

**SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE**



Prehearing Questions

For

Ambassador Philip S. Goldberg

Upon his Nomination to be

Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Intelligence & Research

Department of State

**Additional Prehearing Questions
For
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Assistant Secretary for Intelligence & Research
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General Questions on the Intelligence Community

1. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 states that national intelligence should be “timely, objective, independent of political considerations and based upon all sources available to the intelligence community and other appropriate entities.”

A. How do you intend to ensure that INR produces intelligence analysis that meets these criteria?

INR has a long history of providing the sort of intelligence support the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 describes. If confirmed, I intend to ensure that the Bureau maintains that tradition.

B. How do you define improper pressure on intelligence analysis and what will you do to prevent it?

I define “improper pressure on intelligence analysis” as any effort to alter the outcome of the analytical process for ideological or policy-related reasons. If confirmed, I will maintain in INR an environment that strongly discourages outside efforts to distort analysis, ensures that analysts are prepared to anticipate and resist such efforts, and protects analysts who come under such pressure.

2. Should INR analysts staff Intelligence Community Centers, such as the National Counterterrorism Center or the National Counterproliferation Center?

INR's size makes it difficult to staff positions in IC Centers like NCTC or NCPC on a continuing basis. Nonetheless, if confirmed, I intend to support assignments of INR analysts to such Centers and IC agencies to the greatest extent possible. Such assignments develop analysts and contribute to building a more integrated and collaborative Intelligence Community.

3. Should INR analysts serve as detailees in other analytic agencies within the Intelligence Community?

Yes. Details of up to a year, and perhaps more, to other Intelligence Community (IC) analytic agencies develop and broaden the skills of analysts and build a collaborative spirit within the IC. Typically INR lacks the resources to fill in behind analysts who leave for details to other intelligence agencies. If confirmed, I will look for ways to ease the burden on INR of extended details so that more of the bureau's analysts can benefit from them.

4. If you are confirmed, how will you ensure that analysts from the Bureau of Intelligence and Research actively participate in the process of drafting National Intelligence Council products, including the National Intelligence Estimates?

INR analysts have long played a prominent and key role in both the drafting and coordination of NIC products, including National Intelligence Estimates. If confirmed, I intend to sustain that well-established tradition.

Coordination of Intelligence and Foreign Policy

5. Has the Secretary of State indicated the functions she expects you to perform as the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research? Please elaborate.

It is clear from my contacts with Secretary Clinton that she expects me, if confirmed, to be her Senior Intelligence Advisor, providing advice and counsel on all intelligence-related matters at the State Department. Those matters include ensuring the Department's collection and analytical needs

are met, and injecting the Department's perspective into proposed sensitive intelligence and law enforcement activities.

6. Who are INR's principal customers – Department of State policymakers or other officials in the Executive Branch?

I believe that INR should focus, first, on supplying intelligence and analytical support to diplomats and diplomacy. Thus, INR's principal customers are the Secretary of State and her supporting cast of policymakers at the Department of State and across the world. Her agenda and theirs largely dictate INR's analytical production. That said, a wide array of national security officials use INR analyses, and INR analysts occasionally write directly for the President by drafting articles for the President's Daily Brief. Nonetheless, INR is embedded in the State Department and its primary customers should be the Secretary of State and the foreign policy makers who support her.

7. If you are confirmed as Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, what steps will you take to ensure that INR is both integrated into the Intelligence Community and responsive to the needs of the Department of State?

As a State Department bureau and an element of the IC, INR has "two masters," the Secretary of State and the Director of National Intelligence. If confirmed, I intend to lead INR first and foremost as a State Department element in the Intelligence Community rather than an Intelligence Community entity in the State Department. I think that is how INR can add the most value to the nation and how INR can best fulfill its mission to provide intelligence and analytical support to diplomats and diplomacy. At the same time, if confirmed, I will ensure that INR fulfills all its IC obligations. That is the most certain path to ensuring that vast Intelligence Community resources and programs serve the intelligence needs of the Department of State and the foreign policy community.

8. Are you aware of any disagreements between the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and the Secretary of State with respect to the allocation of National Intelligence Program resources within the Department of State? If there are such differences, what will be your role in resolving them?

I am not aware of any disagreements. I sense a very collaborative relationship between the ODNI and the State Department. If a disagreement were to occur, I'm confident that INR would work with the Department's Chief Financial Officer and the ODNI's Chief Financial Officer to solve it. The likelihood of a disagreement is small, as I understand that INR coordinates resource requests fully and cooperatively with ODNI and State's Chief Financial Officer.

9. Are you aware of any disagreements between the ODNI and the Department of State on matters of policy and procedure with respect to intelligence activities? If there are such disagreements, what will be your role in resolving them?

