[Congressional Record: July 28, 2009 (Senate)] [Page S8202-S8203] STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS By Mr. FEINGOLD: S. 1528. A bill to establish a Foreign Intelligence and Information Commission and for other purposes; to the Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, the legislation I am introducing today would establish an independent, bipartisan Foreign Intelligence and Information Commission to significantly reform and improve our intelligence capabilities. On July 16, the bill was approved, on a bipartisan basis, by the Senate Intelligence Committee as an amendment to the Fiscal Year 2010 Intelligence Authorization bill. The bill is similar to the one I introduced in the last Congress with Senator Hagel, which also had bipartisan support in the Intelligence Committee, and it is my hope and expectation that it will soon become law. The New York Times has also expressed its support for the commission. The work of this commission is critical to our national security. For years, our intelligence officials have acknowledged that we lack adequate coverage around the world and that we have gaps in our ability to anticipate threats and crises before they emerge. The 2006 Annual Report of the Intelligence Community described how current crises divert resources from emerging and strategic issues. In 2007, the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Collection testified that we need to ``pay attention to places that we are not.'' In 2008, the DNI testified that current crisis support ``takes a disproportionate share'' of intelligence resources over emerging and strategic issues. Earlier this year, during his confirmation process, the current CIA Director expressed his concern about the broad set of issues to which insufficient resources are being devoted. The problem, in other words, is not new, nor is it unique to any administration. It is systematic and it results from structural problems in how we develop priorities and allocate resources. These structural problems afflict the Intelligence Community, but they are also much broader. Around the world, information our government needs to inform our foreign policy and protect our country is obtained openly by State Department officials. Yet there is no interagency strategy that integrates the capabilities of our diplomats and other embassy personnel with the activities of our clandestine collectors. The result is big gaps in what we know about the world-- gaps that don't necessarily require more spying. This information pertains to instability and civil conflict, threats to democratic institutions, human rights abuses and corruption, and whether we can count on the support of a country for our policies. This information is also directly related to the threat from al Qaeda, its affiliates and other terrorist organizations. The 9/11 Commission recommended that our government identify and prioritize actual or potential terrorist sanctuaries. Yet, as the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee, ``much of the information about the instability that can lead to safe havens or ideological radicalization comes not from covert collection but from open collection, best done by Foreign Service Officers.'' The solution, then, is to ensure that, if State Department or other U.S. officials are best suited to gather this kind of critical information, they have the capabilities and resources to do so. At the core of the commission's mandate is the need for an interagency strategy that asks and answers four key questions: ``What is it that the U.S. Government needs to know?'' ``How do we best anticipate threats and crises around the world, before they emerge?'' ``Who in our government, within and outside of the Intelligence Community, is best equipped to get this information, report on it, and analyze it?'' ``And how do we develop missions and provide resources so that we are using all of our capabilities on behalf of our national security?'' The commission will provide recommendations on how the government can and should develop this strategy and whether new legislation is needed to clarify the authority of existing executive branch entities or create a new one. And it will provide recommendations on how to ensure that the budget process reflects the best and most efficient means to collect, report on and analyze intelligence and information, rather than the influence of individual bureaucracies. The reform recommendations made by this commission will provide a critical and welcome boost to everyone, in the executive branch and in Congress, responsible for defending our national security. The Intelligence Community, as its own leadership has attested, needs guidance if it is to reprioritize global coverage and long-term threats. It also needs help in areas that need not be its top priorities: if State Department or other U.S. officials outside the Intelligence Community are best equipped to obtain certain information and are given sufficient resources, the IC can focus on areas where clandestine collection is most needed. The State Department will benefit from an interagency process that recognizes the critical reporting capabilities of the diplomatic service and allocates resources accordingly. The President will be provided with recommendations on interagency reforms that extend beyond the purview of any one department or agency. Implementation of the commission's recommendations will allow the congressional intelligence and foreign relations committees to conduct oversight of the Intelligence Community and the State Department in the context of a clearly defined strategy. The [[Page S8203]] budget committees and the appropriators as well as authorizers will have an interagency strategy that explains the rationale for the President's budget request. Congress as a whole will be provided recommendations on whether new legislation is needed to reform the process. This is not just a step toward good governance. It will ensure that taxpayer dollars are used more efficiently and effectively. Most of all, it will make us safer. This bill is not partisan, and it has nothing to do with who is in the White House. The commission will not investigate anyone, nor cast blame for long-standing structural problems. It seeks only to identify the reforms still needed and to provide recommendations, to the executive branch and to Congress, on how to achieve them. ______