111th Congress S. Prt.
1st Session COMMITTEE PRINT 111-5
_______________________________________________________________________
CHANGING CUBA POLICY--IN THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTEREST
__________
STAFF TRIP REPORT
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
One Hundred Eleventh Congress
First Session
February 23, 2009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin Republican Leader designee
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
JIM WEBB, Virginia JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York
David McKean, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ V
Introduction..................................................... 1
Findings......................................................... 2
The Cuban Regime Is Institutionalized....................... 2
Positive Developments Are Occurring in Cuba But They Should
Not Be Mistaken for Structural Reform...................... 3
Popular Dissatisfaction With Cuba's Economic Situation Is
the Regime's Vulnerability................................. 4
The Regime Appears To Be Open to Some Bilateral Dialogue and
Cooperation................................................ 5
Recommendations.................................................. 6
The Resumption of Bilateral Talks on Drug Interdiction and
Migration.................................................. 7
Investments in Alternative Energy........................... 8
Agricultural Trade.......................................... 8
Medical Trade............................................... 9
Bipartisan Commission and a Multilateral Framework.......... 10
Conclusion....................................................... 11
Appendixes
Appendix I....................................................... 13
Appendix II...................................................... 15
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
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February 23, 2009.
Dear Colleagues: From January 11-14, 2009, I directed my
senior Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) staff member
for Latin America, Carl Meacham, to evaluate U.S. policy
towards Cuba. Mr. Meacham traveled to Cuba at the invitation of
the Lexington Institute on official U.S. Government business
under a general license for travel, as provided by the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations (31 C.F.R. Part 515 Section 101 et
seq.). Peter Quilter, Senior Staff on the House International
Relations Committee, was also on the delegation.
During this trip, staff met with government officials,
foreign diplomats, members of the clergy, international media
representatives, Cuban entrepreneurs, and other Cuban citizens
in a variety of informal settings outside the apparent presence
of Cuban Government officials (Appendix 1).
The proclamation by Cuba's National Assembly making Raul
Castro President of Cuba on February 24, 2008, the election of
Barack Obama as President of the United States, on November 4,
2008, and the fiftieth anniversary of the Cuban Revolution on
January 1, 2009, have generated much discussion about U.S.
policy towards the island. This debate is important because it
has implications for security interests in the Straits of
Florida, broader U.S.-Latin American relations, and global
perceptions of U.S. foreign policy. Despite uncertainty about
Cuba's mid-term political future, it is clear that the recent
leadership changes have created an opportunity for the United
States to reevaluate a complex relationship marked by
misunderstanding, suspicion, and open hostility.
Economic sanctions are a legitimate tool of U.S. foreign
policy, and they have sometimes achieved their aims, as in the
case of apartheid South Africa. After 47 years, however, the
unilateral embargo on Cuba has failed to achieve its stated
purpose of ``bringing democracy to the Cuban people,'' while it
may have been used as a foil by the regime to demand further
sacrifices from Cuba's impoverished population. The current
U.S. policy has many passionate defenders, and their criticism
of the Castro regime is justified. Nevertheless, we must
recognize the ineffectiveness of our current policy and deal
with the Cuban regime in a way that enhances U.S. interests.
Mr. Meacham's report provides significant insight and a
number of important recommendations to advance U.S. interests
with Cuba. I hope you find the report helpful. We look forward
to working with you on these issues and welcome any comments
you may have on this report.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Ranking Member.
CHANGING CUBA POLICY--IN THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTEREST
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Introduction
We anticipate a review of U.S. policy regarding Cuba
and look forward to working with members of the
Committee and other members of Congress as we move
forward to the consideration of appropriate steps to
take to help advance U.S. interests and values in the
context of relations with Cuba.--Hillary Clinton \1\
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\1\ This statement was provided on January 12, 2009, as the
response to the following two questions: (1) Cuba has been on the State
Department's State Sponsors of Terrorism list since 1982. Please
provide your views regarding why Cuba should or should not remain on
the State Department's State Sponsors of Terrorism list; (2) Please
provide your views on U.S.-Cuban cooperation on energy security and
environmentally sustainable resource management, especially as Cuba
begins deep-water exploration for potentially significant oil reserves.
Secretary of State Clinton responded to Senator Lugar's
questions for the record with this pledge to conduct a review
of U.S. policy towards Cuba. Echoing President Obama's campaign
position, she also wrote that the Administration intends to
lift restrictions on Cuban-American travel and remittances to
Cuba while maintaining the U.S. trade and investment embargo.
She left the door open for bolder policy changes, however, by
expressing support for U.S.-Cuban cooperation in drug
interdiction and suggesting a willingness to engage with Cuba
on issues of mutual concern.
Staff believes that the promised review of Cuba policy will
reveal at least four weaknesses in current policy. First,
because of Cuba's symbolic importance to Latin America, U.S.
policy towards the island nation remains a contentious subject
with many countries in the region. Chilean President Michelle
Bachelet's February 2009 visit to Havana,\2\ and Cuba's
admission in December 2008 to the Rio Group of more than 20
Latin American and Caribbean countries demonstrate the region's
convergence around a policy of engagement with Cuba, in sharp
contrast to the U.S. policy of isolation. U.S. policy is also a
source of controversy between the U.S. and the European Union,
as reflected in the perennial transatlantic debate over
sanctions versus engagement, as well as in the United Nations,
which has passed a widely supported resolution condemning the
embargo for the past 17 years.
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\2\ This is the first visit by a Chilean leader to Cuba since
President Salvador Allende visited in 1972.
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Second, the United States Government (USG) hurts broader
national security interests by impeding cooperation with Cuba
on matters of shared concern, such as migration and
counternarcotics, among others. There is a precedent for such
bilateral cooperation, yet the broad outcome of the last eight
years was a near-total breakdown in official interaction
between the two governments; coordination of drug interdiction,
for example, is where most official interaction occurs with
Cuba, and only on a limited, case-by-case basis, while semi-
annual U.S.-Cuba migration talks were suspended in 2004.
Third, despite the ostensible goal of promoting a peaceful
transition to democracy in Cuba, U.S. policy has instead
provided the Government of Cuba (GOC) with both a convenient,
though overblown, scapegoat for its economic difficulties and
an external threat with which to justify its authoritarianism.