To my knowledge, there are no such disagreements. If I am confirmed and disagreements arise, I believe my role should be to resolve them in a way that serves the best interests of the Department of State, the Intelligence Community, and the nation.

10. If there are disagreements between ODNI representatives abroad and U.S. ambassadors with respect to intelligence activities or covert actions or regarding other matters, what will be your role in resolving them?

If confirmed, I see INR's role as that of honest broker. INR works to protect Chief of Mission authorities while ensuring that properly coordinated intelligence activities can move forward.

11. One of the most difficult challenges facing the Bureau of Intelligence and Research is maximizing access to sensitive information for policymakers while complying with security requirements for handling this information. If confirmed, what steps will you take, whether technological or otherwise, to increase the availability of sensitive information to appropriately cleared officials within INR, the Department of State, and at diplomatic missions abroad?

I fully agree with the current Intelligence Community's emphasis on sharing information based on the "Responsibility to Share", as opposed to the prior emphasis on "Need to Know." If confirmed, I will support all efforts in this direction. Neither intelligence analysts nor policymakers can do their job if information essential to their mission is declared too sensitive for them to access. Within the Department of State, I intend to press ahead with INR's e-Intel initiative that envisions providing policymakers across the Department nearly all intelligence materials they need at or near their desktops.

INR Management, Personnel and Operations

12. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, what would be your priorities with respect to the management of INR?

- A. How would you ensure the high quality and integrity of INR personnel?

INR's most important resource is its staff. If confirmed, I will place the highest priority on recruiting, training, rewarding, and retaining the most expert and capable personnel possible. The bureau's record on this score is exceptionally good. INR staff is known for its subject matter expertise, its analytic integrity, and its dedication to speaking truth to power. If confirmed, I will do my utmost to sustain and further foster all those qualities

- B. How would you ensure that INR employees with whistleblower concerns are treated properly?

I am committed to leading an organization where all employees are comfortable bringing matters of concern to the attention of management or other sources of redress without fear of reprisal. If confirmed, I will ensure that INR staff are aware of both prohibited personnel practices and whistleblower protections; that all employees know their rights as well as the safeguards that are in place to protect them.

C. If confirmed, what organization or other management changes would you examine or undertake within INR?

If confirmed, I would review INR's organization and management to ensure that they are postured and resourced to inform the development of America's foreign policy and to support its implementation.

13. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, what goals will you set for the performance of INR? What specific actions do you propose to take to achieve those goals?

If confirmed as INR Assistant Secretary, my goal will be to ensure the bureau provides accurate, timely, and insightful intelligence support that is crucial to the State Department's mission of promoting our national interests and protecting our national security.

Some of the specific issues upon which I intend to focus include recruiting and training the next generation of INR experts and making sure the bureau has a modern and efficient production system that distributes tailored intelligence to policymakers when they need it. I will also give priority to guarding against gaps or vulnerabilities in the bureau's security posture. Finally I intend to deploy the bureau's outreach program to infuse the perspectives of outside experts from the private sector, academia, and NGOs into INR's analysis of the most challenging foreign policy and intelligence issues of the day.

14. If confirmed, will you encourage INR analysts to participate in joint analytic training programs with analysts from the rest of the Intelligence Community?

A well-trained workforce is essential for INR to perform its mission. The Bureau has a Professional Development and Training Officer dedicated to ensuring all INR staff have the skills they need to do their jobs. I understand that INR analysts actively participate in joint analytic training. If confirmed, I intend to foster the Bureau's culture of training and strengthen it further in any way I can.

15. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research currently hires its analysts based on competitive service requirements, in line with general State Department civil service hiring practices. Are the competitive service requirements constraining the INR's hiring capabilities, particularly its ability to hire analysts with deep expertise on certain countries or regions? Please elaborate on whether and how the excepted service regulations guiding other intelligence community agencies would benefit the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.

Competitive service requirements clearly have not kept INR from hiring an exceptionally talented, motivated, and dedicated workforce. Thus far, the bureau has not determined that the benefits of excepted service merit attempting to move from competitive service requirements. If confirmed, I will watch this issue closely to ensure that INR is able to recruit, hire, and retain the best possible staff. Its important mission demands nothing less.

16. INR tends to have one analyst covering an intelligence topic while other all-source analytic agencies have teams of analysts covering the same topic. Does INR's smaller size help or hinder the production of accurate and timely analysis? Why?

My sense is that INR's small size presents challenges, but is also one of the Bureau's greatest strengths. The challenges include keeping pace with coordinating analytic products across the sprawling IC and releasing INR staff for joint duty assignments, training, and leave. The benefits of the bureau's size mean and that that INR analysts have a tremendous breadth of scope and knowledge and that they know their colleagues in the bureau as well as those in State's policy offices quite well. The relatively small number of INR analysts also enables nimble teamwork across issues, while the lack of bureaucracy and layers means that INR can respond in minutes to a policymaker's requests. If I am confirmed, part of my job will be keeping the Bureau focused on tasks where INR's size is a comparative advantage.

