[Congressional Record Volume 160, Number 78 (Thursday, May 22, 2014)]
[House]
[Pages H4789-H4804]
{time} 0915
USA FREEDOM ACT
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 590, I call
up the bill (H.R. 3361) to reform the authorities of the Federal
Government to require the production of certain business records,
conduct electronic surveillance, use pen registers and trap and trace
devices, and use other forms of information gathering for foreign
intelligence, counterterrorism, and criminal purposes, and for other
purposes, as amended, and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 590, in lieu of
the amendments in the nature of a substitute recommended by the
Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence printed in the bill, the amendment in the nature of a
substitute printed in part B of House Report 113-460 is adopted, and
the bill, as amended, is considered read.
The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:
H.R. 3361
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) SHORT TITLE.--This Act may be cited as the ``USA
FREEDOM Act''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978.
TITLE I--FISA BUSINESS RECORDS REFORMS
Sec. 101. Additional requirements for call detail records.
Sec. 102. Emergency authority.
Sec. 103. Prohibition on bulk collection of tangible
things.
Sec. 104. Judicial review of minimization procedures for
the production of tangible things.
Sec. 105. Liability protection.
Sec. 106. Compensation for assistance.
Sec. 107. Definitions.
Sec. 108. Inspector general reports on business records
orders.
Sec. 109. Effective date.
Sec. 110. Rule of construction.
TITLE II--FISA PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE REFORM
Sec. 201. Prohibition on bulk collection.
Sec. 202. Privacy procedures.
TITLE III--FISA ACQUISITIONS TARGETING PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED
STATES REFORMS
Sec. 301. Minimization procedures.
Sec. 302. Limits on use of unlawfully obtained information.
TITLE IV--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT REFORMS
Sec. 401. Appointment of amicus curiae.
Sec. 402. Declassification of decisions, orders, and
opinions.
TITLE V--NATIONAL SECURITY LETTER REFORM
Sec. 501. Prohibition on bulk collection.
TITLE VI--FISA TRANSPARENCY AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Sec. 601. Additional reporting on orders requiring
production of business records.
Sec. 602. Business records compliance reports to Congress.
Sec. 603. Annual reports by the Government on orders
entered.
Sec. 604. Public reporting by persons subject to FISA
orders.
Sec. 605. Reporting requirements for decisions of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
Sec. 606. Submission of reports under FISA.
TITLE VII--SUNSETS
Sec. 701. Sunsets.
SEC. 2. AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT OF 1978.
Except as otherwise expressly provided, whenever in this
Act an amendment or repeal is expressed in terms of an
amendment to, or a repeal of, a section or other provision,
the reference shall be considered to be made to a section or
other provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).
TITLE I--FISA BUSINESS RECORDS REFORMS
SEC. 101. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR CALL DETAIL RECORDS.
(a) Application.--Section 501(b)(2) (50 U.S.C. 1861(b)(2))
is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (A)--
(A) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking ``a
statement'' and inserting ``in the case of an application
other than an application described in subparagraph (C)
(including an application for the production of call detail
records other than in the manner described in subparagraph
(C)), a statement''; and
(B) in clause (iii), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as
subparagraphs (B) and (D), respectively; and
(3) by inserting after subparagraph (B) (as so
redesignated) the following new subparagraph:
``(C) in the case of an application for the production on a
daily basis of call detail records created before, on, or
after the date of the application relating to an authorized
investigation (other than a threat assessment) conducted in
accordance with subsection (a)(2) to protect against
international terrorism, a statement of facts showing that--
``(i) there are reasonable grounds to believe that the call
detail records sought to be produced based on the specific
selection term required under subparagraph (A) are relevant
to such investigation; and
``(ii) there are facts giving rise to a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that such specific selection term is
associated with a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power; and''.
(b) Order.--Section 501(c)(2) (50 U.S.C. 1861(c)(2)) is
amended--
(1) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(2) in subparagraph (E), by striking the period and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(F) in the case of an application described in subsection
(b)(2)(C), shall--
``(i) authorize the production on a daily basis of call
detail records for a period not to exceed 180 days;
``(ii) provide that an order for such production may be
extended upon application under subsection (b) and the
judicial finding under paragraph (1);
``(iii) provide that the Government may require the prompt
production of call detail records--
``(I) using the specific selection term that satisfies the
standard required under subsection (b)(2)(C)(ii) as the basis
for production; and
``(II) using call detail records with a direct connection
to such specific selection term as the basis for production
of a second set of call detail records;
``(iv) provide that, when produced, such records be in a
form that will be useful to the Government;
``(v) direct each person the Government directs to produce
call detail records under the order to furnish the Government
forthwith all information, facilities, or technical
assistance necessary to accomplish the production in such a
manner as will protect the secrecy of the production and
produce a minimum of interference with the services that such
person is providing to each subject of the production; and
``(vi) direct the Government to--
``(I) adopt minimization procedures that require the prompt
destruction of all call detail records produced under the
order that the Government determines are not foreign
intelligence information; and
``(II) destroy all call detail records produced under the
order as prescribed by such procedures.''.
SEC. 102. EMERGENCY AUTHORITY.
(a) Authority.--Section 501 (50 U.S.C. 1861) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(i) Emergency Authority for Production of Tangible
Things.--
``(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section,
the Attorney General may require the emergency production of
tangible things if the Attorney General--
``(A) reasonably determines that an emergency situation
requires the production of tangible things before an order
authorizing such production can with due diligence be
obtained;
[[Page H4790]]
``(B) reasonably determines that the factual basis for the
issuance of an order under this section to approve such
production of tangible things exists;
``(C) informs, either personally or through a designee, a
judge having jurisdiction under this section at the time the
Attorney General requires the emergency production of
tangible things that the decision has been made to employ the
authority under this subsection; and
``(D) makes an application in accordance with this section
to a judge having jurisdiction under this section as soon as
practicable, but not later than 7 days after the Attorney
General requires the emergency production of tangible things
under this subsection.
``(2) If the Attorney General authorizes the emergency
production of tangible things under paragraph (1), the
Attorney General shall require that the minimization
procedures required by this section for the issuance of a
judicial order be followed.
``(3) In the absence of a judicial order approving the
production of tangible things under this subsection, the
production shall terminate when the information sought is
obtained, when the application for the order is denied, or
after the expiration of 7 days from the time the Attorney
General begins requiring the emergency production of such
tangible things, whichever is earliest.
``(4) A denial of the application made under this
subsection may be reviewed as provided in section 103.
``(5) If such application for approval is denied, or in any
other case where the production of tangible things is
terminated and no order is issued approving the production,
no information obtained or evidence derived from such
production shall be received in evidence or otherwise
disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or
before any court, grand jury, department, office, agency,
regulatory body, legislative committee, or other authority of
the United States, a State, or political subdivision thereof,
and no information concerning any United States person
acquired from such production shall subsequently be used or
disclosed in any other manner by Federal officers or
employees without the consent of such person, except with the
approval of the Attorney General if the information indicates
a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person.
``(6) The Attorney General shall assess compliance with the
requirements of paragraph (5).''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 501(d) (50 U.S.C.
1861(d)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)--
(A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking
``pursuant to an order'' and inserting ``pursuant to an order
issued or an emergency production required'';
(B) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``such order'' and
inserting ``such order or such emergency production''; and
(C) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``the order'' and
inserting ``the order or the emergency production''; and
(2) in paragraph (2)--
(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``an order'' and
inserting ``an order or emergency production''; and
(B) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``an order'' and
inserting ``an order or emergency production''.
SEC. 103. PROHIBITION ON BULK COLLECTION OF TANGIBLE THINGS.
(a) Application.--Section 501(b)(2) (50 U.S.C. 1861(b)(2)),
as amended by section 101(a) of this Act, is further amended
by inserting before subparagraph (B), as redesignated by such
section 101(a) of this Act, the following new subparagraph:
``(A) a specific selection term to be used as the basis for
the production of the tangible things sought;''.
(b) Order.--Section 501(c) (50 U.S.C. 1861(c)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (2)(A), by striking the semicolon and
inserting ``, including each specific selection term to be
used as the basis for the production;''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) No order issued under this subsection may authorize
the collection of tangible things without the use of a
specific selection term that meets the requirements of
subsection (b)(2).''.
SEC. 104. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES FOR THE
PRODUCTION OF TANGIBLE THINGS.
Section 501(c)(1) (50 U.S.C. 1861(c)(1)) is amended by
inserting after ``subsections (a) and (b)'' the following:
``and that the minimization procedures submitted in
accordance with subsection (b)(2)(D) meet the definition of
minimization procedures under subsection (g)''.
SEC. 105. LIABILITY PROTECTION.
Section 501(e) (50 U.S.C. 1861(e)) is amended to read as
follows:
``(e)(1) No cause of action shall lie in any court against
a person who--
``(A) produces tangible things or provides information,
facilities, or technical assistance pursuant to an order
issued or an emergency production required under this
section; or
``(B) otherwise provides technical assistance to the
Government under this section or to implement the amendments
made to this section by the USA FREEDOM Act.
``(2) A production or provision of information, facilities,
or technical assistance described in paragraph (1) shall not
be deemed to constitute a waiver of any privilege in any
other proceeding or context.''.
SEC. 106. COMPENSATION FOR ASSISTANCE.
Section 501 (50 U.S.C. 1861), as amended by section 102 of
this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(j) Compensation.--The Government shall compensate a
person for reasonable expenses incurred for--
``(1) producing tangible things or providing information,
facilities, or assistance in accordance with an order issued
with respect to an application described in subsection
(b)(2)(C) or an emergency production under subsection (i)
that, to comply with subsection (i)(1)(D), requires an
application described in subsection (b)(2)(C); or
``(2) otherwise providing technical assistance to the
Government under this section or to implement the amendments
made to this section by the USA FREEDOM Act.''.
SEC. 107. DEFINITIONS.
Section 501 (50 U.S.C. 1861), as amended by section 106 of
this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(k) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Call detail record.--The term `call detail record'--
``(A) means session identifying information (including
originating or terminating telephone number, International
Mobile Subscriber Identity number, or International Mobile
Station Equipment Identity number), a telephone calling card
number, or the time or duration of a call; and
``(B) does not include--
``(i) the contents of any communication (as defined in
section 2510(8) of title 18, United States Code);
``(ii) the name, address, or financial information of a
subscriber or customer; or
``(iii) cell site location information.
``(2) Specific selection term.--The term `specific
selection term' means a discrete term, such as a term
specifically identifying a person, entity, account, address,
or device, used by the Government to limit the scope of the
information or tangible things sought pursuant to the statute
authorizing the provision of such information or tangible
things to the Government.''.
SEC. 108. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORTS ON BUSINESS RECORDS
ORDERS.
Section 106A of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005 (Public Law 109-177; 120 Stat.
200) is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``and calendar years
2012 through 2014'' after ``2006'';
(B) by striking paragraphs (2) and (3);
(C) by redesignating paragraphs (4) and (5) as paragraphs
(2) and (3), respectively; and
(D) in paragraph (3) (as so redesignated)--
(i) by striking subparagraph (C) and inserting the
following new subparagraph:
``(C) with respect to calendar years 2012 through 2014, an
examination of the minimization procedures used in relation
to orders under section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861) and whether the
minimization procedures adequately protect the constitutional
rights of United States persons;''; and
(ii) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``(as such term is
defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 401a(4)))'';
(2) in subsection (c), by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
``(3) Calendar years 2012 through 2014.--Not later than
December 31, 2015, the Inspector General of the Department of
Justice shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the
Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report
containing the results of the audit conducted under
subsection (a) for calendar years 2012 through 2014.'';
(3) by redesignating subsections (d) and (e) as subsections
(e) and (f), respectively;
(4) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new
subsection:
``(d) Intelligence Assessment.--
``(1) In general.--For the period beginning on January 1,
2012, and ending on December 31, 2014, the Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community shall assess--
``(A) the importance of the information acquired under
title V of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(50 U.S.C. 1861 et seq.) to the activities of the
intelligence community;
``(B) the manner in which that information was collected,
retained, analyzed, and disseminated by the intelligence
community;
``(C) the minimization procedures used by elements of the
intelligence community under such title and whether the
minimization procedures adequately protect the constitutional
rights of United States persons; and
``(D) any minimization procedures proposed by an element of
the intelligence community under such title that were
modified or denied by the court established under section
103(a) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)).
``(2) Submission date for assessment.--Not later than 180
days after the date on which the Inspector General of the
Department of Justice submits the report required under
subsection (c)(3), the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the
Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives a report
containing the results of the assessment for calendar years
2012 through 2014.'';
(5) in subsection (e), as redesignated by paragraph (3)--
(A) in paragraph (1)--
(i) by striking ``a report under subsection (c)(1) or
(c)(2)'' and inserting ``any report under subsection (c) or
(d)''; and
(ii) by striking ``Inspector General of the Department of
Justice'' and inserting ``Inspector General of the Department
of Justice, the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community, and any Inspector General of an element of the
intelligence community that prepares a report to assist the
Inspector General of the Department of Justice or the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community in complying
with the requirements of this section''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the reports submitted
under subsections (c)(1) and
[[Page H4791]]
(c)(2)'' and inserting ``any report submitted under
subsection (c) or (d)'';
(6) in subsection (f), as redesignated by paragraph (3)--
(A) by striking ``The reports submitted under subsections
(c)(1) and (c)(2)'' and inserting ``Each report submitted
under subsection (c)''; and
(B) by striking ``subsection (d)(2)'' and inserting
``subsection (e)(2)''; and
(7) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Intelligence community.--The term `intelligence
community' has the meaning given that term in section 3 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003).
``(2) United states person.--The term `United States
person' has the meaning given that term in section 101 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1801).''.
SEC. 109. EFFECTIVE DATE.
(a) In General.--The amendments made by sections 101
through 103 shall take effect on the date that is 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(b) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this Act shall be
construed to alter or eliminate the authority of the
Government to obtain an order under title V of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861 et
seq.) as in effect prior to the effective date described in
subsection (a) during the period ending on such effective
date.
SEC. 110. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize the
production of the contents (as such term is defined in
section 2510(8) of title 18, United States Code) of any
electronic communication from an electronic communication
service provider (as such term is defined in section
701(b)(4) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1881(b)(4)) under title V of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861 et
seq.).
TITLE II--FISA PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICE REFORM
SEC. 201. PROHIBITION ON BULK COLLECTION.
(a) Prohibition.--Section 402(c) (50 U.S.C. 1842(c)) is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking the period and inserting
a semicolon; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) a specific selection term to be used as the basis for
selecting the telephone line or other facility to which the
pen register or trap and trace device is to be attached or
applied; and''.
