[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 171 (Monday, December 31, 2012)]
[House]
[Pages H7479-H7485]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I move to suspend the rules
and pass the bill (S. 3454) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2013 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability
System, and for other purposes.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The text of the bill is as follows:
S. 3454
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Sec. 301. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 302. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 303. Non-reimbursable details.
Sec. 304. Automated insider threat detection program.
Sec. 305. Software licensing.
Sec. 306. Strategy for security clearance reciprocity.
Sec. 307. Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010
compliance.
Sec. 308. Subcontractor notification process.
Sec. 309. Modification of reporting schedule.
Sec. 310. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Working capital fund amendments.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 501. Homeland Security Intelligence Program.
Sec. 502. Extension of National Commission for the Review of the
Research and Development Programs of the United States
Intelligence Community.
Sec. 503. Protecting the information technology supply chain of the
United States.
Sec. 504. Notification regarding the authorized public disclosure of
national intelligence.
Sec. 505. Technical amendments related to the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.
Sec. 506. Technical amendment for definition of intelligence agency.
Sec. 507. Budgetary effects.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2013 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and,
subject to section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as
of September 30, 2013, for the conduct of the intelligence
activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through
(16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill S.
3454 of the One Hundred Twelfth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--
(1) Availability to committees of congress.--The classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a)
shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and to the President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of
the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate
portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.
415c);
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National
Intelligence may authorize the employment of civilian
personnel in excess of the number of positions for fiscal
year 2013 authorized by the classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the Director
of National Intelligence determines that such action is
necessary to the performance of important intelligence
functions, except that the number of personnel employed in
excess of the number authorized under such section may not,
for any element of the intelligence community, exceed 3
percent of the number of civilian personnel authorized under
such section for such element.
(b) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern,
for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment
under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a),
including any exemption from such personnel levels, of
employment or assignment in--
(1) a student program, trainee program, or similar program;
(2) a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or
(3) details, joint duty, or long term, full-time training.
(c) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The
Director of National Intelligence shall notify the
congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15
days prior to the initial exercise of an authority described
in subsection (a).
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2013 the sum of $540,721,000. Within such amount, funds
identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2014.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of
National Intelligence are authorized 835 positions as of
September 30, 2013. Personnel serving in such elements may be
permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the
United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are
authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management
Account for fiscal year 2013 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for
advanced research and development shall remain available
until September 30, 2014.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30,
2013, there are authorized such additional personnel for the
Community Management Account as of that date as are specified
in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 102(a).
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement
[[Page H7480]]
and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2013 the sum of
$514,000,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SEC. 301. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 302. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 303. NON-REIMBURSABLE DETAILS.
Section 113A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 404h-1) is amended--
(1) by striking ``two years.'' and inserting ``three
years.''; and
(2) by adding at the end ``A non-reimbursable detail made
under this section shall not be considered an augmentation of
the appropriations of the receiving element of the
intelligence community.''.
SEC. 304. AUTOMATED INSIDER THREAT DETECTION PROGRAM.
Section 402 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 112-18; 50 U.S.C. 403-1 note) is
amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by striking ``October 1, 2012,'' and
inserting ``October 1, 2013,''; and
(2) in subsection (b), by striking ``October 1, 2013,'' and
inserting ``October 1, 2014,''.
SEC. 305. SOFTWARE LICENSING.
(a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, each chief information officer for
an element of the intelligence community, in consultation
with the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence
Community, shall--
(1) conduct an inventory of software licenses held by such
element, including utilized and unutilized licenses; and
(2) report the results of such inventory to the Chief
Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.
(b) Reporting to Congress.--The Chief Information Officer
of the Intelligence Community shall--
(1) not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, provide to the congressional intelligence
committees a copy of each report received by the Chief
Information Officer under subsection (a)(2), along with any
comments the Chief Information Officer wishes to provide; and
(2) transmit any portion of a report submitted under
paragraph (1) involving a component of a department of the
United States Government to the committees of the Senate and
of the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over such
department simultaneously with submission of such report to
the congressional intelligence committees.
SEC. 306. STRATEGY FOR SECURITY CLEARANCE RECIPROCITY.
(a) Strategy.--The President shall develop a strategy and a
schedule for carrying out the requirements of section 3001(d)
of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (50 U.S.C. 435b(d)). Such strategy and schedule shall
include--
(1) a process for accomplishing the reciprocity required
under such section for a security clearance issued by a
department or agency of the Federal Government, including
reciprocity for security clearances that are issued to both
persons who are and who are not employees of the Federal
Government; and
(2) a description of the specific circumstances under which
a department or agency of the Federal Government may not
recognize a security clearance issued by another department
or agency of the Federal Government.
(b) Congressional Notification.--Not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall inform Congress of the strategy and schedule developed
under subsection (a).
SEC. 307. IMPROPER PAYMENTS ELIMINATION AND RECOVERY ACT OF
2010 COMPLIANCE.
(a) Plan for Compliance.--
(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence, the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the
National Security Agency shall each develop a corrective
action plan, with major milestones, that delineates how the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence and each such
Agency will achieve compliance, not later than September 30,
2013, with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act
of 2010 (Public Law 111-204; 124 Stat. 2224), and the
amendments made by that Act.
