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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6476 SSCI #2007-1511-C

March 30, 2007

The Honorable Michael V. Hayden
 Director
 Central Intelligence Agency
 Washington, D.C. 20505


Dear Director Hayden:

We appreciate your participation in our January 11, 2007, hearing on the current and projected national security threats to the United States. Your willingness to address this important issue in open session was appreciated and made an important contribution, not only to the work of our Committee, but to the American public's awareness of U.S. national security interests.

We are submitting the attached questions for the record to you. The unclassified responses to these questions will be an important part of our public hearing transcript which we hope to release as expeditiously as possible. Accordingly, we would appreciate it if you would respond in writing to these questions no later than April 27, 2007.

If there are any questions, please have your staff contact Mr. Don Mitchell, of the Committee staff, at (202) 224-1700.


 John D. Rockefeller IV
 Chairman

Sincerely,

 Christopher S. Bond
 Vice Chairman

Enclosure

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD**Iraqi Support for Attacks Against Coalition Forces**

1) A widely circulating opinion poll has indicated that a majority (61%) of Iraqis believe attacks against Coalition Forces are justified. Do you think this is accurate? How would you characterize Iraqi views toward foreign forces in Iraq?

Assessing the Political Dynamics Within Iran

2) How effective is the CIA in assessing the political dynamics within the Iranian regime? To what extent are their nuclear ambitions linked to their military planning?

The Intelligence Community's Ability to Monitor Terrorist Activity

3) The Intelligence Community is America's early warning system against threats to American lives and property both here and overseas. What are the Intelligence Community's greatest strengths and deficiencies in monitoring terrorism? What lessons have your organizations learned from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to address any shortcomings? Do you believe that you currently have sufficient resources to effectively fight the war on terrorism?

Security of the Russian Nuclear Stockpile

4) Most of the world's production of the radioactive isotope polonium-210 takes place at a nuclear reactor in Russia. This past Fall, a small quantity of polonium-210 found its way into the body of Alexander Litvinenko, a former Russian internal security agent residing in London who subsequently died from radioactive poisoning. Who was responsible for Litvinenko's death? What is your assessment of the safety and security of the Russian nuclear stockpile (including weapons grade material)? How does the security of the Russian nuclear stockpile compare to the security of the U.S. nuclear stockpile?

Libya's Likely Adherence to U.S. Policy Objectives

5) On May 15, 2006, the Bush Administration announced its intention to restore full diplomatic relations with Libya and to rescind Libya's listing as a state sponsor of terrorism and a country not fully cooperating with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. What is your assessment of the likelihood that the

Libyan government would resume its weapons of mass destruction and long-range missile programs and support to terrorism? Who will likely succeed Qadhafi when he passes from the scene?

The India-Pakistan Conflict

6) What is the likelihood that India and Pakistan will go to war within the next year? What is the likelihood that such a conflict would result in an exchange of nuclear weapons? Which nation would likely prevail in such a conflict? Why? What is the likelihood that both India and Pakistan will ultimately agree to accept the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir as their international border?

Afghanistan

7) a) Please provide your assessment of the state of the Afghan security forces, particularly the Afghan National Army as well as the Afghan police. What are the strengths and weaknesses of these organizations?

b) Is Iran expanding its influence in Afghanistan? How is it doing so?

c) How many anti-ISAF (the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force) attacks were conducted against NATO forces in the second half of 2006? How does that compare to the previous six months, and the six months before then? Do you assess that these attacks have undermined the coherence of mission of the NATO-led ISAF forces?

d) What is the number of and trend line on suicide attacks conducted in Afghanistan in 2006? Who are the perpetrators?

Pakistan

8) Is there any indication of the Musharraf government containing pro-Taliban and anti-Kabul activity in Pakistan?

A Civil War in Iraq?

9) The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines a civil war as being "a war between factions or regions of one country." In your opinion, is Iraq currently engaged in a civil war? Why or why not? Is this the unanimous view of all components of the Intelligence Community?

Conflict Between the CIA and the Pentagon?

10) In a May 10, 2006 *New York Times* article, you were quoted as saying that there has been a blurring of functions between the CIA and the Pentagon. In addressing the terrorist threat confronting the United States, how concerned are you, if at all, that the Defense Department may be encroaching on the CIA's activities, particularly its covert action mission, and thereby undermining the effectiveness of our counterterrorist efforts? Do you believe that the Department of Defense conducts any activities that would constitute "non-traditional military activities" as defined in statute [50 U.S.C. 413b] and set forth in report language (S.Rept. No. 102-85, 102nd Congress, 1st sess., p. 47) -- and thereby constitute covert action? Please elaborate.

Notifying Congress

11) Last year, this Committee passed the fiscal year 2007 Intelligence Authorization bill with language to strengthen the requirements for notifying Congress of intelligence activities. In particular, the language aimed at keeping all members of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees "fully and currently informed" as is already required by the National Security Act. This was not done in the case of the Terrorist Surveillance Program or in all aspects of the CIA program to detain and interrogate suspected terrorists. The bill, which we are trying to get enacted into law shortly, would require that every member of the Senate and House intelligence oversight committees be sufficiently informed to assess the legality of all intelligence operations. The details, in highly sensitive cases, would still just be briefed to the Chairman and Vice Chairman. Do you believe that providing summary briefings to the members of this Committee would jeopardize sources and methods? If so, why?

Middle East

12) What is the likelihood, the Intelligence Community's ability to predict, and the ramifications of the following:

- a) Saudi Arabia sending troops or taking action to protect Sunni Iraqis from Shia's militias?
- b) Iran increasing its support to al-Hakim and al-Sadr beyond the current level of funding and material support, or otherwise getting more

deeply involved in violence in Iraq?

c) An escalation in hostilities between Fatah and HAMAS in Gaza that sparks either a strong Israeli response or spurs other nations to get involved militarily?

d) An opening for President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert to make significant progress on peace negotiations?

e) A broader Middle East conflagration that puts Sunni states openly against Iran and its Syrian allies?

India - Pakistan

13) Ambassador Negroponte noted in his testimony that India and Pakistan “approached the brink of war in 2002” and that, despite improved relations, “the prospect of renewed tensions between the two remains.” Gen. Maples testified that India and Pakistan are “building larger stockpiles of fission weapons and are likely to work on advanced warhead and delivery system designs to increase the effectiveness of these weapons.” In light of the history of war between India and Pakistan, unresolved territorial disputes, and terrorist incidents, doesn’t the continuing buildup of their nuclear arsenals pose a threat to the United States?

In a letter to Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV dated April 27, 2007, and classified CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN, Central Intelligence (CIA) Agency Director of Congressional Affairs Christopher J. Walker indicated that the CIA could not provide unclassified written responses to these questions.

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, WEST VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN
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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

SSCI #2007-1511-A

March 30, 2007

The Honorable J. M. McConnell
 Director of National Intelligence
 Office of the Director of National Intelligence
 Washington, D.C. 20511

Dear Director McConnell:

We appreciate your predecessor's participation in our January 11, 2007, hearing on the current and projected national security threats to the United States. His willingness to address this important issue in open session was appreciated and made an important contribution, not only to the work of our Committee, but to the American public's awareness of U.S. national security interests.


We are submitting the attached questions for the record to you. The unclassified responses to these questions will be an important part of our public hearing transcript which we hope to release as expeditiously as possible. Accordingly, we would appreciate it if you would respond in writing to these questions no later than April 27, 2007.

If there are any questions, please have your staff contact Mr. Don Mitchell, of the Committee staff, at (202) 224-1700.



John D. Rockefeller IV
 Chairman

Sincerely,



Christopher S. Bond
 Vice Chairman

Enclosure

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD**A Regional Effort to Stabilize Iraq**

1) The Iraq Study Group final report's first recommendation is that the U.S. should include regional countries -- including Iran and Syria -- in multilateral efforts to stabilize Iraq. Regional countries, under the proposed initiative, would be enlisted to encourage factional reconciliation within Iraq, to secure its borders, to end any interventions in Iraq, and promote trade and commerce with Iraq. What is the Intelligence Community's assessment of the likelihood that regional nations -- particularly Iran and Syria -- would be willing to engage in multilateral efforts to stabilize Iraq?

Iranian Decline in Oil Revenues?

2) According to an analysis recently published in a journal of the National Academy of Sciences, Iran is suffering a staggering decline in revenue from its oil exports, and if the trend continues, income could virtually disappear by 2015. Does the U.S. Intelligence Community share this view? If not, why? If so, does such an analysis suggest that Iran needs nuclear power for civilian purposes as badly as it claims?

The Intelligence Community's Ability to Monitor Terrorist Activity

3) The Intelligence Community is America's early warning system against threats to American lives and property both here and overseas. What are the Intelligence Community's greatest strengths and deficiencies in monitoring terrorism? What lessons have your organizations learned from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to address any shortcomings? Do you believe that you currently have sufficient resources to effectively fight the war on terrorism?

Nuclear Terrorism

4) Perhaps the most frightening terrorist tools are nuclear weapons -- including radiological weapons which would disperse hazardous radioactive isotopes. What is the Intelligence Community's assessment of the likelihood that terrorists already possess such weapons? How confident are you that terrorists have not been able to successfully smuggle such nuclear devices into the U.S. already?

The Continuing Threat Posed by al-Qa'ida

5) What is the status of our efforts against suspected al-Qa'ida cells worldwide? How would you characterize the level of cooperation with the U.S. from foreign intelligence services and law enforcement agencies with the al-Qa'ida target? With respect to cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies, are we hampered by any lack of legal authorities or agreements? How much information has the Intelligence Community obtained on al-Qa'ida from U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq?

Bin Laden's Whereabouts

6) What is the Intelligence Community's assessment of whether Usama Bin Laden is alive and where he might be located? What is the likelihood that Bin Laden will be killed or captured within the next year?

Transfer of Technology from Russia

7) What general trends has the Intelligence Community noticed of scientists, technology and conventional and unconventional military sales from Russia to other nations? What trends have you detected that Russia nuclear materials, BW, CW or ballistic missile-related materials or technology, have found their way to the international black market? What are the implications of these trends for U.S. security?

Stability Within China

8) How firmly is the Chinese Communist Party in control of China? What is the likelihood that pervasive corruption, income disparities, and dislocations in rural and urban areas that have created a large pool of unemployed or under-employed citizens represent long-term challenges to China's stability? What is the risk of severe, growth-stalling financial crisis in China in the next five years? What factors would be necessary to bring this about?

North Korea's Ballistic Missile Capabilities

9) The Intelligence Community assessed in its 1999 ballistic missile threat NIE that North Korea would have an ICBM capability by the end of that year. What is your current assessment of North Korean ballistic missile capabilities? Under what circumstances would North Korea be likely to use its missile capability against the U.S.?

North Korea's Nuclear Weapon Capabilities

10) On October 9, 2006, North Korea tested a nuclear weapon with an

estimated yield of less than one kiloton. Recent press reports suggest that North Korea is about to test another nuclear device. What is the Intelligence Community's assessment of the likelihood that North Korea will test another nuclear weapon soon? What is the current estimate of the size of North Korea's nuclear weapon arsenal? How confident are we that North Korea is complying with the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework regarding plutonium production activities in Yongbyon?

WMD Delivery Systems

11) What is the most likely delivery system of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to be delivered by terrorists or states against the U.S. -- missiles, aircraft or ships? Are the most likely adversaries of the U.S. acquiring weapons of mass destruction and missiles as deterrence or as an offensive military capability to use against the U.S. or its allies?

Stability of the Jordanian Regime

12) How stable is the Jordanian regime of King Abdullah? What threats does King Abdullah face from Islamic fundamentalists? What is the likelihood that resurgent Palestinian nationalism will destabilize Jordan?

Saudi Arabia's Oil Capacity

13) Saudi Arabia has the world's largest proven oil reserves (estimated at 261.7 billion barrels in January 2001). The Saudis produced approximately 9.5 million barrels per day of crude oil as of October 2005. Ten years from now, what will be Saudi Arabia's oil production capacity? Will Saudi Arabia's ability to be the oil market's supplier of last resort be diminished? What would be the implications for U.S. national security if the Saudi oil fields were under the control of a regime that was hostile to the U.S. and its western allies?

Foreign Countries Spying on the U.S.

14) An area of concern is what other countries do to spy on U.S. companies. Are more countries getting into the business of using their intelligence services to engage in economic espionage? How do you balance the benefits that come from collecting intelligence on economic issues against the risk that such collection -- or even the mere allegation of it -- could prompt other countries to retaliate by increasing their defensive measures, by spying in turn on U.S. companies, or by becoming anti-American in policy discussions?

Sharing Information on Avian Flu

15) The Intelligence Community has been doing a fair amount of reporting on avian flu outbreaks and what these outbreaks may mean. Are intelligence assessments on avian flu being made available only in classified papers? Is the Intelligence Community ensuring that information it has on avian flu is getting to U.S. agencies that are not the usual consumers of intelligence, such as the Centers for Disease Control or the National Institutes of Health? Are intelligence assessments routinely downgraded or declassified so that researchers have access to this data?

The Impact of HIV/AIDS and Other Infectious Diseases

16) What will be the impact of HIV/AIDS on Africa and other countries 10 years from now? Upon which countries is HIV/AIDS affecting the military and economy the most? Where do these trends seem to be heading in the long term? What other infectious diseases -- such as tuberculosis, malaria, the avian flu and hepatitis -- will have the most impact over the next 10 years?

Monitoring Climate Change

17) Climate change will have a dramatic environmental, economic and humanitarian impact on strategically important countries and regions around the world. How are analysts in the Intelligence Community factoring in climate change into their long-term projections? To what extent, if any, are the Intelligence Community's collection assets involved in monitoring environmental changes to the Earth? How great a priority is this for the Intelligence Community?

Public Disclosure of the Aggregate Intelligence Budget

18) For a number of years, individuals have advocated the public disclosure of the aggregate intelligence budget. In your opinion, what would be the specific threat to U.S. national security from publicly disclosing the aggregate intelligence budget?

Impact of Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information on U.S. Counterterrorism Effort

19) To what extent are unauthorized disclosures of classified information undermining our counterterrorist efforts and thus increasing the terrorist threat? In 2002, former Attorney General John Ashcroft reported to Congress that new legislation was not necessary to combat unauthorized disclosure of classified information but, rather, that civil penalties and the threat of firing would work better to deter such unauthorized disclosures. Do you agree with the former

Attorney General's assessment? If not, why? How would you suggest that the law be strengthened to address the issue of unauthorized disclosure of classified material? Since you have been DNI, how many crime reports pertaining to unauthorized disclosures of classified information has the Intelligence Community filed with the Department of Justice?

Criminal Organizations and Networks

20) What is the likelihood that criminal organizations and networks will expand the scale and scope of their activities over the next 10 years? What is the likelihood that such groups will traffic in nuclear, biological or chemical weapons?

