[Congressional Record: September 9, 2011 (House)]
[Page H6014-H6032]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all
Members may have 5 legislative
[[Page H6015]]
days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous
material on H.R. 1892.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Brady of Texas). Is there objection to
the request of the gentleman from Michigan?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 392 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 1892.
{time} 0915
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 1892) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2012 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, with Mrs. Miller of Michigan in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the
first time.
The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Chair, I first wish to announce that, subsequent to ordering
the bill reported, the committee has modified the classified schedule
of authorizations to the bill with respect to the level of funding of
certain programs, with bipartisan agreement between myself and my
ranking member, Mr. Ruppersberger.
The classified annex containing the schedule of authorizations is
available for review by all Members of the House, subject to the rules
of the House and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, under
the procedures described in my announcement to the House on Wednesday.
The modified schedule of authorizations is and has been available for
review to Members for the period of time required by the rules of the
House.
Madam Chair, I think this is an important day for the community,
certainly rolling into the weekend of the 10th anniversary of that
tragic event on 9/11. It is important, it is crucial, that we continue
to monitor, to improve, to provide support for our intelligence
services who so bravely around the world and here at home serve to
protect the United States of America.
The bill before us today is a vital tool for our oversight of the
intelligence community's classified activities and is critical to
ensuring our intelligence agencies have the resources and authorities
they need to do their important work. Passing an annual intelligence
bill is vital to keeping the laws governing our intelligence operations
up to date. The FY12 bill sustains today's intelligence operations and
provides for future capabilities while achieving significant savings.
The U.S. intelligence community plays a critical role in the war on
terrorism and securing the country from many other threats that we
face. This bill funds all U.S. intelligence agencies, spanning 17
separate agencies, totaling roughly $80 billion. The bill's
comprehensive classified annex provides detailed guidance on
intelligence spending, including adjustments to costly programs. It
provides oversight and authorization for critical intelligence
activities, including but not limited to the global counterterrorism
operations such as the one that took out Osama bin Laden; tactical
intelligence support to combat units in Afghanistan and Iraq and other
places; cyber defense by the National Security Agency; detecting and
countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the R&D,
research and development, of new technology to maintain our
intelligence agencies' technological edge, including work on code
breaking and spy satellites.
The bill also reflects our tough economic times as well, Madam Chair.
After passage of the Budget Control Act, the committee revamped the
bill it reported out of committee in May to double its budget savings.
The bill is significantly below the President's FY12 budget request and
further still below the FY11 authorized and appropriated levels. We
accomplished this without impacting the mission. The savings were
achieved through a whole series of joint work and effort by many to
merge services and find savings that would bring efficiencies, as I
said, again, Madam Chair, without impacting the mission of the
intelligence services.
The bill curbs unnecessary personnel growth. The cost of additional
personnel would squeeze funding for high-tech investments, which is our
competitive advantage in intelligence. While the bill denies most of
the administration's requested personnel increases, it adds some key
positions in high priority areas such as cyber defense. The bill also
promotes major operating efficiencies in a number of areas, including
data processing, IT, and office leases, finding over $100 million in
savings.
{time} 0920
This bill also makes only ``best value'' investments and shaves $1
billion from a handful of very large-ticket hardware items and programs
that the intelligence community is involved in. The bill protects
investments in cutting-edge R&D and redirects $500 million of savings
to invest in some game-changing technologies.
The bottom line is this bipartisan bill preserves and advances
national security, and it is also fiscally responsible. Secrecy is a
necessary part of our country's intelligence work, so the intelligence
committees must conduct strong and effective oversight on behalf of the
American people. That oversight is impossible, however, without an
annual Intelligence authorization bill. Madam Chair, that's why we
stand before you today with a bill that I think this body can be proud
of, America can be proud of, and our intelligence community can take to
the bank that we're investing in their mission success.
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC, September 2, 2011.
Hon. Mike Rogers,
Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, The Capitol, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Rogers: I write to confirm our mutual
understanding regarding provisions in the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 within the
jurisdiction of the Foreign Affairs Committee, specifically
the preparation of Nuclear Proliferation Assessment
Statements and a requirement that the Department of State
provide information concerning individuals detained at Naval
Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. We appreciate your agreeing to
include the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee in the list of committees to
which this information will be submitted.
In order to expedite Floor consideration of this
legislation, the Committee will not object to the inclusion
of these two provisions and will not mark up the bill. The
Committee takes this action with the mutual understanding
that the Committee's jurisdiction over this, and similar
legislation, is in no way diminished or altered.
The Committee reserves the right to seek appointment to any
House-Senate conference on this legislation, and requests
your support if such a request is made. I would appreciate
your including this letter in the Congressional Record during
consideration of the legislation on the House Floor.
Sincerely,
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence,
Washington, DC, September 6, 2011.
Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Ros-Lehtinen: Thank you for your letter
regarding H.R. 1892, the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012. As you noted, elements of the bill fall
within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
I will continue to work with you on these sections and will
support the request of the Committee on Foreign Affairs for
conferees in any conference that may occur on the bill.
I appreciate your willingness to forego consideration of
the bill in the interest of expediting this legislation for
floor consideration. I acknowledge that by agreeing to waive
consideration of the bill, the Committee on Foreign Affairs
does not waive any jurisdiction it may have over provisions
of the bill or any matters under your jurisdiction. I will
include a copy of your letter and this response in the
Congressional Record during consideration of the legislation
on the House floor.
[[Page H6016]]
Thank you for your assistance in this matter.
Sincerely,
Mike Rogers,
Chairman.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I rise today in favor of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY 2012, and I yield myself such
time as I may consume.
When Chairman Rogers and I took over leadership of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, we made a commitment to
getting back into the practice of passing intelligence budgets. We made
a commitment to the men and women of the intelligence community to do
what is right--to give our intelligence professionals the resources,
capabilities, and authorities they need to keep us safe.
We on the Intelligence Committee have a responsibility to provide
effective oversight; to help build up the community, not to tear it
down; to hold the community accountable for performance while upholding
the Constitution and protecting civil liberties. This is even more
important today as we approach the 10th anniversary of 9/11, where
close to 3,000 innocent Americans lost their lives.
The bill makes smart choices by trimming where possible, eliminating
duplicative efforts, and ensuring we do not affect the current critical
capabilities that protect our Nation now and in the future.
The bill aligns our resources with our current threats in a fiscally
responsible manner. After the debt debate this last summer, our
committee trimmed our budget even further to keep its costs in check.
The bill curbs personal growth when appropriate, never affecting the
core mission. It invests in new positions for select high-priority
needs, such as FBI surveillance officers to keep watch on terrorists,
NSA cyber professionals to protect computers from malicious intrusions,
and Treasury financial analysts to unravel terrorist plots.
We found major savings in operating costs, pushed down the price of
programs through intense oversight, required acquisitions to come in on
budget and on schedule, and invested in research and technology to keep
our competitive edge. We fully funded the President's major satellite
program as well as commercial imagery to ensure our intelligence
professionals, the warfighters and our allies have the information they
need on the front lines around the world.
Right now, this bill includes two controversial provisions relating
to Guantanamo Bay detainees and another making the Director of the
National Security Agency a Senate-confirmed position. These provisions
garnered a veto threat from the White House. Chairman Rogers and I
worked together to come up with a solution. Today's manager's amendment
withdraws the Gitmo and the NSA Director provisions. I encourage all
Members to vote in favor of the manager's amendment. If these
provisions can be successfully eliminated, I will support this bill and
look forward to seeing it become law. This bill will make great
investments in space, cyber, and the warfighter.
Republicans and Democrats have worked together with our Senate
counterparts to make this a good bipartisan bill. Intelligence is
clearly the best defense against terrorism. This is even more important
as we approach the 10-year anniversary of the September 11 attacks.
If this bill is signed into law, it will be the third time in 3 years
that the Intelligence Committee passed an Intel authorization act. For
the 5 years before that, we did not have an Intelligence bill.
With this bill, we are giving the intelligence community guidance and
critical direction. We are doing our job. With the passage of the
manager's amendment, I believe this is a good bipartisan bill that
makes important decisions to protect our families and communities. I
urge my colleagues to support it.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I continue to reserve the
balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California
(Mr. Thompson), the vice chair on the Democratic side of the
Intelligence Committee.
Mr. THOMPSON of California. Madam Chair, I rise in support of H.R.
1892, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, as
amended by the manager's amendment.
As the ranking member of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Human
Intelligence, Analysis, and Counterintelligence, I am pleased that we
were able to work together to bring a bipartisan Intelligence
authorization bill to the floor today.
H.R. 1892 will support critical U.S. intelligence capabilities by
strengthening funding for our intelligence collection programs,
enhancing counterintelligence efforts, and improving upon critical
training operations vital to the future of the intelligence community.
This legislation also includes two provisions that I authored. The
first provision requires the Director of National Intelligence to
compile a threat assessment of foreign drug traffickers that are
increasingly turning to public lands in the United States to further
their operations.
Last year alone, over 3 million marijuana plants were eradicated on
62 of our national forests. The effect of these illegal drugs' growth
has been profound, leading to unacceptable levels of violence and the
devastation of our environment and our natural resources. Our public
lands have been taken away from us. This is wrong, and it must be
stopped.
This threat assessment will examine the ability of law enforcement
and the intelligence community to gather, process, and share critical
intelligence information regarding the presence of foreign drug
traffickers on our Federal public lands. This coordination between the
intelligence community and local law enforcement is extremely
important.
The second provision that I authored requires the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency to provide Congress with a full report on
the events surrounding the May 2011 Osama bin Laden raid. This record,
once complete, will provide an official account of a critical point in
our country's history.
We are all proud of the intelligence community's extraordinary effort
in carrying out the bin Laden operation. I believe it is necessary that
we never forget what actually happened in the raid and to be able to
recognize the amazing contribution of the intelligence community and
this important success.
The historical significance of this mission cannot be understated.
That's why we must make a determined effort to document and preserve
all that went into this operation so that in the future the history
books will be accurate and complete. I would like to just take a moment
to thank my friend, a former committee colleague of ours,
Representative Eshoo, for her work on this important part of the bill.
Madam Chair, our intelligence community must be prepared for any and
all threats. While Osama bin Laden may no longer pose a direct threat
to our country's safety and security, the remaining elements of al
Qaeda and other emerging terrorist organizations are more determined
than ever. It is critical for Congress to pass an Intelligence
authorization that furthers our national security, which I believe this
bill, with a manager's amendment, will do.
This legislation is necessary, will enhance the capabilities of the
intelligence community, specifically our counterterrorism efforts, and
will make our Nation stronger.
I urge my colleagues to support the amended bill.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman
from Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
Mr. KUCINICH. I thank my friend from Maryland.
Madam Chair, I rise in strong support of the dedicated public
servants of our intelligence community. Their work to ensure national
security is to be commended. However, I must oppose the Intelligence
Authorization Act of 2012.
Ten years after 9/11, the United States continues to use its
intelligence and defense apparatus in ways that undermine the rule of
law at home and abroad.
{time} 0930
There are plenty of examples, in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, and
[[Page H6017]]
Libya. In a recent PBS Frontline feature, a top CIA official who was at
the agency for over 34 years was quoted as saying, ``The Obama
administration changed virtually nothing with respect to existing CIA
programs and operations.''
Last month the Associated Press reported that the New York Police
Department was using domestic surveillance methods, in conjunction with
the Central Intelligence Agency, to spy on local communities in a way
that significantly undermined civil liberties. The United States
continues to use drones for targeted assassination under the color of
international law.
Earlier this year we rubberstamped three provisions of the Patriot
Act that allowed the government to conduct surveillance and demand
records from innocent Americans with impunity, even for activities
associated with First and Fourth Amendment rights.
Yesterday, it was reported in The New York Times and other
publications that Russian heat-seeking missiles ``that could be used to
shoot down civilian airliners have gone missing from warehouses in
Libya.'' Now, think about this. Who has control over Libya right now?
The CIA, everyone knows this, the CIA was involved in the overthrow of
the government of Qadhafi.
Now, whether you agree with the overthrow or not is not the point
here. Didn't we know about these weapons warehouses ahead of time?
There was one news report that said there might be as many as 20,000
surface-to-air missiles that could be in jeopardy of being lost,
missing, gone to the black market in who knows whose hands, and it's
the rebels that are running there now.
And I'm also concerned about that because of the stories about al
Qaeda's connection to the rebels from the beginning of the
insurrection. Despite the drones, intelligence personnel we have on the
ground, and nearly a billion dollars we've already spent in the war on
Libya, no one seems to know who took the missiles or who has them. How
is this allowed to happen? And who needs to be held accountable?
This is a debate we should be having exactly today over this
legislation. What happened to the missiles?
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Chair, I have a lot of respect for the gentleman from Ohio. I
think on this, unfortunately, his facts were just not correct. It's
interesting in the business of intelligence because so much of it is
classified that the rhetoric is easy to throw around and the
condemnation is easy to heap on the very brave men and women who are
following the law that we give them overseas. And I think that's one of
the reasons that this administration came to power and said, all of the
kinds of things and all the rhetoric around the political campaign just
wasn't true. They found that they were following the law. They were
comporting with the missions and guidelines and objectives in
accordance with the law of the United States. So they are, in fact
following the law.
There was no, absolutely no role for the CIA to overthrow the Qadhafi
regime. That is just false. So I think we need to be careful about
making these assertions that are pretty damning, if you will, that are
completely inaccurate. We may believe that happened. I can tell you, on
the Intelligence Committee, and my friend, Dutch Ruppersberger, we
watch this closely.
One of the reasons I hope he will change his mind on the bill, Madam
Chair, is that we need the ability to have oversight of these 17
agencies. This bill allows us to do it. By having no bill for 6 years,
no authorization bill of any meaning was passed in this House. That's
when problems start.
This gets us back to regular order. It gets us back into the business
of conducting proper oversight and setting the guidelines in the
classified annex, which I would urge the gentleman to come down and
review in the House Intelligence Committee, which every Member has the
privilege and, I argue, responsibility to do that if that's what they
desire to do. It lays out very clear guidelines on spending and
objectives and policies.
So I would argue that the gentleman's position is misstated. I
understand his frustration. But, again, this gets us back to regular
order, and I praise the administration for continuing the programs that
we know were put in place under the last administration that are
keeping Americans safer today.
With that, Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield 30 seconds to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr.
Kucinich).
Mr. KUCINICH. I honor the chairman's service, and I know of his
dedication to our country.
What I'm pointing out is that I think it's time we have the
discussion about the role that the CIA had in Libya, which was really
no secret, and the fact that these missiles that really we should have
known ahead of time where they were, that that should have been the
first place we want to guard. All of a sudden we have surface-to-air
missiles that can't be accounted for. I think the CIA has to take
responsibility for that.
I want to thank the gentleman, though, for the way in which he's
conducted the points that he's made.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Again, I thank the gentleman for his comments. I too have concerns
about weapons systems in Libya. But one of the problems was you can't
be against the intelligence services being places to collect
information, and then wonder why they're not in a place to get the
information that we might need. And that's part of the problem here.
There was no CIA involvement in the regime change, none. That did not
happen. I don't know where that got started. That is inaccurate
information, and I would be careful about throwing out that the agency
was involved in some regime changes. They were not.
We have pressed the agency and the administration to be more
aggressive on accounting for and rendering safe weapons systems that
are scattered all around Libya. We saw this in Iraq. When the regime
uses these weapons caches, not to protect the citizens of its own state
but to protect its regime, it becomes much more difficult to get a
handle on it. We ought to be celebrating the agency's work in trying to
determine where these systems are and how we render them safe and
account for them, and one way we can do that is passing this bill that
gives them the resources to do exactly that.
