[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 80 (Thursday, May 31, 2012)]
[House]
[Pages H3290-H3309]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013
General Leave
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all
Members may have 5 legislative days to revise and extend their remarks
and include extraneous material on the bill, H.R. 5743.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Michigan?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 667 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 5743.
The Chair appoints the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Yoder) to preside
over the Committee of the Whole.
{time} 1418
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 5743) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2013 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, with Mr. Yoder in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the
first time.
The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
might consume.
Mr. Chairman, I first wish to make an announcement with respect to
the availability of the classified annex to the bill for the Members of
the House. This is to reinforce a previous announcement made to Members
by the Committee on Rules on May 23, 2012, and an informal announcement
by leadership.
{time} 1420
Mr. Chairman, the classified Schedule of Authorizations and the
classified annex accompanying the bill remain available for review by
Members at the offices of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence in room HVC 304 of the Capitol Visitors Center. The
committee office will open during regular business hours for the
convenience of any Member who wishes to review this material prior to
its consideration by the House.
I recommend that Members wishing to review the classified annex
contact the committee's director of security to arrange a time and date
for that viewing. This will assure the availability of committee staff
to assist Members who desire assistance during their review of these
classified documents.
Mr. Chairman, we're especially pleased with this year's fiscal 2013
Intelligence authorization bill and its presence here on the floor
today. This will be our third authorization since I assumed the
chairmanship and my colleague, Mr. Ruppersberger, assumed the ranking
member position on the House Intelligence Committee.
The bill is a vital tool for congressional oversight of the
intelligence community's classified activities and is critical to
ensuring that our intelligence agencies have the resources and
authorities they need to do their important work.
The Intelligence authorization bill funds U.S. intelligence
activities spanning 17 separate agencies. This bill is significantly
below last year's inactive budget, but up modestly from the President's
roughly $72 billion in the unclassified number budget request for
fiscal year 2013. It is also completely in line with the House budget
resolution, which provides for a modest increase of defense activities
above the President's budget.
The FY13 bill sustains our current intelligence capabilities and
provides for the development of future capabilities, all while
achieving significant savings and ensuring the intelligence agencies
are being good stewards of the taxpayers' dollars. The U.S.
intelligence community plays a critical role in the war on terrorism
and securing the country from many threats that we face. Effective and
aggressive congressional oversight is essential to ensuring continued
success in the intelligence community. The current challenging fiscal
environment demands the accountability and financial oversight of our
classified intelligence programs that can only come with an
Intelligence authorization bill.
The bill's comprehensive classified annex provides detailed guidance
on intelligence spending, including adjustments to costly but important
programs. The bill funds requirements of the men and women of the
intelligence community, both military and civilian, many of whom
directly support the war zones and are engaged in other dangerous
operations designed to keep America safe.
It provides oversight and authorization for vital intelligence
activities, including global counterterrorism operations such as the
one that took out Osama bin Laden; efforts by the National Security
Agency to defend us from advance foreign state-sponsored cyberthreats;
countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; global
monitoring of foreign militaries and advanced weapons tests; and
research and development of new technology to maintain our intelligence
agencies' technological edge, including work on code breaking and spy
satellites.
To stay competitive amidst declining budgets, the IC must wring out
cost in all realms of operations--collection, processing, analysis,
logistics, and ``back office'' operations. This bill promotes operating
efficiencies in a number of areas, particularly in information
technology, the ground processing of satellite data, and the
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance departments. The bill
holds personnel levels, one of the biggest cost drivers, at last year's
levels. Even so, the bill adds a limited number of new personnel
positions for select, high-priority positions, such as FBI surveillance
officers to keep watch on terrorists.
The bill contains additional funding for intelligence collection
programs, including increased counterintelligence to thwart foreign
spies. The bill also increases funding for our intelligence community's
comparative advantage--cutting-edge research and development.
[[Page H3291]]
While we're on the subject of funding our intelligence agencies, I
think I would be remiss if we didn't briefly discuss the looming threat
of sequestration and the devastating consequences it would have for our
vital intelligence operations. The intelligence community and the
congressional intelligence oversight committees have worked together
over the last year, in recognition of the current challenging fiscal
environment, to find efficiencies in the intelligence budget. And we've
done that. We've actually done more in certain areas by finding
efficiencies in other areas and reducing the overall cost of our 17
agencies.
Unlike the dangerous, across-the-board cuts of the 1990s, however,
these funding cuts were carefully selected to ensure that no important
operational intelligence capabilities were impacted. Let me be clear:
The intelligence community has given until it hurts to produce better
budget efficiencies, but we have done this without adversely affecting
the mission, which is critically important.
All of this careful work, however, will have been done for nothing if
Congress doesn't avert the sequestration train wreck. Sequestration
will require a devastating cut to defense spending that will also
entail dangerous across-the-board reductions in intelligence funding.
The across-the-board nature of the sequester means that there is very
little discretion left to our intelligence agencies on how to apportion
these reductions.
Let me give you just a few examples of the dangerous impact this
would have. Thousands of intelligence officers and specialized
technicians will be laid off, to include those working around the
world, and around the clock, to stop terrorist plots before they arrive
on U.S. shores. The National Security Agency would have to
significantly reduce its ability to intercept, translate, and analyze
terrorist communications about their plans to attack the United States
and Western targets. This would significantly reduce our odds of
detecting and disrupting those terrorist plots. Intelligence community
support to our soldiers and marines in harm's way in Afghanistan would
significantly be curtailed. Also, the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency would be forced to cut back the number of satellite images that
it analyzes, reducing our odds of detecting significant foreign
military activity, such as North Korean preparations for an attack on
our troops in South Korea.
Our intelligence agencies and the important work they do is our first
line of defense against the many threats around the world to our
national security. Sequestration would be dangerous and irresponsible
for many reasons, not the least of which is the threat to those vital
intelligence capabilities, and Congress must act to avoid it. The House
has put an offer on the table that would avert this disaster. We passed
a bill earlier this month with responsible spending reforms that will
bring down the debt without endangering our national security. I urge
my colleagues in the Senate to take up this bill without further delay.
The bipartisan fiscal year 2013 Intelligence authorization bill
preserves and advances national security and is also fiscally
responsible. We have proven it can be done. The secrecy that is a
necessary part of our country's intelligence work requires that the
congressional Intelligence Committees conduct strong and effective
oversight on behalf of the American people. That strong and effective
oversight is impossible, however, without an annual Intelligence
Authorization bill.
I want to thank all of the members on the committee for their
bipartisan effort to find agreement on a bill that saves money and
moves forward smartly on protecting the interests of national security
for the United States.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
I rise today in support of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2013. It is a bipartisan bill that gives our intelligence
professionals the resources, capabilities, and the authorities they
need to keep our country safe. When Chairman Rogers and I took over the
leadership of the Intelligence Committee, we made a commitment to
bipartisanship. We believe politics has no place on the Intelligence
Committee. The stakes are just too high.
We also made a commitment to passing intelligence budgets to give the
intelligence community financial direction and to conduct proper
oversight. I commend Chairman Rogers for making this an open process
where we reached agreement on issues that will make this country safer
and the intelligence process more efficient.
But we also know we're facing tough economic times so we must use
every dollar wisely. This budget is about 4 percent below the enacted
levels for FY 2012. It holds personnel at last year's levels and
authorizes an initiative to achieve major efficiencies and improve
performance and information technology. We made cuts where appropriate,
eliminated redundancies, and pushed programs to come in on time and on
budget.
The bill allocates resources to critical national security
priorities: space, cybersecurity, counterintelligence, and
counterterrorism.
We restored some of the cuts to commercial satellite imagery to
ensure the warfighter and policymakers have the images they need. I
believe commercial competition is important to ensure the warfighter
and other policymakers get high-quality products while keeping costs
down. It drives innovation and provides a much-needed policy in case
there are problems with other government problems.
{time} 1430
The bill reinforces cybersecurity by protecting the intelligence
community's networks from countries like China and others trying to
steal our valuable data.
The bill also makes counterintelligence a priority by increasing
surveillance of foreign spies from countries like China, Russia, and
Iran.
The bill improves supply-chain security and adds the
counterintelligence analysts this Nation needs.
The bill enhances counterterrorism efforts to continue the fight
against al Qaeda and its affiliates around the world.
The bill increases oversight on the spending of domestic intelligence
agencies.
The bill also expands the intelligence community's capabilities
around the global to ensure the United States is capable and ready to
address the threats worldwide.
The bill authorizes the Defense Clandestine Service created by the
Department of Defense to reorganize its human intelligence collection
and partner with the CIA's National Clandestine Service.
The Democrats on the House Intelligence Committee remain committed to
giving our intelligence professionals what they need to do their jobs
while also providing proper oversight and protecting personal privacy.
Provisions offered by the minority members were accepted as part of
the chairman's mark and other amendments were adopted unanimously by
the committee.
Congresswoman Schakowsky introduced an amendment that protects the
inspector general of an intelligence agency from across-the-board cuts
to preserve their role as a watchdog of an organization. I commend Ms.
Schakowsky for her good work on this bill.
Congressman Thompson introduced an amendment to expand our efforts to
prevent drug cultivation on Federal lands. I commend Mr. Thompson for
his efforts on this bill as well.
In fact, we wouldn't be here today without the hard work of all of
the members of the Intelligence Committee. This is truly a bipartisan
product. The bill passed through markup by a margin of 19 0, a true
testament to the bipartisan spirit of the committee.
I urge my colleagues to support the Intelligence Authorization Act
for 2013. This bill ensures the Nation's intelligence community is
effective, fiscally sound, and subject to appropriate oversight.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to a
distinguished member of the committee, the gentleman from California
(Mr. Nunes).
Mr. NUNES. Mr. Chairman, today is another milestone in our work to
conduct strong oversight of the intelligence community. In just under 2
years as chairman and ranking member, the gentleman from Michigan and
[[Page H3292]]
the gentleman from Maryland have proven that the Intelligence Committee
is now really not just a bipartisan committee, but I think more
importantly a nonpartisan committee, which is why this bill passed out
of committee 19 0.
During these austere times, it is also important to not only sustain
our Nation's intelligence capabilities and provide for future needs,
but to do so in a fiscally responsible way. This bill achieves
significant savings by holding the line on authorizing spending below
last year's levels--curbs unnecessary personnel growth--and targets
intelligence investments. Included in this bill are the tools necessary
to reduce operational costs of the intelligence community's front-line
operators and provisions to conduct a house cleaning of ``back office''
operations.
Moreover, this bill ensures that acquisitions are done on cost and on
schedule while still expanding the IC community's comparative advantage
of cutting-edge research and technology.
One of the critical gaps this bill fixes is with structural
deficiencies in the CIA Inspector General's Office. We are taking steps
to allow the CIA to better recruit and retain a professional staff of
investigators. This is done by allowing the IG to designate certain
positions as law enforcement officers for retirement purposes.
Mr. Chairman, it is critical that the Congress demand accountability
and financial oversight of our classified intelligence programs. That
can only be done through consistent passage of an intelligence
authorization bill. I urge all Members to support the bill before us
today.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to my
distinguished colleague from the State of California (Mr. Thompson).
Mr. THOMPSON of California. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for
yielding, and I also thank the chairman and the ranking member for
making sure that we're able to work together to produce a document that
will benefit the entire country in regard to our national security, and
I rise in strong support of this year's Intelligence authorization
bill.
As the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Human
Intelligence, Analysis, and Counterintelligence, I'm pleased that we're
able to put this product forward, and I strongly support the bill's
emphasis on developing stronger counterintelligence capabilities
throughout the intelligence community.
Every time I travel overseas to observe operating conditions, I've
been impressed by the work being done by our intelligence personnel,
but also concerned about the increasing threats and challenges that we
face. Today, our intelligence officers are facing increasingly hostile
foreign intelligence services, insurgent groups, terrorists
organizations, industrial spies, and the threat of cyberattacks. Many
of our adversaries are working together in ways we haven't seen before.
This is no longer the Cold War world with little cameras and secret
compartments. It's now more complicated to find out how our enemies are
getting intelligence on the United States and how these same enemies
are protecting their own secrets.
To address this threat, this bill provides additional resources to
enable our intelligence community to collect better information and
provide better analysis on how our adversaries are working against us.
Second, since the emergence of the Arab Spring, our subcommittee has
been examining how the intelligence community has been identifying the
types of trends that have literally transformed countries overnight,
countries like Tunisia and Egypt.
I've heard firsthand from our intelligence personnel that they need
more to better get a handle on the dynamics in their countries and
their regions. The Arab Spring phenomenon can happen anywhere anytime,
and our intelligence community must be better prepared the next time.
This bill enables the intelligence community to rebuild its global
mission by realigning and adding to its current resources dedicated to
this collection effort. With these resources, intelligence personnel
will have more tools to identify and report signs of instability in
real-time.
This bill also includes a number of other provisions that I believe
are important to our national security. The bill requires the Director
of National Intelligence to continue compiling threat assessment of
foreign drug traffickers that are turning our public lands in the
United States into hostile areas to further their operations. This
threat assessment was first required in last year's authorization; and
given the scope of the problem, it's essential that our efforts to
combat foreign drug traffickers on our Federal property be continued.
Also, the bill restores funding for the National Gang Intelligence
Center. The analysis that the NGIC has provided on the growing gang
influence in the U.S. military, for example, is critical to finding an
adequate solution to this problem and the very reason Congress created
the NGIC in the first place. It's important that this work continue.
I am a little disappointed that we weren't able to do some things
that we all believe are necessary. For example, the expansion of the
Science, Technology, Engineering and Math cooperative programs at
colleges and universities is extremely important; and I think we need
to continue to do more to make sure that we're able to grow that
resource.
Mr. Chairman, our intelligence community must be prepared for any and
all threats. While Osama bin Laden may no longer pose a direct threat
to our country's safety and security, the remaining elements of al
Qaeda and other emerging terrorist organizations are more determined
than ever. It's critical for Congress to pass this bill, and I strongly
support that we do so today.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I would yield 2\1/2\ minutes to
the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Pompeo).