(2) Submission to congress.--Not later than 45 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act--
(A) each Director referred to in paragraph (1) shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees the corrective
action plan required by such paragraph; and
(B) the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, and
the Director of the National Security Agency shall each
submit to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives the corrective action plan required by
paragraph (1) with respect to the applicable Agency.
(b) Review by Inspectors General.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 45 days after the
completion of a corrective action plan required by subsection
(a)(1), the Inspector General of each Agency required to
develop such a plan, and in the case of the Director of
National Intelligence, the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community, shall provide to the congressional
intelligence committees an assessment of such plan that
includes--
(A) the assessment of the Inspector General of whether such
Agency or Office is or is not likely to reach compliance with
the requirements of the Improper Payments Elimination and
Recovery Act of 2010 (Public Law 111-204; 124 Stat. 2224),
and the amendments made by that Act, by September 30, 2013;
and
(B) the basis of the Inspector General for such assessment.
(2) Additional submission of reviews of certain inspectors
general.--Not later than 45 days after the completion of a
corrective action plan required by subsection (a)(1), the
Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
Inspector General of the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, and the Inspector General of the National Security
Agency shall each submit to the Committee on Armed Services
of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the
House of Representatives the assessment of the applicable
plan provided to the congressional intelligence committees
under paragraph (1).
SEC. 308. SUBCONTRACTOR NOTIFICATION PROCESS.
Not later than October 1, 2013, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report assessing the method by which contractors
at any tier under a contract entered into with an element of
the intelligence community are granted security clearances
and notified of classified contracting opportunities within
the Federal Government and recommendations for the
improvement of such method. Such report shall include--
(1) an assessment of the current method by which
contractors at any tier under a contract entered into with an
element of the intelligence community are notified of
classified contracting opportunities;
(2) an assessment of any problems that may reduce the
overall effectiveness of the ability of the intelligence
community to identify appropriate contractors at any tier
under such a contract;
(3) an assessment of the role the existing security
clearance process has in enhancing or hindering the ability
of the intelligence community to notify such contractors of
contracting opportunities;
(4) an assessment of the role the current security
clearance process has in enhancing or hindering the ability
of contractors at any tier under a contract entered into with
an element of the intelligence community to execute
classified contracts;
(5) a description of the method used by the Director of
National Intelligence for assessing the effectiveness of the
notification process of the intelligence community to produce
a talented pool of subcontractors;
(6) a description of appropriate goals, schedules,
milestones, or metrics used to measure the effectiveness of
such notification process; and
(7) recommendations for improving such notification
process.
SEC. 309. MODIFICATION OF REPORTING SCHEDULE.
(a) Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.--
Section 103H(k)(1)(A) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 403-3h(k)(1)(A)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``January 31 and July 31'' and inserting
``October 31 and April 30''; and
(2) by striking ``December 31 (of the preceding year) and
June 30,'' and inserting ``September 30 and March 31,''.
(b) Inspector General for the Central Intelligence
Agency.--
(1) In general.--Section 17(d)(1) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(1)) is
amended--
(A) by striking ``January 31 and July 31'' and inserting
``October 31 and April 30'';
(B) by striking ``December 31 (of the preceding year) and
June 30,'' and inserting ``September 30 and March 31,''; and
(C) by striking ``Not later than the dates each year
provided for the transmittal of such reports in section 507
of the National Security Act of 1947,'' and inserting ``Not
later than 30 days after the date of the receipt of such
reports,''.
(2) Conforming amendments.--Section 507(b) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b(b)) is amended--
(A) by striking paragraph (1); and
(B) by redesignating paragraphs (2), (3), and (4), as
paragraphs (1), (2), and (3), respectively.
SEC. 310. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Repeal of Reporting Requirements.--
(1) Acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass
destruction and advanced conventional munitions.--Section 721
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997
(50 U.S.C. 2366) is repealed.
(2) Safety and security of russian nuclear facilities and
nuclear military forces.--Section 114 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i) is amended--
(A) by striking subsections (a) and (d); and
(B) by redesignating subsections (b) and (c) as subsections
(a) and (b), respectively.
[[Page H7481]]
(3) Intelligence community business systems budget
information.--Section 506D of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 415a-6) is amended by striking subsection
(e).
(4) Measures to protect the identities of covert agents.--
Title VI of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421
et seq.) is amended--
(A) by striking section 603; and
(B) by redesignating sections 604, 605, and 606 as sections
603, 604, and 605, respectively.
(b) Technical and Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Report submission dates.--Section 507 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b) is amended--
(A) in subsection (a)--
(i) in paragraph (1)--
(I) by striking subparagraphs (A), (C), and (D);
(II) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (E), (F), (G),
(H), and (I) as subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), and
(F), respectively; and
(III) in subparagraph (D), as so redesignated, by striking
``section 114(c).'' and inserting ``section 114(a).''; and
(ii) by amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:
``(2) The date for the submittal to the congressional
intelligence committees of the annual report on the threat of
attack on the United States from weapons of mass destruction
required by section 114(b) shall be the date each year
provided in subsection (c)(1)(B).'';
(B) in subsection (c)(1)(B), by striking ``each'' and
inserting ``the''; and
(C) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking ``an'' and
inserting ``the''.