I would hope the gentleman would have a change of heart.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I just want to confirm, Mr. Kucinich, I do respect
your comments and your point of view, but our role on the Intelligence
Committee is oversight. When we can pass bills, we work and oversee all
these agencies. And if we find out where there are allegations of a
concern, let me know, and we will try to do what we can do to get
information. But I know of no situation that we have not been told in
the last couple of years, when Mr. Rogers and I have been working
together.
I think it's important for the United States of America to remember
this. In my opinion, the best defense against terrorism is
intelligence, but it's got to be done the right way and protect civil
liberties.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I respect the gentleman from Ohio's position
as well and hope that we can work out those differences as we move
forward.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from New York
(Mrs. Maloney).
Mrs. MALONEY. I thank the ranking member for his leadership in so
many ways before this Congress, and Chairman Rogers for his lifetime
commitment to protecting Americans even as a former FBI agent.
I want to underscore what the ranking member said. The best defense
against terrorism is intelligence, and we need to support this bill in
every single way. We were reminded of the need for intelligence
yesterday when Mayor Bloomberg announced there was a credible threat
against New York and Washington. And where did this information come
from? It came from the intelligence community.
After 9/11, the 9/11 Commission report said the biggest failure in
preventing 9/11 was a failure in our intelligence system. This Congress
came together, and
[[Page H6018]]
I was proud to have worked with and helped author a bill that was the
first major reorganization and the most fundamental since 1948, where
it brought all 17 agencies together under Homeland Security and one
director to gather information to make us safer.
This bill very critically supports the task forces, the joint
terrorism task forces that are sharing information and protecting our
citizens, and this bill approaches and focuses on cyber attacks, which
are one of the most serious attacks that we have in our country now on
the Pentagon and on financial institutions. Foreign countries are
hacking into our information systems. This bill addresses that and
focuses resources and oversight in that area.
I congratulate this bipartisan effort. I consider it one of the most
important bills that we have an opportunity to vote on, and I support
it completely.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I continue to reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I yield 3 minutes to my good friend
from Rhode Island, Jim Langevin.
(Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. LANGEVIN. Let me just say how proud I am to support the FY 2012
Intelligence Authorization Act. I appreciate the leadership of both
Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger in crafting this bill.
This has truly been a bipartisan effort of which I have been proud to
be a part.
I am pleased that this bill includes funding to accelerate
implementation of an insider threat detection program, and that's both
on the cyber front but also in cases like the Hasan case that was
tragically in the news and that occurred not long ago and cost many
lives.
This bill basically requires best practices implemented within the
Army to be reviewed for inclusion across the intelligence community.
That's referring to their insider threat detection program.
In addition, the bill supports critical resources needed for
cybersecurity, the broader cybersecurity threat, a threat which demands
the attention of our national security specialists and the entire
country.
As the successful operation against Osama bin Laden showed us earlier
this year, the intelligence community has made significant strides
toward working together to counter the most complex threats facing our
Nation. This productive cooperation and integration embodies the intent
of Congressional intelligence reforms made after the tragic events of
9/11, and I'm encouraged to see this progress in the area of
information-sharing.
{time} 0940
Yet while the sharing of classified information is imperative to keep
our country safe, unrestrained and unregulated access can put our
country at great risk. As we have seen from both the damage of
WikiLeaks and historical espionage cases, the threat from a malicious
insider with the keys to the kingdom is very real. We are far beyond
the risk of paper documents being copied and carried out. Today the
question is how much information can a potential leaker or spy fit on
to a USB drive or a CD.
Although technological advances have strengthened the efforts of our
intelligence community, they have also increased the risk.
Now, with this serious concern in mind, I'm proud that this bill
requires the DNI to review improvements made by the Army's insider
threat regulations and consider implementation of these practices
across the entire intelligence community.
In addition, the bill accelerates other technical initiatives within
the insider threat program. I believe it's imperative that we ensure
that our security officers and network administrators have the
capabilities in place to protect our most sensitive information.
Now, in view of the enormous resources spent on security clearances,
protecting classified information, and securing networks across the
globe, it also makes fiscal sense to protect our investment by taking
advantage of the auditing software already available today. The access
to classified information bears with it significant responsibilities,
one that I know that I and my colleagues on the committee take very
seriously.
The other serious threats which this bill addresses are the risks
posed to our broader cyber networks. Now, I'm proud that it strengthens
resources and it furthers the administration's efforts to address the
threats of our critical infrastructure. I know that that is something
that is also shared by my colleague, Congressman Ruppersberger.
The CHAIR. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute.
Mr. LANGEVIN. While I applaud the administration's work, I think that
we need to go further to raise awareness and work with both public and
private sector partners to meet this threat. We cannot afford to
continue operating with the massive digital vulnerabilities to not just
our sensitive information but also our important intellectual property
that makes up the foundation of our innovative economy. Addressing
these threats must become a national priority, and we must work quickly
to grow our current and future cyber workforce to fill the rising
demand for cybersecurity information assurance.
This bill helps secure our sensitive information and vital networks
to threats from malicious actors beyond our borders and on the inside
because of these important provisions, along with the other merits
cited by my colleagues today.
I thank again Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger for
the outstanding bipartisan cooperation we've seen in their leadership
and also the other members of the committee. It's a committee that I'm
proud to serve on. I thank them and the committee for their work.
I urge Members to support this bill.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time
to close.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I yield myself the balance of my time.
It took a long time for us to get here today: days of important
hearings, analyzing the intelligence community, hours of critical
meetings, making important decisions of what to include and not to
include in the bill and lots of time pulling it together.
Republicans and Democrats came together to make important choices to
do what's right for the intelligence community and for our country. I
commend everyone who participated in this effort, especially the
bipartisan leadership of Chairman Rogers and other members of the
Intelligence Committee.
I would like to thank both Democrat and Republican staff for the
countless hours they spent helping us make this happen. With the
passage of the manager's amendment, I fully support this bill and urge
my colleagues to do the same. The stakes are too high not to.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I yield myself the balance of my
time.
I want to thank the gentleman from Maryland, who is not only a
colleague but a friend, in working so diligently over the course of the
summer and really at the beginning of this year to reestablish the
Intelligence Committee as a force for oversight over the 17 agencies.
It is a tremendous amount of money, and it is a tremendous amount of
responsibility because most of what we do happens behind closed doors
and is classified.
I think working together we have come to one of the best products
certainly I have seen since on the committee of the most thorough
review from line by line by line of both the National Intelligence
Program spending as well as the Military Intelligence Program spending,
and we've had very good cooperation because we've cooperated together
from the agencies themselves.
There really was a unity of effort here that I think Americans can
and should be proud of in an effort to make sure that our men and women
who are risking their lives today to protect the United States of
America have the resources they need and the commitment on behalf of
this Congress and the American people to be successful in their
particular mission.
I want to thank the staffs on both committees. For the first time we
had joint briefings with both Republican and Democrat staff on the very
difficult budget issues that worked sometimes through the process of
the Intelligence authorization bill. They briefed
[[Page H6019]]
at the same table at the same time, which sounds a little--something
that should happen more often but it did not and we have reestablished
that. We have reestablished the quarterly reviews on all of the
programs so that we have regular and consistent oversight on what
happens in the intelligence community. That all wouldn't really have
happened without the leadership of Mr. Ruppersberger and his team and
my team as well.
There are too many to name who spent countless hours on this
particular bill, the leadership team here and all the folks on the
Intelligence staff. Honorable mention to Brian Smith, our budget
director, who gave a lot of his heart and soul to go through every line
and find every penny for us. I know on Mr. Ruppersberger's staff they
have sat beside him the entire time to make that happen.
Without further ado, Madam Chair, we'll get to the amendments; but,
again, I do think this is a product that reflects the best of what
Congress can do when we work together, and the best of the most amazing
people in our intelligence community and what they have to offer in the
protection of the United States of America.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. VAN HOLLEN. Madam Chair, I rise in support of H.R. 1892, The 2012
Intelligence Authorization Act and to congratulate Chairman Rogers and
Ranking Member Ruppersberger for their close collaboration on the bill
and for their willingness to work together to shape a bi-partisan
measure. This legislation demonstrates the Intelligence Committee's
continued commitment to honoring the sacrifices and dedication of the
public servants who comprise the Nation's intelligence community.
Sunday marks the 10th anniversary of the attacks of September 11th,
2001. Today this body will consider two pieces of legislation directly
relevant to that event. H. Res. 391, which expresses the sense of the
House regarding the anniversary of the attacks and H.R. 1892.
H.R. 1892, the FY12 Intelligence Authorization Act, authorizes about
$80 billion in funding for the 17 agencies that oversee and conduct the
nation's intelligence and intelligence-related activities including the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the CIA, and the
National Security Agency, as well as intelligence activities of the
Defense Department, FBI, State Department, Homeland Security
Department, and other agencies. The Intelligence Committee has written
the bill with enhanced oversight and accountability features to better
protect the American taxpayer's investment in national security and to
prevent the wasting of resources. In that regard, the bill cuts one
billion dollars from the intelligence budget without sacrificing the
Nation's security by merging services and finding other savings. The
bill is fiscally responsible and preserves national security. I support
both H. Res. 391 and H.R. 1892 and encourage my colleagues to do the
same.
The intelligence apparatus of the country has evolved and improved
since the tragic events of September 11th and now collaborates on data
collection and analysis in a way that it did not ten years ago. The
culture of our intelligence community now has a more open and inclusive
attitude across all platforms from the highest levels of government
down to the agent in the field.
The fruits of that successful collaboration were on bold display on
May 1, 2011 when a commando team of Navy Seals brought Osama bin Laden
to justice during their secret raid on his compound in Abbottabad,
Pakistan. Due to the concerted efforts, dedication and hard work of our
Nation's clandestine services and the people who support them, the U.S.
is safer now than it was in the days leading up the attacks of
September 11th.
We meet today in advance of Sunday's anniversary to honor and
remember the heroes and victims of 9/11. We also gather to express once
again our gratitude to the focused, determined and persistent efforts
of the men and women who comprise this Nation's intelligence community
for all that they do.
Mr. BLUMENAUER. Madam Chair, today I voted against H.R. 1892. Despite
of the progress we've made in reforming our intelligence community in
size, scope and accountability, today's authorization does not go
nearly far enough.
On the eve of the 10th anniversary of 9/11, there is still nothing
more important than the security of our people. Unfortunate, there is a
clear lack of progress in getting a handle on the sprawling
intelligence bureaucracy.
There are 856,000 people with top-secret security clearances in the
United States. That's nearly the population of the entire state of
Delaware and more than the entire population of San Francisco. In over
10,000 locations scattered across the U.S., there are around 1,200
government organizations and 1,900 private companies that focus on
intelligence gathering and on homeland security.
In the wake of 9/11, we opened the funding floodgates to our
intelligence community. It has now grown so large and so secretive that
we have no idea how much it costs or how many people it employs, let
alone understand how much of this work is duplicative. While
improvements have been made, Congress needs to not just take a closer
look, but reverse this dangerous trend.
With the inability for anyone to really know exactly what's going on,
the surge of information isn't always a source of protection, but a
potential vulnerability. We can have too much information to use
effectively. After all, parts of the bureaucracy were well aware of the
threat from Osama bin Laden immediately prior to
9/11.
The problem is not intelligence gathering, which is essential to the
security of America. The killing of Osama bin Laden would not have been
possible without such efforts. It's simply that since 9/11, the
intelligence community has grown so fast, and so secretively, that
oversight hasn't kept up.
At a time when we are cutting to the bone essential government
services, this is a huge area that is ripe for budget scrutiny and,
very likely, budget reduction. This bill has good features, but avoids
getting this vast intelligence network under control. That is why I
voted against H.R. 1892.
Mr. HOLT. Madam Chair, I rise in reluctant support of this bill.
This bill is, by the conventional standards of the House, an
appropriate vehicle for meeting many of the routine needs of the
Intelligence Community. However, it completely fails to undertake the
kind of probing, large-scale reassessment of the structure, mission,
and purpose of our intelligence enterprise in a post-bin Laden era. I
regret that Congress has not shown the stomach for the kind of
thorough, comprehensive, and brave review of intelligence activities
that was undertaken by the Church Committee in the 1970's. Given the
events of the last decade, such a review is both long overdue and very
badly needed. Despite my strong reservations about what this bill does
not but should do, I will support this bill.
{time} 0950
The CHAIR. All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the bill shall be considered for amendment
under the 5-minute rule.
In lieu of the amendment in the nature of a substitute recommended by
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, printed in the bill, it
shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose of
amendment under the 5-minute rule an amendment in the nature of a
substitute consisting of the text of the Rules Committee print, dated
August 31, 2011. That amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be
considered read.
The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as
follows:
H.R. 1892
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; Table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Annual report on hiring of National Security Education
Program participants.
Sec. 304. Enhancement of authority for flexible personnel management
among the elements of the intelligence community.
Sec. 305. Preparation of nuclear proliferation assessment statements.
Sec. 306. Cost estimates.
Sec. 307. Detainees held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 308. Updates of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism of
detainees held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 309. Submission of information on Guantanamo Bay detainee
transfers.
[[Page H6020]]
Sec. 310. Enhanced procurement authority to manage supply chain risk.
Sec. 311. Modification of certain reporting requirements.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 401. Report and strategic plan on drug trafficking organizations
and impact on public lands.
Sec. 402. Application of certain financial reporting requirements to
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 403. Public availability of information regarding the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 404. Clarification of status of Chief Information Officer in the
Executive Schedule.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Sec. 411. Burial allowance.
Sec. 412. Acceptance of gifts.
Sec. 413. Foreign language proficiency requirements for Central
Intelligence Agency officers.
Sec. 414. Public availability of information regarding the Inspector
General of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 415. Creating an official record of the Osama bin Laden operation.
Sec. 416. Recruitment of personnel in the Office of the Inspector
General.
Subtitle C--National Security Agency
Sec. 421. Confirmation of appointment of the Director of the National
Security Agency.
Sec. 422. Additional authorities for National Security Agency security
personnel.
Subtitle D--Other Elements
Sec. 431. Codification of Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of Homeland Security as element of the
intelligence community.
Sec. 432. Federal Bureau of Investigation participation in the
Department of Justice leave bank.
Sec. 433. Accounts and transfer authority for appropriations and other
amounts for intelligence elements of the Department of
Defense.
Sec. 434. Report on training standards of defense intelligence
workforce.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 501. Report on airspace restrictions for use of unmanned aerial
vehicles along the border of the United States and
Mexico.
Sec. 502. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 503. Technical amendments to title 18, United States Code.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
(A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2012 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and,
subject to section 104, the authorized personnel ceilings as
of September 30, 2012, for the conduct of the intelligence
activities of the elements listed in paragraphs (1) through
(16) of section 101, are those specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill
H.R. 1892 of the One Hundred Twelfth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--
(1) Availability to committees of congress.--The classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a)
shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and to the President.
(2) Distribution by the president.--Subject to paragraph
(3), the President shall provide for suitable distribution of
the classified Schedule of Authorizations, or of appropriate
portions of the Schedule, within the executive branch.
(3) Limits on disclosure.--In carrying out paragraph (2),
the President may disclose only that budget-related
information necessary to execute the classified Schedule of
Authorizations and shall not disclose the Schedule or any
portion of the Schedule publicly.
