Union Calendar No. 589
110th Congress Report
2d Session HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 110-914
_______________________________________________________________________
REPORT ON CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNITED STATES OVERHEAD
ARCHITECTURE
together with
MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS
SUBMITTED BY MR. REYES, CHAIRMAN, PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
October 3, 2008.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
-----
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 2008
Members of the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TECHNICAL AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE
C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER (D-MD), Chairman
ROBERT E. (BUD) CRAMER, Jr. (D-AL), HEATHER WILSON (R-NM), Ranking
Vice Chair Republican
RUSH D. HOLT (D-NJ) TERRY EVERETT (R-AL)
JAMES R. LANGEVIN (D-RI) MAC THORNBERRY (R-TX)
PATRICK J. MURPHY (D-PA)
Silvestre Reyes, HPSCI Chairman (D-TX), ex officio
Peter Hoekstra, HPSCI Ranking Member (R-MI), ex officio
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
House of Representatives,
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, October 3, 2008.
Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Madam Speaker: On behalf of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, I am pleased to transmit to the full
House of Representatives the Report on Challenges and
Recommendations for United States Overhead Architecture
authored by the Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical
Intelligence. This report has been carefully reviewed in
consultation with the appropriate agencies to insure that the
contents are unclassified.
As the 110th Congress closes, I would like to thank you for
your leadership and support of the work of the Committee. I
look forward to continuing my work on behalf of the nation and
the men and women of the Intelligence Community.
Sincerely,
Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman.
C O N T E N T S
Page
Executive Summary................................................ 1
Findings..................................................... 2
Summary of Key Subcommittee Recommendations...................... 3
Introduction..................................................... 6
Methodology.................................................. 6
Comparisons to the Past...................................... 7
Key Detailed Roundtable Findings and Recommendations............. 8
Overhead Architecture........................................ 8
Authorities.................................................. 9
Requirements Discipline...................................... 10
Research and Development..................................... 11
Contracting and Acquisition Strategy......................... 14
Program Management........................................... 16
Workforce Development........................................ 18
Use of Commercial Space Services............................. 21
Government Restrictions on Space-Related Commerce............ 22
Conclusions...................................................... 23
APPENDICES....................................................... 25
Appendix A: Roundtable Participants.......................... 25
Appendix B: Questions Posed to Roundtable Participants....... 26
Minority Views................................................... 27
Additional Views................................................. 30
Union Calendar No. 589
110th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session 110-914
======================================================================
REPORT ON CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNITED STATES OVERHEAD
ARCHITECTURE
_______
October 3, 2008.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Reyes, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence submits the
following report on challenges and recommendations for United
States overhead architecture.
Executive Summary
The United States is losing its preeminence in space. A
once robust partnership between the U.S. Government and the
American space industry has been weakened by years of demanding
space programs, the exponential complexity of technology, and
an inattention to acquisition discipline. The U.S. Government
created an environment that ensured the success of its space
missions in the 1950s and 1960s. It provided appropriate
funding and personnel needed to accomplish ambitious missions
within a reasonable schedule. While the Government still has
creative personnel, innovative ideas, and adequate funding,
American dominance in space is diminishing. The purpose of this
report is to find out why.
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence (TNT or
Subcommittee) has studied the problems with our nation's
overhead satellite architecture. The perceived failure of the
Intelligence Community and Department of Defense (DOD) to
develop an integrated overhead roadmap or architectural plan
for the intelligence mission in space is the principle
motivation for this study. Recent organizational changes and
inter-departmental agreements involving the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), the Department of
Defense (DOD), and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
have highlighted the question of leadership of space
acquisition programs.
The Subcommittee produced this report to document the
issues and challenges facing the development, acquisition, and
execution of a space architecture to serve the demands of the
U.S. Intelligence Community and DOD. This report examines the
narrowing gap between U.S. capabilities and emerging space
powers such as Russia, India, and China. Space continues to
play an increasingly important role in supporting the national
security interests of the United States. As the number and
types of national security threats increase, the nation must
continue to deliver space capabilities that provide policy-
makers and the war fighter with the information they need.
The next few years are a defining moment for the United
States. Experts in both industry and the executive branch were
unanimous in their view that the United States is at an
important crossroads with respect to its space architecture and
that decisive action is required to chart a successful course
to preeminence in space.
FINDINGS
This study resulted in a compilation of Subcommittee
recommendations that, if implemented effectively, will help
restore space acquisition excellence and maintain the United
States' position as the world's leader in space. There are five
key areas of concern.
First, there is no comprehensive space architecture or
strategic plan that accommodates current and future national
security priorities, DOD and Intelligence Community capability
requirements, and budget constraints. The DNI and the Secretary
of Defense need to develop this plan. The current trends with
respect to the space constellation indicate that it will soon
be incapable of satisfying the national security needs.
Second, programs jointly funded in the National
Intelligence Program (NIP) and Military Intelligence Program
(MIP), requiring joint decisions by the DNI and DOD, result in
delayed program starts. While having an appropriate space
architecture will clarify the desired capabilities, the
acquisition process would benefit greatly by moving away from
joint funding and by having more clearly defined authorities.
Third, research and development (R&D) receives inconsistent
funding despite the link between many failed acquisition
programs and insufficient upfront R&D investment. Research
investments must be treated as a national security priority.
Programs need to clearly define what needs to be accomplished
in the R&D, pre-acquisition, and development phases in order to
have a successful satellite program.
Fourth, the Government's expectations of the commercial
data providers are inconsistent and ambiguous. The Intelligence
Community and DOD must define more clearly the Govermment's
expectation surrounding the use of commercial services and
develop the systems needed to more easily access and deliver
data to Government customers.
Finally, current statutes and regulations may negatively
impact the U.S. space industry. The U.S. Government must review
the impact on the space industrial base of the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations and other statutes and regulations
that restrict space commerce to ensure that the effort to
protect U.S. national security interests does not unnecessarily
hinder the success of U.S. industry.
This study is an important first step and the Subcommittee
sincerely expresses its appreciation to the many experts that
participated. The Subcommittee looks forward to continued
support for space programs and to the implementation of changes
that keep the United States preeminent in space.
Summary of Key Subcommittee Recommendations
Overhead Architecture/Roadmap
The Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) should develop a common
architecture for all space-related systems (imagery, signals,
communications, etc.) that supports prioritized national and
military needs and takes into consideration budget constraints.
Organizations proposing new satellites should demonstrate how
their proposals fit into the architecture.
The DNI and SECDEF should agree to the
architecture and related funding decisions. The SECDEF's
agreement ensures that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence (USD(I)) and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) both agree
with the strategy.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) should
carefully consider what space programs it recommends for
funding until both the DNI and SECDEF agree on an architecture.
Authorities
The executive branch should review and, as
appropriate, recommend changes to the law and other authorities
that clarify the DNI's role with respect to jointly funded
programs.
OMB should consider more closely what programs it
decides to fund through the NIP and the MIP.
Requirements discipline
Members of the DNI Mission Requirements Board
(MRB) and the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
should prioritize stakeholder needs and consider the impact of
programmatic changes on cost and schedule.
Program managers should ensure that stakeholders
understand impacts of any change to program requirements.
Program managers must be empowered and resourced to deny
requests to change program requirements if their request would
unacceptably impact cost, schedule, or system performance.
Acquisition organizations should encourage less
complex design solutions. If more complex technology or designs
are needed, program managers should ensure that risk mitigation
options are funded and captured in the schedule.
Research & Development
The DNI and component agencies of the Intelligence
Community should treat R&D as a national security priority and
keep R&D funding stable. Agency leadership should protect long-
term R&D funds from being used for immediate operational needs.
The Deputy DNI/Acquisition and the DNI's Director
of Science and Technology (DST) should define what technology
maturation steps need to take place in an R&D phase as opposed
to in a pre-acquisition or development phase. The DDNI/
Acquisition should ensure the pre-acquisition phase gives ample
consideration to defining technology and manufacturing
maturity.