Finally, current U.S. policy ignores recent developments
that have the potential to redefine relations with Cuba. The
sanctions-based policy has significantly impeded the United
States' ability to influence the direction of policy in Cuba or
gain a broader understanding of events taking place on the
island. By directing policy towards an unlikely scenario of a
short-term democratic transition on the island and rejecting
most tools of diplomatic engagement, the U.S. is left as a
powerless bystander, watching events unfold at a distance.
Findings
The Obama Administration's review of policy towards Cuba
will occur during a complex period on the island and in the
United States, while the onslaught of a global recession
provides an unpredictable environment for foreign relations.
The following sections provide background and staff's principal
observations from travel to Cuba.
The Cuban regime is institutionalized
The Cuban government remains riddled with deep problems
including resource constraints, inefficiency, and corruption,
but it continues to function nonetheless. It exercises control
over its territory, manages government functions such as
taxation, policing, and delivery of social services, and
engages in effective international diplomacy.
Though the Cuban Revolution first emerged as a popular
movement, the process of institutionalization that began in the
1970s has strengthened and formalized the political structure
to the extent that the island's institutions occupy an
important role in the governance of Cuba. This process has been
accelerated by Fidel Castro's retirement in 2008 and the
accompanying departure from his charismatic but erratic
leadership style. Under Raul Castro, decision-making relies on
more regularized and predictable channels such as the Cuban
Communist Party, the National Assembly, and government
ministries.
While a popular uprising against the government cannot be
completely ruled out, staff concluded that a sudden collapse of
the GOC is unlikely given the institutionalized nature of the
regime and the absence of an external war or other catalyst.
Moreover, the internal opposition does not appear sufficiently
well developed to precipitate a negotiated transition, while
external opposition efforts have been proven peripheral.\3\ It
is thus more likely that the post-Castro era will be led by
factions of the current regime.\4\
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\3\ According to a report released by Freedom House in September
2008, the general Cuban public lacks familiarity and interest in
dissident organizations. Staff suspects that this disinterest stems
from several factors, namely the prioritization of economic concerns,
political apathy, the opposition's lack of access to the mass media,
and fear of the state's repressive apparatus.
\4\ Cuba most closely parallels pre-1989 Bulgaria with its thin
opposition movement. Unlike in Hungary or Czechoslovakia, the Bulgarian
regime initiated and controlled the transition. Factionalization within
the communist party led to a series of liberalizing steps and round-
table talks coordinated and chaired by one of the party leaders of the
internal coup. In Hungary, in contrast, the well-organized opposition
set out firm principles of negotiation even before it agreed to enter
talks, while in Czechoslovakia the established opposition groups headed
a provisional government following regime collapse.
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Consequently, the basic premise of U.S. policy--that a
liberal democracy will arise in the post-Castro era without
political continuity from the current system--is unlikely. This
is not to say that a democratic transition is either impossible
or inevitable, but rather that Cuba's future leadership will
not be a tabula rasa. By limiting engagement with Cuba's
second-tier leaders, the USG forgoes the opportunity of
establishing ties that might positively influence the
advancement of U.S. interests in the near future.
Positive developments are occurring in Cuba but they should not be
mistaken for structural reform
Change in Cuba cannot be assessed against a yardstick of
full multi-party democracy, free-market capitalism, and civil
rights. Nevertheless, since officially assuming the presidency
in early 2008, Raul Castro has introduced a series of modest
reforms that are regarded on the island as a departure from the
orthodox policies of his long-ruling brother, Fidel Castro. For
example, Cubans may now purchase cell phones and computers and
stay at hotels previously reserved for foreigners, though the
vast majority of the population cannot afford to take advantage
of these reforms. The GOC is granting new licenses to private
taxi drivers, who set their own prices, for the first time in a
decade. Most significantly, private farmers are now permitted
to purchase their own equipment, and the government is
proceeding with a plan to hand over unused state lands to
private farmers and cooperatives under long-term leases,
including more than 45,500 land grants approved in February
2009.
Raul Castro has repeatedly acknowledged the need to
increase efficiency and production, particularly in the
agricultural sector, and his decisions have demonstrated a
willingness to implement some reforms at a gradual pace, though
it is not clear whether they will lead to structural change. He
has also encouraged a series of town-hall meetings to publicly
debate government programs, but he made it clear that decisions
about changes would rest with the GOC, and many citizens feared
retribution for expressing their real opinions.\5\
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\5\ Freedom House Special Report. (15 Sept. 2008). Change in Cuba:
How Citizens View Their Country's Future.
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While limited economic opening is taking place, the
government continues to ban most political activity that occurs
outside the confines of the Cuban Communist Party. Opposition
parties are illegal, virtually all media remain state
controlled, and Cuba has the highest number of political
prisoners of any country in the Americas. Cuba regularly ranks
at the bottom of most internationally recognized rankings on
political and economic liberty, and the state controls most
means of production.
Still, recent developments in Cuba may indicate that the
government while able and willing to exercise its machinery of
repression, is showing some small signs of political
moderation. According to the non-governmental Cuban Commission
of Human Rights and National Reconciliation (CCDHRN), a
respected domestic human rights group, Cuba had 316 political
prisoners when Raul Castro first took power on a provisional
basis in July 2006, following the serious health setback
suffered by his brother Fidel. By early 2008, when Raul Castro
formally assumed the presidency, that number had declined to
234. In February 2009, the CCDHRN reported that the number of
documented political prisoners had dropped still further to
205.\6\ Raul Castro has commuted most death sentences on the
island, and the GOC signed two United Nations human rights
treaties in February 2007.\7\ As a result, Cuba is about to
undergo its first Universal Periodic Review in the United
Nations Human Rights Council.
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\6\ Comision Cubana de Derechos Humanos y Reconciliacion Nacional.
(2 Feb. 2009). ``Cuba en el ano 2009: La situacion de derechos civiles
politicos y economicos.''
\7\ BBC News. (29 April 2008). ``Cuba to commute death sentences.''