(2) Table of contents of the national security act of
1947.--The table of contents in the first section of the
National Security Act of 1947 is amended by striking the
items relating to sections 603, 604, 605, and 606 and
inserting the following new items:
``Sec. 603. Extraterritorial jurisdiction.
``Sec. 604. Providing information to Congress.
``Sec. 605. Definitions.''.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. WORKING CAPITAL FUND AMENDMENTS.
Section 21 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
(50 U.S.C. 403u) is amended as follows:
(1) In subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (1)--
(i) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(ii) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``program.'' and
inserting ``program; and''; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following:
``(D) authorize such providers to make known their services
to the entities specified in section (a) through Government
communication channels.''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following:
``(3) The authority in paragraph (1)(D) does not include
the authority to distribute gifts or promotional items.'';
and
(2) in subsection (c)--
(A) in paragraph (2)(E), by striking ``from the sale or
exchange of equipment or property of a central service
provider'' and inserting ``from the sale or exchange of
equipment, recyclable materials, or property of a central
service provider.''; and
(B) in paragraph (3)(B), by striking ``subsection (f)(2)''
and inserting ``subsections (b)(1)(D) and (f)(2)''.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 501. HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
There is established within the Department of Homeland
Security a Homeland Security Intelligence Program. The
Homeland Security Intelligence Program constitutes the
intelligence activities of the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis of the Department that serve predominantly
departmental missions.
SEC. 502. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF
THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 1007(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note) is
amended by striking ``Not later than one year after the date
on which all members of the Commission are appointed pursuant
to section 701(a)(3) of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2010,'' and inserting ``Not later than March
31, 2013,''.
SEC. 503. PROTECTING THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SUPPLY CHAIN
OF THE UNITED STATES.
(a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report that--
(1) identifies foreign suppliers of information technology
(including equipment, software, and services) that are linked
directly or indirectly to a foreign government, including--
(A) by ties to the military forces of a foreign government;
(B) by ties to the intelligence services of a foreign
government; or
(C) by being the beneficiaries of significant low interest
or no interest loans, loan forgiveness, or other support by a
foreign government; and
(2) assesses the vulnerability to malicious activity,
including cyber crime or espionage, of the telecommunications
networks of the United States due to the presence of
technology produced by suppliers identified under paragraph
(1).
(b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
(c) Telecommunications Networks of the United States
Defined.--In this section, the term ``telecommunications
networks of the United States'' includes--
(1) telephone systems;
(2) Internet systems;
(3) fiber optic lines, including cable landings;
(4) computer networks; and
(5) smart grid technology under development by the
Department of Energy.
SEC. 504. NOTIFICATION REGARDING THE AUTHORIZED PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Notification.--In the event of an authorized disclosure
of national intelligence or intelligence related to national
security to the persons or entities described in subsection
(b), the government official responsible for authorizing the
disclosure shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees on a timely basis a notification of the disclosure
if--
(1) at the time of the disclosure--
(A) such intelligence is classified; or
(B) is declassified for the purpose of the disclosure; and
(2) the disclosure will be made by an officer, employee, or
contractor of the Executive branch.
(b) Persons or Entities Described.--The persons or entities
described in this subsection are as follows:
(1) Media personnel.
(2) Any person or entity, if the disclosure described in
subsection (a) is made with the intent or knowledge that such
information will be made publicly available.
(c) Content.--Each notification required under subsection
(a) shall--
(1) provide the specific title and authority of the
individual authorizing the disclosure;
(2) if applicable, provide the specific title and authority
of the individual who authorized the declassification of the
intelligence disclosed; and
(3) describe the intelligence disclosed, including the
classification of the intelligence prior to its disclosure or
declassification and the rationale for making the disclosure.
(d) Exception.--The notification requirement in this
section does not apply to a disclosure made--
(1) pursuant to any statutory requirement, including to
section 552 of title 5, United States Code (commonly referred
to as the ``Freedom of Information Act'');
(2) in connection with a civil, criminal, or administrative
proceeding;
(3) as a result of a declassification review process under
Executive Order 13526 (50 U.S.C. 435 note) or any successor
order; or
(4) to any officer, employee, or contractor of the Federal
government or member of an advisory committee to an element
of the intelligence community who possesses an active
security clearance and a need to know the specific national
intelligence or intelligence related to national security, as
defined in section 3(5) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 401a(5)).
(e) Sunset.--The notification requirements of this section
shall cease to be effective for any disclosure described in
subsection (a) that occurs on or after the date that is one
year after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 505. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATED TO THE OFFICE OF THE
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Personnel Practices.--Section 2302(a)(2)(C) of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by striking clause (ii) and
inserting the following:
``(ii)(I) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, and the National Reconnaissance Office; and
``(II) as determined by the President, any executive agency
or unit thereof the principal function of which is the
conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
activities, provided that the determination be made prior to
a personnel action; or''.
(b) Senior Executive Service.--Section 3132(a)(1)(B) of
title 5, United States Code, is amended by inserting ``the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence,'' after
``the Central Intelligence Agency,''.
SEC. 506. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT FOR DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY.
Section 606(5) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 426) is amended to read as follows:
``(5) The term `intelligence agency' means the elements of
the intelligence community, as that term is defined in
section 3(4).''.
SEC. 507. BUDGETARY EFFECTS.
