111th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session 111-186
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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2010
_______
June 26, 2009.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Reyes, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 2701]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 2701) to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2010 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Prohibition on earmarks.
Sec. 106. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Subtitle A--Personnel Matters
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Temporary appointment to fill vacancies in Presidentially
appointed and Senate confirmed positions in the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence.
Sec. 303. Enhanced flexibility in nonreimbursable details to elements
of the intelligence community.
Sec. 304. Provisions relating to the Defense Civilian Intelligence
Personnel System.
Subtitle B--Education
Sec. 311. Permanent authorization for the Pat Roberts Intelligence
Scholars Program.
Sec. 312. Intelligence officer training program.
Sec. 313. Modifications to the Stokes educational scholarship program.
Sec. 314. Pilot program for intensive language instruction in African
languages.
Subtitle C--Congressional Oversight of Covert Actions
Sec. 321. Reporting on covert actions.
Subtitle D--Reports and Other Congressional Oversight
Sec. 331. Report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets.
Sec. 332. Annual personnel level assessments for the intelligence
community.
Sec. 333. Semiannual reports on nuclear weapons programs of Iran,
Syria, and North Korea.
Sec. 334. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the
intelligence community.
Sec. 335. Government Accountability Office audits and investigations.
Sec. 336. Certification of compliance with oversight requirements.
Sec. 337. Reports on foreign industrial espionage.
Sec. 338. Report on intelligence community contractors.
Sec. 339. Report on transformation of the intelligence capabilities of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 340. Report on intelligence resources dedicated to Iraq and
Afghanistan.
Sec. 341. Report on international traffic in arms regulations.
Sec. 342. Report on nuclear trafficking.
Sec. 343. Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit unauthorized
disclosures of classified information.
Sec. 344. Study on electronic waste destruction practices of the
intelligence community.
Sec. 345. Report on retirement benefits for former employees of Air
America.
Sec. 346. Study on college tuition programs for employees of the
intelligence community.
Sec. 347. National Intelligence Estimate on global supply chain
vulnerabilities.
Sec. 348. Review of records relating to potential health risks among
Desert Storm veterans.
Sec. 349. Review of pensions of employees affected by ``five and out''
program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Sec. 350. Summary of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism of
detainees held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 351. Summary of intelligence on Uighur detainees held at United
States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
Sec. 352. Report on interrogation research and training.
Sec. 353. Report on plans to increase diversity within the intelligence
community.
Sec. 354. Review of Federal Bureau of Investigation exercise of
enforcement jurisdiction in foreign nations.
Sec. 355. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 356. Incorporation of reporting requirements.
Sec. 357. Conforming amendments.
Subtitle E--Other Matters
Sec. 361. Modification of availability of funds for different
intelligence activities.
Sec. 362. Protection of certain national security information.
Sec. 363. Extension of authority to delete information about receipt
and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations.
Sec. 364. Exemption of dissemination of terrorist identity information
from Freedom of Information Act.
Sec. 365. Misuse of the intelligence community and Office of the
Director of National Intelligence name, initials, or seal.
Sec. 366. Security clearances: reports; ombudsman; reciprocity.
Sec. 367. Limitation on use of funds for the transfer or release of
individuals detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba.
Sec. 368. Intelligence community financial improvement and audit
readiness.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 401. Clarification of limitation on colocation of the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the
Transportation Security Oversight Board.
Sec. 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology.
Sec. 404. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center energy
efficiency reports.
Sec. 405. Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence
Community.
Sec. 406. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Sec. 411. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 412. Prohibition on the use of private contractors for
interrogations involving persons in the custody of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 413. Appeals from decisions of Central Intelligence Agency
contracting officers.
Sec. 414. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 415. Protection against reprisals.
Sec. 416. Requirement for video recording of interrogations of persons
in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Subtitle C--Other Elements
Sec. 421. Homeland Security intelligence elements.
Sec. 422. Clarification of inclusion of Drug Enforcement Administration
as an element of the intelligence community.
Sec. 423. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the
National Counterintelligence Executive.
Sec. 424. Confirmation of appointment of heads of certain components of
the intelligence community.
Sec. 425. Associate Director of the National Security Agency for
Compliance and Training.
Sec. 426. General Counsel of the National Security Agency.
Sec. 427. Inspector General of the National Security Agency.
Sec. 428. Charter for the National Reconnaissance Office.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters
Sec. 501. Extension of National Commission for the Review of the
Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence
Community.
Sec. 502. Expansion and clarification of the duties of the program
manager for the information sharing environment.
Sec. 503. Classification review of executive branch materials in the
possession of the congressional intelligence committees.
Sec. 504. Prohibition on use of funds to provide Miranda warnings to
certain persons outside of the United States.
Subtitle B--Technical Amendments
Sec. 511. Technical amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1949.
Sec. 512. Technical amendment to mandatory retirement provision of
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.
Sec. 513. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule.
Sec. 514. Technical amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978.
Sec. 515. Technical amendments to section 105 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
Sec. 516. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004.
Sec. 517. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National
Intelligence Program.
Sec. 518. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 519. Technical amendments to title 10, United States Code.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
(A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate.
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2010
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels.--The amounts
authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to section
103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2010, for
the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements listed in
paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill
H.R. 2701 of the One Hundred Eleventh Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a)
shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and to the President. The President shall provide for
suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of
the Schedule, within the executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Increases.--With the approval of the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess
of the number authorized for fiscal year 2010 by the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the
Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions,
except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of civilian
personnel authorized under such Schedule for such element.
(b) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall notify the congressional intelligence
committees in writing at least 15 days prior to each exercise of an
authority described in subsection (a).
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the
Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2010 the sum of
$672,812,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced
research and development shall remain available until September 30,
2011.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National
Intelligence are authorized 853 full-time or full-time equivalent
personnel as of September 30, 2010. Personnel serving in such elements
may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United
States Government.
(c) Construction of Authorities.--The authorities available to the
Director of National Intelligence under section 103 are also available
to the Director for the adjustment of personnel levels within the
Intelligence Community Management Account.
(d) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts
authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to
be appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal
year 2010 such additional amounts as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section
102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2011.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel
authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence
Community Management Account as of September 30, 2010, there
are authorized such additional personnel for the Community
Management Account as of that date as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section
102(a).
SEC. 105. PROHIBITION ON EARMARKS.
(a) In General.--Nothing in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations, a report of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives or the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate to accompany the bill H.R. 2701 of the One
Hundred Eleventh Congress, a joint statement of the managers
accompanying a conference report on such bill, or the classified annex
to this Act, shall be construed to authorize or require the expenditure
of funds for a congressional earmark.
(b) Congressional Earmark Defined.--In this section, the term
``congressional earmark'' means a provision or report language included
primarily at the request of a Member, Delegate, or Resident
Commissioner of the House of Representatives or a Senator providing,
authorizing, or recommending a specific amount of discretionary budget
authority, credit authority, or other spending authority for a
contract, loan, loan guarantee, grant, loan authority, or other
expenditure with or to an entity, or targeted to a specific State,
locality, or congressional district, other than through a statutory or
administrative formula-driven or competitive award process.
SEC. 106. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of
the United States.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2010 the sum of
$290,900,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Subtitle A--Personnel Matters
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement,
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 302. TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT TO FILL VACANCIES IN PRESIDENTIALLY
APPOINTED AND SENATE CONFIRMED POSITIONS IN THE
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
Section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3) is
amended by--
(1) redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (f); and
(2) inserting after subsection (d) the following new
subsection:
``(e) Temporary Appointment to Fill Vacancies.--Notwithstanding
section 3345 of title 5, United States Code, if an officer of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, other than the
Director of National Intelligence, whose appointment to office is
required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, dies, resigns, or is unable to perform the
functions and duties of the office--
``(1) if during the 365-day period immediately preceding the
date of death, resignation, or beginning of inability to serve
of the applicable officer, the person serving as the first
assistant to the office of such officer served as such first
assistant for not less than 90 days, such first assistant shall
perform the functions and duties of the office temporarily in
an acting capacity subject to the time limitations of section
3346 of title 5, United States Code;
``(2) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the President may direct
a person who serves in an office for which appointment is
required to be made by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to perform the functions and duties
of the vacant office temporarily in an acting capacity subject
to the time limitations of such section 3346; or
``(3) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the Director of National
Intelligence shall recommend to the President, and the
President may direct, a person to perform the functions and
duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting capacity
subject to the time limitations of such section 3346, if--
``(A) during the 365-day period preceding the date of
death, resignation, or beginning of inability to serve
of the applicable officer, such person served in a
position in an element of the intelligence community
for not less than 90 days;
``(B) the rate of pay for the position described
under subparagraph (A) is equal to or greater than the
minimum rate of pay payable for a position at GS-15 of
the General Schedule; and
``(C) in the case of a person who is employed by an
element of the intelligence community--
``(i) the Director of National Intelligence
shall consult with the head of such element;
and
``(ii) if the head of such element objects to
the recommendation, the Director of National
Intelligence may make the recommendation to the
President over the objection of the head of
such element after informing the President of
such objection.''.
SEC. 303. ENHANCED FLEXIBILITY IN NONREIMBURSABLE DETAILS TO ELEMENTS
OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 113 the
following new section:
``detail of other personnel
``Sec. 113A. Except as provided in section 904(g)(2) of the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C. 402c(g)(2)) and
section 113 of this Act, and notwithstanding any other provision of
law, an officer or employee of the United States or member of the Armed
Forces may be detailed to an element of the intelligence community
funded through the Community Management Account from another element of
the United States Government on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable
basis, as jointly agreed to by the Director of National Intelligence
and the head of the detailing element, for a period not to exceed two
years.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section
of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note) is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 113 the following new item:
``Sec. 113A. Detail of other personnel.''.
SEC. 304. PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE DEFENSE CIVILIAN INTELLIGENCE
PERSONNEL SYSTEM.
(a) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
(1) the term ``covered position'' means a defense
intelligence position in the Department of Defense established
under chapter 83 of title 10, United States Code, excluding an
Intelligence Senior Level position designated under section
1607 of such title and any position in the Defense Intelligence
Senior Executive Service;
(2) the term ``DCIPS pay system'', as used with respect to a
covered position, means the provisions of the Defense Civilian
Intelligence Personnel System under which the rate of salary or
basic pay for such position is determined, excluding any
provisions relating to bonuses, awards, or any other amounts
not in the nature of salary or basic pay;
(3) the term ``Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel
System'' means the personnel system established under chapter
83 of title 10, United States Code; and
(4) the term ``appropriate pay system'', as used with respect
to a covered position, means--
(A) the system under which, as of September 30, 2007,
the rate of salary or basic pay for such position was
determined; or
(B) if subparagraph (A) does not apply, the system
under which, as of September 30, 2007, the rate of
salary or basic pay was determined for the positions
within the Department of Defense most similar to the
position involved,
excluding any provisions relating to bonuses, awards, or any
other amounts which are not in the nature of salary or basic
pay.
(b) Requirement That Appointments to Covered Positions After June 16,
2009, Be Subject to the Appropriate Pay System.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law--
(1) the DCIPS pay system--
(A) shall not apply to any individual holding a
covered position who is not subject to such system as
of June 16, 2009; and
(B) shall not apply to any covered position which is
not subject to such system as of June 16, 2009; and
(2) any individual who, after June 16, 2009, is appointed to
a covered position shall accordingly be subject to the
appropriate pay system.
(c) Termination of DCIPS Pay System for Covered Positions and
Conversion of Employees Holding Covered Positions to the Appropriate
Pay System.--
(1) In general.--The Secretary of Defense shall take all
actions which may be necessary to provide, within 12 months
after the date of enactment of this Act, for the termination of
the DCIPS pay system with respect to covered positions and for
the conversion of any employees holding any covered positions
which, as of such date of enactment, remain subject to the
DCIPS pay system, to the appropriate pay system. No employee
shall suffer any loss of or decrease in pay because of the
preceding sentence.
(2) Report.--If the Secretary of Defense is of the view that
the DCIPS pay system should not be terminated with respect to
covered positions, as required by paragraph (1), the Secretary
shall submit to the President and both Houses of Congress as
soon as practicable, but in no event later than 6 months after
the date of the enactment of this Act, a written report setting
forth a statement of the Secretary's views and the reasons
therefor. Such report shall specifically include--
(A) the Secretary's opinion as to whether the DCIPS
pay system should be continued, with or without
changes, with respect to covered positions; and
(B) if, in the opinion of the Secretary, the DCIPS
pay system should be continued with respect to covered
positions, with changes--
(i) a detailed description of the proposed
changes; and
(ii) a description of any administrative
action or legislation which may be necessary.
The requirements of this paragraph shall be carried out by the
Secretary of Defense in conjunction with the Director of the
Office of Personnel Management.
(d) Rule of Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
considered to affect--
(1) the provisions of the Defense Civilian Intelligence
Personnel System governing aspects of compensation apart from
salary or basic pay; or
(2) the application of such provisions with respect to a
covered position or any individual holding a covered position,
including after June 16, 2009.
Subtitle B--Education
SEC. 311. PERMANENT AUTHORIZATION FOR THE PAT ROBERTS INTELLIGENCE
SCHOLARS PROGRAM.
(a) Permanent Authorization.--Subtitle C of title X of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441m et seq.) is amended by adding at
the end the following new section:
``program on recruitment and training of intelligence analysts
``Sec. 1022. (a) Program.--(1) The Director of National Intelligence
shall carry out a program to ensure that selected students or former
students are provided funds to continue academic training, or are
reimbursed for academic training previously obtained, in areas of
specialization that the Director, in consultation with the other heads
of the elements of the intelligence community, identifies as areas in
which the current capabilities of the intelligence community are
deficient or in which future capabilities of the intelligence community
are likely to be deficient.
``(2) A student or former student selected for participation in the
program shall commit to employment with an element of the intelligence
community, following completion of appropriate academic training, under
such terms and conditions as the Director considers appropriate.
``(3) The program shall be known as the Pat Roberts Intelligence
Scholars Program.
``(b) Elements.--In carrying out the program under subsection (a),
the Director shall--
``(1) establish such requirements relating to the academic
training of participants as the Director considers appropriate
to ensure that participants are prepared for employment as
intelligence professionals; and
``(2) periodically review the areas of specialization of the
elements of the intelligence community to determine the areas
in which such elements are, or are likely to be, deficient in
capabilities.
``(c) Use of Funds.--Funds made available for the program under
subsection (a) shall be used to--
``(1) provide a monthly stipend for each month that a student
is pursuing a course of study;
``(2) pay the full tuition of a student or former student for
the completion of such course of study;
``(3) pay for books and materials that the student or former
student requires or required to complete such course of study;
``(4) pay the expenses of the student or former student for
travel requested by an element of the intelligence community in
relation to such program; or
``(5) for such other purposes the Director considers
appropriate to carry out such program.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Table of contents.--The table of contents in the first
section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by section
303 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 1021 the following new item:
``Sec. 1022. Program on recruitment and training of intelligence
analysts.''.
(2) Repeal of pilot program.--Section 318 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 50
U.S.C. 441g note) is repealed.
SEC. 312. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM.
(a) Program.--Subtitle C of title X of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 441m et seq.), as amended by section 311 of this Act,
is further amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``intelligence officer training program
``Sec. 1023. (a) Programs.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence may carry out a grant program in accordance with
subsection (b) to enhance the recruitment and retention of an
ethnically and culturally diverse intelligence community workforce with
capabilities critical to the national security interests of the United
States.
``(2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Director of National
Intelligence shall identify the skills necessary to meet current or
emergent needs of the intelligence community and the educational
disciplines that will provide individuals with such skills.
``(b) Institutional Grant Program.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence may provide grants to institutions of higher education to
support the establishment or continued development of programs of study
in educational disciplines identified under subsection (a)(2).
``(2) A grant provided under paragraph (1) may, with respect to the
educational disciplines identified under subsection (a)(2), be used for
the following purposes:
``(A) Curriculum or program development.
``(B) Faculty development.
``(C) Laboratory equipment or improvements.
``(D) Faculty research.
``(3) An institution of higher education seeking a grant under this
section shall submit an application describing the proposed use of the
grant at such time and in such manner as the Director may require.
``(4) An institution of higher education that receives a grant under
this section shall submit to the Director regular reports regarding the
use of such grant, including--
``(A) a description of the benefits to students who
participate in the course of study funded by such grant;
``(B) a description of the results and accomplishments
related to such course of study; and
``(C) any other information that the Director may require.
``(c) Regulations.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out this
section.
``(d) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Institution of higher education.--The term `institution
of higher education' has the meaning given the term in section
101 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001).
``(2) Director.--The term `Director' means the Director of
National Intelligence.''.
(b) Repeal of Duplicative Provisions.--
(1) In general.--The following provisions of law are
repealed:
(A) Section 319 of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 50 U.S.C. 403
note).
(B) Section 1003 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 441g-2).
(C) Section 922 of the Ronald W. Reagan National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public
Law 108-375; 50 U.S.C. 402 note).
(2) Existing agreements.--Notwithstanding the repeals made by
paragraph (1), nothing in this subsection shall be construed to
amend, modify, or abrogate any agreement, contract, or
employment relationship that was in effect in relation to the
provisions repealed under paragraph (1) on the day prior to the
date of the enactment of this Act.
(c) Conforming Amendments.--The table of contents in the first
section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as
amended by section 311 of this Act, is further amended by--
(1) striking the item relating to section 1003; and
(2) inserting after the item relating to section 1022 the
following new item:
``Sec. 1023. Intelligence officer training program.''.
SEC. 313. MODIFICATIONS TO THE STOKES EDUCATIONAL SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM.
(a) Expansion of Program to Graduate Students.--Section 16 of the
National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) by striking ``undergraduate'' and inserting
``undergraduate and graduate''; and
(B) by striking ``the baccalaureate'' and inserting
``a baccalaureate or graduate''; and
(2) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``undergraduate'' and
inserting ``undergraduate and graduate''.
(b) Termination.--Section 16(d)(1)(C) of such Act is amended by
striking ``terminated either by'' and all that follows and inserting
the following: ``terminated by--
``(i) the Agency due to misconduct by the person;
``(ii) the person voluntarily; or
``(iii) by the Agency for the failure of the person
to maintain such level of academic standing in the
educational course of training as the Director of the
National Security Agency specifies in the agreement
under this paragraph; and''.
(c) Authority to Withhold Disclosure of Affiliation With NSA.--
Section 16(e) of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C.
402 note) is amended by striking ``(1) When an employee'' and all that
follows through ``(2) Agency efforts'' and inserting ``Agency
efforts''.
(d) Other Elements of the Intelligence Community.--
(1) Authorization.--Subtitle C of title X of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 441g et seq.), as amended by
section 312 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the
end the following new section:
``stokes scholarship program
``Sec. 1024. The head of an element of the intelligence community may
establish an undergraduate and graduate training program with respect
to civilian employees of such element in the same manner and under the
same conditions as the Secretary of Defense is authorized to establish
such a program under section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of
1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note).''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by section
312 of this Act, is further amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 1023 the following new item:
``Sec. 1024. Stokes scholarship program.''.
SEC. 314. PILOT PROGRAM FOR INTENSIVE LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION IN AFRICAN
LANGUAGES.
(a) Establishment.--The Director of National Intelligence, in
consultation with the National Security Education Board established
under section 803(a) of the David L. Boren National Security Education
Act of 1991 (50 U.S.C. 1903(a)), may establish a pilot program for
intensive language instruction in African languages.
(b) Program.--A pilot program established under subsection (a) shall
provide scholarships for programs that provide intensive language
instruction--
(1) in any of the five highest priority African languages for
which scholarships are not offered under such Act, as
determined by the Director of National Intelligence; and
(2) both in the United States and in a country in which the
language is the native language of a significant portion of the
population, as determined by the Director of National
Intelligence.
(c) Termination.--A pilot program established in accordance with
subsection (a) shall terminate on the date that is 5 years after the
date on which such pilot program is established.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--
(1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated to
carry out this section $2,000,000.
(2) Availability.--Funds authorized to be appropriated under
paragraph (1) shall remain available until the termination of
the pilot program in accordance with subsection (c).
Subtitle C--Congressional Oversight of Covert Actions
SEC. 321. REPORTING ON COVERT ACTIONS.
(a) General Congressional Oversight.--Section 501(a) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413(a)) is amended by adding at the end
the following new paragraph:
``(3) In carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall provide to
the congressional intelligence committees all information necessary to
assess the lawfulness, effectiveness, cost, benefit, intelligence gain,
budgetary authority, and risk of an intelligence activity, including--
``(A) the legal authority under which the intelligence
activity is being or was conducted;
``(B) any legal issues upon which guidance was sought in
carrying out or planning the intelligence activity, including
dissenting legal views;
``(C) any specific operational concerns arising from the
intelligence activity, including the risk of disclosing
intelligence sources or methods;
``(D) the likelihood that the intelligence activity will
exceed the planned or authorized expenditure of funds or other
resources; and
``(E) the likelihood that the intelligence activity will
fail.''.
(b) Procedures.--Section 501(c) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 413(c)) is
amended by striking ``such procedures'' and inserting ``such written
procedures''.
(c) Intelligence Activities.--Section 502(a)(2) of such Act (50
U.S.C. 413a(a)(2)) is amended by inserting ``(including any information
or material relating to the legal authority under which an intelligence
activity is being or was conducted, and any information or material
relating to legal issues upon which guidance was sought in carrying out
or planning the intelligence activity, including dissenting legal
views)'' after ``concerning intelligence activities''.
(d) Covert Actions.--Section 503 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 413b) is
amended--
(1) in subsection (b)(2), by inserting ``(including any
information or material relating to the legal authority under
which a covert action is being or was conducted, and any
information or material relating to legal issues upon which
guidance was sought in carrying out or planning the covert
action, including dissenting legal views)'' after ``concerning
covert actions'';
(2) in subsection (c)--
(A) by striking paragraph (2) and inserting the
following new paragraph:
``(2) If, pursuant to the procedures established by each of the
congressional intelligence committees under section 501(c), one of the
congressional intelligence committees determines that not all members
of that committee are required to have access to a finding under this
subsection, the President may limit access to such finding or such
notice as provided in such procedures.''; and
(B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``is limited to the
Members of Congress specified in paragraph (2)'' and
inserting ``is not provided to all members of one of
the congressional intelligence committees in accordance
with paragraph (2)'';
(3) in subsection (d)--
(A) by striking ``(d) The President'' and inserting
``(d)(1) The President'';
(B) in paragraph (1), as designated by subparagraph
(A) of this paragraph, by striking ``specified in'' and
inserting ``informed in accordance with''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) For purposes of this subsection, an activity shall constitute a
`significant undertaking' if the activity--
``(A) involves the potential for loss of life;
``(B) requires an expansion of existing authorities,
including authorities relating to research, development, or
operations;
``(C) results in the expenditure of significant funds or
other resources;
``(D) requires notification under section 504;
``(E) gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing
intelligence sources or methods; or
``(F) could cause serious damage to the diplomatic relations
of the United States if such activity were disclosed without
authorization.''; and
(4) by adding at the end the following new subsections:
``(g)(1) A Member of Congress to which a finding is reported under
subsection (c) or notice is provided under subsection (d)(1) may submit
to the Director of National Intelligence an objection to any part of
such finding or such notice. Not later than 48 hours after such an
objection is submitted to the Director of National Intelligence, the
Director shall report such objection in writing to the President and
such Member of Congress.
``(2) In any case where access to a finding reported under subsection
(c) or notice provided under subsection (d)(1) is not made available to
all members of a congressional intelligence committee in accordance
with subsection (c)(2), the President shall provide such members with
general information on the content of the finding or notice.
``(3) The President shall--
``(A) maintain a record of the Members of Congress to which a
finding is reported under subsection (c) or notice is provided
under subsection (d)(1) and the date on which each Member of
Congress receives such finding or notice; and
``(B) not later than 30 days after the date on which such
finding is reported or such notice is provided, provide such
record to--
``(i) in the case of a finding reported or notice
provided to a Member of the House of Representatives,
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives; and
``(ii) in the case of a finding reported or notice
provided to a Member of the Senate, the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
``(h) Any requirement under section 501, 502, or this section to
provide information to the congressional intelligence committees shall
be construed to require the submission of such information to all
members of such committees, unless such information is specifically
authorized not to be submitted to all members of one of such committees
in accordance with subsection (c)(2).''.
Subtitle D--Reports and Other Congressional Oversight
SEC. 331. REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST ASSETS.
Section 118 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404m) is
amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``semiannual'' and inserting
``annual'';
(2) in subsection (a)--
(A) in the heading, by striking ``Semiannual'' and
inserting ``Annual'';
(B) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
(i) by striking ``semiannual basis'' and
inserting ``annual basis''; and
(ii) by striking ``preceding six-month
period'' and inserting ``preceding one-year
period'';
(C) by striking paragraph (2); and
(D) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as
paragraphs (2) and (3), respectively; and
(3) in subsection (d)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``the Committee on
Armed Services,'' after ``the Committee on
Appropriations,''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``the Committee on
Armed Services,'' after ``the Committee on
Appropriations,''.
SEC. 332. ANNUAL PERSONNEL LEVEL ASSESSMENTS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.)
is amended by inserting after section 507 the following new section:
``annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence community
``Sec. 508. (a) Assessment.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall, in consultation with the head of each element of the
intelligence community, prepare an annual personnel level assessment
for such element that assesses the personnel levels of such element for
the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the assessment is
submitted.
``(b) Schedule.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted to the congressional intelligence committees each year along
with the budget submitted by the President in accordance with section
1105 of title 31, United States Code.
``(c) Contents.--Each assessment required by subsection (a) shall
include, for the element of the intelligence community concerned, the
following information:
``(1) The budget submission for personnel costs of such
element for the upcoming fiscal year.
``(2) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of such
costs as compared to the personnel costs of the current fiscal
year.
``(3) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of such
costs as compared to the personnel costs during the preceding
five fiscal years.
``(4) The number of personnel positions requested for such
element for the upcoming fiscal year.
``(5) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of
such number as compared to the number of personnel positions of
such element of the current fiscal year.
``(6) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of
such number as compared to the number of personnel positions of
such element during the preceding five fiscal years.
``(7) The best estimate of the number and costs of
contractors to be funded by such element for the upcoming
fiscal year.
``(8) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of
such costs of contractors as compared to the best estimate of
the costs of contractors to be funded by such element during
the current fiscal year.
``(9) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease of
such costs of contractors as compared to the cost of
contractors, and the number of contractors, of such element
during the preceding five fiscal years.
``(10) A written justification for the requested personnel
and contractor levels.
``(11) The number of intelligence collectors and analysts
employed or contracted by such element.
``(12) A list of all contractors that have been the subject
of an investigation completed by the inspector general of such
element during the preceding fiscal year, or are or have been
the subject of an investigation by such inspector general
during the current fiscal year.
``(13) A statement by the Director of National Intelligence
of whether, based on current and projected funding, such
element will have sufficient--
``(A) internal infrastructure to support the
requested personnel and contractor levels;
``(B) training resources to support the requested
personnel levels; and
``(C) funding to support the administrative and
operational activities of the requested personnel
levels.''.
SEC. 333. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS OF IRAN,
SYRIA, AND NORTH KOREA.
(a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 332, is further amended by
adding at the end the following new section:
``semiannual reports on the nuclear weapons programs of iran, syria,
and north korea
``Sec. 509. (a) Requirement for Reports.--Not less frequently than
every 180 days, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to
the appropriate congressional committees a report on the intentions and
capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab Republic,
and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with regard to the
nuclear weapons programs of each such country.
``(b) Content.--Each report submitted under subsection (a) shall
include, with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab
Republic, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea--
``(1) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs of each
country;
``(2) an evaluation of the sources upon which the
intelligence used to prepare the assessment referred to in
paragraph (1) is based, including the number of such sources
and an assessment of the reliability of each source;
``(3) a summary of any intelligence related to any program
gathered or developed since the previous report was submitted
under subsection (a), including intelligence collected from
both open and clandestine sources for each country; and
``(4) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in
knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence in
the assessment referred to in paragraph (1).
``(c) National Intelligence Estimate.--The Director of National
Intelligence may submit a National Intelligence Estimate on the
intentions and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian
Arab Republic, or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in lieu of
a report required by subsection (a) for that country.
``(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this section,
the term `appropriate congressional committees' means--
``(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
``(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
``(3) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate.''.
(b) Applicability Date.--The first report required to be submitted
under section 509 of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by
subsection (a), shall be submitted not later than 120 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 334. ANNUAL REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.),
as amended by section 333 of this Act, is further amended by adding at
the end the following new section:
``report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community
``Sec. 510. Each year on the date provided in section 507, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the
House of Representatives and the Senate a report on the proficiency in
foreign languages and, as appropriate, in foreign dialects, of each
element of the intelligence community, including--
``(1) the number of positions authorized for such element
that require foreign language proficiency and the level of
proficiency required;
``(2) an estimate of the number of such positions that each
element will require during the five-year period beginning on
the date of the submission of the report;
``(3) the number of positions authorized for such element
that require foreign language proficiency that are filled by--
``(A) military personnel; and
``(B) civilian personnel;
``(4) the number of applicants for positions in such element
in the previous fiscal year that indicated foreign language
proficiency, including the foreign language indicated and the
proficiency level;
``(5) the number of persons hired by such element with
foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language
and proficiency level;
``(6) the number of personnel of such element currently
attending foreign language training, including the provider of
such training;
``(7) a description of the efforts of such element to
recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel that are proficient
in a foreign language;
``(8) an assessment of methods and models for basic,
advanced, and intensive foreign language training;
``(9) for each foreign language and, as appropriate, dialect
of a foreign language--
``(A) the number of positions of such element that
require proficiency in the foreign language or dialect;
``(B) the number of personnel of such element that
are serving in a position that requires proficiency in
the foreign language or dialect to perform the primary
duty of the position;
``(C) the number of personnel of such element that
are serving in a position that does not require
proficiency in the foreign language or dialect to
perform the primary duty of the position;
``(D) the number of personnel of such element rated
at each level of proficiency of the Interagency
Language Roundtable;
``(E) whether the number of personnel at each level
of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable
meets the requirements of such element;
``(F) the number of personnel serving or hired to
serve as linguists for such element that are not
qualified as linguists under the standards of the
Interagency Language Roundtable;
``(G) the number of personnel hired to serve as
linguists for such element during the preceding
calendar year;
``(H) the number of personnel serving as linguists
that discontinued serving such element during the
preceding calendar year;
``(I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic
skills that is fulfilled by an ally of the United
States; and
``(J) the percentage of work requiring linguistic
skills that is fulfilled by contractors;
``(10) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and
capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole;
``(11) recommendations for eliminating required reports
relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of
National Intelligence considers outdated or no longer relevant;
and
``(12) an assessment of the feasibility of employing foreign
nationals lawfully present in the United States who have
previously worked as translators or interpreters for the Armed
Forces or another department or agency of the Federal
Government in Iraq or Afghanistan to meet the critical language
needs of such element.''.
SEC. 335. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE AUDITS AND INVESTIGATIONS.
Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.),
as amended by section 334 of this Act, is further amended by adding at
the end the following new section:
``government accountability office analyses, evaluations, and
investigations
``Sec. 511. (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b),
the Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that personnel of
the Government Accountability Office designated by the Comptroller
General are provided with access to all information in the possession
of an element of the intelligence community that the Comptroller
General determines is necessary for such personnel to conduct an
analysis, evaluation, or investigation of a program or activity of an
element of the intelligence community that is requested by one of the
congressional intelligence committees.
``(b) Exception.--(1)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the Director of
National Intelligence may restrict access to information referred to in
subsection (a) by personnel designated in such subsection if the
Director determines that the restriction is necessary to protect vital
national security interests of the United States.
``(B) The Director of National Intelligence may not restrict access
under subparagraph (A) solely on the basis of the level of
classification or compartmentation of information that the personnel
designated in subsection (a) may seek access to while conducting an
analysis, evaluation, or investigation.
``(2) If the Director exercises the authority under paragraph (1),
the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees
an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise
of such authority within 7 days.
``(3) The Director shall notify the Comptroller General at the time a
report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the extent consistent
with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the
Comptroller General with a copy of such report.
``(4) The Comptroller General shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the
Comptroller General has notice under paragraph (3) that the Comptroller
General considers appropriate.''.
SEC. 336. CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH OVERSIGHT REQUIREMENTS.
(a) In General.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 335 of this Act, is further
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``certification of compliance with oversight requirements
``Sec. 512. The head of each element of the intelligence community
shall semiannually submit to the congressional intelligence
committees--
``(1) a certification that, to the best of the knowledge of
the head of such element--
``(A) the head of such element of the intelligence
community is in full compliance with the requirements
of this title; and
``(B) any information required to be submitted by
such head of such element under this Act before the
date of the submission of such certification has been
properly submitted; or
``(2) if such head of such element is unable to submit a
certification under paragraph (1), a statement--
``(A) of the reasons such head of such element is not
able to submit such a certification;
``(B) describing any information required to be
submitted by such head of such element under this Act
before the date of the submission of such statement
that has not been properly submitted; and
``(C) that the head of such element will submit such
information as soon as possible after the submission of
such statement.''.
(b) Applicability Date.--The first certification or statement
required to be submitted by the head of each element of the
intelligence community under section 512 of the National Security Act
of 1947, as added by subsection (a) of this section, shall be submitted
not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 337. REPORTS ON FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE.
(a) In General.--Section 809(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1995 (50 U.S.C. app. 2170b(b)) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``Annual'' and inserting
``Biannual'';
(2) by striking paragraph (1) and inserting the following new
paragraph:
``(1) Submission to congress.--The President shall biannually
submit to the congressional intelligence committees, the
Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives
and the Senate, and congressional leadership a report updating
the information referred to in subsection (a)(1)(D).'';
(3) by striking paragraph (2); and
(4) by redesignating paragraph (3) as paragraph (2).
(b) Initial Report.--The first report required under section
809(b)(1) of such Act, as amended by subsection (a)(2) of this section,
shall be submitted not later than February 1, 2010.
SEC. 338. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS.
(a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than November 1, 2010, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees and the Committees on Armed Services of the
House of Representatives and the Senate a report describing the use of
personal services contracts across the intelligence community, the
impact of the use of such contracts on the intelligence community
workforce, plans for conversion of contractor employment into Federal
Government employment, and the accountability mechanisms that govern
the performance of such personal services contracts.
(b) Content.--
(1) In general.--The report submitted under subsection (a)
shall include--
(A) a description of any relevant regulations or
guidance issued by the Director of National
Intelligence or the head of an element of the
intelligence community relating to minimum standards
required regarding the hiring, training, security
clearance, and assignment of contract personnel and how
those standards may differ from those for Federal
Government employees performing substantially similar
functions;
(B) an identification of contracts where the
contractor is performing substantially similar
functions to a Federal Government employee;
(C) an assessment of costs incurred or savings
achieved by awarding contracts for the performance of
such functions referred to in subparagraph (B) instead
of using full-time employees of the elements of the
intelligence community to perform such functions;
(D) an assessment of the appropriateness of using
contractors to perform the activities described in
paragraph (2);
(E) an estimate of the number of contracts, and the
number of personnel working under such contracts,
related to the performance of activities described in
paragraph (2);
(F) a comparison of the compensation of contract
employees and Federal Government employees performing
substantially similar functions;
(G) an analysis of the attrition of Federal
Government personnel for contractor positions that
provide substantially similar functions;
(H) a description of positions that will be converted
from contractor employment to Federal Government
employment;
(I) an analysis of the oversight and accountability
mechanisms applicable to personal services contracts
awarded for intelligence activities by each element of
the intelligence community during fiscal years 2008 and
2009;
(J) an analysis of procedures in use in the
intelligence community for conducting oversight of
contractors to ensure identification and prosecution of
criminal violations, financial waste, fraud, or other
abuses committed by contractors or contract personnel;
and
(K) an identification of best practices for oversight
and accountability mechanisms applicable to personal
services contracts.
(2) Activities.--Activities described in this paragraph are
the following:
(A) Intelligence collection.
(B) Intelligence analysis.
(C) Covert actions, including rendition, detention,
and interrogation activities.
SEC. 339. REPORT ON TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF
THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report
describing the Director's long-term vision for transforming the
intelligence capabilities of the Bureau and the progress of the
internal reforms of the Bureau intended to achieve that vision. Such
report shall include--
(1) the direction, strategy, and goals for transforming the
intelligence capabilities of the Bureau;
(2) a description of what the fully functional intelligence
and national security functions of the Bureau should entail;
(3) a candid assessment of the effect of internal reforms at
the Bureau and whether such reforms have moved the Bureau
towards achieving the goals of the Director for the
intelligence and national security functions of the Bureau; and
(4) an assessment of how well the Bureau performs tasks that
are critical to the effective functioning of the Bureau as an
intelligence agency, including--
(A) identifying new intelligence targets within the
scope of the national security functions of the Bureau,
outside the parameters of an existing case file or
ongoing investigation;
(B) collecting intelligence domestically, including
collection through human and technical sources;
(C) recruiting human sources;
(D) training Special Agents to spot, assess, recruit,
and handle human sources;
(E) working collaboratively with other Federal
departments and agencies to jointly collect
intelligence on domestic counterterrorism and
counterintelligence targets;
(F) producing a common intelligence picture of
domestic threats to the national security of the United
States;
(G) producing high quality and timely intelligence
analysis;
(H) integrating intelligence analysts into its
intelligence collection operations; and
(I) sharing intelligence information with
intelligence community partners.
SEC. 340. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES DEDICATED TO IRAQ AND
AFGHANISTAN.
Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense
shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and
the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and
the Senate a report on intelligence collection and analysis resources
(1) dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal years 2008 and
2009, and (2) planned to be dedicated during fiscal year 2010. Such
report shall include detailed information on fiscal, human, technical,
and other intelligence collection and analysis resources.
SEC. 341. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS.
(a) Report.--Not later than February 1, 2011, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of
Representatives, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a
report assessing the threat to national security presented by the
efforts of foreign countries to acquire, through espionage, diversion,
or other means, sensitive equipment and technology, and the degree to
which United States export controls (including the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations) are adequate to defeat such efforts.
(b) Form.--The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(c) International Traffic in Arms Regulations Defined.--The term
``International Traffic in Arms Regulations'' means those regulations
contained in parts 120 through 130 of title 22, Code of Federal
Regulations (or successor regulations).
SEC. 342. REPORT ON NUCLEAR TRAFFICKING.
(a) Report.--Not later than February 1, 2010, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on
Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a
report on the illicit trade of nuclear and radiological material and
equipment.
(b) Contents.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall
include, for a period of time including at least the preceding three
years--
(1) details of all known or suspected cases of the illicit
sale, transfer, brokering, or transport of--
(A) nuclear or radiological material;
(B) equipment useful for the production of nuclear or
radiological material; or
(C) nuclear explosive devices;
(2) an assessment of the countries that represent the
greatest risk of nuclear trafficking activities; and
(3) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in knowledge,
or other information that would reduce confidence in the
assessment referred to in paragraph (2).
