[Congressional Record Volume 158, Number 61 (Thursday, April 26, 2012)]
[House]
[Pages H2156-H2186]
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CYBER INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND PROTECTION ACT
General Leave
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all
Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their
remarks and include extraneous material on H.R. 3523.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Woodall). Is there objection to the
request of the gentleman from Michigan?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 631 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 3523.
The Chair appoints the gentlewoman from Illinois (Mrs. Biggert) to
preside over the Committee of the Whole.
{time} 1422
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 3523) to provide for the sharing of certain cyber threat
intelligence and cyber threat information between the intelligence
community and cybersecurity entities, and for other purposes, with Mrs.
Biggert in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the
first time.
[[Page H2157]]
The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield myself 4 minutes.
Never a problem have I seen when it comes to our national security,
Madam Chair, that we are just not prepared to handle.
In just the last few years, nation-states, like China, have stolen
enough intellectual property from just the Fed's contractors that it
would be equivalent to 50 times the print collection of the Library of
Congress. We have nation-states that are literally stealing jobs and
our future. We also have countries that are engaged in activities and
have capabilities that have the ability to break networks, computer
networks, which means you can't just reboot. It means your system is
literally broken. Those kinds of disruptions can be catastrophic when
you think about the financial sector or the energy sector or our
command and control elements for all of our national security
apparatus.
This is as serious a problem as I have seen. So, last year, I and my
partner--Dutch Ruppersberger, the vice chairman and ranking member of
the Intelligence Committee--agreed that this was a significant enough
problem to the future prosperity of America that we'd better do
something about it.
We needed to stop the Chinese Government from stealing our stuff. We
needed to stop the Russians from what they're doing to our networks and
to people's personal information, data, and resources. We needed to
prepare for countries like Iran and North Korea so that they don't do
something catastrophic to our networks here in America and cause real
harm to real people.
So, in a bipartisan way, we set out to do something very, very, very
narrow. When the government spies overseas, it collects malware--
viruses, software that is dangerous to our computers. That means they
can either steal our stuff--the personal information off of your
computer--or they can steal the secrets that make your business viable,
the kinds of secrets that give people jobs.
So wouldn't it be great if we could take that source code, that
software and share it with the private sector so that they could put it
on their private systems, like they do every single day to try to
protect networks, and have that added advantage of that extra coverage
from that malicious source code? The good news is this happens every
day. If you have Norton or McAfee or Symantec or any other antivirus
protection on your computer, it has patches of information that they
know is really bad stuff, and every time you turn your computer on, it
updates and tries to protect your computer, your personal information.
That's all this is. It is adding to that patchwork some zeroes and
some ones that we know is malicious code that is either going to steal
your information or break your computer or something worse. That's all
this bill is. It draws a very fine line between the government and the
private sector. It is all voluntary. There are no new mandates. There
is no government surveillance--none, not any--in this bill. It just
says, if we know we have this source code, shouldn't we be obligated to
give it so it doesn't do something bad to the companies and individuals
in America. That's all this bill does.
We have worked collaboratively with hundreds of companies, with
privacy groups, with civil libertarians. We have worked with government
folks. We have had hundreds and hundreds of meetings for over a year.
We have kept this bill open in an unprecedented transparent way to try
to meet the needs of privacy concerns, civil libertarian concerns,
civil liberties concerns. We wanted to make sure that, with this bill,
people understood exactly what we were trying to do, how simple it is,
and how crucial it is to the future defense of this great Nation.
Without our ideas, without our innovation that countries like China
are stealing every single day, we will cease to be a great Nation. They
are slowly and silently and quickly stealing the value and prosperity
of America.
The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself an additional 1 minute.
One credit card company said that they get attacked for your personal
information 300,000 times a day--one company. We have a company that
can directly show you stolen intellectual property. This one particular
company estimated 20,000 manufacturing jobs that they lost for
Americans, which were good-paying jobs, because countries like China
stole their intellectual property and illegally competed against them
in the marketplace.
This is as bad a problem, Madam Chair, as I have seen. I think you'll
hear throughout the day this has been a responsible debate and that it
has been a responsible negotiation to get to privacy concerns and our
ability to protect your information on your computer through this
series of zeroes and ones, the binary code on our computers.
Again, I want to thank my ranking member for his partnership and his
work. He has been exceptional to work with on something on which we
both agree and on which we agreed, in a bipartisan fashion, was a
danger to the future prosperity of America.
With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
First of all, I do want to thank the chairman for working with us in
a bipartisan way to protect our country from this very serious threat
of cyberattacks.
As the ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee, people
often ask me what keeps me up at night. I tell them: weapons of mass
destruction entering the country undetected and also a catastrophic
cyberattack shutting down our water supply, power grid or banking
systems; and those are just a few of the many areas that could be
attacked and shut down.
Every day, U.S. Web sites and our Nation's networks are threatened by
foreign governments like China, Iran, Russia, and other groups trying
to steal our money and valuable trade secrets. According to the
National Counterterrorism Executive, the number one thing cyberthieves
are trying to steal is information and communication technology, which
form the backbone of nearly every other technology. In fact, according
to the United States Cyber Command, $300 billion worth of trade secrets
are stolen every year. This proves we need to make real changes to how
we protect our cybersystems.
The Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act helps the private
sector protect itself and its clients from these attackers and data
thieves. The intelligence community has the ability to detect these
cyberthreats, these malicious codes and viruses, before they are able
to attack our networks; but right now, Federal law prohibits the
intelligence community from sharing the classified cyberthreat with the
companies that will protect us, that control the network--the AT&Ts,
the Verizons, the Comcasts, those groups. We have the ability to give
them the information to protect us; yet we have to pass a law to do
that, and that's why we are here today.
{time} 1430
The Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act will clearly do
that if we pass the bill. It allows the intelligence community to share
the codes and signatures associated with malware and viruses and the
means to counter the bad stuff with the companies. These companies keep
a lookout for these viruses and work to stop them before they are able
to attack their system.
Companies then voluntarily give information about the cyberattack
back to the government, machine code consisting of strings of zeroes
and ones that uniquely identifies the malware. Cyberanalysts will use
this information to better understand the attack and try to figure out
who launched it and where it came from.
This information will be used to protect against similar attacks in
the future.
Now, the Democrats worked hard to protect privacy and civil liberties
in this bill throughout the entire process. We fought for additional
privacy protections in the original bill that was marked up in
committee. In the version we will vote on tomorrow morning, additional
changes are also included in the amendments.
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Privacy and civil liberty groups and the White House all agree we
made important positive changes that went a long way to improve the
initial bill that came out of committee. We severely limit what
information can be shared with the government and how it can be used.
It is also important to note the entire process is completely
voluntary and provides industry the flexibility they need to deal with
business realities.
The bill also requires an annual report from the inspector general of
the intelligence community to ensure none of the information provided
to the government is mishandled or is misused. This is a very important
privacy issue.
The review will include annual recommendations to improve the
protection of privacy and civil liberties. That review will be done
again by the inspector general.
We also made it clear this legislation grants no new authority to the
Department of Defense, the National Security Agency, or the
intelligence community. At the urging of the White House and others, we
included the Department of Homeland Security in the process so that
there is not even a perception that our intelligence agencies or
military will be in control of this. The Homeland Security Department
will be coordinating as a civil body.
In addition, companies that act in good faith to protect systems and
networks can receive liability protection. This is what our bill does.
Now, what does it not do? The bill does not allow the government to
order companies to turn over private email or other personal
information. This is not surveillance. The bill does not allow the
government to monitor private networks, read private email, censor, or
shut down any Web site.
We have a broad coalition of support with 100 cosponsors, close to 30
companies and industry groups, and dozens of trade organizations like
Facebook, Microsoft, IBM, a lot of different groups that are supporting
this bill.
This is not a perfect bill, but the threat is great. I believe this
legislation is critical for our national security and yet deals with
the issue of privacy. We can do better in privacy, and we hope to get
the bill to the Senate, where there will be a lot more negotiation.
Congress must act now, and I encourage my colleagues to vote for this
bill.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield 2 minutes to the gentlelady from
North Carolina (Mrs. Myrick) who is on the Intelligence Committee and
has a tremendous expertise on counterterrorism issues.
Mrs. MYRICK. I want to say a big thanks to the chair and to the
ranking member for all of their months of hard work on putting this
cybersecurity bill together, and it is a bipartisan Intelligence
Committee bill.
We all know the private sector is a very diverse world that includes
reputable companies but also grey market suppliers and counterfeiters,
and State-owned enterprises and other entities that often act against
the national security interests of the United States, as well as other
private companies.
The information technology sector, in particular, includes companies
that are associated with some foreign governments and militaries and
intelligence services of nations that attack the United States in
cyberspace daily.
State and local entities, along with the private sector, don't have
the resources, the capabilities, or the information necessary to
address these cybersecurity threats. This bill creates a necessary
mechanism for the Federal Government to share its informational
resources and cybersecurity threat analysis with the private sector and
with State and local entities.
The purpose of the bill is to transmit important cybersecurity
information from the Federal Government to the private sector, not vice
versa. The bill would empower the private sector to begin taking
necessary steps to protect itself from cyberattacks, some they don't
have any clue are happening.
Ultimately though, it's going to be important for Congress and the
Federal Government to continue the debate on cybersecurity to determine
how to best confront the changing threats because this world is
changing daily, and the Federal Government can't leave those
responsibilities solely to the private sector, especially, like the
chairman already mentioned, countries like China that are continuously
developing cyberwarfare capabilities and the cyberattacks that they
commit against the Western companies and infrastructures and government
entities we all know about.
So I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on this important piece of
legislation and an important step in trying to protect the private
sector in this country.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my
distinguished colleague from the State of Utah (Mr. Boswell) who
formerly served on the Intelligence Committee.
The CHAIR. The gentleman from Iowa is recognized for 2 minutes.
Mr. BOSWELL. Thank you, I appreciate the correction. We grow corn in
Iowa, and we grow potatoes in Idaho. A little bit of fun.
I rise to speak in support of this bill today. I look across at
Chairman Rogers and here at Ranking Member Ruppersberger, and I have
great confidence. I know these men. I know their staff. They've come to
this very serious matter that lays before our country that we need to
understand. We must take action.
I'm encouraged by the process to involve key stakeholders from
private industry and privacy groups during this drafting. This
transparent engagement shaped many of the bipartisan constructive
amendments being considered today that will improve the bill, and it's
a good thing.
The threat from malicious actors in cyberspace is real. You've heard
it said over and over already by those who have spoken ahead of me. I
concur with what they say. It's an absolutely real thing. You only need
to pick up the newspaper or turn on the TV to see the threats facing
our networks. These networks include those that power our homes, our
factories, and our small businesses, allow our banking system to
function and provide the very backbone to our current American way of
life, and we rely on these networks every day.
The bill under consideration today is a very narrow piece, but what
we can agree on is it's a critical one to helping secure our networks
and, therefore, the way of life as we know it today.
There are continuing debates on how to implement the bill, but the
debate isn't over what needs to be done; it must be done. Information
we ask our intelligence community to use and that protects our
government networks should, in a secure way, be shared to protect the
many other critical networks we rely on.
I believe companies are doing what they can to protect their networks
to the extent they can today, but there is more that must be done.
We cannot be in a situation where the government had information to
prevent or mitigate a catastrophic cyberattack, and yet we did not have
the procedure in place to share this information. Our American way of
life includes a great respect for privacy and our civil liberties. We
make no mistake about that.
This bill, with the addition of many of the amendments which were
drafted in concert with privacy groups, addresses many of those
concerns.
In addition, the annual unclassified report required by the statutory
intelligence community inspector general will inform whether there are
additional adjustments needed to be made.
The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield the gentleman an additional 10 seconds.
Mr. BOSWELL. So, in closing, I want to say this: Congress cannot wait
to act. Network security hasn't kept up with network speed. This is the
fundamental purpose of this bill. I encourage Members to begin to
secure our networks through sharing information about the threats.
Please vote ``yes.''
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Illinois (Mr. Kinzinger).
Mr. KINZINGER of Illinois. I thank the ranking member and the
chairman for your hard work on the issue and the members on the
committee.
This is very important. It goes beyond partisanship. This is about
national security.
The idea of cyberattacks, it's not something that is just out there
in space that we really don't have to worry about. This is an issue
that's here today, and it's here right now. In
[[Page H2159]]
fact, just today, the New York Stock Exchange was the target of a DDoS
attack on some of its external computer systems. That's not something
that we just magically happen to have today. This is happening every
day, thousands and thousands of times a day.
{time} 1440
I'm a military guy and I'm a military pilot. I think a lot about the
threats from outside. You think a lot about threats of terrorism and
threats of invasion or anything along that line. But I'll tell you one
of the biggest threats that really keep us up at night is this idea of
a cyberattack. I think it's something that we have to take head-on.
This voluntary information-sharing between classified portions of our
government and certified private actors will serve to enhance our
defenses greatly.
It is important to note the amount of classified information
currently shared between our government and private industry is muddled
at best. The few private companies who are lucky enough to receive an
invitation into the current classified annex of cybersecurity-sharing
face significant challenges when it comes to even understanding what
that information is. Many times they simply get a badly scanned
printout of a current threat situation from which they try to prevent a
future attack, and it is woefully inadequate.
We talk a lot about the Russians and about the Chinese and their use
of cyberwarfare against us. That's a significant threat. That's
something very serious. But I want to speak just momentarily about the
threat from Iran.
We all know that Iran is a very serious country that is very
seriously focused on bringing down, in many cases, the West. They've
said it themselves. The Iranian regime from the highest level down has
publicly stated their plans to fight enemies with abundant power in
cyberspace and Internet warfare. It's also publicly stated that Iran
blames the West for the Stuxnet virus which disrupted their nuclear
program, and they have vowed retaliation. The combination of the low
cost and effectiveness of cyberwarfare has led the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard to actively and effectively recruit radical
Islamist hackers for nefarious purposes. We can't stand idly by while
we see nations like Iran threaten the future of this country.
So I support this bill, and I commend the folks who have worked on
it.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished
colleague from the State of New Jersey, Mr. Rush Holt, who was formally
on the Intelligence Committee.
Mr. HOLT. Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman.
The proponents of this legislation, who are all friends and well
intentioned, have repeatedly said there's a real threat, a threat to
our critical infrastructure, affecting our waterworks, and our electric
grid. But this bill is so poorly constructed it is not designed to
protect against those threats. There are any number of flaws with it.
The American Civil Liberties Union points out that there would be an
exception to all privacy laws; and it would allow companies to share
private and personal data that they hold on their American customers,
actually, among themselves and with the government. It would not limit
companies to sharing only technical or nonpersonal data. They'd be free
from any liability of misuse. They would only have to plead good
intentions.
The bill fails to narrowly define the privacy laws it would
contravene; it fails to put the cybersecurity efforts in a civilian
agency; it fails to require companies to remove personal identifiable
information about individuals; it fails to sufficiently limit the
government's use of information; it fails to create a robust oversight
and accountability structure. With the bill in its current form,
there's no requirement that personal information must be removed.
There's no consumer or stakeholder group involved in the oversight.
There's no way for any member of the public to know if their data has
been shared in error, and on and on.
And I should point out that it is not just the American Civil
Liberties Union that opposes this. Even the American Library
Association opposes it. The President, himself, says, if this passes,
he will veto it. Passing this bill in response to the cyberthreat would
be like going into Iraq because al Qaeda terrorists were a real threat.
Yes, there's a real threat. This is not the answer.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Stivers).
Mr. STIVERS. Madam Chair, I would like to thank the gentleman from
Michigan for yielding me time. I would also like to thank him for his
leadership on this effort, as well as the ranking member, the gentleman
from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger).
I rise today in support of the cybersecurity legislation under
consideration. As a member of the Cybersecurity Task Force, I'm pleased
that many of our recommendations are included in this bill.
Cybersecurity is a very important issue. Every day there are people
trying to use cyberattacks to steal our money, steal our jobs, and
attack our national security.
I know as a member of the Financial Services Committee that our
financial sector spends billions of dollars every year trying to
protect against cyberattacks. They protect consumers by increasing
controls, making sure they have encryption, authenticating customers,
and protecting customer data.
That's all protecting our wallets, but we also need to protect our
jobs. Unfortunately, there are folks who would like to use cyberattacks
to steal our intellectual property and give it to those who compete
against America, which will steal our jobs.
Not allowing information-sharing like this bill does would be like
saying to the Marines and the Army, You can't share information about
how the enemy is going to attack you. As a member of the National Guard
for the last 26 years, I know that cyber is also a real threat to our
national security.
This bill will update our information-sharing to allow private
companies to share information with the government and the government
to share information, and includes some important liability protection
as well. It's a carefully crafted bill.
I think the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and the gentleman
from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) have been very open to working with
folks to try to improve this bill. I'm looking forward to supporting
some of the bipartisan amendments that I think will improve this bill.
Madam Chair, we must protect ourselves against cyberattacks, against
those who would steal our money, steal our jobs, and attack our
country. This bill is not a panacea, but it's a great start. I'm happy
to support it, and I hope all my colleagues will vote ``yes.''
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished colleague
from the State of California, Mr. Adam Schiff, who is also the ranking
member on the Technical and Tactical Intelligence Committee.
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Madam Chair, I rise in reluctant opposition to the bill. But at the
outset, I want to acknowledge the extraordinary work done by our
chairman, Mike Rogers, and our ranking member, Dutch Ruppersberger.
These two gentlemen have changed the nature and culture of our
committee, made it far more productive, and they've done great work
getting us to this point. And I want to acknowledge that at the outset.
There's still work to be done in two areas principally, and I want to
talk briefly about that. Even before I do that, I want to acknowledge
why we're here.
We do ourselves, I think, a disservice when we talk about a
cyberthreat. That sounds like something that may come in the future,
something to be concerned about that might take place down the line.
We're under cyberattack right now. This is not speculative. This is not
intangible. This is happening right now. This needs to be dealt with,
and we do need a sense of urgency. But there is a distance yet to go,
and in two areas in particular.
One is, when we gather cyberinformation and we share it between
companies or between the government and companies, as we must do, we
want to make sure that we minimize any unnecessary invasion of privacy
of the American people. We can
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do both, and we have to do both. We need to protect ourselves from
cyberattack, and we need to protect and preserve the privacy rights of
the American people.
I think the bill needs a requirement that personally identifiable
information be minimized to the maximum extent practicable. All we're
asking for is what can reasonably be done. We're not asking for the
private sector or the government to do the impossible, but we should
require of our government that they minimize personal information that
is shared to protect us from cybercrime. That's the first thing.
The second item that really needs to be incorporated in this bill
that my colleague, Mr. Thompson, will talk about as well is the need to
protect critical infrastructure. That is a big missing piece in the
bill, and I understand from my colleagues that it's not within the
Intelligence Committee jurisdiction. That's correct. But as we saw from
the Rules Committee, they're more than capable of incorporating things
from more than one committee's jurisdiction in the rule, as we see in a
rule that incorporates student loan interest and a bill on that subject
with a bill on cybersecurity. There is nothing preventing the Rules
Committee from bringing into the discussion today and allowing
amendments on critical infrastructure.
The absence of those two big pieces makes it impossible for me to
support the bill today.
The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
Mr. SCHIFF. I thank the gentleman.
I just want to conclude by saying I look forward to our continued
work on this bill, and I appreciate the great cooperation between the
chair and ranking member, and I have respect for all the members of the
committee.
{time} 1450
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Nevada (Mr. Heck).
Mr. HECK. I come to the floor today to voice my strong support for
the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act. We know that every
day, American companies and computer systems are targeted by foreign
nation-state actors who prey on sensitive business and personal
information to gain an unfair advantage in the global marketplace. The
theft of research and development results, negotiating positions, or
pricing information costs us jobs here at home and puts personal
information at risk. The same vulnerabilities that can result in the
theft of sensitive business information could be used to attack
critical infrastructure we rely on such as power plants, air traffic
control systems, and electrical grids. An attack on these systems would
be devastating. Protecting them and the constituents they serve must be
considered an urgent national security concern.
The government currently uses classified cyberthreat intelligence to
protect its own systems, computer networks, and critical
infrastructure. The business community has voiced its desire to be
given the tools necessary to protect itself from cyberthreats. This
bill will allow the government to provide classified cyberthreat
information to private sector companies so that they can protect
sensitive information and their customers' privacy against malicious
cyberattacks. The bill places no mandates or burdens on private sector
companies and does not expand the size or scope of the Federal
Government. All information-sharing is totally voluntary under this
legislation, and there are strong privacy protections in place for the
information that is shared.
After receiving input from the private sector and civil liberty
groups and by building upon the success of an existing intelligence-
sharing pilot program with defense contractors, we have produced a bill
that upholds constitutional rights to privacy while providing the
private sector with the necessary means to defend itself against
cyberattackers. I want to commend Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member
Ruppersberger for their outstanding leadership in crafting this
legislation that was written in a transparent and bipartisan fashion.
I urge my colleagues to support this bill that protects our homeland,
protects our economy, and protects our privacy.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished
colleague from the State of Mississippi, Mr. Bennie Thompson, who is
also the ranking member of the Homeland Security Committee.
Mr. THOMPSON of Mississippi. Madam Chairman, I rise in opposition to
H.R. 3523. I also appreciate the efforts of my colleagues on the
Intelligence Committee for fostering a greater sharing of cyberthreat
information. This bill is a start, but my opposition is because it does
not do what we know that we need to have done.
Having been involved in homeland security issues for nearly a decade,
I know how important it is to protect our Nation's networks from
cyberattacks. But in an effort to foster information-sharing, this bill
would erode the privacy protections of every single American using the
Internet. It would create a Wild West of information-sharing, where any
certified business can share with any government agency, who can then
use the information for any ``national security'' purpose and grant
that business immunity from virtually any liability. None of the
amendments offered by the chairman and ranking member would change any
of those basic facts.
I and several of my colleagues offered amendments that would have
addressed those concerns by ensuring that civilian agencies would take
the lead in information-sharing, restricting how the government could
use the information, and making sure consumers' sensitive information
is adequately protected. Unfortunately, the House will not have an
opportunity to consider them today.