Substantive Analytic Issues

17. INR tends to dissent more from the consensus analytic view in coordinated intelligence products than do other agencies. Why do you think this is the case? In general, is this practice to be encouraged or discouraged?

My sense is that INR collaborates extremely well with the rest of the Intelligence Community and more often than not joins the IC consensus. I can't confirm that INR dissents more than other agencies, nor have I picked up that dissent is either specifically encouraged or discouraged. When INR dissents in a Community product, I think it probably demonstrates the bureau's commitment to independent analysis; its reliance on the experience, knowledge, and judgment of its analysts; and its dedication to speaking truth to power. Those are all hallmarks of INR that, if confirmed, I look forward to maintaining and advancing.

18. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the analysis produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research both adequately covers the high-profile hot spots in the Middle East and South Asia and ensures in-depth global coverage of the political, economic, and security issues pertinent to other regions of the world?

If confirmed, I am committed to helping INR fulfill its enduring mission to cover every issue, every country, all the time. That, after all, is the Secretary's agenda, and it includes high profile, front burner issues, as well as issues that are less prominent or over-the-horizon. It strikes me that INR has to cover both sets of issues if it is to provide the Secretary and State Department policy offices the intelligence support they need.

19. Describe the balance you would strike at INR between current intelligence and longer term trend analysis and think pieces (strategic intelligence)?

Both current intelligence and longer term trend analysis are important parts of INR's mission. The bureau has a record of success supplying State Department policymakers with current intelligence (usually accompanied by brief analytical comments that provide context), and thoughtful, longer term analysis. If confirmed, I expect to ensure that INR continues to fulfill both those missions.

20. In May 2009, President Obama declared U.S. cyber infrastructure security a national priority. The Department of State and the Intelligence Community will play an integral role in protecting U.S. communications and information infrastructure. What do you believe to be the Bureau of Intelligence and Research's appropriate role in contributing to this national priority?

Cyber is a major priority for the Administration, the Intelligence Community, and for INR, which established an Office of Cyber Affairs to focus on cyber issues. INR/CYBER analyzes cyber developments for State policymakers, facilitates State Department cyber-related activities, and contributes to cyber-related Intelligence Community products.

It also ensures that U.S. cyber activities are consistent with foreign policy, and helps lead the Department's international engagement on cyber issues.

21. Since January 2009, the Department of State and the White House have appointed a Special Envoy on Climate Change, the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, a Special Envoy on Middle East Peace, and a Presidential Advisor on Sudan, among other special advisors. Each of these special envoys, representatives or advisors works inside the State Department but leads an office outside of the traditional functional and regional bureaus.

A. If confirmed as the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research, how will you ensure that the Bureau of Intelligence and Research supports the work of these policy officials?

I will, if confirmed, devote myself to ensuring that INR supplies top quality intelligence support to all policy offices at State, from the Secretary to Desk Officers. That certainly includes supporting the important work of the Department's special envoys.

B. How can the Intelligence Community benefit from the work of these special envoys, representatives and advisors?

INR derives one of its greatest strengths from being embedded in the State Department with those who make and implement foreign policy. The bureau's analysts benefit tremendously from daily interaction that builds understanding of policy priorities and increases their awareness of challenges to implementing those policies. This better enables INR analysts to determine where INR can add value. INR infuses the rest of the IC with the insights it gains from policymakers, including the special envoys.

22. How can the Bureau of Intelligence and Research's analysis support the public diplomacy mission of the Department of State?

The Bureau's Office of Opinion Research directly supports public diplomacy through its analysis of public opinion polls and foreign media

commentary. Such analysis can assist public diplomacy officials to align strategic goals and programmatic activities with what we know about the attitudes, aspirations, and needs of foreign publics.

23. Over the past five years, transnational issues ranging from international pandemics to global financial insecurity have emerged as increasingly central to U.S. national security interests. What steps should the INR take to ensure that its analysts cover such issues, which cut across traditional functional and regional portfolios? Will ensuring the sufficient coverage of transnational issues require any personnel reforms?

INR is well-postured to cover transnational issues. Four of the bureau's ten analytic offices cover functional issues that transcend regional portfolios: the Offices of Economic Analysis; Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Issues; Terrorism, Narcotics, and Crime; and Geographer and Global Issues. INR's small size ensures and demands that its regional offices work hand-in-glove with its functional offices to form powerful standing and ad hoc analytic teams that build on and deeply benefit from each others' strengths.

