

**NOMINATION OF GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS
TO BE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY**

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 2011

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence



Available via the World Wide Web: <http://www.fdsys.gov>

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

72-743 PDF

WASHINGTON : 2012

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800
Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001

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**NOMINATION OF GENERAL DAVID H.
PETRAEUS TO BE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 2011

U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:33 p.m., in Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Rockefeller, Wyden, Mikulski, Nelson of Florida, Conrad, Udall of Colorado, Levin, Chambliss, Snowe, Burr, Risch, Blunt, Rubio, and McCain.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN,
CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA**

Chairman FEINSTEIN. The hearing will come to order.

I've just been told the Vice Chairman will be five or ten minutes late. But it's going to be a long afternoon and I think we should begin.

The Committee meets today to consider the President's nomination of General David Petraeus to be the Director of the CIA. General, welcome and congratulations on your nomination.

The way we will proceed—and I trust it's agreeable—I'll make a statement, the Vice Chairman will make a statement.

Senator Lieberman, it's my understanding you're going to introduce General Petraeus.

And then the general will speak and then we'll do our Q&A.

So, General, I'd like to recognize your wife, Holly Petraeus, who in addition to being the key behind your success, of course, is also serving the nation herself, recently becoming the Assistant Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, where she's in charge of protecting and assisting the service members.

Mrs. Petraeus, we're delighted to have you here this afternoon.

This nomination comes in the midst of a summer of significant change in the national security challenges and posture of the United States. Military and intelligence gains in Afghanistan and Pakistan have for the first time in years shifted the momentum from the Taliban and associated forces to the United States and coalition partners.

But these gains are still reversible. President Obama's announcement last night of a withdrawal this year of 10,000 of the surge troops will have an impact on operations after this summer's fight-

ing season, and I'm sure Members will want to hear your views, General, on that, as well as on the overall situation.

The death of Usama bin Laden in a CIA Intelligence operation carried out by United States special forces marks a strategic shift in our decade-long efforts against al-Qa'ida and transnational terrorist groups. But the near-term threat from retaliatory strikes has gone up.

There is unrest and revolution across the Middle East and northern Africa, affecting key allies and countries of concern alike.

At home, the nation's economic and financial struggles are requiring a new level of fiscal discipline, which means that the major increases of intelligence resources since 2001—and the CIA budget has virtually doubled in that time—will likely end and the intelligence community will have to do more with less.

In Washington, the President's national security team is changing, with Secretary Gates retiring at the end of next week, Director Panetta moving across to the Pentagon, and Ambassador Ryan Crocker likely to be confirmed soon for his posting to Afghanistan.

The CIA has been involved in or affected by all of these changes. If confirmed, General Petraeus will have the opportunity to shape the Agency's response to the new realities we now face, and our purpose today is to understand how he intends to carry out that charge.

General Petraeus is a long-time consumer of intelligence, as the top general in both Afghanistan and Iraq. He has been the combatant commander for a portion of the world where intelligence operations play a key role, and he is especially aware of the coordination between military special ops and intelligence covert actions. So he comes to this nomination with a deep familiarity of the intelligence community and of the CIA in particular.

Still, the Committee is always mindful that the CIA is by far the biggest of the civilian intelligence agencies. While the majority of our intelligence dollars are spent in the Department of Defense, the CIA is tasked to provide independent strategic assessments to the President. It is by design outside of the military chain of command and supposed to balance the need to provide intelligence to warfighters with the need to operate and make assessments globally.

To be sure, CIA directors have in the past come from a military background. I believe there are seven of them. And General Petraeus and I have discussed this privately, and he has assured me that he understands and appreciates the need for independence. And so we look forward to continuing that conversation today.

I've also asked General Petraeus to explain his vision of the CIA and will do so again today so that the Committee has some insight into his thinking.

Members of the Committee don't need an introduction to General Petraeus, but let me just give you a couple of brief highlights. He is without question one of the finest officers and military minds of his generation. He has presided over the shifting of momentum to our favor in Afghanistan and he has engineered, with other important contributing factors, a victory in Iraq when defeat often seemed inevitable.

He has demonstrated outstanding loyalty and service to this country, agreeing to step down from being the commander of CENTCOM to replace General Stanley McChrystal in Afghanistan last year.

At that time, the Senate moved in near record speed, with the Armed Services Committee holding a hearing and reporting out the General's nomination on the same day, and the Senate confirming him one day later with a 99-0 vote.

I'd note as well, and I know Senator Lieberman will do this in more detail, he's also earned a Ph.D. as well as a master's from Princeton, which I believe will serve him well.

Following the Abu Ghurayb scandal and the ensuing debate over detention and interrogation policy, General Petraeus wrote an open letter to all soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marine and Coast Guardsmen sharing under his command in Iraq. Here's what he wrote: "Our values and the laws governing warfare teach us to respect human dignity, maintain our integrity and do what is right. Adherence to our values distinguishes us from our enemy."

I fully agree. It's enormously important to have a Director of the CIA who is guided by these values and has a sense of right and wrong and not only what may or may not be possible.

Let me just say one more thing. The Senate confirmed Director Panetta to be Secretary of Defense by a vote of 100-0 on Tuesday. Even if and when confirmed, General Petraeus will not resign his commission and come to the CIA until he's able to transition the mission in Afghanistan to General Allen. So, for much of the summer the CIA will be under the acting directorship of Mike Morell, the current Deputy Director and lifelong CIA officer.

I want to state for the record that the CIA and the government is very lucky to have such a fine and capable officer at the helm during this difficult time. And I know that he will be a valuable deputy when you take office, General Petraeus.

Let me now turn to the distinguished Vice Chairman for his opening remarks.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, VICE
CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA**

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Well, thank you, Madam Chairman.

General Petraeus, I congratulate you on an exemplary military career as we consider your nomination to be the 22nd Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

I'd like to welcome your wife, Holly, as well, who has not only supported you and the military throughout your career, but has also worked to protect military families from predatory lending practices. We appreciate her being here to support you again as your nation calls on you for another challenging assignment.

Your nomination comes at a pivotal moment in our history as we face threats from across the globe. As a warfighter, you bring a unique perspective to the table, having seen firsthand the tactical value of accurate and timely intelligence.

While a key part of CIA'S tactical mission is to support the warfighter, it serves primarily as a civilian strategic collection and analytic agency. Whatever the topic, from terrorism and nuclear capabilities to the future of Afghanistan and Iraq, policymakers must

have unvarnished analytic judgments. Your job will be to make sure that the CIA delivers these.

There's growing demand for intelligence on nation-states, threats like terrorism, proliferation and cyber attacks, and for keeping a finger on the pulse of the world in as many places as possible. While often overlooked and under-resourced, this last point proved critical this year as events in the Middle East unfolded.

While all of these challenges and ones we don't yet anticipate will have your attention, the threat from terrorism will be your main focus at the CIA. The successful strike on bin Laden removed al-Qa'ida's leader, but not the threat from terrorism. In my view, AQAP in Yemen presents the biggest threat to the homeland and I urge you to make your primary focus the dismantling of that group before they are able to strike us successfully.

I would also urge you to look closely at the intelligence on the detainees held at Guantanamo. Numerous former detainees have joined AQAP and other terrorist groups. You have commented publicly that you believe it is appropriate to close Guantanamo "in a responsible manner." With a recidivism rate now over 25 percent, I'd be interested to know whether you still think that is possible and, if so, how you think it can be done responsibly.

In addition to my concerns about the transfer of dangerous detainees, it seems the focus on closing detention facilities has left us with few realistic options for detaining terrorists captured outside of Afghanistan. You and I, in fact, have had a conversation about that.

As we draw down in Afghanistan, we will have nowhere to detain terrorists. In many press stories you read that the U.S. is not trying very hard to capture terrorists. Instead, we are killing them. But we know that capturing terrorists is one of the best ways to get actionable real-time intelligence to prevent future threats.

We clearly need better-defined detention and interrogation policies. And I'll be interested in your views on this and the appropriate role for the CIA to play in these areas in the future.

You will face many other challenges in this new assignment, and I urge you to speak with Director Panetta about his experiences, practices and priorities while leading the CIA. He set some very good precedents for dealing with this Committee in an open and cooperative manner, and I hope you will continue this relationship in much the same way, and I know you will.

Director Panetta has also been a fierce advocate for the men and women of the CIA. This was evident early on when he criticized a decision by the Department of Justice to reopen the investigation of CIA employees involved in the interrogation of high-value detainees. Unfortunately, that investigation remains ongoing. I feel very strongly that years of investigating these counterterrorism professionals hurts the mission and it is, frankly, unfair and unnecessary when the career professionals in the Department of Justice in the previous administration found no reason to prosecute anyone.

I know you will stand by your employees on this issue, just as I know you stand by our military men and women under your charge today.

General, I've had the privilege of engaging you in-theater and out-of-theater on many occasions. You're the epitome, in my opinion, of what a leader should be all about, as you've done a great job of leading our men and women in uniform. I'm asked quite often, as are all of us, what do you think should happen in Afghanistan? And my first response is, "Well, whatever General Petraeus says, that's the direction in which we ought to go."

That's the kind of respect I have for you, and I look forward to a continued very close relationship as you assume the duties at the CIA.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.

It is now my privilege to recognize the Chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, the distinguished Senator from the state of Connecticut, Joe Lieberman. We're delighted to have you here, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. If you'd like to make your remarks?

**STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOE LIEBERMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT**

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Chairman Feinstein, Senator Chambliss, members of the Committee, colleagues and friends.

I am truly honored to have been asked to appear before you this afternoon to introduce President Obama's nominee to be the next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, General David Petraeus.

Madam Chair, as you indicated earlier, in a literal sense, General Petraeus needs no introduction. So I want to take just a few moments to describe what I believe Dave Petraeus has meant to our country and why I am confident he will be a superb Director of the CIA.

General David Petraeus is the most distinguished general officer of the United States armed forces of his generation. And his generation contains a number of very impressive general officers. He is a true American hero who has twice been called upon by our commander-in-chief to assume leadership of a faltering war effort, and twice he not only answered that call, but led our forces out of the jaws of defeat onto the path to victory. To my knowledge, no one else in American history shares that record with Dave Petraeus.

At a moment when cynicism too often infuses our national politics and partisanship too often affects national security, General Petraeus has won the confidence, gratitude and respect of the American people—Democrats, Republicans and, yes, independents—yes, especially independents.

While commanding our extraordinary troops in wars that have divided our country, General Petraeus has inspired and united our American family. At a moment when too many of our fellow citizens fear that America's best days are behind us, Dave Petraeus' life and leadership have been a reminder that America is still a land of heroes and that individually and as a nation, we are still capable of greatness.

Our debt of national gratitude to the Petraeus family extends beyond Dave, beginning with his wife, remarkable wife Holly. As you've indicated, Madam Chairman and Senator Chambliss, Holly Petraeus shares her husband's strength of character, intelligence and devotion to the cause of public service. As you know, she is currently leading a noble mission of her own, protecting our military families from exploitive and manipulative lending practices.

By my rough calculations, General Petraeus has spent more than twice as many months deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan over the last eight years as he has back home in the United States. Throughout all that time, Holly has remained steadfastly supportive of her husband's service to our country, and I might add, supportive and protective of their gifted children.

So today, I know we all want to say thank you, Holly Petraeus.

General Petraeus' background and accomplishments would make him a superb candidate for any of the top national security positions in the United States government. But there are special set of reasons why I believe he will make a truly superb Director of the CIA, particularly at this time of war.

First, General Petraeus is someone whose very name inspires the trust and confidence of America's friends and the fear and anxiety of America's enemies. As our commander-in-chief in Iraq, then at CENTCOM and now in Afghanistan, he has stood at the epicenter of some of our toughest, most intensive and most effective counterterrorism operations. General Petraeus knows our enemies.

At the same time, he has also built very close personal relationships with our partners and allies in the Middle East, South Asia, the Euro-Atlantic community and around the world.

Dave has proven himself to be a capable leader of organizations that are even larger than the CIA. And because, as you said, Madam Chair, he is not just a soldier, but a scholar as well, having earned a Ph.D. at Princeton, he is very well suited to oversee and demand the highest standards in the critically important analysis done by so many who work at the CIA.

After all he has done, General Petraeus certainly would have been well justified at this point in his career to seek a quiet personal retirement. But, fortunately for the rest of us, service to a cause larger than himself is General David Petraeus' creed and his personal destiny.

The brave and skillful men and women of the Central Intelligence Agency will be in very good hands when he is given the opportunity to be their leader, and all Americans will be fortunate, indeed, and safer when General Petraeus is at the helm there. And that is why I feel so personally honored now to present to this Committee General David Petraeus.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. We very much appreciate your being here. We would welcome you to stay, if you'd like, or I know you have other things as well, so it's very much your choice. But thank you very much.

General Petraeus, we're delighted to hear from you, if you'd like to proceed.

**STATEMENT OF GENERAL DAVID H. PETRAEUS, DIRECTOR-
DESIGNATE, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

General PETRAEUS. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon.

I'd like to thank Senator Lieberman for his very kind introduction. I have, of course, had considerable contact over the past 10 years with Senator Lieberman in his capacity as a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and I might add, also as one of the so-called three amigos.

Throughout that time, his support of and abiding concern for our troopers and their families have been extraordinary. Senator Lieberman is a true patriot and statesman who has served our country magnificently, and I know that he will be sorely missed by his colleagues and his constituents when he hangs up his Senate cleats in January 2013 after 24 years of service on Capitol Hill.

Thank you, Senator.

Thanks also for your kind words about my wife, Holly, here with me today. As you've noted, Holly is no stranger to public service. Indeed, she is an Army daughter, an Army wife, an Army mother, and an advocate for military families.

As was noted, earlier this year she left the office she established some six years ago at the Better Business Bureau to become an Assistant Director of the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, responsible for the Office of Servicemember Affairs.

Holly was recently described as being bright, nice, small and a pit bull, someone you want in your corner. I've been blessed to have had her in my corner for some 37 years and 23 moves, and I appreciate the opportunity this afternoon to recognize her publicly.

While it is, needless to say, a tremendous honor to have been nominated by the President to serve as the next Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I've worked very closely with members of the Agency over the last decade in particular, and I have the highest regard for them and for the Agency as an institution. If confirmed, it will be a true privilege to serve with them and to continue to contribute to the important endeavors to which so many Americans and our coalition partners have given so much in recent years.

Up front this afternoon I thought it might be useful to address a few of the concerns that various pundits have offered about an individual with my background becoming CIA Director. Some observers have, for example, questioned whether I will be able to grade my own work—that is, to ensure that my involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq or other endeavors will not color the Agency's analysis of those efforts.

Let me reassure you on this issue. Clearly, I have views on the efforts in which I've been engaged. I've shared them in the past with the Agency's analysts and I'll do so in the future. However, if confirmed, when I am in the Situation Room with the President, I will strive to present the Agency position.

I will also remain keenly aware that I am the leader of an intelligence agency, not a policymaker. In truth, my goal in uniform has always been to convey the most forthright and accurate picture possible.

I have, to be sure, offered more positive assessments than the intelligence community did on two important occasions: in September 2007 on Iraq and in December 2010 on Afghanistan. In each case, my team and I felt that the situation had changed significantly following the intelligence community assessment cutoff date, typically some six to eight weeks prior to the date of the assessment being reviewed by policymakers. In view of that, we sought to provide our assessment and more up-to-date analysis.

In two other cases, those of the assessments on Iraq in April 2008 and March 2009, I provided less positive assessments than those put forward by the intelligence community, which, again, stopped the clock for analysis purposes a good bit prior to the date that we provided our assessment. My view in those two cases was that the assessment should have been more cautious and more qualified, and that is what I offered.

In short, I have sought to provide the most accurate view possible. My goal has been to speak truth to power, and I will strive to do that as Director of the CIA, if confirmed.

There have also been concerns voiced over militarization of the intelligence community in general and the CIA in particular. One reason I will retire before assuming the directorship, if confirmed, is to allay such concerns.

Beyond that, I have no plans to bring my military brain trust with me to the Agency. There is no shortage of impressive individuals at the Agency, and I look forward to interacting with them and populating my office with them. If confirmed, I will, in short, get out of my vehicle alone on the day that I report to Langley.

Finally, some observers have suggested that someone who has had six commands in a row as a general officer might find the relative flatness of the Agency's organization unsettling. I would remind such individuals that I was, as was earlier noted, privileged to have an academic period in my background and that I have long enjoyed vigorous debate and discussion.

Moreover, I have repeatedly used red teams, outside advisers, directed telescopes and back-channel contacts with individuals well down in the organizations I've been privileged to command.

A practice I used in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, was meeting with groups of company commanders while on battlefield circulations, and I have also corresponded by e-mail with innumerable young commissioned and noncommissioned officers as well.

In short, I will not only be comfortable with the lack of rigid hierarchy at the Agency, I will promote appropriate flatness of the Agency's organization, while recognizing that there does have to be some hierarchy and that at a certain point decisions have to be made, analyses have to be finalized and judgments have to be rendered.

I would also like to offer a few observations about how I see the Agency, observations that benefit from discussions with the Agency's current leadership team, former members of the Agency, including virtually all former Directors and a number of senior leaders, and of course with Director Panetta.

And here, if I could, I would like to salute Director Panetta's principled, forthright leadership of the Agency over the past two and a half years. Indeed, Leon Panetta did an absolutely magnifi-

cent job at the helm of the Agency and it was a pleasure to work with him while I served as commander of U.S. Central Command and as the commander in Afghanistan.

In assessing the organization, it is important that I recognize that the Agency is its people. Indeed, it is blessed with thousands of individuals who truly are national assets, quiet professionals and unsung heroes who go about their work silently and without public recognition. They are the ultimate selfless servants of our nation, individuals with extraordinary expertise, initiative, integrity and courage in the face of adversity and physical danger.

Needless to say, if confirmed, I will work tirelessly to help attract the very best people to the Agency, to ensure that those hired provide the diversity needed for the areas in which we need to perform missions, to ensure that we strive to develop them and invest in them to the maximum extent possible, and to work to retain them for as long as is possible.

The Agency is, of course, but one of 16 elements that comprise the intelligence community. And while it may be the most prominent and well known, it is nonetheless part of a team, and collectively it has to be a team player.

Moreover, it is critical not only that the leaders of Agency elements work well with their partners in the other organizations, it is also critical that the Director work closely and effectively with the DNI.

I have known DNI Jim Clapper for a number of years and worked with him in his current capacity and when he was the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as well. We have worked well together in the past, and we have discussed the imperative of continuing to do likewise if I am confirmed as the next Director of the CIA.

I believe I understand his role as the leader of the intelligence community, and I understand the relationship the D/CIA should have with the DNI.

If confirmed, I also look forward to working closely together with the leaders of the other agencies of the intelligence community. I have, in fact, soldiered with many of them over the past decade while deployed for a year in the Balkans, during some four years in Iraq, as the commander of U.S. Central Command, and of course, over the past year in my present position in Afghanistan.

I am also keenly aware of the need to maintain close ties with Congress. By all reports, the Agency has done an admirable job under Director Panetta in this regard, and I know that keeping the Committee fully and currently informed is imperative.

If confirmed, I will keep the Agency on the trajectory it has been following in this regard under Director Panetta. Indeed, I look forward to furthering the relationship, indeed the partnership, that was built with Congress on his watch.

With respect to additional organizational issues, many I've consulted since my nomination have emphasized the need to continue to improve the development of agency information systems that enable efficient sharing of information, and also to continue the development of tools and applications that help with analysis. I'll focus on such areas, if confirmed, and seek congressional assistance, if required.

Related to that, I understand that the effort to reduce internal Agency stovepipes needs to continue. There reportedly has been considerable improvement in this area in recent years. However, additional attention is reportedly warranted to work the tensions between the need to protect information and the need to share it.

On a related note, I will also strongly support efforts to integrate analysts, all disciplines of intelligence, and operators. In fact, the various centers of the Agency, such as the ones devoted to counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and crime and narcotics, among others, are good examples of such integration. If confirmed, I will support and reinforce such approaches.

Other issues in the organizational arena deserving attention are the need to maintain sensitivity to the counterintelligence threat, improve cyber security, upgrade leadership training for supervisors, continue the expansion of language skills, and strengthen the lessons-learned process, among others. I will examine each of these areas closely, if confirmed, and support appropriate initiatives in them.

The Committee knows well the regional and functional issues on which the Agency needs to focus. Obviously, the Agency is heavily engaged in the front lines in the global fight against violent extremists. There has, needless to say, been important progress against al-Qa'ida in recent months in particular, and I will ensure that we maintain the relentless pressure that has enabled such progress.

Indeed, I have worked closely with various Agency elements in recent years in this campaign and, if confirmed, I will support continuation of the superb cooperation between Agency assets and other intelligence community elements, with the Joint Special Operations Command and other military commands and with relevant elements of the interagency.

Needless to say, support for the ongoing efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as for missions in other locations, such as Yemen, Iraq, and parts of Africa, will remain critical.

The Agency is, of course, specifically charged with the conduct of covert operations. These operations are of enormous importance to our country. And, if confirmed, I will devote considerable attention to ensuring that such activities are properly conducted, resourced and coordinated.

It is also important that the Agency, while staying focused on supporting our ongoing wars, not be totally captured by these efforts. While contributing to such efforts to the utmost, the Agency nonetheless also has to maintain a broad global perspective, one that is constantly searching for new threats and opportunities—the next developments in the Arab spring, the evolution in capabilities of various state and nonstate actors, the development of China and other emerging global powers, and the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Of particular note as well are cyber threats that have emerged in recent years. I share the concerns that many hold about cyber security and, if confirmed, I will ensure that the Agency continues to work closely with intelligence community partners to identify and counter risks, threats and adversaries from issues within our networks to threats from outside attackers.

Related to this, and in view of the Agency's responsibility for conducting and coordinating human intelligence collection, I will also, if confirmed, examine progress and collection on the so-called hard targets and inventory the status of initiatives against them, aligning our efforts as required.

Finally, I also recognize that it will be critical to ensure adequate resources for appropriate investment in Agency infrastructure, science and technology, and other assets, while also striving to be good stewards of our nation's tax dollars and doing our share to help our country deal with challenging fiscal realities.

If confirmed, I will focus intently on those imperatives, as well, noting that I will also not hesitate to seek additional resources that may be needed as emerging missions and tasks require.

The Central Intelligence Agency is at the forefront of the efforts to identify and counter the threats to our nation's securities and interests. It plays a central role in many of our country's most important endeavors.

If confirmed as the Agency's next Director, I will do all that is humanly possible to ensure that the Agency is relentless in pursuit of intelligence needed by our country's leaders, our military, our diplomats, and, indeed, our own covert operators.

It would, in short, be an enormous privilege to be the Agency's Director and to serve with, represent, lead and be an advocate for Agency members, individuals with world-class knowledge of other countries and cultures, with cutting edge technical expertise, with extraordinary courage, initiative and commitment, and with no quest for acclaim or public recognition.

The professionals of the Agency are our country's best and brightest, men and women who voluntarily undertake some of the most difficult tasks for our nation, men and women for whom integrity and analysis is the watch word.

I have served closely with many of them since 9/11, and I cannot say enough about them and the sacrifices they and their families make for our country. Serving as their Director would be a tremendous honor, and again, a tremendous privilege.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of General Petraeus follows:]

Statement for the Record
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Confirmation Hearing for General David H. Petraeus
23 June 2011

Thank you, Madame Chairman, Mr Vice Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon.

And I'd like to thank Senator Lieberman for his very kind introduction. I have, of course, had considerable contact over the past 10 years with Senator Lieberman in his capacity as a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee – and, I might add, as one of the so-called “Three Amigos.” Throughout that time, his support of and abiding concern for our troopers and their families have been extraordinary. Senator Lieberman is, indeed, a true patriot and statesman who has served our country magnificently. And I know that he will be sorely missed by his colleagues and his constituents when he hangs up his Senate cleats in January 2013 after 24 years of service on Capitol Hill.

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Up front, this afternoon, I thought it might be useful to address a few of the concerns that various pundits have offered about an individual with my background becoming CIA Director.

Some observers have, for example, questioned whether I will be able to “grade my own work,” that is, to ensure that my involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, or other endeavors will not color the

Agency's analysis of those efforts. Let me reassure you on this issue. Clearly, I have views on the efforts in which I have been engaged; I have shared them in the past with the Agency's analysts and I will do so in the future. However, if confirmed, when I am in the Situation Room with the President, I will strive to represent the Agency position. I will also remain keenly aware that I am the leader of an intelligence agency, not a policy maker.

In truth, my goal in uniform has always been to convey the most forthright and accurate picture possible. I have, to be sure, offered more positive assessments than the intelligence community did on two important occasions – in September 2007 on Iraq and in December 2010 on Afghanistan. In each case, my team and I felt that the situation had changed significantly following the intelligence community assessment cutoff date, typically some 6-8 weeks prior to the date of the assessment being reviewed by the President. In view of that, we sought to provide our assessment and more up-to-date analysis. In two other cases, however, those of the assessments on Iraq in April 2008 and March 2009, I provided less positive assessments than those put forward by the intelligence community which, again, stopped the clock for analysis purposes a good bit prior to the date that we provided our assessment. My view in those two cases was that the assessments should have been more cautious and more qualified, and that is what I offered. In short, I have sought to provide the most accurate view possible. My goal has always been to "speak truth to power," and I will strive to do that as Director of the CIA, if confirmed.

There have also been concerns voiced over "militarization" of the intelligence community in general and the CIA in particular. One reason I will retire before assuming the directorship, if confirmed, is to allay such concerns. Beyond that, I have no plans to bring my military braintrust with me to the Agency. There is no shortage of impressive individuals at the Agency, and I look forward to interacting with them and populating my office with them. If confirmed, I will, in short, get out of my vehicle alone on the day that I report to Langley.

Finally, some observers have suggested that someone who has had 6 commands in a row as a general officer might find the relative flatness of the Agency's organization unsettling. I would remind such individuals that I was privileged to have an academic period in my background and that I have long enjoyed vigorous debate and discussion. Moreover, I have repeatedly used Red Teams, outside advisors, directed telescopes, and backchannel contacts with individuals well down in the organizations I've been privileged to command. A practice I used in Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, was meeting with groups of company commanders while on battlefield circulations, and I have also corresponded by email with innumerable young commissioned and noncommissioned officers, and so on. In short, I will not only be comfortable with the lack of rigid hierarchy at the Agency, I will promote appropriate "flatness" of the Agency's organization – while recognizing that there does have to be some hierarchy and that at a certain point, decisions have to be made, analyses have to be finalized, and judgments have to be rendered.

I would also like to offer a few observations about how I see the Agency, observations that benefit from discussions with the Agency's current leadership team, former members of the Agency, including a number of former directors and senior leaders, and, of course, with Director Panetta. And, here, if I could, I would like to salute Director Panetta's principled, forthright leadership of the Agency over the past 2-1/2 years. Leon Panetta did an absolutely magnificent job at the helm of the Agency, and it was a pleasure to work with him as Commander of US Central Command and as the commander in Afghanistan.

In assessing the organization, it is important that I recognize that the Agency is its people. Indeed, it is blessed with thousands of individuals who truly are national assets – quiet professionals and unsung heroes who go about their work silently and without public recognition. They are the ultimate selfless servants of our Nation, individuals with extraordinary expertise, initiative, integrity, and courage in the face of adversity and physical danger. Needless to say, if confirmed, I will work tirelessly to help attract the very best people to the Agency, to ensure that those hired provide the diversity needed for the areas in which we need to perform missions, to ensure that we strive to develop them and invest in them to the maximum extent possible, and to work to retain them for as long as is possible.

The Agency is, of course, but one of 16 elements that comprise the intelligence community. And while it may be the most prominent and well known, it is nonetheless part of a team and collectively has to be a team player. Moreover, it is critical not only that the leaders of Agency elements work well with their partners in the other organizations, it is also critical that the Director work closely and effectively with the DNI.

I have known DNI Jim Clapper for a number of years and worked with him in his current capacity and when he was the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence, as well. We have worked well together in the past, and we have discussed the imperative of continuing to do likewise if I am confirmed as the next Director of the CIA. I believe I understand his role as the leader of the intelligence community and I understand the relationship the D/CIA should have with the DNI.

If confirmed, I also look forward to working closely with the leaders of the other agencies of the intelligence community. I have, in fact, soldiered with many of them over the past decade, in particular, while deployed for a year in the Balkans, during some four years in Iraq, as the commander of US Central Command, and, of course, in my present position in Afghanistan.

I am also keenly aware of the need to maintain close ties with Congress. By all reports, the Agency has done an admirable job under Director Panetta in this regard, and I know that keeping the Committee fully and currently informed is imperative. If confirmed, I will keep the Agency on the trajectory it has been following in this regard under Director Panetta; indeed, I look

forward to furthering the relationship -- indeed the partnership -- that was built with Congress on his watch.

With respect to additional organizational issues, many I've consulted since my nomination have emphasized the need to continue to improve the development of Agency information systems that enable efficient sharing of information internally and also of continuing the development of tools and applications that help with analysis. I will focus on such areas, if confirmed, and seek Congressional assistance for such initiatives, if required.

Related to that, I also understand that the effort to reduce internal Agency "stovepipes" needs to continue. There reportedly has been considerable improvement in this area in recent years; however, additional attention is reportedly warranted to work the tensions between the need to protect information and the need to share it.

On a related note, I will also strongly support efforts to integrate analysts, all disciplines of intelligence, and operators. In fact, the various centers at the Agency, such as the ones devoted to counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and crime and narcotics, among others, are good examples of such integration. If confirmed, I will support and reinforce such approaches.

Other issues in the organizational arena deserving attention are the need to maintain sensitivity to the counterintelligence threat, improve cyber security, upgrade leadership training for supervisors, continue the expansion of language skills, and strengthen the lessons learned process, among others. I will examine each of these areas closely, if confirmed, and support appropriate initiatives in them.

