[Congressional Record Volume 159, Number 107 (Wednesday, July 24, 2013)]
[House]
[Pages H5002-H5031]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2014
[...]
Amendment No. 99 Offered by Mr. Pompeo
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 99
printed in House Report 113-170.
Mr. POMPEO. Mr. Chairman, I rise as the designee of Mr. Nugent to
offer the Nugent amendment.
Parliamentary Inquiries
Mr. POLIS. Mr. Chairman, I have a point of parliamentary inquiry.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman may state his parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. POLIS. Mr. Chairman, is it in order for a designee to offer an
amendment on behalf of its sponsor on this bill?
The Acting CHAIR. Would the gentleman please restate the
parliamentary inquiry.
Mr. POLIS. Mr. Chairman, is it in order for a designee to offer an
amendment on behalf of its sponsor on this rule?
The Acting CHAIR. Under the terms of House Report 113-170, the named
sponsor of an amendment may name a designee.
Mr. POLIS. Mr. Chairman, point of further parliamentary inquiry.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman may state his inquiry.
Mr. POLIS. Does the gentleman from Kansas have a formal designation
of the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Nugent)?
The Acting CHAIR. The Chair has been made aware that the gentleman
from Kansas is the designee of the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. POLIS. I thank the Chair.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of the bill (before the short title), add the
following:
Sec. __. None of funds made available by this Act may be
used by the National Security Agency to--
(1) conduct an acquisition pursuant to section 702 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for the purpose
of targeting a United States person; or
(2) acquire, monitor, or store the contents (as such term
is defined in section 2510(8) of title 18, United States
Code) of any electronic communication of a United States
[[Page H5022]]
person from a provider of electronic communication services
to the public pursuant to section 501 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 312, the gentleman
from Kansas (Mr. Pompeo) and a Member opposed each will control 7\1/2\
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kansas.
Mr. POMPEO. Mr. Chairman, the amendment I offer this evening
clarifies and confirms the scope of two programs that Mr. Snowden
illegally exposed while sitting in a hotel room in Communist China.
First, the amendment clarifies that under section 702 no U.S. citizen
or person in the U.S. can be targeted, period. I say again, no U.S.
person under section 702 may be targeted in any way by the United
States Government. While there are other specific authorities the U.S.
person may be subject to an investigation, the U.S. Government may not
do so under section 702. That's what this amendment intends to clarify.
The second part of the amendment clarifies section 215, also known as
section 501 of FISA. The amendment clarifies that no content of
communications can be stored or collected by the National Security
Agency--that's no emails, no video clips, no Skype. No record of the
actual conversation or the contents thereof may be recorded or
collected by the National Security Agency. I can't repeat that enough.
That's the intent of this amendment.
I want to make clear to everyone that, contrary to the suggestions of
some, the NSA has not been acting outside of the scope of its
authorities. The Meta-Data program is carefully designed with program
layers of oversight by all three branchs of government. This is
precisely the way our government ought to operate, with input from
Article I and Article II and Article III of the United States
Constitution.
It is, of course, our duty to ensure that the NSA stays within these
legal bounds here in Congress, and this amendment makes those
boundaries perfectly clear for everyone to know and understand.
And we shouldn't mislead the American people into thinking that the
NSA has been acting illegally. There is perhaps no program in the
United States Government that is as carefully monitored and overseen as
the programs this amendment attempts to clarify.
To the extent that some in this Chamber wish to review or provide
more protections and controls for these programs, we should proceed
through a carefully considered and debated legislative process so that
the full implications for our security are clearly understood.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Indiana is recognized for 7\1/2\
minutes.
{time} 1745
Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Chair, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman
from New York (Mr. Nadler).
Mr. NADLER. Mr. Chairman, this amendment has been described and
offered as an alternative to the Amash-Conyers amendment that we will
consider next. It is not.
This amendment restates the existing ban on the intentional targeting
of United States persons under section 702. It also places into law for
the next fiscal year the Obama administration's current ban on
collecting the contents of the communications of U.S. persons under
section 215. I agree with these prohibitions. But they have nothing to
do with the current misuse of section 215 to engage in the
suspicionless, bulk collection of Americans' telephone records.
The dragnet collection under section 215 telephone metadata program
reveals call information--including all numbers dialed, all incoming
phone numbers and call duration--but not the content of communications.
Therefore, this amendment would have no impact whatsoever on this
misuse of section 215. Metadata reveals highly personal and sensitive
information, including, for example, when and how often one calls the
doctor, a journalist, or the local Tea Party or ACLU affiliate. By
tracing the pattern of calls, the government can paint a detailed
picture of anyone's personal, professional, and political associations
and activities.
Congress never authorized this type of unchecked, sweeping
surveillance of our citizens. It is this problem--the indiscriminate,
bulk collection of metadata under section 215--that we need to fix
right now.
The Amash-Conyers amendment does so by restoring the required
reasonable relationship between the collection of records and specific
persons being investigated under section 215. The Amash-Conyers
amendment ensures that this standard is not ignored by the
administration or by the FISA Court, as is happening now.
This amendment does not fix the problem with 215. The Amash-Conyers
amendment does. However you vote on this amendment, and I intend to
vote in favor of it, it is imperative that we also vote in favor of the
Amash-Conyers amendment because this amendment, although doing no harm,
does not solve the problems that Congress and Mr. Sensenbrenner and
many others have articulated with respect to the misuse of section 215
of the PATRIOT Act.
Mr. POMPEO. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Thornberry).
Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the gentleman from Indiana for yielding, and
I thank the gentleman from Kansas for offering this amendment, because
it helps focus on what concerns most Americans and it clarifies what
really is and is not happening.
