FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 20, 2009
__________
Serial No. 111-30
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
JOHN CONYERS, Jr., Michigan, Chairman
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California LAMAR SMITH, Texas
RICK BOUCHER, Virginia F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, Jr.,
JERROLD NADLER, New York Wisconsin
ROBERT C. ``BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina
MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ZOE LOFGREN, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia
SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California
MAXINE WATERS, California DARRELL E. ISSA, California
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida STEVE KING, Iowa
STEVE COHEN, Tennessee TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas
Georgia JIM JORDAN, Ohio
PEDRO PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico TED POE, Texas
MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah
LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois TOM ROONEY, Florida
BRAD SHERMAN, California GREGG HARPER, Mississippi
TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin
CHARLES A. GONZALEZ, Texas
ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida
DANIEL MAFFEI, New York
Perry Apelbaum, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Sean McLaughlin, Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel
C O N T E N T S
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MAY 20, 2009
Page
OPENING STATEMENTS
The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress
from the State of Michigan, and Chairman, Committee on the
Judiciary...................................................... 1
The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress from the
State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary. 2
WITNESSES
The Honorable Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation
Oral Testimony................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
APPENDIX
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a
Representative in Congress from the State of New York, and
Member, Committee on the Judiciary............................. 65
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Maxine Waters, a
Representative in Congress from the State of California, and
Member, Committee on the Judiciary............................. 66
Post-Hearing Questions submitted to the Honorable Robert S.
Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation........ 67
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 20, 2009
House of Representatives,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:22 a.m., in
room 2141, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable John
Conyers, Jr. (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Conyers, Nadler, Scott, Watt,
Lofgren, Jackson Lee, Waters, Delahunt, Wexler, Cohen, Johnson,
Quigley, Sherman, Gonzalez, Schiff, Wasserman Schultz, Maffei,
Smith, Sensenbrenner, Coble, Gallegly, Lungren, Issa, King,
Franks, Gohmert, Jordan, Poe, Rooney, and Harper.
Staff present: Robert Reed, Majority Oversight Counsel;
Crystal Jezierski, Minority Oversight Counsel; and Renata
Strause, Majority Staff Assistant.
Mr. Conyers. Good morning. The Committee will come to
order.
And now we would like to turn to the business of the day.
This is the regular oversight hearing on the Federal Bureau
of Investigation.
We welcome FBI Director Rob Mueller to today's hearing. The
FBI is the anchor of the Nation's Federal law enforcement.
The bureau has responsibilities, as we recall, to include
the ability to combat crime, conduct surveillance, initiate
investigations, and to effectively perform its responsibility
requires an internal strength inside its own operations.
And I would like to just point out that the recent
inspector general's report regarding the FBI disciplinary
system raised questions about the process within the bureau.
We are hoping that FBI personnel who engaged in the
improper use of exigent letters, once the IG's upcoming report
is released, when we find out what actually happened, we will
expect a proper follow-through.
We want to ensure that the FBI has the resources to combat
the problems that have arisen out of the global financial
crisis that started in the United States with the subprime
mortgage meltdown and we want to make sure that FBI has the
resources to investigate questionable activity.
We know that there was mismanagement, more than likely,
fraud, white-collar crimes, perhaps even RICO issues, that have
contributed to this very serious economic problem now facing
the country.
I will put the rest of my statement in the record, and turn
to Lamar Smith, the Ranking Member of the Committee, from
Texas.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the
mission of the bureau changed dramatically from that of a
traditional law enforcement agency to an agency tasked with
investigating terrorism and national security threats.
The bureau has undertaken significant efforts to conform to
its new mission, to revise its investigative techniques,
retrain its agents, and more effectively analyze and respond to
intelligence information.
America is safer today because the men and women of the
bureau and other agencies work tirelessly to protect us.
At the end of this year, the remaining temporary provisions
of the USA PATRIOT Act are set to expire. These provisions,
which include roving wiretap and FISA business records
authority, are essential to the bureau's ability to prevent
acts of terrorism and respond to other threats to our national
security.
To ensure that there is no lapse in these vital
authorities, I have introduced legislation to extend the
expiring provisions for 10 years.
The threat to America from terrorists, spies and enemy
nations will not sunset at the end of this year and neither
should America's antiterrorism laws.
Despite the bureau's efforts to keep America safe from
terrorists, I am concerned that the new Administration's
decision to close Guantanamo Bay may result in some of the most
dangerous terrorists being transferred to the U.S. or released
into America's communities.
To me, bringing terrorists to the U.S. undermines the
bureau's efforts to prevent another terrorist attack. No good
purpose is served by allowing known terrorists, who trained at
terrorist training camps, to come to the U.S. to live among us.
Guantanamo Bay was never meant to be another Ellis Island.
Terrorists were detained there for a reason--to keep American's
safe.
I understand that the bureau is part of the Gitmo detainee
review process established by President Obama. I hope that the
bureau will express its concerns to the Administration about
the threat these terrorists pose to Americans here at home.
While the bureau pursues its national security efforts, I
know it will continue its law enforcement mission, including
the investigation of widespread fraud associated with America's
financial crisis.
Many factors contributed to this collapse, including
predatory lending by corrupt lenders, mortgage fraud, and even
foreclosure fraud.
Another important focus of the bureau is preventing crimes
against children, particularly Internet-based crimes involving
child pornography or child exploitation.
Often, the only mechanism for identifying an operator or
user of a child pornography Web site is their Internet photo-
call address.
Currently, a law enforcement officer can request subscriber
information from an Internet service provider. However, ISPs
regularly purge these records, making it difficult, if not
impossible for law enforcement officials to apprehend the
distributors and consumers of child pornography on the
Internet.
I have sponsored bipartisan legislation, the Internet
Safety Act, to require ISPs to retain these records for up to 2
years.
I am interested in knowing what are Director Mueller's
thoughts on the need for record retention to investigate child
pornography and other Internet-based crimes, and I will be
asking a question about that in a minute.
Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank Director Mueller for joining
us today and I look forward to hearing from him.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you.
All other Members' statements will be included in the
record at this point.
We welcome, again, Robert Mueller, III, director of the FBI
since September 4, 2001, from Princeton, Virginia Law School,
the Marines, where he received combat medals, assistant United
States attorney in San Francisco, in Boston and Washington, DC.
He served with distinction in two law firms and called back
from San Francisco to Washington in early 2001 to become acting
deputy general, until he served--and is the director.
We welcome you again to our humble Committee room. Your
statement is in the record, and we urge you to make your
comments as you would like us to hear them.
Welcome, again. Good morning.
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT S. MUELLER, III, DIRECTOR,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Mr. Mueller. Thank you, Chairman Conyers, Ranking Member
Smith, and other Members of the Committee.
As, Chairman Conyers, you pointed out, and Congressman
Smith, we in the FBI have undergone unprecedented
transformation in recent years, from developing the
intelligence capabilities necessary to address emerging
terrorist and criminal threats to creating the administrative
and technological structure necessary to meet our mission as a
national security service.
Today, the FBI is a stronger organization, combining better
intelligence capabilities with a longstanding commitment to
protect the American people from criminal threats. And we are
also ever mindful that our mission is not just to safeguard
American lives, but, also, to safeguard American liberties.
Certainly, the threats currently present in the national
security arena continue to be a grave concern. Terrorism
remains our top priority and, as was illustrated by the Mumbai
attacks, we cannot become complacent.
Al Qaida, lesser known groups and homegrown terrorists will
continue to pose a threat to the United States.
And we in the FBI must also continue to guard our country's
most sensitive secrets from hostile intelligence services and
remember that our Nation's cyber infrastructure is vulnerable
to compromise or disruption, be it from a terrorist, a spy or
an international criminal enterprise.
But these three are by no means our priorities. While
Americans justifiably worry about terrorism, it is crime in
their communities that often most directly impacts their daily
lives.
Public corruption continues to be a top criminal priority.
The FBI has 2,500 pending public corruption investigations; in
the last 2 years alone, has convicted more than 1,600 Federal,
state and local officials. And we remain committed to ensuring
that those given the public trust do not abuse it.
As was pointed out, economic crime is, of course, a
critical concern now more than ever. For example, the FBI's
mortgage fraud caseload has nearly tripled in the past 3 years
from over 800 to over 2,400 active investigations.
The FBI currently has more than 580 pending corporate fraud
investigations, including cases directly related to the current
financial crisis.
In response, we have been shifting personnel within the
organization, to the extent possible. We have been using new
analytical techniques to better identify trends and violators,
and we have been building upon existing partnerships to further
leverage expertise and resources.
For example, we created the national mortgage fraud team at
FBI headquarters to prioritize pending investigations, provide
additional tools to identify the most egregious violators, and
provide strategic information to evaluate where additional
manpower is needed.
We also have established 18 mortgage fraud task forces and
50 working groups with other government agencies across the
country so that we may more effectively focus on these problem
areas.
While the FBI is surging resources to mortgage fraud,
public corruption investigations, our expectation is that
economic crimes will continue to skyrocket.
The unprecedented level of financial resources committed by
the Federal Government to combat the economic downturn will
lead to an inevitable increase in economic crime and public
corruption cases.
Historically, the bureau has handled emerging criminal
threats by transferring personnel within its criminal branch to
meet the new threat. Since September 11, we have lost some of
this elasticity.
In response to the September 11 attacks, the FBI
permanently moved approximately 2,000 of its criminal agents to
our national security branch. This transfer has substantially
improved our counterterrorism program and we have no intention
from retreating from preventing another terrorist attack on
American soil as our number one priority.
But the logical consequence of cannibalizing our criminal
resources to augment our national security efforts is that we
have reduced the ability to surge resources within our criminal
branch.
Although we have begun an effort to rebuild our criminal
resources back to our pre-9/11 levels, we still have a
substantial way to go.
As always, the FBI will set priorities to attack the most
severe threats, but a note of realism is in order in light of
the scale of the FBI's existing mission after September 11 and
the degree of strain on our current resources.
Violent crime, let me discuss this for a moment, because
it, quite obviously, is a very serious concern. And although
data indicates violent crime continues to decline across the
country, in general, the citizens of many communities,
especially small to midsized cities, continue to be plagued by
gang violence and gun crime.
Since 2001, our gang cases have doubled and the spread of
international gangs, such as MS-13, has increased. The FBI
continues to combat this threat through more than 200 safe
streets, gang violent crime and major theft task forces across
the country.
These task forces enable us to work effectively with state,
local, tribal and international partners to provide an
immediate response to surges in violent crime.
And so, too, must we continue our work with state and local
counterparts to combat crimes against children, the most
vulnerable members of our communities.
While the FBI is committed to combating child sexual
exploitation, child pornography via the Internet, trafficking
and child prostitution, or abuse on Federal lands or Indian
country, more must be done.
I thank the Committee for its support of increased
resources to the bureau in this area and would be happy to
continue working with you to ensure our Nation's children are
protected.
We are also deeply concerned about the high levels of
violence along the southwest border. Gang activity, drug cartel
competition for supremacy, murders and kidnappings plague the
border in both the United States and Mexico.
