69-006
110TH CONGRESS
REPORT
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
2d Session
110-665
--INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2009
MAY 21, 2008- Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed
Mr. REYES, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 5959]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
 The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom
was referred the bill (H.R. 5959) to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2009 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and
the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and
for other purposes, having considered the same, report favorably
thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do
pass.

CONTENTS
Page
H.R. 5959, as reported to House
1
Purpose
30
Overall Perspective on the Classified Annex and Committee Intent
31
Scope of Committee Review
31
Committee Statement and Views
31
Overview
31
Committee Review
32
The Legislation
32
Areas of Special Interest
34
Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative
34
Overreliance on Supplemental Funding
35
Human Intelligence Capability Throughout the World
35
Issues Regarding Committee Notification of Syria's Nuclear Program
36
Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947
36
Diversity in the Intelligence Community
37
Committee Investigation into the Destruction of Interrogation Videotapes by the Central Intelligence Agency
37
Creation of a National Applications Office in the Department of Homeland Security
38
Major Systems Acquisitions
38
Acquisition Program Performance Notification
39
Advanced Research and Development
39
Future Course for Overhead Architecture
40
Integration of the Counterintelligence Field Activity into the Defense Intelligence Agency
40
FBI's Use of National Security Letters
41
Global Climate Change
42
Committee Consideration and Roll Call Votes
42
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of the Amendment
46
Title I--Intelligence
46
Section 101--Authorization of appropriations
46
Section 102--Classified Schedule of Authorizations
46
Section 103--Personnel ceiling adjustments
46
Section 104--Intelligence Community Management Account
46
Section 105--Limitation on the use of covert action funds
47
Section 106--Prohibition on use of funds to implement `Five and Out' program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
47
Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System
47
 Section 201--Authorization of appropriations
47
Section 202--Technical modification to mandatory retirement provision of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act
47
Title III--General Provisions
47
Section 301--Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law
47
Section 302--Enhanced flexibility in non-reimbursable details to elements of the Intelligence Community
47
Section 303--Multi-level security clearances
48
Section 304--Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for intelligence collection personnel
48
Section 305--Annual personnel level assessments for the Intelligence Community
48
Section 306--Comprehensive report on intelligence community contractors
49
Section 307--Report on proposed pay-for-performance intelligence community personnel management system
50
Section 308--Report on plan to increase diversity within the Intelligence Community
50
Section 309--Report on security clearance determinations
51
Section 311--Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
51
Section 312--Clarification of definition of Intelligence Community under the National Security Act of 1947
51
Section 313--Modification of availability of funds for different intelligence activities
51
Section 314--Protection of certain national security information
52
Section 315--Extension of authority to delete information about receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations
52
Section 316--Report on
compliance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and related
provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006
53
Section 317--Incorporation of reporting requirements
54
Section 318--Repeal of certain reporting requirements
54
Section 319--Enhancement of critical skills training program
54
Section 320--Comprehensive national cybersecurity initiative advisory panel
54
Title IV--Matters Relating To Elements of the Intelligence Community
54
Section 401--Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
54
Section 402--Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the Transportation Security Oversight Board
55
Section 403--Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology
55
Section 404--Leadership and location of certain offices and officials
55
Section 405--Plan to implement recommendations of the data center energy efficiency reports
55
Section 406--Semiannual reports on the nuclear programs of Iran, Syria, and North Korea
56
Section 407--Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community
56
Section 408--Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
56
Section 409--Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the Intelligence Community
58
Section 410--Repeal of certain authorities relating to the office of the National Counterintelligence Executive
58
Section 411--National Intelligence Estimate on weapons of mass destruction in Syria
58
Section 412--Annual report on intelligence resources dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan
59
Section 413--Ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances
59
Section 414--Security clearance reciprocity
59
Section 415--Report on international traffic in arms regulations
59
Section 416--Report on nuclear trafficking
59
Section 417--Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit unauthorized disclosures of classified information
60
Section 421--Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency
60
Section 422--Inapplicability to
the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency of requirement for
annual report on progress in auditable financial statements
60
Section 423--Technical amendments relating to titles of certain CIA positions
61
Section 424--Clarifying amendments relating to Section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004
61
Section 425--Prohibition on the
use of private contractors for interrogations involving person in the
custody or control of the Central Intelligence Agency
61
Section 431--Integration of the Counterintelligence Field Activity into the Defense Intelligence Agency
61
Section 441--Clarification of
inclusion of the Coast Guard and Drug Enforcement Administration as
elements of the Intelligence Community
62
Section 442--Report on transformation of the intelligence capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
62
Title V--Other Matters
63
Section 501--Extension of
National Commission for Review of Research and Development Programs of
the United States Intelligence Community
63
Section 502--Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947
63
Section 503--Report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets
63
Section 504--Notice of intelligence regarding North Korea and China
63
Section 505--Sense of Congress regarding use of intelligence resources
64
Section 511--Technical amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
64
Section 512--Technical amendments to the multi-year National Intelligence Program
64
Section 513--Technical
clarifications of certain references to Joint Military Intelligence
Program and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
64
Section 514--Technical Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947
64
Section 515--Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
64
Section 516--Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule
64
Section 517--Technical amendments relating to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
65
Correspondence with Other Committees Regarding Particular Provisions
65
 Letter from Chairman Berman to Chairman Reyes
65
 Letter from Chairman Reyes to Chairman Berman
65
 Letter from Chairman Skelton to Chairman Reyes
66
 Letter from Chairman Reyes to Chairman Skelton
67
 Letter from Chairman Thompson to Chairman Reyes
67
 Letter from Chairman Reyes to Chairman Thompson
68
 Letter from Chairman Conyers to Chairman Reyes
68
 Letter from Chairman Reyes to Chairman Conyers
69
 Letter from Chairman Waxman to Chairman Reyes
69
 Letter from Chairman Reyes to Chairman Waxman
70
Correspondence with Congressional Budget Office
71
 Letter from Chairman Reyes to Mr. Peter Orszag, Director
71
 Letter from Mr. Orszag to Chairman Reyes
71
 Congressional Budget Office Estimate
71
Changes to Existing Law
73
Minority Views
114

 The amendment is as follows:
 Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
 (a) Short Title- This Act may be cited as the `Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009'.
 (b) Table of Contents- The table of contents for this Act is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Limitation on the use of covert action funds.
Sec. 106. Prohibition on use of funds to implement `5 and out' program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 202. Technical modification to mandatory retirement provision of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Subtitle A--Personnel Matters
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law.
Sec. 302. Enhanced flexibility in nonreimbursable details to elements of the intelligence community.
Sec. 303. Multi-level security clearances.
Sec. 304. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for intelligence collection personnel.
Sec. 305. Annual personnel level assessments for the intelligence community.
Sec. 306. Comprehensive report on intelligence community contractors.
Sec. 307. Report on proposed pay for performance intelligence community personnel management system.
Sec. 308. Report on plans to increase diversity within the intelligence community.
Sec. 309. Report on security clearance determinations.
Subtitle B--Other Matters
Sec. 311. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 312. Clarification of definition of intelligence community under the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 313. Modification of availability of funds for different intelligence activities.
Sec. 314. Protection of certain national security information.
Sec. 315. Extension of authority to delete information about receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations.
Sec. 316. Report on compliance with the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of
2006.
Sec. 317. Incorporation of reporting requirements.
Sec. 318. Repeal of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 319. Enhancement of critical skills training program.
Sec. 320. Comprehensive national cybersecurity initiative advisory panel.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 401. Clarification of limitation on colocation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the Transportation Security Oversight Board.
Sec. 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology.
Sec. 404. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials.
Sec. 405. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center energy efficiency reports.
Sec. 406. Semiannual reports on nuclear programs of Iran, Syria, and North Korea.
Sec. 407. Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 408. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 409. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community.
Sec. 410. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive.
Sec. 411. National intelligence estimate on weapons of mass destruction in Syria.
Sec. 412. Report on intelligence resources dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan.
Sec. 413. Ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances.
Sec. 414. Security clearance reciprocity.
Sec. 415. Report on international traffic in arms regulations.
Sec. 416. Report on nuclear trafficking.
Sec. 417. Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Sec. 421. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 422. Inapplicability to Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency of requirement for annual report on progress in
auditable financial statements.
Sec. 423. Technical amendments relating to titles of certain Central Intelligence Agency positions.
Sec. 424. Clarifying amendments relating to section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
Sec. 425. Prohibition on the use of private contractors
for interrogations involving persons in the custody or control of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components
Sec. 431. Integration of the Counterintelligence Field Activity into the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Subtitle D--Other Elements
Sec. 441. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and
Drug Enforcement Administration as elements of the intelligence
community.
Sec. 442. Report on transformation of the intelligence capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters
Sec. 501. Extension of National Commission for the Review
of the Research and Development Programs of the United States
Intelligence Community.
Sec. 502. Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 503. Report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets.
Sec. 504. Notice of intelligence regarding North Korea and China.
Sec. 505. Sense of Congress regarding use of intelligence resources.
Subtitle B--Technical Amendments
Sec. 511. Technical amendment to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.
Sec. 512. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National Intelligence Program.
Sec. 513. Technical clarification of certain references to
Joint Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and
Related Activities.
Sec. 514. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 515. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.
Sec. 516. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule.
Sec. 517. Technical amendments relating to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
 In this Act:
 (1) CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES- The term `congressional intelligence committees' means--
 (A) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
 (B) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
 (2) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY- The term `intelligence
community' has the meaning given that term in section 3(4) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
TITLE I--BUDGET AND PERSONNEL AUTHORIZATIONS
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
 Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2009 for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the following elements of the United States Government:
 (1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
 (2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
 (3) The Department of Defense.
 (4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
 (5) The National Security Agency.
 (6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy, and the Department of the Air Force.
 (7) The Coast Guard.
 (8) The Department of State.
 (9) The Department of the Treasury.
 (10) The Department of Energy.
 (11) The Department of Justice.
 (12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
 (13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
 (14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
 (15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
 (16) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
 (a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Levels- The
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101 and, subject to
section 103, the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30,
2009, for the conduct of the intelligence activities of the elements
listed in paragraphs (1) through (16) of section 101, are those
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations prepared to
accompany the conference report on the bill H.R. 5959 of the One
Hundred Tenth Congress.
 (b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations-
The classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in subsection (a)
shall be made available to the Committee on Appropriations of the
Senate, the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives, and to the President. The President shall provide for
suitable distribution of the Schedule, or of appropriate portions of
the Schedule, within the executive branch.
 (c) Earmarks-
 (1) IN GENERAL- Nothing in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations, the joint explanatory statement to accompany the
conference report on the bill H.R. 5959 of the One Hundred Tenth
Congress, or the classified annex to this Act, shall be construed to
authorize or require the expenditure of funds for an earmarked purpose.
 (2) EARMARKED PURPOSE DEFINED- In this subsection, the
term `earmarked purpose' means a provision or report language included
primarily at the request of a Member, Delegate, Resident Commissioner
of the House of Representatives or a Senator providing, authorizing, or
recommending a specific amount of discretionary budget authority,
credit authority, or other spending authority for a contract, loan,
loan guarantee, grant, loan authority, or other expenditure with or to
an entity, or targeted to a specific State, locality, or Congressional
district, other than through a statutory or administrative
formula-driven or competitive award process.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
 (a) Authority for Increases- With the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of
National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in
excess of the number authorized for fiscal year 2009 by the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) if the
Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions,
except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed 3 percent of the number of civilian
personnel authorized under such Schedule for such element.
 (b) Notice to Congressional Intelligence Committees- The
Director of National Intelligence shall notify the congressional
intelligence committees in writing at least 15 days prior to each
exercise of an authority described in subsection (a).
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
 (a) Authorization of Appropriations- There is authorized to
be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of
the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2009 the sum of
$648,842,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced
research and development shall remain available until September 30,
2010.
 (b) Authorized Personnel Levels- The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National
Intelligence are authorized 772 full-time or full-time equivalent
personnel as of September 30, 2009. Personnel serving in such elements
may be permanent employees of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence or personnel detailed from other elements of the United
States Government.
 (c) Construction of Authorities- The authorities available
to the Director of National Intelligence under section 103 are also
available to the Director for the adjustment of personnel levels within
the Intelligence Community Management Account.
 (d) Classified Authorizations-
 (1) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS- In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there are authorized to be
appropriated for the Community Management Account for fiscal year 2009
such additional amounts as are specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts
for advanced research and development shall remain available until
September 30, 2010.
 (2) AUTHORIZATION OF PERSONNEL- In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence
Community Management Account as of September 30, 2009, there are
authorized such additional personnel for the Community Management
Account as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
SEC. 105. LIMITATION ON THE USE OF COVERT ACTION FUNDS.
 (a) In General- Not more than 25 percent of the funds
authorized to be appropriated by this Act for the National Intelligence
Program for covert actions may be obligated or expended until the date
on which each member of the congressional intelligence committees has
been fully and currently briefed on all authorizations for covert
actions in effect on April 24, 2008.
 (b) Covert Action Defined- In this section, the term
`covert action' has the meaning given the term in section 503(g) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b(e)).
SEC. 106. PROHIBITION ON USE OF FUNDS TO IMPLEMENT `5 AND OUT' PROGRAM OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
 None of the funds authorized to be appropriated in this Act
may be used to implement the program of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation requiring the mandatory reassignment of a supervisor of
the Bureau after such supervisor serves in a management position for 5
years (commonly known as the `5 and out' program).
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
 There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2009
the sum of $279,200,000.
SEC. 202. TECHNICAL MODIFICATION TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT PROVISION OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT.
 Subparagraph (A) of section 235(b)(1) of the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2055(b)(1)) is amended by
striking `receiving compensation under the Senior Intelligence Service
pay schedule at the rate' and inserting `who is at the Senior
Intelligence Service rank'.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Subtitle A--Personnel Matters
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
 Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased
by such additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for
increases in such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 302. ENHANCED FLEXIBILITY IN NONREIMBURSABLE DETAILS TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
 Except as provided in section 113 of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h) and section 904(g)(2) of the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law
107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c(g)(2)) and notwithstanding any other provision
of law, in any fiscal year after fiscal year 2008 an officer or
employee of the United States or member of the Armed Forces may be
detailed to the staff of an element of the intelligence community
funded through the Community Management Account from another element of
the United States Government on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable
basis, as jointly agreed to by the Director of National Intelligence
and the head of the detailing element (or the designees of such
officials), for a period not to exceed 2 years.
SEC. 303. MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY CLEARANCES.
 (a) In General- Section 102A of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the following
new subsection:
 `(s) Multi-Level Security Clearances- The Director of
National Intelligence shall be responsible for ensuring that the
elements of the intelligence community adopt a multi-level security
clearance approach in order to enable the intelligence community to
make more effective and efficient use of persons proficient in foreign
languages or with cultural, linguistic, or other subject matter
expertise that is critical to national security.'.
 (b) Implementation- The Director of National Intelligence
shall issue guidelines to the intelligence community on the
implementation of subsection (s) of section 102A of the National
Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), not later than 90
days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 304. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR TRAVEL ON COMMON CARRIERS FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL.
 (a) Delegation of Authority- Section 116(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is amended--
 (1) by inserting `(1)' before `The Director';
 (2) in paragraph (1), as designated by paragraph (1) of
this subsection, by striking `may only delegate' and all that follows
and inserting `may delegate the authority in subsection (a) to the head
of any other element of the intelligence community.'; and
 (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
 `(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community
to whom the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant to
paragraph (1) may further delegate such authority to such senior
officials of such element as are specified in guidelines prescribed by
the Director of National Intelligence for purposes of this paragraph.'.
 (b) Submission of Guidelines to Congress- Not later than 6
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence shall prescribe and submit to the congressional
intelligence committees the guidelines referred to in paragraph (2) of
section 116(b) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by
subsection (a).
SEC. 305. ANNUAL PERSONNEL LEVEL ASSESSMENTS FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
 (a) In General- Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 506A
the following new section:
`ANNUAL PERSONNEL LEVEL ASSESSMENT FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
 `Sec. 506B. (a) Requirement To Provide- The Director of
National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the head of the
element of the intelligence community concerned, prepare an annual
personnel level assessment for such element of the intelligence
community that assesses the personnel levels for each such element for
the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the assessment is
submitted.
 `(b) Schedule- Each assessment required by subsection (a)
shall be submitted to the congressional intelligence committees each
year along with the budget submitted by the President under section
1105 of title 31, United States Code.
 `(c) Contents- Each assessment required by subsection (a)
submitted during a fiscal year shall contain, at a minimum, the
following information for the element of the intelligence community
concerned:
 `(1) The budget submission for personnel costs for the upcoming fiscal year.
 `(2) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of
such costs as compared to the personnel costs of the current fiscal
year.
 `(3) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of
such costs as compared to the personnel costs during the prior 5 fiscal
years.
 `(4) The number of personnel positions requested for the upcoming fiscal year.
 `(5) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease
of such number as compared to the number of personnel positions of the
current fiscal year.
 `(6) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease
of such number as compared to the number of personnel positions during
the prior 5 fiscal years.
 `(7) The best estimate of the number and costs of contractors to be funded by the element for the upcoming fiscal year.
 `(8) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease
of such costs of contractors as compared to the best estimate of the
costs of contractors of the current fiscal year.
 `(9) The numerical and percentage increase or decrease
of such costs of contractors as compared to the cost of contractors,
and the number of contractors, during the prior 5 fiscal years.
 `(10) A written justification for the requested personnel and contractor levels.
 `(11) The number of intelligence collectors and analysts employed or contracted by each element of the intelligence community.
 `(12) A list of all contractors that have been the
subject of an investigation completed by the Inspector General of any
element of the intelligence community during the preceding fiscal year,
or are or have been the subject of an investigation by such an
Inspector General during the current fiscal year.
 `(13) A statement by the Director of National
Intelligence that, based on current and projected funding, the element
concerned will have sufficient--
 `(A) internal infrastructure to support the requested personnel and contractor levels;
 `(B) training resources to support the requested personnel levels; and
 `(C) funding to support the administrative and operational activities of the requested personnel levels.'.
 (b) Clerical Amendment- The table of contents in the first
section of that Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 506A the following new item:

`Sec. 506B. Annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence community.'.

SEC. 306. COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS.
 (a) Requirement for Report- Not later than November 1,
2008, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report describing the use of
personal services contracts across the intelligence community, the
impact of such contractors on the intelligence community workforce,
plans for conversion of contractor employment into government
employment, and the accountability mechanisms that govern the
performance of such contractors.
 (b) Content-
 (1) IN GENERAL- The report submitted under subsection (a) shall include--
 (A) a description of any relevant regulations or
guidance issued by the Director of National Intelligence or the head of
an element of the intelligence community relating to minimum standards
required regarding the hiring, training, security clearance, and
assignment of contract personnel and how those standards may differ
from those for government employees performing substantially similar
functions;
 (B) an identification of contracts where the
contractor is performing a substantially similar functions to a
government employee;
 (C) an assessment of costs incurred or savings
achieved by awarding contracts for the performance of such functions
referred to in subparagraph (B) instead of using full-time employees of
the elements of the intelligence community to perform such functions;
 (D) an assessment of the appropriateness of using contractors to perform the activities described in paragraph (2);
 (E) an estimate of the number of contracts, and the
number of personnel working under such contracts, related to the
performance of activities described in paragraph (2);
 (F) a comparison of the compensation of contract employees and government employees performing substantially similar functions;
 (G) an analysis of the attrition of government personnel for contractor positions that provide substantially similar functions;
 (H) a description of positions that will be converted from contractor employment to government employment;
 (I) an analysis of the oversight and accountability
mechanisms applicable to personal services contracts awarded for
intelligence activities by each element of the intelligence community
during fiscal years 2006 and 2007;
 (J) an analysis of procedures in use in the
intelligence community for conducting oversight of contractors to
ensure identification and prosecution of criminal violations, financial
waste, fraud, or other abuses committed by contractors or contract
personnel; and
 (K) an identification of best practices for oversight and accountability mechanisms applicable to personal services contracts.
 (2) ACTIVITIES- Activities described in this paragraph are the following:
 (A) Intelligence collection.
 (B) Intelligence analysis.
 (C) Covert actions, including rendition, detention, and interrogation activities.
SEC. 307. REPORT ON PROPOSED PAY FOR PERFORMANCE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.
 (a) Prohibition on Pay for Performance Until Report- The
Director of National Intelligence and the head of an element of the
intelligence community may not implement a plan that provides
compensation to personnel of that element of the intelligence community
based on performance until the date that is 45 days after the date on
which the Director of National Intelligence submits a report for that
element under subsection (b).
 (b) Report- The Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to Congress a report on performance-based compensation for each
element of the intelligence community, including, with respect to each
such element--
 (1) a description of a proposed employee advisory group
to advise management on the implementation and management of a pay for
performance system in that element, including the scope of
responsibility of the group and the plan for the element for ensuring
diversity in the selection of members of the advisory group;
 (2) a certification that all managers who will
participate in setting performance standards and pay pool
administration have been trained on the implementing guidance of the
system and the criteria upon which the certification is granted; and
 (3) a description of an external appeals mechanism for
employees who wish to appeal pay decisions to someone outside the
management chain of the element employing such employee.
SEC. 308. REPORT ON PLANS TO INCREASE DIVERSITY WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
 (a) Requirement for Report- Not later than November 1,
2008, the Director of National Intelligence, in coordination with the
heads of the elements of the intelligence community, shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a report on the plans of each
element to increase diversity within the intelligence community.
 (b) Content- The report required by subsection (a) shall
include specific implementation plans to increase diversity within each
element of the intelligence community, including--
 (1) specific implementation plans for each such element
designed to achieve the goals articulated in the strategic plan of the
Director of National Intelligence on equal employment opportunity and
diversity;
 (2) specific plans and initiatives for each such element to increase recruiting and hiring of diverse candidates;
 (3) specific plans and initiatives for each such
element to improve retention of diverse Federal employees at the
junior, midgrade, senior, and management levels;
 (4) a description of specific diversity awareness
training and education programs for senior officials and managers of
each such element; and
 (5) a description of performance metrics to measure the
success of carrying out the plans, initiatives, and programs described
in paragraphs (1) through (4).
SEC. 309. REPORT ON SECURITY CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS.
 (a) In General- Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
`REPORT ON SECURITY CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS
 `Sec. 508. Not later than February 1 of each year, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall submit to
Congress a report on security clearance determinations completed or
ongoing during the preceding fiscal year that have taken longer than
one year to complete. Such report shall include--
 `(1) the number of security clearance determinations
for positions as employees of the Federal Government that required more
than one year to complete;
 `(2) the number of security clearance determinations for contractors that required more than one year to complete;
 `(3) the agencies that investigated and adjudicated such determinations; and
 `(4) the cause of significant delays in such determinations.'.
 (b) Conforming Amendment- The table of contents in the
first section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et
seq.) is further amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 507 the following new item:

`Sec. 508. Report on security clearance determinations.'.

Subtitle B--Other Matters
SEC. 311. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
 The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence
activity which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the
laws of the United States.
SEC. 312. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.
 Subparagraph (L) of section 3(4) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended by striking `other' the
second place it appears.
SEC. 313. MODIFICATION OF AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR DIFFERENT INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
 Subparagraph (B) of section 504(a)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)) is amended to read as follows:
 `(B) the use of such funds for such activity supports
an emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases
efficiency; and'.
SEC. 314. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION.
 (a) Increase in Penalties for Disclosure of Undercover Intelligence Officers and Agents-
 (1) DISCLOSURE OF AGENT AFTER ACCESS TO INFORMATION
IDENTIFYING AGENT- Subsection (a) of section 601 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) is amended by striking `ten years'
and inserting `15 years'.
 (2) DISCLOSURE OF AGENT AFTER ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION- Subsection (b) of such section is amended by striking
`five years' and inserting `10 years'.
 (b) Modifications to Annual Report on Protection of
Intelligence Identities- The first sentence of section 603(a) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) is amended by
inserting `including an assessment of the need for any modification of
this title for the purpose of improving legal protections for covert
agents,' after `measures to protect the identities of covert agents,'.
SEC. 315. EXTENSION OF AUTHORITY TO DELETE INFORMATION ABOUT RECEIPT AND DISPOSITION OF FOREIGN GIFTS AND DECORATIONS.
 Paragraph (4) of section 7342(f) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
 `(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of the
intelligence community, the head of such element may delete the
information described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (2) or in
subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (3) if the head of such element
certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of
such information could adversely affect United States intelligence
sources or methods.
 `(B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of State
pursuant to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be transmitted to
the Director of National Intelligence who shall keep a record of such
information.
 `(C) In this paragraph, the term `intelligence community'
has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).'.
SEC. 316. REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE DETAINEE TREATMENT
ACT OF 2005 AND RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE MILITARY COMMISSIONS ACT OF
2006.
 (a) Report Required- Not later than November 1, 2008, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a comprehensive report on all measures taken by
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and by each
element, if any, of the intelligence community with relevant
responsibilities to comply with the provisions of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 (title X of division A of Public Law 109-148; 119
Stat. 2739) and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of
2006 (Public Law 109-366; 120 Stat. 2600).
 (b) Elements- The report required by subsection (a) shall include the following:
 (1) A description of the detention or interrogation
methods, if any, that have been determined to comply with section 1003
of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (119 Stat. 2739; 42 U.S.C.
2000dd) and section 6 of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (120
Stat. 2632; 18 U.S.C. 2441 note) (including the amendments made by such
section 6), and, with respect to each such method--
 (A) an identification of the official making such determination; and
 (B) a statement of the basis for such determination.
 (2) A description of the detention or interrogation
methods, if any, the use of which has been discontinued pursuant to the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 or the Military Commission Act of 2006,
and, with respect to each such method--
 (A) an identification of the official making the determination to discontinue such method; and
 (B) a statement of the basis for such determination.
 (3) A description of any actions that have been taken
to implement section 1004 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (119
Stat. 2740; 42 U.S.C. 2000dd-1), and, with respect to each such action--
 (A) an identification of the official taking such action; and
 (B) a statement of the basis for such action.
 (4) Any other matters that the Director considers
necessary to fully and currently inform the congressional intelligence
committees about the implementation of the Detainee Treatment Act of
2005 and related provisions of the Military Commissions Act of 2006.
 (5) An appendix containing--
 (A) all guidelines for the application of the
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and related provisions of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 to the detention or interrogation activities,
if any, of any element of the intelligence community; and
 (B) all legal justifications of the Department of
Justice, including any office thereof, about the meaning or application
of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 or related provisions of the
Military Commissions Act of 2006 with respect to the detention or
interrogation activities, if any, of any element of the intelligence
community.
 (c) Form- The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in classified form.
 (d) Submission to the Congressional Armed Services
Committees- To the extent that the report required by subsection (a)
addresses an element of the intelligence community within the
Department of Defense, that portion of the report, and any associated
material that is necessary to make that portion understandable, shall
also be submitted by the Director of National Intelligence to the
congressional armed services committees.
 (e) Congressional Armed Services Committee Defined- In this section, the term `congressional armed services committees' means--
 (1) the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate; and
 (2) the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 317. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
 Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional
intelligence committees that is included in the classified annex to
this Act is hereby incorporated into this Act and is hereby made a
requirement in law.
SEC. 318. REPEAL OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
 (a) Annual Certification on Counterintelligence
Initiatives- Section 1102(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 442a(b)) is amended--
 (1) by striking `(1)'; and
 (2) by striking paragraph (2).
 (b) Report and Certification Under Terrorist Identification
Classification System- Section 343 of the Intelligence Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (50 U.S.C. 404n-2) is amended--
 (1) by striking subsection (d); and
 (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), and (h) as subsections (d), (e), (f), and (g), respectively.
 (c) Annual Report on Counterdrug Intelligence Matters-
Section 826 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003
(Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2429; 21 U.S.C. 873 note) is repealed.
 (d) Conforming Amendments- Section 507(a)(2) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b(a)(2)) is amended by
striking subparagraph (D).
SEC. 319. ENHANCEMENT OF CRITICAL SKILLS TRAINING PROGRAM.
 (a) National Security Agency- Subsection (e) of section 16
of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is
amended by striking `(1) When an employee' and all that follows through
`(2) Agency efforts' and inserting `Agency efforts'.
 (b) Other Elements of the Intelligence Community-
 (1) IN GENERAL- The National Security Act of 1947 is
amended by inserting after section 1021 (50 U.S.C. 441m) the following
new section:
`INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACQUISITION OF CRITICAL SKILLS
 `Sec. 1022. (a) In General- The head of an appropriate
department may assign civilian employees of an element of the
intelligence community that is a component of such appropriate
department as students at accredited professional, technical, and other
institutions of higher learning for training at the undergraduate level
in skills critical to effective performance of the mission of such
element of the intelligence community.
 `(b) Payment of Expenses- The head of an appropriate
department may pay, directly or by reimbursement to employees, expenses
incident to assignments under subsection (a), in any fiscal year only
to the extent that appropriated funds are available for such purpose.
 `(c) Eligibility-
 `(1) IN GENERAL- To be eligible for assignment under
subsection (a), an employee of an element of the intelligence community
must agree in writing--
 `(A) to continue in the service of such element for
the period of the assignment and to complete the educational course of
training for which the employee is assigned;
 `(B) to continue in the service of such element
following completion of the assignment for a period of one-and-a-half
years for each year of the assignment or part thereof;
 `(C) to reimburse the United States for the total
cost of education (excluding the employee's pay and allowances)
provided under this section to the employee if, prior to the employee's
completing the educational course of training for which the employee is
assigned, the assignment or the employee's employment with such element
is terminated either by such element due to misconduct by the employee
or by the employee voluntarily; and
 `(D) to reimburse the United States if, after
completing the educational course of training for which the employee is
assigned, the employee's employment with such element is terminated
either by such element due to misconduct by the employee or by the
employee voluntarily, prior to the employee's completion of the service
obligation period described in subparagraph (B), in an amount that
bears the same ratio to the total cost of the education (excluding the
employee's pay and allowances) provided to the employee as the unserved
portion of the service obligation period described in subparagraph (B)
bears to the total period of the service obligation described in
subparagraph (B).
 `(2) DEBT OWING THE UNITED STATES- Subject to paragraph
(3), the obligation to reimburse the United States under an agreement
described in paragraph (1), including interest due on such obligation,
is for all purposes a debt owing the United States.
 `(3) REIMBURSEMENT-
 `(A) BANKRUPTCY- A discharge in bankruptcy under
title 11, United States Code, shall not release a person from an
obligation to reimburse the United States required under an agreement
described in paragraph (1) if the final decree of the discharge in
bankruptcy is issued within five years after the last day of the
combined period of service obligation described in subparagraphs (A)
and (B) of paragraph (1).
 `(B) RELEASE- The head of an appropriate department
may release a person, in whole or in part, from the obligation to
reimburse the United States under an agreement described in paragraph
(1) when, in the discretion of such head of an appropriate department,
such head of an appropriate department determines that equity or the
interests of the United States so require.
 `(C) MONTHLY PAYMENTS- The head of an appropriate
department shall permit an employee assigned under this section who,
prior to commencing a second academic year of such assignment,
voluntarily terminates the assignment or the employee's employment with
the element of the intelligence community that is a component of such
appropriate department, to satisfy the employee's obligation under an
agreement described in paragraph (1) to reimburse the United States by
reimbursement according to a schedule of monthly payments which results
in completion of reimbursement by a date five years after the date of
termination of the assignment or employment or earlier at the option of
the employee.
 `(d) Recruitment- Efforts by an element of the intelligence
community to recruit individuals at educational institutions for
participation in the undergraduate training program established by this
section shall be made openly and according to the common practices of
universities and employers recruiting at such institutions.
 `(e) Inapplication of Provisions on Training- Chapter 41 of
title 5 and subsections (a) and (b) of section 3324 of title 31, United
States Code, shall not apply with respect to this section.
 `(f) Regulations- A head of the appropriate department
assigning employees in accordance with this section may issue such
regulations as such head of the appropriate department considers
necessary to carry out this section.
 `(g) Rules of Construction-
 `(1) COMPONENT- For purposes of this section--
 `(A) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence shall be considered a component of such Office; and
 `(B) the Central Intelligence Agency shall be considered a component of such Agency.
 `(2) REQUIRED EDUCATION PROGRAMS- Nothing in this
section shall be construed to modify, affect, or supercede any
provision of law requiring or otherwise authorizing or providing for a
training program described in this section.
 `(h) Appropriate Department Defined- In this section, the term `appropriate department' means--
 `(1) with respect to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
 `(2) with respect to the Central Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency; and
 `(3) with respect to an element of the intelligence
community other than the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency, the department of the
Federal Government of which such element of the intelligence community
is a component.'.
 (2) CONFORMING AMENDMENT- The table of contents in the
first section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et
seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1021
the following new item:

`Sec. 1022. Intelligence community acquisition of critical skills.'.