(c) Form.--The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in
classified form, but shall include an unclassified summary.
SEC. 343. STUDY ON REVOKING PENSIONS OF PERSONS WHO COMMIT UNAUTHORIZED
DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
(a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct a
study on the feasibility of revoking the pensions of personnel of the
intelligence community who commit unauthorized disclosures of
classified information, including whether revoking such pensions is
feasible under existing law or under the administrative authority of
the Director of National Intelligence or any other head of an element
of the intelligence community.
(b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report containing the results
of the study conducted under subsection (a).
SEC. 344. STUDY ON ELECTRONIC WASTE DESTRUCTION PRACTICES OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Study.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall
conduct a study on the electronic waste destruction practices of the
intelligence community. Such study shall assess--
(1) the security of the electronic waste disposal practices
of the intelligence community, including the potential for
counterintelligence exploitation of destroyed, discarded, or
recycled materials;
(2) the environmental impact of such disposal practices; and
(3) methods to improve the security and environmental impact
of such disposal practices, including steps to prevent the
forensic exploitation of electronic waste.
(b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing
the results of the study conducted under subsection (a).
SEC. 345. REPORT ON RETIREMENT BENEFITS FOR FORMER EMPLOYEES OF AIR
AMERICA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to Congress a report on the advisability of providing Federal
retirement benefits to United States citizens for the service of such
citizens prior to 1977 as employees of Air America or an associated
company during a period when Air America or the associated company was
owned or controlled by the United States Government and operated or
managed by the Central Intelligence Agency.
(b) Report Elements.--The report required by subsection (a) shall
include the following:
(1) The history of Air America and the associated companies
prior to 1977, including a description of--
(A) the relationship between Air America and the
associated companies and the Central Intelligence
Agency or any other element of the United States
Government;
(B) the workforce of Air America and the associated
companies;
(C) the missions performed by Air America, the
associated companies, and their employees for the
United States; and
(D) the casualties suffered by employees of Air
America and the associated companies in the course of
their employment.
(2) A description of--
(A) the retirement benefits contracted for or
promised to the employees of Air America and the
associated companies prior to 1977;
(B) the contributions made by such employees for such
benefits;
(C) the retirement benefits actually paid such
employees;
(D) the entitlement of such employees to the payment
of future retirement benefits; and
(E) the likelihood that such employees will receive
any future retirement benefits.
(3) An assessment of the difference between--
(A) the retirement benefits that former employees of
Air America and the associated companies have received
or will receive by virtue of their employment with Air
America and the associated companies; and
(B) the retirement benefits that such employees would
have received or be eligible to receive if such
employment was deemed to be employment by the United
States Government and their service during such
employment was credited as Federal service for the
purpose of Federal retirement benefits.
(4) Any recommendations regarding the advisability of
legislative action to treat such employment as Federal service
for the purpose of Federal retirement benefits in light of the
relationship between Air America and the associated companies
and the United States Government and the services and
sacrifices of such employees to and for the United States.
(5) If legislative action is considered advisable under
paragraph (4), a proposal for such action and an assessment of
its costs.
(6) The opinions of the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, if any, on any matters covered by the report that the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency considers
appropriate.
(c) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Air america.--The term ``Air America'' means Air America,
Incorporated.
(2) Associated company.--The term ``associated company''
means any entity associated with, predecessor to, or subsidiary
to Air America, including Air Asia Company Limited, CAT
Incorporated, Civil Air Transport Company Limited, and the
Pacific Division of Southern Air Transport, during the period
when such an entity was owned and controlled by the United
States Government.
SEC. 346. STUDY ON COLLEGE TUITION PROGRAMS FOR EMPLOYEES OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall conduct a
study on the feasability of--
(1) providing matching funds for contributions to college
savings programs made by employees of elements of the
intelligence community; and
(2) establishing a program to pay the college tuition of each
child of an employee of an element of the intelligence
community that has died in the performance of the official
duties of such employee.
(b) Report.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to
Congress a report containing the results of the study conducted under
subsection (a).
(c) College Savings Program Defined.--In this section, the term
``college savings program'' means--
(1) a qualified tuition program, as defined in section 529 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986;
(2) a Coverdell education savings account, as defined in
section 530 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986; and
(3) any other appropriate program providing tax incentives
for saving funds to pay for college tuition, as determined by
the Director of National Intelligence.
SEC. 347. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN
VULNERABILITIES.
(a) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to
Congress a National Intelligence Estimate or National Intelligence
Assessment on the global supply chain to determine whether such supply
chain poses a risk to defense and intelligence systems due to
counterfeit components that may be defective or deliberately
manipulated by a foreign government or a criminal organization.
(b) Review of Mitigation.--
(1) NCIX review.--The National Counterintelligence Executive
shall conduct a review of the adequacy of the mechanisms to
identify and mitigate vulnerabilities in the global supply
chain that pose a risk to defense and intelligence systems due
to counterfeit components that may be defective or deliberately
manipulated by a foreign government or a criminal organization.
(2) Submission.--Not later than one year after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the National Counterintelligence
Executive shall submit to Congress a report containing the
results of the review conducted under paragraph (1).
SEC. 348. REVIEW OF RECORDS RELATING TO POTENTIAL HEALTH RISKS AMONG
DESERT STORM VETERANS.
(a) Review.--The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall
conduct a classification review of the records of the Agency that are
relevant to the known or potential health effects suffered by veterans
of Operation Desert Storm as described in the November, 2008, report by
the Department of Veterans Affairs Research Advisory Committee on Gulf
War Veterans Illnesses.
(b) Report.--Not later than one year after the date of the enactment
of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall
submit to Congress the results of the classification review conducted
under subsection (a), including the total number of records of the
Agency that are relevant.
(c) Form.--The report required under subsection (b) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 349. REVIEW OF PENSIONS OF EMPLOYEES AFFECTED BY ``FIVE AND OUT''
PROGRAM OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be
used to implement the program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
requiring the mandatory reassignment of a supervisor of the Bureau
after such supervisor serves in a management position for seven years
(commonly known as the ``seven and out'' program) until the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation submits to the congressional
intelligence committees a certification that the Director has completed
a review of issues related to the pensions of former employees of the
Bureau affected by a previous program of mandatory reassignment after
serving in a management position for five years (commonly known as the
``five and out'' program) and the effect of such program on the Bureau
and the results of such review.
SEC. 350. SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO TERRORIST RECIDIVISM OF
DETAINEES HELD AT UNITED STATES NAVAL STATION,
GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an
unclassified summary of--
(1) intelligence relating to recidivism of detainees
currently or formerly held at United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense; and
(2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will
engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist
organizations.
SEC. 351. SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE ON UIGHUR DETAINEES HELD AT UNITED
STATES NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, shall make publicly available an
unclassified summary of--
(1) intelligence relating to threats posed by Uighur
detainees currently or formerly held at United States Naval
Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the Department of Defense;
and
(2) an assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will
engage in terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist
organizations.
SEC. 352. REPORT ON INTERROGATION RESEARCH AND TRAINING.
(a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than December 31, 2009, the
Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of
the relevant elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report
on the state of research, analysis, and training in interrogation and
debriefing practices.
(b) Content.--The report required under subsection (a) shall
include--
(1) an assessment of--
(A) the quality and value of scientific and technical
research in interrogation and debriefing practices that
has been conducted independently or in affiliation with
the Federal Government and the identification of areas
in which additional research could potentially improve
interrogation practices;
(B) the state of interrogation and debriefing
training in the intelligence community, including the
character and adequacy of the ethical component of such
training, and the identification of any gaps in
training;
(C) the adequacy of efforts to enhance career path
options for intelligence community personnel that serve
as interrogators and debriefers, including efforts to
recruit and retain career personnel; and
(D) the effectiveness of existing processes for
studying and implementing lessons learned and best
practices of interrogation and debriefing; and
(2) any recommendations that the Director considers
appropriate for improving the performance of the intelligence
community with respect to the issues described in subparagraphs
(A) through (D) of paragraph (1).
SEC. 353. REPORT ON PLANS TO INCREASE DIVERSITY WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
(a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than November 1, 2010, the
Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the heads of
the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the plans of each
element to increase diversity within the intelligence community.
(b) Content.--The report required by subsection (a) shall include
specific implementation plans to increase diversity within each element
of the intelligence community, including--
(1) specific implementation plans for each such element
designed to achieve the goals articulated in the strategic plan
of the Director of National Intelligence on equal employment
opportunity and diversity;
(2) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to
increase recruiting and hiring of diverse candidates;
(3) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to
improve retention of diverse Federal employees at the junior,
midgrade, senior, and management levels;
(4) a description of specific diversity awareness training
and education programs for senior officials and managers of
each such element; and
(5) a description of performance metrics to measure the
success of carrying out the plans, initiatives, and programs
described in paragraphs (1) through (4).
SEC. 354. REVIEW OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION EXERCISE OF
ENFORCEMENT JURISDICTION IN FOREIGN NATIONS.
Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall submit to the
appropriate committees of Congress a review of constraints under
international law and the laws of foreign nations to the assertion of
enforcement jurisdiction with respect to criminal investigations of
terrorism offenses under the laws of the United States conducted by
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in foreign nations and
using funds made available for the National Intelligence Program,
including constraints identified in section 432 of the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.
SEC. 355. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Annual Report on Intelligence.--Section 109 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404d) is repealed.
(b) Annual Certification on Counterintelligence Initiatives.--Section
1102(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442a(b)) is
amended--
(1) by striking ``(1) The Director'' and inserting ``The
Director'' ; and
(2) by striking paragraph (2).
(c) Report and Certification Under Terrorist Identification
Classification System.--Section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 404n-2) is amended--
(1) by striking subsection (d); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), and (h) as
subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g), respectively.
(d) Annual Report on Counterdrug Intelligence Matters.--Section 826
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law
107-306; 116 Stat. 2429; 21 U.S.C. 873 note) is repealed.
SEC. 356. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence
committees that is included in the classified annex to this Act is
hereby incorporated into this Act and is hereby made a requirement in
law.
SEC. 357. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.
(a) Report Submission Dates.--Section 507 of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in paragraph (1)--
(i) by striking subparagraphs (A) and (G);
(ii) by redesignating subparagraphs (B), (C),
(D), (E), (F), (H), (I), and (N) as
subparagraphs (A), (B), (C), (D), (E), (F),
(G), and (H), respectively; and
(iii) by adding at the end the following new
subparagraphs:
``(I) The annual report on financial intelligence on
terrorist assets required by section 118.
``(J) The annual report on foreign language proficiency in
the intelligence community required by section 510.''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking subparagraph (D);
and
(2) in subsection (b), by striking paragraph (6).
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first section of
such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by section 313 of this Act,
is further amended by--
(1) striking the item relating to section 109; and
(2) inserting after the item relating to section 507 the
following new items:
``Sec. 508. Annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence
community.
``Sec. 509. Semiannual reports on the nuclear weapons programs of Iran,
Syria, and North Korea.
``Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence
community.
``Sec. 511. Government Accountability Office analyses, evaluations, and
investigations.
``Sec. 512. Certification of compliance with oversight requirements.''.
Subtitle E--Other Matters
SEC. 361. MODIFICATION OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR DIFFERENT
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
Subparagraph (B) of section 504(a)(3) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) is amended to read as follows:
``(B) the use of such funds for such activity
supports an emergent need, improves program
effectiveness, or increases efficiency; and''.
SEC. 362. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION.
(a) Increase in Penalties for Disclosure of Undercover Intelligence
Officers and Agents.--
(1) Disclosure after access to information identifying
agent.--Subsection (a) of section 601 of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended by striking ``ten
years'' and inserting ``15 years''.
(2) Disclosure after access to classified information.--
Subsection (b) of such section is amended by striking ``five
years'' and inserting ``10 years''.
(b) Modifications to Annual Report on Protection of Intelligence
Identities.--The first sentence of section 603(a) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) is amended by inserting
``including an assessment of the need for any modification of this
title for the purpose of improving legal protections for covert
agents,'' after ``measures to protect the identities of covert
agents,''.
SEC. 363. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO DELETE INFORMATION ABOUT RECEIPT
AND DISPOSITION OF FOREIGN GIFTS AND DECORATIONS.
Paragraph (4) of section 7342(f) of title 5, United States Code, is
amended to read as follows:
``(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of the
intelligence community, the head of such element may delete the
information described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (2) or in
subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (3) if the head of such element
certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of
such information could adversely affect United States intelligence
sources or methods.
``(B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of State pursuant
to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted to the
Director of National Intelligence who shall keep a record of such
information.
``(C) In this paragraph, the term `intelligence community' has the
meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).''.
SEC. 364. EXEMPTION OF DISSEMINATION OF TERRORIST IDENTITY INFORMATION
FROM FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.
Section 119 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. Section
404o) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(k) Exemption of Dissemination of Terrorist Identity Information
From Freedom of Information Act.--(1) Terrorist identity information
disseminated for terrorist screening purposes or other authorized
counterterrorism purposes shall be exempt from disclosure under section
552 of title 5, United States Code.
``(2) In this section:
``(A) Authorized counterterrorism purpose.--The term
`authorized counterterrorism purpose' includes disclosure to
and appropriate use by an element of the Federal Government of
terrorist identifiers of persons reasonably suspected to be
terrorists or supporters of terrorists.
``(B) Terrorist identity information.--The term `terrorist
identity information' means--
``(i) information from a database maintained by any
element of the Federal Government that would reveal
whether an individual has or has not been determined to
be a known or suspected terrorist or has or has not
been determined to be within the networks of contacts
and support of a known or suspected terrorist; and
``(ii) information related to a determination as to
whether or not an individual is or should be included
in the Terrorist Screening Database or other screening
databases based on a determination that the individual
is a known or suspected terrorist.
``(C) Terrorist identifiers.--The term `terrorist
identifiers'--
``(i) includes--
``(I) names and aliases;
``(II) dates or places of birth;
``(III) unique identifying numbers or
information;
``(IV) physical identifiers or biometrics;
and
``(V) any other identifying information
provided for watchlisting purposes; and
``(ii) does not include derogatory information or
information that would reveal or compromise
intelligence or law enforcement sources or methods.''.
SEC. 365. MISUSE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND OFFICE OF THE
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE NAME, INITIALS,
OR SEAL.
(a) Intelligence Community.--Title XI of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 442 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``misuse of the intelligence community name, initials, or seal
``Sec. 1103. (a) Prohibited Acts.--No person may, except with the
written permission of the Director of National Intelligence or a
designee of the Director, knowingly use the words `intelligence
community', the initials `IC', the seal of the intelligence community,
or any colorable imitation of such words, initials, or seal in
connection with any merchandise, impersonation, solicitation, or
commercial activity in a manner reasonably calculated to convey the
impression that such use is approved, endorsed, or authorized by the
Director of National Intelligence, except that employees of the
intelligence community may use the intelligence community name,
initials, and seal in accordance with regulations promulgated by the
Director of National Intelligence.
``(b) Injunction.--Whenever it appears to the Attorney General that
any person is engaged or is about to engage in an act or practice which
constitutes or will constitute conduct prohibited by subsection (a),
the Attorney General may initiate a civil proceeding in a district
court of the United States to enjoin such act or practice. Such court
shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination
of such action and may, at any time before final determination, enter
such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other action as
is warranted, to prevent injury to the United States or to any person
or class of persons for whose protection the action is brought.''.
(b) Office of the Director of National Intelligence.--Title XI of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 442 et seq.), as amended by
subsection (a) of this section, is further amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
``misuse of the office of the director of national intelligence name,
initials, or seal
``Sec. 1104. (a) Prohibited Acts.--No person may, except with the
written permission of the Director of National Intelligence or a
designee of the Director, knowingly use the words `Office of the
Director of National Intelligence', the initials `ODNI', the seal of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, or any colorable
imitation of such words, initials, or seal in connection with any
merchandise, impersonation, solicitation, or commercial activity in a
manner reasonably calculated to convey the impression that such use is
approved, endorsed, or authorized by the Director of National
Intelligence.
``(b) Injunction.--Whenever it appears to the Attorney General that
any person is engaged or is about to engage in an act or practice which
constitutes or will constitute conduct prohibited by subsection (a),
the Attorney General may initiate a civil proceeding in a district
court of the United States to enjoin such act or practice. Such court
shall proceed as soon as practicable to the hearing and determination
of such action and may, at any time before final determination, enter
such restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other action as
is warranted, to prevent injury to the United States or to any person
or class of persons for whose protection the action is brought.''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section
of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by section 357 of this
Act, is further amended by adding at the end the following new items:
``Sec. 1103. Misuse of the intelligence community name, initials, or
seal.
``Sec. 1104. Misuse of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence name, initials, or seal.''.
SEC. 366. SECURITY CLEARANCES: REPORTS; OMBUDSMAN; RECIPROCITY.
(a) Reports Relating to Security Clearances.--
(1) Quadrennial audit; security clearance determinations.--
(A) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section
336 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the
end the following new section:
``reports on security clearances
``Sec. 513. (a) Quadrennial Audit of Position Requirements.--(1) The
President shall every four years conduct an audit of how the executive
branch determines whether a security clearance is required for a
particular position in the Federal Government.
``(2) Not later than 30 days after the completion of an audit
conducted under paragraph (1), the President shall submit to Congress
the results of such audit.
``(b) Report on Security Clearance Determinations.--(1) Not later
than February 1 of each year, the President shall submit to Congress a
report on the security clearance process. Such report shall include,
for each security clearance level--
``(A) the number of Federal Government employees who--
``(i) held a security clearance at such level as of
October 1 of the preceding year; and
``(ii) were approved for a security clearance at such
level during the preceding fiscal year;
``(B) the number of contractors to the Federal Government
who--
``(i) held a security clearance at such level as of
October 1 of the preceding year; and
``(ii) were approved for a security clearance at such
level during the preceding fiscal year; and
``(C) for each element of the intelligence community--
``(i) the amount of time it took to process the
fastest 80 percent of security clearance determinations
for such level;
``(ii) the amount of time it took to process the
fastest 90 percent of security clearance determinations
for such level;
``(iii) the number of open security clearance
investigations for such level that have remained open
for--
``(I) 4 months or less;
``(II) between 4 months and 8 months;
``(III) between 8 months and 12 months; and
``(IV) more than a year;
``(iv) the percentage of reviews during the preceding
fiscal year that resulted in a denial or revocation of
a security clearance;
``(v) the percentage of investigations during the
preceding fiscal year that resulted in incomplete
information;
``(vi) the percentage of investigations during the
preceding fiscal year that did not result in enough
information to make a decision on potentially adverse
information; and
``(vii) for security clearance determinations
completed or ongoing during the preceding fiscal year
that have taken longer than one year to complete--
``(I) the number of security clearance
determinations for positions as employees of
the Federal Government that required more than
one year to complete;
``(II) the number of security clearance
determinations for contractors that required
more than one year to complete;
``(III) the agencies that investigated and
adjudicated such determinations; and
``(IV) the cause of significant delays in
such determinations.
``(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the Director of National
Intelligence may consider--
``(A) security clearances at the level of confidential and
secret as one security clearance level; and
``(B) security clearances at the level of top secret or
higher as one security clearance level.''.
(B) Initial audit.--The first audit required to be
conducted under section 513(a)(1) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (as added by paragraph (1)) shall
be completed not later than February 1, 2010.
(C) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the
first section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as
amended by section 365 of this Act, is further amended
by inserting after the item relating to section 512 the
following new item:
``Sec. 513. Reports on security clearances.''.
(2) Report on metrics for adjudication quality.--Not later
than 180 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the
President shall submit to Congress a report on security
clearance investigations and adjudications. Such report shall
include--
(A) Federal Government wide adjudication guidelines
and metrics for adjudication quality;
(B) a plan to improve the professional development of
security clearance adjudicators;
(C) metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of
interagency clearance reciprocity;
(D) Federal Government wide investigation standards
and metrics for investigation quality; and
(E) the feasibility, counterintelligence risk, and
cost effectiveness of--
(i) by not later than January 1, 2012,
requiring the investigation and adjudication of
security clearances to be conducted by not more
than two Federal agencies; and
(ii) by not later than January 1, 2015,
requiring the investigation and adjudication of
security clearances to be conducted by not more
than one Federal agency.
(b) Ombudsman for Intelligence Community Security Clearances.--
(1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 303 of this Act,
is further amended by inserting after section 103G the
following new section:
``ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances
``Sec. 103H. (a) Appointment.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall appoint an ombudsman for intelligence community security
clearances.
``(b) Provision of Information.--The head of an element of the
intelligence community shall provide a person applying for a security
clearance through or in coordination with such element with contact
information for the ombudsman appointed under subsection (a).
``(c) Report.--Not later than November 1 of each year, the ombudsman
appointed under subsection (a) shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report containing--
``(1) the number of persons applying for a security clearance
who have contacted the ombudsman during the preceding 12
months; and
``(2) a summary of the concerns, complaints, and questions
received by the ombudsman from persons applying for security
clearances.''.
(2) Appointment date.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall appoint an ombudsman for intelligence community security
clearances under section 103H(a) of the National Security Act
of 1947, as added by paragraph (1), not later than 120 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(3) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of such Act (50 U.S.C. 401 note), as amended by
subsection (a)(1)(C) of this section, is further amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 103G the following
new item:
``Sec. 103H. Ombudsman for intelligence community security
clearances.''.
(c) Security Clearance Reciprocity.--
(1) Audit.--The Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall conduct an audit of the reciprocity of security
clearances in the intelligence community.
(2) Report.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report containing the results of the
audit conducted under paragraph (1). Such report shall include
an assessment of the time required to obtain a reciprocal
security clearance for--
(A) an employee of an element of the intelligence
community detailed to another element of the
intelligence community;
(B) an employee of an element of the intelligence
community seeking permanent employment with another
element of the intelligence community; and
(C) a contractor seeking permanent employment with an
element of the intelligence community.
SEC. 367. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR THE TRANSFER OR RELEASE OF
INDIVIDUALS DETAINED AT UNITED STATES NAVAL
STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA.
(a) In General.--The Director of National Intelligence may not use
any of the amounts authorized to be appropriated in this Act for fiscal
year 2010 or any subsequent fiscal year to release or transfer any
individual described in subsection (d) to the United States, its
territories, or possessions, until 120 days after the President has
submitted to the congressional defense committees the plan described in
subsection (b).
(b) Plan Required.--The President shall submit to Congress a plan on
the disposition of each individual described in subsection (d). Such
plan shall include--
(1) an assessment of the risk that the individual described
in subsection (d) poses to the national security of the United
States, its territories, or possessions;
(2) a proposal for the disposition for each such individual;
(3) a plan to mitigate any risks described in paragraph (1)
should the proposed disposition required by paragraph (2)
include the release or transfer to the United States, its
territories, or possessions of any such individual; and
(4) a summary of the consultation required in subsection (c).
(c) Consultation Required.--The President shall consult with the
chief executive of the State, the District of Columbia, or the
territory or possession of the United States to which the disposition
in subsection (b) includes a release or transfer to that State,
District of Columbia, or territory or possession.
(d) Detainees Described.--An individual described in this subsection
is any individual who is located at United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as of the date of the enactment of this Act,
who--
(1) is not a citizen of the United States; and
(2) is--
(A) in the custody or under the effective control of
the Department of Defense, or
(B) otherwise under detention at the United States
Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
SEC. 368. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY FINANCIAL IMPROVEMENT AND AUDIT
READINESS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is no longer excusable to allow poor business systems,
a deficiency of resources, or a lack of commitment from senior
leadership of the intelligence community to foster waste or
nonaccountability to the United States taxpayer;
(2) the Director of National Intelligence has not made
compliance with financial management and audit readiness
standards a top priority; and
(3) the Director of National Intelligence should require each
element of the intelligence community to develop and implement
a specific plan to become compliant with the law.
(b) Review; Plan.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall--
(1) conduct a review of the status of the auditability
compliance of each element of the intelligence community; and
(2) develop a plan and timeline to achieve a full,
unqualified audit of each element of the intelligence community
not later than September 30, 2013.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON COLOCATION OF THE OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
Section 103 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3),
as amended by section 302(1) of this Act, is further amended--
(1) in subsection (f) (as so redesignated)--
(A) in the heading, by striking ``With'' and
inserting ``of Headquarters With Headquarters of'';
(B) by striking ``Commencing as of October 1, 2008,
the'' and inserting ``(1) Except as provided in
paragraph (2), the'';
(C) in paragraph (1), as designated by paragraph (2)
of this section, by inserting ``the headquarters of''
before ``the Office'';
(D) in paragraph (1) (as so designated), by striking
``any other element'' and inserting ``the headquarters
of any other element''; and
(E) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) The President may waive the limitation in paragraph (1) if the
President determines that--
``(A) a waiver is in the interests of national security; or
``(B) the costs of a headquarters of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence that is separate from the
headquarters of the other elements of the intelligence
community outweighs the potential benefits of the
separation.''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(g) Location of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.--The headquarters of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence may be located in the Washington metropolitan
region (as defined in section 8301 of title 40, United States Code).''.
SEC. 402. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD.
Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the
Director's designee.''.
SEC. 403. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.
Section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3e)
is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)--
(A) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (7);
(B) in paragraph (4), by striking ``; and'' and
inserting ``;''; and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following
new paragraphs:
``(5) assist the Director of National Intelligence in
establishing goals for basic, applied, and advanced research to
meet the technology needs of the intelligence community;
``(6) submit to the congressional intelligence committees an
annual report on the science and technology strategy of the
Director that shows resources mapped to the goals of the
intelligence community; and''; and
(2) in subsection (d)(3)--
(A) in subparagraph (A)--
(i) by inserting ``and prioritize'' after
``coordinate''; and
(ii) by striking ``; and'' and inserting
``;'';
(B) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph
(C); and
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following
new subparagraph:
``(B) identify basic, advanced, and applied research
programs to be executed by elements of the intelligence
community; and''.
SEC. 404. PLAN TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DATA CENTER ENERGY
EFFICIENCY REPORTS.
(a) Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence shall develop a plan
to implement the recommendations of the report submitted to Congress
under section 1 of the Act entitled ``An Act to study and promote the
use of energy efficient computer servers in the United States'' (Public
Law 109-431; 120 Stat. 2920) across the intelligence community.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report containing the plan developed under
subsection (a).
(2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
SEC. 405. TITLE OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
Section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g)
is amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
(2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
(3) in subsection (c) in the matter preceding paragraph (1),
by inserting ``of the Intelligence Community'' after ``Chief
Information Officer''; and
(4) in subsection (d), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''.
SEC. 406. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Establishment.--
(1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.), as amended by section 366 of this Act,
is further amended by inserting after section 103H (as added by
such section 366) the following new section:
``inspector general of the intelligence community
``Sec. 103I. (a) Office of Inspector General of Intelligence
Community.--There is within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence an Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community.
``(b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community is to--
``(1) be an independent and objective office appropriately
accountable to Congress and to initiate and conduct
investigations, inspections, and audits on matters within the
responsibility and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence;
``(2) recommend policies designed--
``(A) to promote economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in the administration and implementation
of matters within the responsibility and authority of
the Director of National Intelligence; and
``(B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such
matters;
``(3) provide a means for keeping the Director of National
Intelligence fully and currently informed about--
``(A) problems and deficiencies relating to matters
within the responsibility and authority of the Director
of National Intelligence; and
``(B) the necessity for, and the progress of,
corrective actions; and
``(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure that
the congressional intelligence committees are kept informed
of--
``(A) significant problems and deficiencies relating
to matters within the responsibility and authority of
the Director of National Intelligence; and
``(B) the necessity for, and the progress of,
corrective actions.
``(c) Inspector General of Intelligence Community.--(1) There is an
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, who shall be the head
of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community,
who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.
``(2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as Inspector
General shall be made--
``(A) without regard to political affiliation;
``(B) on the basis of integrity, compliance with the security
standards of the intelligence community, and prior experience
in the field of intelligence or national security;
``(C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in accounting,
financial analysis, law, management analysis, public
administration, or auditing; and
``(D) on the basis of expertise in investigations.
``(3) The Inspector General shall report directly to the Director of
National Intelligence.
``(4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by the
President. The President shall communicate in writing to the
congressional intelligence committees the reasons for the removal of
any individual from the position of Inspector General not later than 30
days before the date on which the Inspector General is removed from
office.
``(d) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to subsections (g) and
(h), the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall--
``(1) provide policy direction for, and plan, conduct,
supervise, and coordinate independently, the investigations,
inspections, and audits relating to matters within the
responsibility and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence to ensure they are conducted efficiently and in
accordance with applicable law and regulations;
``(2) keep the Director of National Intelligence and Congress
fully and currently informed concerning violations of law and
regulations, violations of civil liberties and privacy, fraud
and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies that may
occur in matters within the responsibility and authority of the
Director, and report the progress made in implementing
corrective action;
``(3) take due regard for the protection of intelligence
sources and methods in the preparation of all reports issued by
the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with the
purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures as
may be appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence
sources and methods described in such reports; and
``(4) in the execution of the duties and responsibilities
under this section, comply with generally accepted Federal
Government auditing standards.
``(e) Limitations on Activities.--(1)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B),
the Director of National Intelligence may prohibit the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community from initiating, carrying out, or
completing any investigation, inspection, or audit if the Director
determines that such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national
security interests of the United States.
``(B) The Director of National Intelligence may not prohibit an
investigation, inspection, or audit under subparagraph (A) solely on
the basis of the level of classification or compartmentation of
information that the Inspector General may seek access to while
conducting such investigation, inspection, or audit.
``(2) If the Director exercises the authority under paragraph (1),
the Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees
an appropriately classified statement of the reasons for the exercise
of such authority within 7 days.
``(3) The Director shall notify the Inspector General at the time a
report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the extent consistent
with the protection of intelligence sources and methods, provide the
Inspector General with a copy of such report.
``(4) The Inspector General shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the Inspector
General has notice under paragraph (3) that the Inspector General
considers appropriate.
``(f) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall have direct and prompt access to the Director of
National Intelligence when necessary for any purpose pertaining to the
performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any employee, or
any employee of a contractor, of any element of the intelligence
community whose testimony is needed for the performance of the duties
of the Inspector General.
``(B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all records,
reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations, or other
material which relate to the programs and operations with respect to
which the Inspector General has responsibilities under this section.
``(C) The Director or, on the recommendation of the Director, another
appropriate official of the intelligence community, shall take
appropriate administrative action against an employee, or employee of a
contractor, of an element of the intelligence community that fails to
cooperate with the Inspector General. Such administrative action may
include loss of employment or termination of an existing contractual
relationship.
``(3) The Inspector General shall, in accordance with subsection (g),
receive and investigate complaints or information from any person
concerning the existence of an activity within the authorities and
responsibilities of the Director of National Intelligence constituting
a violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross
waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific
danger to the public health and safety. Once such complaint or
information has been received from an employee of the Federal
Government--
``(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the identity
of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless the
Inspector General determines that such disclosure is
unavoidable during the course of the investigation or the
disclosure is made to an official of the Department of Justice
responsible for determining whether a prosecution should be
undertaken; and
``(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of
reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any
employee, unless the complaint was made or the information was
disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with willful
disregard for its truth or falsity.
``(4) The Inspector General shall administer to or take from any
person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, whenever necessary in the
performance of the duties of the Inspector General, which oath,
affirmation, or affidavit when administered or taken by or before an
employee of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community designated by the Inspector General shall have the same force
and effect as if administered or taken by, or before, an officer having
a seal.
``(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector
General may require by subpoena the production of all information,
documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers, and other data
and documentary evidence necessary in the performance of the duties and
responsibilities of the Inspector General.
``(B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other elements of the
United States Government, the Inspector General shall obtain
information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts, papers,
and other data and evidence for the purpose specified in subparagraph
(A) using procedures other than by subpoenas.
``(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for, or on
behalf of, any element of the intelligence community, including the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
``(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued
under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable by order of any
appropriate district court of the United States.
``(6) The Inspector General may obtain services as authorized under
section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at rates for individuals
not to exceed the daily equivalent of the maximum annual rate of basic
pay payable for grade GS-15 of the General Schedule under section 5332
of title 5, United States Code.
``(7) The Inspector may, to the extent and in such amounts as may be
provided in advance by appropriations Acts, enter into contracts and
other arrangements for audits, studies, analyses, and other services
with public agencies and with private persons, and to make such
payments as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
section.
``(g) Coordination Among the Inspectors General of the Intelligence
Community.--(1)(A) If a matter within the jurisdiction of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community that may be subject to an
investigation, inspection, review, or audit by both the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community and an inspector general with
oversight responsibility for an element of the intelligence community,
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and such other
inspector general shall expeditiously resolve the question of which
inspector general shall conduct such investigation, inspection, review,
or audit to avoid unnecessary duplication of the activities of the
inspectors general.
``(B) In attempting to resolve a question under subparagraph (A), the
inspectors general concerned may request the assistance of the
Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum established under
subparagraph (C). If a dispute between an inspector general within an
agency or department of the United States Government and the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community has not been resolved with the
assistance of the Forum, the inspectors general shall submit the
question to the Director of National Intelligence and the head of the
affected agency or department for resolution.
``(C) There is established the Intelligence Community Inspectors
General Forum which shall consist of all statutory or administrative
inspectors general with oversight responsibility for an element of the
intelligence community. The Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall serve as the chair of the Forum. The Forum shall have
no administrative authority over any inspector general, but shall serve
as a mechanism for informing its members of the work of individual
members of the Forum that may be of common interest and discussing
questions about jurisdiction or access to employees, employees of a
contractor, records, audits, reviews, documents, recommendations, or
other materials that may involve or be of assistance to more than one
of its members.
``(2) The inspector general conducting an investigation, inspection,
review, or audit referred to in paragraph (1) shall submit the results
of such investigation, inspection, review, or audit to any other
inspector general, including the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community, with jurisdiction to conduct such investigation, inspection,
review, or audit who did not conduct such investigation, inspection,
review, or audit.
``(h) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence shall provide the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community with appropriate and adequate office space at central and
field office locations and with such equipment, office supplies,
maintenance services, and communications facilities and services as may
be necessary for the operation of such offices.
``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall select, appoint, and employ such
officers and employees as may be necessary to carry out the functions,
powers, and duties of the Inspector General. The Inspector General
shall ensure that any officer or employee selected, appointed, or
employed has a security clearance appropriate for the assigned duties
of such officer or employee.
``(B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the Inspector
General shall ensure that such officers and employees have the
requisite training and experience to enable the Inspector General to
carry out the duties of the Inspector General effectively.
``(C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the Inspector
General shall recommend policies to the Director of National
Intelligence to create within the intelligence community a career cadre
of sufficient size to provide appropriate continuity and objectivity
needed for the effective performance of the duties of the Inspector
General.
``(3)(A) The Inspector General may, in consultation with the
Director, request such information or assistance as may be necessary
for carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector
General from any department, agency, or other element of the United
States Government.
``(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or
assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the department, agency,
or element concerned shall furnish to the Inspector General, or to an
authorized designee, such information or assistance.
``(C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community may, upon
reasonable notice to the head of any element of the intelligence
community and in coordination with the inspector general of that
element pursuant to subsection (g), conduct an inspection, review, or
audit of such element and may enter into any place occupied by such
element for purposes of the performance of the duties of the Inspector
General.
``(i) Reports.--(1)(A) Not later than January 31 and July 31 of each
year, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall prepare
and submit to the Director of National Intelligence a report
summarizing the activities of the Office of the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community during the preceding six-month period. The
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall provide any
portion of the report involving a component of a department of the
United States Government to the head of that department simultaneously
with submission of the report to the Director of National Intelligence.
``(B) Each report under this paragraph shall include the following:
``(i) A list of the titles or subjects of each investigation,
inspection, review, or audit conducted during the period
covered by such report, including a summary of the progress of
each particular investigation, inspection, or audit since the
preceding report of the Inspector General under this paragraph.
``(ii) A description of significant problems, abuses, and
deficiencies relating to the administration and implementation
of programs and operations of the intelligence community, and
in the relationships between elements of the intelligence
community, identified by the Inspector General during the
period covered by such report.
``(iii) A description of the recommendations for disciplinary
action made by the Inspector General during the period covered
by such report with respect to significant problems, abuses, or
deficiencies described in clause (ii).
``(iv) A statement of whether or not corrective or
disciplinary action has been completed on each significant
recommendation described in previous semiannual reports, and,
in a case where corrective action has been completed, a
description of such corrective action.
``(v) A certification of whether or not the Inspector General
has had full and direct access to all information relevant to
the performance of the functions of the Inspector General.
``(vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena
authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector General
during the period covered by such report.
``(vii) Any recommendations that the Inspector General
considers appropriate for legislation to promote economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration and
implementation of matters within the responsibility and
authority of the Director of National Intelligence, and to
detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such matters.
``(C) Not later than 30 days after the date of receipt of a report
under subparagraph (A), the Director shall submit the report to the
congressional intelligence committees together with any comments the
Director considers appropriate.
``(D) Each report submitted under subparagraphs (A) and (C) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
``(2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the
Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of particularly
serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies relating to
matters within the responsibility and authority of the Director of
National Intelligence.
``(B) The Director shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees each report under subparagraph (A) within 7 days of the
receipt of such report, together with such comments as the Director
considers appropriate. The Director shall submit to the committees of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives with jurisdiction over a
department of the United States Government any portion of each report
under subparagraph (A) that involves a problem, abuse, or deficiency
related to a component of such department simultaneously with
transmission of the report to the congressional intelligence
committees.
``(3) The Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit a
report to the congressional intelligence committees on an
investigation, inspection, review, or audit if--
``(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any
significant differences with the Director affecting the
execution of the duties or responsibilities of the Inspector
General;
``(B) the investigation, inspection, review, or audit carried
out by the Inspector General focuses on any current or former
intelligence community official who--
``(i) holds or held a position in an element of the
intelligence community that is subject to appointment
by the President, whether or not by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, including such a position
held on an acting basis;
``(ii) holds or held a position in an element of the
intelligence community, including a position held on an
acting basis, that is appointed by the Director of
National Intelligence; or
``(iii) holds or held a position as head of an
element of the intelligence community or a position
covered by subsection (b) or (c) of section 106;
``(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector General to
the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by a
current or former official described in subparagraph (B);
``(D) the Inspector General receives notice from the
Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of
possible criminal conduct of any current or former official
described in subparagraph (B); or
``(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all possible
alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary
information in the course of such investigation, inspection,
review, or audit.
``(4)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence community, an
employee assigned or detailed to an element of the intelligence
community, or an employee of a contractor of the intelligence community
who intends to report to Congress a complaint or information with
respect to an urgent concern may report such complaint or information
to the Inspector General.
