requires the DNI to report annually to the
congressional intelligence committees on violations of law or
executive order by personnel of an element of the IC that
were identified during the previous calendar year. Under the
National Security Act, the President is required to keep the
congressional intelligence committees fully and currently
informed of the intelligence activities of the United States
government. Nonetheless, this annual reporting requirement is
necessary to ensure that the intelligence oversight
committees of the House and Senate are made fully aware of
violations of law or executive order, including, in
particular, violations of Executive order 12333 for
activities not otherwise subject to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act.
Section 324. Annual report on intelligence activities of the
Department of Homeland Security
Section 324 requires the Under Secretary for Intelligence
and Analysis of the DHS to provide the congressional
intelligence committees with a report on each intelligence
activity of each intelligence component of the Department
that includes, among other things, the amount of funding
requested, the number of full-time employees, and the number
of full-time contractor employees. In addition, Section 324
requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report that examines
the feasibility and advisability of consolidating the
planning, programming, and resourcing of such activities
within the Homeland Security Intelligence Program (HSIP).
The HSIP budget was established to fund those intelligence
activities that principally support missions of the DHS
separately from those of the NIP. To date, however, this
mechanism has only been used to supplement the budget for the
office of Intelligence and Analysis. It has not been used to
fund the activities of the non-IC components in the DHS that
conduct intelligence-related activities. As a result, there
is no comprehensive reporting to Congress regarding the
overall resources and personnel required in support of the
Department's intelligence activities.
Section 325. Report on political prison camps in North Korea
Section 325 requires the DNI to submit a report on
political prison camps in North Korea to the congressional
intelligence committees.
Section 326. Assessment of security of domestic oil
refineries and related rail transportation infrastructure
Section 326 requires the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence and Analysis to conduct an
intelligence assessment of the security of domestic oil
refineries and related rail transportation infrastructure.
Section 327. Enhanced contractor level assessments for the
intelligence community
Section 327 amends the National Security Act of 1947 to
require that the annual personnel level assessments for the
IC, required under Section 506B of the Act, include a
separate estimate of the number of intelligence collectors
and analysts contracted by each element of the IC and a
description of the functions performed by such contractors.
Section 328. Assessment of the efficacy of memoranda of
understanding to facilitate intelligence-sharing
Section 328 requires the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Intelligence and Analysis to provide appropriate
congressional committees with an assessment of the efficacy
of the memoranda of understanding signed between Federal,
State, local, tribal, and territorial agencies to facilitate
intelligence-sharing within and separate from the Joint
Terrorism Task Force. This study should help identify any
obstacles to intelligence sharing between agencies,
particularly any obstacles that might have impeded
intelligence sharing in the wake of the April 2013 bombing of
the Boston Marathon, and find improvements to existing
intelligence sharing relationships.
Section 329. Report on foreign man-made electromagnetic pulse
weapons
Section 329 requires the DNI to provide appropriate
congressional committees with a report on the threat posed by
manmade electromagnetic pulse weapons to United States
interests through 2025.
Section 330. Report on United States counterterrorism
strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and
its affiliated or associated groups
Section 330 requires the DNI to provide appropriate
congressional committees with a report on the United States
counterterrorism strategy to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat
al-Qaeda and its affiliated or associated groups.
Section 331. Feasibility study on retraining veterans in
cybersecurity
Section 331 requires the DNI to submit to Congress a
feasibility study on retraining veterans and retired members
of elements of the IC in cybersecurity.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Chairman Rogers, this is my last opportunity on the floor to thank
you again for your leadership. It has, once again, produced a strong,
bipartisan, and bicameral Intelligence Authorization Act.
Our committee believes that our Nation's security is too important to
be a political football. We have had different views, we argue, but we
work it out for the good of American people.
Mr. Chairman, I hope that your legacy of bipartisanship, hard work,
rigorous oversight, and problem-solving continues and spreads
throughout the Congress. It is amazing what we can accomplish when we
work together to solve problems.
I also want to thank our counterparts in the Senate Intelligence
Committee, Senators Feinstein and Chambliss, for working very closely
with us and each member of our committee. On the Democratic side, I
want to acknowledge all the hard work of Mr. Thompson--who is sitting
here to my left--Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin,
[[Page H8960]]
Mr. Schiff, Mr. Gutierrez, Mr. Pastor, Mr. Himes, and Ms. Sewell. And I
want to thank our staff and the dedicated men and women of the
intelligence community who work every day and all night throughout the
world to protect us. I do agree with the chairman's statements about
those men and women throughout the world who are out there protecting
us and putting their lives on the line.
