110th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session 110-131
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INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008
_______
May 7, 2007.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Reyes, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 2082]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 2082) to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2008 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Incorporation of reporting requirements.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 202. Technical amendment to mandatory retirement provision.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Clarification of definition of intelligence community under
the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 304. Extension to the intelligence community of authority to
delete information about receipt and disposition of foreign gifts.
Sec. 305. Modification of requirements for reprogramming of funds for
intelligence activities.
Sec. 306. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for
intelligence collection personnel.
Sec. 307. Report on proposed pay for performance intelligence community
personnel management system.
Sec. 308. Plan to increase diversity in the intelligence community.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 401. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the
Transportation Security Oversight Board.
Sec. 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology
of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 404. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials.
Sec. 405. Eligibility for incentive awards of personnel assigned to the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 406. Multi-level security clearances.
Sec. 407. National intelligence estimate on global climate change.
Sec. 408. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center
efficiency reports.
Sec. 409. Comprehensive inventory of special access programs.
Sec. 410. Quarterly intelligence reports to Congress on Iran and North
Korea.
Sec. 411. Accountability in intelligence contracting.
Sec. 412. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the
intelligence community.
Sec. 413. Intelligence community reports on foreign language
proficiency.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Sec. 421. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 422. General authorities of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 423. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 424. Report on audited financial statements progress.
Subtitle C--Other Elements
Sec. 431. Clarifying amendments relating to Section 105 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
Sec. 432. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the
National Counterintelligence Executive.
Sec. 433. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug
Enforcement Administration elements in the intelligence community.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters
Sec. 501. Aerial reconnaissance platforms.
Sec. 502. Extension of National Commission for Review of Research and
Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community.
Subtitle B--Technical Amendments
Sec. 511. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National
Intelligence Program.
Sec. 512. Technical clarification of certain references to Joint
Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities.
Sec. 513. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 514. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004.
Sec. 515. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule.
Sec. 516. Technical amendments relating to titles of Central
Intelligence Agency positions.
Sec. 517. Technical amendments relating to redesignation of the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
(A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of
the House of Representatives; and
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the
Senate.
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2008
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts
authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized
personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2008, for the conduct of the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed
in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 2082 of the One
Hundred Tenth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on
Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the
President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the
executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess
of the number authorized for fiscal year 2008 under section 102 when
the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions,
except that the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of civilian
personnel authorized under such section for such element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall promptly notify the congressional intelligence
committees whenever the Director exercises the authority granted by
this section.
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the
Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2008 the sum of
$737,876,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced
research and development shall remain available until September 30,
2009.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National
Intelligence are authorized 1035 full-time personnel as of September
30, 2008. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees
of the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed
from other elements of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts
authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account for fiscal year 2008 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred
to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced
research and development shall remain available until September
30, 2009.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel
authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence
Community Management Account as of September 30, 2008, there
are also authorized such additional personnel for such elements
as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2008 any
officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed
Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community
Management Account from another element of the United States Government
shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such
officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis
for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary
functions as required by the Director of National Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be appropriated
in subsection (a), $39,000,000 shall be available for the
National Drug Intelligence Center. Within such amount, funds
provided for research, development, testing, and evaluation
purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2009, and
funds provided for procurement purposes shall remain available
until September 30, 2010.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall transfer to the Attorney General funds available for the
National Drug Intelligence Center under paragraph (1). The
Attorney General shall utilize funds so transferred for the
activities of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center may not be used for purposes of exercising
police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal
security functions.
(4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the
operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
SEC. 105. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional intelligence
committees that is included in the joint explanatory statement to
accompany the conference report on the bill H.R. 2082 of the One
Hundred Tenth Congress, or in the classified annex to this Act, is
hereby incorporated into this Act, and is hereby made a requirement in
law.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2008 the sum of
$262,500,000.
SEC. 202. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT PROVISION.
Section 235(b)(1)(A) of the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement
Act (50 U.S.C. 2055(b)(1)(A)) is amended to read as follows:
``(A) upon reaching age 65, in the case of a
participant in the system serving in a position with a
Senior Intelligence Service rank of level 4 or
above;''.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement,
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of
the United States.
SEC. 303. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY UNDER
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.
Subparagraph (L) of section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended by striking ``other'' the second place
it appears.
SEC. 304. EXTENSION TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF AUTHORITY TO
DELETE INFORMATION ABOUT RECEIPT AND DISPOSITION OF
FOREIGN GIFTS.
Section 7342(f)(4) of title 5, United States Code, is amended to read
as follows:
``(4) In transmitting such listings for an element of the
intelligence community (as such term is defined in section 3(4) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))), the head of such
element of the intelligence community may delete the information
described in subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the
head of such element of the intelligence community certifies in writing
to the Secretary of State that the publication of such information
could adversely affect United States intelligence sources or
methods.''.
SEC. 305. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR REPROGRAMMING OF FUNDS FOR
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
Section 504(a)(3)(B) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
414(a)(3)(B)) is amended to read as follows:
``(B) the activity to be funded supports an emergent
need, improves program effectiveness, or increases
efficiency; and''.
SEC. 306. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR TRAVEL ON COMMON CARRIERS FOR
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL.
(a) Delegation of Authority.--Section 116(b) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The Director'';
(2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``may only delegate'' and
all that follows and inserting ``may delegate the authority in
subsection (a) to the head of any other element of the
intelligence community.''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community to whom
the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant to paragraph (1)
may further delegate such authority to such senior officials of such
element as are specified in guidelines prescribed by the Director of
National Intelligence for purposes of this paragraph.''.
(b) Submission of Guidelines to Congress.--Not later than six months
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall prescribe and submit to the congressional
intelligence committees the guidelines referred to in paragraph (2) of
section 116(b) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by
subsection (a).
SEC. 307. REPORT ON PROPOSED PAY FOR PERFORMANCE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.
(a) Prohibition on Pay for Performance Until Report.--The Director of
National Intelligence and the head of each element of the intelligence
community may not implement a plan that provides compensation to
personnel of an element of the intelligence community based on
performance until the date that is 45 days after the date on which the
Director of National Intelligence submits a report under subsection
(b).
(b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence shall submit to
the congressional intelligence committees a report on performance-based
compensation for the intelligence community, including--
(1) an implementation time line, by phase and by element of
the intelligence community, which includes target dates for
completion of--
(A) the development of performance appraisal plans;
(B) establishment of oversight and appeal mechanisms;
(C) deployment of information technology systems;
(D) management training;
(E) employee training;
(F) compensation transition; and
(G) full operational capacity;
(2) an estimated budget, by phase of implementation and
element of the intelligence community, for the implementation
of the performance-based compensation system;
(3) an evaluation plan to monitor the implementation of the
performance-based compensation system and to improve and modify
such system;
(4) written standards for measuring the performance of
employees;
(5) a description of the performance-based compensation
system, including budget oversight mechanisms to ensure
sufficient funds to pay employees for bonuses;
(6) a description of internal and external accountability
mechanisms to ensure the fair treatment of employees;
(7) a plan for initial and ongoing training for senior
executives, managers, and employees;
(8) a description of the role of any advisory committee or
other mechanism designed to gather the input of employees
relating to the creation and implementation of the system; and
(9) an assessment of the impact of the performance-based
compensation system on women, minorities, persons with
disabilities, and veterans.
SEC. 308. PLAN TO INCREASE DIVERSITY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Strategic Plan Required.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a plan to
increase diversity across the intelligence community. Such plan shall
include--
(1) a description of the long term and short term goals for
the intelligence community;
(2) a description of how the plan will be implemented by each
element of the intelligence community, taking into account the
unique nature of individual elements of the intelligence
community;
(3) training and education programs for senior officials and
managers; and
(4) performance metrics.
(b) Restriction on Community Management Funds Until Submission of
Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence may only obligate or
expend 80 percent of the funds appropriated to the Intelligence
Community Management Account pursuant to section 104(a) until the date
on which the report required under subsection (a) is submitted.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON CO-LOCATION OF THE OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-
3(e)) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``With'' and inserting ``of
Headquarters With Headquarters of'' ;
(2) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``the
Office''; and
(3) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``any other
element''.
SEC. 402. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD.
Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United States
Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the
Director's designee.''.
SEC. 403. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Coordination and Prioritization of Research Conducted by Elements
of Intelligence Community.--Subsection (d) of section 103E of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3e) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (3)(A), by inserting ``and prioritize''
after ``coordinate''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall identify
basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be executed by
elements of the intelligence community.''.
(b) Development of Technology Goals.--Such section is further
amended--
(1) in subsection (c)--
(A) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6);
and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following
new paragraph:
``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the
elements of the intelligence community to meet the technology
needs of the intelligence community; and''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(e) Goals for Technology Needs of Intelligence Community.--In
carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director of Science and Technology
shall--
``(1) systematically identify and assess the most significant
intelligence challenges that require technical solutions;
``(2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of
research programs; and
``(3) ensure that programs are designed to meet the technical
requirements of the intelligence community.''.
(c) Report.--(1) Not later than June 30, 2008, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report containing a
strategy for the development and use of technology in the intelligence
community through 2018.
(2) The report shall include--
(A) an assessment of the highest priority intelligence gaps
across the intelligence community that may be resolved by the
use of technology;
(B) goals for basic, advanced, and applied research and
development and a strategy to achieve such goals;
(C) an explanation of how each advanced research and
development project funded under the National Intelligence
Program addresses an identified intelligence gap;
(D) a list of all current and projected research and
development projects by research type (basic, advanced, or
applied) with estimated funding levels, estimated initiation
dates, and estimated completion dates; and
(E) a plan to transition technology from research and
development projects into National Intelligence Program
acquisition programs.
(3) The report may be submitted in classified form.
SEC. 404. LEADERSHIP AND LOCATION OF CERTAIN OFFICES AND OFFICIALS.
(a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Establishment.--Not later than 18 months
after the date of the enactment of the National Security
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting ``(1)
Establishment.--The''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter Proliferation
Center shall be the Director of the National Counter Proliferation
Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of National
Intelligence.
``(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center shall be
located within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.''.
(b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)) is
amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (13); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new
paragraphs:
``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the intelligence
community.
``(10) The Inspector General of the intelligence community.
``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.
``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation
Center.''.
SEC. 405. ELIGIBILITY FOR INCENTIVE AWARDS OF PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO THE
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 402 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 (50 U.S.C. 403e-1) is amended to
read as follows:
``(a) Authority for Payment of Awards.--(1) The Director of National
Intelligence may exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of
title 5, United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and
members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence in the same manner as such authority
may be exercised with respect to personnel of the Office.
``(2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may exercise
the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5, United States Code,
with respect to Federal employees and members of the Armed Forces
detailed or assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency in the same
manner as such authority may be exercised with respect to personnel of
the Agency.''.
(b) Repeal of Obsolete Authority.--Such section is further amended--
(1) by striking subsection (c); and
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).
(c) Conforming Amendments.--Such section is further amended--
(1) in subsection (b), by striking ``to the Central
Intelligence Agency or to the Intelligence Community Staff''
and inserting ``to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence or to the Central Intelligence Agency''; and
(2) in subsection (c), as redesignated by subsection (b)(2)
of this section, by striking ``Director of Central
Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence or Director of the Central Intelligence Agency''.
(d) Technical and Stylistic Amendments.--That section is further
amended--
(1) in subsection (b)--
(A) by inserting ``Personnel Eligible for Awards.--''
after ``(b)'';
(B) by striking ``subsection (a) of this section''
and inserting ``subsection (a)''; and
(C) by striking ``a date five years before the date
of enactment of this section'' and inserting ``December
9, 1978''; and
(2) in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by inserting
``Payment and Acceptance of Awards.--'' after ``(c)''.
SEC. 406. MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY CLEARANCES.
(a) In General.--Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
``(s) Multi-Level Security Clearances.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall establish a multi-level security clearance system
for the intelligence community to enable the intelligence community to
more efficiently make use of persons proficient in foreign languages or
with cultural, linguistic, or other subject matter expertise that is
critical to national security.''.
(b) Establishment Date.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
establish a multi-level security clearance system under section 102A(s)
of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a), not
later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 407. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE.
(a) National Intelligence Estimate.--Not later than 270 days after
the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to Congress a national intelligence estimate
on the anticipated geopolitical effects of global climate change and
the implications of such effects on the national security of the United
States.
(b) Content.--In preparing the national intelligence estimate
required by this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall--
(1) assess the political, social, agricultural, and economic
risks during the 30-year period beginning on the date of
enactment of this Act posed by global climate change for
countries or regions that are--
(A) of strategic national security importance to the
United States and at risk of significant impact due to
global climate change; or
(B) at significant risk of large-scale humanitarian
suffering with cross-border implications as predicted
on the basis of the assessments;
(2) assess the capabilities of the countries or regions
described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) to
respond to adverse national security impacts caused by global
climate change;
(3) assess the strategic challenges and opportunities posed
to the United States by the risks described in paragraph (1);
and
(4) assess the impact of global climate change on the
activities of the United States intelligence community
throughout the world.
(c) Coordination.--In preparing the national intelligence estimate
under this section, the Director of National Intelligence shall consult
with representatives of the scientific community, and, as appropriate,
multilateral institutions and allies of the United States that have
conducted significant research on global climate change.
(d) Form.--The national intelligence estimate required by this
section (including key judgments) shall be submitted in unclassified
form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 408. PLAN TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DATA CENTER
EFFICIENCY REPORTS.
(a) Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence shall develop a plan
to implement the recommendations of the report submitted to Congress
under section 1 of the Act entitled ``An Act to study and promote the
use of energy efficient computer servers in the United States'' (Public
Law 109-431; 120 Stat. 2920) across the intelligence community.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later then February 1, 2008, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a
report containing the plan developed under subsection (a).
(2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
SEC. 409. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORY OF SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS.
Not later than January 15, 2008, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees
a classified report providing a comprehensive inventory of all special
access programs under the National Intelligence Program (as defined in
section 3(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(6))).
SEC. 410. QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON IRAN AND NORTH
KOREA.
(a) In General.--
(1) Report.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``quarterly intelligence reports to congress on iran and north korea
``Sec. 508. (a) Report.--
``(1) In general.--On a quarterly basis, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the current intentions and
capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) with regard to the
nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea, respectively,
including--
``(A) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs;
``(B) an evaluation, consistent with existing
reporting standards and practices, of the sources upon
which the intelligence is based, including the number
of sources and the reliability of each source;
``(C) a summary of any new intelligence gathered or
developed since the previous report, including
intelligence collected from both open and clandestine
sources; and
``(D) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in
knowledge, or other information that would reduce
confidence in the overall assessment.
``(2) Form.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) may be
submitted in classified form.
``(b) Access to Report.--Each report submitted under subsection
(a)(1) shall be made available to all members of the congressional
intelligence committees and to all staff of the congressional
intelligence committees with appropriate security clearance. Other
members of the Senate or the House of Representatives may review the
reports in accordance with security procedures established by each of
the congressional intelligence committees.''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of such Act is amended by inserting after the item
relating to section 507 the following new item:
``Sec. 508. Quarterly intelligence reports to Congress on Iran and
North Korea.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The first report required to be submitted under
section 508(a)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by
subsection (a)(1), shall be submitted not later than 30 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 411. ACCOUNTABILITY IN INTELLIGENCE CONTRACTING.
(a) Oversight Report on IC Contractors.--
(1) Report.--
(A) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is further amended by
adding at the end the following new section:
``report on intelligence community contractors
``Sec. 509. Not later each year than the date provided in section
507, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on contractors funded
under the National Intelligence Program. Such report shall include--
``(1) a list of all contractors that--
``(A) have been the subject of an investigation
completed by the Inspector General of any element of
the intelligence community during the preceding fiscal
year,
``(B) are the subject of an investigation by such an
Inspector General during the current fiscal year, or
``(C) will be the subject of an investigation that
may affect the ability of the contractor to deliver
contracted services to the intelligence community by
such an Inspector General during the current fiscal
year,
either as a corporate entity or an individual employee, for
financial waste, fraud, abuse of government resources, failure
to perform a contract, or criminal violations; and
``(2) the number of contractors performing services for each
element of the intelligence community.''.
(B) Report date.--Section 507(a)(1) of such Act (50
U.S.C. 415b(a)(1)) is amended by--
(i) redesignating subparagraph (N) as
subparagraph (J);
(ii) adding at the end the following new
subparagraph:
``(K) The annual report on intelligence community contractors
required by section 509.''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of such Act is further amended by inserting after the
item relating to section 508, as added by section 410, the
following new item:
``Sec. 509. Report on intelligence community contractors''.
(b) Report on Regulations and Accountability Mechanisms Governing
Intelligence Community Contractors.--
(1) Report requirement.--Not later than February 1, 2008, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on
accountability mechanisms that govern the ongoing performance
of contractors for personal services contracts under the
National Intelligence Program.
(2) Matters covered.--The report submitted under paragraph
(1) shall include--
(A) a list of statutes and regulations that govern
the ongoing performance of contractors for services
contracts entered into by each element of the
intelligence community;
(B) an analysis of accountability mechanisms within
services contracts awarded for intelligence activities
by each element of the intelligence community during
fiscal years 2006 and 2007;
(C) an analysis of procedures in use in the
intelligence community for conducting oversight of
contractors to ensure identification and prosecution of
criminal violations, financial waste, fraud, or other
abuses committed by contractors or contract personnel;
and
(D) an identification of best practices of
accountability mechanisms within services contracts.
(3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted
in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.
(c) Impact of Contractors on the Intelligence Community Workforce.--
(1) Report requirement.--Not later than March 1, 2008, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the impact of
contractors on the intelligence community workforce under the
National Intelligence Program.
(2) Matters covered.--The report submitted under paragraph
(1) shall include--
(A) an identification of contracts where the
contractor is providing a substantially similar
functions to a government employee;
(B) a comparison of the compensation of contract
employees and government employees performing
substantially similar functions;
(C) an analysis of the attrition of government
personnel for contractor positions that provide
substantially similar functions; and
(D) an estimate of the value of the infrastructure
provided to contract employees for government furnished
equipment, facilities, or other support, by agency and
expenditure center.