The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of
complying with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go-Act of 2010, shall
be determined by reference to the latest statement titled
``Budgetary Effects of PAYGO Legislation'' for this Act,
submitted for printing in the Congressional Record by the
Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, provided that such
statement has been submitted prior to the vote on passage.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and the gentleman from Maryland (Mr.
Ruppersberger) each will control 20 minutes.
[[Page H7482]]
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
General Leave
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that
all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend
their remarks and include extraneous material on the bill before us
today.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Michigan?
There was no objection.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume, and I appreciate the opportunity to be here on New Year's
Eve.
I first wish to make an announcement with respect to the availability
of the classified annex to the bill under consideration for the Members
of the House. This is to reinforce a previous announcement I made to
Members last evening.
Madam Speaker, the classified Schedule of Authorizations and the
classified annex accompanying the bill remain available for review by
Members at the offices of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence in room HVC-304 of the Capitol Visitor Center. The
committee office will be open during regular business hours for the
convenience of any Member who wishes to review this material prior to
its consideration by the House.
I recommend that Members wishing to review the classified annex
contact the committee's director of security to arrange a time and date
for that viewing. This will assure the availability of committee staff
to assist Members who desire assistance during their review of these
classified documents.
Madam Speaker, I am pleased that the House is considering this
intelligence authorization bill today, the last day of the year. If
passed and enacted, this will be our third intelligence authorization
bill since I assumed the chairmanship and my friend the gentleman from
Maryland became the ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee.
In May, the House overwhelmingly passed, by a vote of 386-28, an
intelligence authorization bill which is the same product as the bill
that is before us today. I appreciate the ranking member's hard work on
this year's bill and that of our colleagues in the Senate to achieve a
bipartisan result between the two Chambers.
{time} 1030
This is indeed a rare occurrence in this town these days, but this is
truly a bipartisan, bicameral product that moves forward when it comes
to protecting the United States and putting us in the best national
security posture we could imagine.
The intelligence authorization bill is vital to ensuring that our
intelligence agencies have the resources and authorities they need to
do their important work. The intelligence community plays a critical
role in the war on terrorism and securing the country from the many
threats that we face.
The annual authorization bill, which funds U.S. intelligence
activities spanning 17 agencies, is also a vital tool for congressional
oversight of the intelligence community's classified activities.
Effective and aggressive congressional oversight is essential to
ensuring the continued success of our intelligence community, and
therefore the safety of all citizens of the United States. The current
challenging fiscal environment demands the accountability and financial
oversight of our classified intelligence programs that can only come
with an intelligence authorization bill.
The FY 2013 bill sustains our current intelligence capabilities and
provides for the development of future capabilities, all while
achieving significant savings and ensuring intelligence agencies are
being good stewards of our taxpayers' money.
This year, the bill is significantly below last year's enacted budget
but up modestly from the President's roughly $72 billion budget request
for fiscal year 2013. It is also in line with the House budget
resolution, which provides for a modest increase of defense activities
above the President's budget.
The bill's comprehensive classified annex provides detailed guidance
on intelligence spending, including adjustments to costly but important
programs. The bill funds requirements of the men and women of the
intelligence community, both military and civilian, many of whom
directly support the war zones and are engaged in other dangerous
operations designed to keep Americans safe.
It provides oversight and authorization for vital intelligence
activities, including the global counterwar on terrorism and efforts by
the National Security Agency to defend us from advanced foreign state-
sponsored cyberthreats. And I can't tell you enough, Madam Speaker, how
in this Chamber we have acted to stand up in the face of a growing
cyberthreat not only to government networks but to private networks as
well. We have, in a bipartisan way, given the first step on how we
stand up our defenses here in the United States to protect us from
nation-states like China and Russia--and now Iran--who seek to do us
harm using the Internet. We will again aggressively pursue next year,
with the help of my ranking member, actions needed, I believe, to
protect the United States against what is the largest threat we face
that we are not prepared to handle, and that is the growing threat of
cyberattack and cyberespionage.
Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is also a
critical, important mission of our intelligence community, and we made
sure the resources were available to that end, as well as for global
monitoring of foreign militaries and advanced weapons systems and
tests, and for research and development of new technology to maintain
our intelligence agencies' technological edge.
And like the House-passed bill, this bill promotes operating
efficiencies in a number of areas, particularly in information
technology, the ground processing of satellite data, and the
procurement and operation of intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance platforms. The bill holds personnel levels, one of the
first and biggest cost drivers, generally at last year's levels. Even
so, the bill adds a limited number of new personnel positions for
select, high-priority positions, such as FBI surveillance officers to
keep watch on terrorists, and personnel for certain other programs that
will increase cooperation and training with our foreign partners in the
critically important role for our intelligence agencies as we move to
protect ourselves from threats all around the world.
The bill authorizes increased funding for intelligence collection
programs, including increased counterintelligence to thwart foreign
spies. It also increases funding for our intelligence community's
comparative advantage--cutting-edge research and development. This is
an incredibly important investment for the United States. If we are
going to continue to lead in the ability to detect before they can do
harm to the United States, we have to make the investment in research
and development of high-end technological advancement.
While I cannot get into the specifics of a lot of these programs,
it's important to mention them as we are going through the process each
year in conducting oversight of intelligence activities and making
funding recommendations that will help the community meet its mission
in the most effective, fiscally responsible way.