Mr. Chairman, sometimes it is a challenge for those of us on the
Intelligence Committee to talk openly about this--even the safeguards--
in some of these programs. But this amendment helps make it clear and
reassures Americans about some of the things they may have read or
heard that is occurring with NSA. But at the same time, this amendment
is not an overreaction that actually increases the danger that
Americans face from terrorism around the world.
This amendment says clearly that NSA cannot acquire information for
the purpose of targeting Americans, and it says clearly that NSA may
not acquire, monitor, or store the content of the communication of any
Americans.
I think the key point that Members need to know is there are multiple
layers of safeguards to make sure that these programs operate exactly
in the way that the FISA Court has laid them out to operate.
The Intelligence Committees of both the House and Senate do a
considerable amount of oversight, get regular reports. Even if somebody
accidentally punches a ``2'' versus a ``3'' on their keyboard, we get a
report about that. And it even goes so far as members of the
Intelligence Committee can go sit next to the analysts and watch what
they are doing.
But it is not just the Intelligence Committees. The FISA Court has
oversight of the same sorts of reports. They can change the guidelines
that it operates under. But in addition to that, there are internal
inspector general monitoring of these. So you get every branch of
government involved in making sure that the safeguards are in place and
those same safeguards will be in place to make sure that the provisions
of the gentleman's amendment are followed as well.
Some, however, Mr. Chairman, would do away with these programs. No
amount of safeguards are good for them. But they never say what would
replace them, they never say what would fill the gap in meeting our
responsibilities to defend Americans. They would just have them go
away, and I guess assume that somehow or other that Americans could be
made safe.
The truth is, we had been incredibly successful and somewhat lucky
since 9/11 as far as preventing further terrorist attacks on our
homeland. That is because of the work of the military, intelligence
professionals, law enforcement and, as I say, a fair amount of luck.
But these programs at NSA have made a crucial contribution to that
success over the last decade. It seems to me it would be foolhardy to
toss them away, as some would want to do.
I think this amendment strikes the right approach. I also believe,
Mr. Chairman, The Wall Street Journal makes a good point in today's
editorial when it says:
[[Page H5023]]
The last thing Congress should do is kill a program in a
rush to honor the reckless claims of Mr. Snowden and his
apologists.
Mr. POMPEO. Mr. Chairman, I am happy to yield 3 minutes to the
ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee, the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger).
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Pompeo.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Pompeo amendment.
This amendment strongly reaffirms that in America, privacy and
security must coexist together. This amendment states in no uncertain
terms that the government cannot use section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA, to intentionally target an
American for surveillance.
This important amendment also reaffirms that phone conversations
cannot be collected through section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. It makes
the intentions of Congress very clear.
I believe the Pompeo amendment makes a powerful statement that NSA
cannot target Americans for the collection or listen to their phone
calls. I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes.'' However, I do understand
the concerns of the American people and of Congress when it comes to
these programs.
On the House Intelligence Committee, we are reviewing and evaluating
potential ways to change the FISA Act that will provide the
intelligence community with the tools it needs to keep our country safe
while also protecting privacy and civil liberties. We are committed to
having this important discussion. However, I do have concerns about the
amendment we will debate next.
The Amash amendment is an on/off switch for section 215 of the
PATRIOT Act. It will have an immediate operational impact and our
country will be more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. This authority
has helped prevent terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. A planned attack on
the New York City subway system was stopped because of section 215.
But the Amash amendment passes this authority and it will end it.
This amendment goes too far, too fast, on the wrong legislative
vehicle. We need to debate the scope of this program, and we are, but
this is an extreme knee-jerk reaction to the situation.
This program has been authorized and reauthorized by Congress. It
receives extensive oversight by the Intelligence Committee and is a
vital tool for our intelligence community to protect our Nation.
Remember, 9/11 happened in part because we failed to connect the dots.
One of the critical tools we now have and use to connect those dots is
section 215 of the PATRIOT Act. Remember, this is just phone records--
just phone numbers--no conversations.
I respectfully urge a ``no'' vote on the Amash amendment and a
``yes'' vote on the Pompeo amendment.
Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman
from the State of California (Ms. Lofgren).
Ms. LOFGREN. Thank you, Mr. Visclosky.
Mr. Chairman, I urge a ``no'' vote on the amendment. Why? Because it
restates current law, and current law has been interpreted by the
administration in a way that is, frankly, contrary to the intent of the
crafters of the PATRIOT Act.
Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act says that you can obtain information
that is relevant to a national security investigation.
Now, what has happened since Congress enacted that provision? It is a
low bar, but under the NSA's interpretation, it is no bar at all.
Because, as has been widely reported, they are collecting the
information about every phone call made by every American. Clearly,
that is not relevant to a terrorist investigation.
I think it is important to note that business records that are the
subject of 215 include a lot of sensitive information. What are
business records? phone records? Internet records? credit card records?
medical records? Are these things that we would voluntarily give up to
the government? No. They are incredibly sensitive, and that's why they
are being sought.
I do think it is important to note that the amendment that will
follow after this one doesn't end the ability of the government to
pursue terrorism. We are all for that. It merely requires that the
government adhere to the law, which requires that there be relevance to
a terrorist investigation.
I certainly do not challenge the motivation of the gentleman who has
offered this amendment, but I do think if you think that this provides
a remedy, then you are wrong. This provides a fig leaf.
We should vote against it, and I hope that we will move on to the
Amash amendment and solve the problem today.
Mr. POMPEO. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to close. I reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. VISCLOSKY. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. POMPEO. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to correct a couple of
things.
This legislation is not a fig leaf. It is intended to clarify some
things that have been said, some beliefs that people hold, about what
section 215 authorizes and what section 702 authorizes.
It is intended to make crystal clear to everyone here, as well as to
the American public, the boundaries of these two important national
security programs. These laws have been in place and interpreted by
multiple administrations in the same way. There was no change in this
law when this President came into office, and we should continue to
support these programs regardless of who is the Commander in Chief for
the United States.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask my colleagues to support this amendment,
and I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Pompeo).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. POMPEO. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Kansas will
be postponed.
