[Congressional Record: March 12, 2009 (Extensions)]
[Page E658-E659]

                  INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT ON H.R. 1463


                            HON. JANE HARMAN

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                        Thursday, March 12, 2009

  Ms. HARMAN. Madam Speaker, one of the most important challenges
confronting the intelligence community is learning the nature of and
damage done by the worldwide network in nuclear centrifuge technology,
bomb components and training run for almost two decades by A. Q. Khan--
the revered ``father'' of his country's nuclear program. Considered a
pariah abroad but a hero at home, that task got a lot tougher when
Pakistan's High Court ordered Khan released from house arrest last
  At the recent Wehrkunde Security Conference in Munich, Pakistani
Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi astonished delegates, telling us
that his government had not decided whether to challenge the court
decision but that Pakistan would continue to monitor Khan.
  For those who stay awake at night worrying about Iran's increasing
mastery of centrifuge technology and the ability of terror groups to
access nuclear components, Pakistan's action is distressing.
  When Khan ``confessed'' in 2004 to his illegal nuclear dealings, he
was promptly placed under ``house arrest'' and pardoned by then
President Pervez Musharraf. The U.S. government was denied access to
him, and was never able to question him about what he did and what else
he knew.
  Today, we introduce legislation to condition future military aid to
Pakistan on two things: that the Pakistani Government make A.Q. Khan
available for questioning and that it monitor Khan's activities.
  This much we do know. As a university student in Europe in the late
1960s and early 1970s, Khan earned degrees in metallurgical engineering
from institutions in Holland and Belgium. In 1972, he began working for
the Dutch partner of a uranium enrichment consortium and almost
immediately raised eyebrows for repeated visits to a facility he was
not cleared to see and for inquiries made about technical data
unrelated to his own assignments.
  Dutch intelligence quietly began to monitor him. In 1974, following
India's first nuclear test, Khan offered his expertise to Pakistani
Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Later that year, Khan's company
assigned him to work on Dutch translations of advanced, German-designed
centrifuges--data to which he had unsupervised access for 16 days.
  By 1975, the damage appears to have been done. Pakistan began to
purchase components for its domestic uranium enrichment program from
European suppliers, and Khan was transferred away from enrichment work
due to concern about his activities.
  In December, he abruptly returned to Pakistan with blueprints for
centrifuges and other components and detailed lists of suppliers.
  Convicted in absentia by the Dutch government for nuclear espionage,
beginning in the mid-1980s, Khan is widely believed to have provided
nuclear weapons technology to Iran, North Korea, Libya and possibly
Syria and Iraq. His network involved front companies

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and operatives in Dubai, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, South
Korea, Switzerland and Turkey. Though much of the network was taken
down following his confession, there is no conclusive evidence that it
was destroyed.
  Khan is again a loose nuke scientist with proven ability to sell the
worst weapons to the worst people. Hopefully, appropriate Pakistani
officials worry as we do that their civilians could become nuclear
targets--as could NATO soldiers in neighboring Afghanistan or civilians
in any number of Western countries.
  Our bill provides a path for the Zardari government to do the right
thing--to allow the U.S. to evaluate the full extent of A. Q. Khan's
proliferation activities in order to halt any ongoing or future harm.