24. Please describe your views on the role of financial networks in sustaining threats such as the Taliban, al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups, WMD proliferation, Iran's and North Korea's missile and nuclear development, and Mexico's violent drug trade.

Clearly, terrorists, proliferators, and drug dealers abuse global financial networks to carry on their activities.

Networks that sustain the Taliban and, al-Qaida include foreign donors, mostly from the Gulf, criminal activities including narcotics, and money raised through charitable or social service work.

WMD proliferation financial networks stem primarily from state-sponsored actors that often conduct activities through legitimate businesses. In Iran and North Korea, state-owned banks and firms facilitate the acquisition of

materials and technologies abroad for missile and WMD proliferation efforts.

Mexican drug cartels use financial institutions to launder billions of dollars, despite the anti-money laundering legislation in place, thus gaining access to funds for weapons purchases--which fuel the spiraling death toll—or for bribing officials.

Professional Background

25. Please describe how you are prepared to take this senior intelligence position without any prior professional experience in the Intelligence Community.

I believe that, if confirmed, I would bring a set of skills and experience to the job of Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research (INR) that will let me effectively lead the Bureau and add value to its work. While I have not worked formally in the Intelligence Community, I have had extensive and relevant experience in almost all aspects of INR's core functions. As a political, economic and biographic officer at embassies overseas, I have worked closely with analysts in the Intelligence Community to produce analytical products. In addition, I have myself produced analytic reports for policymakers, from assignments overseas as well as in Washington. This experience has given me a strong appreciation for the independence, intellectual rigor, experience and personal integrity that contribute to good analytical products. Having worked on policy matters in Washington and overseas in four geographic bureaus and on the seventh floor of the department, I have a strong appreciation for how intelligence can best support diplomacy and its practitioners. This is INR's primary mission.

As Executive Assistant to the Deputy Secretary, I served as liaison with INR and the IC, as well as action officer on a range of sensitive and compartmented intelligence programs. During that period, I travelled with the Director of Central Intelligence to resolve a sensitive IC-State issue at one of our missions in Europe. As a Charge d'affaires and two-time chief of mission, I have

overseen intelligence and law enforcement activities of IC members in the field and ensured that intelligence activities were carried out in support of foreign policy and national security objectives. Most recently, I have served as Coordinator for Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on North Korea, a job that requires analysis of all-source intelligence information, coordination with the ODNI and other IC elements, and decisions on whether to downgrade information for release to other countries. (See next question for further details). Finally, my experience leading large and complex missions overseas, as well as managerial assignments at the State Department, have prepared me to lead this large bureau.

26. Please describe how your experience as the United States Coordinator for Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions on North Korea prepared you for the position of Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research. What lessons about intelligence did you learn as the Coordinator?

My time as Coordinator has provided first-hand and very practical experience in evaluating raw intelligence for use in counter-proliferation activities, especially in efforts to disrupt shipments of proscribed military goods and financial transactions. I have also been involved in efforts to use intelligence information for the purpose of designations of individuals and entities under U.S. law. We have worked with the IC to downgrade information to make it releasable to foreign governments. There are few jobs in government that rely as heavily on actionable and timely intelligence. I have gained a unique perspective about the extent – and limits – of our ability to monitor illicit activities. As a result of my work, I have also seen the tension that exists between the use of intelligence information and the protection of sources and methods.

27. Please provide to the Committee detailed information surrounding the circumstances of the Bolivian Government's decision to declare you *Persona Non Grata* in September 2008. Please precisely detail the instructions you received from the Secretary of State regarding your assignment in Bolivia, how you followed these instructions, and the position of the Bolivian government regarding your activities.

During my assignment in Bolivia, the country team, the State Department in Washington, and I determined that the United States should pursue wide-ranging strategic goals in Bolivia. Among them, we aimed to encourage the Government of Bolivia to pursue political dialogue and respect democratic institutions. We developed programs to advance Bolivia's economic prosperity and security. We attempted to strengthen Bolivia's counternarcotics efforts. We undertook to improve our bilateral security relations. We promoted improved health for Bolivians. We sought to engage, inform, and shape Bolivian public opinion and to influence policy in support of U.S. goals and priorities.

Regrettably, hostility from wide segments of the Bolivian Government-- and repeated provocations--caused our bilateral relations to deteriorate sharply. The Bolivian Government escalated public attacks against the U.S. Government and began to dismantle key partnerships. In June 2008, for example, the government supported a massive and violent march on our embassy and expelled USAID from Bolivia's largest coca growing region. In September, the government expelled DEA from the same area. The next day, President Morales declared me *persona non grata*. President Morales publicly justified his decision with a series of baseless allegations.

I believe that President Morales' decision damaged our bilateral relationship with Bolivia, a relationship with deep, historical roots that benefits the peoples of both our countries. I regret that President Morales chose that course.