Amendment No. 100 Offered by Mr. Amash
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 100
printed in House Report 113-170.
Mr. AMASH. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of the bill (before the short title), insert the
following new section:
Sec. __. None of the funds made available by this Act may
be used to execute a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
order pursuant to section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861) that does not
include the following sentence: ``This Order limits the
collection of any tangible things (including telephone
numbers dialed, telephone numbers of incoming calls, and the
duration of calls) that may be authorized to be collected
pursuant to this Order to those tangible things that pertain
to a person who is the subject of an investigation described
in section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861).''.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 312, the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Amash) and a Member opposed each will control 7\1/2\
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. AMASH. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
We are here today for a very simple reason: to defend the Fourth
Amendment, to defend the privacy of each and every American.
As the Director of National Intelligence has made clear, the
government collects the phone records without suspicion of every single
American in the United States.
My amendment makes a simple, but important change. It limits the
government's collection of the records to those records that pertain to
a person who is the subject of an investigation pursuant to section
215.
{time} 1800
Opponents of this amendment will use the same tactic that every
government throughout history has used to justify its violation of
rights--fear. They will tell you that the government must violate the
rights of the American people to protect us against those who hate our
freedoms. They will tell you there is no expectation of privacy in
documents that are stored with a third party. Tell that to the American
[[Page H5024]]
people. Tell that to our constituents back home.
We are here to answer one question for the people we represent: Do we
oppose the suspicionless collection of every American's phone records?
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Madam Chairman, I rise to claim the time in
opposition to the gentleman's amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 7\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I am very happy to yield 3 minutes to the very
distinguished chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Chairman, I think the American people and, certainly, some well-
intentioned Members in this Chamber have legitimate concerns. They
should be addressed. We should have time and education on what actually
happens in the particular program of which we speak.
I will pledge to each one of you today and give you my word that this
fall, when we do the Intel authorization bill, that we will work to
find additional privacy protections with this program which have no
email, no phone calls, no names, and no addresses.
Fourteen Federal judges have said, yes, this comports with the
Constitution; 800 cases around the 1979 case have affirmed the
underpinnings of the legality of this case--800. So 14 judges are
wrong, and 800 different cases are wrong. The legislators on both
Intelligence committees--Republicans and Democrats--are all wrong.
Why is it that people of both parties came together and looked at
this program at a time when our Nation was under siege by those
individuals who wanted to bring violence to the shores of the United
States?
It is that those who know it best support the program because we
spend as much time on this to get it right, to make sure the oversight
is right. No other program has the legislative branch, the judicial
branch, and the executive branch doing the oversight of a program like
this. If we had this in the other agencies, we would not have problems.
Think about who we are in this body. Have 12 years gone by and our
memories faded so badly that we've forgotten what happened on September
11?
This bill turns off a very specific program. It doesn't stop so-
called ``spying'' and other things that this has been alleged to do.
That's not what's happening. It's not a surveillance bill. It's not
monitoring. It doesn't do any of those things.
What happened after September 11 that we didn't know on September
10--again, passing this amendment takes us back to September 10, and
afterwards we said, wow, there is a seam, a gap--was somebody leading
up to the September 11 attacks who was a terrorist overseas, called a
``terrorist,'' living amongst us in the United States, and we missed it
because we didn't have this capability.
What if we'd have caught it?
The good news is we don't have to what-if. It's not theoretical.
Fifty-four times this and the other program stopped and thwarted
terrorist attacks both here and in Europe--saving real lives. This
isn't a game. This is real. It will have a real consequence. This is
hard.
Think about the people who came here before us in this great body--
Madison, Lincoln, Kennedy served here--and about the issues they dealt
with and about the politics of ``big'' and of moving America forward
while upholding the article I mandate to this House in that we must
provide for the general defense of the United States. Think of those
challenges. Think of those challenges that they met.
Are we so small that we can only look at our Facebook ``likes'' today
in this Chamber, or are we going to stand up and find out how many
lives we can save?
Let us get back to the big politics of protecting America and of
moving America forward. Soundly reject this amendment. Let's do this
right in the Intel authorization bill.
Mr. AMASH. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
Conyers).
Mr. CONYERS. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
Ladies and gentlemen of the House, this amendment will not stop the
proper use of the PATRIOT Act or stop the FISA authorities from
conducting terrorism and intelligence investigations. I'd never block
that.
All this amendment is intending to do is to curtail the ongoing
dragnet collection and storage of the personal records of innocent
Americans. It does not defund the NSA, and it will continue to allow
them to conduct full-fledged surveillance as long as it relates to an
actual investigation.
Our joining together on this bipartisan amendment demonstrates our
joint commitment to ensure that our fight against terrorism and
espionage follows the rule of law and the clear intent of the statutes
passed by this Congress. I urge my colleagues on both sides of the
aisle to vote for this amendment.
I rise in support of this amendment, which I am cosponsoring with my
colleague from Michigan, Representative Justin Amash.
This amendment will prevent mass collection of personal records, such
as phone calling information, under Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.
When Congress passed and later revised this provision, we did not
intend for it to authorize the bulk, indiscriminate collection of
personal information of individuals not under investigation.
However, we have learned that this law has been misused to allow the
collection of call detail information on every phone call made in the
United States under a bizarre interpretation of the statute's
authorization to collect ``relevant'' information. As my colleague and
author of the statute, Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, has stated,
``This expansive characterization of relevance makes a mockery of the
legal standard.''
This amendment will not stop the proper use of PATRIOT Act and FISA
authorities to conduct terrorism and intelligence investigations. All
this amendment is intended to do is curtail the ongoing dragnet
collection and storage of the personal records of innocent Americans.