The Impact of Al-Jazeera

21) What is the impact of the Qatar-based satellite television channel *Al-Jazeera* on anti-U.S. and anti-western sentiment in the Arab world? What was the impact of *Al-Jazeera* coverage on Operation Iraqi Freedom and how are they currently covering the U.S. presence in Iraq and the insurgency?

Afghanistan

22) a) Is it the Intelligence Community's assessment that the Karzai government is stable? How far has the Karzai government extended its control over regions beyond Kabul? How long does the Intelligence Community assess the Afghan government will be dependent on foreign support and assistance?

b) Can the security threat to the current Afghan government be addressed without involving Pakistan?

Pakistan

23) a) Does the Intelligence Community still assess that Usama Bin Laden and Ayman Al-Zawahiri are somewhere in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan?

b) Does the Intelligence Community assess that the September 5, 2006 agreement reached between tribal representatives and the Islamabad government has had any positive effect on (1) our ability to disrupt al-Qa'ida activities in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and

(2) the cross-border incursions conducted by Taliban and other militants into Afghanistan? Is there any positive result of this agreement that has been measured or reported?

c) The Open Source Center does a very good job tracking the propaganda that comes from al-Qa'ida. What has been the trend over the past 12 months in the production of video and internet propaganda that features Zawahiri and Bin Laden?

Somalia

24) In the wake of Ethiopia's military actions in Somalia, what role can Somalia's neighbors and other countries in the region play in pushing for a stable and representative government in Mogadishu?

Terrorist Groups in Nigeria

25) Who is responsible for the recent violence in southern Nigeria and what is the threat to the interests of the United States and its allies, particularly in the oil sector? The most recent State Department terrorism report states that members of al-Qa'ida and the radical Islamic group, the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC), have operated and recruited in Nigeria. How does the Intelligence Community assess the current status of international terrorist organizations in Nigeria?

Status of the New Iraq National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)

26) National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) are the DNI's most authoritative written judgments concerning national security issues. They contain the coordinated judgments of the Intelligence Community regarding the likely course of future events. In July of last year, Senators wrote to you requesting that you direct the production of an updated NIE on the current situation in Iraq. On August 3 of last year, the Senate passed an amendment to the Department of Defense Appropriations bill for fiscal year 2007 requiring an updated NIE on Iraq. Later that month, you announced that you had instructed the National Intelligence Council to initiate the process of preparing such an estimate. Apparently, this NIE will be completed by the end of January 2007.

a) The situation in Iraq is the most compelling national security issue

facing our country today, and it is the primary focus of the Intelligence Community. Why will it have taken 5 months to complete an NIE on this vitally important national security issue?

b) The President announced his new Iraq strategy on January 10, 2007. In formulating his new strategy, was President Bush informed by the results of the new Iraq NIE -- including any dissenting views of Intelligence Community components? If not, why? Has the President or Vice President weighed in with you on any concerns they might have regarding the content and timing of the completion of this NIE? Please elaborate.

c) Will there be an unclassified summary of the NIE's Key Judgments to be publicly released when the NIE is completed? If not, why not? Are sources and methods usually included in NIE Key Judgments?

A Civil War in Iraq?

27) The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines a civil war as being "a war between factions or regions of one country." In your opinion, is Iraq currently engaged in a civil war? Why or why not? Is this the unanimous view of all components of the Intelligence Community?

What Does the Intelligence Community Know About Iran and North Korea's WMD Programs?

28) Five years ago this month in his State of the Union speech, President Bush identified North Korea and Iran -- as well as Iraq -- as part of an "axis of evil" that threatened U.S. security interests. Our nation is currently embroiled in a war in Iraq that is almost 4 years old -- a war that was initiated in large part because of concerns about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which have long since been largely proven to be non-existent. How would you compare what the Intelligence Community currently knows about the WMD programs in Iran and North Korea and what was known about Iraq's WMD programs on the eve of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq? Does the Intelligence Community know more -- or less -- about the North Korean and Iranian programs than it does about Iraq? Could you make a recommendation to the President with high confidence that the U.S. should go to war against Iran or North Korea because of what the Intelligence Community currently knows about their WMD programs?

How Does Focus on Iraq Divert Focus From Other Intelligence Priorities

29) The Iraq Study Group noted that “While the United States has been able to acquire good and sometimes superb tactical intelligence on al Qaeda in Iraq, our government still does not understand very well either the insurgency in Iraq or the role of the militias.” Has the focus on terrorism detracted from other important issues? In particular, has it effected our ability to analyze the Iraqi insurgency? Does it compromise our ability to collect and analyze information on other key countries -- such as China and Russia -- that are likely to have major influences on international politics for decades to come?

Cuba After Castro: A Transition Soon?

30) The December 15, 2006 edition of *The Washington Post* reported that you told a meeting of *Washington Post* editors and reporters that Cuban President Fidel Castro is very ill and close to death. Specifically, you were quoted as stating that “Everything we see indicates it will not be much longer...months, not years.”

a) Please elaborate on your assessment of Fidel Castro’s health. What is the Intelligence Community’s current assessment of his illness and his prognosis for recovery?

b) What is the likelihood that Castro’s death will trigger public protest against the Cuban government’s economic policies? What is the likelihood that a post-Castro transition could also spark a power struggle between conservatives and reformers with the regime?

c) Does the Intelligence Community believe that the resumption of U.S. trade with Cuba could hasten economic and political reform in Cuba?

Hizballah (from Senator Feinstein)

31) I was struck during the July 2006 conflict in the Middle East at Israel’s inability to put an end to Hizballah’s rocket attacks. In briefings and letters after that conflict, I noted my view that the U.S. Intelligence Community was not sufficiently postured to collect against or understand Hizballah’s military and terrorist capabilities or intentions, despite it being perhaps the most capable and dangerous non-state group in the world. Is the Intelligence Community taking new steps to improve its performance against Hizballah? What is your assessment

of Hizballah's capability to inflict serious damage to U.S. personnel and interests, both at home and in the Middle East? Might a prolonged and escalated troop presence in Iraq, especially on the Syrian and Iranian borders, provoke Hizballah to take up arms against us?

Notifying Congress

32) Last year, this Committee passed the fiscal year 2007 Intelligence Authorization bill with language to strengthen the requirements for notifying Congress of intelligence activities. In particular, the language aimed at keeping all members of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees "fully and currently informed" as is already required by the National Security Act. This was not done in the case of the Terrorist Surveillance Program or in all aspects of the CIA program to detain and interrogate suspected terrorists. The bill, which we are trying to get enacted into law shortly, would require that every member of the Senate and House intelligence oversight committees be sufficiently informed to assess the legality of all intelligence operations. The details, in highly sensitive cases, would still just be briefed to the Chairman and Vice Chairman. Do you believe that providing summary briefings to the members of this Committee would jeopardize sources and methods? If so, why?

Middle East

33) What is the likelihood, the Intelligence Community's ability to predict, and the ramifications of the following:

- a) Saudi Arabia sending troops or taking action to protect Sunni Iraqis from Shia's militias?
- b) Iran increasing its support to al-Hakim and al-Sadr beyond the current level of funding and material support, or otherwise getting more deeply involved in violence in Iraq?
- c) An escalation in hostilities between Fatah and HAMAS in Gaza that sparks either a strong Israeli response or spurs other nations to get involved militarily?
- d) An opening for President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert to

make significant progress on peace negotiations?

e) A broader Middle East conflagration that puts Sunni states openly against Iran and its Syrian allies?

Natural Resources as an Element of National Security

34) The DNI noted in a number of places in his testimony the importance of natural resources as a factor in our national security. Please provide for the Committee the following information:

a) a list of which agencies, including the relevant subcomponents in those agencies, that currently provide analysis on the control of natural resource issues as a national security threat;

b) a list of which agencies collect on natural resource issues and the primary collection tools we currently use (i.e., open source, SIGINT, etc.); and

c) please advise if there is a lead agency that coordinates reporting on natural resources as a national security issue, and who in the ODNI is responsible for oversight of our intelligence capabilities on this topic.

Iranian Influence in Iraq

35) What do we know about Iran's capability to increase or decrease the level of violence in Iraq through Shi'ite networks? If Iran has any capability in this regard, has it been employed either to increase or decrease the Shi'a violence in Iraq? If so, by what means has this been done?

b) It would seem to be in Iran's national interest for the violence in Iraq to remain at a level that bogs America down and prevents American "success." Is there any evidence to support that thesis?

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20511

September 12, 2007

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510


The Honorable Christopher S. Bond
Vice Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman and Vice Chairman Bond:

(U) The enclosures to this letter respond to your request for redacted responses for the Committee's January 11, 2007 hearing on the Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States.

(U) If you have any questions on this matter, please contact me on (202) 201-1698.

Sincerely,



Kathleen Turner
Director of Legislative Affairs

Hearing Date: January 11, 2007
Committee: SSCI
Members: Ambassador Negroponte
LTG Maples
General Hayden
Director Mueller
Mr. Fort

Question: 2

Question 2: (U) According to an analysis recently published in a Journal of the National Academy of Sciences, Iran is suffering a staggering decline in revenue from its oil exports, and if the trend continues, income could virtually disappear by 2015. Does the U.S. Intelligence Community share this view? If not, why? If so, does such an analysis suggest that Iran needs nuclear power for civilian purposes as badly as it claims?

Answer: (U) The responses to these questions are not available in an unclassified format.

Question 4: (U) Perhaps the most frightening terrorist tools are nuclear weapons -- including radiological weapons, which would disperse hazardous radioactive isotopes. What is the Intelligence Community's assessment of the likelihood that terrorists already possess such weapons? How confident are you that terrorists have not been able to successfully smuggle such nuclear devices into the U.S. already?

Answer: (U) The responses to these questions are not available in an unclassified format.

Question 12: (U) How stable is the Jordanian regime of King Abdullah? What threats does King Abdullah face from Islamic fundamentalists? What is the likelihood that resurgent Palestinian nationalism will destabilize Jordan?

Answer: (U) The responses to these questions are not available in an unclassified format.

Question 13: (U) Saudi Arabia has the world's largest proven oil reserves (estimated at 261.7 billion barrels in January 2001). The Saudis produced approximately 9.5 million barrels per day of crude oil as of October 2005. Ten years from now, what will be Saudi Arabia's oil production capacity? Will Saudi Arabia's ability to be the oil market's supplier of last resort be diminished? What would be the implications for U.S. national security if the Saudi oil fields were under the control of a regime that was hostile to the U.S. and its western allies?

Answer: (U) The responses to these questions are not available in an unclassified format.

Question 14: (U) An area of concern is what other countries do to spy on U.S. companies. Are more countries getting into the business of using their intelligence services to engage in economic espionage? How do you balance the benefits that come from collecting intelligence on economic issues against the risk that such collection—or even the mere allegation of it—could prompt other countries to retaliate by increasing their defensive measures, by spying in turn on U.S. companies, or by becoming anti-American in policy discussions?

Answer: (U) The Counterintelligence (CI) Community continues to see clear evidence that foreign governments, including foreign intelligence services (FISs), remain actively involved in efforts to acquire U.S. trade secrets, proprietary information and sensitive, export-controlled technology. China, in particular, with its government and government-affiliated defense industries, has active programs to acquire U.S. technology for commercial and military applications. However, determining how many governments or FISs are active in any given year is difficult for a number of reasons:

- a. (U) Foreign governments appear to increasingly rely on their visiting researchers and students as well as their expatriate communities in the United States – including businessmen, scientists, academics and engineers – to collect trade secrets. These experts, many of whom work in U.S. firms, labs, or universities, have access to U.S. technology in the normal course of business. Requirements are usually levied on the collectors when the experts are in their home countries prior to departure for the United States and the U.S. technology is transferred after the experts return, making detection in the United States virtually impossible.
- b. (U) Foreign governments also increasingly use front companies or middlemen operating in the United States or in third countries to transfer trade secrets and technologies. Sometimes U.S. technology is shipped through multiple companies and countries to obscure the final destination and avoid detection. Canada and the United Kingdom provide excellent venues for these companies, because U.S. export controls to these countries are light. In addition, international free trade ports such as Singapore and the United Arab Emirates serve as useful locations, because those countries facilitate the international transfer of goods with little concern for whether the transfer conforms with U.S. trade restrictions. The U.S. law enforcement community has prosecuted U.S. companies and some individuals involved in this activity, but linking the prosecuted firms to agents of foreign governments is often difficult.

(U) In addition to the activity of foreign governments in technology collection, a significant share of the theft of U.S. trade secrets appears to be the work of private sector individuals or firms operating solely on profit motives. The increasing involvement of these firms and their complex nexus with state-owned or affiliated industries further clouds the degree of involvement of foreign governments and FISs in the collection activity.

(U) For additional information on this topic, the National Counterintelligence Executive is nearing completion of their annual report to Congress concerning foreign economic and industrial espionage. This report is a comprehensive review on this topic and delves in far greater granularity.

Question 17: (U) Climate change will have a dramatic environmental, economic and humanitarian impact on strategically important countries and regions around the world. How are analysts in the Intelligence Community factoring in climate change into their long-term projections? To what extent, if any, are the Intelligence Community's collection assets involved in monitoring environmental changes to the Earth? How great a priority is this for the Intelligence Community?

Answer: (U) The Intelligence Community is in the early stages of factoring climate change into intelligence analysis and collection.

- a. (U) The National Intelligence Council is making climate change a major consideration in its planning for its next quadrennial assessment of global trends 15-20 years ahead. The March 2007, Defense Analysis Report (U) Sea Level Increases: Projections and Consequences is the first of several Defense Intelligence Agency planned papers which will account for the implicit defense issues of climate change and rising seas. In addition, the State Department INR's periodical (U) Environment and Sustainable Development Review features both classified and unclassified analysis on environmental issues to include climate changes. Finally, CIA has organized an informal community of analysts to take a multi-disciplinary approach to the national security implications of environmental issues, to include impacts of global climate change.
- b. (U) The Intelligence Community's collection assets are applied regularly to specific environmental events—floods, forest fires, oil spills, volcano eruptions, landslides, hurricane disaster assessment—but have not been intensively focused on monitoring global climate change. Since the mid to late 1990s, however, the Civil Applications Committee (CAC) has employed IC collection assets for longer term monitoring of some 220 environmentally sensitive sites to support baselining of environmental parameters, monitoring for global climate change and related investigations. Sites are imaged one to four times a year, depending on the nature of the site and the reason it was selected. Most of the sites are domestic, being chosen to address the concerns of the CAC member organizations. Data is archived in the Global Fiducials Library of the Advanced Systems Center of the U.S. Geological Survey. Along with the periodically collected Global Fiducials data, the library has classified remote sensing data of a number of other worldwide sites that were the subject of scientific study. Some of these latter efforts have been relatively long term and most would be appropriate for global climate change monitoring.

Question 21: (U) What is the impact of the Qatar-based satellite television channel Al-Jazeera on anti-U.S. and anti-Western sentiment in the Arab world? What was the impact of Al-Jazeera coverage on Operation Iraqi Freedom and how are they currently covering the U.S. presence in Iraq and the insurgency?

