[Congressional Record: June 11, 2009 (Senate)]
[Page S6537-S6538]                       


  Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I oppose the nomination of LTG Stanley 
McChrystal to command U.S. forces in Afghanistan for two reasons. The 
first relates to a classified matter about which I have serious 
concerns. I have conveyed those concerns in a letter to the President. 
The second issue is interrogation.
  At his public confirmation hearing, General McChrystal responded to a 
question from Chairman Levin regarding interrogation policies that 
``included stress positions, the use of dogs and nudity'' by stating 
that ``[s]ome of them were in use when I took over, sir, and then, as 
we immediately began to reduce that.'' When asked whether he was 
``uncomfortable with some of the techniques'' in use, he replied 
``[w]hen I took over, I was.''
  However, following the hearing, Chairman Levin sent General 
McChrystal a question for the record describing many of the 14 
interrogation techniques not listed in the Army Field Manual that were 
authorized under General McChrystal's command, up until May 6, 2004, 
when CENTCOM Commander General John Abizaid suspended the use of all 
such techniques. Chairman Levin's question then described a request 
from General McChrystal, submitted 3 weeks after the suspension, to 
continue using a number of these techniques, including ``sleep 
management,'' ``environmental manipulation,'' and ``control 
positions.'' The request defined ``control positions'' as ``requiring 
the detainee to stand, sit, kneel, squat, maintain sitting position 
with back against the wall, bend over chair, lean with head against 
wall, lie prone across chairs, stand with arms above head or raised to 
shoulders, or other normal physical training positions'' and requested 
that ``in the most exceptional circumstances, and on approval from [the 
commander]'' interrogators be allowed to ``use handcuffs to enforce the 
detainee's position.''
  Asked to square his public testimony with this record, General 
McChrystal responded that, when he took command in 2003, he reviewed 
the interrogation program and, in March 2004, ``reduc[ed] the frequency 
of use of several of the techniques'' by requiring high-level approval. 
He also looked to ``increase the effectiveness of the entire process 
and make it more humane'' but offered no specifics other than 
``improved facilities'' and improvements in the use of other, non-
``enhanced'' techniques. General McChrystal then acknowledged that he 
personally requested approval from General Abizaid to continue using 
several of the techniques that had just been suspended, including 
``control positions.'' General Abizaid rejected the use of ``control 
positions,'' and, according to the Senate Armed Services Committee 
report, the use of ``hooding.''
  I have numerous concerns, both about this history and about General 
McChrystal's public testimony. I have long opposed any interrogation 
techniques, whether conducted by the U.S. military or the intelligence 
community, that are not authorized by the Army Field Manual. I am thus 
dismayed by General McChrystal's personal support for the use of some 

[[Page S6538]]

these techniques, particularly the so-called control positions, and by 
his efforts to continue the techniques after they had been suspended. 
And, while I have no reason to believe that General McChrystal would 
not adhere to current law and policy, I am troubled by his failure to 
express any regret for his previous positions. Finally, I am concerned 
about General McChrystal's public testimony, which sought to convey 
that he was ``uncomfortable'' with various interrogation techniques and 
sought to ``reduce'' their use. Given the full history of his approach 
to interrogations, this testimony appears to be incomplete, at best.