Mr. POMPEO. Mr. Chairman, I want to first start by commending
Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for their great work
on crafting this bipartisan bill, a strong piece of legislation that
addresses some tremendously important issues that face our country.
While this legislation in its detail--and we've heard the chairman
speak about it--talks about new initiatives and programs and three-
letter Agencies, this is about something different from that. This is
about protecting the American people. This is about keeping the
citizens of El Dorado and Coffeyville and Wichita and Anthony, Kansas,
safe against a staggeringly large and very real threat.
On September 11, now over a decade ago, we began to enter a very
different time, very different war. Now 15 years ago, I was serving in
the military. I served along the East German border. Then it was
different. We could see the enemy. They wore uniforms. There were
fences and boundaries. And today, we live in a very, very different
world. And this legislation, the 2013 Intelligence bill, attempts to,
in a fiscally responsible way while protecting the privacy of every
American citizen in a conscientious way, address those very real
threats.
{time} 1440
It is easy sometimes to forget--to forget from a decade ago and
forget that al Qaeda is still there, active and trying, fighting
vigorously to take down the American way of life. And to see this
thoughtful piece of legislation put together in a way that both parties
could agree to, that both parties could say this makes sense, these are
the resources we have available, we're going to do this in a fiscally
prudent way, is something that I think should encourage each of us and
cause every Member to support this legislation.
We can't allow anyone to forget that this threat is real. The gravity
and consequences of not having an active and capable intelligence set
of agencies and forces is too important. I know the chairman and
ranking member both understand this, and I want to thank them for their
work. I want to encourage each and every one of my colleagues to
support the FY 2013 Intelligence Authorization bill.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my
distinguished colleague from the State of Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin),
whom I consider one of the foremost experts in the area of
cybersecurity. Thank you for your work in that field, Mr. Langevin.
(Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
[[Page H3293]]
Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I thank both Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for
their outstanding work on this very important legislation and so many
aspects contained in it.
Last September, I proudly spoke in support of the fiscal year 2012
Intelligence authorization bill because it addressed critical
cybersecurity needs as well as many issues of great importance, not
just to me but to our country and to the men and women of our
intelligence services. I was pleased to be a part of a bipartisan
effort within the Intelligence Committee to craft that legislation and
gratified by the overwhelming bipartisan support that it garnered.
Earlier this year, the House considered the Cyber Intelligence
Sharing and Protection Act, which also received bipartisan support and,
in my opinion, is a critical first step to confront the serious
challenges our Nation faces in the realm of cybersecurity.
Now, I continue to advocate for action on CISPA and on the
comprehensive cybersecurity legislation that will ultimately be
necessary to address this issue, but today I'm proud to support H.R.
5743, the fiscal year 2013 Intelligence authorization bill because it
builds on these earlier efforts to give the U.S. intelligence community
the tools and funding it needs to meet the challenges of the future.
Just as importantly, it supports the men and women of the intelligence
community who enable those investments and keep our Nation secure.
The National Counterintelligence Executive recently warned that China
and Russia are conducting sophisticated cyberespionage against the
U.S., in addition to more traditional espionage operations. They and
other countries seek to undermine our military, technological, and
innovative edge by exploiting our vulnerabilities in the cyber realm,
in particular, our critical infrastructure. This situation presents a
pervasive threat to U.S. economic security, and I'm very sad to say
that they're having success.
The estimates on the losses to U.S. industry and government from
economic espionage range from $2 billion to over $400 billion a year.
Now, this massive spread only emphasizes that we don't yet have the
information we need to fully understand and combat this threat.
The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
Mr. LANGEVIN. The National Counterintelligence Executive cautions
that the intelligence community can't entirely prevent cybertheft of
national and industrial secrets, but the community can minimize the
hostile activity and mitigate the effects. Those efforts will be more
successful if the agencies collaborate, build public-private
partnerships, and improve intelligence collection and analysis of the
cyberthreat to our country.
The FY 2013 bill responds by giving the intelligence agencies the
resources they need to develop a strong, unified effort to counter
China, Russia, and other actors that might threaten our economic
security or technological edge. The bill also does a lot to protect our
supply chain, which is another area of vulnerability.
This is a good bill, it's an important bill, and I urge my colleagues
to support it.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I'll reserve my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my
distinguished colleague from the State of California (Mr. Schiff).
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I want to rise to
congratulate our chairman, Mr. Rogers, and our ranking member, Mr.
Ruppersberger, for their extraordinary work in putting this bill
together, and the incredible and bipartisan operation of the committee.
This work product and the committee operations I think were a model
that many of the rest of the committees on the Hill would do well to
follow.
I rise in strong support of H.R. 5743, an authorization bill that
gives our intelligence community the tools they need to keep America
safe.
I'd like to focus on the technical aspects of the bill, specifically
the intelligence community's future investments in key overhead
technologies. This is a good bill, as it makes necessary budget cuts
without affecting the mission of the intelligence community. And there
is one issue in particular I would like to highlight.
Since 9/11, we have been investigating the potential advantages of
persistent video. Current systems that simply snap pictures miss
critical dynamics of the adversary. Standard pictures limited to
capturing isolated points in time can't tell where a bad actor came
from or where they went after they committed an act of terror.
Hypothetically consider: What if we could use a video and video a
hostile area 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and during this period a
roadside bomb occurred? With a variety of capabilities, we could simply
rewind and watch the perpetrators as they planted the device and trace
their locations both before and after the device exploded. Independent
of the source--whether space, ground, or air--we simply can't do that
with still photography. Similarly, such a capacity might help us
identify proliferators of nuclear and missile technology.
I favor an approach that invests in new technologies that go beyond
our past and present capabilities. In my role as ranking member for the
Technical and Tactical Subcommittee, I work to ensure that cost,
schedule, and performance are met as we strive to explore this
potential advantage for national security.
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, again, I want to thank you for the
opportunity to express my views on this bill. I support it
wholeheartedly and recommend its passage.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my
distinguished colleague from the State of Kentucky (Mr. Chandler).
Mr. CHANDLER. First, I want to start by saying just how wonderful it
is to be a part of a committee that actually works well together, and I
thank Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for that. In
this place these days, it seems a bit unusual, but on this committee,
in my view, they are not Republicans and Democrats; there are patriots
and Americans, and I appreciate that.
I'm proud to support this bill, the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2013. This bill authorizes vital funding for our
intelligence activities which we need to protect America and American
interests.
Congress has an obligation to support intelligence gathering while
also protecting our civil liberties and considering our fiscal
responsibilities. I believe this bill does just that, ensuring that we
have resources and tools needed to keep our country safe even in this
tough economic time.
We live in complicated times, when terrorists can execute a
cyberattack from halfway around the world, bringing down a nation's
infrastructure or compromising individuals' identities and bank
accounts. Now, more than ever before, our intelligence capabilities are
critical to the safety and security of our country.
In my tenure on the Intelligence Committee, I've had the privilege of
working with the fine men and women of the intelligence community, and
I'm here to tell you they are committed patriots who protect our Nation
and our way of life every day. I cannot overstate how important the
work they do is to the safety of our Nation.
This bill, which passed out of the committee with overwhelming
bipartisan support, allocates resources to critical national programs,
including those that detect, prevent, and disrupt terrorist attacks
against Americans. It enhances counterterrorism efforts to continue the
fight against al Qaeda and its affiliates around the world.
Furthermore, this bill shows the committee's commitment to giving our
intelligence professionals what they need to do their jobs while
providing oversight and protecting personal privacy.
The world just saw how first-rate our intelligence community is after
the successful mission to kill Osama bin Laden last year. This
legislation ensures that we can continue to have the world's premiere
intelligence capabilities.
Again, I thank the chairman and I thank the ranking member for the
tremendous way that they cause the committee to work together. It's an
honor
[[Page H3294]]
to serve on this committee, and I thank you.
{time} 1450
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, can I ask how much time each side
has remaining?
The CHAIR. The gentleman from Maryland has 15 minutes remaining. The
gentleman from Michigan has 18 minutes remaining.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time,
also.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I have one more speaker who is
on his way to the floor, I understand, so I continue to reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
I'm proud that the bill under consideration has an emphasis on
supporting counterintelligence resources. Last year, the chairman and I
made it a priority to review the community's counterintelligence
posture after learning more about the aggressive ways foreign
intelligence and security services continue to steal U.S. secrets,
including trade secrets, from U.S. companies.
One of the most disturbing reports came from the National
Counterintelligence Executive which said that Russia and China are both
aggressively utilizing cyberspace to steal U.S. economic secrets. This
informative unclassified report is available on the Director of
National Intelligence Web site. I encourage every U.S. business to read
it to understand the threat they face today. The hard work and money it
takes to innovate and conduct research are all at risk.
What China, Russia, and any other country who engage in espionage
realize is that it's faster and cheaper to steal U.S. creativity than
to develop it themselves. The report also gives examples of the
millions of dollars that are at stake, like a single proprietary paint
formula from Valspar valued at $20 million. These are some economic
impacts of espionage, but they are also the cost to our national
security and those of our allies.
A spy within our intelligence community, with access to our most
sensitive secrets, can mean the lives of our sources and our troops. In
these cases, it is impossible to calculate the impact. Espionage is
countered by the villages of our counterintelligence professionals.
These are the people we depend upon to discover the spies within our
midst. I'm proud that this bill adds the resources and personnel for
this critical mission.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the
gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Heck).
Mr. HECK. Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of H.R. 5743, the
Fiscal Year 2013 Intelligence Authorization Act.
This bill strikes the appropriate balance between the necessity for
fiscal restraint and providing our intelligence community the resources
they need so that they can continue to play a vital role in our
national security. This is especially true in the technical collection
systems that are the focus of the Subcommittee on Technical and
Tactical Intelligence.
H.R. 5743 puts the focus on how well our entire technical collection
architecture systems work together. In the past, we have had a tendency
to focus on a few large acquisition programs and not on the total
capability that all systems bring to the nation. This bill leverages
advancements in technology by making changes that are focused on
ensuring collection platforms work together to simultaneously collect
and correlate data.
Additionally, through funding for the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency programs, this bill incrementally advances the
ability to coordinate collection across a diverse set of collection
platforms that are fielded by the intelligence and military
communities.
H.R. 5743 also takes an important first step toward reducing the cost
of launch, and encourages the further development of commercial launch
services. While the cost of getting to space has not traditionally been
the focus of the intelligence community, these essential reforms will
allow us to reallocate these savings to our Nation's core intelligence
missions.
Mr. Chairman, again I urge support of H.R. 5743. I thank the chairman
and the ranking member for their leadership on this issue.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may
consume.
For the third time in 3 years, Chairman Rogers and I have stood on
the floor of the House encouraging our colleagues to support our
intelligence budget bill. We both rise in support of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. I would like to thank Chairman
Rogers for his bipartisan leadership on this bill.
The bill gives our intelligence professionals the resources,
capabilities, and authorities they need to protect American and
American interests. We crafted a bill that addresses our core needs,
including space, cybersecurity, counterintelligence, and
counterterrorism, while also keeping an eye on the bottom line. This
bill is about 4 percent below last year's budget and holds personnel at
last year's levels.
The Intelligence Committee came together as Democrats and Republicans
to do what is right for our country and for the intelligence community.
The bill unanimously passed out of our committee by a margin of 19 0.
I would also like to thank the staff of the Intelligence Committee
for their hard work on this bill. You're only as good as your team and
your staff.
I urge my colleagues to support the Intelligence Authorization Act
for FY 2013.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as
I may consume.
I, too, want to thank the ranking member for his bipartisan
leadership on this very, very important issue, our national security,
and the staffs of both committees. We did something very unusual. We
have the staffs work together to produce an authorization bill, and we
think it makes a much better product with a lot more voices in the mix.
We think we have gotten to a place that will protect America and save
money for the taxpayers. That's a good place to be.
And at the end of the day, this is about a very serious issue. It's
about the fact that we have folks all around the world who are getting
up in the morning trying to commit acts of violence against U.S.
citizens or our allies. It's about nation-states who want to steal the
very prosperity of America by stealing our intellectual property
through spying or cyberspying. It's about nation-states who are making
an investment in cyberattack capability that would actually cause
catastrophic harm to the United States economy. It is about nation-
states who are engaged in the development of nuclear weapons for
certainly no good purpose.
In the nineties we had a peace dividend because the structure of the
threat changed fundamentally, and we could rearrange the way we looked
at the world and our defense posture and our national security posture
around the world. And I think this is a good moment to caution where we
go in the future.
This is not like the nineties. We don't enjoy the same peace dividend
in the sense that the world is more complicated and, in many ways, more
dangerous than it has ever been before. Those intelligence services are
getting aggressive. Our adversaries are getting better. They are
investing in space and cyber in a way that is breathtaking if we don't
keep pace. We don't have to spend dollar for dollar, but we do have to
match intellectual capital with the solutions that we need to keep
America safe.
The very brave men and women who risk their lives all over the globe
to protect our soldiers by providing them state-of-the-art and up-to-
date information, or by recruiting somebody in a very dangerous place
somewhere else that might give us that little bit of advantage in
knowing what our adversaries are up to, we owe a great debt of
gratitude to those very brave Americans who risk their lives every
single day in defense of this Nation. They are silent and quiet
warriors, but deserve no less of our appreciation and gratitude for
faithful service to this great Nation.
This bill reflects that, and it reflects the important status that we
are going
[[Page H3295]]
to have to take in the intelligence community when it comes to
protecting America in what is promising to be a dangerous future when
it comes to our adversaries. This bill, we think, takes head-on those
new challenges, so that America can be equally prosperous in the future
and as safe as we have ever been.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chair, today I rise in support of H.R. 5743, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. This bipartisan
bill, which was reported by the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence by a unanimous 19 0 vote, provides funding and policy
guidance to the America's intelligence community. Few bills are as
important to our nation's security as this one.
