S. Hrg. 111-172
NOMINATION OF LEON PANETTA TO BE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 5, 2009
FEBRUARY 6, 2009
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
52-741 WASHINGTON : 2009
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
Virginia OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
RON WYDEN, Oregon SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
EVAN BAYH, Indiana RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
BILL NELSON, Florida
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
----------
David Grannis, Staff Director
Louis B. Tucker, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
----------
FEBRUARY 5, 2009
OPENING STATEMENTS
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from California. 1
Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from
Missouri....................................................... 4
WITNESS
Panetta, Leon, Nominee to be Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency......................................................... 6
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS
Prepared Statement of Senator Barbara Boxer...................... 3
Prepared Statement of Leon Panetta............................... 10
Prepared Statement of Senator Russ Feingold...................... 21
Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees............ 42
Prehearing Questions and Responses............................... 66
Questions for the Record and Responses........................... 89
January 30, 2009 Letter from Robert I. Cusick, Office of
Government Ethics, to Senator Dianne Feinstein................. 100
January 8, 2009 Letter from David Abshire to Senator Dianne
Feinstein...................................................... 122
----------
FEBRUARY 6, 2009
WITNESS
Panetta, Leon, Nominee to be Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency......................................................... 124
NOMINATION OF LEON PANETTA TO BE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, 2:34 p.m., in Room
SDG-50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne
Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Rockefeller,
Wyden, Bayh, Mikulski, Feingold, Nelson of Florida, Whitehouse,
Levin, Bond, Hatch, Snowe, Chambliss, Burr, Coburn, and Risch.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Chairman Feinstein. The hearing will come to order.
The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence meets today to
consider the nomination of Leon Panetta to be Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency. I'd like to proceed in this way:
I'll make a short opening statement and then turn to the Vice
Chairman to make his statement. We will then use the early bird
rule--and I'm glad the early birds are here--for five-minute
rounds of questions and have a second round, if needed.
Now, we're due to have a whole series of stacked votes on
the stimulus, the latest report is, beginning around 3:30. We
have called and asked to please delay that. If it's possible to
delay to 4:30--perhaps the staff could call again--we might be
able to get through the hearing. What worries me is, when
they're stacked votes--and they're 10-minute votes--it's
difficult for Members to get back. So we'll just have to be a
little flexible, Mr. Panetta, as we move around.
I'd like to welcome President Obama's nominee to be the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Senator Boxer was
going to be here to introduce him, but cannot due to another
pressing commitment with the Majority Leader.
So I would like to combine with my statement with a brief
introduction of Mr. Panetta. He was born in Monterey,
California. His parents, Carmelo and Carmelina, ran a local
cafe and later purchased a walnut ranch, which he still owns.
He majored in political science at Santa Clara University,
where he graduated Magna Cum Laude in 1960. In 1963, he
received his J.D. from Santa Clara University as well. After
law school, he served in the United States Army from 1964 to
1966 and attended the Army Intelligence School. In 1966, Mr.
Panetta joined the Washington, D.C., staff of Republican
Senator Thomas Kuchel of California.
In 1969, he served as Director of the Office of Civil
Rights in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare in
the Nixon Administration. From 1970 to 1971, he worked as
executive assistant to New York City Mayor John Lindsay.
Afterwards, he returned to Monterey, to private law practice.
In 1976, he ran and won election to the United States House of
Representatives, and he served in that house for 16 years.
During that time, he also served as Chairman of the Budget
Committee.
In 1993, he joined the Clinton Administration as head of
the Office of Management and Budget. In July, 1994, Mr. Panetta
became President Clinton's chief of staff. He served in that
capacity until January of 1997, when he returned to California
and founded and led the Leon and Sylvia Panetta Institute for
Public Policy at California State University at Monterey Bay.
Mr. Panetta and his wife, Sylvia, have three sons and five
grandchildren.
It's very safe and fair for me to say that he has a
reputation for intelligence and integrity. And that, certainly,
has been my personal experience with him, as well. In speaking
with President Obama and Mr. Panetta multiple times, I am
convinced that Mr. Panetta will surround himself with career
professionals, including Deputy Director Steven Kappas. I know
Mr. Panetta has immersed himself in CIA matters since being
nominated, and his top priority, if confirmed, will be to
conduct a complete review of all of the Agency's activities.
Moreover, I strongly believe that the CIA needs a Director
who will take the reins of the Agency and provide the
supervision and oversight that this agency, which operates in a
clandestine world of its own, must have. President Obama has
made clear that a selection of Leon Panetta was intended as a
clean break with the past, a break from secret detentions and
coercive interrogation, a break from outsourcing its work to a
small army of contractors, and a break from analysis that was
not only wrong, but the product of bad practice, that helped
lead our nation to war.
President Obama said, when announcing this nomination, that
this will be a CIA Director ``who has my complete trust and
substantial clout.'' Now, this is a hugely important but
difficult post. The CIA is the largest civilian intelligence
agency with the most disparate of missions. It produces the
most strategic analysis of the intelligence agencies, and it is
the center for human intelligence collection.
It is unique in that it carries out covert action programs
implementing policy through intelligence channels. And so the
committee's job is clear--to make sure that Leon Panetta will
be a Director that makes the CIA not only effective in what it
does, but also makes sure that it operates in a professional
manner that reflects the true values of this country.
I am encouraged by our conversations and with your
responses to the prehearing questions, Mr. Panetta. You made
clear that you will provide independent and unvarnished advice
to the President and policymakers. You describe the lessons
learned from the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction. You pledged to review the CIA's
over-reliance on contractors and not to use contractors for
interrogation. Very importantly, you explain the obligation to
keep Congress fully and currently informed, and your view that
this should apply to the entire committee, not just the
Chairman and the Vice Chairman.
And, as a long-standing member, or just a member, of this
committee, I really appreciate that. The responses to all of
our pre-hearing questions will be posted on the committee's Web
site today.
I now turn to the Vice Chairman for his opening statement
before having Mr. Panetta give his opening statement as well.
[The prepared statement of Senator Boxer follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Hon. Barbara Boxer
Good morning Chairman Feinstein, Vice Chairman Bond, and members of
the Committee.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to introduce my former
colleague and fellow Californian, Leon Panetta, President Obama's
nominee to be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Leon Panetta is a person of vast experience and integrity.
If President Obama wants to build a spirit of trust and
accountability in the Central Intelligence Agency, he has picked
exactly the right person.
Mr. Panetta brings to this post decades of public service and the
respect of countless individuals in Congress, the Executive Branch, and
throughout America.
Mr. Panetta was born in the beautiful city of Monterey, California.
His parents were immigrants, and he went on to earn both his bachelor
and law degree from Santa Clara University, and later serve in the
United States Army.
After coming to Washington in 1966, Mr. Panetta rose to become the
Director of the U.S. Office for Civil Rights where he passionately
fought for the desegregation of public schools.
I saw him bring that same passion to his work as a Member of the
House of Representatives, where I am proud to have served with him. I
will never forget his successful effort to establish the Monterey Bay
National Marine Sanctuary, which preserved this vital coastal resource
for generations to come.
And I will also never forget that it was Leon who worked with me on
the first ever funding to fight AIDS.
As we all know, his commitment to public service continued after he
left Congress. As the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
under President Clinton, Mr. Panetta learned the intricacies of the
federal budget process and, most importantly, how to effectively set
and manage a budget.
If confirmed, this knowledge will serve him particularly well.
As President Clinton's White House Chief of Staff, he engaged the
highest levels of the U.S. intelligence community on our nation's most
important national security issues.
And as a member of the highly respected Iraq Study Group, Mr.
Panetta served with Secretary James Baker and former Representative Lee
Hamilton to formulate bipartisan recommendations for a way forward in
Iraq.
Mr. Panetta's record speaks for itself. He knows how to get things
done in this town.
Perhaps most important, I know that Mr. Panetta will tell President
Obama not what he wants to hear, but what he needs to hear. President
Obama has made it clear that intelligence should be used to make good
policy, not to sell bad policy.
I am also confident that as the Director of the CIA, Mr. Panetta
will work to restore the standing of the United States in the world.
He has already taken a step in that direction by unequivocally
condemning the use of torture.
So Madam Chairman, as you can see, I am very pleased to introduce
Mr. Panetta, and know that he will work to defend our country from
threats, while upholding our values.
I hope that he will get a favorable vote from your committee.
Thank you.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Madam Chair and
Mr. Panetta.
We welcome you here today for this hearing. We have had
pleasant working relationships during the 1990s--not always
agreeing, but certainly very forthright and direct. The CIA is
an important player in our national security, and to be
nominated for that position is a great honor.
There's been some commentary on it in the past few weeks,
and today you'll have the opportunity to respond to some of the
concerns that have been raised about your position and to
describe your vision for the CIA.
I've had constructive meetings with you over the past few
weeks, and I have the confidence that you have the drive and
the focus for a tough assignment like this, and I thank you for
your willingness to serve.
That said, many were surprised by your nomination, because
many of us believed that the next CIA Director should have a
professional intelligence background. And this raises a number
of questions which we've discussed before and I will raise
again today. First, I want to hear your understanding of the
CIA and the vision for it and its role in the 21st-century
operations under the authority of the DNI.
I have questions concerning your views on various
intelligence disciplines and a number of threats, as well as
resource decisions for the Agency. As all American people
expect us to serve above reproach, we'll ask some questions
about your financial background so that we can assure people
there's no counterintelligence concern for the nation and to
make sure there are no financial surprises awaiting discovery.
I know you said you're more than willing to do that, and I
think the American people want to hear it.
Finally, I'm interested in the quality of individuals
you'll surround yourself with in this position. I was
disappointed very recently to hear a rumor, confirmed by the
DNI, that he's asked someone to serve in a sensitive position
on an advisory panel. That person had a questionable record on
intelligence activities and possible damage to national
security. I spoke with the DNI yesterday and informed him that,
while he had authority to make those decisions, I don't think
that it should go unnoticed.
As I recently said to Director Blair on the broader issue,
your nomination and his come at an important time in our
nation's history, as we continue to face threats of many
different kinds, foremost among them, of course, the threat of
terrorism. In the aftermath of 9/11, we learned many things
about ourselves and the state of intelligence community
information. There have been many changes in statute and in
practice since then, but weaknesses remain.
And one of the most glaring examples is the IC's failure to
assess properly the state of Iraq's WMD programs. Your previous
statements about the failures make it clear that you have not
been fully briefed on this Committee's findings that were
unanimously reported in our extensive, two-year review of the
failures that we call our phase one prewar intelligence
assessment on Iraq, and I hope, if you have not, you will read
these findings carefully.
The flawed intelligence resulting from that failure was a
significant factor used by all policymakers in the decisions
about Iraq. We have to ensure that failures of this magnitude
do not recur. The American people spend a lot of money and
trust their security to the IC, and I think we all deserve
better.
Now, the role of the Director has changed since September
11th, since the passage of the Reform Act and Congress created
the DNI with a strong sense that the IC lacked clear direction.
There was also a consensus that the old DCI position was
too big a job for one person and, in my opinion, one of the
primary advantages of creating a DNI was to allow the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency to focus on the Agency's
mission. For too many years we've had turf battles and power
struggles as individual agencies and departments tried to
protect their own piece of the pie and their budgets. I hope
with your cooperation we can make these destructive battles a
thing of the past.
It's our expectation that when confirmed you will give your
full support to the DNI. This doesn't meant there won't be
honest disagreements or vigorous discussions, which we would
hope would occur, but at the end of the day the DNI has to be
the sole leader.
Two weeks ago President Obama issued a series of Executive
Orders relevant to the CIA's interrogation and detention
program. I have some concerns about the impact of these
opinions and will be interested to hear your thoughts on the
impact on the CIA's intelligence collection capabilities and
how you intend to implement them.
They appear to suspend, at least temporarily, an
interrogation program that's helped us prevent further attacks
on our homeland. It makes it even more imperative that the CIA
improve its capabilities in other areas, including human or
HUMINT collection, as we refer to it in the trade, along with
covert action and covert influence.
I also am interested in hearing more from you about
extraordinary renditions. That's a rendition of someone to
another country. These practices started well before the
September 11 attacks and I would like to discuss some of those
with you today.
I'm sure, too, that past and present Agency employees will
be eager to hear whether you share Speaker Pelosi's opinion
that certain people associated with the CIA interrogation
program should be prosecuted. The Agency and the IC as a whole
also must find ways to hire and retain qualified linguists in
critical language areas. It does us no good to collect
information if we can't translate it or use it. Given your
background in management, I'm interested in your thoughts on
what you would do to make these career paths more appealing or
to bring people with those skills into the Agency.
I hope, too, you will use your management experience to
address a longstanding problem that has concerned many of us. I
believe that over that past several years there has been an
unreasonable reluctance to hold CIA employees accountable for
poor performance or bad judgment. In some cases--and I'll go
into specifics in another setting--these individuals have been
promoted or otherwise rewarded. I conveyed this sentiment to
Mr. Hayden and Mr. Kappes on several occasions because I
believe the practice is unacceptable. And I believe from our
previous discussions you would agree.
The committee has adopted a provision I sponsored and I
hope will become law in the near future to give the DNI the
authority to conduct accountability reviews of any element in
the IC and its personnel in relation to a failure or a
deficiency. Now, giving the DNI authority to step in I hope
will encourage accountability and good practices.
Mr. Panetta, I would expect you as the Director to give
your full support to the DNI if and when he must implement that
authority so we can send a clear message that poor performance
will not be necessary. But I hope it would not be necessary
under your watch.
With regard to intelligence experience, I encourage you to
jump in with both feet and make frequent trips away from
Langley. I have been in a lot of hearings and had lots of
wonderful meetings at Langley, but I find out that unless you
go out and see what they're doing in the field you really don't
understand it and too often your views are clouded by a
bureaucracy naturally existing in any large organization's
headquarters.
I understand that you'll be retaining some current high-
level officials and clearly they'll be familiar with the Agency
and its work, but there's a concern they may be too familiar
with it. I have heard some colleagues talk about how important
it is to keep the old guard in your corner, but I for one would
hope you would bring the changes we need in the institution and
not be totally beholden to the old guard.
Further, a recurring criticism of the Agency is it tends to
be risk-averse and insular. You may or may not find this to be
the case. In any case, I urge you to look for fresh ideas
instead of the status quo and encourage perspectives instead of
headquarters-centric bureaucracy.
Madam Chair, there's a lot of ground to go over today. I
hope we can fit it in. It will depend on the floor schedule. I
want to move this process along, but we do need to have
thorough hearings. Mr. Panetta, we look forward to hearing your
views on the direction for the CIA and its programs as we fight
to keep our nation and families safe from attack.
As the Chair indicated, you have a long and distinguished
career of service to the nation. I congratulate you on your
nomination and look forward to your testimony.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
Mr. Panetta.
STATEMENT OF LEON PANETTA, DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Panetta. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, Mr. Vice
Chairman and members of the Intelligence Committee. I am
honored to appear before you as the President's nominee to lead
the Central Intelligence Agency. Let me, Madam Chairman, ask
that my statement be made part of the record and I'd like to
summarize it if I could.
Chairman Feinstein. Without objection.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
I want to begin by thanking the President for placing his
confidence in my ability to run this critical agency during a
time of great peril but also of great opportunity. In
particular, I want to thank you Madam Chairman, Mr. Vice
Chairman and all of the members of the committee for the time
that you spent with me over the past few weeks and for agreeing
to serve as the overseers of our nation's intelligence
services.
And, of course, I could not have served in public life for
40 years without the love and support of my family, in
particular my wife of 46 years, Sylvia, and our three sons. She
regrets not being able to be here, but she now has sole
responsibility for running the Panetta Institute.
In preparing for this day, I had the opportunity also to
talk with all of the former Directors of the CIA. They gave me
excellent advice and shared many lessons. I especially enjoyed
talking to former President George Bush, who ran the CIA and
later, obviously as President, become one of its important
consumers. All of them told me to listen carefully to the
professionals in the Agency but also to stay closely engaged
with the Congress. And if confirmed that's exactly what I
intend to do.
The CIA is on the front lines in the effort to defend this
nation. It's a professional organization. It is comprised of
dedicated women and men whose service to America, out of
necessity, often is unrecognized and unacknowledged. At this
hour, there are CIA officers who are living in the most
isolated corners of the globe; they're serving away from their
families; they're often undercover, sometimes under fire. There
aren't any marching bands to trumpet their valor and there are
no monuments to mark their valor--just the quiet dedication to
the mission.
My youngest son, who just completed a tour of duty in
Afghanistan as a naval intelligence officer, described CIA
officers as silent warriors and I think that's an apt
description.
When President Obama asked me to lead this organization, he
said he wanted somebody he could trust, who was independent and
who would call them as he sees them--someone who would tell
policymakers what they needed to know, not what they wanted to
hear, and someone who knew how to get things done in a
bipartisan and professional manner.
What are the qualities I bring to this job? In a word, 40
years of experience at key levels of government. As mentioned
by Madam Chairman, I began my public service career in the Army
as an intelligence officer and received the Army Commendation
Medal for my services as an intelligence operations officer.
Over the decades, I worked as a legislative assistant to a U.S.
Senator, headed the U.S. Office for Civil Rights, served in
Congress for 16 years, much of that as Chairman of the House
Budget Committee, led a large and professional federal agency,
the Office of Management and Budget, and served as White House
chief of staff.
At OMB, I was responsible for the federal budget, including
the funds spent on intelligence activities, those involved with
clandestine intelligence activities as well as covert actions.
In Congress, obviously, I received a great deal of
briefings on intelligence, as many as you do and many of you
did that were my colleagues in the House. And at the White
House, I participated in the PDB briefings, all of the
intelligence briefings with the President, served on the
National Security Council and dealt with some of the most
sensitive intelligence our agencies produced. And during my
recent service on the Iraq Study Group, we benefited
tremendously from the insights that were provided by the CIA as
well as other intelligence agencies.
In short, what I bring is a broad range of experiences to
this job. I know Washington, I think I know how it works, I
think I also know why it fails to work. I am proud that in
every agency that I had the good fortune to lead, that it
performed its job in an outstanding manner, and I pledge to do
the same at the CIA.
The last several years have been a period of tremendous
change and daunting challenges for the CIA. It's been a
difficult period. The government-wide failure to prevent 9/11,
the 2002 NIE that failed to determine the absence of weapons of
mass destruction, controversies over rendition, detention,
interrogation--these issues emerged in war, challenged
policymakers, are well known to this committee, having consumed
much of your time and your energy. And I know this has been a
period that has resulted in frayed relationships between the
White House and the Congress, between the White House and this
committee and between the political parties. I want to put that
era behind us.
We are a nation at war. And since the attacks of September
11th, the CIA has been in an operational tempo that's unlike
anything it's experienced in its history. It was the first on
the ground in Afghanistan, it's been asked to run spies,
analyze threats, undertake covert action and work with other
intelligence services to keep Americans safe.