The bipartisan fiscal year 2013 intelligence authorization bill we
are considering today preserves and advances national security and is
also fiscally responsible. The secrecy that is a necessary part of this
country's intelligence work requires that the congressional
Intelligence Committees conduct strong and effective oversight on
behalf of the American people and even our colleagues here in the
House. That strong and effective oversight is impossible, however,
without the advancement of these bills.
I want to thank all of the members of the committee for their
bipartisan effort to find agreement on a bill that saves money and
moves forward smartly on protecting the interests of national security
for the United States. I want to thank both of the staffs for working
together to produce this bill. This truly is a collaborative effort
both from staff and Members in this Chamber and in the Senate, proving
that you can work in a bipartisan way to accomplish the best interests
of the United States and, in this case, particularly when it comes to
national security.
[[Page H7483]]
One final note: I want to congratulate Mrs. Myrick on her years of
great service to the Intelligence Committee. She will be leaving us
this year. This will be her last authorization bill that she will
participate in. I am pleased to see that a provision she championed in
May concerning the protection of the United States information
technology supply chain is included in this bill. She has done great
work in her time with the committee, and she certainly will be missed.
She has been a true champion of the national security interests of this
country. She is a great friend of mine, and I wish her well in her new
endeavors.
I thank all who participated. I also want to take this opportunity to
thank my chief counsel for celebrating his birthday today on the House
floor with us on New Year's Eve day. I appreciate that very much.
With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Speaker, I yield myself as much time as I
may consume.
Before us today is the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year
2013. It's a good, bipartisan bill that gives our intelligence
professionals the resources, capabilities, and authorities they need to
keep us safe. And I also want to acknowledge the leadership of Chairman
Rogers. His bipartisan leadership has helped us make the Intelligence
Committee a committee that provides oversight to our intelligence
agencies and gives them the resources that they need to protect our
country. I also want to acknowledge the staff on both sides of the
aisle who worked very closely to put this bill together.
When Chairman Rogers and I took over leadership of the Intelligence
Committee, we made a commitment to bipartisanship. We believe politics
has no place in national security. The stakes are just too high. We
also made a commitment to passing intelligence budgets that provide
oversight to the intelligence community and give it important financial
direction. Chairman Rogers and I also work closely with Chairwoman
Dianne Feinstein and vice chair Saxby Chambliss of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, our counterparts in the Senate, so we can get
things done.
If this bill becomes law, it will be the third budget bill in a row
passed since we took over leadership in January, 2011--a big change
from the previous 6 years when we only passed one budget bill. This was
an open, bipartisan process where we reached agreement on issues that
will make this country safer and intelligence processes more efficient.
We know we are facing tough economic times. This budget is slightly
below the enacted levels of FY 2012. We made cuts where appropriate,
eliminated redundancies, and pushed programs to come in on time and on
budget.
People ask me what keeps me up at night. Besides spicy food, I say
weapons of mass destruction and a catastrophic cyberattack that shuts
down our banking system, water supply, power grids or worse.
This bill continues a substantial investment in cybersecurity that
must be made to keep up with the cyberthreats of today and tomorrow. We
also believe we must protect privacy and civil liberties when it comes
to cybersecurity.
Another priority is space. The bill promotes the commercial space
industry by enhancing the government use of commercial imagery and
commercial communications services. It requires the government to use
commercial imagery to the maximum extent practicable.
I believe competition is important to ensure we get high quality
products while keeping costs down. It drives innovation and provides a
much-needed insurance policy in case there are problems with other
programs. And it does create jobs.
The bill expanded our counterterrorism efforts to continue the fight
against al Qaeda and its affiliates around the world. The bill also
makes counterintelligence the priority it is. It makes strategic
additions across the intelligence community. This will pay for
surveillance, better supply chain security, and the counterintelligence
analysts we need.
The bill added resources to the intelligence community's global
coverage initiatives to ensure the United States is capable and ready
to address threats from any location around the world, especially in
areas of strategic interest.
{time} 1040
It authorizes the Department of Defense's new defense clandestine
service to reorganize its human intelligence collection. It will be a
part of the CIA's national clandestine service. The bill directed the
Director of national intelligence to develop a centralized cloud for
the entire intelligence community; advancing collaboration and further
promoting efficiency; and it required the President to develop a
strategy for security clearance, reciprocity, and a report on how to
better protect our information technology across the global supply
chain.
I urge my colleagues to support the Intelligence Authorization Act
for FY 2012. When this bill was before the House in May, it passed by a
bipartisan margin of 386-28. It's a good bipartisan bill that gives our
intelligence professionals what they need to do their jobs and protect
our Nation.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I inquire if the minority side
has a list of speakers.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. At this time, we have one speaker. We're waiting
for more; but if they don't come, we'll move on.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Then I will continue to reserve the balance
of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the
Congressman from Ohio, Dennis Kucinich.
Mr. KUCINICH. I thank my friend. And I want to thank both my friends,
the chair and the ranking member, for the work that they do on
intelligence. You make a commitment to this country, and I think the
country is in good hands because of your work.