It does not defund the NSA, and it would continue to allow them to
conduct full fledged surveillance as long as it relates to an actual
investigation.
Our joining together on this bipartisan amendment demonstrates our
joint commitment to ensuring that our fight against terrorism and
espionage follows the rule of law and the clear intent of the statutes
passed by Congress. I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to
vote for this amendment to demonstrate our bipartisan commitment to
protecting individual liberty.
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I am very happy to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the
gentlelady from Minnesota (Mrs. Bachmann).
Mrs. BACHMANN. I thank the gentleman from Florida.
Madam Chair, this is a very important issue that we are taking up
today because the number one duty of the Federal Government is the
safety of the American people--of our constituents and of our own
skins, the skins of each one of us in this Chamber today. As we know
all too well, national security is a real and present danger, and it is
something that we have to take quite seriously. We can't deal in false
narratives.
A false narrative has emerged that the Federal Government is taking
in the content of Americans' phone calls. It's not true. It's not
happening.
A false narrative has emerged that the Federal Government is taking
in the content of the American people's emails. It's not true. It's not
happening.
We need to deal in facts. The facts are real, and the facts are
these:
The only people who have benefited from the revelation of classified
information by someone who worked for this government--who
intentionally and without authorization declassified some of the most
sensitive national security information that we have--are those who are
engaged in Islamic jihad. They will have been benefited, and those whom
we seek to protect will have not.
Consider this:
There is more information about each one of us contained in the phone
book that sits at home on your kitchen counter than information that is
in the National Security Database that we're talking about today. Your
name, your address are in the phone book. Your name, your address are
not in this National Security Database.
No other nation in the world has the advantage that the United States
of America has on national security--no
[[Page H5025]]
other nation--and we by this amendment today would agree to handcuff
ourselves and our allies by restricting ourselves? Let it not be. Let
us not deal in false narratives. Let us deal in facts that will keep
the American people safe.
When you look at an envelope, when a letter is put in the mail, is
there a privacy right as to what has been written on that envelope? No,
there isn't. There is a privacy right as to what is contained inside
that envelope. That's a Fourth Amendment right.
Is there a Fourth Amendment right to the record that you called
someone on a certain day? No, there isn't--that's a record--but there
is a Fourth Amendment right to what's in that phone call. Let's deal in
reality, not in false narratives.
Mr. AMASH. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr.
Sensenbrenner).
Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Madam Chair, I rise in strong support of the Amash
amendment. I do so as the person who was the principal author of the
PATRIOT Act in 2001, who got that law through quickly after 9/11 and
who supported and managed its 2006 reauthorization.
Let me make this perfectly clear that unlike what we have heard from
speakers on the other side of this issue, this amendment does not stop
the collection of data under section 215--the people who are subject to
an investigation of an authorized terrorist plot. What it does do is to
prevent the collection of data of people who are not subject to an
investigation.
Now, relevance is required in any type of a grand jury subpoena or in
a criminal collection of data for a criminal trial. This goes far
beyond what the NSA is doing. The time has come to stop it, and the way
we stop it is to approve this amendment.
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. AMASH. I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Colorado (Mr.
Polis).
Mr. POLIS. I thank the gentleman from Michigan for his leadership on
this important issue.
Madam Chair, reports of the NSA surveillance program have broad and
far-reaching consequences.
Many Americans feel that our fundamental liberties as a country and
our constitutional rights are threatened. In addition, it has ruined
and hurt our reputation abroad--threatening our trade relationships
with allies, threatening American jobs as a result, and putting in
danger our cooperative security relationships that we need to fight the
war on terror.
The responsible thing to do is to show some contrition. Let's pass
this amendment. Let's make sure that we can have a practical approach
that shows that protecting our liberties and securities are consistent
and critical for the United States of America. I urge a ``yes'' vote.
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. AMASH. I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from South Carolina
(Mr. Mulvaney).
Mr. MULVANEY. Madam Chair, here is the question:
It's a question of balancing privacy versus security. It's a question
beyond that. It's a question of who will do the balancing.
Right now, the balancing is being done by people we do not know, by
people we do not elect and, in large part right now, by somebody who
has admitted lying to this body at a hearing. That's wrong.
We should be doing the balancing. We were elected to do that. We need
to pass this amendment so that we can do the balancing, not the folks
who are not elected and whom we do not know.
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. AMASH. May I inquire of the Chair how much time remains.
The Acting CHAIR (Ms. Ros-Lehtinen). The gentleman from Michigan has
3\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Mr. AMASH. Madam Chair, I yield 30 seconds to the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Lofgren).
Ms. LOFGREN. I want to talk about the much ballyhooed oversight.
Every year, there is a report to the Judiciary Committee, an annual
report, on section 215. This year, the report was eight sentences--less
than a full page. To think that the Congress has substantial oversight
of this program is simply incorrect. I cannot match Mr. Sensenbrenner's
brilliant remarks; but I do agree that when we wrote the PATRIOT Act
relevance had a meaning.
Madam Chair, I submit for the Record a letter to Mr. Sensenbrenner
from the Department of Justice, which basically says, because 300
inquiries were made, the records of every single American became
relevant. That's a joke.
U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Legislative Affairs,
Washington, DC, July 16, 2013.
Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Representative Sensenbrenner: This responds to your
letter to the Attorney General date June 6, 2013, regarding
the ``business records'' provision of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 50 U.S.C. Sec. 1861,
enacted as section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act.
As you know, on June 5, 2013, the media reported the
unauthorized disclosure of a classified judicial order issued
under this provision that has been used to support a
sensitive intelligence collection program. Under this
program, which has been briefed to Congress and repeatedly
authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) obtains
authorization to collect telephony metadata, including the
telephone numbers dialed and the date, time and duration of
calls, from certain telecommunications service providers. The
National Security Agency (NSA), in turn, archives and
analyzes this information under carefully controlled
circumstances and provides leads to the FBI or others in the
Intelligence Community for counterterrorism purposes. Aspects
of this program remain classified, and there are limits to
what can be said about it in an unclassified letter.