(c) Use of Funds for Certain Activities in the Classified
Annex.--In addition to any other purpose authorized by law,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation may expend funds
authorized in this Act as specified in the Federal Bureau of
Investigation Policy Implementation section of the classified
annex accompanying this Act.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Increases.--The Director of National
Intelligence may authorize the employment of civilian
personnel in excess of the number of full-time equivalent
positions for fiscal year 2012 authorized by the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if
the Director of National Intelligence determines that such
action is necessary for the performance of important
intelligence functions, except that the number of personnel
employed in excess of the number authorized under such
section may not, for any element of the intelligence
community, exceed 3 percent of the number of civilian
personnel authorized under such section for such element.
(b) Authority for Conversion of Activities Performed by
Contract Personnel.--
(1) In general.--In addition to the authority in subsection
(a) and subject to paragraph (2), if the head of an element
of the intelligence community makes a determination that
activities currently being performed by contract personnel
should be performed by employees of such element, the
Director of National Intelligence, in order to reduce a
comparable number of contract personnel, may authorize for
that purpose employment of additional full-time equivalent
personnel in such element equal to the number of full-time
equivalent contract personnel performing such activities.
(2) Concurrence and approval.--The authority described in
paragraph (1) may not be exercised unless the Director of
National Intelligence concurs with the determination
described in such paragraph.
(c) Treatment of Certain Personnel.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall establish guidelines that govern,
for each element of the intelligence community, the treatment
under the personnel levels authorized under section 102(a),
including any exemption from such personnel levels, of
employment or assignment--
(1) in a student program, trainee program, or similar
program;
(2) in a reserve corps or as a reemployed annuitant; or
(3) in details, joint duty, or long-term, full-time
training.
(d) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The
Director of National Intelligence shall notify the
congressional intelligence committees in writing at least 15
days prior to the initial exercise of an authority described
in subsection (a) or (b).
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2012 the sum of $576,393,000. Within such amount, funds
identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2013.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of
National Intelligence are authorized 777 full-time or full-
time equivalent personnel as of September 30, 2012. Personnel
serving in such elements may be permanent employees of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence or personnel
detailed from other elements of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are
authorized to be appropriated for the Community Management
Account for fiscal year 2012 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for
advanced research and development shall remain available
until September 30, 2013.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30,
2012, there are authorized such additional personnel for the
Community Management Account as of that date as are specified
in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 102(a).
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2012 the sum of $514,000,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
[[Page H6021]]
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 303. ANNUAL REPORT ON HIRING OF NATIONAL SECURITY
EDUCATION PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS.
Not later than 90 days after the end of each of fiscal
years 2012, 2013, and 2014, the head of each element of the
intelligence community shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report, which may be in classified
form, containing the number of personnel hired by such
element during such fiscal year that were at any time a
recipient of a grant or scholarship under the David L. Boren
National Security Education Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1901 et
seq.).
SEC. 304. ENHANCEMENT OF AUTHORITY FOR FLEXIBLE PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT AMONG THE ELEMENTS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the following
new subsection:
``(v) Authority To Establish Positions in Excepted
Service.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence, with the
concurrence of the head of the covered department concerned
and in consultation with the Director of the Office of
Personnel Management, may--
``(A) convert competitive service positions, and the
incumbents of such positions, within an element of the
intelligence community in such department, to excepted
service positions as the Director of National Intelligence
determines necessary to carry out the intelligence functions
of such element; and
``(B) establish new positions in the excepted service
within an element of the intelligence community in such
department, if the Director of National Intelligence
determines such positions are necessary to carry out the
intelligence functions of such element.
``(2) An incumbent occupying a position on the date of the
enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2012 selected to be converted to the excepted service
under this section shall have the right to refuse such
conversion. Once such individual no longer occupies the
position, the position may be converted to the excepted
service.
``(3) In this subsection, the term `covered department'
means the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland
Security, the Department of State, or the Department of the
Treasury.''.
SEC. 305. PREPARATION OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ASSESSMENT
STATEMENTS.
Section 102A of the National Seucrity Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-1), as amended by section 304 of this Act, is
further amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
``(w) Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statements
Intelligence Community Addendum.--The Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the heads of the
appropriate elements of the intelligence community and the
Secretary of State, shall provide to the President, the
congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate an addendum to
each Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement accompanying
a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, containing a
comprehensive analysis of the country's export control system
with respect to nuclear-related matters, including
interactions with other countries of proliferation concern
and the actual or suspected nuclear, dual-use, or missile-
related transfers to such countries.''.
SEC. 306. COST ESTIMATES.
(a) In General.--Section 506A of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415a-1) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(2)--
(A) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(2)''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(B) For major system acquisitions requiring a service or
capability from another acquisition or program to deliver the
end-to-end functionality for the intelligence community end
users, independent cost estimates shall include, to the
maximum extent practicable, all estimated costs across all
pertinent elements of the intelligence community. For
collection programs, such cost estimates shall include the
cost of new analyst training, new hardware and software for
data exploitation and analysis, and any unique or additional
costs for data processing, storing, and power, space, and
cooling across the life cycle of the program. If such costs
for processing, exploitation, dissemination, and storage are
scheduled to be executed in other elements of the
intelligence community, the independent cost estimate shall
identify and annotate such costs for such other elements
accordingly.''; and
(2) in subsection (e)(2)--
(A) by inserting ``(A)'' after ``(2)'';
(B) in subparagraph (A), as so designated, by striking
``associated with the acquisition of a major system,'' and
inserting ``associated with the development, acquisition,
procurement, operation, and sustainment of a major system
across its proposed life cycle,''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
``(B) In accordance with subsection (a)(2)(B), each
independent cost estimate shall include all costs required
across elements of the intelligence community to develop,
acquire, procure, operate, and sustain the system to provide
the end-to-end intelligence functionality of the system,
including--
``(i) for collection programs, the cost of new analyst
training, new hardware and software for data exploitation and
analysis, and any unique or additional costs for data
processing, storing, and power, space, and cooling across the
life cycle of the program; and
``(ii) costs for processing, exploitation, dissemination,
and storage costs are scheduled to be executed in other
elements of the intelligence community, such element shall
identify and annotate such costs accordingly.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section
shall take effect on the date that is 180 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 307. DETAINEES HELD AT UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION,
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.
(a) Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act,
2010.--Subsection (e) of section 552 of the Department of
Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010 (Public Law 111-
83; 123 Stat. 2178) is amended--
(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``15
days'' and inserting ``30 days'';
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``such agreement.'' and
inserting ``such agreement and any monitoring assurances
provided by such government.''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) The agency or department of the United States
responsible for ensuring that the agreement described in
paragraph (3) is carried out.''.
(b) Department of the Interior, Environment, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010.--Subsection (e) of section
428 of the Department of the Interior, Environment, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010 (division A of
Public Law 111-88; 123 Stat. 2963) is amended--
(1) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), by striking ``15
days'' and inserting ``30 days'';
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``such agreement.'' and
inserting ``such agreement and any monitoring assurances
provided by such government.''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) The agency or department of the United States
responsible for ensuring that the agreement described in
paragraph (3) is carried out.''.
(c) Savings Clause.--None of the amendments made by this
section shall supersede or otherwise affect the
implementation of the following provisions of law:
(1) Section 1033 of the Ike Skelton National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111q-383;
124 Stat. 4351).
(2) Section 1113 of the Department of Defense and Full-Year
Continuing Appropriations Act, 2011 (Public Law 112-10; 125
Stat. 104).
SEC. 308. UPDATES OF INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO TERRORIST
RECIDIVISM OF DETAINEES HELD AT UNITED STATES
NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.
(a) Updates and Consolidation of Language.--
(1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 506H the following new section:
``summary of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism of detainees
held at united states naval station, guantanamo bay, cuba
``Sec. 506I. (a) In General.--The Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an
unclassified summary of--
``(1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees
currently or formerly held at the Naval Detention Facility at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and
``(2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees
will engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in
terrorist organizations.
``(b) Updates.--Not less frequently than once every 6
months, the Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Secretary of Defense, shall update and make
publicly available an unclassified summary consisting of the
information required by subsection (a) and the number of
individuals formerly detained at Naval Station, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, who are confirmed or suspected of returning to
terrorist activities after release or transfer from such
Naval Station.''.
(2) Initial update.--The initial update required by section
506I(b) of such Act, as added by paragraph (1) of this
subsection, shall be made publicly available not later than
10 days after the date the first report following the date of
the enactment of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2012 is submitted to members and committees of
Congress pursuant to section 319 of the Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32; 10 U.S.C. 801
note).
(b) Table of Contents Amendment.--The table of contents in
the first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 506H
the following new item:
``Sec. 506I. Summary of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism
of detainees held at United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.''.
SEC. 309. SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION ON GUANTANAMO BAY
DETAINEE TRANSFERS.
(a) Requirement for Submission.--Not later than 45 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the House
of Representatives and the Senate information concerning the
transfer or potential transfer of individuals who are or have
been detained by the United States at Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
[[Page H6022]]
(b) Information Required.--The information required by
subsection (a) shall include the following:
(1) An assessment of the sufficiency of the monitoring
undertaken by each foreign country to which an individual
referred to in subsection (a) has been transferred.
(2) Any written or verbal agreement between the Secretary
of State and the government of a foreign country that
describes monitoring and security assurances related to such
an individual.
(3) Each Department of State cable, memorandum, or report
relating to or describing the threat such an individual may
or may not pose.
SEC. 310. ENHANCED PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY TO MANAGE SUPPLY
CHAIN RISK.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered agency.--The term ``covered agency'' means any
element of the intelligence community other than an element
within the Department of Defense.
(2) Covered item of supply.--The term ``covered item of
supply'' means an item of information technology (as that
term is defined in section 11101 of title 40, United States
Code) that is purchased for inclusion in a covered system,
and the loss of integrity of which could result in a supply
chain risk for a covered system.
(3) Covered procurement.--The term ``covered procurement''
means--
(A) a source selection for a covered system or a covered
item of supply; or
(B) any contract action involving a contract for a covered
system or a covered item of supply where such contract
includes a clause establishing requirements relating to
supply chain risk.
(4) Covered procurement action.--The term ``covered
procurement action'' means any of the following actions, if
the action takes place in the course of conducting a covered
procurement:
(A) The exclusion of a source for the purpose of reducing
supply chain risk in the acquisition of covered systems.
(B) The exclusion of a source that fails to achieve an
acceptable rating with regard to an evaluation factor
providing for the consideration of supply chain risk in the
evaluation of proposals for the award of a contract or the
issuance of a task or delivery order.
(C) The decision to withhold consent for a contractor to
subcontract with a particular source or to direct a
contractor for a covered system to exclude a particular
source from consideration for a subcontract under the
contract.
(5) Covered system.--
(A) In general.--The term ``covered system'' means any
information system (including any telecommunications system)
used or operated by an agency or by a contractor of an
agency, or other organization on behalf of an agency--
(i) the function, operation, or use of which--
(I) involves intelligence activities;
(II) involves cryptologic activities related to national
security;
(III) involves command and control of military forces;
(IV) involves equipment that is an integral part of a
weapon or weapons system; or
(V) subject to subparagraph (B), is critical to the direct
fulfillment of military or intelligence missions; or
(ii) is protected at all times by procedures established
for information that have been specifically authorized under
criteria established by an Executive order or an Act of
Congress to be kept classified in the interest of national
defense or foreign policy.
(B) Exception of administrative and business
applications.--Subparagraph (A)(i)(V) does not include a
system that is to be used for routine administrative and
business applications (including payroll, finance, logistics,
and personnel management applications).
(6) Supply chain risk.--The term ``supply chain risk''
means the risk that an adversary may sabotage, maliciously
introduce unwanted function, or otherwise subvert the design,
integrity, manufacturing, production, distribution,
installation, operation, or maintenance of a covered system
so as to surveil, deny, disrupt, or otherwise degrade the
function, use, or operation of such system.
(b) Authority.--Subject to subsection (c), the head of a
covered agency may, in conducting intelligence and
intelligence-related activities--
(1) carry out a covered procurement action; and
(2) limit, notwithstanding any other provision of law, in
whole or in part, the disclosure of information relating to
the basis for carrying out a covered procurement action.
(c) Determination and Notification.--The head of a covered
agency may exercise the authority provided in subsection (b)
only after--
(1) any appropriate consultation with procurement or other
relevant officials of the covered agency;
(2) making a determination in writing, which may be in
classified form, that--
(A) use of the authority in subsection (b)(1) is necessary
to protect national security by reducing supply chain risk;
(B) less intrusive measures are not reasonably available to
reduce such supply chain risk; and
(C) in a case where the head of the covered agency plans to
limit disclosure of information under subsection (b)(2), the
risk to national security due to the disclosure of such
information outweighs the risk due to not disclosing such
information;
(3) notifying the Director of National Intelligence that
there is a significant supply chain risk to the covered
system concerned, unless the head of the covered agency
making the determination is the Director of National
Intelligence; and
(4) providing a notice, which may be in classified form, of
the determination made under paragraph (2) to the
congressional intelligence committees that includes a summary
of the basis for the determination, including a discussion of
less intrusive measures that were considered and why they
were not reasonably available to reduce supply chain risk.
(d) Savings.--The authority under this section is in
addition to any other authority under any other provision of
law. The authority under this section shall not be construed
to alter or effect the exercise of any other provision of
law.
(e) Effective Date.--The requirements of this section shall
take effect on the date that is 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act and shall apply to contracts that
are awarded on or after such date.
(f) Sunset.--The authority provided in this section shall
expire on the date that section 806 of the Ike Skelton
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011
(Public Law 111-383; 10 U.S.C. 2304 note) expires.
SEC. 311. MODIFICATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004.--Section 1041(b) of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (50 U.S.C. 403-1b(b)) is
amended by striking paragraphs (3) and (4).
(b) Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.--
Section 904(d)(1) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 402c(d)(1)) is amended by
striking ``on an annual basis''.
(c) Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995.--
Section 809 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. App. 2170b) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (b); and
(2) in subsection (c), by striking ``reports referred to in
subsections (a) and (b)'' and inserting ``report referred to
in subsection (a)''.
(d) Report on Temporary Personnel Authorizations for
Critical Language Training.--Paragraph (3)(D) of section
102A(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
1(e)), as amended by section 306 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-259;
124 Stat. 2661), is amended by striking ``The'' and inserting
``For each of the fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, the''.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
SEC. 401. REPORT AND STRATEGIC PLAN ON DRUG TRAFFICKING
ORGANIZATIONS AND IMPACT ON PUBLIC LANDS.
(a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than one year after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on--
(1) the intelligence collection efforts of the United
States that assess the threat from covered entities that are
currently or have previously used public lands in the United
States to further their operations; and
(2) efforts to protect public lands of the United States
from illegal drug grows.
(b) Contents.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) An assessment of the intelligence collection efforts of
the United States dedicated to covered entities.
(2) An assessment of any problems that may reduce the
overall effectiveness of United States intelligence
collection and analysis to identify and protect public lands
from illegal drug grows and other activities and threats of
covered entities, including--
(A) intelligence collection gaps or inefficiencies;
(B) information sharing practices in the intelligence
community and other agencies, including Federal land
management agencies; and
(C) cooperation among Federal departments or agencies.
(3) A strategic plan prepared by the Director of National
Intelligence that describes actions the appropriate elements
of the intelligence community can take to close intelligence
gaps related to covered entities, and provide intelligence in
support of efforts by Federal land management agencies to
counter the use by covered entities of public lands for
illegal purposes.