If my colleagues want to accomplish something on cybersecurity, then
vote ``yes'' on any or all of the suspension bills before us today; but
do not vote for H.R. 3523. It violates the ``do no harm'' rule and
would set back the privacy rights of all our citizens who have enjoyed
the establishment of the Internet.
This fatally flawed bill is opposed by not only every major privacy
or civil liberties group, from the ACLU to the Constitution Project to
the Center for Democracy and Technology, but also the Obama
administration. For these reasons, Madam Chair, I strongly urge a
``no'' vote on H.R. 3523.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from Nebraska (Mr. Terry).
Mr. TERRY. I thank the gentleman.
Madam Chairman, I rise in support of this bill. It's a sensible bill
that builds a necessary pillar in the cybersecurity strategy of our
Nation.
I've immersed myself in cybersecurity over the last couple of years.
I've been on two task forces. I'm on the Energy and Commerce Committee.
I've met with industry leaders in all of the critical infrastructure
areas. And as I've gathered information and input, there's two
principles at stake here. The common thread from all of them have said:
we have to be flexible, and we have to be able to communicate. Those
are the two principles on which this bill is based.
Number one, flexibility. What it means is you can't lock this into a
government agency because when government agencies start taking control
of setting standards or working with an industry group to set standards
on cybersecurity, the hackers take 5 seconds to get around that, and it
will take years then for the industry to move around that. You are
setting them up as ducks waiting to be shot if we do that. So we can't.
We've got to give them the flexibility. The least government
interference is what gives them the flexibility.
The next part is communication. What I learned from the critical
infrastructure industries is that what they want to know is, is there a
threat out there, and what's the specifics of the threat? They know
they're under attack every day. Maybe our defense agencies have
specific information they can share, but they can't because it's top
secret.
So this bill allows there to be communication of specific threats to
perhaps communicate from government to private sector some better
practices that they can enact. That's what this breaks down, that
barrier, not some of these civil liberty conspiracy theories. This is
simple communication between government and private sector or private
sector to private sector. This isn't
[[Page H2161]]
reporting on whether you're downloading an illegal movie or whatever.
This is about securing our infrastructure.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished
colleague and friend from the State of Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin), who
is also a member of our Intelligence Committee and has worked very hard
with the chairman and myself on the issue of cybersecurity. I consider
him one of our experts on the Hill in the area of cybersecurity.
(Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LANGEVIN. I want to thank the gentleman for yielding.
I rise in strong support of H.R. 3523, and I want to thank Chairman
Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for a bipartisan and inclusive
process on an extremely difficult and technical issue. While I don't
believe this legislation is perfect, and much work remains to be done,
CISPA represents an important good-faith effort to come together as a
necessary first step towards better cybersecurity for our Nation.
I have long worked on this issue for many years to raise awareness
and to secure our Nation against the threats that we face in
cyberspace. Quite frankly, we are running out of time. I believe it's
important that we act now to begin our legislative response to this
critical issue.
We all know how dependent we are on the Internet and how we use it so
much in our daily lives, but the Internet was never built with security
in mind. What's happening is our adversaries are using the
vulnerabilities against us.
I've also been very clear that we need to have robust privacy
protections that must be included to safeguard personal information and
also defend civil liberties in any cybersecurity response that we do
enact. I'm pleased to say this legislation has been strengthened in
that regard, and I believe more can be done as we continue this
important debate.
That being said, the efficient sharing of cyberthreat information
envisioned by this legislation is vital to combating advanced
cyberthreats and stemming the massive ongoing theft of identities,
intellectual property, and sensitive security information.
{time} 1500
This legislation clearly and simply will allow the government to
provide classified information threat signatures to the private sector
and also allow the private sector to share with us the cybersecurity
attacks that they are experiencing, sharing that with the government so
we have better situational awareness. If you look at this, it basically
gives us radar, if you will, in cyberspace, sharing information back
and forth on cyberthreats that are facing the country.
This bill is a good step, but it's only a first step. Voluntary
information-sharing is helpful and it's needed, but it does not, on its
own, constitute strong cybersecurity.
The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield the gentleman from Rhode Island 30
additional seconds.
Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman for the additional time.
I have long maintained that we must also move forward on legislation
that establishes minimum standards for the cybersystems that govern our
critical infrastructure, particularly the electric grid and our water
systems.
With that, I again want to thank Chairman Rogers and Mr.
Ruppersberger for their outstanding efforts, and I ask my colleagues to
support this important cybersecurity information-sharing legislation.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentlewoman from California (Mrs. Bono Mack).
Mrs. BONO MACK. Madam Chair, I rise today in strong support of this
bill. This critically needed legislation will help to safeguard America
in the future from cyberattacks by unscrupulous and rogue nations,
terrorists and cybercriminals. We need to act before a disaster takes
place, not after it, and this is our chance.
As chairwoman of the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing
and Trade, I have spent the past 16 months holding hearings and
thoroughly examining the issue of online privacy. So as a cosponsor of
this legislation, I have very carefully reviewed its privacy
provisions, and I'm satisfied that it will not negatively impact
American consumers.
Frankly, the privacy concerns are exaggerated. There is no bogeyman
hiding in the closet, and Big Brother is not tapping into your hard
drive. This bill provides absolutely no authority to the Federal
Government to monitor private networks--none. Additionally, all
information-sharing with the government would be completely voluntary.
The bill also encourages the private sector to ``anonymize'' the
information it shares with the government or other entities,
including--and this is very important to remember--the removal of
personally identifiable information prior to sharing it.
Finally, the bill also requires the intelligence community inspector
general to review information-sharing between the private sector and
the government and to provide an annual report to the Congress on its
findings.
These are very strong privacy protection features, and I applaud
Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for working so hard to
protect the American consumer and to make this a truly bipartisan
effort.
Unfortunately, some people and some groups will say anything to try
and scuttle this bill--sounding false alarms and raising imaginary red
flags--despite the very real and dangerous threat posed by terrorists
and our enemies if we do nothing.
Madam Chair, I strongly urge the adoption of H.R. 3523.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished colleague
from the State of Georgia (Mr. Johnson).
Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia. Thank you, Ranking Member Ruppersberger.
Madam Chair, I rise in opposition to this very disturbing bill.
One thing that is important to keeping our country number one has
been the personal freedoms that we have all enjoyed since this
country's beginning. Those freedoms lie in the Bill of Rights. And the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution within that Bill of
Rights provides for a right of privacy. Now this right of privacy can
be impacted by technology and various advances in science that make
eavesdropping, surveillance, and investigation easier and also more
secretive by law enforcement, by personal individuals, and by
corporations, by any component that may look to misuse information for
their personal benefit. So I rise in opposition to this disturbing
bill.
CISPA would grant the private sector blanket permission to harvest
Americans' data for extremely broad ``cybersecurity purposes,''
notwithstanding any other provision of law. It would grant the private
sector blanket permission to then share that data with the Federal
Government, notwithstanding any other privacy laws or agreements with
users.
The Acting CHAIR (Mrs. Capito). The time of the gentleman has
expired.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
Mr. JOHNSON of Georgia. Then, as if that weren't disturbing enough,
this bill would grant the government broad authority to share that
information between intelligence and law enforcement agencies and use
it for virtually any purpose defined as important to cybersecurity or
national security.
I know it's 2012, but it sure feels like ``1984'' in this House
today. If you value liberty, privacy, and the Constitution, then you
will vote ``no'' on CISPA.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from California (Mr. Nunes).
Mr. NUNES. Madam Chair, I rise in strong support of this bill.
The bill before us today is targeted towards a very specific and
growing threat to our Nation. Every day, American businesses are being
targeted by China, Russia, and other foreign actors for cyber-
exploitation and theft. These acts of industrial espionage are causing
enormous losses of valuable American intellectual property that
ultimately costs the United States jobs. We cannot afford to allow
high-paying jobs to be stolen in this manner, nor can we simply sit by
and allow the cyberwarfare being conducted against us to continue
without consequences.
[[Page H2162]]
Madam Chairman, jobs are at stake, as is the technological capital of
the United States. But if the reality of this economic cyberwarfare
isn't convincing enough, you should understand that there are other
good reasons for us to support this bill.
The state-of-the-art technology stolen from Americans can easily be
turned against us and represents a serious threat to America's critical
infrastructure. None in this body would likely disagree that we have to
prevent our enemies from protecting American military technology.
That's why we have long had export controls and other mechanisms to
prevent such a thing from occurring. Madam Chairman, how is the theft
of intellectual property any less a threat today?
Whether we like it or not, cyberwarfare is a reality. Our government
and its security agencies understand this and are using both classified
and unclassified information to fight the threat. But without passage
of this bill, they are being forced to do so without the meaningful
participation of industries--private industries--that are being
subjected to attacks, that in some cases our government even knows
about but cannot share that with those private companies.
So we shouldn't expect America's private sector innovators to protect
themselves if we won't tell them where the attacks are coming from. If
we don't share this information or allow them to share information with
us, how do we expect to secure the sensitive information?
The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield the gentleman from California an
additional 30 seconds.
Mr. NUNES. So we essentially have three choices. We can pass this
bill, very narrowly focused, allowing our intelligence community to
work with private industry, or we can fund a massive new government
program. I think we've proven that those massive new government
programs seldom work and are often costly. Or would the opponents of
this bill simply rather do nothing and allow our country to continue to
be attacked every day?
We need to pass this bill to enable cyberthreat-sharing and provide
clear authority for the private sector to defend its networks.
Madam Chair, I want to close by saying that we should congratulate
Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for the work that
they've done to protect this country.
{time} 1510
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield 3 minutes to my distinguished
colleague from the State of Oklahoma (Mr. Boren), who is also a member
of the Intelligence Committee. He has worked very closely with me and
the chairman to bring this bill to the floor today, and we thank him
for that.
Mr. BOREN. Madam Chair, I rise today in support of the Cyber
Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act. I'm proud to have been a part
of this bipartisan effort, led by Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member
Ruppersberger, to bring this bill to the floor today.
There is one fact on which everyone can agree: our country must
strengthen its cybersecurity capabilities. To achieve this, we need the
cooperation of industry, government, and our citizens, and we need to
protect the unique interests of each of these groups.
Some may be asking the question, how does this bill protect American
industry? It gives private companies the ability to receive classified
information from the government to protect their networks. The bill
also gives them flexibility to share information with the government
without compromising their business equities or harming their
customers. This information-sharing partnership will enhance government
efforts to analyze and understand malicious codes and other
cyberthreats.
I think companies that have publicly supported this legislation have
gotten a bad rap in the press. I think we all need to remember that
these American companies are not the enemy. They employ thousands of
Americans and provide essential cyberservices to millions of people.
They are profit-making entities that want to satisfy their customers
and grow their businesses. These American companies have absolutely no
motivation to send private customer information to the government or
anyone else. In fact, they have every reason to protect it.
Under this legislation, American companies will enhance their
capability to protect the private information of their customers by
receiving classified assistance from the government. Moreover, they
will help their customers and the country by voluntarily informing the
government of malware and other malicious conduct and threats that
emerge from their networks. But that is not the only way that this bill
protects our citizens' privacy. It restricts the government's use and
retention of any personal information that companies may choose to
share. In addition, it directs the intelligence community inspector
general to monitor and report any abuse of users' privacy.
Finally, we must also remember that the government is not the enemy.
The intelligence community does not want to squander this opportunity
to improve our Nation's cybersecurity by abusing the civil liberties or
privacy of American citizens. To this end, the bill specifies that the
government can only use the information it receives from the private
sector for purposes directly related to addressing cyberthreats,
national security, and threats to life and limb.
In closing, this legislation strikes the appropriate balance between
the interests of the private sector industry, the Federal Government,
and private citizens.
The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield the gentleman an additional 30 seconds.
Mr. BOREN. It will help our country avoid a potential
cybercatastrophe that could threaten our national security and endanger
our economic prosperity.
With that, I urge my fellow Members to join me and support this
important bill.
Again, I want to say specifically to our ranking member and our
chairman, thank you for putting the country's interests ahead of
partisan gain. We're working together in this committee, both Democrats
and Republicans, to do what is in the best interest of our intelligence
community and the United States of America.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, may I ask how much time we have on
both sides?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman from Maryland has 8 minutes
remaining, and the gentleman from Michigan has 10\1/2\ minutes
remaining.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Barton).
Mr. BARTON of Texas. I thank the chairman.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
My friends, that is the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, one of
the original 10 in the Bill of Rights protecting, in writing, the
privacy of the United States citizenry.
I want to give Mr. Rogers and Mr. Ruppersberger an ``A'' for effort
in terms of identifying the problem, but I have to give them an ``F''
for problem solution.
The word ``privacy'' in the underlying bill is mentioned one time,
and that in passing. There are no explicit protections for privacy. In
fact, there is an explicit exemption of liability to all people who
engage in the collection, dissemination, transfer, and sharing of
information. The cause of action, if you feel your privacy has been
violated, is to go to district court and prove there was willful and
knowing sharing of your information without your permission. If you
prevail in Federal district court, you get $1,000, or whatever it costs
you.
My friends, we have a real problem. I take the chairman at his word--
he's a former FBI agent--that he wants to solve this cyberthreat. I
know he means it. But until we protect the privacy rights of our
citizens, the solution is worse than the problem that they're trying to
solve.
Please vote ``no'' on this bill.
[[Page H2163]]
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I have no more speakers, and I yield
myself such time as I may consume.
First thing, there were some comments that I would like to respond
to.
First thing, this bill does not allow the wholesale violation of
privacy rights. This bill is extremely important to our national
security, but also important to our citizens of this great country, our
privacy rights, and civil liberties.
The chairman and I have taken this very seriously, as have the
members of our caucus. We know this is not a perfect bill--there will
probably be additional changes. We will have more debate later on this
afternoon.
Now, some of the things I want to address. During the drafting of
this legislation we put forward a wide range of privacy protections. We
worked for the last year with the White House, privacy groups, and
business groups to come to a coalition to make sure that we get this
bill right.
First, the bill severely limits what kind of information can be
shared with the government. Only information directly pertaining to the
threat can be shared, which is mostly formulas, X's and O's of the
virus code. It's almost something that the companies deal with now in
dealing with spam.
Second, the bill encourages companies to voluntarily strip out
personal information that may be associated with these zeroes and ones.
Occasionally, that does occur, and we have to deal with that, and we'll
continue to deal with that issue.
There also are strong use limitations on the data. This information
must be used for cybersecurity purposes or the protection of national
security. The information cannot be used for regulatory purposes. For
example, if there's evidence of tax evasion, that information cannot be
used in a criminal proceeding, only in national security, only in the
areas of life and limb, or for anything involving juvenile crimes.
The bill prohibits the government from requiring the companies to
give information to the government in exchange for receiving the
cyberthreat intelligence. That means that when we pass the information
of the attacks--it's called the secret sauce--to the providers, it's
only voluntarily. The government can't put any restrictions on that
whatsoever. That really means that this is not surveillance at all.
The bill does not allow the government to order you to turn over
private email or other personal information. This is not, again,
surveillance.
The bill does not allow the government to monitor private networks,
read private emails, censor or shut down any Web site. This is not
SOPA.
In an effort to improve the bill even more, the intelligence
community--thank you to the leadership of Chairman Rogers--has been
working with privacy groups, the White House, and other interested
parties to address these concerns with the legislation. We on our side
of the aisle take, again, this issue of privacy very seriously. The
committee has maintained an open door policy and made more changes to
the bill to make it even better as we have gone on up until today.
The legislation grants no new authority to the Department of Defense,
National Security, or the intelligence community that require it to
direct any public or private cybersecurity effort. If the government
violates any of these restrictions placed on it by the legislation, the
government can be sued for damages, costs, and attorneys fees.
I think it is extremely important--we on the Intelligence Committee
deal with these issues every day. This is a very sophisticated area
that we deal with that most people don't know. So we're attempting, and
we have for the last year, to educate as many of our Members as we can.
But it's important to know that national security is clear--our effort
and what we're attempting to do--but also to maintain the privacy, the
constitutional rights of our citizens.
I reserve the balance of my time.
{time} 1520
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry).
Mr. THORNBERRY. Madam Chair, I don't think we can say often enough
how important it is that the chairman and ranking member have worked
together, not only on the substance of this bill, but in the process of
getting us here. They have, truly, put the country's interests first,
and I think all Members should commend them for that.
This was a good bill when it was reported out of committee 17 1. I
think it will be a better bill once the amendments are considered and
adopted. And for any Member who has concerns about privacy or misuse of
information, I think they should look at the amendments that are going
to be adopted; and any reasonable concern, any semi-reasonable concern
about privacy will be addressed with the limitations that those
amendments add.
Madam Chair, this bill does not solve all the problems in
cybersecurity. All four bills that we're considering today and tomorrow
don't solve all the problems we have in cybersecurity. But it makes no
sense to me, as some seem to have argued, that we should not solve this
problem of information-sharing because we're not solving all the
problems that somebody can see out there.
This problem of information-sharing has been central to cybersecurity
concerns for some time. I happened across a report from December 2004
that was issued by a subcommittee I chaired of the Select Committee on
Homeland Security, along with the gentlelady from California (Ms. Zoe
Lofgren), where we wrote: Whether it is vulnerability assessments,
threat warnings, best practices or emergency response, information-
sharing with the private sector is critical to securing the United
States from cyberattack. That was 8 years ago.
Why has it not occurred? Because all the legal obstacles, all the
fear of being sued has prevented it from occurring. And that's what
this bill does. It clears away the legal underbrush that has prevented
the kind of information-sharing that people have been talking about for
a decade.
This is a good, important step. It doesn't solve all the problems,
but it puts more information at the disposal of critical infrastructure
so that they can be protected. It should be adopted.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I have a speaker on the way.
Mr. Rogers, do you have any more speakers?
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I do.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to the
distinguished gentleman from the great State of Oregon (Mr. Walden).
Mr. WALDEN. I thank the chairman and the ranking member for their
bipartisan and thoughtful approach to this incredibly important issue
facing our country. I support your legislation. I commend you both for
identifying a glaring hole in our cyberdefenses: better information-
sharing between the private sector and the government.
Such sharing is a force multiplier. It combines the technological
strength of our network providers with the ongoing efforts of our
agencies to combat growing cyberthreats. From the get-go, the bill has
protected privacy and civil liberties and ensured that any information-
sharing is voluntary.
I understand Chairman Rogers has also gone the extra mile to reach
out to the privacy community and will be offering and supporting
amendments to address any lingering concerns that may remain from
misunderstandings over the language. Breaking down the barriers to
information-sharing is a linchpin to better cybersecurity, and this
legislation will be a tremendous step forward in securing cyberspace
for our citizens.
But don't take my word for it. That's what cybersecurity firms and
researchers, Internet service providers, and government officials told
the Subcommittee on Communications and Technology, which I chair, in
the three separate hearings that we held. That's what a bipartisan
working group I convened concluded when it interviewed a broad spectrum
of stakeholders in the cybersecurity debate.
By contrast, no matter how well-intentioned, cybersecurity
regulations would likely just expand government, reduce flexibility,
impose costs, misallocate capital, create more red tape and not more
security. According to one government witness, regulating cybersecurity
practices would ``stifle
[[Page H2164]]
innovation and harm the industry's ability to protect consumers from
cyberthreats.''
Indeed, voluntary efforts, not government regulation, are already
improving cybersecurity for communications networks that cover 80
percent of Americans.
When Congress is looking at a complex issue like cybersecurity, we
need to heed the Hippocratic Oath: First, do no harm.
So I want to thank my colleagues for making this process especially
open and transparent. Representative Rogers has graciously reached out
to members of the Energy and Commerce Committee to understand our
concerns about protecting privacy and civil liberties and preventing
regulatory overreach, and Representative Thornberry's work in
organizing the House Republican Cybersecurity Task Force, which
included Representatives Terry and Latta, members of my subcommittee.
The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield the gentleman an additional 30
seconds.
Mr. WALDEN. The bottom line is, we're going to protect America from
the greatest threat to America and to Americans with this legislation.
We need to make sure that our private sector is nimble and flexible and
innovative; and tying its hands with prescriptive regulation--we heard
over and over again in our subcommittee hearings--would do the opposite
of that and would result in the bad guys getting an edge on the good
guys.
I support this bipartisan legislation. I urge its passage.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished
colleague from the State of Georgia, Mr. John Lewis, one of the most
respected Members of our Congress.
Mr. LEWIS of Georgia. Madam Chair, I want to thank my friend, the
gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) for yielding.
Madam Chair, I rise to oppose H.R. 3523. It is a step back.
Those of us who protested in the fifties and the sixties, who were
called Communists, who had our telephone calls recorded, we have a long
memory. We remember our Nation's dark past.
Martin Luther King, Jr.'s telephone was wiretapped. His hotel room
was wiretapped. His home was wiretapped. Our office was wiretapped. Our
meetings were wiretapped. And it was not just people spying on civil
rights activists, but people protesting against the war in Vietnam.
We didn't have a Facebook, a Twitter, or email. These new tools must
be protected. Today we have a mission, a mandate, and a moral
obligation to protect future generations of activists and protestors.
So I say to my colleagues, stand with us today. Stand up and stand on
the right side of history. Oppose H.R. 3523.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield myself 2 minutes.
Lots of misinformation about this bill today. I respect the gentleman
from Georgia greatly for his efforts. I heard the gentleman from Texas
talk about searches and seizures. And this is the good news: there are
none of those things in this bill. None.
You know, if I knew that your house was to be robbed, I would expect
that if the police knew, that they'd pick up the phone and call you and
say, you are going to be robbed. Take precaution. We'll be their
shortly.
This bill just says, if we have this nasty source code, these zeroes
and ones, I want to give it to you so you can protect your systems.
That's it. No monitoring, no content, no surveillance, nothing. That's
not what this bill is about.
I understand the passion about it. That's why we've taken a year to
forge this bipartisan effort to get where we believe privacy is
protected. It is paramount that we do that, that our civil liberties
are protected. It is paramount that we do that.