Department of Justice and Intelligence Community staff are
available to provide you a briefing on the program at your
request.
In your letter, you asked whether this intelligence
collection program is consistent with the requirements of
section 215 and the limits of that authority. Under section
215, the Director of the FBI may apply to the FISC for an
order directing the production of any tangible things,
including business records, for investigations to protect
against international terrorism. To issue such an order, the
FISC must determine that (1) there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the things sought are relevant to an authorized
investigation, other than a threat assessment; (2) the
investigation is being conducted under guidelines approved by
the Attorney General under Executive Order 12333; and (3) if
a U.S. person is the subject of the investigation, the
investigation is not being conducted solely upon the basis of
First Amendment protected activities. In addition, the FISC
may only require the production of items that can be obtained
with a grand jury subpoena or any other court order directing
the production of records or tangible things. Finally, the
program must, of course, comport with the Constitution.
The telephony metadata program satisfies each of these
requirements. The lawfulness of the telephony metadata
collection program has repeatedly been affirmed by the FISC.
In the years since its inception, multiple FISC judges have
granted 90-day extensions of the program after concluding
that it meets all applicable legal requirements.
Of particular significance to your question is the
relevance to an authorized international terrorism
investigation of the telephony metadata collected through
this program. First, it is critical to understand the program
in the context of the restrictions imposed by the court.
Those restrictions strictly limit the extent to which the
data is reviewed by the government. In particular, the FISC
allows the data to be queried for intelligence purposes only
when there is reasonable suspicion, based on specific facts,
that a particular query term, such as a telephone number, is
associated with a specific foreign terrorist organization
that was previously identified to and approved by the court.
NSA has reported that in 2012, fewer than 300 unique
identifiers were used to query the data after meeting this
standard. This means that only a very small fraction of the
records is ever reviewed by any person, and only specially
cleared counterterrorism personnel specifically trained in
the court-approved procedures can access the records to
conduct queries. The information generated in response to
these limited queries is not only relevant to authorized
investigations of international terrorism, but may be
especially significant in helping the government identify and
disrupt terrorist plots.
The large volume of telephony metadata is relevant to FBI
investigations into specific foreign terrorist organizations
because the intelligence tools that NSA uses to identify the
existence of potential terrorist communications within the
data require collecting and storing large volumes of the
metadata to enable later analysis. If not collected and held
by NSA, the metadata may not continue to be available for the
period that NSA has deemed necessary for national security
purposes because it need not be retained by
telecommunications service providers. Moreover, unless the
data is aggregated by NSA, it may not be possible to identify
telephony
[[Page H5026]]
metadata records that cross different telecommunications
networks. The bulk collection of telephony metadata--i.e. the
collection of a large volume and high percentage of
information about unrelated communications--is therefore
necessary to identify the much smaller subset of terrorist-
related telephony metadata records contained within the data.
It also allows NSA to make connections related to terrorist
activities over time and can assist counterterrorism
personnel to discover whether known or suspected terrorists
have been in contact with other persons who may be engaged in
terrorist activities, including persons and activities inside
the United States. Because the telephony metadata must be
available in bulk to allow NSA to identify the records of
terrorist communications, there are ``reasonable grounds to
believe'' that the data is relevant to an authorized
investigation to protect against international terrorism, as
section 215 requires, even though most of the records in the
dataset are not associated with terrorist activity.
The program is consistent with the Constitution as well as
with the statute. As noted above, the only type of
information acquired under the program is telephony metadata,
not the content of any communications, not the identity,
address or financial information of any party to the
communication, and not geolocational information. Under
longstanding Supreme Court precedent, there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy with respect to this kind of
information that individuals have already provided to third-
party businesses, and such information therefore is not
protected by the Fourth Amendment. See Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 739-42 (1979).
Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that activities
carried out pursuant to FISA, including those conducted under
this program, are subject to stringent limitations and robust
oversight by all three branches of government. As noted
above, by order of the FISC, the Government is prohibited
from indiscriminately sifting through the telephony metadata
it acquires. Instead, all information that is acquired is
subject to strict, court-imposed restrictions on review and
handling that provide significant and reasonable safeguards
for U.S. persons. The basis for a query must be documented in
writing in advance and must be approved by one of a limited
number of highly trained analysts. The FISC reviews the
program approximately every 90 days.
The Department of Justice conducts rigorous oversight to
ensure the telephony metadata is being handled in strict
compliance with the FISC's orders, and the Department of
Justice and The Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI) conduct thorough and regular reviews to
ensure the program is implemented in compliance with the law.
The program is also subject to extensive congressional
oversight. The classified details of the program have been
briefed to the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees on many
occasions. In addition, in December 2009, the Department of
Justice worked with the Intelligence Community to provide a
classified briefing paper to the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees to be made available to all Members
of Congress regarding the telephony metadata collection
program. It is our understanding that both Intelligence
Committees made this document available to all Members prior
to the February 2010 reauthorization of section 215. That
briefing paper clearly explained that the government and the
FISC had interpreted Section 215 to authorize the collection
of telephony metadata in bulk. An updated version of the
briefing paper was provided to the Senate and House
Intelligence Committees again in February 2011 in connection
with the reauthorization that occurred later that year.