H.R. 5743 provides the necessary resources to vital security
programs, many of which focus on detecting and preventing terrorist
attacks. It is critical that America maintains its qualitative security
edge with respect to intelligence gathering, data analysis, and
counter-terrorism. This bill would ensure that happens.
I recognize that given these challenging economic circumstances,
difficult choices have to be made. This has led the Committee to
authorize funding for intelligence activities at level that is four
percent below last year's enacted budget. I appreciate the way Chairman
Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger have worked together in an
effort to fashion a bill that strikes an appropriate balance.
The committee has made fiscally responsible choices when deciding
where to cut funding, eliminating redundancies and directing that other
programs be managed more efficiently.
Mr. Chair, for obvious reasons many of the programs authorized by
this legislation cannot be discussed publicly. However, these programs
are subjected to congressional oversight and scrutiny by the
Intelligence Committee, which takes seriously obligation to ensure that
the programs authorized under this legislation and the officials who
administer them operate within constitutional and legal bounds.
I am pleased that the bill also contains provisions to strengthen the
protection of the identities of covert agencies, to combat attempts by
other countries to buy technology that could be used to develop weapons
of mass destruction, and to enhance our counterterrorism efforts. As a
member of the Committee on Homeland Security I know how important it is
to make counterintelligence and counterterrorism efforts priorities.
It is a sad truth that we live in an age where our most pressing
concern is the imminent threat of another terrorist attack. Our enemy
does not respond to logic or reason, and therefore we must be prepared
for every situation.
Mr. Chair, I support this bill because I am persuaded that it
furthers the nation's security interests and is the right thing to do.
I urge my colleagues to join me in voting for H.R. 5743.
The CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute
recommended by the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed
in the bill, shall be considered as an original bill for the purpose of
amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered read.
The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is
as follows:
H.R. 5743
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Non-reimbursable details.
Sec. 304. Strategy for security clearance reciprocity.
Sec. 305. Repeal or modification of certain reporting requirements.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Sec. 401. Clarification on authority of CIA to transfer funds to CIA
activities authorized by law.
Sec. 402. Authorities of the Inspector General for the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 403. Working capital fund.
Sec. 404. Intelligence community assistance to counter drug trafficking
organizations using public lands.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 501. Extension of National Commission for the Review of the
Research and Development Programs of the United States
Intelligence Community.
Sec. 502. Technical amendment to title 5, United States Code.
Sec. 503. Technical amendment to the National Security Act of 1947.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2013 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and,
subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as
of September 30, 2013, for the conduct of the intelligence
activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through
(16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill
H.R. 5743 of the One Hundred Twelfth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--
(1) Availability to committees of congress.--The classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a)
shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and to the President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of
the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate
portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--In carrying out paragraph (2),
the President may disclose only that budget-related
information necessary to execute the classified Schedule of
Authorizations and shall not disclose the Schedule or any
portion of the Schedule publicly.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Increases.--With the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director
of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian
personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year
2013 by the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to
in section 102(a) if the Director of National Intelligence
determines that such action is necessary to the performance
of important intelligence functions, except that the number
of personnel employed in excess of the number authorized
under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of
civilian personnel authorized under such Schedule for such
element.
(b) Authority for Conversion of Activities Performed by
Contract Personnel.--
(1) In general.--In addition to the authority in subsection
(a) and subject to paragraph (2), if the head of an element
of the intelligence community makes a determination that
activities currently being performed by contract personnel
should be performed by employees of such element, the
Director of National Intelligence, in order to reduce a
comparable number of contract personnel, may authorize for
that purpose employment of additional full-time equivalent
personnel in such element equal to the number of full-time
equivalent contract personnel performing such activities.
(2) Concurrence and approval.--The authority described in
paragraph (1) may not be exercised unless the Director of
National Intelligence concurs with the determination
described in such paragraph.
[[Page H3296]]
(c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The
Director of National Intelligence shall notify the
congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15
days prior to each exercise of an authority described in
subsection (a).
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2013 the sum of $530,652,000. Within such amount, funds
identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2014.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of
National Intelligence are authorized 831 full-time or full-
time equivalent personnel as of September 30, 2013. Personnel
serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel
detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are
authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management
Account for fiscal year 2013 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for
advanced research and development shall remain available
until September 30, 2014.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30,
2013, there are authorized such additional personnel for the
Community Management Account as of that date as are specified
in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 102(a).
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2013 the sum of $514,000,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 303. NON-REIMBURSABLE DETAILS.
Section 113A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 404h 1) is amended--
(1) by striking ``An officer or employee of the United
States or member of the Armed Forces'' and inserting ``(a)
Civilian Employees.--An officer or employee of the United
States'';
(2) by striking the second sentence; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subsections:
``(b) Members of the Armed Forces.--A member of the Armed
Forces may be detailed to the staff of an element of the
intelligence community funded through the National
Intelligence Program on a non-reimbursable basis, as jointly
agreed to by the head of the receiving and detailing
elements, for a period not to exceed three years.
``(c) No Limitation on Other Authority.--This section does
not limit any other source of authority for or non-
reimbursable details.
``(d) No Effect on Appropriations.--A non-reimbursable
detail made under this section shall not be considered an
augmentation of the appropriations of the element of the
intelligence community receiving such detail.''.
SEC. 304. STRATEGY FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE RECIPROCITY.
(a) Strategy.--The President shall develop a strategy and a
timeline for carrying out the requirements of section 3001(d)
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b(d)). Such strategy and timeline shall
include--
(1) a process for accomplishing the reciprocity required
under such section for a security clearance issued by a
department or agency of the Federal Government, including
reciprocity for security clearances that are issued to both
persons who are and who are not employees of the Federal
Government; and
(2) a description of the specific circumstances under which
a department or agency of the Federal Government may not
recognize a security clearance issued by another department
or agency of the Federal Government.
(b) Congressional Notification.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall inform Congress of the strategy and timeline developed
under subsection (a).
SEC. 305. REPEAL OR MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Repeal of Reporting Requirements.--
(1) Acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass
destruction and advanced conventional munitions.--Section 721
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997
(50 U.S.C. 2366) is repealed.
(2) Threat of attack on the united states using weapons of
mass destruction and the safety and security of russian
nuclear facilities and nuclear military forces.--Section 114
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i) is
amended--
(A) in the heading, by striking ``additional annual reports
from the director of national intelligence'' and inserting
``annual report on hiring and retention of minority
employees'';
(B) by striking subsections (a), (c), and (d);
(C) by striking ``(b) Annual Report on Hiring and Retention
of Minority Employees.--'';
(D) by redesignating paragraphs (1) through (5) as
subsections (a) through (e), respectively;
(E) in subsection (b) (as so redesignated)--
(i) by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), as
paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively; and
(ii) in paragraph (2) (as so redesignated), by
redesignating clauses (i) and (ii) as subparagraphs (A) and
(B), respectively; and
(F) in subsection (e) (as redesignated by subparagraph
(D)), by redesignating subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C), as
paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively.
(3) Measures to protect the identities of covert agents.--
Title VI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421
et seq.) is amended--
(A) by striking section 603; and
(B) by redesignating sections 604, 605, and 606 as sections
603, 604, and 605, respectively.
(b) Modification of Reporting Requirements.--
(1) Intelligence advisory committees.--Section 410(b) of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
(Public Law 111 259; 124 Stat. 2725) is amended to read as
follows:
``(b) Notification of Establishment of Advisory
Committee.--The Director of National Intelligence and the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall each notify
the congressional intelligence committees each time each such
Director creates an advisory committee. Each notification
shall include--
``(1) a description of such advisory committee, including
the subject matter of such committee;
``(2) a list of members of such advisory committee; and
``(3) in the case of an advisory committee created by the
Director of National Intelligence, the reasons for a
determination by the Director under section 4(b)(3) of the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App) that an
advisory committee cannot comply with the requirements of
such Act.''.
(2) Customer feedback on department of homeland security
intelligence reporting.--Section 210A(g)(2) of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 124h) is amended--
(A) by inserting ``and the Select Committee on
Intelligence'' after ``Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs''; and
(B) by inserting ``and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence'' after ``and the Committee on Homeland
Security''.
(3) Intelligence information sharing.--Section 102A(g)(4)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403 1(g)(4))
is amended to read as follows:
``(4) The Director of National Intelligence shall, in a
timely manner, report to Congress any statute, regulation,
policy, or practice that the Director believes impedes the
ability of the Director to fully and effectively ensure
maximum availability of access to intelligence information
within the intelligence community consistent with the
protection of the national security of the United States.''.
(c) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Report submission dates.--Section 507 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)--
(i) by striking ``(1) The date'' and inserting ``The
date'';
(ii) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking
``subsection (c)(1)(A)'' and inserting ``subsection (c)(1)'';
(iii) by striking paragraph (2);
(iv) by striking subparagraphs (A) and (C);
(v) in subparagraph (G), by striking ``114(c)'' and
inserting ``114''; and
(vi) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (D), (E), (F),
(G), (H), and (I), as paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4), (5),
(6), and (7), respectively; and
(B) in subsection (c)(1)--
(i) by striking ``(A) Except as provided'' and inserting
``Except as provided''; and
(ii) by striking subparagraph (B).
(2) Table of contents of the national security act of
1947.--The table of contents in the first section of the
National Security Act of 1947 is amended--
(A) by striking the item relating to section 114 and
inserting the following new item:
``Sec. 114. Annual report on hiring and retention of minority
employees.''; and
(B) by striking the items relating to sections 603, 604,
605, and 606 and inserting the following new items:
``Sec. 603. Extraterritorial jurisdiction.
``Sec. 604. Providing information to Congress.
``Sec. 605. Definitions.''.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION ON AUTHORITY OF CIA TO TRANSFER FUNDS
TO CIA ACTIVITIES AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``any of
the functions or activities authorized under section 104A of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403
[[Page H3297]]
4a).'' and inserting ``any functions or activities of the
Agency authorized by law''.
SEC. 402. AUTHORITIES OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
Section 17(e)(7) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(e)(7)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Subject to applicable law'' and inserting
``(A) Subject to applicable law''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(B)(i) The Inspector General may designate an officer or
employee appointed in accordance with subparagraph (A) as a
law enforcement officer solely for purposes of subchapter III
of chapter 83 or chapter 84 of title 5, United States Code,
if such officer or employee is appointed to a position in
which the duty is to investigate suspected offenses against
the criminal laws of the United States.
``(ii) In carrying out clause (i), the Inspector General
shall ensure that any authority under such clause is
exercised in a manner consistent with the provisions of
section 3307 of title 5, United States Code, as they relate
to law enforcement officers.
``(iii) For purposes of applying sections 3307(d), 8335(b),
and 8425(b) of title 5, United States Code, the Inspector
General may exercise the functions, powers, and duties of an
agency head or appointing authority with respect to the
Office.''.
SEC. 403. WORKING CAPITAL FUND.
Section 21 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
(50 U.S.C. 403u) is amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(1)--
(A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting a semicolon;
(B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period and
inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(D) authorize such providers to advertise through Federal
Government-owned websites the services of such providers to
the entities to which such providers are providing items
under the program, provided that the Director shall not
authorize such providers to distribute gifts or promotional
items.''; and
(2) in subsection (c)--
(A) in paragraph (2)(E), by striking ``equipment or
property'' and inserting ``equipment, recyclable materials,
or property''; and
(B) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ``subsection (f)(2)''
and inserting ``subsections (b)(1)(D) and (f)(2)''.
SEC. 404. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE TO COUNTER DRUG
TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS USING PUBLIC LANDS.
Section 401(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112 87; 125 Stat. 1887) is
amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
(1) by inserting ``and annually thereafter,'' after ``Not
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act,'';
(2) by striking ``submit to'' and inserting ``inform'';
(3) by striking ``a report on the results'' and inserting
``of the results''; and
(4) by striking ``Such report'' and inserting ``Information
provided under this subsection''.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 501. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF
THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 1007 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107 306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note) is
amended by striking ``Not later than one year after the date
on which all members of the Commission are appointed pursuant
to section 701(a)(3) of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010'' and inserting ``Not later than March
31, 2013''.
SEC. 502. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE.
Section 3132(a)(1)(B) of title 5, United States Code, is
amended by inserting ``, the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence'' after ``the Central Intelligence
Agency''.
SEC. 503. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF
1947.
Section 605 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
426) (as redesignated by section 305 of this Act) is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (4)--
(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``intelligence
agency'' each place it appears and inserting ``element of the
intelligence community'';
(B) in subparagraph (B)(i), by striking ``intelligence
agency'' and inserting ``element of the intelligence
community''; and
(C) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``intelligence
agency'' and inserting ``element of the intelligence
community'';
(2) by striking paragraph (5);
(3) by redesignating paragraphs (6) through (10) as
paragraphs (5) through (9), respectively; and
(4) in paragraph (5) (as so redesignated), by striking
``intelligence agency'' and inserting ``element of the
intelligence community''.
The CHAIR. No amendment to the committee amendment in the nature of a
substitute shall be in order except those printed in House Report 112
504. Each amendment may be offered only in the order printed in the
report, by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered read,
shall be debatable for the time specified in the report equally divided
and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject
to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the
question.
Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan
The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in
House Report 112 504.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk
made in order under the rule, amendment No. 1.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Strike section 401 (page 18, lines 4 through 12).
Strike section 403 (page 19, line 13 through page 20, line
11).
The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 667, the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as
I might consume.
Mr. Chairman, this is a manager's amendment to the bill, and very
simply--and I don't want to waste a lot of time on it--it would simply
strike two technical provisions to allow us to resolve any potential
issues going forward.