SEC. 412. ANNUAL REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Report.--
(1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is further amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
``report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence community
``Sec. 510. Not later each year than the date provided in section
507, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the foreign language
proficiency of each element of the intelligence community, including--
``(1) the number of positions authorized for such element
that require foreign language proficiency and the level of
proficiency required;
``(2) the number of positions authorized for such element
that require foreign language proficiency that are filled by--
``(A) military personnel; and
``(B) civilian personnel;
``(3) the number of applicants for positions in such element
in the previous fiscal year that indicated foreign language
proficiency, including the foreign language indicated and the
proficiency level;
``(4) the number of persons hired by such element with
foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language
and proficiency level;
``(5) the number of personnel of such element currently
attending foreign language training, including the provider of
such training;
``(6) a description of such element's efforts to recruit,
hire, train, and retain personnel that are proficient in a
foreign language; and
``(7) an assessment of methods and models for basic,
advanced, and intensive foreign language training.''.
(2) Report date.--Section 507(a)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C.
415b(a)(1)) is further amended by adding at the end the
following new subparagraph:
``(L) The annual report on foreign language proficiency in
the intelligence community required by section 510.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section
of such Act is further amended by inserting after the item relating to
section 509, as added by section 411, the following new item:
``Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence
community.''.
SEC. 413. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE
PROFICIENCY.
(a) Annual Reports.--
(1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``annual reports on foreign language proficiency
``Sec. 120. (a) In General.--The head of each element of the
intelligence community shall annually submit to the Director of
National Intelligence a report on the foreign language proficiency of
the personnel of such element.
``(b) Contents.--
``(1) In general.--Each report submitted under subsection (a)
shall include, for each foreign language and, where
appropriate, dialect of a foreign language--
``(A) the number of positions of such element that
require proficiency in the foreign language or dialect;
``(B) the number of personnel of such element that
are serving in a position that--
``(i) requires proficiency in the foreign
language or dialect to perform the primary duty
of the position; and
``(ii) does not require proficiency in the
foreign language or dialect to perform the
primary duty of the position;
``(C) the number of personnel that are proficient in
the foreign language or dialect that--
``(i) are authorized for the element of the
intelligence community for which the report is
submitted; and
``(ii) the head of such element considers
necessary for such element for each of the five
years following the date of the submission of
the report;
``(D) the number of personnel of such element rated
at each level of proficiency of the Interagency
Language Roundtable;
``(E) whether the number of personnel at each level
of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable
meets the requirements of such element;
``(F) the number of personnel serving or hired to
serve as linguists for such element that are not
qualified as linguists under the standards of the
Interagency Language Roundtable;
``(G) the number of personnel hired to serve as
linguists for such element during the preceding
calendar year;
``(H) the number of personnel serving as linguists
that discontinued serving such element during the
preceding calendar year;
``(I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic
skills that is fulfilled by an ally of the United
States;
``(J) the percentage of work requiring linguistic
skills that is fulfilled by contractors; and
``(K) the percentage of work requiring linguistic
skills that is fulfilled by members of the Armed
Forces.
``(2) Military personnel.--Except as provided in paragraph
(1)(K), a report submitted under subsection (a) shall not
include personnel that are members of the Armed Forces on
active duty assigned to the element for which the report is
submitted.
``(c) DNI Report to Congress.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall annually submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of
the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence
and the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of
the Senate a report containing--
``(1) each report submitted to the Director of National
Intelligence for a year under subsection (a);
``(2) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and
capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole; and
``(3) recommendations for eliminating required reports
relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of
National Intelligence considers outdated or no longer
relevant.''.
(2) Table of contents.--Such Act is further amended in the
table of contents in the first section by inserting after the
item relating to section 119B the following new item:
``Sec. 120. Annual reports on foreign language proficiency.''.
(b) Effective Date.--
(1) Report by heads of elements of the intelligence
community.--The first report required to be submitted by the
head of each element of the intelligence community under
section 120(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added
by subsection (a)(1), shall be submitted not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) Report by dni.--The first report required to be submitted
by the Director of National Intelligence under section 120(c)
of the National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection
(a)(1), shall be submitted not later than 240 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
SEC. 421. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Establishment and Duties of the Position of Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence Agency.--(1) Title I of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section
104A the following new section:
``deputy director of the central intelligence agency
``Sec. 104B. (a) Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency.--There is a Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate.
``(b) Duties.--The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
shall--
``(1) assist the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the
Director; and
``(2) act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency during the absence or
disability of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
or during a vacancy in the position of Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.''.
(2) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the first section
of such Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section
104A the following new item:
``Sec. 104B. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
(b) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Deputy
Directors of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item:
``Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
SEC. 422. GENERAL AUTHORITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50
U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``any of the functions or
activities authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a),
subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections (a) and (g) of
section 104, and section 303 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405),'' and
inserting ``any functions or activities authorized by law to be
conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency''.
SEC. 423. REVIEW OF COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS BY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE
CIA.
(a) In General.--Section 503 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 413b) is amended by--
(1) redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (g) and
transferring such subsection to the end;
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new
subsection:
``(e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.--
``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Inspector
General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct an
audit of each covert action at least every three years.
``(2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector General
of the Central Intelligence Agency is not required to conduct
an audit under paragraph (1) of a covert action that has been
terminated or suspended if such covert action was terminated or
suspend prior to the last audit of such covert action conducted
by the Inspector General and has not been restarted after the
date on which such audit was completed.
``(3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the completion of
an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph (1), the Inspector
General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report containing the
results of such audit.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 501(f) (50 U.S.C. 413(f)), by striking
``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)'';
(2) in section 502(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 413b(a)(1)), by striking
``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''; and
(3) in section 504(c) (50 U.S.C. 414(c)), by striking
``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''.
SEC. 424. REPORT ON AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS PROGRESS.
Section 114A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404i-1)
is amended by striking ``the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency,''.
Subtitle C--Other Elements
SEC. 431. CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SECTION 105 OF THE
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR
2004.
Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31 U.S.C. 311 note) is
amended--
(1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and
inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
(2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after
``subsection (a)),''.
SEC. 432. REPEAL OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE OFFICE OF THE
NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.
(a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of Public Law
107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended--
(1) by striking subsections (d), (h), (i), and (j);
(2) in subsection (g), by striking paragraphs (3) and (4);
and
(3) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (k), (l), and
(m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i),
respectively.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--That section is further amended--
(1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2)
of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it
appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection
(e)''; and
(2) in subsection (e)(2), as so redesignated, by striking
``subsection (e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''.
SEC. 433. CLARIFICATION OF INCLUSION OF COAST GUARD AND DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION ELEMENTS IN THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))
is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (H)--
(A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the
Marine Corps,''; and
(B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement
Administration,'' after ``the Federal Bureau of
Investigation,''; and
(2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the Office
of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters
SEC. 501. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE PLATFORMS.
(a) Limitation on Termination of U-2 Aircraft Program.--The Secretary
of Defense may not begin the process to terminate the U-2 aircraft
program until the Secretary certifies in accordance with subsection (b)
that there would be no loss of national or Department of Defense
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in
transitioning from the U-2 aircraft program to the Global Hawk RQ-4
unmanned aerial vehicle platform.
(b) Report and Certification.--
(1) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study of
aerial reconnaissance platforms to determine whether the Global
Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial vehicle has reached mission
capability and has attained collection capabilities on a par
with the collection capabilities of the U-2 Block 20 aircraft
program as of April 1, 2006.
(2) Report.--The Secretary shall submit to the congressional
committees specified in subsection (c) a report containing the
results of the study. The Secretary shall include in the report
the Secretary's determination as to whether the Global Hawk RQ-
4 unmanned aerial vehicle--
(A) has reached mission capability; and
(B) has attained collection capabilities on a par
with the collection capabilities of the U-2 Block 20
aircraft program as of April 1, 2006.
(3) Certification.--The Secretary shall include with the
report the Secretary's certification, based on the results of
the study, as to whether or not there would be a loss of
national or Department of Defense intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance capabilities with a transition from the U-2
aircraft program to the Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial
vehicle platform.
(c) Specified Committees.--The congressional committees specified in
this subsection are the following:
(1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee
on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 502. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Extension.--
(1) In general.--Section 1007(a) of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306; 50
U.S.C. 401 note) is amended by striking ``September 1, 2004''
and inserting ``September 1, 2008''.
(2) Effective date.--The amendment made by subsection (a)(1)
shall take effect as if included in the enactment of section
1007 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003.
(b) Funding.--
(1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated
by this Act for the Intelligence Community Management Account,
the Director of National Intelligence shall make $2,000,000
available to the National Commission for the Review of the
Research and Development Programs of the United States
Intelligence Community (in this subsection referred to as the
``Commission'') established under section 1002(a) of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law
107-306; 116 Stat. 2438; 50 U.S.C. 401 note) to carry out title
X of such Act.
(2) Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission
under paragraph (1) shall remain available until expended.
Subtitle B--Technical Amendments
SEC. 511. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE MULTIYEAR NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50 U.S.C. 404b) is
amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Foreign''; and
(2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears.
(b) Responsibility of DNI.--That section is further amended--
(1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of
Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence''; and
(2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National
Intelligence'' after ``Director''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of that section is amended to
read as follows:
``SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.''.
SEC. 512. TECHNICAL CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN REFERENCES TO JOINT
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND TACTICAL
INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES.
Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1)
is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets for
the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual
budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor
program or programs''; and
(2) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military
Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence
Program or any successor program or programs''.
SEC. 513. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.
The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is
amended--
(1) in section 102A (50 U.S.C. 403-1)--
(A) in subsection (c)(7)(A), by striking ``section''
and inserting ``subsection'';
(B) in subsection (d)--
(i) in paragraph (3), by striking
``subparagraph (A)'' in the matter preceding
subparagraph (A) and inserting ``paragraph
(1)(A)''; and
(ii) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking ``or
personnel'' in the matter preceding clause (i);
(C) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section''
and inserting ``paragraph''; and
(D) in the heading of subsection (n), by striking
``Acquisition Authorities'' and inserting ``Acquisition
and Other Authorities''; and
(2) in section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by
striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''.
SEC. 514. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM
PREVENTION ACT OF 2004.
(a) Amendments to National Security Intelligence Reform Act of
2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I
of Public Law 108-458) is amended as follows:
(1) In section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 485(e)(10)(B)), by
striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and
inserting ``Department of Justice''.
(2) In section 1061 (5 U.S.C. 601 note)--
(A) in subsection (d)(4)(A), by striking ``National
Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of
National Intelligence''; and
(B) in subsection (h), by striking ``National
Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of
National Intelligence''.
(3) In section 1071(e), by striking ``(1)''.
(4) In section 1072(b), by inserting ``Agency'' after
``Intelligence''.
(b) Other Amendments to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (Public Law 108-458) is amended as follows:
(1) In section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)--
(A) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``of'' before
``an institutional culture'';
(B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National
Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with
section 112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of
National Intelligence in a manner consistent with
applicable law''; and
(C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the
matter preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''.
(2) In section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and
inserting ``Federal''; and
(B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific''
and inserting ``specific''.
SEC. 515. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.
(a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the Director
of Central Intelligence and inserting the following new item:
``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
(b) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5, United
States Code, is amended by striking the item relating to the General
Counsel of the Office of the National Intelligence Director and
inserting the following new item:
``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.''.
SEC. 516. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO TITLES OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY POSITIONS.
Section 17(d)(3)(B)(ii) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(3)(B)(ii)) is amended--
(1) in subclause (I), by striking ``Executive Director'' and
inserting ``Associate Deputy Director'';
(2) in subclause (II), by striking ``Deputy Director for
Operations'' and inserting ``Director of the National
Clandestine Service''; and
(3) in subclause (IV), by striking ``Deputy Director for
Administration'' and inserting ``Director for Support''.
SEC. 517. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO REDESIGNATION OF THE
NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY AS THE NATIONAL
GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Title 5, United States Code.--(1) Title 5, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place
it appears in a provision as follows and inserting ``National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency'':
(A) Section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii).
(B) Section 3132(a)(1)(B).
(C) Section 4301(1) (in clause (ii)).
(D) Section 4701(a)(1)(B).
(E) Section 5102(a)(1) (in clause (x)).
(F) Section 5342(a)(1)(K).
(G) Section 6339(a)(1)(E).
(H) Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i)(XIII).
(2) Section 6339(a)(2)(E) of such title is amended by striking
``National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Director of the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency''.
(b) Title 44, United States Code.--(1)(A) Section 1336 of title 44,
United States Code, is amended by striking ``National Imagery and
Mapping Agency'' both places it appears and inserting ``National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
(B) The heading of such section is amended to read as follows:
``Sec. 1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special
publications''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 13 of such
title is amended by striking the item relating to section 1336 and
inserting the following new item:
``1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special
publications.''.
(c) Homeland Security Act of 2002.--Section 201(f)(2)(E) of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(f)(2)(E)) is amended by
striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting
``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
(d) Inspector General Act of 1978.--Section 8H of the Inspector
General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking ``National
Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place it appears and inserting
``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
(e) Ethics in Government Act of 1978.--Section 105(a)(1) of the
Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by striking
``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
(f) Other Acts.--(1) Section 7(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Employee Polygraph
Protection Act of 1988 (29 U.S.C. 2006(b)(2)(A)(i)) is amended by
striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting
``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
(2) Section 207(a)(2)(B) of the Legislative Branch Appropriations
Act, 1993 (44 U.S.C. 501 note) is amended by striking ``National
Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency''.
Purpose
The purpose of H.R. 2082 is to authorize the intelligence
and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government for FY 2008 in order to enhance the national
security of the United States, to support and assist the armed
forces of the United States, and to support and oversee the
President's execution of the foreign policy of the United
States. The bill also clarifies certain Intelligence Community
authorities and makes technical corrections to existing
statutes.
Classified Annex and Committee Intent
The classified annex to this report includes the classified
Schedule of Authorizations and its associated explanatory
language. The Committee views the classified annex as an
integral part of this legislation. The classified annex
contains a thorough discussion of the issues considered by the
Committee underlying the funding authorizations found in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The Committee intends
that all intelligence programs discussed in the classified
annex to this report be conducted in accordance with the
guidance and limitations set forth as associated language
therein. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is
incorporated directly into this legislation by virtue of
Section 102 of the bill. The classified annex is available for
review by all Members of the House of Representatives, subject
to the requirements of clause 13 of rule XXIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, and rule 14 of the Rules of
Procedure for the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. In addition, Section 105 of the bill incorporates
reporting requirements of the Classified Annex and any Joint
Explanatory Statement into the Act.
Scope of Committee Review
The bill authorizes U.S. intelligence and intelligence-
related activities under the jurisdiction of the Committee,
including the National Intelligence Program (NIP), the Military
Intelligence Program (MIP), and the Information System Security
Program (ISSP). The NIP consists of all activities of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, as well as
national foreign intelligence, intelligence-related, and/or
counterintelligence activities conducted by: (1) the Central
Intelligence Agency; (2) the Department of Defense; (3) the
Defense Intelligence Agency; (4) the National Security Agency;
(5) the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force; (6) the
Coast Guard; (7) the Department of State; (8) the Department of
the Treasury; (9) the Department of Energy; (10) the Department
of Justice; (11) the Federal Bureau of Investigation; (12) the
Drug Enforcement Administration; (13) the National
Reconnaissance Office; (14) the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency; and (15) the Department of Homeland
Security. The Committee has exclusive legislative, authorizing
and oversight jurisdiction of these programs.
Committee Statement and Views
A. OVERVIEW
The change in leadership of the Congress, coupled with the
appointment of a new Director of National Intelligence (DNI) in
early 2007, provides a fresh opportunity for assessing the work
of America's Intelligence Community.
On a bipartisan basis, Members of the Committee have spent
countless hours in briefings, hearings, and field visits with
the professionals who comprise the Intelligence Community. The
Committee is consistently impressed with their patriotism,
dedication to mission, and commitment to doing our nation's
most sensitive--and dangerous--business, often without public
acknowledgment or recognition.
More than five years after the attacks of September 11,
2001, no one disputes the importance that good intelligence
plays in protecting American lives. Intelligence assessments
also play a pivotal role in informing policymakers as they
grapple with monumental decisions about war and peace. And, as
we tragically learned in the context of the Iraq war, faulty
intelligence or the distortion of the intelligence process can
lead to disastrous consequences for the nation.
Today, the United States faces a dynamic set of threats,
challenges, and opportunities. The pressing challenges of Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Al Qa'ida, as well as other long-term
problems, have been the subject of multiple Committee hearings
in the 110th Congress.
Each of these problems requires an integrated, focused
intelligence capability. Two years ago, Congress established
the Director of National Intelligence and reshaped the U.S.
Intelligence Community. Today, that reorganization has clearly
yielded some important benefits to U.S. national security, but
serious challenges remain.
Specifically, the Committee recognizes the important
innovation of providing intelligence from across the Community
to the President and senior policymakers in their daily
briefings. As a result, analysis has become more careful and
more integrated. The Committee also applauds the efforts to
integrate intelligence collection by the Mission Managers--
particularly those for Iran and North Korea--and by other
elements of the DNI staff to hone the process of developing
analysis-driven collection requirements to fill key
intelligence gaps.
The Committee has been less impressed with the effort to
restrain the growth of the DNI's office into a new layer of
bureaucracy. The recent 100-day agenda released by the DNI
contained a great deal of bureaucratic verbiage but failed to
articulate a clear and compelling plan for addressing chronic
problems plaguing the Intelligence Community, such as
deficiencies in foreign language capability, lack of diversity,
information-sharing impediments, overclassification, and the
lack of common security clearance practices.
The Committee believes the President has appointed a
seasoned intelligence professional as DNI. The new Director has
both the experience and the acumen needed to transform the
Intelligence Community and fix the long-standing tension
between the Intelligence Community and the Defense Department.
It is our hope that nothing will distract Director McConnell
from the core task of the DNI: identifying gaps in what America
knows (ranging from the whereabouts of a specific terrorist
cell to the long-range intentions of a rival nation);
corralling the intelligence collectors to close those gaps as
quickly as possible; and applying focused analysis to provide
the support that U.S. policymakers need to address national
security threats.
B. THE COMMITTEE REVIEW
The Committee completed its review of the President's FY
2008 budget request, carrying out its annual responsibility to
prepare an authorization based on close examination of the U.S.
government's intelligence programs and proposed expenditures.
The Committee conducted 15 formal Committee and
Subcommittee budget hearings on numerous topics, including the
following:
National Intelligence Program overview
Military Intelligence Program overview
Facilities and Infrastructure
Signals Intelligence
Geospatial Intelligence
Counterintelligence
Integration of Domestic Intelligence
Research & Development and Systems Acquisition
Personnel and Security
Human Intelligence
All-Source Analysis and Analytic Tradecraft
Covert Action
In addition to these formal hearings, Committee Members and
staff have taken numerous budget-related briefings covering all
major intelligence programs within the National Intelligence
Program, the Military Intelligence Program, and the Information
System Security Program.