(b) Definition.--Section 401 (50 U.S.C. 1841) is amended by
adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) The term `specific selection term' has the meaning
given the term in section 501.''.
SEC. 202. PRIVACY PROCEDURES.
(a) In General.--Section 402 (50 U.S.C. 1842) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(h) The Attorney General shall ensure that appropriate
policies and procedures are in place to safeguard nonpublicly
available information concerning United States persons that
is collected through the use of a pen register or trap and
trace device installed under this section. Such policies and
procedures shall, to the maximum extent practicable and
consistent with the need to protect national security,
include protections for the collection, retention, and use of
information concerning United States persons.''.
(b) Emergency Authority.--Section 403 (50 U.S.C. 1843) is
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(d) Information collected through the use of a pen
register or trap and device installed under this section
shall be subject to the policies and procedures required
under section 402(h).''.
TITLE III--FISA ACQUISITIONS TARGETING PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED
STATES REFORMS
SEC. 301. MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES.
Section 702(e)(1) (50 U.S.C. 1881a(e)(1)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``that meet'' and inserting the following:
``that--
``(A) meet'';
(2) in subparagraph (A) (as designated by paragraph (1) of
this section), by striking the period and inserting ``;
and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(B) consistent with such definition--
``(i) minimize the acquisition, and prohibit the retention
and dissemination, of any communication as to which the
sender and all intended recipients are determined to be
located in the United States at the time of acquisition,
consistent with the need of the United States to obtain,
produce, and disseminate foreign intelligence information;
and
``(ii) prohibit the use of any discrete communication that
is not to, from, or about the target of an acquisition and is
to or from an identifiable United States person or a person
reasonably believed to be located in the United States,
except to protect against an immediate threat to human
life.''.
SEC. 302. LIMITS ON USE OF UNLAWFULLY OBTAINED INFORMATION.
Section 702(i)(3) (50 U.S.C. 1881a(i)(3)) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(D) Limitation on use of information.--
``(i) In general.--Except as provided in clause (ii), to
the extent the Court orders a correction of a deficiency in a
certification or procedures under subparagraph (B), no
information obtained or evidence derived pursuant to the part
of the certification or procedures that has been identified
by the Court as deficient concerning any United States person
shall be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any
trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court,
grand jury, department, office, agency, regulatory body,
legislative committee, or other authority of the United
States, a State, or political subdivision thereof, and no
information concerning any United States person acquired
pursuant to such part of such certification shall
subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner by
Federal officers or employees without the consent of the
United States person, except with the approval of the
Attorney General if the information indicates a threat of
death or serious bodily harm to any person.
``(ii) Exception.--If the Government corrects any
deficiency identified by the order of the Court under
subparagraph (B), the Court may permit the use or disclosure
of information obtained before the date of the correction
under such minimization procedures as the Court shall
establish for purposes of this clause.''.
TITLE IV--FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT REFORMS
SEC. 401. APPOINTMENT OF AMICUS CURIAE.
Section 103 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the
end the following new subsection:
``(i) Amicus Curiae.--
``(1) Authorization.--A court established under subsection
(a) or (b), consistent with the requirement of subsection (c)
and any other statutory requirement that the court act
expeditiously or within a stated time--
``(A) shall appoint an individual to serve as amicus curiae
to assist such court in the consideration of any application
for an order or review that, in the opinion of the court,
presents a novel or significant interpretation of the law,
unless the court issues a written finding that such
appointment is not appropriate; and
``(B) may appoint an individual to serve as amicus curiae
in any other instance as such court deems appropriate.
``(2) Designation.--The presiding judges of the courts
established under subsections (a) and (b) shall jointly
designate not less than 5 individuals to be eligible to serve
as amicus curiae. Such individuals shall be persons who
possess expertise in privacy and civil liberties,
intelligence collection, telecommunications, or any other
area that may lend legal or technical expertise to the courts
and who have been determined by appropriate executive branch
officials to be eligible for access to classified
information.
``(3) Duties.--An individual appointed to serve as amicus
curiae under paragraph (1) shall carry out the duties
assigned by the appointing court. Such court may authorize
the individual appointed to serve as amicus curiae to review
any application, certification, petition, motion, or other
submission that the court determines is relevant to the
duties assigned by the court.
``(4) Notification.--The presiding judges of the courts
established under subsections (a) and (b) shall notify the
Attorney General of each exercise of the authority to appoint
an individual to serve as amicus curiae under paragraph (1).
``(5) Assistance.--A court established under subsection (a)
or (b) may request and receive (including on a non-
reimbursable basis) the assistance of the executive branch in
the implementation of this subsection.
``(6) Administration.--A court established under subsection
(a) or (b) may provide for the designation, appointment,
removal, training, or other support for an individual
appointed to serve as amicus curiae under paragraph (1) in a
manner that is not inconsistent with this subsection.''.
SEC. 402. DECLASSIFICATION OF DECISIONS, ORDERS, AND
OPINIONS.
(a) Declassification.--Title VI (50 U.S.C. 1871 et seq.) is
amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``REPORTING REQUIREMENT''
and inserting ``OVERSIGHT''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 602. DECLASSIFICATION OF SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS,
ORDERS, AND OPINIONS.
``(a) Declassification Required.--Subject to subsection
(b), the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation
with the Attorney General, shall conduct a declassification
review of each decision, order, or opinion issued by the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (as defined in
section 601(e)) that includes a significant construction or
interpretation of any provision of this Act, including a
construction or interpretation of the term `specific
selection term', and, consistent with that review, make
publicly available to the greatest extent practicable each
such decision, order, or opinion.
``(b) Redacted Form.--The Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, may
satisfy the requirement under subsection (a) to make a
decision, order, or opinion described in such subsection
publicly available to the greatest extent practicable by
making such decision, order, or opinion publicly available in
redacted form.
``(c) National Security Waiver.--The Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, may
waive the requirement to declassify and make publicly
available a particular decision, order, or opinion under
subsection (a) if--
``(1) the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Attorney General, determines that a
waiver of such requirement is necessary to protect the
national security of the United States or properly classified
intelligence sources or methods; and
``(2) the Director of National Intelligence makes publicly
available an unclassified statement prepared by the Attorney
General, in consultation with the Director of National
Intelligence--
[[Page H4792]]
``(A) summarizing the significant construction or
interpretation of a provision under this Act; and
``(B) that specifies that the statement has been prepared
by the Attorney General and constitutes no part of the
opinion of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review.''.
(b) Table of Contents Amendments.--The table of contents in
the first section is amended--
(1) by striking the item relating to title VI and inserting
the following new item:
``TITLE VI--OVERSIGHT''; and
(2) by inserting after the item relating to section 601 the
following new item:
``Sec. 602. Declassification of significant decisions, orders, and
opinions.''.
TITLE V--NATIONAL SECURITY LETTER REFORM
SEC. 501. PROHIBITION ON BULK COLLECTION.
(a) Counterintelligence Access to Telephone Toll and
Transactional Records.--Section 2709(b) of title 18, United
States Code, is amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1)
by striking ``may'' and inserting ``may, using a specific
selection term as the basis for a request''.
(b) Access to Financial Records for Certain Intelligence
and Protective Purposes.--Section 1114(a)(2) of the Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414(a)(2)) is
amended by striking the period and inserting ``and a specific
selection term to be used as the basis for the production and
disclosure of financial records.''.
(c) Disclosures to FBI of Certain Consumer Records for
Counterintelligence Purposes.--Section 626(a) of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681u(a)) is amended by
striking ``that information,'' and inserting ``that
information that includes a specific selection term to be
used as the basis for the production of that information,''.
(d) Disclosures to Governmental Agencies for
Counterterrorism Purposes of Consumer Reports.--Section
627(a) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681v(a))
is amended by striking ``analysis.'' and inserting ``analysis
and a specific selection term to be used as the basis for the
production of such information.''.
(e) Definitions.--
(1) Counterintelligence access to telephone toll and
transactional records.--Section 2709 of title 18, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following
new subsection:
``(g) Specific Selection Term Defined.--In this section,
the term `specific selection term' has the meaning given the
term in section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861).''.
(2) Access to financial records for certain intelligence
and protective purposes.--Section 1114 of the Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414) is amended by
adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(e) In this section, the term `specific selection term'
has the meaning given the term in section 501 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861).''.
(3) Disclosures to fbi of certain consumer records for
counterintelligence purposes.--Section 626 of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681u) is amended by adding at the
end the following new subsection:
``(n) Specific Selection Term Defined.--In this section,
the term `specific selection term' has the meaning given the
term in section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861).''.
(4) Disclosures to governmental agencies for
counterterrorism purposes of consumer reports.--Section 627
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681v) is amended
by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(g) Specific Selection Term Defined.--In this section,
the term `specific selection term' has the meaning given the
term in section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861).''.
TITLE VI--FISA TRANSPARENCY AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
SEC. 601. ADDITIONAL REPORTING ON ORDERS REQUIRING PRODUCTION
OF BUSINESS RECORDS.
Section 502(b) (50 U.S.C. 1862(b)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) as
paragraphs (5), (6), and (7), respectively; and
(2) by inserting before paragraph (5) (as so redesignated)
the following new paragraphs:
``(1) the total number of applications described in section
501(b)(2)(B) made for orders approving requests for the
production of tangible things;
``(2) the total number of such orders either granted,
modified, or denied;
``(3) the total number of applications described in section
501(b)(2)(C) made for orders approving requests for the
production of call detail records;
``(4) the total number of such orders either granted,
modified, or denied;''.
SEC. 602. BUSINESS RECORDS COMPLIANCE REPORTS TO CONGRESS.
Section 502(b) (50 U.S.C. 1862(b)), as amended by section
601 of this Act, is further amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (7) as
paragraphs (2) through (8), respectively; and
(2) by inserting before paragraph (2) (as so redesignated)
the following new paragraph:
``(1) a summary of all compliance reviews conducted by the
Federal Government of the production of tangible things under
section 501;''.
SEC. 603. ANNUAL REPORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT ON ORDERS ENTERED.
(a) In General.--Title VI (50 U.S.C. 1871 et seq.), as
amended by section 402 of this Act, is further amended by
adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 603. ANNUAL REPORT ON ORDERS ENTERED.
``(a) Report by Director of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts.--The Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts shall annually submit to
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives
and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on
the Judiciary of the Senate and, subject to a
declassification review by the Attorney General and Director
of National Intelligence, make publicly available on an
Internet website--
``(1) the number of orders entered under each of sections
105, 304, 402, 501, 702, 703, and 704;
``(2) the number of orders modified under each of those
sections;
``(3) the number of orders denied under each of those
sections; and
``(4) the number of appointments of an individual to serve
as amicus curiae under section 103, including the name of
each individual appointed to serve as amicus curiae.
``(b) Report by Director of National Intelligence.--The
Director of National Intelligence shall annually make
publicly available a report that identifies, for the
preceding 12-month period--
``(1) the total number of orders issued pursuant titles I
and III and sections 703 and 704 and the estimated number of
targets affected by such orders;
``(2) the total number of orders issued pursuant to section
702 and the estimated number of targets affected by such
orders;
``(3) the total number of orders issued pursuant to title
IV and the estimated number of targets affected by such
orders;
``(4) the total number of orders issued pursuant to
applications made under section 501(b)(2)(B) and the
estimated number of targets affected by such orders;
``(5) the total number of orders issued pursuant to
applications made under section 501(b)(2)(C) and the
estimated number of targets affected by such orders; and
``(6) the total number of national Security letters issued
and the number of requests for information contained within
such national security letters.
``(c) National Security Letter Defined.--The term `national
security letter' means any of the following provisions:
``(1) Section 2709 of title 18, United States Code.
``(2) Section 1114(a)(5)(A) of the Right to Financial
Privacy Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3414(a)(5)(A)).
``(3) Subsection (a) or (b) of section 626 of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. 1681u(a), 1681u(b)).
``(4) Section 627(a) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (15
U.S.C. 1681v(a)).''.
(b) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in
the first section, as amended by section 402 of this Act, is
further amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 602, as added by such section 402, the following new
item:
``Sec. 603. Annual report on orders entered.''.
SEC. 604. PUBLIC REPORTING BY PERSONS SUBJECT TO FISA ORDERS.
(a) In General.--Title VI (50 U.S.C. 1871 et seq.), as
amended by section 603 of this Act, is further amended by
adding at the end the following new section:
``SEC. 604. PUBLIC REPORTING BY PERSONS SUBJECT TO ORDERS.
``(a) Reporting.--A person may semiannually publicly report
the following information with respect to the preceding half
year using one of the following structures:
``(1) Subject to subsection (b), a report that aggregates
the number of orders or national security letters the person
was required to comply with in the following separate
categories:
``(A) The number of national security letters received,
reported in bands of 1000 starting with 0-999.
``(B) The number of customer accounts affected by national
security letters, reported in bands of 1000 starting with 0-
999.
``(C) The number of orders under this Act for content,
reported in bands of 1000 starting with 0-999.
``(D) With respect to content orders under this Act, in
bands of 1000 starting with 0-999, the number of customer
accounts affected under orders under title I;
``(E) The number of orders under this Act for non-content,
reported in bands of 1000 starting with 0-999.
``(F) With respect to non-content orders under this Act, in
bands of 1000 starting with 0-999, the number of customer
accounts affected under orders under--
``(i) title IV;
``(ii) title V with respect to applications described in
section 501(b)(2)(B); and
``(iii) title V with respect to applications described in
section 501(b)(2)(C).
``(2) A report that aggregates the number of orders,
directives, or national security letters the person was
required to comply with in the following separate categories:
``(A) The total number of all national security process
received, including all national security letters and orders
or directives under this Act, reported as a single number in
a band of 0-249 and thereafter in bands of 250.
``(B) The total number of customer selectors targeted under
all national security process received, including all
national security letters
[[Page H4793]]
and orders or directives under this Act, reported as a single
number in a band of 0-249 and thereafter in bands of 250.
``(3) Subject to subsection (b), a report that aggregates
the number of orders or national security letters the person
was required to comply with in the following separate
categories:
``(A) The number of national security letters received,
reported in bands of 500 starting with 0-499.
``(B) The number of customer accounts affected by national
security letters, reported in bands of 500 starting with 0-
499.
``(C) The number of orders under this Act for content,
reported in bands of 500 starting with 0-499.
``(D) The number of customer selectors targeted under such
orders, in bands of 500 starting with 0-499.
``(E) The number of orders under this Act for non-content,
reported in bands of 500 starting with 0-499.
``(F) The number of customer selectors targeted under such
orders, reported in bands of 500 starting with 0-499.