Answer: (U) The responses to these questions are not available in an unclassified format.

Question 29: (U) The Iraq Study Group noted that "While the United States has been able to acquire good and sometimes superb tactical intelligence on al Qaeda in Iraq, our government still does not understand very well either the insurgency in Iraq or the role of the militias." Has the focus on terrorism detracted from other important issues? In particular, has it affected our ability to analyze the Iraqi insurgency? Does it compromise our ability to collect and analyze information on other key countries -- such as China and Russia -- that are likely to have major influences on international politics for decades to come?

Answer: (U) The responses to these questions are not available in an unclassified format.

Question 33: (U) What is the likelihood of, the Intelligence Community's ability to predict, as well as the ramifications of, the following:

- a. (U) Saudi Arabia sending troops or taking action to protect Sunni Iraqis from Shia militias.
- b. (U)
- c. (U) An escalation of hostilities between Fatah and HAMAS in Gaza that sparks either a strong Israeli response or spurs other nations to get involved militarily?
- d. (U) An opening for President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert to make significant progress on the peace process?
- e. (U) A broader Middle East conflagration that pits Sunni states openly against Iran and its Syrian allies.

Answer: (U) Saudi Arabia is unlikely to send troops to protect Iraqi Sunnis. The Saudi military is designed largely for internal security missions and probably cannot project power beyond the kingdom's borders. Saudi Arabia would be unlikely to send troops to Iraq without first informing Washington. Because of the close nature of Saudi-U.S. relations, multiple indications likely would occur of any Saudi decision to send troops to support Iraqi Sunni Arabs against Shia militias. As a matter of state policy, Riyadh is unlikely to send significant financial support or arms to Iraqi Sunnis as long as U.S. troops are in Iraq. The long Iraqi-Saudi border makes detecting the flow of arms, funds, and militants from Saudi Arabia to Iraq difficult. Private Saudi citizens probably are supporting Iraqi Sunni Arabs. The Saudi government has tried to stop private donations and other support flowing from the kingdom to Iraq.

(U) Iran probably does not see a need to increase its current level of support to Iraqi Shia groups. The general consequences of increased Iranian support to Iraqi Shia militants would be minimal in terms of affecting the cycle of violence in Iraq, since many of these groups do not rely solely on Iranian support for their activities in Iraq and are capable of operating independently from Iran. Explosively formed penetrator attacks aimed at the Coalition could increase, as Iran is the chief supplier of these weapons.

(U) The Intelligence Community is not well positioned to predict specific instances of escalation in HAMAS-Fatah violence, but would be able to identify a predeployment of Israeli forces indicative of a larger-scale incursion. While HAMAS-Fatah tensions may escalate into more internecine violence, Israel most likely would not intervene militarily to stop the fighting. Since its disengagement from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, Israel has been reluctant to conduct large-scale incursions into Gaza. If HAMAS-Fatah tension does not lead to significant Palestinian attacks against Israel, Israel will continue to conduct only limited operations against rocket launch areas

and militant leaders. Despite several recent statements by Israeli officials speculating about the need to respond militarily to the growing threat from HAMAS in the Gaza Strip, a multibrigade incursion by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) probably is not imminent. Other actors, such as the European Union Border Assistance Mission forces currently at the Rafah, Egypt–Gaza border or the voluntary multinational Temporary International Presence in Hebron, may be able to provide some type of monitoring of Israeli-Palestinian forces, but they would be reluctant to get involved militarily.

(U) Prime Minister Olmert has been weakened by Israel's perceived failure in the Lebanon war and by numerous scandals and is unlikely to restart serious negotiations. President Abbas is similarly in a difficult position, as HAMAS leads the national unity government. While Olmert has pledged to regularly talk about quality of life issues with Abbas in his capacity as the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Israel will not talk to HAMAS, which refuses to recognize Israel. The failure to achieve a deal linking the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in exchange for Palestinian prisoners also complicates progress toward peace talks.

(U) The likelihood of a broader Middle East conflagration that puts Sunni states openly against Iran and its Syrian allies is low over the next few years. Shia-Sunni tensions and conflict would likely be confined to the sectarian "tectonic plates," where Sunni and Shia communities rub up against each other, especially in Iraq, but also in Lebanon and some Gulf Arab states. In the longer term, either Iraqi Shia success in consolidating power in Iraq or a government collapse in Iraq would increase the risk of wider conflict—particularly between Iran and the Gulf Arab states—but hostilities would still most likely be confined to fighting between proxy forces on Iraqi territory.

(U) Iraqi state collapse probably would bring a greater level of support to factions, or possibly even direct military involvement from Iraq's neighbors to protect and advance their interests, which could lead to interstate hostilities, with concomitant dangers of even wider regional conflict. The limited capacity of regional states to project conventional military power for a sustained period, however, suggests that a wider regional conflict would most likely take the form of terrorism and covert actions.

(U) Syrian participation in a broader war on the Iranian side is not a given. Syria's alliance with Iran was founded on mutual opposition to Saddam's regime, Iranian support for Damascus in its conflict with Israel, and Iranian backing for Syria's role in Lebanon. Syria would face intense pressure from Sunni Arab regimes to back Iraqi Sunni Arabs against the Shia and Iran in the event of a collapse of the Iraqi state. Syria already hosts more than a million Iraqi expatriates and refugees and has a majority Sunni Arab population to appease. Furthermore, Syria would be concerned about retaliation from radical Sunni extremists if Damascus were seen continuing to side with Iran. A Syrian-Israeli peace would remove an important plank from the Syrian-Iranian alliance.

(U) The risk of a wider war would increase in the event of a large-scale U.S.-Iranian military confrontation. Iran has unconventional and subversive capabilities it could use in Iraq and Gulf Arab states hosting U.S. forces or supporting the United States politically.

(U) The ramifications of a “broader Middle East conflagration” could be immense, involving strategic realignments, significant impact to the world economy, and increased terrorist spillover outside the region.

(U) The Intelligence Community has a low capability to predict the actual form and timing of regional conflict three years out. It has a medium to high capability to identify the dangers and possible sources of large-scale hostilities among regional states.

Question 34: (U) The DNI noted in a number of places in his testimony the importance of natural resources as a factor in our national security. Please provide for the Committee the following information:

- a. (U) A list of which agencies, including the relevant subcomponents in those agencies, that currently provide analysis on the control of natural resource issues as a national security threat;
- b. (U) A list of which agencies collect on natural resource issues and the primary collection tools we currently use (i.e., open source, SIGINT, etc.); and
- c. (U) Please advise if there is a lead agency that coordinates reporting on natural resources as a national security issue, and who in the ODNI is responsible for oversight of our intelligence capabilities on this topic.

Answer: (U) The principal Intelligence Community agency addressing the issue of natural resources and national security is CIA’s Office of Transnational Issues, which has the Intelligence Community’s center-of-excellence on energy resources. OTI also handles water and agricultural issues and looks at the global demand for select industrial metals and ores. In terms of responsibility within ODNI for oversight of capabilities on the topic, the appropriate official is the National Intelligence Officer for Economic and Global Issues.

(U) Significant work on natural resources is also done by U.S. Government agencies outside the Intelligence Community. These would include, for example, the Department of Interior’s U.S. Geological Survey.

Question 35: (U) What do we know about Iran's capability to increase or decrease the level of violence in Iraq through Shiite networks? If Iran has any capability in this regard, has it been employed either to increase or decrease the Shi'a violence in Iraq? If so, by what means has this been done? It would seem to be in Iran's national interest for the violence in Iraq to remain at a level that bogs America down and prevents American "success." Is there any evidence to support that thesis?

Answer: (U) Iranian efforts to secure influence in Iraq include a wide range of activities including media propaganda, intelligence operations, humanitarian assistance, and advancing commercial and economic ties. Some of these activities—while helping stabilize and rebuild Iraq—also undermine and discredit Coalition efforts. As part of Iran's effort to influence Iraq, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Qods Force is covertly supporting a number of Iraqi Shia groups, especially JAM, with lethal aid and training. We judge that this aid and training plays an indirect yet enabling role in shaping the scope, intensity, and sustainability of sectarian violence in the country. We also assess that Iran has focused more lethal support on JAM and JAM splinter groups that are more willing to carry out attacks on the Coalition. Iran's increase in lethal support to JAM splinter groups further aggravates an Iraqi security environment that remains vulnerable to actions of groups at extreme ends of the confessional spectrum. Technical and forensic analysis bolster a large body of reporting that the Qods Force provides weapons, explosives, improvised explosive device (IED) components, and explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) to JAM and other Iraqi Shia militant groups—some of which have been used in attacks against the Coalition in Iraq.

(U) Iran seeks for the United States to bear political, economic, and human casualty costs in Iraq that Tehran perceives are sufficient to deter Washington from conducting a future military campaign aimed at regime change in Iran.

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
 WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475 SSCI #2007-1511-B

March 30, 2007

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The Honorable Robert S. Mueller III
 Director
 Federal Bureau of Investigation
 Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Director Mueller:

We appreciate your participation in our January 11, 2007, hearing on the current and projected national security threats to the United States. Your willingness to address this important issue in open session was appreciated and made an important contribution, not only to the work of our Committee, but to the American public's awareness of U.S. national security interests.

We are submitting the attached questions for the record to you. The unclassified responses to these questions will be an important part of our public hearing transcript which we hope to release as expeditiously as possible. Accordingly, we would appreciate it if you would respond in writing to these questions no later than April 27, 2007.

If there are any questions, please have your staff contact Mr. Don Mitchell, off of the Committee staff, at (202) 224-1700.



John D. Rockefeller IV
 Chairman

Sincerely,


Christopher S. Bond
 Vice Chairman

Enclosure



CSCI# 0003 - 0745

U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Legislative Affairs

Office of the Assistant Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

February 4, 2008

The Honorable John D. Rockefeller, IV
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Please find enclosed responses to questions arising from the appearance of FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III before the Select Committee on Intelligence on January 11, 2007, at a hearing regarding National Security Threats.

We hope that this information is of assistance to the Committee. Please do not hesitate to call upon us if we may be of additional assistance. The Office of Management and Budget has advised us that from the perspective of the Administration's program, there is no objection to submission of this letter.

Sincerely,

Brian A. Benczkowski
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Cc: ✓ The Honorable Christopher S. Bond
Vice Chairman

Enclosures

**Responses of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Based Upon the January 11, 2007 Hearing Before the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Regarding National Security Threats**

1. The Intelligence Community is America's early warning system against threats to American lives and property both here and overseas. What are the Intelligence Community's greatest strengths and deficiencies in monitoring terrorism? What lessons have your organizations learned from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to address any shortcomings? Do you believe that you currently have sufficient resources to effectively fight the war on terrorism?

Response:

The response to this inquiry is classified and was provided to the Committee on January 10, 2008.

2. A major area of U.S. focus since the 9/11 terrorist attacks has been tracking and freezing the finances of al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups. What have we learned about the nature and extent of terrorist financing that we did not know prior to September 11? Where are our most important information gaps when it comes to terrorist financing and how is the Bureau and other Intelligence Community components addressing these gaps?

Response:

Essential to the FBI's effort to counter terrorism is our strategy to counter the manner in which terror networks recruit, plan, train, and effect operations, each of which requires a measure of financial support. The Counterterrorism Division's Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS) was established on the premise that terrorists, their networks, and ultimately their operations require some form of financial support to exist. This financial support involves the raising, moving, and expenditure of resources which, when investigated thoroughly, provide opportunities for law enforcement and the United States Intelligence Community (USIC) to identify, prosecute, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist networks and their operations.

Because counterterrorism investigations benefit significantly from the application of financial investigative techniques, each FBI field office was instructed to create

a financial investigation subfile for each pending and future preliminary or full counterterrorism investigation. This subfile affords focus and organization to counterterrorism investigations and helps the Counterterrorism Division track ongoing field investigations.

Most terrorist financing methods were known prior to 9/11/01, but the extent to which they were being used was not fully appreciated. Terrorist financing methods range from the most basic to the highly sophisticated. Virtually all financing methods have been used at some point by some terrorist or terrorist group. Terrorist efforts have been aided by the use of correspondent bank accounts, private bank accounts, offshore shell banks, Hawalas, bulk cash smuggling, identity theft, credit card fraud, and various other criminal activities.

Because of the scope and complexity of terrorism financing schemes, TFOS created and implemented the Terrorist Financing Coordinator Program, under which each FBI field office designates a Terrorist Financing Coordinator (TFC), who serves as the field office's point of contact for TFOS and for terrorism financing issues. Chief among the TFC's duties are: 1) to assist in identifying potential terrorist financing matters, and 2) to act as the JTTF's conduit for information derived from white collar crime or other financially related investigations.

Some emerging trends that demand attention include the increased use of Internet banking, online payment services (OPS), and stored value cards (SVC). Those who may not have bank accounts or do not qualify for credit cards are now able to use OPS as an international person-to-person payment system. These transactions often leave a very limited investigative trail for law enforcement, because many OPS service providers accept cash and money orders to fund accounts and do not maintain customer identification or other records. SVCs, or "smart cards," are a cash alternative for both legitimate customers and others, including money launderers and terrorist financiers. Some cards have embedded data processing chips or magnetic strips, while others are accessed through access numbers or passwords. SVCs provide a compact, easily transportable, and potentially anonymous way to store and access cash value.

3. What is the Bureau's assessment of the safety and security of the U.S. nuclear arsenal from both a counterintelligence and counter-terrorism perspective? What are the shortcomings in this area?

Response:

The FBI works closely with the Department of Energy (DOE) on counterintelligence matters and has Special Agents embedded with DOE counterintelligence offices at major DOE labs and nuclear weapons facilities. The level of interaction between the DOE and FBI on counterintelligence matters is significant and provides a strong capability to respond to the intelligence threats directed at our nuclear weapons program.

The Department of Defense (DoD) and DOE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which bear the primary responsibility for the safety and security of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, adhere to vigorous and robust protection strategies designed to prevent unauthorized access to nuclear facilities. The FBI works closely with relevant DoD and DOE/NNSA components to ensure the safety and security of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. An assessment of the threat is provided in the DoD Nuclear Security Threat Capabilities Assessment and the DOE/NNSA Design Basis Threat. These threat assessments are reviewed periodically for validation purposes and are adjusted accordingly, and each site is required to establish sufficient security countermeasures to defeat the level of threat indicated in these assessments.

As part of its overall Nuclear Site Security Program, the FBI takes part in these reviews and closely coordinates with DoD and DOE/NNSA nuclear sites in a proactive effort to prevent criminal/terrorist activities that may be directed against these sites. Such efforts include both routine liaison activities, such as intelligence sharing and threat briefings, and more specialized joint training and exercise initiatives, which normally focus on emergency response coordination to disrupt incidents. The FBI is also a regular participant in the interagency process that attempts to evaluate the threat to these nuclear facilities and activities. This interagency cooperation ensures that security planners have a full understanding of the threat environment so they can establish appropriate safeguards for those facilities and activities.