There were two technical issues that were deemed by the
Parliamentarian as appropriation language. We just wanted to take that
language out to make sure that there were no issues. It doesn't change
the nature of the bill in any way, and it has bipartisan support. I
would urge the body's support of the Rogers amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
{time} 1500
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I rise in opposition to the amendment, but I do
support the amendment.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Thompson of California
The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed in
House Report 112 504.
Mr. THOMPSON of California. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the
desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title III, add the following new section:
SEC. 306. SUBCONTRACTOR NOTIFICATION PROCESS.
Not later than October 1, 2013, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report assessing the method by which contractors
at any tier under a contract entered into with an element of
the intelligence community are granted security clearances
and notified of classified contracting opportunities within
the Federal Government and recommendations for the
improvement of such method. Such report shall include--
(1) an assessment of the current method by which
contractors at any tier under a contract entered into with an
element of the intelligence community are notified of
classified contracting opportunities;
(2) an assessment of any problems that may reduce the
overall effectiveness of the ability of the intelligence
community to identify appropriate contractors at any tier
under such a contract;
(3) an assessment of the role the existing security
clearance process has in enhancing or hindering the ability
of the intelligence community to notify such contractors of
contracting opportunities;
(4) an assessment of the role the current security
clearance process in enhancing or hindering the ability of
contractors at any tier under a contract entered into with an
element of the intelligence community to execute classified
contracts;
(5) a description of the method used by the Director of
National Intelligence for assessing the effectiveness of the
notification process of the intelligence community to produce
a talented pool of subcontractors;
(6) a description of appropriate goals, schedules,
milestones, or metrics used to measure the effectiveness of
such notification process; and
(7) recommendations for improving such notification
process.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 667, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Thompson) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
[[Page H3298]]
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. THOMPSON of California. I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
My amendment will help small businesses that have the proper security
clearances to better navigate the intelligence community's contracting
process, and will ensure that they get a fair shot at business
opportunities should these companies have the technical expertise and
capabilities needed. This change will be good for small businesses and
will strengthen our national security.
Second- and third-tier contractors produce highly specialized
technology for the intelligence community, but work directly for larger
companies. These small businesses have extraordinary talent and
expertise, but often find themselves excluded from many business
opportunities with the larger intelligence community because, for
example, they lack access to the classified databases where these
opportunities are presented. Sometimes that access is as simple as a
computer connection for cleared experts to review contracting
opportunities.
By limiting small businesses that have the appropriate security
clearances from these contracting opportunities, we all lose. The
intelligence community loses access to the best technical solutions by
limiting who is able to fulfill or to even bid for those contracts.
Small businesses lose the opportunity to display their expertise and to
expand their companies. As important, the taxpayer loses by virtue of a
lack of market competition and is given no assurance that the
government is getting the best price for its classified contract
requirements.
My amendment addresses this problem by requiring an assessment of the
IC's current contracting practices and a review of these practices to
determine if they present unfair barriers to competition for small
businesses. In particular, my amendment requires the Director of
National Intelligence to report to Congress how the intelligence
community is currently working with second- and third-tier contractors
and to identify any problems that may reduce the overall effectiveness
of this contracting process. In this report, the DNI will be required
to offer recommendations to improve the methods by which second- and
third-tier contractors are granted security clearances and notified of
classified contracting opportunities.
Mr. Chairman, second- and third-tier contractors who support the
technical efforts of the intelligence community are an underutilized
asset. These same second-and third-tier contractors are also small
businesses that many of our communities depend upon for jobs and for
the economies in their local areas. My amendment ensures that the
intelligence community is getting access to the best available
technology while ensuring that small businesses around the country have
a fair shot at expanding their companies.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment, and I reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, while I do not oppose the
amendment, I rise to control the time in opposition.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized for 5
minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I want to thank Mr. Thompson for working with us, not only on the
overall bill, but on any amendment that might strengthen the process. I
am committed to continue to work with Mr. Thompson on these very
issues, and I would support the amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. THOMPSON of California. I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from California (Mr. Thompson).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Conyers
The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 printed in
House Report 112 504.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title III, add the following new section:
SEC. 306. REPORT ON CONSEQUENCES OF MILITARY STRIKE AGAINST
IRAN.
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report
containing an assessment of the consequences of a military
strike against Iran.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 667, the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. CONYERS. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman and Members, I rise in support of this amendment with my
colleagues Mr. Ellison of Minnesota and Ms. Lee of California. Our
amendment would require the Director of National Intelligence to submit
to the congressional Intelligence Committee within 60 days a report
containing an analysis of the potential consequences of a military
strike against Iran.
In recent months, the possibility of a preemptive military strike
against Iran has been openly discussed as a policy option of last
resort as our country and our allies determine how best to confront the
challenge posed by Iran's nuclear program. At the same time, the
national discussion has prompted a large number of current and former
military and intelligence officials to come forward to encourage the
Congress and the administration to consider the possible consequences
both intended and others that may be unintended of such a strike.
These high-level officials include former United States and Israeli
national security officials, including a former Bush administration
National Intelligence Council chairman, a former National Intelligence
officer for the Near East and South Asia, General Colin Powell's former
chief of staff, five retired generals, the former director of the
Israeli Mossad, and a former chief of staff of the Israel Defense
Forces.
All of these experts have raised concerns that an attack on Iran
could possibly result in serious harm to the global economy,
potentially ignite a regional war and even push Iran into building a
nuclear weapon. With consequences as serious as these being raised by
outside and former national security experts, it is critical that the
expertise and collective wisdom of our intelligence community be added
to this debate so that our country's policy options involving war and
peace can be rigorously examined by this body.
For these reasons, I encourage my colleagues to support my amendment,
and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, while I do not oppose the
amendment, I rise to control the time in opposition.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized for 5
minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
This is an interesting amendment. This is something that we do as a
matter of course in the committee, and it is as serious a matter as we
consider: issues of war. It is also interesting that the consequences
of a nuclear Iran are not a part of this. We would encourage that to
happen, and we will engage in that discussion in the committee. A
nuclear arms race in the Middle East is a catastrophe that is the worst
part of a nightmare. Saudi Arabia has said, Hey, if Iran goes nuclear,
we very well can't not go nuclear.
We believe that other nations--Turkey, Egypt, others--have said it's
probably in our best interests not to be the ones without a nuclear
weapon program if Iran gets a nuclear weapon. The proliferation of
nuclear weapons across the Middle East is dangerous, incredibly
dangerous. That's one outcome. We also have to consider that outcome as
well.
{time} 1510
Think about where Israel is today. This is a talk about U.S. action
against Iran, something that we should consider. We should be very
careful about all of those considerations. Now think about Israel and
what they may or may not have to do when it comes to taking out a
nuclear weapon program where they know one of its destinations will
impact the very existence of the people of Israel. They live in a
dangerous neighborhood. Egypt is now an uncertain partner in peace.
There is violence
[[Page H3299]]
breaking out in the Sinai because of the turmoil and the changes
happening in Egypt. Hamas is well armed, as well armed as we have ever
seen them, with missiles aimed at Israel. Hezbollah has about 30,000--
the public number--we believe of very accurate missile systems pointed
at Israel. Iran is moving and marching forward. Clearly the IAEA just
recently reported a 27 percent enrichment rate on traces of uranium.
That doesn't get you to the all-important 95, but it crosses a very
critical threshold and a dangerous one, that 20 percent enrichment
rate. That is a dangerous place for them to be. You hit 20, it's a lot
easier to get to 95.
They have certainly shown that they are bad actors in the world. We
should consider that as well, and we do in the Intelligence Committee.
Imagine the fact that somebody would make the calculation, a nation-
state, to assassinate an ambassador of another nation in our Nation's
capital. And if they killed U.S. civilians, so be it.
We have seen a proliferation of these types of attacks from Iran.
They haven't been very good at it yet. We've caught most of them. But
they're learning from every event. And it's happening in places like
Turkey, Pakistan, Argentina, and other places around the world. We are
in a scary place indeed.
I won't oppose this amendment, but we need to look at this in total.
I will tell you that if you want to stop Iran from getting a nuclear
weapons program, we have to step up. We're doing a fine job on the
sanctions now--thanks to this body leading the way for sanctions
working--but they also have to believe that military options are on the
table. If they do not believe it, they'll continue down this path that
is dangerous for the national security interests of the United States,
of the Middle East, and indeed the world. Nuclear weapons in the hands
of rogue elements is a thing that keeps me up every single night. I
can't imagine that arms race in the Middle East making the job of
stopping that any easier indeed.
I will not oppose this amendment, but I do think it's important that
we put it in all of the context of the threat that a nuclear Iran
poses, not just to the Middle East but to the world.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Conyers. And I want to thank
the chair as well for accepting the amendment, and I rise in support of
the amendment.
I think that Chairman Rogers' concerns are well stated. I know that
the security of this country is something that you're committed to, as
am I. This amendment, I think, will help slow down the rush towards war
by asking those who are involved in our intelligence gathering to focus
on just what a war with Iran will mean.
I've been studying this in terms of the effects because we had a
discussion a few years ago in Congress about the potential of bunker
busters being used, and I looked at that and consulted with medical
scientists who told me that a bunker buster would cause radiation to go
hundreds, even thousands, of miles not only through Iran, but outside
the country and into other countries, as well. It would be a major
health catastrophe with a lot of innocent people killed.
We have to think of the broad impact here of a potential attack. And
I think that it's good that you're including this in the bill.
Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the ranking member and the
chairman of the Intelligence Committee for their concern about this
phase of intelligence, and I hope to enjoy their support and the
support of the committee as a whole in having this amendment added to
the work that is going on here today.
I urge support of the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my
time.
Ms. LEE of California. Mr. Chair, first, let me thank my esteemed
colleague Congressman John Conyers for giving me the opportunity to
speak on this important amendment.
I would also like to recognize Congressman Keith Ellison who has been
an outstanding leader on issues affecting the Middle East.
Mr. Chair, first let me say unequivocally that we can all agree that
we must work to prevent an Iran armed with nuclear weapons--which would
never be unacceptable.
That is not what this amendment is about, this amendment is
noncontroversial.
This amendment is really just about common sense.
It would simply require that the National Intelligence Director give
Congress a report outlining their assessment of the consequences of
launching a military strike against Iran.
This amendment is necessary because, once again we hear very loudly
the drum beat of war.
If we have learned anything from the past ten years, it is that we
have to be deliberate, be thoughtful, be careful, and know exactly what
we are getting ourselves into before we launch another war in the
Middle East.
These decisions should not be taken lightly, and they must be based
on sound reasoning, and the best information, and the best
intelligence.
We have a duty to our brave men and women in uniform who have
sacrificed so much during the past decade of war to have an informed
debate about the consequences of military action.
I urge you to vote ``yes'' on this amendment.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Conyers).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Farr
The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed in
House Report 112 504 as modified by the order of the House of today.
Mr. FARR. I have an amendment at the desk made in order by the rule.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title III, add the following new section:
SEC. 306. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE CONSIDERATION OF FOREIGN
LANGUAGES AND CULTURES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CYBER TOOLS BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
It is the sense of Congress that the head of each element
of the intelligence community should take into consideration
foreign languages and cultures during the development by such
element of the intelligence community of training, tools, and
methodologies to protect the networks of the United States
against cyber attacks and intrusions from foreign entities.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 667, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Farr) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. FARR. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. FARR asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. FARR. I want to thank our colleagues on this committee. Those of
us who are not on the committee have the opportunity to share in
participating in the debate on this bill and voting for it. I have to
say over the years I've been here, I don't think this bill has been
brought to the floor in such bipartisan unity as it has this session. I
want to congratulate both of them for their leadership.
Mr. Chairman, I also want to point out with this amendment that
cyberanalysis is a relatively new field to the intelligence community.
Training and tool development have focused on computer networks, but
it's also important to understand the plans and intentions of foreign
actors who are involved in cyberattacks and intrusions.
How do we best understand foreign plans and intentions? Is it by
providing some aspects of foreign language and cultural training to
intelligent professionals that includes cyberanalysts? This training is
essential because it helps the intelligence community to understand the
behavior of our potential adversaries. It helps them anticipate the
actions that they may be taking, and it helps them develop potential
allies.
The traditional missions of the intelligence community have undergone
many changes, and the community must invest in new tools and develop
creative ways to train its men and women. My amendment is necessary
because the intelligence community department heads are not as focused
as they should be on the gaps in foreign language skills and cultural
knowledge in the workforce.
The intelligence community provides specialized training for its men
and women in foreign languages and culture, in analysis, in
cybersecurity. However, aspects of all these areas should be brought
together as a part of the toolkit for cyberanalysts to best meet our
Nation's challenges.
[[Page H3300]]
My amendment will not cause undue burden to the intelligence
community. It will serve as an essential reminder to those whose
decisions impact training and tool development to remember the value
and importance of including foreign languages and cultural knowledge in
all aspects of our intelligence mission.
I know of no opposition to my amendment, and I would hope that it
would be supported by both sides of the aisle.
I reserve the balance of my time.
When we talk about critical STEM knowledge and skills for our Intel
workforce, we should also be talking about STEM L, which combines STEM
with foreign language.
STEM is Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math. Including foreign
language and culture training with STEM would create a power-house
workforce for the Intelligence Community.
For example, just as cyber analysts should understand some aspects of
foreign language and culture, language and intelligence analysts should
also have some understanding of computer network concepts and
technology.
The Intelligence Community trains its workforce in STEM and foreign
language, but not together. The training is stove-piped by career
field.
This does not suggest that all types of intelligence analysts need to
be experts in STEM or even in a foreign language. However, the
Intelligence Community should consider exploring cross-pollination of
knowledge.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, while I do not oppose the
amendment, I ask unanimous consent to control the time in opposition.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized for 5
minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to
applaud the gentleman for his work. We look forward to working with him
as we move forward, and I will support the amendment.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. FARR. Thank you for your support, and I yield back the balance of
my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from California (Mr. Farr).
The amendment was agreed to.