But we at least take down the hurdle to share nasty source code or
software that's flying through the Internet, that's developed, and it's
very sophisticated, by the Chinese and the Russians and the Iranians
and other groups and non-nation-state actors that are going to steal
your personal information.
That's all this is. It's sharing bad source code so you can put it on
your system so you don't get infected. End of story.
I wish people would read the bill, all of it, every word of it. I
think you'll find the carefully crafted language to make sure that our
rights are protected, that the Fourth Amendment is protected.
And by the way, just like the Army, the Navy, the Marines, your FBI
is protecting you. That's what this bill allows it to do, simply that.
So, as I said, I respect greatly the gentleman from Georgia. There's
a lot of atrocities I think he lived through in his life that no one
should have to live through. We took those things into consideration
when we wrote this bill, and that's why we've got so much support and
so much technical company support, companies like Facebook and
Microsoft and all of those groups.
So I hope people read the bill and support the bill.
I reserve the balance of my time.
{time} 1530
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
In closing, I want to say again that the purpose of this bill, as the
chairman just said, is very basic and simple. We want to protect our
citizens from attacks. We are being attacked as we speak right now.
Just last year, it was estimated we lost $300 billion worth of trade
secrets. We even know that one country is attacking a fertilizer
company to find out how we make it better than they do. This is putting
our businesses in jeopardy and jobs in jeopardy, and we know we sure
need jobs.
More importantly, those of us who work in this field know how serious
these threats are. The head of our FBI, whose responsibility it is to
provide our domestic national security, has said that one of the most
serious threats, if not a bigger threat, in terrorism would be a
catastrophic cyberattack. We've already talked today about what that
would be. We have Secretary Napolitano, the Director of Homeland
Security, who has said the same thing: that it is one of the most
serious issues our country has to deal with. It's unfortunate, but most
of our citizens aren't aware of how serious this threat is.
So we've attempted to allow our intelligence community, which is one
of the best in the world, to have the ability to see these threats
coming in from other countries or from terrorist groups and to be able
right now to give this information over to the private sector to
protect us, you, me, our businesses. That's what this bill does.
Nothing more. What we're attempting to do is to move the bill and get
the bill to the Senate.
We can always do better in the area of privacy and civil liberties,
and we're going to continue to do that. We can always do better in the
area of homeland security and go further to protect those institutions
and our grid systems and that type of thing; but this is the start,
because the one thing that now is stopping our country and is stopping
us from protecting our citizens is this Congress.
This Congress needs to pass this bill now. We need to move forward.
We need to get it to the Senate. We need to start working with the
Senate. Then hopefully we'll deal and work very closely with the White
House and find a bill so that we can protect our citizens and also
protect our civil liberties and privacy.
I also understand Mr. Lewis. We all respect him and what he has gone
through. As a former prosecutor and lawyer who has worked on many
search and seizure warrants and that type of thing, I can tell you
this: there are no violations in this bill at all. That is not what
this bill is about. If it were, I wouldn't be in favor of it.
I thank you, Mr. Rogers, for your cooperation and for working with us
in this bipartisan manner. It is a very serious issue.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself the balance of my time.
I do want to thank the ranking member and both staffs from both
committees who have been tireless in this effort to get it right and to
find that right place where we could all feel comfortable.
The amendments that are following here are months of negotiation and
work with many organizations--privacy groups. We have worked language
[[Page H2165]]
with the Center for Democracy and Technology, and they just the other
day said they applauded our progress on where we're going with privacy
and civil liberties. So we have included a lot of folks.
It has been a long road. It has been the most open and transparent
bill that, I think, I've ever worked on here. We kept it open to the
very end to make sure that we could find the language that clarified
our intent to protect privacy, to protect civil liberties, and to just
be able to share dangerous information with victims. That's all this
bill is. The whopping 13 pages it is does only that. So I appreciate
the comments today. I look forward to the amendment debate.
Again, Mr. Ruppersberger, it has been a joy to work with you on this
particular issue.
As an old Army officer once told me, once you find a problem, you are
morally obligated to do something about it. We set about it a year ago
to make America safe and to protect your network at home from people
stealing it, breaking it, and doing something worse.
So, Madam Chair, I look forward to the debate on the amendments, and
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. CUMMINGS. Madam Chair, although I am voting against the Cyber
Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act of 2011 today, I recommend
Representative C.A. ``Dutch'' Ruppersberger, the Ranking Member of the
House Intelligence Committee, for his efforts to improve the bill
significantly since its passage out of committee. He has been a leader
in protecting our Nation against cyber attacks, and he has gone out of
his way to make this bill as inclusive and bipartisan as possible. I
want to thank him for the time he took to meet with me personally to
discuss this legislation and ways to improve it going forward.
I oppose this bill in its current form for several reasons. First,
the Republicans on the House Rules Committee refused to allow debate on
an amendment offered by Representative Bennie Thompson, the Ranking
Member of the House Committee on Homeland Security, to expand this
legislation to protect our Nation's critical infrastructure.
In testimony before the House Intelligence Committee, then-CIA
Director Leon Panetta called cybersecurity ``the battleground for the
future.'' Our Nation's critical infrastructure--including power
distribution, water supply, telecommunications, and emergency
services--has become increasingly dependent on computerized information
systems to manage their operations and to process, maintain, and report
essential information. Any effort to address this national security
threat must address our Nation's critical infrastructure.
In addition, the legislation includes several provisions that are
problematic. For example, under the information-sharing provisions of
the bill, private entities receive absolute immunity from criminal or
civil liability for any harm that may result from a company's actions
that stem from the sharing or receiving of cyber threat information as
long as the company can show it was acting in good faith.
This bill would also create a new exemption to the Freedom of
Information Act that is unwarranted since current law exemptions
provide the flexibility necessary to protect sensitive information. The
bill would prohibit agencies from disclosing ``cyber threat
information,'' and it would hold the government liable for such
disclosure. Unfortunately, an amendment offered on the floor did not
sufficiently address these concerns.
Finally, the bill would allow companies to share private consumer
data without adequate protections or oversight. Private entities would
decide the type and amount of information to share with the Federal
Government, and nothing in the bill would require companies to strip
out unnecessary personally identifiable information. Again, an
amendment offered on the floor did not go far enough to adequately
address this issue.
I appreciate the great effort that went into pulling this bill
together, but more work is needed before I can offer my support. It is
critical that we protect Americans from cyber attacks, and I hope we
can continue to improve this legislation as we move forward.
Mr. NADLER. Madam Chair, I rise in strong opposition to H.R. 3523,
the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA).
The main topic this week, as announced by the House Republican
Leadership, is cyber security, a serious issue for our Nation. As we
become more dependent on computers and technology for even common or
routine actions that happen every day, we become at increased risk of
great damage from a cyber attack. Nations or individuals who wish us
harm know that, and so we must be vigilant.
What we are considering today is premised on the idea that greater
information sharing of cyber threats between the government and the
private sector will improve security. While this is a relatively
uncontroversial idea in concept, the bill before us raises a number of
concerns.
It is important to note at the outset that the bill allows companies
to share information, including private e-mails and other Internet
communications, with the government--notwithstanding any other law. So,
protections in existing law, such as the Electronic Communications
Privacy Act (ECPA) and the Wiretap Act, are totally superseded. The
government could get all of your information without a warrant or
subpoena, and you would have little ability, if any, to stop it. Such a
blanket exemption should give us great pause.
Unfortunately, the rest of the bill does not provide sufficient
safeguards to justify this blanket exemption. To begin with, the
definition of the cyber threat information to be shared is very broad.
Suggestions have been made that define what should be included as cyber
threat information in a narrow but sufficient way. These suggestions
were not included in this bill.
At the very least, companies and other entities providing the
government with information should be required to take some reasonable
steps to remove personally identifiable information. Such reasonable
steps need not be overly burdensome, but, again, even this limited
protection was not included.
Once this information was shared with the government, it could be
reviewed and used by any department. The Department of Defense,
National Security Agency, and other defense and intelligence agencies
thus would have access to the private, domestic internet activities of
innocent Americans. This mixing of domestic information with military
entities is dangerous and unprecedented. In fact, our policy has long-
been to keep the military out of such domestic affairs. Information
about cyber security should be limited to the relevant domestic
government bodies, such as the Department of Homeland Security.
The power of government to use the information it receives would also
be tremendously broad. One allowable use for this information is the
hopelessly vague ``national security.'' In the past, the government has
considered peace groups, civil rights activists, and other advocates to
be ``threats'' to national security. It is easy to imagine how this
term could be utilized for all the wrong reasons. The bill is supposed
to be about cyber security, but allowing use of the information
collected for national security purposes does not necessarily serve
that purpose.
Further, the bill makes enforcing even the limited restrictions it
contains difficult. With respect to private entities, as long as they
act ``in good faith,'' they are immune from any civil or criminal case
in state or federal court. This low standard means that any time a
company claims it thought it was following the law, persons harmed by
the improper sharing of information will have no recourse.
The bill does allow for civil actions against government violations.
Unfortunately, the ability to bring a lawsuit against the government,
as provided for in the bill, is deficient in three ways.
First, the bill only would allow lawsuits against the government for
breaches if filed ``not later than two years after the date of the
violation.'' That time period is wholly unworkable, unfair, and
unrealistic.
Second, as written the bill only would impose liability on the
government only for ``intentionally'' or ``willfully'' violating its
restrictions. While this is helpful, such a limited liability scheme
ignores damages arising from negligence. Such negligent acts could
involve the failure to properly protect sensitive information or the
failure to act with due care in deciding what information should be
used.
Lastly, the only remedy is monetary damages. Injunctive relief, which
could force the government to change its practices, is not provided
for.
I filed an amendment with the Rules Committee to solve these three
problems regarding the ability to hold the government accountable. It
was not made in order.
In fact, multiple amendments were filed with the Rules Committee
which would have made significant improvements to this bill. They would
have narrowed its terms, limited how information could be used,
protected personal information, and so on. The Rules Committee chose
not to make them in order. Some of the amendments the House was allowed
to consider will improve the bill, but not enough to sufficiently
protect our privacy and civil liberties.
In closing, I want to reiterate that I recognize the importance of
the issue of cyber security. I agree with the proponents of the bill
that we must improve our cyber security defenses.
But, I remain firmly committed to the notion that we can protect our
security and maintain our liberty, privacy, and freedom. This bill puts
our privacy at great risk, and unnecessarily so. As such, I oppose its
passage and recommend my colleagues do the same.
Mr. RAHALL. Madam Chair, I recognize the need to address the threats
posed to our Nation and the American economy in cyber
[[Page H2166]]
space, but I also believe we must be very careful in maintaining the
appropriate balance between protecting our national security and
preserving our civil liberties.
Given the concerns about this measure and the perceived threat to
sensitive and personal information of American citizens, I believe that
the House should take additional time to deliberate on this measure.
The American public deserves an opportunity to gain a fuller
understanding of the provisions included in this bill and how their
daily lives may be affected by it.
For these reasons, I will oppose the bill.
The Acting CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment
under the 5-minute rule.
In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill, it
shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of
amendment under the 5-minute rule an amendment in the nature of a
substitute consisting of the text of Rules Committee print 112 20. That
amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be considered as read.
The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as
follows:
H.R. 3523
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Cyber Intelligence Sharing
and Protection Act''.
SEC. 2. CYBER THREAT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING.
(a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 442 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
``cyber threat intelligence and information sharing
``Sec. 1104. (a) Intelligence Community Sharing of Cyber
Threat Intelligence With Private Sector and Utilities.--
``(1) In general.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall establish procedures to allow elements of the
intelligence community to share cyber threat intelligence
with private-sector entities and utilities and to encourage
the sharing of such intelligence.
``(2) Sharing and use of classified intelligence.--The
procedures established under paragraph (1) shall provide that
classified cyber threat intelligence may only be--
``(A) shared by an element of the intelligence community
with--
``(i) certified entities; or
``(ii) a person with an appropriate security clearance to
receive such cyber threat intelligence;
``(B) shared consistent with the need to protect the
national security of the United States; and
``(C) used by a certified entity in a manner which protects
such cyber threat intelligence from unauthorized disclosure.
``(3) Security clearance approvals.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall issue guidelines providing that
the head of an element of the intelligence community may, as
the head of such element considers necessary to carry out
this subsection--
``(A) grant a security clearance on a temporary or
permanent basis to an employee or officer of a certified
entity;
``(B) grant a security clearance on a temporary or
permanent basis to a certified entity and approval to use
appropriate facilities; and
``(C) expedite the security clearance process for a person
or entity as the head of such element considers necessary,
consistent with the need to protect the national security of
the United States.
``(4) No right or benefit.--The provision of information to
a private-sector entity or a utility under this subsection
shall not create a right or benefit to similar information by
such entity or such utility or any other private-sector
entity or utility.
``(5) Restriction on disclosure of cyber threat
intelligence.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a
certified entity receiving cyber threat intelligence pursuant
to this subsection shall not further disclose such cyber
threat intelligence to another entity, other than to a
certified entity or other appropriate agency or department of
the Federal Government authorized to receive such cyber
threat intelligence.
``(b) Use of Cybersecurity Systems and Sharing of Cyber
Threat Information.--
``(1) In general.--
``(A) Cybersecurity providers.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, a cybersecurity provider, with the express
consent of a protected entity for which such cybersecurity
provider is providing goods or services for cybersecurity
purposes, may, for cybersecurity purposes--
``(i) use cybersecurity systems to identify and obtain
cyber threat information to protect the rights and property
of such protected entity; and
``(ii) share such cyber threat information with any other
entity designated by such protected entity, including, if
specifically designated, the Federal Government.
``(B) Self-protected entities.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, a self-protected entity may, for
cybersecurity purposes--
``(i) use cybersecurity systems to identify and obtain
cyber threat information to protect the rights and property
of such self-protected entity; and
``(ii) share such cyber threat information with any other
entity, including the Federal Government.
``(2) Sharing with the federal government.--
``(A) Information shared with the national cybersecurity
and communications integration center of the department of
homeland security.--Subject to the use and protection of
information requirements under paragraph (3), the head of a
department or agency of the Federal Government receiving
cyber threat information in accordance with paragraph (1)
shall provide such cyber threat information to the National
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center of the
Department of Homeland Security.
``(B) Request to share with another department or agency of
the federal government.--An entity sharing cyber threat
information that is provided to the National Cybersecurity
and Communications Integration Center of the Department of
Homeland Security under subparagraph (A) or paragraph (1) may
request the head of such Center to, and the head of such
Center may, provide such information to another department or
agency of the Federal Government.
``(3) Use and protection of information.--Cyber threat
information shared in accordance with paragraph (1)--
``(A) shall only be shared in accordance with any
restrictions placed on the sharing of such information by the
protected entity or self-protected entity authorizing such
sharing, including appropriate anonymization or minimization
of such information;
``(B) may not be used by an entity to gain an unfair
competitive advantage to the detriment of the protected
entity or the self-protected entity authorizing the sharing
of information;
``(C) if shared with the Federal Government--
``(i) shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of
title 5, United States Code;
``(ii) shall be considered proprietary information and
shall not be disclosed to an entity outside of the Federal
Government except as authorized by the entity sharing such
information;
``(iii) shall not be used by the Federal Government for
regulatory purposes;
``(iv) shall not be provided by the department or agency of
the Federal Government receiving such cyber threat
information to another department or agency of the Federal
Government under paragraph (2)(A) if--
``(I) the entity providing such information determines that
the provision of such information will undermine the purpose
for which such information is shared; or
``(II) unless otherwise directed by the President, the head
of the department or agency of the Federal Government
receiving such cyber threat information determines that the
provision of such information will undermine the purpose for
which such information is shared; and
``(v) shall be handled by the Federal Government consistent
with the need to protect sources and methods and the national
security of the United States; and
``(D) shall be exempt from disclosure under a State, local,
or tribal law or regulation that requires public disclosure
of information by a public or quasi-public entity.
``(4) Exemption from liability.--No civil or criminal cause
of action shall lie or be maintained in Federal or State
court against a protected entity, self-protected entity,
cybersecurity provider, or an officer, employee, or agent of
a protected entity, self-protected entity, or cybersecurity
provider, acting in good faith--
``(A) for using cybersecurity systems or sharing
information in accordance with this section; or
``(B) for decisions made based on cyber threat information
identified, obtained, or shared under this section.
``(5) Relationship to other laws requiring the disclosure
of information.--The submission of information under this
subsection to the Federal Government shall not satisfy or
affect any requirement under any other provision of law for a
person or entity to provide information to the Federal
Government.
``(c) Federal Government Use of Information.--
``(1) Limitation.--The Federal Government may use cyber
threat information shared with the Federal Government in
accordance with subsection (b) for any lawful purpose only
if--
``(A) the use of such information is not for a regulatory
purpose; and
``(B) at least one significant purpose of the use of such
information is--
``(i) a cybersecurity purpose; or
``(ii) the protection of the national security of the
United States.
``(2) Affirmative search restriction.--The Federal
Government may not affirmatively search cyber threat
information shared with the Federal Government under
subsection (b) for a purpose other than a purpose referred to
in paragraph (1)(B).
``(3) Anti-tasking restriction.--Nothing in this section
shall be construed to permit the Federal Government to--
``(A) require a private-sector entity to share information
with the Federal Government; or
``(B) condition the sharing of cyber threat intelligence
with a private-sector entity on the provision of cyber threat
information to the Federal Government.
``(d) Federal Government Liability for Violations of
Restrictions on the Disclosure, Use, and Protection of
Voluntarily Shared Information.--
``(1) In general.--If a department or agency of the Federal
Government intentionally or willfully violates subsection
(b)(3)(C) or subsection
[[Page H2167]]
(c) with respect to the disclosure, use, or protection of
voluntarily shared cyber threat information shared under this
section, the United States shall be liable to a person
adversely affected by such violation in an amount equal to
the sum of--
``(A) the actual damages sustained by the person as a
result of the violation or $1,000, whichever is greater; and
``(B) the costs of the action together with reasonable
attorney fees as determined by the court.
``(2) Venue.--An action to enforce liability created under
this subsection may be brought in the district court of the
United States in--
``(A) the district in which the complainant resides;
``(B) the district in which the principal place of business
of the complainant is located;
``(C) the district in which the department or agency of the
Federal Government that disclosed the information is located;
or
``(D) the District of Columbia.
``(3) Statute of limitations.--No action shall lie under
this subsection unless such action is commenced not later
than two years after the date of the violation of subsection
(b)(3)(C) or subsection (c) that is the basis for the action.
``(4) Exclusive cause of action.--A cause of action under
this subsection shall be the exclusive means available to a
complainant seeking a remedy for a violation of subsection
(b)(3)(C) or subsection (c).
``(e) Report on Information Sharing.--
``(1) Report.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall annually submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report containing a review of the
use of information shared with the Federal Government under
this section, including--
``(A) a review of the use by the Federal Government of such
information for a purpose other than a cybersecurity purpose;
``(B) a review of the type of information shared with the
Federal Government under this section;
``(C) a review of the actions taken by the Federal
Government based on such information;
``(D) appropriate metrics to determine the impact of the
sharing of such information with the Federal Government on
privacy and civil liberties, if any;
``(E) a review of the sharing of such information within
the Federal Government to identify inappropriate stovepiping
of shared information; and
``(F) any recommendations of the Inspector General for
improvements or modifications to the authorities under this
section.
``(2) Form.--Each report required under paragraph (1) shall
be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
``(f) Federal Preemption.--This section supersedes any
statute of a State or political subdivision of a State that
restricts or otherwise expressly regulates an activity
authorized under subsection (b).
``(g) Savings Clauses.--
``(1) Existing authorities.--Nothing in this section shall
be construed to limit any other authority to use a
cybersecurity system or to identify, obtain, or share cyber
threat intelligence or cyber threat information.
``(2) Limitation on military and intelligence community
involvement in private and public sector cybersecurity
efforts.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to
provide additional authority to, or modify an existing
authority of, the Department of Defense or the National
Security Agency or any other element of the intelligence
community to control, modify, require, or otherwise direct
the cybersecurity efforts of a private-sector entity or a
component of the Federal Government or a State, local, or
tribal government.
``(3) Information sharing relationships.--Nothing in this
section shall be construed to--
``(A) limit or modify an existing information sharing
relationship;
``(B) prohibit a new information sharing relationship;
``(C) require a new information sharing relationship
between the Federal Government and a private-sector entity;
or
``(D) modify the authority of a department or agency of the
Federal Government to protect sources and methods and the
national security of the United States.
``(h) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Certified entity.--The term `certified entity' means
a protected entity, self-protected entity, or cybersecurity
provider that--
``(A) possesses or is eligible to obtain a security
clearance, as determined by the Director of National
Intelligence; and
``(B) is able to demonstrate to the Director of National
Intelligence that such provider or such entity can
appropriately protect classified cyber threat intelligence.
``(2) Cyber threat information.--The term `cyber threat
information' means information directly pertaining to a
vulnerability of, or threat to, a system or network of a
government or private entity, including information
pertaining to the protection of a system or network from--
``(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy such system
or network; or
``(B) efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system or
network, including efforts to gain such unauthorized access
to steal or misappropriate private or government information.
``(3) Cyber threat intelligence.--The term `cyber threat
intelligence' means information in the possession of an
element of the intelligence community directly pertaining to
a vulnerability of, or threat to, a system or network of a
government or private entity, including information
pertaining to the protection of a system or network from--
``(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy such system
or network; or
``(B) efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system or
network, including efforts to gain such unauthorized access
to steal or misappropriate private or government information.
``(4) Cybersecurity provider.--The term `cybersecurity
provider' means a non-governmental entity that provides goods
or services intended to be used for cybersecurity purposes.
``(5) Cybersecurity purpose.--The term `cybersecurity
purpose' means the purpose of ensuring the integrity,
confidentiality, or availability of, or safeguarding, a
system or network, including protecting a system or network
from--
``(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy such system
or network; or
``(B) efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system or
network, including efforts to gain such unauthorized access
to steal or misappropriate private or government information.