The Committee knows well the regional and functional issues on which the Agency needs to focus. Obviously, the Agency is heavily engaged on the front lines in the global fight against violent extremists. There has, needless to say, been important progress against Al Qaeda in recent months, in particular, and I will ensure that we maintain the relentless pressure that has enabled such progress. Indeed, I have worked closely with various Agency elements in recent years in this campaign, and if confirmed, I will support continuation of the superb cooperation between Agency assets and other intelligence community elements, with the Joint Special Operations Command and other military commands, and with relevant elements of the interagency. Needless to say, support for the ongoing efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as for missions in other locations such as Yemen, Iraq, and parts of Africa will remain critical.

The Agency is, of course, specifically charged with the conduct of covert operations. These operations are of enormous importance to our country, and if confirmed, I will devote considerable attention to ensuring that such activities are properly conducted, resourced, and coordinated.

It is also important that the Agency, while staying fully focused on supporting our ongoing wars, not be totally captured by those efforts. While contributing to such efforts to the utmost, the Agency nonetheless also has to maintain a broad, global perspective, one that is constantly searching for new threats and opportunities, the next developments in the Arab Spring, the evolution in capabilities of various state and non-state actors, the development of China and other emerging global powers, and the possible proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Of particular note, as well, are cyber threats that have emerged in recent years. I share the concerns that many hold about cybersecurity and, if confirmed, I will ensure that the Agency continues to work closely with intelligence community partners to identify and counter risks, threats, and adversaries from issues within our networks to threats from outside attackers.

Related to this, and in view of the Agency's responsibility for conducting and coordinating human intelligence collection, I will also, if confirmed, examine progress in collection on the so-called "hard targets" and inventory the status of initiatives against them, aligning our efforts as required.

Finally, I also recognize that it will be critical to ensure adequate resources for appropriate investment in Agency infrastructure, science and technology, and other assets, while also striving to be good stewards of our Nation's tax dollars and doing our share to help our country deal with challenging fiscal realities. If confirmed, I will focus intently on those imperatives, as well, noting that I will also not hesitate to seek additional resources that may be needed, as emerging missions and tasks require.

The Central Intelligence Agency is at the forefront of the efforts to identify and counter the threats to our Nation's security and interests. It plays a central role in many of our country's most important endeavors. If confirmed as the Agency's next director, I will do all that is humanly possible to ensure that the Agency is relentless in pursuit of the intelligence needed by our country's leaders, our military, our diplomats, and, indeed, our own covert operators.

It would, in short, be an enormous privilege to be the Agency's Director and to serve with, represent, lead, and be an advocate for individuals with world-class knowledge of other countries and cultures, with cutting-edge technical expertise, with extraordinary courage, initiative, and commitment, and with no quest for acclaim or public recognition. The professionals of the Agency are our country's best and brightest, men and women who voluntarily undertake some of the most difficult tasks for our Nation, men and women for whom integrity in analysis is the watchword. I have served closely with many of them since 9/11, and I cannot say enough about them and the sacrifices they and their families make for our country. Serving as their Director would be a tremendous honor and, again, a tremendous privilege. Thank you very much.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, General Petraeus. Now come the pro forma five questions, if you just answer yes or no, please.

Do you agree to appear before the Committee here or in other venues when invited?

General PETRAEUS. Yes, I do.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to send officials from the CIA and designated staff when invited?

General PETRAEUS. I do.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to provide documents or any other materials requested by the Committee in order for it to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibility?

General PETRAEUS. Yes, I do.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Will you ensure that the CIA and its officials provide such material to the Committee when requested?

General PETRAEUS. I will.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Do you agree to inform and fully brief to the fullest extent possible all members of this Committee of intelligence activities and covert actions, rather than only the Chairman and Vice Chairman?

General PETRAEUS. Yes, I do.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, General.

I know this is not the subject, but because of President Obama's announcement last night, I'd like to put that behind us and then go on to other things.

When we talked, you mentioned that you had presented to the President certain options, and we didn't discuss what they were.

I would just like to ask this question: How do you view the President's decision with respect to bringing home certain troops and maintaining others for the rest of the time prior to 2014?

General PETRAEUS. If I could, Madam Chairman, perhaps I could just walk through the process, because it was quite a substantial one, although in a brief period of time, included three meetings.

After the first meeting, I was given a homework assignment, which I answered by the second meeting, and then the third meeting was the one in which the President ultimately reached a decision.

The responsibility of a combat commander in that kind of situation is to provide options to the President to implement his stated policy, and that's what I did.

Associated with each of those options was an assessment of risk, the risk being assessed in this case from my perspective, the risk having to do with the ability to achieve objectives of the military campaign plan, acknowledging that at every level of the chain of command above me there are additional considerations and that each person above me, all the way up to and including the President, has a broader purview and has broader considerations that are brought to bear, with the President alone in the position of evaluating all of those different considerations, including, certainly, those of the commander on the ground, but also many others as well, in reaching his decision.

I provided such options. I provided assessments of risk. I provided recommendations. We discussed all of this, again at considerable length.

The President then made a decision. The commander in chief has decided. And it is then the responsibility, needless to say, of those in uniform to salute smartly and to do everything humanly possible to execute it.

Now, as Chairman Mullen, Admiral Mullen, stated today before the House Armed Services Committee, the ultimate decision was a more aggressive formulation, if you will, in terms of the time line, than what we had recommended. Again, that is understandable in the sense that there are broader considerations beyond just those of a military commander.

The fact is that there's never been a military commander in history who has had all the forces that he would like to have, for all the time, with all the money, all the authorities, and nowadays with all the bandwidth as well.

So there is always a process of assessing risk, and it's typically, in a case like this, as the Chairman put it today, risk at the margin. We're talking about small differences here, albeit significant from a military commander point of view.

And so, that's how I would lay out, again, the process that took place, the very good discussion. This was, indeed, vigorous. All voices were heard in the Situation Room. And ultimately, the decision has been made.

And with a decision made, obviously I support that and will do all that I can during my remaining time as the commander of ISAF to implement it, to set up General Allen to do likewise so that we can achieve the objectives of the campaign plan. And then also, if confirmed as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to do the same from that position as well.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. I have one minute left.

I have been concerned by many of President Karzai's statements. We all know what this country has done in the last ten years, and it seemed to me to be the development of an adversarial relationship.

How do you view his recent statements?

General PETRAEUS. Well, first of all, let me just say that there have been times when—first of all, we have not always seen issues the same way, and we have worked very hard to resolve such situations.

Secondly, there have been times where we think that perhaps communication to domestic audiences led to some of the kinds of statements that we have heard, which I think have caused legitimate concern among some who have heard those, and that is very understandable.

I should note that I have sat down with President Karzai on innumerable occasions. People ask what's the relationship like, and I say that it is a productive, it is a forthright relationship, it is one in which, again, we do not always see issues from the same perspective initially, but typically, when we have batted these around, we have come to mutually acceptable solutions.

Secretary Gates has observed, I think rightly, that there have been times that we have not listened closely enough to President Karzai. I think this is an important element of the relationship, that at times we need to think about walking a mile or a kilometer in his shoes in the Hindu Kush and to understand, again, that per-

spective and the need to maintain, again, this political foundation that is so challenging there, but without which he cannot operate.

So I have a degree of understanding in this case for President Karzai, with whom I have partnered over the past year, and during which time we have made significant gains on the security front in the greater Kabul security area, in Helmand province, in Kandahar and in other areas in the face of a resilient insurgency.

We have resolved some of the very important issues that have been problematic in the past. The private security contractor issue is now on course. We have reduced civilian casualties each year. We did it in 2010. They're down. The losses due to ISAF or Afghan operations this year are down by over 10 percent.

But that's not good enough, we understand, and we have to continue the efforts to do that. We have worked through mechanisms where now Afghan forces lead. They don't just accompany us, partner us, they lead in nearly 25 percent of the night raids, which are very, very important to the overall effort, although not the be all and end all, because this requires a comprehensive approach that also has to include a variety of other elements in this civil-military campaign plan that we are executing.

So, indeed, I think we have to continue the dialogue and the partnership. There are times, understandably, I think, where there are stresses on that relationship. Addressing those is not optional. And that is, indeed, the way that we approach that relationship.

And I work to help the individual who is the elected leader of a sovereign country and is trying to reach the same kinds of goals that we have for his land there in the Hindu Kush.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much.

General PETRAEUS. Thank you.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Mr. Vice Chairman.

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Thanks, Madam Chairman.

General Petraeus, in listening to the President last night I was somewhat disappointed with the scale of the drawdown, particularly in the short term. And the reason that I was disappointed is because I have visited with you on any number of occasions where you've been very attentive to making sure that we understood what your goals were in Afghanistan, particularly with the now halfway-complete surge from a time line standpoint. And you often talked about needing to make gains in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, as you just talked about, and ultimately making gains in the eastern part of Afghanistan.

As I look back at your testimony in June of 2010, just after the President had made his West Point speech, you talked about him giving two messages in that speech, one of commitment and one of urgency. And I want to quote you. You said, "The urgency was the July 2011 piece—noting that—what happens in July 2011 is a beginning of a process for transition, that it's condition-based and the beginning of a process of responsible drawdown of U.S. forces."

You also said in that testimony that, "As we embark on the process of transition, we should keep in mind the imperative of ensuring that the transition actions we take will be irreversible. We'll get one shot at transition and we need to get it right."

Now, the reason that I'm concerned about what the President said last night is that I know you've made gains in the south, I

know you've made some gains in the east, and I know that you have some additional plans for moving more aggressively in the east.

And I'm concerned because if we are now talking about pulling down 10,000, or a third of the troops by the end of this year that are part of the surge and the balance of them by the end of next summer, before even the fighting season ends next year, what is the risk of losing those gains that you talked about are reversible but need to be irreversible in your testimony back in June of last year?

General PETRAEUS. Let me just, Mr. Vice Chairman, mention that, first of all, transition will begin this summer. It begins next month, in fact, as you know. It will be conducted in seven different locations, three provinces, one of which is Kabul, less one district, and then four different municipal districts.

As I said, it will begin this summer and it will include a substantial number of Afghan citizens. It's nearly 25 percent of the population.

Now, the fact is that in each of these locations transition essentially already has taken place. This has been ongoing over a period of time.

Strikingly, Lashkar Gah in Helmand province, the capital, the municipal district, is going to transition, and this is made possible because over the course of time, indeed, ISAF forces have thinned out and Afghan forces have very much stood up to the point that there are virtually no ISAF forces policing the streets there, nor are they in Kabul, I might add.

Now, we believe very strongly this is certainly the right course to take. It was what we recommended. There will be another tranche in the fall of transition, another in the spring, and another in the fall of next year. And we have an eye on that schedule.

Now, the fact is that we will have our surge forces again, certainly 10,000 will come down by the end of this year. We have flexibility in determining obviously which forces and when they come. There are already some that are coming home without replacement, decisions that were already made, and others identified. And then we'll shape this and scope it, again based on conditions, based on assessments of the mission. And we're constantly refining and updating our campaign plan and we'll do another round of that, needless to say, with the decision having been made.

But basically, we're taking out 33,000 U.S. forces over the course of a 15-month period. It will run to really to I think somewhere in that summer, perhaps as late as mid-September or so, something like that. During that time, I might add, there will be some 70,000 additional Afghan forces added, based on our projections.

So there will be about 50,000 additional Afghan national army and Afghan national police. There will also be probably some 20,000 or so what are called "Afghan public protection force," which are the private security contractors coming underneath the control of the Ministry of Interior, a very important action that is just beginning now. And then there will be some other non-standard elements that are supported by various agencies and international elements such as counterterrorist pursuit teams under the intelligence service and so forth.

It will be critical that we obviously accelerate this as much as we can, something we've always been about doing, so that we can indeed do that hand-off as our forces come out of locations, as we really thin out, because we're not just going to come out and hand off. We'll thin out and indeed hand off to Afghan forces.

Again, throughout this process, we'll be constantly examining, assessing conditions. We will provide forthright advice. People have always asked me, "General, if something happens that's unexpected or that increases the level of risk beyond what you originally provided, will you provide your forthright advice?" In my remaining time, I can assure you that will be the case. And, knowing General Allen, who, of course, was my deputy at Central Command during my time there, I can assure you that he will do the same as well.

Thank you.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman. We'll go regular order, five-minute rounds.

Senator Rockefeller.

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

General Petraeus, when we talked, we talked more about the nature of the CIA, the evolution of the CIA. And it's interesting to me, and you know, you made the statement, "I'm going to get out of the car all by myself." You won't have a uniform on. You will be, in a sense, a new person to them.

I say this because I care tremendously about the morale at the CIA, about the personnel. I think it's in pretty good shape right now because I think Leon Panetta was really good and worked at it. He brought two people with him, but no more.

Other CIA Directors since I've been on this Committee, much less in the Senate, I think have been less effective. Some have demoralized the CIA. Some have developed sort of a very close band of advisers around them to whom they'd turn, but they haven't been very good at reaching down to an unexpected analyst who gets a phone call all of a sudden, reaching outside the usual chain of command.

It's my impression that, first of all, that you want to be a champion for the CIA. That's very important to you. It's also my impression that you want to focus on your duties there, and you used the phrase in your testimony that you understand that you will be commanding a very large agency and you'll be involved with public policy, but not necessarily the nation's leading discussor of policy on Meet the Press, so to speak.

In other words, I think the CIA will look at you first, and they will be very, very impressed, as obviously everybody is, by what you've done. But by the very, very excellence of your performance, they will also be nervous because they will be receiving as their leader somebody who comes in alone and somebody who is kind of a super-star on the military and intellectual force side, but who they don't know.

So my questions to you are the following. One, it is hard to walk into a building—you're still General Petraeus—and to simply develop a sense of confidence. I believe so strongly in the CIA, I think they need the most immediate kind of trust in their leader. I would go so far as to say I think that the entire operation—it's a very

large agency—will turn to a better day's work or a less good day's work based upon how they see you.

So my questions are the following. You will take nobody in with you, but you will have a strategy as to how you're going to make yourself close to the CIA without, in a sense, forcing yourself on them, but you will draw them to you. And we discussed that in my office, and you had some very interesting thoughts and ideas and I wish you would talk about them.

General PETRAEUS. Thanks very much, Senator.

First of all, I agree with you absolutely in your assessment of the Agency. As I told you behind closed doors, and I'll say here, I wanted this job. This is something that was not, you know, a month or two or three in the making. Secretary Gates and I discussed this all the way back last year.

I'm taking off the uniform that I've worn proudly for 37 years to do this job, I think in the right way. I think the world of the Agency and its people, having worked very closely with them for the past 10 years in particular. And I do, again, just feel enormously privileged just to have been nominated to lead them.

You should know on day one after being sworn in, wherever that is, I will indeed get out of the vehicle alone. I will go to the auditorium. We'll do an all-hands. We'll have folks piped in as well. And I will tell them up front right there that you all should know that I'm here to recruit you and I know that you're here to recruit me.

I also know that the Director of the National Clandestine Service is my case officer. I will seek to reassure them. I'll use a lot of the same techniques applied obviously to a different organization that I tried to use in the military—reaching out, reaching down. We talked, for example, about a dissent channel. There is a dissent channel. It's called "ask the Director," and there are an awful lot of great questions that come in for the Director, apparently.

And I'll stress that they should know that. And beyond that, I'll even give them my personal e-mail address, which should be readily available, I'm sure, on the system anyway. And if it's like the military, there won't be any hesitation in the junior ranks in providing unsolicited input to their boss. In fact, actually mothers and fathers of American soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines and Coast Guardsmen occasionally take advantage of that as well, and I'm delighted to answer them.

I did discuss today, in fact this morning, with the Deputy Director and the Associate Deputy Director—and I appreciate your recognition of Mike Morell as a truly superb officer in whose hands the Agency will be very well taken care of in the interim—both of them long-time veterans of the Agency, and we talked about, again, the kinds of strategies that can be pursued indeed to embrace the Agency and to show how much I believe in them, in the missions that they perform, in their enormous contributions to our country's security and interests.

And there's a whole variety of these. I mean, it even starts out by going to the cafeteria a few days a week, and some other days inviting groups to your office—the equivalent, if you will, of company commander lunches; certainly going out to work spaces and visiting them there, rather than summoning them to the seventh

floor. But indeed, summoning someone to the seventh floor because, again, that's an important incentive as well.

So lots and lots of these tactics, techniques and procedures, if you will. And I've been given a number of good ideas like that and I will certainly seek to implement them. But again, I appreciate very much your feeling for the Agency because it is one that I share very deeply.

Senator ROCKEFELLER. And just finally, General Petraeus, the idea of redlining, of having people come at you, systematically challenging decisions that you are about to arrive at or perhaps you have arrived at, as well as just picking up the phone and calling some analyst or police officer somewhere, either in the building or somewhere else in the world, and saying, "What do you think about this? What do you think about that?" That kind of thing spreads wildly fast.

General PETRAEUS. Well, Senator, thanks.

First of all, I think red-teaming is a very important and literally formal red-teaming is an important part, I think, of any such organization, something I've sought to do. Also, as I mentioned, the idea of directed telescopes, people that are actually eyes and ears for you, as well, reaching down into the organization to individuals and, indeed, welcoming and saying, look, you know, this is not a military chain of command here. This is an organization that prides itself on its flatness and in the vigor of its discussions and debates.

And there should not be a case where someone walks out of my office and goes down the hall and says, "Man, I wish I had said this or that." That should not be the case. And I've got to try to create conditions to where people are willing, again not only for the Agency to speak truth to power in the interagency, but for there to be truth spoken to power on the seventh floor of the headquarters, as well.

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I thank you.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Rockefeller. Senator Snowe.

Senator SNOWE. Thank you, Madam Chair. And welcome, General Petraeus.

I, too, want to join everyone in congratulating you and to express my profound gratitude to you for your more than three decades of extraordinary service to this country.

You're more than simply filling a position at the helm of the CIA. You're certainly the man of our times, during this pivotal moment in this country and the multifaceted challenges that are confronting the Agency as well as this country and the fact that you bring a real-world operational experience in the backdrop of being an operational commander in both Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as command of the U.S. Central Command.

So I want to congratulate you, and also to say thank you to your family, your magnificent wife, Holly, for your extraordinary service to this country. Americans owe you a tremendous debt of gratitude.

And so I think that this nomination is an expansion on your illustrious career that is well deserved.

General, I would like to go back to the question of Afghanistan, because, obviously, people in this country, rightfully—and all the

sacrifices that the military families and those who have made the ultimate sacrifice, those who have been injured during the course of this decade-long war, are concerned about, you know, where the future is with respect to the ultimate end game strategy, and particularly in light of the President's proposed redeployment and surge drawdown.

In your March testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, you said that, obviously, we must be ensured that Afghanistan does not once again become a sanctuary for al-Qa'ida.

General PETRAEUS. Right.

Senator SNOWE. You said today in your testimony that we have made important advances in recent months against al-Qa'ida.

But you also said in your testimony back in March that our efforts are fragile and reversible. I'm presuming that that is on the basis that you need a certain level of troops.

The President indicated in his speech last night, in reference to Pakistan, that they will have to expand their capabilities to root out cancer in the violent extremists.

Irrespective of troop levels and irrespective of capabilities ultimately of the Afghan National Army, is it possible to end this insurgency without the Pakistanis' cooperation, their willingness to take durable, unambiguous steps toward eliminating terrorist safe havens?

I know your predecessor—now Secretary Panetta—said that it is one of the most frustrating and complicated relationships with Pakistan. So the real key to all of this is that if Pakistan doesn't cooperate in eliminating those sanctuaries along the porous borders, then will we ever get to a point that the situation will not be fragile and reversible?

General PETRAEUS. Well, Senator, first of all, thanks for your kind words.

Second, I think it is very important to note what Pakistan has done over the course of more than two years now.

If you remember back around, oh, say 30 months or so ago, virtually all of the then-Northwest Frontier Province—now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Swat Valley—were controlled by the Pakistani Taliban, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistani. Other agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Area were controlled by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistani. And it was very clear to all in Pakistan—to the political leaders, the citizens, the religious leaders and the military leaders—that this posed the most pressing existential threat to the very existence of the Pakistani state as it existed at that time.

To their credit, they have conducted very impressive counter-insurgency operations in very extreme terrain, again, in the former Northwest Frontier Province, to clear Swat Valley and associated areas, to clear a number of the agencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas—not all. And certainly, they're in a tough fight in Mohmand Agency right now. And we're working hard to coordinate on the other side of the border, where they at times are the anvil for our operations in Kunar Province and then we are the anvil for their operations in Mohmand or in Bajaur Agencies.

So I think it's very important that we give them credit for what they have done and for the enormous number of casualties. Thou-

sands of soldiers, thousands of police, and, indeed, thousands of civilian have lost their lives to these extremists inside Pakistan.

Now, having said that, there is also very clear recognition that more needs to be done, not only against those extremist elements that are threatening the security of Pakistan, but also against those that are causing problems for neighboring countries—Afghanistan foremost among them—and, indeed, posing a threat to the entire world with the fact that al-Qa'ida, of course, senior leadership is known to be in various locations, again in the rugged tribal border areas.

So there is more that needs to be done.

In some of these areas, we have been able to coordinate to share intelligence and so forth, but in some others, as Director Panetta has forthrightly noted, that has not been the case, and that is difficult.

And there's no question that the order of difficulty, the magnitude of the difficulty for the effort in Afghanistan is greater as a result of the inability to deal with some of those very significant threats that reside in places like North Waziristan, down in certain areas of Baluchistan and so forth.

Now, we have got to work this relationship. There are hugely important mutual objectives that we need to work together to achieve. Clearly, this has been a time when that relationship has been fraught for a whole variety of different reasons, and we've got to redouble our efforts there, indeed, to move forward constructively.

Now, can we achieve our objectives in Afghanistan? Certainly much more difficult if there's not assistance there. And in those cases what we have done, actually, is to establish layered defenses back from the borders of the agencies in which these groups reside most heavily.

So, for example, in Khowst Province down to the southeast of Kabul, which borders North Waziristan, there is quite a substantial Afghan defensive element established there.

Then where you hit the mountains, there's another line of defense, then there's another line of defense just at the southern end of the two provinces just south of Kabul, the Greater Kabul Province area.

And then within Kabul, Afghan security forces are in the lead conducting all operations as the lead elements, including some absolutely superb special operations forces which, indeed, we do seek to support and enable with certain intelligence tools and assets, but which conduct the operations on their own pursuant to arrest warrants issued by Afghan authorities.

So, again, more difficult? Without question. I'm not sure, though, that I would say not doable.

Senator SNOWE. Thank you.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Snowe.

Senator WYDEN.

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair.

And, General, let me join my colleagues in expressing my gratitude for your service.

I also think that what is especially important in the Director position is that Senators get the real story, they get somebody who's

going to be a straight shooter. And I'm convinced you're going to do that, and I appreciate that.

I brought with me a new issue of the Foreign Affairs magazine. And they talk about the era of revolt. And they have a section with a big caption, "Why No One Saw It Coming."

So what I'd like to do is begin by asking you what you believe is reasonable for policymakers to expect the intelligence community to be able to anticipate in terms of major geopolitical events. I would like to take Arab spring really as something of a case study, General.

Certainly, over the last few months, the reporting that we've gotten from the intelligence community has been quite good. But in December and January, when the revolutions were getting started, the intelligence agencies appeared to be about as surprised as everybody else.

In fact, the Director, Jim Clapper, told the Committee a few months ago that the intelligence community first realized that the Mubarak regime was going to have trouble hanging on in Egypt when the leader of Tunisia stepped down in mid-January.

Now, obviously, not every surprise or instability can be predicted, but I'd like to hear your thoughts about whether it's reasonable for policymakers to expect the CIA and other intelligence agencies to see events like the Arab revolutions coming.

So my question is, what should policymakers expect you to know and when should we expect you to know it?

General PETRAEUS. Well, I think, Senator, that it is reasonable to expect the intelligence community and the CIA in particular to do everything humanly possible to identify new developments, emerging developments, like the Arab spring.

And, as you noted, I think the reporting on that has gotten better over time. I don't know whether it is reasonable to expect the intelligence community to be able to anticipate that the self-immolation of a street vendor would bring down a longstanding leader of a country, the dictator of Tunisia. So, I have, you know, some degree of understanding there, frankly.

I think over time that the intelligence, because I have followed it—some of it is of countries from my former Central Command days in which I retain interest—has improved.

But the truth is that this really comes to the point that I made in my opening statement, and that is that the Agency has to, on the one hand, absolutely maintain its focus on prosecuting the global war on terror and going after the violent extremists who pose such an important threat to our country and to our allies and to our troops in a number of locations, but we also can't turn that into a game of magnet ball, to use the kids' soccer analogy, that everybody can't focus on the ball, flock to it, and thereby lose sight of the rest of the field.

Now, I can tell you, having discussed this with Agency leaders, that they are keenly aware of the tension, again, between this focus that has to be maintained on this very important fight, a focus that resulted, of course, in the death of Usama bin Laden, but also ensure that the global coverage mission continues, so that, indeed, new developments don't end up being new surprises to policymakers.

Senator WYDEN. What concerns me, General, and obviously, we'll talk more about this, is there is no question that the intelligence community saw that ordinary Arab citizens generally had a lot of grievances against their respective governments, but we understand you don't have to be a CIA analyst to figure that out.

So the question is going to be, and we'll be talking a lot about it, since we are spending billions and billions of dollars on intelligence, what can we get for that investment so that we really get an improved early warning system with respect to how serious these matters are?

And suffice it to say, we'll continue this. I look forward to supporting you both in the Committee and on the floor of the Senate.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

General PETRAEUS. Thank you.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Wyden.

Senator Burr.

Senator BURR. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

General, many thanks to you and your family for your service. A number of us have had the opportunity to see you in action in Iraq, in Afghanistan. I think we've seen firsthand you don't say things you don't mean.

Given that you've made a statement numerous times that on the day you're sworn in, you're going to get out of your car by yourself, given that you were the only named person in bin Laden's documents, I hope you will change your mind and take somebody with you.

[Laughter.]

General PETRAEUS. There'll be some security. I'm sorry. There will be agency-provided security.

Senator BURR. General, most, if not all, of the finished intelligence that our Committee is provided is finished analysis, and that's derived from source reports and other raw intelligence materials that we don't see and, I might say, we don't always need to see.

In order to assure that our tax dollars are put to good use in the intelligence community, would you agree that part of the Committee's duty is to conduct successful quality oversight of that analysis?

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely. And, as I stated, I think this is not just about keeping the Committee informed, I think it's about a partnership. I know that's the trajectory on which Leon Panetta has the Agency, and that's what we want to continue to do.

Senator BURR. Well, I hope as we go forward that you will agree that, on a case-by-case basis, that there are times that the Committee needs that raw intelligence to make the successful judgment on the accuracy of the analytic product that we are provided.

You just alluded to this. I think on 9/11, the relationship between our intelligence community, and specifically the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, changed. I think it became much more transparent, a much more open line of communication and we had a common goal. And I believe that this Committee should and has been notified as fully as possible on a very quick basis on anything that was significant, especially as it related to changes in threats.

Do you agree that this Committee should have that information in a very timely fashion and that you would provide it?

General PETRAEUS. I do.

Senator BURR. Well, I thank you for that.

Last thing. We continue to be plagued with a process of leaks. Some of that may deal with changes that we need to make in clearances, I'm not sure.

But staff and contractors of the CIA must pass a polygraph in order to have access to classified information. Congressional staff on the Senate and House oversight committees do have access to some of the most sensitive intelligence information from the CIA and the IC community.

Given this access, what's your personal opinion on whether oversight Committee staff should be required to meet the same minimum polygraph standards of all contractors and staff at CIA?

General PETRAEUS. Senator, with respect, that's not something that I have discussed with the leadership of the Agency. And before making a judgment on that before the Committee, what I'd like to do really is to discuss it and then to come back to you for the record, if I could on that.

Senator BURR. I appreciate that, and I think I speak for the entirety of the Committee. We would like to try to begin to make sure that we don't read about the things that we discuss in the Intelligence Committee.

I know the Chairman has a deep interest in that. And any suggestions that you might have that help us to plug those holes, we would greatly appreciate.

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator.

Senator BURR. Thank you.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Burr.

Senator Mikulski.

Senator MIKULSKI. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Well, General Petraeus, it's a pleasure to welcome you and Mrs. Petraeus here. I want to just echo my thanks for your desire for continued service, as my colleagues have said, and really, as someone who has a substantial number of military, particularly enlisted military, in her state, special kudos to Mrs. Petraeus for the way she's protecting them from financial predatory behavior.

I so enjoyed our conversation in my office and listening to the testimony here, because as you know, in our conversation, I wanted to know not about General Petraeus, who I tremendously respect and admire, but who was going to be Mr. Petraeus? Who was going to be Dr. Petraeus? And who in the heck was going to be Director Petraeus?

Now, you answered a lot of those questions, both with me and Senator Rockefeller's question on being the CEO of CIA, and I know we, hopefully, would have time to elaborate on that.

But we also talked about you as a reformer at CIA, because you've certainly been a reformer in the military. So just let me get to a reformer question.

So much of the work of the CIA over the last 10 years has been contracted out. There has been just a trend of a tremendous use of contractors, many of which to do work of dubious quality, and some pretty dirty.

I wonder if you've had the chance, as you've gone through your transition documents, to take a look at the contractor issue and do you see the need for reform there, both in terms of expenditures of money, functions performed, and also the so-called dirty work that we didn't want to know too much about?

General PETRAEUS. Well, I have. In fact, that is a topic I've discussed with the leadership of the Agency. In fact, by the way, it came up when I was briefed on the Agency budget.

And if I might just for the Committee very briefly, I know that that budget is classified. I won't get into the numbers. But I will tell you that, coming from the military, I kept asking, surely there's got to be something more you're not telling me about. Because if our country gets the great CIA for that amount of budget, it's the best bargain we have as a nation.

Now, having said that, there is no question but that quite a substantial component goes for contractors. There is, as you know, Senator, an effort already ongoing to reduce the number of contractors. And I can tell you that that effort will continue, that indeed that thrust is present for a variety of different reasons, some of them, if you will, substantive reasons, that it should be done, but then also because of the fiscal constraints that all elements of government are going to have to deal with in the years that lie ahead.