SEC. 320. COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE ADVISORY PANEL.
 Not later than February 1, 2009, the President shall submit
to Congress a report on options for creating an advisory panel
comprised of representatives of Congress, the Executive Branch, and the
private sector to make policy and procedural recommendations for--
 (1) information security for the Federal Government;
 (2) critical infrastructure;
 (3) the authorities, roles, responsibilities of the
intelligence community, Department of Homeland Security, and Department
of Defense for purposes of supporting the Comprehensive National
Cybersecurity Initiative as described in National Security Policy
Directive 54/Homeland Security Policy Directive 23 entitled
`Cybersecurity Policy' signed by the President on January 8, 2008; and
 (4) other matters related to paragraphs (1) through (3) as the President considers appropriate.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON COLOCATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
 Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(e)) is amended--
 (1) by striking `With' and inserting `of Headquarters With Headquarters of';
 (2) by inserting `the headquarters of' before `the Office'; and
 (3) by striking `any other element' and inserting `the headquarters of any other element'.
SEC. 402. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD.
 Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
 `(F) The Director of National Intelligence.'.
SEC. 403. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.
 Section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3e) is amended--
 (1) in subsection (c)--
 (A) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (7);
 (B) in paragraph (4), by striking `and' at the end; and
 (C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:
 `(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for
basic, applied, and advanced research to meet the technology needs of
the intelligence community;
 `(6) submit to the congressional intelligence
committees an annual report on the science and technology strategy of
the Director that shows resources mapped to the goals of the
intelligence community; and'; and
 (2) in subsection (d)(3)--
 (A) in subparagraph (A)--
 (i) by inserting `and prioritize' after `coordinate'; and
 (ii) by striking `; and' and inserting `;';
 (B) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as subparagraph (C); and
 (C) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the following new subparagraph:
 `(B) identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be executed by elements of the intelligence community; and'.
SEC. 404. LEADERSHIP AND LOCATION OF CERTAIN OFFICES AND OFFICIALS.
 (a) National Counter Proliferation Center- Section 119A(a)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is amended--
 (1) by striking `(a) Establishment- Not later than 18
months after the date of the enactment of the National Security
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the' and inserting the following:
 `(a) In General-
 `(1) ESTABLISHMENT- The'; and
 (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
 `(2) DIRECTOR- The head of the National Counter
Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the National Counter
Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of
National Intelligence.
 `(3) LOCATION- The National Counter Proliferation
Center shall be located within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.'.
 (b) Officers- Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)) is amended--
 (1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (13); and
 (2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new paragraphs:
 `(9) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.
 `(10) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
 `(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.
 `(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center.'.
SEC. 405. PLAN TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DATA CENTER ENERGY EFFICIENCY REPORTS.
 (a) Plan- The Director of National Intelligence shall
develop a plan to implement the recommendations of the report submitted
to Congress under section 1 of the Act entitled `An Act to study and
promote the use of energy efficient computer servers in the United
States' (Public Law 109-431; 120 Stat. 2920) across the intelligence
community.
 (b) Report-
 (1) IN GENERAL- Not later then November 1, 2008, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report containing the plan developed under
subsection (a).
 (2) FORM- The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
SEC. 406. SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON NUCLEAR PROGRAMS OF IRAN, SYRIA, AND NORTH KOREA.
 (a) Reports-
 (1) IN GENERAL- Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by title III, is further
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
`SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMS OF IRAN, SYRIA, AND NORTH KOREA
 `Sec. 509. (a) Requirement for Reports- Not less frequently
than every 180 days, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the intentions
and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian Arab
Republic, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, with regard to
the nuclear programs of each such country.
 `(b) Content- Each report submitted under subsection (a)
shall include, with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian
Arab Republic, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea--
 `(1) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs of each such country;
 `(2) an evaluation, consistent with existing reporting
standards and practices, of the sources upon which the intelligence
used to prepare the assessment described in paragraph (1) is based,
including the number of such sources and an assessment of the
reliability of each such source;
 `(3) a summary of any intelligence related to any such
program gathered or developed since the previous report was submitted
under subsection (a), including intelligence collected from both open
and clandestine sources for each such country; and
 `(4) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in
knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence in the
assessment described in paragraph (1).
 `(c) National Intelligence Estimate- The Director of
National Intelligence may submit a National Intelligence Estimate on
the intentions and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the
Syrian Arab Republic, or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in
lieu of a report required by subsection (a) for that country.
 `(d) Form- Each report submitted under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.'.
 (2) APPLICABILITY DATE- The first report required to be
submitted under section 509 of the National Security Act of 1947, as
added by paragraph (1), shall be submitted not later than 30 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act.
 (b) Conforming Amendment- The table of contents in the
first section of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et
seq.) is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 508
the following new item:

`Sec. 509. Semiannual reports on the nuclear programs of Iran, Syria, and North Korea.'.

SEC. 407. TITLE OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
 Section 103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g) is amended--
 (1) in subsection (a), by inserting `of the Intelligence Community' after `Chief Information Officer';
 (2) in subsection (b), by inserting `of the Intelligence Community' after `Chief Information Officer';
 (3) in subsection (c), by inserting `of the Intelligence Community' after `Chief Information Officer'; and
 (4) in subsection (d), by inserting `of the Intelligence Community' after `Chief Information Officer'.
SEC. 408. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
 (a) Establishment-
 (1) IN GENERAL- Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 103G
the following new section:
`INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
 `Sec. 103H. (a) Office of Inspector General of Intelligence
Community- There is within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence an Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community.
 `(b) Purpose- The purpose of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community is to--
 `(1) create an objective and effective office,
appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct
independently investigations, inspections, and audits on matters within
the responsibility and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence;
 `(2) recommend policies designed--
 `(A) to promote economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in the administration and implementation of matters
within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence; and
 `(B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such matters;
 `(3) provide a means for keeping the Director of National Intelligence fully and currently informed about--
 `(A) problems and deficiencies relating to matters
within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence; and
 `(B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions; and
 `(4) in the manner prescribed by this section, ensure
that the congressional intelligence committees are kept similarly
informed of--
 `(A) significant problems and deficiencies relating
to matters within the responsibility and authority of the Director of
National Intelligence; and
 `(B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions.
 `(c) Inspector General of Intelligence Community- (1) There
is an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, who shall be the
head of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
 `(2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as Inspector General shall be made--
 `(A) without regard to political affiliation;
 `(B) solely on the basis of integrity, compliance with
the security standards of the intelligence community, and prior
experience in the field of intelligence or national security; and
 `(C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in
accounting, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public
administration, or auditing.
 `(3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and be
under the general supervision of the Director of National Intelligence.
 `(4) The Inspector General may be removed from office only
by the President. The President shall immediately communicate in
writing to the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for
the removal of any individual from the position of Inspector General.
 `(d) Duties and Responsibilities- Subject to subsections
(g) and (h), it shall be the duty and responsibility of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community--
 `(1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan,
conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the investigations,
inspections, and audits relating to matters within the responsibility
and authority of the Director of National Intelligence to ensure they
are conducted efficiently and in accordance with applicable law and
regulations;
 `(2) to keep the Director of National Intelligence
fully and currently informed concerning violations of law and
regulations, violations of civil liberties and privacy, fraud and other
serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies that may occur in matters
within the responsibility and authority of the Director, and to report
the progress made in implementing corrective action;
 `(3) to take due regard for the protection of
intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of all reports
issued by the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with the
purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures as may be
appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and
methods described in such reports; and
 `(4) in the execution of the duties and
responsibilities under this section, to comply with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
 `(e) Limitations on Activities- (1) The Director of
National Intelligence may prohibit the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community from initiating, carrying out, or completing any
investigation, inspection, or audit if the Director determines that
such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security
interests of the United States.
 `(2) If the Director exercises the authority under
paragraph (1), the Director shall submit an appropriately classified
statement of the reasons for the exercise of such authority within 7
days to the congressional intelligence committees.
 `(3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at the
time a report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the extent
consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods,
provide the Inspector General with a copy of such report.
 `(4) The Inspector General may submit to the congressional
intelligence committees any comments on a report of which the Inspector
General has notice under paragraph (3) that the Inspector General
considers appropriate.
 `(f) Authorities- (1) The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall have direct and prompt access to the
Director of National Intelligence when necessary for any purpose
pertaining to the performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
 `(2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any
employee, or any employee of a contractor, of any element of the
intelligence community whose testimony is needed for the performance of
the duties of the Inspector General.
 `(B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to all
records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers, recommendations,
or other material which relate to the programs and operations with
respect to which the Inspector General has responsibilities under this
section.
 `(C) The level of classification or compartmentation of
information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient rationale
for denying the Inspector General access to any materials under
subparagraph (B).
 `(D) Failure on the part of any employee, or any employee
of a contractor, of any element of the intelligence community to
cooperate with the Inspector General shall be grounds for appropriate
administrative actions by the Director or, on the recommendation of the
Director, other appropriate officials of the intelligence community,
including loss of employment or the termination of an existing
contractual relationship.
 `(3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and
investigate complaints or information from any person concerning the
existence of an activity constituting a violation of laws, rules, or
regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to the public health
and safety. Once such complaint or information has been received from
an employee of the Federal Government--
 `(A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the
identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless
the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is unavoidable
during the course of the investigation or the disclosure is made to an
official of the Department of Justice responsible for determining
whether a prosecution should be undertaken; and
 `(B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of
reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any employee in a
position to take such actions, unless the complaint was made or the
information was disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with
willful disregard for its truth or falsity.
 `(4) The Inspector General shall have authority to
administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or
affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the duties of the
Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when
administered or taken by or before an employee of the Office of the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community designated by the
Inspector General shall have the same force and effect as if
administered or taken by, or before, an officer having a seal.
 `(5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the
Inspector General is authorized to require by subpoena the production
of all information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts,
papers, and other data and documentary evidence necessary in the
performance of the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General.
 `(B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other
elements of the United States Government, the Inspector General shall
obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts,
papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose specified in
subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by subpoenas.
 `(C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for, or
on behalf of, any other element of the intelligence community,
including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
 `(D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena
issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable by order
of any appropriate district court of the United States.
 `(g) Coordination Among Inspectors General of Intelligence
Community- (1)(A) In the event of a matter within the jurisdiction of
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community that may be subject
to an investigation, inspection, or audit by both the Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community and an Inspector General, whether
statutory or administrative, with oversight responsibility for an
element or elements of the intelligence community, the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community and such other Inspector or
Inspectors General shall expeditiously resolve the question of which
Inspector General shall conduct such investigation, inspection, or
audit.
 `(B) In attempting to resolve a question under subparagraph
(A), the Inspectors General concerned may request the assistance of the
Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum established under
subparagraph (C). In the event of a dispute between an Inspector
General within an agency or department of the United States Government
and the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community that has not
been resolved with the assistance of the Forum, the Inspectors General
shall submit the question to the Director of National Intelligence and
the head of the agency or department for resolution.
 `(C) There is established the Intelligence Community
Inspectors General Forum which shall consist of all statutory or
administrative Inspectors General with oversight responsibility for an
element or elements of the intelligence community. The Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community shall serve as the chair of the
Forum. The Forum shall have no administrative authority over any
Inspector General, but shall serve as a mechanism for informing its
members of the work of individual members of the Forum that may be of
common interest and discussing questions about jurisdiction or access
to employees, employees of a contractor, records, audits, reviews,
documents, recommendations, or other materials that may involve or be
of assistance to more than 1 of its members.
 `(2) The Inspector General conducting an investigation,
inspection, or audit covered by paragraph (1) shall submit the results
of such investigation, inspection, or audit to any other Inspector
General, including the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community,
with jurisdiction to conduct such investigation, inspection, or audit
who did not conduct such investigation, inspection, or audit.
 `(h) Staff and Other Support- (1) The Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community shall be provided with appropriate and
adequate office space at central and field office locations, together
with such equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and
communications facilities and services as may be necessary for the
operation of such offices.
 `(2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of the
Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General shall select,
appoint, and employ such officers and employees as may be necessary to
carry out the functions of the Inspector General. The Inspector General
shall ensure that any officer or employee so selected, appointed, or
employed has security clearances appropriate for the assigned duties of
such officer or employee.
 `(B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the
Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees have
the requisite training and experience to enable the Inspector General
to carry out the duties of the Inspector General effectively.
 `(C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the
Inspector General shall create within the Office of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community a career cadre of sufficient size
to provide appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the
effective performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
 `(3)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the
Inspector General may request such information or assistance as may be
necessary for carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the
Inspector General from any department, agency, or other element of the
United States Government.
 `(B) Upon request of the Inspector General for information
or assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the department,
agency, or element concerned shall, insofar as is practicable and not
in contravention of any existing statutory restriction or regulation of
the department, agency, or element, furnish to the Inspector General,
or to an authorized designee, such information or assistance.
 `(C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
may, upon reasonable notice to the head of any element of the
intelligence community, conduct, as authorized by this section, an
investigation, inspection, or audit of such element and may enter into
any place occupied by such element for purposes of the performance of
the duties of the Inspector General.
 `(i) Reports- (1)(A) The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall, not later than January 31 and July 31 of
each year, prepare and submit to the Director of National Intelligence
a classified, and, as appropriate, unclassified semiannual report
summarizing the activities of the Office of the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community during the immediately preceding 6-month
period ending December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30,
respectively. The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall
provide any portion of the report involving a component of a department
of the United States Government to the head of that department
simultaneously with submission of the report to the Director of
National Intelligence.
 `(B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a minimum, the following:
 `(i) A list of the title or subject of each
investigation, inspection, or audit conducted during the period covered
by such report, including a summary of the progress of each particular
investigation, inspection, or audit since the preceding report of the
Inspector General under this paragraph.
 `(ii) A description of significant problems, abuses,
and deficiencies relating to the administration and implementation of
programs and operations of the intelligence community, and in the
relationships between elements of the intelligence community,
identified by the Inspector General during the period covered by such
report.
 `(iii) A description of the recommendations for
corrective or disciplinary action made by the Inspector General during
the period covered by such report with respect to significant problems,
abuses, or deficiencies identified in clause (ii).
 `(iv) A statement whether or not corrective or
disciplinary action has been completed on each significant
recommendation described in previous semiannual reports, and, in a case
where corrective action has been completed, a description of such
corrective action.
 `(v) A certification whether or not the Inspector
General has had full and direct access to all information relevant to
the performance of the functions of the Inspector General.
 `(vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena
authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector General during the
period covered by such report.
 `(vii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General
considers appropriate for legislation to promote economy, efficiency,
and effectiveness in the administration and implementation of matters
within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence, and to detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such
matters.
 `(C) Not later than the 30 days after the date of receipt
of a report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall transmit the
report to the congressional intelligence committees together with any
comments the Director considers appropriate. The Director shall
transmit to the committees of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives with jurisdiction over a department of the United
States Government any portion of the report involving a component of
such department simultaneously with submission of the report to the
congressional intelligence committees.
 `(2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately to
the Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of
particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies
relating to matters within the responsibility and authority of the
Director of National Intelligence.
 `(B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional
intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A) within 7
calendar days of receipt of such report, together with such comments as
the Director considers appropriate. The Director shall transmit to the
committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives with
jurisdiction over a department of the United States Government any
portion of each report under subparagraph (A) that involves a problem,
abuse, or deficiency related to a component of such department
simultaneously with transmission of the report to the congressional
intelligence committees.
 `(3) In the event that--
 `(A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any
differences with the Director affecting the execution of the duties or
responsibilities of the Inspector General;
 `(B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out
by the Inspector General focuses on any current or former intelligence
community official who--
 `(i) holds or held a position in an element of the
intelligence community that is subject to appointment by the President,
whether or not by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
including such a position held on an acting basis;
 `(ii) holds or held a position in an element of the
intelligence community, including a position held on an acting basis,
that is appointed by the Director of National Intelligence; or
 `(iii) holds or held a position as head of an
element of the intelligence community or a position covered by
subsection (b) or (c) of section 106;
 `(C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector
General to the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by a
current or former official described in subparagraph (B);
 `(D) the Inspector General receives notice from the
Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of possible
criminal conduct of any current or former official described in
subparagraph (B); or
 `(E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all
possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary
information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or audit,
the Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit a report on such matter to the congressional intelligence committees.
 `(4) Pursuant to title V, the Director shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees any report or findings and
recommendations of an investigation, inspection, or audit conducted by
the office which has been requested by the Chairman or Vice Chairman or
Ranking Minority Member of either committee.
 `(5)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence
community, an employee assigned or detailed to an element of the
intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor to the
intelligence community who intends to report to Congress a complaint or
information with respect to an urgent concern may report such complaint
or information to the Inspector General.
 `(B) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day period
beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a complaint or
information under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall
determine whether the complaint or information appears credible. Upon
making such a determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to
the Director a notice of that determination, together with the
complaint or information.
 `(C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector
General under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within 7 calendar
days of such receipt, forward such transmittal to the congressional
intelligence committees, together with any comments the Director
considers appropriate.
 `(D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible
under subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted under
subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or information to
the Director in accurate form under subparagraph (B), the employee
(subject to clause (ii)) may submit the complaint or information to
Congress by contacting either or both of the congressional intelligence
committees directly.
 `(ii) An employee may contact the intelligence committees directly as described in clause (i) only if the employee--
 `(I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the
Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the employee's
complaint or information and notice of the employee's intent to contact
the congressional intelligence committees directly; and
 `(II) obtains and follows from the Director, through
the Inspector General, direction on how to contact the intelligence
committees in accordance with appropriate security practices.
 `(iii) A member or employee of 1 of the congressional
intelligence committees who receives a complaint or information under
clause (i) does so in that member or employee's official capacity as a
member or employee of such committee.
 `(E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who
reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General under this
paragraph of each action taken under this paragraph with respect to the
complaint or information. Such notice shall be provided not later than
3 days after any such action is taken.
 `(F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector General under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial review.
 `(G) In this paragraph, the term `urgent concern' means any of the following:
 `(i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation of
law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the funding,
administration, or operation of an intelligence activity involving
classified information, but does not include differences of opinions
concerning public policy matters.
 `(ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful
withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact relating to the
funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity.
 `(iii) An action, including a personnel action
described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code,
constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under subsection
(f)(3)(B) of this section in response to an employee's reporting an
urgent concern in accordance with this paragraph.
 `(H) In support of this paragraph, Congress makes the
findings set forth in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 701(b) of
the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 (title
VII of Public Law 105-272; 5 U.S.C. App. 8H note).
 `(6) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United
States Code, the Inspector General shall report to the Attorney General
any information, allegation, or complaint received by the Inspector
General relating to violations of Federal criminal law that involves a
program or operation of an element of the intelligence community, or in
the relationships between the elements of the intelligence community,
consistent with such guidelines as may be issued by the Attorney
General pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section. A copy of each
such report shall be furnished to the Director.
 `(j) Separate Budget Account- The Director of National
Intelligence shall, in accordance with procedures to be issued by the
Director in consultation with the congressional intelligence
committees, include in the National Intelligence Program budget a
separate account for the Office of Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community.
 `(k) Construction of Duties Regarding Elements of
Intelligence Community- Except as resolved pursuant to subsection (g),
the performance by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
of any duty, responsibility, or function regarding an element of the
intelligence community shall not be construed to modify or effect the
duties and responsibilities of any other Inspector General, whether
statutory or administrative, having duties and responsibilities
relating to such element.'.
 (2) CLERICAL AMENDMENT- The table of contents in the
first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is amended by
inserting after the item relating to section 103G the following new
item:

`Sec. 103H. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.'.

 (b) Repeal of Superseded Authority To Establish Position-
Section 8K of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is
repealed.
 (c) Executive Schedule Level IV- Section 5315 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new
item:
 `Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.'.
SEC. 409. ANNUAL REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
 (a) Report-
 (1) IN GENERAL- Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.), as amended by section 406 of this Act, is
further amended by adding at the end the following new section:
`REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
 `Sec. 510. Not later than February 1 of each year, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the proficiency in foreign
languages and, if appropriate, in foreign dialects of each element of
the intelligence community, including--
 `(1) the number of positions authorized for such
element that require foreign language proficiency and the level of
proficiency required;
 `(2) an estimate of the number of such positions that
each element will require during the 5-year period beginning on the
date of the submission of the report;
 `(3) the number of positions authorized for such element that require foreign language proficiency that are filled by--
 `(A) military personnel; and
 `(B) civilian personnel;
 `(4) the number of applicants for positions in such
element in the previous fiscal year that indicated foreign language
proficiency, including the foreign language indicated and the
proficiency level;
 `(5) the number of persons hired by such element with
foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language and
proficiency level;
 `(6) the number of personnel of such element currently
attending foreign language training, including the provider of such
training;
 `(7) a description of such element's efforts to
recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel that are proficient in a
foreign language;
 `(8) an assessment of methods and models for basic, advanced, and intensive foreign language training;
 `(9) for each foreign language and, where appropriate, dialect of a foreign language--
 `(A) the number of positions of such element that require proficiency in the foreign language or dialect;
 `(B) the number of personnel of such element that
are serving in a position that requires proficiency in the foreign
language or dialect to perform the primary duty of the position;
 `(C) the number of personnel of such element that
are serving in a position that does not require proficiency in the
foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty of the position;
 `(D) the number of personnel of such element rated at each level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable;
 `(E) whether the number of personnel at each level
of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable meets the
requirements of such element;
 `(F) the number of personnel serving or hired to
serve as linguists for such element that are not qualified as linguists
under the standards of the Interagency Language Roundtable;
 `(G) the number of personnel hired to serve as linguists for such element during the preceding calendar year;
 `(H) the number of personnel serving as linguists that discontinued serving such element during the preceding calendar year;
 `(I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills that is fulfilled by an ally of the United States; and
 `(J) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills that is fulfilled by contractors;
 `(10) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole; and
 `(11) recommendations for eliminating required reports
relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of National
Intelligence considers outdated or no longer relevant.'.
 (2) REPORT DATE- Section 507(a)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 415b(a)(1)) is amended--
 (A) by redesignating subparagraph (N) as subparagraph (J); and
 (B) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
 `(K) The annual report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community required by section 510.'.
 (b) Conforming Amendment- The table of contents in the
first section of such Act is further amended by inserting after the
item relating to section 509 the following new item:

`Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community.'.

SEC. 410. REPEAL OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.
 (a) Repeal of Certain Authorities- Section 904 of the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law
107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended--
 (1) by striking subsections (d), (h), (i), and (j); and
 (2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (k),
(l), and (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i),
respectively; and
 (3) in subsection (f), as redesignated by paragraph (2), by striking paragraphs (3) and (4).
 (b) Conforming Amendments- Such section 904 is further amended--
 (1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection
(a)(2) of this section, by striking `subsection (f)' each place it
appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting `subsection (e)'; and
 (2) in subsection (e), as so redesignated--
 (A) in paragraph (1), by striking `subsection (e)(1)' and inserting `subsection (d)(1)'; and
 (B) in paragraph (2), by striking `subsection (e)(2)' and inserting `subsection (d)(2)'.
SEC. 411. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN SYRIA.
 (a) In General- Not later than 180 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to Congress a National Intelligence Estimate on the history,
status, and projected development of any weapons of mass destruction
development program undertaken by the Government of Syria, or by any
person on behalf of the Government of Syria.
 (b) Form- The National Intelligence Estimate required under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.
SEC. 412. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES DEDICATED TO IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN.
 Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on intelligence
collection resources dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan during fiscal
years 2007 and 2008. Such report shall include detailed information on
fiscal, human, technical, and other intelligence collection resources.
SEC. 413. OMBUDSMAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SECURITY CLEARANCES.
 (a) In General- Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section
103H, as added by section 409 of this Act, the following new section:
`OMBUDSMAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SECURITY CLEARANCES
 `Sec. 103I. (a) Appointment- The Director of National
Intelligence shall appoint an ombudsman for intelligence community
security clearances.
 `(b) Provision of Information- The head of an element of
the intelligence community shall provide a person applying for a
security clearance through or in coordination with such element with
contact information for the ombudsman appointed under subsection (a).
 `(c) Report- Not later than November 1 of each year, the
ombudsman appointed under subsection (a) shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report containing--
 `(1) the number of persons applying for a security
clearance who have contacted the ombudsman during the preceding 12
months; and
 `(2) a summary of the concerns, complaints, and
questions received by the ombudsman from persons applying for security
clearances.'.
 (b) Appointment Date- The Director of National Intelligence
shall appoint an ombudsman for intelligence community security
clearances under section 103I(a) of the National Security Act of 1947,
as added by subsection (a), not later than 60 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act.
 (c) Conforming Amendment- The table of contents in the
first section of the National Security Act of 1947 is further amended
by inserting after the item relating to section 103H the following new
item:

`Sec. 103I. Ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances.'.