Agencies should develop a technology transition
roadmap to keep R&D projects from sitting unused after they
have been demonstrated to provide utility.
The DDNI/Acquisition and individual program
managers should balance the risk of using unproven technologies
by considering the option of using less-capable, but well-
tested technology. The ODNI should develop policy governing the
use of proven and immature technology.
The DST should assess who in Government and in
industry yield the best R&D results and determine whether
similar models would work well for the Intelligence Community's
space-related R&D programs.
Contracting and acquisition strategy
The DDNI/Acquisition should examine the possible
overuse of sole source contracting and its impact on the
industrial base.
The DDNI/Acquisition should explore the broader
use of block buys where appropriate. This could mean having one
vendor develop many systems, or it could mean having the
Government play a larger role in acquisition by purchasing bulk
parts on one contract and providing the parts as Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE) to another contract. Sufficient
information should be provided to Congress to allow it to
assess the funding commitment required for a block buy and
determine the feasibility of authorizing and appropriating
funds in this way.
The DDNI/Acquisition should work with Congress to
determine the best way to structure a Nunn-McCurdy threshold
for major systems acquisitions in the Intelligence Community in
order to keep Congress better informed of acquisition cost
growth.
Program management
Acquisition organizations should embrace
acquisition reform that develops and maintains qualified
Government acquisition personnel while reducing dependence on
systems engineering/technical assistance (SETA) contractors.
The DDNI/Acquisition should mandate that
sufficient margin is built into overall program cost during
initiation of a complex program. The DDNI/Acquisition should
review the track record of Intelligence Community independent
cost estimates (ICEs) to determine if they have been providing
adequate margin or if the risk assessment methodology needs to
be adjusted.
The DDNI/Acquisition should mandate longer tours
for acquisition personnel supporting high priority, multi-year
projects. If rotations are necessary, program offices should
provide sufficient time for overlap and transition of
responsibility.
Workforce development
The DNI and SECDEF should address near-term
workforce issues given the number of retirements that may occur
in the next two to five years. The DNI should consider
developing incentives to keep skilled, retirement-eligible
workers on the job until new recruits can replace them; and
determining to what extent security clearance and other hiring
policies and practices are unnecessarily hindering the hiring
of first- and second-generation scientists and engineers.
Industry and Government should work together to
encourage students to pursue science and engineering careers
and ensure that there are ample opportunities for diverse
experiences and growth. Recommended steps include:
Enhancing partnerships with K-12
institutions to improve math and science education. For
example, the DNI should review and build upon the
National Security Agency (NSA) program that partners
employees with students from the local community to
enhance math, science, and foreign language training;
and
Partnering with universities to prepare
students for space careers and working with
universities to align curriculum with future space
needs.
Aerospace workforce trade groups should review
whether retirement and other benefits could be more easily
portable across the aerospace industry. This would help
encourage contractors to view each other as partners in support
of national security instead of as competing business
interests.
A joint panel comprised of employees from NRO and
ODNI should assess the benefits and challenges of establishing
a limited NRO career service. The panel should explore the
viability of recruiting civilian program managers and system
engineers to fill key leadership and program management roles,
and offering mid-level to senior-level military officers with
program management and system engineering experience an
opportunity to join the career service.
Commercial space services
A joint panel of the DDNI/Collection, NRO,
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and commercial
data providers should assess whether any barriers impede the
tasking or delivery of commercial imagery to potential users.
If the panel identifies any technical barriers it should
perform a cost-benefit analysis of removing those barriers. The
panel should also seek to eliminate policy barriers that
unnecessarily impede the use of commercial imagery services.
The DNI and SECDEF should approach the use of other commercial
services that serve Government, such as communications or other
applications, in the same way.
The DNI and SECDEF should recommend to the next
President whether to strengthen or clarify National Security
Presidential Directives 27 and 49 so that all acquisition
organizations understand their responsibilities under these
directives with respect to using commercial services.
Government restrictions on space-related commerce
The DDNI/Acquisition should assess the impact that
current laws and regulations, including International Traffic
in Arms Regulations (ITAR), are having on the space industrial
base, and it should report recommended changes to Congress.
NGA, as the action agency for commercial remote
sensing data to the DOD and Intelligence Community, should help
ensure that the rules governing how commercial remote sensing
is regulated do not impede the ability of this commercial
industry to compete in international markets.
Introduction
During the 110th Congress, the Committee held several
hearings and numerous briefings to address the challenges
associated with the nation's space architecture. Given the
recognized importance of satellites for information and
intelligence gathering, and the need for a healthy space
constellation, the Subcommittee further explored space issues
during a series of roundtables on the overhead architecture.
Details of the roundtable methodology are provided in a
subsequent section.
The goal of this report is to capture the observations and
recommendations obtained from participants and set forth
Subcommittee recommendations on issues affecting the space
architecture. Discussions with industry were previously
documented in an interim report that was shared with industry
participants and executive branch officials in February 2008.
The interim report served as the basis for additional questions
that were posed to the executive branch during their
roundtables.
The Committee has raised many of these issues before. In
spite of bipartisan engagement within the Committee, the
Administration appears to have ignored the language in multiple
intelligence authorization bills, which identified the need to
ensure longer tours for acquisition personnel, assess the use
of advisory contractors, and develop a comprehensive
architecture for space. The nation cannot afford to continue to
ignore the issues that hamper the effective development and
management of an integrated space architecture.
The Subcommittee further notes the August 2008 release of
the National Space Strategy Independent Assessment Panel
Report, also known as the Allard Commission report.
Subcommittee observations were previously shared with
Independent Assessment Panel (IAP) members and are reflected in
the Allard Commission report. The Subcommittee observes that
many of the IAP's findings and some of the IAP's
recommendations are similar to those captured in this report.
METHODOLOGY
To address critical issues with the overhead architecture,
the Subcommittee chairman chose to use a roundtable format to
supplement the traditional format of hearings and briefings.
The roundtable approach facilitated more open-ended discussions
between members, outside participants, and staff. In contrast
to a formal hearing, there were no time limits on questions or
responses. Most importantly, views shared during the
roundtables were not for attribution. As such, comments
captured in this report are attributed to either ``industry
participants'' or to ``executive branch participants'' rather
than to the companies or individuals who made the statements.
Industry participants included senior management from five
U.S. satellite prime contractors, including Boeing, General
Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon. In
addition, two U.S, commercial imagery providers, Digital Globe
and Geo Eye, participated. Other input was received from Ball
Aerospace, ITT Corporation, Orbital Sciences, and
representatives from the Satellite Industries Association. In
order to encourage open dialogue with industrial partners, the
Subcommittee did not invite representatives from the executive
branch to participate in the industry sessions.
Two roundtable sessions were held with executive branch
participants. The first roundtable included the Director of NGA
and the Director of NRO. The second roundtable included the
DNI, the USD(I), the Deputy Director of the NGA, the Deputy
Director of National Intelligence for Acquisition (DDNI/
Acquisition), and the Deputy Director of National Intelligence
for Collection (DDNI/Collection).
The roundtable discussions were structured around questions
provided to participants in advance of meetings (see Appendix
B). These questions provided a framework for discussions
without limiting the topics of conversation. The overarching
goal was to elicit recommendations to develop an enduring
overhead constellation, and to maintain a healthy aerospace
industrial base and Government workforce.
Executive branch participants were asked to comment on
industry's findings and recommendations, in addition to
offering their own recommendations. They were also asked to
comment on whether any existing policies or laws were impeding
their ability to accomplish their mission.
Participant comments from each roundtable were analyzed by
the Subcommittee to develop the findings and recommendations
presented in this report.
