[Congressional Record: August 5, 2009 (Senate)]
[Page S8857-S8860]
SITUATION IN YEMEN
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I would like to take a few moments to bring
to the attention of my colleagues the burgeoning threat of a potential
safe haven for extremists in Yemen. As I am sure is true of many of my
colleagues, I continue to monitor the press reports surrounding the
future of the Yemeni detainees currently being held at the Guantanamo
Bay detention facility. However, what I believe too few people are
following is the growing threat of Yemen becoming a failed state and
potential safe haven for members of al-Qaida.
A recent New York Times article, ``Some in [al] Qaeda Leave Pakistan
for Somalia and Yemen,'' highlighted the growing concern within the
U.S. Government about relocations of some al-Qaida operatives to Yemen.
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy also highlighted the
growing threat in Yemen in a recent paper, ``Waning Vigilance: al
Qaeda's Resurgence in Yemen,'' that discusses how the threat in Yemen
has simmered in recent years and urgently needs the attention of
policymakers. Mr. President, I will ask that the New York Times and
Washington Institute for Near East Policy articles be printed in the
Record following my comments.
To appreciate fully the concerns about Yemen's stability, it is
important to recall the association of terrorist activities with Yemen.
It is perhaps best known as the site of the U.S.S. Cole attack in
October 2000. But Yemen is also one of the top sources of foreign
fighters in Iraq and Afghanistan, the source of weapons trafficked into
Gaza, and the country of origin of almost 100 of the remaining
detainees at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. It was also where
many mujahedeen returned to after the Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan and, often forgotten, it is the ancestral home of Osama bin
Laden. Further, in 2008, the U.S. Embassy in the Yemeni capital of
Sana'a was attacked twice--first by a mortar attack and the second time
by highly trained terrorists using vehicle-borne improvised explosive
devices, small arms, and suicide vests.
Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair also highlighted the
significance of the situation in Yemen earlier this year in testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Director Blair testified
that losses within al-Qaida's command structure since 2008 have been
significant and that sustained pressure against al-Qaida in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas, FATA, of Pakistan may eventually
force it to vacate the FATA. He stated that it is conceivable that al-
Qaida could relocate to the gulf where it could exploit a weak central
government and close proximity to established recruitment, fundraising,
and facilitation networks.
Yemen is the type of country the Director is concerned about, and,
for good reason. I would direct my colleagues to the most recent issue
of Foreign Policy magazine, which ranks Yemen 18th on its failed states
index, an annual index based on 12 indicators ranging from availability
of public services to demographic pressures to refugee and internally
displaced populations. The failed state index additionally says of
Yemen: ``a perfect storm of state failure is now brewing there:
disappearing oil and water reserves; a mob of migrants, some allegedly
with al Qaeda ties, flooding in from Somalia . . . ; and a weak
government increasingly unable to keep things running.''
The article goes on to suggest what many Yemen observers have been
saying for years: ``Yemen is the next Afghanistan: a global problem
wrapped in a failed state.'' Report after report reaches the same
conclusion about--Yemen--it is a failing state with all the makings of
an extremist safe haven. I believe it is critical that we monitor this
situation closely; fund developmental and counterterrorism assistance
for the Government of Yemen at robust levels; and urge the Obama
administration to engage actively with the Yemeni Government. The
consequences of inaction can be seen right across the Gulf of Aden in
Somalia.
For its part, the administration has increased its focus on this
threat. Earlier this year, Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, Deputy
Director Stephen Kappes reportedly met with Yemeni President Ali
Abdullah Saleh in Sana'a to discuss security and counterterrorism
cooperation. This visit is one of many that the CIA and National
Security Council officials have made in recent months, and in addition
to a visit by General Petraeus shortly after taking command at U.S.
Central Command.