Let me, if I can, pay tribute to General Mike Hayden, the
current Director of CIA, who in many ways has made a good
effort trying to repair relationships. But most importantly, he
has done a great job in restoring morale at the CIA and he's
been an outstanding partner for me in this transition. I want
to build on his successes.
Let me make clear what I want to do if I am confirmed. I
believe the Director should be responsible for shaping the role
of the CIA in the 21st century to protect this nation, to keep
it safe and to bring integrity to intelligence operations. We
will provide credible and accurate intelligence to
policymakers. We will remain clear-eyed about the threats that
are out there. And we will always perform our responsibilities
according to the law, the Constitution and our values.
Let me outline in brief three areas that I think require my
principal focus if I am confirmed. First, I want to work with
the professionals who are there to get the details of all of
our operations and to make certain that we're responding to our
fundamental intelligence needs. In this endeavor, I will have a
full partner in Steve Kappes, who's one of the most senior
intelligence officers at the Agency and has agreed to serve as
my deputy. I will rely on him and the other professional
officers at the CIA to analyze intelligence gaps that exist and
to do what we can to fill those gaps.
Let me assure you, let me assure you that while I will rely
on the professionals for their experience and for their
judgment, the decisions at the CIA will be mine as the
Director. We have to build on the work currently under way to
develop a first-class workforce at the CIA that is diverse,
that is well-trained, that is proficient in languages and
cultures and that is prepared for the world of today and the
world of tomorrow. We must deploy this workforce to fill our
key gaps, which I've identified more fully in my statement.
Obviously, what is al-Qa'ida plotting in the tribal areas
of Pakistan, the FATA? What will it take to get Iran off of its
dangerous nuclear path? What will be the keys to long-term
stability in Afghanistan and in Iraq? Will North Korea give up
its weapons program? Can we defend our networks against cyber-
attack? These are just some of the crucial areas that require
good intelligence, and job one will be to look at the Agency
operations and make certain that we meet these demands. Our
first responsibility is to prevent surprise.
Secondly, I want to focus on improving intelligence
coordination and collaboration under the new structure. I've
been working with Admiral Blair in the days since our
nomination to try to create a process that will foster
collaboration and teamwork. Admiral Blair is an outstanding
leader, and as a combatant commander, he understands what
jointness is all about, and he and I have pledged that we will
keep our lines of communication open and that we will do
everything possible to improve coordination among our
intelligence agencies. The CIA does not operate in a vacuum.
Every day the agency is working with dozens of other agencies,
including DOD and the FBI. We are part of one team.
Contrary to the views of some, I happen to believe that the
new structure can work effectively for the CIA. Freed of its
community management function, we can focus on management of
human intelligence. We are primarily responsible for human
intelligence, the gathering of that intelligence that's so
important to the decisions that have to be made. We are
responsible for covert action. We have tremendous operational
strength, and my hope is to use that operational strength to
perform the goals and the missions assigned by the DNI. We take
the lead with our liaison partners, but we look to the DNI to
establish the strategic goals that are so important for the
intelligence community.
And thirdly, I want to rebuild the relationship of trust
with the Congress. I am a creature of the Congress and proud of
it. I understand the role of the Congress in oversight, those
tremendous responsibilities you have with regards to policy in
this country. I believe the ``Gang of Eight'' process was
overused and therefore abused. Too often, critical issues were
kept from this committee. Keeping this committee fully and
currently informed is not optional--it's the law, and it is my
solemn obligation to fulfill that requirement.
I believe that a strong partnership with this committee and
with your counterparts in the House of Representatives will
improve the CIA. You have a tremendous amount of expertise on
this committee. We can learn from you and we can partner with
you in that effort. That's not to say we'll always see things
the same way, it's not to say that you won't question us and
hold us accountable when appropriate. I expect nothing less.
But our objective ought to be the same--to do everything
possible, working together, to give the CIA what it needs to be
successful.
Madam Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman, if confirmed, I will
honor the history and professionals of the CIA. For over 60
years, the CIA has done some heroic things to protect this
country, and yet at the same time there have been mistakes. But
my goal is to build on the tradition of success, of excellence
and integrity.
Together, I think we can turn the page to a new chapter in
the Agency's history. I've been asked to do this job because we
need a strong CIA that keeps us safe and upholds our values. I
pledge I will do everything in my power to make that goal a
reality. Thank you and I'll be happy to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Panetta follows:]
Prepared Statement of Leon Panetta
Madame Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, and distinguished Members of
the Committee, I am honored to appear before you today as the
President's nominee to lead the Central Intelligence Agency.
I want to begin by thanking the President for placing his
confidence in me to lead this critical Agency during a time of great
peril but also great opportunity.
In particular, I want to thank you Madame Chairman, Mr. Vice
Chairman, the Members of this Committee, and their staffs, for the time
they spent with me over the past two weeks and for agreeing to serve as
overseers of our nation's intelligence services.
And, of course, I could not have served in public life for 40 years
without the love and support of my family, in particular my wife of 46
years, Sylvia, who has been with me every step of the way. She regrets
not being able to be here, but she now has sole responsibility for
running the Panetta Institute.
In preparing for this day, I had the opportunity to talk with most
of the former Directors of CIA. They gave me excellent advice and
shared many lessons learned, especially President George H.W. Bush, who
ran CIA and, later, was its most important consumer. They all told me
to listen carefully to the professionals at the Agency, but also to
stay closely engaged with Congress. If confirmed, that is exactly what
I intend to do.
CIA is on the front lines in the effort to defend this nation. CIA
is a professional organization, comprised of dedicated women and men
whose service to America is, out of necessity, often unrecognized and
unacknowledged. At this hour, CIA officers are living in the most
austere corners of the globe--serving away from their families, often
undercover, and sometimes under fire. There are no marching bands to
trumpet their valor and no monuments to mark their campaigns--just the
quiet dedication to the mission.
When President Obama asked me to lead this organization he said he
wanted someone whom he could trust, who was independent, and who would
call them as he sees them. Someone who would tell policymakers what
they needed to know, not what they wanted to hear. And someone who knew
how to get things done in a bipartisan, professional manner.
Those goals were precisely what led President Truman to create a
center for intelligence in 1947. With the lessons of Pearl Harbor fresh
in his mind, he wanted a single entity that would pull together all
intelligence coming into the government and analyze it in a timely way,
without the bias that was often injected by the policy agencies. CIA
has been serving in that important role ever since, and I believe it
continues to be one its most preeminent functions.
I began my public service career in the Army as an intelligence
officer, where I was proud to wear the uniform. Over four decades, I
worked with policymakers, served in Congress, led a large and complex
federal agency, and served as White House Chief of Staff. At OMB, I was
responsible for the federal budget, including the funds spent on our
clandestine activities and our covert actions. At the White House, I
was a consumer of some of the most sensitive intelligence our agencies
produce. And during my service on the Iraq Study Group, we benefitted
tremendously from the insights provided by CIA and other intelligence
agencies.
The last several years have been a period of tremendous change and
daunting challenges for CIA. The government-wide failure to prevent 9/
11; the 2002 Iraq NIE that missed badly on weapons of mass destruction;
and the controversies over the laws and policies governing rendition,
detention, and interrogation--these issues emerged in war, challenged
policy makers, and are well known to the Committee, having consumed
much of your time and energy.
We are a nation at war, and since the attacks of September 11,
2001, CIA has been on an operational tempo unlike any in its history.
Its budget has increased. Its missions have expanded. The legal
authorities governing CIA have shifted.
The Agency was the first on the ground in Afghanistan. It has been
asked to run spies, analyze threats, undertake covert action, and work
with other intelligence services to keep Americans safe. Few areas of
the government have changed in the past decade as much as CIA in the
effort to protect this country.
I believe the Director should be responsible for shaping the role
of CIA in the twenty-first century to protect this nation, to provide
credible and accurate intelligence to policy makers, to undertake those
missions that will enhance our security, and to always perform our
responsibilities according to the law and our Constitution.
Let me outline three areas that I believe will require my
particular focus, if I am confirmed.
First, I want to work with the professionals to get into the
details of all of our operations and to make certain that we are
responding to our fundamental intelligence needs. In this endeavor, I
will have a full partner in Steve Kappes, one of the most senior
intelligence officers at the Agency, who has agreed to serve as my
deputy. I will rely on him and the professional officers at CIA to
analyze precisely: (1) our intelligence, (2) the quality and
credibility of that intelligence, (3) any gaps that exist, and (4) what
we are doing to fill those gaps.
Let me be specific. We know that Al Qaeda has reestablished a safe-
haven in the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan. We know
they want to hit us again. But we don't know where that next attack
will come from, and we don't have answers to a range of important
questions. How do we deny Al Qaeda its safe haven? How do we
effectively operate against this target and their command structure?
Where are Usama Bin Ladin and his top deputies hiding?
We know that Iran is enriching uranium and supporting terrorists.
But we don't know when they will have that capacity or what exactly it
will take to get Iran off of its dangerous path.
We know that the situation in Afghanistan remains unstable. But we
don't know what it will take to reverse that trend, to stop the
Taliban, or to control corruption and institute long-term stability.
We know that there have been security gains in Iraq. But we don't
know whether these gains will translate into political stability and
create favorable conditions for a safe U.S. drawdown of forces.
We know North Korea detonated a nuclear weapon in 2006. But we
don't know whether Kim Jong-Il is prepared to give up that nuclear
capability once and for all.
We know that our communications networks are vulnerable to
malicious activity and cyber threats. But we don't know what our
adversaries are planning and what damage they are capable of
inflicting.
These are just some of the crucial areas that require good
intelligence. And job one will be to look at Agency operations and make
certain that we meet these demands. This will take time. But it is our
most important task.
Second, I want to focus on improving intelligence coordination and
collaboration. Under the 2004 law passed by Congress, CIA continues to
conduct Human Intelligence, or HUMINT, operations, but the CIA Director
``reports'' to the DNI. The law states that the DNI is the principal
intelligence advisor to the President. I have been working with Admiral
Blair in the days since our nomination to create a process that will
foster collaboration and teamwork. Admiral Blair is n outstanding
leader. As a combatant commander, he understands ``jointness.'' And he
and I have pledged that we will keep the lines of communication open
between us.
And this is an important point: CIA does not operate in a vacuum.
Everyday, the Agency is working with the State Department, the
military, the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance
Office, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the FBI, the
Department of Homeland Security, and others. We are part of one team,
and I pride myself on the ability to get members of a team--in this
case, across many agencies--to work together.
Contrary to the views of some, I believe that the new structure can
work effectively for CIA. The Director is freed from his community
management function. The CIA Director has become the National Human
Intelligence Manager--meaning our professionals are responsible for
training, standards, and operations for HUMINT collection across the
government. We take the lead with our liaison partners. And we can
focus on those things that no other agency can do, such as covert
action.
Third, I want to rebuild a close working and consultative
relationship with Congress. I believe the ``Gang of 8'' process was
overused by the previous White House and, therefore, abused. Too often,
critical issues were kept from this Committee. Keeping this Committee
``fully and currently'' informed is not optional. It is the law. It is
our solemn obligation.
I believe that a strong partnership with this Committee--and with
your counterparts in the House of Representatives--will improve CIA.
You have a tremendous amount of expertise on this Committee. We can
learn from you and we will partner with you.
Finally, there is a great deal the public cannot be told about CIA
operations without revealing the same information to those who would do
us harm. And so, CIA confides in you--and counts on you--to provide the
oversight that the public cannot.
Madam Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman,if confirmed, I pledge not only
to follow the law, but to go a step further and endeavor, as best as I
am able, to rebuild the trust between Congress and CIA. That's not to
say we'll always see things the same way. That's not to say you won't
question us and hold us accountable where appropriate--I expect nothing
less. But our objective ought to be the same: to give the Central
Intelligence Agency all that it needs to succeed.
If confirmed, I will honor the history and professionals of CIA. I
will also help turn the page to a new chapter in the Agency's history.
I have been asked to do this job because we need a strong CIA that
keeps us safe and upholds our values. I pledge to you that I will do
everything in my power to make that goal a reality.
Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Panetta. I
appreciate it. This is the order directly following my
questions and those of the Vice Chairman: Senators Levin,
Wyden, Burr, Chambliss, Feingold, Rockefeller, Coburn,
Whitehouse, Nelson, Mikulski, Snowe, Bayh, Risch and Hatch.
I have just some questions that are traditional, Mr.
Panetta, quickly, and a yes or no answer will suffice. Do you
agree to appear before the committee here or in other venues if
invited?
Mr. Panetta. Yes.
Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to send officials from the
CIA to appear before the committee and designated staff when
invited?
Mr. Panetta. Yes.
Chairman Feinstein. Do you agree to provide documents or
any other material requested by the committee in order for it
to carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?
Mr. Panetta. Yes.
Chairman Feinstein. Will you ensure that the CIA provide
such material to the committee when requested?
Mr. Panetta. Yes.
Chairman Feinstein. And a new question that I hope will
become part of the tradition, and you have alluded to it: Do
you agree to inform and fully brief to the fullest extent
possible all members of the Committee of Intelligence
activities and covert actions rather than only the Chairman and
Vice Chairman?
Mr. Panetta. Yes.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. Let me plunge
right into this.
Will the CIA continue the practice of extraordinary
rendition, by which the CIA would transfer a detainee to either
a foreign government or a black site for the purpose of long-
term detention and interrogation, as opposed to for law
enforcement purposes?
Mr. Panetta. No, we will not, because, under the Executive
Order issued by the President, that kind of extraordinary
rendition, where we send someone for the purposes of torture or
for actions by another country that violate our human values,
that has been forbidden by the Executive Order.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. The CIA--this is one of my
major projects--the CIA has more contractors than any other
intelligence agency, and approximately one-third of the
contractors of the entire community of 16 agencies. Most of
these contractors have been hired since 9/11. Between 2001 and
2006, the number of contractors has doubled. The intelligence
community has estimated--and I mentioned this to Admiral Blair
at his hearing--that the cost of contractors is $80,000 more,
per year, on average, than the cost of a government employee.
And the cost of contractors and employees at the CIA is
likely to have a comparable ratio. You've mentioned that you're
going to review all this. What specifically do you intend to do
about it?
Mr. Panetta. Well, I've asked the questions that you've
raised during some of the briefings as to the extent of the
contracting out that has taken place. I recognize that, coming
out of 9/11, there was a need to reach out to contractors to
try to fill requirements and responsibilities that the CIA,
because of a lack of personnel, just simply didn't have the
resources to do. And so obviously, a number of contracts were
issued during that period.
I really believe that we have a responsibility to bring a
lot of those duties in-house, and to develop the expertise and
the skills within the CIA to perform those responsibilities. I
get very nervous relying on outside contractors to do that job,
A, because I'm not sure who they respond to, but, B, sometimes,
when an employee at the CIA goes out and is then hired by a
contractor and then returns, it's not very good for morale at
the CIA.
Mike Hayden has made some progress in the effort to try to
reduce the number of contracts and begin to build up our
employee force to deal with those responsibilities. My intent
is to do exactly the same thing. What I would like to see,
ultimately, is, yes, there may be a need for contracting out
where there are particular needs that we've got to see
addressed, but I would like to see all of those duties and
responsibilities eventually brought in-house to the employees
of the CIA.
Chairman Feinstein. Quick last question: We've discussed
this privately; I would like to have it on the record. Last
week, there was a front-page story about a CIA chief of station
who has been accused of raping two women overseas. The
allegations are very disturbing and, if true, as you know,
completely unacceptable.
What would be your response if such allegations came to
your attention as Director, in terms of dealing with the
individual in question and notifying the intelligence
committee? Until ABC put out a press release indicating that
they were going to do a show that evening on this subject, we
had no formal notification.
Mr. Panetta. As I indicated to you, Madam Chairman, I think
that was wrong. I think when that kind of behavior comes to the
attention of the Director of the CIA that this committee ought
to be informed with regards to that behavior, number one.
Number two, the level of behavior involved in this situation, I
think, obviously, it had to be referred to the Justice
Department, but frankly, from my point of view, I think it is
so onerous that the person should have been terminated. And we
have the responsibility, as Director the CIA, to implement that
kind of termination.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Mr. Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Panetta, to clarify what you just said, that the United
States has sent individuals to other countries for torture,
that's news to me. Now, I understand that during President
Clinton's term there were approximately 80 renditions of
terrorist suspects that occurred during your watch as chief of
staff of the White House. An official from Human Right Watch
was quoted as saying, ``Clinton policies, in practice, meant
torture.'' Do you have any comments on the renditions which
occurred during your watch as chief of staff?
Mr. Panetta. Well, I think you'd have to define the kind of
renditions we're talking about. Obviously, extraordinary
renditions were, I think, the situation where we took a
prisoner and sent him to another country for questioning. And
oftentimes, that questioning took place under circumstances
that did not meet our test for human values.
Renditions have been a tool used by this government over
the years prior to returning individuals to countries of
jurisdiction. Carlos the Jackal was taken and returned to
France under a rendition. Others have been--there were
prisoners that we captured abroad that were rendered back to
this country for purposes of trial. I think those kinds of
renditions are an appropriate tool. I do not believe that we
ought to use----
Chairman Feinstein. Could you hold--the microphone has just
gone off.
Mr. Panetta. I've got it. I do not believe that--and as I
said, under the Executive Order, I do not believe we ought to
use renditions for the purpose of sending people to black sites
and not providing the kind of oversight that, I believe, is
necessary.
Now, having said that, if we capture a high-value prisoner,
I believe we have the right to hold that individual
temporarily, to be able to debrief that individual and then to
make sure that individual is properly incarcerated so that we
can maintain control over that individual. And I think that--
frankly, I think that's provided for under the Executive Order.
Vice Chairman Bond. To clarify further, are you saying that
the government has sent people to other countries for torture?
And what do you mean by that?
Mr. Panetta. I have not been officially briefed on any of
the extraordinary renditions as to what actually took place. My
understanding is that there were black sites; my understanding
is that we used those during that time. Some of these were
permanent facilities. What took place with those individuals, I
don't have any direct evidence of, but obviously, there were
indications that those countries did not meet the kind of human
values that we would extend to prisoners. So it's for those
reasons that the President acted to prevent extraordinary
renditions.
Vice Chairman Bond. Now, since you don't know about those,
I would assume that would apply to the renditions in the 1990s,
when detainees were transferred to a third country where they
were executed. Does that qualify as torture?
Mr. Panetta. Well, I think in the renditions where we
return an individual to the jurisdiction of another country and
then they exercise, you know, their right to try that
individual and to prosecute him under their laws, I think that
is an appropriate use of rendition.
Vice Chairman Bond. Now, you're talking about not holding
them in black sites. When you capture a high-value target, say
number two, three, four, five in al-Qa'ida, where would you put
that target? Where would that person be held?
Mr. Panetta. Well, again, without going into the exact
location of these sites, I think it's fair to say that if we
captured Usama bin Ladin that we would find a place to hold him
temporarily.