Finally, we do not agree with the suggestion in your letter
that the Department's March 9, 2011 public testimony on
section 215 conveyed a misleading impression as to how this
authority is used. Quoting a portion of that testimony, your
letter states that it ``left the committee with the
impression that the Administration was using the business
records provision sparingly and for specific materials. The
recently released FISA order, however, could not have been
drafted more broadly,'' In fact, key language in the
testimony in question noted that orders issued pursuant to
section 215 ``have also been used to support important and
highly sensitive intelligence collection operations, on which
this committee and others have been separately briefed.'' We
hope that the explanation above regarding the use of this
authority to identify specific terrorism-related telephony
metadata records helps to clarify the point.
The recent unauthorized disclosure of this and other
classified intelligence activities has caused serious harm to
our national security. Since the disclosure of the telephony
metadata collection program, the Department of Justice and
the Intelligence Community have worked to ensure that
Congress and the American people understand how the program
operates, its importance to our security, and the rigorous
oversight that is applied. As part of this effort, senior
officials from ODNI, NSA, DOJ and FI31 provided a classified
briefing for all House Members on June 11, 2013 and separate
classified briefings to the House Democratic Caucus and the
House Republican Conference on June 26, 2013.
The Department of Justice is committed to ensuring that our
efforts to protect national security are conducted lawfully
and respect the privacy and civil liberties of all Americans.
We look forward to continuing to work with you and others in
the Congress to ensure that we meet this objective.
We hope this information is helpful. Please do not hesitate
to contact this office if we may provide additional
assistance with this or any other matter.
Sincerely,
Peter J. Kadzik,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General.
Mr. AMASH. I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
Barton).
(Mr. BARTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BARTON. I thank the gentleman.
Madam Chair, this is not about how sincere the NSA people are in
implementing this technique. It is not about how careful they are. It
is whether they have the right to collect the data in the first place
on every phone call on every American every day.
The PATRIOT Act did not specifically authorize it. Section 215 talks
about tangible things that are relevant to an authorized security
investigation. In the NSA's interpretation of that, ``relevant'' is all
data all the time. That is simply wrong. We should support the Amash
amendment and vote for it.
{time} 1815
Mr. AMASH. Madam Chair, I yield 15 seconds to the gentleman from
South Carolina (Mr. Duncan).
Mr. DUNCAN of South Carolina. Madam Chair, amendment IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
house, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Those who choose to trade liberty for security will find they have
neither.
Mr. AMASH. Madam Chair, I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Poe).
Mr. POE of Texas. Warrants need to be particular and specific about
the place to be searched and the items to be seized.
No judge would ever sign a general search warrant like the British
did, allowing the police to search every house on the block, much less
seize everybody's phone records, but this is what has happened under
section 215 under the government.
The government has gone too far in the name of security and the
Fourth Amendment has been bruised.
Rein in government invasion. No more dragnet operations. Get a
specific warrant based on probable cause, or stay out of our lives.
And that's just the way it is.
Mr. AMASH. I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from New York (Mr.
Nadler).
Mr. NADLER. Madam Chairperson, this amendment stops the government
from misusing section 215, to engage in the dragnet collection of all
of our personal telephone records. Congress did not grant the executive
the authority to collect everything it wants so long as it limits any
subsequent search of that data.
This amendment restores the requirement that records sought are
relevant to an authorized foreign intelligence or terrorist
investigation. It restores the minimal relevant standard required by
Congress but ignored by successive administrations.
No administration should be permitted to operate above or beyond the
law as they have done in this respect. I therefore urge all of my
colleagues to vote in favor of the Amash-Conyers amendment.
Mr. AMASH. I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr.
Griffith).
Mr. GRIFFITH of Virginia. General warrants, writs of assistance,
that's what we're looking at, and the Founding Fathers found that to be
anathema. What they're doing does violate the Fourth Amendment. We took
an oath to uphold the Constitution, and we're supposed to rely on a
secret agency that deals with a secret court that deals with a
selective secrecy committee; and Members of Congress are limited to
their access to the actions of that committee, but we're supposed to
trust them.
Folks, we've got a job to do. Vote ``yes.''
[[Page H5027]]
Mr. AMASH. Madam Chair, may I inquire as to how much time remains?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Michigan has 45 seconds
remaining, and the gentleman from Florida has 2 minutes remaining.
Mr. AMASH. I yield 30 seconds to the gentlelady from Hawaii (Ms.
Gabbard).
Ms. GABBARD. Madam Chairwoman, countless men and women from my State
of Hawaii and all across the country have worn the uniform and put
their lives on the line to protect our freedoms and our liberties. I
cannot in good conscience vote to take a single dollar from the pockets
of hardworking taxpayers from across the country to pay for programs
which infringe on the very liberties and freedoms our troops have
fought and died for.
Ben Franklin said:
They who give up essential liberty to obtain a little
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.
Mr. AMASH. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
We're here to answer one question for the people we represent: Do we
oppose the suspicion list collection of every American's phone records?
When you had the chance to stand up for Americans' privacy, did you?
Please support the Amash amendment and oppose the NSA's blanket
surveillance of our constituents.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Madam Chairwoman, I yield 2 minutes for the
closing argument to the gentleman from Arkansas (Mr. Cotton).
Mr. COTTON. Madam Chairwoman, I rise to strongly urge opposition to
the Amash amendment.
This program has stopped dozens of terrorist attacks. That means it's
saved untold American lives.
This amendment is not simple. It does not limit the program. It does
not modify it. It does not constrain the program. It ends the program.
It blows it up. Some of you've heard the analogy that if you want to
search for a needle in a haystack, you have to have the haystack. This
takes a leaf blower and blows away the entire haystack. You will not
have this program if this amendment passes. And it does so, despite all
of the safeguards you have already heard.
This program is constitutional under Supreme Court precedent--not
recent precedent. Precedent goes back to 1979, just 2 years after I was
born, the year that one of the young sponsors of this amendment was
born. This program is approved by large bipartisan majorities of this
body on the statute--text that they approved, not their secret intents
or wishes.