All of these visits confirmed that the political landscape in Yemen
remains fragile. Throughout his decades of rule, President Saleh has
successfully balanced the various political forces in Yemen--tribes,
political parties, military officials, political elites, and radical
Islamists--to create a stable ruling coalition that has kept his regime
intact. While in many cases this stability has been purchased via
corruption and payoffs, in cases where groups and/or individuals have
not been willing to join President Saleh, he has used law enforcement,
military, and intelligence services to manage threats to stability. In
recent years, al-Qaida has entered into the political landscape and
complicated this delicate 30-year balance. President Saleh has
addressed this situation by reportedly reaching understandings with al-
Qaida that it would be left alone to recruit fighters if it did not
attack the Yemeni Government.
In the Washington Institute for Near East Policy article I mentioned
earlier, the author makes a number of points that underscore this
delicate balancing act and the role of al-Qaida in the political
landscape of Yemen. The author argues that the Yemeni Government is
preoccupied, and its security services overtaxed by increasingly
violent calls for secession from the south, threats of renewed fighting
in the north, and a faltering economy that is dependent on revenue from
rapidly dwindling petroleum reserves.
Between 2002 and 2004, the Yemeni Government, largely with U.S.
assistance, was able to disrupt al-Qaida-inspired terrorist activity in
Yemen. However, in recent years, a new generation of militants, with
either experience in Iraq and Afghanistan or time spent in the Yemeni
prison system, has emerged. This new generation of militants is
inclined to target the Yemeni Government itself, in addition to foreign
interests in Yemen.
The start of this resurgence was a 2006 jailbreak, in which 23
convicted terrorists escaped from a prison in the capital of Sana'a.
Escapees from this jailbreak formed the core of a new group, al-Qaida
in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, which is led by a 2006 escapee whose
deputy is a former Guantanamo detainee. While many Yemen observers
believe that AQAP is not yet strong enough to topple President Saleh's
regime, it is capable of striking high value targets; contributing to
instability across Yemen; and recruiting individuals to strengthen its
ranks. The ideological demands of AQAP are
[[Page S8858]]
familiar: release militants from prison; end cooperation with the
United States; renounce democracy; and implement a strict form of
sharia law.
If al-Qaida operatives and their leadership in Pakistan look for a
new home, Yemen will seem attractive. As in Afghanistan and Pakistan,
it has large areas of naturally defensible land where President Saleh's
regime has little authority; a robust tribal structure that could host
relocating operatives; and a security infrastructure which lacks the
capacity to defend Yemen's sovereign territory. It is also worth
mentioning that these same tribes, in some cases, share the hard-line
views of these relocating al-Qaida operatives and are inclined to help
enlist their own family into AQAP's efforts. This reality only
complicates further the work of President Saleh in balancing
counterterrorism efforts and the survival of his regime.
In June 2007, al-Qaida officially announced its rebirth in Yemen with
a suicide attack on a convoy of Spanish tourists. Since then, the
organization has grown stronger and its attacks more frequent. In
January 2008, it launched a series of attacks, culminating in the
assault on the U.S. Embassy in September 2008. Earlier this year, a
pair of suicide bombers targeted South Koreans, attacking first a group
of tourists in the countryside and then the officials sent to
investigate. Just last month, AQAP demonstrated that it is also
adopting the kidnapping for ransom tactic, which has proven profitable
for other terrorist groups. And, just last month, the Associated Press
reported that security was upgraded in Yemen's capital after
intelligence reports warned of attacks planned against the U.S. Embassy
and other potential targets. In response, the Yemeni chief of
intelligence has reportedly directed an increase in security around
diplomatic missions in the capital and elsewhere in the country. The
culmination of these developments gives the AQAP the ability to attract
relocating foreign fighters and broaden its operational reach.
The United States is by no means the only player in the country.