``(b) Period of Time Covered by Reports.--With respect to a
report described in paragraph (1) or (3) of subsection (a),
such report shall only include information--
``(1) except as provided in paragraph (2), for the period
of time ending on the date that is at least 180 days before
the date of the publication of such report; and
``(2) with respect to an order under this Act or national
security letter received with respect to a platform, product,
or service for which a person did not previously receive such
an order or national security letter (not including an
enhancement to or iteration of an existing publicly available
platform, product, or service), for the period of time ending
on the date that is at least 2 years before the date of the
publication of such report.
``(c) Other Forms of Agreed to Publication.--Nothing in
this section shall be construed to prohibit the Government
and any person from jointly agreeing to the publication of
information referred to in this subsection in a time, form,
or manner other than as described in this section.
``(d) National Security Letter Defined.--The term `national
security letter' has the meaning given the term in section
603.''.
(b) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in
the first section, as amended by section 603 of this Act, is
further amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 603, as added by section 603 of this Act, the
following new item:
``Sec. 604. Public reporting by persons subject to orders.''.
SEC. 605. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FOR DECISIONS OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT.
Section 601(c)(1) (50 U.S.C. 1871(c)) is amended to read as
follows:
``(1) not later than 45 days after the date on which the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review issues a decision,
order, or opinion, including any denial or modification of an
application under this Act, that includes a significant
construction or interpretation of any provision of this Act
or results in a change of application of any provision of
this Act or a new application of any provision of this Act, a
copy of such decision, order, or opinion and any pleadings,
applications, or memoranda of law associated with such
decision, order, or opinion; and''.
SEC. 606. SUBMISSION OF REPORTS UNDER FISA.
(a) Electronic Surveillance.--Section 108(a)(1) (50 U.S.C.
1808(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, and the Committee on the Judiciary
of the Senate,'' and inserting ``the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary
of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the
Senate''.
(b) Physical Searches.--Section 306 (50 U.S.C. 1826) is
amended--
(1) in the first sentence, by striking ``Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate,'' and inserting
``Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives
and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on
the Judiciary of the Senate''; and
(2) in the second sentence, by striking ``and the Committee
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives''.
(c) Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices.--Section
406(b) (50 U.S.C. 1846(b)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``; and'' and inserting a
semicolon;
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking the period and inserting
a semicolon; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(4) each department or agency on behalf of which the
Government has made application for orders approving the use
of pen registers or trap and trace devices under this title;
and
``(5) for each department or agency described in paragraph
(4), a breakdown of the numbers required by paragraphs (1),
(2), and (3).''.
(d) Access to Certain Business Records and Other Tangible
Things.--Section 502(a) (50 U.S.C. 1862(a)) is amended by
striking ``Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the
Senate'' and inserting ``Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives, the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, and the Committees
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the
Senate''.
TITLE VII--SUNSETS
SEC. 701. SUNSETS.
(a) USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of
2005.--Section 102(b)(1) of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and
Reauthorization Act of 2005 (50 U.S.C. 1805 note) is amended
by striking ``June 1, 2015'' and inserting ``December 31,
2017''.
(b) Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004.--Section 6001(b)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 1801 note) is
amended by striking ``June 1, 2015'' and inserting ``December
31, 2017''.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The bill shall be debatable for 1 hour, with
40 minutes equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking
minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary and 20 minutes
equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking minority member
of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) and the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Conyers) each will control 20 minutes. The gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr.
Ruppersberger) each will control 10 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia.
General Leave
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members
may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their
remarks and include extraneous materials on H.R. 3361.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Virginia?
There was no objection.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
From the founding of the American Republic, this country has been
engaged in a profound debate about the limits of government. In the
Federalist Papers, the Founders argued passionately for a Federal
Government that would protect the American people from foreign threats.
At the same time, the Founders struggled to create a structure to
contain and control that government in order to protect the God-given
rights of the American people. They carefully crafted the Constitution
and Bill of Rights to accomplish these two different, yet
complementary, goals.
In essence, this debate has illuminated the exceptionality of the
United States. The ceaseless effort to restrain the reach of government
is in our DNA as Americans. And for 225 years, we have refused to
accept the idea that in order to have national security, we must
sacrifice our personal freedoms.
Some, however, think these goals are in conflict with one another
following last year's unauthorized disclosure of the National Security
Agency's data collection programs operated under the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA.
Today, the House will consider legislation that once again proves
that American liberty and security are not mutually exclusive. We can
protect both Americans' civil liberties and our national security
without compromising either one.
For nearly a year, the House Judiciary Committee has studied this
issue in detail. We have held multiple hearings, consulted the Obama
administration, and worked across party lines to produce bipartisan
legislation to ensure these programs protect our national security and
our individual freedoms.
This bill, the USA FREEDOM Act, was unanimously approved by both the
House Judiciary Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. The USA FREEDOM Act makes clear that the government
cannot indiscriminately acquire Americans' call detail records and
creates a new, narrowly tailored process for the collection of these
records.
Specifically, the USA FREEDOM Act ends bulk collection by keeping
Americans' phone records in the hands of providers and requiring the
government to get the permission of the court to request information
from providers, using a specific selection term in their request to the
court. That limits the scope of information collected. For example, the
government would have to
[[Page H4794]]
identify a specific person or account as part of any request for
information or tangible things.
Furthermore, the USA FREEDOM Act bans bulk collection not just for
the controversial telephone metadata program, but for all of section
215 authorities, as well as NSL letters and pen register, trap and
trace devices. These limitations will protect Americans' records of all
types, including medical records, email records, telephone records, and
firearms purchase records, among many others.
At the same time, the USA FREEDOM Act ensures that the Federal
Government will continue to have the tools it needs to identify and
intercept terrorist attacks. The bill preserves the traditional
operational use of these important authorities by the FBI and other
intelligence agencies. It provides needed emergency authority to
national security officials if there is an immediate national security
threat, but still requires the government to obtain Court approval of
an application within 7 days.
The USA FREEDOM Act increases the transparency of our intelligence-
gathering programs by creating an amicus curiae in the FISA Court. This
amicus will be chosen from a panel of legal experts to help ensure the
court adequately considers privacy concerns and the constitutional
rights of Americans when reviewing the government's request for
records.
It also requires the Director of National Intelligence and the
Attorney General to conduct a declassification review of each decision,
order, or opinion of the court that includes a significant construction
or interpretation of the law and mandates that the government report
the number of orders issued, modified, or denied by the court annually.
Last year's national security leaks have also had a commercial and
financial impact on American technology companies that have provided
these records. They have experienced backlash from both American and
foreign consumers and have had their competitive standing in the global
marketplace damaged. In January of this year, the Justice Department
entered into a settlement with several companies to permit new ways to
report data concerning requests for customer information under FISA.
The USA FREEDOM Act builds on upon this settlement, allowing tech
companies to publicly report national security requests from the
government to inform their American and foreign customers.
From beginning to end, this is a carefully crafted, bipartisan bill.
I would like to thank the sponsor of this legislation, Crime
Subcommittee Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner, full committee Ranking Member
John Conyers, Intellectual Property Subcommittee Ranking Member Jerry
Nadler, and Crime Subcommittee Ranking Member Bobby Scott for working
together with me on this important bipartisan legislation. I also want
to thank the staff of these Members for the many hours, weeks, and
months of hard work they put into this effort.
Furthermore, I would like to thank my staff--Caroline Lynch, the
chief counsel of the Crime Subcommittee, and Sam Ramer--for their long
hours and steadfast dedication to this legislation. And I might add
that Sam Ramer is going to be missed by the committee as he moves on to
take a new responsibility in the private sector, but he wanted to be
sure that he could be present today for the completion of the passage
of this legislation through the House. I thank Sam and Caroline for
their long and dedicated hours put into making sure that this was a
finely crafted piece of legislation.
I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan legislation, and I
reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I rise in support of the USA FREEDOM Act. The version of the bill
pending before us today is not a perfect vehicle. There is more that we
can do and must do to ensure, as the Fourth Amendment requires, ``The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.''
But let me be clear. The compromise bill before us today is a
significant improvement over the status quo. It is a good bill. Now,
with this legislation, we stand poised to end domestic bulk collection
across the board--in section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, in the pen
register authority, and in the national security letter statutes--by
requiring the use of a ``specific selection term'' before the
government may obtain information or tangible things.
This legislation will create a panel of experts from which the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court can draw expertise and
questions involving privacy, civil liberties, and technology. It will
also require the court to disclose every significant opinion it issues,
because in this country there should be no such thing as secret law.
And we have accomplished all these things while providing President
Obama with his requested authority for the limited, prospective
collection of call detail records.
Any bill we might have offered on this subject would have been
imperfect, but we have been careful to include the critical safeguards
in this legislation. With the additional reporting, declassification,
and transparency requirements laid out in the measure before us, we
believe the government would be hard-pressed to attempt to expand its
surveillance authorities beyond the narrow intent of this legislation.
As the administration stated yesterday in a formal statement of
policy, the USA FREEDOM Act ``prohibits bulk collection.'' This is our
intent, and we will hold the current and future administrations to this
intent.
In closing, I want to thank Chairman Goodlatte, Mr. Sensenbrenner of
Wisconsin, Mr. Nadler of New York, and Mr. Scott of Virginia for their
tireless leadership on this issue. I also want to express appreciation
to Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for their
willingness to work with us to reach this point.
The House is poised to approve the first significant rollback of any
aspect of government surveillance since the passage of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978. We must seize this opportunity,
and so I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 3361.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 15 seconds.
I neglected to add another key member of the committee, Congressman
Randy Forbes of Virginia, a member of the Judiciary Committee who has
also been a key bipartisan member of this negotiation.
At this time, it is my pleasure to yield 6 minutes to the gentleman
from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner), the chairman of the Crime,
Terrorism, Homeland Security, and Investigations Subcommittee and the
chief sponsor of this legislation.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the House for
bringing the USA FREEDOM Act to the floor today.
I was the chairman of the Judiciary Committee on September 11, 2001.
In the wake of that tragedy, the committee passed the PATRIOT Act with
unanimous, bipartisan support. The bill easily passed in both the House
and the Senate, and President George W. Bush signed it into law.
I believe the PATRIOT Act made America safer by enhancing the
government's ability to find and stop terrorist attacks. We were
careful to maintain the civil liberties that distinguish us from our
enemies. We are here today because the government misapplied the law
and upset the balance between privacy and security that we had fought
to preserve 13 years ago.
In a feat of legal gymnastics, the administration convinced the FISA
Court that, because some records in the universe of every phone call
Americans made might be relevant to counterterrorism, the entire
universe of calls must be relevant. That decision opened the floodgates
to a practice of bulk collection that Congress never intended when the
PATRIOT Act was passed.
{time} 0930
Senator Leahy and I introduced the USA FREEDOM Act to end bulk
collection, increase transparency, and to reestablish a proper balance
between privacy and security. After months of input and negotiations--
in a historic echo of its vote on the PATRIOT Act--the Judiciary
Committee unanimously passed the FREEDOM Act.
The challenge we faced was to draft legislation that was tight enough
to avoid abuse without infringing on the
[[Page H4795]]
core functions of law enforcement and intelligence collection. Perfect
is rarely possible in politics, and this bill is no exception.
In order to preserve core operations of the intelligence and law
enforcement agencies, the administration insisted on broadening certain
authorities and lessening certain restrictions. Some of the changes
raise justifiable concerns, and I don't blame people for losing trust
in their government, because the government has violated their trust.
Let me be clear: I wish this bill did more. To my colleagues who
lament the changes, I agree with you. To privacy groups who are upset
about lost provisions, I share your disappointment. The negotiations
for this bill were intense, and we have to make compromises, but this
bill still does deserve support. Don't let the perfect become the enemy
of the good. Today, we have the opportunity to make a powerful
statement: Congress does not support bulk collection.
The days of the NSA indiscriminately vacuuming up more data than it
can store will end with the USA FREEDOM Act. After the FREEDOM Act
passes, we will have a law that expresses Congress' unambiguous intent
to end bulk collection of Americans' data across all surveillance
authorities.
The bill requires that, in addition to existing restrictions, the
government must use a specific selection term as the basis for
collecting foreign intelligence information. And maybe more
importantly, after this bill becomes law, we will have critical
transparency provisions to ensure that, if the government again
violates our trust, Congress and the public will know about it and will
be able to do something about it.
The FREEDOM Act gives private companies greater discretion to
disclose their cooperation with the government. These disclosures give
the companies increased autonomy and will alert the public to the
extent of data collection. The bill also requires public notification
of any FISC decision that contains a significant construction of law--
expressly including interpretations of the ``specific selection term.''
This is the end of secret laws. If the administration abuses the intent
of the bill, everyone will know.
That is why the FREEDOM Act will succeed. It bans bulk collection and
ensures disclosure of attempts to dilute it. Today's vote is a first
vote is the first step--and not a final step--in our efforts to reform
surveillance. It gives us the tools to ensure that Congress and the
public can provide an adequate check on the government. In a post-
FREEDOM Act world, we have turned the tables on the NSA and can say to
them: ``We are watching you.'' And we will.
I want to thank Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers and
Congressmen Scott, Nadler and Forbes of Virginia for all their hard
work. I also want to thank the staff for so many long hours. I cannot
overstate the amount of collective sweat and tears that my chief of
staff, Bart Forsyth, Caroline Lynch, Sam Ramer, Aaron Hiller, Heather
Sawyer, and Joe Graupensperger put into this bill.
But most of all, I want to thank my wife. Cheryl has always been the
world's largest and loudest advocate for the preservation of civil
rights. She encouraged, supported--and some might say demanded--that I
lead this effort. There is no question that we would not be here today
for this historic vote on the USA FREEDOM Act if it weren't for her.
I urge my colleagues to support this legislation.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased now to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to
the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), the ranking member of the
Intellectual Property Subcommittee.
Mr. NADLER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, today we have the first chance in more than a decade to
finally place some real limits on the sweeping, unwarranted--and at
times unlawful--government surveillance that many of us have fought
against for years.
First and foremost--and as the administration acknowledges in its
Statement of Administration Policy--this bill will end bulk collection
under section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, and will ensure that the
government is also prohibited from using its National Security Letter
authority, or pen registers and trap-and-trace devices, for bulk
collection. It does so by requiring the government to identify a
specific selection term--something like a person's name, or an account
or telephone number--as the basis for obtaining information. This term
must limit the scope of records collected to those that are
``relevant'' to an authorized investigation, which requires a
reasonable relationship between the particular records and the subjects
of a terrorism investigation.