The impact of these crimes can even extend well beyond the
border into America's communities. And we will continue our
strong alliance with our Mexican and domestic law enforcement
partners to address border-related crime, especially as it
relates to public corruption, gangs, and intelligence analysis.
Finally, we will continue our efforts to combat health care
fraud, mindful of estimates that more than $60 billion of our
Nation's health care spending each year is lost to fraud.
In 2008, FBI investigations led to nearly 700 convictions
of health care-related crime and we will continue partnerships
with the national health care organizations and other Federal
agencies to address these cases as we are able.
I also want to spend just a moment to update you on key
changes we have made within the FBI, both in our structure and
in the way we do business to more effectively meet the
challenges presented since September 11.
We know that the FBI's best and strongest asset is our
people. And so we have paid attention to recruiting, training,
and maintaining a workforce with the skills necessary to meet
the challenges of today's mission.
Our hiring goals include agents, intelligence analysts, IT
specialists, linguists, and professional staff. And this year,
we have received more than 450,000 applications and have
already extended 5,500 job offers.
Finally, a few words regarding improvements in the FBI's
technology. Sentinel, our Web-based case management system, is
on time and on target. The bureau currently has more than
30,000 workstations in the FBI unclassified network, providing
desktop Internet connectivity to employees throughout the
enterprise.
BlackBerries with internet capability have been issued to
24,000 of our employees, and we are strengthening other
information technology programs to help us operate more
efficiently.
In closing, I would like to thank this Committee for your
support to the men and the women of the FBI, and I look forward
to working with the Committee on these and other challenges
facing our country.
Mr. Chairman, Representative Smith, Members of the
Committee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and
look forward to answering your questions.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mueller follows:]
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Robert S. Mueller, III
__________
Mr. Conyers. Thanks for your opening statement.
Could I ask Lamar Smith to begin the questioning today?
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Director Mueller, thank you for being here today.
My first question is this. In general, what concerns do you
have about releasing individuals suspected of terrorism into
our communities? What dangers could they pose?
Mr. Mueller. Well, I am quite aware of the discussions that
are ongoing in the Department of Justice and elsewhere in the
Administration as to what should be done with the detainees in
Guantanamo.
I can speak generally, without getting into those
discussions, that the concerns we have about individuals who
may support terrorism being in the United States run from
concerns about providing financing to terrorists, radicalizing
others with regard to violent extremism, the potential for
individuals undertaking attacks in the United States.
All of those are concerns relevant to an individual who
comes into the United States, from whatever source, who may
present a challenge.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Recently, you have said that you support reauthorization of
the three expiring provisions of the PATRIOT Act.
Do you foresee any need to make any changes in those three
expiring provisions?
Mr. Mueller. No. I previously, when questioned, testified
that the three provisions, the first one, the business records
provision, has been exceptionally useful for us over the period
of time that it has been on the record books and we have used
it over 230 times.
The second provision that is sunsetting relates to roving
wiretaps. We have used that over 140 times. It has been
exceptionally useful and cut down on not only paper, but also
enabled us to better facilitate our investigations.
And, lastly, the Lone Wolf provision, while we have not
used it with regard to an indictment, it continues to be
available for that individual whom we lack evidence to put with
a particular terrorist group, but does present a threat as an
international terrorist.
Each of those three provisions are important to us. And
while I don't believe the Department of Justice has yet weighed
in with its letter, this is what I have testified to in the
past and is my current opinion.
Mr. Smith. And you don't foresee the need to make any
changes in any of those provisions.
Mr. Mueller. Not at this juncture.
Mr. Smith. Okay.
Mr. Mueller. No, sir.
Mr. Smith. Do you see the need to make any changes in the
standards for issuing national security letters?
Mr. Mueller. No, I do not. I know, in the past, I have had
discussion with Congressman Nadler in terms of the standard for
the issuance of national security letters and as I have said
before and believe to this day, that national security letters
enable us to obtain information on the fact of a call as
opposed to the content of a call is absolutely essential in
order to building the probable cause we need for a warrant from
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and we would be
badly hampered if we did not have that tool available to us
with the current standard.
Mr. Smith. Thank you for that answer.
The last question is this, and this goes to--and you
covered it a little bit in your opening statement--the need to
better prosecute and reduce the prevalence of Internet child
pornography.
I have introduced a bill, bipartisan bill, that requires
the Internet service providers to retain their records for 2
years to allow the law enforcement authorities to be able to go
after the individuals who buy their trade.
Would you support that 2-year retention of those records by
the ISPs?
Mr. Mueller. Well, I would be guided by, being in the
Department of Justice, by the--guided by the position taken by
the Attorney General and the Department of Justice.
On the other hand, I can say that in any investigation,
particularly when it comes to child pornography or even
terrorism, where you may identify an individual who is
utilizing the Internet either for child pornography or either
recruiting or operating a terrorist network recruiting or
operating over the Internet, it is not just that which you pick
up on the first day of the investigation that is essential not
only to the investigation, but successful prosecution, but
those records, historical records that may be available that
enable you to both further the investigation and undertake the
prosecution.
Mr. Smith. So longer record retention would be helpful.
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Mr. Smith. Isn't the international standard 2 years for
record retention or don't many countries use that 2-year
period?
Mr. Mueller. I haven't looked at it in a while, but I
believe, the last time I looked at it, it was up to 2 years. I
think the European Union has adopted a standard of up to 2
years.
Mr. Smith. Two years, okay. Thank you, Director Mueller.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Conyers. The Chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee,
Jerry Nadler.
Mr. Nadler. Thank you, Mr. Director.
I heard your answer to Mr. Smith's question a moment ago
about the Guantanamo detainees being released to the United
States, but you were referring to terrorists released to be
free in the United States, obviously, from the context of your
question.
My question is: assuming that people at Guantanamo are
released into super-maximum security prisons in the United
States, is there any problem holding them there?
Mr. Mueller. Well, I hesitate to get into the specifics. It
depends where the person is held, what kind of security
procedures there are.
Mr. Nadler. I didn't ask that. I said do we have the
capacity to hold dangerous people in our maximum security
prisons.
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Mr. Nadler. Does their presence in our maximum security
prisons present any danger to the United States?
Mr. Mueller. Again, it depends on the circumstance. If it
is a national security, if it is Florence or something, I think
it would be very difficult for the person to get out and very
difficult for the person to undertake any activity.
However, I will caveat by saying that in gang activity
around the country, using it as an analogy, there are
individuals in our prisons today, as I think you and others are
familiar, who operate their gangs from inside the walls of
prison.
So while there may not be the opportunity to escape, there
may still be the risk, as we have seen----
Mr. Nadler. We have a very----
Mr. Mueller [continuing]. Operating.
Mr. Nadler. We have a number of Al Qaida prisoners
convicted and things like Ramzi Yousef and the sheikh, what is
his name, from the 1990's, and planned to blow up the World
Trade Center, planned to blow up the Holland Tunnel and so
forth.
We have those people in our prisons today, do we not?
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Mr. Nadler. Have they presented any particular danger to
us?
Mr. Mueller. If you are talking about physical danger in
terms of being able to escape and undertake an attack, no.
Mr. Nadler. Thank you.
Let me turn to the subject of national security letters.
Two years ago, the IG for the Department of Justice issued her
first report on the FBI's use of NSLs from 2003 to 2005. The IG
made 11 recommendations for improvements.
In the second report, last year, the IG found that a number
of actions have not yet been taken to implement their
recommendations.
What is the current status of the FBI's implementation of
the recommendations from the IG's March 2007 report? Have they
all been fully implemented?
Mr. Mueller. I would have to check on each one of those. I
know we pursued every one of them. There may be one or two
which we have a disagreement with, but I would have to get you
the report card on each of those recommendations.
Certainly, as soon as we have received those reports, we
have started implementing those recommendations and, in many
cases, to the extent that we have information about a procedure
that needs to be upgraded or changed, we would make the changes
in anticipation of the report and the recommendations.
Mr. Nadler. Thank you.
Now, as you know, there have been recent reports that--
well, actually, these were responses to questions posed to the
FBI by the--questions posed to the FBI General Counsel Caproni
in response to her March 2007 appearance before this Committee.
And in her answer, provided in January, she said, ``The
FBI''--the questions were with respect to information collected
by NSLs, but not relevant or being no longer relevant, whether
those would be destroyed.
And she writes as follows, ``The FBI has legitimate
investigative reasons for retaining information properly
collected during the course of an authorized investigation,
even if the data pertains to individuals who are ultimately
determined not relevant to that investigation.''
The answer concludes, ``The FBI does not support a policy
that requires the destruction of data merely because, upon
initial analysis, the person to whom it relates appears
irrelevant to national security concerns.''
Is the FBI saying by this answer that all NSL-collected
information is kept indefinitely, even when the subject is not
relevant to an FBI law enforcement purpose?
Mr. Mueller. I think you have to put it in the context of a
records retention policy for all investigations, whether it be
a grand jury subpoena, whether it be records retained as a
result of an NSL, and the records retention policy gives us
guidelines in terms of how long we maintain those records, even
though records may be obtained in the course of an
investigation which proved to be irrelevant to the solution.
It can occur in a national security investigation, it could
occur in a kidnapping investigation, a public corruption
investigation in which we obtain, either by grand jury or
administrative subpoena or testimony, records that only are
determined to be irrelevant, but we keep that according to our
records retention policy.
Mr. Nadler. You keep that indefinitely?
Mr. Mueller. You keep that, sir, and I think it is 20-25
years.
Mr. Nadler. So you keep for 20 or 25 years----
Mr. Mueller. Twenty years, yes.
Mr. Nadler. You keep for 20 years information about
innocent people, private information that you have collected in
the course of an investigation in which it turns out they had
nothing to do with.
Mr. Mueller. We may well undertake an--an allegation may
come in as to the involvement of a person in a mortgage fraud
scheme. We go and investigate, find that that person is
innocent, the allegation is false, we keep those records, yes.
We have a records retention policy, which we have had for
the 100 years of our existence, that, in some sense, requires
us to keep the records.
I can tell you, from the perspective of the Freedom of
Information Act, in terms of what we have to go through, there
are substantial records that have been maintained according to
our records retention policy, even though it may relate to
persons who ultimately are not indicted, are not convicted of a
crime for which they are being investigated.
Mr. Nadler. Thank you.
Mr. Conyers. We now turn to our first ex-attorney general
from the State of California, Dan Lungren.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mueller, a number of years ago, I was in Los Angeles
for a hearing that was, at that time, chaired by Jane Harman.
It was a meeting of the Homeland Security Committee and it was
specifically to investigate the issue of prison radicalization,
at least with respect to California prisons, and we had
testimony from people who had had experience in New York and I
believe we may have had testimony from Federal officials.
This was a concern with respect to hate groups, with
respect to terrorist groups and so forth.
Do you share that concern?
Mr. Mueller. Yes. If I can broaden it somewhat, we
recognize that there is a potential for radicalization in a
number of ways, whether it be for gang activity, for terrorist
groups, for other extremists.
With regard specifically to terrorists, in the wake of
September 11, we have now, I think, it is over 100 joint
terrorism task forces around the country.