Additional information requested in this inquiry is classified and was provided to the Committee on January 10, 2008.

4. To what extent do you still see a pattern of activity and cooperation among terrorist and extremist groups here in the U.S. — including al-Qa'ida? What trends do you see in the involvement of Hizballah, Hamas and other groups in terrorist incidents in the U.S.?

Response:

The response to this inquiry is classified and was provided to the Committee on January 10, 2008.

5. What is the status of our efforts against suspected al-Qa'ida cells worldwide? How would you characterize the level of cooperation with the U.S. from foreign intelligence services and law enforcement agencies with the al-Qa'ida target? With respect to cooperation with foreign law enforcement agencies, are we hampered by any lack of legal authorities or agreements? How much information has the Intelligence Community obtained on al-Qa'ida from U.S. military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq?

Response:

The FBI has an excellent working relationship with foreign intelligence services, the U.S. military, and other law enforcement agencies in the efforts to identify and capture key members of al-Qa'ida. The relationships forged before 9/11/01 through the efforts of those in the FBI's Legal Attaché (Legat) program have been strengthened, and new partnerships have been developed. FBI Legats regularly participate in counterterrorism working groups, where they discuss terrorism threats and related issues with appropriate host nation officials. Based on this coordination, the FBI has deployed individuals overseas to counter emerging threats, respond to terrorist events, and pursue intelligence opportunities.

The FBI and the greater USIC have benefitted from DoD's pursuit of al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan and Iraq. DoD has devoted extensive resources to intelligence collection relating to al-Qa'ida, its operatives, and its tactics. The entire USIC is involved in this collection effort, and personnel from numerous agencies are co-located in several different facilities (in the United States, Iraq, Afghanistan, and at several other international sites) working collaboratively. DoD facilitates this collaborative environment and contributes significant personnel and physical resources, which have been of great assistance to the USIC.

Through the efforts of both DoD and the FBI, substantial progress has been made in the efforts to identify and capture key members of al-Qa'ida in Iraq. The U.S.

military has made intelligence developed through its operations available to the USIC, and the FBI has used this intelligence to further its investigations, which in turn produce intelligence that is disseminated to the USIC.

6. An area of concern is what other countries do to spy on U.S. companies.

a. Are more countries getting into the business of using their intelligence services to engage in economic espionage?

Response:

FBI investigations have not identified a recent increase in the number of foreign governments using their intelligence services to engage in economic espionage, though the previously reported foreign governments traditionally identified as being involved in this activity have been observed to continue these activities. These efforts target U.S. classified, trade secret, and proprietary information and sensitive, export-controlled technologies. The most notable trend in foreign government-sponsored economic espionage is the movement away from the direct involvement of intelligence services to efforts conducted by government and government-affiliated defense and commercial entities. These efforts rely predominantly on their respective expatriate communities in the U.S., including businessmen, scientists, academics, and engineers. The foreign governments capitalize on the access the expatriates have developed to the desired technologies and information in U.S. companies, laboratories, and universities.

b. How do you balance the benefits that come from collecting intelligence on economic issues against the risk that such collection - or even the mere allegation of it - could prompt other countries to retaliate by increasing their defensive measures, by spying in turn on U.S. companies, or by becoming anti-American in policy discussions?

Response:

The offensive efforts of the major foreign intelligence and security services against our technologies are already extremely aggressive and those efforts seem to be independent of U.S. economic collection policy. Instead, the economic espionage attempts of these services seem to be based primarily on foreign demand for U.S. technologies.

During the course of the FBI's economic espionage investigations, the FBI may obtain information that is considered proprietary or trade secret information by a foreign entity. The FBI restricts access to this information and does not share it with competing U.S. companies. If, however, this information has strategic intelligence value (such as information regarding the level of development a specific technology has reached in a country of interest to the U.S.), this information, or aspects of the technology development, may be disseminated to USIC partners (to determine, for example, gaps in the strategic technologies available to the country of interest and the U.S.).

With respect to balancing the benefits of collection against the risks of detection, a country's reaction will depend on its particular circumstances. A country may already be employing their best possible defensive measures because they are aware that the United States is cognizant of their clandestine activities. Another country may decry these investigations as having an ethnic or xenophobic bias if it is aware of several high-profile espionage cases relating to individuals or companies of the same ethnicity or country. Many variables affect a country's response to detection, but the determination to conduct, or forego, an investigation is not premised on the possibility of such a response.

7. Since you became Director of the FBI in 2001, how many crime reports related to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information has the FBI investigated? How many such cases have been successfully prosecuted by the Department of Justice?

Response:

While various types of unauthorized disclosures of classified information are reported to the FBI through various vehicles, a Memorandum of Understanding between the Department of Justice and Intelligence Community agencies requires that unauthorized disclosures of classified information to the media be reported by way of a "crime report." Since September of 2001, the FBI has investigated and ultimately closed 85 investigations based upon crime reports related to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, all of which concerned unauthorized disclosures of classified information to the media. None of these cases reached prosecution. Currently, 21 such cases are under investigation.

8. The FBI's counterterrorism translation capabilities are critical if we are to successfully confront the terrorist threat. In a recent response to a series of questions posed by the

Senate Judiciary Committee, the FBI stated that the Bureau now possesses sufficient translation capability to promptly address all of the highest priority counterterrorism intelligence, often within 24 hours and that the percentage of linguists in certain high priority languages such as Middle Eastern and North African languages has increased 200 percent and more. Please identify those high priority languages and the number of FBI linguists capable of translating each. How many FBI Special Agents speak Arabic?

Response:

The response to this inquiry is classified and was provided to the Committee on January 10, 2008.

9. The issue of domestic surveillance and the use of the FISA process continues to be an issue of high importance for our intelligence capabilities. There needs to be a smooth and efficient process for handling FISA requests for warrants quickly and professionally. In past testimony before the Judiciary Committee on this issue, you have said "We still have some concerns. And we're addressing it with the Department of Justice. . . . But there's still frustration out there in the field in certain areas where, because we've had to prioritize, we cannot get to certain requests for FISA as fast as perhaps we might have in the past." We are told that there have been significant efforts to improve the FISA process. Please tell us how the FISA application process is working now. Are applications moving through quickly, or are you still experiencing delays? Has the creation of the Assistant Attorney General for National Security and the National Security Division made things better? What steps have been taken that have benefitted the work of the FBI and what still remains to be done? What can Congress do to improve the process further?

Response:

As a result of the combined efforts of the FBI and DOJ's Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, we have seen substantial progress in our ability to obtain orders pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) efficiently. While the process has clearly improved, we believe that it continues to take too long to process nonemergency FISA requests. In part, the delays we face are a result of the level of detail required in the applications. We strongly believe that all those involved in the FISA process must look for ways to streamline this process so that we can accomplish the goal of promptly obtaining FISA orders while still providing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court with enough information to make accurate findings relative to these applications. We are very

optimistic that the establishment of DOJ's National Security Division will help achieve our goal of ensuring an efficient and effective FISA process.

With regard to Congressional actions to improve and modernize the FISA process, we urge the Committee to quickly enact the Administration's proposal to modernize FISA in order to significantly streamline the FISA process. Among other inefficiencies, and as also noted by the Director of National Intelligence, sweeping changes in telecommunications technology since FISA was enacted in 1978 have resulted in the requirement to obtain a judicial order before conducting surveillance on suspected terrorists overseas - a result that impairs our intelligence capabilities without affording any protection to the civil liberties of Americans. And, of course, every hour of attorney time spent preparing FISA applications in order to eavesdrop on a suspected terrorist outside the United States (or to conduct a physical search of the suspect's stored communications) is an hour that is not spent preparing a FISA application for a suspected terrorist or spy who is inside the United States and whom the FBI wishes to target for collection.

10. What is the status of the investigation into the individual or group responsible for sending anthrax to the U.S. Senate after the 9/11 terrorist attacks? Does the Bureau believe this is domestic or international terrorism? Why?

Response:

This investigation is ongoing and the FBI continues to pursue every viable lead, whether related to possible domestic terrorism, international terrorism, or otherwise.

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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE SSCI #2007-1511-D
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8475

March 30, 2007

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Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples
Director
Defense Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20340

Dear General Maples:

We appreciate your participation in our January 11, 2007, hearing on the current and projected national security threats to the United States. Your willingness to address this important issue in open session was appreciated and made an important contribution, not only to the work of our Committee, but to the American public's awareness of U.S. national security interests.


We are submitting the attached questions for the record to you. The unclassified responses to these questions will be an important part of our public hearing transcript which we hope to release as expeditiously as possible. Accordingly, we would appreciate it if you would respond in writing to these questions no later than April 27, 2007.

If there are any questions, please have your staff contact Mr. Don Mitchell, of the Committee staff, at (202) 224-1700.

Sincerely,



John D. Rockefeller IV
Chairman



Christopher S. Bond
Vice Chairman

Enclosure

Question 1: (U) The Iraq Study Group strongly criticized U.S. military intelligence—not just the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)—for not having “invested sufficient people and resources to understand the political and military threat to American men and women in the armed forces.” To what extent is this fair criticism? To what extent is DIA involved in providing direct support to military commanders in Iraq? Will you be asking for additional resources?

Answer: (U) DIA has nearly 500 personnel focused on Iraq; this includes almost 300 personnel deployed to the theater to provide direct support to military commanders. DIA works daily with U.S. Central Command to scope, establish, and maintain validated manning requirements filled by deploying DIA personnel. Support requirements to the theater have grown with implementation of the Iraq surge, and DIA is in the process of hiring contract personnel to satisfy many of these requirements. Optimally, DIA would request additional OIF supplemental funding in FY08 to address requirements. As in the past, DIA will strive to keep Congress fully informed on all requirements, programming actions, and other efforts surrounding the submission of supplemental appropriation requests. DIA will continue to conduct extensive coordination and liaison within the Intelligence Community to set priorities, manage risk, and assess requirements for all assigned mission areas.

Question 2: (U) The Iraq Study Group claimed that fewer than 10 DIA analysts have more than two years experience in analyzing the Iraqi insurgency. . . . Subsequently, DIA stated that DIA has a “core cadre of 49 analysts focused exclusively on the insurgency, at least half of whom have more than two years experience working this issue.” Leaving aside specific numbers, are you convinced that DIA has an adequate capability to address this key issue? How would you assess the current state of knowledge on the insurgency?

Answer: (U) The Iraq Intelligence Cell currently has 146 personnel assigned, of which 136 are functioning analysts. DIA has a total of 16 analysts within the cell who focus specifically on the insurgency and have more than 2 years experience working the issue. The cell has an additional 29 analysts working the insurgency with less than 2 years of experience, for a total of 45 analysts analyzing the insurgency.

(U) The Iraq Intelligence Cell was stood up to improve DIA’s ability to analyze and formulate judgments on the full range of issues in Iraq, including the insurgency. The cell is still evolving and integrating new personnel, so it is too early to judge whether the new organization is adequate to address the complexity of the Iraq problem. What DIA can say about the Iraq Intelligence Cell’s capabilities at this point is that, with the additional resources provided by new personnel and functional area analysts from throughout DIA’s Directorate for Analysis, the cell provides more integrated and holistic analysis for the Intelligence Community and national decisionmakers.

(U) DIA still has a lot of work to do regarding mapping the insurgency and nodal analysis. General knowledge of the insurgency is good; however, specific leaders, power brokers, and insurgent decisionmakers as well as financing remain unclear. Insight into these areas will provide significant improvement in the cell’s ability to analyze the insurgency.

Question 3: (U) A widely circulating opinion poll has indicated that a majority (61%) of Iraqis believe attacks against Coalition Forces are justified. Do you think this is accurate? How would you characterize Iraqi views toward foreign forces in Iraq?

Answer: (U) Yes, this percentage is accurate as of early September 2006. A similar nationwide survey likely would yield a similar result if taken now. This poll was commissioned by University of Maryland's Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) and conducted by KA Research Ltd. (KARL), a research firm owned by Iraqis and Turks.

(U) KARL appears to be a reputable firm. For this survey, KARL conducted 1,150 randomly selected face-to-face interviews with Iraqi adults (margin of error +/- 3 percent). Other polling efforts have shown similar results. An ABC-BBC poll from late February/early March 2007 showed that 51 percent thought "attacks on Coalition forces were acceptable," up from 17 percent in 2004.

(U) However, the 61-percent result masks wide ethnosectarian differences. Although 61 percent overall approved of "attacks on US-led forces in Iraq" (27 percent "strongly," 34 percent "somewhat"), 92 percent of Sunni Arabs and 62 percent of Shia Arabs approved. In contrast, only 15 percent of Kurds approved. Also, the 61 figure had increased from the 47 found in an earlier PIPA poll from Jan 06.

(U) Polling also shows not only that wide static ethnosectarian differences exist, but the trends also contrast. Since the onset of Iraq violence in April 2004 and the first major U.S. operation into Fallujah, Sunni Arab sentiment has been steadily very negative and Kurdish sentiment positive. What have changed are attitudes in Baghdad and in Shia areas. Opinion in Baghdad on targeting Coalition forces and on whether they should leave has moderated somewhat in recent months as sectarian and al-Qaida violence in Baghdad became pervasive.

(U) In contrast, opinion in the Shia South regarding the Multinational Forces-Iraq presence has declined since the start of 2006 as Shia have looked suspiciously on U.S./Coalition efforts to increase Sunni inclusion in government and as Coalition forces have increasingly targeted Shia militia.

(U) There are really no "Iraqi views" because of stark differences in opinion among ethnosectarian groups; these are partly pointed out above. Only Kurds can be viewed as having a generally positive view of Coalition forces, largely because they view the Coalition presence as a guarantor of de facto Kurdish independence (and a bulwark against Iraqi civil war and/or Turkish intervention).

(U) Both Sunni and Shia Arabs generally are negative in their confidence in Coalition forces, their support for the Coalition presence, their view of Coalition force contributions to their personal security and to law and order in Iraq, and their suspicion that U.S./Coalition motivations are malevolent. Moreover, they are at best ambivalent about attacks on Coalition forces (in strong contrast to their opposition to attacks on Iraqi civilians and security forces) and do not believe Coalition forces have any intention of ever leaving. Negativity is particularly strong in the Sunni Arab regions to the west and north.

(U) However, while none of the latest polling can be deemed yet to reflect Iraqi conclusions on Baghdad Security Plan III, much of the sentiment regarding Coalition forces appears to have improved substantially in Baghdad since December 2006. A late February/early March 2007 poll by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research showed that, whereas no more than 3 percent in other exclusively Sunni or Shia Arab regions had confidence in Coalition forces, confidence in Baghdad stood at 40 percent (up from 7 percent in December 2006).

(U) Also, a February 2007 survey showed Baghdad to be the only region outside the Kurdish zone in which more attributed the rationale for the U.S. military "surge" to positive motivations (42 percent—to bring security and stability) than negative (33 percent—to attack Iraq's neighbors, to take control, etc.).

