[Congressional Record: July 28, 2009 (Senate)]
[Page S8202-S8203]
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. FEINGOLD:
S. 1528. A bill to establish a Foreign Intelligence and Information
Commission and for other purposes; to the Select Committee on
Intelligence.
Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, the legislation I am introducing today
would establish an independent, bipartisan Foreign Intelligence and
Information Commission to significantly reform and improve our
intelligence capabilities. On July 16, the bill was approved, on a
bipartisan basis, by the Senate Intelligence Committee as an amendment
to the Fiscal Year 2010 Intelligence Authorization bill. The bill is
similar to the one I introduced in the last Congress with Senator
Hagel, which also had bipartisan support in the Intelligence Committee,
and it is my hope and expectation that it will soon become law. The New
York Times has also expressed its support for the commission.
The work of this commission is critical to our national security. For
years, our intelligence officials have acknowledged that we lack
adequate coverage around the world and that we have gaps in our ability
to anticipate threats and crises before they emerge. The 2006 Annual
Report of the Intelligence Community described how current crises
divert resources from emerging and strategic issues. In 2007, the
Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Collection testified that
we need to ``pay attention to places that we are not.'' In 2008, the
DNI testified that current crisis support ``takes a disproportionate
share'' of intelligence resources over emerging and strategic issues.
Earlier this year, during his confirmation process, the current CIA
Director expressed his concern about the broad set of issues to which
insufficient resources are being devoted. The problem, in other words,
is not new, nor is it unique to any administration. It is systematic
and it results from structural problems in how we develop priorities
and allocate resources.
These structural problems afflict the Intelligence Community, but
they are also much broader. Around the world, information our
government needs to inform our foreign policy and protect our country
is obtained openly by State Department officials. Yet there is no
interagency strategy that integrates the capabilities of our diplomats
and other embassy personnel with the activities of our clandestine
collectors. The result is big gaps in what we know about the world--
gaps that don't necessarily require more spying.
This information pertains to instability and civil conflict, threats
to democratic institutions, human rights abuses and corruption, and
whether we can count on the support of a country for our policies. This
information is also directly related to the threat from al Qaeda, its
affiliates and other terrorist organizations. The 9/11 Commission
recommended that our government identify and prioritize actual or
potential terrorist sanctuaries. Yet, as the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee,
``much of the information about the instability that can lead to safe
havens or ideological radicalization comes not from covert collection
but from open collection, best done by Foreign Service Officers.'' The
solution, then, is to ensure that, if State Department or other U.S.
officials are best suited to gather this kind of critical information,
they have the capabilities and resources to do so.
At the core of the commission's mandate is the need for an
interagency strategy that asks and answers four key questions: ``What
is it that the U.S. Government needs to know?'' ``How do we best
anticipate threats and crises around the world, before they emerge?''
``Who in our government, within and outside of the Intelligence
Community, is best equipped to get this information, report on it, and
analyze it?'' ``And how do we develop missions and provide resources so
that we are using all of our capabilities on behalf of our national
security?'' The commission will provide recommendations on how the
government can and should develop this strategy and whether new
legislation is needed to clarify the authority of existing executive
branch entities or create a new one. And it will provide
recommendations on how to ensure that the budget process reflects the
best and most efficient means to collect, report on and analyze
intelligence and information, rather than the influence of individual
bureaucracies.
The reform recommendations made by this commission will provide a
critical and welcome boost to everyone, in the executive branch and in
Congress, responsible for defending our national security. The
Intelligence Community, as its own leadership has attested, needs
guidance if it is to reprioritize global coverage and long-term
threats. It also needs help in areas that need not be its top
priorities: if State Department or other U.S. officials outside the
Intelligence Community are best equipped to obtain certain information
and are given sufficient resources, the IC can focus on areas where
clandestine collection is most needed. The State Department will
benefit from an interagency process that recognizes the critical
reporting capabilities of the diplomatic service and allocates
resources accordingly. The President will be provided with
recommendations on interagency reforms that extend beyond the purview
of any one department or agency.
Implementation of the commission's recommendations will allow the
congressional intelligence and foreign relations committees to conduct
oversight of the Intelligence Community and the State Department in the
context of a clearly defined strategy. The
[[Page S8203]]
budget committees and the appropriators as well as authorizers will
have an interagency strategy that explains the rationale for the
President's budget request. Congress as a whole will be provided
recommendations on whether new legislation is needed to reform the
process.
This is not just a step toward good governance. It will ensure that
taxpayer dollars are used more efficiently and effectively. Most of
all, it will make us safer. This bill is not partisan, and it has
nothing to do with who is in the White House. The commission will not
investigate anyone, nor cast blame for long-standing structural
problems. It seeks only to identify the reforms still needed and to
provide recommendations, to the executive branch and to Congress, on
how to achieve them.
______