``(B) Not later than the end of the 14-day period beginning on the
date of receipt from an employee of a complaint or information under
subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall determine whether the
complaint or information appears credible. Upon making such a
determination, the Inspector General shall submit to the Director a
notice of that determination, together with the complaint or
information.
``(C) Upon receipt of a submittal from the Inspector General under
subparagraph (B), the Director shall, not later than 7 days after such
receipt, forward such transmittal to the congressional intelligence
committees, together with any comments the Director considers
appropriate.
``(D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible under
subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted under
subparagraph (A), or does not submit the complaint or information to
the Director in accurate form under subparagraph (B), the employee
(subject to clause (ii)) may submit the complaint or information to
Congress by contacting either or both of the congressional intelligence
committees directly.
``(ii) An employee may contact the congressional intelligence
committees directly as described in clause (i) only if the employee--
``(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the
Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the
employee's complaint or information and notice of the
employee's intent to contact the congressional intelligence
committees directly; and
``(II) obtains and follows from the Director, through the
Inspector General, direction on how to contact the intelligence
committees in accordance with appropriate security practices.
``(iii) A member or employee of one of the congressional intelligence
committees who receives a complaint or information under clause (ii)
does so in that member or employee's official capacity as a member or
employee of such committee.
``(E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who reports a
complaint or information to the Inspector General under this paragraph
of each action taken under this paragraph with respect to the complaint
or information. Such notice shall be provided not later than 3 days
after any such action is taken.
``(F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector General under
this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial review.
``(G) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to limit the
protections afforded an employee of or contractor to the Central
Intelligence Agency under section 17(e)(3) of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(e)(3)).
``(H) In this paragraph, the term `urgent concern' means any of the
following:
``(i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of law
or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the funding,
administration, or operation of an intelligence activity
involving classified information, but does not include
differences of opinions concerning public policy matters.
``(ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful
withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact
relating to the funding, administration, or operation of an
intelligence activity.
``(iii) An action, including a personnel action described in
section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code,
constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under
subsection (f)(3)(B) of this section.
``(5) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United States Code,
the Inspector General shall report to the Attorney General any
information, allegation, or complaint received by the Inspector General
relating to violations of Federal criminal law that involves a program
or operation of an element of the intelligence community, or in the
relationships between the elements of the intelligence community,
consistent with such guidelines as may be issued by the Attorney
General pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section. A copy of each
such report shall be furnished to the Director.
``(j) Separate Budget Account.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall, in accordance with procedures to be issued by the Director in
consultation with the congressional intelligence committees, include in
the National Intelligence Program budget a separate account for the
Office of Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
``(k) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of Intelligence
Community.--Except as resolved pursuant to subsection (g), the
performance by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community of
any duty, responsibility, or function regarding an element of the
intelligence community shall not be construed to modify or affect the
duties and responsibilities of any other inspector general having
duties and responsibilities relating to such element.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401
note), as amended by section 366 of this Act, is further
amended by inserting after the item relating to section 103H
the following new item:
``Sec. 103I. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''.
(b) Repeal of Superseded Authority To Establish Position.--Section 8K
of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is repealed.
(c) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
``Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.''.
(d) Applicability Date; Transition.--
(1) Applicability.--The amendment made by subsection (b)
shall apply on the earlier of--
(A) the date of the appointment by the President and
confirmation by the Senate of an individual to serve as
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community; or
(B) the date of the cessation of the performance of
the duties of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community by the individual serving as the Inspector
General of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence as of the date of the enactment of this
Act.
(2) Transition.--The individual serving as the Inspector
General of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
as of the date of the enactment of this Act shall perform the
duties of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
until the individual appointed to the position of Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community assumes the duties of
such position.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
SEC. 411. REVIEW OF COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS BY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) In General.--Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 413b), as amended by section 321 of this Act, is further
amended--
(1) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (i) and
transferring such subsection to the end; and
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new
subsection:
``(e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.--
``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Inspector
General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct an
audit of each covert action at least every 3 years. Such audits
shall be conducted subject to the provisions of paragraphs (3)
and (4) of subsection (b) of section 17 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q).
``(2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector General
of the Central Intelligence Agency is not required to conduct
an audit under paragraph (1) of a covert action that has been
terminated or suspended if such covert action was terminated or
suspended prior to the last audit of such covert action
conducted by the Inspector General and has not been restarted
after the date on which such audit was completed.
``(3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the completion of
an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph (1), the Inspector
General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report containing the
results of such audit.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 501(f) (50 U.S.C. 413(f)), by striking
``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(i)'';
(2) in section 502(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 413b(a)(1)), by striking
``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(i)''; and
(3) in section 504(c) (50 U.S.C. 414(c)), by striking
``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(i)''.
SEC. 412. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS FOR
INTERROGATIONS INVOLVING PERSONS IN THE CUSTODY OF
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.)
is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``prohibition on the use of private contractors for interrogations
involving persons in the custody of the central intelligence agency
``Sec. 24. (a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall not expend
or obligate funds for payment to any contractor to conduct the
interrogation of a detainee or prisoner in the custody of the Central
Intelligence Agency.
``(b) Exception.--
``(1) In general.--The Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency may request, and the Director of National Intelligence
may grant, a written waiver of the requirement under subsection
(a) if the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
determines that--
``(A) no employee of the Federal Government is--
``(i) capable of performing such
interrogation; and
``(ii) available to perform such
interrogation; and
``(B) such interrogation is in the national interest
of the United States and requires the use of a
contractor.
``(2) Clarification of applicability of certain laws.--Any
contractor conducting an interrogation pursuant to a waiver
under paragraph (1) shall be subject to all laws on the conduct
of interrogations that would apply if an employee of the
Federal Government were conducting the interrogation.''.
SEC. 413. APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CONTRACTING OFFICERS.
Section 8(d) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 (41 U.S.C. 607(d))
is amended by inserting before the sentence beginning with ``In
exercising'' the following new sentence: ``Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, an appeal from a decision of a contracting officer of
the Central Intelligence Agency relative to a contract made by that
agency may be filed with whichever of the Armed Services Board or the
Civilian Board is specified by the contracting officer as the Board to
which such an appeal may be made and the Board so specified shall have
jurisdiction to decide that appeal.''.
SEC. 414. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Establishment and Duties of Deputy Director of CIA.--Title I of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by
inserting after section 104A the following new section:
``deputy director of the central intelligence agency
``Sec. 104B. (a) Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--
There is a Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who shall
be appointed by the President.
``(b) Duties.--The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
shall--
``(1) assist the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency; and
``(2) during the absence or disability of the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, or during a vacancy in the
position of Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, act
for and exercise the powers of the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--
(1) Executive schedule iii.--Section 5314 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by striking ``Deputy Directors of
Central Intelligence (2)'' and inserting ``Deputy Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency''.
(2) Table of contents.--The table of contents in the first
section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401
note) is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 104A the following new item:
``Sec. 104B. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
(c) Applicability.--The amendments made by this section shall apply
on the earlier of--
(1) the date of the appointment by the President of an
individual to serve as Deputy Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, except that the individual
administratively performing the duties of the Deputy Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency as of the date of the
enactment of this Act may continue to perform such duties until
the individual appointed to the position of Deputy Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency assumes the duties of such
position; or
(2) the date of the cessation of the performance of the
duties of the Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency by the individual administratively performing such
duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 415. PROTECTION AGAINST REPRISALS.
Section 17(e)(3)(B) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
(50 U.S.C. 403q(e)(3)(B)) is amended by inserting ``or providing such
information'' after ``making such complaint''.
SEC. 416. REQUIREMENT FOR VIDEO RECORDING OF INTERROGATIONS OF PERSONS
IN THE CUSTODY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) In General.--The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 403a et seq.), as amended by section 412 of this Act, is further
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
``requirement for video recording of interrogations of persons in the
custody of the central intelligence agency
``Sec. 25. (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b),
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall establish
guidelines to ensure that each interrogation of a person who is in the
custody of the Central Intelligence Agency is recorded in video form
and that the video recording of such interrogation is maintained--
``(1) for not less than 10 years from the date on which such
recording is made; and
``(2) until such time as such recording is no longer relevant
to an ongoing or anticipated legal proceeding or investigation
or required to be maintained under any other provision of law.
``(b) Exception.--The requirement to record an interrogation in video
form under subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to an
interrogation incident to arrest conducted by Agency personnel
designated by the Director under section 15(a) that are assigned to the
headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency and acting in the
official capacity of such personnel.
``(c) Interrogation Defined.--In this section, the term
`interrogation' means the systematic process of attempting to obtain
information from an uncooperative detainee.''.
(b) Submission of Guidelines.--Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees the
guidelines developed under section 25(a) of the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949, as added by subsection (a) of this section. Such
guidelines shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a
classified annex.
Subtitle C--Other Elements
SEC. 421. HOMELAND SECURITY INTELLIGENCE ELEMENTS.
Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))
is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (H), by inserting ``the Coast Guard,''
after ``the Marine Corps,''; and
(2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``The elements'' and all
that follows through ``the Coast Guard'' and inserting ``The
Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of
Homeland Security''.
SEC. 422. CLARIFICATION OF INCLUSION OF DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION
AS AN ELEMENT OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 3(4)(H) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
401a(4)(H)), as amended by section 421 of this Act, is further amended
by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement Administration,'' after ``the
Federal Bureau of Investigation,''.
SEC. 423. REPEAL OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE
NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.
(a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law
107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended--
(1) by striking subsections (d), (h), (i), and (j); and
(2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (k), (l), and
(m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i),
respectively; and
(3) in subsection (f), as redesignated by paragraph (2) of
this subsection, by striking paragraphs (3) and (4).
(b) Conforming Amendments.--Such section 904 is further amended--
(1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2)
of this section--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (f)''
and inserting ``subsection (e)''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (f)''
and inserting ``subsection (e)''; and
(2) in subsection (e), as so redesignated--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection
(e)(1)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(1)''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection
(e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''.
SEC. 424. CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENT OF HEADS OF CERTAIN COMPONENTS OF
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Director of National Security Agency.--The National Security
Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by inserting after
the first section the following new section:
``Sec. 2. (a) There is a Director of the National Security Agency.
``(b) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be appointed
by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
``(c) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be the head
of the National Security Agency and shall discharge such functions and
duties as are provided by this Act or otherwise by law.''.
(b) Director of National Reconnaissance Office.--The Director of the
National Reconnaissance Office shall be appointed by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--Section 106(b)(2) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-6(b)(2)) is amended--
(1) by striking subparagraphs (A) and (B);
(2) by redesignating subparagraphs (C) through (I) as
subparagraphs (A) through (G), respectively; and
(3) by moving subparagraph (G), as redesignated by paragraph
(2) of this subsection, two ems to the left.
(d) Effective Date and Applicability.--The amendment made by
subsection (a) and the provisions of subsection (b) shall apply upon
the earlier of--
(1) the date of the nomination by the President of an
individual to serve in the position concerned, except that the
individual serving in such position as of the date of the
enactment of this Act may continue to perform such duties after
such date of nomination and until the individual appointed to
such position, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, assumes the duties of such position; or
(2) the date of the cessation of the performance of the
duties of such position by the individual performing such
duties as of the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 425. ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY FOR
COMPLIANCE AND TRAINING.
The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note), as
amended by section 424 of this Act, is further amended by inserting
after section 2 (as added by such section 424) the following new
section:
``Sec. 3. (a) There is an Associate Director of the National Security
Agency for Compliance and Training, who shall be appointed by the
Director of the National Security Agency.
``(b) The Associate Director of the National Security Agency for
Compliance and Training shall ensure that--
``(1) all programs and activities of the National Security
Agency are conducted in a manner consistent with all applicable
laws, regulations, and policies; and
``(2) the training of relevant personnel is sufficient to
ensure that such programs and activities are conducted in such
a manner.''.
SEC. 426. GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.
(a) General Counsel.--The National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50
U.S.C. 402 note), as amended by section 425 of this Act, is further
amended by inserting after section 3 (as added by such section 425),
the following new section:
``Sec. 4. (a) There is a General Counsel of the National Security
Agency, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate.
``(b) The General Counsel of the National Security Agency shall serve
as the chief legal officer of the National Security Agency.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall take
effect on the date that is 180 days after the date on which the
Director of the National Security Agency is appointed by the President
and confirmed by the Senate in accordance with section 2 of the
National Security Agency Act of 1959, as added by section 424 of this
Act.
SEC. 427. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY.
Section 12 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by inserting ``the National Security
Agency;'' after ``the Federal Emergency Management Agency,'';
and
(2) in paragraph (2), by inserting ``the National Security
Agency,'' after ``the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration,''.
SEC. 428. CHARTER FOR THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act,
the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense
shall jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and
the congressional defense committees (as defined in section 101(a)(16)
of title 10, United States Code) a revised charter for the National
Reconnaissance Office (in this section referred to as the ``NRO'') .
The charter shall include the following:
(1) The organizational and governance structure of the NRO.
(2) NRO participation in the development and generation of
requirements and acquisition.
(3) The scope of NRO capabilities.
(4) The roles and responsibilities of the NRO and the
relationship of the NRO to other elements of the intelligence
community and the defense community.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters
SEC. 501. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED
STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Extension.--
(1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 1007 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law
107-306; 116 Stat. 2442) is amended by striking ``September 1,
2004'' and inserting ``February 1, 2011''.
(2) Effective date.--Subject to paragraph (3), the amendment
made by paragraph (1) shall take effect as if included in the
enactment of such section 1007.
(3) Commission membership.--
(A) In general.--The membership of the National
Commission for the Review of the Research and
Development Programs of the United States Intelligence
Community established under subsection (a) of section
1002 of such Act (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2438)
(referred to in this section as the ``Commission'')
shall be considered vacant and new members shall be
appointed in accordance with such section 1002, as
amended by subparagraph (B).
(B) Technical amendment.--Paragraph (1) of section
1002(b) of such Act is amended by striking ``The Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence for Community
Management.'' and inserting ``The Principal Deputy
Director of National Intelligence.''.
(4) Clarification of duties.--Section 1002(i) of such Act is
amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking
``including--'' and inserting ``including advanced research and
development programs and activities. Such review shall
include--''.
(b) Funding.--
(1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated
by this Act for the Intelligence Community Management Account,
the Director of National Intelligence shall make $2,000,000
available to the Commission to carry out title X of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law
107-306; 116 Stat. 2437).
(2) Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission
pursuant to paragraph (1) shall remain available until
expended.
SEC. 502. EXPANSION AND CLARIFICATION OF THE DUTIES OF THE PROGRAM
MANAGER FOR THE INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT.
Section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 (6 U.S.C. 485) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in paragraph (3), by striking ``terrorism and
homeland security information'' and inserting
``national security information'';
(B) by redesignating paragraphs (4), (5), and (6) as
paragraphs (5), (6), and (7), respectively; and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following
new paragraph:
``(4) National security information.--The term `national
security information' includes homeland security information
and terrorism information.'';
(2) in subsection (b)--
(A) in paragraph (1)(A), by striking ``terrorism
information'' and inserting ``national security
information''; and
(B) in paragraph (2) in the first sentence of the
matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking
``terrorism information'' and inserting ``national
security information''; and
(3) in subsection (f)(1)--
(A) in the second sentence, by inserting ``in the
Executive Office of the President and shall serve''
after ``The individual designated as the program
manager shall serve''; and
(B) in the third sentence, by striking ``homeland
security information, terrorism information, and
weapons of mass destruction information'' and inserting
``national security information''.
SEC. 503. CLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH MATERIALS IN THE
POSSESSION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COMMITTEES.
The Director of National Intelligence shall, in accordance with
procedures established by each of the congressional intelligence
committees, conduct a classification review of materials in the
possession of each of those committees that--
(1) are not less than 25 years old; and
(2) were created, or provided to that committee, by the
executive branch.
SEC. 504. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO PROVIDE MIRANDA WARNINGS TO
CERTAIN PERSONS OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES.
None of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be
used to provide the warnings of constitutional rights described in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.436 (U.S. 1966), to a person located
outside of the United States who is not a United States person and is--
(1) suspected of terrorism, associated with terrorists, or
believed to have knowledge of terrorists; or
(2) a detainee in the custody of the Armed Forces of the
United States.
Subtitle B--Technical Amendments
SEC. 511. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT
OF 1949.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403a et seq.)
is amended--
(1) in section 5(a)(1), by striking ``authorized under
paragraphs (2) and (3)'' and all that follows through ``(50
U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and
405)'' and inserting ``authorized under section 104A of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a)''; and
(2) in section 17(d)(3)(B)--
(A) in clause (i), by striking ``advise'' and
inserting ``advice''; and
(B) in clause (ii)--
(i) in subclause (I), by striking ``Executive
Director'' and inserting ``Associate Deputy
Director'';
(ii) in subclause (II), by striking ``Deputy
Director for Operations'' and inserting
``Director of the National Clandestine
Service'';
(iii) in subclause (III), by striking
``Deputy Director for Intelligence'' and
inserting ``Director of Intelligence'';
(iv) in subclause (IV), by striking ``Deputy
Director for Administration'' and inserting
``Director of Support''; and
(v) in subclause (V), by striking ``Deputy
Director for Science and Technology'' and
inserting ``Director of Science and
Technology''.
SEC. 512. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT PROVISION OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT.
Section 235(b)(1)(A) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement
Act (50 U.S.C. 2055(b)(1)(A)) is amended to read as follows:
``(A) Upon reaching age 65, in the case of a
participant in the system who is at the Senior
Intelligence Service rank of level 4 or above; and''.
SEC. 513. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.
(a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Director
of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item:
``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
(b) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United
States Code is amended by striking the item relating to the General
Counsel of the Office of the National Intelligence Director and
inserting the following new item:
``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.''.
SEC. 514. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE
ACT OF 1978.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et
seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 101--
(A) in subsection (a), by moving paragraph (7) two
ems to the right; and
(B) by moving subsections (b) through (p) two ems to
the right;
(2) in section 103, by redesignating subsection (i) as
subsection (h);
(3) in section 109(a)--
(A) in paragraph (1), by striking ``section 112.;''
and inserting ``section 112;''; and
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking the second period;
(4) in section 301(1), by striking ```United States''' and
all that follows through ``and `State''' and inserting
```United States', `person', `weapon of mass destruction', and
`State''';
(5) in section 304(b), by striking ``subsection (a)(3)'' and
inserting ``subsection (a)(2)''; and
(6) in section 502(a), by striking ``a annual'' and inserting
``an annual''.
SEC. 515. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 105 OF THE INTELLIGENCE
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004.
Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 U.S.C. 311 note) is
amended--
(1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and
inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
(2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after
``subsection (a)),''.
SEC. 516. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM
PREVENTION ACT OF 2004.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public
Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3638) is amended--
(1) in section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 485(e)(10)(B)), by
striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and
inserting ``Department of Justice'';
(2) in section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)--
(A) in subsection (c)(1)--
(i) by striking ``shall,'' and inserting
``shall''; and
(ii) by inserting ``of'' before ``an
institutional culture'';
(B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National
Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with
section 112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of
National Intelligence in a manner consistent with
applicable law''; and
(C) in subsection (f) in the matter preceding
paragraph (1), by striking ``shall,'' and inserting
``shall''; and
(3) in section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and
inserting ``Federal''; and
(B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific''
and inserting ``specific''.
SEC. 517. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE MULTIYEAR NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
Section 1403 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 404b) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``FOREIGN'';
(2) in subsection (a)--
(A) in the heading, by striking ``Foreign'';
(B) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears;
and
(C) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence''
and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence'';
(3) in subsection (b), by striking ``The Director'' and
inserting ``The Director of National Intelligence''; and
(4) in subsection (c)--
(A) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence''
and inserting ``Director of National Intelligence'';
and
(B) by striking ``section 114a'' and inserting
``section 221''.
SEC. 518. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.
The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is further
amended--
(1) section 3(4)(L), by striking ``other'' the second place
it appears;
(2) in section 102A--
(A) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual
budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and
for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities'' and
inserting ``annual budget for the Military Intelligence
Program or any successor program'';
(B) in subsection (d)--
(i) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking ``Joint
Military Intelligence Program'' and inserting
``Military Intelligence Program or any
successor program'';
(ii) in paragraph (3) in the matter preceding
subparagraph (A), by striking ``subparagraph
(A)'' and inserting ``paragraph (1)(A)''; and
(iii) in paragraph (5)--
(I) in subparagraph (A), by striking
``or personnel'' in the matter
preceding clause (i); and
(II) in subparagraph (B), by striking
``or agency involved'' in the second
sentence and inserting ``involved or
the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (in the case of the
Central Intelligence Agency)'';
(C) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section''
and inserting ``paragraph''; and
(D) in subsection (n), by inserting ``and Other''
after ``Acquisition'';
(3) in section 103(b), by striking ``, the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.),'';
(4) in section 104A(g)(1) in the matter preceding
subparagraph (A), by striking ``Directorate of Operations'' and
inserting ``National Clandestine Service'';
(5) in section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by
striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)'';
(6) in section 701(b)(1), by striking ``Directorate of
Operations'' and inserting ``National Clandestine Service'';
(7) in section 705(e)(2)(D)(i) (50 U.S.C. 432c(e)(2)(D)(i)),
by striking ``responsible'' and inserting ``responsive''; and
(8) in the table of contents in the first section--
(A) by striking the item relating to section 1002;
and
(B) by inserting after the item relating to section
1001 the following new item:
``Sec. 1002. Framework for cross-disciplinary education and
training.''.
SEC. 519. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE.
Section 528(c) of title 10, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``Associate Director of CIA
for Military Affairs'' and inserting ``Associate Director of
Military Affairs, CIA''; and
(2) by striking ``Associate Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency for Military Affairs'' and inserting
``Associate Director of Military Affairs, Central Intelligence
Agency, or any successor position''.
Purpose
The purpose of H.R. 2701 is to authorize the intelligence
and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government for fiscal year 2010 in order to enhance the
national security of the United States, to support and assist
the armed forces of the United States, and to facilitate and
oversee the execution of the foreign policy of the United
States. The bill also clarifies certain authorities of the
Intelligence Community and makes technical corrections to
existing statutes.
Classified Annex and Committee Intent
The classified annex to this report includes the classified
Schedule of Authorizations and its associated explanatory
language. The Committee views the classified annex as an
integral part of this legislation. The classified annex
contains a thorough discussion of the issues considered by the
Committee underlying the funding authorizations found in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The Committee intends
that all intelligence programs discussed in the classified
annex to this report be conducted in accordance with the
guidance and limitations set forth as associated language
therein.
The classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated
directly into this legislation by virtue of Section 102 of the
bill. The classified annex is available for review by all
members of the House of Representatives, subject to the
requirements of clause 13 of Rule XXIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, and Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure
for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. In
addition, Section 356 of the bill incorporates reporting
requirements of the Classified Annex and any Joint Explanatory
Statement into the Act.
Scope of Committee Review
The bill authorizes U.S. intelligence and intelligence-
related activities under the jurisdiction of the Committee,
including the National Intelligence Program (NIP), the Military
Intelligence Program (MIP), and the Information System Security
Program (ISSP). The NIP consists of all activities of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Central
Intelligence Agency, as well as intelligence and intelligence-
related activities conducted by: (1) the Department of Defense;
(2) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (3) the National Security
Agency; (4) the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force;
(5) the Coast Guard; (6) the Department of State; (7) the
Department of the Treasury; (8) the Department of Energy; (9)
the Department of Justice; (10) the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; (11) the Drug Enforcement Administration; (12)
the National Reconnaissance Office; (13) the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and (14) the Department of
Homeland Security. The Committee has legislative, authorizing,
and oversight jurisdiction over these programs.
Oversight Findings
With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, this legislation results from
hearings and other oversight activities conducted by the
Committee, pursuant to clause 3(m) of Rule X and are reflected
in the body of this report.
With respect to clause 3(c) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, this legislation does not
include any new spending or credit authority, nor does it
provide for any increase or decrease in tax revenues or
expenditures. The bill does, however, authorize appropriations.
Other fiscal features of this legislation are addressed in
the estimate prepared by the Committee under clause 3(d)(2) of
Rule XIII of the rules of the House of Representatives.
General Performance Goals and Objectives
With respect to clause 3(c)(4) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, this legislation would address
several general and outcome-related performance goals and
objectives. The general goals and objectives of this
legislation are to provide the necessary resources and
authorities to enhance the national security of the United
States, to support and assist the armed forces of the United
States, and to facilitate and oversee the execution of the
foreign policy of the United States.
Constitutional Authority Statement
Pursuant to clause 3(d)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of the
House of Representatives, the Committee finds the authority for
this legislation in Article I, Section 8 of the United States
Constitution.
Committee Statement and Views
A. OVERVIEW
In drafting the fiscal year 2010 Intelligence Authorization
Act, the Committee sought to adopt legislative measures and
authorize funding that would address the country's most
pressing threats and improve national security. The Committee
applauds the extraordinary efforts that the brave women and men
of the Intelligence Community have put forth to protect our
nation, but recognizes that there is still a great deal of work
still to be done. To that end, H.R. 2701 provides the
Intelligence Community with the necessary funding and
intelligence authorities to continue this important work and
simultaneously establishes critical oversight mechanisms to
ensure that these funds are expended and these authorities are
exercised in an effective, efficient, and responsible manner.
The bill includes specific provisions that will assist the
Intelligence Community in its efforts to continue the fight
against al-Qa'ida where they have established strongholds, to
address concerns from emerging trouble spots such as Yemen and
Somalia, and to confront global challenges posed by such
threats as weapons of mass destruction. The Committee has also
included provisions to improve accountability and oversight by
creating an Intelligence Community Inspector General and by
establishing reporting requirements needed to assess the
Intelligence Community's progress in closing critical
intelligence gaps and making important internal reforms.
As always, the Committee seeks to authorize the funds
necessary to enable the Intelligence Community to carry out its
mission while ensuring that the Congress and the courts are
able to exercise their constitutional responsibility to conduct
effective oversight on behalf of all Americans.
B. THE COMMITTEE REVIEW
The Committee completed its review of the President's
fiscal year 2010 budget request, carrying out its annual
responsibility to prepare an authorization based on close
examination of the U.S. Government's intelligence programs and
proposed expenditures.
Over the past two months, the Committee conducted 11 full
committee-level budget hearings and briefings on numerous
topics, including the following:
National Intelligence Program
Military Intelligence Program
Signals Intelligence
Overhead Architecture
Human Intelligence
Covert Action
Human Capital
Cybersecurity
In addition to these events, Committee members and staff
have taken numerous budget-related briefings covering all
intelligence programs within the National Intelligence Program,
the Military Intelligence Program, and the Information System
Security Program.
As always, the Committee's legislative and budgetary
actions are based on more than these budget-specific hearings
and briefings. The actions taken in this legislation are the
result of the Committee's ongoing, rigorous oversight of the
U.S. Intelligence Community throughout the year. This oversight
activity includes scores of Committee and Subcommittee hearings
and briefings; site visits and fact-finding trips; reviews of
congressionally directed reports; and studies of intelligence
capabilities, strategies, plans, and challenges.
C. THE LEGISLATION
The bill and accompanying classified Schedule of
Authorizations includes the Committee's recommended
authorizations for the Intelligence Community for fiscal year
2010 and includes authorizations for the intelligence portion
of the funding for overseas contingency operations for fiscal
year 2010. The legislative provisions in H.R. 2701 will enhance
U.S. intelligence capabilities in several important respects.
First, the bill invests in human resources by building upon
the Committee's longstanding commitment to improving language
capabilities and increasing diversity in the Intelligence
Community. The bill adds funding and establishes new reporting
requirements designed to provide the Committee with the
information it needs to assess the Intelligence Community's
progress toward critical personnel goals. In an effort to
encourage critical language acquisition, the bill authorizes
the expansion of the Boren Fellowship program to include five
high-priority African languages, and also makes permanent the
Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program, which provides
stipends to college students studying critical languages and
other subjects important to the Intelligence Community. The
bill further requires the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI) to develop a plan to increase diversity within the
Intelligence Community.
The bill mandates implementation of security clearance
reform to allow first- and second-generation Americans, many of
whom may have critical language skills, to serve in the
Intelligence Community with proper clearances. The Committee is
concerned that there are no effective methods of measuring the
quality of the security clearance process. In the absence of
such measures, there are no guarantees that the system is
functioning effectively, by granting trustworthy people access
to classified information and preventing others from having
those accesses. In addition, the delay in granting clearances
frequently costs the Intelligence Community qualified
applicants.
Second, the bill enhances congressional oversight by
ensuring that the Committee receives the information it needs
to conduct its inherent oversight function. The National
Security Act of 1947 mandates that the Committee be ``fully and
currently informed'' of all intelligence activities. Over the
past several years, the executive branch has failed to meet
that standard in a number of important cases. These failures
prompted the Committee to adopt language to enhance reporting
on intelligence activities to the full membership of the
congressional intelligence committees.
One particular provision would repeal the so-called ``Gang
of Eight'' provision, which has allowed the executive branch to
limit notification on certain covert actions to only the
chairmen and ranking members of the congressional intelligence
committees. The new provision in H.R. 2701 would only allow the
President to limit briefings pursuant to written procedures
established by the congressional intelligence committees and
allows the Committee to set procedures for the receipt of such
notifications.
The bill also strengthens the oversight mechanisms
available to the Committee. It would create a statutory and
independent Intelligence Community-wide Inspector General with
a clearly-defined responsibility to report directly to
Congress. A separate provision clarifies the DNI's obligation
to cooperate with GAO investigations requested by the
congressional intelligence committees to ensure that those
committees will benefit from GAO's skilled personnel and
thorough, objective analysis.
In furtherance of the President's emphasis on protecting
government information systems, the bill also makes a sizeable
investment in foundational cybersecurity capabilities.
Finally, the legislation authorizes funding to enhance
human intelligence collection and provides critical funds for
traditional intelligence challenges and other enduring and
emerging global security issues in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America.
D. AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST
The way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan
It is beyond dispute that the security of Afghanistan and
Pakistan is inextricably linked to the security of the United
States and its allies. The Committee notes with increasing
concern that both the political and military situations in
these countries continue to deteriorate.
After an eight-year presence of U.S. military and Coalition
Forces in the region, al-Qa'ida, Taliban, and other affiliated
groups continue to enjoy a safe haven in Pakistan's Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) from which they are able to
plan and operate undeterred and with impunity. The Taliban has
been able to regroup and gain more ground in Afghanistan,
thereby posing a real challenge to the stability of the
national government. The opium trade is booming, providing
funding for the Taliban's illicit activities and attacks on
Coalition forces. Citizens still lack the basic facilities they
expect from their government, such as transportation and
communications infrastructure, education, and health care.
On the other side of the border in Pakistan, the situation
is equally dire. The significance of the threat posed by the
Pakistani Taliban, al-Qa'ida, and their affiliates to Pakistan,
a nuclear-armed ally, cannot be overstated. The Pakistani
Taliban has shown its strength in critical regions of the
country, not only in the minimally-governed FATA, but also in
the settled areas such as Peshawar and the Swat Valley. They
have conducted suicide attacks against Pakistani and Western
interests, including the attack against the Marriot Hotel in
Islamabad, the murder of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto,
and the obstruction of U.S. and Coalition supply routes to
Afghanistan. More recently, the Pakistani Taliban has made
brazen attempts to expand its authority into areas dangerously
close to Islamabad. While the democratically-elected government
has recently taken military action against the Pakistani
Taliban, the government will be relatively weak and unable to
repel these threats without U.S. assistance.
The Committee applauds the Administration's efforts to
reemphasize the significance of these two nations and to
approach the region with a new strategic vision. The Committee
agrees that the United States must devote more resources, both
financial and human, and use all instruments of power to
overcome these challenges.
The Director of National Intelligence has briefed the
Committee on the Intelligence Community's plans to adjust its
strategy to match the situation on the ground. The Committee
will continue to monitor developments as they relate to this
region and will work diligently to ensure that the Intelligence
Community has the resources and support required to carry out
its mission.
Cybersecurity
Shortly after inauguration, the President ordered a 60-day
review to develop a strategic framework for ensuring that all
the various efforts to protect government information systems
are fully integrated, properly resourced, and coordinated with
Congress and the private sector.
In May 2009, the White House presented the results of that
review. This review provides a meaningful roadmap for improving
cybersecurity in the future and outlines some of the challenges
the nation will face in building a robust cybersecurity
capability.
Unfortunately, the national security establishment has come
late to this issue. The Committee recognizes a need for a
comprehensive effort on cybersecurity and appreciates the
gravity and proximity of the cyber threat. The difficulty, as
always, is in the details. As we move forward, there are
critical oversight issues, difficult funding decisions, and
thorny technical and policy questions still to be resolved. In
some cases, those technical and policy questions may have to be
resolved before the Committee has gathered enough information
to be comfortable with authorizing significant sums for loosely
defined purposes.
Several standards will guide the Committee's oversight in
the near-term:
Funding for cybersecurity programs may need to be
reduced or slowed until the future direction for cybersecurity
is better defined.
Any cybersecurity strategy or plans should include
clear goals and metrics to enhance program and congressional
oversight.
There needs to be a clear doctrine for the use of
offensive cyber capabilities.
Securing government information systems should
include efforts beyond building bigger and better firewalls,
such as improving the capability to attribute attacks to
specific government or private actors.
Expansion of cybersecurity authorities and
capabilities must include stronger oversight mechanisms to
ensure that any monitoring is conducted in a manner consistent
with laws and regulations.
Securing government information systems will
require both a significant increase in the number of
cybersecurity experts in government service and a cultural
change in the way federal employees approach computer and
information security.
The Committee will continue to monitor this area closely
and looks forward to cooperating with the Administration in its
efforts. The Committee will be prepared to authorize the
expenditure of funds where those expenditures appear necessary
and will offer legislation when there is a need for new
authorities or greater oversight.
Diversity in the Intelligence Community
The Committee has long been concerned about the lack of
diversity in the Intelligence Community. Despite efforts to
improve the diversity of its workforce, intelligence agencies
continue to lag behind the rest of the federal workforce in
this area.
Diversity in the Intelligence Community is an operational
imperative. For our intelligence apparatus to operate
clandestinely throughout the world, the Intelligence Community
needs officers of differing ethnicities. Diversity can improve
our operational capabilities and, thereby, increase the quality
and quantity of the intelligence our officers are able to
collect.
In order to achieve this operational objective, the
Intelligence Community must adopt measures of diversity that
match its mission requirements. Currently, in measuring
diversity, intelligence agencies use only the six Office of
Management and Budget-approved categories for identifying race
and national origin. These are limited to: (1) Hispanic or
Latino, (2) American Indian or Alaska Native, (3) Asian, (4)
Black or African-American, (5) Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific
Islander, and (6) White. These categories were created to
prevent discriminatory employment and education practices, not
to measure the foreign language skills and cultural knowledge
the Intelligence Community needs to succeed.
While it is important that the Intelligence Community have
a workforce that reflects the American population, it is far
more important that its workforce be capable of operating in,
collecting information about, and analyzing developments in all
parts of the world. If the Intelligence Community is to succeed
in its global mission, it must have a global face.
The Committee is, however, encouraged by the proposal of a
new form for self-identification of ancestry, ethnicity, and
cultural expertise. The form was made available for public
comment on May 11, 2009. This is a good first step toward
improving mission-oriented diversity, and the Committee looks
forward to reviewing public comments.
Improving foreign language proficiency and management
Expert foreign language capability is critical to effective
intelligence collection and analysis. The Committee is
encouraged that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has
launched an initiative to double the number of employees with
critical foreign language skills and looks forward to
evaluating the fruits of that initiative in coming years.
While the Intelligence Community has made significant
strides in hiring personnel who have limited proficiency in a
foreign language, the Committee believes that the Intelligence
Community must intensify efforts to train these personnel to a
higher level of professional proficiency. This degree of
language expertise generally requires a substantial commitment
of time and resources, but the Committee is convinced that
serious, extended foreign language study will yield substantial
benefits for the Intelligence Community. In particular, the
Committee recommends that programs for overseas immersion
language training be expanded.
Currently, many agencies evaluate foreign language
capabilities by tallying the number of filled billets that are
categorized as ``foreign language required'' or ``foreign
language desired.'' This method of accounting does not
distinguish between the varied levels of foreign language
proficiency. In effect, the mechanism distorts the agency's
assessment of foreign language readiness, which, in turn,
adversely affects the agency's ability to accurately evaluate
its foreign language needs, plan its hiring strategies, or
implement necessary training programs.
In order to better inform agency foreign language plans,
the Committee urges the Intelligence Community to adopt a more
precise mechanism to measure the foreign language capabilities
of individual agencies, preferably one that takes into account
language proficiency levels.
Intelligence cooperation with Mexico and Latin America
The Committee notes that Latin America has not received
attention from the Intelligence Community commensurate with the
region's importance to U.S. national security. As a result,
intelligence agencies are hard-pressed to provide needed
insights about the complex threats emanating from the Western
Hemisphere, including a brutal narcotics trade and the
proliferation of violent youth gangs that have moved into
American cities beyond the Southwest border region.
The Committee considers the recent announcement of the
National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy to be a
positive indicator of the Administration's dedication to meet
these hemispheric challenges head-on. In formulating specifics
for the future course of this initiative, the Committee
recommends that the Intelligence Community modify its approach
to the region in the following ways.
First and foremost, the Committee recommends greater
collaboration among the elements of the Intelligence Community.
In particular, the Department of Homeland Security Intelligence
and Analysis Division (DHS I&A) must do a better job of
filtering and disseminating the unique intelligence that it
draws from its operations on the U.S. borders and from state,
local, and tribal resources. The Committee is pleased that DHS
I&A plans to deploy at least one full-time employee to each of
the 70 Fusion Centers operating throughout the country.
Additionally, the Intelligence Community should harness the
expertise of the growing number of Hispanic-Americans, many of
whom have strong cultural and linguistic ties to the region,
including proficiency in regional dialects. To this end, the
Committee encourages the Intelligence Community to intensify
its multipronged efforts to attract Hispanics and other
minorities to its ranks. For hard target countries in the
region, such as Cuba, the Committee urges the Intelligence
Community to tailor recruiting drives to attract exiles from
those countries, just as the United States has done with Iraqi-
Americans in seeking to meet intelligence objectives in Iraq.
Finally, the Committee encourages the Intelligence
Community to strengthen its relationships in Latin America,
particularly with the Mexican government. Mexico is confronting
powerful drug cartels that have used billions of dollars from
drug sales in the United States to bribe officials and arm
themselves with American-purchased weaponry. This is a shared
problem for which the United States and Mexico must both
shoulder the responsibility of finding a solution.