Vice Chairman Bond. Where do you hold him permanently? I
don't think you'd want to let him loose, do you?
Mr. Panetta. We certainly don't want to let him loose. We
would debrief him and then we would incarcerate him, probably
in a military prison.
Vice Chairman Bond. In the United States? I mean, if we're
closing down Guantanamo, where would you send these most
dangerous terrorists?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, I'm not going to speculate on that,
and to some extent, even under the Executive Order, there has
to be a determination what happens to hard core individuals who
cannot be tried or transferred. But in that instance, this
would not come under the definition of a black site, because,
number one, individuals who are held would be able to have
access to the Red Cross. Number two, they are individuals who
would be held on a temporary basis. And number three, the Army
Field Manual would apply.
Vice Chairman Bond. Well, that leaves more questions I'll
catch in another round. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you. I would call everybody's
attention to the five-minute clock, which is going to be
enforced. Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Let me welcome you, Mr. Panetta. I know of nobody better
prepared by experience, by character, the integrity that you
have, by your demeanor to take on this responsibility, and we
congratulate you and hope that you'll be speedily confirmed.
We continue to hear complaints that the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense do not
adequately share intelligence. In other words, they keep
intelligence which they've collected from each other. Do you
believe that there should be maximum sharing of intelligence
between the Department of Defense and the CIA?
Mr. Panetta. Absolutely, and I've met with the Secretary of
Defense and talked to him about making sure that we coordinate
our efforts so that we know what's going on, what they're
doing, and they will know what we're doing so that we can share
that information.
Senator Levin. President Obama has said that waterboarding
is torture. The Attorney General has said the same thing
publicly, that waterboarding constitutes torture. Do you agree?
Mr. Panetta. I've expressed the opinion that I believe that
waterboarding is torture and that it's wrong, but more
importantly the President has expressed the same opinion.
Having said, that I also believe, as the President has
indicated, that those individuals who operated pursuant to a
legal opinion that indicated that was proper and legal ought
not to be prosecuted or investigated, and that they acted
pursuant to the law as it was presented to them by the Attorney
General.
Senator Levin. You were quoted as saying in a column in the
Monterey Herald that ``torture is illegal, immoral, dangerous
and counterproductive.'' Do you think it can be made legal by a
legal opinion?
Mr. Panetta. You know, my view as an attorney was that was
a stretch by the Attorney General during the last
administration making that decision. But when you're an
employee at the CIA, you have to operate based on the legal
opinions that are provided you from the Justice Department,
from the Attorney General. You know, there have to be some
guidelines here, there have to be some standards, and whether
you agree or disagree--and I certainly do not agree with that
particular opinion--nevertheless, when you go out there and
take the kind of actions that have to be taken and rely on
those opinions, I do not think that you ought to be prosecuted
for that.
Senator Levin. The President, I believe, said--the Attorney
General has said that nobody's above the law and that he will
follow the law wherever it takes him. If that takes the
Attorney General, with the approval of the President, into an
inquiry as to the CIA's past practices, including the use of
waterboarding and other harsh techniques, would you oppose that
inquiry?
Mr. Panetta. My approach hopefully would be that this
committee would take steps--if you want--if the purpose is to
learn lessons from what happened in the past, I think this is
the appropriate committee to look at that history and to be
able to determine what was done right and what was done wrong.
I also happen to believe, with the President, that if we
find that there were those who deliberately violated the law--
deliberately violated the law and deliberately took actions
which were above and beyond standards that were presented to
them, then obviously in those limited cases there should be
prosecutions.
Senator Levin. In order to help this committee and the
public to understand exactly what happened and why and what the
validity of the legal opinion was that was pretty quickly
rescinded after it was brought to public light, would you
support the release of the so-called second Bybee memo, which
was an Office of Legal Counsel memo addressed to the CIA that
has not been released, unlike the legal memo which was sent to
the Department of Defense, which has been publicly released.
Would you support that release?
Mr. Panetta. I would certainly do everything possible to
cooperate with this committee in reviewing that history and try
to cooperate with you in getting the information that you need
in order to determine what actually happened.
Senator Levin. It's not just to the committee, but it's
also to the public. The DOD memo, so-called the first Bybee
memo, has been made public. Would you support making the Bybee
legal memo from the Office of Legal Counsel public that went to
the CIA?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, I'd like the opportunity to review
that document and to understand what's in it, but obviously I
would do whatever I can to release those elements that I
believe can be declassified and presented.
Senator Levin. And finally, could you give us your
understanding of the relationship between the CIA and the DNI?
Are you under the supervision, for instance, or is it a more
cooperative, collaborative relationship?
Mr. Panetta. Well, I think that the intention of the
Congress in establishing the DNI was to create an operation
that would coordinate all intelligence activities within the
federal government, would report to the President, and would
establish strategic goals for the intelligence community. I
view my responsibility as an operational partner in that
structure, reporting to the DNI, performing the tasks that are
assigned to me by the DNI and providing him with the
information and support that are needed. I'm an operational
agent of the federal government as head of the CIA, if I'm
confirmed as head of the CIA.
It is a tremendous operational arm. It is very important to
producing the intelligence necessary for this country. It is
deeply involved, obviously, in covert action and in analysis.
So we are an operational arm, just like the NSA, just like the
NRO. And I believe the role of the DNI is to coordinate all of
our activities so we're exchanging information, we understand
what the strategic goals of this country are, and we are
working together as an intelligence team, not stovepiping each
of our operations.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.
Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
I too want to welcome the nominee. I think he's going to do
a first-rate job. I'm struck by how much time you've spent on
things like the President's daily briefing, so clearly you've
been involved in the intelligence policy area.
But I think what I especially like about your background,
Mr. Panetta, is your track record of speaking truth to power.
And I look, for example, at what you did in the Nixon
administration when there was tough pressure on you to back off
on enforcing school desegregation. You were a young guy, and
you said you weren't going to sacrifice your principles. So I
look forward to seeing you confirmed.
I want to dig into the question of interrogation policy and
ask you about one area very specifically. I think our country,
as it looks at this debate, and particularly where we're headed
in the future, wants to know how you would at the Agency deal
with what we call the human ticking time bomb--the person who
has critical threat information, urgent information and you
need to be able to secure that information.
I'm of the view that when you look at the FBI and the U.S.
military, that they have been able to show that it is possible
to get the information that's needed to protect our country's
security, our country's wellbeing without coercive tactics.
They've shown that, and I want to hear from you first whether
you believe these noncoercive approaches can be effective in
protecting our country when we're dealing with one of these
human ticking time bombs.
Mr. Panetta. What the President did in the Executive Order
was to establish a single standard that would apply with
interrogations with the Army Field Manual, and I think it was a
step that was taken because I think he believes deeply that we
don't have to choose between our ideals and our safety and that
we can abide by the law in doing what has to be done to protect
the safety of this country.
And I believe that deeply. I think that's what this country
is all about, that's what all of us who appreciate what the
United States of America is all about. It's what my parents, as
immigrants, believed that this country was all about, was the
rule of law. And I think all of us have a responsibility to
abide by that.
In the particular situation that you mention, where you
have someone who could be a ticking time bomb and it's
absolutely necessary to find out what information that
individual has, I think we have to do everything possible,
everything possible within the law, to get that information.
And that's what I would do if I'm confirmed as the Director of
the CIA.
I believe that if you talk to Bob Mueller, if you talk to
John McCain, if you talk to General Petraeus, that they believe
that information can be obtained without having to resort to
extraordinary measures.
Senator Wyden. I want to continue to work with you on that,
because I think that Bob Mueller at the FBI and the U.S.
military are showing that it's possible to protect our country
when dealing with these human ticking time bombs, and as you
have said in your comments here, do it in line with our values
and using noncoercive techniques.
My second point sort of elaborates on this. Obviously,
there are some people who don't agree with that particular
view. They say you have to use these coercive techniques or our
country will be put in jeopardy by these kinds of individuals.
And so the debate just goes back and forth. You've indicated,
as I feel, that noncoercive techniques will be effective
against these kinds of very dangerous individuals, and the
argument is made by some that it's not.
I think we ought to start declassifying some of the
information in a way that protects sources and methods so as to
better inform the public with respect to this issue. Would you
be willing to work with me and colleagues--this committee--
Democrats and Republicans--to responsibly start declassifying
some of the information about the CIA's interrogation program.
Mr. Panetta. Yes.
Senator Wyden. The last question I want to ask you on this
point is your sense about what can be discussed about the
interrogation program in public, because this goes to a
sensitive kind of area. My view is, unless you were to simply
kill people in the course of interrogations, which is something
no one, obviously, is in favor of, almost all of these
interrogation practices come to light eventually. How would you
look at the question about what can be discussed publicly and
what sensitive information has to be kept private?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, what I think I've got to do first and
foremost when I get into the Agency is find out myself just
exactly what tactics were used, what information was gathered.
At this point, you know, I understand that there are some who
believe that valuable information was gathered using some of
these other techniques. I don't know for a fact that that's the
case. I don't know whether or not there was misinformation that
was provided.
I don't know whether in fact the damage that was done as a
result of those kinds of activities certainly counterbalanced
whatever information we received. Those are all questions that
I have and my goal is to look into those situations, look into
it as best I can, and then to share with this committee what I
find out.
Senator Wyden. My time is expired, Madam Chair. Thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Wyden.
Senator Burr.
Senator Burr. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Welcome, Mr. Panetta. And I know the Chair will
expeditiously move forward with your nomination and we can have
a CIA Director in place.
Let me stay on the same topic, if I can, for a second that
Senator Wyden was on. Mr. Panetta, do you believe that the
President has the executive power to choose to use enhanced
interrogation techniques if in fact he felt that was necessary?
Mr. Panetta. My view is that--I understand the powers that
the President has under Article II and they are broad powers,
but nobody is above the law. Nobody is above the law, and I
think that even the President of the United States has to abide
by the statutes and by the laws passed by the Congress. So,
yes, he has broad authority under Article II but I don't think
he can violate the laws of this country.
Senator Burr. You answered Senator Wyden's question, his
initial question, by saying ``I would go to whatever lengths to
get that information.'' Would you hesitate with asking the
President to use this executive power in a situation as Senator
Wyden presented to you?
Mr. Panetta. If we had a ticking-bomb situation and
obviously whatever was being used I felt was not sufficient, I
would not hesitate to go to the President of the United States
and request whatever additional authority I would need but,
obviously, I would again state that I think this President
would do nothing that would violate the laws that were in
place.
Senator Burr. You and I have had the opportunity to talk
about the threat bioterrorism presents to us. How serious do
you think bioterrorism is as a threat to this country and to
the world and, more importantly, do you have anything you
intend to do initially when you get to the CIA that would
change the way we look at bioterrorism and specifically its
threat?
Mr. Panetta. Obviously, because of the enemy we confront as
the result of 9/11, there are obviously a number of areas that
threaten our security. It's not only acts of terrorism: it's
the potential for using some kind of nuclear weapon, it's the
potential to use cyber-attacks and it is the potential,
obviously, to use bioterrorism. I'm a believer that when you
look at the science and look at the potential on bioterrorism,
that constitutes a very significant threat to the safety of the
American people.
And that's an area that I would hope to look at very
closely as Director of the CIA to ensure that we know as much
as possible about the potential threat out there and that we're
taking steps to try to deal with it.
Senator Burr. On January 22nd, President Obama issued a
series of executive orders, specifically the ones that related
to CIA interrogations and the detention program at Guantanamo.
Let me ask you, were you involved in the thought process of
those executive orders, if at all, and to what degree?
Mr. Panetta. After the announcement that the President made
that he would nominate me as Director of the CIA I did
participate in some briefings on the Executive Order but I was
not involved directly in the development of those executive
orders.
Senator Burr. Are you aware if anybody at the CIA--
officials, attorneys--were consulted about those orders ahead
of time and if their input was considered or included in the
resulting Executive Order?
Mr. Panetta. I believe they did and I believe there was
actually a meeting where they went out to Langley and sat down
with individuals out there to discuss the executive orders and
their implications.
Senator Burr. If you determine that there are any legal or
operational problems caused by the Executive Orders of January
22, will you request that they be modified or rescinded to
accommodate your concerns?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, under each of those there is a review
process that's built into the Executive Orders. Under the
interrogation Executive Order there is a review process in
which we are to look at these enhanced interrogation techniques
and determine exactly what kind of information was derived, how
they were used, et cetera, to determine whether or not any
revisions ought to be made. I am a part of that review process
and, you know, we will obviously make that determination.
Under the Guantanamo process, my understanding is there's a
review process to determine three categories--what prisoners
can be tried, what prisoners can be transferred, what do you do
with those prisoners who can neither be tried or transferred
for some reason and what will happen with them. That's a
process that I as Director of CIA--I'm not a part of that
process, but I would assume that information that CIA has
certainly would be a part of that process.
Senator Burr. I thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Burr.
Senator Chambliss.
Vice Chairman Bond. He's AWOL.
Chairman Feinstein. Not here.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. I thank the chair. And, Madam Chairman,
Congressman Panetta's integrity and independent managerial----
Chairman Feinstein. Could you see that your mike is on,
please?
Senator Feingold. I have it on. His managerial skills and
his broad experience in both the Executive and Legislative
branches suggests----
Chairman Feinstein. Perhaps If you'd move it closer?
Senator Feingold. Let's try this. I thank the Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. You're welcome.
Senator Feingold. Can you hear now?
Senator Mikulski. Is this microphone working? You've got to
act kind of like a rock star. [Laughter.]
Senator Feingold. Congressman Panetta's integrity and
independence, his managerial skills and his broad experience--
--
Chairman Feinstein. I'm sorry, still can't hear you. Try
the one on your right. Try the one on your right.
Vice Chairman Bond. Let him start over, give him full time.
Chairman Feinstein. Yes, you'll get your full five minutes.
Senator Feingold. That's very kind. [Laughter.]
Senator Hatch. Somebody in foreign intelligence is
interfering here, I guess.
Senator Feingold. I believe Congressman Panetta can and
will refocus the brave and dedicated professionals of the
Agency and what they do best and what we need them for the
most. And with his experience and skills working across
agencies I think he's perfectly situated not only to represent
the interests of the CIA within our government but also to
convey an important message to the rest of the world. And
that's when you're talking to the Director of the CIA, he's
speaking for the President and the whole of the administration.
And let me just praise you, Congressman Panetta, for the
directness and clarity of your responses, in particular to the
questions just raised by Senator Burr. I'd ask the Chair that
my full statement be placed in the record.
Chairman Feinstein. It will, Senator.
[The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Russ Feingold
Congressman Panetta has indicated that he appreciates the need to
work with Congress. In his opening statement today, he indicates that
the ``Gang of 8'' process was abused by the Bush Administration and
stresses that notification to the Committee is a legal obligation. I
have every reason to believe that he will usher in a new, collaborative
relationship with the Congress that respects our constitutional
obligation to conduct vigorous, independent oversight.
His commitment to implementing the changes already made by
President Obama in the areas of detention and interrogation are
evidenced by his statements--long before the election--condemning
torture as well as warrantless surveillance of Americans. In the coming
years, however, the CIA will face many challenges that will raise moral
and legal, as well as national security, questions. These matters will
require perspective and a clear-headed understanding of our national
interests. They will also require close consultation with the Congress
and a respect for the policymaking role of the State Department and the
legal counsel of the Department of Justice. The policies already set
forth by President Obama are thus only the beginning of a new era, one
in which we will need a new kind of leadership.
In my meeting with Congressman Panetta, I raised a number of
issues, some of which I will address in today's hearing. They include
human rights, legal reviews of existing programs and ongoing
authorities, and the need to integrate the CIA's clandestine collection
with the information obtained openly by the State Department and others
in our government. There are also many matters that can only be
addressed in classified settings which I look forward to discussing
with the nominee, should he be confirmed.
The fact that the CIA's activities are classified should never
obscure the fact that it serves the American people and must adhere to
our laws and national values, just like any other department or agency
of our government. I have confidence that Congressman Panetta
understands this principle, as well as the notion that members of
Congress, with full knowledge of the CIA's activities, are an essential
part of the checks and balances required of our constitutional system.
As he has indicated in his statement to the committee, the ``CIA
confides in you--and counts on you--to provide the oversight that the
public cannot.''
Senator Feingold. Congressman, you indicated in your
opening statement that the legal authorities governing the CIA
have shifted and acknowledge that there have been controversies
over the laws and policies governing rendition and detention
and interrogation. And Director Blair committed to the
committee that he would submit to the Office of Legal Counsel
of the Department of Justice proposed or ongoing activities
where there is a legal dispute.
Will you ensure that the CIA fully cooperates with the DOJ
as it reviews these matters, as well as any others that may
arise?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
Senator Feingold. And in your response to the committee's
written questions you indicated you are concerned that we've
not devoted sufficient resources in this area to Africa. You
also stated that you'd review CIA operations and resources in
light of emerging or long-range threats and may adjust the
allocation of resources accordingly. That's not easy, frankly,
given the chronic tendency of the intelligence community to be
reactive to current crises at the expense of potential or real
emerging and long-range threats.
If confirmed, will you work with me and other members of
the committee right at the outset on setting those new
priorities and budget allocations, in particular with regard to
Africa?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will. Senator, I really do think that
if we are going to come into the 21st century we have got to
set a list of priorities that not only look at current crises--
and clearly we've got Afghanistan, we've got Pakistan, we've
got Iraq, and we have North Korea. We understand what those
more immediate crises are that we have to focus on--Iran, et
cetera.
But we also have to clearly look at Russia and China. We've
got to look at Africa. We've got to look at Latin America. We
have got to look at where those potential crises can develop
for the future. And that's an area that I would like to focus
on and clearly would work with the committee in those areas.
Senator Feingold. Another aspect of allocating resources:
As you allocate the CIA's finite resources, if confirmed, I'd
like you to consider how much easier that job would be if there
were some strategic direction about where we most need
clandestine collection and, on the other hand, where our
government can do a better job gathering information through
diplomatic reporting or other non-clandestine means.
It's clear that a lack of any such strategy, in my view,
has prevented us from using our nation's resources wisely or
effectively. It's effectively kept us in the dark on a broad
range of national security issues. And that's why I think this
committee approved legislation by Senator Hagel and myself that
would have created an independent commission to recommend ways
to fix this longstanding systemic problem and why a broad range
of former officials, including the former national security
advisors from both parties, have endorsed this legislation.
Do you agree that an interagency strategy that integrates
clandestine and non-clandestine collection would serve our
national interests and would you support an independent review
aimed at providing recommendations on how to achieve that goal?
Mr. Panetta. I would look forward to working with you on
that legislation. I think those goals are good ones to look at.
Senator Feingold. In your opening statement, you stress
that the CIA takes the lead with our liaison partners. As I
indicated in my statement, I see your nomination as a critical
opportunity to convey to those partners that there will be no
more mixed messages from our government.
