[Congressional Record: July 15, 2011 (Extensions)]
[Page E1331-E1333]
IN OPPOSITION TO THE PRESIDENT'S NOMINATION OF MATHEW OLSEN TO LEAD THE
NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
______
HON. FRANK R. WOLF
of virginia
in the house of representatives
Friday, July 15, 2011
Mr. WOLF. Mr. Speaker, I submit a letter I sent to Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence Chairman Dianne Feinstein opposing the
President's nomination of Mr. Matthew Olsen to lead the National
Counterterrorism Center.
House of Representatives
July 14, 2011.
Hon. Dianne Feinstein,
Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Hart
Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Feinstein: I write in opposition to Mr.
Matthew Olsen's nomination to serve as director of the
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which is located in
[[Page E1332]]
my congressional district. I believe Mr. Olsen exercised
questionable judgment and made misleading statements while
serving as the special counselor to the attorney general and
executive director of the Obama Administration's Guantanamo
Review Task Force, where he led the interagency process to
implement the president's executive order that led to the
release of a number of dangerous terrorist detainees held at
the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. Dozens of high risk terrorist
detainees recommended for release by the task force led by
Mr. Olsen were released abroad to dangerously unstable
countries, including Yemen, Somalia and Afghanistan.
As then-ranking member and now chairman of the House
Commerce-Justice-Science Appropriations subcommittee--which
funds the Justice Department, Federal Bureau of
Investigations, Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Marshals Service and
which helped fund the NCTC's predecessor, the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center--I was disturbed by decisions and
statements made by Mr. Olsen in 2009 while he led the task
force. These concerns have deepened based on new information
that has come to light in recent articles from Newsweek, The
Washington Post, The National Journal and The Weekly
Standard. These reports have raised troubling questions about
Mr. Olsen's leadership of the task force and his actions in
response to White House influence.
Additionally, my personal interactions with Mr. Olsen, as
well as these subsequent news reports, lead me to conclude
that he was not forthright with the Congress and may have
changed detainee assessments under political pressure from
administration officials. I believe these are troubling
concerns which deserve a thorough investigation and should
give the Senate serious pause as it considers who should lead
the NCTC. I have visited the NCTC on several occasions and
have met with a number of its former directors, as well as
the former and current directors of National Intelligence. I
have seen firsthand the critical work that is done by the
center and fully understand the need for an independent,
capable and principled director to lead the operation.
There are three concerns that have led me to oppose Mr.
Olsen's nomination. First, it is clear to me that in order to
achieve the president's promise to close Guantanamo Bay
during his first year in office, Mr. Olsen may have been
susceptible to the immense political pressure placed on the
interagency task force to re-classify detainee threat levels.
Second, it has become clear that Mr. Olsen's task force may
have altered some detainee assessments--overturning
Department of Defense assessments--in order to clear and
expedite the release of a large number of detainees. Third, I
have recently learned that Mr. Olsen was not forthright with
me and my staff about the effort to release a number of
Uighur detainees to northern Virginia in 2009. Attached is a
white paper that addresses these concerns in greater detail.
Leading the NCTC is a serious responsibility and requires a
director that is exceptionally experienced, forthcoming,
trustworthy and has good judgment. The analyses and
recommendations provided by the NCTC have direct bearing on
the safety of the American people. The director must be able
to withstand political pressure from all sides, facilitate
the complete and straightforward sharing of information and
ensure unbiased analysis. I do not question Mr. Olsen's
professional qualifications for this position, but from my
observations of his recent leadership positions, I believe
that he lacks the judgment to lead the NCTC.
I am willing to testify about my concerns during your
committee's upcoming confirmation hearing for Mr. Olsen.
Please do not hesitate to contact me at 202-225-5136 to
discuss any of this information.
Best wishes.
Sincerely,
Frank R. Wolf,
Chairman, Commerce-Justice-Science Subcommittee, House
Appropriations Committee.