(U) Overall, Iraqi Arab views of when Coalition forces should leave are tempered by the concern for potential descent into greater violence and civil war. Thus, while 61 percent approved of attacks on Coalition forces, only 37 percent in the same September 2006 PIPA poll desired for Coalition forces to leave immediately. This indicates the belief that attacks are necessary to pressure the United States ultimately to leave but that at least a short-term Coalition presence is preferred to the feared alternative of state disintegration and chaos that could ensue.

Question 4: (U) The Intelligence Community is America's early warning system against threats to American lives and property both here and overseas. What are the Intelligence Community's greatest strengths and deficiencies in monitoring terrorism? What lessons have your organizations learned from the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to address any shortcomings? Do you believe that you currently have sufficient resources to effectively fight the war on terrorism?

Answer: (U) Since the 11 September 2001 attacks, the Intelligence Community (IC) has greatly strengthened its collective capabilities against terrorism. The IC's counterterrorism components are working in close concert to wage an aggressive global campaign against terrorists threatening U.S. citizens and interests. Each component brings its unique mission responsibilities and capabilities to bear on the problem under the umbrella of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). DIA's primary contribution to the terrorism issue is its strong terrorism analysis expertise resident in the Joint Intelligence Task Force—Combating Terrorism (JITF-CT) and the robust capabilities of Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) system. DIA provides valuable and tailored intelligence analysis and collection to Defense Department policymakers and warfighters and, as an integral member of the national counterterrorism community, contributes Defense expertise and perspective to the national effort against terrorism.

(U) Under the NCTC's Counterterrorism Analytic Framework, DIA is responsible for ensuring the vast Defense Department enterprise receives the intelligence required to protect its personnel, facilities, and operations from terrorist attack and to enable military counterterrorism plans and operations. The JITF-CT responds to the full-range of Defense Department combating terrorism requirements, including support to both force protection and counterterrorism missions. The JITF-CT is responsible for prompt assessment and dissemination of intelligence on terrorist threats to the Defense Department; providing tailored analysis and products to Defense policymakers, military commanders at all echelons, and forces deployed worldwide; and performing all-source intelligence analysis in support of military counterterrorism plans and operations. To illustrate the scope of the support provided, during 2006 the JITF-CT produced about 8,000 individual terrorism intelligence products and responded to 7,343 formal terrorism-related taskings from the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Combatant Commands, and the broader counterterrorism community.

(U) In the 5 plus years since 11 September 2001, DIA has developed and is successfully operating a new model to apply terrorism intelligence to Defense operations. Using improved data access, resulting from innovative efforts like the Defense Intelligence Agency–National Security Agency information-sharing program, JTF-CT analysts are producing detailed, tailored counterterrorism campaign support products to target terrorists and their capabilities. These products, combined with the expertise of analysts deployed with key military counterterrorism elements, contributed to the captures or deaths of numerous foreign terrorists and identification of several significant terrorist plots. The success of this effort underscores the immense importance of information sharing and collaboration across the counterterrorism community and the effectiveness of embedding skilled analysts to support and guide collection, detainee interrogations, document exploitation, and counterterrorism operations.

Question 5: (U) How many Taliban and al-Qaida members have been killed, wounded or captured since September 11, 2001? To what extent have al-Qaida and the Taliban been effectively eliminated as a threat to U.S. interests?

Answer: (U) DIA cannot assess with a great degree of confidence specific numbers of al-Qaida members killed, wounded, or captured since 11 September 2001, in part because of the difficulties in defining “membership,” and because of incomplete casualty counts, particularly for the killed and wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan. Al-Qaida currently has several thousand members and associates; although the associates may not pledge allegiance to al-Qaida, they support its ideology and methods, creating a parallel network of networks referred to as the al-Qaida-associated movement. DIA estimates thousands of al-Qaida members and affiliates, including many key leaders and operatives, have been killed, wounded, or captured in Afghanistan, Iraq, and worldwide since September 11th.

(U) Despite counterterrorism successes since 9/11, al-Qaida remains a very capable and active organization posing a threat in many regions of the world. It retains its ability to recruit members and obtain funds, as well as its ability to replace operatives and leaders killed or captured. Al-Qaida’s Pakistan-based leadership retains the ability to support the Afghan and Iraqi insurgencies and to support and direct transnational operations. Al-Qaida associates continue to execute other terrorist attacks, and still other attacks are carried out by local jihadists with little or no direct connection to al-Qaida.

(U) The Taliban has lost thousands of fighters to death, capture, or reconciliation since U.S. and allied operations began in Afghanistan in October 2001. The movement, however, is a greater threat to U.S. interests now than at any point since the Taliban fell from power. This is largely the result of increasing support from Pashtun tribes in eastern and southern Afghanistan and western Pakistan. Increased support, which often is coerced, has allowed the Taliban leadership to steadily increase its manpower reserves. Without an expansion of basic security and an increase in legitimate economic opportunity, this trend undoubtedly will continue.

Question 6: (U) What is the nature and extent of the terrorist threat to U.S. diplomatic and military facilities overseas and how has it changed since September 11, 2001? Do you believe that the Departments of Defense and State have taken appropriate security measures to address the terrorist threat to all of their overseas facilities?

Answer: (U) The terrorist threat to U.S. diplomatic and military facilities overseas remains significant, particularly from the al-Qaida-associated movement, which remains active and capable of improvised explosive device (IED)—including vehicle-borne IED—attacks, armed assaults, and other tactics. Since 9/11, increasing security, improved intelligence, and hardening of many of these facilities have caused some terrorists to focus on softer targets, including transportation infrastructure, restaurants, and nightclubs.

(U) The Department of Defense has taken additional measures to enhance the antiterrorism physical and technical security measures afforded U.S. diplomatic missions around the globe. Working with the Department of State's Bureau of Overseas Building Operations and the Office of the Director for National Intelligence's Center for Security Evaluation, the Defense Department has aggressively ensured all new construction meets the latest standards for antiterrorism and all renovation projects have their physical and technical security enhanced to meet existing requirements.

Question 7: (U) If present trends continue, what will be the Russian military's capability to conduct operations 5 years from now? Do these trends indicate the possibility that Russia may soon have insufficient military force to retain order within Russia?

Answer: (U) Current trends force wide generally are positive and allow the assessment that Russian military forces are fully capable of maintaining order within Russia for the next 5 years.

(U) Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian strategic nuclear forces never lost their ability to execute their strategic strike mission. However, Russia's general purpose forces (especially its Ground Forces and Air Forces) suffered a dramatic loss of combat capabilities. Since 2000, a steady, albeit uneven, improvement has been observed that likely will continue over at least the next 5 years.

(U) The base combat missions assigned to the future Russian Armed Forces likely will cover the full operational spectrum (from low- to high-intensity combat actions) as well as a wide range of possible threats. Senior Russian leaders believe the Armed Forces are capable of executing their required missions. The basic combat mission set of the peacetime Russian Armed Forces is composed of the following five specific missions:

- a) (U) Strategic nuclear strike.
- b) (U) Repulse an enemy aerospace attack.
- c) (U) Repel aggression in an "armed conflict."
- d) (U) Repel aggression in a "local war."
- e) (U) Protect the mobilization and deployment of the Armed Forces for high-intensity wars.

Question 8: (U) Transfer of Technology From Russia. What general trends has the Intelligence Community noticed of scientists, technology and conventional and unconventional military sales from Russia to other nations? What trends have you detected that Russian nuclear materials, BW, CW or ballistic missile-related materials or technology, have found their way to the international black market? What are the implications of these trends for U.S. security?

Answer: (U) Russia has provided nuclear technology to a large number of countries in the form of nuclear power reactors and nuclear research centers. Recipients include Eastern Europe, China, North Korea, Iran, and Algeria. In addition, Russia has provided uranium enrichment technology to China. No evidence indicates Russian uranium enrichment centrifuge technology has found its way onto the black market. With the exception of China, Russia has not provided weapon technology to other countries.

(U) In the chaotic years following the breakup of the Soviet Union, some Russian scientists may have gone to third world countries. For example, in the 1990s the Federal Security Service prevented a planeload of Russian missile experts from leaving for North Korea. While some nuclear scientists may have left, the Russian government did not support scientists' leaving. Many scientists also left for sabbaticals at Western scientific research institutions, with most returning to Russia.

(U) Although DIA cannot exclude the possibility, it is not aware of any significant movement of Russian scientists, materials, or technology directly related to biological weapons to other countries, either directly or by way of the black market. Russia maintains technology-sharing agreements with many other countries, and some of that technology could indirectly support development of biological weapons; however, much of the relevant technology and equipment already is available from open sources, so acquisition of Russian support is not likely a limiting factor for countries pursuing a biological warfare capability.

(U) Although Russia plays a significant role in the international market for technological and conventional military sales, DIA has not seen any sales beyond conventional chemical equipment that directly apply to chemical warfare materials and technology. Russia expresses public support for various nonproliferation regimes and treaties and has ratified key arms control treaties.

(U) Russia's June 2006 "White Paper on Nonproliferation" self-assessed the Russian export control system as reliable and mature. DIA assesses Russia is committed to controlling the outward flow of WMD-applicable technology and expertise; however, Moscow consistently must insure that nonproliferation, to include the security of fissile material and nuclear warheads remains a top priority and those who violate the law will be prosecuted.

Question 9: (U) What is the likelihood that China will attempt an invasion of Taiwan in the next five years? What factors would lead Beijing to consider a military versus a peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues? What is your current assessment of China's amphibious program and future invasion capabilities? How many missiles does China possess that could strike Taiwan, what is the destructive capability of this missile force, and what is Taiwan's retaliatory missile capability? To what extent have close U.S.-Taiwan relations been an obstacle to closer U.S.-China ties?

Answer: (U) Beijing's primary strategic concerns include ensuring domestic security and prosperity and restoring China as an international power. Success in these areas bolsters the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and failure, even temporary, would underscore the CCP's shortcomings. Peace is generally in the CCP's best interest because it provides a stable backdrop for China's continued modernization and economic boom. Although unification with Taiwan remains one of Beijing's long-term objectives, designed to ensure territorial integrity, Beijing appears prepared to defer unification as long as it continues to believe trends are advancing toward that goal and that the costs of conflict outweigh the benefits. However, how precisely Beijing would make such a calculation is uncertain.

(U) During the next 5 years, Beijing's focus is likely one of preventing Taiwan from moving toward de jure independence while continuing to hold out its terms for peaceful resolution under a "one country, two systems" framework that would provide Taiwan a degree of autonomy in exchange for its unification with the mainland. The mainland's current course of action appears to employ political, economic, cultural, legal, diplomatic, and military instruments of power in a coherent strategy to resolve the Taiwan issue in its favor. Indeed, cross-strait economic ties have expanded Beijing's influence in, and leverage over, Taipei. However, Beijing could use military action against Taiwan if it feels Taiwan has drifted too far from unification. Currently the most likely courses of action appear to be limited in scope and meant to deter independence rather than a full-scale invasion of the main island with the intent of unification.

(U) An amphibious campaign of the scale outlined in several Chinese military writings would tax the capabilities of China's armed forces now and for the next several years. An amphibious invasion of Taiwan would be a significant political and military risk for China's leaders and is not likely in the short term. Nevertheless, the Chinese military is preparing a future capability to conduct an amphibious invasion.

(U) China has deployed roughly 900 CSS-6 and CSS-7 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) to garrisons opposite Taiwan. This SRBM force would be extremely effective at striking air defense/early warning radars, missile sites, airfields, and command and control nodes in Taiwan in the opening period of a war across the Taiwan Strait. With the newer generation missiles possessing greater ranges and improved accuracy, fewer missiles would be necessary to successfully destroy a given target. A RAND war game estimated an initial barrage of these SRBMs could reduce the overall effectiveness of Taiwan's air defense systems by 50 percent. Against unhardened facilities, the Chinese SRBMs pose a significant threat to Taiwan's air defenses, airfields, and command and control nodes. China likely would use its SRBM force to shape the battlefield and gain the operational advantage in a conflict with Taiwan. Currently Taiwan does not have a retaliatory ballistic missile capability that could counter China's offensive missile force.

(U) Although China's rhetoric regarding U.S.-Taiwan ties is negative, it has not prevented U.S.-Sino cooperation in areas in which interests coincide—for example, the Six-Party Talks.

Question 10: (U) On October 9, 2006, North Korea tested a nuclear weapon with an estimated yield of less than 1 kiloton. Recent press reports suggest that North Korea is about to test another device. What is the Intelligence Community's assessment of the likelihood that North Korea will test another nuclear weapon soon? What is the current estimate of the size of North Korea's weapon arsenal? How confident are we that North Korea is complying with the terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework regarding plutonium production activities at Yongbyon?

Answer: (U) DIA assesses North Korea could conduct a nuclear test with little to no warning. However, DIA does not assess a nuclear test is imminent.

(U) DIA assesses North Korea could have several plutonium-based nuclear warheads.

(U) DIA assesses with high confidence that North Korea did not comply with terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework regarding plutonium production activities at Yongbyon.

(U) Agreed Framework terms stipulated that North Korea halt its nuclear materials production program and meet all terms of the framework and the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in exchange for delivery of essential reactor components for two 1,000-MWe light-water reactors and annual delivery of 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil for North Korea.

(U) Starting in October 1994, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitored North Korea's nuclear facilities at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center per the Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea. Under this agreement, all graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities were frozen, and about 8,000 nuclear reactor spent fuel rods were placed in storage there under IAEA seal.

- a) (U) In October 2002, revelations surfaced that North Korea had been pursuing a uranium enrichment program in violation of the Agreed Framework.
- b) (U) In December 2002, following suspension of its heavy fuel oil shipments, North Korea expelled IAEA personnel from the country and announced it would re-start its Yongbyon facilities for power production.
- c) (U) On 10 January 2003, Pyongyang announced North Korea's intention to withdraw from the NPT.
- d) (U) In October 2003, North Korean officials declared they had successfully finished reprocessing all 8,000 spent fuel rods.
- e) (U) An unofficial U.S. delegation that visited the site in January 2004 reported that the spent fuel canisters no longer contained the spent fuel rods, an indication they may have been removed for reprocessing.

Question 11: (U) What is the likelihood that North and South Korea will unify within the next 5 years? What is the likelihood that unification between North and South Korea will be a peaceful process? Under what circumstances would a war be likely? How strong is Kim Jong Il's hold on power? Who will likely succeed him?

(U) Despite rhetoric from both North and South Korea on unification as a national goal, the likelihood that the two countries will unify within the next 5 years is low. Kim Jong Il's immediate focus is to maintain political control in North Korea and ensure regime survival rather than push for unification. South Korea sees unification as a long-term objective; hasty unification would pose major financial and social challenges for the South. DIA assesses a forceful reunification by military means to be a remote possibility. A gradual and peaceful unification continues to be the goal of all nations concerned. War would occur only under the direst of circumstances: North Korea would have to be under extreme external pressure or threatened by immediate political collapse to attack the South.