What kind of working relationship will you establish with
the Department of State and others in our government to ensure
that your message is consistent with all elements of our
foreign and national security policies, including
counterterrorism and democratization, counterproliferation and
human rights?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, I think this country is at its
weakest when we send mixed messages abroad as to what our
policy is. I think we have to speak with one voice; we have to
implement one policy. The President sets that policy and we
have to follow it. And I will do everything possible to work
not only with our liaisons, but with the State Department, the
Department of Defense and the other key agencies to make sure
that we are all saying the same thing. And, frankly, I think
that's part of the role of the DNI, is to make sure that we are
all saying the same thing.
Senator Feingold. Thank you very much. Thanks to the Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold.
Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Panetta, I am delighted by your appointment. And I
think one of the qualities that you bring is this enormous
array of experiences you've had, including a great deal of
intelligence, an enormous array of knowledge of government. And
you bring it to the head of the CIA, where we have had people
who are of the CIA but who have never been able to translate to
the rest of the world or to the rest of this government or to
the rest of this Congress in the broad terms, practical terms,
professional terms that you will be able to do.
You will be able to give the CIA new standing, together
with Steve Kappes at an operational level, you both, that I
don't think any other CIA Director has ever had. And so I
strongly support your nomination. I have only one line of
questions to ask you because they have to be asked.
A certain former senior official suggested that the Obama
Administration is more concerned about reading the rights to
al-Qa'ida's terrorists than they are with protecting the United
States. He suggested that the Obama Administration thinks it
can defeat terrorist enemies by ``turning the other cheek,''
and that , ``if we just talk nice to those folks, everything is
going to be okay.''
That needs to be clarified because it's so extraordinary
that such a statement would be made at such an early point in a
new administration. So, to clear the air, do you think language
like this is helpful in developing effective intelligence
policies that can have broad bipartisan support? Can you
envision a debate on these difficult issues in which the people
have strong opinions about how to keep America safe but do not
denigrate the motives or integrity of people who have different
opinions?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, I was disappointed by those comments
because the implication is that somehow this country is more
vulnerable to attack because the President of the United States
wants to abide by the law and the Constitution. I think we're a
stronger nation when we abide by the law and the Constitution.
Senator Rockefeller. Agreed. I'm curious about who that
particular former official was talking about. Of all of the
people you know in the Obama Administration--and you have over
the years, but particularly in this last transition period--do
you know anyone who cares more about reading the rights to a
terrorist than protecting America, on the one hand; anyone who
thinks we should turn the other cheek against terrorists, on
another hand; and anyone who thinks that everything will be
okay if we just go talk nice to terrorists?
Mr. Panetta. No. Senator, there are thousands of men and
women who are on the front lines trying to protect this country
and fighting the battle to ensure that our security is
protected. They're using every tool that our nation can provide
them. And I think that all of us, all of us within this
administration, Republican and Democrat alike, have a
responsibility to make sure that we are all fighting this
battle together and not blaming one or the other for particular
weaknesses. If we don't act together to try to protect this
country, then that is the surest way to lose our security for
the future.
Senator Rockefeller. Have you ever met anyone who thinks,
in this Administration and in the transition period, that
dealing with detention and interrogation policies, including
closing Guantanamo, is actually an easy issue, number one,
anyone who does not know that these issues are complicated and
fraught with difficult and even dangerous questions?
Mr. Panetta. Now, look, these are tough issues. Nobody has
any easy answers here, but I think the fact is that I am
absolutely convinced that we can protect this country, we can
get the information we need, we can provide for the security of
the American people and we can abide by the law. I'm absolutely
convinced that we can do that.
Senator Rockefeller. Can you remember any discussions,
finally, in which you felt that the safety and security of the
American people was not the absolute, number one priority of
everyone with whom you worked and have worked?
Mr. Panetta. Everyone agrees that that's the number-one
priority.
Senator Rockefeller. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator
Rockefeller.
Senator Coburn and then Senator Whitehouse.
Senator Coburn. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Panetta, thank you, thank you for your service. I
enjoyed our conversation in my office this past week. I have a
couple of questions for you, one of them is hypothetical. But
before I get to those, I wasn't clear in your answer to Senator
Levin. Is the DNI your boss or not?
Mr. Panetta. The DNI is my boss. He's the person I respond
to.
Senator Coburn. Okay. Thank you. If an employee of the CIA
under your watch grossly mishandled highly classified
information in a way that that information was divulged to an
adversarial foreign government, would that be grounds for
termination at the CIA under your watch?
Mr. Panetta. Absolutely.
Senator Coburn. Is that information that should be fully
and immediately briefed to the full membership of the oversight
committee?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, it should be.
Senator Coburn. Here's the hypothetical: If a staff member
of the House or Senate intelligence committees similarly
mishandled highly classified information and that information
ended up in the hands of an adversarial foreign government,
what actions would you take, in light of the fact that the CIA
adjudicates itself the staff clearances?
Mr. Panetta. Well, I would certainly bring it to the
attention of this committee, to the Chairman, to the Vice
Chairman and to membership of this committee. That's a serious,
serious breach, and obviously I think the disciplining of that
individual I would leave to this committee, but I could
certainly make a recommendation.
Senator Coburn. Can you imagine what that recommendation
might be?
Mr. Panetta. I think you----
Senator Coburn. I'd like to hear it.
Mr. Panetta. If we were sure that kind of breach had taken
place, then obviously I'd recommend pulling the clearance.
Senator Coburn. Thank you. Third question: Are you aware
that former DCI John Deutch, who in 2001 had his security
clearances revoked and received a pardon for mishandling highly
classified information, do you realize that he has recently
been asked by DNI Director Blair to serve in a fairly sensitive
position on an advisory panel overseeing our most sensitive
intelligence overhead architecture?
Mr. Panetta. I'm not aware of that.
Senator Coburn. Do you think that's appropriate?
Mr. Panetta. I think I'd have to sit down and talk with
Admiral Blair about just exactly what he had in mind.
Senator Coburn. What kind of message do you think that
appointment sends to the men and women of the CIA, who work
every day to collect and protect the most sensitive
intelligence?
Mr. Panetta. Again, Senator, because, this is the first
time I've heard that, I don't want to jump to any quick
conclusions about what the Admiral may or may not have had in
mind, but clearly this is something I need to talk to him
about.
Senator Coburn. All right, thank you. In your pre-hearing
questions, you said that one of your first management
priorities would be to review the CIA's overreliance on
contractors--and I know that's been asked before. Are you at
the position now where you can judge how effectively and how
fast you could do that, because my understanding is much of
that's based on a lack of adequate, available people, as well
as those transferring out and coming back in?
Mr. Panetta. I think that's right. And so it's going to be
a transition. It's not something that can happen overnight,
where you suddenly get rid of all your contractors and hope
your people can fill that job. I think it ought to be done on a
transition basis. We ought to determine what are those areas we
can move into the employees of the CIA and the skills set that
they can pick up, but I do think, over a period of time we
ought to be reducing our dependence on contractors and building
an in-house responsibility in each of these areas.
Senator Coburn. Does that apply even when you could do it
outside for a much lower cost?
Mr. Panetta. Well, I guess I'd be interested in that, you
know. As Director of OMB, I always had to look pretty closely
at people who said you can get cheaper services by contracting
it out, because when we went back and looked at some of those
contracts, we found that the costs, often times, increased.
So my answer would be, I'd like to look at where we do have
to use contractors--and as I said, I'm not saying we shouldn't
use any contractors at all. There may very well be a need for
that. We may need a certain capability, we may need a certain
language skill so that we may need to do that. But in doing it,
I would make very sure that the taxpayers are protected.
Senator Coburn. Thank you, and I think you would, too.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Coburn.
Senator Whitehouse.
Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Madam Chair. Mr. Panetta,
congratulations and welcome.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you.
Senator Whitehouse. During the course of the Bush
Administration, the Department of Justice, through its Office
of Legal Counsel, provided an opinion, which in relevant part I
had de-classified, which indicated that the President was not
under any obligation to follow Executive Orders. He could
depart from Executive Orders without ever disclosing it or
modifying the Executive Order. In effect, the Executive Orders
were something from which the President and the people
operating under his direction were entirely immune.
Obviously, that's not my understanding of what rule of law
means, nor of what Executive Orders amount to. What I would
like you to tell us, given the importance of these new four
executive orders that President Obama has indicated, and
standing Executive Orders such as 12333, which tends to provide
most of the oversight over some of these areas, in the event
that the CIA is tasked to depart from any valid, pending
Executive Order, will you inform the committee of that?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I would. I think that's a serious matter
and this committee ought to be informed of that if I'm being
asked to do that.
Senator Whitehouse. Thank you. Following up on Senator
Rockefeller's topic with respect to a recent administration
official, very early on, when Guantanamo was first opened up,
the Vice President described the occupants of that facility as
the worst of a very bad lot, they are very dangerous, they are
devoted to killing millions of Americans, innocent Americans if
they can, and they're perfectly prepared to die in the effort.
The number ran up close to 800 that were contained in that
facility. About more than two-thirds of those detained have
already been released by the previous administration.
More recently, in June of 2005, Vice President Cheney said
this: ``We had some 800 people down there. We've screened them
all and we've let go those that we've deemed not to be a
continuing threat. But the 520-some that are there now are
serious, deadly threats to the United States. For the most
part, if you let them out, they'll go back to trying to kill
Americans. The 520-some that are there now are serious, deadly
threats. We've screened them all.'' They then released 270 of
those 520.
The reason I point this out is because in the past
administration, the great and necessary privilege of secrecy
that has been conferred upon our intelligence community for
very, very good and legitimate reasons, I believe, has been
abused. And it has been abused to prevent this committee and
the public from having access not to sources and methods whose
release would compromise national security, but to the other
side of an argument that, for political purposes, the
administration wanted to position in a particular way--not
having access to what was going on at Guantanamo, not having a
fair and real understanding of what happened with interrogation
policies, not having a fair understanding of what was going on
with the warrantless wiretapping program.
Over and over again, secrecy was used for rhetorical
propaganda purposes, not for national security purposes, in my
view. I would like to urge you, in the course of your tenure--I
don't think you will behave that way, but once these things
have been done, people can go back and do them again. I'd like
to be able to work with the committee and with you to think of
ways in which we can create different incentives so that
problem doesn't occur. At the moment, the Executive branch has
all the declassifiers and you, as the Director of central
intelligence can sit there and you can say something and it
could be the biggest secret we have, and you haven't revealed
it in any prosecutable way; what you've done is declassified
it.
If Chairman Feinstein were to answer you with something
that was, perhaps, considerably less harmful to national
security, but at least corrected what you had just said
publicly, she would be at risk for, you know, the
administration sending FBI agents to her office. There's an
imbalance there that somehow I think needs to be corrected if
we're going to stop this behavior from happening again in the
future, because the precious trust of secrecy is too important
to be abused that way. What are your thoughts about that?
Mr. Panetta. I had a tremendous regard for Senator
Moynihan, who said a great deal about this issue in terms of
the over-classification that goes on. Look, there's a balance
here. Clearly, there are areas that have to be classified,
particularly when it involves the lives of people and involves
important sources and methods that are being used. But, at the
same time, the public and this committee has a right to know
what's taking place. And there are areas where we have to
declassify in order to ensure that the public is made aware of
what takes place. It's a fine balance. I'd like to work with
this committee to try to achieve that balance.
Senator Whitehouse. I look forward to it and I thank the
Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator
Whitehouse. Senator Nelson is next. I do not see him.
Senator Mikulski.
Senator Mikulski. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
Mr. Panetta, welcome to the committee, and I'd like to say
to the committee, perhaps out of any Member here, I've known
Mr. Panetta the longest and, in some ways, the most up-close
and personal. For the record, I'd like it to show that Mr.
Panetta and I came to the Congress together in 1977. We were
the bicentennial class; we came in at the 200th anniversary of
our country. People came in with us like Gore, Gephardt--when
we got past the Gs, we made something of ourselves. [Laughter.]
But we also had names like Shelby and Stockman. I served in
the House with Mr. Panetta and watched his excellent work on
the Budget Committee and then see him go to OMB and then chief
of staff to the President, and most recently, have been working
with him in his work on the Pew Commission to really deal with
the challenges that our oceans are facing, in terms of the
environment. I can say to my committee colleagues that in all
of those years, I've known Mr. Panetta to be a man of
incredible honor, integrity and, really, an incredible
diligence and work ethic.
And if ever there's anyone who's served in government
that's duty-driven, it's Leon Panetta. And if you know him the
way I do, he's put his values into action. Family, faith and
country--that's the way he was raised; that's the way he lives;
and that's the way he functions. He has represented the most
beautiful place in America--outside of Maryland and the
Chesapeake Bay--in Monterey, and I think we're lucky to have
him.
Having said that, Mr. Panetta, I do have--my questions are,
though, about restoring the honor and integrity of the CIA in
the public--and functionality--in the public's mind. I'd like
to give not a hypothetical, but a real case example about what
happened to Colin Powell and his involvement at the CIA. Mr.
Powell--as we know, Mr. Secretary Powell, General Powell,
citizen extraordinary Powell--went before the United Nations
and presented our case for the Iraq war.
The information he presented was deeply flawed. Therefore,
we, through the CIA and his briefings, discredited one of the
most esteemed men in the world. That occurred because of either
the CIA was grossly incompetent in their preparation of General
Powell or it was cynical manipulation coming from orders of
other areas of our government.
Could you tell us what you will do at the CIA so that we
would never again have another event like what happened to
General Powell as he presented to the world the United States
of America's case for taking a military action?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, I promised the President of the
United States that if I was fortunate enough to be honored with
this position that what I would present him is the very best
intelligence that I could bring together and that I would tell
it straight to him, whether he likes to hear it or not. And I
feel that's my obligation. I will present the best evidence
that we have, the best intelligence that we have and I will
present it to the policymakers and I will ensure that they have
that very best information.
And if by chance someone goes out and strays from that
position and indicates something that's contrary to what I
presented, then I would not only bring it to the attention of
that individual, I'd bring it to the attention of the President
of the United States.
Senator Mikulski. That's an excellent answer. Let me ask,
though, within the CIA there were those that dissented. I'm not
sure always that the highest levels of the CIA knew the dissent
among people working at the CIA. If confirmed, how would you
treat dissent at the CIA and, as we talk about truth to power,
would you actually establish some type of channel for
dissenting opinions to be brought to your attention or to the
leadership of you and Mr. Kappes?
Mr. Panetta. My experience in government, Senator, is that
the worst thing you can have is a group of yes-people around
you: you got to have people that are dissenters; you got to
have people that are willing to ask questions. They have to
feel free to question what's going on. I think people have to
have that opportunity because in the end, you know, the truth
is something that sometimes depends on a certain perspective,
but it's when you get a series of those perspectives that you
can have a better sense of what reality is all about.
So I would encourage dissent; I always have. When I was
chief of staff to the President I was often the only person in
the room who dissented, but I felt that was a role that I had
to fulfill.
Senator Mikulski. Well, I think we've been very clear that
you will speak truth to power in terms of the President and to
the DNI, for whom you work, but I would really hope, in
conclusion, that you would consider a way that the worker bees
at the CIA have a chance of communicating with you and look
forward to further conversation.
Mr. Panetta. I will. Thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. If I can just announce my intent, it's
my understanding that there are going to be 13 votes beginning
in about 10 minutes. The remaining Senators are Senators Snowe,
Bayh, Risch and Hatch. I'd like to conclude a first round. If a
second round is required, it will be my intention to recess the
committee and, if it's agreeable with you, Mr. Panetta, and my
colleagues, carry out the second round tomorrow morning at
10:00 a.m.
Mr. Panetta. That's fine.
Chairman Feinstein. So I'd like to conclude the hearing
part this week. So we will continue and go hopefully until
everybody has at least a first chance. Senator Snowe.
Senator Snowe. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I want to welcome you and congratulate you. I know we go a
long way's back--I won't say how long, either, but a little bit
shorter than Barbara--but I certainly want to commend you. And
you're obviously assuming the helm of this agency at a very
critical time in its history as well as in our nation's
history, without question, and you're certainly equal to the
challenge.
As you mentioned that you're going to rely on professionals
in the Agency, you're going to surround yourself with those
professionals, at the same time ultimately you're going to make
the decisions. As you know, the Agency has gone through, you
know, considerable turmoil and particularly since 9/11,
starting with that event, and then of course the failure to
predict the weapons of mass destruction, the failure to have
the accurate intelligence, the warrantless surveillance, the
interrogation, detention, renditions--I mean, all of those
issues combined that has created very troubling circumstances
both for the Agency and for this country.
How will you make those independent decisions? If you're to
change the status quo within the Agency but yet you have to
rely on the professionals, exactly how will you be changing the
direction of the Agency, because many of these individuals
obviously were part of the policymaking decisions at the time
within the Agency. So how will that represent change?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, my approach to every major job I've
had to deal with is to go in and rely on the people that are
there first and foremost. I did that when I took over at the
Office for Civil Rights, I did that when I took over the Office
of Management and Budget ,and I did that when I became chief of
staff to the President.
My approach is that I will rely on the people that are
there. I'll rely on their experience. I'll see how they do the
job, if they do it effectively, if they participate in the
staff meetings. If I feel that I can get a sense of their
dedication to the job and that they will recommend those
policies that I think are best for the Agency and for the
country, then we will work as a team.
If I feel that there are people there that won't perform in
that manner, then obviously I'll take steps, but my hope is
that we can develop that kind of professional relationship. The
people I have met, I am very impressed with their
professionalism, I'm very impressed with their experience and
their abilities, and I think we have to learn to work together
as a team. But we also have to understand that if changes have
to be made, they ought to be made for the benefit of not only
the Agency but, more importantly, for the country.
Senator Snowe. What do you consider to be the greatest
challenge?
Mr. Panetta. I think greatest challenge at the CIA is the
need to develop the very best intelligence in areas that we are
not anticipating right now may be problems for the future. And
I think we've got a very good effort in Afghanistan. I think
we've got a good effort in Pakistan. I think we've got a good
effort in Iraq. I think we've got a good effort in Iran and
North Korea. But what I worry about are those areas that
concern me for the future. We aren't as strong as we should be,
I believe, in Russia, in China, in Africa.
I think we need to know more, for example, with regards to
the current economic crisis that's not only impacting this
country but impacting the world. What are the consequences of
that in terms of stability in the world? We need to understand
that. We have to be prepared to ensure that we are not
surprised, and I think the biggest challenge I have right now
is to figure out where those gaps are and how do we best deal
with them.
Senator Snowe. Do you believe that al-Qa'ida remains the
number one priority and the top demonstrated threat?
Mr. Panetta. I do because clearly they are the terrorist
who attacked us on 9/11 and we have to do everything possible
to strike against them.
Senator Snowe. Well, what do you think it says that we have
been unable to capture Usama bin Ladin since 9/11? What do you
think that says about our resources or our ability or our
focus?