As always, the Committee's legislative and budgetary
actions are based on more than these budget-specific hearings
and briefings. The actions taken in this bill are the result of
the Committee's ongoing, rigorous oversight of the U.S.
Intelligence Community. This oversight activity includes the
scores of Committee and subcommittee hearings and briefings;
site visits and fact-finding trips; reviews of congressionally
directed reports; and studies of intelligence capabilities,
strategies, plans, and challenges throughout the year.
C. THE LEGISLATION
The bill and accompanying classified Schedule of
Authorizations includes the Committee's recommended
authorizations for the President's FY 2008 budget request. This
includes an authorization for the intelligence portion of the
FY 2008 Emergency Supplemental for funding counterterrorism
operations and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
Committee views these funds as an integral part of the FY 2008
budget and has specifically decided to authorize these
activities for the full year in this legislation at this time.
H.R. 2082 improves U.S. intelligence capabilities in
several important respects.
First, the bill promotes responsible budgeting by shifting
significant resources from the Supplemental request into the
base budget, for both the NIP and the MIP. The Administration's
over-reliance on so-called ``emergency'' supplemental bills has
been a tactic to shield government spending from the scrutiny
of the regular budget process. For years, the Committee has
pressed the Administration to change this practice as it
relates to easily foreseeable programs, particularly in the
counterterrorism area. Shifting money from the supplemental to
the base allows for operators in the field to plan operations
for the year and promotes greater oversight by the Committee.
Second, the bill focuses on improving capabilities in areas
of cross-community importance, such as human capital, research
and development, analysis, human intelligence,
counterintelligence, and acquisition management. The bill
shifts resources into higher priority areas and requires the
Intelligence Community to provide greater focus on areas of
acute need. For example, the bill:
Adds funds to both the General Defense
Intelligence Program (GDIP) and the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) for human intelligence
(HUMINT) training;
Forces managers of a major HUMINT initiative
to develop a stronger organizational strategy for
penetrating hard targets;
Invests in language training for collectors
and analysts as well as in language translation
capabilities;
Adds funding to send additional analysts
overseas;
Cuts wasteful spending on contractors at a
major agency;
Adds funds to implement the recommendations of
an advisory panel that will result in a greater
integration of tasking for critical overhead assets;
Attempts to improve the chances for success of
the National Security Agency's (NSA) flagship
modernization program by mandating the creation of a
streamlined acquisition oversight process;
Provides for additional counterintelligence
field operations, both in the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Defense;
Forces creation of a detailed plan to ensure
coordinated, de-conflicted, and prioritized Research &
Development in the Intelligence Community; and
Adds funds to develop a transition strategy
between current and planned overhead collection systems
to prevent a future capability gap.
Third, the bill compels the Administration to address
critical overhead architecture issues that have been festering
for some time and have been made worse by a series of
acquisition failures. The difficult choices in this area will
ensure that the Intelligence Community's limited resources are
directed towards the systems that will help the U.S. to
maintain its technological edge, particularly in space, and to
support the full range of customers who depend upon space
assets.
Finally, the bill strengthens internal and external
oversight of covert action programs.
D. AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST
Director of National Intelligence
This year, the Committee is reviewing the DNI's second
intelligence budget, and the Committee believes that this is an
appropriate time to evaluate the DNI's progress in meeting the
goals of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
(IRTPA).
The Committee continues to be disappointed that the DNI has
not assumed a more directive role in coordinating the
Intelligence Community. Changing the culture of the
intelligence agencies, breaking down stovepipes, and creating a
unified Intelligence Community takes more than a consensus-
based approach to management. Also, the Committee is concerned
that the DNI has not taken a consistent approach on whether the
ODNI will serve as coordinator, or executor, of Intelligence
Community functions.
The Committee is concerned that the DNI has had several
false starts in meeting the goals of the IRTPA. The Committee
observes that the DNI started, re-evaluated, and changed
direction on both internal organization and on establishing an
integrated collection architecture for the Intelligence
Community. In other areas, the DNI has yet to establish
community-wide requirements to measure progress. In particular,
the Committee is concerned that the DNI remains unable to set
goals and requirements for important skills, including foreign
language capability.
The President's Domestic Surveillance Program
The Administration has proposed sweeping changes to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The Committee is
encouraged that the Administration's response to any
shortcomings in the law is not circumvention of FISA but rather
a legislative proposal to change FISA.
The Committee will seriously consider the Administration's
FISA proposal in both open and closed hearings. We welcome
proposals to ensure that the FISA system has sufficient
resources to conduct surveillance on terrorists operating in
the United States. We also welcome proposals to ensure that
FISA is up to date and technology neutral (i.e., does not
distinguish between ``wire'' and ``radio'' communications).
It is, however, also essential that FISA's original purpose
be maintained: to keep national-security-related surveillance
tightly focused on the people who would do America harm while
protecting the 4th Amendment rights of the American people.
But before the Committee will support any change to
existing law, it is essential that the President provide some
measure of assurance that were he to sign a bill modifying FISA
into law, he would agree to be bound by it.
The Committee believes it is essential to continue its
close oversight of NSA surveillance conducted as part of the
President's Domestic Surveillance Program. Although
surveillance now operates under the supervision of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, to our knowledge, the actual
surveillance activities have not changed. To better understand
what the President authorized, the Committee will continue to
urge the Executive Branch to provide the Intelligence
Committees with copies of the President's authorizations for
this program, as well as underlying memos explaining its
legality. No serious oversight can proceed without these
fundamental documents.
Detainees held by the Intelligence Community
On September 6, 2006, the President revealed the existence
of a CIA program to hold and interrogate certain detainees
suspected of terrorist activities. In that same announcement,
the President declared that all detainees being held in the
program at that time had been transferred to the U.S. Naval
Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, but he stated that this program
would continue and that, in the future, the CIA was authorized
to hold and interrogate other detainees.
This policy continues to be the subject of considerable
controversy, and the Committee believes that allegations of
detainee mistreatment--to include allegations of torture--have
undermined the reputation of the U.S. government. The
perception that the U.S. is not fully committed to the
principles of the Geneva Conventions and recognized standards
of humane treatment endangers U.S. military and civilian
personnel around the world. The Committee believes that
allowing access by an independent, impartial organization would
increase confidence that U.S. treatment of detainees complies
with obligations under the Geneva Conventions as well as U.S.
and international law.
Accordingly, the Committee strongly urges the DNI to begin
negotiations with the International Committee for the Red Cross
(ICRC) on the terms and conditions under which the ICRC would
be provided access to any detainee held by any element of the
Intelligence Community, and to allow the ICRC access to such
facilities.
The ICRC is provided access to all military detention
facilities, and has demonstrated its ability to keep the
records of such visits confidential. The Committee believes
that the ICRC would be able to keep its visits to Intelligence
Community facilities under heightened secrecy and
confidentiality. The DNI should work in consultation with the
Committee to develop an acceptable protocol for allowing ICRC
experts to assess the conditions under which any element of the
Intelligence Community is holding or interrogating any
detainee.
FBI's use of national security letters
The Committee considered very carefully the March 2007
report by the Department of Justice Inspector General (IG)
regarding the FBI's use of national security letters (NSLs).
The report made clear that the FBI believes NSLs are vital for
uncovering threats to our country's national security.
However, as many Members made clear during the Committee's
March 28, 2007 hearing in open session on the IG report, the
Committee is dismayed by the FBI's failure to properly oversee
its use of these investigative tools. Accordingly, the
Committee will continue to evaluate the use of these
authorities and determine whether there is a need to modify
existing legislation.
When Congress was reconsidering NSLs during the
reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2005, FBI and Justice
Department officials offered assurances that the NSL
authorities would be used with great care because of the
potential that NSLs, if abused, could enable law enforcement
officials to infringe upon Americans' civil liberties.
Despite these assurances, the Justice Department IG made
clear that no effective management controls were put in place:
Agents had little understanding of NSL authorities; FBI
officials who were not authorized to issue NSLs sent more than
700 ``exigent letters'' that improperly cited an immediate
threat in order to justify the provision of records; critical
documents were not kept; databases were flawed; violations of
law and policy were not reported as required; and the FBI's
reports to Congress on its use of NSLs were inaccurate. These
myriad management problems led the Inspector General to assert
in congressional testimony that the FBI may have violated the
law, attorney general guidelines, or FBI policies as many as
3,000 times. While the Inspector General found no evidence of
malicious or even intentional misconduct, any misuse of NSL
authorities, for whatever reason, is unacceptable.
Perhaps most disturbingly, FBI officials testified that
these problems might not have been uncovered were it not for
the congressionally mandated Inspector General's inquiry. This
assessment demonstrates the need for outside oversight of NSLs,
as well as the need for improvement in the FBI's ability to
police itself.
The FBI and Justice Department have pledged to take many
corrective measures to address the problems uncovered in the
IG's report, to include an internal investigation to determine
where the Bureau failed and to assess accountability for these
failures. The Committee directs the FBI Director to provide the
FBI's report of this investigation, upon completion, to the
Committee and to inform the Committee of all corrective
measures it takes as a result of this investigation.
FBI officials also asserted that the Bureau is developing a
computer system that will automate many administrative aspects
of NSL requests to prevent mistakes, to ensure compliance with
law, policy, and regulations, and to guarantee accurate reports
to Congress. The Committee requests that the FBI provide
quarterly briefings on the status of the development and
deployment of this computer system beginning in the first
quarter of FY 2008 and continuing until the system has been
fully operational for at least one year.
Counterintelligence
The Committee believes that the nation's management of its
counterintelligence services is in need of significant reform.
Although the nation's vulnerability to foreign intelligence
collection efforts stems from a variety of factors, the
Committee believes that one of the primary factors is
insufficient coordination of the nation's counterintelligence
activities at the national level.
The Congress and the President created the office of the
National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) to coordinate the
nation's disparate counterintelligence functions and to
establish a national policy for counterintelligence. After
nearly five years in operation, the NCIX has yet to fulfill its
initial mandates. As a result, the nation's counterintelligence
activities suffer from redundant structures, inconsistent and
sometimes insufficient training, and a decentralized approach
to carrying out the nation's counterintelligence strategy that
leaves no one person in charge and, therefore, leaves no one
person directly responsible for its failures when they occur.
When management failures do occur in counterintelligence
they can have a dramatic impact on both the national security
of the country and the civil liberties of U.S. citizens. For
example, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board
recently confirmed that the Defense Department's failure to
properly manage the Counterintelligence Field Activity's (CIFA)
TALON database led to the inappropriate collection and
retention of information on U.S. persons. Although the
Committee is encouraged by recent reports that the Defense
Department intends to shut down TALON, the fact remains that
the management structures in place failed the American people
by establishing a system that allowed for such wrongdoing to
occur in the first place.
There are positive signs of reform within the nation's
counterintelligence activities. The office of the NCIX has been
reinvigorated by the work of its new Director and by the DNI's
designation of the NCIX as the Intelligence Community's Mission
Manager for Counterintelligence. Also, the Defense Department
recently named a new Director of CIFA and is undertaking a
wholesale review of CIFA's activities to determine whether it
is carrying out its missions and operating within its mandate.
In its bill, the Committee has made specific authorizations
that bolster the nation's counterintelligence efforts,
including an increase to the resources available for conducting
traditional counterintelligence functions. Also, in order to
more properly exercise its oversight responsibilities over
counterintelligence, the Committee intends to engage in a
comprehensive review of the nation's counterintelligence
effort. The Committee's first step in this review is to request
a report on the full scope of the nation's counterintelligence
capabilities. The Committee's specific authorizations and its
request for a report on the nation's counterintelligence
capabilities are set forth more fully in the classified annex
to this bill.
Financial statement auditability
The Committee appreciates the comprehensive report
delivered by the DNI on the status of financial statement
auditability in the Intelligence Community and the accompanying
plan for each intelligence agency to achieve a ``clean'' audit.
The Committee is extremely disappointed that, according to
current projections, this goal will not be reached until 2011,
despite the intensified leadership focus on this issue under
the new DNI. The Committee understands that the inability to
achieve a clean audit does not mean that the intelligence
agencies are failing to conduct responsible accounting for
their funds. Rather, the problem is that certain aspects of
intelligence agencies' financial management processes prevent
them from getting a clean opinion. Nevertheless, the Committee
views it as extremely important for the Intelligence Community
to abide by the same accounting standards as the rest of the
federal government and urges the DNI to accelerate this
timeline with the submission of the FY 2009 budget.
The ODNI has identified three key areas that are preventing
the Intelligence Community agencies from achieving clean
audits: (1) Fund Balance with Treasury (FBwT); (2) Property,
Plant and Equipment (PP&E) issues; and (3) Intragovernmental
Transactions (IGT).
With respect to PP&E issues, the problem is that the
Intelligence Community agencies' antiquated PP&E ``feeder
systems'' were not designed to accumulate the required cost
data for the balance sheet. With the exception of one sensitive
CIA issue (which may be more a matter of policy than finance),
the Intelligence Community's PP&E challenges are within the
DNI's power to fix and can be resolved through hard work and
sharing of best practices.
The other two issues--FBwT and IGT--are problems for those
intelligence agencies that reside within the Department of
Defense, and these cannot be resolved without the cooperation
of the Department itself. Because of systemic problems with the
Defense Finance and Accounting System that will certainly not
be resolved within the next five years, NSA, NGA and DIA are
unable to reconcile their FBwT or their IGT transactions, both
of which are prerequisites to achieving a clean audit.
The DNI reports that it is working with the Defense
Department to implement solutions to these problems by allowing
intelligence agencies to reconcile their fund balance directly
with the Department of the Treasury, and to create a zero-
balance account to allow proper reconciliation of Military
Inter-Departmental Purchase Requests. Given the fact that the
Intelligence Community cannot achieve the congressional
directive for auditability without these accommodations, the
Committee directs the DNI to submit a report by September 1,
2007, on the progress of these negotiations with the Defense
Department and whether or not appropriate ``fixes'' will be
implemented at the beginning of FY 2008, as laid out in the
DNI's plan. In the meantime, the DNI is urged to accelerate
work on the PP&E issue and advise the Committee if a
legislative solution is required for the CIA in the FY 2009
intelligence authorization bill.
Al Qa'ida
The Committee is not satisfied with efforts to defeat the
al Qa'ida network. Al Qa'ida's leaders--Osama Bin Laden and
Ayman al Zawahiri--remain at large. Key operatives in the
terrorist network continue to operate from Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Perhaps most disturbingly, the Al Qa'ida ``brand''
appears to be growing in strength, as evidenced by the 2007
North Africa attacks by the newly named ``Al Qa'ida in the
Maghreb.''
The Committee is also concerned that, as intelligence
requirements have grown for Iraq, resources have been drained
from the global fight against Al Qa'ida.
Iraq
The January 2007 Iraq National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
included several unclassified Key Judgments that identified a
wide range of political, social, economic, and security
conditions that will, in the Intelligence Community's
collective judgment, lead the security situation in Iraq to
continue to deteriorate.
The NIE provided some important insights; however, the
Committee believes that the NIE did not adequately address the
likelihood that increased coalition military activities in
Baghdad could lead to an increase in violence elsewhere in the
country--a phenomenon which appears to have occurred as the
Baghdad security plan began to be implemented in the Spring of
2007.
The Committee is also disappointed that the NIE assessed
the security implications of a rapid withdrawal of U.S. forces
but failed to evaluate the impact of a gradual drawdown of
troops, along the lines of proposals endorsed by a majority of
Congress. The NIE's assessment of only the most extreme troop
redeployment option available presented the impression that the
United States has an ``all or nothing'' choice between current
troop levels or total rapid withdrawal. If the Intelligence
Community offers assessments of the impact that U.S. government
policy decisions may have on stability in Iraq, it should offer
a nuanced analysis of the several alternatives actually under
consideration, not solely the most extreme and unlikely option.
Iran and North Korea
Iran and North Korea currently represent perhaps the most
serious strategic threats to the United States and to U.S.
interests.
Iran is widely believed to be developing a nuclear weapon
in violation of its international agreements; providing support
to terrorist groups, like Hezbollah, that undermine regional
stability; and contributing to sectarian strife and supporting
armed insurgents in Iraq. Its military activities in the
Arabian Gulf--highlighted by its capture of British sailors and
marines in March 2007--threaten U.S. allies in the region and
undermine international commerce. Finally, its geopolitical
position in the region has undoubtedly been strengthened by the
U.S.-led removal of rival regimes in countries to its east and
west, transforming Iran into a regional hegemon.
North Korea is a heavily militarized state that recently
tested a nuclear weapon; continues efforts to enhance its
nuclear arsenal; proliferates WMD-related weapons technologies;
and poses a serious threat to South Korea, a close U.S. ally,
with its conventional munitions alone. The fact that North
Korea is perhaps the most closed and isolated society in the
world means that Pyongyang and the West each lack the cultural
and political understanding to interpret the other's actions
accurately. This means that a small-scale incident could
potentially escalate into an armed conflict that engulfs all of
east Asia.
The Committee has closely followed the efforts of U.S.
intelligence agencies to improve the quality of its analysis
and collection capabilities on both countries and will continue
to do so. A regular and structured reporting requirement will
help ensure that policymakers are receiving the intelligence
needed to thoroughly understand the nature of the threat
emanating from Iran and North Korea.
The existence of a nuclear-armed North Korea and the
prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran are the gravest elements of
the threats posed by these regimes. Though the Intelligence
Community has made great improvements in analytic tradecraft
since its shortcomings were identified in the WMD Commission
report, the Committee is concerned that its analysis on these
weapons programs--particularly given the dearth of reliable
information--could easily fall victim to groupthink, political
pressure, or acquiescence to conventional wisdom.
Latin America
In the past several years, a number of Latin American
countries have experienced significant political and economic
upheavals that affect U.S. interests, and the Committee is not
convinced that the Intelligence Community has effectively
allocated its resources to address these changes. The Committee
intends to examine the Intelligence Community's ability to
understand and manage the challenges emanating from Latin
America, as well as its ability to address the region
strategically.
Venezuela and Cuba present the two greatest challenges to
U.S. interests in the hemisphere. President Hugo Chavez of
Venezuela has made rabid anti-Americanism a cornerstone of his
rule, and he has helped export this sentiment to new regimes in
Bolivia, Ecuador, and elsewhere. Cuba--whose leader, Fidel
Castro, has recently suffered serious health problems--will
possibly experience momentous change that could reverse almost
five decades of Cuban hostility to the United States. The
Committee was pleased that the previous DNI created a Mission
Manager to address cross-agency intelligence collection and
analysis challenges presented by these two countries and hopes
the DNI takes the needed steps to identify and appoint a
successor. The Committee expects to have a regular and ongoing
dialogue with the new Mission Manager on Intelligence Community
efforts to better understand the challenges posed by these two
nations.