Now, today, we look beyond this Congress. We come together to set the
stage for the continuing oversight of intelligence programs, personnel,
and dollars. By doing so, we reinforce to the American people, and to
the world, that there are checks and balances. We reinforce that the
tools we authorize are for the sole purpose of keeping us, our allies,
and our partners safe.
In May, the House passed the Intelligence Authorization Act for
fiscal years 2014 and 2015 by 345 votes to 19. The Senate, however,
took up each year separately. Over the summer, this House passed the
FY14 bill, which the President signed.
So, we now take up the FY15 bill, which the Senate amended and sent
back to us. This amended bill largely mirrors the relevant portions of
the House-passed combined bill.
Passing a detailed Intelligence Authorization Act ensures that our
intelligence agencies spend money only on programs Congress is informed
of, approves, and can continuously oversee.
{time} 1300
Oversight is extremely important. It helps to make sure that
everything our intelligence agencies do follows the Constitution and
the laws of the United States and maximizes the civil liberties and
privacy of Americans. At the same time, the intelligence agencies need
the clear authorization, direction, and guidance from Congress to do
their vital work to protect and defend America, its allies, and its
partners.
The Intelligence Authorization Act is split into four parts: the
unclassified legislative text; the unclassified report; the classified
annex, which explains our intent for the classified aspects of the
bill; and the classified schedule of authorizations.
While we have made cuts to certain areas and added money in others to
produce a responsible, well thought out, and fiscally prudent budget,
the budget for fiscal year 2015 slightly exceeds the President's
request.
While over the last 4 years we have reduced the intelligence
community's budget by over a billion dollars, this year's bill
acknowledges the need to make corrections after the drastic cuts of
sequestration and the Budget Control Act.
Additionally, this bill acknowledges the need to step up our
intelligence efforts to counter evolving threats such as ISIL. It is a
dangerous world out there, and our bill accounts for that.
Let me also mention some specifics in the bill. First, it continues
to emphasize the value of our space programs and endorses aggressive
action to decrease our reliance on Russian-made engines to launch our
national security satellites.
Two, it makes investments into research and development to defend
against next generation threats and to stay ahead of countries like
China and Russia. Three, it further improves the continuous evaluation
of insider threats while safeguarding privacy and civil liberties.
Next, it enables better intelligence and information sharing to
prevent foreign fighters coming in and out of Syria. It also enables
cutting-edge Defense Intelligence Agency technology. We must stay ahead
of the curve in technology.
The bill also further refines the Department of Defense human
intelligence capabilities while supporting communitywide human
intelligence efforts to better understand the enemies' plans and
intentions. It also establishes increased accountability measures for
our most sensitive programs.
The committee has worked with the intelligence community and the
Senate to produce this solid, bipartisan bill. This bill also
incorporates the valuable floor amendments the House passed in May. It
represents a culmination of our committee's work through extensive
hearings and briefings, travel, and in-depth studies. The bill is
strong, and I am proud to support it.
For the sake of keeping the country, its allies, and partners safe
and for the sake of thoroughly overseeing even the most classified
intelligence programs, I urge my colleagues to pass the bill today.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
I thought I would take a moment to extend my thanks to all the
dedicated staff on the committee, certainly from the Republican side
and to the Democrats as well, who worked hard over the years to get us
back on track in passing this annual authorization bill in our daily
oversight of the intelligence community.
If you will indulge me, Mr. Speaker, thank you to my current
committee staff: Darren Dick, Katie Wheelbarger, Sarah Geffroy, Andy
Keiser, Bryan Smith, Ashley Lowry, Susan Phalen, Tom Corcoran, Michael
Ellis, Chelsey Campbell, Geof Kahn, Brooke Eisele, Randy Smith, Jim
Hildebrand, Shannon Stuart, Rachel Wilson, Lisa Major, and Diane
Rinaldo.
Thank you as well to staff who have played an influential role in the
committee activities during my tenure as chairman in reengaging this as
a force for oversight in the Intelligence Committee: Michael Allen,
Chris Donesa, Jamil Jaffer, Nathan Hauser, Todd Jones, Frank Garcia,
George Pappas, Will Koella, Leah Scott, Fred Fleitz, and Stephanie
Pelton.