It is overseen by article III judges who have been confirmed by the
Senate and are independent of the executive branch. It is reviewed by
the Intelligence Committees, and it is executed primarily by military
officers, not generals, but the majors and the colonels who have been
fighting and bleeding for this country for 12 years.
What is it, metadata? It sounds kind of scary. It's nothing more than
an Excel spreadsheet with five columns: called to, called from, date,
time, and the duration. Five columns, billions of rows. It's in a
lockbox. It can't be searched unless you have specific suspicion of a
number being used by a terrorist. Only then do they go into that
database and do they run a search for what that number has been
calling.
Why do you need it? Verizon, AT&T, other companies will not keep this
data for the years necessary. Secondly, you need it quickly. When I was
in Iraq as a platoon leader with the 101st Airborne, if we rolled up a
bad guy and we found a cell phone or we found a thumb drive, we would
immediately upload that data so intelligence professionals could search
it so they could go roll up another bad guy, because you only have a
few hours to stop a terrorist once you catch another terrorist.
Folks, we are at war. You may not like that truth. I wish it weren't
the truth. But it is the truth. We're at war. Do not take this tool
away from our warriors on the frontline.
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Amash).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. AMASH. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan
will be postponed.
[...]
Amendment No. 99 Offered by Mr. Pompeo
The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Kansas
(Mr. Pompeo) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which
the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
Recorded Vote
The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 409,
noes 12, not voting 12, as follows:
[Roll No. 411]
AYES--409
Aderholt
Alexander
Amash
Amodei
Andrews
Bachmann
Bachus
Barber
Barr
Barrow (GA)
Barton
Bass
Benishek
Bentivolio
Bera (CA)
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Blumenauer
Bonamici
Bonner
Boustany
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Braley (IA)
Bridenstine
Brooks (AL)
Brooks (IN)
Broun (GA)
Brown (FL)
Brownley (CA)
Buchanan
Bucshon
Burgess
Butterfield
Calvert
Camp
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Cardenas
Carney
Carson (IN)
Carter
Cartwright
Cassidy
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Chu
Cicilline
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coffman
Cole
Collins (GA)
Collins (NY)
Conaway
Connolly
Cook
Cooper
Costa
Cotton
Courtney
Cramer
Crawford
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cuellar
Culberson
Cummings
Daines
Davis (CA)
Davis, Danny
Davis, Rodney
DeFazio
DeGette
Delaney
DeLauro
DelBene
Denham
Dent
DeSantis
DesJarlais
Deutch
Diaz-Balart
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle
Duckworth
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Ellison
Ellmers
Engel
Enyart
Eshoo
Esty
Farenthold
Farr
Fattah
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Fleming
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foster
Foxx
Frankel (FL)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gabbard
Gallego
Garamendi
Garcia
Gardner
Garrett
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gibson
Gingrey (GA)
Gohmert
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (MO)
Grayson
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Griffin (AR)
Griffith (VA)
Grimm
Guthrie
Gutierrez
Hahn
Hall
Hanabusa
Hanna
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Heck (NV)
Heck (WA)
Hensarling
Higgins
Himes
Hinojosa
Holding
Hoyer
Hudson
Huelskamp
Huffman
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurt
Israel
Issa
Jackson Lee
Jeffries
Jenkins
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Jordan
Joyce
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly (IL)
Kelly (PA)
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilmer
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kinzinger (IL)
Kirkpatrick
Kline
Kuster
Labrador
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Lance
Langevin
Lankford
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
[[Page H5028]]
Latham
Latta
Lee (CA)
Levin
Lewis
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Long
Lowenthal
Lowey
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan Grisham (NM)
Lujan, Ben Ray (NM)
Lummis
Lynch
Maffei
Maloney, Carolyn
Maloney, Sean
Marchant
Marino
Massie
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul
McClintock
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McHenry
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
Meadows
Meehan
Meeks
Meng
Messer
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Moore
Moran
Mullin
Mulvaney
Murphy (FL)
Murphy (PA)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Neugebauer
Noem
Nolan
Nugent
Nunes
Nunnelee
O'Rourke
Olson
Owens
Palazzo
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Paulsen
Payne
Pearce
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Perry
Peters (CA)
Peters (MI)
Peterson
Petri
Pingree (ME)
Pittenger
Pitts
Pocan
Poe (TX)
Pompeo
Posey
Price (GA)
Price (NC)
Quigley
Radel
Rahall
Reed
Reichert
Renacci
Ribble
Rice (SC)
Richmond
Rigell
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross
Rothfus
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruiz
Runyan
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Salmon
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanford
Sarbanes
Scalise
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schneider
Schrader
Schwartz
Schweikert
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Sewell (AL)
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Sinema
Sires
Slaughter
Smith (MO)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Southerland
Speier
Stewart
Stivers
Stockman
Stutzman
Swalwell (CA)
Takano
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tierney
Tipton
Titus
Tonko
Tsongas
Turner
Upton
Valadao
Van Hollen
Vargas
Veasey
Vela
Velazquez
Visclosky
Wagner
Walberg
Walden
Walorski
Walz
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Weber (TX)
Webster (FL)
Welch
Wenstrup
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Williams
Wilson (FL)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wolf
Womack
Woodall
Yarmuth
Yoder
Yoho
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Young (IN)
NOES--12
Becerra
Capuano
Cohen
Conyers
Edwards
Fudge
Grijalva
Holt
Honda
Lofgren
Polis
Rangel
NOT VOTING--12
Barletta
Beatty
Bustos
Campbell
Coble
Herrera Beutler
Horsford
McCarthy (NY)
Negrete McLeod
Pallone
Rokita
Schock
{time} 1847
Messrs. COLLINS of New York, GALLEGO, HASTINGS of Florida, Mrs.