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, can I have your word that, as the CEO of the CIA, that you will thoroughly scrub this issue of the use of contractors? And we need them. I don't dispute the need. I'm talking about the appropriate need, value for the dollar, and then this whole way, I found, if it was tough interrogation, and even questionable tactics, we used that through contractors.

General PETRAEUS. You have my word.

Senator MIKULSKI. Let me go, in my last time here—the job of the CIA is both to recruit and deploy spies, but also to advise the senior policymakers from the President to the Congress on potential threats and emerging threats. That takes me to cyber security.

You mentioned this in page five. I'd like to hear your comments on that from the perspective of the CIA. My own view is that this is our new enduring war, that coming out of the White House the policy has been thin—a lack of urgency, cohesiveness and muscle.

And I wonder, from your perspective, as we work on a more muscular, focused, urgent policy, how you see the CIA—and without revealing your tactics, your plans—I know it's a complicated question in a public forum.

General PETRAEUS. Well, actually, I appreciate—

Senator MIKULSKI. Could you share with us?

General PETRAEUS. I would be happy to, because in particular as commander of U.S. Central Command I was one of the more vocal proponents of the establishment of the U.S. Cyber Command.

Senator MIKULSKI. General Alexander.

General PETRAEUS. Who happens to be, by the way, a West Point classmate of mine, a longtime friend, and in my personal pantheon of heroes for the extraordinary expertise that he has developed in this area over the years and his leadership of the community that carries out a very substantial portion of activities in this arena.

Clearly, the Agency has to focus very intently on the defenses against cyber threats, intrusions, and so forth. This is where you

do have this tension between need to share and need to protect. And that is something that indeed I look forward to working with the leadership of the Agency.

But we should also remember that the Agency has a unique role to play, as the human intelligence collection agency, if you will, first and foremost—that is a charter of the CIA—in terms of helping other agencies get into networks. And so I indeed look forward to working that role very hard, and in a number of different ways, partnering with General Alexander and the heroes at NSA and Cyber Command, and the other elements of the interagency to assist as is appropriate in that regard, as well.

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, thank you, General, Mister, Doctor, Director Petraeus. And we look forward to working with you. I believe we do protect dot-mil. I have really great anxiety about protecting dot-gov and dot-com, and look forward to working with you.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much Senator Mikulski.

Senator Blunt, you're next.

Senator BLUNT. I thank you, Chairman. And, General, thank you for being here. I want to join all of my colleagues in thanking you and your family for your service.

You mentioned your West Point colleague, General Alexander. I know there are a couple of cadets here today, Doug McFarland from Missouri and Travis Griffin from Maine. And whether they're here or not, I think your leadership and your example are a great role model for those who serve us.

I think the questions of my colleagues have been good and don't need to be repeated. There are a couple of things I would like to pursue a little bit.

One, I just want to mention in my prepared remarks for the statement which I'll submit, I made the comment you made about how it's critically important—as a matter of fact, I'm going to read three sentences from that.

Congressional oversight is fundamental to who we are and to our system of government. By necessity, most of the CIA's activities happen out of public view and under cover. That cover shouldn't be used by elected officials, however, to hide from accountability. Protecting our national security must be a partnership. And I think, as Senator Burr said and you mentioned, it's been a greater partnership since 9/11 than it was before.

I want to talk a little bit about drones for a minute and the use of drones. As I told you in my office a couple of days ago, I'm very supportive of the decisions the President made regarding Abbottabad. And one of the results of that decision was the—well, I—I think we can talk about what I want to talk about here.

General PETRAEUS. I think generically.

Senator BLUNT. The only thing I was going to say about that was, we were able to leave with information in addition to the principal goal, which was justice for Usama bin Laden. And what I was going to ask you in a general context was, what kind of evaluation should go into that decision of how much information might be there, whether you use a drone or not, or whether you make the decision to try to capture the information, as well as eliminate the individual?

General PETRAEUS. Well, thanks, Senator. As we discussed, in fact, our preference in many of our targeted operations—again, speaking now for the military, but it has applications more broadly—is to capture individuals so that you can indeed interrogate them, so that you can develop knowledge about the organizations they're a part of, so that you can build, if you will, the link diagrams, the architectural chart of these organizations, understand the hierarchy, and generally continue to pull the string in, as you develop an ever more granular and nuanced understanding of these organizations that we are seeking to combat.

There are, however, occasions where we cannot, for a variety of different reasons, carry out that kind of operation. And in such cases, then, obviously, kinetic activity is a course of action, whether by drones or other platforms, for that matter, or other kinetic elements. And so that does provide an option to us, other than, again, where you cannot carry out a capture operation.

I would note that the experience of the military with unmanned aerial vehicles is that the precision is quite impressive, that there is a very low incidence of civilian casualties in the course of such operations. The warheads, actually, tend—in many cases, they're as small as a Hellfire, of course, so these are not large munitions.

And as a result, I think, again, the precision is really quite impressive. And it is constantly growing with the proliferation of various platforms that enable us to have the kind of observation and understanding of the targets before they're attacked.

Senator BLUNT. Well, I appreciate that. And I do think a sense of what might be available, who else might be there, all of those things are things that, as the Director, you need to be intimately involved in. And look forward to that leadership and other leadership. And like others on this Committee, I respect your service, I respect your capacity as an individual and look forward to being supportive both during this process and if, as I expect will happen, you're Director, to be supportive of your actions and to help move forward with that partnership that you mentioned, that's such a critical part of this part of our security right now.

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator.

Senator BLUNT. Thank you.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator Blunt.

Senator Nelson, you've returned.

[The prepared statement of Senator Blunt follows:]

**Statement of Senator Blunt on Gen. David Petraeus,
Nominee for CIA Director**

Welcome General Petraeus and thank you for appearing before our Committee today. Before I start, I want to join my colleagues in saluting you for your 37 years of distinguished service in the United States Army. In that time, you have earned the respect and admiration of many here in Washington and across our great nation.

Your career is no doubt an inspiration, and as a graduate of the United States Military Academy, you serve as a role model for current West Point cadets studying to become Army officers. Madam Chairman, I would like to acknowledge two cadets sitting in the audience today, Doug McFarland, a constituent of mine from Missouri, and Travis Griffin from Maine.

General, when we met in my office earlier this week, I told you that I think you are becoming CIA Director at a critical time and with an unmatched set of experience for the job. Your time as the leader of our surge strategy in Afghanistan and your relationships with President Karzai in Afghanistan, General Kayani in Pakistan, and so many others, will prove vital in the weeks and months ahead.

As our top general in Afghanistan, you have been a consumer of intelligence, and you know the vital role it plays in America's military and national security successes. The successful collaboration between the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency—which has a large presence in Missouri — the National Security Agency, the CIA and our military in taking down Osama bin Laden serves as a case study in what can happen when all our resources are best used.

In our earlier discussion, we also talked about the role of the CIA as the premier civilian, all-source analysis center for the federal government. Lawmakers and policy makers count on the CIA to

provide the long-lead, strategic intelligence that we need on the policies, plans and intentions of other nations. I am personally committed to ensuring that the CIA has the tools, resources and authorities it needs to ensure that we are able to gain access to this vital intelligence to keep our homeland safe from those that would threaten us.

Congressional oversight is fundamental to who we are and to our system of government. By necessity, most of the CIA's activities happen out of public view and undercover—that cover should not be used by elected officials to hide from accountability. Protecting our national security must be a partnership.

In the House of Representatives, I helped rewrite our nation's FISA laws, on a bipartisan basis, to ensure that we maintained the ability to keep tabs on terrorists.

Finally, before we get to questions, I think it's important to mention the status of Guantanamo Bay. My recent visit to the detainee facility at GTMO reinforced my view that keeping it open and preparing it for use as a courtroom to prosecute certain detainees under military tribunals is critical to our national security. Obviously public relations are important in our effort to reduce threats to our troops and our nation from terrorists, but I think we would be hard pressed to find a way to both detain and try dangerous individuals without using this facility. I think it's incumbent on us as a nation to demonstrate our commitment to detain these individuals humanely, but I think this Administration's stated policy to close GTMO is unrealistic, confusing, ultimately, dangerous – three very strong reasons why I believe it should be abandoned. I'm hopeful that after you are confirmed, you will be willing to work with us to address the terrorist detention issue once and for all.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

General, I enjoyed talking to you. Amplifying on Senator Rockefeller's comments to you, you and I discussed before that having come out of a military command structure where so often it is of necessity a top-down command structure, that when you get into the intelligence community the collaboration structure is so much more essential to the effective achieving of the mission. And you shared some very interesting thoughts on that with me. Would you repeat them for the folks here?

General PETRAEUS. Well, thanks, Senator.

Indeed, this ability to foster collaboration in an organization like this—and of course it's not strictly unique to the Agency; there are huge elements within the military and among those various intelligence elements in which we seek to shape that same kind of collaboration and sharing.

But critical to the Agency, in particular, is the sharing of all disciplines of intelligence, the fusion of the products of all disciplines, the interaction of operators and analysts, and then the collaboration of all members of the intelligence community as well. I think that's critical.

As we discussed, there certainly have been breakthroughs in every discipline of intelligence since 9/11, whether it's signals intelligence, imagery intelligence, indeed with the proliferation of various platforms and unmanned aerial vehicles, the ability to digitize human intelligence, indeed, even measurement intelligence, because of some of the sophisticated packages, balls, optics and so forth that are now on some of our platforms.

So in every discipline there have been breakthroughs. But the fact is, the biggest breakthrough is occasionally overlooked, and that is the fusion of the products of all of these disciplines, and bringing that all together. And that fusion is carried out by people. Yes, you can have the great applications, computer databases, massive databases that you can throw lots of data into, but at the end of the day, the digitization of this, the use of it, the employment of it is by people.

And it's by people who work together, who are encouraged to do that, who are in centers like the Counterterrorist Center and so forth, and with leaders who indeed bring them together and ensure that all know that teamwork is not optional.

Now, again, I think the tone for this, the culture of this obviously has to start at the top, as is the case with any organization. Every team does, at the end of the day, have a coach. And if I'm privileged to be the coach of team CIA, indeed I will try to foster that kind of approach. I will try to indeed encourage that by my own actions and initiatives, including some of those that we discussed with Senator Rockefeller earlier—reaching down, reaching out, making contact with individuals well down in the organization, allowing dissent channels, welcoming red team contributions and so forth.

Senator NELSON. Describe what you think to be the state of the fight now with al-Qa'ida, and what do we need to do to make sure that al-Qa'ida no longer poses a meaningful threat?

General PETRAEUS. Well, we have to maintain that effort, again that relentless pressure that has resulted in al-Qa'ida being a con-

siderably diminished organization, but noting that it still has considerable capability.

Obviously the loss of the only leader al-Qa'ida had ever known, an iconic figure, is a tremendous blow to the organization, and to the organization in the franchise, if you will, as well.

And indeed, I think even some of the images that came out of that subsequently diminished the perception of Usama bin Laden, and the way in which he was living, and so forth, I think was contrary to what I would assume many of his followers would have expected of him.

Also, of course, over the course of recent years, the number three position in al-Qa'ida was the most hazardous job in the world.

But having said all that, there still is al-Qa'ida senior leadership. There is a new leader of al-Qa'ida, reportedly. And indeed, there will be efforts to regenerate, to resurrect and to continue the efforts to carry out attacks on our homeland and on the homelands of some of our allies.

And as you know, these franchises elsewhere, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula was a concern of mine even before I left Iraq, before even going to Central Command, and indeed over the course of years there, there has been increased pressure on that, as is reasonably well reported.

Al-Qa'ida in East Africa sustained a very substantial loss very recently here. Every now and then, you actually get a break, and that appears to have been the case there with a significant leader being killed at a checkpoint.

Al-Qa'ida in the Maghreb and other parts of Africa also bears very careful watching. Al-Qa'ida in Iraq, enormously diminished, but still capable of carrying out sensational attacks and warrants additional attention.

Now, the fact here is that we cannot ever get into a game of whack a mole. What we have to do is whack all the moles simultaneously. We have to pressure that network with our own network. And one of the major developments since 9/11 has been the establishment of this network, in many cases led by the Joint Special Operations Command of the military, but with very, very good partnering, again with elements of the Central Intelligence Agency, other elements of the intelligence community, and in fact with conventional military forces, the white SOF as well as the special mission units, and certainly with our diplomats and the members of other interagency elements, such as the Treasury Department, State Department, Department of Homeland Security, who also play very important roles in the fight against extremism.

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator.

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS [presiding]. Senator Risch.

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Petraeus was very good with his time with me, and I appreciate you taking time to come to see me and answering my questions. So thank you very much.

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Senator Udall.

Senator UDALL. Senator Risch is a tough act to follow.

[Laughter.]

Senator RISCH. You never said that before, Senator, but I'll take note.

Senator UDALL. One Rocky Mountain westerner to another.

General, thank you as well for your service, for taking time to come and sit down with me. We could have, I know, visited for quite a bit longer. But thank you for the thoughtful way in which you approach everything you've done for our country.

I know you're a keen observer of institutions and people, and in that spirit I know you've also acknowledged in many settings that the men and women in uniform that fight for us not only have to be warriors in this day and age, but they have to be educators, diplomats, small "d" democrats, even human rights advocates.

And I know you mentioned that the CIA isn't in the business of setting policy per se, but there are a set of values and beliefs and principles that you're defending that we all should defend.

So in that context I wanted to talk a little bit about torture, and the very important debate we've had in our country. One of the things that you've said that's been most quoted is, "Some may argue that we would be more effective if we sanctioned torture or other expedient methods to obtain information from the enemy. They would be wrong. Beyond the basic fact that such actions are illegal, history shows that they are also frequently neither useful nor necessary."

And then you went on to say, "Whenever we've perhaps taken expedient measures, they're turned around and bitten us in the backside."

Now, there are some who have argued that by not taking expedient measures we're deprived of valuable information. Do you anticipate your basic views on this issue changing at all as you take the helm with the CIA? In other words, do you see torture any differently in a CIA context than in a military context?

General PETRAEUS. Well, Senator, thanks very much. First of all, I might add that it was not just the counterinsurgency field manual that we oversaw the drafting of when I was a three-star commander at the Combined Arms Center headquartered at Fort Leavenworth. It was also the Army field manual sometimes identified on interrogations. It's actually called the "Human Intelligence Collector Operations."

And that field manual, I might add, thanks to Senator McCain, who knows something on this subject also, has the force of law. Your body gave it the force of law. No one has more experience, I don't believe, overseeing the application of that field manual and those techniques than I do, having commanded in Iraq and in Afghanistan, and in Iraq, when we had some 27,000 detainees at the highest point, and then in Afghanistan where we had far, far fewer, some 2,000 or so.

My experience is that those interrogation techniques, which are judged to be humane, and by the way, we have had the International Committee of the Red Cross in all of our detainee facilities in Iraq and Afghanistan. We opened up some during my time in each of those commands that were conducted by some of our special operations forces. And they have been judged as the gold standard by that international organization.

Those techniques, again, do work. We do gain very important information. And as I mentioned, that's why in many cases we prefer to capture extremists, rather than to kill them. And it is a very rare case, in fact, where those techniques do not elicit the information that we actually are after in these cases.

So I strongly support the continued exercise of that, noting, by the way, that the CIA does not do interrogations and does not hold detainees, but again as a general statement. But also, I would submit to this body and really to policymakers that there may be consideration of a special case. And I have talked about this on the record before. I do think there is a need at the very least to address the possibility of the so-called, you know, you have the individual in your hands who you know has placed a nuclear device under the Empire State Building. It goes off in 30 minutes, he has the codes to turn it off.

I think that is a special case. I think there should be discussion of that by policymakers and by Congress. I think that it should be thought out ahead of time. There should be a process if indeed there is going to be something more than, again, the normal techniques employed in such a case. And again, I would certainly submit that that would be very helpful if that kind of debate could be held and if some resolution could be made as to what should be done in a case like that so that it is worked out ahead of time, rather than under an extraordinary sense of pressure in such a situation.

Senator UDALL. Thank you for that thoughtful answer. I look forward in perhaps a more secure classified setting having that discussion. And in the meantime, I'll note the ways in which you and the military have performed humane interrogations that have generated enormous amounts of information, while keeping faith with the values that make America and Americans special.

Thank you.

General PETRAEUS. Thanks, Senator.

Chairman FEINSTEIN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Udall.

Senator RUBIO.

Senator RUBIO. Thank you, Madam Chair.

General, first of all, I want to echo all the comments that were made here by everyone thanking you for your service to our country and looking forward to supporting you both in Committee and on the floor in your nomination, and hoping you'll come visit Florida like you did from time to time, when you spent some significant amount of time there and the mutual friends that miss you in the Tampa area.

I do want to revisit for a moment the President's decision on Afghanistan because I think it's relevant to the role that you will play in terms of managing our relationship with Pakistan. You earlier, in response to a question from the chairwoman, said that you had provided the President options and that each option had a list of risks. And I guess my question was, did you also provide recommendations to the President?

General PETRAEUS. I did. And I said that earlier, indeed. And as I mentioned earlier, as Chairman Mullen noted today as well, the decision made by the President was a more aggressive formulation, more aggressive timeline in particular, than that which we rec-

ommended. And I also noted that, again, there are broader considerations that guided that, in my view, but I don't think it's my place to try to explain in detail what all those broad considerations are.

I don't think it's appropriate for me to go into the positions of other people in that room either. And I think that you have certainly the right to ask us I think it's termed the "personal view" as we pledge to provide, and I have provided that here this afternoon.

Senator RUBIO. Well, my question was really more toward the—and I understand the President has a number of factors he has to take into account when making this decision. I would think your recommendation would be based on military factors. You wouldn't be able to happen to share that recommendation with us today on exactly what it is you recommended the course of action would be from a military perspective?

General PETRAEUS. Well, Chairman Mullen has already done that today. He talked about having two full fighting seasons, rather than, again—

Senator RUBIO. At the surge level.

General PETRAEUS [continuing]. Well into it. Yes, in other words, the 33K coming down at the end of the second fighting season, roughly in that timeframe there. Now, we do have, as I said, 15 months to do this. And again, there was a good discussion of this and healthy debate.

Senator RUBIO. I just wanted to kind of add to that by asking, the September 2012 date, is there any specific significance to that date from a military or practical perspective in terms of why that date was chosen, September 2012?

General PETRAEUS. Again, I'm not going to try to provide the rationale that individuals used in making the decision. My discussion, my input focused on, again, the duration of a fighting season, and that's what guided that.

Senator RUBIO. Yes, right, and that's what I'm trying to get at, is if the September 2012 a date that had some military significance or fighting season significance?

General PETRAEUS. Well, it does in that it is a reasonable time through the fighting season, to be sure. Right.

Senator RUBIO. Okay. The other question I had is, in light of this decision, one of the things we've heard repeatedly is that, and obviously it's not the only reason, but one of the things that complicates our relationship with Pakistan, and in particular managing our relationship with ISI, is this thought that from the Pakistani side, so they say, they have doubts about America's willingness to stay there and that, in fact, they feel like in the past perhaps we've not stuck to our commitments in the region and have left them holding the bag, and in essence, we encourage them to hedge their bets. Obviously, I don't think that explains all the problems here, but it's one of the things we keep hearing come up in conversations and in media accounts.

I wanted to get your perspective on how not just the President's decision yesterday but in general any decisions that we make about transition in Afghanistan, you know, how that should be handled and how those numbers, dates, decisions that are made, how that

impacts that issue and that role and that view. And in fact, the question would also apply to elements within Afghanistan that have also expressed, you know, some of the same “we need to hedge our bets” attitude because they have questions about America’s commitment to the region and to the conflicts, but specifically about Pakistan and managing that relationship.

General PETRAEUS. Well, sure. First of all, I think it’s very important to recall that the most significant development of the past year in a strategic sense with respect to the campaign in Afghanistan is the commitment that was made at Lisbon this past November for the alliance to remain committed to Afghanistan through the end of 2014, by the end of which time Afghan forces will be in the lead in security terms throughout the country. That was an enormously important moment for the effort in Afghanistan.

Now, implied in that, explicit in that actually, is the idea that obviously during that time there’s going to be a steady drawdown of coalition forces, of ISAF forces, as indeed there is a steady increase of Afghan forces. As I noted earlier, for example, during the 15-month period that we will draw down some 33,000 troops, and at the end of which we’ll still have 68,000 U.S. troops on the ground, and probably another at least 30,000 to 40,000 other non-U.S. ISAF forces, during that time that we draw down 33,000, I think there will be an increase of some 70,000 Afghan forces.

Again, this is not just the army and the police that are authorized. It is also the Afghan public protection force being stood up. It is additional Afghan local police elements that will be established and are very, very important because they’re local defense forces and no one defends his village better than the villager.

So all of that will take place.

And, indeed, I think the commitment to 2014 remains very sound. There will be those, in fact, who will argue that this decision solidifies support for that all the way through, provides the rationale, and so on.

Pakistan sees this. I think they saw 2014, and at that time I think they realized that the United States and the rest of the international community was indeed committed for another, you know, still from here now three and a half years.

And then there is now the discussion of the U.S.-Afghanistan strategic partnership agreement, or declaration. And indeed, there is also discussion of a NATO–Afghanistan partnership agreement that would go beyond 2014.

Countries like Australia, the prime minister has been very clear and explicit in her commitment to continuing beyond 2014 already, as have other countries.

So I don’t think that we face a “Charlie Wilson’s War” kind of scenario here. I don’t see us feeling that, okay, you know, we got rid of the Soviets, we accomplished this mission and now we’re out of here.

I think there is every intention that there be an enduring commitment, albeit one that is much less costly over time, that is more sustainable in that sense, given the fiscal constraints that all of the contributing nations face in Afghanistan, and one that increasingly is characterized by Afghans being in the lead, and Afghans shouldering more and more of the burden.

And I have an obligation here, by the way, for our Afghan partners, to note to this Committee that Afghan forces right now are dying, are being killed in action at a rate that is three times the rate of ISAF forces.

So for anyone to say when will the Afghans start fighting and dying for their country, I can tell you that they are doing that right now, and indeed we should give them enormous credit for being out there, and increasingly shouldering the burdens in their country.

Thanks, Senator. And I will get back to Florida.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Rubio.

General, we have two ex officio members who are very potent members in their own right of a very significant Committee, namely the Chairman and Ranking Member of Armed Services.

And I want you to note their humility. They have sat at the end of this row now for approximately two hours. And I think it's time—

Senator McCAIN. And hated every minute of it.

General PETRAEUS. I have been staying hydrated for this very minute. I want you to know, when I saw Senator McCain, I started drinking water immediately.

[Laughter.]

Chairman FEINSTEIN. So I'd like to recognize the Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chair.

And thank you, General, for your fabulous service. You've been a great commander of our troops. You're a deep thinker in terms of strategy and how to deal with challenges we face, including these kind of insurgencies. We're all very much in your debt, and the country is very much in your debt and that of your family as well.

And, by the way, we're going to have a hearing on General Allen next Tuesday, you'll be happy to hear. We hope to get his confirmation completed next week.

I want to pick up the question of Afghanistan, the decision the President made last night. You gave a number of reasons here today for why you—as I read you, that you are comfortable implementing the decision that the President made, whether or not it was precisely following your recommendation or not, that you do feel comfortable implementing it and supporting it. Is that an accurate reading?

General PETRAEUS. I would be a bit more qualified, Mr. Chairman. And, actually, first, if I could—

Senator LEVIN. Yes, put it any way you want.

General PETRAEUS. Thanks.

And, first, look, in turn, I'd like to thank you for your great support for our troopers over the years. We've actually been through a lot of hearings over those years. And I have appreciated those opportunities. And more importantly, I've appreciated all that you've done for our men and women in uniform, and indeed for their families.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

General PETRAEUS. Sir, what I have said, again, is the same, frankly, as what Admiral Mullen said this morning to the House Armed Services Committee, that this is a more aggressive timeline.

Now, what that means, in, of course, soldier shorthand, commander shorthand, is that that means that we assess that there is a greater risk to the accomplishment of the various objectives of the campaign plan. It doesn't mean they can't be achieved.

That just means from our perspective, which again is admittedly one that does not have some of the broader concerns that those above us in the chain of command, and indeed the President, has to address, that from our perspective, again, that would have been, therefore, preferable.

Now, what I need to do, frankly, is get back—in fact, I'm headed back to Afghanistan first thing tomorrow morning—sit down with the staff, work our way through this. We had done preliminary planning. This was an option that was indeed evaluated.

But now that you have the final answer, we will go to work on how indeed best to implement the policy, how to ensure that Afghan forces are positioned to accept the transition, as we thin out in certain areas, and they are thickened in certain areas.

Senator LEVIN. Would you also agree with Admiral Mullen, as he put it to the Committee, that the truth is that we would have run other kinds of risks by keeping more forces in Afghanistan longer—that's his exact words—and we would have made it easier for the Karzai administration to increase their dependency on us. Those were his words today as well.

We would have denied the Afghan security forces who've grown in capability opportunities to further exercise that capability and to lead. And that, in terms of risks, we would have signaled to the enemy and to our regional partners that the Taliban still possessed strength enough to warrant the full measure of our presence. They do not.

Would you agree with Admiral Mullen on that?

General PETRAEUS. I'm not sure I buy every bit of that characterization, Chairman. Again, you can certainly say that staying longer would reinforce the Taliban narrative that, you know, we're not going to go home, except I think, you know, we are pulling the forces down, gradually reducing those forces.

So, again, I would come back, if I could, Chairman, to my point, which has to do strictly with the military commander on the ground, strictly evaluating, again, the military campaign plan, and the awareness of the strategic context and these other factors that are out there, and explicit recognition that others have to evaluate those factors.

I cannot do that. Only the President of the United States can assess all of the different considerations. And, again, I should note that I stated this in the Situation Room, to acknowledge that indeed in this process there are broader concerns than those of the military commander.

And as a result, I obviously support the ultimate decision of the commander in chief. That is, we take an oath to obey the orders of the President of the United States, and we indeed do that.

Senator LEVIN. And if you couldn't do that consistent with that oath, you would resign?

General PETRAEUS. Well, I'm not a quitter, Chairman.

I think that—I've actually had people e-mail me and say that. And I actually—this is something that I have thought a bit about.

Senator LEVIN. I'm sure you have.

General PETRAEUS. And I don't think that it is the place for a commander actually to consider that kind of step unless you are in a very, very dire situation.

Senator LEVIN. You don't think—

General PETRAEUS. This is an important decision. It is, again, a more aggressive approach than the Chairman, General Mattis and I would have indeed certainly put forward. But this is not something I think where one hangs up the uniform in protest or something like that.

Senator LEVIN. Just a final part of this—

General PETRAEUS. You know, if I could continue, though, Chairman, I feel actually quite strongly about this. Our troopers don't get to quit. And I don't think that commanders should contemplate that, again, as any kind of idle kind of action. That would be an extraordinary action, in my view.

And at the end of the day, this is not about me, it's not about an individual commander, it's not about a reputation. This is about our country.

And the best step for our country, with the commander in chief having made the decision, is to execute that decision to the very best of our ability, to do everything I can during the remainder of my time as commander of ISAF to enable General Allen then to take the effort forward, and then, if confirmed, to be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, to do everything I can from that position with that great organization to support the effort as well.

Senator LEVIN. I think that's well put and it's very reflective of your character. You are a man of extraordinary honor. And we all are in your debt.

If I could just add one quick additional reason for why the conditions on the ground have improved, you mentioned that there would be 70,000, approximately, additional Afghan security forces you expect in the next 15 months. You've indicated that they are capable, and people who don't believe that Afghan army is capable of fighting I think will run right into your very strong, powerful comment about how many of them have died fighting.

I also want to add that in the last 15 months or so—last 18 months—there's been over 100,000 additional Afghan forces that have been trained, and that that has also changed the situation on the ground in a significant way, because now the Taliban has to face those additional troops.

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely.

Senator LEVIN. I thank you.

And I thank you, Madam Chairman, as well.

General PETRAEUS. Thank you again, Chairman.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for being here.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

General, let me add my voice to the chorus of congratulations and appreciation of you and your family for their incredible and wonderful service to our country. I guess you do have a certain sense of relief not having, again, to put up with Colonel Graham's presence with you.

General PETRAEUS. It's a very, very heavy burden that we have had in theater in Iraq, and now in Afghanistan. I thought we'd gotten—

Senator MCCAIN. Your reward will be in heaven for putting up with him, and we're indeed proud of his continued presence and contributions.

I guess my question, sir, and I think you've been very candid with the Committee, particularly in your previous responses to Chairman Levin's comments, I guess one of my questions is this. Is it more difficult or less difficult now for General Allen to be able to achieve the success of his mission in Afghanistan? Does the President's decision make it more or less difficult for General Allen to achieve his goal—the goal or the success of his mission?

General PETRAEUS. Well, Senator, first of all, let me also in turn thank you for all that you have done for our country over the years, including a particularly long tour that you served in uniform, and the way that you then used that experience I think to help guide us as we sought to learn lessons from some experiences early on in the post-9/11 period.

And as I mentioned earlier, the manual to which you gave force of law does prescribe techniques that work. And I remember that debate very well. I was, as I said, the commander of the Combined Arms Center when that manual was produced, and I thought that the way that you guided that debate was truly admirable because it was in the face of some degree of criticism, as you well know, from some quarters, including some of those on your side of the aisle, which made it all the more admirable.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you.

General PETRAEUS. Sir, with respect to the question that you posed, again I would like to use this in terms of risk. But again you have to keep in mind that there are risks not just at the military campaign level, not just in achieving the objectives of that campaign. There are risks that involve other considerations.

And in my view—and again, I don't want to get too much into the reasoning employed by others—but in my view, it is an assessment of those risks, risks having to do with other considerations that led to the decision, that are important as well.

And so I actually can't give a direct answer in that regard because as a commander on the ground you are aware of these other considerations. You are aware of the context in which your options, your recommendations are evaluated. And it is, again, only those at the very top, only the commander in chief, who ultimately, I think, can actually assess those full risks.

Senator MCCAIN. I appreciate that. I appreciate that. And that's the whole structure of our system of government.

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir.

Senator MCCAIN. And I fully acknowledge that.