Finally, a big thank you to our dedicated security and information
technology staff, by the way, who have done well to beat back the
hordes of our nation state actors who, for some reason, Mr. Speaker,
took a good interest in what we were doing in that classified space,
and they kept us up and running every single day: Brandon Smith,
Kristin Jepson, and Kevin Klein.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from California (Mr. Thompson), a great member of our committee who
specialized in infrastructure and also worked very hard to make sure
that our Embassies have the intelligence information they need to
protect themselves.
Mr. THOMPSON of California. I thank the gentleman for yielding and
for all the good work you did on the committee as the ranking member. I
also want to thank Chairman Rogers for the good work that he did as the
chairman.
Working together, he was very accommodating and allowed all of us to
be able to address specific issues that were of concern to us and
regarding the security of our great Nation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We
are going to miss you.
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong support of the passage of this
bill. This bill will provide greater national security for our country
and the people that we all represent.
The bill contains two important provisions that I authored that
protect our communities at home and diplomatic facilities abroad.
My district is home to several oil refineries, employing thousands of
people, providing well-paying, good, middle class jobs, and are a key
part of our regional economy.
As domestic oil production continues to increase in the region, I
have heard from several of my constituents and my local governments
about their growing concern regarding the security of the shipment and
storage of crude oil and subsequent refined products. I believe we have
the responsibility to protect our workers, our domestic refineries, and
our communities from potential threats.
Included in this bill is a provision that directs the Department of
Homeland Security Office of Intelligence and Analysis to conduct an
assessment of the security of our Nation's oil refineries and related
rail transportation infrastructure. It directs the office to make
recommendations on how to improve intelligence collection and sharing
of information to better protect those facilities in the surrounding
communities from any harm.
Additionally, studies conducted in response to the terrible 2012
attack on Benghazi identified the need for security personnel at U.S.
diplomatic posts to receive threat information in a more timely manner.
[[Page H8961]]
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield the gentleman an additional
30 seconds.
Mr. THOMPSON of California. In response to this need, this bill
requires the Director of National Intelligence to provide an assessment
of the status of threat information sharing between the intelligence
community and diplomatic security personnel and to propose actions to
help make sure security personnel at U.S. Embassies are better able to
request and receive security enhancements in a timely manner.
By making sure our intelligence community is taking concerns
seriously and sharing the necessary information, we can better assess
and mitigate threats and increase security at home and abroad and make
our country safer.
I urge my colleagues to join me in passing this good piece of
legislation.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman
from California, Mr. Adam Schiff, a great member of our committee with
a tremendous work ethic. He reads almost every piece of intelligence
information and comes to quality and informed conclusions.
He also has focused a lot and specialized in working with legislation
involving transparency and accountability and has spent a lot of time
on an area that is very important to our Intelligence Committee, the
space program.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I
want to join my colleagues in urging the House to support the 2015
Intelligence Authorization Act which has now returned to us from the
Senate, but before I address the substance of the bill, I would like to
congratulate Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for their
extraordinary efforts to get this bill passed and to the President.
As a member of the Intelligence Committee, I know how hard they and
the staff have worked to make this happen, and I would especially like
to congratulate Chairman Rogers and wish him well as he prepares to
leave the House at the end of the year. It has been a great pleasure
working with you, and I wish you all the very best.
These are challenging days for America's intelligence officers and
analysts. As ISIS continues to threaten the Middle East; as Russia's
``little green men'' continue to coordinate attacks on the Ukrainian
Government; as North Korea's young, isolated, and often dangerously
erratic leader continues his behavior; and as the international
community continues its efforts to secure Iran's agreement to dismantle
its nuclear weapons program and infrastructure, our intelligence
professionals play a vital role in keeping us safe and secure.
Developing and maintaining actionable intelligence on ISIS is of
particular urgency. While the intelligence community has been following
ISIS' growth for some time, the group's takeover of a large swath of
Syria and Iraq has made it a top intelligence priority.
If we are to be effective in partnering with regional allies to
degrade and destroy ISIS, we need to be able to develop the very best
intelligence and accurate ground truth. That takes time, and it takes
assets--on the ground, in the air, in space--to collect information. It
also takes the world class analysts of our intelligence community to
turn that information into recommendations for policymakers.
We must also remain focused on Russian efforts to destabilize its
neighbors, particularly Ukraine, but also the Baltic States. Our
intelligence community has given us insight into Russian involvement in
these efforts and into the events that led to the tragic downing of the
Malaysian airliner last summer.
The bill also prioritizes vital efforts at nonproliferation and will
help give us the tools that we need to assess events on the ground in
North Korea and Iran and wherever there is a threat of WMD.