SEC. 414. SECURITY CLEARANCE RECIPROCITY.
 (a) Audit- The Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall conduct an audit of the reciprocity of security
clearances in the intelligence community.
 (b) Report- Not later than 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a
report containing the results of the audit conducted under subsection
(a). Such report shall include an assessment of the time required to
obtain a reciprocal security clearance for--
 (1) an employee of an element of the intelligence community detailed to another element of the intelligence community;
 (2) an employee of an element of the intelligence
community seeking permanent employment with another element of the
intelligence community and;
 (3) a contractor seeking permanent employment with an element of the intelligence community.
SEC. 415. REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS.
 (a) Report- Not later than February 1, 2009, the Director
of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report assessing--
 (1) the threat to national security presented by the
efforts of foreign countries to acquire, through espionage, diversion,
or other means, sensitive equipment and technology, and the degree to
which United States export controls (including the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations) are adequate to defeat such efforts; and
 (2) the extent to which United States export controls
are well matched to the scope of the foreign threat such controls are
designed to defeat and whether other means could more successfully
defeat such threats.
 (b) Form- The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
 (c) International Traffic in Arms Regulations Defined- The
term `International Traffic in Arms Regulations' means those
regulations contained in parts 120 through 130 of title 22, Code of
Federal Regulations (or successor regulations).
SEC. 416. REPORT ON NUCLEAR TRAFFICKING.
 (a) Report- Not later than February 1, 2009, the Director
of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committee on
Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a
report on the illicit trade of nuclear and radiological material and
equipment.
 (b) Contents- The report submitted under subsection (a)
shall include, for a period of time including at least the preceding
three years--
 (1) details of all known or suspected cases of the
illicit sale, transfer, brokering, or transport of nuclear or
radiological material or equipment useful for the production of nuclear
or radiological material or nuclear explosive devices;
 (2) an assessment of the countries that represent the greatest risk of nuclear trafficking activities; and
 (3) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in
knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence in the
assessment referred to in paragraph (2).
 (c) Form- The report under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form, but shall include an unclassified summary.
SEC. 417. STUDY ON REVOKING PENSIONS OF PERSONS WHO COMMIT UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
 (a) Study- The Director of National Intelligence shall
conduct a study on the feasibility of revoking the pensions of
personnel in the intelligence community who commit unauthorized
disclosures of classified information, including whether revoking such
pensions is feasible under existing law or under the administrative
authority of the Director of National Intelligence or any other head of
an element of the intelligence community.
 (b) Report- Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report containing
the results of the study conducted under subsection (a).
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
SEC. 421. REVIEW OF COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS BY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
 (a) In General- Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b) is amended by--
 (1) redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (g) and transferring such subsection to the end; and
 (2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new subsection:
 `(e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions-
 `(1) IN GENERAL- Subject to paragraph (2), the
Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct an
audit of each covert action at least every 3 years. Such audits shall
be conducted subject to the provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4) of
subsection (b) of section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q).
 `(2) TERMINATED, SUSPENDED PROGRAMS- The Inspector
General of the Central Intelligence Agency is not required to conduct
an audit under paragraph (1) of a covert action that has been
terminated or suspended if such covert action was terminated or
suspended prior to the last audit of such covert action conducted by
the Inspector General and has not been restarted after the date on
which such audit was completed.
 `(3) REPORT- Not later than 60 days after the
completion of an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph (1), the
Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the
results of such audit.'.
 (b) Conforming Amendments- Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended--
 (1) in section 501(f) (50 U.S.C. 413(f)), by striking `503(e)' and inserting `503(g)';
 (2) in section 502(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 413b(a)(1)), by striking `503(e)' and inserting `503(g)'; and
 (3) in section 504(c) (50 U.S.C. 414(c)), by striking `503(e)' and inserting `503(g)'.
SEC. 422. INAPPLICABILITY TO DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF REQUIREMENT FOR ANNUAL REPORT ON PROGRESS IN
AUDITABLE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
 Section 114A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 404i-1) is amended by striking `the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency,'.
SEC. 423. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO TITLES OF CERTAIN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY POSITIONS.
 Section 17(d)(3)(B)(ii) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(3)(B)(ii)) is amended--
 (1) in subclause (I), by striking `Executive Director' and inserting `Associate Deputy Director';
 (2) in subclause (II), by striking `Deputy Director for
Operations' and inserting `Director of the National Clandestine
Service';
 (3) in subclause (III), by striking `Deputy Director for Intelligence' and inserting `Director of Intelligence';
 (4) in subclause (IV), by striking `Deputy Director for Administration' and inserting `Director of Support'; and
 (5) in subclause (V), by striking `Deputy Director for
Science and Technology' and inserting `Director of Science and
Technology'.
SEC. 424. CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SECTION 105 OF THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004.
 Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 U.S.C. 311
note) is amended--
 (1) by striking `Director of Central Intelligence' and inserting `Director of National Intelligence'; and
 (2) by inserting `or in section 313 of such title,' after `subsection (a)),'.
SEC. 425. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS FOR
INTERROGATIONS INVOLVING PERSONS IN THE CUSTODY OR CONTROL OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
 (a) Prohibition- Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall not expend
or obligate funds for payment to any contractor to conduct the
interrogation of a detainee or prisoner in custody or under the
effective control of the Central Intelligence Agency.
 (b) Exception-
 (1) IN GENERAL- The Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency may request, and the Director of National
Intelligence may grant, a written waiver of the requirement under
subsection (a) if the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
determines that--
 (A) no employee of the Federal Government is--
 (i) capable of performing such interrogation; and
 (ii) available to perform such interrogation; and
 (B) such interrogation is in the national interest of the United States and requires the use of a contractor.
 (2) CLARIFICATION OF APPLICABILITY OF CERTAIN LAWS- Any
contractor conducting an interrogation pursuant to a waiver under
paragraph (1) shall be subject to all laws on the conduct of
interrogations that would apply if an employee of the Federal
Government were conducting the interrogation.
Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components
SEC. 431. INTEGRATION OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY INTO THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
 (a) Report- Not later than November 1, 2008, the Under
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence and armed services committees a report outlining the
process by which the Counterintelligence Field Activity is to be
integrated into the Defense Intelligence Agency. Such report shall
include--
 (1) a description of the nature of any law enforcement authorities to be delegated to the Defense Intelligence Agency;
 (2) the authority under which the delegation of authority referred to in paragraph (1) would occur; and
 (3) the guidelines for the implementation of such law enforcement authorities.
 (b) Congressional Intelligence and Armed Services
Committees- In this section, the term `congressional intelligence and
armed services committees' means--
 (1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives;
 (2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
 (3) the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate.
Subtitle D--Other Elements
SEC. 441. CLARIFICATION OF INCLUSION OF COAST GUARD AND DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION AS ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
 Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended--
 (1) in subparagraph (H)--
 (A) by inserting `the Coast Guard,' after `the Marine Corps,'; and
 (B) by inserting `the Drug Enforcement Administration,' after `the Federal Bureau of Investigation,'; and
 (2) in subparagraph (K), by striking `, including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard'.
SEC. 442. REPORT ON TRANSFORMATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
 Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report describing
the Director's long term vision for transforming the intelligence
capabilities of the Bureau and the progress of the internal reforms of
the Bureau intended to achieve that vision. Such report shall include--
 (1) the direction, strategy, and goals for transforming the intelligence capabilities of the Bureau;
 (2) a description of what the fully functional intelligence and national security functions of the Bureau should entail;
 (3) a candid assessment of the effect of internal
reforms at the Bureau and whether such reforms have moved the Bureau
towards achieving the goals of the Director for the intelligence and
national security functions of the Bureau; and
 (4) an assessment of how well the Bureau performs tasks
that are critical to the effective functioning of the Bureau as an
intelligence agency, including--
 (A) identifying new intelligence targets within the
scope of the national security functions of the Bureau, outside the
parameters of an existing case file or ongoing investigation;
 (B) collecting intelligence domestically, including collection through human and technical sources;
 (C) recruiting human sources;
 (D) training Special Agents to spot, assess, recruit, and handle human sources;
 (E) working collaboratively with other Federal
departments and agencies to jointly collect intelligence on domestic
counterterrorism and counterintelligence targets;
 (F) producing a common intelligence picture of domestic threats to the national security of the United States;
 (G) producing high quality and timely intelligence analysis;
 (H) integrating intelligence analysts into its intelligence collection operations; and
 (I) sharing intelligence information with intelligence community partners.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters
SEC. 501. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF
THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
 (a) Extension-
 (1) IN GENERAL- Subsection (a) of section 1007 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law
107-306; 116 Stat. 2442) is amended by striking `September 1, 2004' and
inserting `December 31, 2009'.
 (2) EFFECTIVE DATE- Subject to paragraph (3), the
amendment made by paragraph (1) shall take effect as if included in the
enactment of such section 1007.
 (3) COMMISSION MEMBERSHIP-
 (A) IN GENERAL- The membership of the National
Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of
the United States Intelligence Community established under subsection
(a) of section 1002 of such Act (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2438)
(referred to in this section as the `Commission') shall be considered
vacant and new members shall be appointed in accordance with such
section 1002, as amended by subparagraph (B).
 (B) TECHNICAL AMENDMENT- Paragraph (1) of section
1002(b) of such Act is amended by striking `The Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence for Community Management.' and inserting `The
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.'.
 (4) CLARIFICATION OF DUTIES- Section 1002(i) of such
Act is amended in the matter preceding paragraph (1) by striking
`including--' and inserting `including advanced research and
development programs and activities. Such review shall include--'.
 (b) Funding-
 (1) IN GENERAL- Of the amounts authorized to be
appropriated by this Act for the Intelligence Community Management
Account, the Director of National Intelligence shall make $2,000,000
available to the Commission to carry out title X of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat.
2437).
 (2) AVAILABILITY- Amounts made available to the Commission pursuant to paragraph (1) shall remain available until expended.
SEC. 502. AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.
 (a) General Congressional Oversight- Section 501(a) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413(a)) is amended by adding
at the end the following new paragraph:
 `(3) In carrying out paragraph (1), the President shall
provide to the congressional intelligence committees all information
necessary to assess the lawfulness, effectiveness, cost, benefit,
intelligence gain, budgetary authority, and risk of an intelligence
activity, including--
 `(A) the legal authority under which the intelligence activity is being or was conducted;
 `(B) any legal issues upon which guidance was sought in
carrying out or planning the intelligence activity, including
dissenting legal views;
 `(C) any specific operational concerns arising from the
intelligence activity, including the risk of disclosing intelligence
sources or methods;
 `(D) the likelihood that the intelligence activity will
exceed the planned or authorized expenditure of funds or other
resources; and
 `(E) the likelihood that the intelligence activity will fail.'.
 (b) Reporting on Activities Other Than Covert Actions-
Section 502 of such Act (50 U.S.C. 413a) is amended by adding at the
end the following new subsection:
 `(d) Distribution of Information-
 `(1) REQUEST- Information or material provided in
accordance with subsection (a) shall be made available to each member
of the congressional intelligence committees, unless the President
requests that access to the information or material be limited after
determining that limiting such access is essential to meet
extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United
States. A request under this paragraph and the extraordinary
circumstances referred to in this paragraph shall be detailed in
writing to the Chair and ranking minority member of the congressional
intelligence committees.
 `(2) DISTRIBUTION- If the President submits a request
under paragraph (1), the Chair and ranking minority member of each
congressional intelligence committee may jointly determine whether and
how to limit access to the information or material within such
committee. If the Chair and ranking minority member of such committee
are unable to agree on whether or how to limit such access, access to
the information or material will be limited. Any information or
material to which access is limited shall subsequently be made
available to each member of the congressional intelligence communities
at the earliest possible time and shall include a detailed statement of
the reasons for not providing prior access.'.
 (c) Approval of Covert Actions- Section 503(d) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b(d)) is amended--
 (1) by striking `(d) The President' and inserting `(d)(1) The President'; and
 (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
 `(2) For purposes of this subsection, an activity shall constitute a `significant undertaking' if the activity--
 `(A) involves the potential for loss of life;
 `(B) requires an expansion of existing authorities, including authorities relating to research, development, or operations;
 `(C) results in the expenditure of significant funds or other resources;
 `(D) requires notification under section 504;
 `(E) gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing intelligence sources or methods; or
 `(F) could cause serious damage to the diplomatic
relations of the United States if such activity were disclosed without
authorization.'.
SEC. 503. REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST ASSETS.
 (a) Annual Reports- Section 118 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404m) is amended--
 (1) in the heading, by striking `SEMIANNUAL' and inserting `ANNUAL'; and
 (2) in subsection (a)--
 (A) in the heading, by striking `Semiannual' and inserting `Annual';
 (B) in the matter preceding paragraph (1)--
 (i) by striking `semiannual basis' and inserting `annual basis'; and
 (ii) by striking `preceding six-month period' and inserting `preceding year';
 (C) by striking paragraph (2); and
 (D) by redesignating paragraphs (3) and (4) as paragraphs (2) and (3), respectively.
 (b) Conforming Amendment- Section 507 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 415b) is amended--
 (1) in subsection (a)(1), by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
 `(L) The annual report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets required by section 118.'; and
 (2) in subsection (b), by striking paragraph (6).
SEC. 504. NOTICE OF INTELLIGENCE REGARDING NORTH KOREA AND CHINA.
 Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413) is amended--
 (1) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and
 (2) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new subsection:
 `(f) A notification to the congressional intelligence
committees regarding intelligence information relating to North Korea
or China after all or part of the information has been communicated to
the governments of North Korea or China, respectively, shall not be
construed to fulfill the duty under this title to keep the
congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of
the intelligence activities of the United States.'.
SEC. 505. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING USE OF INTELLIGENCE RESOURCES.
 It is the sense of Congress that the resources authorized
under this Act should not be diverted from human intelligence
collection and other intelligence programs designed to combat al Qaeda
in order to study global climate change.
Subtitle B--Technical Amendments
SEC. 511. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949.
 Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking `authorized under
paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of
section 103, subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3),
403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)' and inserting `authorized
under section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-4a)'.
SEC. 512. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
 (a) In General- Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C.
404b) is amended--
 (1) in the heading, by striking `Foreign'; and
 (2) by striking `foreign' each place it appears.
 (b) Responsibility of Director of National Intelligence- That section is further amended--
 (1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking `Director
of Central Intelligence' and inserting `Director of National
Intelligence'; and
 (2) in subsection (b), by inserting `of National Intelligence' after `Director'.
 (c) Conforming Amendment- The heading of that section is amended to read as follows:
`SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.'.
SEC. 513. TECHNICAL CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN REFERENCES TO
JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND
RELATED ACTIVITIES.
 Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended--
 (1) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking `annual
budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities' and inserting `annual budget for
the Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or
programs'; and
 (2) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking `Joint
Military Intelligence Program' and inserting `Military Intelligence
Program or any successor program or programs'.
SEC. 514. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.
 The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended as follows:
 (1) In section 102A (50 U.S.C. 403-1)--
 (A) in subsection (d)--
 (i) in paragraph (3), by striking `subparagraph (A)' in the matter preceding subparagraph (A) and inserting `paragraph (1)(A)';
 (ii) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking `or personnel' in the matter preceding clause (i); and
 (iii) in paragraph (5)(B), by striking `or
agency involved' in the second sentence and inserting `involved or the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central
Intelligence Agency)';
 (B) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking `section' and inserting `paragraph'; and
 (C) in subsection (n), by inserting `and Other' after `Acquisition'.
 (2) In section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by striking `subsection (h)' and inserting `subsection (i)'.
 (3) In section 705(e)(2)(D)(i) (50 U.S.C. 432c(e)(2)(D)(i)), by striking `responsible' and inserting `responsive'.
SEC. 515. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004.
 (a) Amendments to National Security Intelligence Reform Act
of 2004- The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I
of Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643) is amended as follows:
 (1) In section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 485(e)(10)(B)),
by striking `Attorney General' the second place it appears and
inserting `Department of Justice'.
 (2) In section 1071(e), by striking `(1)'.
 (3) In section 1072(b), in the subsection heading by inserting `Agency' after `Intelligence'.
 (b) Other Amendments to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004- The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3638) is amended
as follows:
 (1) In section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)--
 (A) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting `of' before `an institutional culture';
 (B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking `the National
Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with section 112(e)' and
inserting `the Director of National Intelligence in a manner consistent
with applicable law'; and
 (C) in subsection (f), by striking `shall,' in the matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting `shall'.
 (2) In section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)--
 (A) in paragraph (2), by striking `the Federal' and inserting `Federal'; and
 (B) in paragraph (3), by striking `the specific' and inserting `specific'.
SEC. 516. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.
 (a) Executive Schedule Level II- Section 5313 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the
Director of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item:
`Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.'.
 (b) Executive Schedule Level III- Section 5314 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the
Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence and inserting the following
new item:
`Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.'.
 (c) Executive Schedule Level IV- Section 5315 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the
General Counsel of the Office of the National Intelligence Director and
inserting the following new item:
`General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.'.
SEC. 517. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
 (a) Title 5- Title 5, United States Code, is amended by
striking `National Imagery and Mapping Agency' each place it appears
and inserting `National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency'.
 (b) Title 44- Title 44, United States Code, is amended--
 (1) in section 1336--
 (A) in the heading, by striking `National Imagery and Mapping Agency' and inserting `National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency'; and
 (B) by striking `National Imagery and Mapping
Agency' each place it appears and inserting `National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency'; and
 (2) in the table of sections at the beginning of
chapter 13, by striking the item relating to section 1336 and inserting
the following new item:

`1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special publications.'.