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Due in part to these modest shifts, Cuba's ranking for
civil liberties improved in 2008 from 7 to 6 (on a scale of 1
to 7, with 7 being the least free) on Freedom House's annual
survey, Freedom in the World--still a very low ranking of ``not
free'' but the first change since 1989. The GOC, however, has
increasingly used the practice of arbitrary short-term
detentions to intimidate and repress human rights and democracy
activists. According to the CCDHRN, there were more than 1,500
such detentions in 2008. The government also employs
surveillance and travel restrictions against political
dissidents, and ordinary Cubans still do not have the right to
travel abroad and return to Cuba.
While some positive developments have occurred, they do not
appear to represent a long-term reform program, at least at
this time. These changes are welcomed, but no one should be
under the illusion that there might not be setbacks.
Popular dissatisfaction with Cuba's economic situation is the regime's
vulnerability
Recent developments in Cuba respond to both urgent economic
challenges and raised public expectations for economic change.
Cuba has become increasingly reliant on food imports to feed
its people, and most food crops show declining trends. Since
mid-2008, the Cuban economy has suffered not only the impact of
Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, which caused large crop losses and
food shortages, but also the global financial crisis, with a
resulting decline in credit, tourism revenues, remittance
flows, and demands for nickel, the island's chief export. An
additional vulnerability lies in the island's dependence on
subsidized oil from Venezuela.
Among ordinary Cubans, moreover, staff found that the
harshest complaints are directed at the stark disparity between
incomes and prices. The average monthly wage of a Cuban worker
is US$17, but many goods are sold at prices equivalent to what
they would cost in the United States. This disparity is
sustained through a dual currency system: local salaries are
paid in pesos valued at about 25 to the dollar, and many food
products and consumer goods are sold in prices marked in
convertible pesos (CUC) valued at parity with the dollar. Staff
visited CUC stores that sold items such as Nike, Adidas, and
Reebok apparel, and they were full of Cubans purchasing goods
at U.S. market prices, while the peso stores that staff visited
showed a meager selection of low quality goods. Those who
benefit from remittances or work in the tourism industry are
able to purchase goods at CUC stores. This is in sharp contrast
to the majority of Cubans who, because monthly wages are
insufficient to purchase even basic foodstuffs, engage in
illegal economic activities reflected in popular Cuban jargon
like ``resolver'' (to make do), ``inventar'' (to invent), and
``hacer las cosas por la izquierda'' (to do things ``on the
left,'' i.e. transactions in the underground economy).
Staff believes that popular dissatisfaction with the
economic situation among Cuba's youth is especially problematic
for Raul Castro. During an evening visit to the intersection of
23rd Street and ``Calle G'' (G Street, a popular gathering
place for college students in Havana) staff observed young
adults dressed in fashions similar to average American youth.
The contemporary music that staff could hear played was
Reggaeton, a form of Latin urban music that became popular with
Latin American youth in the early 1990s. Yet even relatively
successful young people expressed frustration with the limits
placed by the state on their prospects for upward mobility.
Staff concluded that this generation, which came of age after
the collapse of the Soviet Union plunged Cuba into profound
economic crisis in the 1990s, has high expectations when it
comes to the economy but has only the most tenuous link with
the Cuban Revolution in political terms.
Cuba's economic challenges and vulnerabilities have
important implications for U.S. interests, for they provide an
incentive for the GOC to advance economic reforms that could
provide commercial opportunities and markets for the United
States.
The regime appears to be open to some bilateral dialogue and
cooperation
Staff's meetings with GOC officials revealed stark
differences between Cuban and U.S. priorities in bilateral
relations. Most of the U.S. policy reforms that are proposed in
Washington center on liberalizing travel to the island, yet the
GOC considers travel to be a domestic issue for the United
States and therefore of less relevance to bilateral
discussions. Most importantly, the GOC views the USG's emphasis
on conditionality (i.e., lifting U.S. economic sanctions in
return for concrete movement toward democracy) as an unlikely
starting point for future negotiations. When staff asked GOC
officials about the human rights situation and the plight of
Cuban dissidents, GOC officials countered with Guantanamo,\8\
Abu Ghraib, and the case of the ``Cuban Five.'' \9\
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\8\ Following staff's trip, President Obama signed an executive
order to close the Guantanamo detention camp. Fidel Castro has demanded
a return of the base to the GOC.
\9\ The Cuban Five are five Cuban unregistered intelligence agents
who infiltrated South Florida exile groups in the 1990s and have been
imprisoned in the United States since 2001.
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When staff asked about what gestures the Cuban government
would find positive, officials expressed concerns with programs
by USAID intended to facilitate a transition to democracy in
Cuba as well as Radio and TV Marti broadcasts from Miami, which
are intended to provide an alternative source of information
for the Cuban people. They view these programs as
interventionist tools of the United States intended to bring
about regime change.
On issues of national security and commerce, however, the
GOC indicated a willingness to cooperate with the United States
where mutual interests exist, echoing previous statements by
Raul Castro on his desire for dialogue with the USG. Since
assuming power in 2006, he has made several overtures to engage
in dialogue with the United States with the condition that the
dialogue is based on the principles of equality, reciprocity,
non-interference, and mutual respect.\10\ According to State
Department sources, the USG has also made overtures over the
last 18 months to discuss narco-trafficking and current
restrictions on travel for diplomats in Havana and Washington,
but these efforts have proven unsuccessful thus far.
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\10\ Sullivan, Mark P. (3 Feb. 2009). ``Cuba: Issues for the 111th
Congress.'' Congressional Research Service.
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Recommendatons
According to a recently published book on U.S. policy
towards Cuba, only three avenues of regular official
communication exist with the GOC: monthly meetings between U.S.
and Cuban military officers at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base,
occasional cooperation between the U.S. and Cuban coast guards
on drug enforcement and migration matters (through a U.S. Coast
Guard attache at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana), and
frequent contact between U.S. and Cuban meteorologists who
track hurricanes in the Caribbean.\11\
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\11\ Erikson, Daniel P. (2008). The Cuba Wars: Fidel Castro, the
United States, and the Next Revolution. New York: Bloomsbury Press.
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Given these precedents and the current state of U.S.-Cuban
relations, staff concluded that progress could be attained by
replacing conditionality with sequenced engagement, beginning
with narrow areas of consensus that develop trust. A steady
series of gradual measures has significant confidence-building
potential and could ultimately create the conditions for
effective dialogue over more contentious issues. By sequencing
this process of engagement with Cuba, the USG would have the
opportunity to continually reassess progress towards the
advancement of national interests. In other words, a pragmatic,
phased approach would allow the USG to halt the engagement
process at any point if U.S. interests were no longer being
served.