I share the concerns that the current definition of ``specific
selection term'' may still allow overbroad collection. But given the
``presumptively relevant'' categories that Congress has already
identified in section 215--and because the bill will now require
participation of an amicus in the FISA Court who can argue against an
overly broad reading of the law--the government would not be permitted
to, for example, use an entire telephone area code or an Internet
router to collect and warehouse records just because a terrorist
suspect might be using a phone in that area code or sending
communications that might traverse that router.
Moreover, to the extent the FISA Court ever construes a specific
selection term too broadly, other reforms in the bill ensure that
Congress and the American people would know about it immediately and
could rein them in.
These changes are quite significant, as are the new restrictions to
the use of FISA section 702, which allows the NSA to target persons
located outside the United States.
The USA FREEDOM Act on the floor today certainly does not give us
everything we want or need. It is the product of heated negotiations
across party and committee lines and with the intelligence community.
It is far from perfect, but it is an important step forward, and we
will work to fix remaining problems and strengthen the bill as it moves
through the Senate. But a ``no'' vote on this bill today may mean no
reform at all, thus leaving in place the framework that could lead to
the continued dragnet surveillance of our citizens. This must end. This
still makes critically important changes that we should all support.
That is why I will vote for it and why I urge everyone else to vote for
it.
With that, I want to thank Congressmen Sensenbrenner, Goodlatte,
Conyers, Scott, and Forbes, and all the staff members who worked on
this bill.
This is a signal occasion. It is the first real progress we will have
made--not enough--but a really good first step.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, at this time, I reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased now to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Scott) who has worked so hard on this.
Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
yielding. I join the author of the bill, the gentleman from Wisconsin
and chair of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Crime, Mr.
Sensenbrenner; my colleague from Virginia, the chair of the full
committee, Mr. Goodlatte; the gentleman from Michigan and ranking
member, Mr. Conyers; Mr. Nadler; and my colleague from Virginia (Mr.
Forbes) for proposing this amended version of the USA FREEDOM Act. I
commend my colleagues for working together to develop a bipartisan
approach to addressing some of the shortcomings in our foreign
intelligence surveillance statutes.
As recent revelations about the way that some of these statutes have
been used have come to light, members of the Judiciary Committee, which
has primary jurisdiction over the statutes, studied the issues,
proposed solutions, and worked together to find a way forward. We have
also worked with our colleagues from the Intelligence Committee to find
common ground in order to bring meaningful surveillance reform to the
floor today.
The bill, as amended, addresses abuses, enhances privacy protections,
provides more rigorous review of critical questions of legal
interpretation, and increases transparency so our citizens will know
what is being decided and done in their name.
While the administration has already indicated that it will change
its procedures, to paraphrase President Reagan, I think the best course
is to ``trust but codify.''
[[Page H4796]]
While this version of the USA FREEDOM Act does not accomplish all
that we had hoped for, it is, in fact, a significant step in the right
direction. I therefore urge my colleagues to support the legislation.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. CONYERS. I am pleased now to yield 2 minutes to the gentlelady
from California (Ms. Lofgren).
Ms. LOFGREN. Mr. Speaker, I certainly respect the role that Mr.
Sensenbrenner has played in this and honor him and his wife, Cheryl,
for their commitment to freedom. But I must oppose the FREEDOM Act that
is on the floor today.
This is not the bill that was reported out of the Judiciary Committee
unanimously. I voted for that bill not because it was perfect but
because it was a step in the right direction. After the bill was
reported out, changes were made without the knowledge of the committee
members, and I think the result is a bill that actually will not end
bulk collections, regretfully.
As Mr. Scott has said, our job is not to trust, but to codify. And if
you take a look at the selection changes made in the bill, it would
allow for bulk collection should the NSA do so. Further, I would note
that the transparency provisions have also been weakened. The 702
section would no longer be reportable by companies who receive orders,
and instead of the Attorney General noting decisions that change the
law, it is now sent over to the Director of National Intelligence.
Regrettably, we have learned that if we leave any ambiguity in the
law, the intelligence agency will run a truck right through that
ambiguity. And I think that is why all the civil liberties groups have
withdrawn their support from this bill: the ACLU, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, CDT, Open Technology. I would add that
FreedomWorks and other libertarian groups have also pulled their
support. Companies like Facebook and Google have also pulled their
support of the bill.
Now, I hope that we will defeat this bill and come back together--
because we do work together well here in the Judiciary Committee--and
fix the problems that were created, I think, at the insistence of the
administration and give honor to Mr. Sensenbrenner's original bill that
had 151 members cosponsoring it.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds simply to point
out two things. First of all, as the gentleman from Wisconsin has
noted, this legislation is an effort to bring together widely disparate
points of view about how to both maximize our national security and our
civil liberties. And there are those outside groups that were just
referenced who would like to see more than the language that they were
able to obtain in this bill. But I think it is very important for
everyone to know that while those groups--some groups--have withdrawn
their support for the bill, they do not oppose the bill, and that is a
very important distinction for Members to understand.
Mr. Speaker, at this time, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to
the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. King), a member of the Judiciary
Committee.
Mr. KING of Iowa. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank the chairman of the
Judiciary Committee for yielding to me, and I want to also thank the
efforts of the Judiciary Committee and the Select Committee on
Intelligence for the broad and intense work they have done on this
bill.
The USA FREEDOM Act starts with the right concept, and that is that
the civil liberties of Americans were at risk. Even though we have very
few examples of people being victimized by it, there is not a level of
comfort in this country. And so the move to block the Federal
Government from storing metadata and still allow for them to be able to
set up under a FISA warrant a query through privately held data is the
right way to go. It is a conclusion that I drew early on in the many
hearings that I have been to, both classified and unclassified
hearings.
I quizzed the witnesses, and I put my mark down on those committee
hearings, but what happened was the process moved quickly, and over a
weekend there was an intense job to write a bill that turned into a
substitute amendment, and a debate in the Judiciary Committee referred
over to the Select Committee on Intel. Both committees acted quickly. I
offered an amendment before the Judiciary Committee. It was voted on.
But I have to say that, in my opinion, it was not considered in a
fashion that would have allowed for the full judgment of the Judiciary
Committee to weigh in.
My amendment is set up so it allows for the intelligence community to
negotiate with the telecoms--the telecommunications providers--for a
period of time longer than is today required by the FCC.
{time} 0945
I think it is not possible for anyone who supports this bill to argue
that it makes us safer. It protects our civil liberties more, but there
is a window beyond the FCC requirements that I would like to see be
available on something other than a voluntary basis.
I wanted to come here to this floor and put my marker down on that
concern, that we should not sacrifice the security in America and we
should protect the civil liberties of Americans. We can do that at the
same time. I think this bill falls somewhat short; although the
underlying concept of the bill, I do support.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased now to yield 2 minutes to the
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee), a very active member of the
Judiciary Committee.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me
this time, and I thank the ranking member and the chairman for this
work.
I also thank Mr. Sensenbrenner, who we have worked with from the
first stages of the PATRIOT Act, when the Judiciary Committee passed it
out on a bipartisan basis after that terrible and heinous act of
terror. Unfortunately, it was changed.
Today, I want to announce that megadata collection as we know it has
ended. That is a major tribute to the American people, and the
Judiciary Committee and the Intelligence Committee heard them.
More importantly, the Intelligence Committee and the Judiciary
Committee stand united. Can we do more? Should there have been an open
rule or a number of other amendments that Members wanted? Yes. I
believe in participatory democracy.
Today, we end bulk collection under the PATRIOT Act section 215. We
can always do better. Today, we prevent the bulk collection under FISA
pen register and National Security Letter authorities and vow to the
American people that we increase the transparency.
Let me make it very clear, when we first discussed and debated the
PATRIOT Act, reverse targeting, to me, was heinous. It means that it
captured an innocent American person as we were looking for someone who
happened to be a terrorist.
Today, in this bill, we have any communications as to which the
sender and all intended recipients are determined to be located in the
United States and prohibit the use of any discrete, nontarget
communication that is determined to be to or from a United States
person or a person who appears to be located in the United States,
except to protect against an immediate threat to harm. It is
eliminated. Reverse targeting is no longer.
In addition, I introduced a bill some time ago called the FISA Court
and Sunshine Act of 2013. In that bill, it required the Attorney
General to disclose each decision, order, or opinion of the FISA Court,
allowing Americans to know how broad of a legal authority the
government is claiming under the PATRIOT Act and the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act to conduct surveillance needed to keep
Americans safe.
I am pleased that, in section 402 and 604 of the USA FREEDOM Act, it
requires the Attorney General to conduct a declassification review of
each decision, order, or opinion. It opens it up to the American
people. That includes a significant construction of interpretation of
the law and to submit to Congress within 45 days.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.
Mr. CONYERS. I yield an additional 30 seconds to the gentlelady.
Ms. JACKSON LEE. I thank the gentleman.
[[Page H4797]]
As indicated, the bill specifically contains an explicit prohibition
on bulk collection of tangible things pursuant to section 215. The
FREEDOM Act provides that section 215 may be used only where specific
selection term is provided as the basis for the production of tangible
things.
Clearly, we worked very hard to contain what was an amoeba that would
not end. Finally, I believe section 301 of the bill, as I indicated,
was included, as it was in my amendment in H.R. 3773.
Let me conclude by simply saying that the Bill of Rights lives. The
Bill of Rights is for the American people, both the right to freedom,
both the right in essence to privacy, and our respect for the gathering
of intelligence to protect us from terrorists.
This bill, the USA FREEDOM Act, is indeed an enormous step forward.
Let us work together to move us even more, but today, we end megadata
collecting as we know it.
Mr. Speaker, I believe we have made a giant step forward for civil
liberties, respect for the integrity of the American people, and their
right to freedom, as well as for the protecting of all of us from
terror.
Mr. Speaker, as a senior member of the Judiciary Committee and a co-
sponsor, I rise in strong support of H.R. 3361, the ``USA Freedom
Act,'' which is short for ``Uniting and Strengthening America by
Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping, Dragnet-collection, and
Online Monitoring Act.''
The USA Freedom Act is the House's unified response to the
unauthorized disclosures and subsequent publication in the media in
June 2013 regarding the National Security Agency's collection from
Verizon of the phone records of all of its American customers, which
was authorized by the FISA Court pursuant to Section 215 of the Patriot
Act.
Public reaction to the news of this massive and secret data gathering
operation was swift and negative.
There was justifiable concern on the part of the public and a large
percentage of the Members of this body that the extent and scale of
this NSA data collection operation, which exceeded by orders of
magnitude anything previously authorized or contemplated, may
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy and threat to the civil
liberties of American citizens.
To quell the growing controversy, the Director of National
Intelligence declassified and released limited information about this
program. According to the DNI, the information acquired under this
program did not include the content of any communications or the
identity of any subscriber.
The DNI stated that ``the only type of information acquired under the
Court's order is telephony metadata, such as telephone numbers dialed
and length of calls.''
The assurance given by the DNI, to put it mildly, was not very
reassuring.
In response, many Members of Congress, including the Ranking Member
Conyers, and Mr. Sensenbrenner, and myself, introduced legislation in
response to the disclosures to ensure that the law and the practices of
the executive branch reflect the intent of Congress in passing the USA
Patriot Act and subsequent amendments.
For example, I introduced H.R. 2440, the ``FISA Court in the Sunshine
Act of 2013,'' bipartisan legislation, that much needed transparency
without compromising national security to the decisions, orders, and
opinions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court or ``FISA
Court.''
Specifically, my bill would require the Attorney General to disclose
each decision, order, or opinion of a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC), allowing Americans to know how broad of a legal authority
the government is claiming under the PATRIOT Act and Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act to conduct the surveillance needed to
keep Americans safe.
I am pleased that these requirements are incorporated in substantial
part as Sections 402 and 604 of the USA Freedom Act, which requires the
Attorney General to conduct a declassification review of each decision,
order, or opinion of the FISA court that includes a significant
construction or interpretation of law and to submit a report to
Congress within 45 days.
I also am pleased that the bill before us contains an explicit
prohibition on bulk collection of tangible things pursuant to Section
215 authority. Instead, the USA Freedom Act provides that Section 215
may only be used where a specific selection term is provided as the
basis for the production of tangible things.
Another important improvement is that the bill's prohibition on
domestic bulk collection, as well as its criteria for specifying the
information to be collected, applies not only to Section 215
surveillance activities but also to other law enforcement
communications interception authorities, such as national security
letters.
Finally, I strongly support the USA Freedom Act because Section 301
of the bill continues the prohibition against ``reverse targeting,''
which became law when an earlier Jackson Lee Amendment was included in
H.R. 3773, the RESTORE Act of 2007.
``Reverse targeting,'' a concept well known to members of this
Committee but not so well understood by those less steeped in the
arcana of electronic surveillance, is the practice where the government
targets foreigners without a warrant while its actual purpose is to
collect information on certain U.S. persons.
One of the main concerns of libertarians and classical conservatives,
as well as progressives and civil liberties organizations, in giving
expanded authority to the executive branch was the temptation of
national security agencies to engage in reverse targeting may be
difficult to resist in the absence of strong safeguards to prevent it.
The Jackson Lee Amendment, codified in Section 301 of the USA Freedom
Act, reduces even further any such temptation to resort to reverse
targeting by requiring the Administration to obtain a regular,
individualized FISA warrant whenever the ``real'' target of the
surveillance is a person in the United States.
In retaining the prohibition on reverse targeting, Section 301
achieves honors the Constitution by requiring the government to obtain
a regular FISA warrant whenever a ``significant purpose of an
acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific person
reasonably believed to be located in the United States.''
I should that nothing in Section 301 requires the Government to
obtain a FISA order for every overseas target on the off chance that
they might pick up a call into or from the United States.
Rather, a FISA order is required only where there is a particular,
known person in the United States at the other end of the foreign
target's calls in whom the Government has a significant interest such
that a significant purpose of the surveillance has become to acquire
that person's communications.
Mr. Speaker, while the bill before is a good bill, it is not perfect.
No legislation ever is.
In particular, my preference would have been to retain the provision
in the bill as originally introduced establishing an Office of the
Special Advocate to vigorously advocate in support of legal
interpretations that protect individual privacy and civil liberties.
As initially contemplated, the Office of the Special Advocate would
be authorized to participate in proceedings before the FISA Court and
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, and to request
reconsiderations of FISA Court decisions and participate in appeals and
reviews.
Regrettably, the provision establishing the Office of the Special
Advocate fell victim to a compromise and replaced with a provision
authorizing both the FISA court and the FISA Court of Review, if they
deem it necessary, to appoint an individual to serve as amicus curiae
in a case involving a novel or significant interpretation of law.
Under this arrangement, the presiding judges of the courts must
designate five individuals eligible to serve in that position who
possess expertise in privacy and civil liberties, intelligence
collection, telecommunications or any other area that may lend legal or
technical expertise to the courts.