Emerging terrorist safehavens
In its role as both the overseer of the Intelligence
Community and a consumer of intelligence, the Committee seeks
to identify those areas of the world in which future threats
lie in order to provide resources and funding to meet those
threats. In that regard, the Committee is concerned with the
threat of increasing instability in Yemen and the continuing
turmoil in Somalia. History has demonstrated that al-Qa'ida and
its affiliates seek out those countries with either a weak
central government or significant instability to use as
safehavens from which to plot against the United States or U.S.
interests abroad. While al-Qa'ida's main safehaven along the
border of Afghanistan and Pakistan is of gravest concern, it is
essential that neither Somalia nor Yemen become the next
safehaven for al-Qa'ida.
Somalia has not had an effective national government since
1991. While certain areas of the country have developed
internationally unrecognized governments, much of Somalia,
including Mogadishu, remains largely lawless despite
international efforts. Today, the terrorist group ``al-
Shabaab,'' which has issued statements praising Osama bin Laden
and associating themselves with al-Qa'ida's global ideology, is
making strides towards taking control of Mogadishu and southern
Somalia. Al-Shabaab's control over this territory, including
its ports, could provide al-Qa'ida a safehaven from which to
plan terrorist attacks.
In 2000, Yemen was the site of the attack on the USS Cole,
an al-Qa'ida strike against the United States that killed 17
U.S. servicemen. Following al-Qa'ida's attacks against the
United States on September 11, 2001, the Yemeni government took
some effective steps against terrorism, but in recent months
the threat has grown again, as exemplified by the September
2008 al-Qa'ida attack against the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa, which
killed 16 civilians. Since then, al-Qa'ida elements in Saudi
Arabia and Yemen merged to become ``Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian
Peninsula'' (AQAP) and are believed to be gaining strength in
Yemen. Concurrently, the al-Houthi revolt in the north and
unrest in the south of Yemen threaten the central government
and may divert its attention from eliminating the AQAP threat.
AQAP is now using the conflicts in the north and south as a
rallying cry to recruit more terrorists into its ranks.
The Committee urges the Intelligence Community, and the
Administration as a whole, to take immediate steps to address
the situations in Somalia and Yemen. The Committee looks
forward to supporting the Intelligence Community in these
efforts.
Oversight of intelligence activities
The Committee notes with concern the blurred distinction
between the intelligence-gathering activities carried out by
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the clandestine
operations of the Department of Defense (DOD). Congress
chartered the Committee for the purpose of conducting oversight
of all intelligence activities of the U.S. Government,
including all programs funded under both the National
Intelligence Program and the Military Intelligence Program.
In categorizing its clandestine activities, DOD frequently
labels them as ``Operational Preparation of the Environment''
(OPE) to distinguish particular operations as traditional
military activities and not as intelligence functions. The
Committee observes, though, that overuse of this term has made
the distinction all but meaningless. The determination as to
whether an operation will be categorized as an intelligence
activity is made on a case-by-case basis; there are no clear
guidelines or principles for making consistent determinations.
The Director of National Intelligence himself has acknowledged
that there is no bright line between traditional intelligence
missions carried out by the military and the operations of the
CIA.
Clandestine military intelligence-gathering operations,
even those legitimately recognized as OPE, carry the same
diplomatic and national security risks as traditional
intelligence-gathering activities. While the purpose of many
such operations is to gather intelligence, DOD has shown a
propensity to apply the OPE label where the slightest nexus of
a theoretical, distant military operation might one day exist.
Consequently, these activities often escape the scrutiny of the
intelligence committees, and the congressional defense
committees cannot be expected to exercise oversight outside of
their jurisdiction.
Based on recent discussions, the Committee is hopeful that
DOD will be more fulsome in its reporting. In the future, if
DOD does not meet its obligations to inform the Committee of
intelligence activities, the Committee will consider
legislative action clarifying the Department's obligation to do
so.
Committee Consideration and Roll Call Votes
On June 18, 2009, the Committee met in open and closed
session and ordered the bill H.R. 2701 favorably reported, as
amended.
OPEN SESSION
In open session, the Committee considered the text of the
bill H.R. 2701.
Chairman Reyes offered an amendment in the nature of a
substitute to H.R. 2701 and moved to adopt the amendment as the
base text for consideration. The motion was agreed to by a
voice vote. The contents of the amendment in the nature of a
substitute, as amended, are described in the Section-by-Section
analysis and the Explanation of Amendment.
The Committee then considered the following amendments to
the amendment in the nature of a substitute:
Mr. Hastings offered an amendment to require the Director
of National Intelligence to submit a report to the
congressional intelligence committees on the plans of each
element of the Intelligence Committee to increase diversity. It
was agreed to by a voice vote.
Mr. Rogers offered an amendment to authorize funds to close
the National Drug Intelligence Center. It was not agreed to by
a roll call vote of 9 ayes to 13 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Thornberry, Mr.
Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. Kline, Mr.
Conaway.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt,
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky,
Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren.
Mr. Thompson offered an amendment to require the Director
of National Intelligence to submit a report to the
congressional intelligence committees and the congressional
appropriations committees on the state of research, analysis,
and training in interrogation and debriefing practices. The
amendment was agreed to by a voice vote.
Mr. Rogers offered an amendment to prohibit the use of
funds for the implementation of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation Global Justice Initiative. Mr. Rogers withdrew
his amendment.
Mr. Langevin offered an amendment to establish, under the
authority of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, a designee to act as the outreach coordinator for
information assurance education. The amendment would further
require an examination of the recruiting, retention, and
professional development of individuals with specialized cyber
operations training and skills. Mr. Langevin withdrew his
amendment.
Mr. Rogers offered an amendment to prohibit the use of
funds authorized in the bill to provide Miranda warnings to
certain persons outside of the United States. The amendment was
agreed to by a roll call vote of 14 ayes, 7 noes, and 1
present:
Voting aye: Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy,
Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr.
Thornberry, Mr. Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr.
Kline, Mr. Conaway.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt,
Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky.
Voting present: Mr. Schiff.
The Committee then recessed for House floor votes and
reconvened in open session for business approximately eight
hours later.
Mr. Kline offered an amendment to require the Director of
National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense to submit to
the congressional intelligence committees and the congressional
defense committees a revised charter for the National
Reconnaissance Office. The amendment was agreed to by a voice
vote.
Mr. Conaway offered an amendment to require the Director of
National Intelligence to conduct a review of the status of
audit readiness of each element of the Intelligence Community
and to develop a plan to achieve a full, unqualified audit of
each element. The amendment was agreed to by a voice vote.
Mrs. Myrick offered an amendment to prohibit the use of
funds to transfer detainees from U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba, to the United States.
Mr. Murphy offered an amendment in the nature of a
substitute to the Myrick amendment, which would limit the use
of funds for the transfer or release of individuals detained at
U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the United States,
until such time as the President presents to the congressional
defense committees a plan regarding the disposition of each
individual to be transferred or released. Mr. Murphy withdrew
his amendment in the nature of the substitute, pending
revision.
Mr. Murphy then offered an amendment in the nature of a
substitute to the Myrick amendment, which would limit the use
of funds for the transfer or release of individuals detained at
U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the United States,
until such time as the President presents to Congress a plan
regarding the disposition of each individual to be transferred
or released. The amendment was agreed to by a roll call vote of
12 ayes and 10 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt,
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin,
Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren.
Voting no: Mr. Tierney, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr.
Thornberry, Mr. Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr.
Kline, Mr. Conaway.
The Committee then considered the question of the amendment
offered by Mrs. Myrick, as amended by the amendment in the
nature of a substitute offered by Mr. Murphy. The amendment was
agreed to by a roll call vote of 14 ayes and 8 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr.
Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr.
Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren, Mr. Thornberry, Mr.
Miller, Mr. Kline.
Voting no: Mr. Holt, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr.
Gallegly, Mr. Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Blunt offered an amendment to prohibit the use of
intelligence funds to make payments to foreign nations for the
relocation of detainees held at U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote
of 10 ayes and 12 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Boren, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr.
Thornberry, Mr. Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr.
Kline, Mr. Conaway.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt,
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky,
Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith.
Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to require the Director
of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, to make publicly available an unclassified
summary of intelligence relating to the recidivism of detainees
held at U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The amendment
was agreed to by a roll call vote of 12 ayes and 10 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Langevin, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr.
Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. Rogers, Mrs.
Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. Kline, Mr. Conaway.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt,
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky,
Mr. Murphy, Mr. Boren.
Mr. Rogers offered an amendment to require a review of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation exercise of enforcement
jurisdiction in foreign nations. Mr. Rogers withdrew his
amendment.
Mr. Rogers offered an amendment to restrict funds for the
implementation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
``seven-and-out'' program until the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation submits a review of pension issues
related to the ``five-and-out'' program. Mr. Rogers withdrew
his amendment.
Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to require the Director
of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, to make publicly available an unclassified
summary of intelligence on Uighur detainees held at U.S. Naval
Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The amendment was agreed to by a
voice vote.
Mr. Thornberry offered an amendment to strike language
related to the video recording of interrogations of persons in
the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency. The amendment
was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 9 ayes and 13 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Thornberry, Mr.
Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. Kline, Mr.
Conaway.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt,
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky,
Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren.
Mr. Rogers offered an amendment to review the enforcement
jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation with
respect to the criminal investigation of terrorism offenses
conducted in foreign nations and using National Intelligence
Program funds. The amendment was agreed to by a voice vote.
Mr. Langevin and Mr. Rogers offered an amendment to
restrict funds for the implementation of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's ``seven-and-out'' program until the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation submits a review of pension
issues related to the ``five-and-out'' program and the effects
of a mandatory reassignment policy on the Bureau. The amendment
was agreed to by a voice vote.
Mr. Conaway offered an amendment to strike language
relating to Government Accountability Office audits and
investigations. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll call
vote of 9 ayes and 13 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Thornberry, Mr.
Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. Kline, Mr.
Conaway.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt,
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky,
Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren.
Mr. Rogers offered an amendment to prohibit payments to
foreign nations for the purposes of conducting surveillance or
monitoring of a detainee who had been held at U.S. Naval
Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The amendment was not agreed to
by a roll call vote of 9 ayes and 13 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Thornberry, Mr.
Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. Kline, Mr.
Conaway.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt,
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky,
Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren.
Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to require the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency to make publicly available
unclassified versions of documents relating to congressional
briefings on the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, as
well as an unclassified version of intelligence products
assessing the information gained from detainee reporting. The
amendment was not agreed to by a roll call vote of 9 ayes and
13 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Thornberry, Mr.
Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. Kline, Mr.
Conaway.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt,
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky,
Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren.
Mr. Thornberry offered an amendment to reform the
congressional notification process as set forth in the National
Security Act of 1947. The amendment was not agreed to by a roll
call vote of 10 ayes and 12 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Holt, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr.
Thornberry, Mr. Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr.
Kline, Mr. Conaway.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr.
Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr.
Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren.
Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment restricting the use of
funds authorized for purposes related to a covert action
finding.
CLOSED SESSION
Mr. Hoekstra moved to close the meeting because national
security would be endangered if the matters to be considered
were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 21
ayes to 0 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt,
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky,
Mr. Langevin, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren, Mr. Hoekstra,
Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr.
Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. Kline, Mr. Conaway.
Voting no: None.
OPEN SESSION
After debate, the Committee returned to open session to
complete consideration of the Hoekstra amendment. Mr. Hoekstra
withdrew his amendment.
The Committee then adopted the Chairman's amendment in the
nature of a substitute, as amended, by a roll call vote of 12
ayes, 9 noes, and 1 present.
Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt,
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin,
Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren.
Voting no: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Thornberry, Mr.
Rogers, Mrs. Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. Kline, Mr.
Conaway.
Voting present: Mr. Tierney.
CLOSED SESSION
The Chairman announced his intention to discuss the
classified Schedule of Authorizations. Mr. Hoekstra moved to
close the meeting because national security would be endangered
if the matters to be considered were disclosed. The motion was
agreed to by a record vote of 22 ayes to 0 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt,
Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky,
Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Smith, Mr. Boren, Mr.
Hoekstra, Mr. Gallegly, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. Rogers, Mrs.
Myrick, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Miller, Mr. Kline, Mr. Conaway.
Voting no: None.
OPEN SESSION
After debate on the classified Schedule of Authorizations,
the Committee returned to open session.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted the Schedule of
Authorizations.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted a motion by the
Chairman to favorably report the bill to the House, as amended,
including by reference the classified Schedule of
Authorizations.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of the Amendment
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 lists the United States Government departments,
agencies, and other elements for which the Act authorizes
appropriations for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities for fiscal year 2010.
Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 makes clear that the details of the amounts
authorized to be appropriated for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities covered under this title for
fiscal year 2010 are contained in a classified Schedule of
Authorizations. Section 102 states that the Schedule of
Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on
Appropriations of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
and to the President.
Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 allows the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI), with the approval of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), to authorize employment of
civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized under
Section 102 by an amount not to exceed three percent of the
total limit applicable to each element of the Intelligence
Community. The DNI must determine that the action is necessary
to the performance of important intelligence functions and must
notify the congressional intelligence committees prior to the
exercise of authority under this section.
Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 104 authorizes the sum of $672,812,000 in fiscal
year 2010 for the Intelligence Community Management Account of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). The
Section authorizes 853 full-time, or full-time equivalent,
personnel for the Intelligence Community Management Account,
who may be either permanent employees of the ODNI or
individuals detailed from other elements of the United States
Government. Section 104 also authorizes additional funds and
personnel in the classified Schedule of Authorizations for the
Intelligence Community Management Account.
Section 105. Prohibition on earmarks
Section 105 prohibits the inclusion of any earmarked
funding requests in this bill.
Section 106. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 106 states that authorization of appropriations for
an activity does not grant authorization for any intelligence
activity that is not otherwise permitted under the Constitution
or laws of the United States.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations in the amount of
$290,900,000 for fiscal year 2010 for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SUBTITLE A--PERSONNEL MATTERS
Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be
appropriated by this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other
benefits for federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in compensation or benefits authorized by law.
Section 302. Temporary appointment to fill vacancies in presidentially-
appointed and Senate-confirmed positions in the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence
Section 302 allows the DNI to fill, in an acting capacity,
presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed positions at the
ODNI with either the deputy to the vacant position or another
Senate-confirmed individual serving elsewhere in the
Intelligence Community. A significant number of ODNI personnel
are detailed from other elements of the Intelligence Community,
and thus may be ineligible under the Vacancies Act to serve in
an acting capacity in Senate-confirmed ODNI positions. This
section helps avoid the potentially prolonged vacancies in
critical positions that could result from the appointment and
confirmation process by allowing the President to appoint
individuals from other elements of the Intelligence Community
with the necessary skills and background to serve in an acting
capacity.
Section 303. Enhanced flexibility in non-reimbursable details to
elements of the Intelligence Community
Section 303 expands from one year to two years the maximum
length of time that U.S. Government personnel may be detailed
to the ODNI on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis. To
utilize this authority, the agreement of both the DNI and the
head of the detailing element is required.
The DNI requested authority to expand the permitted
duration of details from one year to three years. The Committee
believes that a two-year detail strikes the appropriate balance
between the needs of the ODNI and the needs of the other
elements of the Intelligence Community.
Section 304. Provisions relating to the Defense Civilian Intelligence
Personnel System
Section 304 curtails implementation of the Defense Civilian
Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS) by prohibiting the
transition or hiring of any new employees into the system. It
also requires the Secretary of Defense, within one year of
enactment, to terminate the program and transition employees
back to the civilian compensation system that was in effect on
September 30, 2007. The provisions requiring the return of
employees to the previous compensation system do not apply to
members of the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service or
to an individual in an Intelligence Senior Level position, as
defined by Section 1607 of Title 10, Chapter 83.
If the Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management, determines that
the DCIPS pay system should not be terminated with respect to
covered employees, he is required to provide to Congress,
within six months of enactment, a written report with the
Secretary's views and his reasons therefore.
The Committee, together with the Committee on Armed
Services, has expressed its concern about the implementation of
the DCIPS pay system. DCIPS would do away with the existing
General Schedule-pay scale and replace it with a system of pay
bands. This pay-banded system has been misleadingly named
``pay-for-performance.''
For the past three years, the Committee has expressed
concerns that this compensation system lacks transparency and
accountability, and could have an adverse impact on minorities.
The Committee is also concerned that the system was developed
without sufficient consultation with employees in the
Intelligence Community. Further, the pay system is being
implemented across the Intelligence Community without regard to
the needs of different career fields or mission needs of the
various intelligence agencies. In 2003, the Committee objected
to the implementation of a similar program at the Central
Intelligence Agency out of concern that it would have an
undesirable impact on the workforce.
The Committee continues to be concerned that the
implementation of such a system has been rushed and that there
has not been adequate time to ensure managers are properly
trained. Human resources personnel have raised concerns that
they will not have sufficient time prior to implementation to
ensure all employees receive training, nor do they have final
policy guidance. Recent training events have demonstrated that
managers need more practice and guidance in determining
performance objectives under the systems.
The Committee supports the idea of rewarding performance
and believes that the performance bonus system has not been
effectively utilized. Certainly, the existing civil service
system has flaws and needs reform. The Committee notes that the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management has indicated
his intent to reform the civilian personnel system across the
entire federal government. The Committee believes that
additional employees should not transition to pay-for-
performance systems prior to the implementation of a broader,
government-wide pay reform.
SUBTITLE B--EDUCATION
Section 311. Permanent authorization for the Pat Roberts Intelligence
Scholars Program
Section 311 provides permanent authorization for the Pat
Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program (PRISP), which provides
financial assistance to students who pursue studies in critical
language specialties, area studies, and technical and
scientific specialties. PRISP was originally authorized as a
pilot program in Section 318 of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for fiscal year 2004 and has continued under year-to-year
appropriations. The program has been successful and is widely
supported within the Intelligence Community.
Section 312. Intelligence Officer Training Program
Section 312 authorizes the Intelligence Officer Training
Program (IOTP), a program operated by the ODNI and built from a
combination of previously authorized pilot programs. The IOTP
seeks to recruit, prepare, and retain an ethnically and
culturally diverse workforce in the Intelligence Community by
providing grants to institutions of higher learning to develop
courses of study in education disciplines that the DNI deems to
be of critical importance to the intelligence mission. The
Committee encourages the ODNI to consider awarding grants to
institutions developing innovative methods for teaching high-
priority foreign language skills, such as those that utilize
individualized and/or web-based courses of study.
Section 313. Modifications to the Stokes Educational Scholarship
Program
Section 313 expands and strengthens the Stokes Educational
Scholarship Program. The Stokes Program was originally created
for the National Security Agency (NSA) to help undergraduate
students, particularly minority students, develop critical
skills necessary to the Intelligence Community. This provision
extends the program to include graduate students. It would also
make the program available to other elements within the
Intelligence Community.
Section 314. Pilot program for intensive language instruction in
African languages
Section 314 directs the DNI to establish a pilot program to
expand the National Security Education Program/Boren Scholars
Program to include intensive language instruction for five
high-priority African languages. The program will utilize
intensive immersion instruction both in the United States and
abroad, and will likely focus on the Somali, Hausa, Amharic,
Tigrinya, and Kituba languages. The intent of the program is to
begin building capability in African languages spoken in areas
where U.S. national security interests may be affected, but
where insufficient instructional capability exists in the
United States.
SUBTITLE C--CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF COVERT ACTIONS
Section 321. Reporting on covert actions
Section 321 changes the processes for reporting of
intelligence activities, including covert actions, to the
congressional intelligence committees.
Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 requires the
President to ensure that the congressional intelligence
committees are kept fully and currently informed of
intelligence activities. Section 503 of the National Security
Act enumerates specific procedures with respect to briefings on
covert actions.
In the past, the Committee has struggled with the
limitations imposed by the executive branch on reporting of
intelligence activities. To address this problem, subsection
(a) amends Section 501(a) of the National Security Act by
explicitly requiring the President to brief the congressional
intelligence committees on legal authorities, operational
risks, resource concerns, and potential for failure at issue
with respect to significant, anticipated, or ongoing
intelligence activities.
Subsection (b) amends Section 501(c) of the National
Security Act by requiring that the procedures governing the
briefings must be in writing.
Subsection (c) amends Section 502 of the National Security
Act by providing explicit guidance on how the President should
brief the intelligence committees on legal issues related to
intelligence activities.
Subsection (d) amends Section 503 of the National Security
Act by applying the same explicit guidance in subsection (c) to
briefings on covert actions. This subsection also replaces
Section 503(c)(2), which allowed the President to limit reports
on covert actions to the so-called ``Gang of Eight''--the
chairmen and ranking members of the intelligence committees,
the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House of
Representatives, and the majority and minority leaders of the
Senate--if the President determines that extraordinary
circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States
warrant limiting access.
This subsection replaces Section 503(c)(2) with a provision
that requires the President to brief all members of the
congressional intelligence committees, but implicitly provides
for the possibility of more restricted briefings pursuant to
the written procedures established by the congressional
intelligence committees, pursuant to the revised Section
501(c). This language vests the authority to limit the
briefings with the committees, rather than the President. Also,
in defining the term ``significant undertaking,'' the
subsection explicitly establishes certain conditions under
which the President is required to provide information on a
covert action program to the congressional intelligence
committees.
This subsection further provides that, if a briefing on a
finding or notice is restricted to certain members of the
committees, the President shall provide those members with
general information on the content of the finding or notice. It
also allows any member of Congress to whom a covert action
finding or notice has been reported to submit to the DNI an
objection concerning any part of that finding or notice, who
must report that objection to the President in writing within
48 hours.
Additionally, this subsection requires that the President
maintain a record of the members to whom a finding or notice
has been reported and provide that record to the congressional
intelligence committee in question within 30 days.
Finally, this subsection clarifies that, as a matter of
construction, any reference in sections 501, 502, or 503 to a
requirement that information be provided to the intelligence
committees shall be construed to require that such information
be provided to all members of those committees, except as
provided in revised Section 503(c)(2).
The Committee understands well the need to protect
intelligence information from unauthorized disclosure and the
prerogatives of the executive branch with respect to the
protection of classified information. However, these principles
must be balanced against the constitutional requirement for
congressional oversight.
Section 503 of the National Security Act attempted to
establish a balance between the executive and legislative
branches. Over the past eight years, the balance was tipped
towards the executive at the expense of congressional
oversight. That state of affairs was particularly troubling in
light of the controversial nature of some of the programs that
were not briefed to the full membership of the intelligence
committees. This section resets that balance with respect for
the executive branch's prerogatives, but with an eye on
ensuring that Congress is able to fulfill its oversight
responsibility.
SUBTITLE D--REPORTS AND OTHER CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
Section 331. Report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets
Section 331 modifies 50 U.S.C. Section 404(m) to change the
requirement for the United States Department of the Treasury to
submit a report to Congress on financial intelligence
concerning terrorist assets. The existing provision requires
the report to be submitted semiannually. This section would
change the law to require that the report be submitted once
every year and eliminates certain data requirements from that
report.
Section 332. Annual personnel level assessments for the Intelligence
Community
Section 332 provides a new mechanism for overseeing
personnel growth in the Intelligence Community by requiring the
DNI, in consultation with the head of the element of the
Intelligence Community concerned, to prepare an annual
assessment of the personnel and contractor levels for each
element of the Intelligence Community for the subsequent fiscal
year.
The assessment required by Section 332 must report
information about budgeted personnel and contractor costs and
levels, a comparison of this information to current fiscal year
data and data from the previous five fiscal years, and a
justification for the requested personnel and contractor
levels. The assessment also requires the DNI to affirm that,
based on current and projected funding, the individual elements
of the Intelligence Community will have sufficient internal
infrastructure and training resources to support the requested
personnel and contractor levels and sufficient funding to
support the administrative and operational activities of the
requested personnel.
Section 332 also requires that the assessment contain
information about intelligence collectors and analysts employed
or contracted by each element of the Intelligence Community,
and contractors who are the subjects of any inspector general
investigations. The assessment must be submitted to the
congressional intelligence committees concurrent with the
submission of the President's budget request.
The Committee believes that the personnel level assessment
required by Section 332 will provide information necessary for
the executive branch and Congress to understand the
consequences of modifying the Intelligence Community's
personnel levels. Section 332 recognizes that personnel growth
must be better planned in the future to accomplish the goals of
strengthening intelligence collection, analysis, and
dissemination. In addition, the Administration must adequately
fund personnel growth and structure its resources to ensure
that personnel growth does not compromise the implementation
and execution of other programs.
With regard to historical contractor levels to be included
in the annual assessments, the DNI has expressed concern that
there was no comprehensive effort, prior to the ODNI's
contractor inventory initiated in June 2006, to capture
information on the number and costs of contractors throughout
the Intelligence Community. In light of the concerns outlined
by the DNI, the Committee understands that information about
contractor levels prior to June 2006 may need to be reported as
a best estimate.
The personnel assessment required in Section 332 should
assist the DNI and the congressional intelligence committees in
determining the appropriate balance of contractors and
permanent government employees.
Section 333. Semiannual reports on nuclear weapons programs of Iran,
Syria, and North Korea
Section 333 requires the DNI to submit to Congress
classified reports on the nuclear intentions and capabilities
of Iran, Syria, and North Korea not less than once in the four
months after enactment and semiannually thereafter. This
section provides that the DNI may submit a National
Intelligence Estimate on the intentions and capabilities of any
one of the three countries in lieu of submitting a report on
that particular country during a six-month period.
Section 334. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the
Intelligence Community
Section 334 requires the DNI to report annually on the
Intelligence Community's proficiency in foreign languages,
including foreign language training. The report must provide
data on positions in the various Intelligence Community
elements that require foreign language proficiency, the number
of personnel hired with such proficiency, and the efforts of
those elements to recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel
with such proficiency. Additionally, the report requires the
DNI to make an assessment on the feasibility of hiring foreign
nationals previously employed as translators for the U.S.
Government in Iraq and Afghanistan to help meet critical
language needs in the Intelligence Community. This information
is intended to help the Committee better assess the
Intelligence Community's ability to manage language resources.
Section 335. Government Accountability Office audits and investigations
Section 335 directs the DNI to ensure that Government
Accountability Office (GAO) personnel are provided with access
to all information from the Intelligence Community that the
Comptroller General determines necessary for a GAO analysis,
evaluation, or investigation of an Intelligence Community
program or activity, when the Comptroller General conducts such
analysis, evaluation, or investigation at the request of a
congressional intelligence committee. The scope of this
provision is limited to requests from the congressional
intelligence committees.
This provision allows the DNI to restrict access to
information sought by the GAO if the DNI determines that the
restriction is necessary to protect the vital national security
interests of the United States. If the DNI makes such a
determination, the DNI must submit a statement of the reasons
for the determination to the congressional intelligence
committees.
Section 336. Certification of compliance with oversight requirements
Section 336 requires the head of each element of the
Intelligence Community to submit on a semiannual basis a
certification that the element is in full compliance with the
provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 requiring that
the congressional intelligence committees be kept fully and
currently informed of intelligence activities.
This section provides that, if the head of an element is
unable to issue such a certification, he or she must submit to
the congressional intelligence committees an explanation as to
why a certification could not be made and affirm that the
relevant information will be submitted to the committees as
soon as is possible.
The purpose of this section is to ensure that elements of
the Intelligence Community remain current and timely with
respect to their notification obligations.
Section 337. Reports on foreign industrial espionage
Section 337 modifies 50 U.S.C. Section 2170b(b)(1) and (2)
to change the requirement for the submission of a report to
Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial
Espionage. The existing provision requires the report to be
submitted annually. This section would change the law to
require that the report be submitted once every two years.
Section 338. Report on intelligence community contractors
Section 338 requires the DNI to provide a comprehensive
report on the use of contractors in the Intelligence Community.
The report must include data on several critical questions
concerning the use of contractors, including: a description of
guidance issued by the elements of the Intelligence Community
on the hiring, training, security clearance, and assignment of
contract personnel; an identification of contracts in which the
contractor is performing a substantially similar function to a
government employee; an assessment of costs incurred or savings
achieved by awarding contracts for the performance of specific
functions instead of using full-time employees of the
Intelligence Community; an assessment of the appropriateness of
using contractors to perform the activities; and an estimate of
the number of contracts and the number of contract personnel
performing intelligence functions.
These reporting requirements are designed to address the
Committee's concerns regarding the Intelligence Community's
large contractor workforce, including: the lack of
documentation regarding the size and use of the workforce; a
clear definition of the functions that may be appropriately
performed by contractors; or procedures for overseeing
contractors and preventing any waste, fraud, and abuse that may
occur. The report is intended to aid both the Intelligence
Community and the congressional intelligence committees in
conducting oversight and devising appropriate policy solutions.
Section 339. Report on transformation of the intelligence capabilities
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Section 339 requires the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) to submit a comprehensive report on its efforts to
transform its intelligence capabilities and to achieve long-
term goals for developing the national security functions of
the Bureau. This report is intended to help establish clear
goals for the development of the effective functioning of the
Bureau as an intelligence agency.
Section 340. Report on intelligence resources dedicated to Iraq and
Afghanistan
Section 340 requires the DNI and the Secretary of Defense
to submit to the congressional intelligence and defense
committees a report on the intelligence resources dedicated to
Iraq and Afghanistan during the preceding two fiscal years and
on the plan for fiscal year 2010. The Committee wants to ensure
that such resources are sufficient to support policy
determinations and tactical decisions related to U.S. forces
deployed in these two theaters.
Section 341. Report on International Traffic in Arms Regulations
The executive branch and industry have repeatedly
identified the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR)
as an impediment to technology development. ITAR was intended
to protect sensitive technologies and information from being
transferred to nations deemed a potential security risk.
Government and industry assert that the State Department has
managed ITAR in such a way so as to encourage non-U.S.
companies to develop a collaborative research and development
environment that has allowed the indigenous production of
banned technologies, which defeats the premise of ITAR and
causes a significant loss of market share in key industries for
U.S. corporations.
This section requires the DNI to report to the
congressional intelligence committees and to the congressional
foreign affairs committees regarding the threat to national
security posed by foreign government attempts to acquire
sensitive technology and the effectiveness of ITAR in
mitigating that threat.
The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2010, which passed the House in June 2009, would give the
President authority to reform certain aspects of ITAR's
management. The Committee expects that the report required by
this section will help the President and Congress better
evaluate the merits of such a decision.
Commercial imagery providers have suggested that the U.S.
Government has imposed on them significant legal restrictions.
These providers are concerned that U.S. restrictions on the
sale of commercial imagery are beginning to inhibit their
growth and their competitiveness in foreign markets, especially
as foreign imagery satellites improve and foreign reliance on
U.S. systems diminishes. The Committee expects the report
called for by this section to help Congress better understand
the implications of these restrictions.
Section 342. Report on nuclear trafficking
Section 342 requires the DNI to report to certain
congressional committees on the illicit trade of nuclear and
radiological material and equipment. The report must include:
details of all cases of illicit sale, transfer, brokering, or
transport of nuclear material or nuclear explosive devices; an
assessment of the countries that pose the greatest risk of
nuclear trafficking; and a discussion of any dissents, caveats,
gaps, or other information that would reduce confidence in the
assessment of the countries that pose the greatest risk of
nuclear trafficking. The Committee remains concerned about the
threat from the proliferation of nuclear and radiological
materials and equipment, and this report is intended to deliver
an assessment of that threat.
Section 343. Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit
unauthorized disclosures of classified information
Section 343 requires the DNI to conduct a study on the
feasibility of revoking the pensions of personnel in the
Intelligence Community who commit unauthorized disclosures of
classified information and to report the results of that study
to the congressional intelligence committees.
Section 344. Study on electronic waste destruction practices of the
Intelligence Community
Section 344 requires the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community to conduct a study on the security and
environmental impacts of the current electronic waste disposal
practices of the Intelligence Community and provide the results
to the congressional intelligence committees. The Committee is
particularly concerned about the security implications of
poorly-managed electronic waste disposal, but these disposal
practices also raise questions about potential for adverse
environmental effects.
Section 345. Report on retirement benefits for former employees of Air
America
Section 345 requires the DNI to submit a report to Congress
on the advisability of providing federal retirement benefits to
United States citizens who were employees of Air America during
a period when it was owned or controlled by the U. S.
Government. This assessment must include a review of the costs
associated with providing such a benefit and any
recommendations for legislative action necessary to enact such
a benefit.
Section 346. Study on college tuition programs for employees of the
Intelligence Community
Section 346 requires the DNI to conduct a study on the
feasibility of providing matching funds to college savings
plans of personnel in the Intelligence Community and
establishing a program to pay the college tuition for the
children of an employee of the Intelligence Community who dies
in the line of duty. The purpose of this study is to determine
whether it would be practical to provide additional assistance
to employees of the Intelligence Community who face college
tuition payments.
Section 347. National Intelligence Estimate on global supply chain
vulnerabilities
Section 347 requires the DNI to submit to Congress a
National Intelligence Estimate or National Intelligence
Assessment on the risks to U.S. national security resulting
from the presence of counterfeit electronic components that may
be defective or deliberately manipulated by foreign governments
or criminal organizations. With the growing concerns over
cybersecurity, the Committee believes it is appropriate to
focus the Intelligence Community's attention on threats
emanating from the global supply chain that provides much of
the computer systems for both government and private industry.
Section 348. Review of records relating to potential health risks among
Desert Storm veterans
Section 348 requires the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (DCIA) to conduct a classification review
of all CIA records relevant to known or potential health
effects suffered by veterans of Operation Desert Storm. This
section further requires the DCIA to report the results of the
classification review to Congress.
Section 349. Review of pensions of employees affected by ``five and
out'' program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Section 349 states that none of the funds authorized by the
bill may be used to implement an FBI program that requires the
mandatory reassignment of a FBI supervisor after he or she
serves in a management position for seven years. Funds may only
be expended for this program after the Director of the FBI
certifies to the congressional intelligence committees that the
Director has completed a review of issues related to a previous
program that required the mandatory reassignment of an FBI
supervisor after he or she served five years in a management
position.
Section 350. Summary of intelligence relating to terrorist recidivism
of detainees held at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba
Section 350 requires that the DNI, in consultation with the
DCIA and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, make
publicly available an unclassified summary of intelligence
relating to recidivism of detainees currently or formerly held
at the U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and an
assessment of the likelihood that such detainees will engage in
terrorism or communicate with persons in terrorist
organizations.
Section 351. Summary of intelligence on Uighur detainees held at United
States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba
Section 351 requires that the DNI, in consultation with the
DCIA and the Director of the DIA, make publicly available an
unclassified summary of intelligence relating to threats posed
by Uighur detainees currently or formerly held at the U.S.
Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and an assessment of the
likelihood that those detainees will engage in terrorism or
communicate with persons in terrorist organizations.
Section 352. Report on interrogation research and training
Section 352 requires that the DNI, in coordination with the
heads of the relevant elements of the Intelligence Community,
submit to the congressional intelligence committees and the
congressional appropriations committees a report on the state
of research, analysis, and training in interrogation and
debriefing process. The report must include: an assessment of
the quality and value of scientific and technical research in
interrogation and debriefing practices; the state of
interrogation and debriefing training in the Intelligence
Community; the adequacy of efforts to enhance career paths for
employees who conduct interrogations and debriefings; and the
effectiveness of processes for studying and implementing best
practices for interrogation and debriefing.
Section 353. Report on plans to increase diversity within the
intelligence community
Section 353 requires that the DNI, in coordination with the
heads of the elements of the Intelligence Community, submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a report on the plans
of each element to increase diversity within the intelligence
community. Those reports must include: specific plans to
achieve the goals articulated in the DNI's strategic plan on
equal opportunity and diversity; plans and initiatives to
increase recruiting and hiring of diverse candidates; plans and
initiatives to improve retention of diverse federal employees
at the junior, midgrade, senior, and management levels; a
description of specific diversity awareness training and
education programs; and a description of performance metrics to
measure the success of carrying out these plans.
Section 354. Review of Federal Bureau of Investigation exercise of
enforcement jurisdiction in foreign nations
Section 354 requires that, no later than 60 days after
enactment, the Director of the FBI conduct a review of
constraints under international law and the laws of foreign
nations to the assertion of enforcement jurisdiction with
respect to criminal investigations of terrorism offenses under
U.S. law.
Section 355. Repeal of certain reporting requirements
Section 355 eliminates certain reporting requirements that
were considered overly burdensome to the Intelligence Community
in cases where the usefulness of the report has diminished,
either because of changing events or because the information
contained in those reports is duplicative of information
already obtained through other avenues. The Committee is
sensitive to the administrative burden placed on the
Intelligence Community through reporting requirements, and
seeks to eliminate, wherever possible, those reporting
requirements that are no longer useful to aid congressional
oversight.
Section 356. Incorporation of reporting requirements
Section 356 incorporates into the Act by reference each
requirement contained in the classified annex to submit a
report to the congressional intelligence committees to clarify
that the requirement to complete these reports is a requirement
in law.
Section 357. Conforming amendments
Section 357 makes conforming changes to the National
Security Act of 1947 arising from changes and additions to the
reporting requirements enumerated in Section 507 of that Act.
SUBTITLE E--OTHER MATTERS
Section 361. Modification of availability of funds for different
intelligence activities
Section 361 conforms the text of Section 504(a)(3)(B) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(B)) with
the text of Section 102A(d)(5)(A)(ii), as amended by Section
1011(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004, which governs the transfer and reprogramming of
certain intelligence funding by the DNI. It replaces the
``unforeseen requirements'' standard in Section 504(a)(3)(B)
with a more flexible standard (from Section 102A(d)(5)(A)(ii))
to govern reprogramming and transfers of funds authorized for a
different intelligence or intelligence-related activity.
The new standard permits reprogramming or transfer
authority if the new use of funds ``supports an emergent need,
improves program effectiveness, or increases efficiency.'' This
modification brings the standard for reprogramming and
transfers of intelligence funding into conformity with the
standards applicable to reprogramming and transfers under
Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947. This
provision would make no changes to the relevant congressional
reporting requirements or processes associated with the
approval of reprogramming requests.
Section 362. Protection of certain national security information
Section 362 amends Section 601 of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) to increase the criminal penalties for
individuals with authorized access to classified information
who intentionally disclose information identifying a covert
agent, if such individual knows the United States is taking
affirmative measures to conceal the covert agent's intelligence
relationship to the United States.
Section 362 also amends Section 603(a) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) to provide that the
annual report from the President on the protection of
identities of certain U.S. undercover intelligence officers,
agents, informants, and sources also include an assessment of
the need for any legislative modification for the purposes of
improving legal protections for covert agents.
Section 363. Extension of authority to delete information about receipt
and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations
Current law (5 U.S.C. 7342) requires certain federal
employees, spouses, dependents, and others to file reports with
their employing agency regarding receipt of gifts or
decorations from foreign governments. The employing agency is
then required to file detailed reports about these gifts,
including the source of each gift, with the Secretary of State,
who must then publish a list of these reports in the Federal
Register.
The public disclosure of gifts or decorations to personnel
and certain contractors of the Intelligence Community has the
potential to compromise intelligence sources or confirm
intelligence relationships with foreign governments.