Generally, we will have persons on the task force from
certainly the Federal prison entities, but also may well have
persons representing the institutions in a particular state, to
keep our fingers on the potential for radicalization and
prisons.
Also, having been in San Francisco, I am familiar with
Pelican Bay, for instance, and the concerns that one has in
Pelican Bay, not only physically being within Pelican Bay, but
also the operation of those outside of prison.
Mr. Lungren. Well, that is our highest security prison and
even there we have difficulty ensuring that those inside the
prison don't direct actions outside the prison.
Mr. Mueller. But on the Federal side, as well as the state
and local side, there are intelligence efforts to assure that
we pick up on individuals who may present threats.
Mr. Lungren. Does the name Lynne Stewart mean anything to
you?
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Mr. Lungren. And Lynne Stewart is?
Mr. Mueller. I believe she was involved with a radical
group--I am having trouble----
Mr. Lungren. Well, she was a defense attorney representing
the blind sheikh.
Mr. Mueller. Ah, yes, that is----
Mr. Lungren. And I believe she has been convicted of
Federal offenses relating to being a conveyor of information
from the blind sheikh inside the prison setting to those
outside.
Does that refresh your recollection?
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Mr. Lungren. You don't have to state an opinion on that,
but to me, that gives reality to the concerns some have about
increasing the number of terrorists that we have on our shores,
whether they are in prison or out of prison.
I want to give you a hypothetical. If, hypothetically, some
who are currently in Guantanamo were to come here to an
incarceration facility and then, in accordance with a Federal
judge's decision that they be released, they would have to be
released in this country, because the country of origin would
not take them, under those circumstances, would the FBI view
those individuals as suspected terrorists or people that you
would have to keep an eye on while they are in the United
States?
Mr. Mueller. I am not certain it is a hypothetical, but in
the sense that----
Mr. Lungren. Well, I am, because I am not going to
presuppose that a Federal judge would do something like that,
because we know they have great respect for the executive
branch. Under those circumstances.
Mr. Mueller. I think, generally, to the extent that persons
who have some background in either supporting, facilitating or
training with terrorists, it would present a concern to which
we would utilize--maximize our efforts to minimize and mitigate
that concern, whether it be by surveillances or wires or other
efforts to assure that we have minimized that concern.
Mr. Lungren. I appreciate that, because I think the
American people ought to understand that some people held at
Guantanamo Bay are most likely not subject to criminal
prosecution. We are not holding them for that purpose.
We are holding them because they are combatants in the
traditional definition of combatants and under the rules of
war, you have the right to hold them until the cessation of
hostilities.
However, we have had some Federal judges who take a
different position. Therefore, you could have the possibility
of someone coming into the United States by access to the
Federal courts, making the argument that they are not subject
to criminal prosecution, a Federal judge saying you could not
hold them indefinitely, and, therefore, allowing them out, and
a foreign country not receiving them.
And we have limitations as to how long we can keep someone
like that incarcerated before they must go out in the public
domain.
And so while I gave you a hypothetical, I think people
ought to realize that is a legitimate concern that we in
Congress ought to deal with.
And I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank you, Mr. Director, for your time and your
service.
Mr. Conyers. Thank you.
The Chair of the Crime Subcommittee, Bobby Scott of
Virginia.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Mr. Director, for being with us.
You mentioned financial crimes, health care, specifically.
There are other, of course, financial crimes, ID theft, the
securities fraud. We have had a lot of Ponzi schemes revealed,
organized retail theft, which are essentially financial crimes,
and, of course, the mortgage fraud.
We have testimony that there are only about 250 FBI agents
with accounting backgrounds assigned to the mortgage fraud
case, whereas approximately 1,000 were assigned to the savings
and loan debacle a few years ago, which was only one-third the
size.
We just recently passed legislation that would give you
resources to hire additional agents to address financial fraud.
Can you provide us with your capacity needs in terms of
accountants so that we can address these financial crimes?
ID theft is going on now, to a large extent, because nobody
thinks they are going to get caught. If you do the legwork, you
can investigate and prosecute those cases, but, basically, they
are just--the credit card company wipes it off, there is nobody
complaining, and the people continue their fraudulent
activities.
Can you give us an idea of your capacity needs to address
all of these areas of financial misdeeds?
Mr. Mueller. Yes, I would be happy to do that. I will say
that we have--you are accurate in terms of those on mortgage
fraud, we have 260 agents. We have another 100-plus agents on
corporate fraud and another 150 on securities fraud.
But we did have, at the height of the savings and loan
crisis, almost 1,000 agents addressing this.
We would be happy to provide that material. There was, in
the stimulus package that came from the Senate, a bill which
would have accorded us an additional 165 special agents to
address this, but did not last and is not part of the
legislation.
But we will be happy to provide you with a recitation of
the needs that we feel we--or the numbers we would need in
order to fully address the issue.
Mr. Scott. We have legislation on the way to the President
that would authorize additional funding. So hopefully we can
address that.
You are familiar with the Federal Prison Industries.
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Mr. Scott. Do you view that as a positive program that
helps reduce recidivism?
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you.
Backlog and DNA kit. As you know, particularly in New York
City, there are thousands of untested DNA samples, which means
that cases are not being prosecuted and people aren't being
caught.
Can you give us an idea of what we need to provide you in
terms of resources to eliminate the DNA backlog?
Mr. Mueller. Let me address it to you and, also,
Congressman Schiff, I know, has asked questions in the same
area.
If I recall correctly, last week, the question put by
Congressman Schiff to the Attorney General related to the fact
that we got additional moneys, $30 million.
We had made an assertion that with that $30 million, we
would have reduced our backlog from the convicted offender
program by, I think, January 1 or December of this year.
We got the $30 million, but we did not get our budget to
March. And so the personnel that are reflected in that $30
million, along with the technical equipment we need, we now
have and my expectation in reducing the backlog on the
convicted--putting samples into the convicted offender program
will be June 1 of next year.
It has been 6 months because of basically the budget delay.
But we will have, I believe, by this time next year, by then,
have additional persons, but, also, technological improvements,
reduce that backlog.
We do have a caseload backlog. Most of that caseload
backlog relates to missing persons, and I would be happy to get
you additional numbers on that backlog.
When it comes to New York or Los Angeles or other cities
where there is a backlog of rape kits, it generally is where
the police departments utilize either private laboratories,
state laboratories or municipal laboratories, and those--unless
they are a Federal case, we generally do not handle them.
Mr. Scott. I wanted to get in one more question before time
goes out, and that is on the issue of torture.
Can you tell us what participation there was by FBI agents
in enhanced interrogation techniques that everybody in the
world, other than a few people in the last Administration,
viewed as torture, what participation there was by FBI agents?
Mr. Mueller. We followed our protocol, which does not
include coercion of any kind.
Mr. Scott. And what does that mean in terms of your
participation in what was going on?
Mr. Mueller. We did not participate in the--except for
maybe an isolated incident, relatively minor, one or two, we
did not participate in the use of those techniques, enhanced
interrogation techniques.
Mr. Scott. Is that because you concluded that they were
illegal?
Mr. Mueller. I would not say that it was because it was
illegal. I would say because we felt it was necessary to follow
our own protocols. We believe that our protocols work and are
effective and given the work that we do, our protocols were
appropriate to the work we were asked to do.
Mr. Conyers. The Chair recognizes Howard Coble of North
Carolina, a senior Member of Judiciary.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I had to
go to a piracy hearing. I am sorry I am late getting here.
Mr. Director, good to have you with us.
Mr. Director, last week, the Attorney General testified
before this Committee and I posed a question, as did a couple
of my colleagues, regarding the organized retail crime problem.
According to the North Carolina Retail Merchants
Association, the FBI, in conjunction with several other law
enforcement agencies, successfully apprehended and charged
individuals involved in three alleged fencing operations in
western North Carolina.
I am told that future operations may be severely affected
because of resources or lack of resources.
Will the FBI continue to pursue these cases and are you
able to comment on whether the U.S. attorney intends to
prosecute the individuals in these three cases?
Mr. Mueller. I am not in a position to say what the U.S.
attorney would do.
In terms of resources, we are--as I have indicated
previously, we have to prioritize and the retail fraud is down
on our list of priorities.
We try to leverage our capabilities and work closely with
state and local law enforcement. And so quite probably, if
there is a need in a particular jurisdiction to address a
particularized threat, then we would participate and help our
state and local law enforcement authorities to address it.
I am not familiar with those three cases, be happy to get
back to you in terms of what happened in those cases and
whether or not it is likely that we will be participating in
additional such cases.
Mr. Coble. If you could, I would appreciate that, because
as you know, it is a problem that just plagues the retail
community very severely.
Mr. Director, I am told that the bureau currently operates
18 regional task forces and 47 working groups to investigate
mortgage fraud.
Can you update the Judiciary Committee on all the bureau's
efforts to combat mortgage fraud specifically, but other types
of fraud, as well?
Mr. Mueller. Well, as I believe I indicated either in my
written remarks or my opening remarks or in response to other
questions, we have over 2,400 mortgage fraud cases, we have 260
agents that are addressing those; over 580 corporate fraud
cases, of which over 40 of those relate to the subprime
mortgage industry, with 113 agents; and, over 1,300 cases of
securities fraud, with 158 agents.
We have a total of almost 530 agents working in this field.
Many of them are accountants. They are backed up by accounting
technicians, intelligence analysts and professional staff.
As you pointed out, we have a number of task forces. We
have 18 and then another 47 working groups. We have requested
additional resources in the budget submissions and our hope is
to improve on that.
I will say, over a period of time, we have been very
successful in our investigations and prosecutions. What we have
to do is prioritize and expedite those investigations and
prosecutions to have the maximum deterrent effect.
We prioritize them. We want to make certain that the most
culpable are prosecuted swiftly and quickly and are serving
time in jail.
We have reached out to the--with the anticipation of
additional frauds as a result of the TARP program and other
programs, we have reached out to the inspector generals to put
into place recordkeeping systems that will enable us to better
investigate.
I met with the new director of the securities commission,
Mary Schapiro, this last week to coordinate better our works
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, and my expectation
is, working together, that we will continue our successful
investigations and prosecutions. It is a question of resources.
Mr. Coble. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Director, I assume that mortgage fraud is generally
regarded as a Federal offense, is it not?
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Mr. Coble. I thank you, sir. I thank you for your service
and thank you for being with us.
Mr. Mueller. I will say, though, that part of our approach
in addressing this is it is not only a Federal offense, but
often is a state and local offense, and we want to make certain
that if, for some reason, we do not take on the Federal side,
that state and local law enforcement work closely with us and
take it on the state and local side.
Mr. Coble. And I repeat, thank you for your service, for
being here.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Conyers. Mel Watt is a senior Member of the Committee,
Chairman of the Finance Subcommittee, and a past Chairman of
the Congressional Black Caucus.
Mr. Watt. Thank you, Mr. Mueller. Thank you for being here.
I want to try to get to three different areas, if I can.
First of all, we have had, as a very practical question
that I will set up like this, we have had a major spike in my
district offices of complaints about mail fraud and scams on
seniors that essentially involve calls from out-of-state
sources saying that they have won some lottery or ``pay me X
number of dollars to go and find this big bucket of money for
you.''