The Office of the Special Advocate arrangement in my opinion is
superior because it provides for mandatory participation of the public
advocate rather than the discretionary involvement of court designated
amicus curiae provided in the bill before us.
Mr. Speaker, as I noted in an op-ed published way back in October
2007, nearly two centuries ago, Alexis DeTocqueville, who remains the
most astute student of American democracy, observed that the reason
democracies invariably prevail in any military conflict is because
democracy is the governmental form that best rewards and encourages
those traits that are indispensable to success: initiative, innovation,
courage, and a love of justice.
I ask unanimous consent to include in the Record a copy of that op-
ed.
I support the USA Freedom Act because it will help keep us true to
the Bill of Rights and strikes the proper balance between our cherished
liberty and smart security.
I urge my colleagues to support the USA Freedom Act.
NSA Reform Takes Its First Steps
The USA FREEDOM Act takes steps to:
End bulk collection under Patriot Act Section 215. The bill
requires the government to show the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court that the specific records it seeks from
phone companies pertain to a specific email address, account
number or other ``selection term'' before it can demand a
customer's personal information. It creates a new collection
authority for call records but takes meaningful steps to
ensure that such records are not vacuumed up wholesale, as
was happening under the secret programs revealed by Edward
Snowden.
[[Page H4798]]
Prevent bulk collection under FISA pen register and
National Security Letter authorities. The bill also requires
the government to use a ``selection term'' that uniquely
describes its surveillance target and serves as the basis for
collecting information from a telephone line, facility, or
other account. This would help ensure that the government
won't use pen registers and National Security Letters as
convenient substitutes for the 215 program.
Increase transparency. Finally, the bill requires the
government to provide to Congress and to the public
additional reporting on its surveillance programs, while
enabling companies who receive national security
informational requests to more fully inform customers about
the extent to which the government is collecting their data.
Additional governmental reporting requirements and more
particularized third party reporting authorities, however,
are needed in order to ensure that Congress and the public
have the information they need to perform truly robust
oversight.
While the bill makes significant reforms to U.S.
surveillance law, Congress clearly chose not to let the
perfect be the enemy of the good. And, to be clear, more work
needs to be done. Some of the additional reforms we are
calling for, which were in the original USA FREEDOM Act,
include:
Ensuring that judges in the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC) have the authority to determine
whether an application passes legal muster and do not return
to being mere rubber stamps.
Limiting the circumstances under which the government can
gather records more than one ``hop'' out from a target to
help ensure Americans' information is not unnecessarily swept
up.
Closing the ``back door'' search loophole in the FISA
Amendments Act to prevent the government from searching
information collected under Section 702 of FISA for the U.S.
persons' communications content.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 1 minute to
the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Holding), a member of the
Judiciary Committee.
Mr. HOLDING. Mr. Speaker, on Wednesday, the State Department
acknowledged that terrorist attacks worldwide have increased by more
than 43 percent last year, killing nearly 18,000 people. The odds are
rising that we will be hit here in the United States. That is why
balanced legislation that protects civil liberties and keeps Americans
safe is so important, and the USA FREEDOM Act does just that.
I rise in support of the passage of the USA FREEDOM Act, bipartisan
legislation that reforms our intelligence-gathering programs while,
importantly, preserving operational capabilities that protect national
security.
This legislation will make sure that Americans are protected at a
time when the world is a more dangerous place than when the PATRIOT Act
itself was enacted into law.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Honda).
Mr. HONDA. Mr. Speaker, I want to add my thanks to the work that has
been done up to now. I became an original cosponsor of the USA FREEDOM
Act because I was disturbed about the revelations of surveillance
programs.
The bill was a good step toward balancing security and privacy, but
this amendment does not. It leaves open the possibility that bulk
surveillance could still continue, and it no longer protects the public
through a special advocate in the FISA Court.
I am disappointed that this popular, bipartisan bill has been so
drastically weakened. I can no longer support it.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt).
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, and I recognize the
work that Mr. Sensenbrenner, Mr. Conyers, Mr. Goodlatte, Mr. Scott, and
others have put into this, but it still falls woefully short.
This legislation still allows the government to collect everything
they want against Americans, to treat Americans as suspects first and
citizens second.
It still allows decisions about whom to target and how aggressively
to go after acquaintances of acquaintances of targets, to be made by
mid-level employees, not Federal judges.
Most important, the fundamental decisions under this will be made
against a weak, inferior standard that does not reach probable cause,
so that the government can spy on people based on weak suspicions and
not on legally established probable cause. Now, my friends say: don't
let the perfect be the enemy of the good.
The perfect? How can anyone here vote for legislation that doesn't
uphold the constitutional standard of probable cause? Probable cause
has been well-established in law for two centuries, to keep Americans
secure by keeping intelligence and enforcement officers focused on real
threats, not on vague suspicions or wild-goose chases.
A decade ago, there was a major change in the relationship between
Americans and their government. This bill does not correct it.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute to respond to the
gentleman from New Jersey.
A number of the things the gentleman has stated are simply not
accurate. First of all, the selectors all have to be approved by court
order.
Secondly, it is important for everyone to understand that the
information gathered is targeted to foreign nationals, not to American
citizens.
Thirdly, the increased transparency that is created by this
legislation, both in the FISA Court itself and with the fact that the
data is now going to be required to be retained by the companies that
own the data and not held by the government, provides extra assurance
that, if some kind of massive data collection grab were attempted by
the government, it would be exposed, as Mr. Nadler pointed out earlier.
Finally, the special selectors language that was carefully worked out
in a bipartisan manner carefully limits the ability of people to gather
data. It has to be based upon discrete requests, and discretion has a
meaning in the law.
It has to be limited to identifiable persons or things, and it has to
be done in such a way that the court approves it.
Mr. HOLT. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GOODLATTE. I would be happy to yield.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. GOODLATTE. I yield myself 30 seconds and yield to the gentleman.
Mr. HOLT. Is it not correct that this bill does not invoke the
probable cause standard?
Mr. GOODLATTE. This is not a search under the Fourth Amendment, and
probable cause has never applied. It has never applied. The gentleman
is attempting to change the law if he thinks that.
Mr. HOLT. Will the gentleman yield further?
Mr. GOODLATTE. I yield further to the gentleman.
Mr. HOLT. Is there any American who doesn't think that this is a
search, when it comes to gathering, by any common understanding?
Mr. GOODLATTE. Reclaiming my time, Mr. Speaker, when it comes to
gathering information about foreign nationals who are deemed to pose a
national security threat to the United States, the Fourth Amendment
does not apply, and a court must still order the particular selectors
that are used.
The gentleman's characterization is inaccurate.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield an additional 1 minute to the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler), a senior member of the committee.
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I have heard arguments against this bill,
and all of them amount to one argument: the bill doesn't go far enough.
I agree. It doesn't, but it is rarely a good argument against a bill
to say it doesn't go far enough, if it goes a long way towards solving
a real problem.
This bill will end bulk collection. It will end it under section 215.
It will end it under trace and trap, and it will end it under NSLs.
Without this bill--and I hope it is strengthened in the Senate--we will
have no chance to end bulk collection, and the current framework which
allows the dragnet surveillance of our citizens will continue.
I wish this bill were stronger, but it is what we are able to get
now. It is a major step forward, and not to pass this bill now would be
to say to the NSA: Continue what you are doing, we are placing no
restrictions on you beyond what the law already has.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve my time.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 1 minute.
I wanted to take this opportunity to thank staff on both sides of the
aisle for the hard work that went into drafting the bill and the many
compromises
[[Page H4799]]
that were reached when we went into the final product.
In addition to Caroline Lynch and Sam Ramer with Chairman Goodlatte,
Bart Forsyth with Mr. Sensenbrenner, our own staff, Aaron Hiller, Joe
Graupensperger, Heather Sawyer, all deserve appropriate credit and
praise for the many late nights and long weekends that they spent
working on the public's behalf on this critical legislation.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, at this time, I have only one speaker
remaining, and I am prepared to close our portion of the remarks if the
gentleman is prepared to close.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself an additional 1 minute, and
it is to clarify the term ``specific selection term'' because the
definition of specific selection term that appears in the compromise
bill is imperfect, but the USA FREEDOM Act still ends bulk collection.
That is why we are here.
Under the act, the government may not obtain information or tangible
things under section 215, the FISA pen register authority, or the
National Security Letter statutes without using a ``specific selection
term'' as the basis for production.
{time} 1000
Critics are correct. This is not as clean or straightforward as the
definition approved by both the Intelligence Committee and Judiciary
Committee. Nothing in the definition explicitly prohibits the
government from using a very broad selection term like ``area code
202'' or ``the entire eastern seaboard.'' But that concern is largely
theoretical; the type of collection is not likely to be of use to the
government.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GOODLATTE. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, how much time remains?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan has 3 minutes
remaining. The gentleman from Virginia has 2\1/4\ minutes remaining.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, the definition of ``specific selection
term'' includes a phrase pursuant to the statute authorizing the
provision of information, and that is intended to keep the definition
within the four corners of the statute.
There will now be an amicus in the court to argue that expansive
readings of this text--like the reading that took ``relevance'' in
section 215 to mean ``all call detail records''--are inconsistent with
the plain meaning of the law.
Under this bill, any FISA Court opinion that interprets this
definition must be declassified and released to the public within 45
days. If the government tries to expand this authority, the public will
know it in short order.
The House is poised to approve the first significant rollback of any
aspect of government surveillance since the passage of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978. We must seize this opportunity.
If this bill is not approved today, we are giving our intelligence
people and NSA a green light to go ahead, and I cannot imagine that
happening in this body.
I support H.R. 3361 and yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Eighty-six years ago, Justice Louis Brandeis wrote, in his dissent in
Olmstead v. United States: ``The makers of our Constitution undertook
to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They
recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings,
and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure,
and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions, and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
government, the right to be let alone--the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men.''
After the horrific attacks on September 11, 2001, the country was
determined not to allow such an attack to occur again. The changes we
made then to our intelligence laws helped keep us safe from implacable
enemies. Today, we renew our commitment to our Nation's security and to
the safety of the American people.
We also make this pledge: that the United States of America will
remain a nation whose government answers to the will of the people.
This country must be what it always has been: a beacon of freedom to
the world; a place where the principles of the Founders, including the
commitment to individual liberties, will continue to live, protected
and nourished for future generations.
I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan legislation, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I
might consume.
I would like to begin by recognizing Chairman Goodlatte, Mr.
Sensenbrenner, the other judiciary committee sponsors, and Leader
Cantor for all their hard work and continuing to forge a compromise
with the Intelligence Committee that enacts meaningful change to FISA
while preserving operational capabilities.
It is commendable that we have found a responsible legislative
solution to address concerns about the bulk telephone metadata program
so that we may move forward on other national security legislative
priorities. Our obligation to protect this country should not be held
hostage by the actions of a traitor or traitors who leaked classified
information that puts our troops in the field at risk or those who
fearmonger and spread mistruth and misinformation to further their own
misguided agenda.
Following the criminal disclosures of intelligence information last
June, the section 215 telephone metadata program has been the subject
of intense and often inaccurate criticism. The bulk telephone metadata
program is legal, overseen, and effective at saving American lives. No
review has found anything other than that. All three branches of
government oversee this program, including Congress, the FISC,
inspectors general and internal compliance and privacy and civil
liberties offices in the executive branch agencies.
Despite the effectiveness of the program and immense safeguards on
the data, many Americans and many Members of this body still have
concerns about a potential for abuse. Remember, the whole debate here
has been about the potential for abuse, not that abuse had occurred.
The legislation we are considering today is designed to address those
concerns and reflect hundreds of hours of Member and staff work to
negotiate a workable compromise.
In March, the Intelligence Committee ranking member, Mr.
Ruppersberger, and I introduced legislation that was designed to
accomplish these main priorities. We committed to ending bulk metadata
collection for communications and other types of records. We committed
to providing more targeted, narrow authorities so as not to put America
at risk. We committed to provide an even more robust judicial review
than exists today and process for that program. We committed to
providing more transparency into the FISA process and the decisions of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. The revised USA FREEDOM
Act accomplishes the same goals as well.
The USA FREEDOM Act provides the meaningful change to the telephone
metadata that Members of the House have been seeking. If we had the
fortune of having a Commander in Chief firmly dedicated to the
preservation of this program, we may have been able to protect it in
its entirety. With that not being the case, and I believe this is a
workable compromise that protects the core function of a
counterterrorism program we know has saved lives around the world, I
urge Members to support this legislation.
I want to thank all of those who came together to forge something
that has been certainly a difficult process along the way. At the end
of the day, something important happened here: a better understanding
of the threats by, I think, more Members of Congress that pose every
single day to the lives of American citizens by terror groups around
the world. That rise in threat level is getting worse. The matrix for
that threat level is getting worse.
It was important as we forged and, I think, met the concerns of so
many and educated, I think, many on the misinformation that was out
there, that we protect the core capability to detect if a foreign
terrorist on foreign
[[Page H4800]]
soil is making a call to the United States to further advance their
goals of killing Americans. I think we accomplished that today. It is
not the bill I would have written completely, but I think we protected
those operational concerns and met the concerns for those who had a
mistrust of that metadata being locked away with the National Security
Agency.
With that, I look forward to a thoughtful debate and reserve the
balance of my time, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the USA
FREEDOM Act, and I yield myself as much time as I may consume.
On May 8, the House Intelligence Committee passed out of the
committee the bipartisan USA FREEDOM Act, the identical bill that the
Judiciary Committee passed out of committee on May 7.
I especially want to thank Chairman Rogers for his years of
leadership on the House Intelligence Committee. I also want to thank
Chairman Goodlatte and Ranking Member Conyers, and also Congressman
Sensenbrenner and the staff of our Intelligence and Judiciary
Committees for the hard work they did on this bill. We have worked
together in a bipartisan manner, and we have come a long way.
After our committee markups, Chairman Rogers and I have continued to
work with the Judiciary Committee and the administration to iron out
some remaining issues, which we have done and which is represented in
the current bill.
The bill represents the productive efforts of bipartisanship and
working together for the American people. Just yesterday, the
administration stated that it ``strongly supports'' passage of our
bill. Again, the administration said that it ``strongly supports''
passage of our bill. It also stated that the USA FREEDOM Act ``ensures
our intelligence and law enforcement professionals have the authorities
they need to protect the Nation, while further ensuring that
individuals' privacy is appropriately protected.''
The USA FREEDOM Act contains important measures to increase
transparency and enhance privacy while maintaining an important
national security tool.