Staff recommends assessing the viability of reinstating
discussions on drug interdiction and migration, and incremental
steps in other areas, in order to address issues of concern for
both countries. These measures should build upon each other to
establish new foundations for dialogue. Initially, increased
communication and cooperation between the GOC and USG can take
place within the framework of the existing embargo, though
staff suggests consideration of several exceptions to U.S.
sanctions as talks progress, as detailed below.
As an initial unilateral step, staff recommends fulfilling
President Obama's campaign promise to repeal all restrictions
on Cuban-American family travel and remittances before the
Fifth Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago on April
17-19, 2009. The timing of this gesture would signal an
important change and would improve goodwill towards the United
States from Latin American countries, as the USG seeks regional
cooperation on a wide range of issues. Congressional action to
lift all current U.S. travel restrictions should be considered
as an effort along these lines, as well.
Staff suggests that efforts to lift current travel
restrictions on the Cuban Interests Section personnel in
Washington, whose diplomats may not venture beyond the Beltway
without explicit permission from the USG, be supported. Such a
move would encourage a reciprocal lifting of GOC restrictions
on the ability of U.S. diplomats to travel outside of Havana,
improving the USG's ability to understand conditions on the
entire island.
In addition, staff recommends a review of the effectiveness
of several components of U.S. policy in both the legislative
and executive branches: first, the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992
and the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996;
and, the policy recommendations of the 2004 and 2006 reports of
the Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, an inter-agency
commission established in 2003 that was tasked with developing
recommendations to ``hasten'' a transition to democracy in
Cuba.\12\
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\12\ Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba. Retrieved from
http://www.cafc.gov.
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Beyond these immediate unilateral measures, the timing of
policy reforms and elimination of embargo restrictions would
depend on the evolution of negotiations, which should be
spearheaded by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for
Western Hemisphere Affairs. The following are additional areas
of reform for consideration in the short and mid-term:
The resumption of bilateral talks on drug interdiction and migration
Cuba's geographic position makes it key to halting the
rapid increase in drugs flowing through Caribbean routes to the
United States. Yet anti-narcotics cooperation between the USG
and GOC presently occurs on only a limited, case-by-case basis,
despite the GOC's expressed interest in signing a formal
agreement with the USG.
Staff encourages the USG to undertake comprehensive
counternarcotics cooperation with Cuba, including the provision
of needed equipment and technical assistance. Working more
closely with Cuba to combat the growth of drug trafficking
would protect vital U.S. security interests in the region and
would put the United States in a better position to help thwart
any future strategies by international drug traffickers to use
Cuba as a transit point for drug shipments to the United
States.
Regarding migration, staff recommends the revival of U.S.-
Cuban biannual migrations talks, which have been suspended
since 2004. These talks provide an important venue for
discussing the shared problem of illegal migration. The USG
should remain committed to fully implementing its agreements
under the 1994 Joint Communique and the 1995 Joint Statement
(collectively known as the U.S.-Cuba Migration Accords) as
effective tools for promoting safe, legal, and orderly
migration.
In addition, staff suggests an executive branch review of
the ``wet-foot, dry-foot policy.'' Under this policy, Cubans
who are intercepted at sea are sent back to Cuba or to a third
country while those who make it to U.S. soil are allowed to
remain in the United States. The review should assess whether
this policy has led to the inefficient use of U.S. Coast Guard
resources and assets as well as the potential to redirect these
resources to drug interdiction efforts.
Investments in alternative energy
Energy security has vaulted to the top of both the U.S. and
Cuban political agendas amid concerns about supply
interruptions and rising prices, sparking a renewed search for
viable alternative fuels. For the USG, an important element of
an effective energy strategy from both cost and environmental
perspectives lies in forging technological and open trading
relationships in the Western Hemisphere.
For the GOC, upgrading the island's decaying energy
infrastructure and promoting alternative energy sources are
national security priorities referred to as the ``energy
revolution.'' GOC officials indicated to staff that they are
particularly interested in wind power, while other renewable
energy projects are receiving support from the United Nations
Development Program, which maintains an office in Havana and
finances, among other projects, household solar photovoltaics
and hydro power for use in rural areas. In addition, the GOC is
encouraging foreign investment to develop its oil fields, with
probable hydrocarbon reserves of five billion barrels,
according to estimates by the United States Geological Survey--
significant for Cuban energy consumption and comparable to the
oil reserves of Ecuador.
In staff's meetings, GOC officials particularly welcomed
U.S. participation in renewable energy development. If
restrictions were lifted, U.S. technology could help ensure
environmentally-sustainable development of Cuba's energy
sector. Most importantly, cooperation in this area would be
consistent with long-term U.S. interests in energy security and
efficiency in the region.
Agricultural trade
Since the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act
(TSRA) of 2000 lifted sanctions on sales of agricultural
commodities, the U.S. has become Cuba's most important food
provider and its fifth largest overall trading partner. Yet
many restrictions and licensing requirements remain in place,
making it difficult for agricultural exporters to take full
advantage of trade opportunities in Cuba. The TSRA denied
exporters access to U.S. private commercial financing or
credit, and a 2005 regulation by the Treasury's Office of
Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) redefined the sales terms set
forth in TSRA, stipulating that cash payment must be received
by the seller prior to the shipment of goods, rather than prior
to transfer of title and control of the goods, as had been the
practice until 2005.\13\ According to a 2007 Government
Accountability Office report, smaller U.S. exporters have found
OFAC's licensing process to be cumbersome, nontransparent, and
time consuming, while other exporters have complained that
Cuban purchasing officials are routinely denied visas to travel
to the United States for inspections of U.S. processing and
facilities.\14\
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\13\ U.S. International Trade Commission. (July 2007). U.S.
Agricultural Sales to Cuba: Certain Economic Effects of U.S.
Restrictions. Retrieved from http://www.usitc.gov/publications/
pub3932.pdf.
\14\ U.S. Government Accountability Office. (Nov. 2007). Economic
Sanctions: Agencies Face Competing Priorities in Enforcing the U.S.
Embargo on Cuba.