And local law enforcement can't handle that, nor can state
law enforcement handle it, because the calls are coming from
out of state.
I was on the phone recently with some gentleman in San
Francisco professing to be a customs officer with the Federal
Reserve is what he represented to me.
As a member of the Financial Services Committee, I
immediately contacted the Federal Reserve to find out whether
this person existed. He didn't exist. He was representing, in
fact, to my mother that she had won some big pot of money.
My practical question is under those circumstances, what is
the best way for me to get you all engaged when we have a
specific complaint in our district offices?
Mr. Mueller. It is your local FBI office. Just pass it on
to the local FBI office. There is a complaints agent who is
there during the day, will take the complaint and follow up.
What you find is--what we find in these scams, and there
are a number of them out there and it is not just a customs
officer from the Federal Reserve, they use the FBI and they use
me, amongst others.
Mr. Watt. Right.
Mr. Mueller. And what we try to do is accumulate them,
identify the persons responsible, and then pursue them
federally, if it all possible.
Mr. Watt. Well, I have a name and a phone number for you,
and I will get it to my local.
But I am telling you that because of the allocation of
resources that you just discussed with Representative Scott and
Representative Coble, the reallocation of resources to
terrorism, antiterrorism, which is important, a lot of these
things just are not getting priority and they are on the
increase.
So I hope that you all are going to aggressively seek more
agents to do domestic kinds of situations.
I am not suggesting that we can fall back on our efforts to
protect our citizens from the homeland security and terrorism
concerns that are going on around the world or in the United
States, for that matter, but these things are real to people
every day, and, particularly, seniors are vulnerable to those
kinds entreats.
And if you don't pursue them, they just proliferate and get
bigger and bigger, and some big case needs to put some of these
people in jail so that there will be a deterrent effect.
Let me go on to the second issue, which is--I wasn't going
to ask about this, but Jerry Nadler asked you about record
retention policies and it sounded to me like you are following
a 100-year-old record retention policy that may or may not be
justified.
How aggressively have you, as the FBI director, looked at
the rationale of this 100-year-old policy that you are
following and evaluated whether it makes sense to keep records
on people for 25 years who are not engaged in anything?
That increases the demands that you have to meet under the
Freedom of Information Act. If you don't have the files or you
have gotten rid of them, no records there to be providing.
How aggressively have you looked at this policy and
reevaluated it?
Mr. Mueller. I have not looked at it hard. I am not sure it
is 100 years old. It is certainly many years old.
Mr. Watt. Well, that is what you testified. That was your
testimony. It wasn't my testimony.
Mr. Mueller. I am walking back from maybe 100 years. It has
been there, I believe, on the books for a long time and it may
well be, and I would have to look at it, a combination of the
rules for records retention that have been set by the
government and archives, as well as our own internal rules.
But I will go back and look at it, and we will get back to
you on that particular issue.
Mr. Watt. Thank you.
I wanted to ask about some discrimination issues, but my
time has expired.
I want you all to take care of my mother, first of all. So
I will talk to your local people about that.
Mr. Mueller. Well, you can give us the number, if it is
your mother.
Mr. Watt. That is my number one constituent.
Mr. Mueller. Go talk to the local person.
Mr. Watt. I don't get but one of those. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Conyers. The Chair recognizes Darrell Issa, who is, in
addition to Judiciary Committee, the number two man on the
Government Reform Committee, as well as an active participant
on the Intelligence Committee.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You can revise and
extend, if you would like.
I think I will quite while I am ahead there.
Director Mueller, I have got a couple of questions, some of
which go to your predecessor, some are yours.
But the FBI is present at Gitmo, correct?
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Mr. Issa. And has been the entire time.
Mr. Mueller. We have had agents rotating through, yes, for
almost the entire time.
Mr. Issa. And the FBI has presence virtually every place we
have an embassy in the world, correct?
Mr. Mueller. We have over 60 legal attache offices around
the world.
Mr. Issa. Okay. Well, maybe not virtually, but all the
places I hate to go to.
The Administration made a determination to do this enhanced
interrogation technique or now is commonly one of--one of the
techniques being waterboarding.
When were you first made aware of it and when was the FBI
first made aware of it overall?
Mr. Mueller. I believe I first became aware of the use of
enhanced interrogation techniques sometime in the summer of
2002 with an agent who was involved in an interrogation
overseas who indicated that additional techniques beyond what
we traditionally do would be used.
We determined that it was not appropriate for him to
continue in the conduct of that particular interrogation.
Mr. Issa. Was that agent, in 2002 or at the time that you
became aware of it in 2002, was he present for that
interrogation that included waterboarding or other enhanced
interrogation?
Mr. Mueller. And I do not believe that I became aware of
waterboarding, as such, until several years later, and I don't
believe--well, I don't--I can't say really what that agent
knew, but certainly those were not the enhanced techniques that
we, at that time, anticipated were going to be used and
triggered the withdrawal of him from that particular
interrogation.
Mr. Issa. Okay. Earlier, you mentioned that once or twice.
Was that one of the once or twice that your organization was
involved in techniques that would qualify as enhanced
interrogation?
Mr. Mueller. No.
Mr. Issa. What were the once or twice?
Mr. Mueller. Can you excuse me just 1 second?
Mr. Issa. Certainly.
Mr. Mueller. The inspector general did a report and what I
am trying to do is recall from the inspector general's report a
couple of instances where he said that, I think, a prisoner's
hands were handcuffed behind him and he was given water in a
dribble.
It was treatment that is not a treatment that we ordinarily
would use, but it is certainly not in the category of the
enhanced interrogation techniques that we have been talking
about.
I just wanted to be clear that the IG, in his report, had
pointed out two instances where we could have done a better
job.
Mr. Issa. Okay. Has the FBI ever given people large amounts
of water and then told them to wait to go to the bathroom, that
it wasn't available right now?
Mr. Mueller. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Issa. Left lights on deliberately to deny people sleep
or rest?
Mr. Mueller. I can't say for sure, but I have no knowledge
of such treatment. That would go against our protocol.
Mr. Issa. Okay. So each and every one of those techniques
that has now become public for enhanced interrogation would be
inconsistent with what the FBI would ever allow to be done.
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Mr. Issa. The next one is a little more serious. The
speaker of the House has alleged that the CIA outright lied to
her.
Is lying to Congress a crime?
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Mr. Issa. Are you investigating that allegation by the
speaker of the House?
Mr. Mueller. No.
Mr. Issa. Why not?
Mr. Mueller. The process that is followed generally is that
we have a referral--not we--the Justice Department obtains a
referral from Congress.
The Justice Department makes a determination as to whether
or not the referral warrants further investigation, and then we
are called upon to conduct that investigation.
Mr. Issa. I am a Member of Congress. If CIA is lying to any
of us, and I have been briefed many times by them on the
Intelligence Committee, it puts me in a position of not being
able to do my job properly.
Would you say I have standing to ask you to investigate
whether the CIA has lied to any or all of us?
Mr. Mueller. I am not familiar with the intricacies of the
referral process that has been established in such
circumstances.
I know that generally it is triggered by a referral from
Congress to the Justice Department and then we do the--may well
be--others can be asked, but generally we are asked to do the
investigation.
Mr. Issa. Well, then, with my remaining time, I would
assert that I believe I should have standing, that I am in
doubt as to whether or not, unresolved, I can believe in the
briefings that I am receiving from the IT community, and would
ask you to investigate it and ask you to respond as to whether
you believe that my standing and my asking you to do it
represents a proper referral or one that at least you can
follow up on.
Mr. Mueller. We will take what you have indicated, sir, and
pass it to the Department of Justice and then follow the
directives of the department.
Mr. Issa. I will look forward to your response. Thank you.
Mr. Mueller. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Issa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Conyers. The Chair of the Committee on Immigration,
from California, Zoe Lofgren.
Ms. Lofgren. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is good to see you, Director Mueller, and thank you for
your testimony today.
It is good news that you have continued your march forward
with technology, but the march forward with technology also
raises questions. And I wanted to briefly touch on the
investigative data warehouse data mining issue that both the IG
and the Electronic Frontier Foundation have recently discussed.
It is my understanding that there are just shy of a billion
individually identifiable pieces of information in the data
warehouse, which, by way of comparison, I think the Library of
Congress has about 138 million pieces in its collection.
So it is a massive amount of data. And there may have been
litigation on this. You can tell me if that is correct. But I
believe that the FBI would be required to publish a systems of
record notice and a privacy impact assessment related to this
data warehouse, and that that has not been done.
Can you tell me anything about the privacy notices and
whether those are planned or if they haven't been planned, why
not?
Mr. Mueller. We try to be very careful, in terms of
whenever we put a new system online or contemplate it, assuring
that we go through all the steps with notification.
If you are talking about the investigative data warehouse,
it is----
Ms. Lofgren. I am.
Mr. Mueller [continuing]. It is a compendium of our case
files, which has grown up since September 11 in a different
format, a different--different servers, we have different
software, and different type of relational databases. That
enables us to search it better than the old VCS.
I will have to check in terms of privacy notices on the
data, investigative data warehouse. It has been online for a
number of years, but it is our case file system.
Ms. Lofgren. Well, doesn't it have 58 different sources of
data, including----
Mr. Mueller. It may well.
Ms. Lofgren [continuing]. US-VISIT and a variety----
Mr. Mueller. Well, I am not certain which dataset you are
talking about. The investigative data warehouse, I am thinking
one thing. It may be that you are thinking about the records
that are obtained by the foreign terrorist tracking task force,
which looks at individuals coming into the country and utilizes
other private companies that already have data to locate
persons within the United States, which is different than the
investigative data warehouse, which is where we house most of
our data.
I would have to get back to you in response to those
specific questions, to make sure I know which database you are
talking about.
Ms. Lofgren. Yes, it is the investigative data warehouse.
And it is my understanding that it includes 58 sources,
including SEVIS and US-VISIT and the no fly list, and a whole
variety of other items.
And if you want to get back to me, that is absolutely fair.
But could I look to a particular time by which you will get
back?
Mr. Mueller. Two weeks.
Ms. Lofgren. I would appreciate that very much.
Let me move on to another subject, which is the whole--and
you mentioned it briefly in your opening statement--the
situation of concern at the border.
Two years ago, I and a bipartisan group of Members went to
Mexico City and we met with the Mexican attorney general and
some of their law enforcement people, and they expressed
extreme concern over what the United States was not doing in
terms of the flow of guns from the United States to Mexico, as
well as a less than aggressive effort, they felt, to track
money laundering in the United States.
I think that there has been recent attention, we are
ramping up our efforts. But can you tell me--I don't want you
to jeopardize an investigation--but how many ongoing
investigations do we have now into both the gun running issue,
as well as the drug money laundering issue?
Mr. Mueller. Well, the guns flowing from North America to
South America----
Ms. Lofgren. Correct.
Mr. Mueller [continuing]. From the United States into
Mexico is generally in the purview of ATF. And as you say, they
have ramped up. We are going to get additional ATF agents to do
that.
Ms. Lofgren. I thought there were joint task forces
underway.
Mr. Mueller. We do and we participate in task forces along
the border and whenever there are guns involved, we bring in
ATF, because they not only have the expertise, but the
databases that we all use.