 (c) Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002-
Section 201(f)(2)(E) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C.
121) is amended by striking `National Imagery and Mapping Agency' and
inserting `National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency'.
PURPOSE
The purpose of H.R. 5959 is to authorize the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government for
fiscal year 2009 in order to enhance the national security of the
United States, to support and assist the armed forces of the United
States, and to facilitate and oversee the execution of the foreign
policy of the United States. The bill also clarifies certain
intelligence community authorities and makes technical corrections to
existing statutes.
CLASSIFIED ANNEX AND COMMITTEE INTENT
The classified annex to this report includes the classified Schedule
of Authorizations and its associated explanatory language. The
Committee views the classified annex as an integral part of this
legislation. The classified annex contains a thorough discussion of the
issues considered by the Committee underlying the funding
authorizations found in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. The
Committee intends that all intelligence programs discussed in the
classified annex to this report be conducted in accordance with the
guidance and limitations set forth as associated language therein. The
classified Schedule of Authorizations is incorporated directly into
this legislation by virtue of Section 102 of the bill. The classified
annex is available for review by all Members of the House of
Representatives, subject to the requirements of clause 13 of rule XXIII
of the Rules of the House of Representatives, and rule 14 of the Rules
of Procedure for the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
In addition, Section 317 of the bill incorporates reporting
requirements of the Classified Annex and any Joint Explanatory
Statement into the Act.
SCOPE OF COMMITTEE REVIEW
The bill authorizes U.S. intelligence and intelligence-related
activities under the jurisdiction of the Committee, including the
National Intelligence Program (NIP), the Military Intelligence Program
(MIP), and the Information System Security Program (ISSP). The NIP
consists of all activities of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as
intelligence and intelligence-related activities conducted by: (1) the
Department of Defense; (2) the Defense Intelligence Agency; (3) the
National Security Agency; (4) the Departments of the Army, Navy, and
Air Force; (5) the Coast Guard; (6) the Department of State; (7) the
Department of the Treasury; (8) the Department of Energy; (9) the
Department of Justice; (10) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (11)
the Drug Enforcement Administration; (12) the National Reconnaissance
Office; (13) the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and (14) the
Department of Homeland Security. The Committee has legislative,
authorizing, and oversight jurisdiction of these programs.
COMMITTEE STATEMENT AND VIEWS
A. OVERVIEW
In an era of asymmetric threats, intelligence continues to be one of
the nation's most fundamental national security tools. A
well-resourced, well-managed, and well-trained Intelligence Community
is the nation's first line of defense against terrorists, proliferators
of weapons of mass destruction, and other global actors who would do
America harm.
The Committee strongly supports the brave women and men of
America's intelligence agencies and appreciates the personal
sacrifices, overseas deployments, and enormous risks they and their
families undertake to preserve our freedom.
Most of the nation's intelligence successes, of which there are
many, cannot be discussed in an unclassified report. So, too, some of
the biggest intelligence gaps cannot be written about publicly. The
Committee has conducted dozens of classified hearings, briefings, and
site visits to understand the threats, assess our capabilities, and
realign resources to match the threats properly.
The Committee's principal concern continues to be that al-Qaeda
is stronger today than at any time since September 11, 2001. Osama bin
Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri remain at large, likely in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan. Al-Qaeda is not the only
terrorist group to grow in strength over the past seven years.
Hezbollah and Hamas have become more capable and more determined.
Dangerous states, including Syria, continue to pursue nuclear
capabilities. There is the possibility that one of these states could
transfer fissile material to a terrorist group. The Committee is
convinced that this must remain our foremost worry.
B. THE COMMITTEE REVIEW
The Committee completed its review of the President's fiscal year
2009 budget request, carrying out its annual responsibility to prepare
an authorization based on close examination of the U.S. Government's
intelligence programs and proposed expenditures.
Over the past two months, the Committee conducted 14 full
committee-level budget hearings and briefings on numerous topics,
including the following:
 National Intelligence Program
 Military Intelligence Program
 Advanced Research and Development
 Overhead Architecture
 Human Intelligence
 Covert Action
 Human Capital
 Cybersecurity
In addition to these events, committee members and staff have
taken numerous budget-related briefings covering all intelligence
programs within the National Intelligence Program, the Military
Intelligence Program, and the Information System Security Program.
As always, the Committee's legislative and budgetary actions
are based on more than these budget-specific hearings and briefings.
The actions taken in this bill are the result of the Committee's
ongoing, rigorous oversight of the U.S. Intelligence Community
throughout the year. This oversight activity includes scores of
committee and subcommittee hearings and briefings; site visits and
fact-finding trips; reviews of congressionally-directed reports; and
studies of intelligence capabilities, strategies, plans, and
challenges.
C. THE LEGISLATION
The bill and accompanying classified Schedule of Authorizations
includes the Committee's recommended authorizations for the
Intelligence Community for fiscal year 2009. This includes an
authorization for the intelligence portion of the fiscal year 2009
bridge supplemental request to fund counterterrorism operations as well
as operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the time of consideration of
H.R. 5959, the Committee had not received the Administration's full
emergency supplemental funding request for fiscal year 2009. The
Committee will consider that proposal at a later time.
H.R. 5959 improves U.S. intelligence capabilities in several important respects.
First, the bill invests in people, our most important resource.
It adds funding to enhance human intelligence (HUMINT) collection and
provides much-needed funds for other enduring and emerging global
security issues, such as challenges faced in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America.
The bill continues the Committee's longstanding commitment to
improving language capabilities in the Intelligence Community, adding
both funding and reporting requirements in order to improve oversight
of this perennial problem area.
The bill mandates implementation of security clearance reform
to allow first and second generation Americans, many of whom may have
critical language skills, to serve in the Intelligence Community with
proper clearances. In many instances, the cumbersome security clearance
process has delayed the entry of highly-skilled applicants, or
dissuaded them from even seeking employment in the Intelligence
Community. The Committee has addressed a number of these concerns to
encourage the Community to hire the most qualified people.
Second, the bill enhances congressional oversight by ensuring
that the Committee receives the information it needs to conduct its
inherent oversight function. The Committee has borne witness to
repeated failures by the Administration to comply with the National
Security Act of 1947, which mandates that the Committee be `fully and
currently informed' of all intelligence activities. These failures
prompted the Committee to adopt two provisions to enhance reporting on
intelligence activities to the full membership of the congressional
intelligence committees. One provision would limit the use of covert
action funds until the full membership of the intelligence committees
are briefed on all covert actions in effect as of April 24, 2008.
Another provision would restrict the Administration's attempts to limit
information to only the Chairman and Ranking Member, and clarifies the
information that must be reported to the full Committee.
Third, the bill authorizes much of the request for the
foundational activities of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity
Initiative (CNCI), while expressing the Committee's concern about
potential policy, implementation, and governance issues. To that end,
the bill also includes a legislative provision requesting a
presidential report on creating a senior advisory panel composed of
representatives from the executive branch, the legislative branch, and
the private sector for the purposes of providing a vehicle to address
issues of concern. The Committee has performed an extensive review of
the proposed CNCI, which included holding three hearings and numerous
briefings and roundtables.
Fourth, the Committee is also concerned that Congress does not
have a full understanding of the magnitude of human and fiscal
intelligence resources that have been devoted to Iraq, the expenditure
of which often comes at the expense of fighting the war on terror. H.R.
5959 requires a detailed report to the Committee on this topic.
Fifth, the bill addresses a number of long-term technical
challenges in the Intelligence Community. It does so by adding
significant resources in both the National Intelligence Program and the
Military Intelligence Program to modernize signals intelligence
(SIGINT) capabilities and integrate them into a global SIGINT
Enterprise.
Finally, despite the size of the budget request, the
Administration did not include funds adequate to keep the U.S.
Intelligence Community competitive in advanced technologies. Research
and development funding is the nation's investment in retaining state
of the art technologies. The bill adds funds to four agencies
specifically for that purpose; and the Committee urges the executive
branch to sustain, if not increase, this level of funding in future
year requests.
The Committee adopted a number of amendments to H.R. 5959
offered by majority and minority members. The Committee is pleased that
this bill passed with bipartisan support.
D. AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST
Comprehensive national cybersecurity initiative
The single largest request and the most important initiative of
the President's fiscal year 2009 budget request was the CNCI. Since the
announcement of the CNCI and the issuance of the National Security
Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 23 in January 2008, the Committee has
focused much time and effort on understanding the CNCI and its
components.
At present, it would be fair to characterize the Committee's
response to the CNCI as one of conditional support. The Committee finds
a cybersecurity initiative worthwhile in principle, but the details of
the CNCI remain vague and, thus, open to question. Until some of the
governance, implementation, and policy issues are identified, debated,
and resolved, the Committee believes that the funding request is
excessive. Our conclusions are summarized in the following five points:
 A comprehensive, national initiative is long
overdue. The threat has continued to grow in scale and sophistication,
and our countermeasures have stagnated;
 The Administration's near-term approach of securing
federal government systems appears reasonable, although the Committee
remains concerned about program management and systems engineering
capabilities;
 There is consensus that an effective cybersecurity
initiative should be based on a `defense in depth' approach that
synchronizes the activities of different elements of the government.
However, the various components of the CNCI do not seem very
well-connected, nor is it clear there are adequate governance
mechanisms to achieve the necessary coordination;
 The Committee understands the prudence of delaying
debate on major policy issues until the next Administration, given the
limited time remaining in the current one. Nevertheless, the
Administration has addressed some important issues, and we must
consider how best to deal with those issues in order to achieve
progress; and
 For the CNCI to work as described in the Presidential
Directive, it will require a partnership with industry unlike any model
that currently exists. The excessive classification of the CNCI,
however, militates against the collaboration necessary to achieve that
partnership.
The Committee also notes that the federal government is not
presently organized or equipped to negotiate the myriad issues and
challenges presented by the implementation of the CNCI, especially
those that cross organizational and jurisdictional boundaries. As the
CNCI develops, it will be imperative that the government also take into
account the interests and concerns of private citizens, the U.S.
information technology industry, and other elements of the private
sector. Indeed, the success of the CNCI will depend on the ability to
develop and implement a well-defined, comprehensive model for public
sector and private sector cooperation.
Many of the details of the CNCI are still evolving, and an
endeavor of this magnitude will need to be undertaken over the course
of many years. The Committee believes a mechanism should be created to
review the Intelligence Community's progress toward refining and
implementing the CNCI, as well as make policy recommendations to the
executive and legislative branches in the areas of governance, privacy
and civil liberties, and regulatory issues. As a result, the Committee
has included a legislative provision requiring a report from the
President on options for creating a high-level advisory body.
Overreliance on supplemental funding
The Committee wishes to express once again its unequivocal
disapproval of the recurring practice of funding intelligence
activities through emergency supplemental requests rather than within
the parameters of the standard budgeting process. The supplemental
funding process ensures significantly less scrutiny of funding
requests, both within the executive branch and in Congress, and invites
waste. It prevents authorizing committees from performing their
functions of oversight and evaluation, often resulting in investment in
ill-advised and unvetted programs. Many of these programs have out-year
funding `tails' that, in an era of declining budgets, will necessitate
funding within base appropriations once supplemental requests cease.
The practice of budgeting by supplemental is particularly
egregious in the arena of intelligence activities, which by statute are
supposed to receive a higher level of scrutiny than other federal
funding. The Committee hopes that one of the first orders of business
for the new Administration is to stop this fiscally irresponsible
practice and to work with Congress to find funding solutions that do
not bring the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community to a
stand-still.
Human intelligence capability throughout the world
The maintenance of a robust HUMINT capability on a global basis
is as much a mission priority as countering terrorism and supporting
activity in the war theater. As world events continue to demonstrate,
some of the greatest threats to the strategic interests of the United
States emanate from sovereign nations, not from terrorist organizations
or other non-state actors. The need for the National HUMINT Manager and
other senior leadership in the Intelligence Community to devote
sufficient personnel and financial resources to fulfill the global
HUMINT mission has been a significant priority of Congress for many
years.
The Committee remains concerned that identified, meritorious
HUMINT initiatives are not being funded or adequately supported by the
Administration. Accordingly, this bill provides additional, targeted
HUMINT funding to enhance the nation's capability to ascertain the
plans and intentions of those seeking to undermine the interests and
security of the United States.
Issues regarding Committee notification of Syria's nuclear program
In April 2008, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
briefed the Committee on the construction of a covert nuclear facility
in Syria and its subsequent destruction in September 2007.
Over the course of the preceding eight months, the Chairman and
Ranking Minority Member had requested that the President brief the full
membership of the Committee about these developments, which
significantly impact U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East and
North Korea.
Just hours before a highly-orchestrated public roll-out of the
previously classified intelligence, the President finally sent briefers
to the Committee. The delay was inexcusable and violated the National
Security Act of 1947, which requires that the executive branch keep
Congress `fully and currently informed' of all intelligence activities.
Congress should be briefed on the threats to the United States in a
timely manner, not simply when it is politically expedient.
The world is more dangerous today than at any time since 9/11.
There are serious challenges to U.S. national and international
security that require the Administration and Congress to work together.
The Administration's clear disdain for the legitimate oversight role of
Congress makes it difficult for Congress to do its part in meeting
these challenges and keeping America secure.
Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947
The National Security Act of 1947 is the principal legislative
source for the executive's requirement to keep the congressional
intelligence committees informed of the nation's intelligence
activities. As the Committee has noted, this obligation is absolutely
critical to sound congressional oversight, which in turn is central to
a well-functioning and effective Intelligence Community.
In recent years, the Administration has, on several occasions,
ignored the plain language of the Act. In one case, the Administration
refused, for an extended period of time, to brief the full Committee
membership on the President's warrantless surveillance program,
notwithstanding that it was not a covert action program. In another
case, the Administration ignored months of requests for a briefing on
Syria's nuclear program, despite the fact that the Administration was
preparing to brief reporters on the same issue and had already briefed
foreign nations on the issue.
This is unacceptable. For this reason, the Committee has
included several amendments to the reporting requirements of the Act.
These amendments are intended to clarify that the obligation to report
to the committees is not negotiable. It is not an obligation that the
President can ignore at his discretion. It is not an obligation that
can be evaded by claiming that briefing the congressional intelligence
committees will require other committees to be briefed. It is not an
obligation that can be evaded by broad assertions of executive power.
Diversity in the intelligence community
The Committee is committed to increasing diversity in the
Intelligence Community and notes with approval that the DNI identified
treating `diversity as a strategic mission imperative' in his 100-day
and 500-day plans. In particular, the DNI has stated that one of his
goals is to improve the recruiting, hiring, and retention of first and
second generation Americans. Indeed, across the community, minority
hiring is at a five-year high. Despite this progress, the Intelligence
Community overall is still substantially behind the civilian labor
force and the federal workforce in minority and female representation.
This gap is even more apparent in core mission areas and management
positions, especially at the highest levels.
The Committee believes that the DNI's stated commitment should
show measurable results. Unfortunately, several indicators within the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) show a lack of
attention and commitment to diversity. For example, the ODNI is below
average in the Intelligence Community for minority representation, and
is significantly below average in the Intelligence Community in its
hiring of minorities. In particular, the DNI's Office of Equal
Employment Opportunity and Diversity has suffered significant budget
cuts over the past three years, despite taking on new mandates. The
DNI's commitment to diversity can be most clearly shown in the
composition of his own office. The Committee hopes that the ODNI will
show an improvement in minority representation in the future, and urges
the DNI to hold his office to the same standards that he expects from
the rest of the Intelligence Community.
Committee investigation into the destruction of interrogation videotapes by the Central Intelligence Agency
On December 10, 2007, the Committee announced an investigation
into the making, retention, and destruction of interrogation videotapes
by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). That investigation, initiated
as part of the Committee's oversight of the CIA, is intended to
ascertain the facts regarding the destruction of the videotapes and
failure to notify the Committee regarding the destruction.
The Committee's investigation is ongoing and has made
substantial progress. The Committee has received hundreds of pages of
documents in response to its document requests. The Committee has also
held two hearings to take sworn testimony and has conducted several
staff-level interviews.
While the sensitive nature of the investigation prevents
extensive public discussion of the investigation, the Committee
believes that it is critical to its oversight work. The Committee looks
forward to completion of its investigation and plans to issue a report
documenting its findings.
Creation of a National Applications Office in the Department of Homeland Security
Last year, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced
the creation of the National Applications Office (NAO) under the Office
of Intelligence and Analysis to facilitate access by non-traditional
users to national technical means-derived intelligence. This new office
currently has the authority to process imagery, measurement and
signatures, and electronic intelligence requests for civil applications and homeland security purposes.
The Committee notes the apparent care with which the DHS is
approaching the establishment of the NAO. Pursuant to congressional
mandate, the Committee has received several documents outlining the
legal authorities under which NAO will operate. The Committee, however,
remains concerned with the planned use of national technical means for
law enforcement purposes, as opposed to homeland security purposes.
Such use is unprecedented and raises significant constitutional issues.
Therefore, the Committee looks forward to reviewing the results of the
statutorily-mandated Government Accountability Office review of the
Secretary's certification that NAO activities comply with all existing
laws, including all applicable privacy and civil liberties standards.
The NAO charter also requires an interagency legal working
group to resolve any privacy, civil liberties, and policy issues
surrounding the use of national technical means for the purposes of law
enforcement. The Committee expects to be kept apprised of the group's
work on these issues and on the development of legal parameters and
guidance on the functioning of the law enforcement domain within the
NAO.
Major systems acquisitions
The Committee notes with concern the continued cost overruns and
schedule delays affecting the acquisition of many major intelligence
community systems. At the same time, the Committee acknowledges the
effort entailed in preparing the DNI's 2007 Annual Report to Congress
on Intelligence Community Program Management Plans, which compares the
performance of all National Intelligence Program acquisition programs
against a DNI-established baseline. The Committee is also pleased that
one goal of the DNI's 500 Day Plan is to build acquisition excellence
within the Intelligence Community. With Intelligence Community
Directive 105 and Intelligence Community Program Guidance 105.1, the
DNI is requiring practices that will increase the likelihood of
successful acquisitions. Finally, the Committee applauds the DNI's
recommended greater use of experienced systems engineers during the
acquisition process.
The Committee encourages the DNI to issue a formal policy
establishing a procedure by which the Intelligence Community would be
empowered to withhold incentives from companies with poor contract
performance. Such a policy would forcefully demonstrate the
expectations for contractor performance. Despite coverage of this topic
in the Federal Acquisition Regulation, practices are not standard
across the Intelligence Community, even within directorates of
individual agencies. The Committee believes that standardization of
policy would restore meaning to the use of award incentives and benefit
the entire Intelligence Community.
The Committee notes that the continuing consolidation of
industry is impacting the government's ability to contract with
independent companies when conducting major systems acquisitions.
Specifically, the Committee is concerned about cases in which a single
parent company has a contract for engineering technical assistance in
support of a source selection and also intends to compete for the
system development contract. The Committee urges the Deputy DNI for
Acquisition to consider whether established firewalls are sufficient to
prevent any potential conflict of interest in such cases.
Acquisition program performance notification
The Committee is concerned that delays in informing Congress
that major acquisition programs for the Intelligence Community are over
cost, behind schedule, or failing to adhere to milestones serves to
undermine good oversight. In many cases, the Committee has learned of a
program failure only after millions of dollars have been wasted.
To remedy this problem, the Committee urges the DNI to develop,
in consultation with the Committee, a standard for program notification
to keep the Committee fully informed of program issues. The
Nunn-McCurdy Amendment to the Department of Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1982 provides an example of such a standard. The
guidance should, for example, ensure congressional notification at the
end of each quarter of total acquisition costs per unit for each major
intelligence program. It should also require notification if an agency
head has reason to believe a program will exceed the authorized funding
by a specific percentage.
Advanced research and development
Advanced Research and Development (R&D) is critical to the
ability of the Intelligence Community to accomplish its missions.
Intelligence officers must remain several steps ahead of their targets
and adversaries. Technical innovation is often the key to accomplishing
this goal. The Committee believes that the Intelligence Community's
investment in R&D is insufficient to enable the elements of the
Intelligence Community to keep up with both current and future
challenges. The elements of the Intelligence Community must be
encouraged and allowed to invest more resources in Advanced R&D.
The fiscal year 2009 budget presents an example of the R&D
challenge. As often happens in the Intelligence Community, the research
budgets were held steady, or cut, to fund the higher, near-term
priorities of Intelligence Community. The Committee feels that these
decisions were short-sighted. For this reason, the Committee has
increased funding for Advanced R&D above the Administration's
request. In the future, the Committee encourages the DNI to ensure the
allocation of necessary funding and personnel resources to enhance the
Intelligence Community's R&D efforts.
The DNI must also provide adequate resources for the
newly-created Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA).
IARPA was created to address long-term research challenges from the
perspective of the greater Intelligence Community, rather than from an
individual agency's more operationally-focused vantage point. While the
Committee had initial concerns about IARPA's creation and the impact it
would have
on the research programs of the individual elements of the
Intelligence Community, the Committee is pleased that the ODNI has
taken the first required steps for success. IARPA will benefit greatly
from the selection of a Director and the stability of a dedicated
location for its activities. The Committee looks forward to observing
how the ODNI nurtures this organization as it develops new and
innovative long-term research programs.
Future course for overhead architecture
The Committee remains concerned that neither the DNI nor the
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence [USD(I)] is showing an
appropriate sense of urgency in charting a viable future course for the
overhead constellation. The classified annex to the bill contains
guidance to the Intelligence Community to focus on lower-risk and
presumably less-expensive solutions to current architectural problems.
The Committee urges the Intelligence Community to pursue evolutionary
upgrades to existing designs as a way to reduce near-term risk, while
at the same time exhorting the DNI to make more progress in defining
the next-generation designs. The Committee does not prescribe specific
technical solutions, but it does seek to ensure that all available
technologies and existing capabilities are being given full and careful
consideration before the executive branch embarks on formal
acquisitions. The Committee also seeks to ensure that any acquisition
undertaken is part of a clear path towards a future capability or
architecture.
While there is no clear consensus on the specifics of the way
ahead, there is widespread agreement that the DNI and USD(I) have yet
to deliver an architecture sufficiently compelling to win the support
of Congress. The Committee urges the DNI and the USD(I) to develop a
cohesive and comprehensive strategy prior to the submission of the
fiscal year 2010 budget request.
Integration of the Counterintelligence Field Activity into the Defense Intelligence Agency
The Committee has recently learned that the Secretary of Defense
approved the dissolution of the Counterintelligence Field Activity
(CIFA) and the integration of its functional elements into the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA). As part of this integration, the USD(I) is
seeking to amend DIA's charter in order to, among other things,
designate DIA as a law enforcement activity.
The Committee is concerned about DIA's suitability to engage in
law enforcement activities that are designed to investigate non-DIA
personnel. DIA's stated mission is to collect, analyze, and manage
foreign military intelligence for war fighters. The Agency has no
experience with managing, overseeing, and leading criminal
investigations of non-DIA personnel, even investigations that have a
counterintelligence nexus.
The Committee will continue to follow this issue closely, including through reports required elsewhere in this Act.
FBI's use of national security letters
The Committee has been, and remains, extremely concerned by the
reports from the Department of Justice Inspector General (DOJ/IG),
which found that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) abused its
statutory authority with respect to National Security Letters (NSLs)
from 2003 through 2006.
An NSL is a demand letter used by the FBI to obtain, usually
from businesses, the records and data related to telephone and
electronic communications, financial transactions, and credit reports.
Unlike search warrants, they require no probable cause and involve no
judicial oversight unless challenged, which is difficult to do, as 97
percent of NSLs impose non-disclosure and confidentiality restraints on
the recipients.
In a March 2007 report examining FBI activities from 2003
through 2005 and a March 2008 report examining activities in 2006, the
DOJ/IG detailed a complete breakdown in FBI oversight and internal
controls over these intrusive investigative tools, including:
  inaccurate reporting to Congress of the number of NSLs issued;
  poor training on Attorney General guidelines on the balance of privacy interests and legitimate investigative requirements;
  the use of more than 700 `exigent letters' that circumvented the requirements of the NSL statute;
  an absence of FBI guidelines, reliable record-keeping, or effective management controls regarding the use of NSLs; and
 significant problems with the FBI's process for
identifying and reporting to the President's Intelligence Oversight
Board known statutory violations and policy with regard to its use of
NSLs, as required by law.
These abuses are made more worrisome because of the enormous growth
in the FBI's requests to use NSLs, including those which seek
information related to U.S. persons.
Committee members and staff have been provided information
about a series of corrective measures that the FBI has put in place
since the release of the March 2007 report. The Committee agrees with
the DOJ/IG that the FBI has made significant progress toward rectifying
its many failures; and the Committee commends the Bureau's senior
leaders for their personal involvement in these improvements. Among the
changes are (1) new comprehensive guidance on the proper use of NSLs,
accompanied by detailed training for agents nationwide; (2) the
establishment of a new Office of Integrity and Compliance; and (3) the
establishment of an NSL-tracking database to ensure proper
authorizations are received and accurate reports are provided to
Congress.
In spite of these measures, the Committee is concerned that no
one has been held accountable for the myriad failures of leadership,
oversight, training, or quality control, particularly regarding the
egregious issuance of `exigent letters' that demanded information by
inaccurately promising that an NSL or grand jury subpoena would be
forthcoming.
Furthermore, the Committee agrees with the DOJ/IG's conclusion
that it is too early to see if these corrective measures will mitigate
the full range of problems and abuses. In particular, the Committee
notes the DOJ/IG's finding that mechanisms established by the FBI still
inadequately guarantee appropriate privacy safeguards or minimize the
FBI's retention of NSL-derived information. The Committee urges the FBI
to ensure that a proper balance is reached between protecting the
privacy and civil liberties of U.S. persons and the FBI's genuine
investigative needs. The Committee intends to remain fully engaged in
future NSL-related developments and attentive to any accountability
reviews conducted by the Department of Justice.
Global climate change
The Committee continues to acknowledge the critical impact of
climate change on our national security and the inherent intelligence
challenges of developing analytically-sound indicators with which to
gauge the rates and types of global change and the likely impact on
migrations, ethnic and international tensions, and the capacities and
intentions of nations.
Several reports in 2007 and 2008 projected the security
implications of various rates of climate change, and some also called
for more robust intelligence capacities to address these scenarios. For
example, a report by eleven retired U.S. generals and admirals,
published by the Center for Naval Analysis in April 2007, found that
`projected climate change poses a serious threat to America's national
security' and recommended that `the national security consequences of
climate change should be fully integrated into national security and
national defense strategies.'
In the near term, the prospect of a catastrophic
climate-related national security crisis may seem remote. However, the
Committee recalls a time when people thought that the prospect of a
catastrophic terrorist attack on U.S. soil was remote.
To better ensure that the nation is well-positioned to deal
with such a crisis, the Committee has authorized additional funds for
the purpose of enhancing the Intelligence Community's collaboration
efforts with the scientific community to address these challenges and
to build relationships with international and national sources of
expertise. The Committee urges the executive branch to use these
resources as a catalyst for innovative, forward-looking efforts to
build the capacity of the Intelligence Community to provide warning and
strategic analysis in the context of global climate change.
The Committee is pleased that the National Intelligence Council
(NIC) is addressing the security implications of climate change through
a National Intelligence Assessment (NIA). The Committee is optimistic
that publication of the NIA and its associated research will encourage
intelligence analysts and managers to take climate change-related
factors into account in their ongoing assessment of many intelligence
issues.
COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION AND ROLLCALL VOTES
On May 8, 2008, the Committee met in open and closed session and ordered the bill H.R. 5959 favorably reported, as amended.
OPEN SESSION
In open session, the Committee considered the text of the bill H.R. 5959.
Chairman Reyes offered an amendment in the nature of a
substitute to H.R. 5959. The contents of the amendment in the nature of
a substitute, as amended, are described in the Section-by-Section
analysis and the Explanation of Amendment. The Committee considered the
following amendments to the amendment in the nature of a substitute:
Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to limit the use of funds
authorized by the bill for purposes of prohibiting or discouraging the
use of certain words or phrases within the Intelligence Community or
the Federal Government. It was not agreed to by a record vote of 9 ayes
to 12 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr.
Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr.
Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff.
Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to require the DNI to produce
a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the Iranian nuclear
program, to include a reassessment of past intelligence relating to the
program. Mr. Hoekstra's amendment failed on voice vote.
Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment to prohibit the use of
private contractors for interrogation of persons in the custody or
control of the Federal Government. Mr. Rogers offered a second degree
amendment to Ms. Schakowsky's amendment, authorizing the DNI to issue
waivers to the prohibition. Ms. Schakowsky withdrew her amendment.
Mr. Holt offered an amendment to require the video recording of
interrogations of persons in the custody of or under the effective
control of the Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Holt withdrew his
amendment.
Mr. Hoekstra requested unanimous consent to offer three
amendments en bloc: (1) an amendment to require the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation to complete a report on transformation
of the Agency; (2) an amendment to require the
Director of National Intelligence to complete a feasibility
study on revoking the pensions of persons who commit unauthorized
disclosures of classified information; and (3) an amendment stating
that it is the sense of Congress that resources authorized by the bill
should not be diverted from human intelligence collection or other
intelligence programs designed to combat al-Qaeda in order to study
global climate change.
Each amendment en bloc was agreed to by voice vote.
The Committee then recessed for House floor votes and reconvened in open session for business two hours later.
OPEN SESSION
Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment to prohibit the use of private
contractors for interrogations involving persons in the custody or
control of the CIA unless a written waiver is granted by the DNI. It
was agreed to by voice vote.
Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to eliminate all earmarks
from H.R. 5959 and to strike the provision authorizing the transfer of
$39 million to the Department of Justice for the operation of the
National Drug Intelligence Center. The amendment was agreed to by a
record vote of 17 ayes to 4 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Ms. Eshoo, Mr.
Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin,
Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Mr.
Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
Voting no: Mr. Cramer, Mr. Holt, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Tiahrt.
Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to eliminate the provision
establishing an independent Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
The amendment was not agreed to by voice vote.
Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment to limit interrogation
techniques to those proscribed by the United States Army Field Manual
on Human Intelligence Collector Operations. Discussion of the amendment
was deferred because national security would be endangered if the
matters to be considered were disclosed. Later, the amendment was not
agreed to by a record vote of 9 ayes to 12 noes.
Voting aye: Mr. Boswell, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Cramer, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr.
Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr.
McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
Ms. Wilson of New Mexico offered an amendment to amend the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The amendment was not agreed to
by a record vote of 10 ayes to 11 noes.
Voting aye: Mr. Boswell, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr.
Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr.
Rogers, Mr. Issa.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr.
Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin,
Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff.
Mr. Rogers of Michigan offered an amendment to prohibit the use
of funds authorized in the bill for purposes of implementing the FBI's
mandatory reassignment of a supervisor after serving in a management
position for 5 years. The amendment was agreed to by a record vote of
21 ayes to 0 noes.
Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr.
Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr.
Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr.
Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr.
Rogers, Mr. Issa.
Voting no: None.
Mr. McHugh offered an amendment to the National Security Act of
1947 to clarify that reporting regarding North Korea and China must be
provided to the Committee before being provided to those nations. The
amendment was agreed to by a record vote of 17 ayes and 4 noes.
Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Mr. Thompson,
Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr.
Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr.
Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
Voting no: Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney.
Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment to establish rules for
rendition by elements of the Intelligence Community in order to prevent
harsh treatment by third nations, and to encourage timely legal
proceedings against the rendered party.
CLOSED SESSION
Mr. Everett moved to close the meeting because national security
would be endangered if the matters to be considered were disclosed. The
motion was agreed to by a record vote of 19 ayes to 0 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr.
Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr.
Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr.
Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
Voting no: None.
OPEN SESSION
After debate, the Committee returned to open session. The Schakowsky
amendment was not agreed to by a record vote of 10 ayes to 11 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Boswell, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr.
Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin,
Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Cramer, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett,
Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr.
Rogers, Mr. Issa.
By voice vote, the Committee then adopted the Chairman's amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.
CLOSED SESSION
Mr. Hoekstra moved to close the meeting because national security
would be endangered if the matters to be considered were disclosed. The
motion was agreed to by a record vote of 21 ayes to 0 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr.
Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr.
Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr.
Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr.
Rogers, Mr. Issa.
Voting no: None.
Ms. Wilson offered an amendment to modify the classified annex to accompany the classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Mr. Rogers of Michigan offered an amendment to reduce the number of positions and funding for the Community Management Account.
OPEN SESSION
After debate, the Committee returned to open session. The Wilson
amendment was not agreed to by a record vote of 9 ayes to 12 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Ms. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr.
Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr.
Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Schiff.
The Rogers amendment was agreed to by a voice vote.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted the Schedule of Authorizations, as amended.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted a motion by the Chairman to
favorably report the bill to the House, as amended, including by
reference the classified schedule of authorizations.
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS AND EXPLANATION OF THE AMENDMENT
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101. Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 of the Committee report authorizes appropriations
for fiscal year 2009 for the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of a list of United States Government departments, agencies,
and other elements.
Section 102. Classified schedule of authorizations
Section 102 provides that the details of the amounts authorized
to be appropriated under Section 101 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities for fiscal year 2009, and (subject to
Section 103) the personnel ceilings authorized for fiscal year 2009,
are contained in the classified Schedule of Authorizations. The
Schedule of Authorizations will be made available to the committees on
appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives, and to the
President.
Section 102 also contains language indicating that no earmarks are authorized in this Act.
Section 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 provides procedures to enhance the flexibility of
the DNI to manage the personnel levels of the Intelligence Community.
This section allows the DNI, with the approval of the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), to authorize employment
of civilian personnel in excess of the number authorized under Section
102 by an amount not to exceed three percent of the total limit
applicable to each element of the Intelligence Community. The DNI must
determine that the action is necessary to the performance of important
intelligence functions and must notify the congressional intelligence
committees prior to the increase.
It also requires the DNI to notify the congressional intelligence committees of the exercise of authority under this section.
Section 104. Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 104 authorizes the sum of $648,842,000 in fiscal year
2009 for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the DNI. The
Intelligence Community Management Account is part of the Community
Management Account. The section authorizes 772 full-time, or full-time
equivalent, personnel for the Intelligence Community Management
Account, who may be either permanent employees or individuals detailed
from other elements of the United States Government. Section 104 also
authorizes additional funds and personnel in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations for the Community Management Account.
Under Section 104, the DNI may use the authorities in Section
103 to adjust personnel levels in elements within the Intelligence
Community Management Account, subject to the limitations in that
section.
Section 105. Limitation on the use of covert action funds
Section 105 limits the obligation or expenditure of covert
action funds to no more than 25 percent until such time as each member
of the congressional intelligence committees has been briefed on all
authorizations for covert actions in effect on April 24, 2008.
Section 106. Prohibition on use of funds to implement `Five and Out' program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Section 106 bars the use of funds authorized under the Act to
implement a program (commonly referred to as the `Five and Out'
program) requiring the mandatory reassignment of a supervisor of the
FBI after such supervisor serves in a management position for five
years.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201. Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes appropriations of $279,200,000 for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund.
Section 202. Technical modification to mandatory retirement provision of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement Act
Section 202 updates the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement
Act to reflect the use of pay levels within the Senior Intelligence
Service program, rather than pay grades, by the CIA.
TITLE III--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SUBTITLE A--PERSONNEL MATTERS
Section 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by law
Section 301 provides that funds authorized to be appropriated by
this Act for salary, pay, retirement, and other benefits for federal
employees may be increased by such additional or supplemental amounts
as may be necessary for increases in compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
Section 302. Enhanced flexibility in non-reimbursable details to elements of the Intelligence Community
Section 302 expands from one year to two years the maximum
length of time that United States Government personnel may be detailed
to the ODNI on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis, in which case,
the employee continues to be paid by the home agency. To utilize this
authority, the joint agreement of the DNI and head of the detailing
element is required. The DNI had requested authority to expand the
permitted duration of details from one year to three years. The
Committee believes that two years strikes an appropriate balance
between the needs of the DNI and the needs of the elements of the
Intelligence Community.
Section 303. Multi-level security clearances
Section 303 amends section 102A of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), which sets forth the responsibilities and
authorities of the DNI, to require the DNI to ensure that the elements
of the Intelligence Community adopt a multi-level approach to security
clearances. This approach will help ensure that the security clearance
system is flexible enough to allow the elements of the Intelligence
Community to leverage the skills and expertise of persons with
cultural, linguistic or other subject matter expertise critical to
national security.
Section 303 also requires the DNI to establish guidelines implementing the requirements of this section.
Section 304. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for intelligence collection personnel
Section 116 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
404k(b)) allows the DNI to authorize travel on any common carrier when
it is consistent with Intelligence Community mission requirements or,
more specifically, is required for cover purposes, operational needs,
or other exceptional circumstances. Currently, the DNI may only
delegate this authority to the Principal Deputy DNI or, with respect to
CIA employees, to the Director of the CIA.
Section 304 provides that the DNI may delegate the authority in
section 116(b) of the National Security Act of 1947 to the head of any
element. This expansion is consistent with the view that the DNI should
be able to delegate authority throughout the Intelligence Community
when such delegation serves the overall interests of the Intelligence
Community.
Section 304 also provides that the head of an element of the
Intelligence Community, to which travel authority has been delegated,
is empowered to assign such authority to senior officials within the
element, as specified in guidelines issued by the DNI. This allows for
administrative flexibility consistent with the guidance of the DNI
for the entire Intelligence Community. To facilitate oversight,
the DNI shall submit the guidelines to the congressional intelligence
committees.
Section 305. Annual personnel level assessments for the Intelligence Community.
Section 305 requires the DNI, in consultation with the head of
the element of the Intelligence Community concerned, to prepare an
annual assessment of the personnel and contractor levels for each
element of the Intelligence Community for the subsequent fiscal year.
Section 305 is a new mechanism to allow both the executive branch and
Congress to oversee personnel growth in the Intelligence Community.
The assessment required by Section 305 seeks information about
budgeted personnel and contractor costs and levels, a comparison of
this information to current fiscal year data and data from the previous
five fiscal years, and a justification for the requested personnel and
contractor levels. The assessment also requires the DNI to state that,
based on current and projected funding, the element will have
sufficient internal infrastructure and training resources to support
the requested personnel and contractor levels, and sufficient funding
to support the administrative and operational activities of the
requested personnel levels.
Section 305 also requires that the assessment contain
information about intelligence collectors and analysts employed or
contracted by each element of the Intelligence Community and
contractors who are the subjects of any Inspector General
investigations. The assessment must be submitted to congressional
intelligence committees concurrent with the submission of the
President's budget request.
The Committee believes that the personnel level assessment
required by Section 305 will provide information necessary for the
executive branch and Congress to understand the consequences of
modifying the Intelligence Community's personnel levels. Section 305,
therefore, recognizes that personnel growth must be better planned in
the future to accomplish the goals of strengthening intelligence
collection, analysis, and dissemination. In addition, the
Administration must adequately fund its personnel growth plan and
structure its resources to ensure that personnel growth does not
compromise the implementation and execution of other programs.
With regard to historical contractor levels to be included in
the annual assessments, the DNI has expressed concern that there was no
comprehensive effort, prior to the ODNI's contractor inventory
initiated in June 2006, to capture information on the number and costs
of contractors throughout the Intelligence Community. In light of the
concerns outlined by the DNI, the Committee understands that
information about contractor levels prior to June 2006 may need to be
reported as a best estimate.
The Committee is also concerned about the Intelligence
Community's increasing reliance on contractors to meet mission
requirements. The Intelligence Community employs a significant number
of `core' contractors who provide direct support to intelligence
mission areas and are generally indistinguishable from the U.S.
Government personnel whose mission they support. Given the cost
disparity between employing a civilian federal government employee,
estimated at an average of $126,500 annually in fiscal year 2006, and a
core contractor, estimated at an average of over $250,000 annually in
fiscal year 2006, the Committee believes that the Intelligence
Community should strive to reduce its dependence on contractors. The
personnel assessment required in Section 305 should assist the DNI and
the congressional intelligence committees in determining the
appropriate balance of contractors and permanent government employees.
Section 306. Comprehensive report on intelligence community contractors.
Section 306 requires the DNI to provide a one-time report by
November 1, 2008, describing the personnel services activities
performed by contractors across the Intelligence Community, the impact
of contractors on the Intelligence Community, and the accountability
mechanisms governing contractors.
The reporting requirements of this section are designed to
address three primary concerns. First, leaders in the Intelligence
Community do not have sufficient factual documentation regarding the
size and use of its large contractor workforce. Second, the
Intelligence Community lacks a clear definition of the functions that
may be appropriately performed by contractors and, as a result, whether
contractors and government employees are duplicating similar functions.
Third, the Intelligence Community does not have procedures for
overseeing contractors and ensuring the recognition of criminal
violations or the prevention and redress of financial waste, fraud, or
other abuses by contractors. The report is intended to aid both the
Intelligence Community and the congressional intelligence committees in
conducting oversight and devising appropriate policy solutions.
Section 307. Report on proposed pay-for-performance Intelligence Community personnel management system.
Section 307 prohibits the implementation of pay-for-performance
compensation reform within an element of the Intelligence Community
until 45 days after the DNI submits to the Congress a report for each
element of the Intelligence Community, that describes, for each
element, a proposed employee advisory group, a plan for ensuring
diversity in that employee advisory group, a certification that all
managers involved in a pay-for-performance system have been
sufficiently trained on the implementing guidance for that system, and
a description of a mechanism for employees to appeal pay decisions to
someone outside the management chain of each element.
The Committee remains concerned that the DNI is moving forward
with a major overhaul of compensation reform without seeking sufficient
employee input. The employees in the Intelligence Community should be
able to make recommendations and advise senior managers on the creation
and implementation of such a program. Such advisory groups should also
represent racial, ethnic, and gender diversity. In addition, the
transition to this new system will require greater attention and effort
on the part of managers in the intelligence community. Managers should
be trained on the new system
so that they know what will be expected of them, and how to
implement the system fairly. Finally, because this new system leaves
much more to the discretion of managers in setting performance
expectations and rating their employees than ever before, the system is
potentially vulnerable to arbitrariness, discrimination or abuse. The
Committee seeks to ensure employees are adequately protected from such
inappropriate actions and have adequate mechanisms to contest or appeal
adverse decisions.
Section 308. Report on plan to increase diversity within the Intelligence Community
Section 308 requires the DNI, in coordination with the heads of
the elements of the Intelligence Community, to submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the plans of each
element of the Intelligence Community, including the ODNI, to increase
diversity within that element. The report shall include the specific
implementation plans to increase diversity.
To ensure that the report is submitted in a timely fashion,
Section 308 requires the DNI to submit the report by no later than
November 1, 2008.
Section 309. Report on security clearance determinations
Section 309 requires the Director of the OMB to submit to
Congress a report on those security clearance determinations that have
taken longer than one year to complete, including the agencies
requesting such determinations and reasons for the delay. The Committee
welcomes improvements that have been made in improving the timeliness
of security clearance processing, but is concerned that the processing
of some security clearances, particularly for industry, continue to
take far too long. The report will contribute needed data for ongoing
management by the executive branch as well as for congressional
oversight.
SUBTITLE B--OTHER MATTERS
Section 311. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 311 provides that the authorization of appropriations by
the Act shall not be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of
any intelligence activity that is not otherwise authorized by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States.
Section 312. Clarification of definition of Intelligence Community under the National Security Act of 1947
Section 312 amends Section 3(4)(L) of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)(L)) to permit the designation as `element of
the Intelligence Community' of elements of departments and agencies of
the United States Government whether or not those departments and
agencies are listed in Section 3(4).
Section 313. Modification of availability of funds for different intelligence activities
Section 313 conforms the text of Section 504(a)(3)(B) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(B) (governing the
funding of intelligence activities)) with the text of Section
102A(d)(5)(A)(ii) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-1(d)(5)(A)(ii)), as
amended by Section 1011(a) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458 (Dec. 17, 2004) (`IRTPA')
(governing the transfer and reprogramming by the DNI of certain
intelligence funding).
This amendment to the National Security Act replaces the
`unforeseen requirements' standard in Section 504(a)(3)(B) with a more
flexible standard to govern reprogramming and transfers of funds
authorized for a different intelligence or intelligence-related
activity. Under the new standard, reprogramming or transfer authority
may be sought if, in addition to the other requirements of Section
504(a)(3), the new use of funds `supports an emergent need, improves
program effectiveness, or increases efficiency.' This modification
brings the standard for reprogramming and transfers of intelligence
funding into conformity with the standards applicable to reprogramming
and transfers under Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947.
The modification preserves congressional oversight of proposed
reprogramming and transfers while enhancing the Intelligence
Community's ability to carry out missions and functions vital to
national security.
Section 314. Protection of certain national security information
Section 314 amends Section 601 of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 421) to increase the criminal penalties for an
individual with authorized access to classified information who
intentionally discloses any information identifying a covert agent, if
that individual knows the United States is taking affirmative measures
to conceal the covert agent's intelligence relationship to the United
States.
Currently, the maximum sentence for disclosure by someone who
has had `authorized access to classified information that identifies a
covert agent' is ten years. This provision increases that maximum
sentence to 15 years. Currently, the maximum sentence for disclosure by
someone who `as a result of having authorized access to classified
information, learns the identity of a covert agent and intentionally
discloses any information identifying such covert agent' is five years.
This provision increases that maximum sentence to ten years.
Section 314amends Section 603(a) of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) to provide that the annual report from the
President on the protection of identities of certain United States
undercover intelligence officers, agents, informants, and sources, also
include an assessment of the need for any modification for the purpose
of improving legal protections for covert agents.
Section 315. Extension of authority to delete information about receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations
Current law (5 U.S.C. 7342) requires certain federal employees,
spouses, dependents, and others, to file reports with their employing
agency regarding receipt of gifts or decorations from foreign
governments. Following compilation of these reports, the employing
agency is required to file annually with the Secretary of State
detailed information about the receipt of foreign gifts and decorations
by its employees, including the source of the gift. The Secretary of
State is required to publish a comprehensive list of such agency
reports in the Federal Register.
With respect to intelligence activities, the public disclosure
of gifts or decorations for personnel and certain contractors in the
Intelligence Community has the potential to compromise intelligence
sources or confirm intelligence relationships with foreign governments
and, consequently, undermine national security. Recognizing this
concern, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was granted a
limited exemption from reporting certain information about such foreign
gifts or decorations where the publication of the information could
adversely affect United States intelligence sources. Section 1079 of
the IRTPA extended a similar exemption to the DNI and applied the
existing exemption to the Director of the CIA.
Section 315 provides to the heads of each element of the
Intelligence Community the same limited exemption from the specified
public reporting requirements currently authorized for the DNI and
Director of the CIA. The national security concerns that prompt those
exemptions apply equally to other elements of the Intelligence
Community. Section 315 mandates that information not provided to the
Secretary of State be provided to the DNI to ensure continued
independent oversight of the receipt of foreign gifts or decorations by
personnel of the elements of the Intelligence Community.
Gifts received in the course of ordinary contact between senior
officials of elements of the Intelligence Community and their foreign
counterparts should not be excluded under the provisions of Section 315
unless there is a serious concern that such contacts and gifts would
adversely affect United States intelligence sources or methods.
Section 316. Report on compliance with the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 and related provisions of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006
Section 316 requires the DNI to submit a classified,
comprehensive report to the congressional intelligence committees on
all measures taken by the ODNI, and by any other element of the
Intelligence Community with relevant responsibilities, on compliance
with the detention and interrogation provisions of the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 and of the Military Commissions Act of 2006. The
report is to be submitted no later than 45 days after enactment of this
Act.
The Detainee Treatment Act provides that no individual in the
custody or under the physical control of the United States, regardless
of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment. Congress reaffirmed this mandate in
Section 6 of the Military Commissions Act, adding an implementation
mechanism that requires the President to take action to ensure
compliance, including through administrative rules and procedures.
Section 6 provides not only that grave breaches of Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions are war crimes under Title 18 of the United
States Code, but also that the President has authority for the United
States to promulgate higher standards and administrative regulations
for violations of U.S. treaty obligations. It requires the President to
issue those interpretations by Executive Order published in the Federal
Register.
The report required by Section 316 must include a description
of the detention or interrogation methods that have been determined to
comply with the prohibitions of the Detainee Treatment Act and the
Military Commissions Act or have been discontinued pursuant to them.
The Detainee Treatment Act also provides for the protection
against civil or criminal liability for United States Government
personnel who engaged in officially authorized interrogations that were
determined to be lawful at the time. Section 316 requires the DNI to
report on actions taken to implement that provision.
The report shall also include an appendix containing all
guidelines on the application of the Detainee Treatment Act and the
Military Commissions Act to the detention or interrogation activities,
if any, of all elements of the Intelligence Community engaging in such
activities. The appendix shall also include the legal justifications of
any office of the Department of Justice about the meaning of the Acts,
with respect to detention or interrogation activities, if any, of any
element of the Intelligence Community.
To the extent that the report required by Section 316 addresses
an element of the Intelligence Community within the DOD, that portion
of the report, and associated material that is necessary to make that
portion understandable, shall also be submitted by the DNI to the
congressional armed services committees.
Section 317. Incorporation of reporting requirements
Section 317 incorporates into the Act, by reference, each
requirement contained in the classified annex of this Act to submit a
report to the congressional intelligence committees.
Because the classified information in the annex cannot be
included in the text of the bill, incorporating the reporting
provisions of the classified annex is the only available mechanism to
give these reporting requirements the force of law. The Committee,
therefore, chooses to include Section 317 to reflect the importance of
the reporting requirements in the classified annex.
Section 318. Repeal of certain reporting requirements
Section 318 eliminates certain reporting requirements that were
considered particularly burdensome to the Intelligence Community in
cases where the usefulness of
the report, or section thereof, has diminished either because
of changing events or because the information contained in those
reports is duplicative of information already obtained through other
avenues.
Section 319. Enhancement of critical skills training program
Section 319 allows the head of any element of the Intelligence
Community to establish an undergraduate training program for civilian
employees. This is an authority similar to that granted to the
Secretary of Defense under section 16 of the National Security Act of
1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) for civilian employees of the National
Security Agency (NSA).
Section 320. Comprehensive national cybersecurity initiative advisory panel
Section 320 requires the President to submit a report to
Congress outlining options for the creation of an advisory panel to
make policy recommendations on the development of the CNCI. The report
is to be submitted to Congress not later than February 1, 2009.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
SUBTITLE A--OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Section 401. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-3(e)), as added by the IRTPA, provides that commencing on October
1, 2008, the ODNI may not be co-located with any other element of the
Intelligence Community. Section 401 clarifies that this ban applies
only to the co-location of the headquarters of the ODNI with the
headquarters of any other element of the Intelligence Community.
Accordingly, the ODNI may be co-located with non-headquarters units of
elements of the Intelligence Community.
Section 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the Transportation Security Oversight Board
Section 402 substitutes the DNI as a member of the
Transportation Security Oversight Board established under section
115(b)(1) of Title 49, United States Code, in place of the Director of
the CIA or the Director's designee. The Transportation Security
Oversight Board is responsible for, among other things, coordinating
intelligence, security, and law enforcement activities relating to
transportation and facilitating the sharing of intelligence, security,
and law enforcement information relating to transportation among
federal agencies.
Section 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology
Section 403 clarifies the responsibilities and duties of the
Director of Science and Technology within the ODNI and the DNI's
Science and Technology Committee to ensure that, across the
Intelligence Community, there is uniformity in the definitions of
basic, applied, and advanced research goals and improved prioritization
and coordination of science and technology. This section further
requires the DNI to submit to Congress an annual report outlining the
strategy for the development and use of technology in the Intelligence
Community, demonstrating how applied resources map to the outlined
goals.
Section 404. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials
Section 404 confirms in statute that certain officers in the
Intelligence Community are established within the ODNI. These are (1)
the Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community (as renamed
by Section 407); (2) the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community (as created by Section 408); (3) the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC); and (4) the Director of the National
Counter Proliferation Center (NCPC). Section 404 also expressly
provides that the DNI shall appoint the Director of the NCPC. Section
119A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1) previously
provided that the President could establish the NCPC. In doing so, the
President delegated to the DNI the authority to name the Director.
Section 404 codifies that delegation.
Section 405. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center energy efficiency reports
Section 405 requires the DNI to develop a plan to implement the
recommendations of the Environmental Protection Agency (`EPA') report
on data center energy efficiency submitted to Congress under Section 1
of P.L. 109-431. A brief report submitted by the DNI in February 2008
failed to address the recommendations of the EPA report and did not
constitute an actual plan. This requirement is intended to encourage
the Intelligence Community to develop a plan to reduce consumption of
resources such as power and water by community data centers.
Section 406. Semiannual reports on the nuclear programs of Iran, Syria, and North Korea
Section 406 provides that not less than once during the
remainder of this fiscal year and semiannually thereafter, the DNI
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees individual
classified reports on the nuclear intentions and capabilities of Iran,
Syria, and North Korea. An NIE may count as one such report for each
country. The Committee encourages the DNI to make these reports
available to other congressional committees with oversight jurisdiction
to the extent consistent with the protection of sources and methods.
Section 407. Title of Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community
Section 407 expressly designates the position of Chief
Information Officer of the ODNI as Chief Information Officer of the
Intelligence Community. The modification to the title is consistent
with the position's overall responsibilities as outlined in section
103G of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g).
Section 408. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
Section 1078 of the IRTPA authorized the DNI to establish an
Office of Inspector General if the DNI determined that an Inspector
General would be beneficial to improving the operations and
effectiveness of the ODNI. It further provided that the DNI could grant
to the Inspector General any of the duties, responsibilities, and
authorities set forth in the Inspector General Act of 1978. The DNI has
appointed an Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC/IG) and has
granted certain authorities pursuant to DNI Instruction No. 2005-10
(Sept. 7, 2005).
A strong IC/IG is vital to achieving the goal, set forth in the
IRTPA, of improving the operations and effectiveness of the
Intelligence Community. It is also vital to achieving the broader goal
of identifying problems and deficiencies wherever they may be found in
the Intelligence Community with respect to matters within the
responsibility and authority of the DNI, especially the manner in which
elements of the Intelligence Community interact with each other in
providing access to information and undertaking joint or cooperative
activities. This section establishes an IC/IG in order to provide to
the DNI and, through reports, to Congress, the benefits of an Inspector
General with full statutory authorities and the requisite independence.
The IC/IG will keep both the DNI and the congressional
intelligence committees fully and currently informed about problems and
deficiencies in programs and operations in the Intelligence Community
and the need for corrective actions. The IC/IG will be appointed by the
President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, and will report
directly to the DNI. To bolster the IC/IG's independence within the
Intelligence Community, the IC/IG may be removed only by the President,
who must communicate the reasons for the removal to the congressional
intelligence committees.
The DNI may prohibit the IC/IG from conducting an
investigation, inspection, or audit if the DNI determines that it is
necessary to protect vital national security interests. If the DNI
exercises the authority to prohibit an investigation, the DNI must
provide the reasons to the congressional intelligence committees within
seven days. The IC/IG may provide a response to the committees,
including views on the denied investigation.
The IC/IG will have direct and prompt access to the DNI and any
employee of the Intelligence Community or employee of a contractor
whose testimony is needed. The IC/IG will also have direct and prompt
access to all records that relate to programs and activities for which
the IC/IG has oversight responsibility. Failure to cooperate will be
grounds for appropriate administrative action.
The IC/IG will have subpoena authority. However, information
within the possession of the United States Government must be obtained
through other procedures. Subject to the DNI's concurrence, the IC/IG
may request information from any department, agency, or element of the
U.S. Government. Such information must be provided to the IC/IG insofar
as practicable and not in violation of law or regulation.
The IC/IG must submit semiannual reports to the DNI that
include a description of significant problems relating to the programs
and operations of the Intelligence Community and to the relationships
between the elements of the Intelligence Community. The reports must
include a description of IC/IG recommendations and a statement as to
whether corrective action has been completed. The IC/IG shall provide
any portion of the report involving a component of a department of the
U.S. Government to the head of that department simultaneously with
submission of the report to the DNI. Within 30 days of receipt, the DNI
must submit each semiannual report to Congress as transmitted by the
IC/IG.
The IC/IG must report immediately to the DNI particularly
serious or flagrant violations of law. Within seven days, the DNI must
transmit those reports to the congressional intelligence committees
together with any comments. In the event the IC/IG is unable to resolve
differences with the DNI, the IC/IG is authorized to report a serious
or flagrant violation of law directly to the congressional intelligence
committees. Reports to the congressional intelligence committees are
also required with respect to investigations concerning high-ranking
officials in the Intelligence Community.
Employees of the Intelligence Community or employees of
contractors who intend to report to Congress an `urgent concern,' such
as a violation of law or Executive Order, a false statement to
Congress, or a willful withholding from Congress, may report such
complaints and supporting information to the IC/IG. Following a review
by the IC/IG to determine the credibility of the complaint or
information, the IC/IG must transmit such complaint and information to
the DNI. On receiving the complaints or information from the IC/IG
together with the IC/IG's credibility determination, the DNI must
transmit the complaint or information to the congressional intelligence
committees. If the IC/IG does not find a complaint or information to be
credible, the reporting individual may submit the matter directly to
the congressional intelligence committees by following appropriate
security practices outlined by the DNI. Reprisals or threats of
reprisal against reporting individuals constitute reportable `urgent
concerns.'
In providing this channel for whistleblower communications to
Congress, Section 408 does not disturb, and the Committee intends to
retain, the authoritative guidance for analogous provisions of the
Intelligence Community Whistleblower Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-272
(October 20, 1998) as set forth in the findings in paragraphs (1)
through (6) of section 701(b) of that Act, the Senate committee report
for the legislation, S. Rep. No. 105-185, at 25-27, and particularly
the conference report, H.R. Rep. 105-780, at 33-34, which emphasized
that a disclosure to the Inspector General `is not the exclusive
process by which an intelligence community employee may make a report
to Congress.'
For matters within the jurisdiction of both the IC/IG and an
Inspector General for another intelligence community element, the
Inspectors General (IGs) shall resolve, expeditiously, who will
undertake an investigation, inspection, or audit. In resolving that
question, under an extensive subsection entitled `Coordination Among
Inspectors General of Intelligence Community,' the IGs may request the
assistance of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum, a
presently existing informal body whose existence is codified by this
section. In the event that the IGs are still unable to resolve the
question, they shall submit it for resolution to the DNI and the head
of the department in which an Inspector General with jurisdiction
concurrent to that of the IC/IG is located. This basic limitation
addresses the concern raised by the DNI about the preservation of the
authority of heads of departments and agencies over their respective
departments.
Within Congress, mutuality of oversight is assured by the
requirement that Inspector General reports concerning intelligence
committee elements within departments are shared with committees that
have jurisdiction over those departments.
Section 409. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the Intelligence Community
Section 409 provides for an annual report by the DNI on the
proficiency of each element of the Intelligence Community in foreign
languages and, if appropriate, in foreign dialects. The section also
requires the DNI to report on foreign language training. The
Intelligence Community has an increasing need for fluency in
difficult-to-master languages and for expertise in foreign cultures.
The information required by the report will allow the congressional
intelligence committees to better assess the Intelligence Community's
ability to manage language resources.
Section 410. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the office of the National Counterintelligence Executive
Section 410 amends the authorities and structures of the
National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) to eliminate certain
independent administrative authorities that had been vested in the NCIX
when that official was appointed by and reported to the President.
Those authorities are unnecessary now that the NCIX is appointed by and
under the authority of the DNI.
Section 411. National Intelligence Estimate on weapons of mass destruction in Syria
Section 411 provides that the DNI shall submit to Congress an
NIE on the history, status, and projected development of any weapons of
mass destruction program undertaken by Syria. This requirement is
intended to encourage the Intelligence Community to focus attention on
Syria's efforts to develop nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction. Section 411 also provides that the NIE be submitted within
180 days after the enactment of this Act and that it may be submitted
in classified form.
Section 412. Annual report on intelligence resources dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan
Section 412 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees an annual report on the intelligence resources
dedicated to Iraq and Afghanistan during the preceding year.
Section 413. Ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances
Section 413 requires the DNI to appoint an ombudsman for
security clearances in the Intelligence Community. The Committee has
learned that persons experiencing delays in their security clearances
typically do not know where to turn for information or help. The lack
of communication is especially frustrating for applicants who may seek
other employment in the absence of notice about the process. A security
clearance ombudsman will ensure that cases such as these will receive
timely attention, and serve as a clearinghouse for customer concerns in
the security clearance process.
The provision requires the heads of each element of the
Intelligence Community to provide contact information for the ombudsman
to those applying for security clearances, and requires the ombudsman
to make an annual report to the congressional intelligence committees
addressing the concerns, complaints, and questions received over the
preceding 12 months. Nothing in the Section 413 prevents the ombudsman
from having other duties.
Section 414. Security clearance reciprocity
Section 414 requires the IC/IG to conduct an audit of the
reciprocity of security clearances in the Intelligence Community and to
report to the congressional intelligence committees on the results of
that audit. The Committee is concerned that lack of full reciprocity
among agencies is an indicator of concern within the Intelligence
Community about the quality of security clearances. The delay resulting
from `re-clearing' previously-cleared personnel is disruptive to the
operations of the Intelligence Community, costly to contractors, and a
source of great frustration for the individuals and organizations
involved. In creating a joint, collaborative, efficient Intelligence
Community, people must be able to transition efficiently between
agencies and from industry to government.
Section 415. Report on international traffic in arms regulations
Section 415 requires the DNI to report to the congressional
intelligence committees assessing the threat to national security
presented by the efforts of foreign countries to acquire sensitive
equipment and technology and the sufficiency of U.S. export controls in
preventing such acquisitions.
Section 416. Report on nuclear trafficking
Section 416 requires the DNI to report to certain congressional
committees on the illicit trade of nuclear and radiological material
and equipment. The report must include details of all cases of illicit
sale, transfer, brokering or transport of nuclear material or nuclear
explosive devices, an assessment of the countries that pose the
greatest risk of nuclear trafficking, and a discussion of any dissents,
caveats, gaps, or other information that would reduce confidence in the
assessment of the countries that pose the greatest risk of nuclear
trafficking.
Section 417. Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit unauthorized disclosures of classified information
Section 417 requires the DNI to conduct a study on the
feasibility of revoking the pensions of personnel in the Intelligence
Community who commit unauthorized disclosures of classified information
and to report the results of that study to the congressional
intelligence committees.
SUBTITLE B--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Section 421. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency
Title V of the National Security Act of 1947, entitled
`Accountability for Intelligence Activities,' sets forth the Act's
basic requirements on executive branch obligations to keep the
congressional intelligence committees fully informed about intelligence
activities. Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
413b) is specifically devoted to presidential findings and
congressional notification on covert actions. Section 421 of this bill
augments the oversight of covert actions by requiring that the CIA
Inspector General (CIA/IG) conduct an audit of each covert action at
least once every three years and submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report containing the audit results within 60
days of completing the audit. To a considerable extent, this
requirement confirms in statute existing practice and assures its
regularity.
The DNI has expressed concern that this audit requirement, and
several other provisions on intelligence community reports, raises
concerns with respect to the President's authority to control access to
national security information. To allay any such concern regarding the
covert action audit requirement, the Committee has drafted Section 421
to state that the requirement is subject to the longstanding provisions
of section 17(b)(3) and (4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(b)(3) and (4)) that empower the Director of the
CIA to prohibit the CIA/IG from initiating, carrying out, or completing
an audit if the Director determines that the prohibition is necessary
to protect vital national security interests of the United States,
provided that the Director report the reasons to the congressional
intelligence committees.
Section 422. Inapplicability to the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency of requirement for annual report on progress in
auditable financial statements
Section 422 relieves the Director of the CIA from the
requirement in section 114A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 404i-1) to submit to the congressional intelligence committees
an annual report describing the activities being taken to ensure that
financial statements of the CIA can be audited in accordance with
applicable law and the requirements of OMB. Although the Committee
remains concerned that CIA does not expect to be auditable until 2011,
two years later than previously projected, the report required by
Section 114A is unnecessary as CIA is now submitting audited financial
statements. The requirements of Section 114A continue to apply to the
Directors of NSA, DIA, and NGA.
Section 423. Technical amendments relating to titles of certain CIA positions
Section 423 replaces out-of-date titles for CIA positions with
the current titles of the successors of those positions in a provision
in section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
403q) that establishes the obligation of the CIA/IG to notify the
congressional intelligence committees about investigations,
inspections, or audits concerning high-ranking CIA officials.
Section 424. Clarifying amendments relating to Section 105 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004
Section 424 changes the reference to the Director of Central
Intelligence to the Director of National Intelligence to clarify that
the establishment of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis within the
Department of the Treasury (section 105 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (Pub. L. No. 108-177 (Dec. 13,
2003)), and its reorganization within the Office of Terrorism and
Financial Intelligence (section 222 of the Transportation, Treasury,
Independent Agencies, and General Government Appropriations Act, 2005
(Division H, Pub. L. No. 108-447 (Dec. 8, 2004)), do not affect the
authorities and responsibilities of the DNI with respect to the Office
of Intelligence and Analysis as an element of the Intelligence
Community.
Section 425. Prohibition on the use of private contractors
for interrogations involving persons in the custody or control of the
Central Intelligence Agency
Section 425 prohibits the obligation or expenditure of any funds
for payment to any contractor to conduct the interrogation of a
detainee in the custody of the CIA. The DNI may, however, grant a
waiver if the Director of the CIA determines that no employee of the
federal government is capable and available to conduct the
interrogation, and that the interrogation is in the national interest
of the United States. Section 425 also provides that contractors
conducting interrogations pursuant to a waiver by the DNI shall be
governed by the same laws that would apply if the interrogation were
conducted by an employee of the federal government.
SUBTITLE C--DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS
Section 431. Integration of the Counterintelligence Field Activity into the Defense Intelligence Agency
Section 431 requires the USD(I) to submit to the congressional
intelligence and defense committees a report describing the nature of
any law enforcement authorities to be delegated to the DIA; the legal
authority under which the Secretary of Defense is empowered to delegate
a law enforcement function to the DIA; and the guidelines for the
implementation of any law enforcement authorities delegated to the DIA
should such a delegation occur.
The Secretary of Defense recently approved the integration of
CIFA into the DIA. CIFA is, in part, a law enforcement organization
with certain law enforcement authorities. As a result of this impending
integration, the DIA is now considering a change to its charter in
order to absorb CIFA's law enforcement role. The change would designate
the DIA as a law enforcement agency. Unlike CIFA, which is headed by a
civilian director, the DIA is directed by a military officer.
The Committee has several concerns regarding the Department of
Defense's pursuit of this course of action. First, the DIA's stated
mission is to collect, analyze, and manage foreign military
intelligence for war fighters; it has no experience with managing,
overseeing, and leading criminal investigations, even those
investigations that have a counterintelligence nexus. Second, while
there are operational efficiencies associated with absorbing CIFA's law
enforcement capabilities into the DIA, those operational efficiencies
must be balanced properly against the concerns associated with military
services conducting law enforcement activities that could implicate
civilians. The Committee seeks to ensure that the decision to absorb
CIFA's law enforcement authorities into the DIA undergoes a thorough
and exhaustive legal review and that, should the DIA's charter be
amended to absorb the authorities, the amendments include important
boundaries to ensure that civil liberties are adequately protected.
SUBTITLE D--OTHER ELEMENTS
Section 441. Clarification of inclusion of the Coast Guard and
Drug Enforcement Administration as elements of the Intelligence
Community
Section 441 restores, with respect to the United States Coast
Guard, the prior definition of `intelligence community' in the National
Security Act of 1947 applicable to that service, See (50 U.S.C. 401a).
Section 1073 of the IRTPA modified the definition of `intelligence
community,' inadvertently limiting the Coast Guard's inclusion in the
Intelligence Community to the Office of Intelligence or those portions
of the Coast Guard concerned with the analysis of intelligence. Section
441 clarifies that all of the Coast Guard's intelligence elements are
included within the definition of the `intelligence community.'
Section 441 also codifies the joint decision of the DNI and
Attorney General that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) should
be within the Intelligence Community.
Section 442. Report on transformation of the intelligence capabilities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Section 442 requires the Director of the FBI to report to the
congressional intelligence committees on the Director's long-term
vision for transforming the intelligence capabilities of the Bureau and
the progress of the internal reforms of the Bureau intended to achieve
that vision.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
SUBTITLE A--GENERAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
Section 501. Extension of National Commission for Review of
Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence
Community
The National Commission for Review of Research and Development
Programs of the United States Intelligence Community was authorized in
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 and lapsed on
September 1, 2004. Section 501 renews authority for this Commission by
extending the reporting deadline to December 31, 2009, and requiring
that new members be appointed to the Commission. This section also
authorizes $2 million for the Commission from the Intelligence
Community Management Account.
Section 502. Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947
Section 502 amends the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
413) in three ways to clarify the executive branch's obligations to
notify Congress of intelligence activities.
First, Section 502 requires that, in meeting the President's
statutory obligation to keep the congressional intelligence committees
fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities of the
United States, the President must provide to the congressional
intelligence committees all information necessary to assess the
lawfulness, effectiveness, cost, benefit, intelligence gain, budgetary
authority, and risk of intelligence activities.
Second, Section 502 clarifies that for all intelligence
activities other than covert actions, the DNI's obligation to keep the
congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed is
an obligation to keep the entire membership of the congressional
intelligence committees informed, rather than a subset of members of
the committees. Section 502 allows reporting to less than the full
membership of the congressional intelligence committees where the Chair
and Ranking Minority Member of a
congressional intelligence committee jointly determine to agree
to a written request by the President for reporting to less than the
full membership of the committees.
Third, Section 502 defines `significant undertaking,' as that
term is used in 50 U.S.C. 413b(d) to clarify when the President is
required to ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are
notified with respect to covert action.
Section 503. Report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets
Section 503 amends a reporting requirement for the United States
Department of the Treasury. Section 503 makes annual a report which had
previously been required semiannually and eliminates certain data
requirements from that report.
Section 504. Notice of intelligence regarding North Korea and China
Section 504 amends the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
413) to clarify that notification to the congressional intelligence
committees of intelligence information relating to North Korea or China
after all or part of the information has been communicated to the
governments of North Korea or China does not fulfill the National
Security Act's requirement to keep the congressional intelligence
committees fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities
of the United States.
Section 505. Sense of Congress regarding use of intelligence resources
Section 505 expresses the sense of Congress that resources under
the Act shall not be directed from human intelligence collection and
other programs intended to combat al-Qaeda to study global climate
change.
SUBTITLE B--TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS
Section 511. Technical amendments to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
Section 511 amends the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949
by updating references to the National Security Act of 1947 to reflect
amendments made by the IRTPA.
Section 512. Technical amendments to the multi-year National Intelligence Program
Section 512 updates the `multiyear national intelligence
program' to incorporate organizational and nomenclatural changes made
by the IRTPA.
Section 513. Technical clarifications of certain references
to Joint Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and
Related Activities
Section 513 makes technical clarifications to the National
Security Act of 1947 to reflect the consolidation of the Joint Military
Intelligence Program and the Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities program into the Military Intelligence Program. This section
preserves the requirement that the DNI participate in the development
of the annual budget and be consulted prior to the transfer or
reprogramming of funds for the Military Intelligence Program.
Section 514. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947
Section 514 makes a number of technical corrections to the National Security Act of 1947 arising from enactment of the IRTPA.
Section 515. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
Section 515 makes a number of technical and conforming amendments to the IRTPA.
Section 516. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule
Section 516 makes technical amendments to the Executive Schedule
to correct outdated and incorrect references to `Director of Central
Intelligence,' `Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence,' and `General
Counsel to the National Intelligence Director.'
Section 517. Technical amendments relating to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
Section 517 makes technical amendments to Titles 5 and 44 of the
United States Code, and Section 201 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002, by replacing references to `National Imagery and Mapping Agency'
with `National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.'
CORRESPONDENCE WITH OTHER COMMITTEES REGARDING PARTICULAR PROVISIONS
Committee on Foreign Affairs,