These are but a few of the important matters covered in the
Intelligence Authorization bill. As a member of the committee who has
been proud to work closely with both the chair and ranking member, I am
confident it supports our intelligence professionals while providing
oversight that is so critical to the proper functioning of our
intelligence agencies.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Speaker, in closing, I urge my colleagues to vote for this
important bipartisan and bicameral bill. It is the single most
effective oversight tool we have, and it ensures that our intelligence
community has what it needs to keep us and our allies safe.
Intelligence is often the first line of defense against a dangerous
world. Without it, we are in the dark, and we are vulnerable.
Finally, once again, let me just say thank you to my good friend, Mr.
Chairman, and to the members of the committee, to our colleagues in the
Senate, and to the men and women of the intelligence community. It has
been my honor and privilege to work with you under your great
leadership during the 113th Congress.
I also want to thank the Republican and Democratic staffs for working
together. That is what makes it work. You are only as good as your team
and your staff.
I also would like to acknowledge the Democratic staff: Staff Director
Heather Molino, Amanda Rogers-Thorpe, Bob Minehart, Linda Cohen, Carly
Blake, Allison Getty, Deb Haynie, and Michael Bahar.
I also thank staff members who were with us but have retired: Mike
Shank, Janet Fisher, and Khizer Sayed.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my
time.
Mr. Speaker, again, I want to thank my friends on the other side of
the aisle, from Dutch to Heather, and the whole entire team for putting
this product together by putting our country first. It is very
important.
I challenge every Member to read this material next year when it is
announced that you can review the classified annex. Review the
classified annex. I think they will have a better perspective at the
huge number of challenges facing the United States when it comes to
real threats developing around the world.
Mr. Speaker, I would again say thanks to all, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to support the Intelligence
Authorization Act. As a member of the Armed Services and Intelligence
Committees, I know these Authorization bills provide the necessary
accountability, direction, and resources for those who keep our nation
safe.
Today's bill reflects the continuation of the Committee's bipartisan
and bicameral work, and I want to thank Chairman Rogers and Ranking
Member Ruppersberger for their strong and consistent leadership on
these critical issues.
Today I want to highlight two areas of specific interest to me.
First, this legislation strikes a careful balance between ensuring
that our nation's secrets are kept safe and providing appropriate
transparency with the American people. There are lawful ways to raise
concerns of wrongdoing and procedures to declassify information when
appropriate. In the past, Congress has strengthened these avenues,
including by enhancing whistleblower protections and the role of
Inspectors General.
As it has each year, this bill adds to the mission of
counterintelligence to ensure that information is protected and that
the tools utilized by security professionals are handled lawfully and
with full consideration for the privacy and civil liberties of our
intelligence professionals. This bill continues this important
direction, asking the DNI to establish appropriate guidelines to govern
how publicly available information can be utilized.
Second, this bill continues to support the work of the men and women
at the front lines of cybersecurity. It helps cyber professionals at
NSA, FBI, and DHS to hone their tools and skills to protect us, while
supporting initiatives to grow the next-generation cyber workforce. And
it will further aid the Intelligence Community in understanding and
defending certain networks from cyber threats.
Mr. Speaker, I am proud of our work on this bill, and I urge its
passage.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) that the House suspend the
[[Page H8962]]
rules and concur in the Senate amendment to the bill, H.R. 4681.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
Mr. AMASH. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this motion will be postponed.
____________________
[Congressional Record Volume 160, Number 150 (Wednesday, December 10, 2014)]
[House]
[Pages H8991-H8992]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEARS 2014 AND 2015
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The unfinished business is the vote on the
motion to suspend the rules and concur in the Senate amendment to the
bill (H.R. 4681) to authorize appropriations for fiscal years 2014 and
2015 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, on which the yeas and nays were ordered.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) that the House suspend the rules
and concur in the Senate amendment.
