[Congressional Record: June 2, 2009 (Senate)]
[Page S5950-S5951]
SUBMITTED RESOLUTIONS
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SENATE RESOLUTION 164--AMENDING SENATE RESOLUTION 400, 94TH CONGRESS,
AND SENATE RESOLUTION 445, 108TH CONGRESS, TO IMPROVE CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT OF THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED STATES, TO
PROVIDE A STRONG, STABLE, AND CAPABLE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE STRUCTURE
TO PROVIDE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY APPROPRIATE OVERSIGHT, SUPPORT,
AND LEADERSHIP, AND TO IMPLEMENT A KEY RECOMMENDATION OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
Mr. FEINGOLD (for himself, Mr. Burr, Mr. Bayh, Ms. Snowe, and Mr.
McCain) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the
Committee on Rules and Administration:
S. Res. 164
Whereas the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States (hereinafter referred to as the ``9/11
Commission'') conducted a lengthy review of the facts and
circumstances relating to the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, including those relating to the intelligence
community, law enforcement agencies, and the role of
congressional oversight and resource allocation;
Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission found that
congressional oversight of the intelligence activities of the
United States is dysfunctional;
Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission further
found that under the rules of the Senate and the House of
Representatives in effect at the time the report was
completed, the committees of Congress charged with oversight
of the intelligence activities lacked the power, influence,
and sustained capability to meet the daunting challenges
faced by the intelligence community of the United States;
Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission further
found that as long as such oversight is governed by such
rules of the Senate and the House of Representatives, the
people of the United States will not get the security they
want and need;
Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission further
found that a strong, stable, and capable congressional
committee structure is needed to give the intelligence
community of the United States appropriate oversight,
support, and leadership;
Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission further
found that the reforms recommended by the 9/11 Commission in
its final report will not succeed if congressional oversight
of the intelligence community in the United States is not
changed;
Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission
recommended structural changes to Congress to improve the
oversight of intelligence activities;
Whereas in its final report, the 9/11 Commission further
recommended that the authorizing authorities and
appropriating authorities with respect to intelligence
activities in each house of Congress be combined into a
single committee in each house of Congress;
Whereas Congress has enacted some of the recommendations
made by the 9/11 Commission and is considering implementing
additional recommendations of the 9/11 Commission; and
Whereas the Senate adopted Senate Resolution 445 in the
108th Congress to address some of the intelligence oversight
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission by abolishing term
limits for the members of the Select Committee on
Intelligence, clarifying jurisdiction for intelligence-
related nominations, and streamlining procedures for the
referral of intelligence-related legislation, but other
aspects of the 9/11 Commission recommendations regarding
intelligence oversight have not been implemented: Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved,
SECTION 1. PURPOSES.
The purposes of this resolution are--
(1) to improve congressional oversight of the intelligence
activities of the United States;
(2) to provide a strong, stable, and capable congressional
committee structure to provide the intelligence community
appropriate oversight, support, and leadership;
(3) to implement a key recommendation of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the
``9/11 Commission'') that structural changes be made to
Congress to improve the oversight of intelligence activities;
and
(4) to provide vigilant legislative oversight over the
intelligence activities of the United States to ensure that
such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and
laws of the United States.
SEC. 2. INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT.
(a) Authority of the Select Committee on Intelligence.--
Paragraph (5) of section 3(a) of Senate Resolution 400,
agreed to May 19, 1976 (94th Congress), is amended in that
matter preceding subparagraph (A) by striking the comma
following ``authorizations for appropriations'' and inserting
``and appropriations,''.
(b) Abolishment of the Subcommittee on Intelligence.--
Senate Resolution 445, agreed to October 9, 2004, (108th
Congress), is amended by striking section 402.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I am introducing today, along with
Senators Burr, Bayh, Snowe and McCain, a resolution that will implement
a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission--
[[Page S5951]]
the granting of appropriations authority to the Senate Intelligence
Committee. This effort to reform and improve congressional oversight
has a long bipartisan history. It began as an amendment offered by
Senator McCain to the 2004 reorganizing resolution that accompanied the
intelligence reform bill. And, in the last Congress, this resolution
was introduced by Senator Burr. It should also be noted that it has the
same bipartisan set of cosponsors as it did last year, despite the
change of administration. This underscores the principle that effective
congressional oversight is neither a partisan nor political issue and
that it has nothing to do with who the President is. It is about
ensuring that the Intelligence Community is keeping America safe,
complying with the Constitution and laws of our country, and using
taxpayer dollars in an appropriate manner.
Next month will mark the 5th anniversary of the release of the 9/11
Commission's report. The country is by now familiar with the many
recommendations of the Commission that have been implemented, including
the establishment of the DNI and the National Counterterrorism Center.
Yet, the Commission stressed that, ``Of all our recommendations,
strengthening congressional oversight may be among the most difficult
and important.''
In November 2007, Lee Hamilton, the former Vice Chairman of the
Commission testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee on behalf of
himself and former Chairman Tom Kean and again emphasized what needs to
be done. He testified that:
The single most important step to strengthen the power of
the intelligence committees is to give them the power of the
purse. Without it, they will be marginalized. The
intelligence community will not ignore you, but they will
work around you. In a crunch, they will go to the
Appropriations Committee. Within the Congress, the two bodies
with the jurisdiction, time and expertise to carry out a
careful review of the budget and activities of the
Intelligence Community are the Senate and House intelligence
committees. Yet all of us have to live by the Gold Rule: That
is, he who controls the Gold makes the Rules.
The testimony of the former Chairman and Vice Chairman highlighted
three practical examples of why this particular reform is so critical.
First, if and when the U.S. goes to war, the decision will ride largely
on intelligence--and oversight is critical to ensuring that the
intelligence community gets it right. Second, oversight is necessary to
safeguard the privacy and civil liberties of Americans in an age of
enhanced collection capabilities and data mining. Third, the success of
intelligence reform requires sustained congressional oversight.
Vigorous, effective, independent congressional oversight is
fundamental to the checks and balances of our constitutional system. In
recent years, we have seen outright contempt for this oversight,
particularly as the previous administration sought to hide the CIA's
detention and interrogation and the NSA's warrantless wiretapping
programs from Congress. But the inauguration of a new president has not
removed all impediments to effective oversight, nor is it a guarantee
that serious abuses won't occur in the future. That is why the
implementation of this reform is just as important as ever and why this
resolution has bipartisan support.
In the end, this reform is not just about our constitutional system,
as important as that is. It is about how best to protect the American
people. As Lee Hamilton testified, ``the strong point simply is that
the Senate of the U.S. and the House of the U.S. is not doing its job.
And because you are not doing the job, the country is not as safe as it
ought to be, because one of my premises is that robust oversight is
necessary for a stronger intelligence community.''
The implementation of this reform is long overdue. It has been more
than seven and a half years since the attacks of 9/11, almost 5years
since the 9/11 Commission made this recommendation, and a year and a
half since the Senate Intelligence Committee heard directly from former
Chairman Hamilton and former Vice Chairman Kean. There should be no
more excuses, or delays.
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