Recognizing the risks to national security, Congress has
granted limited exemptions to this rule to the DCIA and to the
DNI. Section 363 provides the heads of each element of the
Intelligence Community the same limited exemption from the
specified public reporting requirements previously provided
only to the DNI and DCIA but requires that any information
withheld from the Secretary of State be provided to and
retained by the DNI.
Section 364. Exemption of dissemination of terrorist identity
information from the Freedom of Information Act
Section 364 establishes procedures facilitating the
transfer of information concerning the identity of known or
suspected terrorists from the National Counterterrorism Center
to the Terrorist Screening Center. This section is designed to
encourage the dissemination of information vital to the
prevention of terrorist attacks to state and local law
enforcement by ensuring that the dissemination does not render
information that would otherwise be exempt from disclosure
under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552) subject to
such disclosure.
Section 365. Misuse of the Intelligence Community and Office of the
Director of National Intelligence name, initials, or seal
Section 365 adds a subsection to the National Security Act
of 1947 prohibiting the unauthorized use of the official name,
initials, or seal of either the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence or the Intelligence Community. This
section also permits the Attorney General to pursue injunctive
relief for such unauthorized use.
Section 366. Security Clearances: Reports; Ombudsman; Reciprocity
The Committee welcomes the Intelligence Community's
progress in improving the timeliness of security clearance
processing but remains concerned that the processing of some
security clearances, particularly for industry, takes too long.
Section 366 requires a series of reports that will contribute
needed data for ongoing congressional oversight of the security
clearance process and effective measurement of progress.
This section requires the President to conduct an audit
every four years regarding the manner in which the executive
branch determines whether a security clearance is required for
a particular position in the federal government. This section
also requires the President to submit to Congress an annual
report regarding the number of employees and contractors with
security clearances, the amount of time taken to process
security clearance determinations, and the number of security
clearance determinations that have taken longer than one year
to complete. The section further requires that the President
submit to Congress 180 days after enactment of this Act a
report on establishing security clearance adjudication
standards across the federal government.
This section also directs the DNI to appoint an ombudsman
for security clearances within the Intelligence Community. An
ombudsman will provide persons experiencing delays in obtaining
their security clearances with an avenue for seeking help
resolving such delays.
The Committee has conducted extensive oversight on the
security clearance process, and in particular on the
Administration's attempts to reform the process. In the course
of that oversight, GAO has testified to the lack of meaningful
quality metrics to evaluate the efficacy of the security
clearance process. The legislative measures in this section are
designed to address the concerns raised by GAO in its
testimony.
Section 367. Limitation on use of funds for the transfer or release of
individuals detained at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba
Section 367 states that the DNI may not use any of the
funds authorized by the bill to release or transfer an
individual held at the U.S. Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, to the United States, its territories, or possessions
until 120 days after the President has submitted a plan to
Congress. The plan must include: an assessment of the risk that
each individual to be transferred or released poses to the
national security of the United States; a proposal for the
disposition of each such individual; a plan to mitigate any
risks, should the proposed disposition include the release or
transfer of that individual to the United States, its
territories, or its possessions; and a summary of consultations
by the President with the chief executive of the State,
District of Columbia, territory, or possession to which an
individual may be transferred or released.
Section 368. Intelligence community financial improvement and audit
readiness
Section 368 expresses the sense of Congress regarding the
need for each element of the Intelligence Community to develop
and implement a plan to become compliant with financial
management and audit readiness standards. This section also
requires that the DNI conduct a review of the status of the
auditability compliance of each element of the Intelligence
Community and develop a plan and timeline to achieve a full,
unqualified audit of each element by September 30, 2013.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
SUBTITLE A--OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Section 401. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence
Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-3(e)) provides that the ODNI may not be co-located
with any element of the Intelligence Community. Section 401
clarifies that the ban applies only to the co-location of the
ODNI headquarters with the headquarters of another element of
the Intelligence Community. It also provides the President with
authority to waive that limitation where the interests of
national security so dictate. Further, in response to an
ambiguous requirement concerning the location of all federal
government offices, this section clarifies that the ODNI
offices may be located outside of the District of Columbia.
Section 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the
Transportation Security Oversight Board
Section 402 substitutes the DNI (or the DNI's designee) for
the DCIA as a member of the Transportation Security Oversight
Board, as established by Section 115(b)(1) of Title 49. The
Transportation Security Oversight Board is responsible for,
among other things, coordinating intelligence, security, and
law enforcement activities relating to transportation and
facilitating the sharing of intelligence, security, and law
enforcement information relating to transportation among
federal agencies.
Section 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and
Technology
Section 403 clarifies the additional duties of the DNI's
Director of Science and Technology. This provision ensures
there is uniformity in the definitions of basic, applied, and
advanced research goals and improved prioritization and
coordination of science and technology across the Intelligence
Community.
Section 404. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center
energy efficiency reports
Section 404 requires the DNI to submit a plan to Congress
on compliance with the Environmental Protection Agency's report
on data center energy efficiency submitted to Congress under
Section 1 of P.L. 109-431. The plan is intended to encourage
the Intelligence Community to promote the use of energy
efficient technologies to reduce consumption of resources such
as power and water by the Intelligence Community's data
centers.
Section 405. Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence
Community
Section 405 clarifies that the Chief Information Officer
(CIO) at ODNI serves as the Intelligence Community's CIO, and
not only as the CIO for the ODNI.
Section 406. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Section 1078 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevent Act of 2004 authorized the DNI to establish an Office
of the Inspector General if the DNI determined that such an
Inspector General would be beneficial to improving the
operations and effectiveness of the ODNI. The DNI created an
Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC/IG) in DNI
Instruction No. 2005-10 (September 7, 2005). However, the
Committee believes that an IC/IG with full statutory
authorities and independence can better ensure that the ODNI
identifies problems and deficiencies within the Intelligence
Community, especially with respect to the manner in which
elements of the Intelligence Community share information and
undertake joint or cooperative activities.
Section 406 creates a statutory IC/IG to be appointed by
the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate. The
IC/IG will report directly to the DNI and may only be removed
by the President, who must communicate the reasons for removal
to the congressional intelligence committees. The DNI may
prohibit the IC/IG from conducting an investigation,
inspection, or audit if the DNI determines that such action is
necessary to protect vital national security interests. The DNI
must provide the congressional intelligence committees with the
reasons for such a determination within seven days.
The IC/IG will have subpoena authority, though information
within the possession of the United States Government must be
obtained through other procedures. Subject to the DNI's
concurrence, the IC/IG may request information from any
department, agency, or element of the U.S. Government.
The IC/IG must submit semiannual reports to the DNI that
include a description of significant problems relating to the
programs and operations of the Intelligence Community, and the
DNI must submit such reports to Congress within 30 days of
receipt. The IC/IG must also report immediately to the DNI
serious or flagrant violations of law. Within seven days, the
DNI must transmit those reports to the congressional
intelligence committees.
Employees of the Intelligence Community or employees of a
contractor who intend to report to Congress a violation of law
or Executive Order, a false statement to or willful withholding
from Congress, or other ``urgent concerns'' may report such
complaints and supporting information to the IC/IG. The IC/IG
must transmit this complaint, along with a credibility
determination, to the DNI, which must then transmit the
complaint, credibility determination, and supporting
documentation to the congressional intelligence committees.
This section does not disturb, and the Committee intends to
retain, the authoritative guidance for analogous provisions of
the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-272 (October 20, 1998), the Senate Committee report for
that legislation, S. Rept. 105-185, and the conference report,
H. Rept. 105-780.
For matters within the jurisdiction of both the IC/IG and
an Inspector General for another element of the Intelligence
Community, the Inspectors General (IGs) shall resolve who will
undertake an investigation, inspection, or audit. In resolving
that question, the IGs may request the assistance of the
Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum, an already
extant body codified in this section. In the event that the IGs
are still unable to resolve the question, they shall submit the
matter for resolution to the DNI and to the head of the element
in which an Inspector General with jurisdiction is located.
The Committee notes that the current DNI has expressed his
support for a statutory IG in testimony. In addition, the
previous Inspector General at the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI/IG) has testified to the challenges
that the ODNI/IG faces in the absence of an authorizing statute
and to the benefits that the creation of a statutory IC/IG
would bring to the oversight of the Intelligence Community.
SUBTITLE B--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Section 411. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of
the Central Intelligence Agency
Title V of the National Security Act of 1947, entitled
``Accountability for Intelligence Activities,'' sets forth the
Act's basic requirements for executive branch obligations to
keep the congressional intelligence committees fully informed
of intelligence activities. Section 503 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b) is specifically devoted
to presidential findings and congressional notification on
covert actions.
Section 411 of this bill augments oversight of covert
actions by requiring that the CIA Inspector General (CIA/IG)
conduct an audit of each covert action at least once every
three years and submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report containing the audit results within 60 days
of completing the audit. To a considerable extent, this
requirement codifies in statute existing practice and assures
its regularity.
The DNI has expressed concern that this audit requirement,
and several other provisions pertaining to reports by the
Intelligence Community, raises concerns with respect to the
President's authority to control access to national security
information. To allay any such concern regarding the covert
action audit requirement, the Committee has drafted Section 411
to state that the requirement is subject to the longstanding
provisions of section 17(b)(3) and (4) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(b)(3) and (4)),
which empower the DCIA to prohibit the CIA/IG from initiating,
carrying out, or completing an audit if the Director determines
that the prohibition is necessary to protect vital national
security interests of the United States, provided that the
Director reports the reasons to the congressional intelligence
committees.
Section 412. Prohibition on the use of private contractors for
interrogations involving persons in the custody of the Central
Intelligence Agency
Section 412 prohibits the DCIA from obligating or expending
funds to any contractor to conduct the interrogation of a
detainee in the custody of the CIA. The DNI may, however, grant
a waiver if the DCIA determines that no employee of the federal
government is capable and available to conduct the
interrogation and that the interrogation is in the national
interest of the United States. This section also provides that
contractors conducting interrogations pursuant to a waiver by
the DNI shall be governed by the same laws that would apply if
the interrogation were conducted by an employee of the federal
government. The Committee believes that conducting custodial
interrogations is an inherently governmental function, which
should, to the maximum extent practicable, be conducted by U.S.
Government personnel.
Section 413. Appeals from decisions of Central Intelligence Agency
contracting officers
Section 413 amends current law by providing that an appeal
from a decision of a CIA contracting officer may be made to
whichever of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals or
the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals is specified by the
contracting officer as the appropriate Board. This section also
provides that the board so specified shall have jurisdiction to
decide the appeal.
Section 414. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
Section 414 establishes the position of Deputy Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency (DDCIA) and specifies that the
President shall appoint the DDCIA. This section further
outlines that the duties of the DDCIA are to assist the DCIA in
carrying out his or her duties and to act as DCIA during the
absence of the DCIA or a vacancy in the position.
Section 415. Protection against reprisals
Section 415 expands the protections to CIA personnel who
provide assistance to the CIA/IG. Section 17(e)(3)(B) of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
403q(e)(3)(b)) authorizes the CIA/IG to receive and investigate
both complaints and information. Currently, Section 17(e)(3)(B)
only extends protections to employees against reprisal or
threat of reprisal made in response to complaints filed with
the CIA/IG. This provision would clarify that these protections
also apply with respect to information provided to the CIA/IG
employees that may not be in direct connection with a
complaint.
Section 416. Requirement for video recording of interrogations of
persons in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency
Section 416 adds to the National Security Act of 1947 a
requirement for the DCIA to establish guidelines to ensure that
interrogations of detainees in CIA custody are recorded in
video form, and that the video recording and attendant audio
recording of such interrogation is maintained for a specified
period of time. This provision does not apply a videotaping
requirement to security officers who might question a witness
or a suspect in the course of their official duties while
assigned to CIA headquarters.
SUBTITLE C--OTHER ELEMENTS
Section 421. Homeland Security intelligence elements
Section 421 affirms that both the Coast Guard and Office of
Intelligence and Analysis in the Department of Homeland
Security are elements of the Intelligence Community. This
section further clarifies that the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis is the Department of Homeland Security's Intelligence
Community member in accordance with existing practice and as
defined in Executive Order 12333. The Coast Guard is listed
herein as a military, multi-mission, maritime service that is
located within the Department of Homeland Security.
Section 422. Clarification of inclusion of Drug Enforcement
Administration as an element of the Intelligence Community
Section 422 codifies the joint decision of the DNI and the
Attorney General that the Drug Enforcement Administration
should be within the Intelligence Community.
Section 423. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of
the National Counterintelligence Executive
Section 423 amends the authorities and structures of the
National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) to eliminate
administrative authorities that had been vested in the NCIX
when that official was appointed by and reported to the
President. Those authorities are unnecessary now that the NCIX
is appointed by and under the authority of the DNI.
Section 424. Confirmation of appointment of heads of certain components
of the Intelligence Community
Section 424 establishes that the directors of the National
Security Agency (NSA) and National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
are to be presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed. Under
present law and practice, the directors of the NSA and NRO,
each with a distinct and significant role in the national
intelligence mission, are not confirmed by the Senate in
relation to their leadership of these agencies. Presently, the
President appoints the Director of NSA and the Secretary of
Defense appoints the Director of the NRO. Under current law,
neither of these appointments must be confirmed by the Senate
unless a military officer is promoted or transferred into the
position.
The Committee believes that holding confirmation hearings
in both the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the
Senate Armed Services Committee would bring to these positions
an appropriate level of accountability and responsiveness to
congressional oversight.
Section 425. Associate Director of the National Security Agency for
Compliance and Training
Section 425 establishes an Associate Director for
Compliance and Training at the NSA. This official will report
to the NSA Director and will be responsible for ensuring that
all NSA surveillance programs are in compliance with applicable
laws, regulations, and policies.
The Committee understands the challenges involved in
bringing together surveillance laws with the complicated and
ever-changing technology that the NSA uses to collect vital
intelligence. To date, the NSA has distributed the
responsibility for compliance and training across several
offices within the organization, with none occupying a
sufficiently prominent position to influence outcomes
effectively.
The Committee believes that the establishment of an
additional Associate Director whose sole responsibility is to
ensure that each component within NSA is adhering to the rules
governing surveillance authorities is the best way to minimize
the risk of non-compliance.
The Associate Director for Compliance and Training should
have expertise in both the legal and technical arenas of
surveillance so that he or she can be accountable for each and
every surveillance program the NSA administers.
The Associate Director for Compliance and Training will
also be responsible for establishing and implementing a
training regimen to ensure that the NSA workforce understands
the procedures necessary to comply with the law.
Section 426. General Counsel of the National Security Agency
Section 426 requires presidential appointment and Senate
confirmation for the General Counsel of the NSA. The General
Counsel of the NSA faces important legal, privacy, and civil
liberties issues that are only increasing in complexity. The
Committee believes that holding confirmation hearings in both
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Senate
Armed Services Committee for the NSA's General Counsel is a
warranted additional measure of congressional oversight.
Section 427. Inspector General of the National Security Agency
Section 427 amends Section 12 of the Inspector General Act
of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) to establish an Inspector General of
the NSA. As noted, complex legal, privacy, and civil liberties
issues may arise during the performance of the NSA's mission.
The Committee believes that the Inspector General will play a
vital role in ensuring that the NSA effectively executes its
mission in a manner consistent with all applicable laws and
regulations.
Section 428. Charter for the National Reconnaissance Office
Section 428 requires that the DNI and Secretary of Defense
jointly submit to the congressional intelligence committees and
congressional defense committees a revised charter for the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). The NRO charter has not
changed since the agency's founding nearly forty years ago, and
the Committee believes an updated charter would help the NRO
better implement its current mission.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
SUBTITLE A--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
Section 501. Extension of National Commission for the Review of the
Research and Development Programs of the United States
Intelligence Community
The National Commission for the Review of Research and
Development Programs of the United States Intelligence
Community was authorized in the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2003 and lapsed on September 1, 2004. Section
501 renews the authority for this Commission by extending the
reporting deadline to February 1, 2011, and by requiring that
new members be appointed to the Commission. This section also
authorizes $2 million for the Commission from the Intelligence
Community Management Account.
Section 502. Expansion and clarification of the duties of the Program
Manager for the Information Sharing Environment
Section 502 clarifies the duties of the Information Sharing
Environment (ISE) Program Manager by directing that the ISE
Program Manager shall reside in the Executive Office of the
President.
Section 503. Classification review of executive branch materials in the
possession of the congressional intelligence committees
Section 503 requires the DNI to conduct a classification
review of executive branch materials older than 25 years in the
possession of the congressional intelligence committees. This
provision is intended to review the holdings of the
intelligence committees to determine what executive branch
materials no longer need to remain classified.
Section 504. Prohibition on use of funds to provide Miranda warnings to
certain persons outside of the United States
Section 504 states that no funds authorized by the bill may
be used to provide the warnings of constitutional rights
described in the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona
(384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966)) to any person located outside of the
United States who is not United States person and: (1) is
suspected of terrorism, associated with terrorists, or believed
to have knowledge of terrorists; or (2) is a detainee in the
custody of the U.S. Armed Forces.
SUBTITLE B--TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS
Section 511. Technical amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949
Section 511 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 by updating references to the National Security Act of
1947 to reflect amendments made by the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act and changes in the titles of certain
positions of the CIA.
Section 512. Technical amendment to mandatory retirement provision of
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act
Section 512 updates the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement Act to reflect the use of pay levels within the
Senior Intelligence Service program, rather than pay grades, by
the CIA.
Section 513. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule
Section 513 makes technical amendments to the Executive
Schedule to correct outdated and incorrect references to
``Director of Central Intelligence'' and ``General Counsel to
the National Intelligence Director.''
Section 514. Technical amendments to the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978
Section 514 corrects typographical errors and makes other
technical amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978.
Section 515. Technical amendments to Section 105 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004
Section 515 clarifies that the reorganization of the Office
of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury
into the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence does
not affect its status as an element of the Intelligence
Community or the Director of National Intelligence's
responsibility with respect to that office.
Section 516. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
Section 516 makes technical and conforming amendments to
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act that
correct typographical errors, update titles, and make language
internally consistent.
Section 517. Technical amendments relating to the multi-year National
Intelligence Program
Section 517 updates the ``multi-year national intelligence
program'' to incorporate organizational and nominal changes
made by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.
Section 518. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947
Section 518 makes technical corrections to the National
Security Act of 1947 arising from enactment of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. It also corrects other
technical errors.
Section 519. Technical amendments to Title 10, United States Code
Section 519 amends Title 10 by changing the title of
``Associate Director of CIA for Military Affairs'' to
``Associate Director of Military Affairs, CIA.''
Statement of Federal Mandates
Section 423 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act (as amended by Section 101(a)(2) of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act, P.L. 104-4) requires a statement of
whether the provisions of the reported bill include unfunded
mandates. In compliance with this requirement, the Committee
has received a letter from the Congressional Budget Office
included herein.
Statement on Congressional Earmarks
Pursuant to clause 9 of Rule XXI of the Rules of the House
of Representatives, the Committee reports that the bill
contains no congressional earmarks, limited tax benefits, or
limited tariff benefits.
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, June 25, 2009.
Hon. Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2701, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jason
Wheelock.
Sincerely,
Douglas W. Elmendorf,
Director.
Enclosure.
H.R. 2701--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
Summary: H.R. 2701 would authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2010 for intelligence activities of the U.S.
government, for the Intelligence Community Management Account,
and for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System (CIARDS).
Since CBO does not provide estimates for classified
programs, this estimate addresses only the unclassified
portions of the bill. In addition, CBO cannot provide estimates
of provisions that affect both classified and unclassified
programs. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that
implementing certain provisions of the bill would cost $236
million in 2010 and $669 million over the 2010-2014 period.
Enacting H.R. 2701 would not affect direct spending or
revenues.
H.R. 2701 includes new subpoena authority that would impose
an intergovernmental and private-sector mandate as defined in
the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA), but CBO expects the
cost of complying with the mandate would be small and well
below the thresholds established in UMRA ($69 million for
intergovernmental mandates and $139 million for private-sector
mandates in 2009, adjusted annually for inflation).
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary impact of H.R. 2701 is shown in the following table.
The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 050
(national defense).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
------------------------------------------------------------
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2010-2014
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
Intelligence Community Management Account:
Authorization Level............................ 673 0 0 0 0 673
Estimated Outlays.............................. 236 283 121 20 7 667
Training in African Languages:
Authorization Level............................ 2 0 0 0 0 2
Estimated Outlays.............................. 0 1 1 0 0 2
Total Changes:
Authorization Level........................ 675 0 0 0 0 675
Estimated Outlays.......................... 236 284 122 20 7 669
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Basis of estimate: For this estimate, CBO assumes that H.R.
2701 will be enacted near the beginning of fiscal year 2010,
that the specified amounts will be appropriated, and that
outlays will follow historical spending patterns for existing
or similar programs.
Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 104 would authorize the appropriation of $673
million for the Intelligence Community Management Account,
which provides the principal source of funding for the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence and provides resources
for coordinating programs, overseeing budgets, and managing the
intelligence agencies. CBO estimates that implementing this
provision would cost $667 million over the 2010-2014 period,
assuming appropriation of the specified amount.
Training in African languages
Section 314 would authorize the Director of National
Intelligence, after consultation with the National Security
Education Board, to establish a pilot program to provide
scholarships for training in certain African languages not
currently covered by existing scholarship programs. The bill
would authorize the appropriation of $2 million for that
purpose, and CBO estimates that those amounts would result in
outlays of $1 million in both fiscal years 2010 and 2011,
assuming the appropriation of the specified amount.
Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
Section 201 would authorize the appropriation of $291
million to CIARDS to cover retirement costs attributable to
military service and various unfunded liabilities. The
appropriation to CIARDS is considered mandatory, and the
authorization under this bill would be the same as the amount
in the CBO baseline. Thus, this estimate does not ascribe any
additional cost to that provision.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: H.R. 2701
contains an intergovernmental and private-sector mandate as
defined in UMRA. Section 501 would extend the National
Commission for the Review of Research and Development Programs
of the U.S. Intelligence Community, and the subpoena authority
of that commission. Entities in the public and private sectors,
if subpoenaed, would be required to provide testimony,
documents, or other evidence. CBO expects that the commission
would likely issue subpoenas sparingly and that the costs to
comply with a subpoena would not be significant. Thus, we
estimate that the total costs of the mandate would be small and
well below the annual thresholds established in UMRA ($69
million for intergovernmental mandates and $139 million for
private-sector mandates in 2009, adjusted annually for
inflation).
The bill also would create a grant program to promote the
recruitment and retention of an ethnically and culturally
diverse workforce within the intelligence community, which
would benefit public colleges and universities. Any costs they
may incur, including matching funds, would result from
complying with conditions of aid.
Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Jason Wheelock; Impact
on state, local, and tribal governments: Burke Doherty; Impact
on the private sector: Elizabeth Bass.
Estimate approved by: Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
Correspondence With Other Committees Regarding Particular Provisions
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this
Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of 1947''.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
* * * * * * *
Title I--Coordination for National Security
* * * * * * *
Sec. 103H. Ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances.
Sec. 103I. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 104B. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 109. Annual report on intelligence.]
* * * * * * *
Sec. 113A. Detail of other personnel.
* * * * * * *
Title V--Accountability for Intelligence Activities
* * * * * * *
Sec. 508. Annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence
community.
Sec. 509. Semiannual reports on the nuclear weapons programs of Iran,
Syria, and North Korea.
Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence
community.
Sec. 511. Government Accountability Office analyses, evaluations, and
investigations.
Sec. 512. Certification of compliance with oversight requirements.
Sec. 513. Reports on security clearances.
* * * * * * *
TITLE X--Education in Support of National Intelligence
Subtitle A--Science and Technology
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1002. Framework for cross-disciplinary education and training.
* * * * * * *
Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 1002. Framework for cross-disciplinary education and training.
[Sec. 1003. Intelligence Community Scholarship Program.]
Sec. 1022. Program on recruitment and training of intelligence analysts.
Sec. 1023. Intelligence officer training program.
Sec. 1024. Stokes scholarship program.
TITLE XI--OTHER PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1103. Misuse of the intelligence community name, initials, or seal.
Sec. 1104. Misuse of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
name, initials, or seal.
* * * * * * *
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 3. As used in this Act:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(4) The term ``intelligence community'' includes the
following:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(H) The intelligence elements of the Army,
the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the
Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, and the Department of Energy.
* * * * * * *
(K) [The elements of the Department of
Homeland Security concerned with the analysis
of intelligence information, including the
Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard] The
Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of Homeland Security.
(L) Such other elements of any [other]
department or agency as may be designated by
the President, or designated jointly by the
Director of National Intelligence and the head
of the department or agency concerned, as an
element of the intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
* * * * * * *
RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Sec. 102A. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Budget Authorities.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall
participate in the development by the Secretary of Defense of
the [annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program
and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities] annual
budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor
program.
* * * * * * *
(d) Role of Director of National Intelligence in Transfer and
Reprogramming of Funds.--(1)(A) * * *
(B) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director
of National Intelligence before transferring or reprogramming
funds made available under the [Joint Military Intelligence
Program] Military Intelligence Program or any successor
program.
* * * * * * *
(3) The Director of National Intelligence may only transfer
or reprogram funds referred to in [subparagraph (A)] paragraph
(1)(A)--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(5)(A) A transfer or reprogramming of funds [or personnel]
may be made under this subsection only if--
(i) * * *
* * * * * * *
(B) A transfer or reprogramming may be made without regard to
a limitation set forth in clause (iv) or (v) of subparagraph
(A) if the transfer has the concurrence of the head of the
department involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency). The
authority to provide such concurrence may only be delegated by
the head of the department [or agency involved] involved or the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the
Central Intelligence Agency) to the deputy of such officer.
* * * * * * *
(l) Enhanced Personnel Management.--(1) * * *
(2)(A) * * *
(B) The Director may prescribe regulations to carry out this
[section] paragraph.
* * * * * * *
(n) Acquisition and Other Authorities.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Sec. 103. (a) * * *
(b) Function.--The function of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence is to assist the Director of National
Intelligence in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of
the Director under this Act[, the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.),] and other applicable provisions of
law, and to carry out such other duties as may be prescribed by
the President or by law.
* * * * * * *
(e) Temporary Appointment to Fill Vacancies.--Notwithstanding
section 3345 of title 5, United States Code, if an officer of
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, other than
the Director of National Intelligence, whose appointment to
office is required to be made by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, dies, resigns, or is unable
to perform the functions and duties of the office--
(1) if during the 365-day period immediately
preceding the date of death, resignation, or beginning
of inability to serve of the applicable officer, the
person serving as the first assistant to the office of
such officer served as such first assistant for not
less than 90 days, such first assistant shall perform
the functions and duties of the office temporarily in
an acting capacity subject to the time limitations of
section 3346 of title 5, United States Code;
(2) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the President may
direct a person who serves in an office for which
appointment is required to be made by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to
perform the functions and duties of the vacant office
temporarily in an acting capacity subject to the time
limitations of such section 3346; or
(3) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the Director of
National Intelligence shall recommend to the President,
and the President may direct, a person to perform the
functions and duties of the vacant office temporarily
in an acting capacity subject to the time limitations
of such section 3346, if--
(A) during the 365-day period preceding the
date of death, resignation, or beginning of
inability to serve of the applicable officer,
such person served in a position in an element
of the intelligence community for not less than
90 days;
(B) the rate of pay for the position
described under subparagraph (A) is equal to or
greater than the minimum rate of pay payable
for a position at GS-15 of the General
Schedule; and
(C) in the case of a person who is employed
by an element of the intelligence community--
(i) the Director of National
Intelligence shall consult with the
head of such element; and
(ii) if the head of such element
objects to the recommendation, the
Director of National Intelligence may
make the recommendation to the
President over the objection of the
head of such element after informing
the President of such objection.
[(e)] (f) Limitation on Co-Location [With] of Headquarters
With Headquarters of Other Elements of Intelligence
Community.--[Commencing as of October 1, 2008, the] (1) Except
as provided in paragraph (2), the headquarters of the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence may not be co-located
with [any other element] the headquarters of any other element
of the intelligence community.
(2) The President may waive the limitation in paragraph (1)
if the President determines that--
(A) a waiver is in the interests of national
security; or
(B) the costs of a headquarters of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence that is separate from
the headquarters of the other elements of the
intelligence community outweighs the potential benefits
of the separation.
(g) Location of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.--The headquarters of the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence may be located in the Washington
metropolitan region (as defined in section 8301 of title 40,
United States Code).
* * * * * * *
DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Sec. 103E. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Duties.--The Director of Science and Technology shall--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(4) assist the Director on the science and technology
elements of the budget of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence[; and];
(5) assist the Director of National Intelligence in
establishing goals for basic, applied, and advanced
research to meet the technology needs of the
intelligence community;
(6) submit to the congressional intelligence
committees an annual report on the science and
technology strategy of the Director that shows
resources mapped to the goals of the intelligence
community; and
[(5)] (7) perform other such duties as may be
prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence or
specified by law.
(d) Director of National Intelligence Science and Technology
Committee.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) The Committee shall--
(A) coordinate and prioritize advances in research
and development related to intelligence[; and];
(B) identify basic, advanced, and applied research
programs to be executed by elements of the intelligence
community; and
[(B)] (C) perform such other functions as the
Director of Science and Technology shall prescribe.
* * * * * * *
CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER
Sec. 103G. (a) Chief Information Officer.--To assist the
Director of National Intelligence in carrying out the
responsibilities of the Director under this Act and other
applicable provisions of law, there shall be within the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence a Chief Information
Officer of the Intelligence Community who shall be appointed by
the President, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
(b) Chief Information Officer of Intelligence Community.--The
Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall
serve as the chief information officer of the intelligence
community.
(c) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to the direction of
the Director of National Intelligence, the Chief Information
Officer of the Intelligence Community shall--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Prohibition on Simultaneous Service as Other Chief
Information Officer.--An individual serving in the position of
Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community may
not, while so serving, serve as the chief information officer
of any other department or agency, or component thereof, of the
United States Government.
OMBUDSMAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SECURITY CLEARANCES
Sec. 103H. (a) Appointment.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall appoint an ombudsman for intelligence
community security clearances.
(b) Provision of Information.--The head of an element of the
intelligence community shall provide a person applying for a
security clearance through or in coordination with such element
with contact information for the ombudsman appointed under
subsection (a).
(c) Report.--Not later than November 1 of each year, the
ombudsman appointed under subsection (a) shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report containing--
(1) the number of persons applying for a security
clearance who have contacted the ombudsman during the
preceding 12 months; and
(2) a summary of the concerns, complaints, and
questions received by the ombudsman from persons
applying for security clearances.
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Sec. 103I. (a) Office of Inspector General of Intelligence
Community.--There is within the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence an Office of the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community.
(b) Purpose.--The purpose of the Office of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community is to--
(1) be an independent and objective office
appropriately accountable to Congress and to initiate
and conduct investigations, inspections, and audits on
matters within the responsibility and authority of the
Director of National Intelligence;
(2) recommend policies designed--
(A) to promote economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in the administration and
implementation of matters within the
responsibility and authority of the Director of
National Intelligence; and
(B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in
such matters;
(3) provide a means for keeping the Director of
National Intelligence fully and currently informed
about--
(A) problems and deficiencies relating to
matters within the responsibility and authority
of the Director of National Intelligence; and
(B) the necessity for, and the progress of,
corrective actions; and
(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure
that the congressional intelligence committees are kept
informed of--
(A) significant problems and deficiencies
relating to matters within the responsibility
and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence; and
(B) the necessity for, and the progress of,
corrective actions.
(c) Inspector General of Intelligence Community.--(1) There
is an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, who
shall be the head of the Office of the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community, who shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as
Inspector General shall be made--
(A) without regard to political affiliation;
(B) on the basis of integrity, compliance with the
security standards of the intelligence community, and
prior experience in the field of intelligence or
national security;
(C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in
accounting, financial analysis, law, management
analysis, public administration, or auditing; and
(D) on the basis of expertise in investigations.
(3) The Inspector General shall report directly to the
Director of National Intelligence.
(4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only by
the President. The President shall communicate in writing to
the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for the
removal of any individual from the position of Inspector
General not later than 30 days before the date on which the
Inspector General is removed from office.
(d) Duties and Responsibilities.--Subject to subsections (g)
and (h), the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
shall--
(1) provide policy direction for, and plan, conduct,
supervise, and coordinate independently, the
investigations, inspections, and audits relating to
matters within the responsibility and authority of the
Director of National Intelligence to ensure they are
conducted efficiently and in accordance with applicable
law and regulations;
(2) keep the Director of National Intelligence and
Congress fully and currently informed concerning
violations of law and regulations, violations of civil
liberties and privacy, fraud and other serious
problems, abuses, and deficiencies that may occur in
matters within the responsibility and authority of the
Director, and report the progress made in implementing
corrective action;
(3) take due regard for the protection of
intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of
all reports issued by the Inspector General, and, to
the extent consistent with the purpose and objective of
such reports, take such measures as may be appropriate
to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and
methods described in such reports; and
(4) in the execution of the duties and
responsibilities under this section, comply with
generally accepted Federal Government auditing
standards.
(e) Limitations on Activities.--(1)(A) Subject to
subparagraph (B), the Director of National Intelligence may
prohibit the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
from initiating, carrying out, or completing any investigation,
inspection, or audit if the Director determines that such
prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security
interests of the United States.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence may not prohibit an
investigation, inspection, or audit under subparagraph (A)
solely on the basis of the level of classification or
compartmentation of information that the Inspector General may
seek access to while conducting such investigation, inspection,
or audit.
(2) If the Director exercises the authority under paragraph
(1), the Director shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees an appropriately classified statement
of the reasons for the exercise of such authority within 7
days.
(3) The Director shall notify the Inspector General at the
time a report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the
extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources
and methods, provide the Inspector General with a copy of such
report.
(4) The Inspector General shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the
Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the
Inspector General considers appropriate.
(f) Authorities.--(1) The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall have direct and prompt access to
the Director of National Intelligence when necessary for any
purpose pertaining to the performance of the duties of the
Inspector General.
(2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any
employee, or any employee of a contractor, of any element of
the intelligence community whose testimony is needed for the
performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
(B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all
records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers,
recommendations, or other material which relate to the programs
and operations with respect to which the Inspector General has
responsibilities under this section.
(C) The Director or, on the recommendation of the Director,
another appropriate official of the intelligence community,
shall take appropriate administrative action against an
employee, or employee of a contractor, of an element of the
intelligence community that fails to cooperate with the
Inspector General. Such administrative action may include loss
of employment or termination of an existing contractual
relationship.
(3) The Inspector General shall, in accordance with
subsection (g), receive and investigate complaints or
information from any person concerning the existence of an
activity within the authorities and responsibilities of the
Director of National Intelligence constituting a violation of
laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of
funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger
to the public health and safety. Once such complaint or
information has been received from an employee of the Federal
Government--
(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the
identity of the employee without the consent of the
employee, unless the Inspector General determines that
such disclosure is unavoidable during the course of the
investigation or the disclosure is made to an official
of the Department of Justice responsible for
determining whether a prosecution should be undertaken;
and
(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of
reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any
employee, unless the complaint was made or the
information was disclosed with the knowledge that it
was false or with willful disregard for its truth or
falsity.
(4) The Inspector General shall administer to or take from
any person an oath, affirmation, or affidavit, whenever
necessary in the performance of the duties of the Inspector
General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when
administered or taken by or before an employee of the Office of
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community designated
by the Inspector General shall have the same force and effect
as if administered or taken by, or before, an officer having a
seal.
(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the Inspector
General may require by subpoena the production of all
information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts,
papers, and other data and documentary evidence necessary in
the performance of the duties and responsibilities of the
Inspector General.
(B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other elements
of the United States Government, the Inspector General shall
obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records,
accounts, papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose
specified in subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by
subpoenas.
(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for, or on
behalf of, any element of the intelligence community, including
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena
issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable
by order of any appropriate district court of the United
States.
(6) The Inspector General may obtain services as authorized
under section 3109 of title 5, United States Code, at rates for
individuals not to exceed the daily equivalent of the maximum
annual rate of basic pay payable for grade GS-15 of the General
Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, United States Code.
(7) The Inspector may, to the extent and in such amounts as
may be provided in advance by appropriations Acts, enter into
contracts and other arrangements for audits, studies, analyses,
and other services with public agencies and with private
persons, and to make such payments as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this section.
(g) Coordination Among the Inspectors General of the
Intelligence Community.--(1)(A) If a matter within the
jurisdiction of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community that may be subject to an investigation, inspection,
review, or audit by both the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community and an inspector general with oversight
responsibility for an element of the intelligence community,
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and such
other inspector general shall expeditiously resolve the
question of which inspector general shall conduct such
investigation, inspection, review, or audit to avoid
unnecessary duplication of the activities of the inspectors
general.
(B) In attempting to resolve a question under subparagraph
(A), the inspectors general concerned may request the
assistance of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General
Forum established under subparagraph (C). If a dispute between
an inspector general within an agency or department of the
United States Government and the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community has not been resolved with the
assistance of the Forum, the inspectors general shall submit
the question to the Director of National Intelligence and the
head of the affected agency or department for resolution.
(C) There is established the Intelligence Community
Inspectors General Forum which shall consist of all statutory
or administrative inspectors general with oversight
responsibility for an element of the intelligence community.
The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall serve
as the chair of the Forum. The Forum shall have no
administrative authority over any inspector general, but shall
serve as a mechanism for informing its members of the work of
individual members of the Forum that may be of common interest
and discussing questions about jurisdiction or access to
employees, employees of a contractor, records, audits, reviews,
documents, recommendations, or other materials that may involve
or be of assistance to more than one of its members.
(2) The inspector general conducting an investigation,
inspection, review, or audit referred to in paragraph (1) shall
submit the results of such investigation, inspection, review,
or audit to any other inspector general, including the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, with
jurisdiction to conduct such investigation, inspection, review,
or audit who did not conduct such investigation, inspection,
review, or audit.
(h) Staff and Other Support.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence shall provide the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community with appropriate and adequate office
space at central and field office locations and with such
equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and
communications facilities and services as may be necessary for
the operation of such offices.
(2)(A) The Inspector General shall select, appoint, and
employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to carry
out the functions, powers, and duties of the Inspector General.
The Inspector General shall ensure that any officer or employee
selected, appointed, or employed has a security clearance
appropriate for the assigned duties of such officer or
employee.
(B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the
Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees
have the requisite training and experience to enable the
Inspector General to carry out the duties of the Inspector
General effectively.
(C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the
Inspector General shall recommend policies to the Director of
National Intelligence to create within the intelligence
community a career cadre of sufficient size to provide
appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the effective
performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
(3)(A) The Inspector General may, in consultation with the
Director, request such information or assistance as may be
necessary for carrying out the duties and responsibilities of
the Inspector General from any department, agency, or other
element of the United States Government.
(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information or
assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the department,
agency, or element concerned shall furnish to the Inspector
General, or to an authorized designee, such information or
assistance.