COMPARISONS TO THE PAST
Throughout the roundtable discussions, participants made
repeated references to the way programs were managed in the
past, drawing a comparison between what worked and what did
not. These discussions made obvious reference to the national
security environment of the Cold War period when a well-focused
national security strategy existed to meet the Soviet nuclear
threat. There was consensus that the Cold War threat, because
of its intense focus, was in some regard easier to meet than
today's multi-polar, asymmetric threat.
In 1958, Congress passed the National Defense Education Act
(NDEA) providing funding and motivation for U.S. colleges and
universities to improve their technical curricula and produce
more graduates. Today, many of the leading engineers who
benefited from the NDEA are nearing retirement. Many roundtable
discussions centered on the need for a new initiative, like the
NDEA, to stimulate technology-related education.
The threat of the Cold War created an environment of
urgency within the space industry. Roundtable participants
cited the passion of this era and the dedication to success
that developed within the space industry. One participant
stated, ``No one dreamed of slipping a schedule. We worked
weekends, holidays and made important system decisions based on
maintaining our launch date. Today, many program managers do
not hesitate to slip a program milestone.'' This sense of
urgency, coupled with more effectively defined requirements,
well-defined decision authorities, strong program management,
and effective contract management, will be necessary if the
United States is to succeed.
Key Detailed Roundtable Findings and Recommendations
The following section captures the views of both industry
roundtable participants and executive branch roundtable
participants on topics relating to the development and
acquisition of a space architecture. Where differences exist,
they are noted. Subcommittee views are derived from analysis of
roundtable participant input and independent research and are
presented as a series of recommendations to the executive
branch and to industry.
OVERHEAD ARCHITECTURE
The need for an integrated overhead architecture has been
articulated by Congress, the executive branch, and industry.
Members of Congress have repeatedly expressed their
disappointment that no architectural plan exists, and have
repeatedly asked the Administration for the plan. The lack of
an integrated architecture was one of the first issues to face
the DNI after the office was established in 2005. The
frustration has continued to this day, and many believe that
the nation is no closer to having a clearly defined plan than
it was three years ago.
Although the executive branch participants believe that
they have provided a plan for a future architecture, members of
the Subcommittee disagree. Similarly, industry participants
expressed frustration that the Administration has not provided
a plan with sufficient detail to enable them to effectively
focus their internal investments or align their business plans
to meet Government's future needs.
To better understand this difference of opinion, it seems
prudent to address what Members expect from the Administration.
The architecture must include four well-defined elements:
A problem-driven approach that is based on
securing prioritized, well-defined national security
interests;
A comprehensive solution that balances the
financial investment against the overall risk to
national security;
A realistic delivery schedule that meets the
defined timeline that in many cases must be flexible
and updated against the risk; and
A plan to migrate from a requirements-based
acquisition approach toward a capabilities-based
strategy, with the proviso that a purely capabilities-
based approach could introduce additional challenges.
Both industry and executive branch participants stated that
the most important characteristic of the architecture is for it
to include satellites owned by both DOD and the Intelligence
Community. However, many participants expressed concern that
some DOD personnel believe DOD needs its own space architecture
to meet the needs of the war fighter. In response, executive
branch participants stated several times that it is not in the
best interest of the country to pursue separate national and
military space architectures.
Some executive branch participants suggested that space
systems may not be best suited to meet the needs of the war
fighter, but that space can still support the fight. It was
suggested that advanced airborne capabilities best address the
war fighters' needs and high resolution capabilities from space
best address strategic intelligence needs. Based on current DOD
plans, it is clear that DOD acquisition decision-makers do not
agree. Recent funding decisions and the shifting of space
programs from the NIP to the MIP exacerbate the issue. This
specific issue is further discussed in the section on
Authorities.
Recommendations on the Architecture
The DNI and SECDEF should develop a common
architecture for all space-related systems (imagery, signals,
communications, etc.) that supports prioritized national and
military needs and takes into consideration budget constraints.
Organizations proposing new satellites should demonstrate how
their proposals fit into the architecture.
The DNI and SECDEF should agree to the
architecture and related funding decisions. The SECDEF's
agreement ensures that USD(I) and USD(AT&L) both agree with the
strategy.
OMB should carefully consider what space programs
it recommends for funding until both the DNI and SECDEF agree
on an architecture.
AUTHORITIES
Executive branch participants stated their concern over the
dilution of authorities and accountability for acquisition
decisions. Their concern focused particularly on programs
funded jointly by the NIP and the MIP. The DNI tried to improve
coordination with the DOD by creating a position for the USD(I)
as Director of Defense Intelligence under the DNI.\1\ Although
the USD(I) advocates for intelligence, the USD(I) does not have
acquisition decision authority within the DOD. The USD(AT&L)
decides all acquisition matters. So for example, even if the
USD(I) and the DNI decided on a single system that balanced
both military and national users' needs, the USD(AT&L) could
decide on a different system that better served DOD needs (as
interpreted by USD(AT&L)). The inability of the USD(I) to
control the final acquisition decision for a program can lead
to decisions over jointly funded programs that do not equally
benefit the national and military customer. Participants
suggested that accountability and responsibility are dispersed
when multiple individuals make decisions and that success is
more easily achieved when it is clear who is in charge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to be Dual-Hatted
as Director of Defense Intelligence.'' U.S. Department of Defense News
Release No. 637-07. May 24, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Subcommittee notes that space is only one area in which
there are potential authority conflicts. Public law currently
requires shared decision authority for all national
intelligence systems whose acquisition is managed by a DOD
agency or office (NGA, NRO, NSA). To date, issues have been
avoided because funding mainly comes from the NIP for many of
these development activities. In the future, should other non-
space programs be jointly funded between the NIP and MIP,
similar authority-related problems could be expected.
Recommendations on authorities
The executive branch should review and, as
appropriate, recommend changes to the law and other authorities
that clarify the DNI's role with respect to jointly funded
programs.
OMB should consider more closely what programs it
decides to fund through the NIP and MIP.
REQUIREMENTS DISCIPLINE
Roundtable industry participants suggested that current
satellite programs regularly fail to demonstrate requirements
discipline. The inability of Government program managers to
constrain requirements as satellite programs develop results in
excessive cost increases, schedule delays, and performance
compromises. Program managers, unwilling to deny requests to
add previously unplanned capabilities to a satellite, will
continue to expand the operational performance specifications
of the satellite. They are further motivated to accept
additional requirements because those advocating for the new
requirement usually bring additional funding that is mistakenly
believed to be an overall benefit to the program. This lack of
dedication to the original program requirements increases
program cost, delays the program's schedule, and degrades
program performance.
The Subcommittee identified four specific stumbling blocks
to an efficient and effective requirements discipline.
First and foremost, overhead programs lack adequate
requirements definition. With so few satellites being launched,
many Government organizations seek to add capability to a
spacecraft well after the base requirements have been
established and developed. This leads to a constantly evolving
set of requirements that cannot be managed within current
acquisition guidelines. Satellite requirements develop among
multiple constituencies, without disciplined management to
review and adjudicate potential change orders to programs. This
``requirements creep'' costs millions of dollars and delays
programs in a seemingly never-ending cycle of requirements
review and engineering modifications.
The undisciplined requirement phenomenon is discussed in
the Report of the Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific
Advisory Board Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National
Security Space Programs. According to that report, there was an
increased use of space assets during the 1990s. Currently there
are large numbers of operational users, including some with
regional interests and niche missions. The user base continues
to expand in response to the war on terrorism, bringing with
them new requirements. For many programs, the net result has
been dramatically increased requirements with ineffective
systems engineering, insufficient financial impact assessments,
or both, which in turn overwhelm the existing requirements
management process.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Report of the Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific
Advisory Board Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National Security
Space Programs, May 2003, p. 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the Intelligence Community and DOD seem at odds
with each other over satellite program requirements. Without
adequately defining the requirements of the combatant
commanders, the Air Force and Intelligence Community are forced
to hit an ever-moving or invisible target in managing overhead
program requirements. When asked to list requirements that have
not been satisfied by current systems, DOD did not identify a
single unsatisfied intelligence need to the Committee.\3\ The
competition between DOD and the Intelligence Community for
mission-specific requirements must be better coordinated by the
ODNI, USD(I) and USD(AT&L).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The Subcommittee acknowledges that some imagery products from
the current national systems may be more difficult to share with DOD
partners, but that is a policy failure, not a failure of the national
systems to meet warfighter intelligence needs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, requirements for satellite programs are not
developed in a manner consistent with technological maturity.