At the same time, a number of threats to U.S. interests
from Latin America seem impervious to change. Despite years of
U.S. assistance that bolstered the capabilities of Colombia's
security forces and produced some short-term successes,
Colombia continues to suffer from the ravages of coca
cultivation and the violence it engenders--to include concerns
about possible human rights violations at the hands of
government officials. Few strategic victories have been won
against the drug traffickers and paramilitaries, in part
because of extensive government corruption and a thriving world
narcotics market. Similarly, the Committee is concerned that
the tri-border area where Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil
intersect remains a center of illicit finance, smuggling and
terrorist-related activities, despite efforts by the countries
of the region to understand and control these developments.
The Committee intends to examine the ways in which the
Intelligence Community has approached threats from this region
to determine how it might improve its understanding of these
issues.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Committee Members and staff have traveled to numerous
countries in sub-Saharan Africa in the past few years, and the
Committee has held a wide range of briefings and other
discussions on countries in the region. The Committee believes
that interagency coordination on sub-Saharan Africa is flawed
and that the Intelligence Community needs to realign its
collection, analytic, and linguistic resources to better
understand the threats emanating from this region.
Included among the myriad challenges that Africa poses to
U.S. and regional security are the growth of Islamic extremism;
proliferation; armed conflict; humanitarian disasters, some of
which, such as the crisis in Darfur, stem from state-sponsored
genocide; failed states; and the establishment of ungoverned
spaces and terrorist safe havens, in which terrorists'
exploitation of weak laws and weak or non-existent government
institutions allow them to move money, people, and weapons.
Though the Intelligence Community must address a wide range of
threats that often seem more critical than the challenges posed
by events and trends in Africa, the Committee believes that an
improvement in Intelligence Community expertise in this region
is required to address potentially serious threats from that
region. The Committee will closely scrutinize the Community's
Africa posture during the 110th Congress.
American citizens detained abroad
The Committee expresses its concern at the delay in
provision of consular services to Amir Mohamed Meshal--an
American citizen who fled Somalia in January 2007--while he was
detained in both Kenya and Ethiopia. It is the view of the
Committee that--in order to ensure that the rights of American
citizens are protected--all officers of U.S. government
agencies have a duty to notify the local U.S. ambassador or
chief of mission as soon as they learn of the detention abroad
of an American citizen.
Space acquisition programs--personnel
The Committee is concerned about the career management of
uniformed acquisitions personnel assigned to the National
Reconnaissance Office (NRO)--particularly those from the Air
Force, who make up the vast majority of military personnel
assigned to NRO. The Committee believes that strong space
acquisition programs require depth of expertise and continuity
within the space systems acquisition workforce.
The establishment of the Space Professional Development
Program Certification standards and the creation of the Space
Assignment Advisory Board (SAAB) are encouraging steps toward
providing better management of the Air Force space cadre. The
Committee hopes that the SAAB and the Space Professional
Management Office will have the authority to manage assignments
based on the needs of space acquisition programs, while
promoting space expertise within all acquisition and space-
related specialties. Furthermore, given the particular
importance of having qualified Air Force personnel working on
NRO programs, the Committee is pleased with the assignment of a
senior Air Force officer to the new NRO Deputy Director
position. The Committee trusts that the officers who hold this
position will serve as strong advocates for the personnel
professionalization needs of the NRO and for the development of
space expertise within the acquisition workforce.
The Committee remains concerned, however, that although the
military spends time and resources to educate and train members
of the space cadre, it does not appear to make every attempt to
ensure that this workforce remains in space-related assignments
for the majority of their careers. The Committee believes that
there is significant value in having space acquisition
professionals who spend the vast majority of their careers
working in space-related assignments. Conceptually, this runs
counter to standard Air Force assignment policies, but may be
necessary for the proper development of our national overhead
systems.
The Committee urges the Department of Defense, and, in
particular the Secretary of the Air Force, to give serious
consideration to not only allowing, but encouraging members of
the uniformed space cadre to, over the course of their careers,
gain both depth and breadth of experience from a focused set of
assignments within the space field. In this respect, the
Committee awaits the results of the review commissioned in the
Fiscal Year 2007 National Defense Authorization Act to study
the feasibility of a specialized career field for military
space acquisitions personnel.
The Committee is also concerned that the NRO, and its
nationally critical systems development, acquisitions, and
operations, may be negatively impacted by the Air Force's
pending force reduction. The Committee encourages the DNI, in
coordination with the Director of the NRO and the Chief of
Staff of the Air Force, to determine what, if any, impact the
Air Force changes in workforce and manning will have on the NRO
mission, and establish a mitigation plan as necessary. The
Committee requests to be informed of any plan or the results of
any review that addresses these issues.
Major systems acquisitions
The Committee is concerned with the state of acquisition of
major systems across the Intelligence Community and applauds
the ODNI for standing up a Deputy Director of National
Intelligence for Acquisition to provide additional guidance in
that sector. The Committee appreciates and acknowledges the
effort put forth in preparing the DNI's 2006 Annual Report to
Congress on Intelligence Community Program Management Plans,
the first such report to assess performance of major
acquisition programs across the National Intelligence Program.
Through this report, the DNI established a baseline against
which future performance can be measured and through which
major programs can be tracked over time. The Committee believes
that, had this assessment been performed effectively in the
past, many of the Intelligence Community's acquisition troubles
could have been uncovered earlier.
Good project management is essential to successful
acquisition programs. While the Committee encourages the use of
whatever tools and training are available to teach the
fundamentals of project management, the Committee has observed
that classroom training alone--in the absence of on-the-job
training and mentoring--yields limited success. Therefore, as
part of its acquisition coordination, the Committee recommends
that the DNI require each agency to review their preparation of
future acquisition leaders and optimize the use of successful
techniques, such as mentoring programs.
Because of the significant cost and technical impact of
acquisition failures, the Committee encourages the DNI to
formalize a policy to link poor acquisition performance by the
contractor workforce to the withholding of award incentives for
the contractor. Such a link would underscore the expectations
for contractor acquisition personnel.
In light of highly publicized cost overruns and schedule
slips, the Committee expects the DNI to use the results of its
annual report to help reform acquisition across the
Intelligence Community. Specifically, if common practices lead
to troubled acquisitions, the Committee expects the DNI to
recommend community-wide changes to reduce reliance on these
practices. Similarly if common practices lead to successful
acquisitions, the Committee expects the DNI to recommend
community-wide changes to encourage these practices.
The Committee appreciates the observations and findings
presented in the annual report, as many of these align with
what the Committee has observed in its oversight of the
Intelligence Community. The Committee strongly encourages the
DNI to scrutinize the use of contractors in major systems
acquisitions. The Committee agrees with the contractor
assessments provided in the report, but would also like to more
fully understand the impact of corporate mergers--specifically
of System Engineering/Integration support companies with
development/manufacturing companies--and the effectiveness of
firewalls that separate merged corporate entities. The
Committee directs the DNI to provide this assessment in a
report to be submitted within 120 days of enactment of this
Act.
Finally, the Committee is concerned with the fast rotation
timelines for acquisition program managers. The Committee urges
the DNI to review its program management data to assess impacts
caused by acquisition personnel having tenures shorter than
three years and impacts from personnel changes with
insufficient overlap. The findings from such a review should be
shared with the Intelligence Community.
Advanced research and development
The Committee is concerned that, within the Intelligence
Community, an increased focus on solving near-term problems has
left insufficient funds available to address long-term
challenges. Citing a need for more cutting-edge, long-term or
basic research, the ODNI notified Congress in January 2007 of
its desire to establish the Intelligence Advanced Research
Projects Activity (IARPA). The DNI proposed that IARPA assume
financial and scientific management of basic research currently
performed at the individual agencies in order to better align
all activities with the DNI's long-term research strategy.
While the Committee agrees that there is a need to promote
basic research, there is concern about the construct chosen for
IARPA and whether it is the best option for the Intelligence
Community. Adding to this concern, the DNI has provided only
limited details on how IARPA will function within the
Intelligence Community. Noticeably absent from this proposal is
any discussion of the likely impact on existing Intelligence
Community research entities as a result of their proposed
merger under IARPA. Also missing is any detail on how a
director will be chosen or on what qualifications are required
for that position.
Given the importance of research in the Intelligence
Community, it is critical that the DNI have a plan not only to
protect current research activities but also to align future
research according to a long-term research strategy. It is also
critical that the DNI select a well-recognized leader and
manager with research experience to direct IARPA.
The Committee believes that the ODNI is essential to the
coordination and de-confliction of intelligence research. The
Committee observes that the plan for IARPA appears to be
execution-oriented. In this, it seems inconsistent with the
coordination and de-confliction role originally intended for
the ODNI. Because of this inconsistency, and because of the
lack of detailed planning discussed above, the Committee has
removed scientific and financial management of Intelligence
Community research centers from under IARPA and has designated
specific funding to protect these centers. The Committee has
also fenced a portion of the funds requested for new
initiatives until details are provided on the way ahead for
research in the Intelligence Community and on IARPA's specific
role in that effort.
Intelligence program management
The Committee notes with some distress that both
Intelligence Community acquisition and intelligence program
management have recently suffered serious disappointments.
Despite increasing attention from this Committee, the
Intelligence Community has failed to develop internal
standards, practices, and procedures to ensure that program
risk is managed with adequate attention devoted to cost,
schedule, and performance.
Many programs managed by intelligence agencies are over
cost, behind schedule, and have failed to achieve key
performance parameters. The Committee is frustrated by delays
in notifying Congress that major programs have failed to adhere
to planned development milestones. By the time the Committee
learns of program failure, the program has already expended
millions of dollars.
In order to remedy this issue, the Committee directs the
ODNI to develop in consultation with the Committee a program
notification standard to keep the Committee fully informed of
program issues. The Nunn-McCurdy amendment to the Department of
Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1982 provides an
example of the standard the Committee is requesting. For
example, the DNI should develop guidance for program managers
to ensure congressional notification of total program
acquisition unit costs for each major intelligence program on
the last day of each fiscal quarter. The policy should also
include a requirement to notify the Committee if the DNI has
reason to believe the program will exceed the authorized
funding by a specific percentage. The Committee requests that
this policy be reported to the Committee no later than December
1, 2007.
Diversity in the intelligence community
It is clear that the Intelligence Community suffers from a
lack of diversity. The DNI acknowledges that Intelligence
Community must address this shortfall to protect our national
security. Critical shortfalls also exist in language capability
and cultural understanding for countries in Asia and the Middle
East that pose continuing security challenges.
Pursuant to statutory mandate, the Intelligence Community
has submitted annual reports on workforce diversity. Sadly, the
Intelligence Community is still far short of the mark on
diversity. In the FY 2006 Intelligence Community diversity
report, the DNI reported that minority representation in the
Intelligence Community was 21%--far less than the 37% of the
overall U.S. population. Similarly, women comprise 39% of the
Intelligence Community workforce compared to 51% of the overall
U.S. population. Despite increased hiring of women and
minorities, Intelligence Community core mission areas, senior
grades and management ranks fail to reflect the diversity of
our country.
Unfortunately, the DNI's actions to address the lack of
diversity have been slow, limited, and ineffective. Improving
diversity is not a mission limited to the Equal Employment
Opportunity offices of the various agencies, but must be
infused throughout leadership efforts in the Intelligence
Community. For example, the DNI's Strategic Human Capital Plan
does not identify concrete steps to improve diversity in any of
its reforms. The Committee is concerned that some human capital
reforms may, in fact, undermine the limited, ongoing diversity
efforts.
While the Committee commends the DNI's decision to retain
the Diversity Senior Advisory Panel for the Intelligence
Community (DSAPIC), the Committee is concerned that the DNI has
not made sufficient progress in acting on that panel's 2004
recommendations. Although the panel recommended that agency
directors set measurable diversity objectives to serve as the
basis for evaluating performance and to submit those plans to
the DNI within six months, these plans have not yet been
submitted. The DNI has failed to complete its Community-wide
assessment of knowledge, skills, abilities, and talents needed
for the Intelligence Community workforce.
The Committee encourages the DNI's efforts to get senior
leaders in the Intelligence Community to take ownership of
diversity efforts by their respective agencies. The Committee
is aware that the EEO and Diversity Office in the DNI has
provided agency leaders with the results of the Annual Report
on Hiring and Retention of Minority Employees in the
Intelligence Community, and produced a box score on diversity
to show these leaders where their agencies stand in comparison
to each other on hiring, representation, retention, attrition,
and promotion of women, minorities, and persons with
disabilities.
The Committee notes that these box scores only compare the
agencies to each other, and do not demonstrate the true lack of
diversity in the Intelligence Community in comparison to the
federal and civilian workforces nor in comparison to U.S.
census data. If the DNI is serious about building a workforce
that looks like America, then the leaders of the Intelligence
Community must know how their workforce compares to the
population as a whole, not just to other agencies.
While the Committee welcomes the use of affinity groups to
encourage diversity in the Intelligence Community, this
approach is insufficient. University efforts cannot rest solely
on the shoulders of individuals who represent these diverse
groups. Each leader and manager in the Intelligence Community
bears responsibility for diversity. These efforts should be
visible, specific, personal, and persistent.
The Committee encourages the DNI to develop, as a core part
of its strategic plan, a training program for managers and
senior intelligence executives in diversity awareness, and to
make such training mandatory upon promotion to those positions.
In the same way that the military's joint duty assignment
policy ensures that senior military leaders are aware of
different organizational cultures, the DNI should ensure that
the intelligence agencies' senior leaders are aware of
diversity goals and the challenges that each agency faces.
In addition, the DNI should ensure that agency managers are
held accountable for diversity within their organizations. In
developing performance measurements for managers, the DNI
should include metrics for how well those managers support and
encourage diversity within their organizations, especially in
core mission areas. The Committee further urges the DNI to
establish a structured mentorship program to pair senior
leaders with minority proteges.
Pay for performance system
The Committee is concerned that the DNI is moving forward
aggressively on implementation of the pay-for-performance
system to replace the existing General Schedule Civil-Service
System. The DNI is pushing implementation before this system
has been designed, before it has been reviewed by the
appropriate oversight committees, and before it has the
necessary personnel tracking tools developed and in place.
While the Committee supports the goal of rewarding performance,
proper oversight and safeguards must be in place before
allowing such a radical change to the Community's personnel
management.
The Comptroller General of the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) has testified that federal agencies should not
implement pay-for-performance systems until they have met four
requirements: ``(1) a strategic human capital planning process
linked to the agency's overall strategic plan; (2) capabilities
to design and implement a new human capital system effectively;
(3) a modern, effective, credible, and validated performance
management system that provides a clear linkage between
institutional, unit, and individual performance-oriented
outcomes, and results in meaningful distinctions in ratings;
and (4) adequate internal and external safeguards to ensure the
fair, effective, and non-discriminatory implementation of the
system.''
Developing the wrong performance measurements could
undermine the Intelligence Community. Performance measurements
in a pay-for-performance system could easily have the
unintended consequence of rewarding the wrong kinds of
performance, especially in an area where success may be
difficult to quantify. A pay-for-performance system could
impose pressures on collectors and analysts to produce quantity
instead of quality. Analysts could feel pressure to make their
analysis conform with the views of their managers or risk loss
of income. Collectors might shift their focus to projects that
yield results within their pay period, rather than focusing
projects that might take longer to yield results. Further, it
is unclear how a pay-for-performance system would reward
teamwork and collaboration rather than individual performance.
The Committee is also concerned that the pay-for-
performance plan under consideration by the Office of the DNI
does not have sufficient safeguards to protect the rights of
employees.
DNI witnesses have testified that the pay-for-performance
system will have safeguards. However, the Committee has yet to
see the details of such safeguards. Any system must have
internal and external safeguards to protect employees from
cronyism, discrimination, harassment, partisan pressures, or
arbitrary and capricious management.
In particular, the Committee is concerned that without
proper safeguards and management training, implementation of a
pay-for-performance system may undermine the DNI's diversity
goals. Women and minorities are already underrepresented in the
Intelligence Community. This underrepresentation is even more
pronounced in the senior grades and in management positions.
Without sufficient safeguards to protect equal opportunity, the
Committee is deeply concerned that the pay-for-performance
system will further erode the deficient diversity
representation in the Intelligence Community.
For these reasons, the Committee has fenced all funds in
the General Defense Intelligence Program that are designated
for conversion to the pay modernization system until 45 days
after the DNI provides a plan for the pay-for-performance
system generally, and a plan for any agency-specific pilot
program specifically. In addition, the Committee directs that
any funds in the Community Management Account and the CIA
program designated for pay modernization be spent only on
developing these plans, rather than implementing or converting
to the pay modernization system.
The Committee believes that employees should assist in the
design of the compensation system in which they will have to
operate. To that end, the Committee encourages the DNI to
establish and consult with an employee advisory group in the
development of the plan submitted to Congress. In selecting
this advisory committee, the DNI should ensure it has a diverse
range of occupations, demographic groups, geographic locations,
and seniority. The comments of the advisory group should be
included in the DNI's report to Congress.
Committee Consideration and Rollcall Votes
On May 2, 2007, the Committee met in open and closed
session and ordered the bill H.R. 2082 favorably reported, as
amended.
OPEN SESSION
In open session, the Committee considered the text of the
bill H.R. 2082.
Chairman Reyes offered an amendment in the nature of a
substitute to H.R. 2082. The contents of the amendment in the
nature of a substitute are described in the Section-by-Section
analysis and the Explanation of Amendment. The Committee
considered the following amendments to the amendment in the
nature of a substitute:
Mr. Issa offered an amendment to strike a provision in the
Chairman's mark that requires a National Intelligence Estimate
on the national security impacts of global climate change.
CLOSED SESSION
Mr. Hoekstra moved to close the meeting because national
security would be endangered if the matters to be considered
were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 19
ayes to 0 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo,
Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr.
Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly,
Mrs. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr.
Rogers, Mr. Issa.
Voting no: None
OPEN SESSION
The Committee returned to open session to complete
consideration of the Issa Amendment.
It was not agreed to by a record vote of 9 ayes to 10 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Mrs.
Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr.
Issa.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo,
Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr.
Langevin, Mr. Murphy.
Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment to require the
President to provide the International Committee of the Red
Cross access to persons detained by the Intelligence Community.
Ms. Schakowsky later withdrew her amendment.