From a pure military standpoint, conditions on the ground as they are, the troops coming out before the end of the fighting season next summer in order to comply with the September pullout, does it make it more difficult for General Allen to carry out the pure military aspects of his mission?

General PETRAEUS. Well, again this is a more aggressive time line than that which the Chairman, General Mattis and I put for-

ward. It means that there are, again, further challenges by not getting all the way through the fighting season.

But when you then elevate and consider other factors and other considerations, I think at the end of the day that this is why the Chairman, I think, gave the assessment that he gave earlier today.

Senator MCCAIN. It doesn't surprise me, but it's interesting to note that, according to an article today in the New York Times, only hours after Mr. Obama spoke, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France said on Thursday he would begin drawing down some of the 4,000 French soldiers. The German foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, his country's goal was to be able to reduce the number of German troops for the first time.

We're going to see a domino effect here of this announcement. No elected leader of our alliance is going to tell his people they're staying when the Americans are going. Is that of concern to you, sir?

General PETRAEUS. Well, I think this is expected, with respect. Actually, I talked to the French leadership before, I talked to the German leadership, I've talked to other countries. Indeed, really it's only one country that had already announced; the others were waiting for the announcement. But there was no question that those announcements were coming.

Now, the question is, of course, what is the size of their reductions, does it come as in the case of the U.K. forces; in fact, some of those reductions were support troops who were still at Kandahar Airfield, no longer needed and so on.

But, again, this is an area in which we'll have to look at all of that. We will conduct yet another review of the campaign plan, something that we do on a fairly regular basis, and examine how we may or may not have to relook the battlefield geometry, assess the focus of our campaign over time, over the course of the 15 months of this drawdown effort, and determine the establishment, the increase of Afghan forces that can take over in the transition of our forces.

Senator MCCAIN. Well, we'll be able to discuss it, I'm sure, in the future. But I predict to you now that our allies will accelerate their reductions and presence in Afghanistan. It's only logical for them to do so, which I think exaggerates to some degree the difficulties of the challenge of achieving our goals.

Finally, I'd just like to say I would look forward to working with you on this ticking time bomb scenario. And I'm not sure what the answer is, because I think the person who would have to be responsible would be the President of the United States, who would then be able to go to the American people and say, "I did it because of the imminent threat to security of the country." And I'm not exactly sure how we do it, but I do agree with you.

But I would also agree with you and thank you for your battlefield experience. And that is, that at no time in the Afghan or Iraq conflict has there been a need to torture and violate the Geneva Conventions and the things that we as Americans stand for and believe in.

Comment?

General PETRAEUS. Well, I couldn't agree with you more, sir. As you know, we have been partners in this. There have been quotations from this letter that I sent out to our troopers when I

had a concern at one point in time. It was titled "Live Our Values." These are values we have fought for, that Americans have died for over the course of decades and centuries.

And, as was noted, there are two good reasons to live our values. One is, it's the right thing to do. If someone doesn't accept that, it's the expedient thing to do, because it bites you in the backside over time if you don't. And, again, I thank you for championing that in this body.

With respect to the ticking time bomb scenario, indeed, I actually think—I mean, this could literally be sort of, you know, the nuclear football kind of procedure where it is all thought through—that there is an authorization, but it has to come from the top because something extraordinary is going to be done—and this can't be something where we are forcing low-level individuals to have to make a choice under enormous duress.

I think there has to be a very streamlined process, but I think that's something worth discussing and I appreciate your willingness to take that on, because that is an issue that has to be dealt with, I think, by folks on the Hill and also certainly policymakers.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

I have a couple of odds and ends I want to clear up, and then we'll do a quick second round.

We're going to try—and I spoke with the Vice Chairman—try and get this nomination confirmed by the Fourth of July, so we will have to be very speedy with the questions and the markup. And I hope you'll be able to do that.

General PETRAEUS. We will do it.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Okay. Good.

The second thing is, you know, listening to Senator McCain on the Army field manual, it's easy for us—I've never known torture. It's a different thing for someone that has to really come out I think where Senator McCain has come out. And I, too, and I think every Member appreciates that.

I just wanted the record to be complete on what has happened. The Army field manual does not have the force of law. It has the force of executive order.

General PETRAEUS. I'm sorry. Thank you.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Yes.

General PETRAEUS. Right. Correct.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I put it in the 2008 intelligence authorization bill. That bill was vetoed by the President.

General PETRAEUS. Correct.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. So right now it has the force of executive order.

You know, as I listened to you and the questioners here, the thought that occurred to me was you are bringing direct street smarts from the theater of war to the intelligence community. I think we believe that if we win against terrorists, it's going to be because we have good intelligence.

You are a different nominee than Leon Panetta was. Leon brought street smarts with respect to the administration, with respect to the House, with respect to how government works. This is really a unique situation, I think, where your experiences can hopefully improve the gathering of intelligence.

Do you agree with this? And if so, how do you think this can be realized?

General PETRAEUS. Well, I would certainly hope that that will be the case. As was noted earlier, I don't think there have been any more avid consumers of intelligence in battlefield commands than I have been. We have worked very, very closely together to integrate all elements of military forces and intelligence elements for common objectives.

Clearly, I've got an enormous amount to learn about the Agency as an institution and an organization and its processes and so forth. But again, I'd like to think that the experiences that I have had will prove of value at the helm of this organization, if confirmed. And I can assure you I'll also have the sense to listen to people like Mike Morell and the others who lead the various elements of the Agency. In fact, I've spent a fair amount of time with them over the course of the last week or week-and-a-half already.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you.

The Staff Director gave me a note so that I can clarify this Army field manual further. The Army field manual is by executive order for the intelligence community. The Detainee Treatment Act makes it law for the military service. So there is that slight differential there. I think it's good for all of us to know that as we go forward.

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely. And again, I mean, to us it is what we follow, as you know.

You know, if I could, I also perhaps want to get on the record the fact that I mentioned earlier that I not only would feel privileged to lead the organization, to be its champion, but also to be its advocate. And in that regard, I think that it is time to take the rearview mirrors off the bus with respect to certain actions out there.

I don't want to comment on specific Justice cases, but I think that at a certain moment in time, especially a moment when we do not any longer truly, I think, appreciate the context of the post-9/11 period and some actions that were taking place under direction. And I, for one, again, as the potential leader of the Agency, would like to see us focus forward and indeed put some of these actions behind us once and for all, and put our workforce at rest with respect to that.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much. That's very helpful.

My own view is that you're going to be a terrific asset to the intelligence community and this Committee really looks forward to working with you. I think the closer the relationship in terms of the sharing of material and thinking, the better we all are, the better our authorization bills are, the better the performance of both sectors—the Congress as well as the Agency.

And so this will be, I think for all of us, a very special and very unique experience. And we're lucky to have one of our very best leading it. I have no doubt that you will be.

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Senator Chambliss.

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Thanks, Madam Chair.

General, I just want to go back to the issue of detention and interrogation because I'm extremely concerned about where we are right now with issues like Bagram. What's going to happen to all

of the detainees at Bagram when we turn Bagram over to the Afghans? I am really, really concerned about that. I think I know where you stand on that, too.

Secondly, with respect to the interrogation of detainees, irrespective of what techniques we use, we've got to have detainees to interrogate. And we've got to make sure that we've got facilities in which to hold those detainees. I'm concerned about going forward, that if we are still thinking in terms of closing Guantanamo, it's been very clear that the American people do not want those detainees at Guantanamo transferred to U.S. soil. And now, that's the law of the land, they won't be.

And if we're going to try to house these prisoners somewhere other than Guantanamo, I don't know where it's going to be. And I don't expect you to be able to give me an answer right now on the issue of interrogation of future detainees, but it's something that I hope you'll give some thought to immediately, because while you're kind of on the board of the HIG, the CIA is not a part of the interrogation team. I think that's a mistake. And I hope that that policy will be changed under your leadership.

With respect to housing detainees, I would like your comment there, particularly at Bagram or Guantanamo.

General PETRAEUS. Well, actually I'm very glad you raised that because it's literally in a sense the last issue I really was eager to get out on the table, having had the opportunity to talk about this other one earlier.

I am on the record, as you know obviously, Vice Chairman, as saying that Gitmo should be closed responsibly. This was some—back at least two-and-a-half years ago. I think it was shortly after taking over Central Command. And it was based on the fact that in the Central Command region, the existence of Gitmo indeed had considerable antibodies attached to it. There was a certain degree of radioactivity.

Now, to be fair, some of that was because of an association with Abu Ghurayb that shouldn't have been drawn, but nonetheless these were the kinds of issues that were reality for those of us working in the Central Command area at that time.

By the way, I did that before President Obama made that statement, so this was not something that was trying to be politically correct. This was something that I felt and answered on the record.

Now, the challenge has been, of course, that we have not been able to do this in that responsible manner. There certainly haven't been any state governors that I'm aware of who have raised their hand and said, "Yes, sure, send all the detainees out here." And yet there has to be a location for these detainees. I agree with you absolutely in that regard.

And I think we are in a real conundrum right now. I can tell you that Afghanistan cannot and should not be a location to which detainees taken outside Afghanistan end up being located.

So we are in a very difficult position. And this is, together with the issue of the ticking time bomb scenario, I think this is the other major issue that needs to be addressed by a combination of policymakers and those in Congress, because our nation does have to have a place to hold individuals. There is a very legitimate con-

cern about the recidivism rate of those that have been released to various locations.

In fact, you'll have seen that there was a jail break in Yemen in the last 36 hours or so. I don't yet have the details on whether or not there were any Gitmo detainees as part of that, but I do have confirmation that some of them were al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula figures.

So, again, this is a very, very serious issue, I think, for our country, and it is one I really believe that policymakers and Congress need to address on an expeditious basis.

Vice Chairman CHAMBLISS. Well, we'll look forward to working with you, because I, too, agree that that is at the top of our priority list moving forward. And Yemen is a pretty good example of why that recidivism rate is at 25 percent and maybe even higher than that, I don't know, because there is virtually no supervision of those former Gitmo detainees in Yemen.

Well, thank you very much, General, and we look forward to seeing your confirmation process move quickly.

General PETRAEUS. Thanks, Mr. Vice Chair.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much.

Senator Wyden.

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I appreciate the chance to get into just one other area with you, General. I think you're aware that we sent you the question I'm going to ask you. We sent it to your staff and your staff had it. It deals with the fact that I feel very strongly that intelligence agencies have to be able to conduct secret operations to protect the American people, sources and method, but I also feel strongly that our laws, and particularly how they're interpreted, the official interpretation of how our laws are interpreted, that that has to be public.

So the question that I sent you, and with that essentially as my concern, involves the official interpretation of the CIA'S authorities. And the State Department's top lawyer, Harold Koh, gave a speech last year in March where he laid out the administration's official views regarding counterterrorism and the use of force, but there seems to be some question about whether the speech applies to the entire government or whether there is an exception, really an unspoken exception, for the intelligence agencies.

So the question that I sent and I ask now is, did all the statements made in that speech regarding the use of force against terrorists apply to the CIA?

General PETRAEUS. My apologies, Senator, with respect. I don't know on that. I know that it was sent over. But this is one that I'd like to take for the record, and obviously I'll get you the answer, needless to say, before the confirmation process is complete, touch wood. So I'll get that to you for the record, if I could.

Senator WYDEN. That's very helpful. That was the answer I've been hoping for. And, of course, what's key here is that it be an unclassified answer, because this is, as I say, a question of how the law is being interpreted. I want to make sure, and we had discussions about this before, that nothing is done in any way that threatens sources and methods and collections. And this is about the official interpretation. And to have that in an unclassified fash-

ion, that would be very helpful by the end of the confirmation process, and I thank you.

Senator WYDEN. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Wyden.

Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

The New York Times reported this morning that, according to military officials, the withdrawal plan outlined by the President will result in the curtailment or cancellation of plans to shift U.S. troops coming out of southern and southwestern Afghanistan to eastern Afghanistan, where Afghan, U.S. and coalition forces are fighting insurgents, including the Haqqani group. Is that accurate?

General PETRAEUS. First of all, I don't have a clue who those military sources are, and if they know something I don't know. But I'm just the commander of the theater.

Again, we have not yet done—

Senator LEVIN. As far as you know, is that accurate?

General PETRAEUS. I don't think so. Again, literally just gave guidance to the deputy chief of staff for operations of ISAF, who's also dual-hatted as the J3 for the U.S. forces, this evening on secure Internet as to how to move forward on this. And this is—they're a little bit of the planning process if I could, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LEVIN. So, if this were true, would you know it?

General PETRAEUS. I would certainly hope so. Again, as I said, I don't know how to comment on, quote, "military sources."

I actually saw that and I was a little bit surprised. This is a little bit similar to the military sources, by the way, who are also trying to comment on what my options and recommendations were going to be, and that was curious because there was only one person who knew what those were going to be and that was a four-star action officer named Petraeus.

Senator LEVIN. Well, if it turns out that is accurate, would you let us know?

General PETRAEUS. I'll be happy to.

Actually, let me just clarify, because the plan for the east was never that we were going to move massive forces. It's more that you're going to move the main effort and enablers. And, again, there's not a concept of moving brigades from the south to the east. There is a concept of moving the main effort, the focus, in other words other resources that enable those forces on the ground, and that's how you weight the main effort in a campaign like this. This is not a maneuver campaign. Perhaps there could be some small elements moved.

But, again, we have not yet done the latest iteration of the refinement of the campaign plan, and it would be premature for somebody to try to leak that to the New York Times.

Senator LEVIN. Another article in the Times this morning, the reporter, quoting himself, I think, made a general assertion that the effort to transfer security responsibility to the Afghan security forces remains "elusive" because Afghan troops are "proving unprepared for the job." Can you comment on that?

General PETRAEUS. I'd be happy to. I mean, we're going to transition, as I mentioned, in seven different locations. In those locations those Afghan forces, frankly, are already performing the bulk of the

security tasks, most significantly and prominently in Kabul, where, again, all night raids in Kabul are led and predominantly manned by Afghan forces. Not only do we not do unilateral operations, we don't do even partnered operations there. They are all led by Afghan forces there, in some cases enabled by ISAF and/or other intelligence elements that support them, but we don't do them.

I might also add that 100 percent—actually, there's a small subset we do an occasional kinetic strike—but every targeted special operation conducted in Afghanistan, every single one, is now partnered with Afghan forces. There are Afghan equivalents for our most highly qualified special mission units and then there are other elements. There are some 12,000 Afghan special operations forces now of all different categories, and I'm not including the civil order police among those.

Senator LEVIN. In all those efforts and actions are they proving—not all, but are they generally proving prepared for the job?

General PETRAEUS. They are indeed.

Now, having said that, there is an unevenness to the police in particular that is characteristic of these kinds of endeavors. As you'll recall, we faced the same in Iraq. We actually faced the same in the Balkans and Haiti and a variety of other contingency operations as well.

But there's a substantial number of good forces there, and indeed they have continued to grow and to develop and to prove themselves. It's not to say they're all going to step up to the plate and hit the ball on the first pitch, but the batting average has certainly gone up considerably.

Senator LEVIN. And finally, on President Karzai's comment, his speech about our being occupiers, I've got to tell you that while I agree with you that there are times when we have not listened adequately to President Karzai—I agree with that—on this occasion I was absolutely dismayed because I thought that comment of his, talking about us as occupiers, plays right into the hands of a common enemy, the Taliban.

And I would hope that in your determination to speak truth to power, which is your commitment here as the new CIA Director, that you also will speak truth to the President of Afghanistan, President Karzai, that that comment and that speech of his, as Eikenberry said, was really totally unacceptable and dismaying and plays into the hands of our common enemy.

General PETRAEUS. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that I have always sought, albeit in private and, on many occasions, one-on-one, to have very candid and forthright conversations with President Karzai.

Senator LEVIN. Were you dismayed by that comment?

General PETRAEUS. It did cause concern, without question. I mean, to have that—even though you understand it's to a domestic audience, you can understand some of the pressures of some issues that are out there that are of enormous concern to our Afghan partners, but at the end of the day, it's not just about the Afghan domestic public opinion. There's some domestic opinion in the 49 troop-contributing nations, not the least of which is right here in the United States.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator.

I would like to associate myself with your comments, and I just want to say to you, General, President Karzai's comments had a big impact on me. You know, I come from a state where we have a lot of veterans and a lot of people that have lost limbs, as do other Senators.

It's very hard to sustain what has increasingly become an unpopular war—because we believe we need to do it if we're ever going to stabilize that part of the world and prevent terrorism from growing—it's very hard to do that in the face of comments like this, and I just had them all pulled and took a look at them. And if you look at all of them, they're unbelievable—that we use chemical weapons, that we are occupiers, that we may use a nuclear bomb.

I mean, it's provocative, they're insulting and they're very misleading.

So, you know, we have to appropriate the money for the war. I happen to be on the Defense Subcommittee. And if the person that we're trying to help stabilize a government for him is saying these things about us, you have the automatic reaction, why the heck are we here then?

General PETRAEUS. Well, look, I am entirely sympathetic to that, needless to say. And so I will certainly ensure that that sentiment is shared with our Afghan partners.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. I appreciate that very much.

And again, we will try to get this done just as soon as we can. The questions will go out to you tomorrow by 3:00.

General PETRAEUS. Terrific.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. The sooner you get back and get them back to us, we will have all Members receive them and schedule a markup, and the vote will go to the floor. And somehow I don't think it will be controversial.

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. So thank you very much.

Senator LEVIN. General Petraeus, I think it's all of our hope that you'll get some time to yourself and your family between these two awesome responsibilities. You're entitled to that, and we hope you get it somehow.

General PETRAEUS. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Yes. In the meantime, take your wife out to dinner tonight.

[Laughter.]

General PETRAEUS. That's a novel idea. Thank you.

Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, all of you. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:03 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]

Supplemental Material

SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE



QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES

**SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE**

**QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY
PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES**

PART A - BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

1. NAME: David H. Petraeus
2. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH: 7 November 1952, Cornwall, NY
3. MARITAL STATUS: Married
4. SPOUSE'S NAME: Hollister K. Petraeus
5. SPOUSE'S MAIDEN NAME IF APPLICABLE: Knowlton
6. NAMES AND AGES OF CHILDREN:

[INFORMATION REDACTED]

7. EDUCATION SINCE HIGH SCHOOL:

<u>INSTITUTION</u>	<u>DATES ATTENDED</u>	<u>DEGREE RECEIVED</u>	<u>DATE OF DEGREE</u>
United States Military Academy	Jun 70- Jun 74	BS, No Major	Jun 1974
Princeton University	Jun 83 -Jun 85	MPA, Intl Relations	Jun 1985
Princeton University	Off campus	PHD, Intl Relations	Jun 1987

8. EMPLOYMENT RECORD (LIST ALL POSITIONS HELD SINCE COLLEGE, INCLUDING MILITARY SERVICE. INDICATE NAME OF EMPLOYER, POSITION, TITLE OR DESCRIPTION, LOCATION, AND DATES OF EMPLOYMENT.)

<u>EMPLOYER</u>	<u>POSITION/TITLE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATES</u>
United States Army	Platoon Leader/Plans Officer Battalion Adjutant/1LT	Vicenza, Italy	May 75 - Jan 79
United States Army	Asst. Operations Officer/CPT	Fort Stewart, GA	Jan 79 - Jul 79
United States Army	Company Commander/CPT and Battalion Operations Officer	Fort Stewart, GA	Jul 79 - May 81
United States Army	Aide to the Division Commander/CPT	Fort Stewart, GA	May 81 - May 82
United States Army	Student CGSC/CPT	Fort Leavenworth, KS	May 82 - Jun 83
United States Army	Student, Princeton University	Princeton, NJ	Jun 83 - Jun 85
United States Army	Asst. Professor USMA/MAJ	West Point, NY	Jul 85 - Jun 87

<u>EMPLOYER</u>	<u>POSITION/TITLE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATES</u>
United States Army	Military Asst. to SACEUR/MAJ	SHAPE, Belgium	Jun 87- Jun 88
United States Army	Battalion/Brigade Operations Officer/MAJ	Schweinfurt, Germany	Jun 88 - Aug 89
United States Army	Aide/Asst Executive Officer to the Chief of Staff, US Army/MAJ/LTC	Washington DC	Aug 89 - Aug 91
United States Army	Battalion Commander/LTC	Fort Campbell, KY	Aug 91- Jul 93
United States Army	Division Operations Officer/LTC	Fort Campbell, KY	Jul 93 - Jul 94
United States Army	Senior Service Fellow, Georgetown Univ.	Washington DC	Aug 95 - Jan 95
United States Army	Chief Operations Officer, UNMIH/LTC	Haiti	Jan 95 - Jun 95
United States Army	Brigade Commander/COL	Fort Bragg, NC	Jun 95 - Jun 97
United States Army	EA to the Dir of the Joint Staff/COL	Washington DC	Jun 97 - Sep 97
United States Army	EA to the Chairman of the Joint Staff/COL	Washington DC	Oct 97 - Aug 99
United States Army	Asst. Division Commander/BG	Fort Bragg, NC	Aug 99 - Jul 00
United States Army	Acting Commanding General /BG	Fort Bragg, NC	Jul 00 - Aug 00
United States Army	Chief of Staff, XVIII Airborne Corps /BG	Fort Bragg, NC	Aug 00 - Jun 01
United States Army	ACOS Operations/DCG C-T JIATF /BG	Sarajevo, Bosnia	Jun 01 - Jun 02
United States Army	Commanding General, 101st AB Div/MG	Fort Campbell, KY	Jul 02 - May 04
United States Army	Commander, MNSTC-I/LTG	Baghdad, Iraq	May 04 - Sep 05
United States Army	Commanding General CAC/LTG	Fort Leavenworth, KS	Oct 05 - Feb 07
United States Army	Commander, MNF-1/GEN	Baghdad, Iraq	Feb 07 - Sep 08
United States Army	Commander, USCENTCOM/GEN	Tampa, FL	Oct 08 - Jul 10
United States Army	Commander, ISAF/USFOR-AGEN	Kabul, Afghanistan	Jul 10 - Present

9. GOVERNMENT EXPERIENCE (INDICATE EXPERIENCE IN OR ASSOCIATION WITH FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING ADVISORY, CONSULTATIVE, HONORARY, OR OTHER PART-TIME SERVICE OR POSITION. DO NOT REPEAT INFORMATION ALREADY PROVIDED IN QUESTION 8):

N/A

10. INDICATE ANY SPECIALIZED INTELLIGENCE OR NATIONAL SECURITY EXPERTISE YOU HAVE ACQUIRED HAVING SERVED IN THE POSITIONS DESCRIBED IN QUESTIONS 8 AND/OR 9.

Chief Operations Officer, UN Mission in Haiti, OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, Haiti - Jan - Jun 95
 Commanding General, CJTF-K, OPERATION DESERT SPRING, Kuwait - Aug - Sep 99
 Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, SFOR and Deputy Commander, C-T JIATF, OPERATION JOINT FORGE, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina - Jun 01- Jun 02
 Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq - Mar 03 - Feb 04
 Commander, MNSTC-I, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq - May 04 - Sep 05
 Commander, MNF-I, OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq - Feb 07 - Oct 08
 Commander, USCENTCOM, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida - Oct 08 - Jul 10
 Commander, ISAF/USFOR-A, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan - Jul 10 - Present

11. HONORS AND AWARDS (PROVIDE INFORMATION ON SCHOLARSHIPS, FELLOWSHIPS, HONORARY DEGREES, MILITARY DECORATIONS, CIVILIAN SERVICE CITATIONS, OR ANY OTHER SPECIAL RECOGNITION FOR OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE OR ACHIEVEMENT):

Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
 Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
 Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
 Legion of Merit (with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters)
 Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device
 Defense Meritorious Service Medal
 Meritorious Service Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
 Joint Service Commendation Medal

Army Commendation Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
 Joint Service Achievement Medal
 Army Achievement Medal
 Joint Meritorious Unit Award (with 5 Oak Leaf Clusters)
 Army Meritorious Unit Award
 Army Superior Unit Award
 State Department Secretary's Distinguished Service Award
 State Department Superior Honor Award
 National Defense Service Medal (with 2 Service Stars)
 Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal (with 2 Service Stars)
 Afghanistan Campaign Medal (with 2 Campaign Stars)
 Iraq Campaign Medal (with 4 Campaign Stars)
 Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
 Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
 Armed Forces Service Medal
 Humanitarian Service Medal
 Army Service Ribbon
 Army Overseas Service Ribbon (with award numeral 3)
 NATO Meritorious Service Medal
 NATO Medal for Yugoslavia, NTM-I, and Afghanistan (with 2 bronze service stars)
 Commander of the Order of Merit of the Republic of Poland
 Cross of Merit of the Minister of Defence of the Czech Republic (1st Grade)
 French Légion d'Honneur grade of Officer and Commander
 French Military Campaign Medal
 Gold Award of the Iraqi Order of the Date Palm
 Honorary Officer of the Order of Australia
 Iraqi Distinguished Service Medal
 Polish Iraq Star
 Polish Army Medal (Gold)
 Romanian Chief of Defense Honor Emblem
 United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) Medal
 Combat Action Badge
 Expert Infantryman Badge
 Master Parachutist Badge
 Air Assault Badge
 Ranger Tab
 Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
 Army Staff Identification Badge
 British Army Parachutist Badge (Junior Level)
 French Parachutist Badge
 German Parachutist Badge in bronze
 One of Time's 100 Most Influential People in the World (2011)
 Named number 12 of 50 people who mattered in 2010 by New Statesmen Magazine
 Top Global Thinker of 2010 by Foreign Policy Magazine
 American Enterprise Institute's Irving Kristol Award (2010)
 Citadel Business School's Leader of Principle Award (2010)
 AUSA Massachusetts Bay Area Chapter's Person of the Year Award (2010)
 HELP USA's Award for Veterans (2010)
 Princeton University's James Madison Medal (2010)
 Lotos Club's Award of Distinction and Medal of Merit (2010)
 Pilgrims of the United States' Medallion for Service to the Nation (2010)
 Intrepid Sea, Air, and Space Museum's 2010 Intrepid Freedom Award
 Veterans of Foreign Wars Dwight D. Eisenhower Award (2010)
 American Political Science Association's Hubert H. Humphrey Award (2010)
 Named number eight of the The FP Top 100 Global Thinkers by Foreign Policy (November 2010)
 USO Distinguished Service Award (2010)

George Kennan Award by the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (2010)
 Barbara Walter's pick for the Most Fascinating Person of 2010
 One of Time Magazine's 50 "People Who Mattered" (December 2010)
 Sam M. Gibbons Lifetime Achievement Award (2009)
 American Legion's Distinguished Service Medal (2009)
 Atlantic Council's Military Leadership Award (2009)
 Union League Club of Philadelphia's Abraham Lincoln Award (2009)
 National Father's Day Committee's Father of the Year Award (2009)
 National Committee on American Foreign Policy's George F. Kennan Award (2009)
 National Defense Industrial Association's Eisenhower Award (2009)
 Office of Strategic Service Society's William J. Donovan Award (2009)
 No Greater Sacrifice Freedom Award (2009)
 Congressional Medal of Honor Society's Distinguished Citizen Award (2009)
 Distinguished Member of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (2009)
 Honorary President of the 7th Armored Division Association (2009)
 Named one of Esquire's "75 Best People in the World" (2009)
 Selected in a poll by Foreign Policy and Prospect magazines as one of the world's top 100 intellectuals (2008)
 Eisenhower Award from the Business Executive for National Security (2008)
 Static Line Association's 2008 Man of the Year
 Named "America's most respected soldier" by Der Spiegel (2008)
 GQ's "Leader of the Year: Right Man, Right Time" (2008)
 Newsweek's 16th Most Powerful Person in the World (Dec 20, 2008)
 Prospect Magazine's "Public Intellectual of the Year"(2008)
 One of Time's 100 Most Influential Leaders and Revolutionaries of the Year (2007)
 One of four runners up for Time's Person of the Year (2007)
 The Daily Telegraph's Man of the Year and second most influential American Conservative (2007)
 Selected as one of America's top leaders by US News and World Report (2005)

12. ORGANIZATIONAL AFFILIATIONS (LIST MEMBERSHIPS IN AND OFFICES HELD WITHIN THE LAST TEN YEARS IN ANY PROFESSIONAL, CIVIC, FRATERNAL, BUSINESS, SCHOLARLY, CULTURAL, CHARITABLE, OR OTHER SIMILAR ORGANIZATIONS):

<u>ORGANIZATION</u>	<u>OFFICE HELD</u>	<u>DATES</u>
SHAPE Officers Assoc	None	1988 - Present
Association of the US Army	None	1974 - Present
Edward Howell Family Association	None	1974 - Present
Council on Foreign Relations	None	1985 - Present
504th PIR Association	None	1995 - Present
82nd Airborne Division Association	None	1999 - Present
101st Airborne Division Association	None	2002 - Present
Assoc of Princeton Graduate Alumni	None	1987 - Present
Assoc of Graduates, USMA	None	1974 - Present

13. PUBLISHED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES (LIST THE TITLES, PUBLISHERS, AND PUBLICATION DATES OF ANY BOOKS, ARTICLES, REPORTS, OR OTHER PUBLISHED MATERIALS YOU HAVE AUTHORED. ALSO LIST ANY PUBLIC SPEECHES YOU HAVE MADE WITHIN THE LAST TEN YEARS FOR WHICH THERE IS A TEXT OR TRANSCRIPT. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, PLEASE PROVIDE A COPY OF EACH SUCH PUBLICATION, TEXT, OR TRANSCRIPT):

PUBLICATIONS

- Lorenz, G. C.; Willbanks, James H.; Petraeus, David H.; Stuart, Paul A.; Crittenden, Burr L.; George, Dewey P. (1983). *Operation Junction City, Vietnam 1967 : battle book*. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College. Combat Studies Institute. OCLC 15637627. DTIC ADA139612. LCC DS537.7 .O63 1987.
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- (2007) The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual (Forward)"FM-3-24"^(www.com)
- (2007) "Beyond the Cloister." *The American Interest Magazine*^(www.com)
- Petraeus, David H. (2007). "Iraq: Progress in the Face of Challenges". *Army Magazine* (Arlington, VA: Association of the US Army) 57 (10): pp. 115-123. October 2007.
[http://www.1.usa.gov/Webpub/DeptLisenBook.nsf/byid/WE0P-77GIMHX/\\$File/Petraeus.pdf?OpenElement](http://www.1.usa.gov/Webpub/DeptLisenBook.nsf/byid/WE0P-77GIMHX/$File/Petraeus.pdf?OpenElement)
- Petraeus, David H. (2008). "Iraq: Building on Progress". *Army Magazine* (Arlington, VA: Association of the US Army) 58 (10): pp. 109-123. 2008
- Petraeus, David H. (2008). "Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander's COUNTERINSURGENCY GUIDANCE". *Military Review*, v88: 2-4, September-October 2008.
- Petraeus, David H. (2010). "Counterinsurgency Concepts: What We Learned in Iraq". *Global Policy* 1 (1): 116-117. doi:10.1111/j.1758-3899.2009.00003.x.
- Petraeus, David H. (2010) "Shoulder to shoulder in Afghanistan." *Policy Options*, April 2010.
- Petraeus, David H. (2010) "Setting--and Capitalizing on--Conditions for Progress in Afghanistan". *Army Magazine* (Arlington, VA: Association of the US Army) 60 (10):pp. 85-94. October 2010.
- Petraeus, David H. (2011). "Ryan C. Crocker: Diplomat and Partner Extraordinaire". *Army Magazine* (Arlington, VA: Association of the US Army) 61 (4): pp. 16, 18. April 2011.
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Selected Speeches* of General David H. Petraeus
Assistant Division Commander (Operations), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg,
North Carolina
August 1999 – August 2000

21 March 2000	Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University	Princeton, New Jersey
19 July 2000	Relinquishment of Command, 82d Airborne Division	Fort Bragg, North Carolina
20 July 2000	Signal Conference	Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Selected Speeches* of General David H. Petraeus
Chief of Staff, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
August 2000 – June 2001

23 March 2001	Combined Federal Campaign Super Giver's Luncheon	Fort Bragg, North Carolina
27 March 2001	Women's Day	Fort Bragg, North Carolina
17 May 2001	7 th Annual Rules of Engagement Conference	Fort Bragg, North Carolina

* Selected Speeches exclude routine / opening remarks given in standard military functions such as: change of command, retirement, reenlistment, and promotion ceremonies.