Whatever the mechanism to bring more discipline to the
satellite program management, it must acknowledge the
limitations of technology. The powerful constituencies behind
program requirements seek to capitalize on technology that is
on the very leading edge of development. This increases both
risk and cost, often without any significant enhancement in
capability. Future programs must improve the management of
untested technology with evaluations by known experts, not by
those with a vested interest in the cost of the program.
Additional information on this issue is captured under the
research and development section.
Fourth, the selection of complex system designs contributes
to program risk without the benefit of enhancing system
capability. Its impact is similar to the incorporation of
immature technology. Technical experts and systems engineers
must be consulted regularly in order to reduce the risk of
system integration issues. The integration of immature
technology into an overly complex system design is a recipe for
failure.
Recommendations on requirements discipline
Members of the DNI Mission Requirements Board
(MRB) and DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)
should prioritize stakeholder needs and consider the impact of
programmatic changes on cost and schedule.
Program managers should ensure that stakeholders
understand impacts of any change to the requirements. Program
managers should be empowered and resourced to deny requests to
change program requirements if their acceptances would
unacceptably impact cost, schedule, or system performance.
Acquisition organizations should encourage less
complex design solutions. If more complex technology or designs
are needed, program managers should ensure that risk mitigation
options are funded and captured in the schedule.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
R&D was raised as an issue during nearly every roundtable.
There is consensus among participants that more R&D needs to be
conducted and that the level of R&D funding needs to be
increased. Some participants suggested that as a goal, 10
percent of an organization's budget, instead of the typical
three to four percent, should be devoted to R&D. Both industry
and executive branch participants agree that competing
programmatic challenges often make the 10 percent goal
unreachable but a more realistic funding level may exist.
Examples were given describing how challenging it is to fund
space R&D while the country is recovering from past space
failures and also fighting two wars.
The issue of inadequate R&D maturation was raised by both
industry and executive branch roundtable participants.
Acquisition programs have suffered when they depended upon
technologies that had not been fully matured prior to program
initiation. There were diverging viewpoints regarding the
integration of R&D into ongoing program developments. Some
participants suggested not allowing unproven technologies to be
included within a program development; other participants
suggested requiring technology insertion points, such that if a
new technology is not ready by the time the insertion milestone
is reached, that a proven technology be used instead.
According to roundtable participants, a program acquisition
cycle has three distinct phases: R&D, pre-acquisition, and
development. The purpose of R&D is to show a path to the future
and to allow mistakes to be made prior to entering the pre-
acquisition or development phase. It is too costly to encourage
mistakes to be made once a program has committed to moving into
development. The purpose of the pre-acquisition phase is to
drive out risks and determine if a program is ready to enter
full development. The Subcommittee observes that many of the
current and historically troubled development efforts bypassed
some of these steps, gave far less attention to early steps, or
tried to rush the amount of time that steps were given.
According to some participants, the space community stopped
following this acquisition model due to political, budget, and
schedule pressures. Participants cited examples of programs
that did not spend enough time in the pre-acquisition phase
before going into full development. When program managers
discovered that significant technology development was needed,
schedule and funding plans should have been addressed. Lower
risk technology options should have been chosen, or should have
been developed in parallel. As a lesson learned, executive
branch participants now recommend using both Technology
Readiness Level (TRL) and Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL)
metrics to determine the maturity and manufacturability of the
technology. These metrics are reviewed at the senior
Acquisition Readiness Boards where a decision is made to move
forward in each acquisition phase.
Some industry participants countered that many risks could
be eliminated by choosing only mature technology and holding
requirements firm. This group offered examples of successful
satellite development efforts that used only parts with high
TRLs and MRLs. Many of these examples were from companies
providing commercial services, where cost overruns more
directly impact company profit. Some industry participants
suggested that contract proposals should be evaluated and
awarded based on current capabilities, not assertions of future
capabilities, unless the Government can tolerate the risk.
Other industry participants countered that the nation has only
excelled to date because it took risks with leading edge
technologies. Both industry and the executive branch agreed
that the high risk technology model can work, but the
Government must invest sufficiently and provide enough schedule
margin to manage the risk.
There is a perception by some industry participants that
the Intelligence Community has become risk averse because of
the way the Government chooses to invest in technology. They
suggested that typically, by the time a contract is awarded for
a new system, the customer's needs have become time critical.
As a result, schedules are often compressed to a point that no
failure can be tolerated.
Both groups stated that in some cases it makes sense to
demonstrate a technology and validate that it meets customer
requirements prior to requiring its use in an operational
system. Executive branch participants noted that while
demonstrations are useful for some technologies, not every
system needs to be demonstrated. They also noted that when it
comes to funding operational systems and demonstrations,
demonstrations often lose in the battle over funding.
Participants gave examples of organizations that
simultaneously support both evolutionary and revolutionary
technology improvements. They described how evolutionary
changes build upon the success of operational systems, while
revolutionary changes pave the way for future operational
programs. Industry participants further noted that by having
more R&D in the pipeline, not only is there room for failure,
but there is added stability for industry. They noted that
having more projects supports having more technology options
from which to choose future operational systems.
Some industry participants noted that the Intelligence
Community would benefit from allowing more organizations to
participate in Government R&D efforts, specifically by allowing
multiple contractors to work on the same R&D projects. The
government would then have the ability to choose the best
option while giving more than one company an opportunity to win
future bids to manufacture the delivered prototype. This option
boosts competition by not giving one company a competitive
advantage.
Some industry participants suggested that the Intelligence
Community can learn from organizations like the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) that specialize in
R&D and technology transition. They state that the DARPA model
has worked well for leading-edge military technology. It
encourages a ``spirit of innovation'' by providing a statement
of concept rather than set requirements. DARPA often funds
multiple contractors, selects the best prototypes, and works to
transition the technology to a partner/sponsor.
The Intelligence Community recently formed the Intelligence
Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA). Industry
participants stated that the success of IARPA will ultimately
depend upon several factors which include, but are not limited
to, a continued focus on leading-edge, intelligence related
R&D; good leadership; effective cross-community coordination;
and a sustained funding commitment. Executive branch
participants suggested that IARPA can play a role in ensuring
that R&D is a priority in the Intelligence Community. They also
noted that there will be tension between the agencies and
IARPA, much like between the military services and DARPA, but
the DNI must continue to work toward effective communication
between IARPA and the rest of the Intelligence Community.
Recommendations on R&D
The DNI and component agencies of the Intelligence
Community should treat R&D as a national security priority and
keep R&D funding stable. Agency leadership should protect long-
term R&D funds from being used for immediate operational needs.
The DDNI/Acquisition and the DNI's Director of
Science and Technology (DST) should define what technology
maturation steps need to take place in an R&D phase as opposed
to a pre-acquisition phase or development phase. The DDNI/
Acquisition should ensure the pre-acquisition phase gives ample
consideration to defining technology and manufacturing
maturity.
Agencies should develop a technology transition
roadmap to keep R&D projects from sitting unused after they
have been demonstrated to provide utility.
The DDNI/Acquisition and individual program
managers should balance the risk of using unproven technologies
by considering the option of using less-capable, but well-
tested technology. The ODNI should develop policy governing the
use of proven and immature technology.