Mr. Rogers of Michigan offered an amendment to reject the
Administration's request to increase the authorized personnel
of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
CLOSED SESSION
Mr. Rogers of Michigan moved to close the meeting because
national security would be endangered if the matters to be
considered were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record
vote of 19 ayes to 1 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo,
Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr.
Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly,
Mrs. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr.
Rogers, Mr. Issa.
Voting no: Mr. Tierney.
OPEN SESSION
Mr. McHugh offered an amendment to modify a provision in
the Chairman's amendment in the nature of a substitute that
requires a report on contractors by the Inspector General for
the Director of National Intelligence. Mr. McHugh's amendment
was adopted on voice vote.
Mr. Holt offered an amendment to establish a reporting
requirement for Executive Branch requests for information
concerning officers, employees, and agents of the Intelligence
Community. Mr. Holt later withdrew the amendment.
Mr. Rogers of Michigan offered an amendment to close the
National Drug Intelligence Center. It was not agreed to by a
record vote of 8 ayes to 11 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mrs. Wilson, Mr.
Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Boswell, Mr.
Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson,
Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy.
The Committee then voted on the Rogers amendment to reject
the Administration's request to increase the authorized
personnel of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence. It was not agreed to by a record vote of 9 ayes
to 10 noes, with one member voting present:
Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Mrs.
Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr.
Issa.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Boswell, Mr.
Cramer, Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Ms.
Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy.
Voting present: Ms. Eshoo.
Mr. Rogers offered an amendment relating to an audit of the
effectiveness and role of the National Drug Intelligence
Center. It was not agreed to by a record vote of 9 ayes and 10
noes
Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Mrs.
Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr.
Issa.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Boswell, Mr.
Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Ms.
Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Thornberry offered an amendment requiring the Director
of National Intelligence to provide an annual report on foreign
language capability within each element of the Intelligence
Community. It was agreed to by voice vote.
Mr. Rogers of Michigan offered an amendment requiring the
termination of quarterly reports on North Korean and Iranian
nuclear capabilities and intentions. It was not agreed to by a
record vote of 9 ayes to 10 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Mrs.
Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr.
Issa.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo,
Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr.
Langevin, Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Thornberry offered an amendment requiring the Director
of National Intelligence to provide a report on those reports
required by law to be submitted to any of the congressional
committees that have jurisdiction over elements of the
Intelligence Community. Mr. Thornberry later withdrew his
amendment.
The Committee then recessed for House floor votes and
reconvened for business two hours later.
When the Committee reconvened, Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico
offered an amendment to revise the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act and alter the authorities governing electronic
surveillance.
CLOSED SESSION
Ms. Wilson moved to close the meeting because national
security would be endangered if the matters to be considered
were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 15
ayes to 0 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Holt,
Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr.
Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Mrs. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh,
Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
Voting no: None.
OPEN SESSION
After debate, the Committee returned to open session. The
Wilson amendment was not agreed to by a record vote of 9 ayes
to 10 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Mrs.
Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr.
Issa.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Ms. Eshoo,
Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Thompson, Ms.
Schakowsky, Mr. Murphy.
CLOSED SESSION
Mr. Hoekstra moved to close the meeting because national
security would be endangered if the matters to be considered
were disclosed. The motion was agreed to by a record vote of 21
ayes to 0 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Hastings, Mr. Boswell, Mr.
Cramer, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Ruppersberger, Mr. Tierney,
Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Murphy, Mr.
Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr. Gallegly, Mrs. Wilson, Mr.
Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt, Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
Voting no: None.
Mr. Hoekstra offered an amendment to modify the classified
Schedule of Authorizations. The amendment was adopted by voice
vote.
Ms. Schakowsky offered an amendment to modify the funding
level for a program contained in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations.
OPEN SESSION
After debate, the Committee returned to open session. The
Schakowsky amendment was not agreed to by a record vote of 7
ayes to 14 noes:
Voting aye: Mr. Hastings, Ms. Eshoo, Mr. Holt, Mr. Tierney,
Mr. Thompson, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. Murphy.
Voting no: Mr. Reyes, Mr. Boswell, Mr. Cramer, Mr.
Ruppersberger, Mr. Langevin, Mr. Hoekstra, Mr. Everett, Mr.
Gallegly, Mrs. Wilson, Mr. Thornberry, Mr. McHugh, Mr. Tiahrt,
Mr. Rogers, Mr. Issa.
By voice vote the Committee adopted the Chairman's
amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.
By voice vote, the Committee adopted a motion by the
Chairman to favorably report the bill H.R. 2082 to the House,
as amended.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of the Amendment
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101--Authorization of appropriations
Section 101 of the bill authorizes appropriations for the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence; the Central
Intelligence Agency; the Department of Defense; the Defense
Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the
Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force; the Coast Guard;
the Department of State; the Department of the Treasury; the
Department of Justice; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the
Drug Enforcement Administration; the National Reconnaissance
Office; the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and the
Department of Homeland Security.
Section 102--Classified Schedule of Authorizations
Section 102 provides that the amounts and personnel
ceilings authorized under Section 101 shall be specified in the
accompanying classified Schedule of Authorizations, which shall
be made available to the Committee on Appropriations and to the
President.
Section 103--Personnel ceiling adjustments
Section 103 permits the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI) to authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess
of two percent of the authorized number when the DNI determines
that it is necessary to the performance of important
intelligence functions. This section also requires the DNI to
promptly notify the congressional intelligence committees
whenever he exercises the authority granted under this section.
Section 104--Intelligence Community Management Account
Section 104 authorizes specified personnel and funds for
the Intelligence Community Management Account, as well as
additional personnel and funds in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations. This section also provides for the detail of
personnel to the staff of that account on a reimbursable basis
or on a non-reimbursable basis for periods of less than one
year for the performance of temporary functions. In addition,
this section authorizes funding for the National Drug
Intelligence Center.
Section 105--Incorporation of reporting requirements
Section 105 provides that each requirement to submit a
report to the congressional intelligence committees included in
the joint explanatory statement to accompany the conference
report on the bill is incorporated into the Act and made a
requirement in law.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201--Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes funds for the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) Retirement and Disability System.
Section 202--Technical amendment to mandatory retirement provision
Section 202 updates the CIA mandatory retirement provision
to reflect the abolition of pay grades within the Senior
Intelligence Service and the CIA's adoption of the revised
Senior Intelligence Service program in February 2004.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROVISIONS
Section 301--Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 301 permits the authorized amounts to be increased
to provide increases in compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Section 302--Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of funds in
this act does not constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity not otherwise authorized by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.
Section 303--Clarification of definition of Intelligence Community
under the National Security Act of 1947
Section 303 provides a technical clarification with respect
to designation of members of the Intelligence Community.
Section 304--Extension to the Intelligence Community of authority to
delete information about receipt and disposition of foreign
gifts
Section 304 allows the head of any intelligence agency to
delete information about the donation of foreign gifts if the
head of such agency certifies in writing to the Secretary of
State that the publication of such information could adversely
affect United States intelligence sources or methods.
Gifts received in the course of ordinary contact between
senior officials of elements of the Intelligence Community and
their foreign counterparts should not be excluded under the
provisions of this amendment unless there is a serious concern
that such contacts and gifts would adversely affect United
States intelligence sources or methods.
Section 305--Modification of requirements for reprogramming of funds
for intelligence activities
Section 305 makes the requirements for Intelligence
Community reprogramming of funds consistent with transfer
provisions in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458).
Section 306--Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for
intelligence collection personnel
Section 306 permits the DNI to delegate authority to
approve certain travel on common carriers to the heads of
individual Intelligence Community elements. It also allows
further delegation of that authority by those elements pursuant
to guidelines developed by the DNI and requires such guidelines
to be submitted to the congressional intelligence committees.
Section 307--Report on pay for performance of Intelligence Community
personnel
Section 307 prohibits the implementation of pay-for-
performance compensation reform until 45 days after the DNI
submits a report to the congressional intelligence committees
detailing the proposed plan, performance appraisal standards,
implementation guidelines, accountability mechanisms and
projected impact on the workforce.
Section 308--Plan to increase diversity in the Intelligence Community
Section 308 requires the DNI to submit a strategic plan to
increase diversity in the Intelligence Community. In developing
this plan, the DNI should coordinate with the head of each
agency to ensure that each agency has a specific implementation
plan to increase diversity. The Intelligence Community is
authorized to obligate or expend only 80 percent of the amount
appropriated to the Intelligence Community Management Account
until the report is delivered to Congress.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Section 401--Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence
Section 401 clarifies that the prohibition on the co-
location of the DNI with any other Intelligence Community
element applies only to the co-location of the headquarters of
each.
Section 402--Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the
Transportation Security Oversight Board
Section 402 adds the Director of National Intelligence or
his designee to the Transportation Security Oversight Board.
Section 403--Additional duties of the Director of Science and
Technology of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence
Section 403 redefines the responsibilities and duties of
the DNI Director of Science and Technology and the DNI Science
and Technology Committee to ensure better science and
technology prioritization and coordination across the
Intelligence Community. This section further requires the DNI
to submit to Congress a report outlining the strategy for the
development and use of technology in the Intelligence Community
through 2018.
Section 404--Leadership and location of certain offices and officials
Section 404 includes the Director of the National
Counterproliferation Center (NCPC), the Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center, the Chief Information Officer
and the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community in the
list of officers within the Office of the DNI. This section
also provides that the NCPC Director shall be appointed by the
DNI and that the office located within the Office of the DNI.
Section 405--Eligibility for incentive awards of personnel assigned to
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Section 405 authorizes the DNI and the Director of the CIA
to provide incentive awards to federal employees and military
personnel assigned to the Office of the DNI.
Section 406--Multi-level security clearances
Section 406 directs the Director of National Intelligence
within 180 days after the date of enactment of the Act to
establish and oversee the implementation of a uniform,
flexible, multi-level security clearance system across the
Intelligence Community to fully leverage the cultural,
linguistic and technical skills of subject matter experts and
others proficient in foreign languages critical to national
security.
The Committee believes that the prompt implementation of a
uniform, multi-level security clearance system across the
Intelligence Community would greatly enhance the ability of the
Intelligence Community to carry out its mission. Many of these
individuals with cultural knowledge and language skills
critical to the Intelligence Community's work are prevented
from working for the Intelligence Community under the current
security clearance standards and processes. Therefore, the
Committee believes that it is essential to expeditiously
implement this new system.
Section 407--National intelligence estimate on global climate change
Section 407 requires the DNI to submit to Congress a
National Intelligence Estimate on the impact to U.S. national
security of the geopolitical effects brought about by global
climate change. The Committee is encouraged that the National
Intelligence Council (NIC) is presently engaged in a broad-
based review of this issue with the aim of producing a National
Intelligence Assessment by the summer. (The NIC has indicated
that the document may alternatively be a National Intelligence
Estimate.) The Committee believes that this matter should, in
fact, be given the weight of a formal National Intelligence
Estimate.
Anticipated environmental changes connected to global
climate change represent a potentially significant threat
multiplier for instability around the world. Conflict over
scarce resources could result in increased pressure on already
fragile countries. Under such circumstances, these countries
are at greater risk of losing control over their populations
and of becoming terrorist safe havens. These developments could
have serious implications for military commanders and
intelligence operations.
Eleven former three- and four-star admirals and generals
recently issued a report highlighting the national security
implications of global climate change and urging greater study
of the physical or economic threats to the United States.
A National Intelligence Estimate will aid policymakers in
understanding the national security implications of global
climate change. While the Committee defers to the NIC in
determining the precise scope and parameters of this study, the
estimate should include an assessment of the impact of global
climate change on Intelligence Community operations, personnel,
and resources globally.
The Committee does not anticipate that producing an
Estimate will require the diversion of any collection assets
away from other key priorities. Cost of the core analytic work
is already being performed by professionals from across the IC
who study the environment and resource issues and who are
drafting the National Intelligence Assessment. Also, the
scientific data needed for the Estimate is mostly open source
material that is already in the possession of the U.S.
government.
Section 408--Plan to implement recommendations of the Data Center
Efficiency Reports
Section 408 requires the DNI to develop a plan to implement
the recommendations of the Environmental Protection Agency
report on improving data center efficiency under the Energy
Star Program.
The Committee believes that the Intelligence Community has
a responsibility to assess its use of environmental resources
as it looks for ways to relieve its power, space, and cooling
challenges with regard to its use of data centers.
Section 409--Comprehensive inventory of special access programs
Section 409 requires the DNI to provide a comprehensive
inventory of special access programs to the Committee.
Section 410--Quarterly intelligence reports to Congress on Iran and
North Korea
Section 410 requires the DNI to report to the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees every 90 days on the current
intentions and capabilities of Iran and North Korea with regard
to their nuclear programs.
Iran and North Korea are among the greatest strategic
threats to U.S. national security. Both countries' efforts to
develop a nuclear weapons capability undermine regional
security, and present an ongoing challenge to U.S. interests
globally. This provision is intended to ensure that the
Committee receives reports related to this important subject
matter on a routine and structured basis to further oversight
objectives regarding the collection and analysis of information
regarding these threats.
Section 411--Accountability in intelligence contracting
Section 411 requires the DNI to provide a series of reports
to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees to promote
greater accountability in intelligence contracting. The section
requires the DNI to provide the intelligence committees with an
annual report on contractors committing waste, fraud, abuse,
failing to perform on a contract, or violating the law; review
contract accountability mechanisms; and review the effect of
contractors on the Intelligence Community workforce.
A recent Intelligence Community contractor survey did not
include a review of accountability mechanisms in core
contracts, nor any data to judge whether any contractors have
committed waste, fraud, abuse, or criminal violations. Based on
this and other observations, the Committee has concluded that
Intelligence Community leaders do not have an adequate
understanding of the size and composition of the contractor
work force, a consistent and well-articulated method for
assessing contractor performance, or strategies for managing a
combined staff-contractor workforce. In addition, the Committee
is concerned that the Intelligence Community does not have a
clear definition of what functions are ``inherently
governmental'' and, as a result, whether there are contractors
performing inherently governmental functions.
Section 412--Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the
Intelligence Community
Section 412 requires directs the DNI, in coordination with
the heads of the elements of each intelligence agency, to
report to the Committee on foreign language requirements and
capabilities in the Intelligence Community. This section also
requires the DNI to report on foreign language training tools.
In assessing methods and models for basic, advanced, and
intensive foreign language training, the DNI should explore new
methods for effective language training. For example, one
particularly innovative process, called ``the national network
for language learning,'' brings students together with
professional linguists, learning specialists, experts in the
target language and civilization, and native speaking tutors in
non-traditional settings.
The Intelligence Community's mission increasingly requires
skills fluency in difficult-to-master languages and deep
expertise in foreign cultures. Increasing the number of
employees proficient in hard-target languages will allow the
Intelligence Community to improve its collection and analysis
capabilities.
While the Committee appreciates the steps that the
Intelligence Community has taken to recruit individuals
proficient in foreign languages, the Committee recognizes that
these efforts have not fully met the high demand for language
skills. Additionally, the Committee remains concerned that
neither the Intelligence Community nor the Committee has an
effective and objective mechanism to gauge progress in
improving foreign language capacity and capabilities within the
IC. Factual statistical information will allow Committees of
jurisdiction to better assess the Intelligence Community's
ability to manage language resources.
Section 413--Intelligence Community reports on foreign language
proficiency
Section 413 requires the head of each element of the
Intelligence Community to submit a detailed report to the DNI
providing several different data points concerning the number
of foreign-language-capable positions and personnel at each
such element. This section further requires the DNI to submit
all of these reports to several congressional committees along
with an assessment of foreign language capacity and
capabilities in the Intelligence Community and recommendations
for the elimination of required reports relating to foreign-
language proficiency that the DNI considers outdated.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Section 421--Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
Section 421 establishes in statute the position of the
Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and
requires that the individual serving in such position be
nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate. This
section also describes the duties and authorities of the Deputy
Director, and specifies that the position shall be at Level III
of the Executive Schedule.
Section 422--General authorities of the Central Intelligence Agency
Section 422 clarifies the CIA's authority to transfer funds
to other federal elements to carry out functions which the CIA
is authorized by law to carry out.
Section 423--Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of
the CIA
Section 423 requires the CIA Inspector General to conduct
audits of each covert action program at least once every three
years.
The Committee was dismayed at a recent incident wherein the
Intelligence Community failed to inform the Congress of a
significant covert action activity. This failure to notify
Congress constitutes a violation of the National Security Act
of 1947. Despite agency explanations that the failure was
inadvertent, the Committee is deeply troubled over the fact
that such an oversight could occur, whether intentionally or
inadvertently.
The Committee firmly believes that scrupulous transparency
between the Intelligence Community and this Committee is an
absolute necessity on matters related to covert action. The
Committee intends this audit and reporting requirement to act
as a further check against the risk of insufficient
notification, whether deliberate or inadvertent.
Section 424--Report on audited financial statement progress
Section 424 repeals the requirement for the CIA to submit
an annual report describing steps taken to ensure that its
financial statements can be audited in accordance with
applicable law and Office of Management and Budget
requirements. This section reflects the fact that the CIA has
now submitted, and has promised it will continue to submit,
audited financial statements in accordance with the
Accountability of Tax Dollars Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-289;
31 U.S.C. 3515).
Subtitle C--Other Elements
Section 431--Clarifying amendments relating to Section 105 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004
Section 431 makes a technical correction to section 105 of
the Intelligence Authorization for Fiscal Year 2004, which
clarified that the establishment of the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis within the Department of Treasury and its
reorganization within the Office of Terrorism and Financial
Intelligence did not affect the authorities of the Director of
Central Intelligence with regard to the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis. This section updates section 105 to reflect the
authorities and responsibilities of the DNI as they relate to
these elements of the Department of the Treasury.
Section 432--Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of
the National Counterintelligence Executive
Section 432 makes conforming changes to reflect the
incorporation of the Office of the National Counterintelligence
Executive (NCIX) into the Office of the DNI. These amendments
include the elimination of certain independent administrative
authorities that had been vested in the NCIX when that official
was appointed by and reported to the President prior to
enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), which placed the NCIX under the
authority, direction and control of the DNI.
Section 433--Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug
Enforcement Administration elements in the Intelligence
Community
Section 433 formally includes the Coast Guard and Drug
Enforcement Administration in the list of Intelligence
Community agencies included in the National Security Act.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters
Section 501--Aerial reconnaissance platforms
Section 501 restricts the Secretary of Defense's ability to
terminate the U-2 program until he certifies there will be no
loss of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities in transitioning from the U-2 to the Global Hawk.
This section also requires a comparative study of the two
platforms and a report on the results of the study to be
delivered to the intelligence and armed services committees.