(C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community may,
upon reasonable notice to the head of any element of the
intelligence community and in coordination with the inspector
general of that element pursuant to subsection (g), conduct an
inspection, review, or audit of such element and may enter into
any place occupied by such element for purposes of the
performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
(i) Reports.--(1)(A) Not later than January 31 and July 31 of
each year, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
shall prepare and submit to the Director of National
Intelligence a report summarizing the activities of the Office
of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community during
the preceding six-month period. The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall provide any portion of the report
involving a component of a department of the United States
Government to the head of that department simultaneously with
submission of the report to the Director of National
Intelligence.
(B) Each report under this paragraph shall include the
following:
(i) A list of the titles or subjects of each
investigation, inspection, review, or audit conducted
during the period covered by such report, including a
summary of the progress of each particular
investigation, inspection, or audit since the preceding
report of the Inspector General under this paragraph.
(ii) A description of significant problems, abuses,
and deficiencies relating to the administration and
implementation of programs and operations of the
intelligence community, and in the relationships
between elements of the intelligence community,
identified by the Inspector General during the period
covered by such report.
(iii) A description of the recommendations for
disciplinary action made by the Inspector General
during the period covered by such report with respect
to significant problems, abuses, or deficiencies
described in clause (ii).
(iv) A statement of whether or not corrective or
disciplinary action has been completed on each
significant recommendation described in previous
semiannual reports, and, in a case where corrective
action has been completed, a description of such
corrective action.
(v) A certification of whether or not the Inspector
General has had full and direct access to all
information relevant to the performance of the
functions of the Inspector General.
(vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena
authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector
General during the period covered by such report.
(vii) Any recommendations that the Inspector General
considers appropriate for legislation to promote
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the
administration and implementation of matters within the
responsibility and authority of the Director of
National Intelligence, and to detect and eliminate
fraud and abuse in such matters.
(C) Not later than 30 days after the date of receipt of a
report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall submit the
report to the congressional intelligence committees together
with any comments the Director considers appropriate.
(D) Each report submitted under subparagraphs (A) and (C)
shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a
classified annex.
(2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to the
Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of
particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or
deficiencies relating to matters within the responsibility and
authority of the Director of National Intelligence.
(B) The Director shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A)
within 7 days of the receipt of such report, together with such
comments as the Director considers appropriate. The Director
shall submit to the committees of the Senate and of the House
of Representatives with jurisdiction over a department of the
United States Government any portion of each report under
subparagraph (A) that involves a problem, abuse, or deficiency
related to a component of such department simultaneously with
transmission of the report to the congressional intelligence
committees.
(3) The Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit
a report to the congressional intelligence committees on an
investigation, inspection, review, or audit if--
(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any
significant differences with the Director affecting the
execution of the duties or responsibilities of the
Inspector General;
(B) the investigation, inspection, review, or audit
carried out by the Inspector General focuses on any
current or former intelligence community official who--
(i) holds or held a position in an element of
the intelligence community that is subject to
appointment by the President, whether or not by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
including such a position held on an acting
basis;
(ii) holds or held a position in an element
of the intelligence community, including a
position held on an acting basis, that is
appointed by the Director of National
Intelligence; or
(iii) holds or held a position as head of an
element of the intelligence community or a
position covered by subsection (b) or (c) of
section 106;
(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector
General to the Department of Justice on possible
criminal conduct by a current or former official
described in subparagraph (B);
(D) the Inspector General receives notice from the
Department of Justice declining or approving
prosecution of possible criminal conduct of any current
or former official described in subparagraph (B); or
(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all
possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant
documentary information in the course of such
investigation, inspection, review, or audit.
(4)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence
community, an employee assigned or detailed to an element of
the intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor of
the intelligence community who intends to report to Congress a
complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may
report such complaint or information to the Inspector General.
(B) Not later than the end of the 14-day period beginning on
the date of receipt from an employee of a complaint or
information under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall
determine whether the complaint or information appears
credible. Upon making such a determination, the Inspector
General shall submit to the Director a notice of that
determination, together with the complaint or information.
(C) Upon receipt of a submittal from the Inspector General
under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, not later than 7
days after such receipt, forward such transmittal to the
congressional intelligence committees, together with any
comments the Director considers appropriate.
(D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible under
subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted under
subparagraph (A), or does not submit the complaint or
information to the Director in accurate form under subparagraph
(B), the employee (subject to clause (ii)) may submit the
complaint or information to Congress by contacting either or
both of the congressional intelligence committees directly.
(ii) An employee may contact the congressional intelligence
committees directly as described in clause (i) only if the
employee--
(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the
Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of
the employee's complaint or information and notice of
the employee's intent to contact the congressional
intelligence committees directly; and
(II) obtains and follows from the Director, through
the Inspector General, direction on how to contact the
intelligence committees in accordance with appropriate
security practices.
(iii) A member or employee of one of the congressional
intelligence committees who receives a complaint or information
under clause (ii) does so in that member or employee's official
capacity as a member or employee of such committee.
(E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who
reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General
under this paragraph of each action taken under this paragraph
with respect to the complaint or information. Such notice shall
be provided not later than 3 days after any such action is
taken.
(F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector General
under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial review.
(G) Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed to limit the
protections afforded an employee of or contractor to the
Central Intelligence Agency under section 17(e)(3) of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(e)(3)).
(H) In this paragraph, the term ``urgent concern'' means any
of the following:
(i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation
of law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to
the funding, administration, or operation of an
intelligence activity involving classified information,
but does not include differences of opinions concerning
public policy matters.
(ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful
withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact
relating to the funding, administration, or operation
of an intelligence activity.
(iii) An action, including a personnel action
described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United
States Code, constituting reprisal or threat of
reprisal prohibited under subsection (f)(3)(B) of this
section.
(5) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United States
Code, the Inspector General shall report to the Attorney
General any information, allegation, or complaint received by
the Inspector General relating to violations of Federal
criminal law that involves a program or operation of an element
of the intelligence community, or in the relationships between
the elements of the intelligence community, consistent with
such guidelines as may be issued by the Attorney General
pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section. A copy of each
such report shall be furnished to the Director.
(j) Separate Budget Account.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall, in accordance with procedures to be issued
by the Director in consultation with the congressional
intelligence committees, include in the National Intelligence
Program budget a separate account for the Office of Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community.
(k) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of Intelligence
Community.--Except as resolved pursuant to subsection (g), the
performance by the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community of any duty, responsibility, or function regarding an
element of the intelligence community shall not be construed to
modify or affect the duties and responsibilities of any other
inspector general having duties and responsibilities relating
to such element.
* * * * * * *
DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 104A. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(g) Foreign Language Proficiency for Certain Senior Level
Positions in Central Intelligence Agency.--(1) Except as
provided pursuant to paragraph (2), an individual may not be
appointed to a position in the Senior Intelligence Service in
the Directorate of Intelligence or the [Directorate of
Operations] National Clandestine Service of the Central
Intelligence Agency unless the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency determines that the individual--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 104B. (a) Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Agency.--There is a Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency who shall be appointed by the President.
(b) Duties.--The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency shall--
(1) assist the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency in carrying out the duties and responsibilities
of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; and
(2) during the absence or disability of the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency, or during a vacancy
in the position of Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, act for and exercise the powers of the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency.
* * * * * * *
APPOINTMENT OF OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE FOR INTELLIGENCE-RELATED
ACTIVITIES
Sec. 106. (a) * * *
(b) Concurrence of DNI in Appointments to Positions in the
Intelligence Community.--(1) * * *
(2) Paragraph (1) applies to the following positions:
[(A) The Director of the National Security Agency.
[(B) The Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office.]
[(C)] (A) The Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency.
[(D)] (B) The Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research.
[(E)] (C) The Director of the Office of Intelligence
of the Department of Energy.
[(F)] (D) The Director of the Office of
Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy.
[(G)] (E) The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence
and Analysis of the Department of the Treasury.
[(H)] (F) The Executive Assistant Director for
Intelligence of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or
any successor to that position.
[(I)] (G) The Under Secretary of Homeland Security
for Intelligence and Analysis.
* * * * * * *
[ANNUAL REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE
[Sec. 109. (a) In General.--(1)(A) Not later each year than
the date provided in section 507, the President shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a report on the
requirements of the United States for intelligence and the
activities of the intelligence community.
[(B) Not later than January 31 each year, and included with
the budget of the President for the next fiscal year under
section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code, the President
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees the
report described in subparagraph (A).
[(2) The purpose of the report is to facilitate an assessment
of the activities of the intelligence community during the
preceding fiscal year and to assist in the development of a
mission and a budget for the intelligence community for the
fiscal year beginning in the year in which the report is
submitted.
[(3) The report shall be submitted in unclassified form, but
may include a classified annex.
[(b) Matters Covered.--(1) Each report under subsection (a)
shall--
[(A) specify the intelligence required to meet the
national security interests of the United States, and
set forth an order of priority for the collection and
analysis of intelligence required to meet such
interests, for the fiscal year beginning in the year in
which the report is submitted; and
[(B) evaluate the performance of the intelligence
community in collecting and analyzing intelligence
required to meet such interests during the fiscal year
ending in the year preceding the year in which the
report is submitted, including a description of the
significant successes and significant failures of the
intelligence community in such collection and analysis
during that fiscal year.
[(2) The report shall specify matters under paragraph (1)(A)
in sufficient detail to assist Congress in making decisions
with respect to the allocation of resources for the matters
specified.
[(c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate
congressional committees'' means the following:
[(1) The Committee on Appropriations and the
Committee on Armed Services of the Senate.
[(2) The Committee on Appropriations and the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of
Representatives.]
* * * * * * *
DETAIL OF OTHER PERSONNEL
Sec. 113A. Except as provided in section 904(g)(2) of the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (50 U.S.C.
402c(g)(2)) and section 113 of this Act, and notwithstanding
any other provision of law, an officer or employee of the
United States or member of the Armed Forces may be detailed to
an element of the intelligence community funded through the
Community Management Account from another element of the United
States Government on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis,
as jointly agreed to by the Director of National Intelligence
and the head of the detailing element, for a period not to
exceed two years.
* * * * * * *
[SEMIANNUAL] ANNUAL REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST
ASSETS
Sec. 118. (a) [Semiannual] Annual Report.--On a [semiannual
basis] annual basis, the Secretary of the Treasury (acting
through the head of the Office of Intelligence Support) shall
submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees
that fully informs the committees concerning operations against
terrorist financial networks. Each such report shall include
with respect to the [preceding six-month period] preceding one-
year period--
(1) * * *
[(2) the total number of applications for asset
seizure and designations of individuals or entities
suspected of having engaged in financial support of
terrorist activities that were granted, modified, or
denied;]
[(3)] (2) the total number of physical searches of
offices, residences, or financial records of
individuals or entities suspected of having engaged in
financial support for terrorist activity; and
[(4)] (3) whether the financial intelligence
information seized in these cases has been shared on a
full and timely basis with the all departments,
agencies, and other entities of the United States
Government involved in intelligence activities
participating in the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking
Center.
* * * * * * *
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the following:
(1) The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed
Services, and the Committee on Financial Services of
the House of Representatives.
(2) The Select Committee on Intelligence, the
Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed
Services, and the Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs of the Senate.
NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
Sec. 119. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Reporting.--(1) * * *
(2) The matters described in this paragraph are as follows:
(A) * * *
(B) The activities of the Directorate of Intelligence
of the National Counterterrorism Center under
[subsection (h)] subsection (i).
* * * * * * *
(k) Exemption of Dissemination of Terrorist Identity
Information From Freedom of Information Act.--(1) Terrorist
identity information disseminated for terrorist screening
purposes or other authorized counterterrorism purposes shall be
exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United
States Code.
(2) In this section:
(A) Authorized counterterrorism purpose.--The term
``authorized counterterrorism purpose'' includes
disclosure to and appropriate use by an element of the
Federal Government of terrorist identifiers of persons
reasonably suspected to be terrorists or supporters of
terrorists.
(B) Terrorist identity information.--The term
``terrorist identity information'' means--
(i) information from a database maintained by
any element of the Federal Government that
would reveal whether an individual has or has
not been determined to be a known or suspected
terrorist or has or has not been determined to
be within the networks of contacts and support
of a known or suspected terrorist; and
(ii) information related to a determination
as to whether or not an individual is or should
be included in the Terrorist Screening Database
or other screening databases based on a
determination that the individual is a known or
suspected terrorist.
(C) Terrorist identifiers.--The term ``terrorist
identifiers''--
(i) includes--
(I) names and aliases;
(II) dates or places of birth;
(III) unique identifying numbers or
information;
(IV) physical identifiers or
biometrics; and
(V) any other identifying information
provided for watchlisting purposes; and
(ii) does not include derogatory information
or information that would reveal or compromise
intelligence or law enforcement sources or
methods.
* * * * * * *
TITLE V--ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
GENERAL CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PROVISIONS
Sec. 501. (a)(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) In carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall
provide to the congressional intelligence committees all
information necessary to assess the lawfulness, effectiveness,
cost, benefit, intelligence gain, budgetary authority, and risk
of an intelligence activity, including--
(A) the legal authority under which the intelligence
activity is being or was conducted;
(B) any legal issues upon which guidance was sought
in carrying out or planning the intelligence activity,
including dissenting legal views;
(C) any specific operational concerns arising from
the intelligence activity, including the risk of
disclosing intelligence sources or methods;
(D) the likelihood that the intelligence activity
will exceed the planned or authorized expenditure of
funds or other resources; and
(E) the likelihood that the intelligence activity
will fail.
* * * * * * *
(c) The President and the congressional intelligence
committees shall each establish [such procedures] such written
procedures as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
this title.
* * * * * * *
(f) As used in this section, the term ``intelligence
activities'' includes covert actions as defined in section
[503(e)] 503(i), and includes financial intelligence
activities.
REPORTING OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN COVERT ACTIONS
Sec. 502. (a) In General.--To the extent consistent with due
regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of
classified information relating to sensitive intelligence
sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters,
the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of all
departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States
Government involved in intelligence activities shall--
(1) keep the congressional intelligence committees
fully and currently informed of all intelligence
activities, other than a covert action (as defined in
section [503(e)] 503(i)), which are the responsibility
of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on
behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of the
United States Government, including any significant
anticipated intelligence activity and any significant
intelligence failure; and
(2) furnish the congressional intelligence committees
any information or material concerning intelligence
activities (including any information or material
relating to the legal authority under which an
intelligence activity is being or was conducted, and
any information or material relating to legal issues
upon which guidance was sought in carrying out or
planning the intelligence activity, including
dissenting legal views), other than covert actions,
which is within their custody or control, and which is
requested by either of the congressional intelligence
committees in order to carry out its authorized
responsibilities.
* * * * * * *
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL AND REPORTING OF COVERT ACTIONS
Sec. 503. (a) * * *
(b) To the extent consistent with due regard for the
protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified
information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and
methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters, the Director
of National Intelligence and the heads of all departments,
agencies, and entities of the United States Government involved
in a covert action--
(1) * * *
(2) shall furnish to the congressional intelligence
committees any information or material concerning
covert actions (including any information or material
relating to the legal authority under which a covert
action is being or was conducted, and any information
or material relating to legal issues upon which
guidance was sought in carrying out or planning the
covert action, including dissenting legal views) which
is in the possession, custody, or control of any
department, agency, or entity of the United States
Government and which is requested by either of the
congressional intelligence committees in order to carry
out its authorized responsibilities.
(c)(1) * * *
[(2) If the President determines that it is essential to
limit access to the finding to meet extraordinary circumstances
affecting vital interests of the United States, the finding may
be reported to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the
congressional intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority
leader of the House of Representatives, the majority and
minority leaders of the Senate, and such other member or
members of the congressional leadership as may be included by
the President.]
(2) If, pursuant to the procedures established by each of the
congressional intelligence committees under section 501(c), one
of the congressional intelligence committees determines that
not all members of that committee are required to have access
to a finding under this subsection, the President may limit
access to such finding or such notice as provided in such
procedures.
* * * * * * *
(4) In a case under paragraph (1), (2), or (3), a copy of the
finding, signed by the President, shall be provided to the
chairman of each congressional intelligence committee. When
access to a finding [is limited to the Members of Congress
specified in paragraph (2)] is not provided to all members of
one of the congressional intelligence committees in accordance
with paragraph (2), a statement of the reasons for limiting
such access shall also be provided.
[(d) The President] (d)(1) The President shall ensure that
the congressional intelligence committees, or, if applicable,
the Members of Congress [specified in] informed in accordance
with subsection (c)(2), are notified of any significant change
in a previously approved covert action, or any significant
undertaking pursuant to a previously approved finding, in the
same manner as findings are reported pursuant to subsection
(c).
(2) For purposes of this subsection, an activity shall
constitute a ``significant undertaking'' if the activity--
(A) involves the potential for loss of life;
(B) requires an expansion of existing authorities,
including authorities relating to research,
development, or operations;
(C) results in the expenditure of significant funds
or other resources;
(D) requires notification under section 504;
(E) gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing
intelligence sources or methods; or
(F) could cause serious damage to the diplomatic
relations of the United States if such activity were
disclosed without authorization.
(e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the
Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency
shall conduct an audit of each covert action at least
every 3 years. Such audits shall be conducted subject
to the provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4) of
subsection (b) of section 17 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q).
(2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector
General of the Central Intelligence Agency is not
required to conduct an audit under paragraph (1) of a
covert action that has been terminated or suspended if
such covert action was terminated or suspended prior to
the last audit of such covert action conducted by the
Inspector General and has not been restarted after the
date on which such audit was completed.
(3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the
completion of an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph
(1), the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence
Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report containing the results of such
audit.
* * * * * * *
(g)(1) A Member of Congress to which a finding is reported
under subsection (c) or notice is provided under subsection
(d)(1) may submit to the Director of National Intelligence an
objection to any part of such finding or such notice. Not later
than 48 hours after such an objection is submitted to the
Director of National Intelligence, the Director shall report
such objection in writing to the President and such Member of
Congress.
(2) In any case where access to a finding reported under
subsection (c) or notice provided under subsection (d)(1) is
not made available to all members of a congressional
intelligence committee in accordance with subsection (c)(2),
the President shall provide such members with general
information on the content of the finding or notice.
(3) The President shall--
(A) maintain a record of the Members of Congress to
which a finding is reported under subsection (c) or
notice is provided under subsection (d)(1) and the date
on which each Member of Congress receives such finding
or notice; and
(B) not later than 30 days after the date on which
such finding is reported or such notice is provided,
provide such record to--
(i) in the case of a finding reported or
notice provided to a Member of the House of
Representatives, the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives; and
(ii) in the case of a finding reported or
notice provided to a Member of the Senate, the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(h) Any requirement under section 501, 502, or this section
to provide information to the congressional intelligence
committees shall be construed to require the submission of such
information to all members of such committees, unless such
information is specifically authorized not to be submitted to
all members of one of such committees in accordance with
subsection (c)(2).
[(e)] (i) As used in this title, the term ``covert action''
means an activity or activities of the United States Government
to influence political, economic, or military conditions
abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States
Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but
does not include--
(1) * * *
FUNDING OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 504. (a) Appropriated funds available to an intelligence
agency may be obligated or expended for an intelligence or
intelligence-related activity only if--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) in the case of funds specifically authorized by
the Congress for a different activity--
(A) * * *
[(B) the need for funds for such activity is
based on unforseen requirements; and]
(B) the use of such funds for such activity
supports an emergent need, improves program
effectiveness, or increases efficiency; and
* * * * * * *
(c) No funds appropriated for, or otherwise available to, any
department, agency, or entity of the United States Government
may be expended, or may be directed to be expended, for any
covert action, as defined in section [503(e)] 503(i), unless
and until a Presidential finding required by subsection (a) of
section 503 has been signed or otherwise issued in accordance
with that subsection.
* * * * * * *
DATES FOR SUBMITTAL OF VARIOUS ANNUAL AND SEMIANNUAL REPORTS TO THE
CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES
Sec. 507. (a) Annual Reports.--(1) The date for the submittal
to the congressional intelligence committees of the following
annual reports shall be the date each year provided in
subsection (c)(1)(A):
[(A) The annual report on intelligence required by
section 109.]
[(B)] (A) The annual report on intelligence provided
to the United Nations required by section 112(b)(1).
[(C)] (B) The annual report on the protection of the
identities of covert agents required by section 603.
[(D)] (C) The annual report of the Inspectors
Generals of the intelligence community on proposed
resources and activities of their offices required by
section 8H(g) of the Inspector General Act of 1978.
[(E)] (D) The annual report on the acquisition of
technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and
advanced conventional munitions required by section 721
of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1997 (Public Law 104-293; 50 U.S.C. 2366).
[(F)] (E) The annual report on commercial activities
as security for intelligence collection required by
section 437(c) of title 10, United States Code.
[(G) The annual update on foreign industrial
espionage required by section 809(b) of the
Counterintelligence and Security Enhancements Act of
1994 (title VIII of Public Law 103-359; 50 U.S.C. App.
2170b(b)).]
[(H)] (F) The annual report on certifications for
immunity in interdiction of aircraft engaged in illicit
drug trafficking required by section 1012(c)(2) of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995
(22 U.S.C. 2291-4(c)(2)).
[(I)] (G) The annual report on activities under the
David L. Boren National Security Education Act of 1991
(title VIII of Public Law 102-183; 50 U.S.C. 1901 et
seq.) required by section 806(a) of that Act (50 U.S.C.
1906(a)).
[(N)] (H) The annual report on hiring and retention
of minority employees in the intelligence community
required by section 114(c).
(I) The annual report on financial intelligence on
terrorist assets required by section 118.
(J) The annual report on foreign language proficiency
in the intelligence community required by section 510.
(2) The date for the submittal to the congressional
intelligence committees of the following annual reports shall
be the date each year provided in subsection (c)(1)(B):
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(D) The annual report on counterdrug intelligence
matters required by section 826 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003.]
(b) Semiannual Reports.--The dates for the submittal to the
congressional intelligence committees of the following
semiannual reports shall be the dates each year provided in
subsection (c)(2):
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(6) The semiannual report on financial intelligence
on terrorist assets required by section 118.]
* * * * * * *
ANNUAL PERSONNEL LEVEL ASSESSMENT FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Sec. 508. (a) Assessment.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall, in consultation with the head of each
element of the intelligence community, prepare an annual
personnel level assessment for such element that assesses the
personnel levels of such element for the fiscal year following
the fiscal year in which the assessment is submitted.
(b) Schedule.--Each assessment required by subsection (a)
shall be submitted to the congressional intelligence committees
each year along with the budget submitted by the President in
accordance with section 1105 of title 31, United States Code.
(c) Contents.--Each assessment required by subsection (a)
shall include, for the element of the intelligence community
concerned, the following information:
(1) The budget submission for personnel costs of such
element for the upcoming fiscal year.
(2) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of
such costs as compared to the personnel costs of the
current fiscal year.
(3) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of
such costs as compared to the personnel costs during
the preceding five fiscal years.
(4) The number of personnel positions requested for
such element for the upcoming fiscal year.
(5) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease
of such number as compared to the number of personnel
positions of such element of the current fiscal year.
(6) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease
of such number as compared to the number of personnel
positions of such element during the preceding five
fiscal years.
(7) The best estimate of the number and costs of
contractors to be funded by such element for the
upcoming fiscal year.
(8) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease
of such costs of contractors as compared to the best
estimate of the costs of contractors to be funded by
such element during the current fiscal year.
(9) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease
of such costs of contractors as compared to the cost of
contractors, and the number of contractors, of such
element during the preceding five fiscal years.
(10) A written justification for the requested
personnel and contractor levels.
(11) The number of intelligence collectors and
analysts employed or contracted by such element.
(12) A list of all contractors that have been the
subject of an investigation completed by the inspector
general of such element during the preceding fiscal
year, or are or have been the subject of an
investigation by such inspector general during the
current fiscal year.
(13) A statement by the Director of National
Intelligence of whether, based on current and projected
funding, such element will have sufficient--
(A) internal infrastructure to support the
requested personnel and contractor levels;
(B) training resources to support the
requested personnel levels; and
(C) funding to support the administrative and
operational activities of the requested
personnel levels.
SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS OF IRAN, SYRIA, AND
NORTH KOREA
Sec. 509. (a) Requirement for Reports.--Not less frequently
than every 180 days, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a
report on the intentions and capabilities of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, with regard to the nuclear weapons
programs of each such country.
(b) Content.--Each report submitted under subsection (a)
shall include, with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran,
the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea--
(1) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs of each
country;
(2) an evaluation of the sources upon which the
intelligence used to prepare the assessment referred to
in paragraph (1) is based, including the number of such
sources and an assessment of the reliability of each
source;
(3) a summary of any intelligence related to any
program gathered or developed since the previous report
was submitted under subsection (a), including
intelligence collected from both open and clandestine
sources for each country; and
(4) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in
knowledge, or other information that would reduce
confidence in the assessment referred to in paragraph
(1).
(c) National Intelligence Estimate.--The Director of National
Intelligence may submit a National Intelligence Estimate on the
intentions and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
the Syrian Arab Republic, or the Democratic People's Republic
of Korea in lieu of a report required by subsection (a) for
that country.
(d) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means--
(1) the congressional intelligence committees;
(2) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee
on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and
(3) the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee
on Foreign Relations of the Senate.
REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Sec. 510. Each year on the date provided in section 507, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees and the Committees on
Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a
report on the proficiency in foreign languages and, as
appropriate, in foreign dialects, of each element of the
intelligence community, including--
(1) the number of positions authorized for such
element that require foreign language proficiency and
the level of proficiency required;
(2) an estimate of the number of such positions that
each element will require during the five-year period
beginning on the date of the submission of the report;
(3) the number of positions authorized for such
element that require foreign language proficiency that
are filled by--
(A) military personnel; and
(B) civilian personnel;
(4) the number of applicants for positions in such
element in the previous fiscal year that indicated
foreign language proficiency, including the foreign
language indicated and the proficiency level;
(5) the number of persons hired by such element with
foreign language proficiency, including the foreign
language and proficiency level;
(6) the number of personnel of such element currently
attending foreign language training, including the
provider of such training;
(7) a description of the efforts of such element to
recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel that are
proficient in a foreign language;
(8) an assessment of methods and models for basic,
advanced, and intensive foreign language training;
(9) for each foreign language and, as appropriate,
dialect of a foreign language--
(A) the number of positions of such element
that require proficiency in the foreign
language or dialect;
(B) the number of personnel of such element
that are serving in a position that requires
proficiency in the foreign language or dialect
to perform the primary duty of the position;
(C) the number of personnel of such element
that are serving in a position that does not
require proficiency in the foreign language or
dialect to perform the primary duty of the
position;
(D) the number of personnel of such element
rated at each level of proficiency of the
Interagency Language Roundtable;
(E) whether the number of personnel at each
level of proficiency of the Interagency
Language Roundtable meets the requirements of
such element;
(F) the number of personnel serving or hired
to serve as linguists for such element that are
not qualified as linguists under the standards
of the Interagency Language Roundtable;
(G) the number of personnel hired to serve as
linguists for such element during the preceding
calendar year;
(H) the number of personnel serving as
linguists that discontinued serving such
element during the preceding calendar year;
(I) the percentage of work requiring
linguistic skills that is fulfilled by an ally
of the United States; and
(J) the percentage of work requiring
linguistic skills that is fulfilled by
contractors;
(10) an assessment of the foreign language capacity
and capabilities of the intelligence community as a
whole;
(11) recommendations for eliminating required reports
relating to foreign-language proficiency that the
Director of National Intelligence considers outdated or
no longer relevant; and
(12) an assessment of the feasibility of employing
foreign nationals lawfully present in the United States
who have previously worked as translators or
interpreters for the Armed Forces or another department
or agency of the Federal Government in Iraq or
Afghanistan to meet the critical language needs of such
element.
GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE ANALYSES, EVALUATIONS, AND
INVESTIGATIONS
Sec. 511. (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection
(b), the Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that
personnel of the Government Accountability Office designated by
the Comptroller General are provided with access to all
information in the possession of an element of the intelligence
community that the Comptroller General determines is necessary
for such personnel to conduct an analysis, evaluation, or
investigation of a program or activity of an element of the
intelligence community that is requested by one of the
congressional intelligence committees.
(b) Exception.--(1)(A) Subject to subparagraph (B), the
Director of National Intelligence may restrict access to
information referred to in subsection (a) by personnel
designated in such subsection if the Director determines that
the restriction is necessary to protect vital national security
interests of the United States.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence may not restrict
access under subparagraph (A) solely on the basis of the level
of classification or compartmentation of information that the
personnel designated in subsection (a) may seek access to while
conducting an analysis, evaluation, or investigation.
(2) If the Director exercises the authority under paragraph
(1), the Director shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees an appropriately classified statement
of the reasons for the exercise of such authority within 7
days.
(3) The Director shall notify the Comptroller General at the
time a report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the
extent consistent with the protection of intelligence sources
and methods, provide the Comptroller General with a copy of
such report.
(4) The Comptroller General shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the
Comptroller General has notice under paragraph (3) that the
Comptroller General considers appropriate.
CERTIFICATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH OVERSIGHT REQUIREMENTS
Sec. 512. The head of each element of the intelligence
community shall semiannually submit to the congressional
intelligence committees--
(1) a certification that, to the best of the
knowledge of the head of such element--
(A) the head of such element of the
intelligence community is in full compliance
with the requirements of this title; and
(B) any information required to be submitted
by such head of such element under this Act
before the date of the submission of such
certification has been properly submitted; or
(2) if such head of such element is unable to submit
a certification under paragraph (1), a statement--
(A) of the reasons such head of such element
is not able to submit such a certification;
(B) describing any information required to be
submitted by such head of such element under
this Act before the date of the submission of
such statement that has not been properly
submitted; and
(C) that the head of such element will submit
such information as soon as possible after the
submission of such statement.
REPORTS ON SECURITY CLEARANCES
Sec. 513. (a) Quadrennial Audit of Position Requirements.--
(1) The President shall every four years conduct an audit of
how the executive branch determines whether a security
clearance is required for a particular position in the Federal
Government.
(2) Not later than 30 days after the completion of an audit
conducted under paragraph (1), the President shall submit to
Congress the results of such audit.
(b) Report on Security Clearance Determinations.--(1) Not
later than February 1 of each year, the President shall submit
to Congress a report on the security clearance process. Such
report shall include, for each security clearance level--
(A) the number of Federal Government employees who--
(i) held a security clearance at such level
as of October 1 of the preceding year; and
(ii) were approved for a security clearance
at such level during the preceding fiscal year;
(B) the number of contractors to the Federal
Government who--
(i) held a security clearance at such level
as of October 1 of the preceding year; and
(ii) were approved for a security clearance
at such level during the preceding fiscal year;
and
(C) for each element of the intelligence community--
(i) the amount of time it took to process the
fastest 80 percent of security clearance
determinations for such level;
(ii) the amount of time it took to process
the fastest 90 percent of security clearance
determinations for such level;
(iii) the number of open security clearance
investigations for such level that have
remained open for--
(I) 4 months or less;
(II) between 4 months and 8 months;
(III) between 8 months and 12 months;
and
(IV) more than a year;
(iv) the percentage of reviews during the
preceding fiscal year that resulted in a denial
or revocation of a security clearance;
(v) the percentage of investigations during
the preceding fiscal year that resulted in
incomplete information;
(vi) the percentage of investigations during
the preceding fiscal year that did not result
in enough information to make a decision on
potentially adverse information; and
(vii) for security clearance determinations
completed or ongoing during the preceding
fiscal year that have taken longer than one
year to complete--
(I) the number of security clearance
determinations for positions as
employees of the Federal Government
that required more than one year to
complete;
(II) the number of security clearance
determinations for contractors that
required more than one year to
complete;
(III) the agencies that investigated
and adjudicated such determinations;
and
(IV) the cause of significant delays
in such determinations.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), the Director of National
Intelligence may consider--
(A) security clearances at the level of confidential
and secret as one security clearance level; and
(B) security clearances at the level of top secret or
higher as one security clearance level.
TITLE VI--PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
PROTECTION OF IDENTITIES OF CERTAIN UNITED STATES UNDERCOVER
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AGENTS, INFORMANTS, AND SOURCES
Sec. 601. (a) Whoever, having or having had authorized access
to classified information that identifies a covert agent,
intentionally discloses any information identifying such covert
agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified
information, knowing that the information disclosed so
identifies such covert agent and that the United States is
taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's
intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined
under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than
[ten years] 15 years, or both.
(b) Whoever, as a result of having authorized access to
classified information, learns the identity of a covert agent
and intentionally discloses any information identifying such
covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive
classified information, knowing that the information disclosed
so identifies such covert agent and that the United States is
taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's
intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined
under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not more than
[five years] 10 years, or both.
* * * * * * *
REPORT
Sec. 603. (a) The President, after receiving information from
the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees an annual report on
measures to protect the identities of covert agents, including
an assessment of the need for any modification of this title
for the purpose of improving legal protections for covert
agents, and on any other matter relevant to the protection of
the identities of covert agents. The date for the submittal of
the report shall be the date provided in section 507.
* * * * * * *
TITLE VII--PROTECTION OF OPERATIONAL FILES
OPERATIONAL FILES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 701. (a) * * *
(b) In this section, the term ``operational files'' means--
(1) files of the [Directorate of Operations] National
Clandestine Service which document the conduct of
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence operations
or intelligence or security liaison arrangements or
information exchanges with foreign governments or their
intelligence or security services;
* * * * * * *
OPERATIONAL FILES OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 705. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(e) Allegation; Improper Withholding of Records; Judicial
Review.--(1) * * *
(2) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner
provided under paragraph (1) as follows:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(D)(i) When a complainant alleges that requested
records were improperly withheld because of improper
exemption of operational files, the Defense
Intelligence Agency shall meet its burden under section
552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code, by
demonstrating to the court by sworn written submission
that exempted operational files likely to contain
[responsible] responsive records currently perform the
functions set forth in subsection (b).
* * * * * * *
TITLE X--EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Subtitle A--Science and Technology
* * * * * * *
[INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM
[Sec. 1003. (a) Establishment.--
[(1) In general.--The Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the head of each
agency of the intelligence community, shall establish a
scholarship program (to be known as the ``Intelligence
Community Scholarship Program'') to award scholarships
to individuals that is designed to recruit and prepare
students for civilian careers in the intelligence
community to meet the critical needs of the
intelligence community agencies.
[(2) Selection of recipients.--
[(A) Merit and agency needs.--Individuals
shall be selected to receive scholarships under
this section through a competitive process
primarily on the basis of academic merit and
the needs of the agency.
[(B) Demonstrated commitment.--Individuals
selected under this section shall have a
demonstrated commitment to the field of study
for which the scholarship is awarded.
[(3) Contractual agreements.--To carry out the
Program the head of each agency shall enter into
contractual agreements with individuals selected under
paragraph (2) under which the individuals agree to
serve as full-time employees of the agency, for the
period described in subsection (g)(1), in positions
needed by the agency and for which the individuals are
qualified, in exchange for receiving a scholarship.
[(b) Eligibility.--In order to be eligible to participate in
the Program, an individual shall--
[(1) be enrolled or accepted for enrollment as a
full-time student at an institution of higher education
and be pursuing or intend to pursue undergraduate or
graduate education in an academic field or discipline
described in the list made available under subsection
(d);
[(2) be a United States citizen; and
[(3) at the time of the initial scholarship award,
not be an employee (as defined under section 2105 of
title 5, United States Code).
[(c) Application.--An individual seeking a scholarship under
this section shall submit an application to the Director of
National Intelligence at such time, in such manner, and
containing such information, agreements, or assurances as the
Director may require.
[(d) Programs and Fields of Study.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall--
[(1) make publicly available a list of academic
programs and fields of study for which scholarships
under the Program may be used; and
[(2) update the list as necessary.
[(e) Scholarships.--
[(1) In general.--The Director of National
Intelligence may provide a scholarship under the
Program for an academic year if the individual applying
for the scholarship has submitted to the Director, as
part of the application required under subsection (c),
a proposed academic program leading to a degree in a
program or field of study on the list made available
under subsection (d).
[(2) Limitation on years.--An individual may not
receive a scholarship under this section for more than
4 academic years, unless the Director of National
Intelligence grants a waiver.
[(3) Student responsibilities.--Scholarship
recipients shall maintain satisfactory academic
progress.
[(4) Amount.--The dollar amount of a scholarship
under this section for an academic year shall be
determined under regulations issued by the Director of
National Intelligence, but shall in no case exceed the
cost of tuition, fees, and other authorized expenses as
established by the Director.
[(5) Use of scholarships.--A scholarship provided
under this section may be expended for tuition, fees,
and other authorized expenses as established by the
Director of National Intelligence by regulation.
[(6) Payment to institution of higher education.--The
Director of National Intelligence may enter into a
contractual agreement with an institution of higher
education under which the amounts provided for a
scholarship under this section for tuition, fees, and
other authorized expenses are paid directly to the
institution with respect to which the scholarship is
provided.
[(f) Special Consideration for Current Employees.--
[(1) Set aside of scholarships.--Notwithstanding
paragraphs (1) and (3) of subsection (b), 10 percent of
the scholarships awarded under this section shall be
set aside for individuals who are employees of agencies
on the date of enactment of this section to enhance the
education of such employees in areas of critical needs
of agencies.
[(2) Full- or part-time education.--Employees who are
awarded scholarships under paragraph (1) shall be
permitted to pursue undergraduate or graduate education
under the scholarship on a full-time or part-time
basis.
[(g) Employee Service.--
[(1) Period of service.--Except as provided in
subsection (i)(2), the period of service for which an
individual shall be obligated to serve as an employee
of the agency is 24 months for each academic year for
which a scholarship under this section is provided.
Under no circumstances shall the total period of
obligated service be more than 8 years.
[(2) Beginning of service.--
[(A) In general.--Except as provided in
subparagraph (B), obligated service under
paragraph (1) shall begin not later than 60
days after the individual obtains the
educational degree for which the scholarship
was provided.
[(B) Deferral.--In accordance with
regulations established by the Director of
National Intelligence, the Director or designee
may defer the obligation of an individual to
provide a period of service under paragraph (1)
if the Director or designee determines that
such a deferral is appropriate.
[(h) Repayment.--
[(1) In general.--Scholarship recipients who fail to
maintain a high level of academic standing, as defined
by the Director of National Intelligence, who are
dismissed from their educational institutions for
disciplinary reasons, or who voluntarily terminate
academic training before graduation from the
educational program for which the scholarship was
awarded, shall be in breach of their contractual
agreement and, in lieu of any service obligation
arising under such agreement, shall be liable to the
United States for repayment within 1 year after the
date of default of all scholarship funds paid to them
and to the institution of higher education on their
behalf under the agreement, except as provided in
subsection (i)(2). The repayment period may be extended
by the Director when determined to be necessary, as
established by regulation.