First, we have ended bulk collection of telephone metadata and
ensured the court reviews each and every search application. The big
database up at the National Security Agency that contains phone numbers
of millions of Americans will go away. It will be replaced with a
tailored, narrow process that allows the government to search only for
specific connections to suspected terrorists to keep us safe here at
home. There is an important emergency exception when there isn't time
to get prior approval from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,
also know as FISC.
Second, we have required expanded reporting for court decisions to
improve transparency without threatening sources and methods.
Third, we are creating an advocate to provide outside expertise for
significant matters before the FISA Court.
Fourth, we have established a declassification review process of
court opinions to ensure the public has access to our national security
legal rulings in a manner that still protects our sources and methods.
The USA FREEDOM Act is critical to our country's safety and our
intelligence community. It is a focused, logical bill that will let us
protect our citizens from terrorist attacks through important legal
tools while strengthening civil liberties.
I was opposed to the original USA FREEDOM Act because it set too high
a standard for intelligence collection. In short, it would have
threatened America's safety by cutting off the building blocks of
foreign intelligence investigations. We have worked together in a
bipartisan manner and created a solid bill.
Now, it ends bulk collection of all metadata by the government. Those
that say this bill will legalize bulk collection are wrong. They are
trying to scare you by making you think there are monsters under the
bed. There aren't. We end all collection of metadata records. I am
again saying read the bill. That is what the bill says. There is
nothing else in the bill. It is direct, and it states that we will end
all bulk collection by the government.
The USA FREEDOM Act includes the necessary checks and balances across
all three branches of government. It protects our Nation while also
protecting Americans' privacy and civil liberties.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the bill.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the USA FREEDOM Act. I yield
myself as much time as I may consume.
On May 8th, the House Intelligence Committee favorably reported the
bipartisan USA FREEDOM Act--the same bill that the Judiciary Committee
favorably reported on May 7th.
I especially want to thank Chairman Rogers for his years of
leadership here on the House Intelligence Committee. I also want to
thank Chairman Goodlatte and Ranking Member Conyers, and the staff of
our Intelligence and Judiciary Committees. We have worked together in a
bipartisan manner, and we have come a long way.
After our Committee markups, Chairman Rogers and I have continued to
work with the Judiciary Committee and the Administration to iron out
some remaining issues, which we have done, and which is represented in
the current bill. This bill represents the productive efforts of
bipartisanship and working together for the American people.
Just yesterday, the Administration stated that it ``strongly
supports'' passage of our bill. As the Administration further stated,
our bill ``ensures our intelligence and law enforcement professionals
have the authorities they need to protect the Nation, while further
ensuring that individuals' privacy is appropriately protected when
these authorities are employed.''
The USA FREEDOM Act contains important measures to increase
transparency and enhance privacy while maintaining an important
national security tool.
First, we have ended bulk collection of telephone metadata. ``Bulk''
collection means the/indiscriminate acquisition of information or
tangible things. It does not mean the acquisition of a large number of
communications records or other tangible things. Rather, the
prohibition applies to the use of these authorities to engage in
indiscriminate or ``bulk'' data collection.
There is also an emergency exception when there isn't time to get
prior approval from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court--also
known as the FISC.
Second, we have required expanded reporting for FISC decisions to
improve transparency to the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees
without threatening sources and methods.
Third, we are creating an advocate to provide the FISC with outside
expertise for matters before the FISA Court. Importantly, we are doing
this without infringing on any constitutional provisions or operational
processes.
Fourth, we have established a declassification review process of FISC
opinions, to ensure that the public has access to our national security
legal rulings, while having procedures in place to ensure that our
sources and methods continue to be protected.
The USA FREEDOM Act is critical to our Intelligence Community and to
our country's safety.
It is a focused, logical bill that will let us protect our citizens
from terrorist attacks and protect their civil liberties while
maintaining important legal tools.
For instance, our bill is not intended to impact the current scope or
use of FISA or National Security Letters, outside the context of bulk
data collection, that are traditionally used for national security
investigations. Notably, the introduction of the term ``specific
selection term'' is not intended to limit the types of information and
tangible things that the government is currently able to collect under
FISA or National Security Letter statutes. These changes are
prophylactic and intended to respond to concerns that these authorities
could be used to permit bulk data collection.
Furthermore, the legislation is not intended to limit the government
to use a single ``specific selection term'' in an application under
FISA or a National Security Letter. The government may use multiple
``specific selection terms'' in a single FISA application or a National
Security Letter. For example, the government may request in a single
FISA application or National Security Letter information or tangible
things relating to multiple persons, entities, accounts, addresses or
devices that are relevant to a pending investigation. Similarly, the
government may, in a single FISA application or National Security
Letter, use multiple ``specific selection terms''--such a date and
premises--to further narrow the scope of production by a provider.
Our bill also ensures that America can protect Americans' privacy
interests while at the same time being able to adapt to evolving
national security threats and terrorists' use of ever-changing
technology and capabilities to evade detection.
In particular, Section 501(c)(2)(F)(iii) provides for two hops--in
other words, the Government will be able to obtain the call detail
records in direct contact with a reasonable, articulable suspicion (or,
RAS)-approved seed--this is the first hop--and then, using those call
detail records or ones the Government identifies itself, obtain the
second hop call detail records.
The legislation also creates a new mechanism for obtaining call
detail records on a continuing basis for up to 180 days when there
[[Page H4801]]
are reasonable grounds to believe that the records are relevant to an
authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism and
there is a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the records are
associated with a foreign power or the agent of a foreign power. The
legislation is not intended to affect any current uses of Section 501
outside the bulk collection context, including the use of Section 501
to obtain specified call detail records related to foreign intelligence
information not concerning a U.S. person, clandestine intelligence
activities, or international terrorism.
I believe that our bill has made real improvements in the way our
intelligence collection operates and in improving FISA to achieve even
greater privacy and civil liberties protections.
I was opposed to the original USA FREEDOM Act because it put up too
many legal hurdles that would have impeded our national security. In
short, it would have threatened America's safety by effectively cutting
off the building blocks of foreign intelligence investigations.
But we have worked together in a bipartisan manner, and we have come
a long way Additionally, since our Committee markups, Chairman Rogers
and I have continued to work with the Judiciary Committee and the
Administration to iron out some remaining issues, which we have done,
and which is represented in the current bill.
The USA FREEDOM Act includes the necessary checks and balances across
all three branches of government and strikes the correct balance that
is so critical to protecting our nation, while also protecting
Americans' privacy and civil liberties.
{time} 1015
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. LoBiondo), who has been incredibly
important, not only on forming this piece of legislation to find the
right balance, but his work across North Africa on Boko Haram before it
was even popular in bringing attention and resources to important
intelligence problems around the world in difficult places, a good
friend, a great Member, and a great patriot.
Mr. LoBIONDO. Mr. Speaker, let me start out by thanking my colleagues
for bringing together an incredibly complicated, difficult issue that
probably as recently as a couple of months ago no one thought possible.
Tremendous, tremendous accolades to Chairman Rogers, to Mr.
Ruppersberger, to Mr. Sensenbrenner, to Mr. Conyers on a whole host of
issues that, again, are critically important to our Nation.
You have heard the chairman and Mr. Ruppersberger outline some of the
key portions of this, but I think it is critically important to stress
that the protection of Americans civil liberties must always be a top
priority and always will be a top priority. This bipartisan bill
underscores the importance of that while keeping our Nation safe.
The USA FREEDOM Act increases transparency. That is something that
people have demanded: increased transparency to the American people,
and it allows for greater oversight, something else that we listened to
that people wanted to see.
It firmly, as Mr. Ruppersberger and Mr. Rogers have stated, ends bulk
collection of records. This is critically important.
It reforms the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, or FISC, to
ensure greater checks and balances are placed in such sensitive
national security programs.
But as we discuss this, let's not miss the bigger picture. I have had
the opportunity to see firsthand in some pretty dark and remote places
on the Earth how our enemies are plotting not just on a daily basis,
but on a minute-by-minute basis of how to find a chink in our armor,
how can they find some gap which will allow them to attack our
homeland, to attack our citizens. This is a constant and ongoing
threat.
This bill strikes a balance to allow that transparency for civil
liberties while it underscores the ability of our intelligence
community to be able to do their job. And having been, as Mr. Rogers
indicated, firsthand in some very remote places on the Earth, we have
got some incredibly dedicated people who are putting their lives at
risk every day to protect this country.
This is a good bill. Let's pass it.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman
from Illinois, Ms. Jan Schakowsky, a very important member of our
Intelligence Committee, who focuses very strongly on issues of privacy
and constitutional rights and people's rights.
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Mr. Speaker, as a cosponsor of the USA FREEDOM Act
and a member of Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, I have been
committed to reforming these laws.
No bill is perfect, including this one. The USA FREEDOM Act we are
voting on today is quite different from the original bill I
cosponsored. It has changed significantly from the version recently
passed by the House Intelligence and Judiciary Committees.
On its path to the floor, several of the bills' proposed reforms have
been watered down and many of us would like to see stronger more
meaningful change.
However, we must not let the perfect be the enemy of the good, and I
want to congratulate all those who have been part of this bipartisan
compromise.
The bill we are considering today includes real reforms, and the
intent of Congress is clear: we are putting an end to the bulk
collection of metadata, establishing meaningful prior judicial review,
and ensuring that important FISA Court decisions are declassified for
public consumption. These reforms are important, and future
interpretations of FISA must reflect our intentions here today.
I support the act, and I look forward to the opportunity to continue
to work with my colleagues to make even more improvements in the
future.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the
gentleman from New York (Mr. Reed) to engage in a colloquy.
Mr. REED. Mr. Chairman, I rise today to commend your efforts, along
with those of the Judiciary Committee, in bringing this legislation to
the floor of the House. As you and I have met and discussed on numerous
occasions, along with my good friend from Indiana (Mr. Stutzman), this
issue is important to not only many of my constituents back in western
New York, but also to our country.
Provisions in this bill, such as the reforms made to bulk data
collection and enhanced declassification requirements, are specific
ideas that were shared with me by constituents in western New York and
brought to here, Washington, D.C.
As you know, I am happy to report, through our work with you, these
provisions were incorporated into this legislation.
Mr. Chairman, as this bill moves forward, I hope I have your
commitment to continue to work together to assure that a balance
between national security and the protection of our personal freedoms
is achieved.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the
gentleman from New York for his diligent work on this issue since last
summer. Mr. Reed's work, along with that of Mr. Stutzman from Indiana,
was critical to ensuring that we struck the right balance on this
legislation. We would not have been able to find that sweet spot that
got us to such a strong bipartisan agreement without input from these
and other Members interested in finding a solution. Again, I want to
thank the gentleman from New York for his interest, his time, and his
effort to help be a part of the forging of this important piece of
legislation.
With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman
from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin), an expert in cybersecurity. For the
years I have been in Congress, I have worked with Mr. Langevin on this
issue.
(Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong support of the USA FREEDOM Act.
I want to thank and congratulate all those who had a hand in crafting
the legislation before us, particularly Chairman Rogers and Ranking
Member Ruppersberger.
Changes to our national security program should not be taken lightly,
and this compromise legislation is the result of vigorous debate and
careful consideration. As Chairman Rogers pointed out, with all the
reviews and investigations that have taken place with respect to the
bulk collection program, no violations of law were found. But
[[Page H4802]]
there was concern that there could be abuses in the future, and the
American people wanted a better balance to be struck between national
security and protecting privacy and civil liberties and more
accountability. Many of my constituents have expressed concerns about
the sanctity of their civil liberties, and I share their concern. I
firmly believe that this legislation protects that privacy by ending
bulk metadata collection while still safeguarding our national
security.
I am particularly pleased that this legislation includes provisions
very similar to those that I championed in the Intelligence Committee
which allow the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to appoint an
independent advocate with legal or technical expertise in the field,
such as privacy and civil liberties, intelligence collection,
telecommunication, cyber, or any other area of law necessary in order
to ensure independent checks on government surveillance within the
court's process.
With that, I urge my colleagues to support the bill.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I want to briefly thank Mr.
Langevin, who has done not only incredible work on this particular
bill, but his work on cybersecurity should make Americans proud of his
effort to move that ball down the field. Without his expertise on these
matters, the United States would be a little worse off when it comes to
national security. I want to thank the gentleman for his work on this
bill and his work on cyber and other national security issues.
I continue I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman
from California (Mr. Schiff), a very important member of our committee
who does his homework and has really helped me a lot and advised me on
a lot of issues that are important to our committee.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the USA FREEDOM Act. This bill ends
the bulk collection of American's telephone records and puts in place
reforms to surveillance authorities to protect privacy and increased
transparency.
I have long advocated that the telephone metadata program should end
in favor of a system in which telecommunications providers retain their
own records so they can be queried based on a court-approved,
reasonable, articulable suspicion standard. That is precisely what this
bill puts in place. It allows us to keep the capabilities that we need
to protect the Nation from terrorist plots while protecting privacy and
civil liberties.
There are remaining ways that the bill can be improved, and I hope as
it heads to the Senate there will be opportunities to do so. In
particular, I would like to see provisions to introduce an adversarial
process in the FISA Court. The FISA Court and the public trust would
benefit from an independent advocate in the limited number of cases
that call for significant statutory interpretation or novel legal
issues. I hope that the Senate will include such provisions, which
would be both wise and constitutionally sound.
With that, I urge a ``yes'' vote, and I compliment my chair and
ranking member on the extraordinary job they have done.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Gallego).
Mr. GALLEGO. Mr. Speaker, I serve on the House Armed Services
Committee, and through that assignment I have had the opportunity to
spend a lot of time with soldiers, airmen, marines, sailors, and their
families.
Like all Americans, I certainly want our sons and daughters to be
safe when we send them into harm's way. We want to take as much care of
them as we possibly can.
The media has talked some about some of the documents that were
released by Mr. Snowden, but there were at one point 7 million
documents that were released. Many of these documents didn't even
relate to the NSA. When those files are disclosed in the press and they
are disclosed to our adversaries that naturally puts our sons and
daughters in harm's way. It should say something that the first place
you go is China and the second place you go is Russia. That should say
something to the American people.
This Memorial Day, I want the American people to focus on those men
and women, our country's sons and daughters, who have honorably served
our Nation and have stood by their brothers in arms and protected one
another as we have asked them to fight for us.
Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, thank you for your work on this
legislation.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I am prepared to close, and I yield
myself such time as I may consume.
The USA FREEDOM Act is a bipartisan compromise that is strongly
supported by the administration.
Our bill protects privacy and civil liberties while also protecting
national security.
I urge members to support the USA FREEDOM Act. Nothing in this bill
will legalize bulk collection. Unfortunately, there are those Members
that are saying this will legalize bulk collection. It is clear that
this bill--read the bill--states: there will be no more bulk collection
by the government. That is what the bill says, end of story.