Section 502--Extension of National Commission for Review of Research
and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence
Community
Section 502 extends the reporting deadline for the National
Commission for Review and Research and Development Programs of
the United States Intelligence Community until September 1,
2008, and authorizes funds for the commission's activities. The
commission was originally created in Section 1007 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-
306; 50 U.S.C. 401 note).
Subtitle B--Technical Amendments
Section 511--Technical Amendments relating to the Multiyear National
Intelligence Program
Section 511 updates the ``multiyear national intelligence
program'' provision to incorporate and reflect organizational
and nomenclature changes made by the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458).
Section 512--Technical clarification of certain references to the Joint
Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and
Related Activities
Section 512 makes a technical clarification to reflect the
consolidation of the Joint Military Intelligence Program (JMIP)
and the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities program
(TIARA) into the Military Intelligence Program.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (P.L. 108-458) included a requirement for the DNI to
participate in the development of the annual JMIP and TIARA
budgets and for the Secretary of Defense to consult with the
DNI prior to the transfer or reprogramming of JMIP funds.
Changes provided Section 512 replace the obsolete JMIP and
TIARA references with the new Military Intelligence Program.
Section 513--Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947
Section 513 makes technical changes to the National
Security Act of 1947.
Section 514--Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
Section 514 makes technical changes to the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458)
Section 515--Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule
Section 515 makes technical amendments to the Executive
Schedule relating to the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency and the General Counsel of the Office of the DNI.
Section 516--Technical Amendments to titles of Central Intelligence
Agency positions
Section 516 makes technical changes to correct outdated
references to the Executive Director, Deputy Director for
Operations, and the Deputy Director for Administration in
Section 17(d)(3)(B)(ii) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(3)(B)(ii)).
These amendments reflect the recent changes of the titles
of the Executive Director to the Associate Deputy Director; the
Deputy Director for Operations to the Director of the National
Clandestine Service; and the Deputy Director for Administration
to the Director for Support.
Section 517--Technical amendments relating to redesignation of the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency
Section 517 makes technical changes to the United States
Code reflect the change in name of the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
as provided for in section 921(b) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 (P.L. 108-136).
Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
H.R. 2082--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008
Summary: H.R. 2082 would authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2008 for intelligence activities of the U.S.
Government, for the Intelligence Community Management Account,
and for the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and
Disability System (CIARDS).
This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of
the bill. On that limited basis, CBO estimates that
implementing certain provisions of the bill would cost $406
million in 2008 and approximately $730 million over the 2008-
2012 period, assuming appropriation of the authorized funds.
Enacting H.R. 2082 would not affect direct spending or
revenues.
The unclassified sections of H.R. 2082 would extend an
existing mandate, as defined by the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act (UMRA), on intergovernmental and private-sector entities,
but CBO estimates that the costs of the mandate would not
exceed the annual thresholds established in that act ($67
million for intergovernmental mandates and $134 million for
private-sector mandates in 2007, adjusted annually for
inflation).
Estimated cost to the Federal Government: The estimated
budgetary impact of H.R. 2082 is shown in the following table.
The costs of this legislation fall within budget function 050
(national defense).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
By fiscal year, in millions of dollars--
-----------------------------------------------
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CHANGES IN SPENDING SUBJECT TO APPROPRIATION
Intelligence Community Management Account:
Authorization Level......................................... 738 0 0 0 0 0
Estimated Outlays........................................... 406 258 52 15 0 0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Basis of estimate: Section 104 would authorize the
appropriation of $738 million for the Intelligence Community
Management Account, which provides the principal source of
funding for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
and provides resources for coordination of programs, budget
oversight, and management of the intelligence agencies. CBO
estimates that implementing this provision would cost $406
million in 2008 and approximately $730 million over the 2008-
2012 period, assuming appropriation of the specified amount.
Section 201 would authorize the appropriation of $263
million to CIARDS to cover retirement costs attributable to
military service and various unfunded liabilities. The
appropriation to CIARDS is considered mandatory, and the
authorization under this bill would be the same as assumed in
the CBO baseline. Thus, this estimate does not ascribe any
additional cost to that provision.
Intergovernmental and private-sector impact: The
unclassified sections of this bill would extend the National
Commission for the Review of the Research and Development
Programs of the U.S. Intelligence Community and the authority
of the commission to subpoena testimony and evidence. State,
local, and tribal governments, and entities in the private
sector, if subpoenaed by the commission, would be required to
provide testimony, documents, or other evidence. CBO expects
that the commission would likely exercise this authority
sparingly and that the costs to comply with a subpoena would
not be significant. Thus, CBO estimates that the costs to
public and private entities would be small and well below the
annual thresholds established in UMRA ($67 million for
intergovernmental mandates and $134 million for private-sector
mandates in 2007, adjusted annually for inflation).
The remaining unclassified provisions of the bill contain
no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates and would
impose no costs on state, local, or tribal governments.
Estimate prepared by: Federal Costs: Jason Wheelock. Impact
on State, Local, and Tribal Governments: Melissa Merrell.
Impact on the Private Sector: David Arthur.
Estimate approved by: Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy Assistant
Director for Budget Analysis.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT ACT
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY
SYSTEM
* * * * * * *
Part D--Benefits Accruing to Certain Participants
* * * * * * *
SEC. 235. MANDATORY RETIREMENT.
(a) * * *
(b) Mandatory Retirement for Age.--
(1) In general.--A participant in the system shall be
automatically retired from the Agency--
[(A) upon reaching age 65, in the case of a
participant in the system receiving
compensation under the Senior Intelligence
Service pay schedule at the rate of level 4 or
above; and]
(A) upon reaching age 65, in the case of a
participant in the system serving in a position
with a Senior Intelligence Service rank of
level 4 or above;
* * * * * * *
----------
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
short title
That this Act may be cited as the ``National Security Act of
1947''.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy.
* * * * * * *
Title I--Coordination for National Security
Sec. 101. National Security Council.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 104B. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 120. Annual reports on foreign language proficiency.
* * * * * * *
Title V--Accountability for Intelligence Activities
Sec. 501. General congressional oversight provisions.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 508. Quarterly intelligence reports to Congress on Iran and North
Korea.
Sec. 509. Report on intelligence community contractors.
Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence
community.
* * * * * * *
DEFINITIONS
Sec. 3. As used in this Act:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(4) The term ``intelligence community'' includes the
following:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(H) The intelligence elements of the Army,
the Navy, the Air Force, the Marine Corps, the
Coast Guard, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Drug Enforcement
Administration, and the Department of Energy.
* * * * * * *
(K) The elements of the Department of
Homeland Security concerned with the analysis
of intelligence information[, including the
Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard].
(L) Such other elements of any [other]
department or agency as may be designated by
the President, or designated jointly by the
Director of National Intelligence and the head
of the department or agency concerned, as an
element of the intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
* * * * * * *
RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Sec. 102A. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Budget Authorities.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall
participate in the development by the Secretary of Defense of
the [annual budgets for the Joint Military Intelligence Program
and for Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities] annual
budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor
program or programs.
* * * * * * *
(7)(A) The Director of National Intelligence shall provide a
semi-annual report, beginning April 1, 2005, and ending April
1, 2007, to the President and the Congress regarding
implementation of this [section] subsection.
* * * * * * *
(d) Role of Director of National Intelligence in Transfer and
Reprogramming of Funds.--(1)(A) * * *
(B) The Secretary of Defense shall consult with the Director
of National Intelligence before transferring or reprogramming
funds made available under the [Joint Military Intelligence
Program] Military Intelligence Program or any successor program
or programs.
* * * * * * *
(3) The Director of National Intelligence may only transfer
or reprogram funds referred to in [subparagraph (A)] paragraph
(1)(A)--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(5)(A) A transfer or reprogramming of funds [or personnel]
may be made under this subsection only if--
(i) * * *
* * * * * * *
(l) Enhanced Personnel Management.--(1) * * *
(2)(A) * * *
(B) The Director may prescribe regulations to carry out this
[section] paragraph.
* * * * * * *
(n) Acquisition and Other Authorities.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(s) Multi-Level Security Clearances.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall establish a multi-level security
clearance system for the intelligence community to enable the
intelligence community to more efficiently make use of persons
proficient in foreign languages or with cultural, linguistic,
or other subject matter expertise that is critical to national
security.
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Sec. 103. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Composition.--The Office of the Director of National
Intelligence is composed of the following:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(9) The Chief Information Officer of the intelligence
community.
(10) The Inspector General of the intelligence
community.
(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center.
(12) The Director of the National Counter
Proliferation Center.
[(9)] (13) Such other offices and officials as may be
established by law or the Director may establish or
designate in the Office, including national
intelligence centers.
* * * * * * *
(e) Limitation on Co-Location [With] of Headquarters With
Headquarters of Other Elements of Intelligence Community.--
Commencing as of October 1, 2008, the headquarters of the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence may not be co-
located with the headquarters of any other element of the
intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Sec. 103E. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Duties.--The Director of Science and Technology shall--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(4) assist the Director on the science and technology
elements of the budget of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence; [and]
(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the
elements of the intelligence community to meet the
technology needs of the intelligence community; and
[(5)] (6) perform other such duties as may be
prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence or
specified by law.
(d) Director of National Intelligence Science and Technology
Committee.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) The Committee shall--
(A) coordinate and prioritize advances in research
and development related to intelligence; and
* * * * * * *
(4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall
identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be
executed by elements of the intelligence community.
(e) Goals for Technology Needs of Intelligence Community.--In
carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director of Science and
Technology shall--
(1) systematically identify and assess the most
significant intelligence challenges that require
technical solutions;
(2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of
research programs; and
(3) ensure that programs are designed to meet the
technical requirements of the intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 104B. (a) Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency.--There is a Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
(b) Duties.--The Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency shall--
(1) assist the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency in carrying out the duties and responsibilities
of the Director; and
(2) act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency during the absence
or disability of the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency, or during a vacancy in the
position of Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency.
* * * * * * *
ANNUAL REPORT ON IMPROVEMENT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR AUDITING
PURPOSES
Sec. 114A. Not later each year than the date provided in
section 507, the Director of National Intelligence, [the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,] the Director of
the National Security Agency, the Director of the Defense
Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the National Imagery
and Mapping Agency shall each submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report describing the activities
being undertaken by such official to ensure that the financial
statements of such agency can be audited in accordance with
applicable law and requirements of the Office of Management and
Budget.
* * * * * * *
TRAVEL ON ANY COMMON CARRIER FOR CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
PERSONNEL
Sec. 116. (a) * * *
(b) Authorized Delegation of Duty.--(1) The Director of
National Intelligence [may only delegate the authority granted
by this section to the Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence, or with respect to employees of the Central
Intelligence Agency, to the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.] may delegate the authority in subsection
(a) to the head of any other element of the intelligence
community.
(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community to
whom the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant to
paragraph (1) may further delegate such authority to such
senior officials of such element as are specified in guidelines
prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence for
purposes of this paragraph.
* * * * * * *
NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
Sec. 119. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Reporting.--(1) * * *
(2) The matters described in this paragraph are as follows:
(A) * * *
(B) The activities of the Directorate of Intelligence
of the National Counterterrorism Center under
[subsection (h)] subsection (i).
* * * * * * *
NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION CENTER
Sec. 119A. (a) [Establishment.--Not later than 18 months
after the date of the enactment of the National Security
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the] (1) Establishment.--The
President shall establish a National Counter Proliferation
Center, taking into account all appropriate government tools to
prevent and halt the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials and
technologies.
(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter Proliferation
Center shall be the Director of the National Counter
Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the Director of
National Intelligence.
(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center
shall be located within the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
* * * * * * *
ANNUAL REPORTS ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY
Sec. 120. (a) In General.--The head of each element of the
intelligence community shall annually submit to the Director of
National Intelligence a report on the foreign language
proficiency of the personnel of such element.
(b) Contents.--
(1) In general.--Each report submitted under
subsection (a) shall include, for each foreign language
and, where appropriate, dialect of a foreign language--
(A) the number of positions of such element
that require proficiency in the foreign
language or dialect;
(B) the number of personnel of such element
that are serving in a position that--
(i) requires proficiency in the
foreign language or dialect to perform
the primary duty of the position; and
(ii) does not require proficiency in
the foreign language or dialect to
perform the primary duty of the
position;
(C) the number of personnel that are
proficient in the foreign language or dialect
that--
(i) are authorized for the element of
the intelligence community for which
the report is submitted; and
(ii) the head of such element
considers necessary for such element
for each of the five years following
the date of the submission of the
report;
(D) the number of personnel of such element
rated at each level of proficiency of the
Interagency Language Roundtable;
(E) whether the number of personnel at each
level of proficiency of the Interagency
Language Roundtable meets the requirements of
such element;
(F) the number of personnel serving or hired
to serve as linguists for such element that are
not qualified as linguists under the standards
of the Interagency Language Roundtable;
(G) the number of personnel hired to serve as
linguists for such element during the preceding
calendar year;
(H) the number of personnel serving as
linguists that discontinued serving such
element during the preceding calendar year;
(I) the percentage of work requiring
linguistic skills that is fulfilled by an ally
of the United States;
(J) the percentage of work requiring
linguistic skills that is fulfilled by
contractors; and
(K) the percentage of work requiring
linguistic skills that is fulfilled by members
of the Armed Forces.
(2) Military personnel.--Except as provided in
paragraph (1)(K), a report submitted under subsection
(a) shall not include personnel that are members of the
Armed Forces on active duty assigned to the element for
which the report is submitted.
(c) Dni Report to Congress.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall annually submit to the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Defense of
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives
and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee
on Defense of the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate a
report containing--
(1) each report submitted to the Director of National
Intelligence for a year under subsection (a);
(2) an assessment of the foreign language capacity
and capabilities of the intelligence community as a
whole; and
(3) recommendations for eliminating required reports
relating to foreign-language proficiency that the
Director of National Intelligence considers outdated or
no longer relevant.
* * * * * * *
TITLE V--ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
GENERAL CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PROVISIONS
Sec. 501. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(f) As used in this section, the term ``intelligence
activities'' includes covert actions as defined in section
[503(e)] 503(g), and includes financial intelligence
activities.
REPORTING OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OTHER THAN COVERT ACTIONS
Sec. 502. (a) In General.--To the extent consistent with due
regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of
classified information relating to sensitive intelligence
sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters,
the Director of National Intelligence and the heads of all
departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States
Government involved in intelligence activities shall--
(1) keep the congressional intelligence committees
fully and currently informed of all intelligence
activities, other than a covert action (as defined in
section [503(e)] 503(g)), which are the responsibility
of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on
behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of the
United States Government, including any significant
anticipated intelligence activity and any significant
intelligence failure; and
* * * * * * *
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL AND REPORTING OF COVERT ACTIONS
Sec. 503. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.--
(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the
Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency
shall conduct an audit of each covert action at least
every three years.
(2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector
General of the Central Intelligence Agency is not
required to conduct an audit under paragraph (1) of a
covert action that has been terminated or suspended if
such covert action was terminated or suspend prior to
the last audit of such covert action conducted by the
Inspector General and has not been restarted after the
date on which such audit was completed.
(3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the
completion of an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph
(1), the Inspector General of the Central Intelligence
Agency shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report containing the results of such
audit.
* * * * * * *
[(e)] (g) As used in this title, the term ``covert action''
means an activity or activities of the United States Government
to influence political, economic, or military conditions
abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States
Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly, but
does not include--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
FUNDING OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 504. (a) Appropriated funds available to an intelligence
agency may be obligated or expended for an intelligence or
intelligence-related activity only if--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) in the case of funds specifically authorized by
the Congress for a different activity--
(A) * * *
[(B) the need for funds for such activity is
based on unforseen requirements; and]
(B) the activity to be funded supports an
emergent need, improves program effectiveness,
or increases efficiency; and
* * * * * * *
(c) No funds appropriated for, or otherwise available to, any
department, agency, or entity of the United States Government
may be expended, or may be directed to be expended, for any
covert action, as defined in section [503(e)] 503(g), unless
and until a Presidential finding required by subsection (a) of
section 503 has been signed or otherwise issued in accordance
with that subsection.
* * * * * * *
DATES FOR SUBMITTAL OF VARIOUS ANNUAL AND SEMIANNUAL REPORTS TO THE
CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES
Sec. 507. (a) Annual Reports.--(1) The date for the submittal
to the congressional intelligence committees of the following
annual reports shall be the date each year provided in
subsection (c)(1)(A):
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(N)] (J) The annual report on hiring and retention
of minority employees in the intelligence community
required by section 114(c).
(K) The annual report on intelligence community
contractors required by section 509.
(L) The annual report on foreign language proficiency
in the intelligence community required by section 510.
* * * * * * *
QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON IRAN AND NORTH KOREA
Sec. 508. (a) Report.--
(1) In general.--On a quarterly basis, the Director
of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the
current intentions and capabilities of the Islamic
Republic of Iran and Democratic People's Republic of
Korea (North Korea) with regard to the nuclear programs
of Iran and North Korea, respectively, including--
(A) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs;
(B) an evaluation, consistent with existing reporting
standards and practices, of the sources upon which the
intelligence is based, including the number of sources
and the reliability of each source;
(C) a summary of any new intelligence gathered or
developed since the previous report, including
intelligence collected from both open and clandestine
sources; and
(D) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in
knowledge, or other information that would reduce
confidence in the overall assessment.
(2) Form.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) may be
submitted in classified form.
(b) Access to Report.--Each report submitted under subsection
(a)(1) shall be made available to all members of the
congressional intelligence committees and to all staff of the
congressional intelligence committees with appropriate security
clearance. Other members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives may review the reports in accordance with
security procedures established by each of the congressional
intelligence committees.
REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS
Sec. 509. Not later each year than the date provided in
section 507, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report on
contractors funded under the National Intelligence Program.
Such report shall include--
(1) a list of all contractors that--
(A) have been the subject of an investigation
completed by the Inspector General of any
element of the intelligence community during
the preceding fiscal year,
(B) are the subject of an investigation by
such an Inspector General during the current
fiscal year, or
(C) will be the subject of an investigation
that may affect the ability of the contractor
to deliver contracted services to the
intelligence community by such an Inspector
General during the current fiscal year,
either as a corporate entity or an individual employee,
for financial waste, fraud, abuse of government
resources, failure to perform a contract, or criminal
violations; and
(2) the number of contractors performing services for
each element of the intelligence community.
REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Sec. 510. Not later each year than the date provided in
section 507, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit
to the congressional intelligence committees a report on the
foreign language proficiency of each element of the
intelligence community, including--
(1) the number of positions authorized for such
element that require foreign language proficiency and
the level of proficiency required;
(2) the number of positions authorized for such
element that require foreign language proficiency that
are filled by--
(A) military personnel; and
(B) civilian personnel;
(3) the number of applicants for positions in such
element in the previous fiscal year that indicated
foreign language proficiency, including the foreign
language indicated and the proficiency level;
(4) the number of persons hired by such element with
foreign language proficiency, including the foreign
language and proficiency level;
(5) the number of personnel of such element currently
attending foreign language training, including the
provider of such training;
(6) a description of such element's efforts to
recruit, hire, train, and retain personnel that are
proficient in a foreign language; and
(7) an assessment of methods and models for basic,
advanced, and intensive foreign language training.
* * * * * * *
----------
TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
PART III--EMPLOYEES
* * * * * * *
SUBPART A--GENERAL PROVISIONS
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 23--MERIT SYSTEM PRINCIPLES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 2302. Prohibited personnel practices
(a)(1) * * *
(2) For the purpose of this section--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(C) `a`agency'' means an Executive agency and the
Government Printing Office, but does not include--
(i) * * *
(ii) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the [National Imagery and
Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and, as determined by the President,
any Executive agency or unit thereof the
principal function of which is the conduct of
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
activities; or
* * * * * * *
SUBPART B--EMPLOYMENT AND RETENTION
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 31--AUTHORITY FOR EMPLOYMENT
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER II--THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE
* * * * * * *
Sec. 3132. Definitions and exclusions
(a) For the purpose of this subchapter--
(1) ``agency'' means an Executive agency, except a
Government corporation and the Government
Accountability Office, but does not include--
(A) * * *
(B) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Drug Enforcement Administration, the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the [National Imagery and Mapping
Agency] National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, the National Security Agency,
Department of Defense intelligence activities
the civilian employees of which are subject to
section 1590 of title 10,, and, as determined
by the President, an Executive agency, or unit
thereof, whose principal function is the
conduct of foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence activities;
* * * * * * *
SUBPART C--EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 43--PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER I--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 4301. Definitions
For the purpose of this subchapter--
(1) ``agency'' means--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
but does not include--
(i) * * *
(ii) the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the [National
Imagery and Mapping Agency] National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National
Security Agency, or any Executive agency or
unit thereof which is designated by the
President and the principal function of which
is the conduct of foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence activities; or
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 47--PERSONNEL RESEARCH PROGRAMS AND DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 4701. Definitions
(a) For the purpose of this chapter--
(1) ``agency'' means an Executive agency and the
Government Printing Office, but does not include--
(A) * * *
(B) the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the [National Imagery and
Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and, as determined by the President,
any Executive agency or unit thereof which is
designated by the President and which has as
its principal function the conduct of foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence activities;
or
* * * * * * *
SUBPART D--PAY AND ALLOWANCES
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 51--CLASSIFICATION
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5102. Definitions; application
(a) For the purpose of this chapter--
(1) ``agency'' means--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
but does not include--
(i) * * *
* * * * * * *
(x) the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency]
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
Department of Defense.
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 53--PAY RATES AND SYSTEMS
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER II--EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE PAY RATES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5313. Positions at level II
Level II of the Executive Schedule applies to the following
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
* * * * * * *
[Director of Central Intelligence.]
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5314. Positions at level III
Level III of the Executive Schedule applies to the following
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
* * * * * * *
[Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence (2).]
Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5315. Positions at level IV
Level IV of the Executive Schedule applies to the following
positions, for which the annual rate of basic pay shall be the
rate determined with respect to such level under chapter 11 of
title 2, as adjusted by section 5318 of this title:
* * * * * * *
[General Counsel of the Office of the National
Intelligence Director.]
General Counsel of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER IV--PREVAILING RATE SYSTEMS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 5342. Definitions; application
(a) For the purpose of this subchapter--
(1) ``agency'' means an Executive agency; but does
not include--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(K) the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency]
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency,
Department of Defense;
* * * * * * *
SUBPART E--ATTENDANCE AND LEAVE
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 63--LEAVE
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER III--VOLUNTARY TRANSFERS OF LEAVE
* * * * * * *
Sec. 6339. Additional leave transfer programs
(a) For the purpose of this section--
(1) the term ``excepted agency'' means--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(E) the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency]
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; and
* * * * * * *
(2) the term ``head of an excepted agency'' means--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(E) with respect to the [National Imagery and
Mapping Agency, the Director of the National
Imagery and Mapping Agency] National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Director of
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency;
and
* * * * * * *
SUBPART F--LABOR-MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 73--SUITABILITY, SECURITY, AND CONDUCT
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER III--POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
* * * * * * *
Sec. 7323. Political activity authorized; prohibitions
(a) * * *
(b)(1) * * *
(2)(A) * * *
(B) The provisions of subparagraph (A) shall apply to--
(i) an employee of--
(I) * * *
* * * * * * *
(XIII) the [National Imagery and Mapping
Agency] National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency; or
* * * * * * *
SUBCHAPTER IV--FOREIGN GIFTS AND DECORATIONS
* * * * * * *
Sec. 7342. Receipt and disposition of foreign gifts and decorations
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(f)(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(4)(A) In transmitting such listings for the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency may delete the information described in subparagraphs
(A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the Director certifies
in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of
such information could adversely affect United States
intelligence sources.
[(B) In transmitting such listings for the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, the Director of National
Intelligence may delete the information described in
subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the
Director certifies in writing to the Secretary of State that
the publication of such information could adversely affect
United States intelligence sources.]
(4) In transmitting such listings for an element of the
intelligence community (as such term is defined in section 3(4)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))), the
head of such element of the intelligence community may delete
the information described in subparagraphs (A) and (C) of
paragraphs (2) and (3) if the head of such element of the
intelligence community certifies in writing to the Secretary of
State that the publication of such information could adversely
affect United States intelligence sources or methods.
* * * * * * *
----------
TITLE 49, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
SUBTITLE I--DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
CHAPTER 1--ORGANIZATION
* * * * * * *
Sec. 115. Transportation Security Oversight Board
(a) * * *
(b) Membership.--
(1) Number and appointment.--The Board shall be
composed of 7 members as follows:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(F) The Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, or the Director's designee.]
(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or
the Director's designee.
* * * * * * *
----------
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 1984
* * * * * * *
TITLE IV--ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS RELATED TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF
* * * * * * *
ELIGIBILITY FOR INCENTIVE AWARDS
Sec. 402. [(a) The Director of Central Intelligence may
exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5,
United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and
members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the Central
Intelligence Agency or to the Intelligence Community Staff, in
the same manner as such authority may be exercised with respect
to the personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Intelligence Community Staff.]
(a) Authority for Payment of Awards.--(1) The Director of
National Intelligence may exercise the authority granted in
section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, with respect to
Federal employees and members of the Armed Forces detailed or
assigned to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence
in the same manner as such authority may be exercised with
respect to personnel of the Office.
(2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may
exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5,
United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and
members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the Central
Intelligence Agency in the same manner as such authority may be
exercised with respect to personnel of the Agency.
(b) Personnel Eligible for Awards.--The authority granted by
[subsection (a) of this section] subsection (a) may be
exercised with respect to Federal employees or members of the
Armed Forces detailed or assigned [to the Central Intelligence
Agency or to the Intelligence Community Staff] to the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence or to the Central
Intelligence Agency on or after [a date five years before the
date of enactment of this section] December 9, 1978.
[(c) During fiscal year 1987, the Director of Central
Intelligence may exercise the authority granted in section
4503(2) of title 5, United States Code, with respect to members
of the Armed Forces who are assigned to foreign intelligence
duties at the time of the conduct which gives rise to the
exercise of such authority.]
[(d)] (c) Payment and Acceptance of Awards.--An award made by
the [Director of Central Intelligence] Director of National
Intelligence or Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to
an employee or member of the Armed Forces under the authority
of section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, or this section
may be paid and accepted notwithstanding--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
----------
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ACT OF 1949
* * * * * * *
GENERAL AUTHORITIES
Sec. 5. (a) In General.--In the performance of its functions,
the Central Intelligence Agency is authorized to--
(1) Transfer to and receive from other Government agencies
such sums as may be approved by the Office of Management and
Budget, for the performance of [any of the functions or
activities authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section
102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections
(a) and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7),
(d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405),] any functions or activities
authorized by law to be conducted by the Central Intelligence
Agency and any other Government agency is authorized to
transfer to or receive from the Agency such sums without regard
to any provisions of law limiting or prohibiting transfers
between appropriations. Sums transferred to the Agency in
accordance with this paragraph may be expended for the purposes
and under the authority of this Act without regard to
limitations of appropriations from which transferred;
* * * * * * *
SEC. 17. INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE AGENCY.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Semiannual Reports; Immediate Reports of Serious or
Flagrant Problems; Reports of Functional Problems; Reports to
Congress on Urgent Concerns.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) In the event that--
(A) * * *
(B) an investigation, inspection, or audit carried
out by the Inspector General should focus on any
current or former Agency official who--
(i) * * *
(ii) holds or held the position in the
Agency, including such a position held on an
acting basis, of--
(I) [Executive Director] Associate
Deputy Director;
(II) [Deputy Director for Operations]
Director of the National Clandestine
Service;
* * * * * * *
(IV) [Deputy Director for
Administration] Director for Support;
or
* * * * * * *
----------
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2004
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
* * * * * * *
SEC. 105. OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY.
(a) * * *
(b) Construction of Authority.--Nothing in section 311 of
title 31, United States Code (as amended by subsection (a)), or
in section 313 of such title, shall be construed to alter the
authorities and responsibilities of the [Director of Central
Intelligence] Director of National Intelligence with respect to
the Office of Intelligence and Analysis of the Department of
the Treasury as an element of the intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 904 OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ENHANCEMENT ACT OF 2002
SEC. 904. OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(d) General Counsel.--(1) There shall be in the Office of
the National Counterintelligence Executive a general counsel
who shall serve as principal legal advisor to the National
Counterintelligence Executive.
[(2) The general counsel shall--
[(A) provide legal advice and counsel to the
Executive on matters relating to functions of the
Office;
[(B) ensure that the Office complies with all
applicable laws, regulations, Executive orders, and
guidelines; and
[(C) carry out such other duties as the Executive may
specify.]
[(e)] (d) Functions.--Subject to the direction and control of
the National Counterintelligence Executive, the functions of
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive shall
be as follows:
(1) National threat identification and prioritization
assessment.--Subject to [subsection (f)] subsection
(e), in consultation with appropriate department and
agencies of the United States Government, and private
sector entities, to produce on an annual basis a
strategic planning assessment of the
counterintelligence requirements of the United States
to be known as the National Threat Identification and
Prioritization Assessment.
(2) National counterintelligence strategy.--Subject
to [subsection (f)] subsection (e), in consultation
with appropriate department and agencies of the United
States Government, and private sector entities, and
based on the most current National Threat
Identification and Prioritization Assessment under
paragraph (1), to produce on an annual basis a strategy
for the counterintelligence programs and activities of
the United States Government to be known as the
National Counterintelligence Strategy.
* * * * * * *
[(f)] (e) Additional Requirements Regarding National Threat
Identification and Prioritization Assessment and National
Counterintelligence Strategy.--(1) * * *
(2) A National Counterintelligence Strategy under [subsection
(e)(2)] subsection (d)(2), and any modification of such
strategy, shall not go into effect until approved by the
President.
* * * * * * *
[(g)] (f) Personnel.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(3) The employment of personnel by the Office, including the
appointment, compensation and benefits, management, and
separation of such personnel, shall be governed by the
provisions of law on such matters with respect to the personnel
of the Central Intelligence Agency, except that, for purposes
of the applicability of such provisions of law to personnel of
the Office, the National Counterintelligence Executive shall be
treated as the head of the Office.
[(4) Positions in the Office shall be excepted service
positions for purposes of title 5, United States Code.
[(h) Support.--(1) The Attorney General, Secretary of
Defense, and Director of National Intelligence may each provide
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive such
support as may be necessary to permit the Office to carry out
its functions under this section.
[(2) Subject to any terms and conditions specified by the
Director of National Intelligence, the Director may provide
administrative and contract support to the Office as if the
Office were an element of the Central Intelligence Agency.
[(3) Support provided under this subsection may be provided
on a reimbursable or nonreimbursable basis, at the election of
the official providing such support.
[(i) Availability of Funds for Reimbursement.--The National
Counterintelligence Executive may, from amounts available for
the Office, transfer to a department or agency detailing
personnel under subsection (g), or providing support under
subsection (h), on a reimbursable basis amounts appropriate to
reimburse such department or agency for the detail of such
personnel or the provision of such support, as the case may be.
[(j) Contracts.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the National
Counterintelligence Executive may enter into any contract,
lease, cooperative agreement, or other transaction that the
Executive considers appropriate to carry out the functions of
the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive under
this section.
[(2) The authority under paragraph (1) to enter into
contracts, leases, cooperative agreements, and other
transactions shall be subject to any terms, conditions, and
limitations applicable to the Central Intelligence Agency under
law with respect to similar contracts, leases, cooperative
agreements, and other transactions.]
[(k)] (g) Treatment of Activities Under Certain
Administrative Laws.--The files of the Office shall be treated
as operational files of the Central Intelligence Agency for
purposes of section 701 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 431) to the extent such files meet criteria under
subsection (b) of that section for treatment of files as
operational files of an element of the Agency.
[(l)] (h) Oversight by Congress.--The location of the Office
of the National Counterintelligence Executive within the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence shall not be construed
as affecting access by Congress, or any committee of Congress,
to--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
[(m)] (i) Construction.--Nothing in this section shall be
construed as affecting the authority of the Director of
National Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary
of State, the Attorney General, or the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation as provided or specified under the
National Security Act of 1947 or under other provisions of law.
----------
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2003
* * * * * * *
TITLE X--NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR REVIEW OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1007. FINAL REPORT; TERMINATION.
(a) Final Report.--Not later than [September 1, 2004]
September 1, 2008, the Commission shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees, the Director of Central
Intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense a final report as
required by section 1002(h)(2).
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 1403 OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR
1991
[SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM]
SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
(a) Annual Submission of Multiyear National [Foreign]
Intelligence Program.--The [Director of Central Intelligence]
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional committees specified in subsection (d) each year
a multiyear national [foreign] intelligence program plan
reflecting the estimated expenditures and proposed
appropriations required to support that program. Any such
multiyear national [foreign] intelligence program plan shall
cover the fiscal year with respect to which the budget is
submitted and at least four succeeding fiscal years.
(b) Time of Submission.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall submit the report required by subsection (a)
each year at or about the same time that the budget is
submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31,
United States Code.
(c) Consistency With Budget Estimates.--The [Director of
Central Intelligence] Director of National Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the estimates referred
to in subsection (a) are consistent with the budget estimates
submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105(a) of title 31,
United States Code, for the fiscal year concerned and with the
estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations for the
multiyear defense program submitted pursuant to section 114a of
title 10, United States Code.
* * * * * * *
----------
NATIONAL SECURITY INTELLIGENCE REFORM ACT OF 2004
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--REFORM OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
* * * * * * *
Subtitle A--Establishment of Director of National Intelligence
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1016. INFORMATION SHARING.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(e) Implementation Plan Report.--Not later than one year
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President
shall, with the assistance of the program manager, submit to
Congress a report containing an implementation plan for the
ISE. The report shall include the following:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(10) A delineation of the roles of the Federal
departments and agencies that will participate in the
ISE, including an identification of the agencies that
will deliver the infrastructure needed to operate and
manage the ISE (as distinct from individual department
or agency components that are part of the ISE), with
such delineation of roles to be consistent with--
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(B) the authority of the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Attorney General, and
the role of the Department of Homeland Security
and the [Attorney General] Department of
Justice, in coordinating with State, local, and
tribal officials and the private sector.
* * * * * * *
Subtitle F--Privacy and Civil Liberties
SEC. 1061. PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Access to Information.--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(4) Exceptions for national security.--
(A) In general.--If the [National
Intelligence Director] Director of National
Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney
General, determines that it is necessary to
withhold information requested under paragraph
(3) to protect the national security interests
of the United States, the head of the
department or agency concerned shall not
furnish such information to the Board.
* * * * * * *
(h) Security Clearances.--The appropriate departments and
agencies of the executive branch shall cooperate with the Board
to expeditiously provide Board members and staff with
appropriate security clearances to the extent possible under
applicable procedures and requirements. Promptly upon
commencing its work, the Board shall adopt, after consultation
with the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, and the
[National Intelligence Director] Director of National
Intelligence, rules and procedures of the Board for physical,
communications, computer, document, personnel, and other
security in relation to the work of the Board.
* * * * * * *
Subtitle G--Conforming and Other Amendments
SEC. 1071. CONFORMING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO ROLES OF DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(e) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.--[(1)] The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801
et seq.) is amended by striking ``Director of Central
Intelligence'' each place it appears and inserting ``Director
of National Intelligence''.
* * * * * * *
SEC. 1072. OTHER CONFORMING AMENDMENTS
(a) * * *
(b) Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949.--Section 6 of
the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is
amended by striking ``section 103(c)(7) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3(c)(7))'' and inserting
``section 102A(i) of the National Security Act of 1947''.
* * * * * * *
----------
INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004
* * * * * * *
TITLE II--FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SEC. 2001. IMPROVEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) National Intelligence Workforce.--(1) In developing and
maintaining a national intelligence workforce under subsection
(b), the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall,
develop and maintain a specialized and integrated national
intelligence workforce consisting of agents, analysts,
linguists, and surveillance specialists who are recruited,
trained, and rewarded in a manner which ensures the existence
within the Federal Bureau of Investigation of an institutional
culture with substantial expertise in, and commitment to, the
intelligence mission of the Bureau.
* * * * * * *
(e) Discharge of Improvements.--(1) * * *
(2) The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation shall
carry out subsections (b) through (d) under the joint guidance
of the Attorney General and [the National Intelligence Director
in a manner consistent with section 112(e)] the Director of
National Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable
law.
(f) Budget Matters.--The Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation [shall,] shall establish a budget structure of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation to reflect the four
principal missions of the Bureau as follows:
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
SEC. 2006. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION USE OF TRANSLATORS.
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and annually thereafter, the Attorney General of the
United States shall submit to the Committee on the Judiciary of
the Senate and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives a report that contains, with respect to each
preceding 12-month period--
(1) * * *
(2) any legal or practical impediments to using
translators employed by [the] Federal, State, or local
agencies on a full-time, part-time, or shared basis;
(3) the needs of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
for [the] specific translation services in certain
languages, and recommendations for meeting those needs;
* * * * * * *
----------
TITLE 44, UNITED STATES CODE
* * * * * * *
CHAPTER 13--PARTICULAR REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS
Sec.