[(2) Liability.--Scholarship recipients who, for any
reason, fail to begin or complete their service
obligation after completion of academic training, or
fail to comply with the terms and conditions of
deferment established by the Director of National
Intelligence under subsection (i)(2)(B), shall be in
breach of their contractual agreement. When recipients
breach their agreements for the reasons stated in the
preceding sentence, the recipient shall be liable to
the United States for an amount equal to--
[(A) the total amount of scholarships
received by such individual under this section;
and
[(B) the interest on the amounts of such
awards which would be payable if at the time
the awards were received they were loans
bearing interest at the maximum legal
prevailing rate, as determined by the Treasurer
of the United States, multiplied by 3.
[(i) Cancellation, Waiver, or Suspension of Obligation.--
[(1) Cancellation.--Any obligation of an individual
incurred under the Program (or a contractual agreement
thereunder) for service or payment shall be canceled
upon the death of the individual.
[(2) Waiver or suspension.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall prescribe regulations to provide for
the partial or total waiver or suspension of any
obligation of service or payment incurred by an
individual under the Program (or a contractual
agreement thereunder) whenever compliance by the
individual is impossible or would involve extreme
hardship to the individual, or if enforcement of such
obligation with respect to the individual would be
contrary to the best interests of the Government.
[(j) Regulations.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall prescribe regulations necessary to carry out this
section.
[(k) Definitions.--In this section:
[(1) Agency.--The term ``agency'' means each element
of the intelligence community as determined by the
Director of National Intelligence.
[(2) Institution of higher education.--The term
``institution of higher education'' has the meaning
given that term under section 101 of the Higher
Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001).
[(3) Program.--The term ``Program'' means the
Intelligence Community Scholarship Program established
under subsection (a).]
* * * * * * *
Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions
* * * * * * *
PROGRAM ON RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS
Sec. 1022. (a) Program.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence shall carry out a program to ensure that selected
students or former students are provided funds to continue
academic training, or are reimbursed for academic training
previously obtained, in areas of specialization that the
Director, in consultation with the other heads of the elements
of the intelligence community, identifies as areas in which the
current capabilities of the intelligence community are
deficient or in which future capabilities of the intelligence
community are likely to be deficient.
(2) A student or former student selected for participation in
the program shall commit to employment with an element of the
intelligence community, following completion of appropriate
academic training, under such terms and conditions as the
Director considers appropriate.
(3) The program shall be known as the Pat Roberts
Intelligence Scholars Program.
(b) Elements.--In carrying out the program under subsection
(a), the Director shall--
(1) establish such requirements relating to the
academic training of participants as the Director
considers appropriate to ensure that participants are
prepared for employment as intelligence professionals;
and
(2) periodically review the areas of specialization
of the elements of the intelligence community to
determine the areas in which such elements are, or are
likely to be, deficient in capabilities.
(c) Use of Funds.--Funds made available for the program under
subsection (a) shall be used to--
(1) provide a monthly stipend for each month that a
student is pursuing a course of study;
(2) pay the full tuition of a student or former
student for the completion of such course of study;
(3) pay for books and materials that the student or
former student requires or required to complete such
course of study;
(4) pay the expenses of the student or former student
for travel requested by an element of the intelligence
community in relation to such program; or
(5) for such other purposes the Director considers
appropriate to carry out such program.
INTELLIGENCE OFFICER TRAINING PROGRAM
Sec. 1023. (a) Programs.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence may carry out a grant program in accordance with
subsection (b) to enhance the recruitment and retention of an
ethnically and culturally diverse intelligence community
workforce with capabilities critical to the national security
interests of the United States.
(2) In carrying out paragraph (1), the Director of National
Intelligence shall identify the skills necessary to meet
current or emergent needs of the intelligence community and the
educational disciplines that will provide individuals with such
skills.
(b) Institutional Grant Program.--(1) The Director of
National Intelligence may provide grants to institutions of
higher education to support the establishment or continued
development of programs of study in educational disciplines
identified under subsection (a)(2).
(2) A grant provided under paragraph (1) may, with respect to
the educational disciplines identified under subsection (a)(2),
be used for the following purposes:
(A) Curriculum or program development.
(B) Faculty development.
(C) Laboratory equipment or improvements.
(D) Faculty research.
(3) An institution of higher education seeking a grant under
this section shall submit an application describing the
proposed use of the grant at such time and in such manner as
the Director may require.
(4) An institution of higher education that receives a grant
under this section shall submit to the Director regular reports
regarding the use of such grant, including--
(A) a description of the benefits to students who
participate in the course of study funded by such
grant;
(B) a description of the results and accomplishments
related to such course of study; and
(C) any other information that the Director may
require.
(c) Regulations.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out
this section.
(d) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Institution of higher education.--The term
``institution of higher education'' has the meaning
given the term in section 101 of the Higher Education
Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1001).
(2) Director.--The term ``Director'' means the
Director of National Intelligence.
STOKES SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM
Sec. 1024. The head of an element of the intelligence
community may establish an undergraduate and graduate training
program with respect to civilian employees of such element in
the same manner and under the same conditions as the Secretary
of Defense is authorized to establish such a program under
section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50
U.S.C. 402 note).
TITLE XI--ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES
Sec. 1102. (a) * * *
(b) Annual Review of Dissemination Lists.--[(1) The Director]
The Director of National Intelligence shall establish and
implement a process for all elements of the intelligence
community to review, on an annual basis, individuals included
on distribution lists for access to classified information.
Such process shall ensure that only individuals who have a
particularized ``need to know'' (as determined by the Director)
are continued on such distribution lists.
[(2) Not later than October 15 of each year, the Director
shall certify to the congressional intelligence committees that
the review required under paragraph (1) has been conducted in
all elements of the intelligence community during the preceding
fiscal year.]
* * * * * * *
MISUSE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY NAME, INITIALS, OR SEAL
Sec. 1103. (a) Prohibited Acts.--No person may, except with
the written permission of the Director of National Intelligence
or a designee of the Director, knowingly use the words
``intelligence community'', the initials ``IC'', the seal of
the intelligence community, or any colorable imitation of such
words, initials, or seal in connection with any merchandise,
impersonation, solicitation, or commercial activity in a manner
reasonably calculated to convey the impression that such use is
approved, endorsed, or authorized by the Director of National
Intelligence, except that employees of the intelligence
community may use the intelligence community name, initials,
and seal in accordance with regulations promulgated by the
Director of National Intelligence.
(b) Injunction.--Whenever it appears to the Attorney General
that any person is engaged or is about to engage in an act or
practice which constitutes or will constitute conduct
prohibited by subsection (a), the Attorney General may initiate
a civil proceeding in a district court of the United States to
enjoin such act or practice. Such court shall proceed as soon
as practicable to the hearing and determination of such action
and may, at any time before final determination, enter such
restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other action
as is warranted, to prevent injury to the United States or to
any person or class of persons for whose protection the action
is brought.
MISUSE OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE NAME,
INITIALS, OR SEAL
Sec. 1104. (a) Prohibited Acts.--No person may, except with
the written permission of the Director of National Intelligence
or a designee of the Director, knowingly use the words ``Office
of the Director of National Intelligence'', the initials
``ODNI'', the seal of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, or any colorable imitation of such words,
initials, or seal in connection with any merchandise,
impersonation, solicitation, or commercial activity in a manner
reasonably calculated to convey the impression that such use is
approved, endorsed, or authorized by the Director of National
Intelligence.
(b) Injunction.--Whenever it appears to the Attorney General
that any person is engaged or is about to engage in an act or
practice which constitutes or will constitute conduct
prohibited by subsection (a), the Attorney General may initiate
a civil proceeding in a district court of the United States to
enjoin such act or practice. Such court shall proceed as soon
as practicable to the hearing and determination of such action
and may, at any time before final determination, enter such
restraining orders or prohibitions, or take such other action
as is warranted, to prevent injury to the United States or to
any person or class of persons for whose protection the action
is brought.
----------
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
* * * * * * *
SEC. 105. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY.
(a) * * *
(b) Construction of Authority.--Nothing in section 311 of
title 31, United States Code (as amended by subsection (a)), or
in section 313 of such title, shall be construed to alter the
authorities and responsibilities of the [Director of Central
Intelligence] Director of National Intelligence with respect to
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of
the Treasury as an element of the intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle B--Intelligence
* * * * * * *
[SEC. 318. PILOT PROGRAM ON RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF INTELLIGENCE
ANALYSTS.
[(a) Pilot Program.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence shall carry out a pilot program to ensure that
selected students or former students are provided funds to
continue academic training, or are reimbursed for academic
training previously obtained, in areas of specialization that
the Director, in consultation with the other heads of the
elements of the intelligence community, identifies as areas in
which the current analytic capabilities of the intelligence
community are deficient or in which future analytic
capabilities of the intelligence community are likely to be
deficient.
[(2) A student or former student selected for participation
in the pilot program shall commit to employment with an element
of the intelligence community, following completion of
appropriate academic training, under such terms and conditions
as the Director considers appropriate.
[(3) The pilot program shall be known as the Pat Roberts
Intelligence Scholars Program.
[(b) Elements.--In carrying out the pilot program under
subsection (a), the Director shall--
[(1) establish such requirements relating to the
academic training of participants as the Director
considers appropriate to ensure that participants are
prepared for employment as intelligence analysts; and
[(2) periodically review the areas of specialization
of the elements of the intelligence community to
determine the areas in which such elements are, or are
likely to be, deficient in analytic capabilities.
[(c) Duration.--The Director shall carry out the pilot
program under subsection (a) during fiscal years 2004 through
2006.
[(d) Limitation on Number of Members During Fiscal Year
2004.--The total number of individuals participating in the
pilot program under subsection (a) during fiscal year 2004 may
not exceed 150 students.
[(e) Responsibility.--The Director shall carry out the pilot
program under subsection (a) through the Deputy Director of
National Intelligence.
[(f) Reports.--(1) Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director shall submit to
Congress a preliminary report on the pilot program under
subsection (a), including a description of the pilot program
and the authorities to be utilized in carrying out the pilot
program.
[(2) Not later than one year after the commencement of the
pilot program, the Director shall submit to Congress a report
on the pilot program. The report shall include--
[(A) a description of the activities under the pilot
program, including the number of individuals who
participated in the pilot program and the training
provided such individuals under the pilot program;
[(B) an assessment of the effectiveness of the pilot
program in meeting the purpose of the pilot program;
and
[(C) any recommendations for additional legislative
or administrative action that the Director considers
appropriate in light of the pilot program.
[(g) Funding.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated
by this Act, $4,000,000 shall be available until expended to
carry out this section.
[SEC. 319. IMPROVEMENT OF EQUALITY OF EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
[(a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
[(1) It is the recommendation of the Joint Inquiry of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence into
Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, that the
Intelligence Community should enhance recruitment of a
more ethnically and culturally diverse workforce and
devise a strategy to capitalize upon the unique
cultural and linguistic capabilities of first
generation Americans.
[(2) The Intelligence Community could greatly benefit
from an increased number of employees who are
proficient in foreign languages and knowledgeable of
world cultures, especially in foreign languages that
are critical to the national security interests of the
United States. Particular emphasis should be given to
the recruitment of United States citizens whose
linguistic capabilities are acutely required for the
improvement of the overall intelligence collection and
analysis effort of the United States Government.
[(3) The Intelligence Community has a significantly
lower percentage of women and minorities than the total
workforce of the Federal government and the total
civilian labor force.
[(4) Women and minorities continue to be under-
represented in senior grade levels, and in core mission
areas, of the intelligence community.
[(b) Pilot Project To Promote Equality of Employment
Opportunities for Women and Minorities Throughout the
Intelligence Community Using Innovative Methodologies.--The
Director of National Intelligence shall carry out a pilot
project under this section to test and evaluate alternative,
innovative methods to promote equality of employment
opportunities in the intelligence community for women,
minorities, and individuals with diverse ethnic and cultural
backgrounds, skills, language proficiency, and expertise.
[(c) Methods.--In carrying out the pilot project, the
Director shall employ methods to increase diversity of officers
and employees in the intelligence community.
[(d) Duration of Project.--The Director shall carry out the
project under this section for a 3-year period.
[(e) Report.--Not later than 2 years after the date the
Director implements the pilot project under this section, the
Director shall submit to Congress a report on the project. The
report shall include--
[(1) an assessment of the effectiveness of the
project; and
[(2) recommendations on the continuation of the
project, as well recommendations as for improving the
effectiveness of the project in meeting the goals of
promoting equality of employment opportunities in the
intelligence community for women, minorities, and
individuals with diverse ethnic and cultural
backgrounds, skills, language proficiency, and
expertise.
[(f) Diversity Plan.--(1) Not later than February 15, 2004,
the Director of Central Intelligence shall submit to Congress a
report which describes the plan of the Director, entitled the
``DCI Diversity Strategic Plan'', and any subsequent revision
to that plan, to increase diversity of officers and employees
in the intelligence community, including the short- and long-
term goals of the plan. The report shall also provide a
detailed description of the progress that has been made by each
element of the intelligence community in implementing the plan.
[(2) In implementing the plan, the Director of National
Intelligence shall incorporate innovative methods for
recruitment and hiring that the Director has determined to be
effective from the pilot project carried out under this
section.
[(g) Intelligence Community Defined.--In this section, the
term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given that term
in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
401(4)).]
* * * * * * *
----------
RONALD W. REAGAN NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR
2005
* * * * * * *
DIVISION A--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATIONS
* * * * * * *
TITLE IX--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
* * * * * * *
Subtitle C--Intelligence-Related Matters
* * * * * * *
[SEC. 922. PILOT PROGRAM ON CRYPTOLOGIC SERVICE TRAINING.
[(a) Program Authorized.--The Director of the National
Security Agency may carry out a pilot program on cryptologic
service training for the intelligence community.
[(b) Objective of Program.--The objective of the pilot
program is to increase the number of qualified entry-level
language analysts and intelligence analysts available to the
National Security Agency and the other elements of the
intelligence community through the directed preparation and
recruitment of qualified entry-level language analysts and
intelligence analysts who commit to a period of service or a
career in the intelligence community.
[(c) Program Scope.--The pilot program shall be national in
scope.
[(d) Program Participants.--(1) Subject to the provisions of
this subsection, the Director shall select the participants in
the pilot program from among individuals qualified to
participate in the pilot program utilizing such procedures as
the Director considers appropriate for purposes of the pilot
program.
[(2) Each individual who receives financial assistance under
the pilot program shall perform one year of obligated service
with the National Security Agency, or another element of the
intelligence community approved by the Director, for each
academic year for which such individual receives such financial
assistance upon such individual's completion of post-secondary
education.
[(3) Each individual selected to participate in the pilot
program shall be qualified for a security clearance appropriate
for the individual under the pilot program.
[(4) The total number of participants in the pilot program at
any one time may not exceed 400 individuals.
[(e) Program Management.--In carrying out the pilot program,
the Director shall--
[(1) identify individuals interested in working in
the intelligence community, and committed to taking
college-level courses that will better prepare them for
a career in the intelligence community as a language
analyst or intelligence analyst;
[(2) provide each individual selected for
participation in the pilot program--
[(A) financial assistance for the pursuit of
courses at institutions of higher education
selected by the Director in fields of study
that will qualify such individual for
employment by an element of the intelligence
community as a language analyst or intelligence
analyst; and
[(B) educational counseling on the selection
of courses to be so pursued; and
[(3) provide each individual so selected information
on the opportunities available for employment in the
intelligence community.
[(f) Duration of Program.--(1) The Director shall terminate
the pilot program not later than six years after the date of
the enactment of this Act.
[(2) The termination of the pilot program under paragraph (1)
shall not prevent the Director from continuing to provide
assistance, counseling, and information under subsection (e) to
individuals who are participating in the pilot program on the
date of termination of the pilot program throughout the
academic year in progress as of that date.]
* * * * * * *
----------
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ACT OF 1959
* * * * * * *
Sec. 2. (a) There is a Director of the National Security
Agency.
(b) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be
appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate.
(c) The Director of the National Security Agency shall be the
head of the National Security Agency and shall discharge such
functions and duties as are provided by this Act or otherwise
by law.
Sec. 3. (a) There is an Associate Director of the National
Security Agency for Compliance and Training, who shall be
appointed by the Director of the National Security Agency.
(b) The Associate Director of the National Security Agency
for Compliance and Training shall ensure that--
(1) all programs and activities of the National
Security Agency are conducted in a manner consistent
with all applicable laws, regulations, and policies;
and
(2) the training of relevant personnel is sufficient
to ensure that such programs and activities are
conducted in such a manner.
Sec. 4. (a) There is a General Counsel of the National
Security Agency, who shall be appointed by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
(b) The General Counsel of the National Security Agency shall
serve as the chief legal officer of the National Security
Agency.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 16. (a) The purpose of this section is to establish an
[undergraduate] undergraduate and graduate training program,
which may lead to [the baccalaureate] a baccalaureate or
graduate degree, to facilitate the recruitment of individuals,
particularly minority high school students, with a demonstrated
capability to develop skills critical to the mission of the
National Security Agency, including mathematics, computer
science, engineering, and foreign languages.
* * * * * * *
(d)(1) To be eligible for assignment under subsection (b), an
employee of the Agency must agree in writing--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(C) to reimburse the United States for the total cost
of education (excluding the employee's pay and
allowances) provided under this section to the employee
if, prior to the employee's completing the educational
course of training for which the employee is assigned,
the assignment or the employee's employment with the
Agency is [terminated either by the Agency due to
misconduct by the employee or by the employee
voluntarily; and] terminated by--
(i) the Agency due to misconduct by the
person;
(ii) the person voluntarily; or
(iii) by the Agency for the failure of the
person to maintain such level of academic
standing in the educational course of training
as the Director of the National Security Agency
specifies in the agreement under this
paragraph; and
* * * * * * *
(e)[(1) When an employee is assigned under this section to an
institution, the Agency shall disclose to the institution to
which the employee is assigned that the Agency employs the
employee and that the Agency funds the employee's education.]
[(2)] Agency efforts to recruit individuals at educational
institutions for participation in the [undergraduate]
undergraduate and graduate training program established by this
section shall be made openly and according to the common
practices of universities and employers recruiting at such
institutions.
* * * * * * *
----------
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995
* * * * * * *
TITLE VIII--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
* * * * * * *
SEC. 809. REPORTS ON FOREIGN INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE.
(a) * * *
(b) [Annual] Biannual Update.--
[(1) Submittal to congressional intelligence
committees.--Not later each year than the date provided
in section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947,
the President shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report updating the
information referred to in subsection (a)(1)(D).]
(1) Submission to congress.--The President shall
biannually submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committees on Armed Services of the
House of Representatives and the Senate, and
congressional leadership a report updating the
information referred to in subsection (a)(1)(D).
[(2) Submittal to congressional leadership.--Not
later than April 14 each year, the President shall
submit to the congressional leadership a report
updating the information referred to in subsection
(a)(1)(D).]
[(3)] (2) Definitions.--In this subsection:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
----------
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle E--Terrorism
* * * * * * *
SEC. 343. TERRORIST IDENTIFICATION CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(d) Reporting and Certification.--(1) The Director shall
review on an annual basis the information provided by various
departments and agencies for purposes of the list under
subsection (a) in order to determine whether or not the
information so provided is derived from the widest possible
range of intelligence available to such departments and
agencies.
[(2) The Director shall, as a result of each review under
paragraph (1), certify whether or not the elements of the
intelligence community responsible for the collection of
intelligence related to the list have provided information for
purposes of the list that is derived from the widest possible
range of intelligence available to such department and
agencies.]
[(e)] (d) Report on Criteria for Information Sharing.--(1) *
* *
* * * * * * *
[(f)] (e) System Administration Requirements.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(g)] (f) Report on Status of System.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(h)] (g) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In
this section, the term ``congressional intelligence
committees'' means--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
TITLE VIII--REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle C--Recurring Annual Reports
* * * * * * *
[SEC. 826. ANNUAL REPORT ON COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE MATTERS.
[(a) Annual Report.--The Counterdrug Intelligence
Coordinating Group shall submit to the appropriate committees
of Congress each year a report on current counterdrug
intelligence matters. The report shall include the
recommendations of the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating
Group on the appropriate number of permanent staff, and of
detailed personnel, for the staff of the Counterdrug
Intelligence Executive Secretariat.
[(b) Submittal Date.--The date of the submittal each year of
the report required by subsection (a) shall be the date
provided in section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947,
as added by section 811 of this Act.
[(c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this
section, the term ``appropriate committees of Congress''
means--
[(1) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and House of Representatives; and
[(2) the congressional intelligence committees (as
defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)).]
* * * * * * *
TITLE X--NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1002. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) * * *
(b) Composition.--The Commission shall be composed of 12
members, as follows:
(1) [The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for
Community Management.] The Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence.
* * * * * * *
(i) Review.--The Commission shall review the status of
research and development programs and activities within the
intelligence community, [including] including advanced research
and development programs and activities. Such review shall
include--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1007. FINAL REPORT; TERMINATION.
(a) Final Report.--Not later than [September 1, 2004]
February 1, 2011, the Commission shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Director of Central
Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense a final report as
required by section 1002(h)(2).
* * * * * * *
----------
TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
PART III--EMPLOYEES
* * * * * * *
SUBPART D--PAY AND ALLOWANCES
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 53--PAY RATES AND SYSTEMS
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER II--EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE PAY RATES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5313. Positions at level II
Level II of the Executive Schedule applies to the following
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
Deputy Secretary of Defense.
* * * * * * *
[Director of Central Intelligence.]
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5314. Positions at level III
Level III of the Executive Schedule applies to the following
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
Solicitor General of the United States.
* * * * * * *
Deputy Administrator of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration.
[Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence (2)] Deputy
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
* * * * * * *
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5315. Positions at level IV
Level IV of the Executive Schedule applies to the following
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
Deputy Administrator of General Services.
* * * * * * *
[General Counsel of the Office of the National
Intelligence Director.]
General Counsel of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.
* * * * * * *
SUBPART F--LABOR-MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 73--SUITABILITY, SECURITY, AND CONDUCT
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER IV--FOREIGN GIFTS AND DECORATIONS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 7342. Receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(f)(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency may delete the information described in subparagraphs
(A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the Director certifies
in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of
such information could adversely affect United States
intelligence sources.
[(B) In transmitting such listings for the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, the Director of National
Intelligence may delete the information described in
subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the
Director certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that
the publication of such information could adversely affect
United States intelligence sources.]
(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of the
intelligence community, the head of such element may delete the
information described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph
(2) or in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (3) if the head
of such element certifies in writing to the Secretary of State
that the publication of such information could adversely affect
United States intelligence sources or methods.
(B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of State
pursuant to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be
transmitted to the Director of National Intelligence who shall
keep a record of such information.
(C) In this paragraph, the term ``intelligence community''
has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
* * * * * * *
----------
TITLE 49, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
Subtitle I--Department OF Transportation
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 1--ORGANIZATION
* * * * * * *
Sec. 115. Transportation Security Oversight Board
(a) * * *
(b) Membership.--
(1) Number and appointment.--The Board shall be
composed of 7 members as follows:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(F) The Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, or the Director's designee.]
(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or
the Director's designee.
* * * * * * *
----------
INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978
* * * * * * *
[AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
[Sec. 8K. If the Director of National Intelligence determines
that an Office of Inspector General would be beneficial to
improving the operations and effectiveness of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, the Director of National
Intelligence is authorized to establish, with any of the
duties, responsibilities, and authorities set forth in this
Act, an Office of Inspector General.]
* * * * * * *
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 12. As used in this Act--
(1) the term ``head of the establishment'' means the
Secretary of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education,
Energy, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban
Development, the Interior, Labor, State,
Transportation, Homeland Security, or the Treasury; the
Attorney General; the Administrator of the Agency for
International Development, Environmental Protection,
General Services, National Aeronautics and Space, or
Small Business, or Veterans' Affairs; the Director of
the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the National
Security Agency; or the Office of Personnel Management;
the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or
the Railroad Retirement Board; the Chairperson of the
Thrift Depositor Protection Oversight Board; the Chief
Executive Officer of the Corporation for National and
Community Service; the Administrator of the Community
Development Financial Institutions Fund; the chief
executive officer of the Resolution Trust Corporation;
the Chairperson of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation; the Commissioner of Social Security,
Social Security Administration; the Director of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency; the Board of Directors
of the Tennessee Valley Authority; the President of the
Export-Import Bank; or the Federal Cochairpersons of
the Commissions established under section 15301 of
title 40, United States Code; as the case may be;
(2) the term ``establishment'' means the Department
of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy,
Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban
Development, the Interior, Justice, Labor, State,
Transportation, Homeland Security, or the Treasury; the
Agency for International Development, the Community
Development Financial Institutions Fund, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, the General Services Administration,
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the
National Security Agency, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, the Office of Personnel Management, the
Railroad Retirement Board, the Resolution Trust
Corporation, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
the Small Business Administration, the Corporation for
National and Community Service, or the Veterans'
Administration, the Social Security Administration, the
Federal Housing Finance Agency, the Tennessee Valley
Authority, the Export-Import Bank, or the Commissions
established under section 15301 of title 40, United
States Code, as the case may be;
* * * * * * *
----------
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949
* * * * * * *
GENERAL AUTHORITIES
Sec. 5. (a) In General.--In the performance of its functions,
the Central Intelligence Agency is authorized to--
(1) Transfer to and receive from other Government agencies
such sums as may be approved by the Office of Management and
Budget, for the performance of any of the functions or
activities [authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section
102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections
(a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7),
(d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)] authorized under section 104A of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a), and any
other Government agency is authorized to transfer to or receive
from the Agency such sums without regard to any provisions of
law limiting or prohibiting transfers between appropriations.
Sums transferred to the Agency in accordance with this
paragraph may be expended for the purposes and under the
authority of this Act without regard to limitations of
appropriations from which transferred;
* * * * * * *
SEC. 17. INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE AGENCY.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Semiannual Reports; Immediate Reports of Serious or
Flagrant Problems; Reports of Functional Problems; Reports to
Congress on Urgent Concerns.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) In the event that--
(A) * * *
(B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried
out by the Inspector General should focus on any
current or former Agency official who--
(i) holds or held a position in the Agency
that is subject to appointment by the
President, by and with the [advise] advice and
consent of the Senate, including such a
position held on an acting basis; or
(ii) holds or held the position in the
Agency, including such a position held on an
acting basis, of--
(I) [Executive Director] Associate
Deputy Director;
(II) [Deputy Director for Operations]
Director of the National Clandestine
Service;
(III) [Deputy Director for
Intelligence] Director of Intelligence;
(IV) [Deputy Director for
Administration] Director of Support; or
(V) [Deputy Director for Science and
Technology] Director of Science and
Technology;
* * * * * * *
(e) Authorities of the Inspector General.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and
investigate complaints or information from any person
concerning the existence of an activity constituting a
violation of laws, rules, or regulations, or mismanagement,
gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or a substantial and
specific danger to the public health and safety. Once such
complaint or information has been received from an employee of
the Agency--
(A) * * *
(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of
reprisal, for making such complaint or providing such
information may be taken by any employee of the Agency
in a position to take such actions, unless the
complaint was made or the information was disclosed
with the knowledge that it was false or with willful
disregard for its truth or falsity.
* * * * * * *
PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS FOR INTERROGATIONS
INVOLVING PERSONS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 24. (a) Prohibition.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency shall not expend or obligate funds for payment to any
contractor to conduct the interrogation of a detainee or
prisoner in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(b) Exception.--
(1) In general.--The Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency may request, and the Director of
National Intelligence may grant, a written waiver of
the requirement under subsection (a) if the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency determines that--
(A) no employee of the Federal Government
is--
(i) capable of performing such
interrogation; and
(ii) available to perform such
interrogation; and
(B) such interrogation is in the national
interest of the United States and requires the
use of a contractor.
(2) Clarification of applicability of certain laws.--
Any contractor conducting an interrogation pursuant to
a waiver under paragraph (1) shall be subject to all
laws on the conduct of interrogations that would apply
if an employee of the Federal Government were
conducting the interrogation.
REQUIREMENT FOR VIDEO RECORDING OF INTERROGATIONS OF PERSONS IN THE
CUSTODY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 25. (a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection
(b), the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall
establish guidelines to ensure that each interrogation of a
person who is in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency
is recorded in video form and that the video recording of such
interrogation is maintained--
(1) for not less than 10 years from the date on which
such recording is made; and
(2) until such time as such recording is no longer
relevant to an ongoing or anticipated legal proceeding
or investigation or required to be maintained under any
other provision of law.
(b) Exception.--The requirement to record an interrogation in
video form under subsection (a) shall not apply with respect to
an interrogation incident to arrest conducted by Agency
personnel designated by the Director under section 15(a) that
are assigned to the headquarters of the Central Intelligence
Agency and acting in the official capacity of such personnel.
(c) Interrogation Defined.--In this section, the term
``interrogation'' means the systematic process of attempting to
obtain information from an uncooperative detainee.
----------
CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT OF 1978
* * * * * * *
AGENCY BOARDS OF CONTRACT APPEALS
Sec. 8. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) The Armed Services Board shall have jurisdiction to
decide any appeal from a decision of a contracting officer of
the Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the
Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, or the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration relative to a
contract made by that department or agency. The Civilian Board
shall have jurisdiction to decide any appeal from a decision of
a contracting officer of any executive agency (other than the
Department of Defense, the Department of the Army, the
Department of the Navy, the Department of the Air Force, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the United
States Postal Service, the Postal Rate Commission, or the
Tennessee Valley Authority) relative to a contract made by that
agency. Each other agency board shall have jurisdiction to
decide any appeal from a decision of a contracting officer
relative to a contract made by its agency. Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, an appeal from a decision of a
contracting officer of the Central Intelligence Agency relative
to a contract made by that agency may be filed with whichever
of the Armed Services Board or the Civilian Board is specified
by the contracting officer as the Board to which such an appeal
may be made and the Board so specified shall have jurisdiction
to decide that appeal. In exercising this jurisdiction, the
agency board is authorized to grant any relief that would be
available to a litigant asserting a contract claim in the
United States Court of Federal Claims.
* * * * * * *
----------
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2002
* * * * * * *
TITLE IX--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
* * * * * * *
SEC. 904. OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(d) General Counsel.--(1) There shall be in the Office of
the National Counterintelligence Executive a general counsel
who shall serve as principal legal advisor to the National
Counterintelligence Executive.
[(2) The general counsel shall--
[(A) provide legal advice and counsel to the
Executive on matters relating to functions of the
Office;
[(B) ensure that the Office complies with all
applicable laws, regulations, Executive orders, and
guidelines; and
[(C) carry out such other duties as the Executive may
specify.]
[(e)] (d) Functions.--Subject to the direction and control of
the National Counterintelligence Executive, the functions of
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive shall
be as follows:
(1) National threat identification and prioritization
assessment.--Subject to [subsection (f)] subsection
(e), in consultation with appropriate department and
agencies of the United States Government, and private
sector entities, to produce on an annual basis a
strategic planning assessment of the
counterintelligence requirements of the United States
to be known as the National Threat Identification and
Prioritization Assessment.
(2) National counterintelligence strategy.--Subject
to [subsection (f)] subsection (e), in consultation
with appropriate department and agencies of the United
States Government, and private sector entities, and
based on the most current National Threat
Identification and Prioritization Assessment under
paragraph (1), to produce on an annual basis a strategy
for the counterintelligence programs and activities of
the United States Government to be known as the
National Counterintelligence Strategy.
* * * * * * *
[(f)] (e) Additional Requirements Regarding National Threat
Identification and Prioritization Assessment and National
Counterintelligence Strategy.--(1) A National Threat
Identification and Prioritization Assessment under [subsection
(e)(1)] subsection (d)(1), and any modification of such
assessment, shall not go into effect until approved by the
President.
(2) A National Counterintelligence Strategy under [subsection
(e)(2)] subsection (d)(2), and any modification of such
strategy, shall not go into effect until approved by the
President.
(3) The National Counterintelligence Executive shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees each National
Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment, or
modification thereof, and each National Counterintelligence
Strategy, or modification thereof, approved under this section.
* * * * * * *
[(g)] (f) Personnel.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(3) The employment of personnel by the Office, including the
appointment, compensation and benefits, management, and
separation of such personnel, shall be governed by the
provisions of law on such matters with respect to the personnel
of the Central Intelligence Agency, except that, for purposes
of the applicability of such provisions of law to personnel of
the Office, the National Counterintelligence Executive shall be
treated as the head of the Office.
[(4) Positions in the Office shall be excepted service
positions for purposes of title 5, United States Code.]
[(h) Support.--(1) The Attorney General, Secretary of
Defense, and Director of National Intelligence may each provide
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive such
support as may be necessary to permit the Office to carry out
its functions under this section.
[(2) Subject to any terms and conditions specified by the
Director of National Intelligence, the Director may provide
administrative and contract support to the Office as if the
Office were an element of the Central Intelligence Agency.
[(3) Support provided under this subsection may be provided
on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, at the election of
the official providing such support.
[(i) Availability of Funds for Reimbursement.--The National
Counterintelligence Executive may, from amounts available for
the Office, transfer to a department or agency detailing
personnel under subsection (g), or providing support under
subsection (h), on a reimbursable basis amounts appropriate to
reimburse such department or agency for the detail of such
personnel or the provision of such support, as the case may be.
[(j) Contracts.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the National
Counterintelligence Executive may enter into any contract,
lease, cooperative agreement, or other transaction that the
Executive considers appropriate to carry out the functions of
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive under
this section.
[(2) The authority under paragraph (1) to enter into
contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, and other
transactions shall be subject to any terms, conditions, and
limitations applicable to the Central Intelligence Agency under
law with respect to similar contracts, leases, cooperative
agreements, and other transactions.]
[(k)] (g) Treatment of Activities Under Certain
Administrative Laws.--The files of the Office shall be treated
as operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency for
purposes of section 701 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 431) to the extent such files meet criteria under
subsection (b) of that section for treatment of files as
operational files of an element of the Agency.
[(l)] (h) Oversight by Congress.--The location of the Office
of the National Counterintelligence Executive within the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence shall not be construed
as affecting access by Congress, or any committee of Congress,
to--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(m)] (i) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed as affecting the authority of the Director of
National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of State, the Attorney General, or the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation as provided or specified under the
National Security Act of 1947 or under other provisions of law.
* * * * * * *
----------
INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1016. INFORMATION SHARING.
(a) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) Information sharing environment.--The terms
``information sharing environment'' and ``ISE'' mean an
approach that facilitates the sharing of [terrorism and
homeland security information] national security
information, which may include any method determined
necessary and appropriate for carrying out this
section.
(4) National security information.--The term
``national security information'' includes homeland
security information and terrorism information.
[(4)] (5) Program manager.--The term ``program
manager'' means the program manager designated under
subsection (f).
[(5)] (6) Terrorism information.--The term
``terrorism information''--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(6)] (7) Weapons of mass destruction information.--
The term ``weapons of mass destruction information''
means information that could reasonably be expected to
assist in the development, proliferation, or use of a
weapon of mass destruction (including a chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear weapon) that could
be used by a terrorist or a terrorist organization
against the United States, including information about
the location of any stockpile of nuclear materials that
could be exploited for use in such a weapon that could
be used by a terrorist or a terrorist organization
against the United States.
(b) Information Sharing Environment.--
(1) Establishment.--The President shall--
(A) create an information sharing environment
for the sharing of [terrorism information]
national security information in a manner
consistent with national security and with
applicable legal standards relating to privacy
and civil liberties;
* * * * * * *
(2) Attributes.--The President shall, through the
structures described in subparagraphs (B) and (C) of
paragraph (1), ensure that the ISE provides and
facilitates the means for sharing [terrorism
information] national security information among all
appropriate Federal, State, local, and tribal entities,
and the private sector through the use of policy
guidelines and technologies. The President shall, to
the greatest extent practicable, ensure that the ISE
provides the functional equivalent of, or otherwise
supports, a decentralized, distributed, and coordinated
environment that--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(e) Implementation Plan Report.--Not later than one year
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall, with the assistance of the program manager, submit to
Congress a report containing an implementation plan for the
ISE. The report shall include the following:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(10) A delineation of the roles of the Federal
departments and agencies that will participate in the
ISE, including an identification of the agencies that
will deliver the infrastructure needed to operate and
manage the ISE (as distinct from individual department
or agency components that are part of the ISE), with
such delineation of roles to be consistent with--
(A) * * *
(B) the authority of the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Attorney General, and
the role of the Department of Homeland Security
and the [Attorney General] Department of
Justice, in coordinating with State, local, and
tribal officials and the private sector.
* * * * * * *
(f) Program Manager.--
(1) Designation.--Not later than 120 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, with notification to
Congress, the President shall designate an individual
as the program manager responsible for information
sharing across the Federal Government. The individual
designated as the program manager shall serve in the
Executive Office of the President and shall serve as
program manager until removed from service or replaced
by the President (at the President's sole discretion).
The program manager, in consultation with the head of
any affected department or agency, shall have and
exercise governmentwide authority over the sharing of
information within the scope of the information sharing
environment, including [homeland security information,
terrorism information, and weapons of mass destruction
information] national security information, by all
Federal departments, agencies, and components,
irrespective of the Federal department, agency, or
component in which the program manager may be
administratively located, except as otherwise expressly
provided by law.
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SEC. 2001. IMPROVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) National Intelligence Workforce.--(1) In developing and
maintaining a national intelligence workforce under subsection
(b), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
[shall,] shall develop and maintain a specialized and
integrated national intelligence workforce consisting of
agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists who
are recruited, trained, and rewarded in a manner which ensures
the existence within the Federal Bureau of Investigation of an
institutional culture with substantial expertise in, and
commitment to, the intelligence mission of the Bureau.
* * * * * * *
(e) Discharge of Improvements.--(1) * * *
(2) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall
carry out subsections (b) through (d) under the joint guidance
of the Attorney General and [the National Intelligence Director
in a manner consistent with section 112(e)] the Director of
National Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable
law.
(f) Budget Matters.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation [shall,] shall establish a budget structure of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to reflect the four
principal missions of the Bureau as follows:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
SEC. 2006. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION USE OF TRANSLATORS.
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and annually thereafter, the Attorney General of the
United States shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of
the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives a report that contains, with respect to each
preceding 12-month period--
(1) * * *
(2) any legal or practical impediments to using
translators employed by [the Federal] Federal, State,
or local agencies on a full-time, part-time, or shared
basis;
(3) the needs of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
for [the specific] specific translation services in
certain languages, and recommendations for meeting
those needs;
* * * * * * *
----------
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY
SYSTEM
* * * * * * *
Part D--Benefits Accruing to Certain Participants
* * * * * * *
SEC. 235. MANDATORY RETIREMENT.