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Easing these restrictions would benefit U.S. economic
interests and expand an important source of dialogue and
engagement between the two countries. According to staff's
sources, the GOC welcomes this nascent trading relationship,
due to the quality and proximity of U.S. goods, and the
professionalism of U.S. exporters. This is especially true
following Hurricanes Gustav and Ike, which badly depleted Cuban
food stores, creating food shortages. Specifically, staff
recommends assessing the viability of a combination of
potential executive and legislative actions to: (1) review the
``cash in advance'' requirement; (2) authorize private
financing for agricultural sales; (3) expand the types of
products that may be sold to include agricultural machinery and
supplies, which are especially needed for rebuilding in the
wake of the recent hurricanes; (4) authorize general licenses
for travel to Cuba for the marketing, negotiation, and delivery
of agricultural goods; (5) facilitate the issuance of U.S.
visas for Cuban officials to conduct activities, including
sanitary inspections, related to such sales.
Medical trade
Because the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement
Act did not clearly repeal or supersede the relevant Cuban
Democracy Act (CDA) provisions on medical items, the latter's
requirements still apply. The CDA required the issuance of a
specific license from the Department of Commerce as well as
``proper end-use monitoring'' to ensure that medical items
would be used for their intended purpose.\15\ In contrast to
U.S. agricultural exports, U.S. exports of medical products
have not increased substantially since 2001 and remain a minor
part of U.S. exports to the island.
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\15\ U.S. Department of State. Fact Sheet: Medical Sales to Cuba.
Retrieved from http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001/fsjulydec/
2612.htm.
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Staff recommends reviewing the viability of authorizing
private financing for medical sales as well as general licenses
for travel to Cuba for the marketing and sale of these goods.
Appropriate legislative action could also include a review of
the current end-use monitoring requirement, which is why some
U.S. companies do not export medical products to Cuba.
In addition, staff suggests reviewing the potential for
legislative action to permit pharmaceutical imports from Cuba's
rapidly developing biotech industry. Cuba has made important
strides in biotechnology, including the production of
meningitis and hepatitis B vaccines, and U.S. scientists have
called for enhanced research cooperation with their Cuban
counterparts.\16\ In 2004, the Treasury Department allowed
California's CancerVax Corporation to conduct clinical trials
of three cancer vaccines in conjunction with Cuba's Center for
Molecular Immunology, yet the embargo prohibits importation of
medical products, and there is no permanent program of
cooperation between Cuban and U.S. research institutions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ U.S.-Cuban Scientific Relations. (17 Oct. 2008). Science. Vol.
322.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bipartisan commission and a multilateral framework
In sum, increased dialogue through appropriate channels,
coupled with looser trade terms, would lay the groundwork for
more substantial discussions between the USG and GOC. Staff
believes that the USG should begin treating Cuba as it does
other nations with whom it has fundamental disagreements but
where engagement advances broader interests.
In the short-term, staff recommends the targeted sequencing
of U.S. unilateral options in addition to the pursuit of a
multilateral approach to Cuba. No U.S. strategy to reform its
relationship with Cuba will be fully successful if it is
pursued unilaterally. With this goal, the Administration should
consider establishing a bipartisan commission to forge a new,
multilateral strategy with Latin American and European Union
partners. Just as the bipartisan Iraq Study Group proposed
important recommendations based on a comprehensive policy
review, a Cuba Study Group could complement the State
Department's ongoing policy review with a road map for future
policy direction.
A multilateral component of this road map could include
reengagement with Cuba in international institutions. In the
medium-term, the USG could review dropping opposition to Cuban
participation in the International Monetary Fund, the World
Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank. Cuban membership
of these financial institutions would increase the GOC's
accountability to the international community and encourage
free-market reforms consistent with U.S. commercial interests.
In addition, a member country of the Organization of
American States (OAS) could call for the reincorporation of
Cuba as a member of the OAS. This would require a resolution by
the OAS General Assembly to revoke the 1962 decision that
suspended the GOC's membership privileges because it was
concluded that Cuba was a Marxist-Leninist country, whose
government was incompatible with the inter-American system. In
the event of such a development, the GOC would be required to
sign the Inter-American Democratic Charter in order to be
considered a full member.
On the diplomatic front, staff recommends the consideration
of a mechanism for regular information-sharing and coordinated
action between the USG and other countries that have a
bilateral human rights dialogue with the GOC, including members
of the European Union, Japan, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and
Canada. An appropriate model is provided by the Berne Process
in Beijing, which has afforded a framework for dialogue among
diplomats in China, including from the USG, to enhance
cooperation with other diplomatic missions interested in
engaging the Government of China on sensitive human rights
issues. A similar process should be considered as a framework
for our diplomats in Havana.
Conclusion
Cuba is important for the United States because of
proximity, intertwined history, and culture. Cuba is important
in Latin America because it is a romanticized symbol of a small
country that stood up to the most powerful country in the
world. The Cuban Revolution legitimizes some of the passions
that fuel the outrage that many Latin Americans feel regarding
the inequality of their own societies, and for 50 years,
rightly or wrongly, Cuba has ably portrayed itself as having
fought this fight for them, as well as for the downtrodden
around the world.
During the visit, a Cuban official stated to staff that
``U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America goes through
Cuba.'' With the end of the Cold War, however, the GOC does not
represent the security threat to the U.S. that it once did. The
USG still has significant grievances with the GOC--mostly, its
human rights practices and the stifling of political pluralism
and property rights as well as the lack of adequate
compensation for expropriated assets of U.S. firms and
individuals. The remaining security issues, on the other hand,
are limited to the potential for a migration crisis provoked by
political or economic instability on the island. While Cuba's
alliance with Venezuela has intentions of influencing regional
affairs, the GOC has not been positioned to ably export its
Revolution since the collapse of the Soviet Union forced an end
to Cuba's financial support for Latin American guerrilla
movements. The GOC's program of medical diplomacy, which
exports doctors to developing countries, bolsters the island's
soft power, but does not represent a significant threat to U.S.
national security. Given current economic challenges, any
revenue gained from economic engagement with the United States
would likely be used for internal economic priorities, not
international activism.
