[Congressional Record: June 4, 2009 (Extensions)]
[Page E1314]
H.R. 2703 AND H.R. 2704
______
HON. JANE HARMAN
of california
in the house of representatives
Thursday, June 4, 2009
Ms. HARMAN. Madam Speaker, some of the most powerful military and
intelligence satellites in the world are designed and produced in my
Congressional District. They are remarkably formidable tools that daily
assist our troops in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, and are
indispensable in learning and thwarting the plans of those who would do
us harm.
But imagine, for a moment, what it would be like if one of these
satellites were directed on your neighborhood or home, a school or
place or worship--and without an adequate legal framework or operating
procedures in place for regulating their use. I daresay the reaction
might be that Big Brother has finally arrived and the black helicopters
can't be far behind.
Yet this is precisely what the Department of Homeland Security
proposes to do in standing up the benign-sounding National Applications
Office, or NAO.
Despite objections by the civil liberties community, a series of
letters sent by Members of Congress, an established record of
opposition by the House Homeland Security Committee and the prior
fencing of funds, the DHS has requested funding in the classified annex
to its FY2010 budget for the NAO.
The Appropriations Committee has repeatedly expressed skepticism
about the need for the NAO, and fenced funding for the office last
year. I understand that the Committee intends to send a strong message
again this year. I introduce two bills today to stop the Department of
Homeland Security from moving ahead with the misguided National
Applications Office.
The first bill, introduced with Representative Norm Dicks, prohibits
DHS from expending any funds on this office. The second bill de-
authorizes the NAO, requiring the Secretary of Homeland Security to
close the office immediately.
As proposed, the NAO, housed in the DHS Office of Intelligence &
Analysis, the NAO would manage the tasking of military intelligence
satellites over the United States--despite the absence a of clear legal
framework, legitimate Posse Comitatus concerns, and even though the
Interior Department already has existing circumscribed authority to
deploy satellites over large-scale public events or natural disasters.
In its current form, the NAO would enable a group of undefined law
enforcement and homeland security ``users'' greater access to imagery
collection capabilities of the intelligence community--purportedly to
supplement data already available during disasters or to aid in
``investigations.'' It would serve as a clearinghouse for requests by
law enforcement, border security, and other domestic homeland security
agencies to access real-time, high-quality feeds from spy satellites.
Except law enforcement officials haven't asked for the additional
capability and major law enforcement organizations do not believe it is
necessary.
The new DHS leadership has assured me in my role as the Chair of the
Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence and Terrorism Risk
Assessment that the issue is under review. Although Congress last year
withheld most funding for the NAO, the Department has again budgeted
for the office (the exact amount is classified) without prior
notification of the relevant congressional committees.
Well, not if we can help it.
Today, we introduce legislation to shut down the NAO--period.
____________________
HR 2703 IH
111th CONGRESS 1st Session H. R. 2703
To prohibit the Secretary of Homeland Security from obligating or expending funds for the National Applications Office of the Department of Homeland Security. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 4, 2009 Ms. HARMAN (for herself and Mr. DICKS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security
A BILL
To prohibit the Secretary of Homeland Security from obligating or expending funds for the National Applications Office of the Department of Homeland Security. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) In its current form, the National Applications Office of the Department of Homeland Security (NAO) would process requests for classified satellite information from nontraditional users of intelligence for civil, homeland security, and law enforcement purposes without a clear legal framework to govern its use or stringent standards and protocols to protect privacy and civil liberties.
(2) Existing law already provides that capability through a `Civil Applications Committee' within the Department of Interior.
(3) The United States law enforcement community, who comprise a majority of the new users of the NAO, have not requested that new capability.
(4) Section 525 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 110-161; 121 Stat. 2074) prohibited funds from being made available to commence operations of the NAO until the Secretary of Homeland Security certified that the program complies with all existing laws, including all applicable privacy and civil liberties standards, and that certification was reviewed by the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
(5) GAO found serious flaws in the NAO, specifically that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has failed to provide sufficient assurances that requests for classified information will be fully reviewed to ensure it can be legally provided.
(6) On April 9, 2008, in a letter to Members of Congress, the Secretary of Homeland Security certified that the NAO complies with all existing laws, including all applicable privacy and civil liberties standards. The Secretary also provided a charter for the office, privacy and civil liberties impact assessments, and NAO standard operating procedures. GAO deemed the certification and standard operating procedures insufficient.
(7) Despite numerous requests by Congress in writing, in open hearings, and in person for a legal framework and a full justification for the Department's certification of the NAO, DHS seeks to operate the office before establishing clear definitions for law enforcement and homeland security requests for satellite imagery.
(8) Operation of the NAO in its current state poses serious constitutional questions and threatens to violate the privacy of Americans and their civil liberties.
SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR THE NATIONAL APPLICATIONS OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall not obligate or expend funds for--
(1) the National Applications Office of the Department of Homeland Security; or
(2) any office of the Department of Homeland Security tasked to process requests for classified satellite information for civil, homeland security, or law enforcement purposes.
HR 2704 IH
111th CONGRESS 1st Session H. R. 2704
To direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to close the National Applications Office of the Department of Homeland Security. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
June 4, 2009 Ms. HARMAN introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security
A BILL
To direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to close the National Applications Office of the Department of Homeland Security. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) In its current form, the National Applications Office of the Department of Homeland Security (NAO) would process requests for classified satellite information from nontraditional users of intelligence for civil, homeland security, and law enforcement purposes without a clear legal framework to govern its use or stringent standards and protocols to protect privacy and civil liberties.
(2) Existing law already provides that capability through a `Civil Applications Committee' within the Department of Interior.
(3) The United States law enforcement community, who comprise a majority of the new users of the NAO, have not requested that new capability.
(4) Section 525 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (Public Law 110-161; 121 Stat. 2074) prohibited funds from being made available to commence operations of the NAO until the Secretary of Homeland Security certified that the program complies with all existing laws, including all applicable privacy and civil liberties standards, and that certification was reviewed by the Government Accountability Office (GAO).
(5) GAO found serious flaws in the NAO, specifically that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has failed to provide sufficient assurances that requests for classified information will be fully reviewed to ensure it can be legally provided.
(6) On April 9, 2008, in a letter to Members of Congress, the Secretary of Homeland Security certified that the NAO complies with all existing laws, including all applicable privacy and civil liberties standards. The Secretary also provided a charter for the office, privacy and civil liberties impact assessments, and NAO standard operating procedures. GAO deemed the certification and standard operating procedures insufficient.
(7) Despite numerous requests by Congress in writing, in open hearings, and in person for a legal framework and a full justification for the Department's certification of the NAO, DHS seeks to operate the office before establishing clear definitions for law enforcement and homeland security requests for satellite imagery.
(8) Operation of the NAO in its current state poses serious constitutional questions and threatens to violate the privacy of Americans and their civil liberties.
SEC. 2. CLOSURE OF THE NATIONAL APPLICATIONS OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY.
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall immediately close the National Applications Office of the Department of Homeland Security.