**Selected Speeches* of General David H. Petraeus
Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and Fort Campbell
July 2002 – May 2004**

16 January 2002	Hop-Town Kiwanis Luncheon	Near Fort Campbell, Kentucky
11 February 2002	Remarks to the Citizens of Fort Campbell	Fort Campbell, Kentucky
9 August 2002	Speaker Introduction for the Kaisu Replacement Center Memorialization	Fort Campbell, Kentucky
7 September 2002	Hop-Town Salutes	Fort Campbell, Kentucky
26 September 2002	Chamber of Commerce, Clarksville, Tennessee	Clarksville, Tennessee
30 September 2002	Henry O. Kinnard Competition	Fort Campbell, Kentucky
30 September 2002	RCI Signing Ceremony	Fort Campbell, Kentucky
1 October 2002	Ceremony in Honor of the 50 th Anniversary of the Korean War	Fort Campbell, Kentucky
22 October 2002	Tennessee/Kentucky Reception	Fort Campbell, Kentucky
9 November 2002	Veterans Day Breakfast	Clarksville, Tennessee
9 November 2002	Veterans Day Ceremony	Clarksville, Tennessee
22 November 2002	G3 OPD	Fort Campbell, Kentucky
7 December 2002	WK and T Memorial Dinner	Fort Campbell, Kentucky
20 February 2003	AUSA Dinner	Fort Campbell, Kentucky
8 August 2003	Joint Iraqi Security Course (JISC) Graduation	Iraq
16 August 2003	57 th Anniversary of the Kurdistan Democratic Party	Iraq
8 September 2003	Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) Graduation	Camp Claiborne, Mosul, Iraq
13 September 2003	Opening of the Mosul Regional Confinement Facility	Mosul, Iraq
18 September 2003	Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) Graduation	Mosul, Iraq
11 September 2003	Remarks in Honor of the 9/11 Commemoration	Mosul, Iraq
14 November 2003	Dedication of the Dietrich Training Center	Mosul, Iraq
6 January 2004	Iraqi Army Birthday Celebration	Iraq
5 March 2004	USMA Class of 2004 100 th Night	West Point, New York
18 March 2004	Introduction of President Bush	Fort Campbell, Kentucky
26 March 2004	AAAA	Fort Campbell, Kentucky
10 May 2004	Dedication of the Sam Johnson Golf Clubhouse	Fort Campbell, Kentucky
14 May 2004	101st Division Change of Command	Fort Campbell, Kentucky

**Selected Speeches* of General David H. Petraeus
Commander, Combined Arms Center
October 2005-December 2006**

20 October 2005	Combined Arms Center Assumption of Command	Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
9 December 2005	International Military Students' Holiday Dinner Dance	Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
15 December 2005	Information Operations Symposium	Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
4 March 2006	Leavenworth Public Schools Foundation	Leavenworth, Kansas
6 April 2006	Kansas Proclamation Ceremony In Honor Of General Wallace	Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
20 April 2006	Frontier Army Museum Reopening	Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
23 April 2006	Military Review, North Georgia College and State	Dahlonega, Georgia

	University	
2 May 2006	Hall of Fame Induction Ceremony for General Gordon R. Sullivan	Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
8 May 2006	Truman Luncheon	Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
25 May 2006	Wounded Warrior Luncheon	Nashville, Tennessee
15 June 2006	International Military Student Graduate Badge Ceremony	Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
8 August 2006	Combat Studies Institute Conference	Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
14 August 2006	International Military Student Flag Ceremony	Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
19 August 2006	American Legion Riders Legacy Run	Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
7 September 2006	555 th Parachute Infantry Association Bust Dedication Ceremony	Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
7 September 2006	555 th Parachute Infantry Association Banquet	Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
23 September 2006	MP Open Collar Regimental Strategy Dinner	Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri
5 October 2006	International Hall of Fame Induction Ceremony	Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
26 October 2006	Excerpts from Military Reporters and Editors	Chicago, Illinois
15 November 2006	The Bernstein Lecture, Johns Hopkins "Soldiering and the Schoolhouse"	Washington, DC

**Selected Speeches* and Letters of General David H. Petraeus
Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq
10 February 2007-16 September 2008**

10 February 2007	Multi-National Force-Iraq Change of Command	Baghdad, Iraq
5 May 2007	MNF-I Change of Responsibility Ceremony	Baghdad, Iraq
7 May 2007	Keynote Address to the Newspaper Association of America	New York, NY (via VTC)
15 May 2007	2 nd Anniversary of Iraqi Ground Forces Command	Baghdad, Iraq
6 June 2007	Iraqi Commanders' Conference	Baghdad, Iraq
10 June 2007	MNSTC-I Change of Command	Baghdad, Iraq
28 June 2007	Iraqi Police Graduation	Hillah, Iraq
9 July 2007	Connecticut World Affairs Council Dinner	Hartford, CT (taped remarks)
18 July 2007	Baghdad Police Summit	Baghdad, Iraq
20 August 2007	Veterans of Foreign Wars National Conference	Kansas City, MO (taped remarks)
29 August 2007	American Legion National Conference	Reno, NV (taped remarks)
6 December 2007	Opening Statement for Roundtable with SecDef's Press Pool	Baghdad, Iraq
13 December 2007	Tribal Luncheon	Baghdad, Iraq
18 December 2007	Iraqi National Police Carabinieri Graduation	Baghdad, Iraq
12 January 2008	Opening Statement for Roundtable with POTUS's Press Pool	Kuwait
17 January 2008	Remarks at the Joint Contracting Command – Iraq / Afghanistan Change of Command	Baghdad, Iraq
21 January 2008	Remarks for Iraqi National Police Basic Recruit Training and Advanced Individual Training Graduation	Numaniyah, Iraq
31 January 2008	Zembiac-Pad Dedication Ceremony	Baghdad, Iraq

14 February 2008	Multi-National Corps-Iraq TOA	Baghdad, Iraq
28 April 2008	Consortium for Complex Operations	Washington, DC (taped)
April 2008	Iraqi Air Day	Baghdad, Iraq
23 June 2008	Opening Remarks for Biometrics Conference	Baghdad, Iraq
3 July 2008	MNSTC-I Change of Command	Baghdad, Iraq
July 2008	Remarks for 1,000th HMMWV Ceremony	Baghdad, Iraq
4 July 2008	4th of July Re-enlistment Ceremony	Baghdad, Iraq
7 July 2008	Iraqi JHQ Division Commanders' Conference	Baghdad, Iraq
16 July 2008	Northern Province Police Conference	Iraq
17 July 2008	ICAF Strategic Leadership Course	Baghdad, Iraq (taped)
August 2008	Remarks for Jadriyah Lake Park Opening	Jadriyah, Iraq
August 2008	"What it Means to be an NCO"	Iraq
30 August 2008	Remarks for MNF-I Reception	Baghdad, Iraq
September 2008	Remarks for MoD Farewell Ceremony	Baghdad, Iraq
16 September 2008	MNF-I Change of Command Ceremony	Baghdad, Iraq
25 September 2008	Talk at Collège Interarmées de Défense	Paris, France
30 September 2008	Presentation to the Pilgrims Society	London, England
17 October 2008	Naval War College Remarks	Newport, Rhode Island
October 2008	Remarks for the Center for Oral History	

**Selected Speeches* and Articles of General David H. Petraeus
Commander, United States Central Command, MacDIII, AFB, Florida,
October 2008 – July 2010**

31-Oct-08	US Central Command Change of Command	Tampa, FL
19-Nov-08	BENS Eisenhower Award Dinner	New York, NY
14-Dec-08	Manama Dialogue Plenary Session: "Changing Regional Security Architecture"	Manama, Bahrain
15-Dec-08	USO Armed Forces Gala and Gold Award Banquet	New York, NY
8-Jan-09	United States Institute of Peace Passing the Baton Conference: "The Way Forward in Afghanistan"	Washington, DC
8-Feb-09	45 th Munich Security Conference: "The Future of the Alliance and the Mission in Afghanistan"	Munich, Germany
4-Mar-09	Ambassadors Conference	Washington, DC
7-Mar-09	Medal of Honor Society Celebration of Freedom Gala	Simi Valley, CA
11-Mar-09	Armed Services YMCA "Angels of the Battlefield" Keynote Address	Washington, DC
9-Apr-09	Forum Club of the Palm Beaches	West Palm Beach, FL
21-Apr-09	Harvard Veterans Tribute Dinner	Cambridge, MA
27-Apr-09	Landon Lecture	Manhattan, KS
29-Apr-09	Atlantic Council of the United States Award Gala	Washington, DC
1-May-09	No Greater Sacrifice Freedom Award Gala	Washington, DC
2-May-09	OSS Donovan Award Dinner	Washington, DC
3-May-09	New Jersey Hall of Fame Ceremony (LT Brennan Intro)	Newark, NJ
8-May-09	NDIA Eisenhower Award	Washington, DC

16-May-09	VMI Commencement Address	Lexington, VA
28-May-09	NCAFP George F. Kennan Award	New York, NY
31-May-09	Princeton University Baccalaureate Address	Princeton, NJ
7-Jun-09	ICAF Course Intro (Taping)	Tampa, FL
8-Jun-09	Kwanis Club of St. Petersburg	St. Petersburg, FL
30-Jul-09	Marine Corps Association Annual Dinner	Washington, DC
25-Aug-09	American Legion Distinguished Service Medal	Louisville, KY
26-Aug-09	"The Vince" Dedication Ceremony	Tampa, FL
28-Aug-09	Civil Affairs Association Eli Nobleman Award (Taping)	Tampa, FL
17-Sep-09	Colin Cramphorn Memorial Lecture: CENTCOM Strategic Assessment	London, England
20-Sep-09	Waal River Crossing	Netherlands
5-Oct-09	Woodrow Wilson School VTC	Princeton, NJ (via VTC)
6-Oct-09	AUSA Conference Opening Remarks	Washington, DC
8-Oct-09	Highway Dedication in NY	Corwall, NY
14-Oct-09	WTC Tampa Lifetime Achievement Award Banquet	Tampa, FL
22-Oct-09	CENTCOM Forward HQ Ribbon Cutting Ceremony	Qatar
3-Nov-09	Australian Investiture Ceremony	Tampa, FL
4-Nov-09	Woodrow Wilson Award for Public Service	St. Petersburg, FL
4-Nov-09	US Chamber of Commerce	Washington, DC
4-Nov-09	Home Front Cares Annual Dinner	Colorado Springs, CO
6-Nov-09	Naval War College	Newport, RI
11-Nov-09	Veterans Day Video Message (Taping)	Taped in Tampa, Florida
13-Nov-09	NDU Foundation American Patriot Award	Washington, DC
13-Nov-09	American Veterans Center Conference	Arlington, VA
21-Nov-09	Delta Formal	Pinehurst, NC
3-Dec-09	USAID Mission Directors Conference	Washington, DC
13-Dec-09	IISS Manama Dialogue 2009 Regional Security Architecture	Manama, Bahrain
19-Dec-09	World Wrestling Entertainment "Tribute to the Troops" Holiday TV Special (Taping)	Taped in Tampa, Florida
1-Jan-10	USF-I Ceremony	Baghdad, Iraq
14-Jan-10	St. Pete's Chamber Award	St. Petersburg, FL
9-Feb-10	Lotos Club Awards	New York, NY
20-Feb-10	Princeton University Madison Medal Public Lecture	Princeton, NJ
20-Feb-10	Madison Medal Reception Remarks	Princeton, NJ
22-Feb-10	Pakistan Military Academy Visit	Pakistan
2-Mar-10	HELP USA Tribute Award Dinner	New York, NY
4-Mar-10	73rd Annual General Meeting of the Conference of Defense Associations	Ottawa, Canada
4-Mar-10	Massachusetts AUSA "Person of the Year" Award	Burlington, MA
11-Mar-10	Womens' Shelter Groundbreaking Ceremony	Kyrgyzstan

24-Mar-10	St. Anselm College (OREMS)	Manchester, NH
25-Mar-10	Brigham Young University (OREMS)	Provo, Utah
25-Mar-10	Yale University Grand Strategy Program	New Haven, CT
28-Mar-10	Honda Grand Prix	St. Petersburg, FL
30-Mar-10	Economic Faculty Association Rotterdam – Business Week 2010: "Strategic Leadership"	Rotterdam, Netherlands
31-Mar-10	International Air and Missile Defense Symposium (Taping)	United Arab Emirates
1-Apr-10	Ranger School Graduation	Fort Benning, GA
13-Apr-10	TAPS Honor Gala	Washington, DC
15-Apr-10	Cital Business School Hall of Fame	Charleston, SC
15-Apr-10	United States Holocaust Memorial Museum: National Days of Remembrance Commemoration	US Capitol Building, Washington DC
16-Apr-10	Netherland-America Foundation Awards Dinner	Arlington, VA
17-Apr-10	Quad Cities Call to Remembrance (Taping)	Moline, IL
23-Apr-10	DISA Partnership Conference (Taping)	Washington, DC
6-May-10	Irving Kristol Award, "The Surge of Ideas: COINdinitas and Change in the US Army in 2006"	Washington, DC
13-May-10	Texas A&M Commencement	College Station, TX
14-May-10	Louisville Armed Forces Day Dinner	Louisville, KY
21-May-10	Council for National Policy George Washington Military Leadership Award	Washington, DC
23-May-10	Eckerd College Commencement	St. Petersburg, FL
27-May-10	Intrepid Freedom Award Salute to Freedom	New York, NY
28-May-10	State Department POLAD Forum	Washington, DC
31-May-10	American Movie Classics Movie Marathon (2010 Memorial Day)	Taped in Tampa, FL
10-Jun-10	RUSI Land Warfare Institute Presentation	London, England
17-Jun-10	Scotty Smiley Father of the Year Award (Taping)	New York, NY
21-Jun-10	Truman Library Korean War Veterans Appreciation Ceremony: "Far From Forgotten"	Independence, Missouri
24-Jun-10	Hudson Institute	New York, NY
25-Jun-10	Cornwall High School Graduation Address	Cornwall, NY
25-Jun-10	National Purple Heart Hall of Honor Tribute: "Heroes Worth Honoring...Stories Worth Hearing"	New Windsor, NY

**Selected Speeches* and Articles of General David H. Petraeus
Commander, International Security Assistance Force/US Forces-Afghanistan,
4 July 2010 – 28 April 2011**

4 July 2010	ISAF/US Forces-Afghanistan Assumption of Command	ISAF HQs, Kabul, Afghanistan
5 July 2010	ANA Senior NCO Seminar	Kabul Military Training Center, Kabul, Afghanistan
7 August 2010	Afghan National Youth Conference	Kabul, Afghanistan

9 August 2010	COMISAF Message to the Afghan People for Ramazan (Tape)	ISAF HQs, Kabul, Afghanistan
23 August 2010	Veterans of Foreign Wars Annual Convention Eisenhower Award Acceptance Remarks (VTC)	ISAG HQs, Kabul, Afghanistan
28 August 2010	"The US-Afghan Strategic Partnership" Media Roundtable	Shar-e-Naw, Afghanistan
August 2010	2010 AUSA Greenbook Submission	Published
1 September 2010	ISAF/US Forces-Afghanistan Change of Responsibility Ceremony	Kabul, Afghanistan
10-12 September 2010	Eid-Al-Fitr Message to the Afghan People (Tape)	ISAF HQs, Kabul, Afghanistan
2 October 2010	VSO/ALP Video Series Opening Remarks (Tape)	ISAF HQs, Kabul, Afghanistan
3 October 2010	Humanitarian Service Medal Presentation	Bagram Air Field, Afghanistan
15 October 2010	Royal United Services Institute Opening Remarks	London, England
1 November 2010	National Youth High Council General Assembly	Safi Landmark Hotel, Kabul, Afghanistan
November 2010	Contribution to Katie Couric's Book of Advice	Kabul, Afghanistan
12 November 2010	ISAF Joint Command: One Year Anniversary (Tape)	Kabul, Afghanistan
15 November 2010	Eid-al-Adha Message (Tape)	Kabul, Afghanistan
28 November 2010	Albanian Independence Day Ceremony	The Milano, ISAF HQs, Kabul, Afghanistan
30 November 2010	ISAF Training Conference (VTC)	ISAF HQs, Kabul, Afghanistan
1 December 2010	Romanian National Day Ceremony	The Milano, ISAF HQs, Kabul, Afghanistan
3 December 2010	Opening Remarks for POTUS	Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan
9 December 2010	CFSOCC-A ALP Conference	New Kabul Compound, Kabul, Afghanistan
14 December 2010	Remarks for ANCOP Senior Leaders Seminar	Kabul, Afghanistan
14 December 2010	Petraeus on Holbrooks (Op-Ed)	published
15 December 2010	Remarks at ISOF SOF Conference	ISAF HQs, Kabul, Afghanistan
27 January 2011	ANP Symposium (VTC)	ISAF HQs, Kabul, Afghanistan
27 January 2011	Emily J.T. Perez Foundation Annual Banquet (Tape)	ISAF HQs, Kabul, Afghanistan
2 February 2011	CFSOCC-A Leadership Conference (VTC)	ISAF HQs, Kabul, Afghanistan
2 February 2011	Remarks for the Regional Support Commander's Conference	National Training Mission-Afghanistan, Camp Eggers, Kabul, Afghanistan
26 February 2011	Now Rūz (New Year) Message to the People of Afghanistan (Tape)	ISAF HQs, Kabul, Afghanistan
3 March 2011	Bulgarian Liberation Day Ceremony	Camp Phoenix, Afghanistan
11 March 2011	NATO Defense Ministerial Afghanistan Troop Contributing Nations Intervention	Brussels, Belgium
24 March 2011	Norwuz (New Year's) Celebration (Tape)	ISAF HQs, Kabul, Afghanistan
30 March 2011	Remarks for ISAF CJ6 Transition Conference	Kabul, Afghanistan
6 April 2011	Afghan Hands Conference	Camp Phoenix, Kabul, Afghanistan
9 April 2011	Amb. Mark Sedwill Farewell	ISAF HQs, Kabul, Afghanistan
9 April 2011	CFSOCC-A ALP Conference	New Kabul Compound (NKC), Kabul, Afghanistan
12 April 2011	160 th SOAR 30 th Anniversary Ball (Tape)	ISAF HQs, Kabul, Afghanistan

12 April 2011	COIN Leader's Conference	Camp Julien, Kabul
14 April 2011	Foreign Affairs Ministerial (VTC)	ISAF HQs, Kabul, Afghanistan
April 2011	Public Statement Condemning Terry Jones Actions/Michigan Event (Tape)	ISAF HQs, Kabul, Afghanistan
26 April 2011	Posting to Chris Hondros's website upon his death in Libya (Web)	ISAF HQs, Kabul, Afghanistan
28 April 2011	Remarks on Nomination as the 20 th Director of the CIA	The White House, Washington, DC

* Selected Speeches exclude routine / opening remarks given in standard military functions such as: change of command, retirement, reenlistment, and promotion ceremonies.

Congressional Testimony

23 January 2007	Commanding General, Multi-National Force – Iraq; Confirmation Hearing	Senate Armed Services Committee
25 April 2007	Iraq Operations / Intelligence Update Hearing	Full House Members
25 April 2007	Iraq Operations / Intelligence Update Hearing	Full Senate Members
19 July 2007	Update on Situation in Iraq to Congressional Leaders	Congress (via VTC)
10 September 2007	The Status of the War and Political Developments in Iraq	House Armed Services Committee and House Foreign Affairs Committee (Combined)
11 September 2007	Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq	Senate Armed Services Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Combined)
08 April 2008	Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq	Senate Armed Services Committee
08 April 2008	Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq	Senate Foreign Relations Committee
09 April 2008	Hearing on the Status of the War and Political Developments in Iraq	House Armed Services Committee
09 April 2008	Report on Iraq to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs	House Foreign Affairs Committee
22 May 2008	US Central Command Confirmation Hearing	Senate Armed Services Committee
01 April 2009	The Afghanistan-Pakistan Strategic Review and the Posture of US Central Command	Senate Armed Services Committee
22 April 2009	The Posture of US Central Command (Closed)	House Appropriations Committee – Defense Subcommittee
24 April 2009	The Posture of US Central Command (Closed)	House Appropriations Committee – Military Construction and Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee

9 December 2009	The Situation in Afghanistan	Senate Foreign Relations Committee
16 March 2010	The Posture of US Central Command	Senate Armed Services Committee
16 March 2010	The Posture of US Central Command (Closed)	House Appropriations Committee – Defense Subcommittee
17 March 2010	The Posture of US Central Command	House Appropriations Committee – Military Construction and Veterans' Affairs Subcommittee
17 March 2010	The Posture of US Central Command	House Armed Service Committee
5 May 2010	The Posture of US Central Command, SOCOM and AFRICOM (Closed Briefing)	Senate Appropriations Committee—Defense Subcommittee
15 June 2010	The Situation in Afghanistan (Ended Early)	Senate Armed Services Committee
16 June 2010	The Situation in Afghanistan	Senate Armed Services Committee
16 June 2010	The Situation in Afghanistan	House Armed Services Committee
29 June 2010	Confirmation Hearing for nomination as Commander ISAF	Senate Armed Services Committee
15 March 2011	The Situation in Afghanistan	Senate Armed Services Committee
16 March 2011	The Situation in Afghanistan	House Armed Services Committee
16 March 2011	The Situation in Afghanistan	Senate Foreign Relations Committee
17 March 2011	The Situation in Afghanistan (Closed)	House Appropriations Committee – Defense Subcommittee

PART B - QUALIFICATIONS

14. QUALIFICATIONS (DESCRIBE WHY YOU BELIEVE YOU ARE QUALIFIED TO SERVE IN THE POSITION FOR WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED):

Throughout my career, and particularly in the last decade, I have been involved in military operations to counter some of our nation's most dangerous enemies and to address complex national security challenges. As a result, I have become familiar both with the primary threats facing our nation and with the Agency's vital role in protecting the American people. In particular, as COMMNF-I, COMUSCENTCOM, and COMISAF, I have commanded both operational and tactical intelligence assets; coordinated closely with the Agency on day-to-day operations; helped to develop comprehensive campaign plans to integrate Agency assets with other instruments of national power in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere; and participated in the review of National Intelligence Estimates. Moreover, during this time, I have been a consummate consumer of daily intelligence reports, and have also had the chance to observe firsthand the importance of intelligence assessments for senior policymakers.

PART C - POLITICAL AND FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

15. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES (LIST ANY MEMBERSHIPS OR OFFICES HELD IN OR FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS OR SERVICES RENDERED TO, ANY POLITICAL PARTY, ELECTION COMMITTEE, POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE, OR INDIVIDUAL CANDIDATE DURING THE LAST TEN YEARS):

None

16. CANDIDACY FOR PUBLIC OFFICE (FURNISH DETAILS OF ANY CANDIDACY FOR ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICE):

None

17. FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

(NOTE: QUESTIONS 17A AND B ARE NOT LIMITED TO RELATIONSHIPS REQUIRING REGISTRATION UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT. QUESTIONS 17A, B, AND C DO NOT CALL FOR A POSITIVE RESPONSE IF THE REPRESENTATION OR TRANSACTION WAS AUTHORIZED BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN CONNECTION WITH YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE.)

A. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER REPRESENTED IN ANY CAPACITY (E.G. EMPLOYEE, ATTORNEY, OR POLITICAL/BUSINESS CONSULTANT), WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR AN ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE FULLY DESCRIBE SUCH RELATIONSHIP.

No

B. HAVE ANY OF YOUR OR YOUR SPOUSE'S ASSOCIATES REPRESENTED, IN ANY CAPACITY, WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR AN ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE FULLY DESCRIBE SUCH RELATIONSHIP.

No

C. DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE RECEIVED ANY COMPENSATION FROM, OR BEEN INVOLVED IN ANY FINANCIAL OR BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS WITH, A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OR ANY ENTITY CONTROLLED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

D. HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER REGISTERED UNDER THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

18. DESCRIBE ANY LOBBYING ACTIVITY DURING THE PAST TEN YEARS, OTHER THAN IN AN OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT CAPACITY, IN WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE ENGAGED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY INFLUENCING THE PASSAGE, DEFEAT, OR MODIFICATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION, OR FOR THE PURPOSE OF AFFECTING THE ADMINISTRATION AND EXECUTION OF FEDERAL LAW OR PUBLIC POLICY.

No

PART D - FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST

19. DESCRIBE ANY EMPLOYMENT, BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP, FINANCIAL TRANSACTION, INVESTMENT, ASSOCIATION, OR ACTIVITY (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, DEALINGS WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ON YOUR OWN BEHALF OR ON BEHALF OF A CLIENT), WHICH COULD CREATE, OR APPEAR TO CREATE, A CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED.

In connection with the nomination process, I have consulted with the Office of Government Ethics and the Office of Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) Designated Agency Ethics Official to identify potential conflicts of interest. Any potential conflicts of interest will be resolved in accordance with the terms of an ethics agreement that I have entered into with the CIA's Designated Agency Ethics Official and that has been provided to this Committee. I am not aware of any other potential conflicts of interest.

20. DO YOU INTEND TO SEVER ALL BUSINESS CONNECTIONS WITH YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYERS, FIRMS, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES AND/OR PARTNERSHIPS, OR OTHER ORGANIZATIONS IN THE EVENT THAT YOU ARE CONFIRMED BY THE SENATE? IF NOT, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

I will be retiring from active duty military service on completion of assignment as Commander ISAF.

21. DESCRIBE THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS YOU HAVE MADE OR PLAN TO MAKE, IF YOU ARE CONFIRMED, IN CONNECTION WITH SEVERANCE FROM YOUR CURRENT POSITION. PLEASE INCLUDE SEVERANCE PAY, PENSION RIGHTS, STOCK OPTIONS, DEFERRED INCOME ARRANGEMENTS, AND ANY AND ALL COMPENSATION THAT WILL OR MIGHT BE RECEIVED IN THE FUTURE AS A RESULT OF YOUR CURRENT BUSINESS OR PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS.

In connection with the nomination process, I have consulted with the Office of Government Ethics and the Office of Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA's) Designated Agency Ethics Official to identify potential conflicts of interest. Any potential conflicts of interest will be resolved in accordance with the terms of an ethics agreement that I have entered into with the CIA's Designated Agency Ethics Official and that has been provided to this Committee. I am not aware of any other potential conflicts of interest.

22. DO YOU HAVE ANY PLANS, COMMITMENTS, OR AGREEMENTS TO PURSUE OUTSIDE EMPLOYMENT, WITH OR WITHOUT COMPENSATION, DURING YOUR SERVICE WITH THE GOVERNMENT? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

23. AS FAR AS CAN BE FORESEEN, STATE YOUR PLANS AFTER COMPLETING GOVERNMENT SERVICE. PLEASE SPECIFICALLY DESCRIBE ANY AGREEMENTS OR UNDERSTANDINGS, WRITTEN OR UNWRITTEN, CONCERNING EMPLOYMENT AFTER LEAVING GOVERNMENT SERVICE. IN PARTICULAR, DESCRIBE ANY AGREEMENTS, UNDERSTANDINGS, OR OPTIONS TO RETURN TO YOUR CURRENT POSITION.

None

24. IF YOU ARE PRESENTLY IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE, DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS OF SUCH SERVICE, HAVE YOU RECEIVED FROM A PERSON OUTSIDE OF GOVERNMENT AN OFFER OR EXPRESSION OF INTEREST TO EMPLOY YOUR SERVICES AFTER YOU LEAVE GOVERNMENT SERVICE? IF YES, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

25. IS YOUR SPOUSE EMPLOYED? IF YES AND THE NATURE OF THIS EMPLOYMENT IS RELATED IN ANY WAY TO THE POSITION FOR WHICH YOU ARE SEEKING CONFIRMATION, PLEASE INDICATE YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYER, THE POSITION, AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THE POSITION HAS BEEN HELD. IF YOUR SPOUSE'S EMPLOYMENT IS NOT RELATED TO THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED, PLEASE SO STATE.