We also, though, from our perspective, have increased
personnel addressed to cross-border kidnappings, individuals in
the United States who travel to Mexico, they may have family,
they may have businesses down there, are kidnapped and the
victims' families are in the United States. We have ramped it
up in places like San Diego and El Paso.
Ms. Lofgren. And Phoenix, I assume.
Mr. Mueller. Pardon?
Ms. Lofgren. Phoenix, as well?
Mr. Mueller. And Phoenix, yes, but the phenomenon there is
a little bit different than in San Diego and El Paso. Phoenix
is--they have a very high rate of home invasions and the like
and, yes, we work on task forces there.
The other step that we have taken is to combine our
intelligence capabilities along the border along with EPIC. So
that our field offices, our legal attache office in Mexico has
access to the information relating to border crime immediately
as opposed to coming back through headquarters and is linked up
with EPIC, the El Paso Intelligence Center, to give us a much
more effective view of what is happening along the border.
Ms. Lofgren. My time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Director.
Mr. Conyers. The gentleman from Iowa, Steve King, Ranking
Member on Immigration.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate being
recognized.
And, Director, I appreciate your testimony and I think it
reflects the long service to this country and the significant
depth of knowledge that has been built upon that experience.
And I would--based upon that, I would ask you if you are
familiar with 18 USC 47, 1001, which reads, in part, ``Whoever,
in any matter, knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or
covers up, by any trick, scheme or device, a material fact,
whoever makes any material false, fictitious or fraudulent
statement or representation shall be imprisoned not more than 8
years.'' That is in part.
Do you at least have some basis of knowledge that would
reflect that section of the----
Mr. Mueller. I am familiar with 1001, yes.
Mr. King. And I reiterate this, because would you--would
you view that to be at last a statute that you would review if
you were to respond affirmatively to Mr. Issa's request?
Mr. Mueller. I believe the prosecutor is looking at this.
Department of Justice attorneys would look at 1001, absolutely,
as a possible statute to be applied.
Mr. King. And with your long and deep experience, and we
have, I think, about 15 members of the intelligence community,
their sense of integrity in their office, when their integrity
is challenged, can you tell us what happens to the morale if
that should continue, if their integrity is challenged?
Mr. Mueller. Well, I understand the import of the question
and, generally, I will speak very generally, of course, in any
institution in which there has been a challenge to the
effectiveness, efficiency, integrity of the department, it does
affect morale.
Mr. King. And if someone challenges the integrity of your
agency or any other, is it likely that there would be people
within your agency that would volunteer to do a briefing to
that person?
Mr. Mueller. Well, all I know, part of my responsibility is
to represent my agency fully and appropriately, I admit
mistakes when the mistakes happen and move forward, and to also
speak out when you think that your detractors are off base.
Mr. King. And should there be a reluctance to provide that
briefing to whichever individuals would have security
clearance, could that potentially impact negatively on our
national security due to that lack of information and perhaps
lack of appropriations and perhaps policy changes that might
flow from that relationship that could be interrupted or
distrusted because of the allegations?
Mr. Mueller. I am sorry, sir. I am not familiar with the
predicate of the question in terms of briefing.
Mr. King. I am seeking to ask the question hypothetically,
and so it maybe sounds a little vague and I will try to keep it
hypothetical, Director, for the benefit of everyone in this
room.
But when that relationship of trust is severed, then the
working relationship would, I think, certainly be damaged. And
are you concerned that it could affect our national security?
Mr. Mueller. I can't answer that hypothetical, sir.
Mr. King. I understand, Director, and I think that you do
understand my question.
Let me move--let me, first, join Mr. Issa in his request,
if two are better than one. I would ask you to look into the
basis that you have responded to Mr. Issa and I won't ask you
to respond to that question again to me.
But I would like to take this down to Gitmo and ask you
instead, of the techniques that have been used to interrogate
the Gitmo detainees, are you aware that there were any
techniques used there that were more severe than we have used
in training of our own special forces?
Mr. Mueller. I don't think I have sufficient knowledge to
answer the question, sir.
Mr. King. Well, do you have any indication otherwise?
Mr. Mueller. I don't have sufficient knowledge to answer
the question.
Mr. King. Do you have any indication that the PATRIOT Act
has violated anyone's civil rights--been utilized to violate
someone's civil rights?
Mr. Mueller. I don't believe so, but I must also say that
without--and put in context--that when it comes to NSLs, in
particular, NSLs, they were issued improperly.
Now, I don't want to parse words in terms of--but I don't
want you to think that that is not a concern of ours, was not a
concern of ours, and I do believe it was remedied, but that was
a concern, because it does affect civil liberties, it does
affect the privacy interests of individuals.
Mr. King. Was there anything done at Gitmo that would be
criminal if it was done in the United States?
Mr. Mueller. I can't answer that question, sir.
Mr. King. I thank you, Director.
And I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. Lofgren. [Presiding.] The gentleman yields back.
I would recognize now the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
Delahunt.
Mr. Delahunt. Yes, thank you.
Welcome, Mr. Director.
Recently, there has been considerable discussion about
Guantanamo and a group of detainees that are Uighurs, Chinese
Muslims. And there has been the use of the term ``terrorist''
as it relates to these Uighurs.
And I have a concern that that is an unfair label and some
have indicated that that label came about as a result of
communist Chinese intelligence, which, I would submit, is
extremely suspect given the history of suppression by the
Chinese Communist government as it relates to that particular
minority.
There was a report issued in May of 2008 by the Department
of Justice inspector general, and I am going to read an excerpt
to you and ask you to respond.
``Another FBI agent,'' and, again, I am reading from the IG
report, ``Another FBI agent stated in his survey response that
several Uighur detainees were subjected to sleep deprivation or
disruption while being interrogated at Camp X-Ray by Chinese
officials prior to April 2002.
Chinese officials visited Guantanamo and were granted
access to these detainees for interrogation purposes. The agent
stated that he understood that the treatment of the Uighur
detainees was either carried out by Chinese interrogators or
was carried out by U.S. military personnel at the behest of the
Chinese interrogators.''
Are you familiar with the report of Mr. Fine and are you
familiar with this report emanating from an FBI agent?
Mr. Mueller. Now that you read the excerpt, Congressman, I
think it was from the report that the inspector general did on
the FBI's interrogation or interviewing techniques.
And I would check one thing, if I might.
Mr. Delahunt. Please.
Mr. Mueller. It is a report, I believe, that was done on
our interviewing/interrogation techniques. I am not familiar
with the incident other than what is in the IG report.
Mr. Delahunt. The IG report is, obviously, based on a
report by an FBI special agent.
Mr. Mueller. Apparently.
Mr. Delahunt. And you would not contradict that report.
Mr. Mueller. I have no knowledge of the incident, so I
cannot contradict the report.
Mr. Delahunt. Okay, but it is in the report and it is a
statement by one of your agents that Chinese Communist
intelligence agents were allowed to interview Guantanamo
detainees. That is their statement according to the IG report,
as you understand it.
Mr. Mueller. In the IG report, the investigators for the IG
must have talked to an agent and that is what they wrote down
with regard to what the agent told them.
Mr. Delahunt. Mr. Director, myself and several other
Members of Congress would prefer to have some briefing done by
the FBI regarding this particular issue, and I know I would
like to have an opportunity to interview the FBI agent that
actually wrote this report and would make that request to you,
so that we can actually make a determination as to the status
of the Uighur, because there was another report that was done
by another FBI agent, and I want to read it into the record, if
the Chair will indulge me for another minute.
I am reading, again, reading from that report, ``The
Uighurs are moderate Muslims who occupy east Turkistan, which
was taken over by the Chinese. The Uighurs would often land in
Afghanistan in order to gather personnel opposing Chinese
suppression.
They were often inspired by Radio Free Asia. The Uighurs
considered themselves to be fighting for democracy and they
idolized the United States. Although the Uighurs are Muslim,
their agenda did not appear to include Islamic radicalism.
They claim to have no political connection to Islamic
terrorists or the Taliban. However, their camp in Afghanistan
was bombed and they fled to Pakistan. The Uighurs were captured
by the Pakistanis, with half being transferred to the U.S. and
half being remanded directly to the Chinese.
It was alleged that the Uighurs who were transferred
directly to the Chinese were immediately executed. The Uighur
detainees at Guantanamo were convinced that they would be
immediately executed if they were returned to China.''
And I would also note that it is a matter of public
knowledge that they were captured not by American soldiers. In
fact, they were apprehended by Pakistanis, who, in turn,
received a $5,000 bounty for each of these Uighurs that were
turned over to the Americans and, presumably, to the Red
Chinese, who allegedly executed them upon their release.
I suggest this is a very, very important issue, because
questions are being raised, statements are being made, and I
dare say we don't really know the truth yet.
And I think before we find ourselves in an embarrassing
situation, and I am, again, referring to Members of Congress,
that we ought to have a thorough review, and I think the FBI,
your credibility, and, again, I think the excellent record of
the FBI in terms of Guantanamo ought to lead this investigation
and provide information.
Ms. Lofgren. The gentleman's time has expired.
I would turn now to Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Madam Chair.
And thank you, Director Mueller.
I would say to you, sir, that the way you have comported
yourself with the hearing this morning affirms the conclusion
that many of us have held in the past that you have personified
public service and your patriotism and your professionalism,
and I appreciate you being here.
Mr. Mueller. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Franks. Attorney General Holder was here before our
Committee last week and, in my judgment, he seemed to have a
difficult time articulating what a terrorist really is, and
that concerns me, since he is the lead law enforcement official
in the country, charged with protecting us from terrorists.
And I was struck to find out that someone in the Obama
administration, however, seems to have no difficulty in
articulating what a terrorist is, and that is the director of
Homeland Security, secretary of homeland security, Janet
Napolitano, the former governor of my state.
Ms. Napolitano was the subject of controversy after the
Department of Homeland Security threat assessment report,
entitled ``Right Wing Extremism,'' was made public in April of
2009.
Now, the report indicated several factors, including the
election of the first mixed President in the person of Barack
Obama, perceived further gun control measures, illegal
immigration, the economic downturn beginning in 2008,
disgruntled military veterans' possible vulnerability to
recruitment efforts by extremist groups, as risk factors for
right-wing extremism.
Then it kind of went on to explain and define right-wing
extremism in roughly general terms, like opposing restriction
on firearms or opposing lax immigration, opposing the policies
of the Obama administration the expansion of social programs,
opposing continuation of free trade agreements, paranoia of
foreign regimes, fear of communist regimes, fear of one-will
governments, and bemoaning the decline of U.S. stature in the
world.
Now, Mr. Director, not to be tongue-in-cheek here too much,
but that includes about 70 percent of my district and I am
concerned, since this report was directed to law enforcement
agencies, which I presume means the FBI, as well, I am
concerned how the FBI might interpret this report.
I mean, should my district be concerned at this point,
being the subjects of concern on the part of the FBI as
potential right-wing extremists?
Mr. Mueller. I don't believe so at all. We open
investigations where we have allegations that a person may be
involved in violent extremist or illegal activity.