(4) A description of appropriate goals, schedules,
milestones, or metrics to measure the long-term effectiveness
of actions implemented to carry out the plan described in
paragraph (4).
(c) Implementation of Strategic Plan.--Not later than 30
days after the date on which the Director of National
Intelligence submits the report required by subsection (a),
the Director shall begin implementation of the strategic plan
described in subsection (b)(4).
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered entity.--The term ``covered entity'' means an
international drug trafficking organization or other actor
involved in drug trafficking generally.
(2) Federal land management agency.--The term ``Federal
land management agency'' includes--
(A) the Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture;
(B) the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the
Interior;
(C) the National Park Service of the Department of the
Interior;
(D) the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the
Interior; and
(E) the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of the
Interior.
(3) Public lands.--The term ``public lands'' has the
meaning given that term in section 103 of the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1702).
SEC. 402. APPLICATION OF CERTAIN FINANCIAL REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
For each of the fiscal years 2010, 2011, and 2012, the
requirements of section 3515 of title 31,
[[Page H6023]]
United States Code, to submit an audited financial statement
shall not apply to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence if the Director of National Intelligence
determines and notifies Congress that audited financial
statements for such years for such Office cannot be produced
on a cost-effective basis.
SEC. 403. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION REGARDING THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
Section 103H of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-3h) is amended by adding at the end the following
new subsection:
``(o) Information on Website.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence shall establish and maintain on the homepage of
the publicly accessible website of the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence information relating to the Office
of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
including methods to contact the Inspector General.
``(2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be
obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information
related to the Office of the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community.''.
SEC. 404. CLARIFICATION OF STATUS OF CHIEF INFORMATION
OFFICER IN THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.
Section 5315 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by
inserting after the item relating to the Chief Information
Officer, Small Business Administration the following new
item:
``Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence
Community.''.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
SEC. 411. BURIAL ALLOWANCE.
(a) In General.--Section 11 of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403k) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by inserting ``and burial allowance''
after ``gratuities''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(c)(1) At the request of a representative of the estate
of any officer or employee of the Agency (as determined in
accordance with the laws of a State) who dies in a manner
described in subsection (a)(1), the Director may pay to such
estate a burial allowance.
``(2) A burial allowance paid under paragraph (1) may be
used to cover burial expenses, including recovery, mortuary,
funeral or memorial service, cremation, burial costs, and
costs of transportation by common carrier to the place
selected for final disposition of the deceased.
``(3) Each payment made under this subsection shall be--
``(A) in an amount not greater than $15,000 plus the actual
costs of transportation referred to in paragraph (2); and
``(B) in addition to any other benefit that may be due
under any other provision of law.
``(4) The Director may annually increase the amount in
paragraph (3)(A) to reflect any increase in the Consumer
Price Index occurring during the preceding year.
``(5) The Director may pay the burial benefit authorized
under this subsection more than once for funeral, memorial,
or burial expenses stemming from a single death of an officer
or employee of the Agency if the remains of such officer or
employee were not recovered, were recovered after
considerable delay, or were not recovered intact.''.
(b) Effective Date of Authority to Increase Allowance.--
Section 11(c)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949, as added by subsection (a), shall take effect on the
date that is one year after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
SEC. 412. ACCEPTANCE OF GIFTS.
Section 12 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
(50 U.S.C. 403l(a)) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)''; and
(B) by striking the second and third sentences and
inserting the following:
``(2) Any gift accepted under this section (and any income
produced by any such gift)--
``(A) may be used only for--''
``(i) artistic display;
``(ii) purposes relating to the general welfare, education,
or recreation of employees or dependents of employees of the
Agency or for similar purposes; or
``(iii) purposes relating to the welfare, education, or
recreation of an individual described in paragraph (3); and
``(B) under no circumstances may such a gift (or any income
produced by any such gift) be used for operational purposes.
``(3) An individual described in this paragraph is an
individual who--
``(A) is an employee or a former employee of the Agency who
suffered injury or illness while employed by the Agency
that--
``(i) resulted from hostile or terrorist activities;
``(ii) occurred in connection with an intelligence activity
having a significant element of risk; or
``(iii) occurred under other circumstances determined by
the Director to be analogous to the circumstances described
in clause (i) or (ii);
``(B) is a family member of such an employee or former
employee; or
``(C) is a surviving family member of an employee of the
Agency who died in circumstances described in clause (i),
(ii), or (iii) of subparagraph (A).
``(4) The Director may not accept any gift under this
section that is expressly conditioned upon any expenditure
not to be met from the gift itself or from income produced by
the gift unless such expenditure has been authorized by law.
``(5) The Director may, in the Director's discretion,
determine that an individual described in subparagraph (A) or
(B) of paragraph (3) may accept a gift for the purposes
described in paragraph (2)(A)(iii).''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(f) The Director, in consultation with the Director of
the Office of Government Ethics, shall issue regulations to
carry out the authority provided in this section. Such
regulations shall ensure that such authority is exercised
consistent with all relevant ethical constraints and
principles, including--
``(1) the avoidance of any prohibited conflict of interest
or appearance of impropriety; and
``(2) a prohibition against the acceptance of a gift from a
foreign government or an agent of a foreign government.''.
SEC. 413. FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICERS.
(a) In General.--Section 104A(g) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a(g)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)--
(A) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A)--
(i) by inserting ``in the Directorate of Intelligence
career service or the National Clandestine Service career
service'' after ``an individual'';
(ii) by inserting ``or promoted'' after ``appointed''; and
(iii) by striking ``individual--'' and inserting
``individual has been certified as having a professional
speaking and reading proficiency in a foreign language, such
proficiency being at least level 3 on the Interagency
Language Roundtable Language Skills Level or commensurate
proficiency level using such other indicator of proficiency
as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency considers
appropriate.'';
(B) by striking subparagraphs (A) and (B); and
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``position or category of
positions'' both places that term appears and inserting
``position, category of positions, or occupation''.
(b) Effective Date.--Section 611(b) of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487;
50 U.S.C. 403-4a note) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``or promotions'' after ``appointments'';
and
(2) by striking ``that is one year after the date''.
(c) Report on Waivers.--Section 611(c) of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487;
118 Stat. 3955) is amended--
(1) in the first sentence--
(A) by striking ``positions'' and inserting ``individual
waivers''; and
(B) by striking ``Directorate of Operations'' and inserting
``National Clandestine Service''; and
(2) in the second sentence, by striking ``position or
category of positions'' and inserting ``position, category of
positions, or occupation''.
(d) Report on Transfers.--Not later than 45 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and on an annual basis for
each of the following 3 years, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the number of Senior
Intelligence Service employees of the Agency who--
(1) were transferred during the reporting period to a
Senior Intelligence Service position in the Directorate of
Intelligence career service or the National Clandestine
Service career service; and
(2) did not meet the foreign language requirements
specified in section 104A(g)(1) of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a(g)(1)) at the time of such
transfer.
SEC. 414. PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION REGARDING THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY.
Section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
(50 U.S.C. 403q) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(h) Information on Website.--(1) The Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency shall establish and maintain on
the homepage of the Agency's publicly accessible website
information relating to the Office of the Inspector General
including methods to contact the Inspector General.
``(2) The information referred to in paragraph (1) shall be
obvious and facilitate accessibility to the information
related to the Office of the Inspector General.''.
SEC. 415. CREATING AN OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE OSAMA BIN LADEN
OPERATION.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds the following:
(1) On May 1, 2011, United States personnel killed
terrorist leader Osama bin Laden during the course of a
targeted strike against his secret compound in Abbottabad,
Pakistan.
(2) Osama bin Laden was the leader of the al Qaeda
terrorist organization, the most significant terrorism threat
to the United States and the international community.
(3) Osama bin Laden was the architect of terrorist attacks
which killed nearly 3,000 civilians on September 11, 2001,
the most deadly terrorist attack against our Nation, in which
al Qaeda terrorists hijacked four airplanes and crashed them
into the World Trade Center in New York City, the Pentagon in
Washington, D.C., and, due to heroic efforts by civilian
passengers to disrupt the terrorists, near Shanksville,
Pennsylvania.
(4) Osama bin Laden planned or supported numerous other
deadly terrorist attacks against the United States and its
allies, including the 1998 bombings of United States
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the 2000 attack on the
U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, and against innocent civilians in
countries around the world, including the 2004 attack on
commuter trains in Madrid, Spain and the 2005 bombings of the
mass transit system in London, England.
[[Page H6024]]
(5) Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
the United States, under President George W. Bush, led an
international coalition into Afghanistan to dismantle al
Qaeda, deny them a safe haven in Afghanistan and ungoverned
areas along the Pakistani border, and bring Osama bin Laden
to justice.
(6) President Barack Obama in 2009 committed additional
forces and resources to efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan
as ``the central front in our enduring struggle against
terrorism and extremism''.
(7) The valiant members of the United States Armed Forces
have courageously and vigorously pursued al Qaeda and its
affiliates in Afghanistan and around the world.
(8) The anonymous, unsung heroes of the intelligence
community have pursued al Qaeda and affiliates in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and around the world with tremendous
dedication, sacrifice, and professionalism.
(9) The close collaboration between the Armed Forces and
the intelligence community prompted the Director of National
Intelligence, General James Clapper, to state, ``Never have I
seen a more remarkable example of focused integration,
seamless collaboration, and sheer professional magnificence
as was demonstrated by the Intelligence Community in the
ultimate demise of Osama bin Laden.''.
(10) While the death of Osama bin Laden represents a
significant blow to the al Qaeda organization and its
affiliates and to terrorist organizations around the world,
terrorism remains a critical threat to United States national
security.
(11) President Obama said, ``For over two decades, bin
Laden has been al Qaeda's leader and symbol, and has
continued to plot attacks against our country and our friends
and allies. The death of bin Laden marks the most significant
achievement to date in our Nation's effort to defeat al
Qaeda.''.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the raid that killed Osama bin Laden demonstrated the
best of the intelligence communities capabilities and
teamwork;
(2) for years to come, Americans will look back at this
event as a defining point in the history of the United
States;
(3) it is vitally important that the United States
memorialize all the events that led to the raid so that
future generations will have an official record of the events
that transpired before, during, and as a result of the
operation; and
(4) preserving this history now will allow the United
States to have an accurate account of the events while those
that participated in the events are still serving in the
Government.
(c) Report on the Operation That Killed Osama Bin Laden.--
Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in
consultation with other agencies and entities involved in the
operation that killed Osama bin Laden, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a classified report
that memorializes such operation including a description of
the events leading up to the discovery of the location of
Osama bin Laden, the planning and execution of the raid, and
the results of the intelligence gained from the raid.
(d) Preservation of Records.--The Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall preserve any records, including
intelligence information and assessments, used to generate
the report described in subsection (c).
SEC. 416. RECRUITMENT OF PERSONNEL IN THE OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL.
(a) Study.--The Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, in consultation with the Inspector General of the
Central Intelligence Agency, shall carry out a study of the
personnel issues of the Office of the Inspector General. Such
study shall include--
(1) identification of any barriers or disincentives to the
recruitment or retention of experienced investigators within
the Office of the Inspector General; and
(2) a comparison of the personnel authorities of the
Inspector General with personnel authorities of Inspectors
General of other agencies and departments of the United
States, including a comparison of the benefits available to
experienced investigators within the Office of the Inspector
General of the Central Intelligence Agency with similar
benefits available within the offices of Inspectors General
of such other agencies or departments.
(b) Recommendations.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees--
(1) any recommendations of the Director for legislative
action based on the results of the study conducted under
subsection (a); and
(2) a description of any administrative actions taken by
the Director based on such results.
Subtitle C--National Security Agency
SEC. 421. CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.
(a) Director of National Security Agency.--Section 2 of the
National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is
amended--
(1) by inserting ``(b)'' before ``There''; and
(2) by inserting before subsection (b), as so designated by
paragraph (1), the following new subsection
``(a)(1) There is a Director of the National Security
Agency.
``(2) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.
``(3) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be
the head of the National Security Agency and shall discharge
such functions and duties as are provided by this Act or
otherwise by law.''.
(b) Positions of Importance and Responsibility.--The
President may designate the Director of the National Security
Agency as a position of importance and responsibility under
section 601 of title 10, United States Code.
(c) Effective Date and Applicability.--
(1) In general.--The amendments made by subsection (a)
shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act
and shall apply upon the earlier of--
(A) the date of the nomination by the President of an
individual to serve as the Director of the National Security
Agency, except that the individual serving as such Director
as of the date of the enactment of this Act may continue to
perform such duties after such date of nomination and until
the individual appointed as such Director, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, assumes the duties of such
Director; or
(B) the date of the cessation of the performance of the
duties of such Director by the individual performing such
duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) Positions of importance and responsibility.--Subsection
(b) shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this
Act.
SEC. 422. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
SECURITY PERSONNEL.
(a) Authority To Transport Apprehended Persons.--Paragraph
(5) of section 11(a) of the National Security Agency Act of
1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended to read as follows:
``(5) Agency personnel authorized by the Director under
paragraph (1) may transport an individual apprehended under
the authority of this section from the premises at which the
individual was apprehended, as described in subparagraph (A)
or (B) of paragraph (1), for the purpose of transferring such
individual to the custody of law enforcement officials. Such
transportation may be provided only to make a transfer of
custody at a location within 30 miles of the premises
described in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1).''.
(b) Conforming Amendment Relating to Tort Liability.--
Paragraph (1) of section 11(d) of the National Security
Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``or'' at the end;
(2) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period at the end
and inserting ``; or''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(D) transport an individual pursuant to subsection
(a)(2).''.
Subtitle D--Other Elements
SEC. 431. CODIFICATION OF OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY AS
ELEMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 3(4)(K) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a(4)(K)) is amended to read as follows:
``(K) The Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of Homeland Security.''.
SEC. 432. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION PARTICIPATION IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE LEAVE BANK.
Subsection (b) of section 6372 of title 5, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) and
notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter,
neither an excepted agency nor any individual employed in or
under an excepted agency may be included in a leave bank
program established under any of the preceding provisions of
this subchapter.
``(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation may authorize
an individual employed by the Bureau to participate in a
leave bank program administered by the Department of Justice
under this subchapter if in the Director's judgment such
participation will not adversely affect the protection of
intelligence sources and methods.''.
SEC. 433. ACCOUNTS AND TRANSFER AUTHORITY FOR APPROPRIATIONS
AND OTHER AMOUNTS FOR INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
(a) In General.--Chapter 21 of title 10, United States
Code, is amended by inserting after section 428 the following
new section:
``Sec. 429. Appropriations for Defense intelligence elements:
accounts for transfers; transfer authority
``(a) Accounts for Appropriations for Defense Intelligence
Elements.--The Secretary of Defense may transfer
appropriations of the Department of Defense which are
available for the activities of Defense intelligence elements
to an account or accounts established for receipt of such
transfers. Each such account may also receive transfers from
the Director of National Intelligence if made pursuant to
Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-1), and transfers and reimbursements arising from
transactions, as authorized by law, between a Defense
intelligence element and another entity. Appropriation
balances in each such account may be transferred back to the
account or accounts from which such appropriations originated
as appropriation refunds.
``(b) Recordation of Transfers.--Transfers made pursuant to
subsection (a) shall be recorded as expenditure transfers.
``(c) Availability of Funds.--Funds transferred pursuant to
subsection (a) shall remain available for the same time
period and for the same purpose as the appropriation from
which transferred, and shall remain subject to the same
limitations provided in the act making the appropriation.