I want to raise a question--and we've had some of these conversations
between ourselves. I'm very concerned about the shift that's occurred
in our national security policy where the Central Intelligence Agency
has increasingly played a very powerful paramilitary role with the
execution of drone strikes. Numerous studies have indicated that there
are many innocent civilians being killed by drone strikes. There's a
lack of accountability here. There have been studies that suggest, for
example in Yemen, that drone strikes are stirring up anti-American
sentiment to the point where al Qaeda is actually being empowered.
We really have to ask of the CIA, but even more than that, of our
entire national security infrastructure, What's the game plan here? We
see there have been changes in military policy where certain functions
have been ceded to the CIA. We see changes in foreign policy where the
State Department has let go of some of its functions. We know that the
military has made an attempt with the Defense Intelligence Agency to
try to become more actively involved as a separate organization. They
were seeking 1,600 new spies.
We have this architecture of national security which is so powerful,
but I'm not sure that it's actually that effective. I don't question
the effectiveness of our chair or our ranking member, but I do question
the effectiveness of what we're doing.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield an additional 1 minute to the gentleman
from Ohio.
Mr. KUCINICH. I do question the effectiveness of this drone program,
its adherence to international law or lack thereof, the intel gathering
on targeted killings where we've seen reports of efforts of one group
to target individuals and other groups as a way of trying to settle
some scores between people so they put them up as a potential terrorist
and they get marked on a list and executed. And as I mentioned earlier,
the concern about civilian deaths.
I think that the Central Intelligence Agency functions best in
gathering intelligence, and we ought to support them in that regard. I
was very concerned and expressed this on the floor about what happened
in Benghazi. If we'd paid more attention to the CIA, we probably would
still have some of our officials there alive. But that's gone and it's
over. We have to recognize that putting the CIA more and more into a
paramilitary position is not in the best interest of this country, I
don't believe.
[[Page H7484]]
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The gentleman and I have had these conversations, and I respect his
position greatly and the work he does in Congress.
I have some disagreements, and I'll tell you why--and I hope that the
gentleman will consider voting for this bill today. The amount of
oversight that the ranking member and I have increased on programs that
may have concerns on behalf of Americans, because we have the same
concerns. There are tools that America engages in, including air
strikes. Air strikes have been something that we have used since we
could figure out how to get something off the ground and throw
something at the ground. They have been used as a tool. It's not a
policy of the United States; it's a tool of the United States to make
America safe.
The amount of oversight that happens--and I will tell you this: if
there is any air strike conducted that involves an enemy combatant of
the United States outside the theater of direct combat, it gets
reviewed by this committee. I am talking about every single one. That's
an important thing. There are very strict reviews put on all of this
material. There are very strict guidelines about how these air strikes
may or may not occur, because we have that same feeling. If people lose
faith in the ability of our intelligence services to do their work,
then they will be ineffective, and, therefore, we will be less safe.
Our argument has been we want that oversight, we want aggressive
oversight, and we want thorough review. I can tell you--and I think
you'd be proud--of the very work that we do on the committee to that
end. We never really did covert-action reviews, except for
sporadically. Now we do regularly, quarterly, and monthly covert-action
reviews on this committee to make sure that we get it right, that they
get it right.
Mr. KUCINICH. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I would be honored to yield to the gentleman
from Ohio.
Mr. KUCINICH. I have no question about the commitment of the chair
and the ranking member to proper oversight, but what I do question is
that the proliferation of the drone strikes puts such an extraordinary
burden on our own oversight capacities. I'm wondering, looking
retrospectively at the number of civilian casualties that have
occurred, the oversight--there's a decoupling of the oversight capacity
from the consequences of the strikes, and that's the point that I'm
making here.
I would ask my friend going forward for the committee to be ever more
vigilant on--if you're for these strikes and you are conducting the
oversight, look at the consequences of civilian casualties to raise
questions about the information that's being given you. That's the
point that I'm making.
With that, I thank my friend for yielding.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I appreciate that, and I reclaim my time.
I think this is very important. Again, I personally review and the
committee reviews the material that comes to these committees.
There are many in the world who have political agendas about civilian
casualties. I can tell you to rest assured that that is a point of
review for any activity--I'm talking about any activity--that our
intelligence community may or may not engage in. I think that you would
be shocked and stunned how wrong those public reports are about
civilian casualties, and I say that with all seriousness and with the
very thought that every one of these events is reviewed.
If there is an air strike used as a technique anywhere in the world
to keep America safe, it is reviewed if it comes within the purview of
the intelligence community, both military and civilian, on this
committee. Those reports are wrong. They are not just wrong; they are
wildly wrong. And I do believe people use those reports for their own
political purposes outside of the country to try to put pressure on the
United States.
{time} 1050
Mr. KUCINICH. If I may, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. KUCINICH. What I would like to do, Mr. Chairman, is to present to
you and the ranking member reports that have been forwarded to me
regarding these casualties. Maybe these are reports that you've seen,
and maybe they aren't; but I certainly think that in the interest of
acquitting our country's efforts that we make sure that every effort is
made to avoid civilian casualties. So I will present those to you and
the ranking member in the next few days, and I want to thank you for
giving me this opportunity.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. In reclaiming my time, I just want to assure
the gentleman that every one of these is reviewed, and rest assured
that the public reports about civilian casualties are not just a little
bit wrong; they are wildly wrong.
