[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 155 (Wednesday, December 5, 2012)]
[Senate]
[Pages S7461-S7636]
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013
On Tuesday, November 4, 2012, the Senate passed S. 3254, as follows:
S. 3254
[...]
SEC. 932. DEFENSE CLANDESTINE SERVICE.
(a) Prohibition on Use of Funds for Additional Personnel.--
Amounts authorized to be appropriated by this Act for the
Military Intelligence Program (MIP) may not be obligated or
expended to provide for a number of personnel conducting or
supporting human intelligence within the Department of
Defense in excess of the number of such personnel as of April
20, 2012.
(b) CAPE Report on Costs.--Not later than 120 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of Cost
Assessment and Program Evaluation of the Department of
Defense shall submit to the appropriate committees of
Congress an independent estimate of the costs of the Defense
Clandestine Service, whether funded through the Military
Intelligence Program or the National Intelligence Program,
including an estimate of the costs over the period of the
current future-years defense program and an estimate of the
out year costs.
(c) USDI Report on DCS.--
(1) Report required.--Not later than February 1, 2013, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence shall submit to
the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the
Defense Clandestine Service.
(2) Elements.--The report under paragraph (1) shall include
the following:
(A) A detailed description of the location and schedule for
current and anticipated deployments of case officers trained
under the Field Tradecraft Course, whether overseas or
domestically, and a certification whether or not such
deployments can be accommodated and supported.
(B) A statement of the objectives for the effective
management of case officers trained under the Field
Tradecraft Course for each of the Armed Forces, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and the United States Special Operations
Command, including objectives on numbers of tours requiring
training in the Field Tradecraft Course and objectives for
management of career tracks and case officer covers.
(C) A statement of the manner in which each Armed Force,
the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the United States
Special Operations Command will each achieve the objectives
applicable thereto under subparagraph (B).
(D) A copy of any memoranda of understanding or memoranda
of agreement between the Department of Defense and other
departments and agencies of the United States Government, or
between components or elements of the Department of Defense,
that are required to implement objectives for the Defense
Clandestine Service.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) The term ``appropriate committees of Congress'' means--
(A) the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations and
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House
of Representatives.
(2) The term ``future-years defense program'' means the
future-years defense program under section 221 of title 10,
United States Code.
[...]
Senate Report 112-173
Defense Clandestine Service (sec. 932)
The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit the obligation of
appropriated Military Intelligence Program (MIP) funds in fiscal year 2013
to exceed the number of personnel conducting or supporting human
intelligence within the Department of Defense (DOD) as of April 20, 2012.
This provision would also require the Office of Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation (CAPE) to provide an estimate of the total cost of the Defense
Clandestine Service (DCS) to the congressional defense and intelligence
committees. This cost estimate should look at the total costs of the DCS,
including whether that cost is incurred in the MIP, in the National
Intelligence Program, or in other non-intelligence funding for the
Department of Defense (e.g. Major Force Program 11 funding for U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM)). The estimate should include costs in the out
years of the future-years defense program and beyond, especially those
associated with closing existing personnel basing; creating new basing
arrangements; and supporting overseas deployments.
The provision also would require the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence (USDI) to provide a report to the congressional defense and
intelligence committees by February 1, 2013, that provides or explains:
where DOD case officers will be deployed or based and a schedule for
those deployments;
certification that the prospective locations can and will accommodate
these deployments;
the objectives established for each military service, USSOCOM, and the
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to improve career management for case
officers, and the plans to achieve the objectives of the DCS; and
any Memoranda of Agreement or Understanding necessary to implement
planned reforms with other departments and agencies and between DOD
components.
The committee appreciates the fact that the USDI and the Director of the DIA,
in initiating the DCS, intend to make reforms to the Defense Human
Intelligence (HUMINT) Service to correct longstanding problems. These
problems include inefficient utilization of personnel trained at significant
expense to conduct clandestine HUMINT; poor or non-existent career management
for trained HUMINT personnel; cover challenges; and unproductive deployment
locations. Multiple studies since the end of the Cold War document these
deficiencies, and they led the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of
the United States Intelligence Community, chaired by two former Secretaries
of Defense, to recommend transferring to the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) all responsibilities for the clandestine recruitment of human sources,
utilizing military personnel on detail from the DOD as necessary.
The committee notes that President Bush authorized 50 percent growth in the
CIA's case officer workforce, which followed significant growth under
President Clinton. Since 9/11, DOD's case officer ranks have grown
substantially as well. The committee is concerned that, despite this
expansion and the winding down of two overseas conflicts that required large
HUMINT resources, DOD believes that its needs are not being met.
The committee concludes that DOD needs to demonstrate that it can improve the
management of clandestine HUMINT before undertaking any further expansion.
Furthermore, if DOD is able to utilize existing resources much more
effectively, the case could be made that investment in this area could
decline, rather than remain steady or grow, to assist the Department in
managing its fiscal and personnel challenges.
