[Congressional Record Volume 159, Number 153 (Wednesday, October 30, 2013)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7675-S7682]
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Ms. COLLINS (for herself, Mrs. McCaskill, Ms. Ayotte, and Ms.
Heitkamp):
S. 1618. A bill to enhance the Office of Personnel Management
background check system for the granting, denial, or revocation of
security clearances or access to classified information of employees
and contractors of the Federal Government; to the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs.
Ms. COLLINS. Mr. President, today, Senator McCaskill, Senator Ayotte,
Senator Heitkamp, and I are introducing the Enhanced Security Clearance
Act of 2013, which would strengthen our process for allowing federal
employees and other individuals to have access to classified
information. We must improve our current security clearance process to
prevent, as much as possible, future incidents such as the murders at
the Washington Navy Yard. Our bill directs OPM to institute at least
two audits of every security clearance at random times during each
five-year period the clearance is active. Any red flags raised would
then be reported back to the employing agency to determine if a re-
investigation of the clearance is needed.
As a former Chairman and Ranking Member of the Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee, the issue of background investigations
as it relates to security clearances is an issue with which I am well
acquainted. There needs to be a balance between processing of
clearances quickly enough to allow individuals to do their jobs, but
also thoroughly enough to flag potential problems.
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, and several high-profile
espionage cases, heightened national security concerns underscored the
need for a timely, high-quality personnel security clearance process.
In the early part of this decade, the Department of Defense processed
hundreds of thousands of security clearance background investigation
requests--both initial and re-clearances, for service members,
government employees, and industry personnel who were conducting
classified work for the government. The timeliness of DOD's security
clearance process was a problem which, when coupled with an increased
demand for security clearances, had led to a backlog of more than
500,000 investigations.
Delays in updating overdue clearances for command, agency, and
industry personnel performing classified government work increased
risks to national security and the costs of doing classified government
work. This led GAO to designate the DOD clearance program as a high-
risk area, and in 2005 for DOD to transfer its personnel security
function and about 1,600 personnel to OPM. At the time, this change
seemed a logical step in addressing the problems caused by the backlog.
And by 2008 OPM had eliminated the backlog and announced end-to-end
electronic processing of background investigations. Now, OPM oversees
approximately 90 percent of all background investigations for security
clearances with the assistance of private sector contractors.
Although we have made significant advances in the processing of
background checks, there is still a gaping hole in the current security
clearance process that has enabled people who exhibit obvious signs of
high-risk behavior to remain undetected. We have seen this time and
time again in incidents like Edward Snowden's disclosure of stolen
classified information, and most recently we have Aaron Alexis, the
Navy Yard shooter with apparently severe mental illness.
Once an individual is cleared, the process of maintaining the
clearance requires a reinvestigation at various points in time based
upon the type of clearance. These ``gaps'' between clearance and re-
clearance can be 5, 10 or even 15 years, and most of the data is self-
reported by the individuals themselves. These periods of time pose a
significant concern in the current clearance process. OPM has
announced, in some cases, that it is going to reduce the time frame
down to one year, but this is not the case for all clearances. People's
lives may change dramatically over these gaps of time, which poses
significant and unnecessary security risks.
The United States issues approximately 5 million clearances to
government employees and contractors, and the ongoing review process is
conducted manually, by a limited number of investigators. Further, the
manual process is flawed. The OPM Inspector General recently reviewed
18 investigators and found disturbing abuses in the quality of
clearance investigations they conducted, which included interviews that
never occurred, answers to questions that were never asked, and record
checks that were never conducted. Even if done properly, however, given
the limited number of investigative agents in the field, it is not
feasible to manually track nearly five million clearances effectively.
For example, in fiscal year 2010, fewer than one percent of all
contractors with clearances filed an incident report, despite the fact
that they are required to file these reports on a wide variety of
events including marital status change, excessive financial hardship,
and criminal activity, to maintain their clearance. Generally, such
events occur in the lives of more than half of the U.S. population
during the same time periods. The fact is, cleared personnel under-
report lifestyle changes, allegiance changes, and derogatory
information for fear of job loss, embarrassment, and, most important,
the discovery of nefarious intent. Further, because the system relies
on self-reported data, the chances of someone getting caught are
minimal. Between 1997 and 2013, of the civilian clearances issued,
fewer than one percent were revoked. This can mean that the people who
are cleared very seldom-go bad, that cleared individuals are not self-
reporting changes in their lives, or the current process is not
detecting everything.
In 2004, I sponsored the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act, which became law in December of that year. This law allows for the
use of advanced technology and third party databases to expedite,
verify, and enhance the investigative and adjudicative process. The
government needs to utilize existing solutions, which are already used
by law enforcement, to automate random audits on individuals with
active security clearances.
If random audits had been in place after Aaron Alexis's secret
clearance was granted in 2007, red flags would have been generated with
his arrest in 2009 and the two liens on his property, which could
indicate potential excessive financial hardship. Further, it may have
identified a potential alias with a vast social media trail indicating
other concerning traits. The alerts generated would have prompted OPM
to notify DOD, which would have provoked a reevaluation before Alexis's
2017 re-clearance. This re-evaluation could have discovered that he
openly discussed ``hearing voices,'' a clear sign of his mental
illness. A random audit would have alerted OPM of these new issues and
potentially averted tragedy.
The OPM Background Investigation process must be capable of flagging
high-risk individuals holding clearances and alert case officers of
situations requiring review before any adverse consequence takes place.
The current process, however, is dated, but the system can be
strengthened to better help the government identify these dangerous
individuals. OPM must address the blind spots that exist in the current
manual security clearance review process. The shooting tragedies at the
Washington Navy Yard, along with the information security breaches
perpetrated by Bradley Manning and Edward Snowden, have demonstrated
that the current security clearance process is inadequate.
This legislation has been endorsed by the Federal Managers
Association; the FBI Agents Association; the Alcohol-Tobacco-Firearms
and Explosives Association; The International Association of Chiefs of
Police; The International Federation of Professional and Technical
Engineers, AFL-CIO & CLC; The National Native American Law Enforcement
Association; TechAmerica; General Dynamics Information Technologies;
LexisNexis; Lt. Gen. Charles
[[Page S7678]]
J. Cunningham Jr., Former Director of the Defense Security Service,
1999-2002; Brian Stafford, Former Director of the United States Secret
Service, 1999-2003; Howard Safir, Former Police Commissioner of New
York City, 1996-2000; Floyd Clarke, Former Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, 1993; and Michael Sullivan, Former Acting
Director of the ATF, 2006-2009, and US Attorney for the District of
Massachusetts, 2001-2009.
We must act now. Our legislation represents a sensible path forward
to protect national security and to help prevent future tragedies. I
urge my colleagues to support this common sense solution.
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