With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
First, I do want to acknowledge the work that has been done by Dennis
Kucinich as a Member of Congress. Dennis and I don't always
philosophically agree, but I respect that he has a good point of view.
That's the whole process here in Congress--that we have different
points of view, that we come together, that we debate, and that we can
make decisions.
So, Dennis, we are going to miss you. Good luck to you and your
family in the future, and I'm glad that one of the last things you're
going to do is come here and talk about our bill today.
In just acknowledging what the chairman said, there is an aggressive
legal process that is undertaken as far as drones are concerned that
goes to the highest levels of our government before strikes are taken.
In everything that I have reviewed, if there are children or innocent
victims there, the strike does not take place. So there is a process.
Unfortunately, there are some casualties--very minor. I would also
agree with the chairman as far as this is concerned: in that what you
read in the media is usually not what the facts are.
It is part of what we do. Why do we have the Intelligence Committee?
We have it because there is classified information that if it got out
would hurt the national security of our country. It's part of our role
and our committee's role to take this classified information and work
with the agencies to which we provide oversight so we will continue to
work through that process.
Mr. Kucinich, I'm glad that you did raise that as an issue, as we all
should.
Madam Speaker, for the third time in 3 years, Chairman Rogers and I
have stood on the floor of the House encouraging our colleagues to
support our intelligence budget bill. Today, we both rise in support of
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013. The bill gives
our intelligence professionals the resources, capabilities, and
authorities they need to protect America and American interests.
We crafted a bill that addresses our core needs, including space,
cybersecurity, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism. We are also
keeping an eye on the bottom line. The bill is slightly below last
year's budget and holds personnel at last year's levels. In a very
strong bipartisan way, the Intelligence Committee came together as
Democrats and Republicans to do what is right for our country and for
the intelligence community.
I thank the staff again for what it has done, and I thank the
chairman for his leadership in helping to provide this bill in a very
fair, bipartisan way.
I would also like to acknowledge two Democratic Members who will be
leaving us at the end of this session--Congressman Dan Boren of
Oklahoma and Congressman Ben Chandler of Kentucky. Both Members will be
greatly missed, and I appreciate their service on the Intelligence
Committee.
Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the Intelligence
Authorization Act for FY 2013, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, may I inquire as to how much
time is remaining.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan has 5\1/2\
minutes remaining.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Again, I want to thank my ranking member and both staffs on the
Intelligence Committee for the long hours, hard work and thorough,
detailed work
[[Page H7485]]
on the budgets and on the classified annex of this report.
I think it should alleviate many of the good concerns of Mr. Kucinich
and others who are concerned about these activities. I think it's
important to reiterate that we have the same concerns, which is why we
are so thorough and why we have joined together in a bipartisan way to
increase the level of congressional oversight and to increase our
impact and influence on the policies of the intelligence community in
order to make sure it conforms with what this body and what I think the
United States of America wants and needs in its intelligence services.
We have now done, as I said before, regularly scheduled covert
action, which, I think, should rest assured Americans that it is
serious, thoughtful and thorough oversight. For counterintelligence
activities, we now have regularly scheduled oversight. Every department
is required to proffer its budget request, and we go over it line by
line, dollar by dollar, policy by policy to make sure it conforms with
the concerns of everyone in this body.
As I said before, these are very brave Americans who are serving in
really tough neighborhoods all over the world--trying to collect
information, trying to take actionable intelligence to a point that it
protects us from harm here at home. They deserve our respect, our
encouragement, our high-five and pat on the back when they come home.
They want thorough oversight. You wouldn't believe it, but they do.
They want to know that the work that they're doing would make America
proud for them risking their lives and being away from their families
and putting it all on the line to keep America safe.
That's why we agreed to do this in a bipartisan way and to be so
thorough in its congressional oversight, because without that--without
that confidence, without that faith of the American people that they're
doing something on behalf of this great Nation--they will lose their
ability to do what they do, and they will lose the courage and
confidence that they need to do it in the right way. So that's what
this bill reflects.
I understand your concerns. I look forward to our further
conversations on this; and in further conversations, I'd like to have
the opportunity, if we can arrange this, to give you some examples--a
peek behind the curtain as to exactly what goes on in the processes of
making sure that we keep the good people safe and that the bad guys are
brought to justice. I think you'd be proud of that work. This bill
reflects that.
Again, thanks to the ranking member and to the staffs and to the
members on both sides of this committee. Thanks to Senator Feinstein
and to Senator Saxby Chambliss for their help in putting this bill
together.
I hope we'll get a large show of support with a strong vote of
bipartisanship for the men and women who are serving at our
intelligence posts all around the world today. Let's send this to the
President so we can go about the business of keeping America safe and
maybe even look at some other details that the Speaker may have
interest in dealing with today.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Madam Speaker, today, I voted against the Fiscal Year
2013 Intelligence Authorization Act. Despite keeping funding levels
flat and capping personnel levels to that of Fiscal Year 2012, this
authorization is not significantly different than the earlier version I
voted against in May.
It is another missed opportunity to make significant, smart
reductions in our intelligence infrastructure, at a time when we're
asking so many others to make significant budgetary sacrifices in the
midst of austerity. This legislation continues to spend way too much
money--$72 to $78 billion a year--with little transparency or efforts
to reduce the sprawling intelligence community and protect privacy
rights.