``(d) Obligation and Expenditure of Funds.--Unless
otherwise specifically authorized by law, funds transferred
pursuant to subsection (a) shall only be obligated and
expended
[[Page H6025]]
in accordance with chapter 15 of title 31 and all other
applicable provisions of law.
``(e) Defense Intelligence Element Defined.--In this
section, the term `Defense intelligence element' means any of
the Department of Defense agencies, offices, and elements
included within the definition of `intelligence community'
under section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a(4)).".''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of subchapter I of such chapter is amended by
adding at the end the following new item:
``429. Appropriations for Defense intelligence elements: accounts for
transfers; transfer authority.''.
SEC. 434. REPORT ON TRAINING STANDARDS OF DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE WORKFORCE.
(a) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
and the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence shall
submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and
the Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and
the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate a report on the
training standards of the defense intelligence workforce.
Such report shall include--
(1) a description of existing training, education, and
professional development standards applied to personnel of
defense intelligence components; and
(2) an assessment of the ability to implement a
certification program for personnel of the defense
intelligence components based on achievement of required
training, education, and professional development standards.
(b) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Defense intelligence components.--The term ``defense
intelligence components'' means--
(A) the National Security Agency;
(B) the Defense Intelligence Agency;
(C) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;
(D) the National Reconnaissance Office;
(E) the intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the
Air Force, and the Marine Corps; and
(F) other offices within the Department of Defense for the
collection of specialized national intelligence through
reconnaissance programs.
(2) Defense intelligence workforce.--The term ``defense
intelligence workforce'' means the personnel of the defense
intelligence components.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 501. REPORT ON AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS FOR USE OF UNMANNED
AERIAL VEHICLES ALONG THE BORDER OF THE UNITED
STATES AND MEXICO.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees, the Committee on
Homeland Security of the House of Representatives, and the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of
the Senate a report on whether restrictions on the use of
airspace are hampering the use of unmanned aerial vehicles by
the Department of Homeland Security along the international
border between the United States and Mexico.
SEC. 502. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
OF 1947.
The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.)
is amended--
(1) in section 3(6) (50 U.S.C. 401a(6)), by striking
``Director of Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director
of National Intelligence'';
(2) in section 506(b) (50 U.S.C. 415a(b)), by striking
``Director of Central Intelligence.'' and inserting
``Director of National Intelligence.''; and
(3) in section 506A(c)(2)(C) (50 U.S.C. 415a-1(c)(2)(C)),
by striking ``National Foreign Intelligence Program'' both
places that term appears and inserting ``National
Intelligence Program''.
SEC. 503. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 18, UNITED STATES
CODE.
Section 351(a) of title 18, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by inserting ``the Director (or a person nominated to
be Director during the pendency of such nomination) or
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence,'' after
``in such department,''; and
(2) by striking ``Central Intelligence,'' and inserting
``the Central Intelligence Agency,''.
The CHAIR. No amendment to the amendment in the nature of a
substitute made in order as original text shall be in order except
those printed in part B of House Report 112-200 and amendments en bloc
described in section 2(f) of House Resolution 392. Each amendment
printed in part B of the report may be offered only by a Member
designated in the report, shall be considered as read, shall be
debatable for the time specified in the report equally divided and
controlled by the proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to
amendment, and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the
question.
It shall be in order at any time for the chair of the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence or his designee to offer amendments en
bloc consisting of amendments printed in part B not earlier disposed
of. Amendments en bloc shall be considered as read, shall be debatable
for 10 minutes equally divided and controlled by the chair and ranking
minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence or
their designees, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall not be
subject to a demand for division of the question. The original
proponent of an amendment included in such amendments en bloc may
insert a statement in the Congressional Record immediately before
disposition of the amendments en bloc.
Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan
The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in
part B of House Report 112-200.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Page 5, strike lines 9 through 14 and insert the following:
(3) Limits on disclosure.--The President shall not publicly
disclose the classified Schedule of Authorizations or any
portion of such Schedule except--
(A) as provided in section 601(a) of the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (50 U.S.C.
415c)
(B) to the extent necessary to implement the budget; or
(C) as otherwise required by law.
Page 5, line 17, insert ``the Director of'' before ``the
Federal Bureau of Investigation''.
Strike section 307 (page 15, line 1 through page 16, line
18).
Strike section 309 (page 18, line 17 through page 19, line
16).
Page 24, after line 15 insert the following:
(d) Delegation.--The head of a covered agency may not
delegate the authority provided in subsection (b) or the
responsibility to make a determination under subsection (c)
to an official below the level of the service acquisition
executive for the agency concerned.
At the end of subtitle A of title IV (page 30, after line
18), add the following new section:
SEC. 405. TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT TO FILL VACANCIES WITHIN
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE.
Section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-3) is amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new
subsection:
``(e) Temporary Filling of Vacancies.--With respect to
filling temporarily a vacancy in an office within the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence (other than that of
the Director of National Intelligence), section 3345(a)(3) of
title 5, United States Code, may be applied--
``(1) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by
substituting `an element of the intelligence community, as
that term is defined in section 3(4) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)),' for `such Executive
agency'; and
``(2) in subparagraph (A), by substituting `the
intelligence community' for `such agency'.''.
Strike section 421 (page 43, line 14 through page 45, line
9).
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I ask unanimous consent to
modify the manager's amendment to include a clarification at the
request of the ranking member. The modification is at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will report the modification.
The Clerk read as follows:
Modification to amendment No. 1:
After the amendment to line 15 of page 24 of the bill,
insert the following:
Strike section 401 (page 26, line 12 through page 29, line
6) and insert the following new section:
SEC. 401. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ASSISTANCE TO COUNTER DRUG
TRAFFICKING ORGANIZATIONS USING PUBLIC LANDS.
(a) Consultation.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall consult with the heads of the Federal land management
agencies on the appropriate actions the intelligence
community can take to assist such agencies in responding to
the threat from covered entities that are currently or have
previously used public lands in the United States to further
the operations of such entities.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report on the results of the consultation under subsection
(a). Such report shall include--
(1) an assessment of the intelligence community collection
efforts dedicated to covered entities, including any
collection gaps or inefficiencies; and
(2) an assessment of the ability of the intelligence
community to assist Federal land management agencies in
identifying and protecting public lands from illegal drug
grows and other activities and threats of covered entities,
including through the sharing of intelligence information.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Covered entity.--The term ``covered entity'' means an
international drug trafficking organization or other actor
involved in drug trafficking generally.
[[Page H6026]]
(2) Federal land management agency.--The term ``Federal
land management agency'' includes--
(A) the Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture;
(B) the Bureau of Land Management of the Department of the
Interior;
(C) the National Park Service of the Department of the
Interior;
(D) the Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the
Interior; and
(E) the Bureau of Reclamation of the Department of the
Interior.
(3) Public lands.--The term ``public lands'' has the
meaning given that term in section 103 of the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976 (43 U.S.C. 1702).
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan (during the reading). I ask unanimous consent
that the modification be considered as read.
The CHAIR. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from
Michigan?
There was no objection.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the amendment is modified.
There was no objection.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 392, the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, this is the manager's amendment
to the bill. These are the last few details that we were able to work
out in a bipartisan way to bring the bill to the floor.
The manager's amendment is primarily intended to remove three
provisions that have been the subject of a veto threat by the
administration. In addition, it makes a number of largely technical
clarifications and adds a provision on authority to fill vacancies, a
provision that was inadvertently omitted from the Rules Committee's
print of the bill.
Madam Chair, as I explained during the general debate, moving this
bill forward is critical to ensure comprehensive legislative oversight
of our intelligence activities and, just as importantly, intelligence
budgeting and spending. While I regret that our efforts to reach
accommodation on these provisions, which were originally included in
the Senate Intelligence Committee's bill, it is important that we
remove these contentious provisions now so that the detailed spending
and oversight recommendations in the classified annex can go forward.
The first contentious provision would have required Senate
confirmation of the National Security Administration's Director. The
other two contentious provisions subject to veto would have required
the production of certain State Department cables related to detainee
negotiations. While I support the production of these materials, the
committees seeking them have other tools at their disposal to obtain
them, and the bill should not be held up over that document dispute.
In addition, the manager's amendment includes a clarification to
clarify section 310 on mitigating risks in the supply chain to ensure
that those authorities cannot be delegated below the level of a service
acquisition executive. The change is important to ensure the
appropriate level of management is involved in such important
decisions. This change reflects the committee's understanding that
these acquisition authorities will not be used lightly and that all
decisions under this provision will be carried out by responsible
senior officials within the intelligence community and coordinated and
overseen by the Director of National Intelligence.
Finally, the manager's amendment contains a modification requested by
the ranking member to a provision concerning narcotics trafficking on
public lands. The modification is needed to clarify the intended scope
of the provision to ensure it is not read too broadly.
With that, Madam Chair, I ask Members to support the manager's
amendment, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I claim time in opposition to the amendment,
although I am not opposed.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I strongly support the manager's
amendment.
The manager's amendment deals with the issues that the chairman
talked about. Also, it was our negotiation to resolve certain issues,
and that has been done. So I fully support it.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment, as modified, offered by
the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Wolf
The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed in
part B of House Report 112-200.
Mr. WOLF. I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of title III, add the following:
SEC. 312. ESTABLISHMENT OF COUNTERTERRORISM COMPETITIVE
ANALYSIS COUNCIL.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) terrorism and domestic radicalization represent
evolving, dynamic, multidimensional threats that necessitate
a structured, iterative process to continuously revise plans,
operations, concepts, organizations, and capabilities; and
(2) past federal experience in competitive analysis
executed by experts drawn from outside the government has
helped the intelligence community and policymakers better
understand the nature of complex threats to the United
States.
(b) Establishment.--Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et. seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following:
``counterterrorism competitive analysis council
``Sec. 120. (a) Establishment.--There is established a
council to be known as the `Counterterrorism Competitive
Analysis Council' (in this section referred to as the
`Council').
``(b) Duties.--The Council shall--
``(1) advise the Director of National Intelligence on
matters of policy relating to the threats of international
terrorism and domestic radicalization based on all-source
information;
``(2) prepare a competitive analysis of each national
intelligence estimate concerning al-Qaeda and other foreign
terrorist organizations and submit such analysis to the
Director of National Intelligence and the National
Intelligence Council; and
``(3) annually submit to Congress a report in unclassified
form, which may include a classified annex, on trends in
counterterrorism and domestic radicalization, including a
summary of any competitive analysis prepared pursuant to
paragraph (2).
``(c) Members.--(1) The Council shall be composed of eight
members appointed by the Director of National Intelligence,
in consultation with the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate. Members shall be
selected on the basis of previous experience with matters of
policy relating to international terrorism and domestic
radicalization.
``(2)(A) The Director of National Intelligence may not
appoint an individual to the Council if such individual has
served as an officer or employee of the Federal Government
within a five-year period of the date of appointment.
``(B) The Director of National Intelligence may not appoint
an individual to the Council if--
``(i) such individual has served as an officer or employee
of the Federal Government within a 15-year period of the date
of appointment; and
``(ii) on the date of appointment, three of the members of
the Council have served as officers or employees of the
Federal Government within a 15-year period of the date of
appointment.
``(3) The term of a member is five years, and a member may
not serve more than two terms, except that a member appointed
to fill a vacancy may serve two additional terms after the
expiration of the term in which that vacancy occured.
``(4) Any member appointed to fill a vacancy occurring
before the expiration of a term shall be appointed for the
remainder of that term.
``(5) Every two years, the Council shall select a chair and
vice chair from among its members.
``(6) To the extent provided in advance in appropriation
Acts, each member shall be paid at a rate not to exceed the
annual rate of basic pay for level V of the Executive
Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code.
``(7) Any member of the Council may, if authorized by the
Council, take any action which the Council is authorized to
take by this section.
``(d) Staff of Council.--(1) To the extent provided in
advance in appropriation Acts, the Council shall appoint and
fix the compensation of a Director and such additional staff
as may be necessary to enable the Council to carry out its
duties.
``(2) The Director and staff of the Council may be
appointed without regard to the provisions of title 5, United
States Code, governing appointments in the competitive
[[Page H6027]]
service, and may be paid without regard to the provisions of
chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of that title
relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates,
except that the rate of pay fixed for the Director and staff
may not exceed the annual rate of basic pay for level V of
the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United
States Code.
``(3) In accordance with rules adopted by the Council, and
to the extent provided in advance in appropriation Acts, the
Council may procure the services of experts and consultants
under section 3109(b) of title 5, United States Code, but at
rates for individuals not to exceed the daily equivalent of
the annual rate of basic pay for level V of the Executive
Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United States Code.
``(e) Access to Intelligence Information.--(1) The Director
of National Intelligence shall transmit to the Council each
national intelligence estimate concerning al-Qaeda and other
foreign terrorist organizations.
``(2) Upon request of the Council, the Director of National
Intelligence shall make available to the Council any
intelligence information in the possession of the
intelligence community.
``(3) The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure
that the appropriate executive departments and agencies
cooperate with the Council in expeditiously providing to the
members and staff appropriate security clearances in a manner
consistent with existing procedures and requirements.
``(f) Applicability of Federal Advisory Committee Act.--
Section 14(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5
U.S.C. App.), relating to the termination of advisory
committees, shall not apply to the Council.
``(g) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated to carry out this section $5,000,000 for
each of fiscal years 2012 through 2017. No amount is
authorized to carry out this section for a fiscal year unless
the appropriation for the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence for such fiscal year is reduced by an amount
equal to the amount appropriated to carry out this section
for such fiscal year.''.
(c) Initial Report.--The initial report required to be
submitted under section 120(b)(2) of the National Security
Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), shall be filed not
later than 1 year after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
(d) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et. seq.) is
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 119B
the following:
``Sec. 120. Counterterrorism Competitive Analysis Council.''.
Mr. WOLF. I have a modification at the desk, and I ask unanimous
consent for its consideration.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will report the modification.
The Clerk read as follows:
Modification to amendment No. 2:
Strike the entire text of the amendment and insert the
following:
At the end of title III, add the following:
SEC. 312. COUNTERTERRORISM COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS COMMISSION.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) terrorism and domestic radicalization represent
evolving and dynamic threats to the United States;
(2) biases and group think can prevent intelligence
analysts from detecting important changes in such threats
that can prevent the detection and prevention of terrorist
attacks; and
(3) competitive and alternative intelligence analysis are
important tools to prevent biases and group think from
resulting in analytical failures and can help the
intelligence community and policy makers better understand
the nature of complex threats to the United States.
(b) Establishment.--There is established a Commission to be
known as the ``Counterterrorism Competitive Analysis
Commission'' (in this section referred to as the
``Commission'').
(c) Duties.--
(1) Study.--The Commission shall conduct a study on--
(A) how the elements of the intelligence community use red
teams, alternative analysis, and competitive analysis of
foreign intelligence to address domestic radicalization;
(B) whether such analysis is timely, objective, based upon
all sources of available foreign intelligence, and employs
the standards of proper analytic tradecraft; and
(C) the feasibility and advisability of establishing a
permanent entity to--
(i) advise the Director on matters of policy relating to
the threats of international terrorism and domestic
radicalization;
(ii) prepare competitive analyses of national intelligence
estimates prepared by the intelligence community and submit
such analyses to the Director and the National Intelligence
Commission; and
(iii) annually submit to Congress a report in unclassified
form, which may include a classified annex, on trends in
counterterrorism and domestic radicalization, including a
summary of any competitive analyses referred to in clause
(ii).