That covers a number of various groups of individuals, but
the predicate is illegal activity and, generally, it is violent
extremism, and I don't believe the intent of the report was to
paint with such a broad brush.
But I do not believe that the question is should persons be
concerned about our undertaking investigations against
individuals who are exercising, rightfully so, their first
amendment privilege or rights under the Constitution. I do not
believe so.
We take that exceptionally seriously. When it looks like
one of our investigative actions will implicate the first
amendment, we have a series of reviews that have to be done to
assure that the actions taken are appropriate to the
circumstances, and I believe that was the intent of the piece
from the Department of Homeland Security.
Certainly, it is our intent in each of our investigations
to assure that we don't trespass on the first amendment right
without the appropriate, adequate predication.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, sir.
Let me shift gears then. We had testimony before this
Committee regarding our terrorist surveillance program that
people within the United States boundaries don't really need to
be fearful of surveillance.
One of the parts of the testimony was that even if Osama
Bin Laden was in a downtown hotel making calls, that we
couldn't--and we knew it was him, but we couldn't monitor his
calls without a warrant.
And I think because he is here in--if he was here in the
United States, I think that makes sense, to me. I think that
comforts me a great deal.
I guess my question to you, sir, is under the new
Administration, has the practice or the policy related to
terrorist surveillance changed to any appreciable degree and
are you concerned that citizens either in the previous
Administration or this Administration need to be concerned
about their private phones being tapped here in this country?
Mr. Mueller. No. As all are well aware, the FISA statute
was amended a year or so ago and it answered a number of the
issues we have, particularly with regard to the interception of
conversations by individuals overseas talking to other persons
overseas who are not American citizens. And it addressed, I
believe, a difficult issue and resolved that.
I have seen no change in terms of the approach to the FISA
statute, any difference in this Administration than I saw in
the past Administration.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you for your service, sir. Thank
you very much.
Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Lofgren. The gentleman yields back.
I would recognize Mr. Cohen at this time.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Director, you have done, I think a marvelous job and you
have a great reputation on the Hill, but your activities are so
abundant, your areas of investigation, from counterterrorism,
which you kept concentrating on, and counterintelligence to the
traditional FBI days of criminal activities.
Do you think that the FBI has grown so much that maybe it
needs to have two different bureaus, one for homeland security
and counterterrorism and counterintelligence and all these
areas, our borders, and another for the criminal section?
Mr. Mueller. For approximately 2 to 3 years now, we have
had essentially a criminal branch and a national security
branch. The national security branch is counterterrorism and
counterintelligence, and the directorate of intelligence.
In the criminal branch, we have the criminal division, we
have the cyber division. And I am probably missing one or two,
but there has been that development of two branches, we call
branches, not the bureau, as you say, for the focus on national
security, on the one side, and the criminal programs on the
other side.
Mr. Cohen. You don't believe that it would be beneficial
possibly to have two different distinct offices. You think that
them coming under one umbrella is the most efficient way to
operate.
Mr. Mueller. Absolutely, and, increasingly, in this
globalized world, terrorism cuts across--money laundering cuts
across cyber issues. Terrorists are funded through narcotics
trafficking in Colombia and Afghanistan.
Mr. Cohen. Let me ask you about narcotics trafficking, and
I think I asked you about this last year.
The war on drugs has gone on since, I think, President
Nixon coined the term maybe and maybe since Harry Anslinger,
and we haven't become more successful. I mean, if it goes back
to Anslinger, it is like 80 years and we are zero and 79 and
winning.
Do you feel we are any closer to winning the war on drugs,
based on all of the problems with Mexico and the cartels and
the fights over our border and the drugs being imported from
Mexico, than we were last year?
Mr. Mueller. Well, whether you call it a war on drugs or
some other term, I mean, I firmly believe that we need to do
what we should to stem drug trafficking into the United States
and drug usage in the United States, and I do believe there
have been some successes, particularly when it comes to the use
of drugs by children in high school or college and the like.
There are others, ONDCP and others who are much more
familiar with that than I am.
Mr. Cohen. When you say some successes, do you have any
statistics to show? Statistics actually say that more people
are using, say, marijuana than have, because the public has a
feeling about use of certain drugs that maybe the FBI doesn't.
Is there a better way that some people suggest of looking
into a system of legalization that might be effective in
stemming the tide of drugs from Mexico and in the border wars
and the immigration problems from Mexico? Have you considered
this as a possibility?
Mr. Mueller. I think anybody who looks at this problem
considers it and, ultimately, when you look at it, rejects it.
I tend to think that the use of particular drugs goes in
waves. You will have marijuana for a period of time, then you
will have heroin, then you will have cocaine, then you have
crack cocaine, then you will have methamphetamine, and then you
will have Oxycontin, and it goes in waves.
And too many people----
Mr. Cohen. Let me ask you about----
Mr. Mueller. I am sorry. There are too many individuals,
both parents and others, who have lost their lives to drugs, to
give a ready answer that it should be legalized.
Mr. Cohen. I agree with you, sir, and there are lots of
parents who have lost their lives to crack cocaine,
methamphetamine, heroin, and they have somewhat gone in waves.
Name me a couple of parents who have lost their lives to
marijuana.
Mr. Mueller. Can't.
Mr. Cohen. Exactly, you can't, because that hasn't
happened. There hasn't been a wave, because that has been a
constant thing in America since Harry Anslinger, because
African-Americans used it and saw it as something that was
crippling and gave it to the Latin Americans and put an ethnic
tone to it.
When have we--don't we--is there sometime we are going to
see that we ought to prioritize meth, crack, cocaine and
heroin, and deal with the drugs that the American culture is
really being affected by and lives are being lost?
Mr. Mueller. The only thing I would say is that you talk to
parents who have lost their children to drugs----
Mr. Cohen. Right.
Mr. Mueller [continuing]. And they will inevitably say that
they started off with marijuana.
Mr. Cohen. The probably started off with milk and then went
to beer, and then they went to bourbon, and then they might
have gone to marijuana.
The gateway theory doesn't work. It is a reality.
Obviously, we are not going to agree there.
Let me ask you about this. In Memphis, we have got a real
serious problem with the rape crisis program. We used to have a
national honored, awarded rape crisis program.
It has come to light that as much as $500,000 which has
been given to our local city of Memphis government for rape
crisis reimbursements for kits and for examinations is not
being reported in their budget.
And I know the Federal Government pays for the treatment of
the victims and the kits are provided through our state
government, I think, through the Fed.
What area in the FBI would look into the misuse of Federal
funds, if there is misuse, in local governments and using
moneys for rape victims and look into the use of our Federal
funds and appropriating those to see if they have been used for
the proper purposes?
Mr. Mueller. I think, initially, it would be up to the
state and local law enforcement, whether it be the police
departments or district attorneys to look at it.
But we also might be involved in terms of public
corruption, fraud and the like, depending on the seriousness of
the issue.
Mr. Cohen. Madam Chair, if I could just close.
Would you maybe look into it with your local office in
Memphis to see if there has been an abuse of Federal funds? And
if there is, that is a serious wrong in these days when we use
money for----
Ms. Lofgren. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Lofgren. Mr. Gohmert, the gentleman from Texas, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And, Director, it is good to see you again.
Mr. Mueller. And you, sir.
Mr. Gohmert. I am going to change gears from the milk to
beer line of questioning.
In the Ted Stevens case, is there any information that any
FBI agents were aware of the withholding of exculpatory
evidence that the judge got upset about?
Mr. Mueller. I think it has been made public that there was
one agent who brought to the attention of others actions which
he was concerned of. But because the case is in litigation--not
in litigation, but under investigation, let me just put it that
way, in terms of what occurred in the course of that case,
under investigation by, I believe, OPR and Department of
Justice, I am really constrained from saying much more about
it.
Mr. Gohmert. Was it FBI agents who recorded conversations
between Rick Renzi and his attorney that were apparently pretty
clear they were attorney-client privileged conversations?
Mr. Mueller. I think I would have to disagree with you in
terms of the context of conversations, and, again, that case
is----
Mr. Gohmert. But they were between an attorney and a
client, correct?
Mr. Mueller. I am not certain what conversations you are
talking about and because it is in litigation, I really am
precluded from talking about.
Mr. Gohmert. With regard to the widely reported wiretap of
conversations between Jane Harman of this congressional body
and two Israelis, was that based--were those wiretaps based on
a warrant or were they based on warrantless wiretaps out of the
PATRIOT Act?
Mr. Mueller. I cannot speak to a particular case, but I can
tell you that we do not intercept the content of conversations
without a warrant from a Federal judge, whether it be from
the----
Mr. Gohmert. But we covered this now when we talked about
the PATRIOT Act. And some of us were very defensive of the
provision that would allow the wiretapping of suspected foreign
terrorists who were calling from a foreign country, and that
there would be times that, because they are being wiretapped in
a foreign country, when they may call in to the United States,
and the wiretap would pick up a conversation with someone in
the United States.
And testimony we have heard before indicated, though, that
once it was realized it was someone in the United States and it
was warrantless, based on the PATRIOT Act, then that would be
minimized and no further wiretaps regarding that individual
would be had within the United States without first getting a
warrant.
That is why I am asking the question. Could that have
been--were the Israelis actually outside the country, which
would authorize, under the PATRIOT Act, those warrantless
wiretaps?
Mr. Mueller. I can't get into the details of any national
security investigations we----
Mr. Gohmert. Well, somebody has gotten into them, because
it is out in the public that Jane Harman was wiretapped. And
that is why I am trying to figure out is this consistent with
what we were told here in this Committee would be done with the
PATRIOT Act or were these wiretaps within the country?
Somebody is getting that information out. Otherwise, I
wouldn't know about it, other than reading the paper.
Mr. Mueller. All I can tell you is that interceptions by
the FBI in the United States of individuals in the United
States are conducted either under Title 3, in the case of a
criminal matter, or under----
Mr. Gohmert. But you don't know what happened in the case
of Jane Harman, correct?
Mr. Mueller. Pardon?
Mr. Gohmert. You don't know what happened in the case of
Jane Harman.
Mr. Mueller. I am not going to say that. I am going to tell
you I cannot talk to you about ongoing or past national
security investigations.
Mr. Gohmert. So you think Jane Harman is a suspect?
Mr. Mueller. No, I am not saying that. I am telling you
that I cannot discuss the details of the case.
Mr. Gohmert. Well, since I was one of those who----
Mr. Mueller. And let me just say that that does not assume
there is a case. I am saying that I cannot discuss the matter
which you are seeking to get answers.
Mr. Gohmert. I was one of those who defended the provision
that would allow warrantless wiretaps of foreign agents in
foreign countries and who may inadvertently pick something up
coming in this country. I want to make sure that that is not
being violated.
And I know you are concerned about past improprieties not
being repeated and this was certainly before your watch, but in
the vein of trying to prevent future illegal disclosures of FBI
file contents, do you know how it was that 1,000 FBI files,
approximately, came into the possession of the Clinton White
House and what steps may have been done to prevent that
illegality from happening again?
I know Chuck Colson went to prison for having one in the
White House. Do you know how that occurred?
Mr. Mueller. I am not familiar with that.
Mr. Gohmert. Does it concern you that 1,000 FBI files could
make their way into the White House to be reviewed there?