Yes, she is currently employed by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as Assistant Director: Office of Servicemember Affairs. She was hired on 12 January 2011. There is no connection between my wife's employment and my nomination as the Director of CIA.

26. LIST BELOW ALL CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, FOUNDATIONS, TRUSTS, OR OTHER ENTITIES TOWARD WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS OR IN WHICH YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE HAVE HELD DIRECTORSHIPS OR OTHER POSITIONS OF TRUST DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS.

[INFORMATION REDACTED]

27. LIST ALL GIFTS EXCEEDING \$100 IN VALUE RECEIVED DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS BY YOU, YOUR SPOUSE, OR YOUR DEPENDENTS. (NOTE: GIFTS RECEIVED FROM RELATIVES AND GIFTS GIVEN TO YOUR SPOUSE OR DEPENDENT NEED NOT BE INCLUDED UNLESS THE GIFT WAS GIVEN WITH YOUR KNOWLEDGE AND ACQUIESCENCE AND YOU HAD REASON TO BELIEVE THE GIFT WAS GIVEN BECAUSE OF YOUR OFFICIAL POSITION.)

I received ceremonial gifts on numerous occasions from foreign officials in the course of my duties. The gifts were handled in accordance with current DoD instructions and policies. All gifts/events below were approved by the ethics advisor.

Date	Gift/Award	Value (\$)	Donor (\$)	Total Cost	Donor
11-Mar-11	iPod Touch 8	[INFORMATION REDACTED]			Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili
24-Jun-10	James H. Doolittle Prize (Lead Crystal sculpture)				The Hudson Institute
1-May-10	Irving Kristol Award (Bow)				AEI
1-May-10	George Washington Military Leadership Award (Plaque)				Council for National Policy

Date	Gift/ Award	Value (\$)	Dinner (\$)	Total Cost	Donor
2-Mar-10	Veteran Excellence Award (2 Crystal Houses)	[INFORMATION REDACTED]			HELP USA
20-Feb-10	James Madison Medal				Assn of Princeton Graduate Alumni
2010	Pilgrims of the United States' Medallion for Service to the Nation				Pilgrim's Club NYC
13-Nov-09	American Patriot Award (Eagle)				NDU Foundation
9 Nov 09	Woodrow Wilson Award for Public Service (Crystal troph)				Woodrow Wilson Int'l Center & Smithsonian
25 Aug 09	Distinguished Service Medal				American Legion
16-Jun-09	Abraham Lincoln Award (Bronze statue on a wood base)				Union League of Philadelphia
28-May-09	George F. Kennan Award for Distinguished Public Service (Plaque)				The National Committee on Foreign Policy
8-May-09	Dwight D. Eisenhower Award and Medal (Brass/gold Medal)				National Defense Industrial Assn
2-May-09	William J. Donovan Award (Medal)				OSS Society
1-May-09	Freedom Award (Plaque w/eagle)				No Greater Sacrifice

Date	Gift/ Award	Value (\$)	Dinner (\$)	Total Cost	Donor
29-Apr-09	Distinguished Military Leadership Award	[INFORMATION REDACTED]			Atlantic Council
7-Mar-09	Distinguished Citizen Award (Silver Medallion)				The CMH Society
2009	Sam M. Gibbons Lifetime Achievement Award				World Trade Center Tampa Bay
13-Dec-08	Distinguished Service Award				USO of Metropolitan New York
19-Nov-08	Eisenhower Award (Steuben crystal eagle)				Business Executives for National Security

* Award/Dinner prices annotated with an asterisk (*) are estimated as the precise amount could not be confirmed.

28. LIST ALL SECURITIES, REAL PROPERTY, PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS, OR OTHER INVESTMENTS OR RECEIVABLES WITH A CURRENT MARKET VALUE (OR, IF MARKET VALUE IS NOT ASCERTAINABLE, ESTIMATED CURRENT FAIR VALUE) IN EXCESS OF \$1,000. (NOTE: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE A OF THE DISCLOSURE FORMS OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAY BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE, PROVIDED THAT CURRENT VALUATIONS ARE USED.)

DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY VALUE METHOD OF VALUATION
 Schedule A of the enclosed Nominee OGE Form 278 provided. Valuations are current as of 5 May 2011.

29. LIST ALL LOANS OR OTHER INDEBTEDNESS (INCLUDING ANY CONTINGENT LIABILITIES) IN EXCESS OF \$10,000. EXCLUDE A MORTGAGE ON YOUR PERSONAL RESIDENCE UNLESS IT IS RENTED OUT, AND LOANS SECURED BY AUTOMOBILES, HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE, OR APPLIANCES. (NOTE: THE INFORMATION PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO SCHEDULE C OF THE DISCLOSURE FORM OF THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS MAY BE INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE, PROVIDED THAT CONTINGENT LIABILITIES ARE ALSO INCLUDED.)

NATURE OF OBLIGATION NAME OF OBLIGEE AMOUNT

None

30. ARE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE NOW IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATION? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE BEEN IN DEFAULT ON ANY LOAN, DEBT, OR OTHER FINANCIAL OBLIGATION IN THE PAST TEN YEARS? HAVE YOU OR YOUR SPOUSE EVER BEEN REFUSED CREDIT OR HAD A LOAN APPLICATION DENIED? IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THESE QUESTIONS IS YES, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

31. LIST THE SPECIFIC SOURCES AND AMOUNTS OF ALL INCOME RECEIVED DURING THE LAST FIVE YEARS, INCLUDING ALL SALARIES, FEES, DIVIDENDS, INTEREST, GIFTS, RENTS, ROYALTIES, PATENTS, HONORARIA, AND OTHER ITEMS EXCEEDING \$200. (COPIES OF U.S. INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR THESE YEARS MAY BE SUBSTITUTED HERE, BUT THEIR SUBMISSION IS NOT REQUIRED.)

[INFORMATION REDACTED]

32. IF ASKED, WILL YOU PROVIDE THE COMMITTEE WITH COPIES OF YOUR AND YOUR SPOUSE'S FEDERAL INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR THE PAST THREE YEARS?

Yes

33. LIST ALL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU AND YOUR SPOUSE FILE ANNUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS.

New Hampshire

34. HAVE YOUR FEDERAL OR STATE TAX RETURNS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF AN AUDIT, INVESTIGATION, OR INQUIRY AT ANY TIME? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS, INCLUDING THE RESULT OF ANY SUCH PROCEEDING.

No

35. IF YOU ARE AN ATTORNEY, ACCOUNTANT, OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL, PLEASE LIST ALL CLIENTS AND CUSTOMERS WHOM YOU BILLED MORE THAN \$200 WORTH OF SERVICES DURING THE PAST FIVE YEARS. ALSO, LIST ALL JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH YOU ARE LICENSED TO PRACTICE.

Not applicable

36. DO YOU INTEND TO PLACE YOUR FINANCIAL HOLDINGS AND THOSE OF YOUR SPOUSE AND DEPENDENT MEMBERS OF YOUR IMMEDIATE HOUSEHOLD IN A BLIND TRUST? IF YES, PLEASE FURNISH DETAILS. IF NO, DESCRIBE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS FOR AVOIDING ANY POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.

No

37. IF APPLICABLE, ATTACH THE LAST THREE YEARS OF ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE FORMS YOU HAVE BEEN REQUIRED TO FILE WITH YOUR AGENCY, DEPARTMENT, OR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT.

See Attached.

PART E - ETHICAL MATTERS

38. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING OR CITED FOR A BREACH OF ETHICS OR UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BY, OR BEEN THE SUBJECT OF A COMPLAINT TO, ANY COURT, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION, DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE, OR OTHER PROFESSIONAL GROUP? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

39. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN INVESTIGATED, HELD, ARRESTED, OR CHARGED BY ANY FEDERAL, STATE, OR OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY FOR VIOLATION OF ANY FEDERAL, STATE, COUNTY, OR MUNICIPAL LAW, REGULATION, OR ORDINANCE, OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE, OR NAMED AS A DEFENDANT OR OTHERWISE IN ANY INDICTMENT OR INFORMATION RELATING TO SUCH VIOLATION? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

40. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN CONVICTED OF OR ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY OR NOLO CONTENDERE TO ANY CRIMINAL VIOLATION OTHER THAN A MINOR TRAFFIC OFFENSE? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

41. ARE YOU PRESENTLY OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A PARTY IN INTEREST IN ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEEDING OR CIVIL LITIGATION? IF SO, PLEASE PROVIDE DETAILS.

No

42. HAVE YOU BEEN INTERVIEWED OR ASKED TO SUPPLY ANY INFORMATION AS A WITNESS OR OTHERWISE IN CONNECTION WITH ANY CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION, FEDERAL, OR STATE AGENCY PROCEEDING, GRAND JURY INVESTIGATION, OR CRIMINAL OR CIVIL LITIGATION IN THE PAST TEN YEARS? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS.

No, to the best of my knowledge. I have been interviewed by audit agencies including GAO, DoDIG, SIGIR, and SIGAR, among others, for audits and studies of the missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. For example, I was interviewed by GAO in 2007 for a report titled "Stabilizing Iraq: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces (GAO-07-711)." The report states that it is a "Report for Congressional Committees" and "Because of broad-based congressional interest in this issue, we performed our work under the authority of the Comptroller General of the United States to conduct reviews on his own initiative." In the report, I was not personally named and was referred to as the "former MNSTC-I commander."

43. HAS ANY BUSINESS OF WHICH YOU ARE OR WERE AN OFFICER, DIRECTOR, OR PARTNER BEEN A PARTY TO ANY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PROCEEDING OR CRIMINAL OR CIVIL LITIGATION RELEVANT TO THE POSITION TO WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN NOMINATED? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS. (WITH RESPECT TO A BUSINESS OF WHICH YOU ARE OR WERE AN OFFICER, YOU NEED ONLY CONSIDER PROCEEDINGS AND LITIGATION THAT OCCURRED WHILE YOU WERE AN OFFICER OF THAT BUSINESS.)

No

44. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN THE SUBJECT OF ANY INSPECTOR GENERAL INVESTIGATION? IF SO, PROVIDE DETAILS.

a. DoD Case 03-103040 (Not Substantiated): The Army IG investigated an allegation that then-MG Petraeus, Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division, improperly presented two gold-plated AK-47 rifles to the Commanding General, V Corps, during a May 2003 Battle Update Brief. The investigation determined that the weapons were not presented as a personal gift to the CG and were being processed as historical artifacts to be displayed at the V Corps headquarters in Heidelberg, Germany.

b. DoD Case 05-103727 (Not Substantiated): The Commanding General, Multi-National Forces—Iraq, requested the Army IG conduct a special investigation into several issues identified in a letter written by a colonel who committed suicide while assigned to Multi-National Security Transition Command—Iraq (MNSTC-I). The letter criticized "P3," who was assumed to be then-LTG Petraeus, Commander, MNSTC-I. The investigation focused on whether "P3" provided adequate mission support to subordinates; provided adequate supervision and oversight of the contract mission; took appropriate action in response to allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse; and created or ignored a command climate or mission that led to corruption and human rights abuses. The investigation determined that the issues were not substantiated and found the command climate to be very positive.

c. DoD Case 10-116025 (Not Substantiated): USCENTCOM investigated allegations that a general officer failed to properly secure and protect classified material while serving in Afghanistan and that GEN Petraeus closed the initial inquiry in order to protect the general. The USCENTCOM investigation determined that GEN Petraeus took appropriate action by directing an AR 15-6 investigation, approving the substantiated findings and recommendations, and administering corrective action against the general officer. The investigation also confirmed that all security-related reporting requirements were accomplished.

PART F - SECURITY INFORMATION

45. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DENIED ANY SECURITY CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION FOR ANY REASON? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN IN DETAIL.

No

46. HAVE YOU BEEN REQUIRED TO TAKE A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION FOR ANY SECURITY CLEARANCE OR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

Yes, to be given a "global read-on" as Executive Assistant to the CJCS in 1997.

47. HAVE YOU EVER REFUSED TO SUBMIT TO A POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION? IF YES, PLEASE EXPLAIN.

No

PART G - ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

48. DESCRIBE IN YOUR OWN WORDS THE CONCEPT OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. IN PARTICULAR, CHARACTERIZE WHAT YOU BELIEVE TO BE THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE DIRECTOR OF CIA AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES OF THE CONGRESS RESPECTIVELY IN THE OVERSIGHT PROCESS.

The concept of congressional oversight derives from the Constitution and, as such, is one of Congress's most important duties to the American people. Similarly, the Director of CIA has a solemn obligation to provide all necessary information to enable Congress to discharge these duties. If confirmed, I believe it will be my responsibility to ensure that the relevant committees are kept informed of the full range of the Agency's activities – to include both successes and failures – as well as budgetary matters to ensure that the Agency is being a responsible steward of taxpayer money. Moreover, it is the responsibility of the committees and the Director to ensure that the Agency conforms to all US laws and, most importantly, the Constitution.

49. EXPLAIN YOUR UNDERSTANDING OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF CIA.

It is my understanding that the Director of CIA is responsible for the global operations, personnel, and budget of the CIA. The Director provides timely, un-biased, and accurate intelligence information to the President, to the National Security Council, and to other government entities supporting our national-security mission. He reports to the Director of National Intelligence and acts as the National Human Source Intelligence Manager.

AFFIRMATION

I, David H. Petraeus, DO SWEAR THAT THE ANSWERS I HAVE PROVIDED TO THIS QUESTIONNAIRE ARE ACCURATE AND COMPLETE.

June 21, 2011 [SIGNATURE]
(Date) (Name)

[SIGNATURE]
(Notary)



TO THE CHAIRMAN, SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE:

In connection with my nomination to be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, I hereby express my willingness to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

_____[SIGNATURE]_____
Signature

Date: 14 June 2011

**QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS**

"Ticking Time Bomb" Scenario

At your confirmation hearing, you stated your view that the interrogation techniques in the Army Field Manual for Human Intelligence Collector Operations were sufficient and effective, but suggested that there should be discussion among policy-makers about authorizing additional interrogation techniques for extraordinary "ticking time bomb" scenarios.

General Charles Krulak and General Joseph Hoar referenced this option in a 2007 Washington Post op-ed column, writing "As has happened with every other nation that has tried to engage in a little bit of torture -- only for the toughest cases, only when nothing else works -- the abuse spread like wildfire, and every captured prisoner became the key to defusing a potential ticking time bomb. Our soldiers in Iraq confront real "ticking time bomb" situations every day, in the form of improvised explosive devices, and any degree of "flexibility" about torture at the top drops down the chain of command like a stone -- the rare exception fast becoming the rule." (<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/16/AR2007051602395.html>)

- *Do you believe that techniques beyond those in the Army Field Manual would be more effective or less likely to produce information of questionable value in the "ticking time bomb" scenarios than they would be in other circumstances?*

ANSWER: As I mentioned in testimony, approved interrogation techniques outlined in the Army Field Manual and the Counterinsurgency Field Manual remain effective in the field. However, the "ticking time bomb" scenario does pose a unique set of challenges that must be discussed at length before such a situation arises. We may face situations where large numbers of US citizens face an imminent threat. In such a time-constrained scenario, policy-makers may not have the luxury to allow interrogators to take the time to establish the type of relationship that will provide valuable intelligence.

It is unclear at this point whether additional techniques beyond the Army Field Manual would conclusively shorten the time required to elicit credible information from a detainee. That is why I believe research is required now -- rather than working through policy and legal issues when the clock is working against us -- so we are best prepared to handle this type of situation, should it arise. Clearly, we must continue to live our values, and by structuring the discussion and doing research beforehand, we can prevent a situation where the urgency to act could compromise those values.

If confirmed, I will work with the Attorney General and members of the Intelligence Community to prevent such a situation, but also to develop informed options for the President that will mitigate the inherent risks for such an event.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FROM SENATOR ROCKEFELLER**Review of CIA Detention and Interrogation Program**

As you know, the Committee has undertaken a multi-year review of the CIA's past detention and interrogation policies. This review began over three years ago, in early 2008, when the Committee under then-Chairman Rockefeller and then-Vice Chairman Bond undertook an examination of the enhanced interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri after learning that the CIA had destroyed videotapes of these interrogations. Upon presentation to the Committee of the preliminary staff findings of this examination in early 2009, the Committee under the leadership of Chairman Feinstein and Vice Chairman Bond approved a comprehensive review of the CIA's detention and interrogation program with a bipartisan vote on March 5, 2009.

Since that time, Committee staff have reviewed millions of pages of documents pertaining to the program and are nearing completion of a report. This review is the only comprehensive in-depth look at the facts and documents pertaining to the creation, management, and effectiveness of the CIA detention and interrogation program. This effort is aimed at informing policymakers and CIA leaders in the future; it is intended to impart constructive lessons-learned from the program. It is an effort to find out what went wrong, what went right, and to learn from it all. It is what you as a Commanding General would call an After-Action Review.

If confirmed, you will be the CIA Director at the time the Committee finishes this review and completes the report.

- Is it your understanding that this effort is intended to arrive at constructive lessons-learned to inform future policy discussions?
- We saw in the days after the killing of Osama bin Laden that policymakers and the public do not yet possess a common set of facts about the CIA's detention and interrogation program, especially regarding the intelligence it produced. Do you agree that it is important to have a comprehensive and informed set of verified facts on which to base future detention and interrogation policies?

- If you are confirmed as the next CIA Director, will you endeavor to work with the Committee to transcend the political fights of the past on these issues?

ANSWER: As stated in my testimony, I believe that a holistic and comprehensive review of the United States Government's detention and interrogation programs can lead to valuable lessons that might inform future policies.

The best way to gain a common set of facts would be to reach-out to the intelligence and military communities responsible for detentions and interrogations and for implementing future policies. As we have learned after countless iterations in the military, after-action reports prove invaluable for guiding future decision-making. At the same time, to gain the proper insights from a series of actions or decisions, we cannot separate the review process from the public servants undertaking the actions. I believe that a series of recommendations divorced from a proper understanding of the circumstances in question—which can only be gained by including the participants—can only result in a partial answer.

If confirmed, my staff will stand ready to work with the Committee, in order to ensure that a complete review yields the best policies necessary to the nation's future detention and interrogation policies.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FROM SENATOR WYDEN**Syria**

You noted that you have maintained an interest in your former CENTCOM area of responsibility. What is your assessment of the recent upheaval in Syria, and the stability of the current regime?

ANSWER: Syrian President Bashar al-Asad continues to battle anti-regime protests, many of which have turned violent. Major cities in the south and along the coast that saw unrest in April and May have returned to a tense calm after earlier military and internal security service operations in those areas, but unrest has flared in new locations in the north and east of the country and, since basic grievances are not being addressed, continued unrest is likely. At least 12,000 refugees who fled violence in northern Syria are currently being hosted in camps in Turkey. Protests have not yet coalesced around a single group of leaders, and key minority groups, including Christians and Kurds, have not joined demonstrations in large numbers. If confirmed, this is clearly a situation that I will monitor closely.

Critical Language Capabilities

Under Director Panetta's leadership the CIA has made new efforts to increase the critical language capabilities of its workforce. What role do you believe improved diagnostic assessments should play in these efforts?

ANSWER: I wholeheartedly agree with Director Panetta's emphasis on the workforce's language capability. If confirmed, I will endeavor to keep the Agency on-track to reach its established goals regarding language training. Diagnostic assessments are certainly one set of useful tools for determining which employees should be selected for language training. However, we should also consider an employee's prior experience with foreign languages and his/her level of commitment to learning a new language. As my experience with the Afghan hands program has taught us, having people with the right language and culture training can be invaluable to the collecting and analysis of credible and timely intelligence.

Counterterrorism

The State Department's top lawyer, Harold Koh, gave a speech last year in March where he laid out the administration's official views regarding counterterrorism and the use of force. Did all the statements made in that speech regarding the use of force against terrorists apply to the CIA? Please provide an unclassified answer.

ANSWER: My understanding is that Mr. Koh's speech discussed the lawfulness of United States operations against al-Qa'ida, with particular reference to lethal operations using unmanned aerial vehicles, under applicable U.S. and international law. Mr. Koh spoke in public and did not name CIA at any point in the speech. I cannot provide an unclassified answer regarding the existence of any CIA program involving such operations. Accordingly, I cannot confirm that any or all of the statements made in Mr. Koh's speech regarding the use of force against terrorists apply to CIA.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FROM SENATOR UDALL**Afghanistan**

As I am also a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, I have a question about President Obama's announcement regarding the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. He talked about bringing home the remainder of the surge forces by the "summer" of 2012.

- Is it your understanding that redeploying those remaining 23,000 forces on that timetable would mean that all those forces WILL or WILL NOT be part of U.S. military efforts during next year's "fighting season" in Afghanistan?
- If all 23,000 remaining surge forces will not be part of those efforts, does that concern you? If so, why? If not, why not?

ANSWER: The remaining 23,000 US forces associated with the surge will be redeployed by the end of September 2012. Since the Taliban's campaign season usually lasts into the autumn, we will be withdrawing troops while at the tail end of the historical fighting season. I am comfortable with this decision, because we are undertaking a number of measures to reduce the risk associated with the troop withdrawal:

- First, coalition and Afghan forces are undertaking a relentless campaign against our adversaries that has achieved significant gains against the insurgents since the December 2009 speech by the President. This campaign will continue through the winter of this year and the spring of 2012, making maximum use of the troops for as long as possible. Because of this pace, we expect the insurgency to be even further degraded.
- Second, the growth of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) will mitigate risks associated with the departure of the surge forces. Between now and September 2012, our Afghan allies will add an additional 70,000 security personnel. Furthermore, the ANSF is maturing rapidly as an independent fighting force. We are seeing the ANSF increasingly take the lead during partnered operations. We will use this time to continue to develop Afghan sustainment capabilities that will make the force more self-sufficient over the long-term. Finally, in a number of recent cases, individual ANSF units and commanders have demonstrated the initiative, drive, and commitment that are essential for their ability to ultimately defeat the insurgency, secure their country, and help us achieve our objectives in the region.

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD FROM SENATOR LEVIN**Army Field Manual**

Executive Order 13491 of January 22, 2009, requires that:

“Effective immediately, an individual in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, employee, or other agent of the United States Government, or detained within a facility owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States, in any armed conflict, shall not be subjected to any interrogation technique or approach, or any treatment related to interrogation, that is not authorized by and listed in Army Field Manual 2-22.3.”

- Is the Army Field Manual 2-22.3 binding on the Central Intelligence Agency and all of its employees?
- Is the Army Field Manual 2-22.3 binding on contractors of the Central Intelligence Agency and their employees?

ANSWER: Yes. The Central Intelligence Agency, including all of its employees and contractors, are bound by and will follow the President's directive in Executive Order 13941 not to use any interrogation technique, approach, or treatment related to interrogation that is not authorized by and listed in Army Field Manual 2-22.3.

Professor Juan Cole

There are media reports alleging that the CIA sought to obtain sensitive derogatory information on Professor Juan Cole, a University of Michigan professor.

- Did the CIA provide any derogatory information to anyone about Professor Cole?
- Will you investigate these allegations?

ANSWER: It is my understanding that the CIA has looked into this allegation, and they did not provide any derogatory information to anyone on Professor Cole.

SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE



Additional Prehearing Questions
for
General David H. Petraeus
upon his selection to be
the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency

Responsibilities of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

QUESTION 1: Under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA), the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (D/CIA) shall serve as the head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); collect intelligence through human sources and other appropriate means; correlate, evaluate and disseminate intelligence; provide overall direction for and coordination of the collection of national intelligence outside the United States; and perform such other functions related to intelligence affecting the national security as the President or the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) may direct.

- A. Has the President indicated the functions he expects you to perform, and goals you should attain, as the D/CIA? If so, what are these?

After the President asked me to serve as CIA Director, we had a very candid discussion of his expectations. The President expects to be provided timely, accurate, and un-biased intelligence assessments, and he also expects the Agency to provide the same to Congress. Obviously, accurate intelligence analyses also require the identification of what the Agency does not know, and the President expects the Agency to be very clear about gaps and uncertainties in assessments. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the President expects that, under my leadership, the Agency will discharge its duties and responsibilities in accordance with our nation's values, laws, and Constitution.

- B. Has the DNI indicated the functions he expects you to perform, and goals you should attain, as D/CIA? If so, what are these?

Although Director Clapper and I have not yet discussed his specific expectations, if confirmed, understanding his expectations will be one of my first priorities. That said, Director Clapper and I have a longstanding relationship that has been built over many years and, during recent conversations, we both agreed that all U.S. intelligence components need to work together as a team to ensure that U.S. intelligence capabilities are effectively fused through the DNI. Indeed, through my work in Iraq, at CENTCOM, and in Afghanistan, I have seen firsthand how important it is for the various intelligence agencies to work together (and with the military) to achieve our shared national-security objectives.

QUESTION 2: In what ways can a D/CIA achieve sufficient independence and distance from political considerations to serve the nation with objective and dispassionate intelligence collection and analysis?

- What is your view of the responsibility of a Director of the CIA to inform senior Administration policy officials or their spokesmen when the available intelligence either does not support or contradicts public statements they may have made?

In my view, the key to maintaining the requisite independence and objectivity is for the Director to ensure that a system is in place at CIA that consistently produces clear, unbiased, timely, and complete intelligence that is responsive to the information needs of the President and other senior officials within the Executive Branch. This effort would include resisting any possible attempts by policymakers to influence the analysis the Agency produces, and remaining vigilant to avoid political influence or other bias at all levels, from individual analysts up to the Director himself. The role of analysts is to work closely with policy makers to inform policy-making. It is not to tailor analysis to support a pre-determined policy choice. Fostering and reinforcing independent thought and alternative analysis within the CIA system helps alleviate such pressures, thereby allowing the Agency to produce objective and dispassionate products to inform senior Administration officials, which in turn serves to promote accuracy in the public statements of those officials and their spokesmen.

QUESTION 3: The National Security Act of 1947 provides, under a section entitled "Supervision," that the "Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall report to the Director of National Intelligence regarding the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency." What is your understanding of the D/CIA's responsibilities under this provision and how do you think the DNI should accomplish this supervision?

If confirmed, I intend to fully support the DNI in the execution of his and the CIA's responsibilities. I will work to ensure openness with the DNI with regard to CIA activities consistent with the policies and procedures he has put in place. I have developed a strong relationship with Director Clapper during his recent assignments in the intelligence community. If confirmed, I expect that we will work together openly and constructively, particularly in regards to accountability and the allocation of funding.

CIA Culture and Lessons Learned

QUESTION 4: No institution in the American government is more of a learning organization than the U.S. military. When American soldiers, Marines, airmen and sailors are not in combat, they are in training, and studying. Even in combat, every engagement is followed by a lessons learned exercise.

- What are the institutions of learning at the CIA?

The formal institutions of learning are CIA University (CIAU) and the Directorate Schools; the informal institutions of learning include applied learning and lessons learned forums.

CIAU was established by DCI Tenet in 2002 “to equip CIA officers with the shared values, commitment to mission, knowledge and excellence in intelligence tradecraft and leadership needed to accomplish extraordinary tasks in service to our nation.”

CIAU’s core schools – the CIA Mission Academy, the CIA Leadership Academy, and the CIA Intelligence Language Institute – offer training that spans the entire Agency and provides opportunities for employees from multiple occupations to learn common principles in a classroom environment.

In addition, there are four Directorate schools that provide training specific to the mission areas of the respective Directorates:

- The Directorate of Intelligence Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis
- The National Clandestine Service Tradecraft Training Division
- The Director for Science and Technology George Methlie School
- The DS Mahoney Center for Support Tradecraft and Leadership

The CIA also has additional elements that focus on applied learning, such as the Center for Studies in Intelligence (CSI), which focuses on the Agency’s history, lessons learned, oral history, and emerging trends. The CIA uses the case study method to identify and distill lessons into training curricula, as well as to improve intelligence tradecraft.

- From what you have observed in working with the CIA, do you believe that the CIA is sufficiently a learning organization? Should it be more so?

Every organization should constantly strive to be a better learning organization, and I suspect that the Agency is no exception. Having said that, the Agency clearly seeks to improve performance by studying past successes — and past failures. For example, new instructors in the DI's Career Analysts Program (CAP) use case studies to teach analysts the importance of questioning analytic assumptions. The CAP analysts also study the need for due diligence in vetting and validating information.

In the case of the suicide bomber at the base in Khowst, Afghanistan, e.g., the Agency conducted a thorough lessons learned process to identify the key takeaways from the tragedy, and the Agency has implemented a number of the recommendations that came out of that effort. I understand the Agency is conducting a similar review of the recent UBL operation to better understand the critical factors that led to the success of that endeavor.

Finally, CIA develops expertise among its employees by promoting experiential learning. For example, officers may serve on short-fuse "tiger teams" to generate solutions to vexing problems, to participate in an inter-agency task force, to rotate to other parts of the U.S. Government, or to learn about the legislative process by serving as a Congressional Fellow.

- What principles will apply to evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of learning mechanisms at the CIA

The fundamental goal of learning at CIA is to prepare employees to excel in meeting mission requirements. Organizational and individual self-assessment, often through lessons learned activities, is a powerful tool in evaluating the success of learning mechanisms at CIA. After-action reviews are done with increasing frequency, and there is a regular training cycle that conveys continuously updated lessons to personnel. Moreover, CIAU and the Directorate schools incorporate such material in their coursework.

When I was the Commander of the U.S. Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, we spent significant time examining the lessons learned coming out of Iraq and applying them to the writing of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual. We also reduced the timeframe for incorporating lessons learned into doctrine and training, making the Army a more effective learning organization. These experiences convinced me that lessons learned are powerful tools for helping institutions to adapt and to evolve to meet changing requirements. If confirmed, I

have every intention of using my experiences to further the CIA's culture of learning.

- On the basis of what you now know, do you foresee changing or expanding those mechanisms at the CIA?

The CIA is clearly investing in creating a learning environment that promotes self-assessment and knowledge transfer. If confirmed, I plan on encouraging these efforts, and I will consider expanding this capability once I have had an opportunity to observe – firsthand – the effectiveness of such programs.