(U) Kim Jong Il maintains complete control over North Korea, and the strength of multiple security services adds to his overall hold on power. DIA notes that no organized opposition to his continued rule has been observed, elite loyalty remains strong, and no concrete steps have been taken to establish a successor to Kim. Continued idolization of the Kim family and a decisionmaking structure centered on Kim Jong Il portend continued Kim family rule of North Korea.

Question 12: (U) Trends in Conventional Arms Transfer Activities: What are the most recent trends you have identified in conventional arms transfer activities with respect to sales to the Middle East from foreign suppliers, to China by Russia, and by all suppliers to Iran? What specific major conventional weapons systems have been transferred from Russia to Iran and to China

Answer: (U) The Middle East/North Africa (MENA) region is the world's second-largest regional arms market, behind Asia. In 2005-06, Britain was the largest non-U.S. supplier to MENA as a result of a multibillion dollar arms-for-oil agreement with Saudi Arabia. Russia was the next-largest supplier; its sales to this region in 2005 and 2006 were more than three times its previous annual average. Algeria and Iran were Moscow's leading customers. Algeria signed a multibillion dollar agreement for fighter aircraft, tanks, and air defense systems, and Iran signed a \$700 million contract for SA-15/GAUNTLET air defense systems. Russia was Iran's largest supplier during this period, followed by China.

(U) Germany and France also are leading arms suppliers to the MENA region. Significant German arms agreements included sale of two submarines to Israel and armored vehicles and naval vessels to the United Arab Emirates. France signed new agreements to supply the United Arab Emirates Mirage fighter aircraft and antiship missiles.

(U) The United Kingdom, Russia, Germany, and France will continue to be significant non-U.S. suppliers to the MENA region. In addition to current arms-for-oil arrangements, London soon may sell Eurofighter Typhoon fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia.

(U) Iran's major suppliers are Russia and China. Russia has signed the largest contracts with Tehran, selling about \$1 billion worth of military equipment, including 29 SA-15B air defense systems, fighter aircraft overhauls, and patrol boats. Deliveries of this system already have begun. Tehran will continue to rely on these arms suppliers in the future, partly out of necessity because Western countries refuse to sell to Iran. Relations with Moscow, however, currently are strained because of Iran's intransigence on nuclear issues, which could affect future arms sales.

(U) China traditionally has been Russia's largest customer, on average purchasing billions of dollars worth of arms every year. Russia is China's largest supplier, accounting for more than 80 percent of Chinese arms imports. Major purchases have included Kilo Class submarines, SA-20/GARGOYLE air defense systems, Su-30MKK/MK2/FLANKER fighter aircraft, and various Mi-series military helicopters. Although 2006 saw a significant drop in purchases, this is only a temporary dip, as Beijing has billions of dollars worth of purchases in the negotiation phase. Russia will continue to be China's main supplier of arms for the foreseeable future.

Question 13 (U) How much progress has President Uribe made against Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) insurgents and other illegal armed groups? How has the government's overall security been improved? What is the likelihood of continued instability in Colombia over the next several years because of the FARC and other armed groups?

(U) Since 2002, Colombia's security forces have reduced FARC manpower to about 12,000—down from a peak of 15,000-16,000. The FARC has very little popular support—no higher than 2 percent in polls over the past 5 years—but sustains itself through involvement in the illegal drug trade, which allows it to continue to resist a political settlement with the Colombian government.

a) (U) A humanitarian prisoner/hostage exchange would be a key prerequisite for any future peace negotiations with the FARC. Despite significant government concessions, the two sides have consistently failed to agree on conditions for an exchange. FARC leaders are unlikely to consider peace negotiations, opting instead to wait out the remaining 3 years of President Uribe's second term.

(U) Exploratory peace talks between the government and the National Liberation Army (ELN)—Colombia's other major insurgent group—began in December 2005, and the sixth round resumed in Havana, Cuba, on 12 April 2007. International interlocutors may be able to apply enough pressure to encourage the ELN to demobilize. Nonetheless, not all ELN rebels actually would demobilize, and some probably would gravitate to the FARC or other criminal gangs.

a) (U) Since 2000, the ELN has been reduced by about 50 percent from about 6,000. Although the ELN previously regarded the drug trade as immoral, some elements are increasingly engaging in drug trafficking to fund operations, and competition over trafficking territory has led to some deadly confrontations with the FARC.

(U) President Uribe implemented a National Security Strategy shortly after assuming office in August 2002 to expand the scope of government control throughout Colombia. In June 2003, the military launched a major counterinsurgency campaign, which has achieved notable military gains against the FARC but has yet to compel it to engage in peace negotiations.

a) (U) Since August 2002, Uribe has nearly doubled the strength of the military. For the Army in particular, several new mobile brigades have been manned and deployed, along with seven high-mountain battalions, which are garrisoned in the mountains to deprive insurgents of access to mountain sanctuaries and to allow the government to control vital lines of communication. According to press reporting, the 8th High-Mountain Battalion was to have been activated in March 2007 in the mountains east of Cali. The Army also has trained some 20,000 Hometown Soldiers to augment rural police forces in areas the Army already has cleared.

(U) Because of the availability of nearly unlimited funding from the illegal drug trade, the FARC is likely to continue to be a destabilizing force in Colombia for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, security forces continue to reduce FARC manpower while simultaneously expanding government security forces and services into areas the FARC formerly controlled. Eventually security forces are likely to kill or capture one or more members of the FARC Secretariat, which likely would project the group into a crisis mode.

a) (U) FARC Supreme Commander Manuel Marulanda, who is widely respected by the rank and file, is rumored to be in poor health. Moreover, he will turn 76 on 13 May. If and when he dies or is captured, the FARC could face an identity crisis, particularly if another Secretariat member fails to secure the allegiance of midlevel FARC commanders.

(U) Since July 2005, some 32,000 United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) rightwing paramilitary members demobilized, but as many as 3,000 may have forsaken the process to join emerging criminal bands. In addition to the 29,000 AUC members who remain demobilized, however, some 11,000 FARC, ELN, and AUC deserters also surrendered to security forces since June 2002.

a) (U) Taken together, the collective AUC demobilizations and desertions of individuals are noteworthy, resulting in some 40,000 fewer armed combatants engaging in criminal activities. Since the AUC demobilized, Colombia's homicide rate dropped 13 percent.

(U) President Uribe will continue his National Security Strategy for the remainder of his term in an effort to eliminate the FARC, ELN, and other criminal groups. His administration also will continue its efforts to expand the scope of social development programs and services to further isolate these illegal armed groups. Nonetheless, despite gains of the Uribe government against the FARC, demobilization of some 40,000 illegally armed combatants, and the hopeful prospects for a peace accord with the ELN, a permanent solution to Colombia's internal conflict is likely to remain difficult and elusive. Even if the FARC and ELN are eliminated, billions of drug dollars will continue to foster well-armed criminal entities in Colombia. Therefore, aggressive counternarcotics operations will continue to be an essential part of Colombia's long-term national security strategy.

Question 14: (U) How stable is the Saudi government? What factors would be most likely to bring about change in that country? What is the likelihood that the next leadership transition will lead to a period of instability? To what extent are the Saudi government and public supportive of the U.S.-led campaign against Usama bin Ladin and terrorism, as well as the U.S.-led effort in Iraq? To what extent would the removal of U.S. military forces from Saudi Arabia diminish anti-U.S. sentiment both within Saudi Arabia and throughout the Islamic world? If the U.S. were to withdraw from Iraq, what is the likelihood that al-Qaida and other terrorist groups in Iraq would turn their attention to the Saudi regime?

Answer: (U) High oil prices, gradual reforms, improved counterterrorism capabilities, and a string of counterterrorism successes all have made the Saudi government significantly more stable than in previous years. Unless a major precipitating event occurs, the Saudi regime is likely to endure for the foreseeable future, and leadership changes are unlikely to cause significant or lasting instability.

(U) Saudi leaders fear instability, and the royal family is likely to be able to quickly achieve consensus on future leaders. Previous leadership changes have gone smoothly, and future power transfers are likely to occur without incident. A new succession law, announced in October 2006, aims to formalize and regularize future successions.

(U) Since 2004, the Saudi public appears to have become increasingly hostile to acts of terrorism and those who perpetrate them, especially inside the kingdom. According to press reports, Saudi citizens often report suspicious, terrorist-related activities to the authorities. The Saudi government is committed to combating terrorism and Usama bin Ladin.

(U) Even if trainers for the Defense Ministry and Saudi Arabian National Guard are counted, significantly fewer U.S. military personnel are in the kingdom today than in 2003. Any further reduction in U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia is unlikely to have an appreciable impact on anti-U.S. sentiment in the kingdom or throughout the Islamic world. The presence of U.S. forces on the Arabian Peninsula is no longer a significant part of anti-U.S. Islamist rhetoric.

(U) A Coalition withdrawal from Iraq likely will have little effect, if any, on al-Qaida's targeting of the Saudi regime, as the overthrow of the Saudi regime has long been one of the key goals of al-Qaida senior leaders. While Saudi counterterrorism forces have waged a sustained campaign against al-Qaida since 2003, remaining at-large operatives continue to pose a significant threat to U.S., other Western, and Saudi interests in the kingdom. The return to Saudi Arabia of some foreign fighters who choose not to remain in Iraq following Coalition withdrawal could bring additional skills and connections to the Saudi al-Qaida network, which al-Qaida could use in its campaign against the kingdom.

Question 15: (U) Language Skills of DIA Analysts. The 9/11 Commission and other outside groups have emphasized the importance of having more analysts with foreign language skills in interpreting the mass of information available from both classified and unclassified sources. Could you give the Committee a status report on the issue as it affects DIA? In particular, how difficult is it to employ the services of first or second generation Americans with family ties in potentially hostile countries?

Answer: (U) To conduct accurate analysis of both classified and unclassified sources, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) requires analysts with regional and cultural expertise. The volume of information available in open sources far exceeds our ability to identify and process information of value or useful to the Intelligence Community (IC), and the volume is increasing exponentially as communications technology and the Internet spread around the world. English-only speakers cannot fully use this information until it is translated. Information from classified sources must also be translated into English before it can be used. Even information from foreign sources provided in English often contains errors that must be identified and corrected by language-skilled analysts with background in the subject matter. Finding cleared translators, particularly for technical documents, can be a problem, because they may lack the subject matter expertise to render accurate translations. While improving, machine translations still leave much to be desired and continue to require human intervention to ensure accuracy. Precise, accurate translations are essential to good all-source analysis. This requires language-skilled analysts who can either identify items of interest and submit them for translation or perform the translation themselves.

(U) Since language skills are such an important tool both for achieving the necessary regional and cultural expertise and analyzing primary source material, DIA has undertaken an aggressive recruiting effort to hire more language-skilled individuals. This includes an incentive program to encourage referrals of language-skilled applicants, active recruitment from the National Security Education Program, full utilization of the Pat Roberts Intelligence Scholars Program, and a focused effort to recruit from the various National Flagship Language Programs.

(U) As a result, DIA's Directorate for Analysis has nearly doubled the number of individuals who qualify for Foreign Language Proficiency Pay (FLPP) in the past two years. The number drawing FLPP for critical languages (such as Arabic, Chinese, Dari, Farsi, Russian, etc.) has nearly tripled. All of the analysts in DIA are U.S. citizens who have attained a Top Secret/SCI clearance.

(U) In addition, DIA requires highly-skilled language professionals at the National Media Exploitation Center (NMEC) who are literate in the target language, understanding nuances and slang as well as normal text. NMEC employs more than 330 full-time equivalent contracted translators. For unclassified material, this can be done using Category I (uncleared) translators, who are native speaking foreign nationals who have passed some security screening (such as polygraph, subject interview and name checks).

(U) For classified material, NMEC uses Category II (Secret) and Category III (Top Secret/SCI) cleared translators. The investigative and adjudicative requirements for these individuals are more rigorous than for Category I. The granting authority for all collateral security clearances (i.e., TOP SECRET and below, non-SCI) resides exclusively with the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO). In emergency circumstances, DIA has used its delegated authority to appoint persons to sensitive positions in DIA for a limited period of time for whom a full field investigation or other appropriate investigation, including the National Agency Check (NAC), has not been conducted. For example, DIA employs an accelerated process for clearing linguists, which allowed us to clear almost 800 contractors (mostly linguists) over a three-month period for assignment to the Iraqi Survey Group, with an average turnaround time of less than 30 days. The contractor company must have initiated the required NAC and requested an expedited interim clearance decision from DISCO, while DIA conducts credit and law enforcement checks and a subject interview of the contract linguist. DIA advises DISCO of the results of these compensatory security checks.

(U) The requirements for TS/SCI eligibility are dictated by Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/4 (soon to be Intelligence Community Directive 704), which specifies the investigative and adjudicative requirements. One of the most difficult requirements for the population in question (native or heritage speakers with families living abroad) is the ability to investigate 7-10 years of their background. If an individual has lived abroad until recently (or only been in the U.S. for the 3-5 years necessary to meet residency requirements for citizenship), conducting a full background investigation is problematic. The challenge facing the IC is how to assess an individual's trustworthiness without investigating their background beyond a few years. DIA has taken steps to enhance our effectiveness in this area, including deploying a security officer to CIA (to gain access to other data bases in a more timely manner) and working with IC psychologists to deploy a special interview protocol during the security interviews (to more accurately determine the degree to which an individual has assimilated themselves into the U.S. mainstream).

(U) Obtaining a TS/SCI clearance on an individual who has spent their life in the U.S. takes, on average across DIA as a whole, about 75 days for the full investigation and adjudication. An individual with extensive overseas travel / connections can take two to three times that long as we have to await what overseas leads can reasonably be conducted. Thus, native or heritage speakers of critical languages can be cleared up to the TS/SCI level – but it takes much longer.

(U) The majority of native or heritage language speakers deemed ineligible for a TS/SCI clearance were dual citizens who refused to agree not to exercise any benefits of their non-U.S. citizenship (such as maintaining a current foreign passport, voting in foreign elections, or receiving foreign government benefits) while employed and cleared by the U.S. Government, not because of foreign family members. The major obstacle DIA faces is not the ability to obtain security clearances for native / heritage speakers of foreign languages (even those with families living abroad), but difficulty of getting such clearances in a timely manner.

Question 16: (U) **Criminal Organizations and Networks:** What is the likelihood that criminal organizations and networks will expand the scale and scope of their activities over the next 10 years? What is the likelihood that such groups will traffic in nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons?

Answer: (U) International organized crime increasingly will threaten U.S. national security over the next 10 years. Globalization—the growing interconnectedness of global economies and societies—will continue to facilitate expansion of organized criminal activities and networks in the coming decade. Organized criminal activities include drug trafficking, human trafficking, arms smuggling, and illicit financial activities, to include manipulating financial markets. Organized criminal groups will become increasingly adept in exploiting globally integrated economies, sophisticated technology, advanced computer networking, and better connected transportation systems. In particular, these groups likely will expand the scope and scale of cybercrime activities over the next 10 years. Criminal networks likely will thrive in resource-rich states or regions undergoing significant political and economic transformation.