``(6) Cybersecurity system.--The term `cybersecurity
system' means a system designed or employed to ensure the
integrity, confidentiality, or availability of, or safeguard,
a system or network, including protecting a system or network
from--
``(A) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy such system
or network; or
``(B) efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system or
network, including efforts to gain such unauthorized access
to steal or misappropriate private or government information.
``(7) Protected entity.--The term `protected entity' means
an entity, other than an individual, that contracts with a
cybersecurity provider for goods or services to be used for
cybersecurity purposes.
``(8) Self-protected entity.--The term `self-protected
entity' means an entity, other than an individual, that
provides goods or services for cybersecurity purposes to
itself.
``(9) Utility.--The term `utility' means an entity
providing essential services (other than law enforcement or
regulatory services), including electricity, natural gas,
propane, telecommunications, transportation, water, or
wastewater services.''.
(b) Procedures and Guidelines.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall--
(1) not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, establish procedures under paragraph (1) of
section 1104(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as
added by subsection (a) of this section, and issue guidelines
under paragraph (3) of such section 1104(a);
(2) in establishing such procedures and issuing such
guidelines, consult with the Secretary of Homeland Security
to ensure that such procedures and such guidelines permit the
owners and operators of critical infrastructure to receive
all appropriate cyber threat intelligence (as defined in
section 1104(h)(3) of such Act, as added by subsection (a))
in the possession of the Federal Government; and
(3) following the establishment of such procedures and the
issuance of such guidelines, expeditiously distribute such
procedures and such guidelines to appropriate departments and
agencies of the Federal Government, private-sector entities,
and utilities (as defined in section 1104(h)(9) of such Act,
as added by subsection (a)).
(c) Initial Report.--The first report required to be
submitted under subsection (e) of section 1104 of the
National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of
this section, shall be submitted not later than one year
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(d) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in
the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is
amended by adding at the end the following new item:
``Sec. 1104. Cyber threat intelligence and information sharing.''.
The Acting CHAIR. No amendment to that amendment in the nature of a
substitute shall be in order except those printed in House Report 112
454. Each such amendment may be offered only in the order printed in
the report, by a Member designated in the report, shall be considered
as read, shall be debatable for the time specified in the report
equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall
not be subject to amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for
division of the question.
Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Langevin
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1
printed in House Report 112 454.
Mr. LANGEVIN. I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 1, line 13, strike ``Utilities'' and insert ``Critical
Infrastructure Owners and Operators''.
Page 2, line 1, strike ``utilities'' and insert ``critical
infrastructure owners and operators''.
Page 3, line 13, strike ``utility'' and insert ``critical
infrastructure owner or operator''.
Page 3, line 16, strike ``utility'' each place it appears
and insert ``critical infrastructure owner or operator''.
Page 17, strike lines 12 through 16.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman
from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin) and a Member opposed each will control
5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode Island.
Mr. LANGEVIN. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
[[Page H2168]]
The bill that we are considering today creates a voluntary
information-sharing network, which could provide owners and operators
of critical infrastructure with valuable threat information that would
help them to secure their networks from cyberattacks.
Unfortunately, the legislation specifies that it applies only to
``private sector entities and utilities.'' While ``utilities'' is
defined extremely broadly in the legislation as any entity that
provides ``essential services,'' including telecommunications and
transportation providers, there remains the possibility that the
definition may exclude pieces of our critical infrastructure that have
significant cybervulnerabilities.
My amendment, which I am offering with my good friend Mr. Lungren
from California, strikes the uses of the word ``utilities'' and
replaces it in each instance with the phrase ``critical infrastructure
owners and operators.'' This is a commonsense way to avoid potential
confusion and to eliminate any possibility that critical entities could
be denied the opportunity to opt into this voluntary information-
sharing framework and thereby share and receive the valuable classified
threat information that will be available under CISPA.
This amendment will not significantly expand the scope of the
legislation, but instead will help prevent interpretations of language
that could be contrary to the committee's intent, which I believe is
the same as mine.
Now, while I recognize that any regulation of critical infrastructure
would be outside the Intelligence Committee's jurisdiction, I
nonetheless want to take this opportunity to voice my strong conviction
that our efforts must not stop with the legislation that we are
considering this week.
Just as the airline industry must follow Federal Aviation
Administration safety standards, the companies that own and operate the
infrastructure on which the public most relies should be accountable
for protecting their consumers when confronted with a significant risk.
I, along with many Members on both sides of the aisle and experts
within and outside of government, have come to the same basic
conclusion: the status quo of voluntary action will not result in
strong cyberprotections for our most valuable and vulnerable
industries. The Secretary of Homeland Security emphasized last week
that our critical infrastructure control systems, which are mainly in
private hands, must come up to a certain baseline level in
cybersecurity standards.
With increased public awareness helping to build momentum for
legislative action, we have a real chance to address these threats. I
hope that we will not look back on this moment years from now,
regretting a missed opportunity after the damage has been done. While
the amendment we are offering today will not by itself provide the
protections that Mr. Lungren and I ultimately believe are necessary for
our critical infrastructure, it is a useful first step, and I am
thankful to Mr. Lungren for joining me in this effort.
With that, Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I want to first compliment Mr. Langevin for
working with us on the cybersecurity bill. He has been an instrumental
force in pushing this cybersecurity issue to the front and in getting
the language that we have that finds that right balance.
My concern with this, which is why I thought, at least, the
President's advisers who were recommending to him that he veto the bill
were misguided, is that now we have done something in this bill that is
fairly unique. It is all voluntary, and we have separated the
government and the private sector. The government is not going to be
involved in private sector networks, and they're not going to be
involved in the government networks. Perfect. That's exactly the
balance we found.
With this, it crosses both of those, and it gets us to a place that I
think we need to have a lot more discussion on, and you can see by the
level of debate just on this issue how people are really nervous about
the Federal Government getting into their business.
{time} 1540
This, I'm afraid, opens it up to that. Here's the good news. We
believe this is already covered in the bill as far as the sharing
component, and you replace the word ``utility'' with something that
isn't defined, ``critical infrastructure, owners and operators.'' We're
not sure what that is, and in some cases you could extrapolate that to
be even the local police, who argue they're part of the national
security infrastructure. Does that mean local police are going to get
very sensitive foreign cyberintelligence information? And why would
they have it? We don't know the answers to those questions, and that's
why we're having such a hard time with this amendment.
I would argue that there does need to be a Homeland Security bill,
and it really shouldn't be done in the Intelligence Committee. It
should be done in the Homeland Security Committee.
So I would love to work with Mr. Langevin as the process works its
way through the Homeland Security Committee and believe that that
should be fully debated.
Remember, when you start getting regulation into the private sector,
including private networks, that, I argue, is troublesome and very
worrisome to me, and something I would have a hard time supporting.
So, I look forward to working with the gentleman. I would have to
oppose this amendment, but I want to thank you for all your work on the
cyberissue and, clearly, this cyber information-sharing bill.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the chairman of the Intelligence Committee for
his thoughts. I respectfully disagree. The word ``utilities'' is
important, but I believe ``critical infrastructure,'' out of an
abundance of caution, is a better term than ``utilities''.
How much time do I have, Madam Chair?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman has 2 minutes remaining.
Mr. LANGEVIN. I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished chairman on
the Department of Homeland Security Committee, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Daniel E. Lungren).
Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. I think the amendment is quite
simple. As written, the bill allows for information to be shared with
the private sector and utilities, but there are those that do not fall
within that that I think we would all agree should be able to have this
relationship.
Our amendment would have the simple effect of including those
elements such as airport authorities, mass transit authorities, or
municipal hospitals, which are neither private sector nor utilities, to
be able to participate in this voluntary information-sharing regime.
I find it odd to find out that the committee is worried about the
definition of ``critical infrastructure.'' That has been defined in the
U.S. Code for over a decade. It is in the language in 42 U.S.C. 5195c,
the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2001, which defines
critical infrastructure as:
Systems or assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to
the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such
systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on
security, national economic security, national public health
or safety, or any combination of those matters.
That has been the definition that we have supported. That's been the
definition that we've worked on. Your committee, our committee, all
committees have. I find this a very simple amendment that tries to
reach what we are all trying to reach. It does not grant any more
authority to the Federal Government. It allows for the sharing of
information to vital entities, as the gentleman has suggested, that we
would all agree ought to be there.
I would hope that pride of authorship is not the problem here. We're
trying to do something that we think makes common sense. And if folks
have trouble with the definition of critical infrastructure, you would
have thought it would have been raised in the last decade.
The Acting CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. LANGEVIN. I yield the gentleman an additional 15 seconds.
Mr. DANIEL E. LUNGREN of California. I would hope that we could have
support for this bipartisan amendment brought forward by the gentleman
who
[[Page H2169]]
serves on the Intelligence Committee. I serve on the Homeland Security
Committee. I'm chairman of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity.
It seems to me to make imminent sense. I do not understand why there
is some opposition to this amendment. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. How much time do I have remaining?
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman has 3 minutes remaining.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I would just remind the gentleman that the
definition does not go back anywhere in this bill to that. It leaves it
open, and when you start, again, crossing that valley between the
government and the private sector, it causes serious issues--as you can
see, the people who are very concerned that the government is going to
get into regulating anything on the Internet.
I would say this is no pride of authorship. I don't know if Mr.
Ruppersberger and I could have any more authors participate in our bill
than we have.
The problem here is very real and very substantive. And that's why I
think both the gentlemen, who have as much passion and care and
commitment to this issue as I've seen, need to work that issue on the
Homeland Security Committee so you can do it in a way that won't rise
to the level of the objections that we have seen when just the
suggestion of regulating outside of the purview of national security
comes into discussion.
That's why I would hope the gentleman would exercise extreme caution
when taking that walk. It is perilous for the government to get into
regulating the Internet, and I oppose that completely. That's why we
have these problems, I think, arise from it. I think, if these are
issues that they can get over, that this should have substantive
debate. Remember, this very narrow bill took 1 year--1 year--of work
and negotiation and discussions to get it to where we are today.
So, I would encourage that maybe more thought ought to be put in it,
and I would look forward to working with both gentleman as they
introduce and work their bills through the Homeland Security Committee,
as I think would be appropriate.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. LANGEVIN. Again, I thank the chairman of the Intelligence
Committee for his thoughts. I want to be very clear that this term
substituting ``critical infrastructure'' for ``utilities'' does not
lend to regulating critical infrastructure. It just allows for the
broadest possible definition of information-sharing among those
entities that are deemed to be critical infrastructure.
With that, I thank Chairman Lungren for his support of this
bipartisan amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. LANGEVIN. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Rhode Island
will be postponed.
The Chair understands that amendment No. 2 will not be offered.
Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Pompeo
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3
printed in House Report 112 454.
Mr. POMPEO. I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 8, beginning on line 18, strike ``or sharing
information'' and insert ``to identify or obtain cyber threat
information or for sharing such information''.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman
from Kansas (Mr. Pompeo) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kansas.
Mr. POMPEO. I want to thank Chairman Rogers and Chairman
Ruppersberger for their hard work on this important piece of
legislation. I am among those folks who, when I first learned of this
legislation, had some concerns to make sure that it was balanced and it
did the right things. Also as a former Army officer, I recognize the
deep national security implications of the cyberthreat, but I also
wanted to make sure that we also did everything that was necessary to
protect everyone's privacy rights.
This is a simple amendment. It makes clear that the liability
protection in the bill with respect to the use of such systems only
extends to the identification and acquisition of cyberthreat
information and no further.
This is an unprecedented threat from countries like China and Russia.
These are hostile nations, and they're committing resources,
unprecedented resources, to attack U.S. networks each and every minute
of every day. While this new threat is being developed by our foreign
enemies, organized criminals and foreign hackers also just as easily
deploy malicious cyberattacks to disrupt stock markets, transportation
networks, businesses, governments, and even our military operations.
A devastating cyberattack could easily be unleashed from the remote
comfort of enemies' computers thousands of miles away from our Nation.
We must take this threat very, very seriously.
Part of the challenge in cyberspace is that a line of computer code
could be just as deadly as a traditional military weapon. We've already
seen these attacks used as an instrument of war. In 2008, Georgia
suffered a significant cyberattack prior to the invasion by Russia.
This attack crippled Georgia's banking system and disrupted the
nation's cell phone services, helping to clear the battlefield for the
invading Russians.
Perhaps the most significant dangerous activity in cyberspace even
goes unnoticed. Cyberspies lay in wait for years in order to eventually
steal precious military and economic secrets. Each of these examples
further illustrates the need for legislation. Unfortunately, some civil
liberties and privacy advocates claim that liability protection in this
bill with respect to the use of cybersecurity systems could lead to
broader activities than authorized.
This legislation doesn't do that, but my amendment simply provides
clarifying language to the original language of the bill, and thus
enjoys the support of bipartisan cosponsors of the legislation, as well
as the outside groups that raise these concerns.
Madam Chair, I urge approval of this amendment.
With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. Does any Member seek time in opposition?
Mr. POMPEO. I yield as much time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Rogers), the chairman of the Intelligence Committee.
{time} 1550
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I want to thank Mr. Pompeo for working with
us. This was an amendment negotiated with Mr. Ruppersberger and myself
and Mr. Pompeo to clearly define the intention of the bill, and I think
it offers protections. I think we should all strongly support Mr.
Pompeo's amendment.
Mr. POMPEO. Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Pompeo).
The amendment was agreed to.
amendment no. 4 offered by mr. rogers of michigan
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4
printed in House Report 112 454.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I have an amendment at the desk, Madam Chair.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 9, beginning on line 2, strike ``affect any'' and
insert ``affect--''.
Page 9, strike lines 3 through 5 and insert the following:
``(A) any requirement under any other provision of law for
a person or entity to provide information to the Federal
Government; or
``(B) the applicability of other provisions of law,
including section 552 of title 5, United
[[Page H2170]]
States Code (commonly known as the `Freedom of Information
Act'), with respect to information required to be provided to
the Federal Government under such other provision of law.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I strongly encourage the support
of this amendment. It's a simple amendment we negotiated. It is
clarifying language again on FOIA.
With that, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from
California (Mr. Issa).
Mr. ISSA. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Hopefully there will be
time left over also for Mr. Chaffetz, who has worked hard on this
amendment.
I want to thank the chairman for working with our committee on this
amendment that clarifies in the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and
Protection Act that FOIA, the Freedom of Information Access Act, is in
fact clearly in effect for the vast majority of this information.
We understand that companies--I will just take an example--such as
electric utility companies may share their very vulnerabilities as a
part of a process to reduce or eliminate these vulnerabilities. We
certainly understand that that's not FOIAable. National security is not
FOIAable. However, we, in this amendment, ensure that everything is at
least possibly FOIAable whenever it would be appropriate, and then the
only question is does it stand for one of the exclusions. So by making
it narrow, we tell the American people that the Freedom of Information
Act is in effect on cybersecurity and will not be unreasonably
withheld.
I think this is critical at a time when greater transparency is the
promise and there is a great deal of concern about cybersecurity
somehow being something that would take away America's freedoms. Just
the opposite is true. Our freedom of the Internet, our freedom to have
an effective and efficient system on which to build our infrastructure
both for electricity and other utilities, but also for our everyday
life, essentially requires the kind of cooperation that we anticipate.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I claim time in opposition to the
amendment; however, I do not oppose the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I agree with Mr. Issa's comments. This is a joint
amendment of Mr. Rogers and me. The amendment would make it clear that
while FOIA exemption protects information obtained under the bill,
regulatory information required by other authorities remains subject to
FOIA requests.
The chairman and I agree the law should not create a broad change.
The type of information that is available under the Freedom of
Information Act, we have a responsibility to protect classified
information from disclosure, but we also understand the need to keep
information open to the public. The amendment makes clear that
information available under other authorities remains subject to FOIA,
and I urge all Members to support this bipartisan amendment.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield to the gentleman from Utah.
Mr. CHAFFETZ. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I appreciate the bipartisan nature in which this is moving forward. I
appreciate specifically Chairman Rogers, Chairman Issa, and the ranking
member.
I stand in support of this amendment. I think FOIA is a very
important principle we have in this, and this just strengthens that.
I would also say, Madam Chair, that I was opposed to SOPA. I was
adamantly opposed to this. But this bill in particular is desperately
needed in this country. Cybersecurity is a very real threat, and this
bill is something that is needed in this country. I think it is strong
in its Fourth Amendment protections. I think it's appropriate for this
Nation to do this. We need to make sure that we're smart in how we
advance.
There have been some much-needed amendments that were adopted. But
again, the bill, as we see it moving forward, I think, will strengthen
cybersecurity in this country, and I'm proud of the fact that Chairman
Rogers is bringing this bill to the floor.
I urge the support of this amendment and the underlying bill.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan
will be postponed.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed in House
Report 112 454.
Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Quayle
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6
printed in House Report 112 454.
Mr. QUAYLE. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 9, strike lines 8 through 18 and insert the following:
``(1) Limitation.--The Federal Government may use cyber
threat information shared with the Federal Government in
accordance with subsection (b)--
``(A) for cybersecurity purposes;
``(B) for the investigation and prosecution of
cybersecurity crimes;
``(C) for the protection of individuals from the danger of
death or serious bodily harm and the investigation and
prosecution of crimes involving such danger of death or
serious bodily harm;
``(D) for the protection of minors from child pornography,
any risk of sexual exploitation, and serious threats to the
physical safety of such minor, including kidnapping and
trafficking and the investigation and prosecution of crimes
involving child pornography, any risk of sexual exploitation,
and serious threats to the physical safety of minors,
including kidnapping and trafficking, and any crime referred
to in 2258A(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code; or
``(E) to protect the national security of the United
States.
Page 16, before line 1 insert the following:
``(4) Cybersecurity crime.--The term `cybersecurity crime'
means--
``(A) a crime under a Federal or State law that involves--
``(i) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy a system or
network;
``(ii) efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system or
network; or
``(iii) efforts to exfiltrate information from a system or
network without authorization; or
``(B) the violation of a provision of Federal law relating
to computer crimes, including a violation of any provision of
title 18, United States Code, created or amended by the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986 (Public Law 99 474).''.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman
from Arizona (Mr. Quayle) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona.
Mr. QUAYLE. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I appreciate the opportunity to speak in favor of this bipartisan
amendment that I'm offering along with Congresswoman Eshoo, Congressman
Thompson, and Congressman Broun.
H.R. 3523 is designed to increase the sharing of government
intelligence and cyberthreats with the private sector and allow private
sector companies to share threat information on a voluntary basis. The
bill is consistent with our founding principles and our Constitution.
Indeed, as the nature of the threats facing our Nation change, I
believe this legislation is vital to protecting our country.
Every day our military intelligence communities work to counter
traditional threats like nuclear and biological weapons in order to
prevent a catastrophic attack on U.S. soil, but today's security
threats are becoming less traditional. Four nations have chosen
cyberspace as an area of particular
[[Page H2171]]
vulnerability for America and are targeting critical military and
economic cyberinfrastructure.
Admiral Mike Mullen, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, lists cyberattacks as one of the top threats facing the United
States. Secretary of Defense and former CIA Director Leon Panetta
warned that the next Pearl Harbor we confront could very well be a
cyberattack that cripples our power systems, our grid, our security
systems, our financial systems, our governmental systems.
This legislation not only protects our national security and
intellectual property, it also provides private and public entities to
voluntarily work with the government to protect every individual's
personal information from nation-state actors like China, Russia, and
Iran, who are determined to use cyberattacks to steal from us and
weaken us.
{time} 1600
This bipartisan amendment will further solidify protecting the
homeland from foreign nation-states wishing to do us harm, while
protecting civil liberties.
This amendment significantly narrows the bill's current limitation of
the Federal Government's use of cyberthreat information that is
voluntarily shared by the private sector. Specifically, this amendment
strictly limits the Federal Government's use of voluntarily shared
cyberthreat information to the following five purposes: cybersecurity
purposes; investigation and prosecution of cybersecurity crimes;
protection of individuals from danger of death or serious bodily harm;
and protection of minors from child pornography, any risk of sexual
exploitation, and serious threats to the physical safety of a minor;
finally, protection of the national security of the United States.
If the government violates the use limitation, the bill provides for
government liability for actual damages, costs, and attorney fees in
Federal court. These provisions together ensure that information cannot
be shared with the government or used under this bill unless there's a
direct tie to cybersecurity.
Cyberterrorists work fast, so Congress needs to work faster to
protect America. Enabling information-sharing between the government
and private sector is the quickest and easiest way to prevent a
cyberattack on our Nation. Our amendment ensures we can accomplish this
goal while also protecting the privacy of all Americans, and I urge my
colleagues to support it.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I rise to claim time in opposition, but I do not
oppose the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield to the gentleman from California (Mr.
Thompson). He is on the Intelligence Committee and also a sponsor of
this amendment.
Mr. THOMPSON of California. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Madam Chair, I rise in support of the Thompson-Eshoo-Quayle-Broun
amendment to this bill. The threat of a devastating cyberattack is real
and cannot be understated. I believe the Federal Government and private
companies need to work together to protect our national and economic
security. But in doing so, we still have a responsibility to protect
the constitutional rights of law-abiding citizens.
I'm concerned that the underlying bill is drafted in a way where
consumer information could be shared too broadly and used in ways
unrelated to combating cybersecurity threats. The Thompson-Eshoo-
Quayle-Broun amendment will tighten the bill's limitation on the
Federal Government's use of cyberthreat information shared under this
legislation. Specifically, our amendment will limit the Federal
Government's use of shared information only for cybersecurity purposes,
for the investigation and prosecution of cybersecurity crimes, to
protect against the threat of imminent harm, and protect our country's
national security.
This bill, even with our amendment, isn't perfect. As this
legislation moves forward, I expect the word of the chairman to be
honored when he says that our committee will work together to further
protect personal information and limit its use. For example, further
narrowing terms in this bill, such as ``to protect the national
security of the United States,'' will be necessary, I believe, to fully
protect our civil liberties.
Mr. QUAYLE. I yield 30 seconds to the chairman of the Intelligence
Committee, Mr. Rogers.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Quayle.
Again, this is an amendment worked out with Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr.