{time} 1520
Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Cuellar
The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed in
House Report 112 504.
Mr. CUELLAR. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title IV, add the following new section:
SEC. 405. INTELLIGENCE SHARING WITH MEXICO AND CANADA.
(a) Authorization.--The Director of National Intelligence
may--
(1) if the Director determines that the sharing of
intelligence information with Mexico and Canada for purposes
of reducing drug trafficking would not threaten national
security, allow the sharing of such intelligence information
with Mexico and Canada; and
(2) make use of intelligence information from Mexico and
Canada for such purposes.
(b) Type of Information.--Information shared or used under
subsection (a) may include the movements of drug cartels and
other criminal behavior.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 667, the gentleman from Texas
(Mr. Cuellar) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. CUELLAR. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise today and encourage my colleagues to support my
amendment to the Intelligence Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2013.
Particularly, I want to thank Chairman Rogers and our ranking member,
Mr. Ruppersberger, for their bipartisan approach on this particular
piece of legislation.
My amendment would authorize the Director of National Intelligence to
participate in information sharing with the Republic of Mexico and
Canada for the purposes of border security and combating drug
trafficking and any related crimes.
Nothing in this amendment requires the Director of National
Intelligence to share their information, but based on this information,
this amendment simply gives the agency the power to do so in the event
that the Director sees the real benefit in combating the flow of drugs
throughout the United States and our neighbors.
This important amendment will go a long way in making sure that our
northern and southern neighbors have all the tools we can offer to stop
the violence and trafficking caused by drug cartels. The Republic of
Mexico, Canada, and the United States share a deep concern over the
threat to our societies by drug trafficking and other criminal
organizations operating on both sides of our common borders. The
growing operational and financial capabilities of criminal groups that
traffic in drugs, arms, persons, as well as transnational criminal
activity, pose a clear and present threat to our lives and the well-
being of U.S., Canadian, and Mexican citizens.
North America must make it a priority to break the power and impunity
of drug and criminal organizations that threaten the health and public
safety of their citizens and the stability and security of the region.
Both the Canadian and Mexican Governments are profoundly committed to
the concerted bilateral strategic and tactical cooperation necessary to
combat effectively this criminal activity, particularly the threat it
presents to our Nation's youth and the importance of having adequate
access to intelligence information.
This amendment will make whatever intelligence gathered by the United
States that can be shared, will be shared to stop the flow of illegal
drugs. In addition, this amendment will ensure that whatever
intelligence gathered by our neighbors can be properly used by our law
enforcement to make sure that we stop the drugs.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I certainly want to say that I do appreciate,
again, the work of our ranking member, the chairman. I hope that the
chairman is supportive of this amendment, and I certainly want to thank
all the committee members.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, while I do not oppose the
amendment, I ask unanimous consent to control the time in opposition.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized for 5
minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I want to compliment the gentleman for his work in bringing attention
to this very important issue.
We have a serious problem on our southern border with our friend,
neighbor, and ally, Mexico. They are under siege by organized criminal
narcotrafficking organizations.
If you have just looked at the sheer death count and the murder and
mayhem in some of the provinces along our southern border, it is
shocking; and I think this will serve to at least make an advance on
trying to help our southern neighbors get a handle on what is a serious
and growing violent problem to our neighbor to the south. And I commend
the gentleman and look forward to working with him in the future on
this very important issue, and I would support the amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. CUELLAR. Again, I want to thank Chairman Rogers for his work, our
ranking member also, and the committee staff. Thank you for the
support.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Cuellar).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 6 Offered by Ms. Hahn
The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed in
House Report 112 504 as modified by the order of the House of today.
Ms. HAHN. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title IV (page 21, after line 2), add the
following new section:
SEC. 405. CIVIL LIBERTIES PROTECTION OFFICER REVIEW OF
CYBERSECURITY POLICIES, PROGRAMS, AND
ACTIVITIES.
Section 103D(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403 3d(b)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (6), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) by redesignating paragraph (7) as paragraph (8); and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (6) the following new
paragraph:
[[Page H3301]]
``(7) ensure that any coordination and training between an
element of the intelligence community and a law enforcement
agency does not violate the Constitutional rights of racial
or ethnic minorities; and''.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 667, the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Hahn) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. HAHN. I also want to start out by thanking Chairman Rogers and
Ranking Member Ruppersberger for bringing forward this bipartisan bill,
and I am echoing I think what everyone is feeling today, that I think
it's important for the American people to see this, to see us come
together on such an important issue when it comes to protecting all
Americans, so it feels good to be a part of this today.
I know that we face complex challenges and threats to our national
security, and I don't think anyone ever wants to see another September
11 terrorist attack on this Nation. To prevent that, I know we need to
use many tools at our disposal to combat the ever-evolving dangers that
threaten our society. We need all levels of law enforcement to work
together to ensure that we're safe.
We must protect the rights of all of our citizens as we do this. We
cannot allow our desire to protect our country come at the expense of
any group in this great country. This is the promise of our Nation's
Founding Fathers. The promise of equal justice under the law is etched
in our Supreme Court building. This is part of our Nation's DNA that
there is the promise of equality.
My amendment furthers this promise. It requires the Civil Liberties
Protection Officer, which is in the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, to ensure that any training between the intelligence
community and law enforcement includes the protection of constitutional
rights of racial and ethnic minorities.
Mr. Chairman, we cannot take our national security for granted, but
we have to ensure that everyone has equal justice under the law.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, while I do not oppose the
amendment, I ask unanimous consent to control the time in opposition.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized for 5
minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I want to thank the gentlelady for her concern on these very
important issues. One of the things that's so important, I think, to
our country, is that we do have a strong and robust national security
service of all sorts.
In order for that to work and be the most effective, people have to
have trust in it. They have to understand that their rights are
protected, and I think this amendment states exactly where they are and
where they should be. And, therefore, I won't oppose the amendment, and
I applaud the gentlelady's concern and effort. It will serve as a
valuable reminder, I think, to the men and women who are standing tall
in our defense what it's all about and why they do it.
I support the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. HAHN. Thank you to the chairman and the ranking member for
bringing this bipartisan bill forward that I think will have such great
support.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Hahn).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 7 Offered by Ms. Jackson Lee of Texas
The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed in
House Report 112 504.
Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the
desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title IV (page 21, after line 2), add the
following new section:
SEC. 405. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON HIRING OF MINORITY EMPLOYEES
BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
It is the sense of Congress that the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency should take such actions as the
Director considers necessary to increase the recruitment and
training of ethnic minorities as officers and employees of
the Central Intelligence Agency.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 667, the gentlewoman from
Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Texas.
Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. I thank the chairperson of the Intelligence
Committee and the ranking member and speak in the spirit of
bipartisanship, and I congratulate both gentlemen for recognizing that
the security and intelligence of America speaks loudly to the idea of
bipartisanship.
Just a few hours ago, I was in a classified briefing--for fear of
anyone thinking that I will share that classified briefing, I will not.
But what I will say is it is clear that intelligence is a key to the
peace and security that the American people have experienced since 9/
11. Through the work of Members of Congress and the intelligence
community, of which we owe a great deal of that gratitude, we have been
able to, for now some 11 years plus on our soil, experience the safety
and security, although we have had many attempts.
For that reason, I believe this is important work. My amendment says
that it is important for the Director to consider the necessary
processes to increase the recruitment and training of ethnic minorities
as officers and employees of the CIA.
{time} 1530
We have done this before. We have encouraged them to do so. And we
can say that there have been gradual steps. And we applaud that. But
the men and women who conduct this important work certainly deserve our
support and all of the resources that we can muster to make sure they
are successful in their endeavors. Yet we also ensure that the CIA
itself reflects the American population and that of the world. Having
agents who can be deployed anywhere at any time is vital to our
national security, as well as the ability to interact with foreign
nationals who speak the language is truly important. A diverse
workforce can make America safer and more secure.
Historically, there's been an exclusion of minorities, particularly
African Americans and Latinos, in the highest levels of national
security. Let's continue to break that barrier. It's taken decades for
minorities to make inroads into America's national security apparatus.
And I know that this is a sense of Congress, but I always have faith
that people will adhere to a positive statement by this body.
Although the number of CIA employees remains a classified secret, the
Agency has released some numbers over the years. In 1966, blacks
represented 10 percent of the CIA's total workforce and only 3 percent
of the Agency's officers in senior intelligence service, whereas 17
percent of the clerical staff and 22 percent of the Agency's blue
collar workforce was African American.
Over this past weekend, we commemorated, mourned, and celebrated our
fallen soldiers. I had the privilege of having uncles who went off to
war in World War II, one who served as a chief petty officer in the
United States Navy. That was the integrated United States Navy. I can
tell you that we are better for it when we utilize the talents of all
Americans.
In 1992, a declassified study of CIA personnel found that about half
of all black intelligence officers reported that they had been victims
of racial harassment by the Agency. As of today, of the CIA's core of
case officers, which is believed to number more than 1,000, only 11
percent are minorities and 18 percent are women. The majority of the
Agency's top managers are still predominantly nonminorities.
According to CIA officials, one-third of the new operations officers
hired in 2011 have been women, while just 11 percent have been
minorities, as traditionally defined: African Americans, Asian
Americans, or Latinos. Twenty percent of all new operations officers
are native speakers of a foreign language and 75 percent have advanced
proficiency in foreign languages, many because they've lived abroad.
Almost half have advanced degrees.
I applaud that and I truly believe, as some may be listening and
saying, Aren't we are all Americans? Yes, we are. If we are all
Americans, then our
[[Page H3302]]
CIA, one of our most storied Agencies, needs to join and continue to
recruit and improve on bringing in the diverse picture of the face of
America because we'll be better for it.
When President Truman integrated the United States military, we
became better for it. We celebrate all people who are willing to put
the Nation's uniform on and die for their country. Likewise, for this
wonderful intelligence Agency, we do the same.
With that, I ask my colleagues to support my amendment, and I reserve
the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, though I do not oppose the
amendment, I ask unanimous consent to control the time in opposition.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized for 5
minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I thank the gentlelady for her amendment. Certainly, the good news
is, as she said, she has pointed out the progress that has been made.
And that's right, they have done an exceptionally good job of
understanding that diversity is part of the success of our intelligence
services. So restating that policy is probably a good idea. I will not
oppose the amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. I thank the gentleman. I thank the ranking
member as well.
In closing, let me just pay tribute to Garrett Jones, who served as a
CIA station chief in Somalia during peacekeeping operations in 1993 and
was cited as an African American officer who was able to work
undercover for weeks in North Mogadishu, which his duty officers said
would have been all but impossible by Jones' other officers.
We all have a contribution to make. And I look forward to this sense
of Congress not being weeded out in conference and reemphasizing the
importance of this effort.
With that I ask support of my amendment, and I yield back the balance
of my time.
Mr. Chair, I rise to debate my amendment #7 to H.R. 5743
``Intelligence Authorization Act,'' which is a Sense of Congress that
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency should take such
actions as the Director considers necessary to increase the recruitment
and training of ethnic minorities as officers and employees of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
The men and women who conduct this important work certainly deserve
our support and all of the resources that we can muster to make sure
that they're successful in their endeavors. Yet, we must also ensure
that the CIA itself reflects the American population and that of the
world. Having agents who can be deployed anywhere at any time is vital
to our national security. As is a diversity of thought and perspectives
that can be garnered by having a diverse workforce.
Historically there has been an exclusion of minorities, particularly
African Americans and Latinos in the highest levels of national
security.
It has taken decades for minorities to make inroads into America's
national security apparatus.
Although the number of CIA employees remains a classified secret, the
agency has released some numbers over the years. In 1996 Blacks
represented 10 percent of the CIA's total work force and only 3 percent
of the agency's officers in senior intelligence service whereas 17
percent of the clerical staff and 22 percent of the agency's blue-
collar work force was African American.
In 1992 a declassified study of CIA personnel found that about half
of all black intelligence officers reported that they had been victims
of racial harassment by the agency.
As of today the CIA's corps of case officers which is believed to
number more than 1,000 and only 11 percent are minorities and 18
percent are women.
The Majority of the agency's top managers are still predominantly
White males.
According to the CIA officials one-third of the new operations
officers hired in 2011 have been women. While just 11 percent have been
minorities as traditionally defined (African Americans, Asian Americans
or Latinos), 20 percent of all new operations officers are native
speakers of a foreign language and 75 percent have advanced proficiency
in foreign languages, many because they have lived abroad. Almost half
have advanced degrees.
There have been improvements since 1992, however, more must and
should be done to ensure that diversity is reflected at the highest
levels of the CIA.
The value of diversity in a spy service that operates in almost every
country would seem to be obvious.
Garrett Jones who served as CIA station chief in Somalia during
peacekeeping operations in 1993, cited the example of an African
American officer who was able to work undercover for weeks in north
Mogadishu, which he said would have been all but impossible for Jones
or any of the station's other white officers. As we must deploy CIA
agents all over the world. We need agents that are able to blend into a
variety of situations. We need diversity.
Interest in working for the CIA rose after the Sept. 11 attacks.
Between October 2001 and October 2002, the agency received 170,000
resumes.
Since founding of Office of the Director of National Intelligence
minority representation increased to nearly 23 percent in 2009 in FY
2009, up since FY05, when it was 20 percent. Minorities received nearly
25 percent of promotions in FY09 and over 27 percent of new hires were
minority. Women earned 46 percent of promotions in FY09, significantly
higher than their representation at about 39 percent.
Letitia ``Tish'' Long is the first woman to head a major intelligence
agency as director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the
office responsible for collecting and analyzing overhead imagery and
geospatial information.
Women have held the #2 spot at several intelligence agencies,
including National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office and
NGA. CIA however has never had a woman as #2, but has had a woman in
its #3 spot.
My amendment is a reflection of the need to continue to place the
spotlight on the intelligence community to ensure that they continue in
their efforts to reflect the needs of this country by recruiting,
training, and retaining qualified minorities,
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 8 Offered by Ms. Jackson Lee of Texas
The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 printed in
House Report 112 504.
Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
After section 501 (page 21, after line 14), insert the
following new section:
SEC. 502. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE NEED FOR THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY TO PROTECT CIVIL LIBERTIES OF
RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC MINORITIES.
It is the sense of Congress that the intelligence community
should take all appropriate actions necessary to protect the
civil liberties of religious and ethnic minorities.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 667, the gentlewoman from
Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Texas.
Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. Again, let me thank the chairman of the
committee and the ranking member for bringing forward a bipartisan
initiative, and I hope that this would add to, again, reemphasizing
what we have begun to do and that we will continue to do, and that is
to recognize the value of security, but also recognize what Americans
hold dear--their privacy, their respect for individual rights, their
civil liberties. And so this amendment speaks specifically to the
importance of protecting the civil liberties of religious and ethic
minorities.
I can cite the moments in history where we have failed. Certainly,
the Japanese interment loudly speaks in current, modern-day history of
the tragedy of not respecting the civil liberties of Americans.
Certainly, if we went as far back as the slave history of America, we
can see that those who are on American soil who would have sought well
to be Americans, their civil liberties were not protected.
But America has made great progress, and I think it is important as
we look at new populations that come to this country that we
particularly focus on this whole concept of religious liberty. It is a
concept that sometimes is very difficult to adhere to. I may not agree
with your faith and your religion, but you have the right to practice
it as long as you're not doing harm to the American people.
For example, President George W. Bush in 2001 told the American
Congress during that very difficult time that terrorists practice a
fringe form of Islamic extremism that has been rejected by Muslim
scholars and the vast
[[Page H3303]]
majority of Muslim clerics, a fringe movement that perverts the
peaceful teachings of Islam.
And so this particular faith certainly has been one that has been
most noted. I think we have all come to the conclusion that we should
protect the civil liberties of those who practice their faith under the
Constitution of the United States, which the First Amendment guarantees
the right to the freedom of access, freedom of movement, freedom of
religion, freedom of speech.
I would hope that in the intelligence community, as they do their
work fighting terrorism, fighting the potential of those terrorist
cells that may find themselves on our soil, that they will recognize
the right of individuals to practice the faith and the aspect of the
faith that follows the tenets of their faith and not categorize those
individuals simply because of their faith that they might be intending
to do us wrong.
There are many incidences where we have the kind of treatment of
individuals because they happen to be of a particular background,
particular ethnicity, racial background, and then, of course, faith.
But I want to speak to this amendment so that people will know that it
is a broad base, because many times we have disagreement with a number
of subsets of different faiths, whether it's Protestant, whether it's
faith that we are used to addressing.
So it is a statement that says that the civil liberties of all
Americans will not be deprived through the necessity of protecting this
land through our intelligence community on the basis of their religion
and ethnic minorities.
We know that in some jurisdictions there have been incidences of
individuals that believe that their privacy has been intruded upon. I
would hope that in the framework of the fine work that the intelligence
community has to do that there is no intimidation of making sure that
civil liberties can be protected.
Many of us have debated a number of bills on the floor of the House
dealing with privacy questions. I think it is important in this sense
of Congress to always restate that we are committed to national
security, but we're committed to the civil liberties of those within
our soil--American citizens.
With that, I ask my colleagues to support my amendment, and I reserve
the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, while I do not oppose the
amendment, I ask unanimous consent to control the time in opposition.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized for 5
minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I want to thank the gentlelady. Civil liberties are incredibly
important. It's important that the American people have faith in their
intelligence services that they are, in fact, catching bad guys and
protecting Americans' civil liberties. The good news is that as a part
of the Director of National Intelligence they have a Civil Liberties
Protection Officer. This is a reaffirmation, I think, of that valuable
work that that particular officer does, and really all of the members
of our intelligence community need be reminded that protection of
American civil liberties is an important value and an important thing
to do while in fact you're catching the bad guys.
I support the amendment and yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. Let me capture what the chairman said. I
like the terminology that says the American people must have faith in
their intelligence community, but faith in the principles upon which we
live. And they must know that the Constitution is a living, breathing
document. And we as Members of Congress must as well.
{time} 1540
So, again, I make a plea that this sense of Congress is a
reaffirmation, but also an encouragement and a statement that should be
in this bill that we respect the civil liberties of racial, ethnic, and
religious minorities, and in fact so will our intelligence community.
With that in mind, I would ask my colleagues to support the amendment
and also ask that it be maintained even in conference, the
reaffirmation of this important instruction as the civil liberties
protection officer operates and does the work that they need to do. I
ask my colleagues to support the amendment, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. Chair, I rise to debate my amendment #8 to H.R. 5743,
``Intelligence Authorization Act,'' which is a Sense of Congress that
the intelligence community should take all appropriate actions
necessary to protect the civil liberties of religious and ethnic
minorities.
We can obtain vital intelligence without compromising our civil
liberties. As you know, risks to civil liberties are inherent in the
very nature of domestic intelligence. This is because intelligence
necessarily operates in secret and as a result, it is difficult to
subject intelligence activities to the checks and balances that the
Framers of the Constitution realized were essential to prevent abuses
of power. Even judicial reviews of intelligence activities are often
given deference.
Intelligence is the information we use to identify and locate
individuals involved in planning terrorist acts. This information must
then be used to prevent any potential attack and can be done in ways
that are legally permissible.
Domestic intelligence community left unchecked could pose significant
dangers to open government, individual privacy, and civil liberties. My
amendment is designed as a limitation for a reason. We need a bill that
is strong on civil liberties, and includes protections against
infringement of our constitutional right to privacy.
My amendment serves as a reminder that the American people have put
their faith in the intelligence community and in Congress to protect
not only their security but the very essence of what makes America
great . . . our freedoms.
Thomas Jefferson in 1787 stated that ``[A] bill of rights is what the
people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or
particular, and what no just government should refuse.''
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on America have forced
serious reflections about the institutional framework of civil society
and the commitment to democratic principles. Although the balancing of
the protections of citizens' rights and liberties against their peace
and security is a continuous constitutional struggle. Especially during
war and national crisis.
According to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ``We're likely to experience
more restrictions on our personal freedom than has ever been the case
in our country . . . it will cause us to re-examine some of our laws
pertaining to criminal surveillance, wiretapping, immigration and so
on'' (New York Times, Sept. 29 2001).
Our efforts to provide for the safety and security has required
Americans to accept certain restriction on their freedoms--more
surveillance of their papers and communications, more searches of their
belongings, possible detention without a writ of habeas corpus, and
proceedings by military tribunals without the standard protections of
due process of civil courts.
I realize that we must give our intelligence community the proper
tools to protect us while upholding the civil liberties of Americans.
We must always recognize that the American people are being asked to
trade off civil liberties and personal freedom for a greater sense of
security from the threat of terrorist.
It is no answer to these legitimate concerns that police officers or
member of the intelligence community who monitor political or religious
meetings, compile dossiers on political activists, or infiltrate lawful
protest organizations are complying with the Fourth Amendment and are
doing no more than any member of the public could do on his or her own.
When government acts, it has a special obligation to respect
constitutional rights--which include the First as well as the Fourth
Amendment--an obligation not imposed on private citizens. My amendment
is a Sense that it is the intent of this body to protect the civil
liberties of the very groups that may be monitored as a direct response
to our concerns about a terrorist attack. We must be led not by fear
but by reason!
The challenge to our intelligence community is the same as the
challenge for the nation as a whole. Securing the Nation's freedom
depends not on making a choice between security and liberty, but in
designing and implementing policies that allow the American people to
be both safe and free.
Increased threats of terrorism after September 11, 2001, lightning-
fast technological innovation, and the erosion of key privacy
protections under the law threaten to alter the American way of life in
fundamental ways.
Terrorism threatens--and is calculated to threaten--not only our
sense of safety, but also our freedom and way of life. Terrorists
intend to frighten us into changing our basic laws and values and to
take actions that are not in our long-term interests.
While the government has both the power and the obligation under the
Constitution to
[[Page H3304]]
defend the nation and its security, these powers cannot be exercised in
a manner that contravenes individual constitutional liberties. Among
others, these include the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of
speech, religion, and association, and the Fourth Amendment's
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. In addition, as
with all government powers, national security and intelligence
gathering powers should be subject to checks and balances, including
meaningful judicial review and probing oversight by the Congress.
The internment of thousands of Japanese serves as a reminder for why
we must protect the civil liberties of religious and ethnic minorities.
JAPANESE INTERNMENT--A LESSON ON THE IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTING CIVIL
LIBERTIES
One week after the Pearl Harbor attack, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt promised to preserve constitutional freedoms, ``We will not,
under any threat, or in the face of any danger, surrender the
guarantees of liberty our forefathers framed for us in our Bill of
Rights'' but it was not long after that speech that the War Department
was concerned about a foreign threat to the west coast.
Congress held hearing and in 1942 the Congressional Subcommittee on
Aliens and Sabotage recommended ``the immediate evacuation of all
persons of Japanese lineage and all the other, aliens and citizens
alike, whose presence shall be deemed dangerous or inimical to the
defense of the U.S. from all strategic areas''. President Roosevelt
signed the Executive order 9066 calling for the evacuations . . .
Roosevelt justified the action as ``war requires every possible
protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense
material, national-defense premises . . .''
The result: More than 120,000 Japanese Americans, the majority of
whom were American citizens or legal permanent residents were placed in
internment camps violating their civil rights to be treated with
fairness and equality, without discrimination and their Fifth Amendment
right to due process.
It was not until 1988 that victims received a reparation check and an
apology from President Reagan. ``The United States unjustly interned,
evacuated, or relocated you and many other Japanese Americans . . . and
unfairly denied Japanese Americans and their families fundamental
liberties during World War II . . . the Nation's actions were rooted
deeply in racial prejudice, wartime hysteria, and a lack of political
leadership.''
My amendment stands as a reminder that we must not repeat the
mistakes of our past.
protect personal privacy
When the Bill of Rights was written, protecting personal privacy was
largely an issue of protecting the integrity of physical property--and
so the Fourth Amendment speaks of the people's right to security in
their ``persons, houses, papers, and effects . . .''
Today, our most intimate conversations, correspondence and records
are apt to be recorded digitally, rather than contained in paper
records secured in private homes and offices. Likewise, the most
routine details of daily life--credit card purchases at a drug store or
bookstore, passage through a toll booth or subway station, the
television shows recorded by a digital video recorder--now leave
electronic footprints scattered across a myriad of computer databases.
Today, the transformation of our society from one dependent primarily
on the privacy of ``persons, houses, papers, and effects'' in the
physical world is accelerating exponentially. As the result of this
transformation, a host of previously anonymous behavior and private
information can now be captured and linked to a specific person without
any trespass into the person's home or office.
Our laws are struggling to catch up. So far, the courts have left
largely immune from Fourth Amendment scrutiny a range of highly
personal information--including financial records, medical records, and
library and book records--on a theory that there is no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information in the hands of third parties.
See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Today, we live a world in which a personal calendar or journal--once
stored in paper form in a home, office, or briefcase--is now as likely
to be stored on a personal digital assistant connected to a server
owned by a third party. In such a world, the courts should reconsider
the idea that information held by third parties lacks constitutional
protection.
In United States v. United States District Court (``Keith''), 407
U.S. 297 (1972), the Supreme Court decided that wiretapping was subject
to the Fourth Amendment even if it was conducted for national security
purposes. That case involved a domestic terrorist conspiracy to bomb
the office of the Central Intelligence Agency in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Still, without dismissing the real national security threat posed by
such illegal activity, the Supreme Court rejected Attorney General John
Mitchell's claim of a clandestine domestic intelligence gathering power
that would allow the executive branch to wiretap without court review
or congressional authorization.
Such an unchecked power, the Supreme Court observed, would inevitably
pose dangers to lawful dissent: ``Though the investigative duty of the
executive may be stronger in such [national security] cases, so also is
there greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech. . . .
History abundantly documents the tendency of government--however
benevolent and benign its motives--to view with suspicion those who
most fervently dispute its policies. . . . The price of lawful public
dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an unchecked surveillance
power.'' Keith, 407 U.S. at 313 314.
Safeguards also must exist to protect First Amendment freedoms of
speech, worship and association. When conducting counter-terrorism and
counter-intelligence investigations, the Department of Justice operates
under guidelines approved by the Attorney General. The purpose of
investigative guidelines is to ensure that intrusive investigative
techniques are used to monitor terrorists, spies, and foreign agents,
not political or religious organizations engaged in lawful dissent.
These guidelines recognize that such techniques, which are left largely
unregulated by the Fourth Amendment, pose a risk to First Amendment
freedom of association.
The Supreme court has recognized a ``vital relationship between
freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations.'' NAACP v.
State of Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). Where individuals
participate in unpopular political or religious organizations, members
of those organizations fear--often with good reason--``economic
reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other
manifestations of public hostility.'' Routine, intrusive government
investigations of lawful, but unpopular, political organizations would
clearly pose a serious risk to the First Amendment because their
members would fear that such information, if leaked, could be used
against them.
It should be the Government's burden to establish, to the
satisfaction of Congress, that intelligence gathering initiatives do
not pose a threat to fundamental American values. Congress can decide
simply to forbid the policy from going forward at all because it cannot
be implemented consistently with fundamental American civil liberties.
Support my amendment!
Racial Profiling/Religious Profiling
The Department of Justice, DOJ, banned any use of racial profiling in
2003. Despite this, racial profiling still occurs; there are some who
claim racial profiling led to the 50 percent decrease in violent crime.
In reality, racial profiling is against our basic values, it does not
work, and it actually hinders effective law enforcement. That opinion
is shared by law enforcement professionals and legal scholars, as well
advocates of populations most likely to be targeted by profiling. The
overwhelming weight of statistical data supports this position.