Saudi Arabia provides the most assistance to Yemen, some of it via
official channels to the government and some portions of it
unofficially. A myriad of countries are involved in the Yemeni energy
sector, and Russia and China are the Yemeni Government's major arms
suppliers. To complicate matters further, Yemen's tribal leaders,
powerful within the Yemeni political landscape, are suspicious of U.S.
policy in the region. These tribal leaders are often the proxies used
by President Saleh, Saudi Arabia, and others interested in influencing
the government and other elites.
Over the past several fiscal years, Yemen has received on average
between $20 and $25 million annually in total U.S. foreign aid. For
fiscal year 2009, the U.S. provided over $40 million in assistance for
Yemen, an increase from its $18 million aid package in fiscal year
2008. Between fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007, Yemen also
received approximately $31.5 million from the U.S. Department of
Defense's section 1206 account to train and equip Yemeni
counterterrorism units. The Obama administration also recently sent to
Congress a new package of 1206 funded projects, which includes $65
million in counterterrorism assistance for various Yemeni military
units. The recently passed fiscal year 2009 supplemental included $10
million for the U.S. Agency for International Development to support
U.S.-sponsored rural engagement measures, focused on civil affairs
activities and civilian capacity building in the ungoverned regions of
Yemen.
While these programs are important and need to be funded, Yemen
observers have expressed frustration with how little ``bang for the
buck'' the U.S. gets for its financial assistance to Yemen on
counterterrorism operations. This is one area where I hope the
administration will continue to press the Yemeni Government. In the
past, the Yemeni Government has complained that the United States has
provided them with insufficient assistance. However, based on the most
recent administration efforts, the situation has clearly changed, and
it is time for President Saleh's government to be more responsive. And,
just as in Pakistan, it is critical that our government make two things
very clear: first, we stand ready to assist in training and equipping
counterterrorism forces; and second, the threats confronting Yemen are
ultimately a threat to its own existence. American security assistance
will ultimately only be as effective as the Yemeni Government's will to
execute an aggressive counterterrorism and counter-recruitment mission.
To date, the administration has not officially characterized Yemen as
an al-Qaida safe haven, but should President Saleh prove unwilling to
confront adequately the threat posed by relocating foreign fighters;
the growing threat of AQAP; and the sympathy of some tribal leaders in
his country to support extremist elements, the administration should
consider more vigorous action. While the U.S. Embassy in Sana'a is
working hard to find an amenable resolution for the transfer of the
Yemeni detainees at Guantanamo, it is also working on these very
complex counterterrorism efforts. I would urge my colleagues to look at
the threats emanating from Yemen and to support efforts by the
administration to cooperate with the Yemeni Government and other
regional actors, particularly Saudi Arabia, to address the burgeoning
threat in the country.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record
the New York Times and Washington Institute for Near East Policy
articles to which I referred.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the New York Times, June 12, 2009]
Some in Qaeda Leave Pakistan for Somalia and Yemen
(By Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger)
Washington.--American officials say they are seeing the
first evidence that dozens of fighters with Al Qaeda, and a
small handful of the terrorist group's leaders, are moving to
Somalia and Yemen from their principal haven in Pakistan's
tribal areas. In communications that are being watched
carefully at the Pentagon, the White House and the Central
Intelligence Agency, the terrorist groups in all three
locations are now communicating more frequently, and
apparently trying to coordinate their actions, the officials
said.
Some aides to President Obama attribute the moves to
pressure from intensified drone attacks against Qaeda
operatives in Pakistan, after years of unsuccessful American
efforts to dislodge the terrorist group from their haven
there.
But there are other possible explanations. Chief among them
is the growth of the jihadist campaigns in both Somalia and
Yemen, which may now have some of the same appeal for
militants that Iraq did after the American military invasion
there in 2003.
Somalia is now a failed state that bears some resemblance
to Afghanistan before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, while
Yemen's weak government is ineffectually trying to combat the
militants, American officials say.