Thompson, Mr. Quayle, and myself. Ms. Eshoo is also on the amendment.
This is in consultation with all of the privacy groups and the civil
liberty groups. We wanted to make sure that the intent matched the
language. And we think this is a limiting amendment on what it can be
used for, which is very narrow, is very specific; and we think this
enhances already good privacy protections in the bill, and I strongly
support it and would encourage the House to strongly support the
bipartisan amendment.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. QUAYLE. I just want to thank the chairman and the ranking member
and their staffs for working tirelessly on this bill. It's a good bill,
and this amendment, I believe, strengthens it.
I urge my colleagues to support it, and I yield back the balance of
my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Quayle).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arizona will
be postponed.
Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Amash
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7
printed in House Report 112 454.
Mr. AMASH. I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 10, after line 10, insert the following new paragraph:
``(4) Protection of sensitive personal documents.--The
Federal Government may not use the following information,
containing information that identifies a person, shared with
the Federal Government in accordance with subsection (b):
``(A) Library circulation records.
``(B) Library patron lists.
``(C) Book sales records.
``(D) Book customer lists.
``(E) Firearms sales records.
``(F) Tax return records.
``(G) Educational records.
``(H) Medical records.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Amash) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. AMASH. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I'm extremely concerned about the privacy implications of the bill.
The liability waiver goes too far, and the government can access too
much of Americans' private information and use it in too many ways.
Our amendment addresses that last concern. Our amendment prohibits
CISPA from being used to snoop through sensitive documents that can
personally identify Americans. The documents that our amendment makes
off-limits to the government are library and book records, information
on gun sales, tax returns, educational records, and medical records.
We didn't pull this list out of thin air. In fact, the list already
exists in Federal law as part of the PATRIOT Act. Under the PATRIOT
Act, the Federal Government can obtain these documents as part of a
foreign intelligence investigation only if senior FBI officials request
the documents and a Federal judge approves.
Many have questioned the wisdom of allowing the government access to
sensitive documents even in those more limited circumstances. If the
PATRIOT Act requires the approval of a Federal judge and a senior FBI
official, surely we can't allow access to such personal information
without any judicial or agency oversight. I don't know why the
[[Page H2172]]
government would want to snoop through library lists or tax returns to
counter a cyberattack. But if the government wants these records, it
has existing legal processes to obtain them. Our constituents' privacy
demands that we not give the government unfettered and unsupervised
access to these documents in the name of cybersecurity.
Please support the bipartisan Amash-Labrador-Nadler-Paul-Polis
amendment.
I reserve the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. Does any Member seek recognition in opposition to
the amendment?
Mr. AMASH. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. NADLER. Madam Chair, I rise in strong support of the Amash-
Labrador-Nadler-Paul-Polis Amendment.
While I believe most Members agree both that a cyber attack could be
devastating and that sharing information will help to fight that
threat, the underlying bill is overly broad and intrusive. Our
amendment will add at least a modicum of protection for Americans'
privacy.
While the idea of privacy may seem quaint to some in this day of
social networking and the Internet, most Americans still believe that
they have a zone of privacy vis-a-vis the government. As such, it is
important we protect private actions from the prying eyes of
government. Moreover, the government has a history of misusing such
information and so we need to be very circumspect in what we allow it
access to.
Our amendment prohibits records or information regarding what books
you bought or checked out of the library, your medical records, tax
returns, and so on from being used by the government for any purpose if
it obtained that information pursuant to this bill. There is no need
for the government to have this most personal of information--I don't
see how any of it could be possibly relevant to cyber security. And, if
the information can't be legally used, hopefully that will discourage
companies from sharing it in the first place.
The categories of information in our amendment are already given a
protected status in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).
FISA requires a court order and the approval of a high-ranking FBI
official to request these personal materials. If that is the standard
under FISA, we should not let companies cavalierly hand such records to
the government with no independent review at all.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Amash).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. AMASH. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan
will be postponed.
Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Mulvaney
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8
printed in House Report 112 454.
Mr. MULVANEY. I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 10, after line 10 insert the following:
``(4) Notification of non-cyber threat information.--If a
department or agency of the Federal Government receiving
information pursuant to subsection (b)(1) determines that
such information is not cyber threat information, such
department or agency shall notify the entity or provider
sharing such information pursuant to subsection (b)(1).
``(5) Retention and use of cyber threat information.--No
department or agency of the Federal Government shall retain
or use information shared pursuant to subsection (b)(1) for
any use other than a use permitted under subsection (c)(1).
``(6) Protection of individual information.--The Federal
Government may, consistent with the need to protect Federal
systems and critical information infrastructure from
cybersecurity threats and to mitigate such threats, undertake
reasonable efforts to limit the impact on privacy and civil
liberties of the sharing of cyber threat information with the
Federal Government pursuant to this subsection.
Page 14, after line 13, insert the following:
``(4) Use and retention of information.--Nothing in this
section shall be construed to authorize, or to modify any
existing authority of, a department or agency of the Federal
Government to retain or use information shared pursuant to
subsection (b)(1) for any use other than a use permitted
under subsection (c)(1).''.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman
from South Carolina (Mr. Mulvaney) and a Member opposed each will
control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina.
Mr. MULVANEY. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Chair, I appreciate the opportunity to rise today to speak in
favor to this amendment to the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and
Protection Act. CISPA is fundamentally based on the authority granted
to Congress in article I of the Constitution and article IV of the
Constitution, specifically to provide for the common defense and to
protect the Nation against invasion--in fact, the only affirmative duty
that this government is obligated to meet under the terms of our
Constitution.
This bill protects our Nation from foreign cyberthreats through the
voluntary sharing of cyberthreat information. It is important for
Members to understand this bill allows for only voluntary sharing of
information on cybersecurity threats to the United States between the
government and the private sector.
{time} 1610
It includes no mandates to the private sector. It contains no new
spending and strictly limits how the government can use the information
that is voluntarily provided by the private sector. The amendment that
I've offered with Mr. Dicks today goes one step further to protect the
private information of American citizens. It explicitly prohibits the
Federal Government from retaining or using the information for purposes
other than specifically specified or set forth in the legislation.
Let's make it clear. The government cannot keep or use the shared
information to see if you failed to pay your taxes. The government
cannot use this information to read your emails. The government cannot
use this information to track your credit card purchases or look at the
Web sites that you've been visiting. Under our amendment, the Federal
Government cannot use retained information unless it was directly
related to a cyber or national security threat.
Finally, this bipartisan amendment requires--requires--the Federal
Government to notify any private sector entity that shares information
with the government if that information is not, in fact, cyberthreat
information so that it doesn't happen again, and the government must
delete that information.
The privacy of American citizens is simply too important to dismiss.
Our amendment narrows the scope of the bill to ensure personal
information is protected and that we are focusing on the true threat--
advanced, foreign state-sponsored cyberattacks against America and its
private entities.
With that, I would yield such time as he may consume to the chairman.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I just want to rise in strong
support of this amendment. I appreciate Mr. Mulvaney's working with the
committee.
This is a limiting amendment, and I think it, again, is in response
to making sure that the intent of the bill meets the language of the
bill, and this is well done to continue to protect privacy and civil
liberties of all Americans and still allow for the government to share
malicious source code with the private sector.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I rise in opposition to the
amendment; although I do not oppose the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I also support this amendment. It is very
important. It's another example of what we're attempting to do to
protect the privacy and civil liberties of our citizens but yet have a
bill that we clearly need to protect them from a national security
perspective.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. MULVANEY. I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Mulvaney).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
[[Page H2173]]
Mr. MULVANEY. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from South
Carolina will be postponed.
Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Flake
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9
printed in House Report 112 454.
Mr. FLAKE. I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 12, after line 18, insert the following new
subparagraph:
``(E) a list of the department or agency receiving such
information;
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman
from Arizona (Mr. Flake) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona.
Mr. FLAKE. This amendment is straightforward. It would require the
inspector general of the intelligence community to include a list of
federal agencies and departments receiving information shared with the
government in the report already required by the underlying
legislation.
This act is an important piece of legislation that will help private
entities and utilities protect themselves from catastrophic attacks to
their networks by creating the authority for private entities and
utilities to voluntarily share information pertaining to cyberattacks
with the Federal Government and vice versa.
H.R. 3523 avoids placing costly mandates on private industry and the
creation of a new regulatory structure. That's what I really appreciate
about this legislation, as I'm sure everyone does--it's voluntary.
As with any new intelligence program, however, it's incumbent on us
to make sure robust protections exist to safeguard privacy rights. The
inspector general report required under H.R. 3523 will provide a
thorough review of the information shared under these new authorities
and will address any impacts such sharing has on privacy and civil
liberties. Adding the list of the departments and agencies that were
recipients of this shared information, as my amendment would do, would
add information on which government agencies exactly are receiving
shared information. Such information will further mitigate the risk of
abuse to privacy rights and increase the effectiveness of the inspector
general's report.
I commend my colleagues from Michigan and Maryland. They've been
working hard to put together this bipartisan measure, working up until
the very last minute to ensure that Members' concerns are addressed,
and I believe that this is an important piece of legislation.
I'd like to yield to the gentleman from Michigan such time as he may
consume.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I want to thank the gentleman from Arizona
for working with us. This, again, was a negotiated amendment. The
gentleman approached us with concerns to make sure that the IG report
adequately reflected and allowed us to perform the adequate oversight.
This amendment does that. I appreciate his work and effort, and I think
this strengthens the bill and continues to provide the oversight and
protection of civil liberties and privacy for all Americans.
The Acting CHAIR. Does any Member seek recognition in opposition?
Mr. FLAKE. I just want to say I support the legislation in the
underlying bill, and I would urge support for this amendment as well,
and I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Flake).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 11 Offered by Mr. Pompeo
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 11
printed in House Report 112 454.
Mr. POMPEO. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 14, after line 13, insert the following:
``(4) Limitation on federal government use of cybersecurity
systems.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to
provide additional authority to, or modify an existing
authority of, any entity to use a cybersecurity system owned
or controlled by the Federal Government on a private-sector
system or network to protect such private-sector system or
network.''.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman
from Kansas (Mr. Pompeo) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Kansas.
Mr. POMPEO. Madam Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to offer a
second amendment to this incredibly important piece of legislation
that's been worked on for an awfully long time to balance the security
needs of our Nation and the privacy rights of every United States
citizen.
Similar to the first amendment I offered, this amendment addresses
some of the concerns raised by me, privacy folks, and civil libertarian
advocates to make very clear the intentions of this legislation. I
talked earlier about the threat we face today. It's real, it's foreign,
it's domestic, and these cyberattacks are an enormous risk to our
national security and to our economic security.
I now strongly support this legislation. I've had a chance to work
with Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger to solidify
limitations on this legislation that make it very clear that this
government's use of this information will be limited.
I think some have claimed incorrectly that the current bill could be
read to provide new authority to the Federal Government to install its
Einstein system on private sector networks and to monitor traffic and
send it back to the government with absolutely no limitations. That's
wrong.
This amendment, however, makes it even more clear. This amendment
makes clear that nothing in this bill would alter existing authorities
or provide any new authority to any entity to use a Federal Government-
owned or -operated cybersecurity system on a private sector system or
network to protect such a system or network.
Again, I'm pleased to support the legislation. It doesn't create any
new regulatory regime. It doesn't create any more Federal bureaucracy.
And it has no additional spending. I urge my colleagues to support this
amendment and final passage of CISPA.
I yield whatever time he might consume to the chairman of the
Intelligence Committee.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. This is an important amendment, and again, I
think it alleviates some of the concerns. They were misguided, but this
locks it down, makes it very tight and makes it very clear on the
limiting of this information, which is the intent of this bill. So I
think this amendment addresses the privacy and civil liberties
advocates' claims that the liability protection in the bill with
respect to the use of cybersecurity systems could be read to be broader
than the activities authorized by the legislation.
As I said, that was not true, certainly not the intent. This
amendment makes that very clear in the bill that that would not be its
purpose, and it is a limiting amendment. I strongly support this
amendment. It is a bipartisan amendment as well.
Mr. POMPEO. Madam Chairwoman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Pompeo).
The amendment was agreed to.
{time} 1620
Amendment No. 12 Offered by Mr. Woodall
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 12
printed in House Report 112 454.
Mr. WOODALL. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 14, after line 13 insert the following:
``(4) No liability for non-participation.--Nothing in this
section shall be construed to subject a protected entity,
self-protected entity, cyber security provider, or an
officer, employee, or agent of a protected entity, self-
protected entity, or cybersecurity provider, to liability for
choosing not to engage in the voluntary activities authorized
under this section.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman
[[Page H2174]]
from Georgia (Mr. Woodall) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Georgia.
Mr. WOODALL. Madam Chair, my amendment is a simple amendment. What
we're doing here in this bill today, to the great credit of the
chairman and the ranking member, is instituting a voluntary system by
which our private companies and utilities can cooperate in the name of
securing America's cyberspace. But what happens so often is, when the
Federal Government creates a so-called ``voluntary'' standard, suddenly
those folks who choose not to play on that playing field are subject to
new liabilities because they rejected that voluntary standard.
Well, if it's going to be a truly voluntary standard, we have to
ensure that those who reject it are not held to any new liabilities. I
believe that was the intent of the committee as they crafted this
legislation, but my amendment makes that clear to say that no new
liabilities arise for any company that chooses not to participate in
this new truly voluntary cybersecurity cooperative regime.
With that, I reserve the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. Does any Member seek recognition in opposition?
Mr. WOODALL. With that, I want to thank the ranking member and the
chairman for their tremendous openness throughout this entire process.
Briefing after briefing, phone call after phone call, they both made
themselves available to Members on both sides of the aisle so that we
could get our questions answered in what is sometimes a difficult area
to understand and digest. I thank them both for their leadership, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Woodall).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 13 Offered by Mr. Goodlatte
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 13
printed in House Report 112 454.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Madam Chairman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 14, after line 14 insert the following:
``(1) Availability.--The term `availability' means ensuring
timely and reliable access to and use of information.
Page 15, strike lines 1 through 25 and insert the
following:
``(2) Confidentiality.--The term `confidentiality' means
preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure,
including means for protecting personal privacy and
proprietary information.
``(3) Cyber threat information.--
``(A) In general.--The term `cyber threat information'
means information directly pertaining to--
``(i) a vulnerability of a system or network of a
government or private entity;
``(ii) a threat to the integrity, confidentiality, or
availability of a system or network of a government or
private entity or any information stored on, processed on, or
transiting such a system or network;
``(iii) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy a system or
network of a government or private entity; or
``(iv) efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system or
network of a government or private entity, including to gain
such unauthorized access for the purpose of exfiltrating
information stored on, processed on, or transiting a system
or network of a government or private entity.
``(B) Exclusion.-- Such term does not include information
pertaining to efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system
or network of a government or private entity that solely
involve violations of consumer terms of service or consumer
licensing agreements and do not otherwise constitute
unauthorized access.
``(4) Cyber threat intelligence.--
``(A) In general.--The term `cyber threat intelligence'
means intelligence in the possession of an element of the
intelligence community directly pertaining to--
``(i) a vulnerability of a system or network of a
government or private entity;
``(ii) a threat to the integrity, confidentiality, or
availability of a system or network of a government or
private entity or any information stored on, processed on, or
transiting such a system or network;
``(iii) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy a system or
network of a government or private entity; or
``(iv) efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system or
network of a government or private entity, including to gain
such unauthorized access for the purpose of exfiltrating
information stored on, processed on, or transiting a system
or network of a government or private entity.
``(B) Exclusion.-- Such term does not include intelligence
pertaining to efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system
or network of a government or private entity that solely
involve violations of consumer terms of service or consumer
licensing agreements and do not otherwise constitute
unauthorized access.
Page 16, strike line 5 and all that follows through page
17, line 2, and insert the following:
``(5) Cybersecurity purpose.--
``(A) In general.--The term `cybersecurity purpose' means
the purpose of ensuring the integrity, confidentiality, or
availability of, or safeguarding, a system or network,
including protecting a system or network from--
``(i) a vulnerability of a system or network;
``(ii) a threat to the integrity, confidentiality, or
availability of a system or network or any information stored
on, processed on, or transiting such a system or network;
``(iii) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy a system or
network; or
``(iv) efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system or
network, including to gain such unauthorized access for the
purpose of exfiltrating information stored on, processed on,
or transiting a system or network.
``(B) Exclusion.-- Such term does not include the purpose
of protecting a system or network from efforts to gain
unauthorized access to such system or network that solely
involve violations of consumer terms of service or consumer
licensing agreements and do not otherwise constitute
unauthorized access.
``(6) Cybersecurity system.--
``(A) In general.--The term `cybersecurity system' means a
system designed or employed to ensure the integrity,
confidentiality, or availability of, or safeguard, a system
or network, including protecting a system or network from--
``(i) a vulnerability of a system or network;
``(ii) a threat to the integrity, confidentiality, or
availability of a system or network or any information stored
on, processed on, or transiting such a system or network;
``(iii) efforts to degrade, disrupt, or destroy a system or
network; or
``(iv) efforts to gain unauthorized access to a system or
network, including to gain such unauthorized access for the
purpose of exfiltrating information stored on, processed on,
or transiting a system or network.
``(B) Exclusion.-- Such term does not include a system
designed or employed to protect a system or network from
efforts to gain unauthorized access to such system or network
that solely involve violations of consumer terms of service
or consumer licensing agreements and do not otherwise
constitute unauthorized access.
Page 17, after line 2 insert the following:
``(7) Integrity.--The term `integrity' means guarding
against improper information modification or destruction,
including ensuring information nonrepudiation and
authenticity.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman
from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Madam Chair, I rise to offer an amendment to H.R.
3523. This amendment is the result of a series of long discussions
between Members of the bipartisan coalition supporting this bill and
various privacy and civil liberties groups.
As many know, I have long worked with these outside groups and with
industry to make sure that where Congress acts with respect to
technology, it does so in a way that is thoughtful, intelligent, and
shows a strong respect for privacy and civil liberties.
I am a firm believer that Congress can craft legislation that
addresses technology issues and allows the private sector to flourish
while also protecting the rights of Americans. This amendment seeks to
move the legislation further down that path.
To do so, this amendment carefully narrows the definitions of the key
terms in the bill--``cyberthreat information,'' ``cyberthreat
intelligence,'' ``cybersecurity purposes,'' and ``cybersecurity
systems''--and adds in three new definitions from the existing law.
Together, these new definitions ensure that companies in the private
sector can protect themselves against very real cyberthreats. At the
same time, they limit what information the private sector can identify,
obtain, and share with others, and they do so in a way that is
technology neutral so that the definitions we write into law today do
not become obsolete before the ink is dry.
Specifically, these new definitions remove language from prior
versions of the bill that could have been interpreted in broad ways.
They remove or modify definitions that could have
[[Page H2175]]
been thought to cover things that the bill did not intend to cover,
like unauthorized access to a system or network that purely involves
violations of a terms of service. These revised definitions also rely
in part on existing law to cover the appropriate set of threats to
networks and systems without being overly broad.
I would note that these definitional changes are important on their
own for the narrowing function they serve. In the view of groups like
the Center for Democracy and Technology and the Constitution Project,
this amendment represents ``important privacy improvement.''
Specifically, the change to the definitions addresses a number of key
issues raised by a variety of groups, and many in the Internet user
community. As such, these amendments move an already important bill in
an even better direction.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chairman, I rise in opposition to the
amendment, but I do not oppose the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
Poe).
Mr. POE of Texas. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Anytime the government gets involved in data sharing and data
storage, there is going to be the possibility for abuse.
I hear from my constituents in Texas and U.S. companies that they
continue to lose information to cyberattacks from abroad. Most of these
attacks come from none other than the organized crime syndicate of
China, as I call it. They steal our intellectual property, and then
they use the stolen information to compete against the United States.
We need a commonsense information-sharing system to combat the
growing threat to this way of life that we have in America. However, we
have to do it in such a way that protects our privacy and
constitutional rights of citizens.
While I believe the intent of the base bill was never to allow the
government to use information it obtained for any other purposes than
cybersecurity, I believe that the clear and simple language in Mr.
Goodlatte's amendment is necessary to make it 100 percent clear that
this is strictly prohibited.
As we remember from the 2012 NDAA debate, it's important, especially
when dealing with legislation that affects civil liberties and
constitutional rights, Congress needs to be perfectly 100 percent
clear. I believe the Goodlatte amendment does this. I urge all Members
to support it.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Madam Chairman, at this time, I am pleased to yield 1
minute to the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I want to thank the distinguished former
chairman and member, Mr. Goodlatte, for his commonsense amendment.
Again, this is working to make sure that this bill is restricted for
both information use, privacy, and civil liberties, and why the
coalition, I argue, continues to grow because of the good work of folks
like Mr. Goodlatte. It's bipartisan in nature, and I would strongly
urge the body's support for the Goodlatte amendment.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Madam Chairman, I am not aware of any other speakers
on this amendment, so I would urge my colleagues to support the
amendment. It is, as the chairman indicated and the ranking member
indicated, bipartisan legislation that will improve the underlying bill
in significant ways and protect the civil liberties of American
citizens in a more clear fashion.
I thank all of those in the Chamber and outside who contributed ideas
to help us craft this amendment and urge all of my colleagues to
support it.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia
will be postponed.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I move that the Committee do now
rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Woodall) having assumed the chair, Mrs. Capito, Acting Chair of the
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 3523) to
provide for the sharing of certain cyber threat intelligence and cyber
threat information between the intelligence community and cybersecurity
entities, and for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that
during further consideration of H.R. 3523, pursuant to House Resolution
631, amendments No. 10 and No. 5 in House Report 112 454 may be
considered out of sequence.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Michigan?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 631 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the bill,
H.R. 3523.
Will the gentlewoman from West Virginia (Mrs. Capito) kindly resume
the chair.
{time} 1630
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of
the bill (H.R. 3523) to provide for the sharing of certain cyber threat
intelligence and cyber threat information between the intelligence
community and cybersecurity entities, and for other purposes, with Mrs.