House of Representatives,

Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.
Hon. SILVESTRE REYES,

Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am writing to you concerning the bill H.R.
5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009. There
are certain provisions in the legislation which fall within the Rule X
jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.
In the interest of permitting your committee to proceed
expeditiously to floor consideration of this important bill, I am
willing to waive this committee's right to sequential referral. I do so
with the understanding that, by waiving consideration of the bill, the
Committee on Foreign Affairs does not waive any future jurisdictional
claim over the subject matters contained in the bill which fall within
its Rule X jurisdiction. I request that you urge the Speaker of the
House of Representatives to appoint members of this committee to any
conference committee which is named to consider such provisions.
Please place this letter into the committee report on H.R. 5959
and into the Congressional Record during consideration of the measure
on the House floor. Thank you for the cooperative spirit in which you
have worked regarding this matter and others between our respective
committees.
Sincerely,
Howard L. Berman,
Chairman.
-
House of Representatives,

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.
Hon. HOWARD L. BERMAN,

Chairman,  Committee on Foreign Affairs,

House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.
I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this
legislation. I recognize that this bill contains amendments to
provisions of law related to matters that tall within the Title X
jurisdiction of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. In addition. I
acknowledge that the Committee on Foreign Affairs will not seek a
sequential referral of this legislation and that your decision to forgo
a sequential referral on this bill does not waive any future
jurisdictional claim of the subject matters which fall under your
committee's Rule X jurisdiction.
Further, I recognize that your committee reserves the right to
seek appointment of conferees on the bill for the portions of the bill
that are within your jurisdiction, and I agree to support such a
request.
I will ensure that this exchange of letters in included in the
Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional Record during
floor consideration of this measure on the House floor. I look forward
to working with you on this legislation and other matters of great
importance to this nation.
Sincerely,
Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman.
-
House Committee on Armed Services,

House of Representatives,

Washington, DC, May 8, 2008.
Hon. SILVESTRE REYES,

Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

United States Capitol, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I write to confirm our mutual understanding
regarding H.R. 5959, authorizing appropriations for fiscal year 2009
for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United
States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes. This legislation contains subject matter within the
jurisdiction of the House Committee on Armed Services.
Our Committee recognizes the importance of H.R. 5959 and the
need for the legislation to move expeditiously. Therefore, while we
have a valid claim to jurisdiction over this legislation, the Committee
on Armed Services will waive further consideration of H.R. 5959. I do
so with the understanding that by waiving further consideration of the
bill, the Committee does not waive any future jurisdictional claims
over similar measures. In the event of a conference with the Senate on
this bill, the Committee on Armed Services reserves the right to seek
the appointment of conferees.
I would appreciate the inclusion of this letter and a copy of
the response in your Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the
Congressional Record during consideration of the measure on the House
floor.
Very truly yours,
Ike Skelton,
Chairman.
-
House of Representatives,

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.
Hon. IKE SKELTON,

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services,

House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.
I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this
legislation. I recognize that this bill contains amendments to
provisions of law related to matters that fall under the jurisdiction
of the Committee on Armed Services. In addition. I acknowledge that the
Committee on Armed Services will not seek a sequential referral of this
legislation and that your decision to forgo a sequential referral on
this bill does not waive, alter, or otherwise affect the jurisdiction
of the Committee on Armed Services.
Further, I recognize that your committee reserves the right to
seek appointment of conferees on the bill for the portions of the bill
that are within your jurisdiction, and I agree to support such a
request.
I will ensure that this exchange of letters in included in the
Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional Record during
floor consideration of H.R. 5959. I look forward to working with you on
this legislation and other matters of great importance to this nation.
Sincerely,
Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman.
-
House of Representatives,

Committee on Homeland Security,

Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.
Hon. Silvestre Reyes,

Chairman, House Select Committee on Intelligence,

The Capitol, Washington, DC.
DEAR CHAIRMAN REYES: I am writing to you regarding H.R. 5959,
the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, a bill to
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2009 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government.
H.R. 5959 contains provisions that fall within the House Rule X
jurisdiction of the Committee on Homeland Security. I recognize and
appreciate your desire to bring this bill to the full House
expeditiously. Accordingly, I will not seek a sequential referral of
the bill. However, this decision to waive consideration of H.R. 5959
should not be construed as the Committee on Homeland Security waiving,
altering, or diminishing its jurisdiction over this or similar
legislation.
Additionally, the Committee on Homeland Security reserves the
right to seek the appointment of conferees during any House-Senate
conference convened on this legislation or on similar legislation that
is within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Homeland Security. I ask
for your commitment to support any such request by the Committee on
Homeland Security for the appointment of conferees on H.R. 5959 or
similar legislation. Finally, I respectfully ask that you place a copy
of your letter and this letter in the Committee Report on H.R. 5959 and
in the Congressional Record during floor consideration of H.R. 5959.
Thank you for your timely consideration of my request. I look
forward to working with you as we prepare to pass this important
national security legislation.
Sincerely,
Bennie G. Thompson,
Chairman.
-
House of Representatives,

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.
Hon. Bennie G. Thompson,

Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security,

House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.
I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this
legislation. I recognize that this bill contains amendments to
provisions of law related to matters that fall under the jurisdiction
of the Committee on Homeland Security. In addition, I acknowledge that
the Committee on Homeland Security will not seek a sequential referral
of this legislation and that your decision to forgo a sequential
referral on this bill does not waive, alter, or otherwise affect the
jurisdiction of the Committee on Homeland Security.
Further, I recognize that your committee reserves the right to
seek appointment of conferees on the bill for the portions of the bill
that are within your jurisdiction. and I agree to support such a
request.
I will ensure that this exchange of letters is included in the
Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional Record during
floor consideration of H.R. 5959. I look forward to working with you on
this legislation and other matters of great importance to this nation.
Sincerely,
Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman.
-
House of Representatives,