(2) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Commission shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report containing the
results of the study under paragraph (1).
(d) Members.--
(1) Appointment.--The Commission shall be composed of six
members selected on the basis of previous experience with
matters of policy relating to international terrorism,
intelligence analysis, and domestic radicalization, of whom--
(A) 2 members shall be appointed by the President;
(B) 1 member shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House
of Representatives;
(C) 1 member shall be appointed by the minority leader of
the House of Representatives;
(D) 1 member shall be appointed by the majority leader of
the Senate; and
(E) 1 member shall be appointed by the minority leader of
the Senate.
(2) Qualifications.--An individual may not be appointed to
the Commission under paragraph (1) if such individual has
served as an officer or employee of the Federal Government
within a three-year period of the date of appointment.
(3) Compensation.--To the extent provided in advance in
appropriation Acts, each member of the Commission shall be
paid consistent with the skill and experience of such member
at a rate not to exceed the annual rate of basic pay for
level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title
5, United States Code.
(4) Actions of commission.-- Any member of the Commission
may, if authorized by the Commission, take any action which
the Commission is authorized to take by this section.
(e) Staff of Commission.--
(1) Compensation.--To the extent provided in advance in
appropriation Acts, the Commission shall appoint and fix the
compensation of a Director and such additional staff as may
be necessary to enable the Commission to carry out its
duties.
(2) Rate of pay.-- The Director and staff of the Commission
may be appointed without regard to the provisions of title 5,
United States Code, governing appointments in the competitive
service, and may be paid without regard to the provisions of
chapter 51 and subchapter III of chapter 53 of that title
relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates,
except that the rate of pay fixed for the Director and staff
may not exceed the annual rate of basic pay for level V of
the Executive Schedule under section 5316 of title 5, United
States Code.
(3) Experts and consultants.-- In accordance with rules
adopted by the Commission, and to the extent provided in
advance in appropriation Acts, the Commission may procure the
services of experts and consultants under section 3109(b) of
title 5, United States Code, but at rates for individuals not
to exceed the daily equivalent of the annual rate of basic
pay for level V of the Executive Schedule under section 5316
of title 5, United States Code.
(f) Security Clearances.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall ensure that the appropriate executive
departments and agencies cooperate with the Commission in
expeditiously providing to the members and staff appropriate
security clearances in a manner consistent with existing
procedures and requirements.
(g) Termination.--The Commission shall terminate on the
date that is 30 days after the date on which the Commission
submits the report required under subsection (c)(2), or on
the date that is 395 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, whichever is earlier.
Mr. WOLF (during the reading). I ask unanimous consent to dispense
with the reading.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the reading of the amendment, as
modified, is dispensed with.
There was no objection.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the amendment is modified.
There was no objection.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 392, the gentleman from
Virginia (Mr. Wolf) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Virginia.
Mr. WOLF. I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. WOLF asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. WOLF. I want to personally thank Mr. Rogers and his staff for
helping with regard to this amendment with regard to radicalization,
and I also want to thank Mr. Ruppersberger. Also, as somebody who has
served here for a number of years, I want to say that I don't think
there have been two finer chairmen and ranking members of the
Intelligence Committee since I've been here. I think it's very
impressive to see that, and I just want everyone up here, particularly
in the country, to know that.
Very briefly, Madam Chair, this amendment deals with radicalization.
I won't go into the whole statement, but I will just read several
examples of radicalization that have taken place in northern Virginia.
[[Page H6028]]
In October 2010, Farooque Ahmed from Ashburn, in my congressional
district of Vienna, was arrested for allegedly plotting attacks on the
Washington Metro system, targeting Metro stations to find optimal times
to kill as many innocent people as possible.
In July 2010, Zachary Chesser, a graduate of nearby Oakton High
School, which is very close to where I live, was arrested in New York
en route to join al Shabaab in Somalia. Late last year, Chesser pled
guilty to charges of providing material support to terrorists,
communicating threats and soliciting crimes of violence, and was
sentenced to 30 years in prison.
In November 2009, five American teenagers from Fairfax County,
Virginia, were arrested in Pakistan, attempting to join militant
Islamist organizations. They have been sentenced to 10 years in a
Pakistan prison.
In November 2009, Virginia native Army Major Nidal Hassan attacked
Fort Hood in Texas and was charged with the shooting deaths of 13
service men and women and civilians. Hassan was a graduate of Virginia
Tech and grew up in Arlington County and Roanoke, Virginia.
In 2004, Abdul Rahman al-Amoudi from Falls Church, Virginia, was
convicted on three charges of terrorist financing and conspiring to
assassinate Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah and was sentenced to 23 years
in jail.
In 2003, Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, a northern Virginia resident and the
Islamic Saudi Academy's 1999 valedictorian, was arrested in Saudi
Arabia and was later convicted in Federal District Court in Alexandria
of conspiracy to commit terrorism, including a plot to assassinate
President Bush. He was sentenced to life in prison.
Probably the number one terrorist threat today is Aulaqi, who is an
American citizen and who went to college on American taxpayers' money.
He was with a mosque in northern Virginia, in Falls Church, which used
to be in my old congressional district. So this issue of radicalization
is very important.
Again, I want to thank the chairman and his staff and Mr.
Ruppersberger and his staff.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
{time} 1000
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I claim time in opposition to the amendment,
although I do not intend to oppose it.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. I just want to thank my friend, the gentleman from
Virginia, for his involvement in all national security issues. We serve
together on the Commerce-Justice Subcommittee in Appropriations and we
work together on gangs. So I appreciate your focus on this area to
protect the citizens of our country and our district.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment, as modified, offered by
the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Wolf).
The amendment, as modified, was agreed to.
The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 printed in
part B of House Report 112-200.
The Chair understands that amendment No. 4 will not be offered.
Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Holt
The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed in
part B of House Report 112-200.
Mr. HOLT. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
At the end of subtitle A of title IV, add the following new
section:
SEC. 405. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON THE IMPACT OF
REVOLUTIONS IN NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE
EAST.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to Congress a national intelligence estimate on the impact of
the recent revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East on
the security of the State of Israel.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 392, the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Holt) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey.
Mr. HOLT. Madam Chair, many have expressed deep concern about the
security situation in the Middle East. There are many hopeful signs
from the so-called Arab Spring, but there are also concerns about the
security of Israel and neighboring States.
Several among us and among my constituents expressed concern some
months ago about what would happen with a weakened border between Egypt
and Israel. And, as we all know, on August 18 several groups of
terrorists killed eight Israelis, wounded several more in attacks along
the road leading to Eilat.
This is just one example of what we need to pay attention to in the
area. Will Egypt become a staging ground for more terrorist attacks
against Israel? Can al Qaeda gain new safe haven in any of the
countries undergoing massive political change? We hope not, I would
like to think not, but it is important that we have good, solid
intelligence assessments of the situation.
My amendment would direct the Director of National Intelligence to
submit to Congress within half a year of passage of this law an
estimate on the implications of these revolutions for the security of
the State of Israel and to report to Congress in a way that is
accessible to all Members of Congress on the implications of the so-
called Arab Spring and the changes in the countries around the area.
This amendment is for obvious reasons. Israel is an important ally
and really is founded on principles of law and fairness and justice,
and we want to see those values upheld and extended.
I recognized, in conversations with Chairman Rogers and the ranking
member, that an amendment to this legislation is, perhaps, not the best
way to accomplish this. So in a moment I will ask unanimous consent to
withdraw the amendment, giving notice to the Chair, but with the
understanding that we will make this same request of the Director of
National Intelligence by way of a letter and that we will have
available to Members of Congress this estimate of this security
situation.
I thank the chairman and the ranking member very much for their
cooperation on this. They are fully aware of this, which is partly why
it is not necessary to offer an amendment to that effect.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HOLT. I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I appreciate the gentleman for working with
us. It is an important issue, and you have our commitment from myself
and, I believe, the ranking member to coordinate this particular
report.
I appreciate the gentleman's consideration, because it will allow the
community to prioritize it. It may take 3 weeks or longer, or 3 weeks
shorter than an amendment might call for, but it allows them to adjust
according to the demands at the particular time on the intelligence
community. For that, I want to thank the gentleman, and I look forward
to working with him on the issue.
Mr. HOLT. Reclaiming my time, having served on the Intelligence
Committee until this year for a number of years, I am very much aware
of the constraints that are sometimes placed on the agencies by lots of
reports due on lots of dates.
I look forward to working with the chairman and the ranking member to
see that we get this estimate done in the most constructive way.
With that, I ask unanimous consent to withdraw the pending amendment.
The Acting CHAIR. Without objection, the amendment is withdrawn.
There was no objection.
Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Hunter
The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed in
part B of House Report 112-200.
Mr. HUNTER. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
After section 501 (page 51, after line 18), insert the
following new section:
SEC. 502. STRATEGY TO COUNTER IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.
(a) Strategy.--
(1) Establishment.--The Director of National Intelligence
and the Secretary of Defense shall establish a coordinated
strategy
[[Page H6029]]
utilizing all available personnel and assets for intelligence
collection and analysis to identify and counter network
activity and operations in Pakistan and Afghanistan relating
to the development and use of improvised explosive devices.
(2) Contents.--The strategy established under paragraph (1)
shall identify--
(A) the networks that design improvised explosive devices,
provide training on improvised explosive device assembly and
employment, and smuggle improvised explosive device
components into Afghanistan;
(B) the persons and organizations not directly affiliated
with insurgents in Afghanistan who knowingly enable the
movement of commercial products and material used in
improvised explosive device construction from factories and
vendors in Pakistan into Afghanistan;
(C) the financiers, financial networks, institutions, and
funding streams that provide resources to the insurgency in
Afghanistan; and
(D) the links to military, intelligence services, and
government officials who are complicit in allowing the
insurgent networks in Afghanistan to operate.
(b) Report and Implementation.--Not later than 120 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense shall--
(1) submit to the congressional intelligence committees and
the Committees on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives and the Senate a report containing the
strategy established under subsection (a); and
(2) implement such strategy.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 392, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Hunter) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. HUNTER. Madam Chair, my amendment is pretty simple. It requests
that the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of
Defense, 120 days after the passage of this bill, submit a plan and
execute the plan to develop a coordinated strategy between our
intelligence communities and our Department of Defense to go after IED
manufacturers and IED transporters between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The majority of improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan come from
Pakistan. We know where a lot of those IED manufacturers are, but our
DOD is not able to execute the strategy of going after those IED
manufacturers and the people that transport them across the border on
their own. They need the intelligence community and the 16 agencies
which make up that community to be on their side.
More than 80 percent of the explosive devices used against our U.S.
troops in Afghanistan have homemade explosives as the main charge and
are almost exclusively derived from calcium ammonium nitrate fertilizer
produced in Pakistan. Homemade explosives are also called HMEs.
The vast majority of IED components, including commercial explosives,
radio-control triggers, and HME precursors are sourced from and/or
transmitted through Pakistan. The continued uncontrolled availability
of ammonium nitrate and other HME precursor materials smuggled into
Afghanistan from Pakistan is the most significant factor contributing
to the Afghan IED problem. Over 70 percent of our casualties in
Afghanistan come from these homemade IEDs.
IEDs are also a problem in Pakistan and to the Pakistani people.
Since January of 2011, more than 500 people have been killed and over
14,000 people have been injured by IEDs in Pakistan.
The Afghanistan IED threat cannot be defeated without addressing the
networks and precursors in Pakistan. To defeat the Pakistan-produced
HME-fueled IEDs in Afghanistan, the solution requires integrated
efforts and leveraging of the combined authorities, policies, and
capabilities of many agencies of our government, coalition partners,
and especially the intelligence community.
We need to identify the key facilitators of raw materials supplying
the HME pipeline into Afghanistan. We also need to identify specific
financial networks and funding streams for these HME networks, as well
as identify these key financiers.
That's what my amendment does. It makes the intelligence community
and the defense community get together, submit a plan, and execute that
plan to work on the same page, because right now there is a severe gap
between what the DOD considers its number 1 priority, our defense guys
over there, our soldiers and marines on the ground; their number 1
priority is different from the intelligence community's number one
priority.
{time} 1010
The intelligence community right now goes after high-value targets.
They go after the bad guys wherever they may be found, but they need to
work together on these IEDs coming over from Pakistan. It's the only
way we can defeat them.
With that, I urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to accept
my amendment.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chair, I claim time in opposition, although
I am not opposed to the amendment.
The CHAIR. Without objection, the gentleman from Maryland is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. First, I just want to acknowledge the gentleman's
service. You have been on the field. I think IEDs are one of the
biggest threats that we have to our men and women in theater, and I
strongly support that we move forward with your amendment.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. HUNTER. Madam Chair, I yield the balance of my time to the
gentleman from Michigan, Chairman Rogers.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I thank the gentleman from California.
This is an important amendment. These are issues we have been working
on in committee; and I can tell you, we have been a tad bit frustrated
at that lack of coordination. I think it is unfortunate it took this
amendment as a part of the Intelligence bill to continue to put
pressure on the administration to get their act together on this
particular issue. It is an issue we absolutely must solve, not only for
the safety and security of the men and women who serve in our Armed
Forces in Afghanistan, but also for the greater impact on the war on
terror. I strongly urge support of the Hunter amendment.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from California (Mr. Hunter).
The question was taken; and the Chair announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings on
the amendment offered by the gentleman from California will be
postponed.
Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Carney
The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed in
part B of House Report 112-200.
Mr. CARNEY. Madam Chair, I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Insert after section 501 the following new section:
SEC. 502. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PRIORITY OF RAILWAY
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the nation's railway transportation (including subway
transit) network is broad and technically complex, requiring
robust communication between private sector stakeholders and
the intelligence community to identify, monitor, and respond
to threats;
(2) the Department of Homeland Security Office of
Intelligence and Analysis maintains a constructive
relationship with other Federal agencies, state and local
governments, and private entities to safeguard our railways;
and
(3) railway transportation security (including subway
transit security) should continue to be prioritized in the
critical infrastructure threat assessment developed by the
Office of Intelligence and Analysis and included in threat
assessment budgets of the intelligence community.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 392, the gentleman from
Delaware (Mr. Carney) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Delaware.
Mr. CARNEY. Madam Chair, I rise to recognize the importance of rail
security in the effort to access, prepare for, and neutralize terrorist
threats to our critical infrastructure. While roughly 1.7 million
passengers ride in domestic and international air flights daily, every
weekday 34 million Americans ride on trains and transit systems.
[[Page H6030]]
We have seen the tragic consequences of attacks to rail and subway
systems in Britain, Spain, and India. We know al Qaeda was looking to
target American rail systems this year. An attack on our rail system
here in the United States would simply be devastating.
Earlier this year, the House adopted an amendment I offered to the
fiscal year 2011 Intelligence Authorization Act. There was broad
bipartisan support for making rail security an intelligence priority. I
continue to believe we must address the security vulnerabilities in our
rail and transit systems. Our intelligence community does great work to
coordinate with those who own and operate trains and rail lines. In
particular, the Office of Intelligence Analysis within the Department
of Homeland Security develops a threat assessment for critical
infrastructure.
My amendment is a simple amendment. It affirms the importance of
assessments and information sharing conducted by intelligence analysts.
It expresses the sense of Congress that the intelligence community must
continue to prioritize rail security in identifying and preventing
terrorist threats.
As a near daily rider of Amtrak myself, I want to know that the
United States Government is doing all it can to keep my fellow
passengers and rail passengers across the country safe. I urge my
colleagues to support this amendment. I thank you for your
consideration.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I claim time in opposition to the amendment.
The CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Again, I appreciate the gentleman's concern
for rail security. It is an incredibly important issue. I continue to
believe, as I did the last go-round, this is not the right place for
this. I have agreed not to officially oppose his amendment.
I just want to again remind individuals that this is 17 agencies
across the whole spectrum of intelligence work. And for Congress to
step in and say rail priority, even if their agency might be satellite
oriented, just does not make a lot of sense to me; and I know it won't
make a lot of sense to them as well.
Again, I agree that rail security is incredibly important. We have
segments of the intelligence community, and I want to re-emphasize
segments, and here in our homeland security, that worry about rail
security, and I argue that would be a better place for this amendment.
As I said, I will not officially oppose it. I have made no official
recommendation. Again, I appreciate the gentleman's position. I will be
voting ``no,'' but I would tell the rest of the Members to do what they
see fit.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. CARNEY. In closing, I would like to thank the chair. I appreciate
his position on this. I thank him for not officially opposing it and
ask for support from everyone in the Chamber.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Delaware (Mr. Carney).
The question was taken; and the Chair announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. CARNEY. Madam Chair, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings on
the amendment offered by the gentleman from Delaware will be postponed.
The Chair understands that amendment No. 8 will not be offered.
Amendment No. 9 Offered by Mr. Keating
The CHAIR. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 printed in
part B of House Report 112-200.
Mr. KEATING. I have an amendment at the desk.
The CHAIR. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
After section 501 (page 51, after line 18), insert the
following new section:
SEC. 502. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING INTEGRATION OF FUSION
CENTERS.
It is the sense of Congress that ten years after the
terrorist attacks upon the United States on September 11,
2001, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation
with the Director of National Intelligence, should continue
to integrate and leverage fusion centers to enlist all of the
intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security
capabilities of the United States in a manner that is
consistent with the Constitution to prevent acts of terrorism
against the United States.
The CHAIR. Pursuant to House Resolution 392, the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Keating) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Madam Chair; and thank you, Mr.
Ruppersberger, for allowing me to present this timely amendment to the
FY12 Intelligence authorization.
Madam Chair, there are 72 fusion centers throughout the United
States, including one in Massachusetts, which is also the home of the
sole joint terrorism task force that is housed in an airport. However,
as noted yesterday by Mr. Lee Hamilton, vice chair of the 9/11
Commission, during the Committee on Homeland Security hearing, which
dealt with looking back 10 years after 9/11, all 72 fusion centers have
varying degrees of quality, and this results in gaps in communication.
Gaps in sharing, such as agencies' failure to link information about
the individual who attempted the December 25, 2009, airline bombing,
prevented him from being included in the Federal Government's terrorist
watch list, a tool used by DHS to screen for persons who pose a
significant security threat.
This week, the GAO released a report to the Department of Homeland
Security recommending that DHS improve its assistance and services to
State and local homeland security partners and streamline some of the
information-sharing mechanisms.
Furthermore, in July 2011, DHS reported that it established
performance measures for assessing its information-sharing efforts.
These measures include, for example, the percent of intelligence
reports customers rated as satisfactory, enabling customers to
anticipate emergency threats.
DHS plans to report on these metrics beginning in fiscal year 2012.
While these are positive steps, GAO's work has shown that developing
outcome-based performance measures that gauge information-sharing
efforts are really necessary to strengthen the accountability of these
efforts, and we are still waiting for DHS to implement these steps.
Now, as a former district attorney of over a decade, I understand how
critical it is to share information and how not sharing that
information enhances and enables critical activity. That, indeed,
carries over to terrorists themselves.
{time} 1020
This amendment encourages this type of streamlining process by
further integrating and leveraging fusion centers to enlist all the
intelligence, law enforcement, homeland security capabilities in the
United States in a manner that's consistent with the Constitution to
prevent acts of terrorism against the United States of America. It was
just a few months ago that Secretary Napolitano in testimony before the
Homeland Security Committee said that the threat of terrorism is at its
most heightened state since 9/11. That's what she's saying now.
So I encourage all Members to vote for this amendment, as well as the
manager's amendment, to strengthen this bill and incorporate all the
elements of the intelligence community, particularly trying to merge
information, enhance sharing of information with State and local
officials who have their ear to the ground.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I claim time in opposition.
The CHAIR. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Again, I appreciate the gentleman's interest
here. I don't know any organization that we established not to operate
under the rules and construct of the Constitution of the United States.
It is a little bit redundant, in my perspective; and also we deal with
these issues through IGs, we do this through congressional oversight,
and we deal with this in the classified annex. I would encourage the
gentleman to take a look at the classified annex. A lot of the work
that we do is to make sure that these organizations are functioning
according to rules, regulation, and constitutional law.
I am not going to oppose his amendment. I have no recommendation. I
do think, however, it's probably not well placed in this particular
piece of legislation.
[[Page H6031]]
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. KEATING. I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger).
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. First, I support this amendment. The amendment
would include a sense of Congress language to encourage the Director of
National Intelligence and the Secretary of Homeland Security to
integrate the intelligence-sharing capability of fusion centers and
leverage participation from all intelligence, law enforcement, and
homeland security agencies to prevent acts of terrorism against the
United States.
I thank the gentleman for this amendment, which is very timely as we
approach the 10th anniversary of September 11. The Intelligence
Committee is holding a series of open hearings in order to acknowledge
the progress made in the intelligence and national security community
since 9/11 and to identify areas that will need improvement.
One area we will explore is Federal collaboration with first
responders at State and local levels. The Bipartisan Policy Center and
the former cochairman of the 9/11 Commission, Lee Hamilton, recently
issued a report about our national response to 9/11 over the last 10
years. They found that Federal and local information sharing is still
not as good as it could be.
The proposed sense of Congress is consistent with the findings of
numerous organizations, but our Nation still requires better
integration of intelligence. I therefore urge a ``yes'' vote on the
amendment.
Also, I acknowledge the fact you are a former prosecutor. I am a
former prosecutor. Our chairman is a former FBI agent.
Mr. KEATING. I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Massachusetts (Mr. Keating).
The amendment was agreed to.
Announcement by the Chair
The CHAIR. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, proceedings will now
resume on those amendments printed in part B of House Report 112-200 on
which further proceedings were postponed, in the following order:
Amendment No. 6 by Mr. Hunter of California.
Amendment No. 7 by Mr. Carney of Delaware.
The Chair will reduce to 2 minutes the time for any electronic vote
after the first vote in this series.
Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Hunter
The CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a recorded vote
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Hunter)
on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the ayes
prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
Recorded Vote
The CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 397,
noes 0, not voting 34, as follows:
[Roll No. 695]
AYES--397
Ackerman
Adams
Aderholt
Alexander
Altmire
Amash
Andrews
Austria
Baca
Bachus
Baldwin
Barrow
Bartlett
Bass (CA)
Bass (NH)
Benishek
Berg
Berkley
Berman
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Black
Blackburn
Blumenauer
Bonner
Bono Mack
Boren
Boswell
Boustany
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Braley (IA)
Brooks
Broun (GA)
Buchanan
Bucshon
Buerkle
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canseco
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Carnahan
Carney
Carson (IN)
Carter
Cassidy
Castor (FL)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Chandler
Chu
Cicilline
Clarke (MI)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Coffman (CO)
Cohen
Cole
Conaway
Connolly (VA)
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cravaack
Crawford
Crenshaw
Critz
Crowley
Cuellar
Culberson
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis (KY)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Denham
Dent
DesJarlais
Deutch
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dold
Donnelly (IN)
Doyle
Dreier
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Edwards
Ellison
Ellmers
Emerson
Eshoo
Farenthold
Farr
Fattah
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Flake
Fleischmann
Fleming
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Fudge
Gallegly
Garamendi
Gardner
Garrett
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gibson
Gingrey (GA)
Gohmert
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Graves (GA)
Graves (MO)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Griffin (AR)
Griffith (VA)
Grijalva
Grimm
Guinta
Guthrie
Gutierrez
Hahn
Hall
Hanabusa
Hanna
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Heck
Heinrich
Hensarling
Herger
Herrera Beutler
Himes
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hochul
Holt
Hoyer
Huelskamp
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurt
Inslee
Israel
Issa
Jackson (IL)
Jackson Lee (TX)
Jenkins
Johnson (IL)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Jordan
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly
Kildee
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kinzinger (IL)
Kissell
Kline
Kucinich
Labrador
Lamborn
Lance
Landry
Langevin
Lankford
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Latta
Lee (CA)
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Long
Lowey
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan
Lummis
Lynch
Mack
Maloney
Manzullo
Marchant
Markey
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (CA)
McCarthy (NY)
McCaul
McClintock
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McHenry
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
Meehan
Meeks
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Moore
Moran
Mulvaney
Murphy (CT)
Murphy (PA)
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neugebauer
Noem
Nugent
Nunes
Nunnelee
Olson
Olver
Owens
Palazzo
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Paulsen
Payne
Pearce
Pelosi
Pence
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Petri
Pingree (ME)
Platts
Poe (TX)
Polis
Pompeo
Posey
Price (GA)
Price (NC)
Quayle
Quigley
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Rehberg
Reichert
Renacci
Ribble
Richardson
Richmond
Rigell
Rivera
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross (AR)
Ross (FL)
Rothman (NJ)
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Runyan
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Scalise
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schilling
Schmidt
Schock
Schrader
Schwartz
Schweikert
Scott (SC)
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Sewell
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuler
Shuster
Simpson
Sires
Slaughter
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Southerland
Speier
Stark
Stearns
Stivers
Stutzman
Sutton
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tierney
Tipton
Tonko
Towns
Tsongas
Turner
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walberg
Walden
Walsh (IL)
Walz (MN)
Watt
Waxman
Webster
Welch
West
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (FL)
Wolf
Womack
Woodall
Woolsey
Yarmuth
Yoder
Young (IN)
NOT VOTING--34
Akin
Bachmann
Barletta
Barton (TX)
Becerra
Bishop (UT)
Brown (FL)
Cardoza
Diaz-Balart
Engel
Filner
Giffords
Granger
Higgins
Holden
Honda
Johnson (GA)
Lewis (GA)
Lungren, Daniel E.
Marino
McCotter
Miller, Gary
Neal
Paul
Pitts
Reyes
Sullivan
Thompson (PA)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
{time} 1053
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. FILNER. Madam Chair, on rollcall 695, I was unable to vote. Had I
been present, I would have voted ``aye.''
Amendment No. 7 Offered by Mr. Carney
The CHAIR. The unfinished business is the demand for a recorded vote
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Carney) on
which further proceedings were postponed and on which the noes
prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
Recorded Vote
The CHAIR. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The CHAIR. This will be a 2-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 303,
noes 92, not voting 36, as follows:
[[Page H6032]]
[Roll No. 696]
AYES--303
Ackerman
Adams
Aderholt
Alexander
Altmire
Andrews
Austria
Baca
Bachus
Baldwin
Barrow
Bartlett
Bass (CA)
Bass (NH)
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Bonner
Bono Mack
Boren
Boswell
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Braley (IA)
Brooks
Buchanan
Bucshon
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Capuano
Carnahan
Carney
Carson (IN)
Cassidy
Castor (FL)
Chabot
Chandler
Chu
Cicilline
Clarke (MI)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Cohen
Cole
Connolly (VA)
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cravaack
Crawford
Crenshaw
Critz
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Denham
Dent
Deutch
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Dold
Donnelly (IN)
Doyle
Dreier
Edwards
Ellison
Ellmers
Emerson
Eshoo
Farr
Fattah
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Fleming
Forbes
Fortenberry
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Fudge
Gallegly
Garamendi
Gardner
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gibson
Gohmert
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Gosar
Graves (MO)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Griffin (AR)
Griffith (VA)
Grijalva
Grimm
Guinta
Guthrie
Gutierrez
Hahn
Hanabusa
Hanna
Harper
Harris
Hastings (FL)
Hayworth
Heinrich
Herger
Herrera Beutler
Himes
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hochul
Holt
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson Lee (TX)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly
Kildee
Kind
Kinzinger (IL)
Kissell
Kline
Kucinich
Lance
Landry
Langevin
Lankford
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Latta
Lee (CA)
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan
Lynch
Mack
Maloney
Manzullo
Markey
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (CA)
McCarthy (NY)
McCaul
McCollum
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
Meehan
Meeks
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Moore
Moran
Mulvaney
Murphy (CT)
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Nunes
Nunnelee
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Paulsen
Payne
Pearce
Pelosi
Pence
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Pingree (ME)
Platts
Polis
Price (NC)
Quigley
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Rehberg
Renacci
Richardson
Richmond
Rigell
Rivera
Rogers (AL)
Rokita
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross (AR)
Rothman (NJ)
Roybal-Allard
Runyan
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Scalise
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schmidt
Schrader
Schwartz
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sewell
Sherman
Shuler
Shuster
Simpson
Sires
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Speier
Stark
Stearns
Stivers
Sutton
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tiberi
Tierney
Tipton
Tonko
Towns
Tsongas
Turner
Upton
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walberg
Walden
Walz (MN)
Watt
Waxman
Webster
Welch
Whitfield
Wilson (FL)
Wolf
Woolsey
Yarmuth
Yoder
Young (IN)
NOES--92
Amash
Benishek
Berg
Black
Blackburn
Boustany
Broun (GA)
Buerkle
Burgess
Canseco
Carter
Chaffetz
Coffman (CO)
Conaway
Culberson
Davis (KY)
DesJarlais
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Farenthold
Flake
Fleischmann
Flores
Foxx
Garrett
Gingrey (GA)
Gowdy
Graves (GA)
Hall
Hartzler
Hastings (WA)
Heck
Hensarling
Huelskamp
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurt
Issa
Jenkins
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Labrador
Lamborn
Long
Lummis
Marchant
McClintock
McHenry
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Murphy (PA)
Neugebauer
Noem
Nugent
Olson
Palazzo
Poe (TX)
Pompeo
Posey
Price (GA)
Quayle
Reichert
Ribble
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Rooney
Ross (FL)
Royce
Schilling
Schock
Schweikert
Scott (SC)
Sessions
Shimkus
Smith (NE)
Southerland
Stutzman
Thornberry
Walsh (IL)
West
Westmoreland
Womack
Woodall
NOT VOTING--36
Akin
Bachmann
Barletta
Barton (TX)
Bishop (UT)
Brown (FL)
Cardoza
Diaz-Balart
Engel
Filner
Giffords
Granger
Higgins
Holden
Honda
Johnson (GA)
Lewis (GA)
Lungren, Daniel E.
Marino
McCotter
Miller, Gary
Neal
Paul
Petri
Pitts
Reyes
Smith (TX)
Sullivan
Thompson (PA)
Van Hollen
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Wilson (SC)
Wittman
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
{time} 1100
Mrs. BLACK changed her vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. PENCE and Ms. HAYWORTH changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. FILNER. Madam Chair, on rollcall No. 696, I was unable to vote.
Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye.''
Mr. PETRI. Madam Chair, I inadvertently did not vote on the Carney
amendment to H.R. 1892. I would have voted for adoption of the
amendment.
Mr. AKIN. Madam Chair, on rollcall Nos. 695 and 696, I was delayed
and unable to vote. Had I been present I would have voted ``aye'' on
both.
PERSONAL EXPLANATION
Mr. WITTMAN. Madam Chair, on rollcall Nos. 695 and 696, I was
unavoidably detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye'' on
695 and ``aye'' on 696.