1301. Agriculture, Department of: report of Secretary.
* * * * * * *
[1336. National Imagery and Mapping Agency: special publications.]
1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special publications.
* * * * * * *
[Sec. 1336. National Imagery and Mapping Agency: special publications]
Sec. 1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special
publications
The Director of the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency]
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency may authorize the
printing of notices to mariners, light lists, sailing
directions, bulletins, and other special publications of the
[National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency in editions the interests of the Government
and of the public may require.
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 201 OF THE HOMELAND SECURITY ACT OF 2002
SEC. 201. DIRECTORATE FOR INFORMATION ANALYSIS AND INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION.
(a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(f) Detail of Personnel.--
(1) * * *
(2) Covered agencies.--The agencies referred to in
this paragraph are as follows:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
(E) The [National Imagery and Mapping Agency]
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 8H OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT OF 1978
* * * * * * *
Sec. 8H.(a)(1)(A) An employee of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance
Office, or the National Security Agency, or of a contractor of
any of those Agencies, who intends to report to Congress a
complaint or information with respect to an urgent concern may
report the complaint or information to the Inspector General of
the Department of Defense (or designee).
* * * * * * *
(g)(1) The Inspector General of the Defense Intelligence
Agency, the [National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance
Office, and the National Security Agency shall each submit to
the congressional intelligence committees each year a report
that sets forth the following:
(A) * * *
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 105 OF THE ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1978
CUSTODY OF AND PUBLIC ACCESS TO REPORTS
Sec. 105. (a) Each agency, each supervising ethics office in
the executive or judicial branch, the Clerk of the House of
Representatives, and the Secretary of the Senate shall make
available to the public, in accordance with subsection (b),
each report filed under this title with such agency or office
or with the Clerk or the Secretary of the Senate, except that--
(1) this section does not require public availability of a
report filed by any individual in the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the [National Imagery and Mapping
Agency] National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, or the
National Security Agency, or any individual engaged in
intelligence activities in any agency of the United States, if
the President finds or has found that, due to the nature of the
office or position occupied by such individual, public
disclosure of such report would, be revealing the identity of
the individual or other sensitive information, compromise the
national interest of the United States; and such individuals
may be authorized, notwithstanding section 104(a), to file such
additional reports as are necessary to protect their identity
from public disclosure if the President first finds or has
found that such filing is necessary in the national interest;
and
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 7 OF THE EMPLOYEE POLYGRAPH PROTECTION ACT OF 1988
SEC. 7. EXEMPTIONS.
(a) * * *
(b) National Defense and Security Exemption.--
(1) * * *
(2) Security.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed
to prohibit the administration, by the Federal
Government, in the performance of any intelligence or
counterintelligence function, of any lie detector test
to--
(A)(i) any individual employed by, assigned
to, or detailed to, the National Security
Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
[National Imagery and Mapping Agency] National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, or the Central
Intelligence Agency,
* * * * * * *
----------
SECTION 207 OF THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 1993
Sec. 207. (a)(1) * * *
(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply to (A) individual printing
orders costing not more than $1,000, if the work is not of a
continuing or repetitive nature, and, as certified by the
Public Printer, if the work is included in a class of work
which cannot be provided more economically through the
Government Printing Office, (B) printing for the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, [National
Imagery and Mapping Agency] National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, or the National Security Agency, or (C) printing from
other sources that is specifically authorized by law.
* * * * * * *
MINORITY VIEWS
We join with our majority colleagues in the provisions of
this bill that provide bipartisan support to critical national
security programs protecting our nation in a time of continued
struggle against worldwide threats posed by radical jihadists
and others who seek to harm America and its interests. We have
significant concerns, however, that aspects of this bill would
begin to take us back to the failed, politically-based,
policies of the 1990s that dangerously impaired our national
security and intelligence capabilities by questionable
allocation and underfunding of resources and significant
``politically correct'' restrictions and constraints on
intelligence operations.
In numerous important respects, this bill fails to provide
adequate support to intelligence community activities at the
forefront of its ability to protect our national security. In
the classified annex, the majority cuts human intelligence
programs counter to the recommendations of the 9111 Commission,
and significantly cuts certain specific initiatives related to
America's efforts to counter radical jihadists and to support
our nation's objectives in Iraq. In another key intelligence
collection area, the bill would have dramatically cut key
activities had a Republican amendment to preserve the resources
for a vital classified national intelligence capability not
succeeded. In yet another key area, a Democratic amendment
would have terminated one of America's most essential
programs--which has been conducted in full accordance with the
law and under close oversight by the Committee--had it not been
defeated after Republican opposition.
While it is not possible to describe these issues in
greater detail due to the classified nature of the programs and
the Schedule of Authorizations, these are the most significant
shortcomings of the bill and we wish to strongly emphasize the
importance of these programs and this funding in a time of
continued threat. We are a nation locked in a struggle with
radical jihadists, and facing continued uncertainty and other
threats around the globe. Republicans will not diminish our
support for a robust, empowered, and capable intelligence
community that provides our first line of defense.
The Committee also failed to support the intelligence
community and our national defense against attack by rejecting
a Republican amendment to include important legislation to
modernize the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. This
identical language passed the House of Representatives last
year with bipartisan support. In fact, just over six months ago
the bill was reported from this Committee by voice vote. The
current legal framework governing electronic surveillance of
foreign terrorists and spies is outdated. It significantly
impairs the responsiveness of the intelligence community while
simultaneously diverting resources away from protecting the
privacy and civil liberties of Americans. Legal uncertainty
with respect to FISA continues to threaten our capabilities to
detect and prevent potential terrorist acts, and it is critical
for the Congress to act immediately to definitively clarify the
statute to preserve necessary capabilities, control the
exercise of authority by the Executive Branch affecting civil
liberties, and forestall the possibility that the matter would
be improperly legislated by unelected judges.
In addition to these significant shortcomings, we are
concerned that this bill begins a return to the ``politically
correct'' intelligence policies that undermined the
capabilities of the United States IC in the 1990s. There is no
better illustration of this problem than Section 407 of the
bill, which would require the intelligence community to direct
its resources to a National Intelligence Estimate on global
climate change when answers to even fundamental questions about
al Qaeda and such potential adversaries as Iran, North Korea,
and China remain unknown due to their inherent challenge. The
majority decries that investments in Iraq are undermining the
IC's ability to provide information on other priorities around
the world. We believe that studies such as this are far less
important than emphasizing intelligence support to our military
forces in harm's way.
In this bill, the intelligence community is not being asked
to assess whether global warming is a reality; it is being
asked to analyze supposed risks from global warming as an
intelligence issue. The task of the intelligence community is
to steal foreign secrets. Global climate change simply does not
require clandestinely acquired, classified information or
analysis. The United States is spending more than $6.5 billion
in FY07 on global climate change. Thousands of reports have
been paid for on global climate change across the U.S.
government. Hundreds of universities and private organizations
have written many more reports on climate change. This is not
the time to force our intelligence professionals to waste
scarce intelligence resources on trendy topics such as global
warming for the purposes of ``political correctness''.
The bill would also significantly hamper the intelligence
community for the purposes of making a political statement in
Section 307, which would impose prescriptive and burdensome
reporting requirements as a prerequisite to the implementation
of a ``pay for performance'' personnel management system in the
intelligence community. While as a general matter the overall
performance of our personnel remains outstanding, specific
examples of both publicly known and unknown shortcomings should
make the desirability of such incentives to promote and reward
urgency and innovation obvious. This initiative should not be
delayed for the purposes of promoting political agendas. The
Executive Branch has learned many lessons and corrected issues
with earlier such efforts. The pilot program at issue would be
pursued based on those lessons learned.
Finally, it is unfortunate that the Democratic majority
killed Republican efforts to end--or in fact to even audit--
wasteful spending funneled through the intelligence budget that
could have been better directed to true national security
interests. A Republican amendment would have followed the
recommendation of the President's budget and provided for the
termination of the National Drug Intelligence Center (with
transfer of some functions). A formal oversight report by the
Committee on Government Reform last year concluded that NDIC is
``an expensive and duplicative use of scarce Federal drug
enforcement resources.''\1\ The report noted that the agency
overlaps with already-existing drug intelligence centers such
as the Drug Enforcement Administration's El Paso Intelligence
Center. Critics also questioned why a federal intelligence
center would be physically located so far--in Johnstown,
Pennsylvania--from every other Federal drug enforcement agency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\H. Rpt. 109-434, ``2006 Congressional Drug Control Budget and
Policy Assessment: A Review of the 2007 National Drug Control Budget
and 2006 National Drug Control Strategy,'' Committee on Government
Reform, April 25, 2006, at 90.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Democratic majority rejected this amendment even though
nearly $400 million has been spent on this program that media
reports have called a ``boondoggle''. When the amendment
failed, Republicans then offered an amendment to have the
Department of Justice Inspector General conduct a neutral audit
of whether the National Drug Intelligence Center in fact
duplicates functions carried out by other components of the
Department of Justice. Without any substantive explanation,
even this wholly uncontroversial proposition to explore
potential waste and abuse was rejected by a party-line vote.
The annual Intelligence Authorization Act ultimately should
seek to provide the fullest possible support to America's
intelligence community to protect the national security
interests of the United States on behalf of all Americans, and
not to advance political or parochial interests. While many of
the provisions of this bill deserve our support for doing so,
it is important to emphasize our significant concern with the
elements of the legislation that do not.
In addition, we are concerned at an unusual partisan or
political tone to certain specific provisions of the majority's
report. We wish to clarify and provide our view on these
important issues.
TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
Although the issue may appear to be simply one of partisan
semantics, the irresponsible use by the majority of the
political term ``The President's Domestic Surveillance
Program'' to describe an ongoing initiative to detect and
prevent potential terrorist attacks in the United States is
inaccurate, alarmist, and deserves public clarification. The
term, of course, evokes images of the President personally
conducting unfettered snooping on private conversations between
ordinary Americans for purposes that it is implicitly suggested
must be nefarious.
Democratic Committee members have been fully and
extensively briefed on this program, as has the current Speaker
of the House since its inception. Because of its clear
importance to national security, none have called for it to be
ended, and the majority should know full well that its implicit
fearmongering is contrary to the facts. As has publicly been
explained on repeated occasions, the Terrorist Surveillance
Program is limited to international communications between a
user in the United States and one in a foreign country, and
only where probable cause is established to believe that one
end of the conversation is associated with al Qaeda or
affiliated terrorists. The program--which is now subject to the
approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court--is
carried out by career professionals for the limited purpose of
detecting terrorists and potential attacks. The procedures and
constraints which govern it to protect civil liberties are
extensive, as has been recognized on a bipartisan basis by
members of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. As
Democrat Lanny Davis pointed out, ``If the American public,
especially civil libertarians like myself, could be more
informed about how careful the government is to protect our
privacy [in this program] while still protecting us from
attacks, we'd be more reassured.''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\Solomon, ``Oversight Board Told of Privacy Protections,''
Associated Press, November 28, 2006. (http://www.boston.com/news/
nation/washington/articles/2006/11/28/oversight_board
_told_of_privacy_protections/), accessed May 4, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As we noted above, there are significant, serious, and
substantive issues involving the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act that require immediate and careful attention.
As the proxies for the American people with respect to these
classified and highly sensitive matters, the Committee should
seek to help inform the American people on these issues as Mr.
Davis suggested rather than to alarm and mislead them.
AL QAEDA
The Committee Report includes four puzzling sentences about
the threat from al Qaeda. The majority says that it ``is not
satisfied with efforts to defeat the al Qaeda network'',
specifically noting worldwide al Qaeda activity. At the same
time, however, the majority claims that increased Iraq-related
intelligence requirements have drained resources from the fight
against al Qaeda. This contradicts the April 2006 National
Intelligence Estimate, ``Trends in Global Terrorism:
Implications for the United States,'' which said in its
declassified key judgments:
Al-Qa'ida, now merged with Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi's
network, is exploiting the situation in Iraq to attract
new recruits and donors and to maintain its leadership
role.
It should be beyond dispute that the struggle against
radical jihadists is a global and unified one, and that Iraq is
a critical front--a front that al Qaeda itself has specifically
stated as its priority. On April 26, 2007, General David
Petraeus noted that ``Iraq is, in fact, the central front of al
Qaeda's global campaign.'' The January, 2007, National
Intelligence Estimate on Iraq assessed that if a rapid
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq were to take place, ``AQI
would attempt to use parts of the country--particularly al-
Anbar province--to plan increased attacks in and outside of
Iraq * * *'' In January, CIA Director Hayden testified in the
Committee that ``I strongly believe [U.S. failure in Iraq]
would lead to al Qaeda with what it is they said is their goal
there, which is the foundations of the caliphate, and in
operational terms for us, a safe haven from which then to plan
and conduct attacks against the West.''
The majority significantly misapprehends the potential
threat from al Qaeda in Iraq and proposes in the classified
annex to decrease intelligence funding the President has
requested to fight al Qaeda in Iraq. It is important to
emphasize that the problem of sectarian violence in Iraq cannot
be separated from the threat from al Qaeda, because al Qaeda's
explicit goal is to create sectarian violence to destabilize
the government so they can establish a safe haven within the
country. It should be clear that the intelligence requirements
in Iraq are specifically supporting the fight against al Qaeda.
IRAQ
The majority attempts to influence the priority and output
of analysis by the intelligence community by suggesting a
specific analytical framework, selectively citing elements of a
careful and balanced National Intelligence Estimate to suit its
political objectives. Specifically, the majority faults the
Intelligence Community for not providing intelligence
assessments of the implications of various ways Democrats have
proposed that the United States withdraw from Iraq.
This criticism amounts to political pressure on the
intelligence community. Intelligence analysts should follow the
evidence where it leads them and draw the appropriate
conclusions. They should not be subjected to criticism--
unrelated to any authorization or legislative text of the
bill--because they did not write papers that conform to the
foreign policy assumptions and positions of the majority.
IRAN AND NORTH KOREA
The majority's view on Iran and North Korea represents an
improvement in its realization about the seriousness of the
threat from these nations' nuclear weapons programs. Just last
fall, for example, some Democratic members denounced as too
alarmist a bipartisan Committee report on Iran that discussed
the threat from its nuclear weapons program and raised
questions about Intelligence Community analysis. They had
similar criticism for a HPSCI report on North Korea.\3\ Since
then, the Iran report was proven right by new revelations about
Iranian behavior. We are grateful that the majority now is
beginning to recognize the reality of the threats posed by both
Iran's and North Korea's nuclear programs and the reliability
of the reports the Republican majority stewarded on a
bipartisan basis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\Subsequent to the Committee's report, North Korea tested a
nuclear device.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the Committee report language on Iran is off the
mark in claiming that U.S. removal of rival regimes has turned
Iran into a regional hegemon, apparently because of the fall of
the Saddam Hussein and Taliban regimes. This language bizarrely
attempts to blame America for the radical agenda of the Iranian
leadership, even though President Ahmadinejad's philosophy may
date as far back as the 1979 hostage crisis. Apparently, the
majority believes that the region would be better off if the
Taliban and Saddam were still in power.
While we agree that intelligence analysis on North Korea
and Iran needs improvement, we regard the requirement for
quarterly reports on these nations as unnecessarily burdensome
since the Committee is already regularly briefed on these
topics. The additional legislated requirement could actually
detract from the quality of information provided to the
Committee by providing such a rigid, specified structure.
Moreover, the intelligence community provided the Committee
with over a dozen written reports on each country over the last
year. We believe there are more important projects our
intelligence analysts could be spending their time on instead
of writing reports for Congress that duplicate what they are
already providing.
COLOMBIA
The majority claims that ``[f]lew strategic victories have
been won against the drug traffickers and paramilitiaries'' in
Colombia--a breathtakingly inaccurate mischaracterization of
the facts. While the situation in Colombia remains complex,
just last month Democratic Western Hemisphere Subcommittee
Chairman Eliot Engel recognized ``the impact that Plan Colombia
has had in reducing homicides, kidnappings and massacres,
particularly under President [Alvaro] Uribe. Kidnappings in
Colombia are down by 76 percent since 2000 and homicides are
down by 40 percent.'' He also noted that Colombian coca
cultivation fell 47% from 2000 to 2005.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\Opening Statement of Chairman Eliot L. Engel, ``U.S.-Colombia
Relations,'' Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere, April 24, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Former Speaker of the House J. Dennis Hastert testified at
the same hearing that ``In every significant category Columbia
is improving: rates of homicides, kidnappings, acts of
terrorism, and displaced persons are all significantly down.
Conversely, school enrollment, GDP, unemployment and poverty
rates, and beneficiaries of public health care have
considerably improved.'' Speaker Hastert further pointed out
that ``wholesale heroin purity seized at major U.S. ports of
entry has sharply declined in recent years, suggesting a
reduction in Colombian heroin production. Furthermore,
according to ONDCP, there is a continuing decline in purity for
cocaine in the U.S. * * * In part, this has led to a 23%
decrease in overall youth drug use since 2001.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\Statement by Representative J. Dennis Hastert, ``U.S.-Colombia
Relations,'' Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Western
Hemisphere, April 24, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We wish to correct and clarify the record on these issues.
Peter Hoekstra.
Terry Everett.
Elton Gallegly.
Mac Thornberry.
John M. McHugh.
Mike Rogers.
Darrell Issa.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF THE CHAIRMAN
I am disappointed by the tone and substance of the Minority
Views.
The Committee worked on a bipartisan basis to help set the
funding levels for key intelligence programs in this bill.
These programs would help detect and disrupt the plans of
America's enemies. It is strange that instead of expressing
support for these vital programs, the Minority has chosen to
make this a political issue. Politicizing intelligence is a
practice that has harmed America's national security, and the
Committee strongly urges the Minority to reject this approach.
The Minority claims that this bill ``significantly cuts
certain specific initiatives related to America's efforts to
counter radical jihadists.'' In a press statement, the Ranking
Minority Member has referred to ``deep cuts to classified CIA
programs.'' I invite Members to review the classified annex of
the legislation to see how misleading these statements are. In
fact, in the FY 2007 Authorization, the Minority voted to cut
the same CIA programs by the same percentage.
Additionally, the Committee added funding and support for
key programs to analyze critical intelligence on terrorist
activities. The total FY 2008 budget request for CIA programs
was trimmed by less than 2% to eliminate wasteful spending on
programs some of which have come under criticism by both the
Majority and Minority.
The work of this Committee and its oversight
responsibilities should never be politicized. The national
security of this country is too important for that.
Silvestre Reyes.