QUESTION 5: In your view, what lessons should a new D/CIA draw from:

- The Khowst suicide bombing incident;
- The decade long search for Usama Bin Laden;
- The operation that resulted in his death; and
- The pre-Iraq war intelligence.

A key lesson from the December 2009 terrorist attack at Forward Operating Base Chapman is that CIA officers must always exercise strong security awareness. At the same time, to accomplish their mission, they must engage with potentially dangerous people in situations involving a high degree of ambiguity and risk. Based on what was known at the time, Hummam al-Balawi (who carried out the suicide attack) had to be met. The information he reportedly had was too important to ignore. Having said that, and while recognizing that a certain level of risk is unavoidable, I would also note that the Agency task force that conducted a comprehensive CI and Security review of the Khowst attack identified several key findings designed to mitigate those risks to the greatest possible extent.

- Those findings include the need for robust documentation and communications, a strong CI capability to help challenge existing assumptions, a work force with the training and experience necessary to handle the unique challenges of War Zone operations, careful management of liaison operations, and strong coordination between operational and security elements.
- I understand that improvements in these areas are already being made even as CIA maintains a high operational tempo against terrorist targets.

CIA learned several lessons from the 10-year hunt for Usama Bin Ladin that will assist in its efforts to hunt down other elusive high-value terrorists.

- First and foremost, identifying and locating Bin Ladin's primary facilitator was the key to finding him. Analysts and targeters spent years whittling down the list of Bin Ladin's trusted aides until they were finally able to zero-in on Abu Ahmad al-Kuwaiti, who was Bin Ladin's caretaker and courier in Abbottabad.
- We were again reminded that history matters and that whoever was protecting Bin Ladin probably had known him for years. This key assumption compelled the Agency to systematically and repeatedly review historical intelligence reporting to develop new leads.
- We must not forget that our foes are adaptable. We could not be wedded to old stereotypes of Bin Ladin hiding in caves and moving frequently under the protection of large Arab security details. As it turned out, Bin Ladin had located in an affluent neighborhood where his profile was almost nonexistent.
- Finally, it is clear that once a trail goes cold – as it did following Bin Ladin's escape from the mountains of Tora Bora, Afghanistan in December 2001 – it is very difficult to reacquire. Difficult, however, must never be seen as impossible. The success in finding Bin Ladin showed that tenacity and ingenuity should never be underrated.

CIA also learned several important lessons in planning the raid that resulted in Bin Ladin's death, and these lessons will be instructive when considering other high-risk intelligence-based operations:

- It is essential to devote sufficient resources to effectively exploit opportunities that arise during the pursuit of high-value targets.
- We must always strive to be clear and explicit in differentiating facts from analysis, identifying intelligence gaps, and articulating risks associated with potential courses of action.
- CIA's Counter Terrorism Center seamlessly integrated different streams of collection to offer policymakers the most complete intelligence picture

available in this operation, highlighting the benefits of close teamwork across CIA and with other agencies.

- Finally, CIA's close work with military partners in planning the raid was vital; the Agency provided tactical and strategic intelligence and analysis to help ensure mission success.

There was no single cause behind the Intelligence Community's failure to accurately characterize the state of Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear programs. In fact, uncovering the contributing factors required an intensive, objective, bottom-up review of all relevant raw intelligence as well as NIC and DI-related products. The group identified the following lessons, which apply well beyond the pre-war Iraq WMD intelligence issue. If confirmed, I will ensure that efforts that are already underway to address these issues are continued.

- First, a continuing commitment to searchable records and archives – of raw data as well as finished intelligence products – as well as the development of new tools is key if analysts are to be able to detect shifting analytic lines and confidence levels, extract key insights from large data sets, and glean new insights from large, disparate sets of raw intelligence information.
- Second, increased transparency into the reliability and quality of sources is key in producing more reliable intelligence assessments.
- Third, rigorous tradecraft that underpins strong analysis requires an organizational commitment to continuous learning as well as constant self-awareness and scrutiny.
- And finally, analytic outreach is important if analysts are to challenge their assessments by seeking diverse, nonwestern views and outlooks that can provide different perspectives and help mitigate group think.

QUESTION 6: In your long career and your many foreign deployments to theaters of conflict, you have had many opportunities to observe and work with the CIA. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, your commands have worked very closely with the CIA. In answering these questions about organizational culture, please include observations about command or leadership structure, approaches to dissent, accountability for correcting errors, among other matters that you deem relevant to understanding potential difference between the CIA and the U.S. military.

There are certain core cultural values that characterize the Agency as a whole: excellence, integrity, knowledge, and creativity. Agency employees are also proud, skeptical, critical, and analytical. But foremost among the Agency's core values is dedication to mission and a "can do" spirit that permeates all of the Agency's organizations. Whether it relates to collecting information, producing timely analysis, or conducting covert actions, all Agency employees rightly take pride in their extraordinary responsiveness to the needs of their "customers." It is not in the Agency culture to say "no" to a request for help from a battlefield commander or a national policymaker.

CIA also has organizational cultures within the Directorates – the culture of the NCS is different from the culture of the DI, and both are different from that of the DS&T and the DS. These directorates developed somewhat independently of one another and have distinct characteristics. NCS officers, for example require a distinct set of skills that are understandably different from those required by DI analysts. In addition, there is a distinct difference between the culture of the field – where one-quarter of the Agency's employees reside – and that of Headquarters.

- How would you characterize the difference between the CIA culture and the military culture?

As a general rule, it appears that the Agency is more informal and less rank conscious. Intellectual rigor and experience tend to trump rank, and I appreciate the creativity that can generate. The Agency has a flatter chain of command and tends to give its officers somewhat more discretionary authority, especially in the field, and this often leads to impressive organizational agility. The attrition rate is very low at the Agency and its employees tend to stay on board for 25 years or more.

- Is the CIA culture today well-suited to the challenges CIA faces, and will face under your direction should you be confirmed?

Yes. However, I would also make the following points. I believe there are three key ingredients to creating and maintaining a culture of success at CIA. First, CIA needs to rely upon cross-component and cross-discipline collaboration. I would point to the countless examples where success has come from the integration of operational skill, analysis, technology, and support services. Second, the Agency needs to continue to learn from its past efforts and to share that knowledge with those who can benefit from it. And third, with roughly half of the Agency's

employees hired since 9/11, we must provide new employees with the skills and experience they will need to carry out the Agency's missions in the future. The Agency is its people; we must invest in them and their development.

Central Intelligence Agency: Strengths and Weaknesses

QUESTION 7: A fundamental goal of the CIA is to prevent an adverse "strategic surprise" from threatening the United States.

- In your opinion, what would be the most likely source and nature of a "strategic surprise" to the United States?

I share concerns that the U.S. could face strategic surprise as states hostile to our interests acquire weapons of mass destruction. While this might not be the most likely strategic surprise, it would present the most serious threat to the security of the U.S. and our allies. The examples of Syria's covert reactor and Iran's underground uranium enrichment plant show that countries are willing to pursue secret nuclear programs despite the consequences of their discovery. Identifying leadership decisions to begin such activities is among the hardest of intelligence challenges, and the Agency's goal has to be to discover those illicit efforts as early as possible. The Agency also has to be focused on helping to prevent terrorists from gaining access to these development efforts and to stockpiles of weapons in countries with mature programs.

An unexpected regime change in a region of instability probably is more likely to present a strategic surprise, even if the outcome may not be as dire as undetected nuclear proliferation. Such shifts can be difficult to predict because even the foreign actors themselves often have not carefully planned the course of action they will take as a crisis unfolds. Looking at the ongoing unrest in the Middle East and North Africa, intelligence analysts may not be able to predict precisely how and whether another government might fall, but they can identify trends and potential outcomes. And they certainly can track and report indicators of possible change.

- Do you believe that the CIA is properly organized to counter this threat?

My experience has been that intelligence can *minimize* the risk of surprise, but never fully *prevent* it, because there are simply too many unknowns in periods of upheaval. To minimize surprise, the CIA has to constantly revisit its analytic

judgments, identify the signposts that portend change, and work with collectors to focus intelligence gathering. My early impression is that the Agency is organized reasonably well to anticipate strategic surprise. On counterproliferation, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and Iran, analysts and operators are co-located, increasing the Agency's effectiveness in analysis and operations. I think that sort of collaboration would be useful on the other issues, as well.

QUESTION 8: What do you believe the role has been and should be for all-source analysis at the CIA?

CIA's Directorate of Intelligence (DI) has a fundamental mission to provide objective, all-source analysis to those who make and execute policy, including the President and his national security team. The DI is the U.S. government's only all-source analytic unit that does not reside in a policy department, and it is one of only a handful of analytic units that are all-source (many others focus on a single discipline of intelligence). This role is vital, and I see no reason to change it.

- Based on your prior experience with CIA, what are the strengths and weaknesses of all-source analysis at the CIA?

I have seen firsthand and benefited from the strengths of all-source analysis from the CIA. The Directorate of Intelligence is respected throughout the Intelligence Community for its analytic depth and breadth of expertise, the rigor of its analytic tradecraft, and its close ties to the National Clandestine Service, which provides ground truth on key issues and insight into the quality of HUMINT collection. The DI has understandably needed to focus its resources on the highest priority issues (counterterrorism, counterproliferation, China, Iran, the Middle East, etc.), and the Agency is perhaps not as deep on other important but lower priority issues as it should be. As we have seen, threats and opportunities for U.S. National Security interests can emerge across a growing spectrum of countries and issues, and the DI, along with the entire Agency, must be prepared to "cover the globe" like never before.

- If confirmed, how will you address the weaknesses and maintain the strengths of all-source analysis within the CIA?

Based on the initial briefings I have received, the DI – as part of a broader Agency initiative – has a game plan to advance its global coverage mission and address the challenges created by a world where threats and opportunities can emerge from unexpected places. I agree with this effort and, if confirmed, I will work to

strengthen it. For example, I have personally seen the value of getting analysts into the field and developing firsthand knowledge of a country, its people, and its challenges in order to better serve senior U.S. policymakers and warfighters. As Director, I would look to expand these efforts and enhance their value. I also recognize that speed matters in this fast-paced world, and threats and opportunities for U.S. policymakers can and do arise quickly. Although the DI has done well in meeting the demand for quick turnaround products, the pace of world events and the exponential growth in potentially useful data will only increase, and the technologies, systems, and tools we have in place for collecting and exploiting information and producing insightful intelligence today will likely be insufficient tomorrow. At that same time, we will need to take into consideration that we cannot sacrifice quality in our quest for speed. Moreover, we need to continue to ensure that alternative analytic views are being considered and respected, and that procedural measures are maintained to safeguard against politicization and “group-think.”

- How should the analytic workforce of the CIA be developed and deployed?

From my experience over the past decade, it is clear that the DI places high priority on the development of its analytic workforce. The DI maintains robust onboarding and continuing education programs to develop deep substantive expertise, reinforce tradecraft, and boost analytic rigor; enhances both its relevance and working relationships through a system of rotational opportunities across the policy, intelligence, and law enforcement communities; and seeks to expand analytic capabilities and insight through language training and overseas service opportunities. Although the majority of the DI workforce is based in Washington, DC, where it can be close to its primary customers, nearly 10 percent of the DI analytic workforce is now stationed overseas, with many more officers deploying for shorter stints in support of key initiatives. DI officers in the field provide direct support to the State Department, the U.S. military, CIA operators, and U.S. policymakers. I strongly support the DI's overseas presence – as well as its programs for continuing education, language training, and outreach – as an essential part of building the strongest possible analytic cadre.

- What role should the analytic workforce of the CIA have in ensuring there is sufficient attention to long-term strategic intelligence analysis, rather than intelligence analysis on issues of immediate concern, within the IC?

The distinction between long-term strategic intelligence analysis and intelligence analysis on issues of immediate concern is often an artificial one. The analytic

workforce needs to invest in long-term strategic analysis and expertise-building in order to be able to put issues of immediate concern into context for the President and his national security team. Making that investment can be a challenge, particularly in light of the pace of world events and the heavy demand from policymakers for daily intelligence support. The DI has been a leader within the Intelligence Community in making that investment, including providing extensive support for academic training and taking analysts “off-line” to focus on strategic issues and provide stand-back analyses.

QUESTION 9: What are the strengths and weaknesses of the CIA in clandestine operations and the collection of intelligence from human sources respectively?

- How will you address the weaknesses and maintain the strengths with respect to each of these activities?
- How should the conduct of these activities be balanced and prioritized in the future at the CIA?

Every leader coming into a new organization faces the challenge of assessing the strengths and weaknesses of that organization and determining what its priorities should be and what changes, if any, need to be made. I have not been briefed in extensive detail on all CIA clandestine operations, paramilitary activities, and HUMINT and technical collection. If confirmed, I will focus significant attention on such an assessment of the CIA’s mission, capabilities, and activities – and not just on its clandestine operations and HUMINT collection – as well as on determining the appropriate adjustments to the Agency’s priorities. To be sure, I will share my assessments with the Committee.

QUESTION 10: How do you view the responsibilities of the CIA to collect and analyze both tactical intelligence to support military operations in theaters of war and strategic intelligence for policymakers?

- What do you see as the current prioritization and resource allocation for these two efforts, and do you believe them to be appropriate?

Since its establishment under the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA has by mandate both collected and analyzed information relevant to military developments and operations. While the CIA’s charter assigns the Agency primary responsibility for providing strategic intelligence for policymakers, the CIA has for decades increasingly also been supporting military operations in

theaters of war. I believe CIA's primary mission and resources should be dedicated to the organization's core responsibility to provide the best possible strategic intelligence for the nation's most senior policymakers. Having been a combat commander in wartime theaters, I also value the Agency's commitment and ability to apply these same resources in support of our warfighters in harm's way. Moreover, the best strategic assessments often come from a thorough tactical knowledge of the situation in these war zones – which often derives from time spent in these operational theaters and from interaction with our military personnel on the ground. In short, I see these two efforts – support to policymakers and support to the warfighters – as complementary rather than contradictory.

QUESTION 11: What role do you see for the CIA in paramilitary-style covert action?

- How do you distinguish between the appropriate roles of the CIA and the United States Special Forces in paramilitary-style covert action?
- Are there measures that should be taken to improve coordination between the CIA and elements of the DOD, including in operational planning and execution, and in informing chiefs-of-mission and congressional intelligence committees?

I have not yet been briefed in detail on all CIA covert operations, paramilitary activities, and HUMINT collection. That said, as a commander in various theaters I have worked with the CIA and understand the need for cooperation and deconfliction of military and intelligence activities. My personal experience in coordination in the field has been positive. If confirmed – moving from the DOD side to the CIA side of this situation – I would like to think that I can bring a perspective that may improve cooperation even more.

Both U.S. Special Forces and the CIA must remain available resources for the President in executing any paramilitary-style covert action. He must have the flexibility to select that element best suited to the goals of any specific mission. U.S. Special Forces and CIA paramilitary personnel bring capabilities to the table that can differ in small but materially-important ways. Among other issues, factors such as the size of the force, materiel needed for a mission, and availability in light of competing missions would play a role in the selection of the personnel and authorities to use.

QUESTION 12: What is your understanding of the respective roles of the Executive Office of the President and the CIA in the formulation and implementation of covert action programs?

The CIA carries out covert action on behalf of the President. It is the President, his national security staff, or other members of the executive branch that propose ideas for covert action programs that will support the national security objectives of the U.S. CIA then develops a plan for carrying out the program, including the preparation of a draft Presidential Finding or Memorandum of Notification (MON) and supporting paperwork. The CIA then submits that plan to the National Security Staff, after coordination with the ODNI and the Intelligence Community, as appropriate. The proposed Finding or MON is reviewed by the National Security Staff and then sent to the President for approval. Once approved, and after required notification to the two intelligence committees, the President typically will direct the CIA to implement the program. Once implemented, the Agency itself, as well as the NSC and the intelligence committees of Congress, review the conduct of the program on an ongoing basis.

- What actions would you take if directed to undertake covert action activities that you believed to be illegal, ineffective, or not well suited with respect to CIA capabilities and resources?

If confirmed as Director of the CIA, I would refuse to carry out any activity that I believed to be illegal. As outlined above, the CIA has an active role in the development of any covert action program, and I intend to be a strong voice for the CIA in that process. If I assessed that a covert action proposal would be ineffective or otherwise unsuited to the Agency's capabilities, I would recommend against such a program, and, if necessary, raise my concerns directly with the President.

- What principles should govern the apportionment and reconciliation of responsibilities of the CIA in the conduct of covert action under Title 50 and the Department of Defense (DOD) in the conduct of any similar or related activities under Title 10?

The key principles that have guided CIA and DOD in the allocation of responsibilities between covert activities and traditional military activities are: (1) optimizing the accomplishment of U.S. national security objectives through the most effective use of collective CIA and DOD capabilities; (2) ensuring related DOD and CIA activities are well coordinated and designed to advance both the

military and intelligence missions; (3) complying with applicable statutes with respect to authorities and prohibitions; and (4) keeping Congress appropriately notified of these activities, whether undertaken by CIA under Title 50 or by DOD under Title 10. I believe these are appropriate and will be guided by them if I am confirmed as Director.

QUESTION 13: What role do you see for the CIA in the collection of intelligence from human sources within the United States?

- What do you understand to be the legal and policy authority and limitations on this collection and the coordination that is required with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)?

CIA's role is in the collection of *foreign* intelligence from human sources within the United States. Foreign intelligence collected domestically contributes to and enhances the foreign intelligence product. CIA's authority to collect foreign intelligence from within the U.S. is governed by the National Security Act of 1947, the CIA Act of 1949, and Executive Order (E.O.) 12333. CIA's interaction and collaboration with U.S. persons in furtherance of CIA's foreign intelligence responsibilities is governed primarily by E.O. 12333 and internal Agency regulations. Pursuant to this authority, the CIA collects information of foreign intelligence interest from non-U.S. persons and cooperating U.S. persons. The CIA also has the authority to collect information of foreign intelligence value pertaining to U.S. persons; however, CIA is not authorized to collect on the purely domestic activities of U.S. persons. The 2005 CIA/FBI Memorandum of Understanding provides the guidelines for coordination, collaboration, and deconfliction between CIA and FBI both here in the United States and abroad.

QUESTION 14: With respect to operational activities, what do you believe are the main issues that the CIA clandestine service addresses, or should address, in working with the personnel of the following entities:

- The FBI (to the extent not answered in response to Question 12);

With respect to working with our partners in the Intelligence Community and with our other partners – be they in local, state, tribal, or federal government I am aware from my DoD experience that the main issues usually involve: (1) deconflicting operations that may involve the same target; (2) coordinating operations so that national requirements are met and duplication of effort is avoided; (3) concerns over sharing information that reveals especially sensitive sources and methods; and

(4) responding to questions concerning the respective legal authorities of the agencies involved. I believe that we are able to effectively deal with these issues in most cases; however, if confirmed, I will work with the DNI to determine where problems exist and work with my counterparts – at the FBI, DOD, and elsewhere – to resolve them expeditiously.

With regard to specific organizations, my understanding is that the CIA and the FBI, under the leadership of Director Robert Mueller, have enhanced their working relationship, both inside the U.S. and abroad. I am aware of historic rivalries and past “turf battles,” but my impression is that there has been improvement in resolving them since 9/11, in particular. I understand that the CIA and FBI have taken specific steps to establish a closer working relationship. For example, FBI agents are now granted slots in the Agency’s training programs, and CIA and FBI analysts work side-by-side to analyze counterterrorism intelligence at the National Counterterrorism Center. Although FBI has an intelligence mission, it also, of course, has a law enforcement mission that is ever present. That dual mission should always be kept in mind by CIA/NCS and addressed with FBI when sharing information between the organizations, engaging in joint operations, using a joint asset, and addressing the authorities to be used in any joint operation. To some extent, there are, and should always be, efforts to balance between intelligence interests and equities and law enforcement interests and equities.

- The National Security Division at the Department of Justice;

I understand that CIA has a good relationship with DOJ/NSD, and I respect the need for close cooperation in coordinating law enforcement and intelligence equities.

- Other law enforcement agencies;

At this time, I am not aware of any problems in the working relationship between CIA and other law enforcement agencies, whether they be federal, state, local, or tribal authorities.

- The National Security Agency (NSA);

As a consumer of both SIGINT and HUMINT over the past decade, I have appreciated the solid working relationship between the CIA and NSA.

- Other elements of the DOD?

The fusion of inter-agency intelligence has been a particular focus of mine. I have personally observed the results of effective Title 10 and Title 50 coordination. The relationship between CIA and DoD is strong – particularly due to the personal efforts of Director Panetta and Secretary Gates. I am confident that the relationship between CIA and DoD will only grow stronger.

QUESTION 15: What is your assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the accountability system that has been in place at the CIA and what actions, if any, should be taken to both strengthen accountability and ensure fair process at the CIA?

- Explain your responsibilities, if confirmed, in making decisions on recommendations concerning the accountability of officials of the CIA with respect to matters of serious misconduct.

The leader of any organization is responsible for establishing the necessary climate and processes for ensuring appropriate performance and behavior by the organizations' members. I am confident that the CIA has a culture of high standards and the necessary regulatory processes for managing wrongdoing or misconduct. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that these processes are managed efficiently and fairly. Beyond supervising internal processes, if confirmed, I will stand prepared to exercise the authority granted by the National Security Act of 1947 to terminate the employment of a CIA employee or officer should I deem it necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.

- What is your view of the role of the CIA Inspector General and how would you utilize the work of the Office of the IG in managing the operations of the CIA if confirmed?

Throughout my military career, I have relied heavily on the work of Inspectors General to provide objective assessments of the performance of the organizations I have led. If confirmed, I expect to use the CIA's Inspector General similarly, particularly in areas that by their nature warrant assurance and areas that I might deem problematic.

- What is your understanding of the role of accountability boards at the CIA?

It is my understanding that for disciplinary and corrective matters, the D/CIA may convene an accountability board composed of senior CIA officers to conduct

inquiries, weigh facts, and issue recommendations. This is one of several mechanisms at the D/CIA's disposal for strengthening accountability and ensuring that the Agency learns from its failures and successes.

- Please describe your views on informing the CIA workforce about accountability decisions, including the basis for them, and also informing the intelligence committees.

I believe that keeping all of the members of an organization informed is a critical leadership responsibility, particularly on matters that pertain to workforce management. And, I also support keeping the intelligence committees fully informed of significant Agency developments.

Science & Technology and Research & Development

QUESTION 16: An important component of the CIA is the Directorate of Science and Technology.

- What do you believe is the proper role of science and technology (S&T) activities within the CIA?
- If confirmed, how do you intend to improve S&T activities in the CIA and improve recruiting and retention of the best available S&T talent?
- What would be your top priorities for S&T in your first year in office?
- What qualities are most important to you in your top S&T official, the Director for Science and Technology, and what role and priorities would you assign to this S&T leader?
- What is your philosophy of the role of Research and Development (R&D) in the CIA and what are your top priorities with respect to R&D in the CIA?

I have not yet been briefed on the specific activities of the S&T Directorate. However, I know well the benefits of science and technology in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence. Moreover, I understand the requirement for recruiting, training, and retaining high quality personnel to employ that technology, to conduct research, and to develop new and innovative products to meet the CIA's unique needs. If confirmed, I would assess the CIA's S&T

activities to determine where it should place its priorities and what resources and talent the Directorate might need.

QUESTION 17: The Committee's Technical Advisory Group (TAG), a volunteer group of nationally recognized national security S&T leaders, plays a key role in advising the Committee on high priority S&T issues every year.

- If confirmed, will you fully support Committee TAG studies and allow the TAG members to have access to the people and information required for their studies upon the Committee's request?

Yes, I recognize the value of the TAG and, if confirmed, I will support their efforts.

Cyber Security and Information Assurance

QUESTION 18: The issues of cyber security and computer operations are of particular concern to the Committee.

I, too, am concerned about cyber security. If confirmed, I will make cyber security a priority. At CIA, we must protect the secrets entrusted to us while ensuring we are collecting, analyzing, and sharing the intelligence required by this nation's network defenders. Moreover, I will work together with other community elements to ensure that we are effectively pursuing the foreign threats to our nation's networks, while also emphasizing world-class protection of our own information and networks.

- What role do you envision for CIA in providing for the cyber security of the nation?

CIA's first role in cyber security is to collect the actionable intelligence this nation requires to better prevent, defend, and mitigate against threats, and, when necessary, to recover from threats and attacks against our nation's networks. I would note that the CIA's effectiveness relies upon excellent teamwork to leverage and support the activities of other Intelligence, Defense, and Homeland Security organizations. Examples of this teamwork abound from our experiences in Iraq and in the fight against Al Qa'ida.

- What is your assessment of how effectively CIA and elements of the Department of Defense cooperate with respect to cyber security?

CIA has long had solid working relationships with DoD and other departments and agencies in sharing information assurance concepts and other cyber capabilities. CIA is heavily engaged in efforts to improve this nation's cyber security and cyber-counterintelligence capabilities and capacity, contributing in areas ranging from policy to implementation. Despite ever-growing cooperation, differences of opinion reportedly do arise occasionally, and we will always need to resolve these. During my tenure, if confirmed, I will ensure CIA's cyber security cooperation with DoD and others continues to increase.

- What are your top priorities for cyber security in your first year in office?

As stated previously, if confirmed, I will strive to ensure that CIA is positioned to continue improving protections against cyber threats to our own information and networks. In addition, as one of the CIA's enduring missions, I will focus on CIA's efforts to collect intelligence on foreign cyber threats.

- How should CIA incorporate cyber operations into its core missions?

Cyber and cyber-enabled technologies permeate the globe. Ubiquitous in virtually all aspects of life – communications, social interactions, commerce, government, military – these technologies are transforming the world. Likewise, the business of espionage is also transforming. CIA will continue to blend proven clandestine HUMINT tradecraft with use of state-of-the-art technology to maximize access to the information we seek – taking advantage of opportunities to leverage cyber-enabled technologies to the maximum extent possible. In sum, cyber is woven throughout all that the Agency does.

QUESTION 19: If confirmed, how would you manage, and what priority would you give to addressing the following issues:

- The vulnerability of CIA information systems to harm or espionage by trusted insiders?

A trusted workforce lies at the very heart of our security systems. We thoroughly and thoughtfully vet individuals initially and continuously for access to classified information using robust personnel security screening practices. To support the

continuous evaluation of cleared personnel, CIA uses state-of-the-art technical measures to monitor and audit on-line activities.

The CIA's Insider Threat Detection Program is considered to be the IC's "gold standard" and it continues to evolve. By policy, the Agency ensures all data is protected by default with a tightly managed network, which allows only a restricted class of users to remove data from the classified network. CIA's success stems from a strong partnership between its Office of Security and its Counterintelligence elements to identify and investigate anomalies on CIA's information systems. The Agency must remain alert to opportunities presented through emerging technologies and capabilities and adjust programs accordingly. Unfortunately, there will always be spies among us, and the Agency's goal must be to quickly identify and isolate the trusted insider who is misusing access.

- The vulnerability of CIA information systems to outside penetration;

Any information system connected to the internet is vulnerable to penetration and possible exploitation. Additionally, the inter-connectivity of IC networks, operating at various protection levels, presents another avenue for penetrating and exploiting CIA networks. As with the insider threat issue, CIA has a robust information assurance and Computer Incident Response Team (CIRT) program to monitor and investigate incidents but must still remain alert to vulnerabilities presented through emerging technologies and capabilities.

- The readiness of CIA to maintain continuity of operations;

It is my understanding that the CIA has robust procedures and programs in place designed to maintain continuity of operations, including procedures that ensure CIA systems will be available to support the Mission Essential Functions of the Agency during a crisis. Plans and procedures call for strategic deployment of key personnel to alternate locations during a crisis to ensure command and control, and, if confirmed, I will certainly be involved early on in exercises to assure myself that CIA can meet its obligations in a crisis.

- The ability of CIA to adopt advanced information technology efficiently and effectively;

Through creative venues, such as In-Q-Tel, private sector outreach, and partnerships with the interagency and a few key foreign partners, CIA is well-

positioned to identify, adopt, and integrate advanced information technology into the Agency's core capabilities.

- The CIA's recruitment and retention of skilled information technology professionals.

Like all U.S. Government agencies, I am certain CIA has to work hard to hire and retain qualified information technology employees given the competition from private industry. I am also certain, though, that CIA is a very attractive employer and competes very well, and, if confirmed, I will certainly work to ensure it remains so.

Information Sharing

QUESTION 20: The sharing of intelligence information has been a topic of considerable concern for many years.

- What is your general assessment as to how well the Intelligence Community is sharing information?

I have seen firsthand over the past decade the strides that the Intelligence Community has made in increasing both the amount of information that is shared and the number of consumers having access to the information. In fact, I believe information sharing by the IC is at an all time high. The DNI has made information sharing a top priority and has made great progress in implementing processes and procedures to ensure that information is shared with those who need it to accomplish their missions. Those of us in Iraq and Afghanistan have seen the results on the battlefield, where intelligence that was shared with the military and our coalition partners enabled successful targeting of top Al-Qaida and Taliban leaders. I understand that the IC is also beginning to extend its sharing efforts by reaching out beyond the Intelligence Community to State, Local, Tribal, and private sector partners, as appropriate.

But as the imperative for information sharing continues and as the IC works to securely automate need to know and need to share principles, the IT infrastructure challenges become increasingly complex. This is particularly true for the most sensitive intelligence, where the value to national security is the greatest. The IC has made great strides in information sharing, but it still has challenges to overcome.

- Is the Intelligence Community striking the right balance between “need to know” and “need to share?”

I believe the IC is closer to achieving the right balance between need to know and need to share than it has ever been. The DNI has been clear in his guidance to all 16 elements of the Intelligence Community on the need to strike this balance. The right balance is not a fixed formula, but one that requires constant consideration of the relationship between the sensitivity of the data and national security needs. What may be the right balance today may not be the right balance tomorrow. Wikileaks highlighted the risks of the delicate balance between sharing and protecting information. But it can be done, and the most impressive example of achieving this balance was the successful targeting of UBL.

- If confirmed how will you achieve and maintain the right balance between “need to know” and “need to share” for CIA data?