This bill balances the issue of taking care and protecting our
country from people and individuals who want to kill us and attack us
and our allies. But yet it also does what is so important to Americans:
to make sure that we protect our constitutional rights and our privacy.
It is a balance--it is Republicans, Democrats, left, right, in the
middle--coming together and doing what is right for this country. This
is what this body should do. We are asking for a ``yes'' vote on the
USA FREEDOM Act.
Also, in closing, I want to acknowledge the leadership of Chairman
Rogers and his important leadership that has allowed us to get to this
level, the Judiciary Committee, Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member
Conyers, and also Mr. Sensenbrenner.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
In the comity of the moment, with all the love extended and the group
hugs and the high fives, I think it is important to America to
understand how much effort--how proud I think they should be about the
intensity of the debate and discussion over what this bill looks like
because I believe everybody involved in this cares about civil
liberties and privacy; they do, wherever you fall on it. And I do
believe that everybody who is involved in this cares about our national
security.
{time} 1030
This debate--this fierce, intense debate--that happened off of this
floor in committees, in negotiations over every word and every
paragraph and every period, resulted in the bill that you see before us
today that did get bipartisan support and buy-in for a very critical
issue: at the end of the day, the national security of the United
States and the public's trust in the intelligence agencies, which have
the responsibility each and every day, in some very dangerous places
around the world, to collect the information that keeps America safe.
At the end of this, I hope that people take away from this debate
that those who believed that the first round of negotiations meant that
our national security was in peril and those who believed in the first
round of negotiations that our civil liberties and privacy were in
peril found that right balance today. It is that important for our
country.
Mr. Speaker, I only bring that up, and I thank all of those
involved--the Republicans and Democrats on the Judiciary, the
Republicans and Democrats on the Intel Committee, and all of those who
were involved in this negotiation.
I think they have done America a favor today, and they have brought
back the institutional notion of negotiation and intensity of debate
that brings us to a better place today. I think this bill is a result
of that. America should be proud.
Now, we can move forward on other national security priorities that
will
[[Page H4803]]
serve to protect Americans' and our allies' lives around the world.
With that, Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Speaker, I reluctantly vote for H.R. 3361. I do
so because I recognize that important authorities which help keep our
people safe expire next year and that there is a significant chance
that those authorities may not be renewed. I also recognize that the
abuse of government power by the Obama Administration has damaged the
trust that the American people have even in the military and civilian
professionals at the National Security Agency. An orchestrated campaign
of distortions and half-truths has called NSA's trustworthiness into
question for too many Americans.
That is unfortunate and unfair. The men and women at NSA have had
more than a decade of remarkable success, not only in protecting our
country from another 9/11-type attack, but supporting our warfighters
on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world. While few
Americans will ever learn the details of their accomplishments, we all
benefit from their hard work, dedication to their mission, and
professionalism.
We should be clear-eyed about the effects of this bill. It makes it
harder to gather the information necessary to stop terrorism; it means
that it will take longer to find the essential connections of terrorist
networks; and this bill makes it less likely, hopefully only slightly
less likely, that we will stop future terrorist attacks. But there is
no doubt that America will be less safe from terrorist attack after
this bill takes effect than it is today.
Apparently, that result is inevitable if we are to prevent even worse
damage to our country's security and our people's safety. So, I vote
today to minimize the damage to our national security while maintaining
respect and gratitude for the men and women in the military,
intelligence community, and law enforcement who dedicate their lives to
keeping us all safe.
Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, government should protect our liberties, not
violate them. Individuals and businesses alike must be able to trust
their government to work for them--not spy on them. The NSA's bulk
collection of Americans' phone records threatens our constitutional
liberties.
We have the opportunity to pass legislation that both limits the
reach of the NSA and provides the transparency to lawmakers and the
American people necessary to prevent abusive practices from happening
again. We have the opportunity to begin to restore the trust of the
American people.
The original and Committee-passed versions of the USA FREEDOM Act
struck a careful balance between our liberty and our security,
providing the reforms necessary to restore trust. I was proud to be an
original co-sponsor of this bill, and commend Representative Jim
Sensenbrenner and Chairman Bob Goodlatte for their work to protect our
civil liberties.
Unfortunately, the floor-version of the USA FREEDOM Act falls short
of our goal.
This legislation would still allow for the mass collection of
information. The Committee-passed legislation required court orders to
be based on ``specific-selection terms''--which was defined as a
``person, entity or account.'' The floor version broadens the scope of
``specific-selection term'' by defining it as a ``discrete term.'' This
ambiguous legal phrase does not have defined limitations, and could
capture millions of individuals' information.
The existing data collection programs that were revealed to the
American people within the last year are unacceptable, and we must not
only legislate stronger safeguards for intelligence gathering but must
vigorously conduct oversight to prevent constitutional intrusions by
big government. Of the few transparency requirements left in the bill,
significant construction of law made by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC) would be reviewed for declassification to the
American people. However, the floor version of the bill transfers the
authority to conduct declassification to the Director of National
Intelligence, James Clapper. Last year, Director Clapper lied under
oath to Congress when asked about the existence of programs that
collect data on millions of Americans. I cannot in good conscious
support legislation that would place the responsibility of transparency
with a government official who has already violated the trust of the
American people.
For these reasons, I will not support the floor version of the USA
FREEDOM Act. I hope that my colleagues and I will be able to come
together to enact reforms the American people deserve.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. All time for debate has expired.
Pursuant to House Resolution 590, the previous question is ordered on
the bill, as amended.
The question is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 303,
nays 121, not voting 7, as follows:
[Roll No. 230]
YEAS--303
Aderholt
Amodei
Bachmann
Bachus
Barber
Barletta
Barr
Barrow (GA)
Beatty
Benishek
Bera (CA)
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Braley (IA)
Bridenstine
Brooks (AL)
Brooks (IN)
Brown (FL)
Brownley (CA)
Buchanan
Bucshon
Bustos
Butterfield
Byrne
Calvert
Camp
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Carney
Carson (IN)
Carter
Cassidy
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Chu
Cicilline
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Coffman
Cohen
Cole
Collins (GA)
Collins (NY)
Conaway
Connolly
Conyers
Cook
Cooper
Costa
Cotton
Courtney
Cramer
Crawford
Crenshaw
Cuellar
Culberson
Davis (CA)
Davis, Rodney
Delaney
DeLauro
Denham
Dent
DeSantis
Deutch
Diaz-Balart
Dingell
Duckworth
Duncan (TN)
Ellmers
Engel
Enyart
Esty
Farenthold
Fincher
Fleischmann
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Frankel (FL)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Fudge
Gallego
Garamendi
Garcia
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gingrey (GA)
Goodlatte
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (MO)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Griffin (AR)
Grimm
Guthrie
Gutierrez
Hall
Harper
Hartzler
Hastings (WA)
Heck (NV)
Heck (WA)
Hensarling
Herrera Beutler
Higgins
Himes
Holding
Hoyer
Hudson
Huffman
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurt
Israel
Jackson Lee
Jenkins
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jolly
Joyce
Kelly (IL)
Kelly (PA)
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilmer
Kind
King (NY)
Kinzinger (IL)
Kirkpatrick
Kline
Kuster
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Lance
Langevin
Lankford
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
Latta
Levin
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Long
Lowey
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan Grisham (NM)
Lujan, Ben Ray (NM)
Lynch
Maloney, Carolyn
Maloney, Sean
Marino
Matheson
McAllister
McCarthy (CA)
McCarthy (NY)
McCaul
McDermott
McHenry
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
Meehan
Meeks
Meng
Messer
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Moore
Moran
Mullin
Murphy (FL)
Murphy (PA)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neugebauer
Noem
Nugent
Nunes
Nunnelee
Olson
Palazzo
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Paulsen
Payne
Pearce
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters (CA)
Peters (MI)
Peterson
Petri
Pittenger
Pitts
Pocan
Pompeo
Price (GA)
Price (NC)
Quigley
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Reichert
Renacci
Rice (SC)
Rigell
Roby
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruiz
Runyan
Ruppersberger
Ryan (WI)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sarbanes
Scalise
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schneider
Schock
Schrader
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Sewell (AL)
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Sinema
Sires
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Southerland
Stewart
Stivers
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Titus
Tsongas
Turner
Upton
Valadao
Van Hollen
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Wagner
Walberg
Walden
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Webster (FL)
Wenstrup
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Williams
Wilson (FL)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wolf
Womack
Woodall
Yoder
Young (AK)
Young (IN)
NAYS--121
Amash
Barton
Becerra
Bentivolio
Blumenauer
Bonamici
Brady (PA)
Broun (GA)
Burgess
Campbell
Capuano
Cardenas
Cartwright
Clark (MA)
Clarke (NY)
Crowley
Cummings
Daines
Davis, Danny
DeFazio
DeGette
DelBene
DesJarlais
Doggett
Doyle
Duncan (SC)
Edwards
Ellison
Eshoo
Farr
Fattah
Fitzpatrick
Fleming
Foster
Gabbard
Gardner
Garrett
Gibson
Gohmert
Gosar
Graves (GA)
Grayson
Griffith (VA)
Grijalva
Hahn
Hanabusa
Hanna
Harris
Hastings (FL)
Hinojosa
Holt
Honda
Horsford
Huelskamp
Issa
Jeffries
Jones
Jordan
Kaptur
Keating
King (IA)
Kingston
Labrador
Lee (CA)
Lewis
Lofgren
Lowenthal
Lummis
Maffei
[[Page H4804]]
Marchant
Massie
Matsui
McClintock
McCollum
McGovern
Meadows
Miller, George
Mulvaney
Neal
Negrete McLeod
Nolan
O'Rourke
Owens
Pallone
Perry
Pingree (ME)
Poe (TX)
Polis
Posey
Ribble
Roe (TN)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rothfus
Ryan (OH)
Salmon
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanford
Schweikert
Serrano
Shea-Porter
Smith (WA)
Speier
Stockman
Stutzman
Swalwell (CA)
Takano
Terry
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Tipton
Tonko
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walorski
Walz
Waxman
Weber (TX)
Welch
Yarmuth
Yoho
NOT VOTING--7
Bass
Duffy
Miller, Gary
Richmond
Rush
Schwartz
Slaughter
{time} 1103
Messrs. DANNY DAVIS of Illinois, ROHRABACHER, ISSA, BRADY of
Pennsylvania, WELCH, TONKO, FITZPATRICK, SERRANO, CUMMINGS, MAFFEI,
ELLISON, and LOWENTHAL changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
Mrs. CAROLYN B. MALONEY of New York, Messrs. HIMES, COLE, LYNCH, Ms.
MOORE, Messrs. LaMALFA and DeSANTIS changed their vote from ``nay'' to
``yea.''
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________
[Congressional Record Volume 160, Number 78 (Thursday, May 22, 2014)]
[House]
[Pages H4817-H4819]
{time} 1300
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT AND CURRENT EVENTS
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the Speaker's announced policy of
January 3, 2013, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Gohmert) is recognized
for 60 minutes as the designee of the majority leader.
Mr. GOHMERT. [...]
But I also want to touch on the USA FREEDOM Act, as it was labeled. I
had an amendment. Though I applauded the work that was done by my
friend from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner) to negotiate an agreement, I
still had the same concern I had back in 2005 and 2006 as a freshman.
At that time, I brought it to the attention of the Gonzales Justice
Department. I brought it to the attention of the Bush administration
that I am concerned about this part in the PATRIOT Act where it says,
like in section 215, that you can go after anybody in ``an
investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning
a United States person or to protect against international terrorism.''
So in both of those cases, they have to involve a foreign entity, a
foreign agent, a foreign country, a foreign group of some kind,
international terrorism. Those have to be involved for the PATRIOT Act
to apply because as, apparently, Congress was told when the PATRIOT Act
was passed back in desperation after 9/11/2001, we have got to protect
against international terrorism, foreign agents, people who are dealing
with foreign agents. That is what it was for.
So this third part concerned me because it says, or to protect
against ``clandestine intelligence activities.'' ``Clandestine
intelligence activities,'' what does that mean? It is very vague. And
it doesn't say ``foreign.'' It doesn't say ``international.'' And since
we were told that we are not allowed to just go gather information
about American citizens, then this should have the word ``foreign'' or
``international'' in there.
So my amendment to the USA FREEDOM Act that would amend this put that
in there. It dealt with that, the amendment that was fought against by
my friend from Wisconsin (Mr. Sensenbrenner). They had too perfect of a
cake that they had baked, and they, as MacArthur Park says, ``may never
have the recipe again. Oh, no.'' They couldn't allow a change to their
recipe. So they didn't allow any reference to ``foreign'' or
``international.''
And the other references within the PATRIOT Act and the other
references, like in 18 U.S.C. 1842 talks about to obtain ``foreign
intelligence information not concerning a United States person'' or
``to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
intelligence activities.'' So it needed the word ``foreign'' or
``international'' somehow in there. I provided that, but the proponents
of the USA FREEDOM Act did not want it in.
Although my amendment originally passed in committee, it was revoted
on a voice vote quickly after we were coming back from a vote on the
floor and taken out. And although a majority of those in the Rules
Committee said that my amendment needed to be in the law to protect it
and to protect American citizens, when the rule came out, the rule said
that my amendment was not going to be allowed to have a vote.
So I had to vote against the USA FREEDOM Act because this is a gaping
hole that allows the Federal Government to go after and spy on American
citizens who have no contact with any foreign government, any foreign
agent, have no ties at all to international terrorism, haven't
necessarily ever even thought about terrorism. But with this, if they
can be alleged to have engaged in any type of clandestine intelligence
activities, you can go after them and spy on them.
And what does that mean? Well, I have asked the question, and I have
not gotten any satisfactory answer--any answer, really. Well, does that
mean, if somebody looks over a fence into a Federal enclave, that that
is trying to get intelligence and that might invoke this provision of
the PATRIOT Act? Or how about if someone mistakenly goes to a Web site,
does that invoke this provision that allows you to go after them? And I
haven't gotten a good answer, and I haven't been told how this has been
applied. I was hoping to get an answer that it has never been used, but
I haven't gotten that either.
As a result, I had to vote against the USA FREEDOM Act because I
didn't want my name on a bill that leaves a hole this large, allowing
the Federal Government to go after American citizens who have never
even thought about terrorism and have never had any contact with a
foreign agent.
[...]
[Congressional Record Volume 160, Number 78 (Thursday, May 22, 2014)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E825]
USA FREEDOM ACT
_____
HON. SUSAN K. DelBENE
of washington
in the house of representatives
Thursday, May 22, 2014
Ms. DelBENE. Mr. Speaker, as an original cosponsor of the USA Freedom
Act, I am disappointed that I cannot support this bill as it is
considered on the floor today.