Mr. Panetta. That's the same question I ask every day,
because I think one of the responsibilities we have is to go
after our worst enemy, and that is Usama bin Ladin. I've asked
the question, you know, why have we not been able to do it?
There obviously have been a lot of efforts to try to locate
him. Oftentimes the trail goes cold, but there is a continuing
effort to try to ensure that we do everything possible to try
to find him. It would be one of my priorities, frankly, to make
sure that we in fact do find him and bring him to justice.
Senator Snowe. Thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Snowe.
Senator Bayh.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Panetta. I've been very impressed by your
testimony here today, as I was by our meeting some time ago. It
is my hope that you will be an exemplary Director of Central
Intelligence. That's a vitally important position, as you know,
often thankless as I'm sure if you don't know you will find
out. But I am personally grateful to you for your willingness
to take on this important responsibility at this challenging
time.
Some of my questions may be in the vein of playing the
devil's advocate, but as we wrestle with these I think it's
important to sometimes examine them from not only the point of
view that we've adopted but perhaps from an alternative point
of view as well to ensure that we've reached the right
decision.
With regard to the detainees at Guantanamo, as you know and
I think as Senator Whitehouse pointed out, the previous
administration released quite a few detainees for repatriation.
It has been published that a significant percentage of them
have returned to terrorist activities.
In fact, published reports indicate that at least one
carried out a deadly attack or participated in a deadly attack
on the U.S. Embassy in Yemen, killing several Yemenis and one
U.S. citizen. It is my understanding that this administration
will continue the practice of the previous administration of
repatriating at least some of these detainees. They go through
the process in Saudi Arabia that is considered to be good. But
some of them, it's not successful.
So my question to you is, if some of these individuals that
we release from our custody go back to participating in these
activities and innocent people are killed as a result of that,
what do we say to the families of those victims? How do we
justify that decision?
Mr. Panetta. I hope we never have to do that. And I think
the best way to try to prevent that from happening is to make
the best determination about what prisoners can in fact be
repatriated and whether or not they are subject to being able
to return to civilian life in some way.
I think we have to do a very challenging job of gathering
the evidence, gathering the information on each of these
prisoners, and then making the determination which ones can be
tried, which ones can be transferred, but which ones ought
never to leave incarceration. There probably has to develop
some kind of process that allows for some kind of reporting to
the federal courts so that there is an ongoing system of
reporting why they are being incarcerated and why they are
being held so that they just aren't, you know, put away without
any resort to our justice system. But I think there are going
to be a group of prisoners that, very frankly, are going to
have to be held in detainment for a long time.
Senator Bayh. I think your answer was right to the heart of
the matter. And I would just encourage you, we need to be
realistic about the success of some of the countries to whom we
repatriate individuals, look at their track record, and make
our evaluations accordingly. And as you say, in evaluating
which category these individuals fall into, I personally
would--where in doubt--encourage you to err on the side of
protecting the safety of innocent people. And I'm sure that you
will.
Let me move on. This involves the National Intelligence
Estimates. We had an unfortunate case that I'm sure you're
aware of with regard to Iran, where the way in which the
National Intelligence Estimate was written highlighted the fact
that apparently they suspended the weaponization aspect of
their program. Then, in a footnote, it noted that they
continued apace with their attempts to develop fissile material
and delivery capabilities and those kind of things, and in fact
may have restarted their weaponization efforts. We just don't
know.
So I would encourage you--just a comment--to look very
carefully how these things are written, because that really
undermined our diplomatic efforts to gather our allies to put
pressure on Iran to stop those kind of activities. So my
comment, my question is, is it your belief that Iran is seeking
a nuclear military capability? Or are their interests solely
limited to the civilian sphere?
Mr. Panetta. From all the information that I've seen, I
think there is no question that they are seeking that
capability.
Senator Bayh. Two quick questions. In, I guess, his exit
interview or last testimony before the committee, Admiral
McConnell talked about the leak phenomenon that I'm sure you'll
become intimately familiar with. And he indicated that he had
referred numerous cases to the Justice Department, none of
which had been prosecuted. They couldn't make a case.
It was his opinion that some of the pending legislation
that would deal with shield laws and that kind of thing--this
was his opinion now--would make it virtually impossible in the
future to ever bring a prosecution for a leak. I'd be
interested if you've had a chance to contemplate that issue
and, if so, if you shared his opinion?
Mr. Panetta. When I was chief of staff, one of the things
the President constantly complained about were leaks. And
they're not easy to deal with because you don't know, you know,
where the leak came from. You can make all kinds of assumptions
but it's very difficult to prove it.
Having said that, you know, I consider leaking--
particularly where it involves secrets that are important to
this country--treasonous. And I think they have to be
prosecuted in that manner. And I guess I would hope to work
with the Attorney General to make sure that we aren't simply
referring these things into an empty hole, but that they would
take actions against them.
Senator Bayh. I've exceeded my time. Thank you.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Bayh.
Interestingly enough, the votes have been postponed until
4:30. I believe we will be able to go through the remaining
three Senators, and I know the Vice Chairman has some
additional questions. So I'm going to try to keep going as long
as we can in hopes of concluding it today.
Let me call upon Senator Risch. You're next. And then
Senator Hatch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. Panetta, thank you for coming to see me. I sincerely
appreciate it. Madam Chairman and members of the committee----
Mr. Panetta. It's a part of the Senate I've never seen
before.
Senator Risch. Thank you for pointing that out. I'm
reminded of that every day when I get to work. Madam Chairman,
members of the committee, Mr. Panetta held up well under my
withering cross-examination and answered all the questions I
had very well and, I think, openly and candidly and I sincerely
appreciate that. And that's all I have.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, and thank you for
remaining; it's very much appreciated.
Senator Hatch, my old friend.
Senator Hatch. You're right about that; I'm your old
friend. But I'm also Leon Panetta's old friend as well, and I
welcome you to the committee. And I appreciate the time and
courtesy you showed me in coming to my office and spending as
much time as you did. We've known each other a long time and
we've worked together on numerous occasions, but none of these
occasions dealt with national security issues at all.
Now, I might add, you're not the most inexperienced person
to be nominated for this job, as you know, and I certainly
believe that one can lead the Agency without having spent a
lifetime--or spent your previous life as an ``espiocrat''--
we'll put it that way.
But you're choosing to accept this nomination at a time
when this country is engaged in two major wars, as well as the
global war against terrorism and terrorists. And the role of
intelligence in prosecuting these wars is unprecedented. And
the ranks of the intelligence officers, due to the Presidential
mandate, are larger than ever, with many dynamic junior
officers volunteering to spend their careers spending work
that, by definition, will never be specifically heralded.
In short, the role of intelligence has never been greater
in advancing our national security, and the demands have never
been higher. So I believe that you have a wonderful opportunity
ahead of you to help our country and help protect it. And I
believe you'll fulfill that responsibility very well.
Let me just say, referring to Senator Mikulski's questions,
you're aware that the CIA wrote Secretary Powell's speech?
Mr. Panetta. Yes.
Senator Hatch. They wrote it, and of course, George Tenet
was seated right behind him at the time. So it's an important
thing to realize that they were relying on worldwide
intelligence at the time--not just ours--and every major
country intelligence community believed that was the case.
Right?
Mr. Panetta. That's correct.
Senator Hatch. Yes. Perhaps we can agree that the primary
goal of the CIA is to prevent another ``strategic surprise''
such as the one that occurred on September 11th. Now, you held
the position of chief of staff to the President from 1994 until
1997. Now, presumably, this is the period when you had the most
experience as a consumer of intelligence, although you did have
experience in the military.
Mr. Panetta. Senator, let me correct you. I was chief of
staff from roughly 1993 to 1997--early 1997.
Senator Hatch. I was wrong. I'll be corrected. It was
during this period that President Clinton must have become
aware of the rise of O sama bin Ladin. I first spoke publicly
of this in 1996 and I threw out warnings that we'd better watch
him because he's going to kill Americans, at the time. Now, as
a consumer of intelligence at that time, what did you do with
regard to the first reports you were getting about bin Ladin
and al-Qa'ida? And I'd just like to see where we go on that.
Mr. Panetta. Senator, I can remember in the briefings that
I was part of that terrorism, very early on, became a major
area of concern--that bin Ladin, other terrorists, particularly
after what happened in New York at the Trade Center--the
bombing of the Trade Center--that there was an awareness that,
clearly, there were these major threats from terrorists that we
had to pay attention to.
And our national security advisors--our national security
team--all continued to bring those matters to the attention of
the President and there were oftentimes steps that were
recommended to go after them when the intelligence was there
that they were trying to either go after planes in Los Angeles
or in the Philippines or what have you. So it was a matter that
the Administration continued to pay attention to as a major
priority.
Senator Hatch. I notice my time is up, Madam Chair. So I'll
finish with that.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Hatch.
It looks like we may be able to finish. I know the Vice
Chairman has additional comments. So if it's agreeable with
you, I'd like to just turn to him. Mr. Vice Chairman, why don't
you proceed?
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Several of our members on this side had left thinking they
wouldn't have the opportunity to ask questions. There are a
number of questions that I have further to clarify some of the
issues that we have discussed. And I'm a little bit at a loss
to make sure exactly what you meant.
Now, near the end of my first round of questioning, you
said, and we've discussed it a little bit, that you sent people
to other countries for torture. And you said that--number one,
I assume that was not the case when you were chief of staff.
Were you fully advised of the extraordinary renditions that
went on during that time?
Mr. Panetta. Renditions were discussed. I was not aware of
all of the steps that were taken, because sometimes those
involved with the National Security Council were involved with
particular renditions. But generally, they would indicate when
they were moving someone to an area of jurisdiction or moving
someone from outside the country into the country because of
the need for prosecution.
Vice Chairman Bond. And you said we have transferred
detainees to other countries for torture. Now, what information
do you have about that. Did I misunderstand you?
Mr. Panetta. Well, let me correct it in terms of--I have
not seen specific information and I did not have access to
specific information within the Agency that determined that was
the case. Clearly, there have been indications that
waterboarding was used in instances early on, and----
Vice Chairman Bond. In extraordinary renditions?
Mr. Panetta. I don't know whether it took place in
extraordinary renditions or not. But the indication has been
that even Mike Hayden has basically admitted that----
Vice Chairman Bond. Well, they said three detainees were
subjected to waterboarding.
Mr. Panetta. That's correct. And I don't know whether there
were other steps. Clearly, under the definition that was
provided by the Attorney General in providing additional
enhanced interrogation, that was something that obviously was
used. And, as I said, it followed the legal opinion that was
provided at the time. Whether those were done as parts of
renditions or not, I don't know.
It is clear that there were black sites. It is clear that
individuals were brought there. What happened there, you know,
I can't tell you specifically what kind of actions were taken,
but clearly steps were taken that prompted this President to
basically say those things ought not to take place again.
Vice Chairman Bond. Well, we have been advised that no
extraordinary renditions occurred during your period in the
Clinton Administration, during the Bush Administration, if
there was any doubt that--if there was any question that
torture might be used.
But I want to go back to the assertion that there were
renditions for torture. Are you saying now you have no
information about that?
Mr. Panetta. I'm saying that I can neither affirm or deny
what took place, because I haven't had access to that
information.
Vice Chairman Bond. Well, so you would have to withdraw
your blanket statement.
Mr. Panetta. I guess my understanding is that there were
renditions to countries that engaged in certain behavior. I
have not seen that evidence. I'm basically saying what I've
read in the press.
Vice Chairman Bond. I think that's a lot different from
making a blanket assertion. And I would hope you would make
that clear, that you have no----
Mr. Panetta. I will make clear, I have no official
information from within that, in fact, those kinds of
renditions took place.
Vice Chairman Bond. All right.
Now, in talking about disposition of detainees, Senator
Bayh mentioned the problem of recidivism of some of the people
who have been let loose from Guantanamo.
I believe the one person who went back to Saudi Arabia has
now been claimed by al-Qa'ida as the deputy chief of operations
for al-Qa'ida in the Horn of Africa. And I read in the papers
today that Saudi Arabia has on their most wanted list, I
believe--the news story, and again this was only from the news
story--has 11 Guantanamo alumni on their most wanted list.
And I further understood that Saudi Arabia had what was
regarded as one of the best rehabilitation programs of any of
the countries to which we return their citizens whom we have
captured on the battlefield.
Now, does that raise a question? You said we'd have to
review it. I think that raises a question about the
effectiveness.
Chairman Feinstein. I understand. Your time is up. And I
know others, if there is going to be a second round, would like
to----
Mr. Panetta. If I could respond to your question----
Vice Chairman Bond. I want to follow up but I do want to
let others, if they have questions.
Mr. Panetta. Well, you've raised obviously--I read the same
stories and shared the same concern.
I do think that there are indications that they have
probably a pretty effective rehab program that they go on. But
the problem is that we have evidence that some of these
individuals are making their way back to al-Qa'ida, and that
concerns me. I think in making determinations about what
happens to prisoners at Guantanamo we really do have to make a
determination whether or not in fact any of these individuals
can be rehabilitated before we send them there.
Chairman Feinstein. If I may just, before calling on
Senator Wyden, say one thing, it seems to me that maybe too we
ought to look at some different criteria, like despite the fact
that someone did not commit an offense against the United
States but was picked up on the battlefield--if in fact they
have been trained or participated in training with al-Qa'ida in
the past, it may well put them in a different category, is what
I have been seeing from looking at some of this material, where
they remain a security threat because the intention is to go
back to al-Qa'ida, no matter how long it takes.
Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Very briefly, Madam Chair, and I may have
been out of the room when we got into this rendition issue as
well, but I think that a fairly straightforward question gets
at what I think your views have been, and that is, Mr. Panetta,
do you believe that the U.S. has rendered people to a third
country for purposes of torture?
Mr. Panetta. I suspect that that's been the case.
Chairman Feinstein. Speak up, please. I missed that.
Mr. Panetta. I said I suspect that has been the case, that
we have rendered individuals to other countries knowing that
they would use certain techniques in order to get information
from individuals that violated our own standards.
That's what I suspect. I don't have any evidence of that. I
haven't looked at the information within the CIA to determine
whether or not that took place. But every indication seems to
be that we used this extraordinary rendition for that purpose.
Senator Wyden. Okay. We'll want to talk with you some more
about that in a classified kind of fashion.
I want to ask you one question about the Hamas and Gaza
conflict. I mean, clearly this issue between Israeli forces and
Hamas is going to be one of the major national security
challenges facing the country. Now you've been out of the
government for a while, and obviously you're going to get up to
speed on it. What do you think, in terms of your current
information on this, are the big challenges to understanding
this problem?
Mr. Panetta. Obviously this is an area that we really do
need the very best intelligence that we can get with regards to
what's taking place there.
And I'm afraid that what we really need to do is to develop
much better intelligence about what's going on with Hamas,
where the tunnels are located, what's taking place with regards
to these tunnels, what is the information with regards to how
Iran is or is not providing arms to Hamas in this effort.
I think we need to have the very best intelligence we can
gather because if George Mitchell is to make a difference
there, then he'd better have the best information we can
provide as to what, in fact, is taking place.
Senator Wyden. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
It's my understanding that Senator Chambliss is on his way
back. He is not yet here. Senator Hatch, I understand you have
some questions.
Senator Hatch. I hate to keep you any longer, but if I
could just ask a few questions, I'd appreciate it.
We in Congress have certain biases when it comes to--you
know, when we think of reform, as a creature of Congress, I
know that you've shared some of those biases from time to time
that we have around here. When we try to reform a large agency
like the CIA, we create boxes, we move boxes around.
And this is not to disparage, for example, the creation of
the DNI, which I know is an initiative of our esteemed Chairman
here. On the DNI to date, I still remain agnostic. But I have
admired the most recent Directors and their contributions and
look forward to working with our new Director.
But this is what Congress does, because creating new boxes
in an organization chart and moving others around are things
that we can dictate through legislation. The organizational
culture is much harder to affect by legislation. It's changed
from the outset by sustained oversight.
Now, in your view, is the organization and culture of the
CIA the right one to face the threats of our lives today and
the threats that may come in the future, or do you need to make
some wholesale changes out there based upon what you do know at
this point?
And if you don't feel like you can answer that question,
that's okay.
Mr. Panetta. No, I think based on what I've seen out there
and the briefings that I've had, I really do think that the CIA
has the tools necessary to deal with the threats that are
there. What we have to ensure is that we are continuing to push
to get the very best people involved in human intelligence. And
it's my view that we have got to have people who are well
trained, who understand the language, who understand the
cultures, so that we can place these people in positions where
we can get the very best human intelligence.
And I do think, while we have the tools, I think we still
have to stress the kind of training, the kind of language
training, the kind of diversity that would make the CIA much
more effective in producing intelligence.
Senator Hatch. Thank you. I want to help you in this job
and will do whatever I can to bring help to you.
Mr. Panetta. I appreciate it, sir.
Senator Hatch. As you know, I support you.
And last Wednesday, members of the committee heard about
allegations of gross--it's been raised, but I'm going to raise
it again--gross illegality by a CIA employee serving in a
Muslim country. Now, we did not learn about that from CIA. We
learned about that from ABC News, which I think is pretty
pathetic.
And then while we cannot and should not talk about an
investigation that's under way, the manner in which this story
unfolded was very troublesome to me, not only for the
Legislative branch of government, which conducts CIA's
oversight, but also, it blew back on the Executive as well, I
think unfairly, in this case.
First on oversight, do you believe such a development as
alleged in the story that I've alluded to is a ``significant
intelligence matter'' to be briefed to the oversight Committee
in a timely manner?
Mr. Panetta. Absolutely.
Senator Hatch. Okay. Now, the repercussions for the
administration. These allegations ran in the media less than 48
hours after President Obama conducted a major high-profile
public diplomacy effort by taking an interview with Al-Arabiya,
one of the largest media broadcasters in the whole Arab world.
And while I would disagree with some of the rhetoric the
President used in the interview, I commend him for granting the
interview and trying to communicate over the heads of the
leaders of the Middle East--and right to the publics, as well.
Now, it was bold. And based on first impressions, I think it
had a positive effect.
And then the CIA story comes out less than two days later.
Now, I haven't seen substantive analysis of the impact, but
it's not counterintuitive that such a story had to have
dampened the effects of the President's efforts two days prior.
And assuming the CIA couldn't control the release of the story
on the allegations of gross illegality, but also assuming the
CIA knew about this more than two days prior, what do you think
they should have done to mitigate such conduct--or conflict, I
should say?
Had you been the Director the last six months, what would
you have done differently? And what will you do if such an
event occurs on your watch? And how will you manage to control
spillover effects on other executive policy efforts?
That's a lot of questions.
Mr. Panetta. Senator, my understanding is that first
information about this actually came to our attention some time
back in October. And I think that was the time to have briefed
the Congress and the committees as to that situation--A.