The DST should assess who in the Government and in
industry yield the best R&D successes and determine whether
similar models would work well for the Intelligence Community's
space-related R&D programs.
CONTRACTING AND ACQUISITION STRATEGY
Once all the other necessary components such as defined
requirements, R&D and pre-acquisition efforts are in place, all
participants agreed that the choice of contract vehicle, the
method of competition and source selection, and the acquisition
strategy will all have an impact on space systems acquisition.
When little development work is needed and the requirements
are clear, a firm, fixed price contract should be considered.
For a higher risk development, reimbursing for cost while
providing performance, cost, or schedule incentives would be a
better option (i.e., cost plus award or incentive fee
contract). Participants cited examples of both successful and
unsuccessful fixed price and cost-plus contracts. Fixed price
contracts are used by both larger defense contractors and by
commercial data providers (CDPs) who purchase their own
satellites to sell imagery products to the Government.
Participants noted that CDPs tend to use this contracting
strategy more often.
One element of the acquisition strategy that can
significantly impact efficiency and cost effectiveness is the
buying strategy. Industry participants note that the Government
often does not employ efficient buying strategies. It is clear
that greater savings can occasionally be realized by purchasing
multiple satellites on a single contract, also known as a
``block buy.'' In these cases, the pass-through cost charged by
the prime contractor to procure sub-components could be
reduced.\4\ Block buying is a method of contracting which
covers more than one year's requirements as an alternative to a
series of annual contracts. Block buying frees manufacturers
from having to make smaller, more costly piecemeal buys and
thus promises to reduce overall costs.\5\ Industry participants
note that past use of this acquisition strategy benefited the
Government by saving money and improving contractor
productivity.
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\4\ The history of block buys dates back to the 1960s. However,
several cancellations and funding overruns during the 1970s caused this
strategy to fall out of favor with Congress. In the early 1980s, with
the passage of section 909 of the Department of Defense Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1982 (Public Law No. 97-86), this
acquisition approach became viable once again.
\5\ Multi-year Procurement, A Desktop Guide, David R. Sutton, June
1997.
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The satellite business is, however, not a volume business;
it does not produce thousands of copies to reduce manufacturing
costs. Nevertheless, industry and executive branch roundtable
participants maintained that there were potential cost savings
and benefits, and were strongly in favor of using block buys
whenever possible. They cited examples of programs that use
this strategy to reduce costs, limit risk, and stabilize the
subcontractor base.
Some industry participants complained that recent satellite
acquisitions had not been chosen through a competitive
selection; rather, they had been sole sourced to a subset of
contractors frequently used by satellite acquisition
organizations. Given this lack of competition, these industrial
participants suggested that upcoming contract decisions may
determine the number of satellite prime contractors that
survives into the future. These same contractors stated that
limited experience should not be used to keep qualified
contractors from winning contracts. The counterargument was
also offered that significant past performance should enable
the use of sole source contracting when evolved versions of
current systems are being procured. These participants
suggested in these cases that sole source contracts save the
Government both time and money.
Executive branch and some industry participants provided
examples of programs that ran into challenges because a
contract was awarded to a company that had little experience
building the type of system desired by the Government. If the
executive branch chooses to issue contracts to companies
without demonstrated successes with similar technology, it must
improve the initial assessments of the technology maturity and
manufacturability (as described in the R&D section). The
executive branch must also ensure that sufficient resources are
applied and that realistic milestones are set.
The Defense Science Board previously reported that the
``space acquisition system is strongly biased to produce
unrealistically low cost estimates . . . [that] lead to
unrealistic budgets and unexecutable programs.'' \6\ Roundtable
participants agree that this still appears to be an issue that
must be addressed. The firm, fixed price approach to satellite
development with well-defined system requirements has become a
very attractive approach for the Government to consider as a
way to avoid low cost estimates. Because the contract price
directly impacts company profits, realistic proposals are more
likely to be received.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Report of the Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific
Advisory Board Joint Task Force on Acquisition of National Security
Space Programs, May 2003, p. 19.
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The Subcommittee finds that while the way a contract is
selected is important, the oversight of the contract will also
affect the contract's success. The Intelligence Community can
potentially learn from the implementation of the Nunn-McCurdy
Amendment as a mechanism to reign in cost-overruns at DOD.\7\
The Nunn-McCurdy Amendment requires DOD notification of the
SECDEF and Congress if costs increase by a threshold of 15
percent over current baseline estimates or 30 percent over
original baseline estimates. Additional financial repercussions
exist if the higher threshold of 25 percent and 50 percent to
the aforementioned baselines is reached. The DNI has
implemented policy within Intelligence Community Program
Guidance 105.1 \8\ that requires notification to the OMB and to
the ODNI for growth over 15 percent.
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\7\ The threshold was named after Senator Sam Nunn and
Representative David McCurdy, who proposed cost growth control
legislation as an amendment to the Department of Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1982 (Public Law No. 97-86). It was later made
permanent in the Department of Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1983 (Public Law No. 97-252).
\8\ IC Program Guidance 105.1 on Acquisition was released on July
12, 2007.
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Since the Intelligence Community has no similar statutorily
mandated cost growth threshold requiring notification to
Congress, the House and Senate agreed to include a provision
similar to Nunn-McCurdy in the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2008. More recently, the House version of
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 required
the DNI to work with Congress to tailor threshold legislation
for the Intelligence Community in order to rectify the
differences in DOD and Intelligence Community acquisition
regulations.
Recommendations on contracting
The DDNI/Acquisition should examine the possible
overuse of sole source contracting and its impact on the
industrial base.
The DDNI/Acquisition should explore the broader
use of block buys where appropriate. This could mean having one
vendor develop many systems, or it could mean having the
Government play a larger role in acquisition by purchasing bulk
parts on one contract and providing the parts as Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE) to another contract. Sufficient
information should be provided to Congress to allow it to
assess the funding commitment required for a block buy and
determine the feasibility of authorizing and appropriating
funds in this way.
The DDNI/Acquisition should work with Congress to
determine the best way to structure a Nunn-McCurdy-like
threshold for major Intelligence Community systems
acquisitions, to better keep Congress informed of acquisition
cost growth.
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
Roundtable participants suggested that a well-managed
program displays several common characteristics, including an
experienced Government team led by an experienced program
manager; an experienced industry team led by an experienced
program manager; open communication between the two teams;
ample resources; sufficient margin; and clear lines of
authority and accountability within each team.
Both industry and Government roundtable participants noted
that the ranks of experienced Government program managers began
to decrease in the 1990s with the downsizing of the defense
budget. Simultaneously, there was a push to accomplish more
with less resources; this included a push to rely more on
contractors and less on Government expertise. The result was
Contractor Total System Performance Responsibility (TSPR).\9\
TSPR was ``originally used as a contract condition for the
acquisition of new systems that obligated the prime contractor
to be totally responsible for the complete integration of an
entire weapon system. The idea of contractor TSPR was to ensure
that the Government received an integrated system that would
meet the performance requirements as defined in the system
specification.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ ``Reexamining Military Acquisition Reform: Are We There Yet?''
C. H. Hanks, E. I. Axelband, S. Lindsay, M. R. Malik, B. D. Steele.
Prepared for the United States Army by the RAND Corporation, 2005.
\10\ Ibid.
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Both the industry and executive branch participants agreed
that during this TSPR period, reliance on support contractors,
also known as systems engineering/technical assistance (SETA),
increased dramatically. Both groups agreed that Government
personnel became less able to make technical decisions on their
own. The desire to build ``faster, better, cheaper'' systems
led the Government down a path that required the contractor to
oversee itself and make decisions that were better suited to
Government personnel. Participants stated that this dependence
has become a source of frustration for both the satellite
developers and the Government. From the satellite developers'
perspective, the Government's domain expertise and technical
qualifications were replaced by an overly bureaucratic process
and increased paperwork. Executive branch participants stated
that many experienced program managers left the Government
because their skills were no longer valued. Many employees left
aerospace altogether.