For these reasons, the United States' relationships with
Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Chile, have taken priority in
Latin America. Cuba, too, has demonstrated that relations with
the United States, though advantageous, are not necessary to
its survival, having forged closer relationships around the
globe. Venezuela, China, and Canada are Cuba's top three
trading partners, and recent economic agreements with Brazil
and Russia are examples of Cuba's resourcefulness in this
regard. As one GOC official told staff, ``We've endured much
harsher conditions during the Special Period. We can survive
with or without the United States.'' \17\
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\17\ The Special Period refers to the economic crisis caused by the
1991 collapse of the Soviet Union and the resulting loss of economic
subsidies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In hindsight, the U.S. embargo has not served a national
security agenda since Cuba ceased to be an effective threat to
the security of the United States. In the immediate post-Cold
War era, the cost of maintaining this policy was negligible in
comparison to the domestic political benefit derived from
satisfying Cuban-American groups in the United States. The USG
justified the embargo policy as an incentive or inducement for
negotiations with the Cuban government, the rationale being
that the U.S. would lift the embargo, or parts of it, in
response to reform on human rights and democracy. This narrow
approach, however, has not furthered progress in human rights
or democracy in Cuba and has come at the expense of other
direct and regional strategic U.S. interests.
Today it is clear that a reform of our policy would serve
U.S. security and economic interests in managing migration
effectively and combating the illegal drug trade, among other
interests. By seizing the initiative at the beginning of a new
U.S. Administration and at an important moment in Cuban
history, the USG would relinquish a conditional posture that
has made any policy changes contingent on Havana, not
Washington.
Reform of U.S.-Cuban relations would also benefit our
regional relations. Certain Latin American leaders, whose
political appeal depends on the propagation of an array of
anti-Washington grievances, would lose momentum as a
centerpiece of these grievances is removed. More significantly,
Latin Americans would view U.S. engagement with Cuba as a
demonstration that the United States understands their
perspectives on the history of U.S. policy in the region and no
longer insists that all of Latin America must share U.S.
hostility to a 50-year-old regime. The resulting improvement to
the United States' image in the region would facilitate the
advancement of U.S. interests.
If reform in U.S.-Cuba policy were to occur in the
direction of sequenced engagement, the impact on the region
would be swift and to the benefit of the security and
prosperity of the United States. In due order, we must correct
the failures of our current policy in a way that enhances U.S.
interests.
APPENDIX I
----------
Contributor
Kezia McKeague, Legislative Assistant, Committee on Foreign
Relations, United States Senate
MEETINGS WITH INDIVIDUALS IN CUBA
U.S. diplomats
Jonathan Farrar, Principal Officer, U.S. Interests Section, and
country team members
Cuban government officials
Vice Minister for Economy and Planning, Alfonso Casanova
Vice Minister for Foreign Relations, Dagoberto Rodriguez
Advisor to the President of the Cuban National Assembly, Miguel
Alvarez
Advisor to the President of the Cuban National Assembly, Ana
Mayra Alvarez
Alimport representatives
Center for Molecular Immunology representatives
Ministry of Basic Industries representatives
Cupet (Cuban oil company) representatives
Foreign diplomats
Manuel Cacho Quesada, Spanish Ambassador to Cuba
Susan McDade, United Nations Resident Coordinator for Cuba
Bernardo Pericas, Brazilian Ambassador to Cuba
Catholic Church
Orlando Marquez, advisor to Cardinal Jaime Ortega and editor of
archdiocesan monthly Palabra Nueva
Foreign correspondents
Gerardo Arreola, La Jornada
Maurico Vicent, El Pais
Other individuals
Omar Everleny Perez, Cuban economist
Cuban farmers in private cooperative in Managua, Cuba
Cuban citizens in Santa Maria del Rosario
APPENDIX II
----------
Staff's recommendations rely on actions by both the
executive and legislative branches of the USG. For this reason,
staff requested the following information from the
Congressional Research Service (CRS). It summarizes the
potential actions the executive branch could take on its own to
move towards normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations versus
actions that would require congressional action.
Potential Presidential Actions
Travel restrictions
The President has the authority to ease U.S. restrictions
on travel to Cuba that are in place today. Restrictions on
travel are set forth in the Cuban Assets Control Regulations
(CACR) (31 CFR, Part 515), the main body of Cuba embargo
regulations administered by the Department of Treasury that set
forth 12 categories of permissible travel. The embargo
regulations do not ban travel itself, but place restrictions on
any financial transactions related to travel to Cuba, which
effectively result in a travel ban. Under the CACR, certain
categories of travelers (such as journalists and full-time
professional researchers) may travel to Cuba under a general
license, which means that there is no need to obtain special
permission from the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC), which implements the Cuba embargo. In
addition, a wide variety of travelers engaging in family
visits, and educational, religious, humanitarian, and other
activities may be eligible for specific licenses. Applications
for specific licenses are reviewed and granted by OFAC on a
case-by-case basis.
There have been various changes to the travel restrictions
over time. For example, the Clinton Administration tightened
family travel restrictions in 1994 by requiring a specific as
opposed to a general license, and subsequently reversed this
action in 1995. In 1999, the Clinton Administration announced a
number of changes to the travel regulations that allowed
people-to-people exchanges in a variety of areas. In contrast,
the Bush Administration tightened travel restrictions in 2003
by prohibiting people-to-people exchanges unrelated to academic
coursework, and in 2004 restricted family travel in various
ways. This included requiring a specific license, limiting such
travel to once every three years with no exceptions, allowing
visits only to immediate family (grandparents, grandchildren,
parents, siblings, spouses, and children) for a period not to
exceed 14 days, and reducing the amount that can be spent while
in Cuba to $50 daily (from the State Department per diem rate
of $179).
Just as President Bush tightened travel restrictions,
President Obama could ease the restrictions by amending the
CACR travel regulations. As a presidential candidate, Obama
vowed to change U.S. policy toward Cuba by allowing unlimited
family travel, which would require changes to the licensing
procedures in the CACR. The 12 categories of permissible travel
are defined in law, but within those categories the
Administration has the authority to make changes to licensing
procedures. For example, the President could choose to change
the CACR travel regulations back to as they were during the
first two years of the Bush Administration. This would include
easing restrictions on travel for family visits, people-to-
people educational activities, academic educational activities
(including for secondary schools), and participation in amateur
or semi-professional sports competitions.