Capito (Acting Chair) in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The Acting CHAIR. When the Committee of the Whole rose earlier today,
a request for a recorded vote on amendment No. 13 printed in House
Report 112 454 by the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Goodlatte) had been
postponed.
Amendment No. 14 Offered by Mr. Turner of Ohio
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 14
printed in House Report 112 454.
Mr. TURNER of Ohio. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 15, line 7, insert ``deny access to or'' before
``degrade''.
Page 15, line 20, insert ``deny access to or'' before
``degrade''.
Page 16, line 10, insert ``deny access to or'' before
``degrade''.
Page 16, line 21, insert ``deny access to or'' before
``degrade''.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman
from Ohio (Mr. Turner) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. TURNER of Ohio. Madam Chairman, this amendment would make a
technical correction to the definition sections of this bill to ensure
that U.S. cybersecurity policies remain consistent for protections
against threats to our government and private sector networks.
This amendment will maintain consistency among this bill and other
cybersecurity policies. The terms ``deny, degrade, disrupt or destroy''
are found throughout our national cybersecurity strategy and our
guidance documents. The term ``deny'' was inadvertently omitted from
H.R. 3523. Inserting ``deny'' makes the bill consistent with other
national documents in the discussion of cybersecurity.
The increase in cybersecurity incidents led to the development of
centers like the Air Force's Cyberspace Technical Center of Excellence
at Wright Patterson Air Force base in my district in Dayton, Ohio. To
combat this growing trend in the sophistication of cyberattacks, the
Center of Technical Excellence has been turned to that focus.
The need to protect U.S. networks from denial-of-service attacks was
made clear when, for 3 weeks in 2007, Estonia was the target of a
large-scale
[[Page H2176]]
series of denial-of-service attacks against government Web sites,
banks, universities, and Estonian newspapers.
I urge all of my colleagues to support this amendment and the
underlying bill.
I yield 30 seconds to the chairman.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I want to, again, thank Mr.
Turner for this important clarification amendment and working with us
to improve the status of the bill to make sure that we are able to
protect America's networks and increases the ability for us to protect
privacy and civil liberties.
I appreciate the gentleman's good effort, and I would encourage the
House to support the Turner amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. Does any Member seek recognition in opposition?
Mr. TURNER of Ohio. Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Turner).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 15 Offered by Mr. Mulvaney
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 15
printed in House Report 112 454.
Mr. MULVANEY. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of the bill, add the following new section:
SEC. 3. SUNSET.
Effective on the date that is five years after the date of
the enactment of this Act--
(1) section 1104 of the National Security Act of 1947, as
added by section 2(a) of this Act, is repealed; and
(2) the table of contents in the first section of the
National Security Act of 1947, as amended by section 2(d) of
this Act, is amended by striking the item relating to section
1104, as added by such section 2(d).
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentleman
from South Carolina (Mr. Mulvaney) and a Member opposed each will
control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina.
Mr. MULVANEY. This amendment, ladies and gentlemen, is fairly simple
and straightforward, but it bears discussion for a few moments. It
requires the bill to expire of its own terms within 5 years. It's what
we call in this business a sunset clause. And by its own terms, if the
bill is passed, it will automatically cease to be, cease to be
enforceable after 5 years unless this body acts affirmatively to renew
it.
Generally, I think this is good policy with most things that we do in
Washington, D.C. In fact, several people say that one of the biggest
difficulties we have in this town is that we simply create laws all the
time and they never go away. So generally speaking, I think sunset
clauses are to be admired and to be encouraged.
Even more so is the case, however, when we deal with situations where
we have concerns regarding individual liberties. We've worked very,
very hard to make this bill a good bill. It is an excellent bill. I'm
proud to be a cosponsor of this bill.
But every single time that we start moving into the realm where the
government action starts to bump up against individual liberties, it's
a good idea to take a pause after this certain amount of time, in this
case 5 years, and look our hands over, look over the actual
implementation of the bill and make sure that we did exactly what we
thought that we were going to do.
Finally, I think in a case when we're dealing with technology, which
moves so very rapidly--in fact, we've written this bill as well as we
possibly could to try and deal with unanticipated development in
technology--but when you're dealing with technology that moves so
rapidly and changes so quickly, I think it's important, after a certain
period of time, again, here, 5 years, to step back, look our hands over
and make sure that things worked exactly as we thought they would.
So, for that reason, Madam Chairman, I ask that this amendment be
considered and be approved.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. Does any Member seek recognition in opposition to
the Member's amendment?
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from South
Carolina (Mr. Mulvaney).
The question was taken; and the Acting Chair announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. MULVANEY. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further
proceedings on the amendment offered by the gentleman from South
Carolina will be postponed.
Amendment No. 5 Offered by Ms. Jackson Lee of Texas
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5
printed in House Report 112 454.
Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the
desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 9, after line 5, insert the following:
``(c) Cybersecurity Operational Activity.--
``(1) In general.--In receiving information authorized to
be shared with the Federal Government under this section, the
Secretary of Homeland Security is authorized, notwithstanding
any other provision of law, to acquire, intercept, retain,
use, and disclose communications and other system traffic
that are transiting to or from or stored on Federal systems
and to deploy countermeasures with regard to such
communications and system traffic for cybersecurity purposes
provided that the Secretary certifies that--
``(A) such acquisitions, interceptions, and countermeasures
are reasonable necessary for the purpose of protection
Federal systems from cybersecurity threats;
``(B) the content of communications will be collected and
retained only when the communication is associated with known
or reasonably suspected cybersecurity threat, and
communications and system traffic will not be subject to the
operation of a countermeasure unless associated with such
threats;
``(C) information obtained pursuant to activities
authorized under this subsection will only be retained, used
or disclosed to protect Federal systems from cybersecurity
threats, mitigate against such threats, or, with the approval
of the Attorney General, for law enforcement purposes when
the information is evidence of a crime which has been, is
being, or is about to be committed; and
``(D) notice has been provided to users of Federal systems
concerning the potential for acquisition, interception,
retention, use, and disclosure of communications and other
system traffic.
``(2) Contracts.-- The Secretary may enter into contracts
or other agreements, or otherwise request and obtain the
assistance of, private entities that provide electronic
communication or cybersecurity services to acquire,
intercept, retain, use, and disclose communications and other
system traffic consistent with paragraph (1).
``(3) Privileged communications.--No otherwise privileged
communication obtained in accordance with, or in violation
of, this section shall lose its privileged character.
``(4) Policies and procedures.-- The Secretary of Homeland
Security shall establish policies and procedures that--
``(A) minimize the impact on privacy and civil liberties,
consistent with the need to protect Federal systems and
critical information infrastructure from cybersecurity
threats and mitigate cybersecurity threats;
``(B) reasonably limit the acquisition, interception,
retention, use, and disclosure of communications, records,
system traffic, or other information associated with specific
persons consistent with the need to carry out the
responsibilities of this section, including establishing a
process for the timely destruction on recognition of
communications, records, system traffic, or other information
that is acquired or intercepted pursuant to this section that
does not reasonably appear to be related to protecting
Federal systems and critical information infrastructure from
cybersecurity threats and mitigating cybersecurity threats;
``(C) include requirements to safeguard communications,
records, system traffic, or other information that can be
used to identify specific persons from unauthorized access or
acquisition; and
``(D) protect the confidentiality of disclosed
communications, records, system traffic, or other information
associated with specific persons to the greatest extent
practicable and require recipients of such information to be
informed that the communications, records, system traffic, or
other information disclosed may only be used for protecting
information systems against cybersecurity threats, mitigating
against cybersecurity threats, or law enforcement purposes
when the information is evidence of a crime that has been, is
being, or is about to be committed, as specified by the
Secretary.
Page 14, after line 24, insert the following:
``(2) Countermeasure.--The term `countermeasure' means an
automated action with defensive intent to modify or block
data packets associated with electronic or wire
communications, internet traffic, program code, or other
system traffic transiting to or from or stored on an
information system to counteract a cybersecurity threat.''.
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentlewoman
from Texas (Ms. Jackson Lee) and a
[[Page H2177]]
Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Texas.
Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. Madam Chair, let me thank you for your
courtesy. Let me thank the chairperson for his courtesy and the ranking
member for his courtesy. I was very appreciative, with the overlapping
committee work, for the courtesy of the floor. I thank you very much.
Let me hold up the Constitution and say that I believe in the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights, particularly, that protects us
against unreasonable search and seizure. And I also recognize the
bipartisan effort of this particular legislation and recognize that we
may have disagreement.
My amendment ensures that comprehensive policies and procedures are
implemented by the Department of Homeland Security to protect Federal
systems from cybersecurity threats and minimize the impact on privacy.
What it does not do is allow Homeland Security and the Justice
Department to spy on Americans.
Let me be very clear. It does not allow the infrastructure of
Homeland Security and the Justice Department to spy on Americans. I
would not adhere to that.
It is a shame that oversight of our Nation's critical infrastructure,
however, was not included in this bill. The hard work that has been
done by the Committee on Homeland Security, Mr. Lungren and Ms. Clarke,
joined with other Members, was worthy of consideration.
I understand the strictures that we're dealing with. My amendment is
designed to put in place comprehensive privacy protections in order to
prevent any gross infringement of an individual's civil liberties or
privacy rights. It allows the Department of Homeland Security to
protect Federal systems that enable air traffic controllers to operate.
Madam Chairperson, we know the climate that we live in. God has
blessed us, if I might even say that, but more importantly, the hard
work of men and women who happen to be Federal employees, that no
action has occurred on our soil since 9/11.
This amendment would allow the Department of Homeland Security to
protect Federal systems that enable air traffic controllers to operate,
that enable Congress to operate, that enable all Federal agencies to
operate.
My amendment is intentionally narrowly tailored to go after known or
reasonable threats to our Federal systems. Let me be very clear. This
is not a reflection on this legislation from the extent of hard work.
{time} 1640
I am just saying that, coming from my perspective, I would hope that
we would look at infrastructure.
I am not advocating for the bill. I am advocating for an open
discussion on this issue that certain elements have to be resolved in
dealing with the cyberthreats that we face. I've long been an advocate
for protecting the right to privacy and the civil liberties of all
Americans--that is very much a part of this amendment--but I am also
mindful of the importance of the infrastructure.
As we assess cybersecurity measures and take steps to implement
legislation, I believe we must be sure to strike the proper balance
between effective and strong security for our digital networks and
protecting the privacy of individuals as well as infrastructure that
involves transportation. I am ever mindful that we must be careful not
to go about strengthening cybersecurity at the expense of infringing on
people's privacy rights and civil liberties, which is why my amendment
is narrowly tailored and sets clear restrictions on the scope of
communications addressed and why and how that information can be used.
Our Nation's critical infrastructures are composed of public and
private institutions in the sectors of agriculture, food, water, public
health, emergency services, government, defense industrial base,
information and telecommunications, energy, transportation, banking and
finance, chemicals and hazardous materials.
I ask my colleagues to support the amendment, and I reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself 1\1/2\ minutes.
If you thought it was good for the businesses to require Facebook to
give them your passwords, you'll love this. If not, you should go
apoplectic. I think that's an awful practice on Facebook. This is
worse. I want to read just from the law. Notwithstanding any other
provision, it allows them to:
acquire, intercept, retain, use, and disclose
communications and other system traffic that are transiting
to and from or are stored on the Federal systems and to
deploy countermeasures with regard to such communications and
system traffic for cybersecurity purposes.
This is dangerous. It's dangerous. For the very narrow bill that has
been misrepresented from what we do, this is Big Brother on steroids.
We cannot allow this to happen. This would be the government tracking
communications or your medical records from the veterans' association.
It would track your IRS forms coming in and out of the Federal
Government. This is exactly what scares people about trying to get into
the business of making sure we protect our networks, but we can't do it
by trampling on privacy and civil liberties.
This is awful. I am just shocked, after all of this debate and all of
this discussion on our very narrow bill, that my friends would come up
with something that wholesale monitors the Internet and gets all of the
information which we've fought so hard to protect on behalf of average
Americans.
I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Westmoreland).
Mr. WESTMORELAND. I want to thank the chairman for yielding.
Let me say this to my colleague from Texas: that we have had a number
of amendments here today that have tried to streamline this bill in
order to make it even narrower and to take out any perception that it
would be personal information and limit what government can do and be
very explicit in the terms of what this sharing is, which is voluntary,
which is narrowly drawn.
The chairman and the ranking member have done a wonderful job of
working with other Members to allow these amendments to make this bill
better. I am very disappointed. This amendment basically guts the
bill--it expands it--when everybody who has been down here so far has
been trying to narrow it. This just expands it even more. This is the
type of amendment that people fear in that we would give Homeland
Security the ability to intercept and keep the transmissions. That is
totally out of hand.
I just hope that we will vote against this amendment and support the
underlying bill.
Ms. JACKSON LEE of Texas. What an exaggeration. I know that they have
been propelled by all of the media that has given them great support.
They know that the underlying bill, in fact, is considered an
invasion of privacy; but if you look at my amendment, it is only when
the communication is associated with a known or a reasonably suspected
cybersecurity threat. It is narrow, but more importantly, it has a
privacy provision. I believe in privacy. Let me just say that I was not
going to be denied the right to come to the floor to be able to frame
what we should be doing--looking at infrastructure and the complement
of making sure that privacy is protected.
This particular book, even with the amendments they have, will
probably not draw this to the point of acceptance. So I would argue
that this is a productive debate but that the amendment that Jackson
Lee has submitted does not, in fact, at all violate privacy. I would
say to them that I look forward to being able to address this question
as we go forward.
I am going to ask, at this time, unanimous consent to withdraw this
amendment for the misinterpretation that my friends on the other side
of the aisle have predicted or thought that they were going to put on
this particular amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the amendment is withdrawn.
There was no objection.
Amendment No. 10 Offered by Ms. Richardson
The Acting CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 10
printed in House Report 112 454.
[[Page H2178]]
Ms. RICHARDSON. Madam Chairwoman, I have an amendment at the desk.
The Acting CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 14, after line 6, insert the following new
subparagraph:
``(C) prohibit a department or agency of the Federal
Government from providing cyber threat information to owners
and operators of critical infrastructure;
The Acting CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 631, the gentlewoman
from California (Ms. Richardson) and a Member opposed each will control
5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. RICHARDSON. I stand today in support of the Richardson amendment
to H.R. 3523; but I would like to take a moment to thank the majority
leader, Mr. Cantor, Chairman Rogers, and Ranking Member Ruppersberger
for their tolerance in allowing us to come to the floor. I was ranking
member of a committee that was in operation at this time, and I thank
you for allowing us to come forward.
The Richardson amendment ensures that owners and operators of
critical infrastructure systems that are potential targets to
cyberattacks receive information about cyberthreats. Some examples of
our critical infrastructure systems that this amendment would apply to
are: energy facilities, banking and finance facilities, chemical
facilities, dams, nuclear plants, emergency services, agriculture and
food systems, water treatment systems. Many of these would be in great
danger and would need information.
Every single Member of Congress has critical infrastructure sectors
in their districts, whether they be public or private, and every
community in this Nation has some critical infrastructure presence that
should be protected and advised of threats. In my district, I have the
Home Depot Athletic Center, which holds up to 27,000 people. There is
the Boeing Company, which manufactures the C 17 planes. There is the
Long Beach Police and Fire Department EOC center, the Long Beach Gas
and Oil Department, and water treatment facilities. The numbers go on.
We need to make sure that not only ports and government facilities but
also private facilities are approved and entitled to have this same
information.
Some inherent complications are that there are 18 different Federal
Government agencies that have jurisdiction over critical infrastructure
sectors. For example, the Department of Homeland Security has
jurisdiction over chemical, commercial facilities, dams, emergency
services, and nuclear power alone.
H.R. 3523, as currently drafted, does not mention how critical
infrastructure sectors that do not fall within the jurisdiction of
government intelligence agencies would receive critical cyberthreat
information or have the systems in place to share information
appropriately. This amendment makes an important improvement to that
legislation.
I would like to commend Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member
Ruppersberger, who mentioned in their testimony before the Rules
Committee and the Intelligence Committee that there was a key fault
here in this critical infrastructure section. I am further pleased that
the Rules Committee acknowledged that by finding this amendment in
order, and I urge my colleagues to consider this seriously.
While Chairman Lungren's original cyber bill did not make it to the
House floor, I offer this Richardson amendment in the same bipartisan
spirit that I did when his bill was brought forward in our
subcommittee. Mr. Lungren and Mr. Langevin spoke earlier on the
bipartisan amendment regarding critical infrastructure, hence my
building my comments on that.
Richardson amendment No. 10 ensures that our critical infrastructure
sectors will not be left out from receiving information that could
protect their systems against a terrorist attack.
{time} 1650
This amendment makes sure that industries most at risk of a
cyberattack receive information that they need to protect the public
and the facilities at large. My amendment makes explicit that critical
infrastructure sectors be included in information-sharing relationships
and does not include any new Federal authorities.
With that, Madam Chairwoman, I urge my colleagues to support the
amendment.
Mr. ROGERS from Michigan. Madam Chair, I rise in opposition to the
amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I appreciate the gentlelady's effort. Again,
we were pretty careful in this year-long process of trying to find a
very narrow solution because of all of the challenges that come with
trying to get a piece of legislation across the House to the Senate to
the President's desk.
I argue that the Homeland Security Committee should engage in a
critical infrastructure debate. Here's the problem: it's not defined
for the purposes of this bill. So we don't know what that means. We've
been very careful to separate the government from the private sector.
There is no government involvement in the private sector networks. It
is just information, malicious source code-sharing. That's it.
This, we're not sure where it goes. Many in industry believe that
they're talking about the backbone of the Internet. Are they talking
about the backbone of the Internet? We don't know. It's not well
defined. That would mean, then, that the government for the first time
gets into the backbone of the Internet. I think that's a horrible,
terrible idea.
So I don't think that's what the gentlelady intends, but the problem
is that's not what the language says.
I look forward to working with the gentlelady as she works through
those issues on Homeland Security because these are hard. They are
tricky. Sometimes a word will get you in trouble, as we have found
along the path here, and as it should. We should be really careful
about how we're doing this.
So I would encourage the gentlelady to work with us. I know Mr.
Ruppersberger, since we've been through this, we can provide some help
along the way, and we look forward to the product that you all work on
that is geared toward the infrastructure piece. Again, this was never
intended to solve all the problems. It was intended to be a very narrow
first step to say, Hey, if your house is being robbed, we want to tell
you before the robber gets there. That's all this bill does. It tells
if your computer is going to get hacked and your personal information
stolen, we want you to have the malicious code so you can protect
yourself. That's all this bill does.
So we get a little nervous when it starts crossing that divide that
we've established between the government and the private sector. You
start crossing that divide, we think you can get into some serious
trouble in a hurry without very clearly defined language and
definition.
Unfortunately, I have to oppose the amendment, but I look forward to
working with the gentlelady on a very important issue, infrastructure
protection, as the Homeland Security does its work.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. As we said before, our bill is extremely limited,
and we're attempting again to allow our government, our intelligence
community, to give the information that's necessary to protect our
citizens from these cyberattacks.
Ours is the most active bill that is out there now. Our bill,
hopefully, will pass and go to the Senate, and there will be a lot more
negotiation. But there is a lot of work to do in other areas, too, such
as Homeland Security; and I know there are other issues involved in the
Homeland Security markup, I know that there are issues involving
Judiciary.
I can say this: I know that the chairman and I for 1 year now have
worked very openly with every group that we think would be involved in
this bill. Because of different positions taken, including HLU, we
listened. This bill is better, and we hope that it passes.
So we clearly will work with you, but we on the Intelligence
Committee are very limited to our jurisdiction, and that's why a lot of
these issues we can't deal with other than what is in our bill right
now.
[[Page H2179]]
I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Ms. RICHARDSON. Again, I'd like to thank both the chairman and the
ranking member and look forward to the opportunity to work with you.
I would just give you one analogy to consider as we move forward. As
you recall on 9/11 when the planes hit those two Twin Towers, the
government had the ability to notify the private airlines to scramble
the planes and to demand that all of the planes would be landed because
we didn't know where they were going to go.
At that point, the government had the ability to work with the
private sector, with the airline industry, to communicate information
that they were now becoming aware of.
I'm certainly not suggesting that we interfere with the free-flowing
ideas of the Internet. What this amendment is suggesting, and I look
forward to working with you in the future, is that the government does
have the ability if in the event something happens with dropping some
chemicals into water, for example, treatment facilities, that the
government should certainly have the ability to work with those private
sector companies to be able to notify them and ensure that the public
is protected.
I thank you for hearing the amendment, and I look forward to working
with you going forward.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I thank the gentlelady, and I look forward to
that opportunity.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Richardson).
The amendment was rejected.
Announcement by the Acting Chair
The Acting CHAIR. The Chair understands that amendment No. 16 will
not be offered.
Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, proceedings will now resume on
those amendments printed in House Report 112 454 on which further
proceedings were postponed, in the following order:
Amendment No. 1 by Mr. Langevin of Rhode Island.
Amendment No. 4 by Mr. Rogers of Michigan.
Amendment No. 6 by Mr. Quayle of Arizona.
Amendment No. 7 by Mr. Amash of Michigan.
Amendment No. 8 by Mr. Mulvaney of South Carolina.
Amendment No. 13 by Mr. Goodlatte of Virginia.
Amendment No. 15 by Mr. Mulvaney of South Carolina.
The Chair will reduce to 2 minutes the minimum time for any
electronic vote after the first vote in this series.
Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Langevin
The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Rhode
Island (Mr. Langevin) on which further proceedings were postponed and
on which the noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
Recorded Vote
The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 167,
noes 243, not voting 21, as follows:
[Roll No. 184]
AYES--167
Ackerman
Andrews
Baldwin
Bass (CA)
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bonamici
Boren
Boswell
Brady (TX)
Braley (IA)
Brown (FL)
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Carnahan
Carney
Carson (IN)
Castor (FL)
Chandler
Chu
Cicilline
Clarke (MI)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coffman (CO)
Cohen
Connolly (VA)
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Critz
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Dent
Deutch
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle
Edwards
Ellison
Engel
Farr
Fattah
Frank (MA)
Fudge
Garamendi
Gibson
Gonzalez
Green, Al
Grijalva
Grimm
Gutierrez
Hahn
Hanabusa
Hastings (FL)
Heinrich
Higgins
Himes
Hinchey
Hochul
Holt
Honda
Hoyer
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson Lee (TX)
Johnson, E. B.