Mr. Mueller. Well, I can tell you that during the time I
have been at the bureau, we, both between--well, the bureau,
but, also, with the Department of Justice, assure that we
follow the appropriate procedures for keeping the privacy of
our files.
Mr. Gohmert. Madam Chair, could I ask for a written
response for one quick question?
Ms. Lofgren. Certainly.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you.
Director, there is information about 15 percent of
terrorism cases, this is an IG report, the FBI failed to
nominate subjects to a watch list. In 8 percent of closed
terrorism cases, they failed to remove subjects from the watch
list, and that the FBI removed a subject untimely from the
watch list, 72 percent of the time it was untimely.
Could you give us a report on what is being done to try to
make that more effective?
As somebody who has prior service members who still find
themselves on the watch list inappropriately----
Ms. Lofgren. I think that is a request for a written
answer.
Mr. Gohmert. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Mueller. Let me just respond. There were 16
recommendations made in that IG report and we are pursuing each
one of those recommendations, and many of them have already
been put into place.
Mr. Gohmert. Okay. If we could find that out, that would be
great.
Mr. Mueller. I would be happy to get back to you on that.
Mr. Gohmert. Thank you, Director.
Ms. Lofgren. The gentleman yields back.
The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Quigley, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Quigley. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I guess good afternoon now, Director.
Sir, if you could respond to the reports that have been
listed here, as well, about members of the FBI and ATF not
always getting along, I guess is the best way to describe it,
reportedly, at crime scenes where FBI and ATF agents threaten
to arrest each other or a battle over jurisdiction and key
evidence.
Mr. Mueller. I think that was a problem, it was much more
of a problem several years ago. I think we have done much to
resolve those issues.
There is overlapping jurisdiction in some areas, but I
think we have done much to remove those barriers between the
two agencies.
When I travel around, one of the first questions I ask in
an office is, ``How are you getting along with DEA? How are you
getting along with ATF?'' The fact of the matter is 99 percent
of the times in the field, the answer is, ``We get along
fine.''
There are some cases where we will have somebody who has a
long memory about some slight from ATF or somebody in ATF has a
long memory about some slight from the FBI, but I do think it
is more personality driven in isolated instances as opposed to
what I think, some years ago, was an institutional problem.
That does not mean that there are not areas that we still
are in the process of resolving in terms of explosives
databases and the like, but I think we have made substantial
headway.
I will tell you that John Pistole, our deputy, spends a
great deal of time with his counterparts at ATF to minimize
such problems.
Mr. Quigley. And I appreciate your candor. When it happens
on a scene, such as I described, it is one thing. That lack of
cooperation, if it dealt with national security type issues,
would be all together another and far more important and
dramatic, obviously.
Earlier, you spoke about the cartels and the drug wars as
relates to the Mexican border, and one of my colleagues
discussed the issues of representatives from Mexico concerned
how we were tracking weapons or how weapons are--most of the
weapons that are being used in Mexico come from the United
States.
I guess I juxtaposition this with if these are assault
weapons and we are concerned about tracking them, wouldn't it
just be a whole lot easier if we renewed the ban on assault
weapons as was done previously?
Mr. Mueller. It might have some impact. One of the things
that we talk about the percentage of weapons going to Mexico,
large numbers come from the United States, but, also, the
cartels, the Zetas and others, are not averse to buying
elsewhere.
And so I think you will also find a number of weapons,
particularly military style weapons, that come into Mexico from
countries other than the United States.
That does not mean that we should not be doing better in
terms of stopping the flow from the United States into Mexico,
and several, I guess, discussed legislatively may have some
impact on it.
Mr. Quigley. Well, the manpower required, the difficulties
required with tracking or trying to stop, you are judging how
effective that is versus not selling assault weapons in the
United States.
Mr. Mueller. I can't give you an insight into that. I would
refer to you my friends at ATF who may have better and more
precise knowledge on those particular issues.
Mr. Quigley. Well, I appreciate your candor and your
service. Thank you.
Mr. Mueller. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Quigley. I yield back.
Ms. Lofgren. The gentleman yields back.
I recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Poe, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for your patience.
Thank you for being here.
I want to follow up on the weapons in Mexico. Isn't it true
that there have been at least 100,000 members of the military
that deserted and most of them took their weapons, which many
of them, if not all of them, are made in Belgium? The Mexican
military. Are you familiar with that?
Mr. Mueller. I am familiar with the fact that there have
been--one of the issues that the military in Mexico faces is
desertions. I am not familiar with the numbers.
Mr. Poe. And regardless of where the weapons come from, and
I take issue that most of them come from the United States, I
think the statistics prove they come from all over the world.
Would it seem to you that Mexico has the responsibility to
protect their borders from illegal weapons coming in, just like
we have the responsibility to keep drugs out of our country?
Mr. Mueller. Yes, yes, yes, shares responsibility and both
sides have a shared responsibility in ensuring that contraband
does not flow either way.
Mr. Poe. Going on to another issue. I appreciate the fact
that you know what terrorism is. FBI has a definition of
terrorism, does it not?
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Mr. Poe. And without going into it today, I was somewhat
disturbed that the Attorney General came in here and I asked
him what he thought terrorism was and he could not give me an
answer. So he is supposed to give us a written answer on that.
But at least the FBI knows terrorism when they see it.
Mr. Mueller. There is a statutory definition of terrorism.
Mr. Poe. You all follow it.
You have been to Guantanamo Bay prison.
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Mr. Poe. How many times have you been there?
Mr. Mueller. Once.
Mr. Poe. I have been there two. And the information that
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed provided the United States in now
Justice Department secret memos that have been released to the
whole world regarding a plot to blow up the Brooklyn Bridge, a
plot to crash a plane into the tower in Los Angeles, ratting on
a cell of 17, including Majid Khan, Hambali, Rusman ``Gun Gun''
Gunawan, he is an interesting fellow, and Yazid Suffat, Jose
Padilla, and Iman Farris.
Did all that information turn out to be true, what he told
us?
Mr. Mueller. That is a very broad question, sir, and----
Mr. Poe. I know, because you told us a lot of things.
Mr. Mueller [continuing]. Individuals, I can't--I can't
speak to pieces of information that were provided by those
individuals.
Mr. Poe. My question is did information that KSM gave the
United States, did that information, any of it, turn out to be
true?
Mr. Mueller. Without looking at a particular piece of paper
or whatever, yes, I believe so.
Mr. Poe. Do you know of any place in the United States
where people have offered to house Gitmo detainees in the
United States? Do you know any state, local, Federal Government
that wants those people?
Mr. Mueller. I don't, but I would not necessarily be the
person to know that, other than what is written--what is in the
newspaper.
Mr. Poe. Do you have a solution what to do with them all?
Mr. Mueller. I don't. That is being discussed across the
street and down the avenue.
Mr. Poe. All right.
Mr. Mueller. I think it is a very difficult--I mean, I will
say I think everybody recognizes it is a very difficult issue
and people are honestly wrestling with what the best resolution
is, and it is a very difficult issue.
Mr. Poe. And my last question. You said you went to Gitmo.
When were you there?
Mr. Mueller. Several years ago. I can't recall. I would
have to get back to you on that, if it is important.
Mr. Poe. It is all right. You don't have to get back with
me on it.
Thank you very much. Yield back.
Ms. Lofgren. The gentleman yields back.
We have been called for votes, but what I would like to do,
if we can and if Members will be very concise, we have two more
Members who would like to ask questions. If we can get through
this, we can go vote and you can go off to do your work without
waiting for us.
So Ms. Jackson Lee is actually, since she was here earlier,
is next, and she is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Director, thank you very much. And let
me apologize for being in a markup in another Committee, but we
had a chance to greet each other just a few--just a day or two
ago.
I am very interested in what progress has been made in the
diversity of the workforce of the FBI. I think that is crucial.
I also want to emphasize that I have great respect for your
special agent in charge, agents in charge across America. And I
think it is important for them to be made aware that
collaborating with the community is okay.
We realize that the resources are to be spent on
investigation, but say, for example, there is a child abduction
and the community is in an uproar or a predator on the loose.
And, in fact, a few years ago, I called on the special agent in
charge in Houston to help our police department find a
predator, but calm a community.
Now, the way they handled that was that they were able to
use the FBI's lab. At that time, we were in a flux about DNA.
But there is some skepticism and I would appreciate if some
protocol would be established that it is okay for SACs to come
to a meeting where a community is to explain what the FBI does.
Certainly, that is not their main occupation.
So I would like to just capture that in terms of how SACs
work in the community.
The other aspect is to comment on the work that the FBI is
doing as it relates to civil rights investigations, what level
or what percentage of work involves that, and I would include
hate crimes in that.
Then, lastly, I would be very interested--we have had
challenges on the watch list, which, as you well know, is said
to be held by the FBI. That is a complicated, difficult paper
list, it appears.
I am interested in how you create or do you create
terrorist profiles and what kind of underlying data you use,
but, more importantly, I want to know what progress have we
made with updating that watch list?
And I thank the gentleman very much.
Mr. Mueller. Let me see if I can hit the first one in terms
of diversity. I absolutely agree with you, the importance of
diversity. All of our SACs are evaluated on the contributions
made to diversity in their hiring, promotion, and we have made,
I believe, good progress, but there is more progress to be
made.
I would be happy to get you the----
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think that would help me, if you would.
And I would like to work with you on outreach issues regarding
that, please.
Mr. Mueller. With regard to the civil rights cases, again,
I think that would take some time. We have an initiative to
look at older civil rights cases, and I would like to have you
briefed on where we are in that particular initiative and the
numbers we assign to that.
In terms of having our SACs or the office respond to a
child abduction or another immediate emergency where persons'
lives are at danger, there is not a one that would not do it in
a second. And every SAC is encouraged and evaluated on the
outreach to the community.
I cannot imagine, in Houston, for instance, that you would
not have had the full support at your community meetings or
otherwise from our personnel in Houston.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Now, it will be even better.
Mr. Mueller. It will, but that is wherever we are. We have
got 400 resident agencies, we have got 56 field offices. We
know that responding to a child abduction is important to every
one of us.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. And the terrorists?
Mr. Mueller. The terrorist screening centers, I indicated
before, the IG report that identifies deficiencies made 16
recommendations. Many of those recommendations have already
been pursued and the rest of them are being followed up on.
We would be happy to tell you where we are and the progress
we have made on that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Chair, I am going to yield back, but
I am going to ask the director if we can have a more detailed
discussion.
I sit on the Homeland Security Committee, as well, and deal
with the watch list as relates to airports, and I would like a
very detailed briefing, if necessary, classified, on that issue
dealing with the watch list.
And I thank you. On the other issues, I will take a
briefing on the diversity and, as well, cases involving civil
rights and hate crimes.
Mr. Mueller. A briefing on the terrorist screening center,
I think it would be beneficial to have a joint briefing between
ourselves and DHS.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Very good. I yield back.
Ms. Lofgren. The gentlelady yields back.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Schiff, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Schiff. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thank you, Mr. Director, for the good work you do.
I have three questions which I am going to just get out
very quickly and see if you have time to respond. If not, maybe
we could follow up later.