Summary of Concerns Regarding Mr. Olsen's Leadership and Actions as
Executive Director of the Obama Administration's Guantanamo Review Task
Force
1. Questionable altering of Guantanamo Bay detainee assessments
I am concerned about new information reported by The Weekly
Standard about the assessments of detainees who were
transferred abroad in 2009. Throughout that year, I
repeatedly wrote the president and attorney general
expressing concern over the release of certain detainees
believed to be threats by the Department of Defense (DOD). I
was also deeply concerned that detainees were being released
to dangerously unstable countries, such as Yemen, Somalia and
Afghanistan. Despite my warnings in the fall of 2009,
detainees continued to be released to these countries until
the administration was forced to halt releases to Yemen
following the attempted attack by the Christmas Day bomber,
who trained in Yemen with al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
According to a July 13, 2011, article in The Weekly
Standard, ``[Olsen's] task force approved most of the
detainees remaining at Guantanamo for transfer, clearing the
way for the Obama administration to empty most of the
detention facility's cells. But a review of leaked detainee
threat assessments reveals that many of the detainees
approved for transfer [by Olsen's task force] were deemed
``high'' risks by Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO),
which oversees the detention and interrogation of detainees.
Moreover. JTF-GTMO recommended that most of these detainees
be retained in U.S. custody--precisely the opposite of the
task force's recommendations.''
The article continues, ``In its final report, dated January
22, 2010, Olsen's task force reported that 126 detainees, out
of a total of 240, were 'approved for transfer.' Olsen's task
force approved roughly 2 out of every 3 (65 percent)
Guantanamo detainees for transfer, JTF-GTMO recommended that
approximately 1 out of every 4 (25 percent) be transferred.''
There is one case in particular that serves as a good
example of the troubling discrepancy between Olsen's
recommend release of a detainee that JTF-GTMO considered to
be ``high'' risk. In early 2010, I wrote White House
counterterrorism adviser John Brennan about one detainee,
Ayman Batarfi, whom the DOD believed to be closely connected
to al Qaeda's anthrax program. Brennan forcefully rejected my
concerns about Batarfi. However, as a recent Weekly Standard
article notes:
``A recently leaked threat assessment prepared at
Guantanamo draws into question the Obama administration's
analysis of a detainee [Batarfi] who was transferred to Yemen
shortly before all future transfers to the unstable nation
were suspended.''
``Brennan decided to answer Wolf's challenge by sending a
letter on White House stationery to then-House speaker Nancy
Pelosi on February 1, 2010. ABC News obtained a copy of the
letter and published it online. Brennan wrote:
`During the briefing on January 13, Representative Wolf
made allegations that one detainee repatriated to Yemen had
been involved in weapons of mass destruction. As it has done
in every case, the task force thoroughly reviewed all
information available to the government about this individual
and concluded that there is no basis for the assertions
Representative Wolf made during this session. I am attaching
a classified addendum to this letter that addresses these
concerns directly.'
``But a recently leaked April 29, 2008, threat assessment
prepared by Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO) contains
numerous references to Batarfi's ties to al Qaeda's anthrax
program. These connections were made through a known al Qaeda
front named al Wafa, which employed Batarfi and provided
cover for al Qaeda's pre-9/11 pursuit of an anthrax
capability . . .
``For all of these reasons, and more. Batarfi was deemed a
`high risk' who is `likely to pose a threat to the U.S.. its
interests, and allies' by the JTF-GTMO team. Batarfi was also
considered to be of `high intelligence value.' ''
This newly leaked 2008 assessment raises serious questions
about why Olsen's task force didn't include the DOD's
information about Batarfi's ties to the al Qaeda anthrax
program as well as their judgment that Batarfi was, in fact,
``likely to pose a threat to the U.S.'' This information
raises questions about the integrity of the task force's
review and whether undue political pressure to release more
detainees led task force members to doctor detainee
assessments.
The Weekly Standard's Thomas Jocelyn succinctly posits in
the July 13, 2011, article, ``It is clear that the Guantanamo
Review Task Force, headed by Matthew Olsen, approved a large
number of `high' risk transfers. The senators presiding over
Olsen's confirmation hearing may want to ask: Why?''
2. Political pressure on the Guantanamo Bay Detainee Task Force
I am concerned about political pressure placed on Olsen and
the task force by administration officials. Although the
administration asserts that the task force was independent,
it is clear that the task force reported directly to the
White House and participated in meetings led by White House
chief of staff Rahm Emanuel. According to the April 23, 2011,
Washington Post article:
``In late April [2009], Obama heard some jarring news
during a Situation Room meeting with the interagency task
force reviewing the case of every detainee at Guantanamo.
``The president asked Matthew G. Olsen, the Justice
Department lawyer heading the task force, approximately how
many Guantanamo detainees could be prosecuted, according to
administration officials.
``Probably fewer than 20, Olsen said.