The DNI created the DDNI/Acquisition position to
reestablish program management skills, stabilize funding, and
manage requirements within the Intelligence Community. The
Subcommittee believes that efforts must continue to reestablish
acquisition excellence, such as the enforcement of acquisition
Intelligence Community Directive (lCD) 105 \11\ and
Intelligence Community Program Guidance (ICPG) 105.1, and the
annual report to Congress of acquisition program management
plans.
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\11\ IC Directive 105 on Acquisition was released on August 15,
2006.
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Both groups complained that executive branch and industry
program managers do not have adequate funding margins to
accommodate unexpected problems that typically arise during the
course of a complex development effort. They described how this
sometimes results in program managers having insufficient funds
to address these unanticipated challenges and choosing not to
communicate problems to senior leadership in an attempt to
``keep the program going'' with the faint hope that things will
work out over time. Some participants recommended maintaining
up to a 20 percent margin to protect against unexpected issues
and to further motivate program managers to communicate
problems to leadership.
The Subcommittee observes that the Intelligence Community
has only been consistently funding the DNI's Independent Cost
Estimates (ICE) for a few years; the cited instances of
insufficient margin may pre-date this practice. However, the
component agencies of the Intelligence Community should be
compiling a track record of its ICEs compared to actual program
costs and making appropriate adjustments. In particular, the
DNI should ascertain whether its ICEs are making sufficient
provision for risk and ``unknown unknowns.'' If not, and the
cause is not determined to be an underlying issue such as the
previously discussed rush of immature technologies into
acquisition, then the methodology must be adjusted or the
programs must be formally allowed to program additional margin.
The results of the track record comparisons and any adjustments
that have been made should be briefed to the congressional
oversight committees at least every five years.
Industry participants further observed that Government
acquisition personnel frequently rotate during the life of the
average satellite development program, They note that most
personnel changes involve loss of program knowledge and often
require the new employee to come up to speed very quickly.
Continuity benefits both the Government team and the industry
team that supports them; an effort is needed to maintain
personnel on programs or ensure that continuity is maintained.
Recommendations on program management
Acquisition organizations should embrace
acquisition reform that develops and maintains qualified
Government acquisition personnel while reducing dependence on
systems engineering/technical assistance (SETA) contractors.
The DDNI/Acquisition should mandate that
sufficient margin is built into overall program cost during
initiation of a complex program. The DDNI/Acquisition should
review the track record of Intelligence Community ICEs to
determine if they have been providing adequate margin or if the
risk assessment methodology needs to be adjusted.
The DDNI/Acquisition should mandate longer tours
for acquisition personnel supporting high priority, multi-year
projects. If rotations are necessary, program offices should
provide sufficient time for overlap and transition of
responsibility.
WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Roundtable participants agreed that the influence of the
United States in world affairs is supported by its leadership
in space. In order to maintain its standing, the United States
must overcome three significant challenges relating to the
development of the aerospace workforce. First, space systems
are becoming ever more complex with new technologies posing
engineering and scientific challenges; employees must be
trained to understand the new challenges. Second, the space
workforce is facing a significant loss of talent and expertise
due to pending retirements and the challenge exists to smoothly
transition to a new space workforce. Third, colleges and
universities are graduating fewer scientists and engineers who
are U.S. citizens. Creative solutions are needed to encourage
more graduates and to recruit those who are already trained but
who are not supporting the Intelligence Community.
Experts in the field of space leadership suggest that an
important element is education and training. This is a
foundational issue for anything the United States wants to do
in space now and in the future.\12\ A healthy industrial base
depends on a capable workforce that can take on increasing
engineering and scientific challenges. The Subcommittee
believes that both industry and the U.S. Government must ensure
that adequate employee development and continuing education
opportunities exist to keep all personnel abreast of new
technology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ ``Space policy questions and decisions facing a new
administration,'' The Space Review, Eligar Sadeh, June 9, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subcommittee research shows that while engineering and
scientific challenges are ever present, current losses of
talent and expertise require immediate attention and directly
affect development of the space workforce. In 2007, an analysis
completed by Aerospace Corporation concluded that the national
security space workforce has eroded significantly over the last
decade. They found that employment in the U.S. aerospace and
defense industry totaled 1.1 million employees in 1990 but
dropped to 584,000 by 2003.
Compounding the loss of personnel is the fact that much of
the aerospace and defense industry workforce is nearing or has
reached retirement age. According to the Aerospace Industries
Association, the average aerospace/defense engineer in the
United States is nearly 60 years old. Today, approximately 27
percent of employed engineers are eligible for retirement and
the number of employees with science and engineering degrees
reaching traditional retirement age will triple during the next
decade. This demographic shift in the aerospace/defense
population, coupled with increased research, development, and
procurement spending, has led to the most fundamental
industrial base concern for the defense industry: a lack of
skilled and experienced scientists and engineers.\13\
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\13\ Crosslink, The State of the National Security Space Workforce,
Patricia Maloney and Michael Leon, Spring 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
An additional complicating factor in the development of the
U.S. space workforce involves the number of American students
receiving engineering and scientific degrees. A senior Defense
Acquisition University (DAU) official stated that the
acquisition community as a whole is facing a serious
demographic problem. Other sources suggest that close to 30
percent of all graduate students in science and engineering
disciplines at U.S. universities and colleges are foreign
nationals. At the post-doctorate level, the percentage of
foreign nationals in science and engineering disciplines climbs
to 60 percent.\14\
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\14\ The Space Review, Essays and Commentary about the final
Frontier, Eligar Sadeh, June 9, 2008.
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Long-term trends show that fewer U.S. students are entering
engineering programs. Although college attendance is
increasing, the interest U.S. high school seniors express in
engineering has remained flat in recent years. There will be
more jobs available than candidates because of the strict
security clearance requirements mandated for national security
employment and the general lack of available students
graduating with technical degrees. New initiatives are needed
to increase graduation rates in science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields. New policies are
needed to better recruit citizens with technical degrees that
have had difficulty entering the Intelligence Community.
NRO has its own unique workforce development issues.
Programs initiated in the 1990s ``outsourced Government
oversight,'' \15\ which resulted in a loss of talent and
experience and removed the Government program offices from day-
to-day program management. Roundtable participants discussed
the fact that the NRO does not have its own workforce. Some
executive branch participants suggested that the NRO may need a
small but dedicated workforce, such as an NRO career service,
to provide stability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ ``Reexamining Military Acquisition Reform: Are We There
Yet?'', 2005, C. H. Hanks, E. I. Axelband, S. Lindsay, M. R. Malik, B.
D. Steele. Prepared for the United States Army by the RAND Corporation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Roundtable participants also noted other factors affecting
workforce development. They stated that many engineers find
that the work in the satellite industry is repetitive and
sporadic. New engineers who choose aerospace careers are not
attracted to building identical models of existing satellites.
Because new engineering graduates perceive the space industry
as very cyclical, they enter the industry already looking for
frequent career changes. Long program timelines prohibit some
engineers from ever seeing a completed mission. In addition,
the participants stated that current relationships between
satellite developers are very competitive. Limited budgets
supporting multiple large projects drive companies to believe
that they must win business at all cost. Participants gave
examples of how limited pools of talented personnel are
sometimes lured from one company to another depending on who
wins a contract; the Government usually has to pay the added
salary costs.
However, the majority of the workforce is left to their own
devices when contract work shifts between companies. Many
workers lose valuable benefits and become frustrated when
forced to move. The Subcommittee believes that portable
benefits could minimize the frustration for employees who must
move between companies due to a loss of a contract or other
downsizing,
Recommendations on workforce development
The DNI and SECDEF should address near term
workforce issues given the number of retirements that may occur
in the next two to five years. The DNI should consider
developing incentives to keep skilled, retirement eligible
workers on the job until new recruits can replace them; and
determining to what extent security clearance and other hiring
policies and practices are impacting the hiring of first- and
second-generation scientists and engineers.