Like many Americans, I was shocked to learn about the National
Security Agency's domestic spying program that was sweeping up the
private communications records of millions of innocent Americans. It
goes against American values and our Constitution. That's why two weeks
ago I was pleased to join my colleagues on the Judiciary Committee in
unanimously supporting the USA Freedom Act as it passed out of the
committee.
I believed that the compromise, while far from perfect, would help
rebuild the public trust in government by ending bulk collection,
assuring that government surveillance authorities are rule-bound,
narrowly tailored, transparent and subject to oversight, all while
ensuring that the nation's intelligence community can protect national
security.
Unfortunately, since then, negotiations with the Administration have
resulted in this bill moving in the wrong direction. While I believe
that the intent of this bill is to end bulk collection and I am glad
that there is widespread agreement that Congress must act to end bulk
collection, I am not convinced the bill effectively achieves this. The
weakened definition of ``specific selection term'' must be addressed as
this bill moves forward in order to provide absolute certainty that the
legislative language achieves this intent, and that the bill's ban on
bulk collection is air-tight. Today's bill simply fall short of what is
needed to provide a clear guarantee to the public that the massive data
collection by the NSA will be put to a full stop.
I appreciate the efforts of the Committees and Leadership to support
greater transparency in the bill. The transparency reporting amendment
that I offered in the Judiciary Committee that is included in the bill
will allow companies to disclose information regarding the number and
nature of government demands for user information. However, the new
manager's amendment that we are considering on the House floor today
has weakened this provision by, for example, adding a two-year delay
that prohibits companies from issuing transparency reports for new
products or services. I offered several amendments to the Rules
Committee to address my concerns with the weakened language in the
manager's amendment, but none of these amendments were given an
opportunity for debate or a vote on the House floor.
I thank the Committees and the Leadership for their work to move this
important conversation forward, but I simply cannot support the bill in
its current form.
____________________
[Congressional Record Volume 160, Number 79 (Friday, May 23, 2014)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E834]
USA FREEDOM ACT
______
speech of
HON. MIKE ROGERS
of michigan
in the house of representatives
Thursday, May 22, 2014
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I would like to begin by
thanking Chairman Goodlatte, Mr. Sensenbrenner, the other Judiciary
Committee sponsors, and Leader Cantor for all of their hard work coming
to a compromise with the Intelligence Committee that enacts meaningful
change to FISA while preserving operational capabilities.
It is commendable that we have found a responsible legislative
solution to address concerns about the bulk telephone metadata program
so that we may move forward on other national security legislative
priorities. Our obligation to protect this country should not be held
hostage by the actions of traitors who leak classified information that
puts our troops in the field at risk or those who fear-monger and
spread mistruth to further their own misguided agenda.
Following the criminal disclosures of intelligence information last
June, the Section 215 telephone metadata program has been the subject
of intense, and often inaccurate, criticism. The bulk telephone
metadata program is legal, overseen, and effective at saving American
lives. All three branches of government oversee this program, including
Congress, inspectors general, and internal compliance and privacy and
civil liberties offices in executive branch agencies.
Despite the effectiveness of the program, and the immense safeguards
on the data, many Americans and many Members of this body still have
concerns about a potential for abuse. The legislation we are
considering today is designed to address those concerns and reflects
hundreds of hours of Member and staff work to negotiate a workable
compromise.
In March, Intelligence Committee Ranking Member Ruppersberger and I
introduced legislation that was designed to accomplish these main
priorities: We committed to ending bulk metadata collection of
communications and other types of records. We committed to providing
more targeted, narrow authorities so as not to put America at risk. We
committed to providing an even more robust judicial review process for
the program. And we committed to providing more transparency into the
FISA process and the decisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court. The revised USA Freedom Act accomplishes the same goals, as
well.
This legislation is intended to prohibit ``bulk'' collection
activities under the authorities in question. ``Bulk'' collection means
the indiscriminate acquisition of information or tangible things. It
does not mean the acquisition of a large number of communications
records or other tangible things. Rather, the prohibition applies to
the use of these authorities to engage in indiscriminate or ``bulk''
data collection. These changes are intended to respond to concerns that
these authorities could be used to permit a bulk data collection
``loophole.''
The bill bans bulk collection by introducing the requirement for a
``specific selection term.'' The ban on bulk collection, however, is
not intended to limit acquisition of information through the
traditional, targeted types of FISA or National Security Letters. The
list of examples of what may constitute a specific selection term is
non exhaustive, and we anticipate there will be other forms of
discriminants than those contained in the legislation.
The legislation also creates a new mechanism for obtaining call
detail records on a continuing basis for up to 180 days to protect
against international terrorism. The legislation is not intended to
affect any current uses of Section 501 outside of the bulk context,
including for records related to foreign intelligence information not
concerning a U.S. person and clandestine intelligence activities.
We also assured that the language we are considering today permits a
return of two hops to include using records identified by the
government as the basis for the second hop. Additionally, it is
important that when records are produced to the government they are
produced in a form that will be useful--meaning that the government can
set conditions on their production, including by determining the format
and manner for production. This does not, however, mandate that
companies change their business practices to store data in any
particular form.
The USA Freedom Act provides the meaningful change to the telephone
metadata program that Members of the House have been seeking. If we had
the fortune of having a Commander in Chief firmly dedicated to the
preservation of this program as is, we may have been able to protect it
in its entirety. With that not being the case, I believe this is a
workable compromise that protects the core function of a
counterterrorism program we know has saved lives around the world.
I urge Members to support this legislation.
____________________
[Congressional Record Volume 160, Number 79 (Friday, May 23, 2014)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Pages E835-E836]
USA FREEDOM ACT
______
speech of
HON. RUSH HOLT
of new jersey
in the house of representatives
Thursday, May 22, 2014
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I recognize the work that Mr. Sensenbrenner,
Mr. Conyers, Mr. Goodlatte, Mr. Scott, and others have put into this,
but the bill before us still falls woefully short of what is required
to correct the abuses brought to light over the last year.
This legislation still allows the government to collect everything
they want against Americans--to treat Americans as suspects first and
[[Page E836]]
citizens second. It still allows decisions about whom to target, and
how aggressively to go after acquaintances of acquaintances of targets,
to be made by mid-level intelligence community employees, not federal
judges. This so-called ``two-hops'' surveillance casts a very wide net
that can reach millions of people.
Most important, the fundamental decisions made under the authorities
provided in this bill will be made using a weak, inferior standard that
does not reach the probable cause standard. In other words, the
government can spy on people based on weak suspicions and not on
legally established probable cause.
Now, my friends say, ``Don't let the perfect be the enemy of the
good.'' The perfect? How could anyone here vote for legislation that
doesn't uphold the constitutional standard of probable cause?
Probable cause has been well established in law for two centuries to
keep Americans secure by keeping intelligence and enforcement officers
focused on real threats, not on vague suspicions or wild-goose chases.
Indeed, the debate over adding a Bill of Rights to the Constitution was
about raising the standard for the government's legal interaction with
its citizens, not lowering it as we are now. That standard for the
behavior of intelligence and law enforcement officers is not archaic.
The power of the government to oppress individuals based on false
suspicions is not less, but greater, than when the Constitution and
Bill of Rights were written.
The bill also fails to deal with some of the most important abuses
revealed over the last year. It provides no protection for national
security whistleblowers, whose revelations over the last decade are the
only reason why we are finally having such a public debate on this
issue. The secrecy of the Intelligence Community is so complete that
Congress will never be able to have meaningful oversight without
whistleblowers from within the community, and rarely will they speak up
without some protection against firing or worse. And human nature has
not changed. The propensity for investigators to let their suspicions
get the better of them is as great as it ever was--even well
intentioned investigators.
The bill also allows the government to continue surreptitiously to
compromise encryption and privacy technology built into American
electronics and software products, putting at direct risk America's hi-
tech business sector and the jobs it provides.
A decade ago there was a major change in the relationship between
Americans and their government. This bill does not correct it. Members
should reject this badly flawed bill and the House leadership should
allow an open debate on a real surveillance reform bill.
____________________
[Congressional Record Volume 160, Number 81 (Wednesday, May 28, 2014)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E843]
USA FREEDOM ACT
______
speech of
HON. BENNIE G. THOMPSON
of mississippi
in the house of representatives
Thursday, May 22, 2014
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Mr. Speaker, today, I rise in reluctant
opposition to H.R. 3361, the USA FREEDOM Act, which I cosponsored at
introduction. I am troubled by the changes that were made to the bill
behind closed doors that stripped key protections and opened the door
to bulk collection. The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board
found the NSA's bulk collection of metadata to be illegal and called
for it to be stopped. The legislation before us today includes language
that raises the specter of the programs continuing in some limited
form. This is not what the law or the American people demand.
I had intended to support the USA FREEDOM Act, which at introduction
would have brought an end to the NSA's bulk metadata program, however,
changes that were made to the measure, outside of the committee
process, behind closed doors, at the insistence of the NSA undercut the
bill. In its current form, the ban on bulk collection is watered down
and potentially exploitable by proponents of these programs. In the
original bill, the phrase ``specific selection term'' was narrowly-
defined as ``a term used to uniquely describe a person, entity or
account.'' In the version before us today, that definition was
significantly re-written to allow the list of potential selection terms
to be so open-ended as to encompass whole area codes or ZIP codes. In
effect, bulk collection could continue under this definition.
I am also troubled that H.R. 3361 no longer includes language to
establish an independent public advocate. Such a position is essential
to give voice to ordinary Americans in the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court (FISC), which sets the legal parameters for NSA
surveillance. The absence of such a position means that the FISC will
continue to hear only from the government. There would be no one to
stand up before the court and challenge the government's legal
positions on what surveillance is permissible and represent the
American public, whose data is being collected.
The arguments for ending the NSA's bulk metadata programs are strong
one. Since it came to light last year that the NSA had assembled a
database that includes calls made by nearly every American since 2007,
many of us have asked tough questions about whether it was
constitutional or even effective as a counterterrorism tool. A January
2014 Pew Research poll found that 70 percent of Americans believe they
should not have to give up their privacy in order to be safe from
terrorism with a majority expressing disapproval of the NSA
surveillance program outright. The record on the effectiveness of these
programs is scant. Before his recent retirement, NSA Director General
Keith Alexander testified before Congress that these bulk collection
programs foiled ``one or perhaps two'' terrorist plots against the
United States but provided no further detail. The Director of National
Intelligence, James Clapper, has stated that the number of prevented
plots is not an appropriate metric to measure whether the programs are
necessary or useful.
I had hoped we could come together and act on the recommendations of
the independent Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) and
end what the Board determined to be illegal programs. Unfortunately,
what we have before us does not bring about the changes in the law that
would be necessary. I appreciate that some of my colleagues will vote
for this measure to move the ball forward and get the issue before the
Senate. There's certainly a case to be made for such an approach but
given that the proponents of these programs have repeatedly exploited
ambiguities in the law to advance their own ambitions, I cannot stand
by and let the measure pass, in its current form.
For these reasons, I reluctantly oppose H.R. 3361.
____________________
[Congressional Record Volume 160, Number 81 (Wednesday, May 28, 2014)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E846]
USA FREEDOM ACT
______
speech of
HON. SUZANNE BONAMICI
of oregon
in the house of representatives
Thursday, May 22, 2014
Ms. BONAMICI. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H.R. 3361, the USA
FREEDOM Act, as amended. Although I was a cosponsor of the USA Freedom
Act as originally written, the bill we voted on today was changed
substantially before being brought to the floor. I am very concerned
with the short time frame members had to consider this sweeping
legislation, which was negotiated behind closed doors and would not do
enough to protect Americans from government surveillance.
I support ending the bulk collection of Americans' communications,
secret interpretations of law by the FISA Court, and ``reverse
targeting'' of Americans by the intelligence agencies. Although H.R.
3361 is an improvement over current law, the House should negotiate a
stronger bill in a transparent process through regular order that will
do more to protect Americans' privacy.
I encourage the Senate to make much needed changes to this bill and
send back a real reform package that does a better job of protecting
privacy and is consistent with the expectations of our constituents.
____________________
[Congressional Record Volume 160, Number 81 (Wednesday, May 28, 2014)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E852]
USA FREEDOM ACT
______
speech of
HON. CHRIS VAN HOLLEN
of maryland
in the house of representatives
Thursday, May 22, 2014
Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in support of H.R. 3361,
the USA Freedom Act.
I want to commend Chairman Goodlatte, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Conyers, and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for crafting a compromise
bill--and taking into account many of the recommendations offered by
the Presidents' Review Group on Intelligence and Communications
Technologies--that will strengthen the privacy and civil liberties of
all Americans. At the same time, the USA Freedom Act will ensure that
that our nation continues to have the necessary and appropriate tools
to protect our country from those who would seek to do us harm.
This legislation represents an important first step in reforming many
of the powers that the National Security Agency (NSA) currently has at
its disposal. Specifically, it would end the government's bulk
collection of phone metadata and other tangible records through the use
of Section 215, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) pen
registers, and National Security letters. It would also increase
transparency and oversight within our surveillance operations by
requiring the government to disclose the number of requests made for
call records under the new collection process and provide Congress a
summary of compliance records related to the use of Section 215.
Another significant change is that for the first time, every request
made by the NSA for specific call records must be reviewed on a case-
by-case basis by the FISA court. This improved oversight is something I
have advocated for and I am pleased it was included in this bill.
While this bill is an improvement over current practices, it still
falls short of what is needed to ensure adequate privacy protections. I
am disappointed that the bill does not establish a Citizens Advocate to
represent citizens' privacy interests at the secret FISA Court
proceedings. Last December, Representative Jim Jordan and I introduced
bipartisan legislation to create such a position. I was pleased when
the earlier versions of this bill adopted a similar provision.
Unfortunately, Section 401 of H.R. 3361 has since been weakened and
only provides for a panel of advisors to be employed at the discretion
of the FISC.
I also have concerns that last minute changes have the potential to
create a backdoor loophole where the government can continue to collect
vast amounts of phone metadata under certain circumstances. It is my
hope that the Senate will strengthen the bill we voted on today by
reinstituting the Special Advocate under Section 401, and more narrowly
defining what constitutes a ``discrete term''.
Despite these reservations, the USA Freedom Act represents real
progress and a departure from the untenable status quo. It ensures that
the intelligence and law enforcement community have the necessary tools
they need to protect our nation, but it does so in a manner that is
consistent with the fundamental principles in our Constitution to
protect the civil liberties of all Americans.
____________________