Committee on the Judiciary,

Washington, DC, May 19, 2008.
Hon. SILVESTRE REYES,

Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
DEAR CHAIRMAN REYES: In recognition of the desire to expedite
consideration of H.R. 5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2009, the Committee on the Judiciary agrees to waive formal
consideration of the bill as to provisions that fall within the
Committee's rule X jurisdiction.
The Committee takes this action with the mutual understanding
that by foregoing consideration of H.R. 5959 at this time, the
Committee on the Judiciary does not waive any jurisdiction over subject
matter contained in this or similar legislation. The Committee also
reserves the right to seek appointment of an appropriate number of
conferees to any House-Senate conference involving this legislation,
and requests your support if such a request is made.
I would appreciate your including this letter in the committee
report on the bill, or in the Congressional Record during consideration
of the bill on the House floor.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
John Conyers, Jr.,
Chairman.
-
House of Representatives,

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

Washington, DC, May 20, 2008.
Hon. JOHN CONYERS, Jr.,

Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,

House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act tier Fiscal Year 2009.
I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this
legislation. I recognize that this bill contains amendments to
provisions of law related to matters that fall within the rule X
jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary. In addition, I
acknowledge that the Committee on the Judiciary will not seek a
sequential referral of this legislation and that your decision to forgo
a sequential referral on this bill does not waive any future
jurisdictional claim of the subject matters which fall under your
committee's rule X jurisdiction.
Further, I recognize that your committee reserves the right to
seek appointment of conferees on the bill for the portions of the bill
that are within your jurisdiction, and I agree to support such a
request.
I will ensure that this exchange of letters is included in the
Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional Record during
floor consideration of this measure on the House floor. I look forward
to working with you on this legislation and other matters of great
importance to this nation.
Sincerely,
Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman.
-
House of Representatives,

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,

Washington, DC, May 13, 2008.
Hon. SILVESTRE REYES,

Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
DEAR CHAIRMAN REYES: I am writing about H.R. 5959, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009, which the Select
Committee on Intelligence plans to markup on May 15, 2008.
I appreciate your effort to consult with the Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform regarding those provisions of H.R. 5959
that fall within the Oversight Committee's jurisdiction. These
provisions include Inspectors General, federal civil service and
personnel matters, and the disclosure of certain information regarding
the receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations.
In the interest of expediting consideration of H.R. 5959, the
Oversight Committee will not request a sequential referral of this
bill. I would, however, request your support for the appointment of
conferees from the Oversight Committee should H.R. 5959 or a similar
Senate bill be considered in conference with the Senate.
This letter should not be construed as a waiver of the
Oversight Committee's legislative jurisdiction over subjects addressed
in H.R. 5959 that fall within the jurisdiction of the Oversight
Committee.
Finally, I request that you include our exchange of letters on
this matter in the Intelligence Committee Report on H.R. 5959 and in
the Congressional Record during consideration of this legislation on
the House floor.
Thank you for your attention to these matters.
Sincerely,
Henry A. Waxman,
Chairman.
-
House of Representatives,

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

Washington, DC, May 15, 2008.
Hon. HENRY A. WAXMAN,

Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,

House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter regarding H.R. 5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.
I appreciate your willingness to work cooperatively on this
legislation. I recognize that this bill contains amendments to
provisions of law related to matters that fall within the jurisdiction
of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. In addition, I
acknowledge that the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform will
not seek a sequential referral of this legislation and that your
decision to forgo a sequential referral on this bill does not waive any
future jurisdictional claim over the subjects which fall under your
committee's jurisdiction.
Further, I recognize that your committee reserves the right to
seek appointment of conferees on the bill for the portions of the bill
that are within your jurisdiction, and I agree to support such a
request.
I will ensure that this exchange of letters in included in the
Committee's report on H.R. 5959 and in the Congressional Record during
consideration of this measure on the House floor. I look forward to
working with you on this legislation and other matters of great
importance to this nation.
Sincerely,
Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman.
CORRESPONDENCE WITH CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE
House of Representatives,

Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

Washington, DC, May 8, 2008.
Mr. PETER R. ORSZAG,

Director, Congressional Budget Office,

Ford House Office Building, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. ORSZAG: In compliance with clause 3 of Rule XIII of the
Rules of the House of Representatives, I am writing to request a cost
estimate of H.R. 5959, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2009, pursuant to sections 308 and 403 of the Congressional Budget
Act of 1974. I have attached a copy of the bill as approved by the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
I hope to bring this legislation to the House floor as soon as
possible, and I would very much appreciate an expedited response to
this request. Should you have any questions related to this request,
please contact Caryn Wagner, the Committee's Budget Director, at
202-225-7690.
Thank you in advance for your assistance.
Sincerely,
Silvestre Reyes,
Chairman.
-
U.S. Congress,

Congressional Budget Office,

Washington, DC, May 19, 2008.
Hon. SILVESTRE REYES,

Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,

House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared
the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 5959, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jason Wheelock.
Sincerely,
Peter R. Orszag,
Director.
Enclosure.
H.R. 5959--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009
Summary: H.R. 5959 would authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2009 for intelligence activities of the U.S. government, for the
Intelligence Community Management Account, and for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS).
This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of the
bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that implementing certain
provisions of the bill would cost $325 million in 2009 and $642 million
over the 2009-2013 period, assuming appropriation of the authorized
funds. Enacting H.R. 5959 would not affect direct spending or revenues.
The bill includes new subpoena authority that would impose
intergovernmental and private-sector mandates as defined in the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA), but CBO expects the cost of
complying with those mandates would be small and well below the annual
thresholds established in that act ($68 million for intergovernmental
mandates and $136 million for private-sector mandates in 2008, adjusted
annually for inflation.)
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary impact of H.R. 5959 is shown in the following table. The
costs of this legislation fall within budget function 050 (national
defense).


----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--                     
                                                                                 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION                                                              
Intelligence Community Management Account:                                                                
Authorization Level                                                               649    0    0    0    0 
Estimated Outlays                                                                 325  292   19    6    0 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Basis of estimate: Section 104 would authorize the appropriation of
$649 million for the Intelligence Community Management Account, which
provides the principal source of funding for the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence and provides resources for coordination of
programs, budget oversight, and management of the intelligence
agencies. CBO estimates that implementing this provision would cost
$325 million in 2009 and $642 million over the 2009-2013 period,
assuming appropriation of the specified amount.
Section 201 would authorize the appropriation of $279 million
to CIARDS to cover retirement costs attributable to military service
and various unfunded liabilities. The appropriation to CIARDS is
considered mandatory, and the authorization under this bill would be
the same as the amount assumed in the CBO baseline. Thus, this estimate
does not ascribe any additional cost to that provision.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: The bill contains
intergovernmental and private-sector mandates as defined in UMRA.
Section 408 would establish an Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community with subpoena authority. Section 501 would extend the
National Commission for the Review of Research and Development Programs
of the U.S. Intelligence Community, and the subpoena authority of that
commission. Entities in the public and private sectors, if subpoenaed,
would be required to provide testimony, documents, or other evidence.
CBO expects that the Inspector General and the commission would likely
issue subpoenas sparingly, and that the costs to comply with a subpoena
would not be significant. Thus, CBO estimates that the total costs of
the mandates would be small and well below the annual thresholds
established in UMRA ($68 million for intergovernmental mandates and
$136 million for private-sector mandates in 2008, adjusted annual for
inflation).
The remaining unclassified provisions of the bill contain no mandates as defined in UMRA.
Estimate prepared by: Federal costs: Jason Wheelock; Impact on
state, local, and tribal governments: Neil Hood; Impact on the private
sector: Dan Frisk.
Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED
 In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by the bill,
as reported, are shown as follows (existing law proposed to be omitted
is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italic,
existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in roman):
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
* * * * * * *
Part D--Benefits Accruing to Certain Participants
* * * * * * *
SEC. 235. MANDATORY RETIREMENT.
 (a) * * *
 (b) Mandatory Retirement for Age-
 (1) IN GENERAL- A participant in the system shall be automatically retired from the Agency--
 (A) upon reaching age 65, in the case of a participant in the system  [Struck out->][ receiving compensation under the Senior Intelligence Service pay schedule at the rate ][<-Struck out]  who is at the Senior Intelligence Service rank of level 4 or above; and
* * * * * * *
-
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
SHORT TITLE
 That this Act may be cited as the `National Security Act of 1947'.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
* * * * * * *
Title I--Coordination for National Security
Sec. 101. National Security Council.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 103H. Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
Sec. 103I. Ombudsman for intelligence community security clearances.
* * * * * * *
Title V--Accountability for Intelligence Activities
* * * * * * *
Sec. 506B. Annual personnel level assessment for the intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 508. Report on security clearance determinations.
Sec. 509. Semiannual reports on the nuclear programs of Iran, Syria, and North Korea.
Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
TITLE X--EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
* * * * * * *
Subtitle C--Additional Education Provisions
* * * * * * *
Sec. 1022. Intelligence community acquisition of critical skills.