Kaptur
Keating
Kildee
Kind
King (NY)
Kissell
Kucinich
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee (CA)
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lujan
Lungren, Daniel E.
Lynch
Markey
Matsui
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
Meehan
Meeks
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Moore
Moran
Nadler
Neal
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Pingree (ME)
Polis
Price (NC)
Quigley
Reyes
Richardson
Richmond
Rothman (NJ)
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sewell
Shuler
Smith (WA)
Speier
Stark
Sutton
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tierney
Tonko
Towns
Tsongas
Turner (NY)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Wilson (FL)
Woodall
Woolsey
Yarmuth
NOES--243
Adams
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Altmire
Amash
Amodei
Austria
Baca
Bachmann
Bachus
Barletta
Barrow
Bartlett
Barton (TX)
Bass (NH)
Benishek
Berg
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Bonner
Bono Mack
Boustany
Brady (PA)
Brooks
Broun (GA)
Buchanan
Buerkle
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Capito
Carter
Cassidy
Chabot
Chaffetz
Coble
Cole
Conaway
Costello
Courtney
Cravaack
Crawford
Crenshaw
Crowley
Culberson
Denham
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Dold
Donnelly (IN)
Dreier
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Ellmers
Emerson
Eshoo
Farenthold
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Flake
Fleischmann
Fleming
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Gardner
Garrett
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gingrey (GA)
Gohmert
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (MO)
Green, Gene
Griffin (AR)
Griffith (VA)
Guinta
Guthrie
Hall
Hanna
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Heck
Hensarling
Herger
Herrera Beutler
Hinojosa
Huelskamp
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurt
Issa
Jenkins
Johnson (IL)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Jordan
Kelly
King (IA)
Kingston
Kinzinger (IL)
Kline
Labrador
Lamborn
Lance
Landry
Lankford
Latham
LaTourette
Latta
Lewis (CA)
LoBiondo
Long
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lummis
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
Matheson
McCarthy (CA)
McCarthy (NY)
McCaul
McClintock
McCotter
McKeon
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Mulvaney
Murphy (PA)
Myrick
Napolitano
Neugebauer
Noem
Nugent
Nunes
Nunnelee
Olson
Palazzo
Paulsen
Pearce
Peterson
Petri
Pitts
Platts
Poe (TX)
Pompeo
Posey
Price (GA)
Quayle
Rahall
Reed
Rehberg
Reichert
Renacci
Ribble
Rigell
Rivera
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross (AR)
Ross (FL)
Royce
Runyan
Ryan (WI)
Scalise
Schilling
Schmidt
Schock
Schrader
Schweikert
Scott (SC)
Scott, Austin
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Southerland
Stearns
Stivers
Stutzman
Sullivan
Terry
Thompson (PA)
Tiberi
Tipton
Turner (OH)
Upton
Walberg
Walden
Walsh (IL)
Webster
Welch
West
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wolf
Womack
Yoder
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Young (IN)
NOT VOTING--21
Blumenauer
Bucshon
Canseco
Cantor
Cardoza
Clarke (NY)
Davis (KY)
Filner
Hirono
Holden
Johnson (GA)
Maloney
Marino
McHenry
Murphy (CT)
Paul
Pence
Rangel
Scott, David
Sires
Slaughter
{time} 1723
Messrs. ALEXANDER, COSTELLO, DUNCAN of South Carolina, REHBERG,
COURTNEY and PEARCE changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. BRADY of Texas, Ms. SEWELL, Ms. LORETTA SANCHEZ of California,
Mr. CONYERS, Ms. WATERS, Ms. McCOLLUM and Ms. PINGREE of Maine changed
their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chair, on rollcall 184, I was away from the Capitol
due to prior commitments to my constituents. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``aye.''
[[Page H2180]]
Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan
The Acting CHAIR (Mr. Chaffetz). The unfinished business is the
demand for a recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) on which further proceedings were postponed
and on which the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
Recorded Vote
The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The Acting CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 412,
noes 0, not voting 19, as follows:
[Roll No. 185]
AYES--412
Ackerman
Adams
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Altmire
Amash
Amodei
Andrews
Austria
Baca
Bachmann
Bachus
Baldwin
Barletta
Barrow
Bartlett
Barton (TX)
Bass (CA)
Bass (NH)
Becerra
Benishek
Berg
Berkley
Berman
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Bonamici
Bonner
Bono Mack
Boren
Boswell
Boustany
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Braley (IA)
Brooks
Broun (GA)
Brown (FL)
Buchanan
Buerkle
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson (IN)
Carter
Cassidy
Castor (FL)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Chandler
Chu
Cicilline
Clarke (MI)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Coffman (CO)
Cohen
Cole
Conaway
Connolly (VA)
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cravaack
Crawford
Crenshaw
Critz
Crowley
Cuellar
Culberson
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Denham
Dent
DesJarlais
Deutch
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dold
Donnelly (IN)
Doyle
Dreier
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Edwards
Ellison
Ellmers
Emerson
Engel
Eshoo
Farenthold
Farr
Fattah
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Flake
Fleischmann
Fleming
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Fudge
Gallegly
Garamendi
Gardner
Garrett
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gibson
Gingrey (GA)
Gohmert
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (MO)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Griffin (AR)
Griffith (VA)
Grijalva
Grimm
Guinta
Guthrie
Gutierrez
Hahn
Hall
Hanabusa
Hanna
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Heck
Heinrich
Hensarling
Herger
Herrera Beutler
Higgins
Himes
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hochul
Holt
Honda
Hoyer
Huelskamp
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurt
Israel
Issa
Jackson (IL)
Jackson Lee (TX)
Jenkins
Johnson (IL)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Jordan
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly
Kildee
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kinzinger (IL)
Kissell
Kline
Kucinich
Labrador
Lamborn
Lance
Langevin
Lankford
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Latta
Lee (CA)
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Long
Lowey
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan
Lummis
Lungren, Daniel E.
Lynch
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
Markey
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (CA)
McCarthy (NY)
McCaul
McClintock
McCollum
McCotter
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
Meehan
Meeks
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Moore
Moran
Mulvaney
Murphy (CT)
Murphy (PA)
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Neugebauer
Noem
Nugent
Nunes
Nunnelee
Olson
Olver
Owens
Palazzo
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Paulsen
Pearce
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Petri
Pingree (ME)
Pitts
Platts
Poe (TX)
Polis
Pompeo
Posey
Price (GA)
Price (NC)
Quayle
Quigley
Rahall
Reed
Rehberg
Reichert
Renacci
Reyes
Ribble
Richardson
Richmond
Rigell
Rivera
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross (AR)
Ross (FL)
Rothman (NJ)
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Runyan
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Scalise
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schilling
Schmidt
Schock
Schwartz
Schweikert
Scott (SC)
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Sewell
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuler
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Southerland
Speier
Stark
Stearns
Stivers
Stutzman
Sullivan
Sutton
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tierney
Tipton
Tonko
Towns
Tsongas
Turner (NY)
Turner (OH)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walberg
Walden
Walsh (IL)
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Webster
Welch
West
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (FL)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wolf
Womack
Woodall
Woolsey
Yarmuth
Yoder
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Young (IN)
NOT VOTING--19
Blumenauer
Bucshon
Canseco
Clarke (NY)
Davis (KY)
Filner
Hirono
Holden
Johnson (GA)
Landry
Maloney
Marino
McHenry
Paul
Pence
Rangel
Schrader
Sires
Slaughter
{time} 1727
Mr. CUMMINGS changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chair, on rollcall No. 185, I was away from the
Capitol due to prior commitments to my constituents. Had I been
present, I would have voted ``aye.''
Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Quayle
The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Arizona
(Mr. Quayle) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which
the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
Recorded Vote
The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The Acting CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 410,
noes 3, not voting 18, as follows:
[Roll No. 186]
AYES--410
Ackerman
Adams
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Altmire
Amash
Amodei
Andrews
Austria
Baca
Bachmann
Bachus
Baldwin
Barletta
Barrow
Bartlett
Barton (TX)
Bass (CA)
Bass (NH)
Becerra
Benishek
Berg
Berkley
Berman
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Bonamici
Bonner
Bono Mack
Boren
Boswell
Boustany
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Braley (IA)
Brooks
Broun (GA)
Brown (FL)
Buchanan
Buerkle
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson (IN)
Carter
Cassidy
Castor (FL)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Chandler
Chu
Cicilline
Clarke (MI)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Coffman (CO)
Cohen
Cole
Conaway
Connolly (VA)
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cravaack
Crawford
Crenshaw
Critz
Crowley
Cuellar
Culberson
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Denham
Dent
DesJarlais
Deutch
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dold
Donnelly (IN)
Doyle
Dreier
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Edwards
Ellison
Ellmers
Emerson
Engel
Eshoo
Farenthold
Farr
Fattah
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Flake
Fleischmann
Fleming
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Fudge
Gallegly
Garamendi
Gardner
Garrett
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gibson
Gingrey (GA)
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (MO)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Griffin (AR)
Griffith (VA)
Grijalva
Grimm
Guinta
Guthrie
Gutierrez
Hahn
Hall
Hanabusa
Hanna
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Heck
Heinrich
Hensarling
Herger
Herrera Beutler
Higgins
Himes
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hochul
Holt
Honda
Hoyer
Huelskamp
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurt
Israel
Issa
Jackson (IL)
Jackson Lee (TX)
Jenkins
Johnson (IL)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Jordan
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly
Kildee
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kinzinger (IL)
Kissell
Kline
Kucinich
Labrador
Lamborn
Lance
Landry
Langevin
Lankford
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Latta
[[Page H2181]]
Lee (CA)
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Long
Lowey
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan
Lummis
Lungren, Daniel E.
Lynch
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
Markey
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (CA)
McCarthy (NY)
McCaul
McCollum
McCotter
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
Meehan
Meeks
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Moore
Moran
Mulvaney
Murphy (CT)
Murphy (PA)
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Neugebauer
Noem
Nugent
Nunes
Nunnelee
Olson
Olver
Owens
Palazzo
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Paulsen
Pearce
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Petri
Pingree (ME)
Pitts
Platts
Poe (TX)
Polis
Pompeo
Posey
Price (GA)
Price (NC)
Quayle
Quigley
Rahall
Reed
Rehberg
Reichert
Renacci
Reyes
Ribble
Richardson
Richmond
Rigell
Rivera
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross (AR)
Ross (FL)
Rothman (NJ)
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Runyan
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Scalise
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schilling
Schmidt
Schock
Schwartz
Schweikert
Scott (SC)
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Sewell
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuler
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Southerland
Speier
Stark
Stearns
Stivers
Stutzman
Sutton
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tierney
Tipton
Tonko
Towns
Tsongas
Turner (NY)
Turner (OH)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walberg
Walden
Walsh (IL)
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Webster
Welch
West
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (FL)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wolf
Womack
Woodall
Woolsey
Yarmuth
Yoder
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Young (IN)
NOES--3
Gohmert
Lofgren, Zoe
McClintock
NOT VOTING--18
Blumenauer
Bucshon
Canseco
Davis (KY)
Filner
Hirono
Holden
Johnson (GA)
Maloney
Marino
McHenry
Paul
Pence
Rangel
Schrader
Sires
Slaughter
Sullivan
{time} 1731
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chair, on rollcall 186, I was away from the Capitol
due to prior commitments to my constituents. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``aye.''
Amendment No. 7 Offered by Amash
The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan
(Mr. Amash) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which
the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
Recorded Vote
The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The Acting CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 415,
noes 0, not voting 16, as follows:
[Roll No. 187]
AYES--415
Ackerman
Adams
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Altmire
Amash
Amodei
Andrews
Austria
Baca
Bachmann
Bachus
Baldwin
Barletta
Barrow
Bartlett
Barton (TX)
Bass (CA)
Bass (NH)
Becerra
Benishek
Berg
Berkley
Berman
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Bonamici
Bonner
Bono Mack
Boren
Boswell
Boustany
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Braley (IA)
Brooks
Broun (GA)
Brown (FL)
Buchanan
Buerkle
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson (IN)
Carter
Cassidy
Castor (FL)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Chandler
Chu
Cicilline
Clarke (MI)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Coffman (CO)
Cohen
Cole
Conaway
Connolly (VA)
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cravaack
Crawford
Crenshaw
Critz
Crowley
Cuellar
Culberson
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Denham
Dent
DesJarlais
Deutch
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dold
Donnelly (IN)
Doyle
Dreier
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Edwards
Ellison
Ellmers
Emerson
Engel
Eshoo
Farenthold
Farr
Fattah
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Flake
Fleischmann
Fleming
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Fudge
Gallegly
Garamendi
Gardner
Garrett
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gibson
Gingrey (GA)
Gohmert
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (MO)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Griffin (AR)
Griffith (VA)
Grijalva
Grimm
Guinta
Guthrie
Gutierrez
Hahn
Hall
Hanabusa
Hanna
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Heck
Heinrich
Hensarling
Herger
Herrera Beutler
Higgins
Himes
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hochul
Holt
Honda
Hoyer
Huelskamp
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurt
Israel
Issa
Jackson (IL)
Jackson Lee (TX)
Jenkins
Johnson (IL)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Jordan
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly
Kildee
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kinzinger (IL)
Kissell
Kline
Kucinich
Labrador
Lamborn
Lance
Landry
Langevin
Lankford
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Latta
Lee (CA)
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Long
Lowey
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan
Lummis
Lungren, Daniel E.
Lynch
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
Markey
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (CA)
McCarthy (NY)
McCaul
McClintock
McCollum
McCotter
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
Meehan
Meeks
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Moore
Moran
Mulvaney
Murphy (CT)
Murphy (PA)
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Neugebauer
Noem
Nugent
Nunes
Nunnelee
Olson
Olver
Owens
Palazzo
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Paulsen
Pearce
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Petri
Pingree (ME)
Pitts
Platts
Poe (TX)
Polis
Pompeo
Posey
Price (GA)
Price (NC)
Quayle
Quigley
Rahall
Reed
Rehberg
Reichert
Renacci
Reyes
Ribble
Richardson
Richmond
Rigell
Rivera
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross (AR)
Ross (FL)
Rothman (NJ)
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Runyan
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Scalise
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schilling
Schmidt
Schock
Schrader
Schwartz
Schweikert
Scott (SC)
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Sewell
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuler
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Southerland
Speier
Stark
Stearns
Stivers
Stutzman
Sullivan
Sutton
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tierney
Tipton
Tonko
Towns
Tsongas
Turner (NY)
Turner (OH)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walberg
Walden
Walsh (IL)
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Webster
Welch
West
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (FL)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wolf
Womack
Woodall
Woolsey
Yarmuth
Yoder
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Young (IN)
NOT VOTING--16
Blumenauer
Bucshon
Canseco
Davis (KY)
Filner
Hirono
Holden
Johnson (GA)
Maloney
Marino
McHenry
Paul
Pence
Rangel
Sires
Slaughter
{time} 1736
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chair, on rollcall 187, I was away from the Capitol
due to prior commitments to my constituents. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``aye.''
Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Mulvaney
The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from South
Carolina (Mr. Mulvaney) on which further proceedings were postponed and
on which the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
[[Page H2182]]
Recorded Vote
The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The Acting CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 416,
noes 0, not voting 15, as follows:
[Roll No. 188]
AYES--416
Ackerman
Adams
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Altmire
Amash
Amodei
Andrews
Austria
Baca
Bachmann
Bachus
Baldwin
Barletta
Barrow
Bartlett
Barton (TX)
Bass (CA)
Bass (NH)
Becerra
Benishek
Berg
Berkley
Berman
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Bonamici
Bonner
Bono Mack
Boren
Boswell
Boustany
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Braley (IA)
Brooks
Broun (GA)
Brown (FL)
Buchanan
Buerkle
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson (IN)
Carter
Cassidy
Castor (FL)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Chandler
Chu
Cicilline
Clarke (MI)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Coffman (CO)
Cohen
Cole
Conaway
Connolly (VA)
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cravaack
Crawford
Crenshaw
Critz
Crowley
Cuellar
Culberson
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Denham
Dent
DesJarlais
Deutch
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dold
Donnelly (IN)
Doyle
Dreier
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Edwards
Ellison
Ellmers
Emerson
Engel
Eshoo
Farenthold
Farr
Fattah
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Flake
Fleischmann
Fleming
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Fudge
Gallegly
Garamendi
Gardner
Garrett
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gibson
Gingrey (GA)
Gohmert
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (MO)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Griffin (AR)
Griffith (VA)
Grijalva
Grimm
Guinta
Guthrie
Gutierrez
Hahn
Hall
Hanabusa
Hanna
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Heck
Heinrich
Hensarling
Herger
Herrera Beutler
Higgins
Himes
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hochul
Holt
Honda
Hoyer
Huelskamp
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurt
Israel
Issa
Jackson (IL)
Jackson Lee (TX)
Jenkins
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Jordan
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly
Kildee
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kinzinger (IL)
Kissell
Kline
Kucinich
Labrador
Lamborn
Lance
Landry
Langevin
Lankford
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Latta
Lee (CA)
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Long
Lowey
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan
Lummis
Lungren, Daniel E.
Lynch
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
Markey
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (CA)
McCarthy (NY)
McCaul
McClintock
McCollum
McCotter
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
Meehan
Meeks
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Moore
Moran
Mulvaney
Murphy (CT)
Murphy (PA)
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Neugebauer
Noem
Nugent
Nunes
Nunnelee
Olson
Olver
Owens
Palazzo
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Paulsen
Pearce
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Petri
Pingree (ME)
Pitts
Platts
Poe (TX)
Polis
Pompeo
Posey
Price (GA)
Price (NC)
Quayle
Quigley
Rahall
Reed
Rehberg
Reichert
Renacci
Reyes
Ribble
Richardson
Richmond
Rigell
Rivera
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross (AR)
Ross (FL)
Rothman (NJ)
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Runyan
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Scalise
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schilling
Schmidt
Schock
Schrader
Schwartz
Schweikert
Scott (SC)
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Sewell
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuler
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Southerland
Speier
Stark
Stearns
Stivers
Stutzman
Sullivan
Sutton
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tierney
Tipton
Tonko
Towns
Tsongas
Turner (NY)
Turner (OH)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walberg
Walden
Walsh (IL)
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Webster
Welch
West
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (FL)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wolf
Womack
Woodall
Woolsey
Yarmuth
Yoder
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Young (IN)
NOT VOTING--15
Blumenauer
Bucshon
Canseco
Davis (KY)
Filner
Hirono
Holden
Maloney
Marino
McHenry
Paul
Pence
Rangel
Sires
Slaughter
{time} 1740
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chair, on rollcall 188, I was away from the Capitol
due to prior commitments to my constituents. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``aye.''
Amendment No. 13 Offered by Mr. Goodlatte
The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Virginia
(Mr. Goodlatte) on which further proceedings were postponed and on
which the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
Recorded Vote
The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The Acting CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 414,
noes 1, not voting 16, as follows:
[Roll No. 189]
AYES--414
Ackerman
Adams
Aderholt
Alexander
Altmire
Amash
Amodei
Andrews
Austria
Baca
Bachmann
Bachus
Baldwin
Barletta
Barrow
Bartlett
Barton (TX)
Bass (CA)
Bass (NH)
Becerra
Benishek
Berg
Berkley
Berman
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Bonamici
Bonner
Bono Mack
Boren
Boswell
Boustany
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Braley (IA)
Brooks
Broun (GA)
Brown (FL)
Buchanan
Buerkle
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson (IN)
Carter
Cassidy
Castor (FL)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Chandler
Chu
Cicilline
Clarke (MI)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Coffman (CO)
Cohen
Cole
Conaway
Connolly (VA)
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cravaack
Crawford
Crenshaw
Critz
Crowley
Cuellar
Culberson
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Denham
Dent
DesJarlais
Deutch
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dold
Donnelly (IN)
Doyle
Dreier
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Edwards
Ellison
Ellmers
Emerson
Engel
Eshoo
Farenthold
Farr
Fattah
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Flake
Fleischmann
Fleming
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Fudge
Gallegly
Garamendi
Gardner
Garrett
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gibson
Gingrey (GA)
Gohmert
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (MO)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Griffin (AR)
Griffith (VA)
Grijalva
Grimm
Guinta
Guthrie
Gutierrez
Hahn
Hall
Hanabusa
Hanna
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Heck
Heinrich
Hensarling
Herger
Herrera Beutler
Higgins
Himes
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hochul
Holt
Honda
Hoyer
Huelskamp
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurt
Israel
Issa
Jackson (IL)
Jackson Lee (TX)
Jenkins
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Jordan
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly
Kildee
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kinzinger (IL)
Kissell
Kline
Kucinich
Labrador
Lamborn
Lance
Landry
Langevin
Lankford
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Latta
Lee (CA)
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Long
Lowey
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan
Lummis
Lungren, Daniel E.
Lynch
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
Markey
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (CA)
McCarthy (NY)
McCaul
McClintock
McCollum
McCotter
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
Meehan
Meeks
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Moore
Moran
Mulvaney
Murphy (CT)
Murphy (PA)
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
[[Page H2183]]
Neal
Neugebauer
Noem
Nugent
Nunes
Nunnelee
Olson
Olver
Owens
Palazzo
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Paulsen
Pearce
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Petri
Pingree (ME)
Pitts
Platts
Poe (TX)
Polis
Pompeo
Posey
Price (GA)
Price (NC)
Quayle
Quigley
Rahall
Reed
Rehberg
Reichert
Renacci
Reyes
Ribble
Richardson
Richmond
Rigell
Rivera
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross (AR)
Ross (FL)
Rothman (NJ)
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Runyan
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Scalise
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schilling
Schmidt
Schock
Schrader
Schwartz
Schweikert
Scott (SC)
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Sewell
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuler
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Southerland
Speier
Stark
Stearns
Stivers
Stutzman
Sullivan
Sutton
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tierney
Tipton
Tonko
Towns
Tsongas
Turner (NY)
Turner (OH)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walberg
Walden
Walsh (IL)
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Webster
Welch
West
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (FL)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wolf
Womack
Woodall
Woolsey
Yarmuth
Yoder
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Young (IN)
NOES--1
Lofgren, Zoe
NOT VOTING--16
Akin
Blumenauer
Bucshon
Canseco
Davis (KY)
Filner
Hirono
Holden
Maloney
Marino
McHenry
Paul
Pence
Rangel
Sires
Slaughter
{time} 1744
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chair, on rollcall 189, I was away from the Capitol
due to prior commitments to my constituents. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``aye.''