(U) The potential exists for organized criminal organizations to engage in trafficking of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) materials. Terrorist groups could turn to criminal organizations to provide goods, including CBRN materials, they cannot procure on their own. However, any relationship between organized criminal networks and terrorists likely would be a matter of business, as organized criminal networks are hesitant to participate in any activity—including CBRN trafficking—regarded as risky or bad for business.

Question 17: (U) **While Turkey was not supportive of US forces crossing its territory to attack Iraq from the north during Operation Iraqi Freedom, how supportive has Turkey been of US counterterrorism efforts? What approach has the Turkish government taken regarding the northern Iraq Kurdish groups? What is the likelihood that Turkey will go so far as to invade northern Iraq and retain a permanent presence there to prevent a Kurdish state?**

Answer: (U) Turkey supported U.S. counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East. However, Turkey's primary counterterrorism concern remains the Kurdistan People's Congress (KGK), operating in Turkey, with training and logistic camps in northern Iraq. The lack of tangible U.S. action against Turkey's primary terrorism concern continues to negatively affect public opinion regarding the United States in Turkey.

(U) The Turkish military refuses to meet with Iraqi Kurds because of the military's belief that the Iraqi Kurds support the KGK. The ruling Justice and Development Party has taken a more flexible approach in dealing with the Iraqi Kurds, but it cannot do much in the current environment owing to a lack of Iraqi Kurdish action against the KGK, Turkish military pressure, and upcoming presidential elections.

(U) Turkey may invade northern Iraq in the near term, especially if the United States and/or the Iraqi Kurds do not take tangible action against the KGK camps in northern Iraq. Ankara is unlikely to invade northern Iraq and maintain a permanent presence to prevent establishment of an Iraqi Kurdish state. However, through persistent diplomatic and economic means Turkey will continue to pressure the Iraqi Kurds to remain a part of the Iraqi nation.

Question 18 (U) Please provide your assessment of the state of the Afghan security forces, particularly the Afghan National Army as well as the Afghan police. What are the strengths and weaknesses of these organizations? How many anti-ISAF (the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force) attacks were conducted against NATO forces in the second half of 2006? How does that compare to the previous six months, and the six months before then? Do you assess that these attacks have undermined the coherence of mission of the NATO-led ISAF forces? What is the number of and trend line on suicide attacks conducted in Afghanistan in 2006? Who are the perpetrators?

Answer: (U) Afghan National Army (ANA) units are limited by resource shortages, high attrition rates, inadequate training, and corruption. While no ANA units are assessed as capable of independent operations, some units are capable of leading small-scale operations with Coalition support.

(U) Afghan National Police (ANP) units suffer from inadequate training, equipment shortages, high levels of corruption, and influence by local tribes. While not proficient by Western standards, ANP elements are capable of handling low-level tasks such as manning checkpoints and providing local security.

(U) There were 1,878 attacks against Coalition and NATO forces in the second half of 2006, 839 during the first half of 2006, and 655 in the last half of 2005. These attacks undermine the coherence of the mission by portraying the Coalition/NATO as unable to provide security for the local populace.

(U) There were 130 suicide attacks in Afghanistan in 2006. Most suicide bombers in Afghanistan have been Pashtuns from Afghanistan or Pakistan, with smaller numbers emanating from foreign fighters. There have been 43 attacks so far in 2007 compared to 28 during the same time period in 2006. If this trend continues the number of suicide attacks will exceed last year's totals.

Question 19: (U) **Limiting the Flow of Conventional Weapons in Africa: How can the Intelligence Community and the United States government track and limit the flow of conventional weapons fueling conflicts in Africa?**

Answer: (U) Limiting the flow of conventional arms that are fueling conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa is difficult because of the sheer size of the region. The bulk of the arms transferred to this region go via sea routes to numerous ports. Attempts to limit the flow of arms to these ports would be ineffective because arms suppliers simply would reroute shipments to other ports. They also could increase arms shipped by air. While air transport is costlier, it also is more difficult to track. Shipments of all types are generally small and often do not involve government to government entities and are therefore difficult track.

(U) One option to limit the flow would be to put diplomatic pressure on the major arms suppliers. China is the leading supplier to this region. Other significant suppliers include Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.

Question 20: (U) The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines a civil war as being “a war between factions of regions of one country.” In your opinion, is Iraq currently engaged in a civil war? Why or why not? Is this the unanimous view of all components of the Intelligence Community?

Answer: (U) This issue is addressed on page 7 of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE): “The Intelligence Community judges that the term ‘civil war’ does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq, which includes extensive Shia-on-Shia violence, al-Qaida and Sunni insurgent attacks on Coalition forces, and widespread criminally motivated violence. Nonetheless, the term ‘civil war’ accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of ethnosectarian identities, a sea change in the character of the violence, ethnosectarian mobilization, and population displacements.”

Question 21: (U) The President intends to “surge” an additional 20,000 troops in Iraq in order to quell the insurgency and help end sectarian violence. What is your intelligence assessment of what these additional troops will be able to accomplish?

Answer: (U) An assessment of what U.S. forces will be able to accomplish is an operational matter. The presence of additional coalition forces will likely bring about a change in the security situation, however, our assessment is that the insurgency remains resilient and sectarian violence will continue until political reconciliation is achieved.

Question 22: (U) What is the likelihood of the Intelligence Community’s ability to predict, as well as the ramifications of, the following: Saudi Arabia sending troops or taking action to protect Sunni Iraqis from Shia militias? Iran increasing its support to al-Hakim and al-Sadr beyond the current level of funding and material support, or otherwise getting more deeply involved in violence in Iraq? An escalation of hostilities between Fatah and HAMAS in Gaza that sparks either a strong Israeli response or spurs other nations to get involved militarily? An opening for President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert to make significant progress on the peace process? A broader Middle East conflagration that puts Sunni states openly against Iran and its Syrian allies?

Answer: (U) Saudi Arabia is unlikely to send troops to protect Iraqi Sunnis. The Saudi military is designed largely for internal security missions and probably cannot project power beyond the kingdom’s borders.

(U) Saudi Arabia would be unlikely to send troops to Iraq without first informing Washington. Because of the close nature of Saudi-U.S. relations, multiple indications likely would occur of any Saudi decision to send troops to support Iraqi Sunni Arabs against Shia militias.

(U) As a matter of state policy, Riyadh is unlikely to send significant financial support or arms to Iraqi Sunni Arabs as long as U.S. troops are in Iraq. The long Iraqi-Saudi border and high rates of intraregional travel make detecting the flow of arms, funds, and militants from Saudi Arabia to Iraq difficult. Private Saudi citizens probably are supporting Iraqi Sunni Arabs now. The Saudi government has tried to stop private donations and other support flowing from the kingdom to Iraq.

(U) Significant, official Saudi support to Iraqi Sunni Arabs could provoke an Iranian-Saudi proxy war in Iraq that could inflame regional tensions and eventually a broader regional conflict pitting Saudi Arabia and other Sunni states against Iran and possibly Syria.

(U) Iran probably will not see a need to increase its current level of support to Iraqi Shia groups unless a direct threat develops to the influence Iran currently has among Iraqi Shia groups, attacks on the Iraqi Shia community increase significantly, or Tehran desires to increase the level of Coalition casualties.

(U) The covert nature of Iran's support to these groups makes predicting changes, other than noting changes in the conditions cited above, difficult.

(U) The general consequences of increased Iranian support to Iraqi Shia militants would be minimal in terms of affecting the cycle of violence in Iraq, since many of these groups do not rely solely on Iranian support for their activities in Iraq and are capable of operating independently from Iran. Explosively formed penetrator attacks aimed at the Coalition could increase, as Iran is the chief supplier of these weapons.

(U) DIA has high confidence in the Intelligence Community's ability to predict an escalation of HAMAS-Fatah or Israeli-Palestinian hostilities. While HAMAS-Fatah tensions may escalate into more internecine violence, Israel most likely would not intervene militarily to stop the fighting. Since its disengagement from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, Israel has been reluctant to conduct large-scale incursions into Gaza. If HAMAS-Fatah tension does not lead to significant Palestinian attacks against Israel, Israel will continue to conduct only limited operations against rocket launch areas and militant leaders. Israel may take action to seal the Gaza-Egyptian border or undertake a large-scale operation aimed at degrading HAMAS's military buildup if more advanced weapons are smuggled into the Gaza Strip. Other nations may be willing to provide some type of monitoring, such as the European Union Border Assistance Mission forces currently at the Rafah, Egypt-Gaza border or the voluntary multinational Temporary International Presence in Hebron, but they would be reluctant to get involved militarily.

(U) DIA has high confidence in the Intelligence Community's ability to predict progress on the peace process. Olmert has been weakened by Israel's perceived failure in the Lebanon war and by numerous scandals and is unlikely to take the steps necessary to restart serious negotiations. Abbas is similarly in a difficult position, as HAMAS leads the national unity government. While negotiations could be conducted through Abbas in his capacity as the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Israel will not talk to HAMAS, which refuses to recognize Israel. The release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, however, could lead to limited progress on the peace process.

(U) The likelihood of a broader Middle East conflagration that puts Sunni states openly against Iran and its Syrian allies is low in the near term (1-3 years).

(U) Shia-Sunni tensions and conflict are likely to be confined to the sectarian "tectonic plates," where Sunni and Shia communities rub up against each other, especially in Iraq, but also in Lebanon and some Gulf Arab states. Iraq will be the crucible. In the longer term, either Iraqi Shia success in consolidating power in Iraq or majority-Shia government failure in Iraq would bring dangers of wider conflict.

(U) Iraqi state collapse probably would bring some level of direct military involvement or support to factions from Iraq's neighbors to protect and advance their interests, which could lead to interstate hostilities, with concomitant dangers of even wider regional conflict. The advent of a larger conflict probably would be gradual.

(U) Syrian participation in a broader war on the Iranian side is not a given. Syria's alliance with Iran was founded on mutual opposition to Saddam's regime, supported Damascus with strategic depth in its conflict with Israel, and augmented its role in Lebanon. A Syrian-Israeli peace would remove an important plank from the Syrian-Iranian alliance. Syria already hosts more than a million Iraqi expatriates and refugees and has a majority-Sunni Arab population to appease. Furthermore, Syria is concerned about spillover of radical Sunni extremism into its territory and has to address Syrian-Iraqi tribal and Kurdish connections.

(U) The risk of a wider war would increase in the event of a large-scale U.S.-Iranian military confrontation. Iran has unconventional and subversive capabilities in Iraq and against Gulf Arab states hosting U.S. forces or supporting the United States politically, as well as some military reach to these states.

(U) The ramifications of a "broader Middle East conflagration" could be immense, involving strategic realignments, significant impact to the world economy, and increased terrorist spillover outside the region.

(U) The Intelligence Community has a low capability to predict the actual form and timing of regional conflict 3 years out. It has a medium to high capability to identify the dangers and possible sources of large-scale hostilities among regional states.

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-8476

SSCR #2007-1511-E

March 30, 2007

The Honorable Randall Fort
 Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research
 Department of State
 Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Assistant Secretary Fort:

We appreciate your participation in our January 11, 2007, hearing on the current and projected national security threats to the United States. Your willingness to address this important issue in open session was appreciated and made an important contribution, not only to the work of our Committee, but to the American public's awareness of U.S. national security interests.

We are submitting the attached questions for the record to you. The unclassified responses to these questions will be an important part of our public hearing transcript which we hope to release as expeditiously as possible. Accordingly, we would appreciate it if you would respond in writing to these questions no later than April 27, 2007.

If there are any questions, please have your staff contact Mr. Don Mitchell, of the Committee staff, at (202) 224-1700.

Sincerely,

John D. Rockefeller IV
Chairman

Christopher S. Bond
Vice Chairman

Enclosure



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 2, 2007

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF

ATTACHMENT

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Following the January 11, 2007 hearing at which Assistant Secretary Randall Fort testified, additional questions were submitted for the record. Please find enclosed the responses to those questions.

If we can be of further assistance to you, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Jeffrey T. Bergner".

Jeffrey T. Bergner
Assistant Secretary
Legislative Affairs

Enclosure:
As stated.

The Honorable
John Rockefeller, Chairman,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
United States Senate.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF

ATTACHMENT

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary Randall Fort by
Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV and Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond (#1)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
January 11, 2007**

Question:

(U) The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) has been widely praised for the prescience of its analysts in regard to Iraqi WMD prior to the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom. How confident is INR that Intelligence Community judgments on Iranian WMD programs are valid? What is the margin of error?

Answer:

(U) INR is fully engaged with the IC's effort to assess Iran's programs and, as circumstances warrant, expresses its own interpretation of the relevant data. INR participates in regular IC discussions of Iran's programs under the auspices of the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and NIC committees and in less formal formats, as well as in intelligence exchanges with our allies.

(U) INR has not dissented from any of the IC's recent judgments of Iran's nuclear program, including the assessment that Iran is determined to acquire nuclear weapons but is unlikely to be able to do so before early to mid next decade.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary Randall Fort by
Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV and Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond (#2)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
January 11, 2007**

Question:

(U) The various public statements of Iranian President Ahmadinejad have raised many questions about Iranian goals in the region and beyond. Does INR consider that we have realistic insights into the relationship between Ahmadinejad's statements and the underlying realities of Iranian goals? How much is public posturing and how much is a policy program? To what extent does Ahmadinejad control the nuclear and security policies of Iran?

Answer:

(U) Ahmadinejad does not control Iranian nuclear or security policy. Supreme Leader Khamenei is Iran's ultimate authority with final say in those (and all other) government policy areas, but he does not exercise control arbitrarily or unilaterally. Instead, the Leader employs the Iranian traditional practice of consultation and consensus building, balancing various political, economic, and religious interests in fashioning official policy positions. The Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS), of which chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani is secretary, has control over Iran's nuclear and security policies. As President, Ahmadinejad chairs that body, but is only one voice among many in its discussions. Decisions of the SCNS must be approved by Khamenei.

(U) Though he lacks real authority on nuclear and security issues, Ahmadinejad's rhetoric and grandstanding have been able to toughen official Tehran policy by stirring up domestic nationalism and by taking hard-line positions before international bodies and media that have maneuvered Iran into a confrontational posture vis-à-vis the West. The

Supreme Leader has allowed this to happen, in some cases, to bolster domestic and Third World "street support" for the Iranian regime. However, Khamenei has occasionally also had to rein in the President when his hyperbole began to undermine regime legitimacy, as occurred after Ahmadinejad's statements last year challenging the holocaust.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary Randall Fort by
Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV and Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond (#3)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
January 11, 2007**

Question:

(U) The Intelligence Community is America's early warning system against threats to American lives and property both here and overseas. What are the Intelligence Community's greatest strengths and deficiencies in monitoring terrorism? What lessons have your organizations learned from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks to address any shortcomings? Do you believe that you currently have sufficient resources to effectively fight the war on terrorism?