The CHAIR. The question is on the amendment in the nature of a
substitute, as amended.
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIR. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Grimm) having assumed the chair, Mrs. Miller of Michigan, Chair of the
Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 1892) to
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2012 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, and, pursuant
to House Resolution 392, reported the bill back to the House with an
amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
Pursuant to clause 1(c) of rule XIX, further consideration of H.R.
1892 is postponed.
____________________
[Congressional Record: September 9, 2011 (House)]
[Page H6033-H6035]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr09se11-84]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 1(c) of rule XIX, further
consideration of H.R. 1892 will now resume. The Clerk will report the
title.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment
to the amendment reported from the Committee of the Whole?
If not, the question is on the amendment in the nature of a
substitute, as amended.
The amendment was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
Motion to Recommit
Ms. HOCHUL. Mr. Speaker, I have a motion to recommit at the desk.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentlewoman opposed to the bill?
Ms. HOCHUL. I am opposed to the bill in its current form.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:
Ms. Hochul moves to recommit the bill, H.R. 1892, to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence with instructions
to report the same back to the House forthwith with the
following amendment:
At the end of title III (page 26, after line 6), add the
following new section:
SEC. 312. PRIORITIZATION OF FUNDING TO COUNTER THE THREAT
POSED BY TRANSNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING.
In obligating and expending funds authorized to be
appropriated in this Act, the head of each element of the
intelligence community shall include as a priority activities
in support of countering the threat posed by transnational
drug trafficking and the protection of United States borders
from drug-related crime, violence, and gang-related activity
in connection with transnational drug trafficking.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentlewoman from New York is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Ms. HOCHUL. My amendment will very simply help the intelligence
community prioritize its funding and ensure that we direct it toward
securing our borders from many threats--terrorists as well as drug
dealers.
I want to be clear that support for my simple amendment, which is a
statement of our priorities, will ensure that our intelligence
community cooperates fully to protect our borders against terrorists as
well as the scourge of drug dealers. If support for my amendment is
passed, we can also vote on the underlying bill immediately following.
So my amendment does not harm the bill, and I want to make that very
clear.
Last night, as we sat in this Chamber, we all became aware of the
continued threat that we all face as intelligence reports were coming
out about unspecified threats in New York City and in Washington,
perhaps putting us in danger. And while the President so eloquently
laid out his comments on how we need to get our country back to work
and people off the unemployment lines, I will tell you today there are
groups of individuals I'd like to see on the unemployment lines--the
terrorists and the drug dealers, who are trying to do harm to this
country. My amendment is simply a statement of our priorities.
{time} 1110
Just 2 days ago in my district in Upstate New York, we had the
largest drug bust come over from Canada in our history. It equated to 9
million doses of cocaine that was going to be spread through our
community.
Mr. Speaker, that is intolerable. We have got to do more to secure
our borders, and we can work harder with our intelligence community and
their resources to secure our borders, and that's exactly what my
amendment would do.
It is not just the northern border; we all know what's occurring on
the southern border. Military operations are being conducted in our
country by Mexican drug cartels even as we speak. We have to do more to
protect our borders.
The murder capital of the world is not in some Far Eastern country,
Middle East. It is miles away from the U.S. border near El Paso, Texas.
I have a real problem with that as an American citizen. We need to do
more to protect our borders.
As the President spoke last night, we have to do so much more to get
our economy going again. Has anyone ever calculated the true cost to
our economy of what the drug problem is doing, this illegal drug
trafficking that's coming through our borders, what it's doing to our
communities on the southern border and on the northern border?
Ladies and gentlemen, we have got to do much more, and my amendment
is simply an opportunity. If you support this, it is a statement of
saying the intelligence community will make a
[[Page H6034]]
higher priority of protecting our borders from the drug dealers and
terrorists and drug dealers who want to do us harm.
I think this is a simple amendment. Again, support for this will not
hurt the underlying bill. We can vote on this amendment and immediately
support the bill following.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I rise in opposition to the motion to
recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, this goes to the fundamental
heart of why some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle--and
I think their intentions are good--but fundamentally do not understand
the role and function of the intelligence community to protect the
United States of America.
Just as the gentlelady stated, the newspaper reported a very credible
threat to the security of the United States and to the violence of the
citizens and maybe two prominent cities here on our homeland. So every
day somebody gets up around the world with the sole intention of
killing innocent Americans in this country through an act of terrorism.
In addition to that, people are trying to penetrate our cybernetworks
all over this country, not only for intellectual property, but to cause
harm and damage. We have nuclear treaties and nuclear proliferation
that we ask and push and nudge our intelligence services to be on top
of and not to make a mistake. Don't make a mistake that would result in
a catastrophic event anywhere in the world, let alone here in the
United States of America.
I know some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle don't
want to deal with the hard issues of the border. But taking it from an
open, aggressive, build a fence, put more resources on the border,
getting serious about policing our southern border to take it into the
classified, nobody can see it, see, aren't we doing something, is the
wrong thing to do for this country.
We need to stand up for these men and women who we ask every day to
protect this country. When you try to divert resources to gang violence
from our intelligence services, that sends a very clear signal to
America: you don't get it.
I want terrorists caught. I want a great raid on somebody like Osama
bin Laden. I want all of the resources of the intelligence community
geared to keeping us safe.
We have a Border Patrol; we have National Guard. We have lots of
other ways to secure our border. Let's not waste the resources. Let's
not give a slap in the face to every member of our intelligence
community who is risking their life today to get a piece of
information, to take an action that keeps us safe here in the homeland.
I strongly urge the rejection of this misguided amendment.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is
ordered on the motion to recommit.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Ms. HOCHUL. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair
will reduce to 5 minutes the minimum time for any electronic vote on
the question of passage.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 145,
noes 257, not voting 29, as follows:
[Roll No. 697]
AYES--145
Ackerman
Altmire
Andrews
Baca
Baldwin
Barrow
Bass (CA)
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boren
Boswell
Braley (IA)
Butterfield
Capps
Carnahan
Carney
Carson (IN)
Castor (FL)
Chandler
Chu
Cicilline
Clarke (MI)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cuellar
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Deutch
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Ellison
Engel
Eshoo
Farr
Filner
Frank (MA)
Fudge
Garamendi
Gonzalez
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Hahn
Hanabusa
Hastings (FL)
Heinrich
Higgins
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hochul
Holt
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson Lee (TX)
Johnson, E. B.
Kaptur
Keating
Kildee
Kind
Kucinich
Langevin
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Levin
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lowey
Lujan
Lynch
Maloney
Markey
McCollum
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
Meeks
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Moore
Moran
Murphy (CT)
Napolitano
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pastor (AZ)
Payne
Pelosi
Perlmutter
Peters
Pingree (ME)
Price (NC)
Quigley
Rangel
Richardson
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schrader
Scott, David
Serrano
Sewell
Sherman
Sires
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Stark
Sutton
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Tonko
Towns
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz (MN)
Waxman
Welch
Wilson (FL)
Yarmuth
NOES--257
Adams
Aderholt
Alexander
Amash
Austria
Bachus
Bartlett
Bass (NH)
Benishek
Berg
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Black
Blackburn
Bonner
Bono Mack
Boustany
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brooks
Broun (GA)
Buchanan
Bucshon
Buerkle
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canseco
Cantor
Capito
Capuano
Carter
Cassidy
Chabot
Chaffetz
Coble
Coffman (CO)
Cohen
Cole
Conaway
Connolly (VA)
Cravaack
Crawford
Crenshaw
Critz
Crowley
Culberson
Cummings
Davis (KY)
Denham
Dent
DesJarlais
Dold
Donnelly (IN)
Doyle
Dreier
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Duncan (TN)
Edwards
Ellmers
Emerson
Farenthold
Fattah
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Flake
Fleischmann
Fleming
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Gardner
Garrett
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gibson
Gingrey (GA)
Gohmert
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Graves (GA)
Graves (MO)
Griffin (AR)
Griffith (VA)
Grimm
Guinta
Guthrie
Gutierrez
Hall
Hanna
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Heck
Hensarling
Herger
Herrera Beutler
Himes
Huelskamp
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurt
Issa
Jenkins
Johnson (IL)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Jordan
Kelly
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kinzinger (IL)
Kissell
Kline
Labrador
Lamborn
Lance
Landry
Lankford
Latham
LaTourette
Latta
Lee (CA)
Lewis (CA)
LoBiondo
Lofgren, Zoe
Long
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lummis
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (CA)
McCarthy (NY)
McCaul
McClintock
McDermott
McHenry
McKeon
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
Meehan
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Mulvaney
Murphy (PA)
Myrick
Nadler
Neugebauer
Noem
Nugent
Nunes
Nunnelee
Olson
Palazzo
Pascrell
Paulsen
Pearce
Pence
Peterson
Petri
Platts
Poe (TX)
Polis
Pompeo
Posey
Price (GA)
Quayle
Rahall
Reed
Rehberg
Reichert
Renacci
Ribble
Richmond
Rigell
Rivera
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross (AR)
Ross (FL)
Rothman (NJ)
Royce
Runyan
Ryan (WI)
Scalise
Schilling
Schmidt
Schock
Schwartz
Schweikert
Scott (SC)
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shimkus
Shuler
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Southerland
Speier
Stearns
Stivers
Stutzman
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tipton
Tsongas
Turner
Upton
Walberg
Walden
Walsh (IL)
Watt
Webster
West
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wittman
Wolf
Womack
Woodall
Woolsey
Yoder
Young (IN)
NOT VOTING--29
Akin
Bachmann
Barletta
Barton (TX)
Bishop (UT)
Brown (FL)
Cardoza
Diaz-Balart
Giffords
Granger
Holden
Honda
Johnson (GA)
Lewis (GA)
Lungren, Daniel E.
Marino
McCotter
Miller, Gary
Neal
Paul
Pitts
Reyes
Sullivan
Thompson (PA)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Wilson (SC)
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Two minutes are remaining
in this vote.
{time} 1132
Messrs. SCOTT of Virginia, CROWLEY, COHEN, and McDERMOTT changed
their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
So the motion to recommit was rejected.
[[Page H6035]]
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This is a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 384,
noes 14, not voting 33, as follows:
[Roll No. 698]
AYES--384
Ackerman
Adams
Aderholt
Alexander
Altmire
Andrews
Austria
Baca
Bachus
Baldwin
Barrow
Bartlett
Bass (CA)
Bass (NH)
Becerra
Benishek
Berg
Berkley
Berman
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Black
Blackburn
Bonner
Bono Mack
Boren
Boustany
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Braley (IA)
Brooks
Broun (GA)
Buchanan
Bucshon
Buerkle
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Calvert
Camp
Campbell
Canseco
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Carnahan
Carney
Carson (IN)
Carter
Cassidy
Castor (FL)
Chabot
Chaffetz
Chandler
Chu
Cicilline
Clarke (MI)
Clarke (NY)
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Coffman (CO)
Cohen
Cole
Conaway
Connolly (VA)
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cravaack
Crawford
Crenshaw
Critz
Crowley
Cuellar
Culberson
Cummings
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis (KY)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLauro
Denham
Dent
DesJarlais
Deutch
Dicks
Doggett
Dold
Donnelly (IN)
Doyle
Dreier
Duffy
Duncan (SC)
Edwards
Ellison
Ellmers
Emerson
Engel
Eshoo
Farenthold
Farr
Fattah
Fincher
Fitzpatrick
Flake
Fleischmann
Fleming
Flores
Forbes
Fortenberry
Foxx
Frank (MA)
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Fudge
Gallegly
Garamendi
Gardner
Garrett
Gerlach
Gibbs
Gingrey (GA)
Gohmert
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Gosar
Gowdy
Graves (GA)
Graves (MO)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Griffin (AR)
Griffith (VA)
Grijalva
Grimm
Guinta
Guthrie
Gutierrez
Hahn
Hall
Hanabusa
Hanna
Harper
Harris
Hartzler
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayworth
Heck
Heinrich
Hensarling
Herger
Herrera Beutler
Higgins
Himes
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hochul
Holt
Hoyer
Huelskamp
Huizenga (MI)
Hultgren
Hunter
Hurt
Inslee
Israel
Issa
Jackson (IL)
Jackson Lee (TX)
Jenkins
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson (OH)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones
Jordan
Kaptur
Keating
Kelly
Kildee
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kinzinger (IL)
Kissell
Kline
Labrador
Lamborn
Lance
Landry
Langevin
Lankford
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Latham
LaTourette
Latta
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Long
Lowey
Lucas
Luetkemeyer
Lujan
Lummis
Lynch
Mack
Maloney
Manzullo
Marchant
Markey
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (CA)
McCarthy (NY)
McCaul
McClintock
McCollum
McHenry
McIntyre
McKeon
McKinley
McMorris Rodgers
McNerney
Meehan
Meeks
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Moran
Mulvaney
Murphy (CT)
Murphy (PA)
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neugebauer
Noem
Nugent
Nunes
Nunnelee
Olson
Olver
Owens
Palazzo
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor (AZ)
Paulsen
Payne
Pearce
Pence
Perlmutter
Peters
Peterson
Petri
Pingree (ME)
Platts
Poe (TX)
Polis
Pompeo
Posey
Price (GA)
Price (NC)
Quayle
Quigley
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Rehberg
Reichert
Renacci
Ribble
Richardson
Richmond
Rigell
Rivera
Roby
Roe (TN)
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Rokita
Rooney
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Ross (AR)
Ross (FL)
Rothman (NJ)
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Runyan
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Scalise
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schilling
Schmidt
Schock
Schrader
Schwartz
Schweikert
Scott (SC)
Scott (VA)
Scott, Austin
Scott, David
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Sewell
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuler
Shuster
Simpson
Sires
Slaughter
Smith (NE)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Southerland
Speier
Stearns
Stivers
Stutzman
Sutton
Terry
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiberi
Tierney
Tipton
Tonko
Towns
Tsongas
Turner
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walberg
Walden
Walsh (IL)
Walz (MN)
Watt
Waxman
Webster
Welch
West
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wilson (FL)
Wittman
Wolf
Womack
Woodall
Yarmuth
Yoder
Young (IN)
NOES--14
Amash
Blumenauer
Capuano
Duncan (TN)
Filner
Gibson
Kucinich
Lee (CA)
McDermott
McGovern
Miller, George
Moore
Stark
Woolsey
NOT VOTING--33
Akin
Bachmann
Barletta
Barton (TX)
Bishop (UT)
Boswell
Brown (FL)
Cardoza
Conyers
Diaz-Balart
Dingell
Giffords
Granger
Holden
Honda
Lewis (GA)
Lungren, Daniel E.
Marino
McCotter
Miller, Gary
Neal
Paul
Pelosi
Pitts
Reyes
Smith (NJ)
Sullivan
Thompson (PA)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Wilson (SC)
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Two minutes are remaining
in this vote.
{time} 1138
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Stated for:
Mr. CARDOZA. Mr. Speaker, unfortunately, I was unable to vote on H.R.
1892, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 because
of road closures caused by flooding in and around my home. The roads
were impassable, and I regret that I could not be present for votes.
Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye'' on final passage.
Personal explanation
Mr. AKIN. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall Nos. 697 and 698, I was delayed
and unable to vote. Had I been present I would have voted ``no'' on
rollcall No. 697 and ``aye'' on rollcall No. 698.
Authorizing the Clerk to Correct Engrossment
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that in
the engrossment of the bill, H.R. 1892, the Clerk be authorized to make
such technical and conforming changes as necessary to reflect the
actions of the House.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Michigan?
There was no objection.
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