Amendment No. 15 Offered by Mr. Mulvaney
The Acting CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a
recorded vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from South
Carolina (Mr. Mulvaney) on which further proceedings were postponed and
on which the ayes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
Recorded Vote
The Acting CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The Acting CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 413,
noes 3, not voting 15, as follows:
[Roll No. 190]
AYES--413
Ackerman
Adams
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Altmire
Amash
Amodei
Andrews
Austria
Baca
Bachmann
Bachus
Baldwin
Barletta
Barrow
Bartlett
Barton (TX)
Bass (CA)
Bass (NH)
Becerra
Benishek
Berg
Berkley
Berman
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Bonamici
Bonner
Bono Mack
Boren
Boswell
Boustany
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Braley (IA)
Brooks
Broun (GA)
Brown (FL)
Buchanan
Buerkle
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson (IN)
Carter
Cassidy
Castor (FL)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Chandler
Chu
Cicilline
Clarke (MI)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Coffman (CO)
Cohen
Cole
Conaway
Connolly (VA)
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cravaack
Crawford
Crenshaw
Critz
Crowley
Cuellar
Culberson
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Denham
Dent
DesJarlais
Deutch
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Doggett
Dold
Donnelly (IN)
Doyle
Dreier
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Edwards
Ellison
Ellmers
Emerson
Engel
Eshoo
Farenthold
Farr
Fattah
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Flake
Fleischmann
Fleming
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Fudge
Gallegly
Garamendi
Gardner
Garrett
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gibson
Gingrey (GA)
Gohmert
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (MO)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Griffin (AR)
Griffith (VA)
Grijalva
Grimm
Guinta
Guthrie
Gutierrez
Hahn
Hall
Hanabusa
Hanna
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Heck
Heinrich
Hensarling
Herger
Herrera Beutler
Higgins
Himes
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hochul
Holt
Honda
Hoyer
Huelskamp
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurt
Israel
Issa
Jackson (IL)
Jackson Lee (TX)
Jenkins
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Jordan
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly
Kildee
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kinzinger (IL)
Kissell
Kline
Kucinich
Labrador
Lamborn
Lance
Landry
Langevin
Lankford
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Latta
Lee (CA)
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Long
Lowey
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan
Lummis
Lungren, Daniel E.
Lynch
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
Markey
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (CA)
McCarthy (NY)
McCaul
McClintock
McCollum
McCotter
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
Meehan
Meeks
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Miller, George
Moore
Moran
Mulvaney
Murphy (CT)
Murphy (PA)
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Neugebauer
Noem
Nugent
Nunes
Nunnelee
Olson
Olver
Owens
Palazzo
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Paulsen
Pearce
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Petri
Pingree (ME)
Pitts
Platts
Poe (TX)
Polis
Pompeo
Posey
Price (GA)
Price (NC)
Quayle
Quigley
Rahall
Reed
Rehberg
Reichert
Renacci
Reyes
Ribble
Richardson
Richmond
Rigell
Rivera
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross (AR)
Ross (FL)
Rothman (NJ)
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Runyan
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Scalise
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schilling
Schmidt
Schock
Schwartz
Schweikert
Scott (SC)
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Sewell
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuler
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Southerland
Speier
Stark
Stearns
Stivers
Stutzman
Sullivan
Sutton
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tierney
Tipton
Tonko
Towns
Tsongas
Turner (OH)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walberg
Walden
Walsh (IL)
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Webster
Welch
West
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (FL)
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wolf
Womack
Woodall
Woolsey
Yarmuth
Yoder
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Young (IN)
NOES--3
Dingell
Schrader
Turner (NY)
NOT VOTING--15
Blumenauer
Bucshon
Canseco
Davis (KY)
Filner
Hirono
Holden
Maloney
Marino
McHenry
Paul
Pence
Rangel
Sires
Slaughter
{time} 1747
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Chair, on rollcall 190, I was away from the Capitol
due to prior commitments to my constituents. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``aye.''
The Acting CHAIR. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a
substitute, as amended.
The amendment was agreed to.
The Acting CHAIR. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Woodall) having assumed the chair, Mr. Chaffetz, Acting Chair of the
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 3523) to
provide for the sharing of certain cyber threat intelligence and cyber
threat information between the intelligence community and cybersecurity
entities, and for other purposes, and, pursuant to House Resolution
631, he reported the bill back to the House with an amendment adopted
in the Committee of the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
[[Page H2184]]
Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the amendment
reported from the Committee of the Whole?
If not, the question is on the amendment in the nature of a
substitute, as amended.
The amendment was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
Motion to Recommit
Mr. PERLMUTTER. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to recommit at the desk.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
Mr. PERLMUTTER. In its current form, I am.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. Perlmutter moves to recommit the bill, H.R. 3523, to
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence with
instructions to report the same back to the House forthwith
with the following amendments:
At the end of the bill, add the following new section:
SEC. 3. PROTECTING THE PRIVACY OF INTERNET PASSWORDS AND THE
CREATIVITY OF THE INTERNET.
Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act
shall be construed to--
(1) permit an employer, a prospective employer, or the
Federal Government to require the disclosure of a
confidential password for a social networking website or a
personal account of an employee or job applicant without a
court order; or
(2) permit the Federal Government to establish a mechanism
to control United States citizens' access to and use of the
Internet through the creation of a national Internet firewall
similar to the ``Great Internet Firewall of China'', as
determined by the Director of the National Intelligence.
Page 12, line 22, strike ``and''.
Page 12, line 25, strike the period and insert a semicolon.
Page 12, after line 25, insert the following:
``(G) the number of Americans who have--
``(i) been required by employers, prospective employers, or
the Federal Government to release confidential passwords for
social networking websites; and
``(ii) had personal information released to the Federal
Government under this section or obtained in connection with
a cybersecurity breach; and
``(H) the impact of the information that has been released
or obtained as referred to in subparagraph (G) on privacy,
electronic commerce, Internet usage, and online content.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Colorado is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. PERLMUTTER. Mr. Speaker, the House has heard this before. It's
very simple, sweet and direct, and I will take a moment and just read
it so that everybody has a chance to understand it again. What we're
doing is avoiding and prohibiting an employer, as a condition of
employment, from demanding a confidential Facebook password--Twitter,
Tumblr--or any social media of the like. It reads this way:
Nothing in this act or the amendments made by this act
shall be construed to permit an employer, a prospective
employer, or the Federal Government to require the disclosure
of a confidential password for a social networking Web site
or a personal account of an employee or job applicant without
a court order; or permit the Federal Government to establish
a mechanism to control United States citizens' access to and
use of the Internet through the creation of a national
Internet firewall, similar to the ``Great Internet Firewall
of China'', as determined by the Director of National
Intelligence.
So what this amendment does is two things. It is the final amendment
to this bill. There are no more amendments to this bill. I know some
people voted against this amendment when it was brought up a couple of
weeks ago; and for those of you who regret voting against it, you're
going to get a chance to correct that vote. This is something I've been
working on with Mr. Heinrich and Mr. McHenry. It just says we're not
going to allow as a condition of employment the requirement of a
Facebook password or the like. Now, there is a reason for this.
One, there is all sorts of personal information that I may have or
that somebody else may have with respect to Facebook or Twitter or
LinkedIn, whatever it might be; and they're entitled to have an
expectation of privacy, a sense that their freedom of speech--their
freedom to peaceably assemble, in effect--is not violated. So that's
the first reason.
The second reason is if an employer or the Federal Government poses
as somebody, by having their Facebook passwords, then they can
impersonate; they can become imposters. It is a two-way exchange of
information so that somebody who is completely unrelated to the
employment now is communicating with an impostor. That's another reason
for this.
The third reason is for the employers, themselves, to avoid liability
by learning information that may then cause them to take actions that
would violate a protected group. So there are at least three good
reasons to do this.
We have precedent in our law, and it is the Employee Polygraph
Protection Act of 1988. We said we're not going to allow as a condition
of employment the use of lie detectors. You can use background checks,
and you can use references. There are plenty of vehicles by which to
check out somebody's employment references; but we're not going to
allow lie detectors, and we should not allow that the Facebook
passwords be given up as a condition of employment. So we have
precedent in the law. We don't allow polygraphs or lie detectors as a
condition of employment. Let's use what we already have--background
checks, references, et cetera.
The second piece of this is that we will not allow the command and
control of the Internet or access to the Internet by the United States
Government, saying that which is similar: that we want to avoid what
has happened in China, that we want to avoid what has happened in Iran.
We don't want the Internet taken down and our access, individuals'
access, to the Internet broken.
So there are two pieces to this. One is not allowing the demand of a
confidential password and not allowing the government to have the
command and control and the ability to take down the Internet, an
action similar to what we've seen in other countries.
This is a very simple amendment. It's very straightforward. We've had
a lot of amendments that have garnered the support of virtually every
Member of this House. This should be one of those. This is the final
amendment. I would hope that we would uphold the Constitution by
passing this amendment, as well as by making sure that the Internet is
available to anyone who wants to use it at any time.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I rise in opposition to the motion to
recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Today, 300,000 times somebody will be trying
to get into our credit card companies--300,000 times, one company. In
just the last few years, just in defense contractors, foreign nation-
states have stolen more intellectual property, which will end up
protecting this country, equivalent to 50 times the print collection of
our U.S. Library of Congress. Anonymous is attacking businesses, and
today attacked Wall Street because they're anti-capitalists. There are
people out there today who are literally robbing the future of America
for our jobs, our prosperity, and our economic prowess in the world;
and they're doing it by design.
A year ago, we set out to try to do something small. If we have some
bad software--some bad, malicious virus information--shouldn't we be
obligated to share that with the private sector so they can protect
themselves? Absolutely.
If we don't do this, a nation-state like China has geared up its
military and intelligence services for the very purpose of economically
wounding the United States--by draining our intellectual property dry.
They have done it by stealing pesticide formulas. They have done it by
stealing pharmaceutical formulas. They have done it by stealing
intellectual property when it relates to military hardware and then
have copied it, and it has cost us a tremendous amount of more money to
have had to go back and redesign it.
{time} 1800
So we can play games. We can do silly things. This amendment actually
does nothing to protect a person's private password at home. Nothing.
Not one thing. But it is serving to try to obfuscate and maybe send it
back to committee and come back.
[[Page H2185]]
This has been a bipartisan bill, and I can't tell you how
disappointing this amendment is to me. I have worked with Mr.
Ruppersberger and the members of this committee. I have worked with the
privacy groups. We've worked with civil libertarians. They threw
everything but the kitchen sink at us. By the way, this does nothing,
or this would have been thrown at us, too. You know why? Because it
doesn't do anything. I get it. Sounds great. You're going to run out
and do some bad things with it.
But this is our Nation's defense. This is the last bastion of things
we need to do to protect this country. We've done it since 9/11. We did
Homeland Security. We've done the Patriot Act. We've done other things
that this body and the other body and the President of the United
States signed to protect this country, as our Constitution tells us to
do for the common defense of this great Nation.
I will tell you something. We can have this debate. We can talk about
a bill that does absolutely nothing to protect someone's private
password at home, or we can get about the business of trying to give
the private sector just a little bit of information to protect people's
private information in the comfort of their homes, so that we can
protect this Nation from a catastrophic attack.
The director of the national security didn't say ``maybe,'' didn't
say, ``could happen.'' They said it will happen.
This is the one small thing we get to do to prepare for a whole bunch
of folks out there that want to bring this Nation down.
We ought to stand together today in a bipartisan way. We ought to
reject all of the confusion and obfuscation and all of the things that
they're saying about this bill that just are not true. We ought to
stand here and say, We respected the fact that you kept the government
stuff government, and the private stuff private, and you're not mixing
it up, and you're not surveilling. You're doing none of those things.
You're just sharing some pretty bad information so that they can apply
it to their patches that happen on your computer every single day,
thousands of times a day, to try to keep viruses off your computer, and
that's it.
We've spent a lot of time today trying to go in a different
direction. People are upset that there aren't things in the bill. Okay.
I mean, the Buffett rule isn't in the bill. I don't think that ought to
get a veto threat either.
This is where we are. This is that first small threat.
I'm going to ask all of you to join us today. Reject this red
herring, this obfuscation, and stand with America. They need it. There
are 3 million businesses with all of the associations telling us,
Please, give us that classified secret malware information that your
government has so we can protect the people we have as customers and
clients. They're begging for it because they're getting killed every
single day. It's happening right this second.
This is our chance to stand up. This was a bipartisan effort. If you
really believe in bipartisanship, if you believe that's the future of
this Chamber, and that's the dignity of the very Founding Fathers that
gave it to us, then today is the day to prove it.
Reject this amendment, stand for America. Support this bill.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is
ordered on the motion to recommit.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Mr. PERLMUTTER. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clauses 8 and 9 of rule XX, this
15-minute vote on the motion to recommit will be followed by 5-minute
votes on passage of H.R. 3523, if ordered; and suspension of the rules
with regard to H.R. 2050, if ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 183,
nays 233, not voting 15, as follows:
[Roll No. 191]
YEAS--183
Ackerman
Altmire
Andrews
Baca
Baldwin
Barrow
Bass (CA)
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bonamici
Boren
Boswell
Brady (PA)
Braley (IA)
Brown (FL)
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson (IN)
Castor (FL)
Chandler
Chu
Cicilline
Clarke (MI)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Connolly (VA)
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Critz
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Deutch
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly (IN)
Doyle
Edwards
Ellison
Engel
Eshoo
Farr
Fattah
Frank (MA)
Fudge
Garamendi
Gonzalez
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hahn
Hanabusa
Hastings (FL)
Heinrich
Higgins
Himes
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hochul
Holt
Honda
Hoyer
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson Lee (TX)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones
Kaptur
Keating
Kildee
Kind
Kissell
Kucinich
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee (CA)
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lujan
Lynch
Markey
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
Meeks
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Moore
Moran
Murphy (CT)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Pingree (ME)
Polis
Price (NC)
Quigley
Rahall
Reyes
Richardson
Richmond
Ross (AR)
Rothman (NJ)
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schrader
Schwartz
Scott (VA)
Scott, David
Serrano
Sewell
Sherman
Shuler
Smith (WA)
Speier
Stark
Sutton
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Tonko
Towns
Tsongas
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Welch
Wilson (FL)
Woolsey
Yarmuth
NAYS--233
Adams
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Amash
Amodei
Austria
Bachmann
Bachus
Barletta
Bartlett
Barton (TX)
Bass (NH)
Benishek
Berg
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Black
Blackburn
Bonner
Bono Mack
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Brooks
Broun (GA)
Buchanan
Buerkle
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Cantor
Capito
Carter
Cassidy
Chabot
Chaffetz
Coble
Coffman (CO)
Cole
Conaway
Cravaack
Crawford
Crenshaw
Culberson
Denham
Dent
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Dold
Dreier
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Ellmers
Emerson
Farenthold
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Flake
Fleischmann
Fleming
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Gardner
Garrett
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gibson
Gingrey (GA)
Gohmert
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (MO)
Griffin (AR)
Griffith (VA)
Grimm
Guinta
Guthrie
Hall
Hanna
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Heck
Hensarling
Herger
Herrera Beutler
Huelskamp
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurt
Issa
Jenkins
Johnson (IL)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Kelly
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kinzinger (IL)
Kline
Labrador
Lamborn
Lance
Landry
Lankford
Latham
LaTourette
Latta
Lewis (CA)
LoBiondo
Long
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lummis
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul
McClintock
McCotter
McKeon
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
Meehan
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Mulvaney
Murphy (PA)
Myrick
Neugebauer
Noem
Nugent
Nunes
Nunnelee
Olson
Palazzo
Paulsen
Pearce
Petri
Pitts
Platts
Poe (TX)
Pompeo
Posey
Price (GA)
Quayle
Reed
Rehberg
Reichert
Renacci
Ribble
Rigell
Rivera
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross (FL)
Royce
Runyan
Ryan (WI)
Scalise
Schilling
Schmidt
Schock
Schweikert
Scott (SC)
Scott, Austin
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Southerland
Stearns
Stivers
Stutzman
Sullivan
Terry
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tipton
Turner (NY)
Turner (OH)
Upton
Walberg
Walden
Walsh (IL)
Webster
West
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wolf
Womack
Woodall
Yoder
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Young (IN)
NOT VOTING--15
Blumenauer
Bucshon
Canseco
Davis (KY)
Filner
Hirono
Holden
Maloney
Marino
McHenry
Paul
Pence
Rangel
Sires
Slaughter
[[Page H2186]]
{time} 1823
So the motion to recommit was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall 191, I was away from the Capitol
due to prior commitments to my constituents. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``aye.''
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 248,
noes 168, not voting 15, as follows:
[Roll No. 192]
AYES--248
Adams
Aderholt
Alexander
Altmire
Amodei
Austria
Bachmann
Bachus
Barletta
Barrow
Bartlett
Bass (NH)
Benishek
Berg
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Black
Blackburn
Bonner
Bono Mack
Boren
Boswell
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Broun (GA)
Buchanan
Buerkle
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Cantor
Capito
Cardoza
Carney
Carter
Cassidy
Castor (FL)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Chandler
Clyburn
Coble
Coffman (CO)
Cole
Conaway
Connolly (VA)
Cooper
Costa
Cravaack
Crawford
Crenshaw
Critz
Cuellar
Culberson
Denham
Dent
DesJarlais
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Dold
Donnelly (IN)
Dreier
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Ellmers
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Flake
Fleischmann
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garamendi
Gardner
Garrett
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gingrey (GA)
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Gowdy
Granger
Graves (GA)
Graves (MO)
Griffin (AR)
Griffith (VA)
Grimm
Guinta
Guthrie
Hanabusa
Hanna
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Heck
Hensarling
Herger
Herrera Beutler
Hochul
Huelskamp
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurt
Israel
Issa
Jenkins
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Kelly
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kinzinger (IL)
Kissell
Kline
Labrador
Lamborn
Lance
Langevin
Lankford
Larsen (WA)
Latham
LaTourette
Latta
Lewis (CA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Long
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lummis
Lungren, Daniel E.
Manzullo
Matheson
McCarthy (CA)
McCarthy (NY)
McCaul
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
Meehan
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran
Mulvaney
Murphy (PA)
Myrick
Neugebauer
Noem
Nugent
Nunes
Nunnelee
Olson
Owens
Palazzo
Paulsen
Peterson
Petri
Pitts
Platts
Poe (TX)
Pompeo
Price (GA)
Quayle
Reed
Reichert
Renacci
Ribble
Rivera
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rokita
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross (AR)
Ross (FL)
Royce
Runyan
Ruppersberger
Ryan (WI)
Scalise
Schilling
Schmidt
Schock
Schrader
Scott (SC)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sessions
Shimkus
Shuler
Shuster
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Southerland
Stearns
Stivers
Stutzman
Sullivan
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (PA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tipton
Towns
Turner (NY)
Turner (OH)
Upton
Walberg
Walden
Webster
West
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Wolf
Womack
Woodall
Yoder
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Young (IN)
NOES--168
Ackerman
Akin
Amash
Andrews
Baca
Baldwin
Barton (TX)
Bass (CA)
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Bishop (UT)
Bonamici
Brady (PA)
Braley (IA)
Brooks
Brown (FL)
Capps
Capuano
Carnahan
Carson (IN)
Chu
Cicilline
Clarke (MI)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Cohen
Conyers
Costello
Courtney
Crowley
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Deutch
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle
Edwards
Ellison
Emerson
Engel
Eshoo
Farenthold
Farr
Fattah
Fleming
Frank (MA)
Fudge
Gibson
Gohmert
Gosar
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hahn
Hall
Hastings (FL)
Heinrich
Higgins
Himes
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Holt
Honda
Hoyer
Jackson (IL)
Jackson Lee (TX)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones
Kaptur
Keating
Kildee
Kind
Kucinich
Landry
Larson (CT)
Lee (CA)
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lujan
Lynch
Mack
Marchant
Markey
Matsui
McClintock
McCollum
McCotter
McDermott
McGovern
McNerney
Meeks
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Moore
Murphy (CT)
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal
Olver
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Pearce
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Pingree (ME)
Polis
Posey
Price (NC)
Quigley
Rahall
Rehberg
Reyes
Richardson
Richmond
Rigell
Rohrabacher
Rothman (NJ)
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Schweikert
Scott (VA)
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sewell
Sherman
Simpson
Speier
Stark
Sutton
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Tonko
Tsongas
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walsh (IL)
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Welch
Wilson (FL)
Woolsey
Yarmuth
NOT VOTING--15
Blumenauer
Bucshon
Canseco
Davis (KY)
Filner
Hirono
Holden
Maloney
Marino
McHenry
Paul
Pence
Rangel
Sires
Slaughter
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). There are 2 minutes
remaining.
{time} 1831
Mr. HOYER changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. TIPTON changed his vote from ``no'' to aye.''
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Stated against:
Mr. FILNER. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall 192, I was away from the Capitol
due to prior commitments to my constituents. Had I been present, I
would have voted ``no.''
personal explanation
Ms. SLAUGHTER. Mr. Speaker, I was unavoidably detained and missed
rollcall vote Nos. 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191,
and 192. Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye'' on rollcall
vote Nos. 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, and 191. I would have
voted ``no'' on rollcall vote Nos. 182, 183, and 192.
____________________