B, that person should have been immediately brought back.
I believe that he was relieved of duty at that time. But he
was referred to the Justice Department for action. And as I
said, I think the allegations were serious enough that he
should have been terminated.
Senator Hatch. Thank you. My time is up.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
There are 12 minutes left on the first vote. Do you have
additional questions?
Vice Chairman Bond. Yes, ma'am. I have a significant number
of questions, and Senator Chambliss and others have indicated a
desire to do it. I would propose that we follow your suggestion
and reconvene at 10:00 in the morning.
Chairman Feinstein. All right. That's fine with me if
that's agreeable with Mr. Panetta.
Vice Chairman Bond. If that's all right, if that's
convenient for Mr. Panetta. He's been very courteous.
Chairman Feinstein. It is. And we will be in Hart 216
tomorrow morning, Mr. Panetta.
So I will recess the committee until 10:00 a.m. tomorrow
morning for a hearing in Hart-216.
[Whereupon, at 4:41 p.m., the Committee recessed, to
reconvene at 10:00 a.m., Friday, February 6, 2009.]
Supplemental Material
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.010
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.015
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.016
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.018
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.019
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.021
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.022
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.023
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.024
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.025
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.026
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.027
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.028
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.029
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.030
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.031
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.032
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.033
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.034
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.035
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.036
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.037
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.038
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.039
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.040
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.041
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.042
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.043
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.044
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.045
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.046
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.047
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.048
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.049
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.050
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.051
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.052
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.053
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.054
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.055
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.056
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.057
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.058
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.059
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.060
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.061
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.062
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.063
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.064
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.065
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.066
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.067
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.068
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.069
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.070
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.071
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.072
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.073
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.074
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.075
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.076
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.077
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.078
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.079
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.080
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.081
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.082
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 52741.002
NOMINATION OF LEON PANETTA TO BE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
----------
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2009
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 10:03 a.m., in
Room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Dianne
Feinstein (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members Present: Senators Feinstein, Rockefeller,
Nelson of Florida, Whitehouse, Levin, Bond, Hatch, and
Chambliss.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, CHAIRMAN, A U.S.
SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Chairman Feinstein. The hearing will come to order.
We meet today to continue the confirmation hearing for Leon
Panetta to become the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency. We'll proceed with the second round of questions for
Mr. Panetta. Prior to that, I will call on Senator Chambliss.
He did not have a first round, so he will go first with
questions this morning.
I hope there will not be a need to send a lengthy list of
questions for the record following this hearing. I believe
everybody has had ample chance to ask their questions. And I'd
like to ask that all questions for the record be submitted in
writing by 5:00 this afternoon so we can get them over the
weekend to Mr. Panetta for his responses.
Before the questioning begins, I'd like to offer the
nominee the chance to make any statements up front or add or
clarify any statements that he made yesterday. It's not
necessary, Mr. Panetta, but if you'd like to, this is an
opportunity.
STATEMENT OF LEON PANETTA, DIRECTOR-DESIGNATE, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Panetta. What I would prefer is just to proceed with
the questions, and----
Chairman Feinstein. Fine.
Mr. Panetta [continuing]. As we proceed, then I can make
any appropriate clarifications.
Chairman Feinstein. Fine. And I ask unanimous consent that
the record for the hearing be held open for additional
materials regarding the nomination. Without objection.
And I will turn to Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. And
I apologized to the witness earlier for hopefully not being
responsible for him having to be back here today. But
obviously, with what was going on on the floor yesterday, I
just got caught twixt and between.
First of all, Mr. Panetta, thank you for your willingness
to come back in public service. You and I had a lot of contact
during your days in the Clinton Administration. And you served
us well, and we appreciate your willingness to come back.
And I want to start off by asking about the interrogation
process, and particularly about what has transpired over the
last several years since September 11th. There appears to be
some indication from some folks on the Hill that they're not
only interested in going back and reviewing what's happened in
the past, but even potentially moving towards prosecution of
individuals who carried out interrogations in a way that we may
not be interrogating folks going forward, even though there
appeared to be legal justification for those interrogations.
And these individuals, obviously, will be your employees or
your contract employees as DCI, so I'd like your comments and
what your thoughts are relative to that issue.
Mr. Panetta. Senator, thank you for the question. And as I
indicated yesterday, my view is that, whether you agree or
disagree with the opinions that were issued by the Attorney
General with regards to interrogation methods, that the
employees at the CIA were operating pursuant to those opinions.
And I think as long as you operate based on the legal opinions
that are provided by the Justice Department, by the Attorney
General to guide you in those interrogations, that frankly you
ought not to be prosecuted, you ought not to be investigated;
you did your job, pursuant to the law, as it was defined by
that Administration.
And for that reason, certainly as Director of the CIA, it
isn't my intent to go to the past. I think we've got to move
forward to try to deal with the challenges we face from here on
out.
Senator Chambliss. Obviously I can't imagine anything of
more detriment to the morale of the brave men and women that
carry out the job of the CIA if in fact the opposite to what
you just alluded to was true or was to take place.
One of the criticisms of you--and you and I have talked
about this in my office--is the fact that you don't have the
experience that maybe some other DCIs have had in the past. And
as we talk through what experience you do have there,
obviously, as chief of staff to the White House you indicated
you had the benefit of the PDBs, and you also sat in on
national security meetings.
During that time when you were chief of staff, there were
two NIEs that were issued relative to terrorist threats to the
United States, one in 1995, I guess before you were chief of
staff, and one in 1997. And, according to the 9/11 Commission
report, the 1995 NIE predicted future terrorist attacks against
the United States and in the United States, and it warned that
this danger would increase over the next several years. It even
indicated that the most vulnerable assets were the White House,
the Capitol, such symbols of capitalism as Wall Street, et
cetera.
My question is, were you involved in discussions relative
to the issues pointed out in those NIEs? If so, tell me what
the genesis of those discussions was and what preparations or
action did you and those that you were involved in discussing
this issue take relative to those significant warnings?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, acting on recollection here, I
believe I was there for the 1995 NIE as the chief of staff. I
was not there in 1997; I'd left that position at that time.
But with regards to the terrorism NIE that was provided in
1995, as I mentioned yesterday to the Committee, terrorism was
one of the major priorities that was identified within the
Administration that needed attention--obviously, the bombings
that took place, and the fact that it was clear that there was
a rising threat with terrorists throughout the world. This
became a major focus of attention within the Administration and
within the White House.
The national security advisers--Tony Lake, Sandy Berger--
constantly reminded the President of the importance of dealing
with this issue. And as a result of that, people like Richard
Clarke and others--and I can remember this, as chief of staff--
brought to my attention as chief of staff when there were
indications that additional threats were out there.
We had one instance where there were--there was a
possibility that we had received information that they would
take over airlines in the Philippines or be able to hold
hostages. And as a result of that, we advised and took steps to
ensure that would not happen. There were other things that took
place, as well. But I can assure you that within the
Administration there was a great deal of attention to the issue
of terrorism and what steps we needed to take to try to protect
this country.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
We will now go on to our second round of questions. I
wanted to ask you a question about covert action. The CIA
conducts covert actions under clear authorities and with clear
oversight. And that's all laid out in the National Security
Act. Each covert action must be authorized by a written
Finding, signed by the President. And significant undertakings
are governed by what we call MONs, or memoranda of
notification. The Intelligence Committees must be notified. And
there are quarterly updates to the Committees. We're going to
have one shortly.
The Department of Defense has separate authorities under
Title 10 for clandestine operations for military source
operations. That's what they call it, in quotes, ``military
source operations.'' Now, these often are almost identical to
covert operations, but under a different guise.
So you have one entity doing this, and you have another
entity doing this. Do you believe the CIA should be consulted
on these defense activities? Should the chief of station have
oversight and the ability to veto such intelligence activities
in his or her area of responsibility?
Mr. Panetta. Madam Chairman, this is an issue that I think
we are going to have to work with the committees, to ensure
that there is not only proper notification but that there's
coordination of these efforts. These are all covert actions.
They come under different titles.
Title 50 requires, as you pointed out, that we go to the
President, that we get the Finding, that we provide notice to
this Committee. There are rules required under the law in order
to ensure that the Committee and others are properly notified
about the actions that are taken under covert action.
Under Title 10, these are military actions taken to
basically deal with the environment in the battlefield. That's
how this originated. However, as a result of what we've seen in
the last few years, there are clearly covert actions that are
being taken that have to be coordinated.
There's no question here. There has to be coordination. If
each of these go off on their own, we're going to be tripping
over each other and we're going to be failing to use resources
properly. And frankly it isn't going to work. What we need to
do is to have better coordination of these efforts.
And I've talked to the Secretary of Defense about this,
that we need to improve our coordination, that people in the
field, particularly the station chiefs, need to be aware of
these efforts so that they can coordinate them and make sure
that each understands what is involved here. And I would think
the third thing that I would suggest to you is that there has
to be some kind of notification process that's involved.
Now, I understand, they do provide some notice to members
of the Armed Services Committee. But, very frankly it seems to
me that it's appropriate that perhaps the committees in the
Congress establish some kind of notification procedure to
ensure that it isn't just the Armed Services Committee but it's
the Intelligence Committee that is aware of these kinds of
actions.
Chairman Feinstein. I thank you for that. I think that's
very important. Some countries may be very small. The
ambassador doesn't know. The chief of station doesn't know, and
we don't know. And I think that's a big mistake. So I very much
appreciate that answer.
Second question: What steps do you intend to take, beyond
what has been done already, if there is anything, so that the
analysis of information is improved, so we can be assured that
a flawed and bad NIE cannot happen again?
Mr. Panetta. It's really important to have analysts who are
trained, who are aware of the country that they're getting
information from, the sources that they're getting information
from, and analysts who are prepared to ask questions, to
challenge the information that's being provided, so that they
can ensure that information comes from reliable sources.
I think, you know, I'm very impressed by the analysts that
I've met. They obviously are in their own ways independent and
objective. And I think that's important.
But sometimes there is--as we all know, within any
bureaucracy there's a kind of groupthink that takes place, in
which there's a sense that you kind of do it by the numbers.
Information comes in, and you pass it on, and nobody says
``stop, wait, what's involved here?'' and is willing to
challenge it. Because kind of the message in the bureaucracy,
from my own experience is, you don't make waves.
Well, very frankly, you have to make waves. If you're not
asking those questions, if you're not challenging, then that's
when we make mistakes, and that's when this country becomes
vulnerable. So what I hope to do, working with the good people
in that section, is to create an atmosphere where they're
willing to ask those questions and to challenge it, and if it
doesn't happen at their level, you can bet it's going to happen
at the Director's level.
Chairman Feinstein. Well, I just want to say that my prime
mission, and one of the reasons I was interested in the
chairmanship of this Committee, is to see that it never happens
again. I know I cast a vote that I have to live with for the
rest of my life, based on that Iraq NIE. And I think about it
every single day. So I will plague your house to see that we
have in place everything we can to see that intelligence is
good and never again is a Secretary of State put out before the
world based on a CIA speech that is dead wrong.
Mr. Panetta. I agree with that.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you.
Mr. Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you, Madam Chair. And again,
thank you, Mr. Panetta, for bringing your considerable
background, experience and abilities to this position. I
appreciated your answers to Senator Feinstein's two questions,
and I agree with those.
But yesterday you made a statement with which I believe
everyone on this Committee agrees, and you said, ``We can
protect this country. We can get the information we need. We
can provide security for the American people. And we can abide
by the law.'' That was the position of your predecessors in the
previous administration, and that's what I've been aware of
ever since I've served on this oversight panel. And I'm very
pleased, as we all are, that you'll continue, if confirmed.
But I need to pick up where you left off yesterday, because
I'm still not sure I completely understand your follow-up to
one of your responses to the Chair during the first round of
questions yesterday, and several others, in which you stated
that the United States has sent individuals to other nations
``for torture.'' That implies deliberate intent of U.S.
officials to send individuals to other countries for the
purpose of being tortured.
That's a serious allegation, and one which should not be
made lightly or without evidence. Now, if that's ever happened,
it's news to me. Former Secretary of State Rice made clear on a
number of occasions what the Bush Administration policy was on
renditions. For example, December 5, 2005: ``The United States
does not transport, and has not transported, detainees from one
country to another for the purpose of interrogation using
torture. The United States has not transported anyone and will
not transport anyone to a country when we believe you will be
tortured. Where appropriate, the United States seeks assurances
that transferred persons will not be tortured.''
Now, if you're saying that she was wrong and this was done,
then I would expect your first order of business as Director of
the CIA to round up your people that did this and turn them
over with a crimes report to the Justice Department for
prosecution.
I, for one, don't believe this has happened. So you said
yesterday that you have not even been briefed into these
programs, so I'm not sure how you can make such a statement. So
my question is, what evidence are you basing this assertion on?
Or would you like to retract that statement.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you for the question, Senator, because I
think there is some clarification required here because
renditions are one of these areas where the press has
identified extraordinary renditions. Nobody quite has defined
exactly what that means; everybody has a certain reaction to
what is involved and there are obviously other kinds of
renditions. Let me describe what I think are the three types of
renditions that we need to discuss.
One is the rendition that takes place where individuals
have been delivered to black sites and questioned there. Under
the Executive Order that the President provided, because it
requires that we eliminate black sites, that kind of rendition
will not take place because black sites will no longer exist.
There is a second kind of rendition, where individuals are
turned over to a country for purposes of questioning, and it is
my understanding that--and I want to clear up the record on
this--there were efforts by the CIA to seek and to receive
assurances that those individuals would not be mistreated and
that they did receive those assurances.
As I pointed out yesterday, there are obviously some claims
that was not the case; I am not aware of the validity of those
claims but clearly those claims have been made that was not the
case. With regards to that area, I think using renditions we
may very well direct individuals to third countries. I will
seek the same kinds of assurances that they will be not treated
inhumanely. I intend to use the State Department to ensure that
those assurances are in fact implemented and stood by, by those
countries.
In addition to that, I would point out that under the
Executive Order, we are to look at those kinds of transfers and
how that takes place to ensure that those kinds of assurances
are received and that those countries stand by those
assurances.
And I would point out there's a third area of renditions,
which involves transferring individuals to countries for
purposes of legal action, and in those instances I think those
are appropriate tools of rendition and hopefully we would
continue to use those.
Vice Chairman Bond. But to follow up on that, I don't
believe I was clear on your answer. You stated yesterday that
we transported people for the purpose of torture. Now, nothing
you've said tells me that you have any solid information for
that. Do you have any information? So would you retract that
statement?
Mr. Panetta. But Senator, on that particular quote--that
people were transferred for purposes of torture--that was not
the policy of the United States. It was clearly to transfer
people for purposes of questioning and receiving assurances
that would not take place. So to that extent yes, I would
retract that statement.
Vice Chairman Bond. All right, because that's a serious
assertion. Maybe media, liberal blogs--but having made that
statement, you--not a private citizen, but as a nominee for
this very important position--cannot be making statements or
making judgments based on rumors or news stories. And that was
one of the elements that was at the base of our misinformation
and the bad intelligence we got, so I would ask you to assure
this Committee that you will not make rash judgments based on
hearsay, you will demand that the Agency make statements only
based on hard facts and rule out political bias, determine the
truth and then deliver your best judgment to us and to the
President and, to where appropriate, to the media. Do I have
your assurance?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, you have my assurance that I intend
to do that. My approach is going to be to seek the truth and do
everything possible to seek the truth and I will in turn
provide that kind of information to this Committee.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you, Mr. Panetta.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Senator Whitehouse.
Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Two questions at this point, Mr. Panetta. The first:
There's been some discussion about the rule of law and how it
applies to interrogations that were conducted by the CIA. One
of the hazards, as we all know, of the rule of law is it's not
always easy. It's not always convenient and it's not always
conducive to everybody's good morale. But it is, in my view, a
very high principle.
In this case, the rule of law includes things like defenses
that follow from, say, advice of counsel. Those are defenses
that have their own legal limitations to them. You don't give
up on a racketeering prosecution against a mobster just because
he has a mob lawyer, who's handed him a document saying this is
a legitimate business proposition. Advice of counsel has its
limits. Waiver by estoppel is a doctrine that prevents a
government agency that has licensed conduct from then
sanctioning the conduct that it has itself licensed.
That as a doctrine of law also has its own limitations.
However all this works itself out, will you assure that
whatever backward look is necessary into the CIA and whatever
forward conduct is undertaken by the CIA abides ultimately by
the rule of law?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I think, as I said yesterday, as the son
of immigrants who came to this country, the one thing that they
always said was one of the reasons they came to this country
was because of the rule of law. And I think that's what has
made this country great; that's why we stand out as moral
authority around the world, is because we abide by the rule of
law. And I feel it's my obligation and, frankly, my sworn duty
to ensure that we live by that rule of law in whatever we do.
Senator Whitehouse. Even if it's not easy, even if it's not
convenient, even if it's not conducive to everybody's good
morale?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, as an attorney, having dealt with
cases like you and obviously having run into serious challenges
as you go through a trial process to try to make those
decisions, I'm still convinced that in the end it is the best
process in the world for providing due process to individuals.
And yes, it gets tough sometimes and yes, it's not convenient
and yes, sometimes you don't get to the end you want to
achieve. But the reality is that if you abide by due process,
if you abide by our constitution and the rule of law, that in
the end we serve the best interest of this country.
Senator Whitehouse. Switching to the other side of the
world, you noted in your written statement that al-Qa'ida has
reestablished a safe haven in the border region between
Pakistan and Afghanistan. Now, I've been out there and been
thoroughly briefed on the difficulties that this border
creates. The Talibani syndicates and al-Qa'ida don't even
notice it. It is a zero-factor in their operations. For us, it
is a significant factor because of the sovereignty prerogatives
of the Afghanistan and Pakistan governments.
We have there a border coordination center that has been
set up--just one. There are supposed to be six. My sense is
that it's going very slowly. Only the one is operational and I
think these border coordination centers, if they can develop
into trilateral targeting and tactical direction centers for
that area, could provide enormous advantage in the battle with
al-Qa'ida and the Taliban syndicates.
I will ask you this question for the record because my time
is running out and if you could get back to us in writing I
would appreciate it, but I would like to know what do you think
the U.S. government can do to move more quickly to establish
the remaining five border coordination centers and make them
secure, because as we all know there have been issues with
information leakage in various places, and effective--as
effective as we are capable of making them, which in other
areas and contexts the coordination efforts have been
extremely, extremely effective.
Mr. Panetta. Senator, be careful not to get into a
classified area here, but obviously let me look into that issue
and try to get you the answer that I can provide because I
think that issue is important. It's obviously an area where
operationally there are all kinds of things that are taking
place that are very important. But I believe that we need to
set up those kinds of border stations in order to improve our
relationship, in order to improve our security, particularly in
Afghanistan.
Senator Whitehouse. It has operational and political value
because of the sovereignty problem. Thank you very much, Madam
Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Senator Hatch, you are next.