Remittances
The President has the authority to ease restrictions on
remittances to Cuba. These restrictions are also set forth in
the CACR and have changed over time. In June 2004, the Bush
Administration tightened restrictions so that remittances may
only be sent to nationals of Cuba who are members of the
remitter's immediate family (spouse, child, grandchild, parent,
grandparent, or sibling). Up to $300 in remittances may be
carried by an authorized traveler to Cuba. Prior to those
changes, remittances were not restricted to members of the
remitter's immediate family, but could be sent to any household
in Cuba, provided the household did not include a senior-level
Cuban government official or senior-level Communist Party
official. Authorized travelers also could carry up to $3,000 in
cash remittances compared to $300 now. Both before and after
the June 2004 tightening, however, the level of remittances
that can be provided per quarter remained the same, $300 per
household.
Gift parcels
Consistent with the U.S. embargo of Cuba, the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR), implemented by the Department
of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, require a license
for exports of all items subject to the EAR to Cuba, with only
a limited number of license exceptions. The President has the
authority to make changes to the EAR. For example, in June
2004, the Bush Administration tightened restrictions on items
that may be included in humanitarian gift parcels sent to Cuba.
The new regulations prohibited gift parcels from including
seeds, clothing, personal hygiene items, veterinary medicines
and supplies, fishing equipment and supplies, and soap-making
equipment (15 CFR 740.12). The President could ease these
restrictions on gift parcels. In June 2008, the Bush
Administration added mobile phones and related accessories to
the eligible list of gift parcel items, and increased the value
of the gift parcel from $200 to $400 (which does not apply to
the value of food sent in the parcel).
U.S. agricultural exports
The President has the authority to reverse the Treasury
Department's February 2005 amendment to the CACR that provides
a definition of the term ``payment of cash in advance'' for
exporting U.S. agricultural goods to Cuba. The Trade Sanctions
Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA, P.L. 106-387,
Title IX) allows for U.S. commercial agricultural exports to
Cuba, but with numerous conditions and licensing requirements.
TSRA requires that all transactions must be conducted by
payment of cash in advance or financing by third country
financial institutions. In February 2005, the Treasury
Department amended the CACR to define the term ``payment of
cash in advance'' to mean ``that payment is received by the
seller or the seller's agent prior to the shipment of the goods
from the port at which they are loaded.'' This was in contrast
to past practice whereby the seller would receive payment while
the goods were in transit or before they arrived at a Cuban
port. U.S. exporters and some Members of Congress objected to
the amendment as a new sanction that violated the intent of
TSRA. There have been various legislative initiatives over the
past several years to ease sanctions on U.S. agricultural
exports to Cuba by preventing the Treasury Department from
implementing the February 2005 amendment defining payment of
cash in advance.
Bilateral talks and agreements
The Executive Branch could choose to engage Cuba in
bilateral talks in a range of areas or negotiate new bilateral
agreements with Cuba. In 2002, Cuba proposed the negotiation of
bilateral agreements on drug interdiction, terrorism, and
migration issues. In the context of Fidel Castro's departure
from political power in 2006, some observers called for a
policy of engagement with Cuba in these areas as well as on
efforts to combat human trafficking and environmental
cooperation.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ For a discussion of this approach, see CRS Report RL33622,
Cuba's Future Political Scenarios and U.S. Policy Approaches, September
3, 2006.
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For example, the President could choose to restart the
semi-annual U.S.-Cuban talks on the implementation of the 1994
and 1995 bilateral migration accords. The Bush Administration
cancelled those talks in January 2004 before the 20th round,
and no talks have been held since. The State Department
maintained that they cancelled the talks because Cuba refused
to discuss five issues: (1) the issuance of exit permits for
all qualified migrants; (2) cooperation in holding a new
registration for an immigrant lottery; (3) the need for a
deeper Cuban port used by the U.S. Coast Guard for the
repatriation of Cubans interdicted at sea; (4) the issue of
Cuba's responsibility to permit U.S. diplomats to travel to
monitor returned migrants; and (5) Cuba's acceptance of the
return of Cuban nationals determined to be inadmissible to the
United States.\19\ In response to the cancellation of the
talks, Cuban officials maintained that the U.S. decision was
irresponsible and that Cuba was prepared to discuss all of the
issues raised by the United States.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ U.S. Department of State. State Department Regular Briefing,
Richard Boucher, January 7, 2004.
\20\ ``Migration Talks Cancelled,'' Miami Herald, January 8, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another example could be closer cooperation on anti-drug
efforts or the negotiation of an anti-drug agreement with Cuba.
Bilateral cooperation on anti-drug efforts has increased since
1999 when U.S. and Cuban officials met in Havana to discuss
ways to improve anti-drug cooperation, and Cuba accepted the
stationing of a U.S. Coast Guard Drug Interdiction Specialist
(DIS) at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. In 2002, Cuba
called for a bilateral anti-drug agreement with the United
States, but the Bush Administration indicated at the time that
cooperation would continue on a case-by-case basis, not through
a bilateral agreement. More recently, Assistant Secretary of
State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Tom Shannon maintained in
an interview with Spain's El Pais newspaper in early January
2009 that a drug trafficking accord with Cuba would be logical,
although he could not anticipate what the next Administration
would do.\21\
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\21\ Jose Manuel Calvo, ``Thomas Shannon Secretario de Estado
adjunto para Latinoamerica: Seria un acuerdo contra el narcotrafico
entre Cuba y EE UU,'' El Pais, January 11, 2009.
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Foreign assistance
Numerous provisions of law prohibit U.S. assistance to
Cuba, some without waiver authority. For instance, Section
620(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 generally
prohibits assistance to the present government of Cuba and does
not authorize the President to waive its application.
Nevertheless, the President does retain authority to provide
certain types of assistance to Cuba. Pursuant to Section 491 of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, for example, the President
is authorized to provide assistance to any foreign country,
``on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for
international disaster relief and rehabilitation, including
assistance relating to disaster preparedness, and to the
prediction of, and contingency planning for, natural disasters
abroad.'' Another example is Section 104(c)(4) of the Act,
which allows for health-related assistance notwithstanding any
other provision of law. Section 109 of the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114)
authorizes the President to provide support to individuals and
independent nongovernmental organizations working to support
democracy-building efforts for Cuba. In addition, annual
foreign operations appropriations measures have had a provision
(for FY2008, see Section 634(b) of P.L. 110-161, Division J)
allowing for assistance to support tropical forestry and
biodiversity conservation and energy programs aimed at reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. This provision, however, has been
subject to Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
that prohibits assistance to governments supporting
international terrorism unless the President determines that
national security interests or humanitarian reasons justify a
waiver. Such a waiver would be required for Cuba since it is on
the State Department's list of countries supporting
international terrorism.
Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act withholds the
U.S. proportionate share from international organizations
conducting programs in specific countries, including Cuba, with
the exception of programs of the United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF) and certain programs of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). This provision is largely symbolic,
however, and does not prevent international organizations from
conducting programs in Cuba. For example, the United Nations
Development Program has an active program in Cuba.
The President also has special authority under Section 614
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to authorize a limited
amount of assistance each fiscal year ``when the President
determines and so notifies in writing to the Speaker of the
House and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate, that to do so is important to the security
interests of the United States.'' Before exercising this
authority, the President needs to consult with and provide a
written policy justification to the appropriations and foreign
relations committees in both houses.
Diplomatic relations
While the President has the power to restore full
diplomatic relations with Cuba, such an action would usually
occur as part of a broader effort toward normalizing relations.
For example, the normalization of U.S. relations with Vietnam
proceeded incrementally for a number of years, with Congress
playing a significant role in the normalization process. A
detailed roadmap for the normalization of relations with
Vietnam was issued in 1991, although an Ambassador was not
appointed until 1997, after President Clinton issued a
determination that certain conditions had been met regarding
Vietnamese cooperation on POW/MIA issues. The President has the
power to appoint Ambassadors with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
Terrorism lists
The President has authority to remove Cuba from various
terrorist lists in U.S. law. Under Section 40A of the Arms
Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2781), the Secretary
of State makes an annual determination listing those countries
that are not cooperating fully with U.S. antiterrorism efforts.
Being on the list prohibits the export of defense articles and
defense services, but the President may waive the sanction if
he determines that the transaction is important to the national
interests of the United States. Cuba was added to the State
Department's list of states sponsoring international terrorism
in 1982 pursuant to Section 6(j) of the Export Administration
Act (P.L. 96-72). Exports of dual-use good and services require
a license to any country identified as a state supporter of
terrorism. Being listed under Section 6(j) also triggers other
laws that limit economic transactions. Pursuant to provisions
in the Act, the President may remove a country from the list in
two ways. The first option is to submit a report to Congress
certifying, before the removal would take effect, that: (1)
there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and
policies of the government; (2) the government is not
supporting acts of international terrorism; and (3) the
government has provided assurances that it will not support
acts of international terrorism in the future. The second
option is to submit a report at least 45 days before the
removal of the country from the list certifying that: (1) the
government has not provided any support for international
terrorism during the preceding six-month period, and (2) that
the government has provided assurances that it will not support
acts of international terrorism in the future.
Actions Requiring Legislative Action
Embargo
Lifting or substantially easing the U.S. economic embargo
on Cuba today as set forth in the CACR would require
legislative action to amend or repeal certain provisions in the
Libertad Act (P.L. 104-114) and other Acts. Section 102(h) of
that law codified the economic embargo, including the CACR
restrictions. While the CACR itself includes licensing
authority that provides administrative flexibility, totally
lifting or substantially easing the embargo regulations would
appear to violate the intention of Congress. Additional
provisions of the Libertad Act, Sections 204-206, require that
certain conditions be met before the President may suspend or
ultimately terminate the economic embargo. For the suspension
of the embargo, these conditions require that a transition
government: does not include Fidel or Raul Castro; has
legalized all political activity; has released all political
prisoners; has dissolved several coercive elements of state
security; has made commitments to free and fair elections for a
new government in 18 months; has ceased interference with Radio
and TV Marti broadcasts; is making demonstrable progress in
establishing an independent judiciary, respecting international
recognized human rights and basic freedoms, and allowing the
establishment of independent trade unions and social, economic,
and political associations; and has given assurances that it
will allow the speedy and efficient distribution of assistance
to the Cuban people. The actual termination of the embargo
would require additional conditions, including most
significantly, that an elected civilian government is in power.
Travel
Lifting travel restrictions altogether would require
legislative action. This is because of the codification of the
embargo in Section 102(h) of the Libertad Act discussed above,
although, as noted above, the Administration retains
flexibility through licensing authority to ease travel
restrictions. In addition, a provision in the TSRA (Section
910(b) of P.L. 106-387, Title IX) prevents the Administration
from licensing travel for tourist activities, and defines such
activities as any activity not expressly authorized in the 12
categories of travel set forth in the CACR regulations. This
legislative provision essentially circumscribes the authority
of the Executive Branch to issue travel licenses for activities
beyond those already allowed, and would have to be amended or
repealed in order to expand categories of travel to Cuba or
lift travel restrictions altogether.
Agricultural and medical exports
Further lifting restrictions on the sale of agricultural
and medical exports to Cuba would require legislative action.
TSRA allows for the granting of one-year export licenses for
shipping food and medicine to Cuba. However, no U.S. government
assistance (including foreign assistance, export assistance,
credits, or credit guarantees) can be made available to finance
such exports. The law also denies exporters access to U.S.
private commercial financing or credit, and, as noted above,
all transactions must be conducted with payment of cash in
advance, or with financing from third countries. The Cuban
Democracy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-484, Section 1705) allows
commercial medical exports to Cuba under certain conditions.
The law requires specific licenses for such transactions, and
requires onsite verification to determine that the exported
item is to be used for the purposes for which it was intended
and only for the use and benefit of the Cuban people.
U.S. foreign subsidiary trade with Cuba
Allowing U.S. foreign subsidiaries to trade with Cuba would
require legislative action. A provision in the Cuban Democracy
Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-484, Section 1706) prohibits U.S. foreign
subsidiary trade with Cuba. When this provision went into
effect, U.S. foreign subsidiary exports to Cuba amounted to
over $400 million.\22\ This provision would have to be repealed
for such trade to be allowed.
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\22\ Donna Rich Kaplowitz, Anatomy of a Failed Embargo, U.S.
Sanctions Against Cuba (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p. 152.
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