I have not been briefed in detail on CIA’s specific efforts to achieve this balance. As I previously mentioned, however, that balance is critical. To CIA’s credit, I understand that the Agency is an IC leader in the development of technology, tools and practices that help to continuously balance the risks to sources and methods while sharing more information. If confirmed, I will examine resources, capabilities, policies, and risks associated with this issue. I will continue to push for the development of technology to enable secure and responsible information sharing. I will review current policies and implementation of those policies and identify gaps or issues preventing CIA from striking that balance. I will work to better understand the needs of our consumers, while ensuring due diligence to protection of sources and methods.

- If confirmed, how will you improve CIA’s progress in making all information collected and all analysis produced by CIA available for discovery by automated means by authorized IC personnel, as directed in Intelligence Community Directive 501.

I have not yet been fully briefed on CIA’s progress in this area, but I know firsthand the value of CIA’s information to decision makers and war fighters. If confirmed, I am committed to making available for secure discovery and sharing as much of the information collected and analysis produced by CIA as is possible, while ensuring sources and methods are protected from compromise. I understand

that CIA has made excellent progress in meeting requirements for discovery and access for the phased implementation of ICD 501. Nonetheless, automation presents complex challenges, especially for discovery and access to the Nation's most sensitive intelligence. Working on behalf of the DNI, CIA has been a leader in developing solutions to move to the next phase of ICD 501 implementation, and if confirmed I will continue to strongly support those efforts.

QUESTION 21: To what degree and in what circumstances should operational details concerning CIA sources or methods be disseminated to individuals in the Intelligence Community outside the National Clandestine Service?

- Under what conditions should Intelligence Community analysts with valid clearances and a need-to-know not have access to pertinent information contained in operational cables?

The NCS has moral, operational, and legal obligations to protect its human intelligence sources and, simultaneously, to provide its consumers with the fullest context for the intelligence it provides them. When the operational details of the intelligence have real analytic value, such as for assessing the credibility of the information being reported, these details should be made available to the analysts – with appropriate safeguards. How this is handled should depend on the sensitivity of the operational information at issue.

HUMINT in the Intelligence Community

QUESTION 22: What do you understand to be the responsibilities of the Director of the CIA as national HUMINT manager?

- What is your view of the strengths and weaknesses of the elements of the Intelligence Community other than the CIA to collect the HUMINT necessary to protect national security?

Over the past ten years, I have been a consumer of much HUMINT-derived intelligence, including that coming from agencies other than the CIA. If confirmed as Director of CIA, I will work as National HUMINT Manager to capitalize on the strengths of all the HUMINT mission partners to ensure the most effective and efficient combination of capabilities necessary to protect our national security.

- Is it appropriate for the Director of the CIA to continue to be the National HUMINT manager?

Yes. CIA has a historic and ongoing role as the center of HUMINT collection in the IC. Its resources are vast and its capabilities unparalleled. Leveraging this expertise, CIA has long been the IC's leader in training on HUMINT collection. For these reasons, it is the obvious and correct agency to act as the IC's HUMINT Community manager.

- In your view, does the National HUMINT manager have the authorities necessary to set and enforce national standards for all HUMINT training and operations, including those of the FBI and DOD?

The National HUMINT manager does, in my view, have sufficient authority to set and enforce national standards for HUMINT training and operations. Standards have been established and promulgated as National HUMINT Manager Directives (NHMDs) for the following areas: training, requirements and intelligence report format, source validation, technical operations, and operational coordination. Additional standards under some of these categories continue to be developed and issued as annexes to the basic NHMDs. All standards are developed collaboratively, via a broad spectrum of stakeholders from across the community, and approved by the HUMINT Enterprise Board of Directors and Board of Governors. There is a comprehensive training validation program for assessing training standards. Performance metrics for other areas are under development.

QUESTION 23: What do you consider to be the appropriate division of responsibilities for HUMINT between the CIA and the various components of the Department of Defense? Please explain specifically for the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Special Operations Command, and the Military Departments.

While CIA's HUMINT collection produces wide-ranging intelligence consumed throughout the government, it does not meet all of the Defense Department's requirements. DIA and each of the military services have specialized intelligence elements that are responsible for collecting against their own requirements. I believe this historic division of labor is appropriate. However, as I understand it, DOD HUMINT elements operate under the national-level requirements that are coordinated by CIA. EO 12333 gives the DNI the charter to establish procedures for the deconfliction, coordination, and synchronization of IC activities with "activities that involve foreign intelligence and security services, or activities that involve the use of clandestine methods, conducted by other United States

Government departments, agencies, and establishments.” The National HUMINT Manager has the responsibility to develop, promulgate, and oversee implementation of these procedures, pursuant to delegation from the DNI.

Relationship to Congress

QUESTION 24: Explain your understanding of the obligations of the D/CIA under Sections 502 and 503 of the National Security Act of 1947.

I believe that it’s important to state at the outset that the statutory language is only one facet of the relationship between the D/CIA and Congress. I would like to emphasize that if confirmed, I will seek to continue the good relationship that Director Panetta and the CIA have built with this Committee, and Congress as a whole, through briefings, notifications, hearings, reports, and informal discussions.

It is my understanding that the statute provides for the following: As the “head of an . . . agency . . . of the United States Government involved in intelligence activities,” the D/CIA, pursuant to section 502, keep the two intelligence committees “fully and currently informed” of the Agency’s activities – other than covert action – including any “significant anticipated activities” and any “significant intelligence failure.” The Director is obligated, by law, to inform the committees before CIA undertakes significant activities and to report significant developments. Section 502 also directs that notice to the two committees shall be in a manner consistent with the protection of sources and methods. This language does not provide blanket authority to the D/CIA to withhold notice from the committees. Rather, I understand this language as providing the D/CIA with some level of latitude, regarding the timing and manner in which CIA provides notice. Section 502’s language allows for D/CIA to make necessary accommodations with the committees so that they may perform appropriate oversight, while protecting sensitive intelligence sources and methods and while respecting applicable executive branch privileges. Section 502 also requires the Director to provide any information or material in his custody or control, including the legal basis for the activity, that the committees request in order to carry out their responsibilities. The “sources and methods” provision also serves as a condition on this obligation.

Section 503 requires that the Director keep the two intelligence committees “fully and currently informed” of all covert action in which the CIA is involved, including any “significant failures.” The obligation to provide the committees with initial notice of a covert action program (by means of a Finding), and with

subsequent notice of a significant change or a significant undertaking (by means of a Memorandum of Notification), rests with the President rather than with the Director. Section 503 also requires the Director to furnish any information or material in his custody or control, to include the legal basis that the committees request to carry out their oversight responsibilities. The "sources and methods" provision also serves as a condition on both of the obligations in Section 503.

- Under what circumstances do you believe notification may be limited to the Chairman and Vice Chairman or Ranking Member of the congressional intelligence committees?

The Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2010 allows the CIA, in extraordinary circumstances, to withhold notice to the full committees or delay notice until the particular sensitivity passes. This limited notification process should, however, be the exception, not the rule. There are very limited circumstances in which I could foresee having to confine disclosure, for example, if wider dissemination could put lives at risk or compromise the success of a specific operation. The President can also make such determinations. However, in these cases, I would reach out to the leaders of the two committees and attempt to reach agreement on how the information at issue would be shared with their respective committees.

- In those circumstances, what is the obligation of the D/CIA to notify subsequently the full membership of the committees as expeditiously as possible?

As stated in the latest amendments to the statute, any limited notification requires reconsideration not later than 180 days from the date of the original limited notification. The statutory changes recognize that the President may continue to restrict broader dissemination of the information at issue where extraordinary circumstances affect vital interests of the United States.

- Please describe your understanding of the obligation to provide to the intelligence committees any information or material concerning intelligence activities or covert actions, including their legal basis, which is requested by either of the intelligence committees.

I view this obligation as further refinement of the general obligation in the National Security Act prior to the amendments. The CIA, as with other intelligence agencies, must balance the need to satisfy the legitimate needs of oversight bodies, to include Congress, with the need to carry out its mission effectively and preserve

sensitive Executive branch equities. This language serves as the common reference point for arriving at an accommodation that enables the committees to perform appropriate oversight functions effectively, while protecting sensitive intelligence sources and methods and respecting applicable Executive branch interests and privileges. As I stated above, I believe that the statutory language is but one element of the overall relationship, and if confirmed I look forward to building on Director Panetta's commitment, transparency, and cooperation.

Treatment of U.S. Person Information

QUESTION 25: What principles, in your view, should govern rules pertaining to the collection and retention of U.S. person information by U.S. intelligence agencies?

I strongly agree with the obligation set forth in Executive Order 12333 that, "[t]he United States Government has a solemn obligation, and shall continue in the conduct of intelligence activities under this order, to protect fully the legal rights of all United States persons, including freedoms, civil liberties, and privacy rights guaranteed by federal law."

CIA must adhere to the Constitution and statutes of the United States. Specifically, the CIA must be vigilant in its protection of the civil liberties and privacy interests of U.S. persons, wherever they are located. To ensure this, the CIA must maintain strict accountability standards for all CIA officers.

- Are there any special rules or exceptions necessary for the collection and retention of U.S. person information by the CIA? Please explain.

It is my understanding that Executive Order 12333 authorizes elements of the Intelligence Community to collect, retain, and disseminate U.S. person information only in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency and approved by the Attorney General. CIA regulations specify not only the kinds of information that CIA may lawfully seek to obtain on U.S. persons, but also what may be retained and disseminated outside the Agency.

Detention, Interrogation, and Rendition Issues

QUESTION 26: In answering the following, please include your understanding of the obligations of the United States under U.S. law and international law, as applied to the Intelligence Community, with respect to the detention and interrogation of detainees and also with respect to access to them by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

- What principles should govern the detention, interrogation, and rendition practices and policies of the Intelligence Community, and in particular the CIA?

Detention, interrogation, and rendition practices and policies of the Intelligence Community are governed by several entities. These policies and practices must fully comply with the Constitution and statutes of the United States, and with the policy set by the President. Regarding the latter, the President's January 22, 2009, Executive Order directs all U.S. agencies to use Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as the minimum baseline for the treatment and interrogation of persons detained in any armed conflict. The Executive Order also states that agencies must notify the International Committee of the Red Cross of such detainees and provide the Red Cross access to them, and that interrogations must comply with the standards of the Army Field Manual. With respect to renditions, the Intelligence Community must comply with U.S. obligations under the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment, including obligations under Article 3, which prohibits rendition to a country where it is more likely than not he will be subjected to torture.

- Should there be uniform rules for military and intelligence interrogations? If not, what differences do you believe would be justified? To the extent that any difference may be justified, what fundamental requirements should be constant?

The Executive Order 13491 Task Force's 2009 final report to the President made clear that CIA did not seek interrogation techniques beyond those in the Army Field Manual – the same set of rules used by U.S. military debriefers (and given the force of law by Congress). CIA stands by that representation and does not currently seek techniques beyond those currently used by the U.S. military. CIA also notes that the interagency High-Value Interrogation Group (HIG), which was created pursuant to the Task Force's recommendation, is currently conducting additional research into the science of interrogation in order to potentially develop new and more effective lawful interrogation practices, approaches, and strategies. If the HIG's research identifies and/or proposes techniques not covered by the

Army Field Manual, but that are otherwise consistent with U.S. law, CIA, in coordination with other HIG participants, would consider them and, at that time, would evaluate and discuss with legal authorities and Congressional leaders whether a variance from the Army Field Manual would be appropriate.

- What is the appropriate use, if any, of contractors within the Intelligence Community in the interrogation of detainees?

I believe the debriefing of detainees should be conducted under clear guidance, close supervision, and strict accountability. There should always be a clear chain of government responsibility. Most optimally, interrogations would be conducted by a cadre of very skilled, government intelligence officers. But in the rare case that a specific expertise is required, such as a special language or dialect, use of a contractor may be warranted. However, this should be an extremely rare exception to the rule.

Law Enforcement Proviso

QUESTION 27: The National Security Act of 1947 (Section 104A (d)(1)) states that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency "shall have no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security functions."

- Explain your understanding of this proviso, including the manner in which it governs the allocation of responsibilities between the FBI and the CIA.

I understand this language was originally included in the National Security Act of 1947 in large part to ensure that CIA did not, either intentionally or inadvertently over time, come to use its extraordinary authorities and capabilities for internal security or law enforcement purposes. I believe the principle underlying this proviso – that CIA should maintain its focus on foreign intelligence matters – remains as valid today as it was in 1947.

The proviso means that CIA cannot itself exercise police, law enforcement, or internal security functions. CIA cannot execute arrests, seize or collect evidence for law enforcement purposes, or conduct general law enforcement activities in the United States.

However, the proviso does not preclude CIA and law enforcement authorities from sharing information of common interest or concern; nor does it prevent CIA from

providing other types of appropriate assistance to law enforcement, including technical assistance and expertise. This collaboration has proved invaluable, particularly in counterterrorism and counterintelligence matters.

The proviso also does not, as I understand it, prohibit CIA from taking appropriate security steps to protect its employees and facilities. As the Committee is aware, in cases where CIA acquires information indicating that a violation of federal law has occurred or may occur, CIA is required to provide that information to the Department of Justice.

Management of the CIA

QUESTION 28: Please describe in detail how you intend to fill key positions in the Office of the Director, and elsewhere within the CIA, in order to ensure that those individuals who are part of your management team have significant and appropriate intelligence experience.

I believe that getting the right people into the critical leadership positions of an organization is vital to that organization's success. These individuals must be consummate professionals with the right expertise and experience for the job. I believe CIA has a solid and effective management team right now. Indeed, the heads of the Agency's four main directorates are all career intelligence professionals. And if confirmed, I intend to ask them all to remain at their current post for the time being.

QUESTION 29: Drawing on your most recent command experiences, please describe in detail your management philosophy and how you envision it might need to be modified, if at all, in leading a civilian organization such as the CIA.

My management philosophy is to determine the proper strategic vision – the big ideas that guide our work – and to communicate that vision frequently and consistently throughout the organization; to work as a team to implement that vision; and most importantly, to continuously refine the vision based on lessons learned and best practices. My career leading military personnel and defense civilians shaped this philosophy, and I anticipate that it will also be a useful approach at the Agency.

If confirmed, I anticipate focusing primarily on the broader vision and goals for the Agency, while remaining up to date on any significant operations or analyses that

we have in train, especially operations involving serious risk or analysis of key issues that are expected to be contentious. The Deputy Director, other senior leaders, and I will collaborate on significant decisions affecting the Agency.

QUESTION 30: Sexual harassment in the workplace remains an issue of concern in both government and private sector organizations. In the past, there have been allegations that sexual harassment at the CIA has been overlooked and ignored, including in decisions regarding appointments to high-level management positions.

- How do you believe the handling of sexual harassment cases affects the morale and mission performance of an organization?

The immediate and effective handling of all cases of discrimination and harassment, including sexual harassment, is essential for the morale and mission of any organization. Moreover, a diverse workforce is a critical enabler for the Agency and is an increasingly important factor in future success. The nature of the Agency's mission and the way we must conduct our business if we are to be effective require that each employee be able to develop and exercise his or her strengths to the fullest. Demeaning words and acts inhibit people from contributing freely and affect us all.

- How will you address sexual harassment cases within the CIA should you be confirmed?

The Agency has to embody and reflect the highest values of our Nation. Thus, the CIA must have zero tolerance for harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, genetic information, sexual orientation, or status as a parent. To that end, if confirmed, I will reinforce the Agency's policy of Zero Tolerance for Harassment and Discrimination and accompanying Agency regulations.

If confirmed as Director of the CIA, I intend to hold managers at every level accountable for the working environment in the units they lead. Every Agency employee – supervisor and non-supervisor alike – has a shared responsibility to ensure that the CIA is an equitable, harassment-free place in which to serve, grow, and excel.

Professional Experience

QUESTION 31: For each of the following, please specifically describe how your experiences will enable you to serve effectively as the Director of the CIA:

As the Commander of International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan, I command both operational and tactical intelligence assets, coordinate closely with Agency personnel on day-to-day operations, review daily military and Agency intelligence reports, and develop comprehensive campaign plans to integrate all assets with other instruments of national power. As a result of this experience, I have become familiar with the primary threats facing our nation – particularly from transnational terrorists – and with the Agency's capabilities. Additionally, I have had numerous opportunities to work with Director Panetta and Director Clapper, and I meet routinely with Agency personnel in Kabul to synch our operations. I have also participated in the review of National Intelligence Estimates, and I have seen the importance of timely and accurate intelligence assessments for the civilian and military leadership.

- Commander, U.S. Central Command;

As Commander U.S. Central Command, I was responsible for an area of operations that comprised 20 nations. My responsibilities included overseeing a variety of efforts, promoting bilateral and multilateral relationships, responding to crises, deterring state and non-state aggression, and overseeing the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. In order to carry out these duties, I developed a strong relationship with Director Panetta and the Agency personnel whose insight was critical to understanding the region. Specifically, as a member of the Counterterrorism Board of Directors, Director Panetta and I – and other leaders – met quarterly to discuss ongoing initiatives, coordination opportunities, and ways to refine intelligence collection.

- Commander, Multi-National Force Iraq;

As Commander, Multi-National Force Iraq, I had similar responsibilities to my current position, and, as such, commanded operational and tactical intelligence assets. Additionally, I engaged firsthand with myriad intelligence personnel, and intelligence reports significantly shaped many of the important decisions that I had to make in Iraq.

One of the critical lessons I learned about intelligence while in Iraq was the importance of considering different analyses from different intelligence agencies.

When the National Intelligence Council was conducting its National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq in the summer of 2007, I invited intelligence leaders to come see the conditions on the ground firsthand and to meet with the MNF-I intelligence officials. Although each agency retained its independence, this coordination and competitive analysis sharpened the products of all members of the intelligence community and led to the best possible input for the President and for the Congress.

- U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth;

As Commander, U.S. Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, I was charged with the overall integration of substantial parts of the U.S. Army's doctrine, training, organization, leader development, and other systems so that the Army could confront current challenges while preparing for the future. This experience helped me see how ideas drive organizations and how important education and training systems are for long-term effectiveness.

For example, when I was Commander of the Combined Arms Center, my Marine Corps counterpart (General Jim Mattis) and I worked together on examining the principles of counterinsurgency and codifying them in the Counterinsurgency Field Manual. This was significant, not just because of the manual itself, but because of the wide discussion and debate that accompanied that effort, and because of the way in which the counterinsurgency concepts changed the way that the Army, the Marine Corps, and, to some extent, all of government operated.

Also at Fort Leavenworth, I contributed to the Army's system of doctrine, training, education, leader development, and other functions that are essential to preparing Army leaders for the future. We called the overall group of organizations we oversaw the "Engine of Change," and it was critical in the Army's preparation of its leaders and units to confront the challenges that they were to face in the future. We also developed the Army's leadership manual and the field manual that now has the force of law on the conduct of interrogations of detainees.

- Commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq and the NATO Training Mission-Iraq;

As Commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and the NATO Training Mission-Iraq, I was charged with developing the organization responsible for building the Iraqi Army and Police force under extremely difficult circumstances. This experience was particularly helpful since I

learned a great detail about recruiting, training, and equipping foreign forces, and about building the infrastructure and institutions that support those forces. If confirmed, I anticipate that my experience at MNSTC-I will help me examine Agency programs that support host nation forces, as well as the science and technology programs that make CIA the effective, cutting-edge organization it is today.

- Deputy Commander of JIATF Justice Assured and the U.S. Joint Counter-Terrorism Task Force-Bosnia.

As the Deputy Commander of JIATF Justice Assured and the U.S. Joint Counter-Terrorism Task Force-Bosnia, I was tasked to oversee operations intended to bring persons indicted for war crimes to justice, and, after September 11, 2001, to target affiliates of al Qa'ida and other extremists operating in Bosnia.

Given the scope of the mission, I learned the importance of working with a variety of partners to achieve a common purpose. Specifically, the mission required us to integrate a number of diverse agencies from the Defense Department, the intelligence community, the State Department, special operations forces, conventional units, the FBI, and other law-enforcement agencies, as well as elements from other nations. Additionally, immediately after September 11, policies, laws, and procedures had not been fully developed for confronting the different security challenges, so we worked very carefully within the existing laws and policies while identifying areas that needed to be improved or where we needed additional guidance or authorities.



United States
Office of Government Ethics
1201 New York Avenue, NW, Suite 500
Washington, DC 20005-3917

JUN 9 2011

The Honorable Dianne Feinstein
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Chairman:

In accordance with the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, I enclose a copy of the financial disclosure report filed by David H. Petraeus, who has been nominated by President Obama for the position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

We have reviewed the report and have also obtained advice from the agency concerning any possible conflict in light of its functions and the nominee's proposed duties. Also enclosed is an ethics agreement outlining the actions that the nominee will undertake to avoid conflicts of interest. Unless a date for compliance is indicated in the ethics agreement, the nominee must fully comply within three months of confirmation with any action specified in the ethics agreement.

Based thereon, we believe that this nominee is in compliance with applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest.

Sincerely,

[SIGNATURE]

Don W. Fox
Acting Director

Enclosures

Form Approved:
OMB No. 1199-0001

Executive Branch Personnel Public Financial Disclosure Report

OMB Form 278 (Rev. 04-2010)
5 C.F.R. Part 263A
U.S. Office of Government Ethics

Form Approved:
OMB No. 1199-0001

Reporting Individual's Name	David	New Entrant Candidate	Termination Date (Month, Day, Year)	Fee for Late Filing Any individual who is required to file this report and does not file it by the date the report is required to be filed is subject to a civil penalty of not more than 30 days after the last day of the filing extension period, shall be subject to a \$200 fee.
Position for Which Filing	Director	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> New Entrant Candidate <input type="checkbox"/> Existing Candidate		
Location of Present Office (or forwarding address)	1400 SAFFORD AVE Arlington, VA 22204	<input type="checkbox"/> Incumbent <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> New Entrant Candidate		
Presidential Nominee Subject to Senate Confirmation	Do not list in Part I, Schedule A, Required Information.	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No		
Other Reviewer (if desired by agency)				
Signature of Reporting Official	[SIGNATURE]		Date (Month, Day, Year) JUN 2, 2011	
Signature of Other Reviewer	[SIGNATURE]		Date (Month, Day, Year) 2 Jun 2011	
Signature of Agency Ethics Official/Revisor	[SIGNATURE]		Date (Month, Day, Year) 2 June 2011	
Signature of Government Ethics Office Use Only	[SIGNATURE]		Date (Month, Day, Year) 6/9/11	
Comments of Reviewing Officials (if additional space is required, use the reverse side of this sheet)				
(Check box if filing extension granted # indicate number of days) <input type="checkbox"/>				
(Check box if comments are continued on the reverse side) <input type="checkbox"/>				

Supplement SF 278 Edition.

ODIG Form 278 (Rev. 09/20/04)
2 C.F.R. Part 2634
U.S. Office of Government Ethics

Reporting Individual's Name
Peterson, David H.

SCHEDULE A

Page Number
2 of 11

Income: type and amount. If "None (or less than \$201)" is checked, no other entry is needed in Block C for that item.

Valuation of Assets at close of reporting period

Assets and Income

BLOCK A	BLOCK B										BLOCK C																								
	None (or less than \$1,001)	\$1,001 - \$50,000	\$50,001 - \$100,000	\$100,001 - \$250,000	\$250,001 - \$500,000	\$500,001 - \$1,000,000	Over \$1,000,000*	Over \$1,000,000*	\$1,000,001 - \$5,000,000	\$5,000,001 - \$25,000,000	\$25,000,001 - \$50,000,000	Over \$50,000,000	None (or less than \$201)	Capital Gains	Interest	Rents and Royalties	Dividends	Qualified Trust	Accepted Investment Fund	Qualified Trust	None (or less than \$201)	\$201 - \$1,000	\$1,001 - \$2,500	\$2,501 - \$5,000	\$5,001 - \$15,000	\$15,001 - \$50,000	\$50,001 - \$100,000	\$100,001 - \$1,000,000	Over \$1,000,000*	Over \$1,000,000*	\$1,000,001 - \$5,000,000	Over \$5,000,000	Other Income (Specify Type & Actual Amount)	Date (Mo., Day, Yr.) Only if Honoraria	
1 (U) US GOVT SERIES EE BONDS	X																																		
2 (U) BE ACRES UNIMP LAND, 10 OWNER BAY SPRINGFIELD, NH, US																																			
3 (U) CITIZENS BANK-NEW HAMPSHIRE checking accounts																																			
4 (U) WELLS FARGO ADV: Echon Vantage Mutual Fd. Tax Managed Growth I, I, C, C (ECTOX)																																			
5 Wells Fargo Adv RIRA-Kemper Life Ins Tax Deferred Variable Fnd & Market Val Adj Vtd An																																			
6 5:1 ALGER AMERICAN CAPITAL APPREC																																			

* This category applies only if the asset/income is solely that of the filer's spouse or dependent children. If the asset/income is either that of the filer or jointly held by the filer with the spouse or dependent children, mark the other higher category of value, as appropriate.

SCHEDULE A continued
(Use only if needed)

Form Number
3 of 11

OMB Form 278 (Rev. 06/2011)
5 C.F.R. Part 2634
U.S. Office of Government Ethics

Reporting Individual's Name
Petrusik, David H.

Assets and Income	BLOCK B										BLOCK C													
	Valuation of Assets at Close of Reporting Period										Income: type and amount. If "None (or less than \$20)" is checked, no other entry is needed in Block C for that item.													
	None (or less than \$1,001)		\$1,001 - \$15,000		\$15,001 - \$50,000		\$50,001 - \$100,000		\$100,001 - \$250,000		\$250,001 - \$500,000		\$500,001 - \$1,000,000		\$1,000,001 - \$5,000,000		\$5,000,001 - \$25,000,000		Over \$25,000,000		Type	Amount	Date (Mo., Day, Yr.) Only if Honorary	
1 5.2 DWS GLOBAL THEMATIC																								
2 5.3 DWS GOV & AGENCY SEC VIP																								
3 5.4 DWS STRATEGIC VALUE																								
4 5.5 DWS HIGH INCOME																								
5 5.6 DWS CAPITAL GROWTH																								
6 5.7 Credit Suisse TRUST INTL EQUITY FLEX III																								
7 6 (S) Wells Fargo Adv R-18A-Kempco Ltd Inc Tr Deferred Variable Fund & Mkt Val Adj VGR Alt																								
8 R.1 (S) ALGER AMERICAN CAPITAL APPREC																								
9 6.2 (S) DWS GLOBAL THEMATIC																								

* This category applies only if the asset/income is solely that of the filer's spouse or dependent children. If the asset/income is either that of the filer or jointly held by the filer with the spouse or dependent children, mark the minor higher category of value, as appropriate.

OMB Form 7278 (Rev. 09/2010)
 5 CFR Part 2634
 U.S. Office of Government Ethics

Reporting Individual's Name
 Peurano, David H.

BLOCK A		BLOCK B												BLOCK C		Page Number												
Assets and Income		Valuation of Assets at close of reporting period												Type		Amount		Date (Mo., Day, Yr.) Only if Honorary										
		None (or less than \$1,001)	\$1,001 - \$15,000	\$15,001 - \$50,000	\$50,001 - \$100,000	\$100,001 - \$250,000	\$250,001 - \$500,000	\$500,001 - \$1,000,000	Over \$1,000,000*	\$1,000,001 - \$5,000,000	\$5,000,001 - \$25,000,000	\$25,000,001 - \$50,000,000	Over \$50,000,000	Dividends	Interest	Capital Gains	None (or less than \$201)	\$201 - \$1,000	\$1,001 - \$2,500	\$2,501 - \$5,000	\$5,001 - \$15,000	\$15,001 - \$50,000	\$50,001 - \$100,000	Over \$100,000	Over \$1,000,000	Over \$5,000,000		
1	10.1 (S) WELLS FARGO ADVANTAGE ASSET ALLOC FID CL C	X															X											
2	10.2 (S) ALGER AMERICAN CAPITAL APPRECIATION																											
3	10.3 (S) DWS GLOBAL THEMATIC																											
4	10.4 (S) DWS GOV & AGENCY SEC																											
5	10.5 (S) DWS STRATEGIC VALUE																											
6	10.6 (S) DWS HIGH INCOME																											
7	10.7 (S) DWS CAPITAL GROWTH																											
8	10.8 (S) Credit Suisse TRUST INTL ECQY FLEX III																											
9	11 WELLS FARGO ADV IRA-NEW LIFE INSTX DEF AVA MCLEAN, VA USA																											

* This category applies only if the asset/income is solely that of the filer's spouse or dependent children. If the asset/income is either that of the filer or jointly held by the filer with the spouse or dependent children, mark the other higher categories of value, as appropriate.

SCHEDULE D

Page Number: 11 of 11

CGS Form 274 (Rev. 06/2010)
 5 C.F.R. Part 2634
 U.S. Office of Government Ethics

Reporting Individual's Name: **Peirce, David H.**

Part I: Positions Held Outside U.S. Government
 Report any positions held during the applicable reporting period, whether compensated or not. Positions include but are not limited to those of an officer, director, trustee, general partner, proprietor, representative, employee, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise or any non-profit organization or educational institution. Exclude positions with religious, social, fraternal, or political entities and those solely of an honorary nature. None

Organization (Name and Address)	Type of Organization	Position Held	From (Mo./Yr.)	To (Mo./Yr.)
1 FABER, LLC 1001 N. Main St., Suite 100 Peirce, David H., Peirce, David H., Peirce, David H.	PROPERTY-HOLDING LLC	MEMBER	06/2009	PRESENT
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				

Part II: Compensation in Excess of \$5,000 Paid by One Source
 Report sources of more than \$5,000 compensation received by you or your spouse or dependent child during the reporting period. Do not complete this part if you are an Incumbent, Termination Payer, or Vice Presidential or Presidential Candidate. Do not report compensation when you directly provided the services generating a fee or payment of more than \$5,000. You need not report the U.S. Government as a source. None

Source (Name and Address)	Amount	Year	Other Description of Source
1 The Jones & Smith, Haverhill, Mass. 100 Main St., Haverhill, Mass. Peirce, David H., Peirce, David H., Peirce, David H.			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			