The shift of fighters is still small, perhaps a few dozen,
and there is no evidence that the top leaders--Osama bin
Laden and Ayman al-Zawahri--are considering a move from their
refuge in the Pakistani tribal areas, according to more than
half a dozen senior administration, military and
counterterrorism officials interviewed in recent days.
Most officials would not comment on the record about the
details of what they are seeing, because of the sensitivity
of the intelligence information they are gathering.
Leon E. Panetta, the C.I.A. director, said in remarks here
on Thursday that the United States must prevent Al Qaeda from
creating a new sanctuary in Yemen or Somalia.
The steady trickle of fighters from Pakistan could worsen
the chaos in Somalia, where an Islamic militant group, the
Shabab, has attracted hundreds of foreign jihadists in its
quest to topple the weak moderate Islamist government in
Mogadishu. It could also swell the ranks of a growing menace
in Yemen, where militants now control large areas of the
country outside the capital.
``I am very worried about growing safe havens in both
Somalia and Yemen, specifically because we have seen Al Qaeda
leadership, some leaders, start to flow to Yemen,'' Adm. Mike
Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in
remarks at the Brookings Institution here on May 18.
For the United States, the movement creates opportunities
as well as risks. With the Obama administration focusing its
fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda on the havens in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, a shift of fighters and some
leaders to new locations could complicate American efforts to
strike a lasting blow.
But in the tribal areas of Pakistan, Qaeda and Taliban
forces have drawn for protection on Pashtun tribes with whom
they have deep familial and tribal ties. A move away from
those areas could expose Qaeda leaders to betrayal, while
communications among militants in Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen
have
[[Page S8859]]
created a new opportunity for American intelligence to zero
in on insurgents who gave up many electronic communication
devices shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks to avoid
detection.
A senior Obama administration official attributed some of
the movement to ``the enormous heat we've been putting on the
leadership and the mid-ranks'' with Predator strikes,
launched from both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mr. Obama's
strategy so far has been to intensify many of the strikes
begun under the Bush administration.
``There are indications that some Al Qaeda terrorists are
starting to see the tribal areas of Pakistan as a tough place
to be,'' said an American counterterrorism official. ``It is
likely that a small number have left the region as a result.
Among these individuals, some have probably ended up in
Somalia and Yemen, among other places. The Al Qaeda
terrorists who are leaving the tribal areas of Pakistan are
predominantly foot soldiers.''
Measuring the numbers of these movements is almost as
difficult as assessing the motivations of those who are on
their way out of the tribal areas.
But American officials say there is evidence of a shift.
One senior American military official who follows Africa
closely said that more than 100 foreign fighters had trained
in terrorism camps in Somalia alone in the past few years.
Another senior military officer said that Qaeda operatives
and confederates in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia had stepped
up communications with one another.
``What really has us worried is that they're communicating
with each other much more--Al Qaeda in Pakistan, Somalia and
Yemen,'' the senior military officer said. ``They're asking,
`What do you need? Financing? Fighters?' ''
Mr. Obama's strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan placed
the defeat of Al Qaeda as the No. 1 objective, largely to
make sure that the group could not plot new attacks against
the United States.
Thus, the movement of the fighters, and the disruption that
causes, has been interpreted by some of the president's top
advisers as a sign of success.
But the emergence of new havens, from which Al Qaeda and
its affiliates could plot new attacks, raises difficult
questions for the United States on how to combat the growing
threat, and creates the possibility that increased missile
strikes are in the offing in Yemen and Somalia.
``Those are issues that I think the international community
is going to have to address because Al Qaeda is not going
away,'' Admiral Mullen told a Senate committee on May 21.
The C.I.A. says its drone attacks in Pakistan have
disrupted Al Qaeda's operations and damaged the group's
senior ranks. American officials say that strikes have killed
11 of the top 20 Qaeda leaders in the past year.
``Al Qaeda has been hit by drones and it has generated a
lot of insecurity among them,'' said Talat Masood, a retired
Pakistani general and military analyst in Islamabad.