It's of paramount importance to keep our country safe, and that's
exactly what our intelligence community has done, but we cannot afford
to spend as much on intelligence as Russia does on its entire military
budget or employ hundreds of thousands of people with secret clearance.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) that the House suspend the rules
and pass the bill, S. 3454.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Speaker, I object to the vote on the
ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a
quorum is not present.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 of rule XX, further
proceedings on this question will be postponed.
The point of no quorum is considered withdrawn.
____________________
[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 171 (Monday, December 31, 2012)]
[House]
[Page H7512]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The unfinished business is the question on
suspending the rules and passing the bill (S. 3454) to authorize
appropriations for fiscal year 2013 for intelligence and intelligence-
related activities of the United States Government and the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) that the House suspend the rules
and pass the bill.
The question was taken.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. In the opinion of the Chair, two-thirds
being in the affirmative, the ayes have it.
Mr. SCHWEIKERT. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 373,
nays 29, not voting 29, as follows:
[Roll No. 652]
YEAS--373
Adams
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Altmire
Amodei
Andrews
Austria
Baca
Bachmann
Bachus
Baldwin
Barber
Barletta
Barrow
Bartlett
Barton (TX)
Bass (CA)
Becerra
Benishek
Berg
Berkley
Berman
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Bonamici
Bonner
Boren
Boswell
Boustany
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Braley (IA)
Brooks
Broun (GA)
Brown (FL)
Buchanan
Bucshon
Buerkle
Burgess
Butterfield
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canseco
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Carnahan
Carney
Carson (IN)
Carter
Cassidy
Chabot
Chaffetz
Chandler
Chu
Cicilline
Clarke (MI)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Coffman (CO)
Cole
Conaway
Connolly (VA)
Cooper
Costa
Courtney
Cravaack
Crenshaw
Critz
Crowley
Cuellar
Culberson
Curson (MI)
Davis (CA)
DeFazio
DeLauro
DelBene
Denham
Dent
DesJarlais
Deutch
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Dingell
Dold
Donnelly (IN)
Doyle
Dreier
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Edwards
Ellmers
Emerson
Engel
Eshoo
Farenthold
Farr
Fattah
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Flake
Fleischmann
Fleming
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Fudge
Garamendi
Gardner
Garrett
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gingrey (GA)
Gohmert
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (MO)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Griffin (AR)
Griffith (VA)
Grimm
Guinta
Guthrie
Hall
Hanabusa
Hanna
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Heck
Heinrich
Hensarling
Herger
Herrera Beutler
Higgins
Himes
Hinchey
Hirono
Hochul
Holden
Hoyer
Huelskamp
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurt
Israel
Issa
Jackson Lee (TX)
Jenkins
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly
Kildee
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kinzinger (IL)
Kissell
Kline
Labrador
Lamborn
Lance
Landry
Langevin
Lankford
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Latta
Levin
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Long
Lowey
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan
Lummis
Lungren, Daniel E.
Lynch
Manzullo
Marchant
Marino
Markey
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul
McClintock
McCollum
McDermott
McHenry
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
Meehan
Meeks
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Moore
Moran
Mulvaney
Murphy (CT)
Murphy (PA)
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Neugebauer
Noem
Nugent
Nunes
Nunnelee
Olson
Owens
Palazzo
Pallone
Paulsen
Payne
Pearce
Pence
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Petri
Pitts
Platts
Poe (TX)
Pompeo
Posey
Price (GA)
Price (NC)
Quayle
Quigley
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Rehberg
Reichert
Renacci
Reyes
Ribble
Richardson
Richmond
Rigell
Rivera
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rokita
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross (AR)
Rothman (NJ)
Royce
Runyan
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Scalise
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schilling
Schock
Schrader
Schwartz
Schweikert
Scott (SC)
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Sewell
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuster
Sires
Slaughter
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Southerland
Stearns
Stivers
Stutzman
Sullivan
Sutton
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tierney
Tipton
Tonko
Tsongas
Turner (NY)
Turner (OH)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walberg
Walden
Walsh (IL)
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Watt
Webster
Welch
West
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (FL)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wolf
Womack
Woodall
Yarmuth
Yoder
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Young (IN)
NAYS--29
Amash
Blumenauer
Capuano
Cohen
Conyers
Cummings
Davis (IL)
DeGette
Doggett
Duncan (TN)
Ellison
Gibson
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hahn
Holt
Honda
Jones
Kucinich
Lee (CA)
Lofgren, Zoe
Massie
McGovern
Miller, George
Olver
Pingree (ME)
Polis
Speier
Waters
NOT VOTING--29
Ackerman
Bass (NH)
Bono Mack
Burton (IN)
Castor (FL)
Costello
Crawford
Gallegly
Hinojosa
Johnson (IL)
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Mack
Maloney
McCarthy (NY)
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Paul
Pelosi
Rohrabacher
Ross (FL)
Roybal-Allard
Schmidt
Shuler
Simpson
Stark
Towns
Waxman
Woolsey
{time} 1805
Messrs. CONYERS, COHEN, CUMMINGS, DOGGETT, GRIJALVA, and Ms. SPEIER
changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
Mr. SERRANO changed his vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
So (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and
the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________