Thank you, Senator Whitehouse.
Senator Hatch. Well, thank you, Madam Chair.
I'm not going to ask you, Leon, what you've been reading on
intelligence as you prepare for this key position, but I am
going to remind you that this Committee does much more than
conduct nomination hearings, produce authorization bills--we
will be passing one later this year, won't we, Madam Chair?
[Laughter.]
Vice Chairman Bond. Two.
Senator Hatch. Two--that would be a wonderful thing.
As I mentioned in Admiral Blair's hearing, the Committee
has conducted historic investigations, none more historic than
the one that resulted in our report of July 2004 on the
intelligence failures related to the Iraqi WMD. And yes, I'm
blowing the Committee's horn but yes, this intelligence failure
was spectacular and I cannot imagine anyone taking any
responsible position in the IC without understanding it in
detail. Have you read that report yet?
Mr. Panetta. I have not read the full report.
Senator Hatch. You need to read it. I think it's important
to you. Do you think it's important?
Mr. Panetta. Absolutely.
Senator Hatch. Okay. Now, this may be unfair at this time
but let me ask it anyway. What in your opinion were the causes
of the intelligence failure regarding the Iraqi WMD and do you
believe this could occur again and why and why not?
Mr. Panetta. Well, obviously, I mean, this Committee did a
full study into the issue and provided that report. I've looked
at some of the summaries that were involved there and there
were several problem areas that developed. Obviously, one was
that we did not have sufficient sources of information within
that country to be able to verify that there were in fact
weapons of mass destruction. And so a lot of this is the result
of not having adequate resources, not having adequate assets
within the country to help verify that kind of information.
Secondly, we relied on sources that were questionable in
terms of saying that it was present. The questionability of
those sources was not really brought to the attention of the
people that should have known that. And thirdly, I think there
was a kind of group-think, in which everybody basically assumed
that those weapons were there, that Saddam Hussein had used
those weapons and therefore he must have them at the present
time and frankly his behavior conveyed the impression that
somehow he continued to maintain them.
Now, I think it's the result of all of that produced the
NIE that said, essentially, that he had all of these weapons of
mass destruction. It is a great learning lesson as to how you
should not do intelligence. The problem is that sometimes when
policymakers are trying to make decisions and move to a certain
conclusion that people who are involved in intelligence will
try to respond to what policy makers want to hear rather than
the truth. And I think that's what took place.
Senator Hatch. While the DNI is specifically a named
participant, the CIA Director is not specifically named as a
member of the review team created by Executive Order that will
consider the status of Guantanamo Bay detainees.
Do you expect to play, either personally or through
personnel of the CIA, any role in the disposition of these
detainees? And let me just add a couple other questions to
that.
If criminal trials are initiated, either in the federal
district courts or in U.S. military courts, what issues are
there and what procedures should apply to take into account the
need of the CIA to protect its sources and methods? That's an
important question.
And finally, what criteria do you believe should be used to
determine whether a detainee is tried, held indefinitely
pursuant to a procedure other than trial or returned to another
country or released? Sorry to add all those questions, but I
think they go together.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Senator. Obviously, there is
established, under the Executive Order, a review process to go
through the very questions that you've raised and to determine
which individuals can be brought to trial, which ones ought to
be transferred to other countries, and which ones ought to be
held indefinitely. The reality is that, as Director of the CIA,
I think I'll have to play a role because there's information
involved here that involves our assets, that involves
individuals and sources that were involved in the arrest of
many of these individuals.
And so I hope to participate in that process, to provide
that kind of information. Obviously, if there are situations
where the information would reveal important sources or
information that could jeopardize lives, then it would seem to
me that the Attorney General and others who are going to make
the final decisions need to be aware of that, because that
could impact on whether or not these individuals are tried.
There are going to be a group of individuals that I think
all of us recognize will not be able to be tried for those
reasons and probably ought not to be transferred because they
remain dangerous. And it is that situation that I think we
probably all need to focus on, because if we are going to
maintain those individuals and keep them in prison, the reality
is we probably ought to establish at least some kind of
reporting mechanism with the federal courts to ensure that
there is at least some mechanism to make the courts aware of
why we are continuing to hold these individuals.
Senator Hatch. Well, thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Hatch.
We are joined by Senator Nelson. As you know, Mr. Panetta,
he is one of the crossover members between Armed Services and
Intelligence, and we're delighted to have him. This is his
first round, so if you require a little bit more time, just say
so. Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Well, if I took any more time, it would
certainly upset Senator Rockefeller, who----
Chairman Feinstein. You don't want to do that.
Senator Nelson [continuing]. Who likes to cut me off.
[Laughter.]
But I'm accustomed to operating within those constraints. I
just want to say that, as your name came up and the fact that
the first questions arose, does Leon have any experience in
this area, my response--and I think most of our responses--is
that anybody who has been chief of staff in the White House is
capable of handling any position in the government of the
United States. And that, especially since you have had the
wisdom, as you announced yesterday, to keep a real professional
like Steve Kappes as the deputy.
I think it's a great team. One area that has not been
covered is that there was some question in the past as to
whether or not a message was sent of questioning or
intimidation of the Inspector General of the CIA for that IG to
do the aggressive job that an IG ought to do. We've seen that
in some other agencies in the last eight years, and I'd like
for you, just for the record, to say how you're going to handle
your Inspector General.
Mr. Panetta. Well, I'm a believer in inspectors general. I
was in the Congress when the inspector general law was passed.
I really do believe you have to maintain a person who's
independent, who can investigate matters within the various
departments and agencies. And I believe that having an IG at
the CIA is extremely important for those very reasons.
And from my point of view, I expect the IG to perform
independently, to be objective, to do the investigations that
have to be done and to arrive at those conclusions without any
interference from the Director or from people within the
Agency. You need to have independent judgments that are made by
the IG. And, if I'm confirmed, that will be the case with
regards to my IG.
Senator Nelson. Just in conclusion, Madam Chairman, I just
want to say that the privilege that I've had on this Committee
and traveling on a good part of the globe and meeting the young
people that are going into the CIA, I am mightily impressed.
And as the Director-designate indicated yesterday, so much of
the success of his agency will be in human intelligence. And
these young people that we have on the ground all over the
globe are just exceptional. So I'm very optimistic.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Rockefeller.
Senator Rockefeller. Good morning, Director-designate
Panetta.
Mr. Panetta. Good morning, Senator.
Senator Rockefeller. This may have been discussed somewhat
this morning already, but I wasn't here so how am I to know? I
think, from my point of view, it's indisputable that the Bush
Administration changed the United States interrogation and
detention policies after 9/11. They used the fear of attack,
John Yoo, neo-con cabal--I mean, you can mix whatever you want
into it--but there was no question, you know, this man can no
longer do us any justice. These kind of public statements
indicate carrying something further.
So I have disagreed strongly with the direction of the
administration. But let me ask you this. Do you think that the
Bush Administration ordered any renditions for any other
reasons than because they thought, rightly or wrongly, that it
would help secure our country?
Mr. Panetta. No, I don't question the sincerity of the Bush
Administration in trying to make decisions that they thought
would protect the security of this country. I think they made
some wrong decisions; I think they made mistakes. But I don't
question the sincerity of how they approached that issue.
Senator Rockefeller. So that you think that sometimes the
government can get off track in doing things that are
counterproductive, even if they intend for those things to be--
--
Mr. Panetta. I think sometimes they believed that the ends
justified the means, and I think that's where people sometimes
go wrong. But I don't question that their ends were what they
thought was in the security interest of this country.
Senator Rockefeller. Do you think that the Bush
administration got off track, for whatever motivation, maybe a
good motivation, or not, on rendition policies?
Mr. Panetta. I think what happens is that, obviously, in
the concern about--particularly after 9/11--the concern of what
happened to the country, the concern that perhaps we might
suffer another attack, that in that mode that followed, in
which there was a great deal of consternation about what could
happen next, that it's at that point that you have to kind of
stop and say, wait a minute, how do we approach this to ensure
that we don't violate the Constitution and we don't violate the
laws that are out there?
And I think, to some extent, in that situation, the mood--
and I can imagine this within the Oval Office, having been
there--that the mood is, we have to do whatever's necessary and
take whatever steps we can, and that we can't be bothered with
legalisms. And I think it's that kind of thinking process that
probably took place.
Senator Rockefeller. All right. Let's go on. We've got more
than a billion Muslims in the world and President Obama has
spoken about that, you know, that there are some bad apples in
there, but these are good people. Many of them are American
citizens.
Their income, actually, is higher--average income is higher
than the non-Muslim American income, because they're very, very
successful in what they do and work very hard. Do you think
that they believe the United States at least enabled the
torture of Muslim detainees and, at worst, participated in
torture? Do you think that would be their view?
Mr. Panetta. Well, it's always dangerous to draw broad
conclusions about how a group of people feel. I mean, I am sure
there are those that think that was the case.
Senator Rockefeller. And do you think that affects our
counterterrorism policies--the effectiveness of them,
implementing them?
Mr. Panetta. Well, I don't think there's any question but
that the approaches that were taken, the decisions that were
made as to how we treat individuals has a serious downside in
terms of causing damage to the moral authority of this country
around the world. Our greatest weapon is our moral authority
and our stature and the view that we always abide by the
Constitution, and I think the sense that we were willing to set
that aside, I think, did damage our security.
Senator Rockefeller. Madam Chairman, I'll just ask to
finish with a statement. Don't you think it's important,
therefore, that if there are ambiguities, let's say if there's
an incident and then they tighten up, they want to hunker down
in the national security, but on the other hand, if they have,
let's say, sort of what they call a unitary form of
government--that there's really only one branch of government
that counts--that we go to particular lengths, and that you
might go to particular lengths, working with the White House to
make sure that what is begun in the way of unusual methods is
shared a little bit more easily with the Intelligence
Committee, or a little more early with the Intelligence
Committee than five years later?
Mr. Panetta. I think the best way to ensure that those
kinds of mistakes are not made is to rely on the process, our
democratic process. A, that involves, within the White House
and within the Administration, people who are willing to stand
up and speak what they believe, that they're willing to say
wait a minute, a serious mistake is being made here. I mean,
that's not easy. I've been there; I know what it's like. People
like to tell the President what he likes to hear.
You have to have people who are willing to stand up and say
this is a mistake. And frankly, if they feel strongly enough
about it, they ought to quit to make that point. In addition to
that, the other part of it is the ability to speak to members
of this Committee, who have a lot of experience, who have a lot
of dedication to what this country is all about, and to have
your input in that process. I mean, it makes a difference if,
you know, the Vice Chairman or the Chairman go to the President
of the United States and say wait a minute, you know, we've
just been notified about this; this is wrong.
It makes a President stop and think about what's going to
happen. Those are the checks and balances in the democratic
process. And when you avoid those checks and balances, that's
when we get in trouble.
Senator Rockefeller. And notification is at the heart of
that?
Mr. Panetta. Absolutely.
Senator Rockefeller. I thank the Chair and I thank the
Chairman for patience.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much. We'll begin
another round.
Mr. Panetta, sometime in late 2006, I had a call from Al
Gore who asked me if I would take a look at a program. The
program was MEDEA. And I said I would and I had a meeting in
February of 2007. I received the classified and the
unclassified documents. I looked at them and what I found was
that a program had been instituted where a very distinguished
scientific panel was put together and certain assets were used
to map climate change.
And as I looked at some of the mapping that was done, I
found it to be very precise and very interesting, because it
had a national security nexus. And it became a kind of ongoing
compendium of what was happening in the world. Now, it has had
people that are not very enthusiastic about it, to be very
candid, within the Agency. We put it back into the intelligence
budget, and I'd like to ask that you take a good look at both
the classified and unclassified documents and, hopefully,
support this program to its fullest.
Nothing can track climate change quite like the CIA's
assets can. And if you do this over a period of years, even
decades, I think we're going to get very, very useful and
lifesaving information from it. So I am a big supporter of it.
Mr. Panetta. Madam Chairman, the former Vice President gave
me a call on this very issue and indicated his concern, having
put this in place. And I know that you have exercised
leadership on this issue to try to maintain that program. You
know, my view is that we need to seek out important
intelligence in many different ways in order to determine what
the impact is going to be in terms of the security of this
world.
For example, I think, on the economic side, we need to look
at the impact of a worldwide recession in terms of the
stability of countries like China and others and what the
impact will be in terms of our own security.
The same thing is true with regards to climate change
issues. We need to know if there are countries that are going
through droughts--serious droughts--if there are sea-rise
impacts on ports and facilities. We need to know that. We need
to know what's happening in the world as a result of that. And
I think that's an important aspect of gathering intelligence in
a broad range of areas in order to get the best information
possible.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Now, a couple of quick questions. You know our concern
about not being notified about people being taken from the
field because of unacceptable activities. And I would like your
commitment that the new Congressional relations person for the
department carry out the National Security Act fully in terms
of notifying this Committee, in writing, of bad events. The
good takes care of themselves; the bad do not. And may I have
that commitment, please?
Mr. Panetta. Absolutely.
Chairman Feinstein. And will you do this as a first order
of business?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
Chairman Feinstein. I appreciate it very much. I have
watched a situation--and I agree with what Senator Nelson said;
people in the CIA are, in the main, very good. They care a lot
about the country. They work very hard. They put themselves in
great personal danger. And it's a very difficult job.
But I have seen occasions where the Agency has engaged in
poor analytic tradecraft--we've been through that--poor use of
taxpayer dollars, unbecoming conduct overseas and even applying
incorrect legal standards to CIA operations.
And they've had no adverse affect on their career. As a
matter of fact, some of them have even been promoted. How do
you intend to hold people accountable for failures in carrying
out what are, in fact, official duties?
Mr. Panetta. Well, I'm a strong believer in ensuring good
discipline within any operation, but particularly within the
CIA, I think, it's very important that people behave according
to a certain standard, because these are individuals that are
out there. They're in difficult positions. They have to serve
in difficult places and they have a difficult mission to
implement.
We have to rely on their good character. We have to rely on
their commitment to a standard of behavior that will ensure
that the difficult job they do will not result in the kind of
accusations and misbehavior that can damage the agency. I want
to get that message across to the employees.
I believe as you do that a large majority of individuals
associated with the CIA are good people trying to do the right
kind of job. But one bad apple can hurt. And so my view will be
that, if I find that kind of misbehavior, I'm going to take
action to make sure that those kinds of individuals are either
withdrawn or terminated from their position.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Mr. Vice Chairman.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Madam Chair and
Mr. Panetta.
We certainly agree on accountability, and the chair and I
are working together to make sure we operate on a bipartisan
basis, that our majority and minority staffs work together. And
we also have to have open channels of communication with the
intelligence community.
You may have already said it, but for the record, will you
cooperate with the members of the Committee, Democrat and
Republican, the chiefs of staff of the majority and the
minority, responding promptly to any written or oral inquiries,
sharing information as soon as it is available, directing your
staff to do the same?
Mr. Panetta. Yes.
Vice Chairman Bond. You've heard several examples where
that's not happened. And we also want to set a new tone of
bipartisanship on the Committee and assure accountability. And
not just for you, but of our own operations as well. If we
expect you to keep your house, then we expect you to help us.
And information has come to us that there may be problems in
our own house. We have had to find that out by the back door,
not having been fully briefed.
Therefore, would you agree to brief this Committee on any
investigations or inquiries that you become aware of concerning
leaks or security violations by Congressional staff both from
the House and Senate? That would come in the form of criminal
referrals through the Department of Justice or your own efforts
and any subsequent result, findings, and/or damage assessments?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I would.
Vice Chairman Bond. As I said, we've learned about some of
these by our own investigative work. And we'll find out about
it at some point, but we expect you, when you are confirmed, as
I'm sure you will be, to take the lead and let us know. If
we've got a problem, we've got to fix it. So we will count on
you so we won't have to ask the question, but you will come
forward with it.
Mr. Panetta. Senator, we are dealing with very sensitive
issues, and sensitive intelligence, and lives are on the line.
And I think when people misbehave and reveal those kinds of
leak information that could impact and jeopardize lives, that's
a serious matter.
Vice Chairman Bond. I couldn't agree more. And now, as we
discussed yesterday, in order for the intelligence community to
function as we've directed, the DNI must be the top
intelligence adviser for the President. I think that's in the
law. And will you ensure that any personal or professional
relationship you may have with the White House takes a back
seat, and the DNI, Director Blair, is the President's
intelligence adviser?
Mr. Panetta. Senator----
Vice Chairman Bond. I know it's not going to be easy.
That's why I want you to--I want you to try.
Mr. Panetta. You know what, I've spent my share of time in
the Oval Office. That's not a big deal for me.
Vice Chairman Bond. Okay.
Mr. Panetta. I'm fully prepared to allow the DNI to do
that. And when the President wants me to be there, I'll be
there.
Vice Chairman Bond. Further clarification on a question you
answered yesterday about the use of contractors. Given the fact
that high value detainees are very infrequently questioned, and
that experienced interrogators in such sensitive matters may
not be on the CIA payroll, and you will have to inform yourself
fully of that if you've not. You mentioned yesterday a lack of
language skill. Do you believe there should be a complete ban
on using properly trained contractors under full CIA
supervision for this purpose?
Mr. Panetta. No, I wouldn't support a complete ban because
there are going to be instances where you may have to get a
certain language ability or a certain capability that isn't in-
house. And if you've got to question somebody you're going to
have to get somebody who has that capability.
Vice Chairman Bond. Under the strong supervision of CIA?
Mr. Panetta. That's correct.
Vice Chairman Bond. On the detainees, Senators Roberts and
Brownback and I have introduced legislation requiring Congress
to be notified 90 days before any action is taken to close
Guantanamo Bay and transfer detainees to the United States with
a comprehensive study addressing the feasibility of closing
Gitmo, including the legal ramifications of transferring
detainees to the United States.
Do you agree that Congress should be notified and provided
with a full plan in advance of action taken to close Guantanamo
and dispose of these detainees?
Mr. Panetta. Obviously, there is this review process that's
going on, and I would think that it would be very important to
notify Congress as to what conclusions are arrived at, and be
able to seek your guidance and consult in that process.
Vice Chairman Bond. Madam Chair, I have another line of
questioning that's going to go rather long, so I will--well,
I've already gone over my time anyhow.
Chairman Feinstein. All right.
Vice Chairman Bond. I will wait until the next round.
Chairman Feinstein. All right, thank you. Thank you,
Senator.
Senator Hatch.
Senator Hatch. Well, thank you, Madam Chair.
I just want you to know that I feel very deeply as--your
importance, and--and I respect your willingness to serve after
all these years you've been back here, after all the pain you
went through in the past in the Oval Office as well as probably
even worse up here in the Congress. But I appreciate you, I
always have. And I'm proud to support you.
But let me just ask you just one or two more questions.
Correct me if I'm wrong on this, but if I recall, you've
indicated that the CIA and the intelligence community may have
a role with regard to globalization issues. What do you mean by
that?