``The president seemed peeved that the number was so small,
in contrast with the optimistic predictions during his
election campaign that nearly all of the remaining detainees
could face trial or be transferred. The number would
eventually rise to 36.''
I am concerned that pressure from White House officials may
have led Olsen and his task force to inflate the number of
cases eligible for prosecution from ``fewer than 20'' to the
36 that were ultimately provided to the administration. The
nearly 100 percent increase in the number of cases brought
forward for prosecution following the president's comment
merits a serious review of whether political pressure led the
task force to alter its independent assessment of detainees.
The recent Weekly Standard analysis notes, ``[Olsen's] task
force approved only 35 percent of the detainees for
indefinite detention or prosecution, whereas JTF-GTMO
recommended that roughly 75 percent be retained in DoD
custody.'' This dramatic shift
[[Page E1333]]
in the number of cases recommended by Mr. Olsen raise serious
questions about whether pressure from the president and other
administration officials led him to inflate the number of
detainees recommended for trial.
3. Misleading Congress about the transfer of Uighur detainees to the
United States
It has become clear that the administration was directing
Mr. Olsen to intentionally withhold information from members
of Congress and he willingly complied with their
inappropriate direction. According to Newsweek The Washington
Post and The National Journal, the administration was
planning a secret transfer and settlement of at least two
Uighur detainees to northern Virginia in April 2009. Each of
these reports indicates the degree to which the White House
attempted to hide this effort from the Congress and the
public.
According to a May 2009, article in Newsweek, White House
officials are alleged to have been particularly concerned
about Republican members of Congress being made aware of the
secret transfer. Newsweek reported, ``As part of their
efforts to shut down the Guantanamo Bay detention center,
Obama Administration officials were poised in late April to
make a bold, stealthy move: they instructed the U.S. Marshals
Service to prepare an aircraft and a Special Ops group to fly
two Chinese Uighurs, and up to five more on subsequent
flights, from Gitmo to northern Virginia for resettlement. In
a conference call overseen by the National Security Council,
Justice and Pentagon officials had been warned that any
public statements about Gitmo transfers would inflame
congressional Republicans, according to a law-enforcement
official who asked not to be named discussing internal
deliberations.'' (This operation appears similar to the
administration's secret transfer of Somali terrorist Ahmed
Abdulkadir Warsame to New York City for civilian trial on
July 5 after spending two months on a U.S. Navy ship).
It has recently come to my attention that I was misled
about the status of the transfer of the Uighur detainees in
April 2009. This information confirms the Newsweek report
that career federal employees were explicitly directed to
hide this information from members of Congress, especially
Republican members.
During an April 22, 2009, meeting in my office with members
of the Guantanamo Bay Detainee Review Task Force, including
Mr. Olsen, I inquired about the status of the potential
transfer of Uighur detainees to the United States. Mr. Olsen
indicated that a decision had not yet been reached on the
transfer of the detainees. None of the other career or
political officials in the meeting countered Mr. Olsen's
assertion.
That is why I was deeply concerned to learn in an April
2011, Washington Post article, that the final decision on the
transfer of the Uighur detainees had been made during a White
House meeting eight days before my meeting with Mr. Olsen.
According to The Washington Post article, ``The first
concrete step toward closing the detention center was agreed
upon during an April 14, 2009, session at the White House.
`It was to be a stealth move . . . They were going to show up
here, and we were going to announce it,' said one senior
official, describing the swift, secretive operation that was
designed by the administration to preempt any political
outcry that could prevent the transfer.''
Following the publication of this article in April, I
personally called Mr. Olsen to ask whether he was aware at
the time of my meeting with him on April 22, 2009, that a
decision had already been made on the transfer of the
detainees. He told me that he had been aware of the decision
prior to our meeting.
I believe that I was intentionally misled by Mr. Olsen and
other administration officials during my April 22 meeting
with the task force. I also am concerned that the attorney
general did not acknowledge that a decision had been made
when he appeared before the House Commerce-Justice-Science
Appropriations subcommittee the following day. That is why I
was surprised when my office was notified by a career federal
employee that the administration was misleading the Congress
and planned to secretly transfer the detainees around May 1,
2009.
As Newsweek reported, ``Then on May 1, Virginia GOP Rep.
Frank Wolf got tipped off. Furious, he fired off a public
letter to President Obama, charging that the release of the
Uighurs--Muslim separatists opposed to the Chinese
government--could `directly threaten the security of the
American people.' White House officials were not happy . . .
The flight never took off.''
____________________