BACHMANN, Ms. SHEA-PORTER, Mr. DOYLE, Ms. LEE of California, Ms. KELLY
of Illinois, Ms. DeGETTE, Messrs. McGOVERN, McDERMOTT, GRIMM, LEWIS,
PEARCE, PAYNE, ANDREWS, and CARSON of Indiana changed their vote from
``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Amendment No. 100 Offered by Mr. Amash
The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan
(Mr. Amash) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which
the noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
Recorded Vote
The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The Acting CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 205,
noes 217, not voting 12, as follows:
[Roll No. 412]
AYES--205
Amash
Amodei
Bachus
Barton
Bass
Becerra
Bentivolio
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Blumenauer
Bonamici
Brady (PA)
Braley (IA)
Bridenstine
Broun (GA)
Buchanan
Burgess
Capps
Capuano
Cardenas
Carson (IN)
Cartwright
Cassidy
Chabot
Chaffetz
Chu
Cicilline
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coffman
Cohen
Connolly
Conyers
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cummings
Daines
Davis, Danny
Davis, Rodney
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
DelBene
DeSantis
DesJarlais
Deutch
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Edwards
Ellison
Eshoo
Farenthold
Farr
Fattah
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Fleischmann
Fleming
Fudge
Gabbard
Garamendi
Gardner
Garrett
Gibson
Gohmert
Gosar
Gowdy
Graves (GA)
Grayson
Green, Gene
Griffin (AR)
Griffith (VA)
Grijalva
Hahn
Hall
Harris
Hastings (FL)
Holt
Honda
Huelskamp
Huffman
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Jeffries
Jenkins
Johnson (OH)
Jones
Jordan
Keating
Kildee
Kingston
Labrador
LaMalfa
Lamborn
Larson (CT)
Lee (CA)
Lewis
Loebsack
Lofgren
Lowenthal
Lujan Grisham (NM)
Lujan, Ben Ray (NM)
Lummis
Lynch
Maffei
Maloney, Carolyn
Marchant
Massie
Matsui
McClintock
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McHenry
McMorris Rodgers
Meadows
Mica
Michaud
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Moore
Moran
Mullin
Mulvaney
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Nolan
Nugent
O'Rourke
Owens
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Pearce
Perlmutter
Perry
Petri
Pingree (ME)
Pocan
Poe (TX)
Polis
Posey
Price (GA)
Radel
Rahall
Rangel
Ribble
Rice (SC)
Richmond
Roe (TN)
Rohrabacher
Ross
Rothfus
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Salmon
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanford
Sarbanes
Scalise
Schiff
Schrader
Schweikert
Scott (VA)
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Smith (MO)
Smith (NJ)
Southerland
Speier
Stewart
Stockman
Swalwell (CA)
Takano
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Tierney
Tipton
Tonko
Tsongas
Vela
Velazquez
Walz
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Weber (TX)
Welch
Williams
Wilson (SC)
Yarmuth
Yoder
Yoho
Young (AK)
NOES--217
Aderholt
Alexander
Andrews
Bachmann
Barber
Barr
Barrow (GA)
Benishek
Bera (CA)
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Boehner
Bonner
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Brooks (AL)
Brooks (IN)
Brown (FL)
Brownley (CA)
Bucshon
Butterfield
Calvert
Camp
Cantor
Capito
Carney
Carter
Castor (FL)
Castro (TX)
Cole
Collins (GA)
Collins (NY)
Conaway
Cook
Cooper
Costa
Cotton
Crawford
Crenshaw
Cuellar
Culberson
Davis (CA)
Delaney
Denham
Dent
Diaz-Balart
Duckworth
Ellmers
Engel
Enyart
Esty
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foster
Foxx
Frankel (FL)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallego
Garcia
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gingrey (GA)
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves (MO)
Green, Al
Grimm
Guthrie
Gutierrez
Hanabusa
Hanna
Harper
Hartzler
Hastings (WA)
Heck (NV)
Heck (WA)
Hensarling
Higgins
Himes
Hinojosa
Holding
Hoyer
Hudson
Hunter
Hurt
Israel
Issa
Jackson Lee
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Joyce
Kaptur
Kelly (IL)
Kelly (PA)
Kennedy
Kilmer
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kinzinger (IL)
Kirkpatrick
Kline
Kuster
Lance
Langevin
Lankford
Larsen (WA)
Latham
Latta
Levin
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Long
Lowey
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Maloney, Sean
Marino
Matheson
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinley
McNerney
Meehan
Meeks
Meng
Messer
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Murphy (FL)
Murphy (PA)
Neugebauer
Noem
Nunes
Nunnelee
Olson
Palazzo
Paulsen
Payne
Pelosi
Peters (CA)
Peters (MI)
Peterson
Pittenger
Pitts
Pompeo
Price (NC)
Quigley
Reed
Reichert
Renacci
Rigell
Roby
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Ruiz
Runyan
Ruppersberger
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Schakowsky
Schneider
Schwartz
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sessions
Sewell (AL)
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Sinema
Sires
Slaughter
Smith (NE)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Stivers
Stutzman
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Titus
Turner
Upton
Valadao
Van Hollen
Vargas
Veasey
Visclosky
Wagner
Walberg
Walden
Walorski
Wasserman Schultz
Webster (FL)
Wenstrup
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (FL)
Wittman
Wolf
Womack
Woodall
Young (FL)
Young (IN)
NOT VOTING--12
Barletta
Beatty
Bustos
Campbell
Coble
Herrera Beutler
Horsford
McCarthy (NY)
Negrete McLeod
Pallone
Rokita
Schock
{time} 1851
Mr. CICILLINE changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Personal Explanation
Mrs. BEATTY. Mr. Chair, on rollcall Nos. 411--Pompeo amendment #99,
``yes'' and 412--Amash amendment #100, ``No.''
[...]
