[Congressional Record: March 10, 2008 (House)]
[Page H1419-H1420]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008--VETO MESSAGE FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES (H. DOC. NO. 110-100)
The SPEAKER pro tempore laid before the House the following veto
message from the President of the United States:
To the House of Representatives:
I am returning herewith without my approval H.R. 2082, the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008.'' The bill would
impede the United States Government's efforts to protect the American
people effectively from terrorist attacks and other threats because it
imposes several unnecessary
[[Page H1420]]
and unacceptable burdens on our Intelligence Community.
Section 444 of the bill would impose additional Senate confirmation
requirements on two national security positions--the Director of the
National Security Agency and the Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States (9/11 Commission) observed that the
effectiveness of the Intelligence Community suffers due to delays in
the confirmation process; section 444 would only aggravate those
serious problems. Senior intelligence officials need to assume their
duties and responsibilities as quickly as possible to address the
pressing requirements of national security. Instead of addressing the
9/11 Commission's concern, the bill would subject two additional vital
positions to a more protracted process of Senate confirmation. Apart
from causing such potentially harmful delays, this unwarranted
requirement for Senate confirmation would also risk injecting political
pressure into these positions of technical expertise and public trust.
Section 413 would create a new Inspector General for the Intelligence
Community. This new office is duplicative and unnecessary. Each
intelligence community component already has an Inspector General, and
the Inspector General of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence has been vested with all the legal powers of any inspector
general to carry out investigations on matters under the jurisdiction
of the Director of National Intelligence. There is no reason to commit
taxpayer resources to an additional inspector general with competing
jurisdiction over the same intelligence elements. Creating duplicative
inspectors general, who may have inconsistent views on the handling of
particular matters, has the potential to create conflicts and impede
the Intelligence Community from efficiently resolving issues and
carrying out its core mission. In addition, the creation of a new
inspector general would add yet another position in the Intelligence
Community subject to Senate confirmation, contrary to the 9/11
Commission's recommendations.
Section 327 of the bill would harm our national security by requiring
any element of the Intelligence Community to use only the interrogation
methods authorized in the Army Field Manual on Interrogations. It is
vitally important that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) be allowed
to maintain a separate and classified interrogation program. The Army
Field Manual is directed at guiding the actions of nearly three million
active duty and reserve military personnel in connection with the
detention of lawful combatants during the course of traditional armed
conflicts, but terrorists often are trained specifically to resist
techniques prescribed in publicly available military regulations such
as the Manual. The CIA's ability to conduct a separate and specialized
interrogation program for terrorists who possess the most critical
information in the War on Terror has helped the United States prevent a
number of attacks, including plots to fly passenger airplanes into the
Library Tower in Los Angeles and into Heathrow Airport or buildings in
downtown London. While details of the current CIA program are
classified, the Attorney General has reviewed it and determined that it
is lawful under existing domestic and international law,
including Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. I remain
committed to an intelligence-gathering program that complies with our
legal obligations and our basic values as a people. The United States
opposes torture, and I remain committed to following international and
domestic law regarding the humane treatment of people in its custody,
including the ``Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.''
My disagreement over section 327 is not over any particular
interrogation technique; for instance, it is not over waterboarding,
which is not part of the current CIA program. Rather, my concern is the
need to maintain a separate CIA program that will shield from
disclosure to al Qaeda and other terrorists the interrogation
techniques they may face upon capture. In accordance with a clear
purpose of the ``Military Commissions Act of 2006,'' my veto is
intended to allow the continuation of a separate and classified CIA
interrogation program that the Department of Justice has determined is
lawful and that operates according to rules distinct from the more
general rules applicable to the Department of Defense. While I will
continue to work with the Congress on the implementation of laws passed
in this area in recent years, I cannot sign into law a bill that would
prevent me, and future Presidents, from authorizing the CIA to conduct
a separate, lawful intelligence program, and from taking all lawful
actions necessary to protect Americans from attack.
Other provisions of the bill purport to require the executive branch
to submit information to the Congress that may be constitutionally
protected from disclosure, including information the disclosure of
which could impair foreign relations, the national security, the
deliberative processes of the Executive, or the performance of the
Executive's constitutional duties. Section 326, for example, would
require that the executive branch report, on a very short deadline and
in accordance with a rigid set of specific statutory requirements, the
details of highly classified interrogation techniques and the
confidential legal advice concerning them. The executive branch
voluntarily has provided much of this information to appropriate
Members of Congress, demonstrating that questions concerning access to
such information are best addressed through the customary practices and
arrangements between the executive and legislative branches on such
matters, rather than through the enactment of legislation.
In addition, section 406 would require a consolidated inventory of
Special Access Programs (SAPs) to be submitted to the Congress. Special
Access Programs concern the most sensitive information maintained by
the Government, and SAP materials are maintained separately precisely
to avoid the existence of one document that can serve as a roadmap to
our Nation's most vital information. The executive branch must be
permitted to present this information in a manner that does not
jeopardize national security. The executive branch will continue to
keep the Congress appropriately informed of the matters to which the
provisions relate in accordance with the accommodation principles the
Constitution contemplates and the executive and legislative branches
have long and successfully used to address information sharing on
matters of national security.
George W. Bush.
The White House, March 8, 2008.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The objections of the President will be
spread at large upon the Journal, and the veto message and the bill
will be printed as a House document.
Mr. LOEBSACK. Madam Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that further
consideration of the veto message and the bill be postponed until
Tuesday, March 11, 2008.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Iowa?
There was no objection.
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