This is a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 325,
nays 100, not voting 9, as follows:
[Roll No. 558]
YEAS--325
Adams
Aderholt
Amodei
Bachmann
Bachus
Barber
Barletta
Barr
Barrow (GA)
Barton
Beatty
Becerra
Benishek
Bera (CA)
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Boustany
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Braley (IA)
Brooks (IN)
Brown (FL)
Brownley (CA)
Buchanan
Bucshon
Bustos
Butterfield
Byrne
Calvert
Camp
Capito
Capps
Cardenas
Carney
Carson (IN)
Carter
Cartwright
Cassidy
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Cicilline
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Coffman
Cole
Collins (GA)
Collins (NY)
Conaway
Connolly
Cook
Cooper
Costa
Cotton
Courtney
Cramer
Crawford
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cuellar
Culberson
Daines
Davis (CA)
Davis, Danny
Davis, Rodney
DeGette
Delaney
DeLauro
Denham
Dent
DeSantis
Deutch
Diaz-Balart
Dingell
Duffy
Edwards
Ellison
Ellmers
Engel
Enyart
Esty
Farenthold
Fattah
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Fleming
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foster
Foxx
Frankel (FL)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
[[Page H8992]]
Fudge
Gabbard
Gallego
Gardner
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gingrey (GA)
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves (MO)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Griffin (AR)
Grimm
Guthrie
Hanna
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hastings (WA)
Heck (NV)
Hensarling
Herrera Beutler
Higgins
Himes
Hinojosa
Holding
Horsford
Hoyer
Hudson
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurt
Israel
Issa
Jeffries
Jenkins
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jolly
Joyce
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kelly (PA)
Kennedy
Kilmer
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kinzinger (IL)
Kirkpatrick
Kline
Kuster
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Lance
Langevin
Lankford
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
Latta
Levin
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Long
Lowey
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan Grisham (NM)
Lujan, Ben Ray (NM)
Lynch
Maffei
Maloney, Carolyn
Maloney, Sean
Marchant
Marino
Matheson
McAllister
McCarthy (CA)
McCarthy (NY)
McCaul
McHenry
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
Meehan
Meeks
Meng
Messer
Michaud
Miller (MI)
Miller, George
Moran
Mullin
Murphy (FL)
Murphy (PA)
Napolitano
Neal
Neugebauer
Noem
Nolan
Norcross
Nunes
Nunnelee
Olson
Owens
Palazzo
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Paulsen
Payne
Pearce
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters (CA)
Peters (MI)
Peterson
Petri
Pingree (ME)
Pittenger
Pitts
Pompeo
Price (GA)
Price (NC)
Quigley
Rahall
Reed
Reichert
Renacci
Rice (SC)
Richmond
Rigell
Roby
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rokita
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross
Rothfus
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruiz
Runyan
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Scalise
Schiff
Schneider
Schock
Schwartz
Schweikert
Scott (VA)
Scott, David
Sessions
Sewell (AL)
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Sinema
Sires
Slaughter
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Southerland
Stewart
Stivers
Stutzman
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Titus
Tonko
Tsongas
Turner
Upton
Valadao
Van Hollen
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Visclosky
Wagner
Walberg
Walden
Walorski
Walz
Wasserman Schultz
Waxman
Webster (FL)
Wenstrup
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Williams
Wilson (FL)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wolf
Womack
Yoder
Young (AK)
Young (IN)
NAYS--100
Amash
Bass
Bentivolio
Blumenauer
Bonamici
Brat
Bridenstine
Brooks (AL)
Broun (GA)
Burgess
Chu
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Clawson (FL)
Cohen
Conyers
Cummings
DeFazio
DelBene
DesJarlais
Doggett
Doyle
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Eshoo
Farr
Garamendi
Garcia
Garrett
Gibson
Gohmert
Gosar
Gowdy
Graves (GA)
Grayson
Griffith (VA)
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hahn
Hanabusa
Hastings (FL)
Heck (WA)
Holt
Honda
Huelskamp
Huffman
Jackson Lee
Jones
Jordan
Kaptur
Kildee
Kingston
Labrador
Lee (CA)
Lewis
Lofgren
Lowenthal
Lummis
Massie
Matsui
McClintock
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
Meadows
Mica
Moore
Mulvaney
Nadler
Nugent
O'Rourke
Pallone
Perry
Pocan
Poe (TX)
Polis
Posey
Rangel
Ribble
Roe (TN)
Rohrabacher
Salmon
Sanford
Schakowsky
Scott, Austin
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Speier
Stockman
Swalwell (CA)
Takano
Tierney
Tipton
Velazquez
Waters
Weber (TX)
Welch
Woodall
Yarmuth
Yoho
NOT VOTING--9
Campbell
Capuano
Duckworth
Hall
Miller (FL)
Miller, Gary
Negrete McLeod
Schrader
Smith (WA)
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Hultgren) (during the vote). There are 2
minutes remaining.
{time} 1704
Mr. SERRANO changed his vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
Mr. ELLISON changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
So (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and
the Senate amendment was concurred in.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Stated against:
Mr. ELLISON. Mr. Speaker, during rollcall vote No. 558 on H.R. 4681,
I mistakenly recorded my vote as ``yes'' when I should have voted
``no.''
____________________