Industry and Government should work together to
encourage students to pursue science and engineering careers
and ensure that there are ample opportunities for diverse
experiences and growth. Recommended steps include:
Enhancing partnerships with K-12
institutions to improve math and science education. For
example, the DNI should review and build upon the
National Security Agency program that partners
employees with students from the local community to
enhance math, science, and foreign language training.
Partnering with universities to prepare
students for space careers and working with
universities to align curricula with future space
needs.
Aerospace workforce trade groups should review
whether retirement and other benefits could be more easily
portable across the aerospace industry. This would help
encourage contractors to view each other as partners in support
of national security instead of as competing business
interests.
A joint panel comprised of employees from the NRO
and ODNI should assess the benefits and challenges of
establishing a limited NRO career service. The panel should
explore the viability of recruiting civilian program managers
and system engineers to fill key leadership and program
management roles, and offering mid- to senior-level military
officers with program management and system engineering
experience an opportunity to join the career service.
USE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE SERVICES
The inclusion of industry representatives from both
traditional defense contractors and commercial service
providers ensured that the Intelligence Community's use of
commercial services was addressed extensively. The Government
purchases services from both commercial communications (both
space and ground based) and commercial remote sensing
companies.
National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 27: ``U.S.
Commercial Remote Sensing Space Policy'' (2003), and NSPD 49:
``U.S. National Space Policy'' (2006) both dictate that
commercial imagery services must be used where applicable and
affordable. NSPD 49 states:
Use U.S. commercial space capabilities and services
to the maximum practical extent; purchase commercial
capabilities and services when they are available in
the commercial marketplace and meet United States
Government requirements; and modify commercially
available capabilities and services to meet those
United States Government requirements when the
modification is cost effective.
On the surface, this guidance is clear. In practice, the
Commercial Data Providers (CDPs) suggest that they often
struggle for inclusion in the Intelligence Community's pool of
satellite imagery providers. They state that Government
investment in commercial services, as opposed to Government
purchase of Government-owned high-resolution systems, has been
limited.
Participants agreed that commercial imagery services are a
complementary capability that contributes substantially to
national security. Despite this acknowledgement, executive
branch participants suggested that commercial services had
significant limitations that prevented them from being used
more frequently to satisfy Government needs.
CDPs state that one reason given by Government customers
for their reluctance to rely on commercial imagery is the lack
of ``assured access.'' Assured access is loosely defined as the
ability of the customer to collect and receive data whenever it
is needed, including the ability to be prioritized over other
customers. Executive branch participants seem to believe that
the Government is only assured access to systems that it
physically owns. The commercial providers believe that a
contractual agreement would afford the same assurance.
Commercial providers have heard that potential customers
believe that it takes longer to task and receive imagery from
commercial systems. The executive branch is responsible for
both the tasking and dissemination of commercial data to
Government customers. They are also responsible for the
requirements levied on CDPs that enable the dissemination of
their data to those customers. Given where the control lies,
Subcommittee members question whether CDPs' inability to
satisfy all users is driven more by the constraints imposed on
them, rather than by anything inherently related to a
commercial service. To eliminate the argument, tasking and
dissemination systems will need to improve to enable commercial
providers to better support DOD and customers in the
Intelligence Community.
CDPs report that some Government agencies have not invited
them to bid on high resolution systems. At times these
Government agencies have restricted proposals to Government-
owned systems and not considered whether a commercial service
can satisfy the need. Agency general counsels should review the
legality of this limitation. Members question why the best
solution would not become apparent after an open competition. A
decision based on a balance between the proposed technology,
the total cost (including Government personnel in the case of a
Government-owned solution), and the past experience of the
bidder in developing a system of the same caliber, should
provide the best outcome.
Recommendations on the use of commercial space services
A joint panel of the DDNI/Collection, NRO, NGA,
and commercial data providers should assess whether any
barriers impede the tasking or delivery of commercial imagery
to potential users. If the panel identifies any technical
barriers, it should perform a cost-benefit analysis of removing
those barriers. The panel should also seek to eliminate policy
barriers that unnecessarily impede the use of commercial
imagery services. The DNI and SECDEF should approach the use of
other commercial services that serve Government, such as
communications or other applications, in the same way.
The DNI and SECDEF should recommend to the next
Administration whether to strengthen or clarify NSPD 27 and 49
so that all acquisition organizations understand their
responsibilities under these directives with respect to using
commercial services.
GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS ON SPACE-RELATED COMMERCE
The Subcommittee was surprised by the frequency with which
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) were
identified by both industry and the executive branch as an
impediment to technology development. ITAR, which is managed by
the State Department, is intended to protect sensitive
technologies and information from being transferred to nations
deemed a potential security risk. Government and industry
participants described how ITAR has motivated European
companies to establish an international (non-U.S) collaborative
R&D environment where ITAR-banned technologies are produced
indigenously, thereby defeating the premise of ITAR.\16\
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\16\ EADs and Alcatel are two companies that have profited by
selling ITAR-free technology.
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Government and industry participants asserted that U.S.
corporations are experiencing a loss of market share from
openly marketed ITAR-free products and services. They further
stated that the ITAR-free market may soon provide foreign
countries with capabilities that match some of those of the
United States, further placing U.S. companies at risk.
Commercial data providers also suggested that the U.S.
Government has imposed on them significant legal restrictions
as part of its oversight. CDPs are concerned that U.S.
restrictions on the sale of commercial imagery are beginning to
inhibit their growth and their competitiveness in foreign
markets, especially as foreign imagery satellites improve and
foreign reliance on U.S. systems diminishes.\17\
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\17\ Currently commercial companies are operating under a
panchromatic resolution restriction of 0.5 m, meaning that companies
cannot sell data of higher resolution to non-U.S. Government entities
without approval. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's
licensing office states that resolution restrictions are ``subject to
change based upon foreign availability and other considerations.''
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Recommendations on Government restrictions on space-related commerce
The DDNI/Acquisition should assess the impact that
current laws and regulations, including International Traffic
in Arms Regulations (ITAR), are having on the space industrial
base, and it should report recommended changes to Congress.
NGA, as the action agency for commercial remote
sensing data to the DOD and Intelligence Community, should help
ensure that the rules governing how commercial remote sensing
is regulated do not impede the ability of this commercial
industry to compete in international markets.\18\
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\18\ NGA participates in the Advisory Committee on Commercial
Remote Sensing (ACCRES), which provides information, advice, and
recommendations to the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and
Atmosphere on matters relating to the U.S. satellite commercial remote
sensing industry.
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Conclusions
The good news is that the United States has an enduring
space legacy. Many of the characteristics that made the
aerospace industry great in the past still exist.
Some of the issues facing the aerospace industry have
existed for many years; for example engaging and training
personnel, stabilizing funding, ensuring open competitions that
yield the best value to the Government, and minimizing agency
duplication of efforts. In recent years, the industry has been
forced to tackle new challenges such as jointly-funded programs
with unclear authorities, significant numbers of retiring
professionals, insufficient engineers/scientists graduating
from colleges and universities, and failed programs that
continue to plague current development efforts years after
their termination.
The executive branch has a choice. It can keep doing things
the way it is currently doing them, or it can respond to
Congress with a plan that clearly prioritizes and outlines all
user requirements against a timeline that shows how the
proposed systems fit into a funding-constrained architecture.
Such a step will help bring stability to the aerospace
community, both Government and industry. Admittedly, not
everyone will be happy, but everyone will understand the
roadmap, where they fit in, and where they can best contribute.