(a) * * *
(b) Mandatory Retirement for Age.--
(1) In general.--A participant in the system shall be
automatically retired from the Agency--
[(A) upon reaching age 65, in the case of a
participant in the system receiving
compensation under the Senior Intelligence
Service pay schedule at the rate of level 4 or
above; and]
(A) Upon reaching age 65, in the case of a
participant in the system who is at the Senior
Intelligence Service rank of level 4 or above;
and
* * * * * * *
----------
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES FOR FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 101. As used in this title:
(a) ``Foreign power'' means--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(7) an entity not substantially composed of
United States persons that is engaged in the
international proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
(b) ``Agent of a foreign power'' means--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) ``International terrorism'' means activities
that--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) ``Sabotage'' means activities that involve a
violation of chapter 105 of title 18, United States
Code, or that would involve such a violation if
committed against the United States.
(e) ``Foreign intelligence information'' means--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(f) ``Electronic surveillance'' means--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(g) ``Attorney General'' means the Attorney General
of the United States (or Acting Attorney General), the
Deputy Attorney General, or, upon the designation of
the Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General
designated as the Assistant Attorney General for
National Security under section 507A of title 28,
United States Code.
(h) ``Minimization procedures'', with respect to
electronic surveillance, means--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(i) ``United States person'' means a citizen of the
United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence (as defined in section 101(a)(20) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act), an unincorporated
association a substantial number of members of which
are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully
admitted for permanent residence, or a corporation
which is incorporated in the United States, but does
not include a corporation or an association which is a
foreign power, as defined in subsection (a) (1), (2),
or (3).
(j) ``United States'', when used in a geographic
sense, means all areas under the territorial
sovereignty of the United States and the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands.
(k) ``Aggrieved person'' means a person who is the
target of an electronic surveillance or any other
person whose communications or activities were subject
to electronic surveillance.
(l) ``Wire communication'' means any communications
while it is being carried by a wire, cable, or other
like connection furnished or operated by any person
engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating
such facilities for the transmission of interstate or
foreign communications.
(m) ``Person'' means any individual, including any
officer or employee of the Federal Government, or any
group, entity, association, corporation, or foreign
power.
(n) ``Contents'', when used with respect to a
communication, includes any information concerning the
identity of the parties to such communications or the
existence, substance, purport, or meaning of that
communication.
(o) ``State'' means any State of the United States,
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, an
any territory or possession of the United States.
(p) ``Weapon of mass destruction'' means--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
DESIGNATION OF JUDGES
Sec. 103.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(i)] (h) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to reduce or
contravene the inherent authority of the court established
under subsection (a) to determine or enforce compliance with an
order or a rule of such court or with a procedure approved by
such court.
* * * * * * *
PENALTIES
Sec. 109. (a) Offense.--A person is guilty of an offense if
he intentionally--
(1) engages in electronic surveillance under color of
law except as authorized by this Act, chapter 119, 121,
or 206 of title 18, United States Code, or any express
statutory authorization that is an additional exclusive
means for conducting electronic surveillance under
[section 112.;] section 112; or
(2) disclose or uses information obtained under color
of law by electronic surveillance, knowing or having
reason to known that the information was obtained
through electronic surveillance not authorized by this
Act, chapter 119, 121, or 206 of title 18, United
States Code, or any express statutory authorization
that is an additional exclusive means for conducting
electronic surveillance under section 112.[.]
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--PHYSICAL SEARCHES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES FOR FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 301. As used in this title:
(1) The terms ``foreign power'', ``agent of a foreign
power'', ``international terrorism'', ``sabotage'',
``foreign intelligence information'', ``Attorney
General'', ``United States person'', [``United
States'', ``person'', ``weapon of mass destruction'',
and ``State''] ``United States'', ``person'', ``weapon
of mass destruction'', and ``State'' shall have the
same meanings as in section 101 of this Act, except as
specifically provided by this title.
* * * * * * *
ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER
Sec. 304. (a) * * *
(b) In determining whether or not probable cause exists for
purposes of an order under [subsection (a)(3)] subsection
(a)(2), a judge may consider past activities of the target, as
well as facts and circumstances relating to current or future
activities of the target.
* * * * * * *
TITLE V--ACCESS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
PURPOSES
* * * * * * *
SEC. 502. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT.
(a) On [a annual] an annual basis, the Attorney General shall
fully inform the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate
concerning all requests for the production of tangible things
under section 501.
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 1403 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR
1991
SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL [FOREIGN] INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
(a) Annual Submission of Multiyear National [Foreign]
Intelligence Program.--The [Director of Central Intelligence]
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional committees specified in subsection (d) each year
a multiyear national [foreign] intelligence program plan
reflecting the estimated expenditures and proposed
appropriations required to support that program. Any such
multiyear national [foreign] intelligence program plan shall
cover the fiscal year with respect to which the budget is
submitted and at least four succeeding fiscal years.
(b) Time of Submission.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall submit the report required by subsection (a)
each year at or about the same time that the budget is
submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31,
United States Code.
(c) Consistency With Budget Estimates.--The [Director of
Central Intelligence] Director of National Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the estimates referred
to in subsection (a) are consistent with the budget estimates
submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31,
United States Code, for the fiscal year concerned and with the
estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations for the
multiyear defense program submitted pursuant to section [114a]
221 of title 10, United States Code.
----------
TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
Subtitle A--General Military Law
* * * * * * *
PART II--PERSONNEL
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 32--OFFICER STRENGTH AND DISTRIBUTION IN GRADE
* * * * * * *
Sec. 528. Officers serving in certain intelligence positions: military
status; exclusion from distribution and strength
limitations; pay and allowances
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) [Associate Director of CIA for Military Affairs]
Associate Director of Military Affairs, CIA.--An officer of the
armed forces serving in the position of [Associate Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency for Military Affairs] Associate
Director of Military Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency, or
any successor position, while serving in that position, shall
be excluded from the limitations in sections 525 and 526 of
this title.
* * * * * * *
Minority Views
H.R. 2701--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010
We are disappointed that this year's intelligence
authorization bill has taken a significant step back from last
year's bipartisan legislation. It puts aside consensus in last
year's bill and in this year's classified Schedule of
Authorizations with respect to many significant issues.
Instead, it advances provisions that appear to be designed for
partisan messaging rather than to address critical national
security issues, and it would reopen and modify areas of
bipartisan consensus reached with respect to several discrete
issues in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.
In its current form, the bill also contains provisions that we
believe would inappropriately hamper the flexibility and
responsiveness of the intelligence community and includes
discrete items that we believe are flawed or have not been
fully vetted. In many respects, the bill is not fully
transparent with respect to its purpose and effect or in making
information available to the public that could be released on
important issues.
While we believe that the bill has been strengthened by
successful bipartisan work on the classified schedule of
authorizations and by Republican amendments adopted by the
Committee, on balance we have significant reservations with the
bill in its current form that force us to oppose it. We hope
that these issues can be addressed going forward in the
legislative process in order to complete bipartisan legislation
to authorize the critical activities of the intelligence
community.
THE BILL FAILS TO ADDRESS CRITICAL NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES,
CONCENTRATING INSTEAD ON CREATING PARTISAN COVER
The transition to a new Administration has caused several
longstanding national security issues to be revisited, from the
President's decision to release legal memoranda concerning
sensitive compartmented activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency and to close the detention facility at Guantanamo, to
decisions to relocate detainees and potentially to bring them
into the United States, to the apparent initiation of policies
intended to convert the global war on terrorism into a matter
of prosecution and litigation. While we recognize that changes
in policy are inevitable in a new Administration and that
President Obama has also wisely continued many past policies,
we are deeply concerned that many decisions with significant
implications for the intelligence community have been and
continue to be implemented with absolutely no consultation with
Congress, contrary to the established practice of the previous
Administration.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\We have expressed concern in the past at the failure of the
previous Administration to fully brief the Committee with respect to
certain discrete matters, but the record is clear that the Committee
was consulted regularly with respect to certain major initiatives. By
contrast, the current Administration has conducted little to no
consultation at all. In fact, the President's task forces with respect
to some of the most relevant issues still have not briefed the
Committee even on their processes and have twice cancelled Committee
briefings, despite having held repeated meetings with outside advocacy
groups. This is plainly unacceptable.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
H.R. 2701 fails entirely to address many of these critical
issues, abdicating the responsibility of the Committee. In
other areas, it appears more focused on creating partisan cover
for certain inconvenient truths faced by the Majority than in
honestly confronting them. These inconvenient truths include
the bipartisan consensus that has existed with respect to
critical national security programs, even though they may no
longer be seen as ``politically correct'' as threats become
perceived as less imminent. We continue to believe that these
issues must be addressed on their substantive merits, with the
paramount goal of empowering the intelligence community to
protect the American people consistent with our values. It is
unfortunate that this bill fails to do so.
National Security Act Amendments
Last year, we wrote that ``It is likely that there is no
single current issue on which there is a stronger bipartisan
consensus than our shared deep concern that the Administration
is not fulfilling its statutory duty to keep each member of the
Committee fully and currently informed with respect to certain
intelligence matters.'' It is precisely for this reason that we
joined with Chairman Reyes at that time in supporting truly
bipartisan language to reform provisions of the National
Security Act governing reporting of intelligence activities to
the Committee. Inexplicably, that provision was removed from
this year's bill and replaced with a partisan provision with
serious flaws. The need for the change was so poorly understood
that Chairman Reyes centered his opposition to a Republican
amendment to restore the bipartisan language on provisions that
had been in his own bill last year, and Majority counsel had to
correct the record at markup to clarify that they had not
properly described or apparently even understood their own
proposal. The core provisions of the National Security Act are
no place for such hasty, partisan lawmaking.
This fiasco seems to have arisen because the Majority
believed it needed political cover for its claims that it had
not been briefed with respect to several intelligence community
programs on which the record incontrovertibly shows not only
that multiple members were briefed repeatedly on the programs
in question on a bipartisan basis, but that they raised no
objections, and took no action to object or to defend the
programs as career intelligence officers acted in reliance on
such approvals. Thus was born the canard that the ``problem''
somehow was not the failure of members to seek further
information or raise whatever concerns they may have had, but
instead was the fault of the career briefers, or the process
itself. The Majority promptly issued a press release to promise
that it would fix such problems--with no mention of the
bipartisan provisions from the previous year.\2\ Those
provisions were developed to address the real and repeatedly
demonstrated problem of briefings that had been too narrowly
limited to certain members rather than the new, politically
convenient, false issues relating to the conduct of the
briefings themselves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\``Reyes Statement on Congressional Notification Reform,'' May
14, 2009. (http://intelligence.house.gov/Media/PDFS/
ReyesRelease051109.pdf)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Section 502 of last year's bill makes amendments to certain
congressional notification procedures of the National Security
Act of 1947. It was the product of bipartisan discussion and
agreement between Chairman Reyes and Ranking Member Hoekstra
and includes language suggested by both. The provision
expressly provided that information briefed to the Committee
reporting on activities other than covert actions shall be made
available to each member of the Committee, unless the President
requests in writing that access to the information be limited
and details extraordinary circumstances justifying the request.
In the event of such a request to limit access, the Chairman
and Ranking Member of the Committee may jointly determine
whether and how to limit access to the material within the
Committee. Absent such an agreement, access to the information
or material would be limited. The provision specifically
addressed and balanced the Constitutional powers and
responsibilities of both the Executive and Legislative
Branches, and set forth a specific mechanism to reconcile them.
By contrast, the partisan provision in Section 321 of this
year's bill would do nothing to solve the problem. In fact, it
is so poorly drafted that it would lead to nothing but
confusion. It nowhere creates a statutory presumption that all
Members of the Committee should be briefed. Instead, it would
require the Committee to unilaterally develop procedures for
the handling of reporting on sensitive matters, even though the
President has significant constitutional authorities in the
area of national security that Courts have repeatedly said must
be considered with and balanced against the authorities of
Congress. The provision nowhere provides a mechanism for
ensuring that decisions within the Committee are made on a
bipartisan basis or for reconciling any dispute between the
branches with respect to such reporting, which is a recipe for
Constitutional gridlock that could be disastrous with respect
to such sensitive matters.
Moreover, the partisan provision purports to regulate
objections that Members might wish to raise to a sensitive
activity, including a statutory 48 hour time limit. The
Majority staff indicated its belief at markup that this
provision only requires an objection to be memorialized and
transmitted to the Executive Branch within 48 hours, but the
overall structure of the provision is not explicit. It is
possible that such a provision could be read to restrict the
time period in which members could raise objections. While we
agree that formalizing and memorializing the process of
objection to sensitive activities may be warranted, this sloppy
provision nowhere states the legal scope or effect of such an
objection and could require hasty decisionmaking on potentially
critical matters. Moreover, if circumstances change or
additional information is gathered after initial reporting of a
covert action, the provision might be read to bar subsequent
objection by Congress.
Congressman Mac Thornberry offered an amendment at markup
to replace this sloppy provision with last year's bipartisan
language--further extended to include reporting of covert
actions--even though we believe parts of that compromise are
excessively prescriptive and focus disproportionately on legal
issues rather than intelligence policy issues. The amendment to
remove the partisan provision was defeated virtually on a party
line vote, with only Congressman Rush Holt now supporting the
original compromise on the Majority side. The core of the
National Security Act is far too important for such
gamesmanship, and this provision must be addressed and repaired
as the legislation advances.
Release of unclassified versions of briefing memoranda and finished
intelligence products assessing information gained from
detainee reporting
On a related issue, Ranking Member Hoekstra offered an
amendment that would allow the American people to reach their
own well-informed conclusions with respect to briefings to
Congress on the use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques. This
issue gave rise to the broader controversy over briefings to
the Committee after President Obama unilaterally and
selectively released legal memoranda dealing with previously
highly compartmented intelligence activities that lead to
public calls for individuals to be held accountable for the
activities, despite clear bipartisan consensus and support for
the programs in question in repeated briefings to Members of
the Committee. Ranking Member Hoekstra and Republican Members
and staff of the Committee have had the opportunity to review
the memoranda memorializing such briefings and believe that two
facts are readily apparent. First, the memoranda clearly
indicate that members of the Committee supported the activities
in question on a bipartisan basis and raised no objections to
the activities in question. Second, while certain redactions
might still be justified to protect identities of intelligence
community personnel, detainees, or details of sources and
methods, there is little reason why the core of the documents
could not be declassified and publicly released to allow the
American people to decide for themselves.
Similarly, Ranking Member Hoekstra's amendment would have
provided for the release of unclassified versions of finished
intelligence products assessing the information gained from
detainee reporting after the September 1 1 attacks.
Unfortunately, however, despite the President's unilateral
decision to release the legal memoranda and publicly confirm
substantial elements of these sensitive intelligence
activities, the Majority voted in favor of partisan cover and
would not support the release of these documents that would
allow the full picture to be known and understood. It is ironic
that many members of the Committee who have so vehemently
argued in favor of greater transparency by the intelligence
community and against perceived selective ``cherry-picking'' of
publicly disclosed intelligence opposed this amendment, again
for apparent partisan purposes. The record on this matter
cannot he fully or fairly evaluated by the public until a
version of these documents is made public.
``Global Justice'' Initiative
The bill also has not addressed critical aspects of the so-
called ``Global Justice'' initiative being considered by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, which we believe could
significantly hamper intelligence collection and potentially
prevention of terrorist acts by making it a priority to handle
these matters abroad as law enforcement matters. While we
appreciate the commitments from Chairman Reyes and Subcommittee
Chairman Thompson to further review the matter, we believe that
the Committee should have immediately made a clear and
unambiguous statement against the implementation of any such
policy.
The Committee has devoted substantial energy and attention
since the September 11, 2001 attacks to ensure that prevention
of attacks and intelligence collection take priority in foreign
countries over the inherent disadvantages of the criminal
justice model. The FBI and Department of Justice should not
unilaterally seek to undo these important, carefully
coordinated efforts. The 9/11 Commission noted that ``The
concern about the FBI is that it has long favored its criminal
justice mission over its national security mission.''
Unfortunately, efforts to develop the ``Global Justice''
initiative suggest that this message has not yet been fully
heeded.
The initiative represents a fundamental policy shift in the
fight against radical jihadists. As part of this new
initiative, FBI agents would be deployed in the middle of
intelligence collection activities worldwide, potentially
including the battlefield, to gather evidence. FBI agents would
also take first priority in questioning persons of interest
rather than trained intelligence interrogators. Thus, FBI
agents might read Miranda warnings to non-U.S. persons held
overseas who are not entitled to such rights outside the
context of a criminal prosecution inside the United States--a
significant disincentive for any subject to provide information
that might be urgently needed to prevent an attack. And if
those detainees didn't immediately ``lawyer up,'' FBI agents
would ask questions to build a litigation case- not to produce
intelligence.
Given the gravity of this potential policy shift, we are
pleased that the Committee recognized the importance of some
implications of the Global Justice Initiative, but we do not
believe sufficient steps have been taken to address our
fundamental concerns about this new and dangerous program. On a
positive note, the Committee adopted two amendments offered by
Congressman Mike Rogers. The first amendment prohibits the use
of intelligence funds to read Miranda warnings to non-U.S.
person detainees held by the U.S. military overseas. As
previously mentioned, we believe strongly that such warnings
could impair the immediate collection of critical intelligence
and could serve as a significant disincentive to cooperation.
It is important to emphasize that U.S. courts have repeatedly
held that foreign persons in foreign countries generally do not
enjoy constitutional protections, rendering the Miranda
warnings unnecessary absent an immediate, specific intent to
initiate criminal prosecution.
The second amendment related to the ``Global Justice''
initiative requires the FBI Director to review the legal
problems caused by FBI agents trying to conduct investigations
(using intelligence funding) of non U.S. persons outside of the
United States and to report his findings to the congressional
intelligence committees. As recognized by the authoritative
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, international law clearly provides as a matter of
sovereignty that U.S. law enforcement officers may only
exercise their functions in other countries with the specific
consent of duly authorized officials of those countries.
Without such authorization, those countries could protest and
seek reparation from the United States.
This initiative must be reviewed carefully as the
legislation moves forward.
National Drug Intelligence Center
Congressman Mike Rogers offered an amendment that would
have authorized funding to close the National Drug Intelligence
Center (NDIC), which is located in central Pennsylvania and has
long-been a controversial and questionable effort inside the
intelligence community. U.S. News and World Report once
famously describe the center as, a ``Drug War boondoggle rocked
by scandal'' and quoted its first deputy director as stating
that the center was, ``in search of a mission.'' In light of
its reputation and dubious usefulness, the previous
administration repeatedly recommended the facility be budgeted
for closure and its minimal efforts shifted to the more
productive and better situated El Paso Intelligence Center. The
Majority refused to take responsibility for this boondoggle,
and voted against the amendment.
NDIC has only remained open the past several years as a
result of receiving the largest single, pork barrel expenditure
in the intelligence budget. In the Fiscal Year 2007
Intelligence Authorization Act, the Majority improperly
included the earmark in the bill with no transparency, contrary
to the applicable rules. Oversight visits and briefings with
the Committee have repeatedly borne out that the center is
duplicative, poorly located, lacking in mission, with no clear
direction for the future, and its funding could be directed to
higher intelligence community priorities.
In light of bipartisan, Republican-led, action in the
Intelligence Committee in recent years to end the earmark and
close NDIC, its political patrons apparently had enough and
have attempted to shift its authorization to the House
Judiciary Committee after years hidden away in intelligence
funding. The resulting attempt to hide oversight for an
``intelligence center'' in the Judiciary Committee is a direct
affront to this Committee's proper authorities and
responsibilities in the House. It is an unprecedented effort to
shift and diminish the power of this Committee for purely
political reasons and the Majority should not have allowed this
bald-faced political move to stand. This amendment would have
placed NDIC back under the proper oversight of the House
Intelligence Committee and directs, as this Committee has
previously, that funds be appropriated to cease the center's
operations.
Since its inception, more than $400 million in taxpayer
dollars has been spent with little to show in the way of
results. A report by the House Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight concluded that NDIC should be terminated because
it is ``an expensive and duplicative use of scarce Federal drug
enforcement resources,'' and the Office of Management and
Budget previously concluded that ``NDIC has experienced
problems with duplication of effort and lack of coordination
with other intelligence providers and consumers. Focusing
resources on a smaller number of intelligence providers would
increase the impact of those resources.''
At a time when the American people are stretching to more
with less and the federal budget deficit is soaring out of
control, this Committee has an obligation to ensure taxpayer
money for national security is being used in the wisest and
best manner possible to ensure our nation's safety. Committee
Members have a fiduciary responsibility to stand up for the
Committee's authorities. The Majority, however, voted to accept
this attempt to shift and hide NDIC funding and continue to
shirk responsibility for Member pet projects.
Detainees
This bill fails entirely to address the critical issue of
the disposition of the detainees currently held at Guantanamo
Bay in the wake of the President's unilateral decision to close
the facility, before reviewing the relevant facts and options
and with no plan. We believe that the security of the American
people must come first. The Majority blocked an amendment,
offered by Congressman Roy Blunt, which would have prohibited
the use of intelligence funds to foreign countries in exchange
for accepting newly relocated Guantanamo detainees. This issue
must be handled transparently--secret intelligence funds should
not be used as a slush fund to pay foreign countries to relieve
the United States of its responsibilities.
Despite its willingness to secretly pay foreign nations
potentially significant amounts of taxpayer dollars to take
detainees, the Majority apparently believes that these
detainees are still dangerous, voting against an amendment
offered by Congressman Mike Rogers to clarify the record on the
issue by preventing the Administration from paying foreign
countries to conduct surveillance on or monitor newly released
detainees. The Majority apparently agrees that these newly
released detainees need to be monitored, but does not believe
they pose a sufficient threat to prevent them from being
released in the first place.
The Majority also rejected an amendment, offered by
Congresswoman Sue Myrick, which would have prevented
intelligence dollars from being spent to bring Guantanamo
detainees into the United States, despite clear bipartisan
opposition in the House and among the American people to
bringing dangerous terrorists into the United States. Instead,
the Majority adopted a watered-down substitute that withholds
money until the President submits a ``plan'' for these
Guantanamo detainees.
Hastily drafted despite delays in the Committee's markup,
the substitute amendment requires the ``plan'' to be submitted
to the Congressional defense committees rather than this
Committee, despite later Majority criticism of a Republican
amendment on the ground that such a provision would cause a
sequential referral. In addition, the watered down substitute
would have limited effect, restricting funding only to the
Director of National Intelligence and not to individual
agencies in the intelligence community. The Majority is
apparently comfortable allowing the Administration to put down
whatever it likes on paper, call it a ``plan'' for dealing with
detainees, and spend money to send these terrorists virtually
anywhere from Palau to Peoria. We are not satisfied by half
measures. The President and the Majority must more meaningfully
address the ``problem'' of Guantanamo Bay--caused by the
premature decision to close the facility--head on.
The Committee agreed to two amendments offered by Ranking
Member Hoekstra to require the intelligence community to
produce an unclassified summary of the threat posed by the
Uighurs at Guantanamo and an unclassified summary on the
recidivism of Guantanamo detainees repatriated or released to
third countries over the years, although we are disappointed
that only a few members of the Majority supported these
amendments. These amendments will provide greater transparency
and clarity to the public debate over these detainees. The
American people deserve to know exactly what kind of people are
being held at Guantanamo and exactly what kind of threats we
will all face if these detainees are released, brought to this
country for trial, or ultimately inserted into the federal
prison system.
Failure to protect intelligence community personnel
This bill also contains a provision that we believe will
unnecessarily expose intelligence personnel to risk. Section
416 of this bill requires the Central Intelligence Agency to
videotape interrogations of detainees. This requirement could
quickly become a substantial liability for our CIA officers in
the field if the President allows them to interrogate suspected
terrorists again. These tapes could pose a logistical and
security nightmare, and it is clear that the implications of
such a requirement have not been fully vetted.\3\ Officers at
remote locations would have to figure out a way to securely
store the tapes. If these tapes were ever lost or stolen, they
would create tremendous risks. Videotaped interrogations could
reveal the identity of our CIA officers--making them and their
families a target for retaliation. Tapes could also betray
detainees who might choose to cooperate and mark them for
death. Of course, images from even a lawful, properly conducted
interrogation might provide material for our adversaries to
exploit for propaganda purposes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\The Committee's investigation with respect to the destruction of
previous tapes has suggested potentially significant issues with
respect to the destruction of previously created interrogation
videotapes. We wish to note the distinction between the need to
preserve existing or future videotapes once created and the policy
question of whether such tapes should be created in the future.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congressman Mac Thornberry offered an amendment to strip
section 416 out of this bill and protect our CIA officers going
forward. Unfortunately, the amendment was defeated in a split
partisan vote. This provision must be more carefully addressed
going forward.
More broadly, we are concerned at the increasing
politicization of career intelligence community personnel
merely for carrying out policies that were authorized by the
President and approved and funded by the Congress.
On May 4, 2009, Philip Mudd, a veteran intelligence officer
who has worked for the CIA and the FBI, was nominated to be
Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis for the
Department of Homeland Security. However, on June 5, 2009, Mudd
withdrew his nomination because of worries that attacks by
Senate Democrats over his work on anti-terror programs would be
a ``distraction'' to the Obama administration. Last November,
former CIA officer John Brennan withdrew from consideration to
be appointed the CIA Director for the same reason.
We are concerned that highly qualified intelligence
officers are becoming pawns in a political game which has
caused the careers of some extremely talented intelligence
officers, like Mudd and Brennan, to hit a brick wall. These
officers are being punished not for wrongdoing but for their
success in administering innovative anti-terrorist programs
that kept our nation safe from terrorist attack over the last
seven years.
It is time to stop this assault on our intelligence
community. This is not just wrong, it's dangerous. There are
many dire threats facing our nation from radical jihadists, WMD
proliferation, the global economic situation, and many regional
issues. America needs an intelligence corps that is prepared to
take manageable risks without fear of being undercut by
changing political moods. Using intelligence officers as pawns
in political games will dissuade our best and brightest
intelligence officers from serving in controversial and high-
risk environments.
THE BILL CONTAINS SIGNIFICANT SUBSTANTIVE FLAWS
The base bill hastily drafted by the Majority contains
several operative provisions that significantly concern us, and
equally as many that are poorly researched, of questionable
need or have unknown implications. Many of the new provisions
reflect the fact that this bill was thrown together in a few
days time and is largely cobbled from ODNI proposals that have
not been thoroughly considered, and reversals on old issues
that were resolved on a bipartisan basis during negotiations on
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA).
Management issues
The base bill was improved by two Republican initiatives on
key management issues. One Republican amendment, offered by
Congressman John Kline, requires the National Reconnaissance
Office (NRO) to submit an updated charter to Congress within 90
days of enactment of the bill. The NRO's existing charter was
adopted in 1965 and has not been updated in the forty plus
years since that time and no longer reflects the
organizational, functional and operational realities of today's
NRO. For example, from a practical perspective, neither the
ODNI nor the current DOD acquisition guidelines existed when
the current charter was written. This amendment would require
the NRO and DOD to finalize and submit a new charter, which we
understand has been in the drafting process for quite some
time. The amendment was intended to ensure that the NRO's
current organizational structure and reporting chains are
reflected in the charter, as well as the modern day functional
duties of NRO.
Another Republican amendment offered by Congressman Mike
Conaway contained a sense of Congress that reaching
auditability for all intelligence community elements should be
a priority for the DNI. This is intended to put the IC on
notice that it is critically necessary to reach and maintain a
level of auditability for all elements of the community and to
make certain that the DNI takes a leadership role in ensuring
this happens. The amendment also requires the DNI to complete a
review to determine specifically where the office is in this
process, and to come up with a measurable time frame for
reaching a point where the entire IC can be audited. It is
essential that the DNI maintains strong financial management
and business systems that allow for comprehensive auditing, in
order to improve financial management government-wide. The
American taxpayers should be assured that we hold government
agencies to the same high standards as we do publicly traded
companies. These two Republican amendments significantly
improve the bill from management and accountability standpoint.
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
We have significant concerns with Section 406 of the bill,
which would create a new Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community. While we do not oppose either enhanced oversight of
the intelligence community or a capability to review cross-
cutting issues within the intelligence community, we are
concerned that this provision duplicates efforts of Department
and Agency inspectors general, is unnecessarily complex and
unwieldy, and threatens to further grow the size and
bureaucracy of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence. For example, the bill would make various changes
that would subject the National Security Agency to the
jurisdiction of not one, but three statutory inspectors
general. (Department of Defense, Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community, and National Security Agency).
Moreover, the Committee's experience has been that increasing
size of the bureaucracy has in some cases delayed work on
important investigations. This provision can only make the
problem worse and further hamper the timeliness of review by
the Committee.
General Accounting Office
Section 335 of the bill would require the DNI to provide
access for GAO employees to all information that the
Comptroller General of the GAO deems necessary to conduct an
investigation that is requested by one of the intelligence
committees. It is unclear why the Majority believes this broad
expansion is even necessary. The elements of the intelligence
community all currently have Inspectors General that are able
to perform the investigative and auditory functions sought
here, while limiting the number of persons that have access to
sensitive intelligence information. Moreover, this Committee is
charged with oversight of IC programs, and we find it
surprising that the Majority is willing to outsource that
oversight responsibility. That the Majority is incapable or
unwilling to perform the Committee's oversight function is not
a sufficient reason to break from a longstanding, carefully
structured oversight process designed to balance congressional
oversight needs with the Executive's need to protect sensitive
information. This provision dangerously subordinates the DNI's
responsibility to protect the Nation's most sensitive national
security information to an entity responsible for performing
audits at Congress' behest.
The provision also lacks any restriction governing the
handling of classified information by the GAO--which is not
subject to the detailed Rules of the House or the Committee on
such matters--and the use and distribution of GAO products. As
drafted, the GAO will have access to the most sensitive
national security information, and there is no restriction on
how they may use that information, who may be designated to
receive it and how it may be distributed--especially after the
information is incorporated into a GAO product or report. Under
the House Rules, this Committee has jurisdiction over sources
and methods, and nothing in this provision would prevent the
GAO from distributing sensitive sources and methods material
beyond this Committee. Aside from the institutional interests
that the Majority should be more concerned with protecting, the
potential for sensitive information to be inadvertently or
intentionally disclosed greatly and dangerously increases with
this provision included in the bill.
Less flexibility and more bureaucracy for the intelligence community
The bill also contains several provisions that will hamper
the flexibility of community personnel. It will require for the
first time Senate confirmation of the National Security Agency
Director, NSA General Counsel, and the Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office. These positions have traditionally not
required Senate confirmation and have been filled by career
intelligence professionals. Despite the 9/11 Commission's
recommendation that we minimize as much as possible the
disruption of national security policymaking by accelerating
the process for national security appointments, the Majority
seeks to instead add more politics and more delay into the
process by requiring additional key intelligence positions to
be subject to lengthy, politicized Senate confirmation process.
It is unclear how subjecting career intelligence employees to
these processes or replacing them in favor of partisan
political appointments will enhance our ability to respond to
catastrophic terrorist attacks like 9/11.
The bill also adds another layer of bureaucracy to NSA by
creating a new Associate Director position that will duplicate
oversight responsibilities already charged to the General
Counsel. If there are concerns with the way NSA's Office of the
General Counsel has handled matters in the past, creating
another layer in the bureaucracy at an additional cost to the
taxpayers is not the best way to address those concerns.
Further hampering the IC is the Majority's unexplained
decision to mandate personnel practices in the Defense
Department that are opposed by the current Administration.
Section 304 of the bill terminates DOD's use of the Defense
Civilian Intelligence Personnel System or ``pay for
performance'' as the system is more familiarly known. The
rationale for this provision is not transparent. DOD is
implementing DCIPS to bring DOD intelligence personnel in line
with the rest of the IC. While we are aware of some concerns
with respect to compensation reform at the CIA, we believe that
the concept has generally worked at DOD. The Administration has
already responded to the Majority's concerns about pay for
performance earlier this month after delaying implementation
and conducting a review following a request from the Chairman.
Suspension of DCIPS will leave Intelligence employees working
side by side under different systems and different terms of
employment.
Burdensome reports and Congressionally Directed Actions
We are once again troubled by the proliferation of reports
that are required of the intelligence community. At least 41
new reports and Congressionally Directed Actions are mandated
in the bill and classified annex, while only five statutorily
required reports are removed.
In order for the House and Senate intelligence committees
to do their job on behalf of Congress and the American people,
the Committees must have access to the necessary information.
Requiring that an agency produce a periodic report on certain
activities is sometimes the most efficient way to obtain that
information. But at other times, a briefing or a simple letter
can serve just as well. Too often, requiring a new report is
used as a substitute for reading, studying, and learning from
what has already been provided. Many times, such a requirement
is used to convey interest in a topic or as a fall-back
position to a thwarted legislative provision.
The burden of researching, writing, approving, and
transmitting this volume of reports to Congress, strains the
resources of the intelligence community. If the congressional
Committees were to carefully read and study each one, it would
also strain the Committee's resources. Unfortunately, these
reports frequently become a paper shuffling exercise for both
branches, rather than a serious, substantive exchange of
information needed for proper oversight and decisions.
We believe that the Committee should be much more judicious
in the reports it requires and that it should demand high
quality responses to those requests. The growing demand for
little read or used mounds of paper does not benefit either
branch.
Modifications to provisions of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act
Several provisions of the bill change elements of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA)
enacted after exhaustive bipartisan discussion and
consideration. With no apparent rationale, the Majority has
also loosened the agreed upon threshold that is required for
the IC to request a reprogramming of funds that were directed
by Congress to be used in specific ways. Currently, the IC may
request a reprogramming of funds when there is need based on
``unforeseen requirements.'' Under the standard just adopted by
the Majority, the IC may request reprogramming based on an
emergent need, improved program effectiveness or an increase in
efficiency. In effect, this significant change would allow
reprogrammings whenever the Executive Branch seeks to do so
with only the thinnest of justifications. It is unclear why the
Majority would water down our institutional interests by giving
up control and oversight of IC spending.
Several provisions are also inconsistent with the
bipartisan IRTPA agreement that became law not quite five years
ago, and the reason for the changes are not transparent. The
DNI requested that Agencies be mandated to allow non-
reimbursable detailees to serve at ODNI for an extended period,
and the Majority did so without an appropriate review of
whether it was truly needed, or what the repercussions may be.
Similarly, the bill makes changes to the duties of the program
manager for the Information Sharing Environment whose
responsibilities were set forth in IRTPA. Without explanation,
the Majority decided to open up issues long ago resolved where
there is no demonstrated need to do so. Like many of the IRTPA
provisions, these provisions were the subject of detailed
Committee consideration and in-depth discussions in 2004 and
ill-considered changes at the behest of the ODNI whose
authorities were so carefully balanced in that bill without
full consideration for the implications is ill-advised.
Additional substantive concerns
The bill also contains additional provisions that do not
appear to have been well-thought through or vetted, some
submitted by the Administration two days before the legislative
package was drafted and incorporated verbatim in the bill.
While these provisions may appear technical on the surface,
they could have significant substantive implications and do not
appear to have been studied or justified. It is simply not
possible to thoroughly study and contemplate the intent and
implications of these provisions in just a couple of days.
Rather than spending the time to consider these provisions, the
Majority added them to this bill.
Notably, several education and scholarship programs are
made permanent without any specific demonstration of their
effectiveness and impact from the IC. While these programs may
have merit, it does not make sense to permanently authorize
certain pilot programs merely because the IC asks for them. The
Committee has not received any information indicating how these
programs have worked and why they should be made permanent. To
blindly enact these programs does a disservice to the
Committee's important oversight role.
Section 302 of the bill also permits the DNI to temporarily
appoint certain personnel from other IC agencies to fill
vacancies of presidentially appointed or Senate confirmed
positions. This is another provision that the Committee
received from the Administration days before it was included in
the bill. ODNI indicated it recently had trouble filling a
specialized Senate confirmed position on a temporary basis
necessitating this provision. Instead of considering whether
the ODNI's issue may be addressed in other ways, the Majority
accepted most of the Administration's language on this
provision and the implications of greatly expanding the DNI's
authority to fill critical positions previously subject to
confirmation remain unknown.
Section 413 allows CIA contractors to appeal disputes to
the Armed Services contracting appeals board. The provision
also appeared in the bill just days after the Administration
requested the provision be included in this year's
authorization bill. The provision would amend current law to
permit a CIA contracting officer to appeal a contracting
decision to the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals or the
Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. Until recently, the law
provided for appeal to both boards and was only recently
amended to permit appeal to the Civilian Board only. We are
unaware of any consideration given to the ramifications of
expanding this jurisdiction or even if the reasoning behind why
the law was recently amended has been reviewed.
The bill contains provisions requested by the DNI that
would protect from misuse of the DNI seal. We have no
information from the DNI that misuse of the seal is a
significant problem they have encountered. This provision was
also added to the bill without any consideration of its
necessity. Frankly, we find it surprising that a provision like
this would receive any attention in a time where the IC is
facing much more pressing and serious issues that the Committee
needs to address, particularly when the Community has not had
an authorization bill in several years.
Section 502 of the bill extends the National Commission for
the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the
intelligence community. Again, the Committee has not been
provided with a rationale for reauthorizing this Commission and
the Majority has not articulated any reason to reauthorize a
Commission whose previous authorization expired before the
Committee ever met.
Section 503 of the bill requires the DNI to conduct a
classification review of materials in the possession of the
intelligence communities that are at least twenty-five years
old and were provided to the Committee by the Executive Branch.
This provision appeared in the draft bill in the days before
Committee consideration without explanation and fails to
recognize that the Executive Branch already conducts
classification reviews of such material pursuant to its
original classification authorities. We believe that our
intelligence professionals could better spend their time on a
variety of matters that do not involve doing duplicative
classification reviews. Our recommendation on a better method
for minimizing the mounds of paper that are put into the
Committee's storage would be to stop propounding dozens of new
reporting requirements to the IC each time we pass an
authorization bill.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we are disappointed that substantial
bipartisan agreement on this year's classified Schedule of
Authorizations and in the legislative provisions of last year's
bill have been put aside, apparently to turn this critical
national security bill into a partisan messaging tool and a
vehicle in many cases for questionable provisions to advance
partisan policy initiatives or rubber stamp the requests of the
Administration, ignoring other critical substantive issues. We
hope that these concerns can be addressed as the bill moves
forward in the legislative process, but must urge our
colleagues to oppose it in its current form.
Peter Hoekstra.
Elton Gallegly.
Mac Thornberry.
Mike Rogers.
Sue Myrick.
Roy Blunt.
Jeff Miller.
John Kline.
K. Michael Conaway.
Additional Views
During committee consideration of the bill H.R. 2701, I
indicated that I had additional questions on portions of the
classified annex and was not yet prepared to vote to approve
the Schedule of Authorizations. As a result, I requested that I
be recorded as voting present on the question of whether to
report the bill favorably to the House.
I have subsequently received answers to my questions. Had I
known those answers at the time of the mark-up, I would have
voted to report the bill favorably.
Alcee L. Hastings,
Vice Chairman.