* * * * * * *
DEFINITIONS
 SEC. 3. As used in this Act:
 (1) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (4) The term `intelligence community' includes the following:
 (A) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (H) The intelligence elements of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Department of Energy.
* * * * * * *
 (K) The elements of the Department of Homeland
Security concerned with the analysis of intelligence information
[Struck out->][ , including the Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard ][<-Struck out] .
 (L) Such other elements of any  [Struck out->][ other ][<-Struck
out] department or agency as may be designated by the President, or
designated jointly by the Director of National Intelligence and the
head of the department or agency concerned, as an element of the
intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
* * * * * * *
RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
 SEC. 102A. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (c) BUDGET AUTHORITIES- (1) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall
participate in the development by the Secretary of Defense of the
[Struck out->][ annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities ][<-Struck out]  annual budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs.
* * * * * * *
 (d) ROLE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN TRANSFER AND REPROGRAMMING OF FUNDS- (1)(A) * * *
 (B) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the
Director of National Intelligence before transferring or reprogramming
funds made available under the [Struck out->][ Joint Military Intelligence Program ][<-Struck out]  Military Intelligence Program or any successor program or programs.
* * * * * * *
 (3) The Director of National Intelligence may only transfer or reprogram funds referred to in  [Struck out->][ subparagraph (A) ][<-Struck out]  paragraph (1)(A)--
 (A)  * * *
* * * * * * *
 (5)(A) A transfer or reprogramming of funds  [Struck out->][ or personnel ][<-Struck out]   may be made under this subsection only if--
 (i) the funds are being transferred to an activity that is a higher priority intelligence activity;
* * * * * * *
 (B) A transfer or reprogramming may be made without
regard to a limitation set forth in clause (iv) or (v) of subparagraph
(A) if the transfer has the concurrence of the head of the department
involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the
case of the Central Intelligence Agency). The authority to provide such
concurrence may only be delegated by the head of the department [Struck
out->][ or agency involved ][<-Struck out]  involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency) to the deputy of such officer.
* * * * * * *
 (l) ENHANCED PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT- (1) * * *
 (2)(A) * * *
 (B) The Director may prescribe regulations to carry out this  [Struck out->][ section ][<-Struck out]  paragraph.
* * * * * * *
 (n) ACQUISITION AND OTHER AUTHORITIES- (1) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (s) Multi-Level Security Clearances- The Director
of National Intelligence shall be responsible for ensuring that the
elements of the intelligence community adopt a multi-level security
clearance approach in order to enable the intelligence community to
make more effective and efficient use of persons proficient in foreign
languages or with cultural, linguistic, or other subject matter
expertise that is critical to national security.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
 SEC. 103. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (c) COMPOSITION- The Office of the Director of National Intelligence is composed of the following:
 (1) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (9) The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community.
 (10) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
 (11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.
 (12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation Center.
  [Struck out->][ (9) ][<-Struck out]  (13)
Such other offices and officials as may be established by law or the
Director may establish or designate in the Office, including national
intelligence centers.
* * * * * * *
 (e) LIMITATION ON CO-LOCATION  [Struck out->][ WITH ][<-Struck
out] OF HEADQUARTERS WITH HEADQUARTERS OF OTHER ELEMENTS OF
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY- Commencing as of October 1, 2008, the headquarters of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence may not be co-located with  [Struck out->][ any other element ][<-Struck out]  the headquarters of any other element of the intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
 SEC. 103E. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (c) DUTIES- The Director of Science and Technology shall--
 (1) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (4) assist the Director on the science and
technology elements of the budget of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence; [Struck out->][ and ][<-Struck out]
 (5) assist the Director in establishing goals for
basic, applied, and advanced research to meet the technology needs of
the intelligence community;
 (6) submit to the congressional intelligence
committees an annual report on the science and technology strategy of
the Director that shows resources mapped to the goals of the
intelligence community; and
  [Struck out->][ (5) ][<-Struck out]  (7) perform other such duties as may be prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence or specified by law.
 (d) DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEE- (1) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (3) The Committee shall--
 (A) coordinate and prioritize advances in research and development related to intelligence [Struck out->][ ; and ][<-Struck out] ;
 (B) identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be executed by elements of the intelligence community; and
  [Struck out->][ (B) ][<-Struck out]  (C) perform such other functions as the Director of Science and Technology shall prescribe.
* * * * * * *
CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER
 SEC. 103G. (a) CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER- To assist the
Director of National Intelligence in carrying out the responsibilities
of the Director under this Act and other applicable provisions of law,
there shall be within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence a Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
 (b) CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY- The Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence Community shall serve as the chief information officer of the intelligence community.
 (c) DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES- Subject to the direction
of the Director of National Intelligence, the Chief Information Officer
of the Intelligence Community shall--
 (1) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (d) PROHIBITION ON SIMULTANEOUS SERVICE AS OTHER CHIEF
INFORMATION OFFICER- An individual serving in the position of Chief
Information Officer of the Intelligence Community may not,
while so serving, serve as the chief information officer of any other
department or agency, or component thereof, of the United States
Government.
-
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
 SEC. 103H. (a) OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL OF
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY- There is within the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence an Office of the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community.
 (b) PURPOSE- The purpose of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community is to--
 (1) create an objective and effective office,
appropriately accountable to Congress, to initiate and conduct
independently investigations, inspections, and audits on matters within
the responsibility and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence;
 (2) recommend policies designed--
 (A) to promote economy, efficiency, and
effectiveness in the administration and implementation of matters
within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence; and
 (B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such matters;
 (3) provide a means for keeping the Director of National Intelligence fully and currently informed about--
 (A) problems and deficiencies relating to
matters within the responsibility and authority of the Director of
National Intelligence; and
 (B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions; and
 (4) in the manner prescribed by this section,
ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are kept
similarly informed of--
 (A) significant problems and deficiencies
relating to matters within the responsibility and authority of the
Director of National Intelligence; and
 (B) the necessity for, and the progress of, corrective actions.
 (c) INSPECTOR GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY- (1)
There is an Inspector General of the Intelligence Community, who shall
be the head of the Office of the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community, who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
 (2) The nomination of an individual for appointment as Inspector General shall be made--
 (A) without regard to political affiliation;
 (B) solely on the basis of integrity, compliance
with the security standards of the intelligence community, and prior
experience in the field of intelligence or national security; and
 (C) on the basis of demonstrated ability in
accounting, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public
administration, or auditing.
 (3) The Inspector General shall report directly to and
be under the general supervision of the Director of National
Intelligence.
 (4) The Inspector General may be removed from office
only by the President. The President shall immediately communicate in
writing to the congressional intelligence committees the reasons for
the removal of any individual from the position of Inspector General.
 (d) DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES- Subject to subsections
(g) and (h), it shall be the duty and responsibility of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community--
 (1) to provide policy direction for, and to plan,
conduct, supervise, and coordinate independently, the investigations,
inspections, and audits relating to matters within the responsibility
and authority of the Director of National Intelligence to ensure they
are conducted efficiently and in accordance with applicable law and
regulations;
 (2) to keep the Director of National Intelligence
fully and currently informed concerning violations of law and
regulations, violations of civil liberties and privacy, fraud and other
serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies that may occur in matters
within the responsibility and authority of the Director, and to report
the progress made in implementing corrective action;
 (3) to take due regard for the protection of
intelligence sources and methods in the preparation of all reports
issued by the Inspector General, and, to the extent consistent with the
purpose and objective of such reports, take such measures as may be
appropriate to minimize the disclosure of intelligence sources and
methods described in such reports; and
 (4) in the execution of the duties and
responsibilities under this section, to comply with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
 (e) LIMITATIONS ON ACTIVITIES- (1) The Director of
National Intelligence may prohibit the Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community from initiating, carrying out, or completing any
investigation, inspection, or audit if the Director determines that
such prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security
interests of the United States.
 (2) If the Director exercises the authority under
paragraph (1), the Director shall submit an appropriately classified
statement of the reasons for the exercise of such authority within 7
days to the congressional intelligence committees.
 (3) The Director shall advise the Inspector General at
the time a report under paragraph (2) is submitted, and, to the extent
consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods,
provide the Inspector General with a copy of such report.
 (4) The Inspector General may submit to the
congressional intelligence committees any comments on a report of which
the Inspector General has notice under paragraph (3) that the Inspector
General considers appropriate.
 (f) AUTHORITIES- (1) The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall have direct and prompt access to the
Director of National Intelligence when necessary for any purpose
pertaining to the performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
 (2)(A) The Inspector General shall have access to any
employee, or any employee of a contractor, of any element of the
intelligence community whose testimony is needed for the performance of
the duties of the Inspector General.
 (B) The Inspector General shall have direct access to
all records, reports, audits, reviews, documents, papers,
recommendations, or other material which relate to the programs and
operations with respect to which the Inspector General has
responsibilities under this section.
 (C) The level of classification or compartmentation of
information shall not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient rationale
for denying the Inspector General access to any materials under
subparagraph (B).
 (D) Failure on the part of any employee, or any
employee of a contractor, of any element of the intelligence community
to cooperate with the Inspector General shall be grounds for
appropriate administrative actions by the Director or, on the
recommendation of the Director, other appropriate officials of the
intelligence community, including loss of employment or the termination
of an existing contractual relationship.
 (3) The Inspector General is authorized to receive and
investigate complaints or information from any person concerning the
existence of an activity constituting a violation of laws, rules, or
regulations, or mismanagement, gross waste of funds, abuse of
authority, or a substantial and specific danger to the public health
and safety. Once such complaint or information has been received from
an employee of the Federal Government--
 (A) the Inspector General shall not disclose the
identity of the employee without the consent of the employee, unless
the Inspector General determines that such disclosure is unavoidable
during the course of the investigation or the disclosure is made to an
official of the Department of Justice responsible for determining
whether a prosecution should be undertaken; and
 (B) no action constituting a reprisal, or threat of
reprisal, for making such complaint may be taken by any employee in a
position to take such actions, unless the complaint was made or the
information was disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with
willful disregard for its truth or falsity.
 (4) The Inspector General shall have authority to
administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, or
affidavit, whenever necessary in the performance of the duties of the
Inspector General, which oath, affirmation, or affidavit when
administered or taken by or before an employee of the Office of the
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community designated by the
Inspector General shall have the same force and effect as if
administered or taken by, or before, an officer having a seal.
 (5)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the
Inspector General is authorized to require by subpoena the production
of all information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts,
papers, and other data and documentary evidence necessary in the
performance of the duties and responsibilities of the Inspector General.
 (B) In the case of departments, agencies, and other
elements of the United States Government, the Inspector General shall
obtain information, documents, reports, answers, records, accounts,
papers, and other data and evidence for the purpose specified in
subparagraph (A) using procedures other than by subpoenas.
 (C) The Inspector General may not issue a subpoena for,
or on behalf of, any other element of the intelligence community,
including the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
 (D) In the case of contumacy or refusal to obey a
subpoena issued under this paragraph, the subpoena shall be enforceable
by order of any appropriate district court of the United States.
 (g) COORDINATION AMONG INSPECTORS GENERAL OF
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY- (1)(A) In the event of a matter within the
jurisdiction of the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
that may be subject to an investigation, inspection, or audit by both
the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and an Inspector
General, whether statutory or administrative, with oversight
responsibility for an element or elements of the intelligence
community, the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community and such
other Inspector or Inspectors General shall expeditiously resolve the
question of which Inspector General shall conduct such investigation,
inspection, or audit.
 (B) In attempting to resolve a question under
subparagraph (A), the Inspectors General concerned may request the
assistance of the Intelligence Community Inspectors General Forum
established under subparagraph (C). In the event of a dispute between
an Inspector General within an agency or department of the United
States Government and the Inspector General of the Intelligence
Community that has not been resolved with the assistance of the Forum,
the Inspectors General shall submit the question to the Director of
National Intelligence and the head of the agency or department for
resolution.
 (C) There is established the Intelligence Community
Inspectors General Forum which shall consist of all statutory or
administrative Inspectors General with oversight responsibility for an
element or elements of the intelligence community. The Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community shall serve as the chair of the
Forum. The Forum shall have no administrative authority over any
Inspector General, but shall serve as a mechanism for informing its
members of the work of individual members of the Forum that may be of
common interest and discussing questions about jurisdiction or access
to employees, employees of a contractor, records, audits, reviews,
documents, recommendations, or other materials that may involve or be
of assistance to more than 1 of its members.
 (2) The Inspector General conducting an investigation,
inspection, or audit covered by paragraph (1) shall submit the results
of such investigation, inspection, or audit to any other Inspector
General, including the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community,
with jurisdiction to conduct such investigation, inspection, or audit
who did not conduct such investigation, inspection, or audit.
 (h) STAFF AND OTHER SUPPORT- (1) The Inspector General
of the Intelligence Community shall be provided with appropriate and
adequate office space at central and field office locations, together
with such equipment, office supplies, maintenance services, and
communications facilities and services as may be necessary for the
operation of such offices.
 (2)(A) Subject to applicable law and the policies of
the Director of National Intelligence, the Inspector General shall
select, appoint, and employ such officers and employees as may be
necessary to carry out the functions of the Inspector General. The
Inspector General shall ensure that any officer or employee so
selected, appointed, or employed has security clearances appropriate
for the assigned duties of such officer or employee.
 (B) In making selections under subparagraph (A), the
Inspector General shall ensure that such officers and employees have
the requisite training and experience to enable the Inspector General
to carry out the duties of the Inspector General effectively.
 (C) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, the
Inspector General shall create within the Office of the Inspector
General of the Intelligence Community a career cadre of sufficient size
to provide appropriate continuity and objectivity needed for the
effective performance of the duties of the Inspector General.
 (3)(A) Subject to the concurrence of the Director, the
Inspector General may request such information or assistance as may be
necessary for carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the
Inspector General from any department, agency, or other element of the
United States Government.
 (B) Upon request of the Inspector General for
information or assistance under subparagraph (A), the head of the
department, agency, or element concerned shall, insofar as is
practicable and not in contravention of any existing statutory
restriction or regulation of the department, agency, or element,
furnish to the Inspector General, or to an authorized designee, such
information or assistance.
 (C) The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
may, upon reasonable notice to the head of any element of the
intelligence community, conduct, as authorized by this section, an
investigation, inspection, or audit of such element and may enter into
any place occupied by such element for purposes of the performance of
the duties of the Inspector General.
 (i) REPORTS- (1)(A) The Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community shall, not later than January 31 and July 31 of
each year, prepare and submit to the Director of National Intelligence
a classified, and, as appropriate, unclassified semiannual report
summarizing the activities of the Office of the Inspector General of
the Intelligence Community during the immediately preceding 6-month
period ending December 31 (of the preceding year) and June 30,
respectively. The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community shall
provide any portion of the report involving a component of a department
of the United States Government to the head of that department
simultaneously with submission of the report to the Director of
National Intelligence.
 (B) Each report under this paragraph shall include, at a minimum, the following:
 (i) A list of the title or subject of each
investigation, inspection, or audit conducted during the period covered
by such report, including a summary of the progress of each particular
investigation, inspection, or audit since the preceding report of the
Inspector General under this paragraph.
 (ii) A description of significant problems, abuses,
and deficiencies relating to the administration and implementation of
programs and operations of the intelligence community, and in the
relationships between elements of the intelligence community,
identified by the Inspector General during the period covered by such
report.
 (iii) A description of the recommendations for
corrective or disciplinary action made by the Inspector General during
the period covered by such report with respect to significant problems,
abuses, or deficiencies identified in clause (ii).
 (iv) A statement whether or not corrective or
disciplinary action has been completed on each significant
recommendation described in previous semiannual reports, and, in a case
where corrective action has been completed, a description of such
corrective action.
 (v) A certification whether or not the Inspector
General has had full and direct access to all information relevant to
the performance of the functions of the Inspector General.
 (vi) A description of the exercise of the subpoena
authority under subsection (f)(5) by the Inspector General during the
period covered by such report.
 (vii) Such recommendations as the Inspector General
considers appropriate for legislation to promote economy, efficiency,
and effectiveness in the administration and implementation of matters
within the responsibility and authority of the Director of National
Intelligence, and to detect and eliminate fraud and abuse in such
matters.
 (C) Not later than the 30 days after the date of
receipt of a report under subparagraph (A), the Director shall transmit
the report to the congressional intelligence committees together with
any comments the Director considers appropriate. The Director shall
transmit to the committees of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives with jurisdiction over a department of the United
States Government any portion of the report involving a component of
such department simultaneously with submission of the report to the
congressional intelligence committees.
 (2)(A) The Inspector General shall report immediately
to the Director whenever the Inspector General becomes aware of
particularly serious or flagrant problems, abuses, or deficiencies
relating to matters within the responsibility and authority of the
Director of National Intelligence.
 (B) The Director shall transmit to the congressional
intelligence committees each report under subparagraph (A) within 7
calendar days of receipt of such report, together with such comments as
the Director considers appropriate. The Director shall transmit to the
committees of the Senate and of the House of Representatives with
jurisdiction over a department of the United States Government any
portion of each report under subparagraph (A) that involves a problem,
abuse, or deficiency related to a component of such department
simultaneously with transmission of the report to the congressional
intelligence committees.
 (3) In the event that--
 (A) the Inspector General is unable to resolve any
differences with the Director affecting the execution of the duties or
responsibilities of the Inspector General;
 (B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried
out by the Inspector General focuses on any current or former
intelligence community official who--
 (i) holds or held a position in an element of
the intelligence community that is subject to appointment by the
President, whether or not by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, including such a position held on an acting basis;
 (ii) holds or held a position in an element of
the intelligence community, including a position held on an acting
basis, that is appointed by the Director of National Intelligence; or
 (iii) holds or held a position as head of an
element of the intelligence community or a position covered by
subsection (b) or (c) of section 106;
 (C) a matter requires a report by the Inspector
General to the Department of Justice on possible criminal conduct by a
current or former official described in subparagraph (B);
 (D) the Inspector General receives notice from the
Department of Justice declining or approving prosecution of possible
criminal conduct of any current or former official described in
subparagraph (B); or
 (E) the Inspector General, after exhausting all
possible alternatives, is unable to obtain significant documentary
information in the course of an investigation, inspection, or audit,
the Inspector General shall immediately notify and submit a report on such matter to the congressional intelligence committees.
 (4) Pursuant to title V, the Director shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees any report or findings and
recommendations of an investigation, inspection, or audit conducted by
the office which has been requested by the Chairman or Vice Chairman or
Ranking Minority Member of either committee.
 (5)(A) An employee of an element of the intelligence
community, an employee assigned or detailed to an element of the
intelligence community, or an employee of a contractor to the
intelligence community who intends to report to Congress a complaint or
information with respect to an urgent concern may report such complaint
or information to the Inspector General.
 (B) Not later than the end of the 14-calendar day
period beginning on the date of receipt from an employee of a complaint
or information under subparagraph (A), the Inspector General shall
determine whether the complaint or information appears credible. Upon
making such a determination, the Inspector General shall transmit to
the Director a notice of that determination, together with the
complaint or information.
 (C) Upon receipt of a transmittal from the Inspector
General under subparagraph (B), the Director shall, within 7 calendar
days of such receipt, forward such transmittal to the congressional
intelligence committees, together with any comments the Director
considers appropriate.
 (D)(i) If the Inspector General does not find credible
under subparagraph (B) a complaint or information submitted under
subparagraph (A), or does not transmit the complaint or information to
the Director in accurate form under subparagraph (B), the employee
(subject to clause (ii)) may submit the complaint or information to
Congress by contacting either or both of the congressional intelligence
committees directly.
 (ii) An employee may contact the intelligence committees directly as described in clause (i) only if the employee--
 (I) before making such a contact, furnishes to the
Director, through the Inspector General, a statement of the employee's
complaint or information and notice of the employee's intent to contact
the congressional intelligence committees directly; and
 (II) obtains and follows from the Director, through
the Inspector General, direction on how to contact the intelligence
committees in accordance with appropriate security practices.
 (iii) A member or employee of 1 of the congressional
intelligence committees who receives a complaint or information under
clause (i) does so in that member or employee's official capacity as a
member or employee of such committee.
 (E) The Inspector General shall notify an employee who
reports a complaint or information to the Inspector General under this
paragraph of each action taken under this paragraph with respect to the
complaint or information. Such notice shall be provided not later than
3 days after any such action is taken.
 (F) An action taken by the Director or the Inspector General under this paragraph shall not be subject to judicial review.
 (G) In this paragraph, the term `urgent concern' means any of the following:
 (i) A serious or flagrant problem, abuse, violation
of law or Executive order, or deficiency relating to the funding,
administration, or operation of an intelligence activity involving
classified information, but does not include differences of opinions
concerning public policy matters.
 (ii) A false statement to Congress, or a willful
withholding from Congress, on an issue of material fact relating to the
funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity.
 (iii) An action, including a personnel action
described in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5, United States Code,
constituting reprisal or threat of reprisal prohibited under subsection
(f)(3)(B) of this section in response to an employee's reporting an
urgent concern in accordance with this paragraph.
 (H) In support of this paragraph, Congress makes the
findings set forth in paragraphs (1) through (6) of section 701(b) of
the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 (title
VII of Public Law 105-272; 5 U.S.C. App. 8H note).
 (6) In accordance with section 535 of title 28, United
States Code, the Inspector General shall report to the Attorney General
any information, allegation, or complaint received by the Inspector
General relating to violations of Federal criminal law that involves a
program or operation of an element of the intelligence community, or in
the relationships between the elements of the intelligence community,
consistent with such guidelines as may be issued by the Attorney
General pursuant to subsection (b)(2) of such section. A copy of each
such report shall be furnished to the Director.
 (j) SEPARATE BUDGET ACCOUNT- The Director of National
Intelligence shall, in accordance with procedures to be issued by the
Director in consultation with the congressional intelligence
committees, include in the National Intelligence Program budget a
separate account for the Office of Inspector General of the
Intelligence Community.
 (k) CONSTRUCTION OF DUTIES REGARDING ELEMENTS OF
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY- Except as resolved pursuant to subsection (g),
the performance by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
of any duty, responsibility, or function regarding an element of the
intelligence community shall not be construed to modify or effect the
duties and responsibilities of any other Inspector General, whether
statutory or administrative, having duties and responsibilities
relating to such element.
OMBUDSMAN FOR INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY SECURITY CLEARANCES
 Sec. 103I. (a) Appointment- The Director of National
Intelligence shall appoint an ombudsman for intelligence community
security clearances.
 (b) Provision of Information- The head of an element of
the intelligence community shall provide a person applying for a
security clearance through or in coordination with such element with
contact information for the ombudsman appointed under subsection (a).
 (c) Report- Not later than November 1 of each year, the
ombudsman appointed under subsection (a) shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report containing--
 (1) the number of persons applying for a security
clearance who have contacted the ombudsman during the preceding 12
months; and
 (2) a summary of the concerns, complaints, and
questions received by the ombudsman from persons applying for security
clearances.
* * * * * * *
ANNUAL REPORT ON IMPROVEMENT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR AUDITING PURPOSES
 SEC. 114A. Not later each year than the date provided in section 507, the Director of National Intelligence,  [Struck out->][ the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, ][<-Struck
out] the Director of the National Security Agency, the Director of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency shall each submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report describing the activities being undertaken by such
official to ensure that the financial statements of such agency can be
audited in accordance with applicable law and requirements of the
Office of Management and Budget.
* * * * * * *
TRAVEL ON ANY COMMON CARRIER FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL
 SEC. 116. (a) * * *
 (b) AUTHORIZED DELEGATION OF DUTY- (1) The Director of National Intelligence  [Struck out->][
may only delegate the authority granted by this section to the
Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence, or with respect to
employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, to the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency. ][<-Struck out]  may delegate the authority in subsection (a) to the head of any other element of the intelligence community.
 (2) The head of an element of the intelligence
community to whom the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant
to paragraph (1) may further delegate such authority to such senior
officials of such element as are specified in guidelines prescribed by
the Director of National Intelligence for purposes of this paragraph.
* * * * * * *
 [Struck out->][ SEMIANNUAL ][<-Struck out]  ANNUAL REPORT ON FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE ON TERRORIST ASSETS
 SEC. 118. (a)  [Struck out->][ SEMIANNUAL ][<-Struck out]  ANNUAL REPORT- On a  [Struck out->][ semiannual basis ][<-Struck out]  annual basis,
the Secretary of the Treasury (acting through the head of the Office of
Intelligence Support) shall submit a report to the appropriate
congressional committees that fully informs the committees concerning
operations against terrorist financial networks. Each such report shall
include with respect to the preceding [Struck out->][ six-month period ][<-Struck out]  year--
 (1) * * *
  [Struck out->][ (2) the
total number of applications for asset seizure and designations of
individuals or entities suspected of having engaged in financial
support of terrorist activities that were granted, modified, or denied;
][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (3) ][<-Struck out]  (2)
the total number of physical searches of offices, residences, or
financial records of individuals or entities suspected of having
engaged in financial support for terrorist activity; and
  [Struck out->][ (4) ][<-Struck out]  (3)
whether the financial intelligence information seized in these cases
has been shared on a full and timely basis with the all departments,
agencies, and other entities of the United States Government involved
in intelligence activities participating in the Foreign Terrorist Asset
Tracking Center.
* * * * * * *
NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
 SEC. 119. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (c) REPORTING- (1) * * *
 (2) The matters described in this paragraph are as follows:
 (A) * * *
 (B) The activities of the Directorate of Intelligence of the National Counterterrorism Center under  [Struck out->][ subsection (h) ][<-Struck out]  subsection (i).
* * * * * * *
NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION CENTER
 SEC. 119A.  [Struck out->][ (a)
Establishment- Not later than 18 months after the date of the enactment
of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the ][<-Struck out]
 (a) IN GENERAL-
 (1) ESTABLISHMENT- The President
shall establish a National Counter Proliferation Center, taking into
account all appropriate government tools to prevent and halt the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems,
and related materials and technologies.
 (2) DIRECTOR- The head of the National Counter
Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the National Counter
Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of
National Intelligence.
 (3) LOCATION- The National Counter Proliferation
Center shall be located within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
* * * * * * *
TITLE V--ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
GENERAL CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PROVISIONS
 SEC. 501. (a)(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (3) In carrying out paragraph (1), the President
shall provide to the congressional intelligence committees all
information necessary to assess the lawfulness, effectiveness, cost,
benefit, intelligence gain, budgetary authority, and risk of an
intelligence activity, including--
 (A) the legal authority under which the intelligence activity is being or was conducted;
 (B) any legal issues upon which guidance was sought
in carrying out or planning the intelligence activity, including
dissenting legal views;
 (C) any specific operational concerns arising from
the intelligence activity, including the risk of disclosing
intelligence sources or methods;
 (D) the likelihood that the intelligence activity
will exceed the planned or authorized expenditure of funds or other
resources; and
 (E)  the likelihood that the intelligence activity will fail.
* * * * * * *
 (f) A notification to the congressional
intelligence committees regarding intelligence information relating to
North Korea or China after all or part of the information has been
communicated to the governments of North Korea or China, respectively,
shall not be construed to fulfill the duty under this title to keep the
congressional intelligence committees fully and currently informed of
the intelligence activities of the United States.
  [Struck out->][ (f) ][<-Struck out]  (g) As used in this section, the term `intelligence activities' includes covert actions as defined in section  [Struck out->][ 503(e) ][<-Struck out]  503(g), and includes financial intelligence activities.
REPORTING OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN COVERT ACTIONS
 SEC. 502. (a) IN GENERAL- To the extent consistent with due
regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of classified
information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or
other exceptionally sensitive matters, the Director of National
Intelligence and the heads of all departments, agencies, and other
entities of the United States Government involved in intelligence
activities shall--
 (1) keep the congressional intelligence committees
fully and currently informed of all intelligence activities, other than
a covert action (as defined in section [Struck out->][ 503(e) ][<-Struck out]  503(g)),
which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out
for or on behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of the United
States Government, including any significant anticipated intelligence
activity and any significant intelligence failure; and
* * * * * * *
 (d) DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION- 
 (1) REQUEST- Information or material provided in
accordance with subsection (a) shall be made available to each member
of the congressional intelligence committees, unless the President
requests that access to the information or material be limited after
determining that limiting such access is essential to meet
extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United
States. A request under this paragraph and the extraordinary
circumstances referred to in this paragraph shall be detailed in
writing to the Chair and ranking minority member of the congressional
intelligence committees.
 (2) DISTRIBUTION- If the President submits a
request under paragraph (1), the Chair and ranking minority member of
each congressional intelligence committee may jointly determine whether
and how to limit access to the information or material within such
committee. If the Chair and ranking minority member of such committee
are unable to agree on whether or how to limit such access, access to
the information or material will be limited. Any information or
material to which access is limited shall subsequently be made
available to each member of the congressional intelligence communities
at the earliest possible time and shall include a detailed statement of
the reasons for not providing prior access.
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL AND REPORTING OF COVERT ACTIONS
 SEC. 503. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
  [Struck out->][ (d) The President ][<-Struck out]  (d)(1) The President
shall ensure that the congressional intelligence committees, or, if
applicable, the Members of Congress specified in subsection (c)(2), are
notified of any significant change in a previously approved covert
action, or any significant undertaking pursuant to a previously
approved finding, in the same manner as findings are reported pursuant
to subsection (c).
 (2) For purposes of this subsection, an activity shall constitute a `significant undertaking' if the activity--
 (A) involves the potential for loss of life;
 (B) requires an expansion of existing authorities, including authorities relating to research, development, or operations;
 (C) results in the expenditure of significant funds or other resources;
 (D) requires notification under section 504;
 (E) gives rise to a significant risk of disclosing intelligence sources or methods; or
 (F) could cause serious damage to the diplomatic
relations of the United States if such activity were disclosed without
authorization.
 (e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions- 
 (1) IN GENERAL- Subject to paragraph (2), the
Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct an
audit of each covert action at least every 3 years. Such audits shall
be conducted subject to the provisions of paragraphs (3) and (4) of
subsection (b) of section 17 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q).
 (2) TERMINATED, SUSPENDED PROGRAMS- The Inspector
General of the Central Intelligence Agency is not required to conduct
an audit under paragraph (1) of a covert action that has been
terminated or suspended if such covert action was terminated or
suspended prior to the last audit of such covert action conducted by
the Inspector General and has not been restarted after the date on
which such audit was completed.
 (3) REPORT- Not later than 60 days after the
completion of an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph (1), the
Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a report containing the
results of such audit.
* * * * * * *
  [Struck out->][ (e) ][<-Struck out]  (g)
As used in this title, the term `covert action' means an activity or
activities of the United States Government to influence political,
economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the
role of the United States Government will not be apparent or
acknowledged publicly, but does not include--
 (1) * * *
* * * * * * *
FUNDING OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
 SEC. 504. (a) Appropriated funds available to an
intelligence agency may be obligated or expended for an intelligence or
intelligence-related activity only if--
 (1) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (3) in the case of funds specifically authorized by the Congress for a different activity--
 (A) * * *
  [Struck out->][ (B) the need for funds for such activity is based on unforseen requirements; and ][<-Struck out]
 (B) the use of such funds for such activity
supports an emergent need, improves program effectiveness, or increases
efficiency; and
* * * * * * *
 (c) No funds appropriated for, or otherwise available
to, any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government
may be expended, or may be directed to be expended, for any covert
action, as defined in section [Struck out->][ 503(e) ][<-Struck out]  503(g),
unless and until a Presidential finding required by subsection (a) of
section 503 has been signed or otherwise issued in accordance with that
subsection.
* * * * * * *
ANNUAL PERSONNEL LEVEL ASSESSMENT FOR THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
 Sec. 506B. (a) Requirement To Provide- The Director of
National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the head of the
element of the intelligence community concerned, prepare an annual
personnel level assessment for such element of the intelligence
community that assesses the personnel levels for each such element for
the fiscal year following the fiscal year in which the assessment is
submitted.
 (b) Schedule- Each assessment required by subsection
(a) shall be submitted to the congressional intelligence committees
each year along with the budget submitted by the President under
section 1105 of title 31, United States Code.
 (c) Contents- Each assessment required by subsection
(a) submitted during a fiscal year shall contain, at a minimum, the
following information for the element of the intelligence community
concerned:
 (1) The budget submission for personnel costs for the upcoming fiscal year.
 (2) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease of such costs as compared to the personnel costs of the current fiscal year.
 (3) The dollar and percentage increase or decrease
of such costs as compared to the personnel costs during the prior 5
fiscal years.
 (4) The number of personnel positions requested for the upcoming fiscal year.
 (5) The numerical and percentage increase or
decrease of such number as compared to the number of personnel
positions of the current fiscal year.
 (6) The numerical and percentage increase or
decrease of such number as compared to the number of personnel
positions during the prior 5 fiscal years.
 (7) The best estimate of the number and costs of contractors to be funded by the element for the upcoming fiscal year.
 (8) The numerical and percentage increase or
decrease of such costs of contractors as compared to the best estimate
of the costs of contractors of the current fiscal year.
 (9) The numerical and percentage increase or
decrease of such costs of contractors as compared to the cost of
contractors, and the number of contractors, during the prior 5 fiscal
years.
 (10) A written justification for the requested personnel and contractor levels.
 (11) The number of intelligence collectors and analysts employed or contracted by each element of the intelligence community.
 (12) A list of all contractors that have been the
subject of an investigation completed by the Inspector General of any
element of the intelligence community during the preceding fiscal year,
or are or have been the subject of an investigation by such an
Inspector General during the current fiscal year.
 (13) A statement by the Director of National
Intelligence that, based on current and projected funding, the element
concerned will have sufficient--
 (A) internal infrastructure to support the requested personnel and contractor levels;
 (B) training resources to support the requested personnel levels; and
 (C) funding to support the administrative and operational activities of the requested personnel levels.
DATES FOR SUBMITTAL OF VARIOUS ANNUAL AND SEMIANNUAL REPORTS TO THE CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES
 SEC. 507. (a) ANNUAL REPORTS- (1) The date for the
submittal to the congressional intelligence committees of the following
annual reports shall be the date each year provided in subsection
(c)(1)(A):
 (A) * * *
* * * * * * *
  [Struck out->][ (N) ][<-Struck out]  (J) The annual report on hiring and retention of minority employees in the intelligence community required by section 114(c).
 (K) The annual report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community required by section 510.
 (L) The annual report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets required by section 118.
 (2) The date for the submittal to the congressional
intelligence committees of the following annual reports shall be the
date each year provided in subsection (c)(1)(B):
 (A) * * *
* * * * * * *
  [Struck out->][ (D) The
annual report on counterdrug intelligence matters required by section
826 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003. ][<-Struck out]
 (b) SEMIANNUAL REPORTS- The dates for the submittal to the
congressional intelligence committees of the following semiannual
reports shall be the dates each year provided in subsection (c)(2):
 (1)  * * *
* * * * * * *
  [Struck out->][ (6) The semiannual report on financial intelligence on terrorist assets required by section 118. ][<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
-
REPORT ON SECURITY CLEARANCE DETERMINATIONS
 SEC. 508. Not later than February 1 of each year, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall submit to
Congress a report on security clearance determinations completed or
ongoing during the preceding fiscal year that have taken longer than
one year to complete. Such report shall include--
 (1) the number of security clearance determinations
for positions as employees of the Federal Government that required more
than one year to complete;
 (2) the number of security clearance determinations for contractors that required more than one year to complete;
 (3) the agencies that investigated and adjudicated such determinations; and
 (4) the cause of significant delays in such determinations.-
SEMIANNUAL REPORTS ON THE NUCLEAR PROGRAMS OF IRAN, SYRIA, AND NORTH KOREA
 SEC. 509. (a) REQUIREMENT FOR REPORTS- Not less
frequently than every 180 days, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on
the intentions and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the
Syrian Arab Republic, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
with regard to the nuclear programs of each such country.
 (b) CONTENT- Each report submitted under subsection (a)
shall include, with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Syrian
Arab Republic, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea--
 (1) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs of each such country;
 (2) an evaluation, consistent with existing
reporting standards and practices, of the sources upon which the
intelligence used to prepare the assessment described in paragraph (1)
is based, including the number of such sources and an assessment of the
reliability of each such source;
 (3) a summary of any intelligence related to any
such program gathered or developed since the previous report was
submitted under subsection (a), including intelligence collected from
both open and clandestine sources for each such country; and
 (4) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in
knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence in the
assessment described in paragraph (1).
 (c) NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE- The Director of
National Intelligence may submit a National Intelligence Estimate on
the intentions and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the
Syrian Arab Republic, or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in
lieu of a report required by subsection (a) for that country.
 (d) FORM- Each report submitted under subsection (a) may be submitted in classified form.-
REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
 SEC. 510. Not later than February 1 of each year, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the proficiency in foreign
languages and, if appropriate, in foreign dialects of each element of
the intelligence community, including--
 (1) the number of positions authorized for such
element that require foreign language proficiency and the level of
proficiency required;
 (2) an estimate of the number of such positions
that each element will require during the 5-year period beginning on
the date of the submission of the report;
 (3) the number of positions authorized for such element that require foreign language proficiency that are filled by--
 (A) military personnel; and
 (B) civilian personnel;
 (4) the number of applicants for positions in such
element in the previous fiscal year that indicated foreign language
proficiency, including the foreign language indicated and the
proficiency level;
 (5) the number of persons hired by such element
with foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language and
proficiency level;
 (6) the number of personnel of such element
currently attending foreign language training, including the provider
of such training;
 (7) a description of such element's efforts to
recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel that are proficient in a
foreign language;
 (8) an assessment of methods and models for basic, advanced, and intensive foreign language training;
 (9) for each foreign language and, where appropriate, dialect of a foreign language--
 (A) the number of positions of such element that require proficiency in the foreign language or dialect;
 (B) the number of personnel of such element
that are serving in a position that requires proficiency in the foreign
language or dialect to perform the primary duty of the position;
 (C) the number of personnel of such element
that are serving in a position that does not require proficiency in the
foreign language or dialect to perform the primary duty of the position;
 (D) the number of personnel of such element rated at each level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable;
 (E) whether the number of personnel at each
level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable meets the
requirements of such element;
 (F) the number of personnel serving or hired to
serve as linguists for such element that are not qualified as linguists
under the standards of the Interagency Language Roundtable;
 (G) the number of personnel hired to serve as linguists for such element during the preceding calendar year;
 (H) the number of personnel serving as linguists that discontinued serving such element during the preceding calendar year;
 (I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills that is fulfilled by an ally of the United States; and
 (J) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills that is fulfilled by contractors;
 (10) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole; and
 (11) recommendations for eliminating required
reports relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of
National Intelligence considers outdated or no longer relevant.
-
TITLE VI--PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
PROTECTION OF IDENTITIES OF CERTAIN UNITED STATES UNDERCOVER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AGENTS, INFORMANTS, AND SOURCES
 SEC. 601. (a) Whoever, having or having had authorized
access to classified information that identifies a covert agent,
intentionally discloses any information identifying such covert agent
to any individual not authorized to receive classified information,
knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such covert agent
and that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal
such covert agent's intelligence relationship to the United States,
shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not
more than [Struck out->][ ten years ][<-Struck out]  15 years, or both.
 (b) Whoever, as a result of having authorized access to
classified information, learns the identity of a covert agent and
intentionally discloses any information identifying such covert agent
to any individual not authorized to receive classified information,
knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such covert agent
and that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal
such covert agent's intelligence relationship to the United States,
shall be fined under title 18, United States Code, or imprisoned not
more than [Struck out->][ five years ][<-Struck out]  10 years, or both.
* * * * * * *
REPORT
 SEC. 603. (a) The President, after receiving information
from the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees an annual report on measures to
protect the identities of covert agents, including an assessment
of the need for any modification of this title for the purpose of
improving legal protections for covert agents, and on any other
matter relevant to the protection of the identities of covert agents.
The date for the submittal of the report shall be the date provided in
section 507.
* * * * * * *
TITLE VII--PROTECTION OF OPERATIONAL FILES
* * * * * * *
OPERATIONAL FILES OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SEC. 705. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (e) ALLEGATION; IMPROPER WITHHOLDING OF RECORDS; JUDICIAL REVIEW- (1) * * *
 (2) Judicial review shall not be available in the manner provided under paragraph (1) as follows:
 (A) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (D)(i) When a complainant alleges that requested
records were improperly withheld because of improper exemption of
operational files, the Defense Intelligence Agency shall meet its
burden under section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5, United States Code, by
demonstrating to the court by sworn written submission that exempted
operational files likely to contain [Struck out->][ responsible ][<-Struck out]  responsive records currently perform the functions set forth in subsection (b).
* * * * * * *
TITLE X--EDUCATION IN SUPPORT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
* * * * * * *
SUBTITLE C--ADDITIONAL EDUCATION PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACQUISITION OF CRITICAL SKILLS
 Sec. 1022. (a) In General- The head of an appropriate
department may assign civilian employees of an element of the
intelligence community that is a component of such appropriate
department as students at accredited professional, technical, and other
institutions of higher learning for training at the undergraduate level
in skills critical to effective performance of the mission of such
element of the intelligence community.
 (b) Payment of Expenses- The head of an appropriate
department may pay, directly or by reimbursement to employees, expenses
incident to assignments under subsection (a), in any fiscal year only
to the extent that appropriated funds are available for such purpose.
 (c) Eligibility- 
 (1) IN GENERAL- To be eligible for assignment under
subsection (a), an employee of an element of the intelligence community
must agree in writing--
 (A) to continue in the service of such element
for the period of the assignment and to complete the educational course
of training for which the employee is assigned;
 (B) to continue in the service of such element
following completion of the assignment for a period of one-and-a-half
years for each year of the assignment or part thereof;
 (C) to reimburse the United States for the
total cost of education (excluding the employee's pay and allowances)
provided under this section to the employee if, prior to the employee's
completing the educational course of training for which the employee is
assigned, the assignment or the employee's employment with such element
is terminated either by such element due to misconduct by the employee
or by the employee voluntarily; and
 (D) to reimburse the United States if, after
completing the educational course of training for which the employee is
assigned, the employee's employment with such element is terminated
either by such element due to misconduct by the employee or by the
employee voluntarily, prior to the employee's completion of the service
obligation period described in subparagraph (B), in an amount that
bears the same ratio to the total cost of the education (excluding the
employee's pay and allowances) provided to the employee as the unserved
portion of the service obligation period described in subparagraph (B)
bears to the total period of the service obligation described in
subparagraph (B).
 (2) DEBT OWING THE UNITED STATES- Subject to
paragraph (3), the obligation to reimburse the United States under an
agreement described in paragraph (1), including interest due on such
obligation, is for all purposes a debt owing the United States.
 (3) REIMBURSEMENT- 
 (A) BANKRUPTCY- A discharge in bankruptcy under
title 11, United States Code, shall not release a person from an
obligation to reimburse the United States required under an agreement
described in paragraph (1) if the final decree of the discharge in
bankruptcy is issued within five years after the last day of the
combined period of service obligation described in subparagraphs (A)
and (B) of paragraph (1).
 (B) RELEASE- The head of an appropriate
department may release a person, in whole or in part, from the
obligation to reimburse the United States under an agreement described
in paragraph (1) when, in the discretion of such head of an appropriate
department, such head of an appropriate department determines that
equity or the interests of the United States so require.
 (C) MONTHLY PAYMENTS- The head of an
appropriate department shall permit an employee assigned under this
section who, prior to commencing a second academic year of such
assignment, voluntarily terminates the assignment or the employee's
employment with the element of the intelligence community that is a
component of such appropriate department, to satisfy the employee's
obligation under an agreement described in paragraph (1) to reimburse
the United States by reimbursement according to a schedule of monthly
payments which results in completion of reimbursement by a date five
years after the date of termination of the assignment or employment or
earlier at the option of the employee.
 (d) Recruitment- Efforts by an element of the
intelligence community to recruit individuals at educational
institutions for participation in the undergraduate training program
established by this section shall be made openly and according to the
common practices of universities and employers recruiting at such
institutions.
 (e) Inapplication of Provisions on Training- Chapter 41
of title 5 and subsections (a) and (b) of section 3324 of title 31,
United States Code, shall not apply with respect to this section.
 (f) Regulations- A head of the appropriate department
assigning employees in accordance with this section may issue such
regulations as such head of the appropriate department considers
necessary to carry out this section.
 (g) Rules of Construction- 
 (1) COMPONENT- For purposes of this section--
 (A) the Office of the Director of National Intelligence shall be considered a component of such Office; and
 (B) the Central Intelligence Agency shall be considered a component of such Agency.
 (2) REQUIRED EDUCATION PROGRAMS- Nothing in this
section shall be construed to modify, affect, or supercede any
provision of law requiring or otherwise authorizing or providing for a
training program described in this section.
 (h) Appropriate Department Defined- In this section, the term `appropriate department' means--
 (1) with respect to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence;
 (2) with respect to the Central Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency; and
 (3) with respect to an element of the intelligence
community other than the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and the Central Intelligence Agency, the department of the
Federal Government of which such element of the intelligence community
is a component.
TITLE XI--ADDITIONAL MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INITIATIVES
 SEC. 1102. (a) * * *
 (b) ANNUAL REVIEW OF DISSEMINATION LISTS-  [Struck out->][ (1) ][<-Struck
out] The Director of National Intelligence shall establish and
implement a process for all elements of the intelligence community to
review, on an annual basis, individuals included on distribution lists
for access to classified information. Such process shall ensure that
only individuals who have a particularized `need to know' (as
determined by the Director) are continued on such distribution lists.
  [Struck out->][ (2) Not later
than October 15 of each year, the Director shall certify to the
congressional intelligence committees that the review required under
paragraph (1) has been conducted in all elements of the intelligence
community during the preceding fiscal year. ][<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
-
TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
PART III--EMPLOYEES
* * * * * * *
SUBPART A--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 23--MERIT SYSTEM PRINCIPLES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 2302. Prohibited personnel practices
 (a)(1) * * *
 (2) For the purpose of this section--
 (A) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (C) `agency' means an Executive agency and the Government Printing Office, but does not include--
 (i)  * * *
 (ii) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
[Struck out->][ National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck out]  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
the National Security Agency, and, as determined by the President, any
Executive agency or unit thereof the principal function of which is the
conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activities; or
* * * * * * *
SUBPART C--EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 43--PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER I--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 4301. Definitions
 For the purpose of this subchapter--
 (1) `agency' means--
 (A) * * *
but does not include--
 (i) a Government corporation;
 (ii) the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the  [Struck out->][ National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck out]  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
the National Security Agency, or any Executive agency or unit thereof
which is designated by the President and the principal function of
which is the conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
activities; or
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 47--PERSONNEL RESEARCH PROGRAMS AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 4701. Definitions
 (a) For the purpose of this chapter--
 (1) `agency' means an Executive agency and the Government Printing Office, but does not include--
 (A) * * *
 (B) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
[Struck out->][ National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck out]  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
the National Security Agency, and, as determined by the President, any
Executive agency or unit thereof which is designated by the President
and which has as its principal function the conduct of foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence activities; or
* * * * * * *
SUBPART D--PAY AND ALLOWANCES
CHAPTER 51--CLASSIFICATION
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5102. Definitions; application
 (a) For the purpose of this chapter--
 (1) `agency' means--
 (A) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (F) the government of the District of Columbia;
but does not include--
 (i) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (x) the  [Struck out->][ National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck out]  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense.
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 53--PAY RATES AND SYSTEMS
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER II--EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE PAY RATES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5313. Positions at level II
 Level II of the Executive Schedule applies to the following
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the rate
determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of title 2, as
adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
Deputy Secretary of Defense.
* * * * * * *
 [Struck out->][ Director of Central Intelligence. ][<-Struck out]
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5314. Positions at level III
 Level III of the Executive Schedule applies to the
following positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be
the rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
Solicitor General of the United States.
* * * * * * *
 [Struck out->][ Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence (2). ][<-Struck out]
Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5315. Positions at level IV
 Level IV of the Executive Schedule applies to the following
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the rate
determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of title 2, as
adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
Deputy Administrator of General Services.
* * * * * * *
 [Struck out->][ General Counsel of the Office of the National Intelligence Director. ][<-Struck out]
General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
* * * * * * *
Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER IV--PREVAILING RATE SYSTEMS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5342. Definitions; application
 (a) For the purpose of this subchapter--
 (1) `agency' means an Executive agency; but does not include--
 (A) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (K) the  [Struck out->][ National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck out]  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense;
* * * * * * *
SUBPART E--ATTENDANCE AND LEAVE
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 63--LEAVE
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER III--VOLUNTARY TRANSFERS OF LEAVE
* * * * * * *
Sec. 6339. Additional leave transfer programs
 (a) For the purpose of this section--
 (1) the term `excepted agency' means--
 (A) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (E) the  [Struck out->][ National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck out]  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and
* * * * * * *
 (2) the term `head of an excepted agency' means--
 (A) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (E) with respect to the  [Struck out->][ National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck out]  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Director of the  [Struck out->][ National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck out]  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and
* * * * * * *
SUBPART F--LABOR-MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 73--SUITABILITY, SECURITY, AND CONDUCT
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER III--POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 7323. Political activity authorized; prohibitions
 (a) * * *
 (b)(1) * * *
 (2)(A) * * *
 (B) The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall apply to--
 (i) an employee of--
 (I) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (XIII) the  [Struck out->][ National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck out]  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; or
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER IV--FOREIGN GIFTS AND DECORATIONS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 7342. Receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations
 (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (f)(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
  [Struck out->][ (4)(A) In
transmitting such listings for the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may delete the information
described in subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the
Director certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the
publication of such information could adversely affect United States
intelligence sources. ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (B) In
transmitting such listings for the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, the Director of National Intelligence may delete the
information described in subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs (2)
and (3) if the Director certifies in writing to the Secretary of State
that the publication of such information could adversely affect United
States intelligence sources. ][<-Struck out]
 (4)(A) In transmitting such listings for an element of
the intelligence community, the head of such element may delete the
information described in subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (2) or in
subparagraph (A) or (C) of paragraph (3) if the head of such element
certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of
such information could adversely affect United States intelligence
sources or methods.
 (B) Any information not provided to the Secretary of
State pursuant to the authority in subparagraph (A) shall be
transmitted to the Director of National Intelligence who shall keep a
record of such information.
 (C) In this paragraph, the term `intelligence
community' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
* * * * * * *
-
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003
* * * * * * *
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle E--Terrorism
* * * * * * *
SEC. 343. TERRORIST IDENTIFICATION CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM.
 (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
  [Struck out->][ (d)
Reporting and Certification- (1) The Director shall review on an annual
basis the information provided by various departments and agencies for
purposes of the list under subsection (a) in order to determine whether
or not the information so provided is derived from the widest possible
range of intelligence available to such departments and agencies. ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (2) The Director
shall, as a result of each review under paragraph (1), certify whether
or not the elements of the intelligence community responsible for the
collection of intelligence related to the list have provided
information for purposes of the list that is derived from the widest
possible range of intelligence available to such department and
agencies. ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (e) ][<-Struck out]  (d) Report on Criteria for Information Sharing- (1) * * *
* * * * * * *
  [Struck out->][ (f) ][<-Struck out]  (e) System Administration Requirements- (1) * * *
* * * * * * *
  [Struck out->][ (g) ][<-Struck out]  (f) Report on Status of System- (1) * * *
* * * * * * *
  [Struck out->][ (h) ][<-Struck out]  (g) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined- In this section, the term `congressional intelligence committees' means--
 (1) * * *
* * * * * * *
TITLE VIII--REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
* * * * * * *
Subtitle C--Recurring Annual Reports
* * * * * * *
 [Struck out->][ SEC. 826. ANNUAL REPORT ON COUNTERDRUG INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (a) Annual
Report- The Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group shall submit to
the appropriate committees of Congress each year a report on current
counterdrug intelligence matters. The report shall include the
recommendations of the Counterdrug Intelligence Coordinating Group on
the appropriate number of permanent staff, and of detailed personnel,
for the staff of the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat. ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (b) Submittal
Date- The date of the submittal each year of the report required by
subsection (a) shall be the date provided in section 507 of the
National Security Act of 1947, as added by section 811 of this Act. ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (c) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined- In this section, the term `appropriate committees of Congress' means-- ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (1) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives; and ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (2) the congressional intelligence committees (as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a)). ][<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
TITLE X--NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1002. NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF THE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
 (a)  * * *
 (b) COMPOSITION- The Commission shall be composed of 12 members, as follows:
 (1)  [Struck out->][ The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management. ][<-Struck out]  The Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
* * * * * * *
 (i) REVIEW- The Commission shall review the status of
research and development programs and activities within the
intelligence community, [Struck out->][ including-- ][<-Struck out]  including advanced research and development programs and activities. Such review shall include--
 (1)  * * *
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1007. FINAL REPORT; TERMINATION.
 (a) Final Report- Not later than  [Struck out->][ September 1, 2004 ][<-Struck out]  December 31, 2009,
the Commission shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Secretary of
Defense a final report as required by section 1002(h)(2).
* * * * * * *
-
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY ACT OF 1959
* * * * * * *
 SEC. 16. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (e) [Struck out->][ (1) When
an employee is assigned under this section to an institution, the
Agency shall disclose to the institution to which the employee is
assigned that the Agency employs the employee and that the Agency funds
the employee's education. ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (2) Agency efforts ][<-Struck out]  Agency efforts
to recruit individuals at educational institutions for participation in
the undergraduate training program established by this section shall be
made openly and according to the common practices of universities and
employers recruiting at such institutions.
* * * * * * *
-
SECTION 115 OF TITLE 49, UNITED STATES CODE
Sec. 115. Transportation Security Oversight Board
 (a) * * *
 (b) Membership-
 (1) Number and appointment- The Board shall be composed of 7 members as follows:
 (A) * * *
* * * * * * *
  [Struck out->][ (F) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, or the Director's designee. ][<-Struck out]
 (F) The Director of National Intelligence.
* * * * * * *
-
INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978
* * * * * * *
 [Struck out->][ AUTHORITY TO ESTABLISH INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ SEC. 8K. If the
Director of National Intelligence determines that an Office of
Inspector General would be beneficial to improving the operations and
effectiveness of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
the Director of National Intelligence is authorized to establish, with
any of the duties, responsibilities, and authorities set forth in this
Act, an Office of Inspector General. ][<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
-
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2002
* * * * * * *
TITLE IX--COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
* * * * * * *
SEC. 904. OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.
 (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
  [Struck out->][ (d) General
Counsel- (1) There shall be in the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive a general counsel who shall serve as
principal legal advisor to the National Counterintelligence Executive. ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (2) The general counsel shall-- ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (A) provide legal advice and counsel to the Executive on matters relating to functions of the Office; ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (B) ensure that the Office complies with all applicable laws, regulations, Executive orders, and guidelines; and ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (C) carry out such other duties as the Executive may specify. ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (e) ][<-Struck out]  (d)
Functions- Subject to the direction and control of the National
Counterintelligence Executive, the functions of the Office of the
National Counterintelligence Executive shall be as follows:
 (1) NATIONAL THREAT IDENTIFICATION AND PRIORITIZATION ASSESSMENT- Subject to  [Struck out->][ subsection (f) ][<-Struck out]  subsection (e),
in consultation with appropriate department and agencies of the United
States Government, and private sector entities, to produce on an annual
basis a strategic planning assessment of the counterintelligence
requirements of the United States to be known as the National Threat
Identification and Prioritization Assessment.
 (2) NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STRATEGY- Subject to  [Struck out->][ subsection (f) ][<-Struck out]  subsection (e),
in consultation with appropriate department and agencies of the United
States Government, and private sector entities, and based on the most
current National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment
under paragraph (1), to produce on an annual basis a strategy for the
counterintelligence programs and activities of the United States
Government to be known as the National Counterintelligence Strategy.
* * * * * * *
  [Struck out->][ (f) ][<-Struck out]  (e)
Additional Requirements Regarding National Threat Identification and
Prioritization Assessment and National Counterintelligence Strategy-
(1) A National Threat Identification and Prioritization Assessment
under [Struck out->][ subsection (e)(1) ][<-Struck out]  subsection (d)(1), and any modification of such assessment, shall not go into effect until approved by the President.
 (2) A National Counterintelligence Strategy under  [Struck out->][ subsection (e)(2) ][<-Struck out]  subsection (d)(2), and any modification of such strategy, shall not go into effect until approved by the President.
* * * * * * *
  [Struck out->][ (g) ][<-Struck out]  (f) Personnel- (1) * * *
* * * * * * *
  [Struck out->][ (3) The
employment of personnel by the Office, including the appointment,
compensation and benefits, management, and separation of such
personnel, shall be governed by the provisions of law on such matters
with respect to the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency,
except that, for purposes of the applicability of such provisions of
law to personnel of the Office, the National Counterintelligence
Executive shall be treated as the head of the Office. ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (4) Positions in the Office shall be excepted service positions for purposes of title 5, United States Code. ][<-Struck out]
* * * * * * *
  [Struck out->][ (h) Support-
(1) The Attorney General, Secretary of Defense, and Director of
National Intelligence may each provide the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive such support as may be necessary to
permit the Office to carry out its functions under this section. ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (2) Subject to
any terms and conditions specified by the Director of National
Intelligence, the Director may provide administrative and contract
support to the Office as if the Office were an element of the Central
Intelligence Agency. ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (3) Support
provided under this subsection may be provided on a reimbursable or
nonreimbursable basis, at the election of the official providing such
support. ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (i) Availability
of Funds for Reimbursement- The National Counterintelligence Executive
may, from amounts available for the Office, transfer to a department or
agency detailing personnel under subsection (g), or providing support
under subsection (h), on a reimbursable basis amounts appropriate to
reimburse such department or agency for the detail of such personnel or
the provision of such support, as the case may be. ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (j) Contracts-
(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the National Counterintelligence
Executive may enter into any contract, lease, cooperative agreement, or
other transaction that the Executive considers appropriate to carry out
the functions of the Office of the National Counterintelligence
Executive under this section. ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (2) The
authority under paragraph (1) to enter into contracts, leases,
cooperative agreements, and other transactions shall be subject to any
terms, conditions, and limitations applicable to the Central
Intelligence Agency under law with respect to similar contracts,
leases, cooperative agreements, and other transactions. ][<-Struck out]
  [Struck out->][ (k) ][<-Struck out]  (g)
Treatment of Activities Under Certain Administrative Laws- The files of
the Office shall be treated as operational files of the Central
Intelligence Agency for purposes of section 701 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 431) to the extent such files meet
criteria under subsection (b) of that section for treatment of files as
operational files of an element of the Agency.
  [Struck out->][ (l) ][<-Struck out]  (h)
Oversight by Congress- The location of the Office of the National
Counterintelligence Executive within the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence shall not be construed as affecting access by
Congress, or any committee of Congress, to--
 (1) * * *
* * * * * * *
  [Struck out->][ (m) ][<-Struck out]  (i)
Construction- Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting
the authority of the Director of National Intelligence, the Secretary
of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, or the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation as provided or
specified under the National Security Act of 1947 or under other
provisions of law.
* * * * * * *
-
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949
* * * * * * *
GENERAL AUTHORITIES
 SEC. 5. (a) IN GENERAL- In the performance of its functions, the Central Intelligence Agency is authorized to--
 (1) Transfer to and receive from other Government
agencies such sums as may be approved by the Office of Management and
Budget, for the performance of any of the functions or activities
[Struck out->][ authorized under paragraphs
(2) and (3) of section 102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section
103, subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7),
(d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405) ][<-Struck out]  authorized under section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a),
and any other Government agency is authorized to transfer to or receive
from the Agency such sums without regard to any provisions of law
limiting or prohibiting transfers between appropriations. Sums
transferred to the Agency in accordance with this paragraph may be
expended for the purposes and under the authority of this Act without
regard to limitations of appropriations from which transferred;
* * * * * * *
SEC. 17. INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE AGENCY.
 (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (d) Semiannual Reports; Immediate Reports of Serious or
Flagrant Problems; Reports of Functional Problems; Reports to Congress
on Urgent Concerns- (1) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (3) In the event that--
 (A) * * *
 (B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried out
by the Inspector General should focus on any current or former Agency
official who--
 (i) * * *
 (ii) holds or held the position in the Agency, including such a position held on an acting basis, of--
 (I)  [Struck out->][ Executive Director ][<-Struck out]  Associate Deputy Director;
 (II)  [Struck out->][ Deputy Director for Operations ][<-Struck out]  Director of the National Clandestine Service;
 (III)  [Struck out->][ Deputy Director for Intelligence ][<-Struck out]  Director of Intelligence;
 (IV)  [Struck out->][ Deputy Director for Administration ][<-Struck out]  Director of Support; or
 (V)  [Struck out->][ Deputy Director for Science and Technology ][<-Struck out]  Director of Science and Technology;
* * * * * * *
-
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
* * * * * * *
SEC. 105. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY.
 (a) * * *
 (b) Construction of Authority- Nothing in section 311 of title 31, United States Code (as amended by subsection (a)), or in section 313 of such title, shall be construed to alter the authorities and responsibilities of the  [Struck out->][ Director of Central Intelligence ][<-Struck out]  Director of National Intelligence
with respect to the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the
Department of the Treasury as an element of the intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
-
SECTION 1403 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1991
 [Struck out->][ SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM ][<-Struck out]
SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
 (a) ANNUAL SUBMISSION OF MULTIYEAR NATIONAL  [Struck out->][ FOREIGN ][<-Struck out]  INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM- The Director of  [Struck out->][ Central Intelligence ][<-Struck out]  National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional committees specified in subsection (d) each year a multiyear national  [Struck out->][ foreign ][<-Struck
out] intelligence program plan reflecting the estimated expenditures
and proposed appropriations required to support that program. Any such
multiyear national [Struck out->][ foreign ][<-Struck
out] intelligence program plan shall cover the fiscal year with respect
to which the budget is submitted and at least four succeeding fiscal
years.
 (b) TIME OF SUBMISSION- The Director of National Intelligence
shall submit the report required by subsection (a) each year at or
about the same time that the budget is submitted to Congress pursuant
to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States Code.
 (c) CONSISTENCY WITH BUDGET ESTIMATES- The Director of  [Struck out->][ Central Intelligence ][<-Struck out]  National Intelligence
and the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the estimates referred
to in subsection (a) are consistent with the budget estimates submitted
to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31, United States
Code, for the fiscal year concerned and with the estimated expenditures
and proposed appropriations for the multiyear defense program submitted
pursuant to section 114a of title 10, United States Code.
* * * * * * *
-
NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
* * * * * * *
Subtitle A--Establishment of Director of National Intelligence
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1016. INFORMATION SHARING.
 (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (e) Implementation Plan Report- Not later than one year
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall, with
the assistance of the program manager, submit to Congress a report
containing an implementation plan for the ISE. The report shall include
the following:
 (1) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (10) A delineation of the roles of the Federal
departments and agencies that will participate in the ISE, including an
identification of the agencies that will deliver the infrastructure
needed to operate and manage the ISE (as distinct from individual
department or agency components that are part of the ISE), with such
delineation of roles to be consistent with--
 (A) * * *
 (B) the authority of the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Attorney General, and the role of the Department of
Homeland Security and the [Struck out->][ Attorney General ][<-Struck out]  Department of Justice, in coordinating with State, local, and tribal officials and the private sector.
* * * * * * *
Subtitle G--Conforming and Other Amendments
SEC. 1071. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO ROLES OF
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
 (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (e) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978-  [Struck out->][ (1) ][<-Struck
out] The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801
et seq.) is amended by striking `Director of Central Intelligence' each
place it appears and inserting `Director of National Intelligence'.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1072. OTHER CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.
 (a) * * *
 (b) Central Intelligence AGENCY ACT OF 1949- Section 6 of
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended
by striking `section 103(c)(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))' and inserting `section 102A(i) of the National
Security Act of 1947'.
* * * * * * *
-
INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SEC. 2001. IMPROVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
 (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (c) National Intelligence Workforce- (1) In developing
and maintaining a national intelligence workforce under subsection (b),
the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall, develop and
maintain a specialized and integrated national intelligence workforce
consisting of agents, analysts, linguists, and surveillance specialists
who are recruited, trained, and rewarded in a manner which ensures the
existence within the Federal Bureau of Investigation of an institutional culture with substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the intelligence mission of the Bureau.
* * * * * * *
 (e) Discharge of Improvements- (1) * * *
 (2) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
shall carry out subsections (b) through (d) under the joint guidance of
the Attorney General and [Struck out->][ the National Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with section 112(e) ][<-Struck out]  the Director of National Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable law.
 (f) Budget Matters- The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation  [Struck out->][ shall, ][<-Struck out]  shall
establish a budget structure of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to
reflect the four principal missions of the Bureau as follows:
 (1)  * * *
* * * * * * *
SEC. 2006. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION USE OF TRANSLATORS.
 Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and annually thereafter, the Attorney General of the United
States shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate and
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives a report
that contains, with respect to each preceding 12-month period--
 (1) * * *
 (2) any legal or practical impediments to using translators employed by  [Struck out->][ the Federal ][<-Struck out]  Federal, State, or local agencies on a full-time, part-time, or shared basis;
 (3) the needs of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for  [Struck out->][ the specific ][<-Struck out]  specific translation services in certain languages, and recommendations for meeting those needs;
* * * * * * *
-
CHAPTER 13 OF TITLE 44, UNITED STATES CODE
CHAPTER 13--PARTICULAR REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS

Sec.
1301. Agriculture, Department of: report of Secretary.
* * * * * * *
 [Struck out->][ 1336. National Imagery and Mapping Agency: special publications. ][<-Struck out] 
1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special publications.

* * * * * * *
Sec. 1336.  [Struck out->][ National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck out]  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special publications
 The Director of the  [Struck out->][ National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck out]  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
may authorize the printing of notices to mariners, light lists, sailing
directions, bulletins, and other special publications of the [Struck
out->][ National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck out]  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency in editions the interests of the Government and of the public may require.
* * * * * * *
-
HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
Subtitle A--Information and Analysis and Infrastructure Protection; Access to Information
SEC. 201. INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION.
 (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (f) Detail of Personnel-
 (1) * * *
 (2) COVERED AGENCIES- The agencies referred to in this paragraph are as follows:
 (A) * * *
* * * * * * *
 (E) The  [Struck out->][ National Imagery and Mapping Agency ][<-Struck out]  National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
* * * * * * *
MINORITY VIEWS
The annual Intelligence Authorization Act is one of the most
important bills that the House passes each year. It provides and
allocates resources to critical national security programs that are the
front lines of America's defense and foreign policies and, most
critically, work to detect, prevent, and disrupt potential terrorist
attacks on the American people. The bill also is essential to ensure
close and effective congressional oversight of the intelligence
community.
Although we have concerns with issues that we believe must
continue to be addressed and resolved as the legislative process
continues, we are encouraged that this bill avoids many of the
contentious items that have recently prevented the enactment of an
intelligence authorization bill and that it reflects areas of
bipartisan consensus on critical national security issues. We also
believe that the bill was significantly improved by seven Republican
amendments that were adopted on a bipartisan basis to address important
issues facing the intelligence community.
Our views follow with respect to a number of important issues.
We are pleased that many of them have been addressed in the bill, and
disappointed that others remain unresolved. We look forward to
continuing the Committee's efforts to move a bipartisan, consensus bill
to enactment.
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT MODERNIZATION
This bill is still missing the most significant and most critically
needed consensus legislation on intelligence currently pending before
Congress--the bipartisan compromise legislation to modernize the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that passed the Senate by a vote
of 68-29 and is supported by a majority of the House. With the
expiration of the Protect America Act on February 17, 2008, the
Intelligence Community lost critical authorities to react with speed
and agility to potential terrorist threats around the world. The
problem will soon be even further compounded when authority under
existing certifications expires.
It is irresponsible for the Democratic leadership of the House
to continue to abuse its power to block vital national security
legislation that the Senate passed on an overwhelming bipartisan basis,
that a majority of the House has indicated that it will support on a
bipartisan basis, and that the President has indicated that he will
sign. Congresswoman Heather Wilson offered an amendment to include this
vitally needed legislation in the bill. The amendment received
bipartisan support but was not adopted by a vote of 10-11.
The remarks of two Democratic members of the Committee during
the markup recognizing the importance of FISA modernization to our
national security and the urgency of completing action only reinforce
the consensus that this issue must be dealt with immediately. We will
continue to work with our colleagues on a bipartisan basis to enact the
compromise legislation passed by the Senate at the earliest
opportunity.
EARMARKS
Last year, the House adopted a motion by Ranking Republican Pete
Hoekstra to instruct House conferees on the Fiscal Year 2008
Intelligence Authorization to remove all earmarks from the bill by a
bipartisan vote of 249-160. Those instructions were nonetheless
disregarded by House conferees. This year, the Committee--by a
bipartisan vote of 17-4--adopted an amendment by Congressman Hoekstra
to remove all earmarks, including an earmark in the bill text for the
National Drug Intelligence Center.
As a number of incidents have illustrated in previous years up
to last year, our intelligence programs should be based on only one
primary consideration--what best ensures that the intelligence
community is able to do its job in the interest of the national
security of the United States. Our priority should be those programs
that the members of this Committee have collectively taken a careful
look at, debated, and determined where money should be spent with input
from the intelligence community--not member projects which all too
often can be directed to parochial interests or wasteful spending
rather than the national interest.
The Committee's bipartisan vote to remove earmarks from this
year's bill is an unprecedented step that we hope will set an example
for this Committee as well as other legislation moving forward.
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT AMENDMENTS
It is likely that there is no single current issue on which there is
a stronger bipartisan consensus than our shared deep concern that the
Administration is not fulfilling its statutory duty to keep each member
of the Committee fully and currently informed with respect to certain
intelligence matters. In the past year alone, Chairman Reyes and
Ranking Member Hoekstra jointly called on the President to brief the
Members of the Committee with respect to intelligence regarding the al
Kibar facility in Syria, which was subsequently disclosed to the public
on the same afternoon that Committee members were finally briefed,
several months later. With respect to another matter, the
Administration refuses to brief all Members of the Committee even
though it has briefed five members of the Committee staff. This follows
other incidents in which no member of the Committee was briefed in a
timely fashion, if at all, with respect to critical and sensitive
matters within the scope of the statutory duty to report. It is clear
that reforms are necessary.
Section 502 of the bill makes amendments to certain
congressional notification procedures of the National Security Act of
1947. It is the product of bipartisan discussion and agreement between
Chairman Reyes and Ranking Member Hoekstra and includes language
suggested by both. The provision expressly provides that information
briefed to the Committee reporting on activities other than covert
actions shall be made available to
each member of the Committee, unless the President requests in
writing that access to the information be limited and details
extraordinary circumstances justifying the request. In the event of
such a request to limit access, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the
Committee may jointly determine whether and how to limit access to the
material within the Committee. Absent such an agreement, access to the
information or material will be limited.
In our view, this provision does two critical things. First, it
sets forth a statutory presumption that information briefed to the
Committee should be made available to each member of the Committee
rather than restricted to the Chairman and Ranking Member. Second, it
provides a mechanism to permit exceptions when legitimate extraordinary
circumstances arise impacting national security. We believe that this
provision reflects a better balance than the current practice. It
respects the Constitutional duty of the President to protect national
security information by providing a mechanism to request that access to
the information be limited. It also respects the Constitutional
authority of the House to organize itself and to determine how to share
information within the Committee. Ultimately, these interests are
balanced and resolved by requiring a clear bipartisan consensus to
override any request by the President to limit access to information.
We are concerned that the new enhanced reporting requirements
provided for in paragraph (a) of Section 502 of the bill are too
prescriptive and burdensome and may not be practically workable. We
hope that these provisions can be perfected as the bill moves forward
in the legislative process. On the whole, however, this provision is a
significant step forward to strengthen congressional oversight of
intelligence activities in a manner consistent with the Constitution.
Additionally, the Committee adopted by a bipartisan vote of
17-4 an amendment by Congressman John McHugh clarifying that the
statutory duty to `fully and currently' inform the intelligence
committees with respect to intelligence information relating to North
Korea or China is not fulfilled if a Committee is briefed after the
information has been communicated to the governments of those
countries. We are extremely disappointed that this clarification is
necessary.
It should be emphasized that this amendment is not intended to
apply outside the scope of notifications understood to be required
under Section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, and is not
intended to preclude communicating information to the Governments of
North Korea or China in emergency or exigent circumstances.
NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE SYSTEMS
We are disappointed with certain provisions of the classified annex
with respect to national security space systems. National security
space systems have been and will continue to be a cornerstone of the
nation's intelligence collection capability. However, the current bill
lacks a sense of urgency with regard to making decisions on overhead
architecture and fails to address critical architectural shortfalls. It
does not adequately fund critical national security space systems and
is overly prescriptive in certain areas mandating technical solutions
without complete analysis. Despite these shortcomings, however, we
believe the bill authorizes a minimally acceptable level of funding for
these systems.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION MATTERS
The Intelligence Community continues to move forward with a number
of reform initiatives in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks on the United States. Perhaps none of these initiatives is more
important than the transformation of the intelligence elements of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation from a culture of law enforcement and
prosecution to one directed at detecting and preventing potential
terrorist attacks in the United States. While the FBI has a number of
initiatives in place underway with respect to its intelligence
components, we remain significantly concerned at the Bureau's failure
to communicate a high-level strategic vision for its transformation,
and that the process simply isn't moving fast enough to implement
fundamental change. In addition, the Committee remains
concerned--without determining responsibility--with respect to specific
instances where the working relationship between the Bureau, other
elements of the intelligence community, and state and local governments
has been strained. At the same time, however, the Committee's oversight
efforts have repeatedly suggested that the FBI is the most appropriate
federal agency to lead domestic counterterrorism and
counterintelligence matters, and that the Bureau should be given time
to make its reforms work before more radical alternatives are
considered.
The Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment by Congressman
Mike Rogers to require the Director of the FBI to submit a report to
the congressional intelligence committees describing his long term,
strategic, vision for transforming the intelligence capabilities of the
Bureau and the progress of the internal reforms intended to achieve
that vision. It is important to stress that this report is intended to
be a high-level strategic report in which the Director describes the
fundamental principles underlying his view of the transformation, the
desired FBI capabilities and doctrinal approach at the end of the
transformation, and the way to get there. The Committee has already
received numerous reports and briefings detailing specific
organizational changes and initiatives, but none have satisfactorily
communicated a comprehensive, cohesive strategic vision for the overall
transformation.
In addition, the Committee adopted, by a unanimous vote of
21-0, an amendment by Congressman Rogers to prohibit any funds
authorized in the bill from being used to implement the mandatory
reassignment of a supervisor of the Bureau after five years of service
in a management position, commonly known as the `five and out' policy.
We believe that this policy has hampered optimum counterterrorism
capability, just as similar mandatory reassignment and rotation
policies have adversely impacted other elements of the Intelligence
Community. A substantial portion of FBI funding is authorized in this
bill. We believe this personnel policy is counterproductive and unwise
and do not support authorizing funds to further implement it.
SIZE OF THE OFFICE OF DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
The Committee shares a bipartisan consensus that the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, just three years old, has already
grown in size and scope well beyond the intentions of the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act that created it. By voice vote, the
Committee adopted an amendment to the classified Schedule of
Authorizations by Congressman Mike Rogers to stop further growth and
limit the size of the ODNI. In particular, we are dismayed at efforts
by the ODNI to justify further growth by attempting to omit personnel
from the National Counterterrorism Center from its personnel count,
despite the express statutory provision that the NCTC is part of the
ODNI.
The Committee on a bipartisan basis had made clear that it
views the ODNI as a coordinator, not a doer of functions. Our effort is
about making ODNI an effective coordinator, not another layer of
bureaucracy that stifles the speed, agility and creativity necessary in
today's intelligence environment. During the Committee's oversight
efforts, intelligence community personnel have indicated that they are
spending increasing amounts of time responding to taskings and requests
from the ODNI bureaucracy with little apparent benefit. Rather than
attempt to rationalize further bureaucratic growth, we hope that the
ODNI will carefully revisit how to accomplish its core coordinating
goals within the authorized personnel strength.
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
As we have emphasized repeatedly in the past, the problem of
unauthorized disclosure remains a grave one. Such disclosures harm
national security, place American citizens and intelligence community
personnel at increased risk, and inevitably result in substantial
consequences to the United States--both tangible and intangible. We are
disappointed that the Committee has held no hearings and conducted
little to no substantial oversight on this issue during this Congress.
In addition, we are concerned that the issue is becoming increasingly
politicized, sometimes under the false premise that there are `good
leaks' and `bad leaks'. The Committee should take a firm and clear
position that no unauthorized disclosures of classified information should be tolerated.
Oversight efforts during the previous Congress clearly
established that prosecution under current laws relating to
unauthorized disclosure has not been an effective deterrent tool. The
Committee adopted by voice vote an amendment offered by Congressman Mac
Thornberry that requires the DNI to review whether current law or
administrative authorities enable the revocation of pensions of
intelligence community personnel who commit unauthorized disclosures of
classified information. This provision is identical to one included by
the House in the Fiscal Year 2007 Intelligence Authorization Act. We
hope that it will be enacted and that the DNI will carefully review
this matter and other options in an effort to provide a more effective
deterrent to unauthorized disclosures of classified information.
INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
We have significant concerns with Section 408 of the bill, which
would create a new Inspector General of the Intelligence Community.
While we do not oppose either enhanced oversight of the Intelligence
Community or a capability to review cross-cutting issues within the
Intelligence Community, we are concerned that this provision--which is
almost a quarter of the entire bill--duplicates efforts of Department
and Agency inspectors general, is unnecessarily complex and unwieldy,
and threatens to further grow the size and bureaucracy of the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence. Committee Republicans offered an
amendment to strike this provision, which failed by a voice vote. We
hope to work with our colleagues toward a more limited and rational
resolution of this issue.
JIHADISTS
Over the last few months, the National Counterterrorism Center, the
State Department, and the Department of Homeland Security issued memos
instructing their employees to not use several terms related to Islam
and radical Jihadism, including `jihadist,' `jihad,' `Mujahadeen,'
`caliphate,' `Islamist,' `Islamo-fascist,' and `Wahhabi.' These memos
also recommend using the term `mainstream Muslims' instead of `moderate
Muslims.' This new policy reportedly reflected advice from unnamed
American Muslim leaders on avoiding rhetoric that could offend Muslim
audiences or bolster the cause of radical Jihadist groups like al
Qaeda.
During Committee consideration of the bill, Ranking Member
Hoekstra offered an amendment to prohibit the use of any funds
authorized by the bill from being used to prohibit or discourage the
use of those terms. The amendment should not have been controversial,
yet it was defeated by a party-line vote. We do not believe that free
speech should be controversial, nor should candid, accurate, and fair
discussion of the self-professed nature and goals of enemies who have
attacked the United States, sworn to kill more Americans, and regularly
seek to violently stifle the slightest criticism of their activities
and intentions. It is more than ironic that some who have complained
about alleged politicization of the Intelligence Community opposed this
amendment, which simply would have ensured free speech and open,
objective analysis, and it is unfortunate that they refuse to
acknowledge the nature of the threats posed by our enemies.
It is important to emphasize that we do not support any form of
religious discrimination, bigotry, or hatred, or U.S. officials making
statements that insult Muslims or any other religious or ethnic group.
However, this new `speech code' is in line with other efforts by U.S.
Muslim leaders sympathetic to radical Jihadist groups like Hamas and
Hezbollah to stifle open debate about radical Islam by banning
important terms that describe their efforts. For example, since
Hizballah, Hamas, and al Qaeda routinely describe their terrorist
activities as a `Jihad' against the West, one cannot sensibly discuss
their activities without using this word. Similarly, Osama bin Ladin
claims his terrorist efforts are intended to recreate a `caliphate,' in
an area stretching from Morocco
to Indonesia that was under Muslim rule in medieval times. It
is impossible to have an honest discussion of bin Laden's philosophy
without using the word caliphate.
We hope that common sense and free speech will prevail with
respect to this issue, and will continue to pursue solutions through
close and continuing oversight efforts.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON IRAN
Recent revelations with respect to the al Kibar facility in Syria
have suggested the need for close and careful reassessment of previous
intelligence and assessments with respect to other nations. Ranking
Member Hoekstra offered an amendment to require a revised and updated
National Intelligence Estimate with regard to the Iranian nuclear
program, which would have specifically required a reassessment of prior
estimates in light of the experience with al Kibar, as well as a review
of how that incident affects the confidence level of the Director of
National Intelligence in current assessments of the Iran nuclear
program. The amendment failed by voice vote.
We continue to believe, however, that the November 2007
National Intelligence Estimate on Iran was so poorly drafted and so
seriously undermined by subsequent developments and
intelligence--especially the Syrian nuclear facility--that it is
necessary for the DNI to go back to the drawing board and start over.
We will continue to monitor this issue closely and seek the necessary
review and reassessment through the oversight process.
DIVERSION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY RESOURCES TO STUDY GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE
The Committee adopted by voice vote a Republican amendment making
clear the sense of Congress that resources should not be diverted from
human intelligence collection and other intelligence programs designed
to combat al Qaeda in order to study global climate change. Despite the
existence of numerous more appropriate government programs and
initiatives to study this issue, pressure to use intelligence resources
in inappropriate and nonproductive ways relative to global climate
change continues. This provision makes clear that intelligence
resources should not be diverted from al Qaeda for this purpose.
LIMITATION ON INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES
The Committee defeated--by a bipartisan vote of 9-12--an amendment
that would have limited all elements of the intelligence community to
the interrogation techniques authorized by the United States Army Field
Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations. We think it is
important to highlight this vote by the Committee. Despite vigorous
debate and comment by other Members of Congress and the public at large
(often based on inaccurate information or supposition) we want to
reiterate our strong view that the congressional intelligence
committees continue to be in the best position to review this issue.
The Committee's bipartisan vote emphasizes some critical
points. First, the United States does not torture, and the intelligence
community conducts itself in accordance with the law, including the
treaty obligations of the United States. The Committee has been briefed
on the interrogation techniques currently being used by the
Intelligence Community, and has conducted intensive oversight of both
the underlying policy and its application. Second, it is critical not
to provide al Qaeda or other potential adversaries with an enumeration
and explanation of those techniques. To do so would severely undermine
the capabilities of the Intelligence Community to collect information,
sometimes in critical circumstances, and accordingly the security of
the United States.
While we fully recognize the importance of the underlying
issues, we believe the better solution for the substantially more
limited programs of the intelligence community is continued close and
careful oversight, as provided for in the amendment adopted by the
Committee on a bipartisan basis to prohibit the use of contractors in
interrogations by the intelligence community, and several provisions of
the classified annex to the bill.

Peter Hoekstra.

Terry Everett.

Elton Gallegly.

Mac Thornberry.

John M. McHugh.

Todd Tiahrt.

Mike Rogers.

Darrell Issa.