Fixing the issues that exist will not take a monumental
effort like the ``Manhattan Project,'' but it will take a
paradigm shift. Both Government and industry will need to step
away from their respective parochial interests. It will take
great integrity for leaders to make decisions, not from where
they sit in the hierarchy, but from a desire to do what is best
for the nation. The Committee is ready to support such an
effort.
APPENDICES
Appendix A: Roundtable Participants
Industry
Boeing
Digital Globe, Inc.
General Dynamics
Geo Eye
Lockheed Martin
Northrop Grumman
Raytheon Company
Other industry sources
Ball Aerospace and Technology Corporation
ITT Corporation
Orbital Sciences
Satellite Industry Associates
Executive branch
Director of National Intelligence
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Deputy Director, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Acquisition
Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Collections
Appendix B: Questions Posed to Roundtable Participants
Questions for industry participants
1. What recommendations would your company make to the DNI
as the best way ahead for our overhead architecture?
2. What key issues, if any, are being overlooked by the
Intelligence Community with respect to the way ahead decision?
Do you foresee any paths being considered that are technically
or programmatically dangerous?
3. Recognizing the importance of technical employees
entering and remaining in the aerospace industry for the
success of any program, how would you invest our nation's
resources to insure a healthy industrial base both now and in
the future? How is your company ensuring it has access to
sufficiently skilled technical employees?
Additional topics for executive branch participants
1. Best practices for managing system level requirements;
2. The role and importance of maintaining a stable research
and development program which matures technologies in advance
of initiating an acquisition;
3. The role of commercial imagery in the Intelligence
Community and Department of Defense;
4. The need for improved contract and program management;
5. Interagency collaboration and the challenges associated
with the acquisition of satellites and the acquisition of the
tasking, collection, processing, and exploitation and
dissemination systems; and
6. Challenges that are influenced by current policies or
authorities.
MINORITY VIEWS
REPORT: ``CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR UNITED STATES OVERHEAD
ARCHITECTURE''
We cannot support this report in its current form. It is
unfortunate that it fails so completely to represent the
countless hours of time invested by Committee Members and
staff, along with private sector and Executive Branch
representatives to explore the shortfalls of satellite
intelligence collection programs--America's ``overhead
architecture''. These serious shortcomings are particularly
disappointing given the continuous efforts of the Republican
Majority of the Committee during the previous Congress to force
the Administration to develop a comprehensive architecture plan
and to address significant flaws in current programs.
The report falls well short of being a succinct, balanced,
or well thought out treatment of the problems plaguing the
overhead architecture for a number of reasons. The Majority's
``challenges and recommendations'' contained in the report are
biased by the methodology used during a series of round table
discussions, and ultimately in presenting its findings. In
short, the Majority failed to:
capture participants' dissenting views;
treat problems plaguing the Nation's
overhead architecture comprehensively rather than in a
haphazard, piecemeal fashion;
address the classified systems and threats
that drive many architectural decisions;
address the importance of integrated ground
systems for tasking, processing, exploitation and
dissemination;
discuss possible adverse aspects of using
commercial space services;
protect the candor of discussions with the
Committee that were made on a ``not for-attribution''
basis;
make a linkage between acquisition practices
and maintenance of one of the Nation's most important
treasures--our dedicated aerospace professionals.
The series of roundtable discussions provided an excellent
forum for Members of the Committee to discuss and learn about
these systems, but failed to reach conclusions to help repair
policy shortcomings at the core of the Nation's overhead
architecture problems.
When participants were invited to attend the roundtable
discussions they were told that their comments would be made
without individual attribution to ensure candor. Yet, the
Majority has chosen to list the organizations that participated
in the roundtable discussions. This betrays the trust the
private sector (or for that matter, any individual) should have
in a commitment from Congress, and it also appears to falsely
suggest that the views of the participants are favored. It is
critical that We maintain the trust of the private sector and
the American people, and keep our commitments,
On substance, the Majority has failed to address the views
offered by the roundtable participants that do not agree with
their views. The unknowing reader is misled to believe that the
Majority's conclusions are the result of unanimous agreement.
For example, participants' views differed on sole source
contracting and open competitive contract bidding. Some of the
private sector participants believed that a more reliable
product results from awarding follow on work to current
contractors via a firm fixed price contract, while smaller
aerospace firms argued that they have difficulty gaining
insight needed to compete with existing performers. These are
clearly different views amongst industry participants. Failing
to include dissenting views or disagreements among participants
has resulted in a fundamentally flawed report.
The report also fails to adequately address the most
important issues related to overhead architecture. The report
does not address the need for a durable and coherent
architecture that can last through changes in administration
and congressional leadership. The report does not discuss
classified threats or classified aspects of the overhead
architecture, which are the most important issues facing us.
Instead of developing ideas and actions required to correct the
nation's architectural shortfalls, the Majority offers only
platitudes and general observations.
The Majority also ignores one of the most fundamental and
important aspects of developing an overhead architecture--the
ground segment. Few of the industry participants came prepared
to have any detailed discussions about how to improve tasking,
processing, exploitation and dissemination of information
derived from sensors in both air and space. Those systems are a
vital element of our overhead assets. This is not principally a
technology issue; it is a bureaucratic challenge. Developing an
integrated ground capability requires leadership to cut through
bureaucracy hindering its rapid improvement. This is an area
where small dollar investment could yield tremendous
improvements--which was completely unexplored by the Majority.
The report also fails to address critical issues related to
use of commercial satellites, even though a series of
Presidential decision directives encourages their use to the
maximum extent possible. Commercial remote sensing has become
an increasingly viable answer to a host of national security
demands. Recent Administration decisions to acquire tiers of
collection platforms that can operate within a comprehensive
architecture require it to address how the U.S. will
incorporate commercial remote sensing into its architecture and
to perform a more robust cost analysis balancing commercial
costs against the flexibility and capability gained through ad
hoc collection tasking changes, while also continuing the
research and development for next generation systems. The
issues involved in these discussions are complex and important
and the Majority report doesn't even mention them.
Lastly, while the report fails to address key deficiencies
in government acquisition policies that have negatively
impacted our ability to retain a stable, long-term, aerospace
workforce. Government acquisition practices have forced layoffs
and massive program reassignments when a few, expensive, highly
technical programs are started, stalled, killed and sometimes
restarted. We may need to fix those practices and focus on more
frequent and steady acquisitions with shorter life spans, The
report treats acquisition issues only superficially.
The shortfalls above are some of the most glaring problems
with this report, which cannot be called a comprehensive
effort. There are times when minor revisions can result in a
product that is useful and worthy of bipartisan support. The
flaws in this draft were so substantial that it was not
possible to improve the report in the time available. It is our
view that the report is incomplete, insufficiently rigorous and
fails to fully analyze the serious problems we face. Its
recommendations are, in some cases, superficial or self-evident
and in other cases questionable or not adequately supported. We
therefore cannot recommend it as a guide for policymakers or
decision making.
Peter Hoekstra.
Terry Everett.
Elton Gallegly.
Heather Wilson.
Mac Thornberry.
John M. McHugh.
Todd Tiahrt.
Mike Rogers.
Darrell Issa.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
I want to thank the Minority Members and staff for their
contributions to this comprehensive report. It is unfortunate,
however, that they have chosen to focus on partisanship rather
than the important issues facing our space programs. The status
of our overhead architecture and space workforce is simply too
important to taint with partisan rancor; their actions are
disappointing.
Although the roundtables generated discussions related to
the integrated ground architecture, the majority of these
discussions were classified. This unclassified report was
therefore not the proper venue to address issues related to the
ground architecture. Instead, this is an appropriate topic for
further study in the 111th Congress.
Finally, I want to thank all staff who contributed toward
this report including Robert Minehart, Staff Director for the
Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence, Don
Campbell, Stacey Dixon, and Mark Young. In addition, I would
also like to thank Frank Garcia of the Minority staff whose
timely input, independent of the Minority Views, contributed
substantially to this report.
C. A. Dutch Ruppersberger.