``Many among them are uneasy and it is possible that they
are leaving for Somalia and other jihadi battle fronts,'' he
said. ``The hard core, however, will like to stay on.''
Without singling out any countries, Adm. Eric T. Olson, the
head of the Special Operations Command, spoke in general
terms last week about how the increased Pakistani military
operations in the Swat Valley and early indications of a new
Pakistani offensive in South Waziristan had put militants on
the run.
``As the Pakistanis are applying pressure,'' Admiral Olson
told a House panel, ``it will shift some of the sanctuaries
to other places.''
____
[From the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, July 14, 2009]
Waning Vigilance: Al-Qaeda's Resurgence in Yemen
(By Gregory Johnsen)
Recent reports suggesting that al-Qaeda fighters are
leaving Pakistan and Afghanistan, where the group has
suffered serious setbacks, have renewed international
concerns that Yemen is reemerging once again as a major
terrorist safe haven. Although the assessments of al-Qaeda's
resurgence in Yemen are accurate, the deteriorating situation
is not due to U.S. successes elsewhere; rather, it is the
result of waning U.S. and Yemeni attention over the past five
years. Renewed cooperation between Sana and Washington in
tackling al-Qaeda and addressing Yemen's systemic problems
could help reduce the terrorist organization's appeal in this
troubled country.
The Apparent Defeat of al-Qaeda in Yemen
By late 2003, al-Qaeda in Yemen had been largely defeated
through the close cooperation of U.S. and Yemeni security
forces. This cooperation reached its zenith in November 2002
when the CIA assassinated the head of the organization, Abu
Ali al-Harithi, but the Pentagon bypassed the agreed-on cover
story and leaked the operation to the press. Washington
needed an early victory in the war on terror and the
assassination of an al-Qaeda leader was too good to go
unacknowledged.
Yemen, however, believed it was sold out to U.S. domestic
concerns. Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Salih paid a high
price for allowing the United States to carry out the
attack--something al-Qaeda still uses to great propaganda
effect--and it took more than a year for the government to
publicly admit that it had authorized Washington to act.
In November 2003, the United States was still paying for
this mistake when Yemen arrested al-Harithi's replacement,
Muhammad Hamdi al-Ahdal, on the streets of Sana. Instead of
being granted direct access to al-Ahdal, U.S. officials were
forced to work through Yemeni intermediaries; however, with
its leadership dead or in jail, its infrastructure largely
destroyed, and its militants more attracted to the insurgency
in Iraq than jihad at home, al-Qaeda in Yemen appeared
largely defeated.
Al-Qaeda Rebuilds
The United States and Yemen both treated this victory as
absolute, failing to realize that a defeated enemy is not
necessarily a vanquished one. In effect, al-Qaeda was crossed
off both countries' list of priorities and replaced by other,
seemingly more pressing, concerns. For Washington, democratic
reforms and anticorruption campaigns dominated the bilateral
agenda as part of the Bush administration's desire to mold a
new Middle East. For Yemen, attention was increasingly
diverted by a five-year-old sectarian civil war in the north
and more recently by threats of secession from the south.
Over the next two years of relative calm, the threat from al-
Qaeda, while not necessarily forgotten, was certainly
ignored. Tourism flourished, and the U.S. State Department
initiated a Yemen study-abroad program.
Even the prison break of twenty-three al-Qaeda suspects in
early 2006, which U.S. officials privately blamed on Yemeni
government collaboration, was treated more like an aberration
than the opening volley of a new battle. Among the escapees
were Qasim al-Raymi and Nasir al-Wahayshi, a former secretary
to Usama bin Laden and a veteran of the fighting at Tora
Bora. The nearly two and a half years of government neglect
had created a great deal of space for the two men to
reorganize and rebuild al-Qaeda in Yemen.