As the Ranking Member on the Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Transportation and Senior Member of the Judiciary Committee, I am aware
of the injustices that are faced by minorities in this country due to
racial profiling. In Homeland Security I had to sit through a hearing
on the Radicalization of our Prisons, the need to watch Muslim
Americans, and certain Somali Americans.
In the days following the devastating attacks of September 11, 2001,
this country came together in an unprecedented and inspiring display of
unity and patriotism. Americans of differing ethnicities, background
and religions came together in support of the nation.
In his address to a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001,
President George W. Bush told Congress, the American people, and the
world that ``terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism
that has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of
Muslim clerics; a fringe movement that perverts the peaceful teachings
of Islam.''
The Homeland Security Committee continues to focus on the Islamic
faith and those who follow it, as a threat to national security. We set
the example that the Intelligence Community follows. We must stand up
to violations of a person's civil liberty, but most especially for
religious and ethic minorities. It is clear that Muslim Americans since
9/11 have been singled out and targeted for their religious beliefs.
Racial and religious profiling is against our basic values, it does
not work, and it actually hinders effective law enforcement. That
opinion is shared by law enforcement professionals and legal scholars,
as well advocates of populations most likely to be targeted by
profiling. The overwhelming weight of statistical data supports this
position.
And yet, there are still those who insist that it is a valid tool for
crime fighting and anti-terrorism work. They insist that if you have
nothing to hide, you have no reason to mind answering a few simple
questions, that it is a minor inconvenience. I find that inexplicable.
[[Page H3305]]
It is more than a minor inconvenience to have the police or FBI come
into your workplace, to question you in front of your coworkers, and
put your job at risk. It is more than a minor inconvenience to be
stopped on the street, to be pulled over on a pretext, so that police
officers can find a reason to question you. When the use of force or
threat of force by police officers is dramatically increasing, it is
more than a minor inconvenience to be more likely to be pulled over and
put in that position, because of the color of your skin.
Thirty two million Americans have reported that they were the victims
of racial profiling. That is thirty two million Americans humiliated,
intimidated, and treated as second class citizens in service of a
policy that does nothing to keep us safer.
In past years, I have supported measures that would end this
practice. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses about how we can
end this ineffective, un-American practice, whether through training,
executive orders, or through legislation we craft in Congress.
RACIAL PROFILING AND TERRORISM
``DRIVING WHILE ARAB''
The events of September 11, 2001, have had a profound impact on
racial profiling. Following the terrorist attacks, law enforcement
agents have subjected individuals of Arab or South Asian descent,
Muslims, and Sikhs to racial profiling. While national and local
statistics are not yet available, anecdotal accounts how Arabs,
Muslims, and Sikhs have endured racial profiling.
For example, in the months following September 11th, a new type of
racial profiling has developed: ``driving while Arab.'' Arabs, Muslim,
and Sikhs across the country were subjected to traffic stops and
searches based in whole or part on their ethnicity or religion.
On October 4, 2001, in Gwinnett, Georgia, an Arab motorist's car was
stopped, he was approached by a police officer whose gun was drawn, and
he was called a ``bin Laden supporter'' all for making an illegal U-
turn. On October 8, 2001, two Alexandria, VA, police officers stopped
three Arab motorists. The officers questioned the motorists about a
verse of the Koran hanging from the rear view mirror, and asked about
documents in the back seat. The police officer confiscated the
motorists' identification cards and drove off without explanation. He
returned 10 minutes later, and claimed be had had to take another call.
On December 5, 2001, a veiled Muslim woman in Burbank, Illinois, was
stopped by a police officer for driving with suspended plates. The
officer asked the woman when Ramadan was over, asked her offensive
question about her hair, and pushed her into his patrol car as he
arrested her for driving with suspended plates. The woman was released
from custody later that day.
DEPORTATION WITHOUT DUE PROCESS
A particularly egregious form of terrorism profiling occurs when Arab
men and women are detained and deported without due process.
Since September 11th, hundreds of Arab and Muslim individuals have
been detained on suspicion of terrorist activity. Practically none of
these individuals was involved with terrorism. However, many were
detained for weeks and eventually changed with minor immigration
violations.
Based on these minor immigration violations some were deported. In
one case, two Pakistani immigrants were arrested and detained 45 days
for allegedly overstaying their visas.
In another case an Israeli was detained for 66 days before being
charged with entering the United States unlawfully.
In a particularly shocking case, a French teacher from Yemen, who was
married to an American citizen and therefore eligible to become a
citizen himself, was reporting for duty as an army recruit at Fort
Campbell, Kentucky, on September 15, 2001. The man was apprehended by
Federal agents, separated from his wife and interrogated for 12 hours.
The agents accused him of violating immigration laws, conspiring with
Russian terrorists, spousal abuse, and threatened him with beatings.
The man was given a lie detector test which proved he was telling the
truth when he denied being associated with terrorists.
CONSEQUENCES OF RACIAL PROFILING
The consequences of Racial Profiling for minority groups in the
United States, for Arab, Muslim and Sikh groups, and in the
immigrations context are dire for individual who are both innocent and
guilty of criminal activity.
In the case of the innocent, for every person in possession of drugs
apprehended through profiling, many more law-abiding minorities are
treated as if they are criminals.
Racial profiling increases the stops and arrests of minority groups.
Frequent stops and arrests of minorities generate more extensive
criminal histories, and result in longer sentences.
Racial profiling results in increased arrests and convictions of
minorities. In many states, a felony conviction can impact a person's
ability to exercise their basic social rights. In 46 States and the
District of Columbia, convicted adults cannot vote. Thirty-two States
disenfranchise felons on parole, while 29 States disenfranchise felons
on probation.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mrs. Myrick
The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 printed in
House Report 112 504.
Mrs. MYRICK. Mr. Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
After section 501 (page 21, after line 14), insert the
following new section:
SEC. 502. PROTECTING THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SUPPLY CHAIN
OF THE UNITED STATES.
(a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report that--
(1) identifies foreign suppliers of information technology
(including equipment, software, and services) that are linked
directly or indirectly to a foreign government, including--
(A) by ties to the military forces of a foreign government;
(B) by ties to the intelligence services of a foreign
government; or
(C) by being the beneficiaries of significant low interest
or no interest loans, loan forgiveness, or other support by a
foreign government;
(2) assesses the vulnerability to malicious activity,
including cyber crime or espionage, of the telecommunications
networks of the United States due to the presence of
technology produced by suppliers identified under paragraph
(1).
(b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
(c) Telecommunications Networks of the United States
Defined.--In this section, the term ``telecommunications
networks of the United States'' includes--
(1) telephone systems;
(2) Internet systems;
(3) fiber optic lines, including cable landings;
(4) computer networks; and
(5) smart grid technology under development by the
Department of Energy.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 667, the gentlewoman from
North Carolina (Mrs. Myrick) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from North Carolina.
Mrs. MYRICK. Mr. Chairman, first, like other Members today, I want to
express my gratitude and thanks to Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member
Ruppersberger for all of the work that they've done, just the
incredible bipartisan working relationship that they've established on
our committee. It really is kind of unheard of, and we're very proud of
it, and I'm very proud to be a member of the committee.
I rise today to urge my colleagues to support my amendment to the
Intelligence authorization bill, and I'm pleased that Representative
Wolf is a cosponsor of this initiative, and I'd like to thank him for
his support and all his work on this issue.
This amendment would require the Director of National Intelligence to
submit an unclassified report to Congress that would identify foreign
suppliers of information technology with ties to a foreign government,
military, or intelligence service. It would also require the DNI to
provide an assessment of the risks associated with such entities.
The U.S. Government has serious concerns about public and private
sector information technology supply chains. A network is only as
secure as the components that make up that network. If the origin of
those components is unknown or the security of those components is
compromised, that's a major flaw in the network.
I believe these concerns need to be better shared with industry and
the public. Sharing more information along these lines will help the
private sector better understand potential risks and take action that
will help the U.S. Government mitigate its supply-chain concerns.
The more that the private sector knows of potential problems, the
better it can protect itself. If the private sector is more aware of
potential risks, then it can better work with the Federal Government to
mitigate potential supply-chain concerns.
I would like to thank Chairman Rogers for his support of this
amendment,
[[Page H3306]]
and I again urge my colleagues to support the amendment on the floor.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the
amendment, though I do not oppose it.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. First, I support this amendment as a continuation
of the work that we have begun in Congress as an attempt to focus our
intelligence community and the executive Agencies to this important
threat that my friend and colleague has made.
Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield to the gentlewoman from Texas.
Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. I do not rise on the gentlelady's
amendment. In the statement I made on amendment No. 7, I indicated that
the CIA officer's name that was undercover, that was not the CIA's
undercover agent's name, which I would not give. It was the section
station director's name, Mr. Garrett Jones. The CIA agent was
undercover and remains unnamed. But he was an African American who did
his duty because of his background.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mrs. MYRICK. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the
chairman of our committee, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I want to thank the gentlelady from North
Carolina, say thank you very, very much for her work on the supply
chain and its vulnerabilities. She has spent a lot of time on our
committee making sure that we're doing all the right things to try to
protect the supply chain when it comes to cyberthreats and other
vulnerabilities that may exist, so I couldn't support the amendment
more.
Lastly, I would just like to thank the gentlelady. This will be her
last authorization bill. She has been a fantastic member of this
committee and has brought a lot of stature to the issues she's engaged
in--everything from home-grown terrorism to cyber to supply chain
management. She has been a national treasure on that committee. She
will be sorely missed. I wanted to offer our congratulations and our
thanks to a job well done.
Mrs. MYRICK. I thank the gentleman for his kind words, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from North Carolina (Mrs. Myrick).
The amendment was agreed to.
The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Platts). The question is on the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.
The amendment was agreed to.
The Acting CHAIR. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Yoder) having assumed the chair, Mr. Platts, Acting Chair of the
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 5743) to
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2013 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, and, pursuant
to House Resolution 667, he reported the bill back to the House with an
amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the amendment
reported from the Committee of the Whole?
If not, the question is on the committee amendment in the nature of a
substitute, as amended.
The amendment was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
Motion to Recommit
Mr. CRITZ. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
Mr. CRITZ. I am, in its present form.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. Critz moves to recommit the bill, H.R. 5743, to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence with instructions
to report the same back to the House forthwith with the
following amendment:
After section 501 (page 21, after line 14), insert the
following new section:
SEC. 502. PROTECTING UNITED STATES MILITARY STRENGTH,
TECHNOLOGICAL PROWESS, AND AMERICAN JOBS.
(a) In General.--In obligating and expending funds
authorized to be appropriated by this Act, the head of each
element of the intelligence community shall take all steps
necessary to protect and ensure that--
(1) the intelligence and military capability of the United
States is not improperly transferred to or stolen by a
foreign nation or a state sponsor of terrorism;
(2) the intelligence and military capability of the United
States and sensitive information pertaining to economic,
financial, and consumer information is protected from
cybersecurity attacks, including cybersecurity attacks from
Iran and China; and
(3) contracts and work performed for such element of the
intelligence community is first provided to United States
companies and workers and not outsourced to foreign-owned
companies, unless the Director of National Intelligence
determines that it is in the interests of national security.
(b) State Sponsor of Terrorism Defined.--In this section,
the term ``state sponsor of terrorism'' means any country the
government of which the Secretary of State determines has
repeatedly provided support for acts of international
terrorism pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979 (as continued in effect pursuant
to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act), section
40 of the Arms Export Control Act, section 620A of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, or any other provision of
law.
Mr. CRITZ (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent
that the reading be dispensed with.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I object.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Objection is heard.
The Clerk will read.
The Clerk continued to read.
{time} 1550
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that the motion be considered as read.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Michigan?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Pennsylvania is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. CRITZ. Mr. Speaker, intelligence gathering has always been a key
component of keeping America strong and resilient through our history,
and it is imperative in this post-9/11 era.
It is crucial that the intelligence community be provided the
resources they need to combat threats from foreign powers and global
terrorist organizations. This is why I'm offering this final amendment
today, to help strengthen our defenses against physical and
cybersecurity attacks.
Mr. Speaker, this is the final amendment to the bill. This amendment
will not kill the bill or send it back to the committee. If it is
adopted, the bill will immediately proceed to final passage as amended.
My amendment contains three components that will ensure we continue
to provide the best security to our Nation.
First, it would instruct the head of each element of the intelligence
community to take all steps and precautions to ensure that the
intelligence and military capability of the United States is not
improperly transferred or stolen by a foreign nation or a state sponsor
of terrorism.
Mr. Speaker, we live in a time where information is readily available
and transferable at the click of a mouse or the stroke of a keyboard.
While the advantages of such readily available information have helped
spur economic opportunities and growth, it has also opened the door for
one of the many intelligence challenges we face as a Nation.
We already have in place a number of protocols that dictate how and
under what circumstances our military can transfer technology, goods,
and services to our allies across the globe, but it is imperative that
we do everything we can to ensure this information doesn't end up in
the hands of unfriendly foreign powers or state sponsors of terrorism.
[[Page H3307]]
Within the past few years, we have seen foreign nations attempt to
steal our Nation's military technology and sensitive information
through the use of joint ventures and other techniques. We must do
everything that we can to ensure that our military and intelligence
secrets remain our secrets. Many of those same capabilities reside in,
are accessed through, or are enabled through cyberspace.
Reliable access to cyberspace is critical to U.S. national security,
public safety, and economic well-being, but cyberthreats continue to
grow in scope and severity daily. Tens of thousands of new malicious
software programs originating from Iran or China are identified each
day, threatening our security, our economy, and our citizens.
No longer do we need to just worry about foreign spies infiltrating
our military and intelligence agencies. Our worry must now extend to
the young man or woman sitting in their apartment 6,000 miles away
utilizing a laptop to tap into our government mainframes.
Secondly, my amendment would direct the head of each element of the
intelligence community to take those steps necessary to ensure that our
Nation's intelligence and military capabilities, as well as sensitive
economic, financial, and consumer information, remain protected from
improper transfer, theft, or cybersecurity attack.