Mr. Panetta. Well, you're talking about the economic area.
I just think that what we're seeing happen as a result of this
economic recession that's impacting across the world that we
just need to be aware of what the implications of that are in
terms of the stability of the world.
I mean, the best example of that obviously is China, and
what could happen if they fall below a certain growth level,
and what kind of stability problems might develop as a result
of that. I just think we need to have the capacity to be able
to gather that kind of intelligence and make sure that
policymakers are aware of what----
Senator Hatch. Do you consider that part of what the CIA's
role is in obtaining intelligence, in obtaining secrets that--
some say stealing secrets.
Mr. Panetta. It's all of that.
Senator Hatch. I didn't really want to say that, but there
is something to it.
Just one last question. In your responses to the
Committee's prehearing questions, you stated that the CIA
Director can achieve sufficient independence from political
considerations by ensuring that there's a system in place to
produce clear, objective, unbiased, timely and complete
analysis responsive to the President's needs.
Do you believe that the CIA has not been producing clear,
objective and unbiased analysis? I just wondered what you feel,
because you could go either way on that, and frankly, I'd
probably go one way more than on the other.
And in your opinion what safeguards would be included in
the system you describe?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, you know, obviously, I guess we all
have to draw our own conclusions about what happened with
regard to how intelligence was presented to the President of
the United States, and whether or not it was intelligence that
the President and others wanted to hear, or whether it really
revealed the truth.
Having been in the Oval Office, I understand that if you
walk into the Oval Office, you're dealing with the President of
the United States. The tendency is not to confront the
President, but hopefully to try to tell the President what he
likes to hear because you don't want to offend him. You're in
the Oval Office. It has an intimidating impact on people that
walk into that office; I've seen that happen.
But, at the same time, I think the President is badly
served if he does not have individuals, not only within the
White House staff but in agencies like the CIA, that are not
willing to walk into the Oval Office and tell him the bad news,
tell him what he may not want to hear. That's the role of
having a CIA present the very best intelligence that has to be
presented to the President. And it may often conflict with what
the President wants to do. It may often conflict with what
policymakers may want to do. It may often conflict with what
the Joint Chiefs of Staff want to do. But the purpose of the
CIA is to present that kind of information. And I think we
violate certainly a commitment to presenting objective,
independent intelligence if you only tell people what they want
to hear.
Senator Hatch. Thank you. You know, there have been a
plethora of books written about the CIA, many of them highly
critical.
Mr. Panetta. Yes.
Senator Hatch. Which I agree with, and a lot of which I
think is overstated. But this is a very complex important
position. And my caution to you is, you have tremendous
academic credentials. You have great administrative
credentials, good Congressional credentials. But you haven't
had a lot of experience in this area. It's a very complex, very
difficult area, as we all know. But if anybody can handle it, I
personally believe you can. And I'm just personally grateful
you are willing to take on this job.
I just hope that you will continue to help us here on this
Committee to do our job. We have a very limited amount of time
to spend on these things compared to the CIA Director and
others at the CIA. So we need your help, and we hope you'll
give it. And I know you will, having had lots of experience
with you in the past.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Hatch. Thank you for your service.
Thanks, Madam Chair.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much, Senator Hatch.
We are joined by the Chairman of the Armed Services
Committee, also, the second crossover member of this Committee.
And I'd like to recognize him. Senator, take the time that you
need, because you missed a couple of rounds.
Senator Levin. Thank you so much, Madam Chairman.
Welcome again, Mr. Panetta. Yesterday you said that when
you get to the Agency, which we look forward to, that you're
going to be looking at the interrogation tactics which have
been used and whether those tactics yielded valuable
information or misinformation, and whether damage done as a
result of the use of those tactics might have counterbalanced
whatever information was received. And that's fair enough and
we think it would be valuable for you to do that.
But I think it's important that you broaden your inquiry
when you look at what you call counterbalancing. I want to ask
you whether you're willing to look at some other aspects of
this issue that should go on that scale.
First, Alberto Mora, who is the former general counsel of
the Navy, has pointed out that the tactics which were used
damaged our national security down at the tactical or
operational level in a number of ways. And he cited a number of
examples.
First he said there are U.S. flag rank officers serving now
who maintain that the first and second identifiable causes of
U.S. combat deaths in Iraq, as judged by their effectiveness in
recruiting insurgent fighter into combat against them are,
respectively, the symbols of Abu Ghurayb and Guantanamo.
Now, so we have flag officers who are commanders who are
saying that those symbols are the major cause of U.S. combat
deaths because they helped to recruit people to come to war and
to attack us. Will you take a look at that testimony and those
statements of those commanders as part of your review? Because
if you are looking to see at the balance, did we get any useful
information, and is it counterbalanced by the--I think as you
phrased it yesterday--the damage to our country, will you
specifically take a look at that, what I just mentioned?
Mr. Panetta. Yes. I think any review process that looks at
those kinds of interrogation techniques and the value of
whatever information was brought has to consider the downside,
and you have just pointed out part of that downside.
Senator Levin. All right, let me give you some more
downsides, which I'll ask you if you're going to take a look
when you're looking at the overall scale here. Allied nations,
according to Mr. Mora, have hesitated on occasion to
participate in combat operations if there was a possibility
that as a result individuals captured during the operation
could be abused by U.S. or other forces. Are you willing to
take a look at that downside?
Mr. Panetta. Yes.
Senator Levin. Third, allied nations have refused on
occasion to train with us in joint detainee capture and
handling operations because of concerns about U.S. detainee
policies. Will you take a look at that downside?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, sir.
Senator Levin. Fourth, senior NATO officers in Afghanistan
have been reported to have left the room when issues of
detainee treatment have been raised by U.S. officials out of a
fear that they may be complicit in detainee abuse. Will you add
that to your list?
Mr. Panetta. Yes.
Senator Levin. Will you also take a look at some of these
other factors? When I visited our troops in Afghanistan, I
spoke to one of our senior intelligence officers who told me
that treating detainees harshly is an impediment, it's actually
a road block--to use that officer's words--to getting useful
intelligence from them.
Now this can happen in a number of ways. One of the ways
this could happen--and there is testimony to this effect that
we had at our hearings on torture at the Armed Services
Committee--one of the reasons this could happen is that you
actually can increase the resistance on the part of a detainee
to cooperate, because if you mistreat him or abuse him or
torture him, that can reinforce the idea that's been placed in
his head that he will be tortured, and instead of treating that
person humanely, which can break down that previous training
that he's going to be tortured, it reinforces that previous
training and makes it less likely that we would be getting
information from him.
Now this is testimony from our people. Will you add that to
your list of downsides from the use of these tactics?
Next, we have testimony and there's a great deal of it,
that when you mistreat or torture people, that they will say
anything to end the torture, particularly with waterboarding as
an example. And when they say anything, that means that they
will give you false information which can then be the basis of
your taking action which can, because it's based on false
information, actually cost lives and create injuries as a
result of acting on the false information which is obtained
when people will say anything or do anything to end being
tortured.
Can you put that on your list?
Mr. Panetta. Yes, I will.
Senator Levin. By the way, we have examples of that, or may
be examples--I've got to be careful here. We don't know why a
man named al-Libi gave us false information. We're not sure of
that. But we do know he gave us false information, saying that
first hand information that the Iraqis had trained al-Qa'ida in
the use of poison gases. That was used as one of the major
reasons, the linkages alleged between Iraq and the people who
attacked us for our going to war. False information, part of
the reasons used for going to war. So that becomes--and again,
I'm not saying and I don't know that was the result of torture,
but we do know it was false information, and that torture
produces false information.
So I welcome what you're going to do. I think it's
important, your review of the use of the techniques and the
tactics, and to see whether or not the information which may
have been produced by the use of abusive tactics
counterbalanced the downsides, as you just put it. But I think
it's important that you broaden this view. You could look at
broadening on both sides of the equation. If there's anything
on the upside, I don't know of it. But if there is any, throw
that on the balance as well.
But sometimes it's much too narrow a view taken of the
downsides of torture. We hear a lot, and properly so, about
what we stand for as a country, and how we are injured when
that perception of us is changed to a negative perception, how
it makes it more difficult to win allies in the war on terror
when we are perceived as engaging in inhumane treatment
ourselves. And those are important points, and I've made them
many times.
But specifically here, because you're going to get into
this area when you are confirmed, I think it's important that
you take a look at the vast number of downsides to our security
and how we are harmed, and how these abusive practices cost us
lives. The argument is made, they can save lives. Take a look
at that, see if it's valid. But take a look at all of these
downsides that exist.
And one further one. Just the other day when the
prosecution of somebody had to be dropped because we had
engaged in abusive tactics against that person, you know, if we
lose the ability to prosecute terrorists because of our
treatment of them, we surely are weakening our own security.
And this seems to be evident by the acknowledgment by the
convening authority of the military commissions, Judge Crawford
who said the charges against al-Kitani could not proceed
because she had determined that he had been tortured. So these
are--putting aside all the moral issues, the endangerment to
our own troops if and when they're captured, when we engage in
these practices, there are significant threats to our own
wellbeing and security when we engage in these practices.
And we look forward not just to your review, which you
yesterday talked about, but also then, as you also committed to
do, to keeping this Committee informed of that review.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Levin. Thank you.
Mr. Panetta. I appreciate all of your comments. This is
obviously an important area to review. I think, when it comes
to interrogation, everybody, going back to my days as an
intelligence officer, everybody kind of had their own views as
to what was the most effective way to draw information.
But I think in particular today, considering the situation
we face in the world, we had better develop those kinds of
techniques that produce the best kind of information and don't
provide the kind of down sides that you pointed out. And
hopefully the review process that I will conduct will look at
all of these aspects.
Senator Levin. I believe you yesterday said that in any
event, whatever this review produces, that you will not condone
or authorize illegal conduct by CIA personnel or contractors.
Mr. Panetta. That's correct.
Senator Levin. Did I hear you correctly?
Mr. Panetta. That's correct.
Senator Levin. Thank you. Madam Chairman, thank you so
much.
Chairman Feinstein. Thank you very much.
I believe we're winding down, Mr. Panetta. There's likely
to be votes at 11:30. I'd like to, just for a moment, follow up
on what Senator Levin said, and then I think the Ranking Member
and perhaps Senator Rockefeller has a question.
I feel very strongly about not using contractors for
interrogation. I have studied the matter. I think there are
real problems. Bob Mueller pulled his people out in 2002, and I
think it was because of what they witnessed going on. I believe
that any contract with a contractor to do interrogation should
be severed.
I think the concept of,``Well, the government will distance
itself from the person doing interrogation'' is wrong. The
military does their own interrogation. The FBI does their own
interrogation. And I believe it was FBI interrogators in the
1993 World Trade bombings that got a number of convictions
without torture. And an FBI interrogator that interrogated
Saddam Hussein was able to get a death penalty sentence, again,
without torture.
And, I mean, I've reached the point where this is a
fundamental question of credibility, because it is a distancing
of responsibility from the actions taken in the interrogation
process. I really want your assurance that you will sever these
contracts.
Mr. Panetta. You have my assurance that, you know, I want
to obviously go in and look at the situation and determine
what's happening. But my approach is going to be to--as I said,
I think these kinds of responsibilities ought to be brought in-
house, particularly with regards to questioning and
interrogation. And so my approach will be that this ought not
to be areas that are contracted out and in which we allow
others to do the job that we're responsible for.
As I indicated to the Vice Chair, there may be some
situations--once we've gotten rid of these contractors, there
may be some situations where we have to rely on a particular
ability. But if that's to happen, it has to happen under clear
supervision of the CIA. And frankly, I think we ought to inform
this Committee if, in fact, we need to do that.
Chairman Feinstein. I believe you should as well. Thank you
very much.
Mr. Vice Chairman, do you have a comment?
Vice Chairman Bond. Yes, Madam Chair. I've got about two or
three rounds of questioning and a comment.
Chairman Feinstein. Well, we're not going to do two or
three. Perhaps you can submit questions after----
Vice Chairman Bond. If there are further questions that
Senator Rockefeller has, I'll be happy to yield to him. I can
finish this up very quickly.
Chairman Feinstein. Good.
Vice Chairman Bond. And I will have some further questions
for the record.
But just for the record, Mr. Panetta, in December we were
at the facility, the military facility in Afghanistan, and they
found that two-thirds of their interrogators are contract
employees operating under the close supervision of U.S.
military officials. And they did so because those were the
only, the contractors were the only people who had the ability.
So your answer to my original question was correct. There are
instances where you must use them. And we will leave it to the
Armed Services Committee to look into the use of contractors
there.
I want to pursue a line of questions that Senator Coburn
brought up yesterday regarding former Director John Deutch.
It's been reported that, as chief of staff in 1995, you backed
the nomination of John Deutch as Director of Central
Intelligence. Is that correct? Did you support----
Mr. Panetta. I was chief of staff, and I think personnel
actually made the recommendations, and I conveyed those to the
President, and the President makes that choice.
Vice Chairman Bond. All right. As we found out after he
left office, his actions while serving both as Deputy Secretary
of Defense and the DCI caused grave damage to our national
security. In 2000, the CIA's Inspector General issued a report
on Mr. Deutch's improper handling of classified information.
This report noted, ``CIA records reflect that Deutch had
problems before becoming Director with regard to the handling
of classified information.''
Knowing more about the classified portion of that report, I
can tell you that quote is just the tip of the iceberg. Much
lies below the surface. In summary, the Inspector General found
Mr. Deutch to be a known counterintelligence risk, yet he was
allowed to serve in two positions, at DOD and as DCI, all three
requiring confirmations.
Neither the Armed Services Committee nor this Committee
were made aware of the risks Mr. Deutch posed to our national
security. And before he could be prosecuted, he was pardoned on
President Clinton's last day in office, as were Marc Rich and
others.
Can you tell me why, during the time you were chief of
staff, if you had information on this, neither this Committee
nor the Senate Armed Services Committee were informed that Mr.
Deutch posed a counterintelligence risk that would have
disqualified him from a position with access to our most
sensitive information?
Mr. Panetta. Senator, I can assure you that as chief of
staff I was not aware of any of that information.
Vice Chairman Bond. With that potential security risk,
would you think he would be an effective Director of the
Agency?
Mr. Panetta. Well, as I said, at the time I was certainly
not aware of any of that information. He did do his job over at
the Department of Defense. And, you know, as far as we knew, he
had all of the capabilities to go in as Director of the CIA.
Obviously the things you pointed out that have taken place
after that occurred, looking back on it, it raises legitimate
concerns.
Vice Chairman Bond. Did you at any time support or advocate
a pardon for Mr. Deutch?
Mr. Panetta. No.
Vice Chairman Bond. Well, I will ask you to review the IG
report to see whether he should be holding a security
clearance.
Mr. Panetta. Right.
Vice Chairman Bond. Next, a staff statement to the joint
inquiry into the terrorist attacks September 11 described some
problems with the PDD-35 issued in 1995, which established a
tier system for national security priorities. The staff
statement noted that as certain threats, including terrorism,
increased in the 1990s, none of the lower-level tier one
priorities were downgraded so as to allow resources to be
reallocated. The end result was that terrorism issues were set
on a priority--remained on a priority with other existing
priorities. Did you have any role in the issuance of PDD-35?
Mr. Panetta. No, I did not.
Vice Chairman Bond. Were you aware of its existence when
you were chief of staff?
Mr. Panetta. I don't recollect that, Senator.
Vice Chairman Bond. And you don't recall whether you were
briefed on that----
Mr. Panetta. No.
Vice Chairman Bond [continuing]. PDD-35. One of the primary
criticisms of the pre-9/11 world is that terrorism was treated
primarily as a law enforcement matter, where much of the focus
was on arresting and prosecuting terrorists. Do you now believe
that terrorism is a law enforcement matter?
Mr. Panetta. I believe it's a national security matter. And
I think that those walls have come down, and they should come
down, in terms of dealing with this threat.
Vice Chairman Bond. All right. The recent Executive Order
ensuring lawful interrogations currently allows no flexibility
for interrogating terrorists using techniques outside the Army
Field Manual. Have you been briefed by General Hayden on his
view that interrogation techniques listed in the Army Field
Manual or in other media are not and will not be effective in
obtaining critical information from well-informed, hardened and
bright HVTs who have access to a description of these
techniques?
Mr. Panetta. I have not. Again, there is a review process
that's built into that Executive Order that I am going to be a
part of that will look at those kinds of enhanced techniques to
determine how effective they were or weren't and whether any
appropriate revisions need to be made as a result of that.
Vice Chairman Bond. I would hope you would. And I would ask
you, do you believe the President has the authority to expand
upon and supplement this order for the use of lawful
techniques, lawful techniques, similar to but different from
the EITs that are authorized in the Army Field Manual?
Mr. Panetta. As I pointed out yesterday, Article II
provides a great deal of power to the President of the United
States. But I believe that whatever power he can exert under
Article II still is limited by the laws passed by the Congress.
Vice Chairman Bond. And by treaties and the Constitution.
Mr. Panetta. And by treaties and by other----
Vice Chairman Bond. And I think we're all in agreement with
that. But I would ask you to pay very careful attention to that
and report back on your findings.
Mr. Panetta. Right.
Vice Chairman Bond. And I will submit several other
questions based on general operations. And I would ask,
finally, do you think Congress should legislate in the area of
interrogation techniques, or is this something that must be
handled by the executive with full briefing, using the Article
II authority, carrying out the full briefing required by the
Intelligence Committee?
Mr. Panetta. I would hope--the preferred way to do that is
to be able to have the Executive branch implement the
approaches, but with full consultation with the members of this
Committee so that Congress is fully aware of what approaches
are being used and should be used.
Vice Chairman Bond. We would expect a full briefing. And we
appreciate very much your answers.
Madam Chair, I think I'll just give him a few more
questions----
Chairman Feinstein. How about in writing?
Vice Chairman Bond [continuing]. For the record. I will do
it.
And when you give us the notifications that we asked about,
this business of calling up a member of the staff, one of the
staff directors, and saying, ``Here's some information,'' and
when they asked for it writing, said, ``Oh, we can't do that,''
that day has come to a close.
Mr. Panetta. It has.
Vice Chairman Bond. Well, I thank you, Madam Chairman. Most
of all, I thank Mr. Panetta for taking on a very difficult job.
As you have seen, we follow the work of the community very
closely. We want to work with you, because your success and the
success of the great men and women you will be leading is
absolutely critical to our national security. So I thank you,
Mr. Panetta, for being willing to get back into the ring. You
deserve a lot of credit.
Chairman Feinstein. I also would like to thank you and look
forward to your service. We will keep the record open.
Hopefully the questions will be in by 5:00 tonight, and
hopefully you will be able to answer them over the weekend. It
is my intention--I believe we're having three meetings next
week--to schedule a markup at one of them.
So at this time the hearing will be adjourned.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