The involvement of al-Raymi and al-Wahayshi, along with
numerous other Yemenis from across the country, illustrates
one of the more worrying facts about al-Qaeda's current
incarnation: it is the most representative organization in
the country. Al-Qaeda in Yemen transcends class, tribe, and
regional identity in a way that no other Yemeni group or
political party can match. Al-Wahayshi and others within the
organization have proven particularly talented at
articulating a narrative designed to appeal to a local
audience, using everything from Palestine to the plight of
Sheikh al-Muayad--a Yemeni cleric who ran a popular charity
and is currently in a U.S. prison for providing funds to
terrorists--to increase their rhetorical appeal to young
Yemenis. Both the U.S. and Yemeni governments have been
incapable of countering this approach and have effectively
ceded the field to al-Qaeda.
In June 2007, al-Qaeda officially announced its presence in
the country with al-Wahayshi as its commander. It underscored
its intentions within days by a suicide attack on a convoy of
Spanish tourists. Since then, the organization has grown
stronger. In January 2008, it released the first issue of its
bimonthly journal, Sada al-Malahim (``The Echo of Battles''),
and that same month it launched a series of attacks,
culminating in the assault on the U.S. embassy in September
2008. Earlier this year, a pair of suicide bombers targeted
South Koreans, attacking first a group of tourists and then
the officials sent to investigate.
Al-Qaeda has also capitalized on its recent successes,
attracting recruits from both Yemen and Saudi Arabia. In
January, two former Guantanamo Bay detainees joined the group
as commanders, spearheading the merger of local branches in
Saudi Arabia and Yemen into a single regional franchise. One
of the leaders, Muhammad al-Awfi, has since turned himself in
to Saudi authorities, but this gesture appears to be prompted
more from a desire to protect his family than from a change
of heart.
This new regional organization, which calls itself al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula, is indicative of al-Wahayshi's
growing ambition. Throughout the first two years of his
leadership, he worked hard to create a durable infrastructure
that could survive the loss of key commanders. His success in
this regard is demonstrated by the fact that even though the
organization lost a particularly skilled local commander,
Hamza al-Quayti, in a shootout with Yemeni security forces in
August 2008, it was still able to launch an attack on the
U.S. embassy just one month later. Al-Wahayshi is now looking
to use the undergoverned regions of Yemen as a staging ground
for attacks not only in Yemen but also throughout the Arabian
peninsula and the Horn of Africa.
Lessons Learned
Al-Qaeda's resurgence in Yemen does not stem from
displacement of U.S. successes elsewhere. Rather, the United
States and its allies need to understand that defeating one
generation of al-Qaeda does not eliminate the threat
completely. In conjunction with Yemen and Gulf Cooperation
Council allies, Washington must develop a two-track strategy
to eliminate al-Qaeda in Yemen. In the short term, the United
States must discretely partner with Yemen and Saudi Arabia
once again and target al-Qaeda's leadership and
infrastructure. Although successfully doing so will be much
harder the second time around, it can be accomplished with
careful and coordinated strikes.
The long-term approach, however, is both more important and
more difficult to implement. The current incarnation of al-
Qaeda in
[[Page S8860]]
Yemen has more recruits--and younger recruits--than ever, due
to al-Wahayshi's powerful propaganda as well as the lack of
opportunity and an incipient breakdown in traditional social
authorities. Furthermore, Yemen is preoccupied, and its
security services overtaxed with the increasingly violent
calls for secession from the south, threats of renewed
fighting in the north, and, most importantly, a faltering
economy that makes traditional modes of patronage-style
governance nearly impossible. The United States and Yemen are
also facing an al-Qaeda group that is now more accepted as a
legitimate organization. Killing or arresting al-Qaeda
leaders in Yemen and dismantling its infrastructure will be
an important step forward, but will unlikely eliminate the
problem in the long term. Tackling the underlying issues,
although very difficult, will be key to ensuring that al-
Qaeda does not reemerge in Yemen once again.
____________________