But one brief commentary on some of my colleagues' points
on the other side of the aisle vis-a-vis Gitmo. And that is, I
assume my colleagues on the other side of the aisle support
efforts the Administration is making to get some of our allies
to agree to take some of these detainees and detain them.
I don't know where my colleagues think they are going to be
detained in these other countries or how we can make the case
that Germany or France or England ought to take detainees and
detain them if we are unwilling to detain any of them in our
maximum security prisons.
That is just an aside.
My three questions are this. First, on the issue of crack
cocaine, I know the Administration supports changing the
enormous disparity between crack and powder cocaine in terms of
sentencing.
Do you, Mr. Director, favor a strict equivalence or are
there some reasons that you feel that crack's nature lends
itself to some continued disparity or do you think the
disparity should be eliminated, both in terms mandatory
minimums and in terms of quantities? That is the first
question.
The second question is on the DNA issue. If I understood
you correctly earlier, you anticipate that there will be no
backlog in the offender DNA as of June of next year.
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Mr. Schiff. What additional resources do you need, if any,
to make sure that there is no backlog in June of next year on
case samples?
And then, finally, if I could, and you may need to respond
to this last question at a later date. When I was with the U.S.
attorneys, I handled the Miller spy case involving an FBI
agent, Richard Miller.
So I am very interested in the counterespionage and
penetration issues. I know the IG did a follow-up report to see
how many of its earlier recommendations in terms of performance
had been implemented, and there were, I think, a few very
pivotal ones that had not yet been implemented in terms of
preventing penetration.
One was to create a unit within the bureau focused on
internal penetration. A second was developing a computer need-
to-know system, but now that we have gone from a virtual case
file system to Sentinel, will the Sentinel have that kind of
safeguard in it and then will that be ready by the end of the
year?
And then, finally, in the Hanson case, he was able to walk
out of the FBI with classified documents without any
difficulty.
Have measures been taken to be able to detect that people
are leaving the premises with classified information?
But if you could address the first two questions and if you
get time on the last, great; if not, I will follow up with you
at a later date.
Ms. Lofgren. There are 2 minutes left.
Mr. Mueller. On crack cocaine, I have not wrestled with
that issue. I would have to defer to Justice on that.
On the second one with regard to the resources necessary to
reduce the backlog or eliminate the backlog on the case work as
opposed to the convicted offender program, I would have to get
back to you on that.
We are making progress each day, particularly with regard
to technological fixes, but I would have to get back to you on
the specific resources.
In terms of the third issue relating to counterespionage,
we did establish a unit that is focused on that, which was a
recommendation of the IG.
The Sentinel program has those precautions in it to assure
that we track and monitor everybody who is using the system and
put out alerts if it is being--if persons are trying to get
into or get access where they are not allowed to go.
And lastly, in terms of detecting persons who are exiting
the building, we have put into place some measures, but it is
very difficult to prevent a person who has a classified paper
document or a thumb drive from exiting a building. It is near
impossible.
So while we have put into place some provisions, I can't
tell you that we would be able to stop a person leaving the
organization with a thumb drive or a classified document.
Mr. Schiff. Mr. Director, thank you. You have managed to do
that in 2 minutes, remarkable.
Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. Lofgren. The gentleman yields back.
We have been joined by Mr. Johnson. We do have 2-1/2
minutes before the vote is called.
So we will ask Mr. Johnson to be as terse as possible, and
we will conclude our hearing.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I feel abused and discriminated against, and we will talk
about this later.
Ms. Lofgren. Well, we will stay for 5 minutes.
Mr. Johnson. All right. I don't think it is going to take
that long.
Director Mueller, thank you for your service to the Nation
and thank you for coming out today.
And I have three questions, all three of them just simply
requiring a yes or no answer, and then I will allow you to
follow up.
The first question is: there is a well established link
between the drug trade and weapons. Isn't that true?
Mr. Mueller. Yes.
Mr. Johnson. And, also, isn't it a fact that most of the
guns that are in the hands of these drug cartels are basically
American-made weaponry?
Mr. Mueller. The figure that is thrown around is 90
percent. I am not certain the basis of that and the accuracy of
it, but that is what I have seen elsewhere.
Mr. Johnson. If you heard--well, I won't even ask that
question.
Mr. Mueller. I have heard, yes. I mean, I will tell you, I
have heard that, also, they have weapons, particularly weapons
they cannot get in the United States, higher power, and
explosives and the like elsewhere from the United States, from
other governments in South and Central America.
Mr. Johnson. Okay. And assault weapons, in particular, are
the weapon of choice around the world for drug cartels, for
street crimes, et cetera, et cetera. Correct?
Mr. Mueller. I would have to say not necessarily. I know
you want a no or a yes, but not necessarily. It depends on
where you are in the United States.
There are certain areas of the United States where assault
weapons have become a weapon of choice, but there are other
areas in the United States, most of the communities in the
United States, where that is not the case.
Certainly, around the world, you could make the case that
assault weapons are the Kalashnikovs or AK-47s or the like are
the weapons of choice.
Mr. Johnson. Yes. Well, let me ask this question, then.
Given those facts that you have just agreed to, with the
exception of the last one, which is qualified, as I would say,
can you tell us the justification for the continued failure to
address the assault weapons ban in terms of the gun shows,
where you can buy anything open and notoriously, without a
background check, just any kind of weapon whatsoever?
Can you respond to that?
Mr. Mueller. I would have to defer to the Department of
Justice on that. That is a policy issue that has--I have been
through two Administrations and there are questions that are
asked in each Administration and each time on this particular
issue, I defer to the Department of Justice.
It is a policy issue that the Attorney General generally
opines on.
Mr. Johnson. Yes, certainly, that would be appropriate.
But I just wanted to know what--and I know that you carry
out policies, but I do want to know. Have you discussed this
issue with the Administration, with the President?
Mr. Mueller. Not with the President nor do I think I have
discussed it with the Attorney General. It has not been a topic
of our discussions to date.
Mr. Johnson. Do you think it should be?
Mr. Mueller. It probably, at some point, will come up. I am
not certain I can opine on whether it should or should not be.
Mr. Johnson. Is there any justification for gun show
loophole remaining like it is, in your mind?
Mr. Mueller. Well, there are a number of explanations and
policy arguments both for and against that.
Mr. Johnson. Can you tell us, briefly, what those are?
Mr. Mueller. It would be hard for me to resurrect them.
Clearly, those who oppose the--clearly, on one side will be
those that believe that the gun shows are a loophole that allow
felons and others to obtain weapons that they ordinarily could
not have access to.
There are others who argue that, for the most part, you
have antique weapons that are appropriately both kept and sold.
Ms. Lofgren. The gentleman's 5 minutes has expired.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Ms. Lofgren. We will adjourn this meeting, with thanks, Mr.
Director, for your testimony and your service.
Without objection, Members will have a minimum of 5
legislative days to submit additional written questions to you,
Mr. Director, which we will forward and ask that you answer
promptly.
Without objection, the record will remain open for 5
legislative days for the submission of other material.
This has been a very useful hearing, I think. We look
forward to the additional material you have agreed to send to
us.
And this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Jerrold Nadler, a Representative in
Congress from the State of New York, and Member, Committee on the
Judiciary
Thank you, Chairman Conyers. And thank you, Director Mueller, for
being here and providing your testimony.
As you may recall, Director Mueller, I am very concerned about
National Security Letters (NSLs) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) handling of its NSL authority. In the past I have
talked about this at hearings with you and other FBI officials. I am
going to keep talking about this issue until the relevant statutes get
fixed--the privacy and constitutional rights of the American people are
at stake.
NSLs allow the FBI to gain almost limitless personal information
about any American from third parties. These requests are done in
secret and without court approval--there is no one to check the FBI.
These requests for records or other information can go to a variety of
third parties, including telephone companies, internet service
providers, insurance companies, travel agencies, banks, car
dealerships, and so on. And, since the PATRIOT Act, the requests have
only to be ``relevant'' to a counter-terrorism or counter-intelligence
investigation.
Not surprisingly, with such a low standard, the number of NSL
requests exploded. It rose from 8,500 in 2000 to an average of about
50,000 per year between 2003 and 2006. It is difficult to say what
benefits this has yielded, because outside of general statements and
idiosyncratic data on their use, I have not seen any hard, empirical
evidence that this explosion in requests has had any measurable impact
on counter-terrorism or counter-intelligence.
What I have seen is that between 2001 and 2008, outside of spikes
in 2002 and 2004, the number of international terrorism prosecutions
stayed relatively stable. And, the share of international terrorism
cases referred by the FBI but rejected for prosecution by the
Department of Justice (DOJ) rose from 33 percent in 2001 to 87 percent
in 2006. More information and investigation is not leading to more
prosecution.
We also have recently seen evidence of numerous mistakes and abuses
by the FBI in using its NSL authority. DOJ Inspector General (IG)
reports in March 2007 and 2008 showed that FBI improperly collected or
retained personal information. Responses to NSLs were also lost,
putting our privacy and security at risk. Another IG report, showing
how the FBI abused its authority by issuing so-called ``exigent
letters,'' will hopefully be released shortly.
Not only do NSLs affect the privacy rights of Americans, but they
affect the First Amendment rights of third parties as well. Those who
are recipients of NSLs are generally prevented from talking about them
by the government. Under the statute as written, recipients have the
burden of bringing court challenges of these orders, and government
assertions that such disclosures would harm national security,
diplomatic relations, certain investigations, and so on are treated as
conclusive. Fortunately, last December, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in Doe v. Mukasey, struck down some of these ``gag
order'' provisions as unconstitutional. It is time for Congress to fix
the statute with respect to gag orders and the entire NSL scheme.
Along with Reps. Delahunt, Flake, and Paul, I have re-introduced
legislation, H.R. 1800, the National Security Letters Reform Act of
2009, to address these issues. Among other improvements it would
restore the pre-PATRIOT Act standard that there must be ``specific and
articulable facts'' that the information requested pertains to a
foreign power or agent thereof, provide NSL recipients a meaningful
right to challenge the letter and the nondisclosure requirement, allow
NSL targets to challenge their issuance, and require procedures so that
information concerning persons no longer of interest is destroyed. I
think this legislation is critical to restoring the balance between
fighting terrorism and protecting our civil liberties and freedoms.
I look forward to talking with you, Director Mueller, about NSLs
and hearing your testimony on what I am sure will be a whole host of
issues. Thanks again for being here.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Maxine Waters, a Representative in
Congress from the State of California, and Member, Committee on the
Judiciary
Mr. Chairman, thank you for arranging today's oversight hearing for
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I'd also like to welcome Director
Mueller back before the Committee today.
I'd like to focus my time and questions today on three areas that I
believe need more attention: crimes related to mortgage and financial
fraud; problems of police misconduct; and the need to address
persistent complaints of discrimination and double standards at the
FBI. In the limited time I have today, let's see what information you
can provide now and the remainder of my questions will be submitted to
you in writing.
Post-Hearing Questions submitted to the Honorable Robert S. Mueller,
III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
*Note: At the time of the printing of this hearing, the Committee
had not received a response to the post-hearing questions submitted to
the this witness.