Finally, my amendment would ensure that we continue to promote
American businesses and keep jobs--especially one of such crucial
importance--in America.
As the number of threats to our Nation has grown and the required
response has put a large demand on the intelligence community, we have
increasingly relied on contractors to perform tasks to ensure the
safety of our Nation. This amendment would instruct our intelligence
community to always put American workers first and not outsource these
jobs to foreign-owned companies.
Mr. Speaker, I have witnessed the detrimental effects that
outsourcing has had. Numerous areas of our country have also seen the
ugly effects of outsourcing, and we must put American workers and
businesses first, especially in the critical sphere of intelligence.
Compounding the economic damage outsourcing has done to our country,
the national security risk posed by allowing foreign companies to
operate our intelligence capabilities would be catastrophic to the
environment of our Nation.
Mr. Speaker, in the global environment in which we operate, we must
keep America strong, keep America competitive, and keep America first.
Mr. Speaker, again, my amendment will be the final amendment to the
bill. I have great respect for the chairman, Mr. Rogers, and the
ranking member, Mr. Ruppersberger, for the bipartisan bill they put
together. It is important to note that this amendment will not kill the
bill or send it back to committee. If it is adopted, the bill will
immediately proceed to final passage as amended. My amendment will
ensure we have an even stronger American intelligence community.
I urge a ``yes'' vote on this final amendment, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the
motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. First of all, this is a motion to recommit.
Let's not fool ourselves. And I understand this is the loyal opposition
portion of the debate. It happens in each and every bill; I get it.
We've spent a lot of time in a bipartisan way getting the bill, and I
think it's one of our better products given the detail with which we
went over every budget line and operational detail in this budget. So
when I read this, it looks like it was prepared fairly quickly in order
to meet the time demand here, and it's very concerning.
In some of the things that we've done--even in this Chamber, we
debated the cybersecurity bill and people had strong passions on both
sides of the aisle of that bill about protection of civil liberties and
just making sure there were checks and balances on our ability just to
share information, a very small little piece. When you read this bill,
that makes our cybersecurity bill look like a walk in the park. This is
an expansion of the government involved in the Internet in a way that I
find a little bit scary and shocking that they would allow it to get
this far. Let me read it:
The intelligence community shall take all steps necessary
to protect and ensure that--
Sensitive information pertaining to economic, financial,
and consumer information is protected from cybersecurity
attacks.
That means you've got to reach way out into the Internet. Now you've
just empowered the intelligence community--the very people we said we
want to keep separate--into the Internet. This is dangerous. That's
what happens when you get in a hurry and try to have a political
amendment on a very bipartisan bill, and that's unfortunate about this.
The first paragraph, I would submit, we should make as a part of the
``department of redundancy department.'' All of that already happens.
We do that as a matter of course and mission.
Again, it's a little bit surprising that they would allow this. I
would even hope that your Members would take a very close look at this.
You have just put your Members in a pretty bad spot about making them
vote on something that will actually have the government involved in
your Internet. Welcome to the laptop near you. Very concerning to me.
I will passionately oppose this, would urge all of my colleagues to
passionately oppose this, and I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is
ordered.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Mr. CRITZ. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair
will reduce to 5 minutes the minimum time for any electronic vote on
the question of passage.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 180,
nays 235, not voting 16, as follows:
[Roll No. 300]
YEAS--180
Ackerman
Altmire
Andrews
Baca
Baldwin
Barrow
Bass (CA)
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Bonamici
Boren
Boswell
Brady (PA)
Braley (IA)
Brown (FL)
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson (IN)
Castor (FL)
Chandler
Chu
Cicilline
Clarke (MI)
Clarke (NY)
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Connolly (VA)
Cooper
Costello
Courtney
Critz
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Deutch
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly (IN)
Edwards
Engel
Eshoo
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Frank (MA)
Fudge
Garamendi
Gonzalez
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hahn
Hanabusa
Hastings (FL)
Heinrich
Higgins
Himes
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hochul
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hoyer
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson Lee (TX)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones
Kaptur
Keating
Kildee
Kind
Kissell
Kucinich
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee (CA)
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lujan
Lynch
Markey
Matheson
Matsui
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
Meeks
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Moore
Moran
Murphy (CT)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Pingree (ME)
Polis
Price (NC)
Quigley
Rahall
Reyes
Richardson
Richmond
Ross (AR)
Rothman (NJ)
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schrader
Schwartz
Scott (VA)
Scott, David
Serrano
Sewell
Sherman
Sires
Smith (WA)
Speier
Stark
Sutton
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Tonko
Towns
Tsongas
Van Hollen
Visclosky
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Welch
Wilson (FL)
Woolsey
Yarmuth
NAYS--235
Adams
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Amash
Amodei
Austria
Bachmann
Bachus
Barletta
Bartlett
Barton (TX)
Bass (NH)
Benishek
Berg
[[Page H3308]]
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Bonner
Bono Mack
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Brooks
Broun (GA)
Buchanan
Bucshon
Buerkle
Burgess
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canseco
Cantor
Capito
Carter
Cassidy
Chabot
Chaffetz
Coble
Coffman (CO)
Cole
Conaway
Conyers
Costa
Cravaack
Crawford
Crenshaw
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Denham
Dent
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Dold
Dreier
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Ellmers
Emerson
Farenthold
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Flake
Fleischmann
Fleming
Flores
Forbes
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Gardner
Garrett
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gibson
Gingrey (GA)
Gohmert
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Graves (GA)
Graves (MO)
Griffin (AR)
Griffith (VA)
Grimm
Guthrie
Hall
Hanna
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Heck
Hensarling
Herger
Herrera Beutler
Huelskamp
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurt
Issa
Jenkins
Johnson (IL)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Kelly
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kinzinger (IL)
Kline
Labrador
Lamborn
Lance
Landry
Lankford
Latham
LaTourette
Latta
LoBiondo
Long
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lummis
Lungren, Daniel E.
Manzullo
Marchant
Marino
McCarthy (NY)
McCaul
McClintock
McCotter
McHenry
McKeon
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
Meehan
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Mulvaney
Murphy (PA)
Myrick
Neugebauer
Noem
Nugent
Nunes
Nunnelee
Olson
Palazzo
Paul
Paulsen
Pearce
Pence
Petri
Pitts
Platts
Poe (TX)
Pompeo
Posey
Price (GA)
Quayle
Reed
Rehberg
Reichert
Renacci
Ribble
Rigell
Rivera
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross (FL)
Royce
Runyan
Ryan (WI)
Scalise
Schilling
Schmidt
Schock
Schweikert
Scott (SC)
Scott, Austin
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shimkus
Shuler
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Southerland
Stearns
Stivers
Stutzman
Sullivan
Terry
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tipton
Turner (NY)
Turner (OH)
Upton
Walberg
Walden
Walsh (IL)
Webster
West
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wolf
Womack
Woodall
Yoder
Young (AK)
Young (IN)
NOT VOTING--16
Burton (IN)
Clay
Doyle
Ellison
Fortenberry
Granger
Guinta
Lewis (CA)
Mack
Maloney
McCarthy (CA)
Rangel
Roby
Slaughter
Velazquez
Young (FL)
{time} 1620
Messrs. GOWDY, STIVERS, GRIMM, THOMPSON of Pennsylvania, KINGSTON,
COLE, CARTER, MULVANEY and NUNNELEE changed their votes from ``yea'' to
``nay.''
So the motion to recommit was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 386,
noes 28, not voting 17, as follows:
[Roll No. 301]
AYES--386
Ackerman
Adams
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Altmire
Amodei
Andrews
Austria
Baca
Bachmann
Bachus
Baldwin
Barletta
Barrow
Bartlett
Barton (TX)
Bass (CA)
Bass (NH)
Becerra
Benishek
Berg
Berkley
Berman
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Bonamici
Bonner
Bono Mack
Boren
Boswell
Boustany
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Braley (IA)
Brooks
Broun (GA)
Brown (FL)
Buchanan
Bucshon
Buerkle
Burgess
Butterfield
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canseco
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson (IN)
Carter
Cassidy
Castor (FL)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Chandler
Chu
Cicilline
Clarke (MI)
Clyburn
Coble
Coffman (CO)
Cohen
Cole
Conaway
Connolly (VA)
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cravaack
Crawford
Crenshaw
Critz
Crowley
Cuellar
Culberson
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis (KY)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Denham
Dent
DesJarlais
Deutch
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dold
Donnelly (IN)
Dreier
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Edwards
Ellmers
Emerson
Engel
Eshoo
Farenthold
Farr
Fattah
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Flake
Fleischmann
Fleming
Flores
Forbes
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Fudge
Gallegly
Garamendi
Gardner
Garrett
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gingrey (GA)
Gohmert
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (MO)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Griffin (AR)
Griffith (VA)
Grijalva
Grimm
Guthrie
Gutierrez
Hahn
Hall
Hanabusa
Hanna
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Heck
Heinrich
Hensarling
Herger
Herrera Beutler
Higgins
Himes
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hochul
Holden
Honda
Hoyer
Huelskamp
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurt
Israel
Issa
Jackson Lee (TX)
Jenkins
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly
Kildee
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kinzinger (IL)
Kissell
Kline
Labrador
Lamborn
Lance
Landry
Langevin
Lankford
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
Latta
Levin
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Long
Lowey
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan
Lummis
Lungren, Daniel E.
Lynch
Maloney
Manzullo
Marchant
Marino
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCaul
McClintock
McCollum
McCotter
McHenry
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
Meehan
Meeks
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Moore
Moran
Mulvaney
Murphy (CT)
Murphy (PA)
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Neugebauer
Noem
Nugent
Nunes
Nunnelee
Olson
Owens
Palazzo
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Paulsen
Pearce
Pelosi
Pence
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Petri
Pingree (ME)
Pitts
Platts
Poe (TX)
Pompeo
Posey
Price (GA)
Price (NC)
Quayle
Quigley
Rahall
Reed
Rehberg
Reichert
Renacci
Reyes
Ribble
Richardson
Richmond
Rigell
Rivera
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross (AR)
Ross (FL)
Rothman (NJ)
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Runyan
Ruppersberger
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Scalise
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schilling
Schmidt
Schock
Schrader
Schwartz
Schweikert
Scott (SC)
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Sewell
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuler
Shuster
Simpson
Sires
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Southerland
Speier
Stearns
Stivers
Stutzman
Sullivan
Sutton
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tierney
Tipton
Tonko
Towns
Tsongas
Turner (NY)
Turner (OH)
Upton
Van Hollen
Visclosky
Walberg
Walden
Walsh (IL)
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Webster
Welch
West
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (FL)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wolf
Womack
Woodall
Yarmuth
Yoder
Young (IN)
NOES--28
Amash
Blumenauer
Capuano
Clarke (NY)
Duncan (TN)
Filner
Frank (MA)
Gibson
Holt
Jackson (IL)
Johnson (IL)
Jones
Kind
Kucinich
Lee (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren, Zoe
Markey
McDermott
McGovern
Miller, George
Olver
Paul
Polis
Rush
Stark
Woolsey
Young (AK)
NOT VOTING--17
Burton (IN)
Clay
Cleaver
Doyle
Ellison
Fortenberry
Guinta
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Mack
McCarthy (CA)
Rangel
Roby
Slaughter
Tiberi
Velazquez
Young (FL)
{time} 1628
Mr. RUSH changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
{time} 1630
Authorizing the Clerk to Make Corrections in Engrossment
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that in
the engrossment of the bill, H.R. 5743, the Clerk be authorized to make
such technical and conforming changes as necessary to reflect the
actions of the House.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Woodall). Is there objection to the
request of the gentleman from Michigan?
[[Page H3309]]
There was no objection.
Permission to Include Exchange of Letters
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to
include an exchange of letters with the chairman of the Committee on
Homeland Security with respect to the bill at this point in the Record.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Michigan?
There was no objection.
House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence,
Washington, DC, May 31, 2012.
Hon. Peter King,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding
certain intelligence and intelligence-related programs and/or
activities of the Department of Homeland Security that are
authorized in H.R. 5743, the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2013.
While the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
continues to authorize these programs and intelligence-
related activities consistent with the legislative history
describing the respective jurisdictions of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on
Homeland Security (Congressional Record, January 4, 2005,
page H25), I agree that certain elements of these activities
could raise issues that would benefit from discussion amongst
the Committees and the Department of Homeland Security with
respect to the overall organization of the Department, and
would be glad to discuss such issues.
As you asked, I will include a copy of your letter to me
and this response in the Congressional Record during
consideration of H.R. 5743 on the House floor.
Sincerely,
Mike Rogers,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC, May 29, 2012.
Hon. Mike Rogers,
Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Rogers: I am writing in regards to the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 recently
approved by the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence--specifically, the section of the legislation
that authorizes the newly created Homeland Security
Intelligence Program (HSIP) at the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS).
As you know, the HSIP, in essence, consists of several
activities within the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at
DHS that the Director of National Intelligence has deemed
should no longer be part of the National Intelligence Program
(NIP). While the details of the program are classified, the
creation of the HSIP raises new issues that are of mutual
interest to our committees and requires further discussion
between our staffs and clarification from DHS.
While those discussions are ongoing and will take time, I
understand the importance of advancing this legislation to
the House floor in an expeditious manner and I do not, in any
way, wish to impede that from happening. However, given that
there remains issues that our committees must work through
with DHS--including how to best fund, organize, and budget
certain HSIP activities--I respectfully request that we
formally memorialize our mutual agreement to continue our
dialogue regarding the HSIP as legislation moves forward as
you approach a conference with the Senate.
I also request that this letter and your response be
included in the House Permanent Select Committee report of
this bill and in the Congressional Record during
consideration of this measure on the House floor. Thank you
for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
Peter T. King,
Chairman.
____________________