Answer:

(U) The ability of the Intelligence Community (IC) to understand and predict strategic trends in terrorism remains strong. As part of this effort, the IC has produced in recent years a large body of analysis related to terrorism. This work has provided policymakers with information, insight and background to help them craft strategies in the so-called "war of ideas" that seek to undermine the ideology and recruitment efforts of al-Qaida and like-minded terrorist groups.

(U) The IC is good at analyzing and forecasting the general anti-U.S. threat environment. We can generally identify factors/events that will spark terrorism, countries where the threat is higher and a rough timeframe when attacks may be more likely to occur. We are, however, constantly trying to add specificity and granularity to our threat warnings. We will continue to face challenges in identifying more precisely the timing, targets and venue of attacks before they happen.

(U) The chief lesson of 9/11 is the need to integrate terrorism information gathered domestically with that collected abroad. The creation of the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) helps address that problem.

(U) The President's Budget for FY 2008 includes a request for additional analytical resources. We would likely use any new resources to provide additional assistance to elements of the State Department engaged in the "war of ideas" in the global war on terrorism.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary Randall Fort by
Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV and Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond (#4)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
January 11, 2007**

Question:

(U) The Secretary of State maintains a list of countries that have “repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.” Currently, the five countries on this terrorism list are: Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. How good is our intelligence on the terrorist related activities of these countries? Has the Intelligence Community noted any increase or diminution of these countries’ support to terrorism in the last year?

Answer:

(U) Despite the difficult operating environments in the five nations designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism - Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria – our monitoring of terrorist related activity by these countries is relatively good, but could always be improved. The Intelligence Community is continually striving for more comprehensive coverage of terrorist activity globally, when avenues are not available to us due to poor or no diplomatic relations with a subject country, we look for other options to get the information we need to protect our national security.

(U) Iran and Syria are the most active State Sponsors of Terrorism at present. The Department of State’s Annual Country Reports on Terrorism is due to be published soon, and will contain greater detail. We assess that both countries provided increased levels of support to Lebanese Hizballah during the 2006 summer conflict with Israel. Both countries observe good operational security, making them difficult targets, and we remain at risk for unpleasant surprises.

(U) In Cuba, our focus is on the activities of terrorist groups who are allowed safe haven on the island, including Spain's Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) and Colombia's Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and National Liberation Army (ELN). Despite the difficulties posed by Cuba's totalitarian society, our coverage of terrorist activity in Cuba is sufficient to adequately monitor these terrorist groups.

(U) Regarding North Korea, we are continually monitoring intelligence reports that would indicate a linkage between the North Korean regime and known international terrorist entities. We are confident that the information we have supports our assessment that the DRPK is not actively supporting international terrorism. Similarly, we continually monitor available intelligence regarding Sudan's status as a state sponsor of terrorism. While acknowledging intelligence gaps, we are confident in our assessment that Khartoum is not actively supporting known international terrorist entities; moreover, Sudan has been cooperative in its commitment to combating international terrorism.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary Randall Fort by
Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV and Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond (#5)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
January 11, 2007**

Question:

(U) What is the nature and extent of the terrorist threat to U.S. diplomatic and military facilities overseas and how has it changed since September 11, 2001? Do you believe that the Departments of Defense and State have taken appropriate security measures to address the terrorist threat to all of their overseas facilities?

Answer:

(U) DIA can provide a more informed view of the threat to military facilities abroad.

(U) Concerning our diplomatic missions, our long term effort to harden these facilities has probably contributed to the terrorists' preference for so-called soft non-official targets, including public ground transportation, commercial aviation, tourist industry hotels, and the petroleum industry.

(U) That said, however, U.S. diplomatic facilities have not escaped the terrorists' attention since 9/11: witness the bombing of our embassy in Tashkent in July 2004, the attack on our consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in December 2004, a car bomb detonated next to our consulate in Karachi in March 2006, and an armed attack on embassy Damascus in September 2006.

(U) Beyond these attacks, we continue to receive a large volume of threat reporting related to U.S. missions, in response to which the Intelligence Community must devote considerable analytical and other resources.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary Randall Fort by
Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV and Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond (#6)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
January 11, 2007**

Question:

(U) What is the likelihood that China will decrease its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles? To what extent have you observed an improvement in China's human rights policy? How cooperative has China been with the U.S. on the war on terror? To what extent have close U.S. – Taiwan relations been an impediment to closer U.S. – China ties?

Answer:

(U) China over the past decade has acceded to almost every international WMD non-proliferation convention and has created a relatively comprehensive set of laws and regulations to implement their commitments. China no longer exports missiles or missile systems that exceed the MTCR guidelines to which they have agreed. Implementation of controls over dual-use items, components, and parts has been more problematic. Beijing has assured us it will attempt to close any loopholes, but its success is likely to be uneven for some time. In contrast, China remains outside the Wassenaar Arrangement, the international arrangement concerning conventional arms, and continues to export conventional arms and related technologies to countries of concern.

(U) China's progress on human rights remains spotty. While Chinese have far more choices and face far less party or government intrusion into their daily lives than in the past, the regime still reacts harshly to any political dissent, jailing, harassing, or otherwise intimidating potential "troublemakers." Although Beijing has loosened restrictions on

foreign journalists in advance of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, it has tightened controls over domestic media and internet access by Chinese. Beijing continues to allow relatively free worship within State-recognized religious facilities, though worshippers attending unofficial or unauthorized services are sometimes harassed. State-controlled “Associations” and government religious affairs bureaus exert substantial control over training, assignment and travel overseas of clerics. The regime continues to persecute groups it considers to be dangerous cults, such as Falungong.

(U) Counterterrorism cooperation with China has been mixed. China has taken some steps to participate in the fight against terrorism, but broader cooperation has been hampered by China’s tendency to equate domestic ethnic separatism with terrorism. China has placed holds on some of our submissions of terrorist supporters to the UN 1267 Committee for designation and asset freezing, apparently out of annoyance that we will not agree to designate the Chinese Uighur group ETLO/Shat. Due to the sensitive nature of the counterterrorism issues, a fuller response would necessarily be classified.

(U) Close U.S.-Taiwan relations are an irritant but not an impediment to closer U.S.-China relations. Beijing makes clear its displeasure with various aspects of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship and lobbies Washington to refrain from actions that it perceives as encouraging the Taiwan authorities, such as selling weapons to Taipei. These complaints have not prevented China from cooperating with the United States on a wide range of bilateral and global issues.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary Randall Fort by
Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV and Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond (#7)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
January 11, 2007**

Question:

(U) How effectively is Haiti President Rene Preval dealing with a divided legislature, entrenched gangs, and the worsening humanitarian situation? What is the likelihood in the next several years that we will see a dramatic increase in the number of Haitians seeking refuge in neighboring countries, including the United States?

Answer:

(U) The Government of Haiti has been working cooperatively and productively with the U.N. Stabilization Mission to Haiti (MINUSTAH) in a serious effort to break gang control of Port-au-Prince's crime-ridden slums, including, notably, the embattled Cite Soleil area. There have been several notable recent successes, with more than 400 arrests so far this year, including several important gang leaders. As a result, gangs responsible for a significant percentage of crime, including kidnappings, generally have found a harsher operational environment. The Haitian government is also cooperating with the United Nation's police reform plan, which originated in an agreement with MINUSTAH in August 2006. The Haitian government has an acceptable working relationship with the legislature. While many Haitians continue to live in poverty, there are currently no acute humanitarian emergencies. The government remains highly dependent on external support in coping with humanitarian situations and providing other social services.

(U) Despite larger-than-expected numbers in March 2007, the monthly rate of maritime interdictions of Haitians since October 2006 has consistently trailed its 5-year average.

The lower flow may be partially attributable to the improved security situation. While temporary spikes like the one in March are not uncommon, there is little likelihood that Haitians will take to the sea en masse in the near-to-medium term. Both previous Haitian mass migrations were precipitated by changes in U.S. immigration policy. In 1992, legal action prohibiting the U.S. Coast Guard from repatriating migrants led to hundreds of Haitians daily taking to sea. In 1994, a change in U.S. policy that granted Haitians found at sea interviews by immigration officials prompted a flood of migrants.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary Randall Fort by
Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV and Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond (#8)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
January 11, 2007**

Question:

(U) How stable is the regime of President Bashar al Asad of Syria? What are the most significant threats to his regime? What is the status of Syria's weapons of mass destruction infrastructure, as well as its support for international terrorism? What role is Syrian currently playing in Iraq?

Answer:

(U) The regime of President Bashar al-Asad is currently stable. Asad appears to have weathered the most severe crisis of his presidency, which occurred in mid- to late-2005 due to the UN investigation into former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri's assassination and Syria's subsequent withdrawal from Lebanon.

(U) We assess that the most likely threat to President Asad, should it arise, would come from regime insiders seeking to replace him, or from a coalition of powerful elites. At present, opposition groups, both inside the country and out—such as the National Salvation Front, headed by former Vice President Abd al-Halim Khaddam—do not pose a significant challenge to the government. Domestic civil society activity remains closely monitored and restricted by the Syrian government.

(U) The regime portrays the greatest threat to the government, and stability in Syria more generally, as arising from extremist Islamist elements. These include Syrian-born extremists and foreign jihadists who have used Syria as a base from which to travel to

and from Iraq. Syrian extremists have conducted sporadic attacks against Syrian government and international institutions in the last few years—most recently, against the US Embassy in Damascus in September 2006.

(U) Syria to date has relied on its chemical warfare (CW) program as the foundation for its strategic deterrent against other states in the region, principally Israel. It has had a CW program for many years and also has a sufficiently developed biotechnical infrastructure to support a very limited biological warfare program at the R&D stage. Although Syria has a modest civilian nuclear research and development program and has expressed interest in enhancing its capabilities, the program is under IAEA full-scope safeguards and available data does not support a conclusion that Syria has embarked on a nuclear weapon development program. Nonetheless, the Intelligence Community continues to monitor the situation closely for any signs that Damascus may opt to pursue such a program.

(U) Syria has grown confident about its regional policies, largely due to what it sees as vindication of its support to Hizballah and HAMAS and its perceived success in overcoming international attempts to isolate the regime. Damascus continues to meddle in Lebanon, has failed to crack down consistently on militant infiltration into Iraq, and has increased ties with Iran.

(U) Syrian interests in Iraq appear to be guided by multiple factors: hastening the departure of Coalition forces, avoiding a full-scale civil war and fragmentation of the

country, and preventing the spillover of instability and extremism into Syria. At the same time, the Syrian regime has not taken sufficient steps to ensure that its territory is not used for terrorist or insurgent activities in Iraq.

(U) Syria remains a principal transit point for foreign fighters traveling to and from Iraq. Although the Syrian government has taken steps against these and other extremist elements, especially those whom it believes pose a threat to the regime, it could do more to prevent militant infiltration into Iraq and to work cooperatively with neighboring states to curb extremist movements.

(U) The Syrian regime continues to offer safe-haven to a number of Iraqi former regime elements associated with the Iraqi Ba'th Party and suspected of supporting the insurgency in Iraq.

(U) The Syrian government does not appear to be playing a significant role in Iraqi politics, though it maintains ties with a range of Iraqi political and tribal factions. Damascus has sought to improve its diplomatic standing with the Iraqi government, including hosting a visit by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani in January 2007.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary Randall Fort by
Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV and Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond (#9)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
January 11, 2007**

Question:

(U) Is there any indication of the Musharraf government containing pro-Taliban and anti-Kabul activity in Pakistan?

Answer:

(U) There is growing concern in Pakistan about the spread of Taliban extremism from the tribal areas along the Afghan border into other parts of the country. Many believe that growing Taliban influence poses a serious security threat to Pakistan as well as Afghanistan.

(U) The Pakistan government has deployed some 60,000 troops in the tribal districts and lost hundreds of soldiers in military operations against militants. According to a press report of April 20, Pakistani leaders told Admiral Fallon that two more army brigades had been deployed from the border with India to western Pakistan and that President Musharraf had authorized army commanders to work with US counterparts in Afghanistan down to the battalion level.

(U) Also, Islamabad has negotiated a series of ceasefire agreements with tribal leaders in an effort to end militant attacks and create a political atmosphere in which the government can better tackle the problem of extremism through political and economic means. Recently, Pakistan has stepped up its efforts to deny the Taliban and other

extremists the use of Pakistani territory as a safehaven, resulting in the arrest of several important Taliban leaders. The Government of Pakistan also has supported the efforts of local leaders to expel Uzbek extremists from tribal areas.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary Randall Fort by
Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV and Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond (#10)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
January 11, 2007**

Question:

(U) The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines a civil war as being “a war between factions or regions of one country.” In your opinion, is Iraq currently engaged in a civil war? Why or why not? Is this the unanimous view of all components of the Intelligence Community?

Answer:

(U) While some key elements of the Iraqi conflict fit the American Heritage Dictionary of English Language's definition of "civil war," INR and the rest of the Intelligence Community judge that the term "civil war" does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq. Nonetheless, the term "civil war" accurately describes certain key elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of ethno-sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population displacements. This assessment is included in the January 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, a product coordinated with and supported by INR.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary Randall Fort by
Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV and Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond (#11a)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
January 11, 2007**

Question:

(U) What is the likelihood, the Intelligence Community's ability to predict, and the ramifications of the following:

- a) (U) Saudi Arabia's sending troops or taking action to protect Sunni Iraqis from Shia's militias?

Answer:

(U) Saudi Arabia (S.A.) is unlikely to send troops to Iraq to defend Iraq's Arab Sunni minority. However, S.A. may fund the creation of, or reinforce existing, Sunni (non-al-Qaida) militias. The al-Qaida angle is related to competition between the Saudis and al-Qaida for leadership in defending Iraq's Sunni Arabs. Al-Qaida staked a claim with its recent declaration of the "Islamic State of Iraq," whose avowed purpose is the protection of the Sunni community. Aware of that challenge and the ideological threat al-Qaida has posed to S.A.'s Islamic legitimacy, S.A. will likely reassert its role as the defender of Sunni (Arab) Islam in Iraq.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary Randall Fort by
Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV and Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond (#11b)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
January 11, 2007**

Question:

(U) What is the likelihood, the Intelligence Community's ability to predict, and the ramifications of the following:

- b) (U) Iran increasing its support to al-Hakim and al-Sadr beyond the current level of funding and material support, or otherwise getting more deeply involved in violence in Iraq?

Answer:

(U) An accurate and responsive answer to this question cannot be provided without recourse to classified information. A classified answer can be provided in appropriate channels.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary Randall Fort by
Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV and Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond (#11c)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
January 11, 2007**

Question:

(U) What is the likelihood, the Intelligence Community's ability to predict, and the ramifications of the following:

- c) (U) An escalation in hostilities between Fatah and HAMAS in Gaza that sparks either a strong Israeli response or spurs other nations to get involved militarily?

Answer:

(U) The Intelligence Community (IC) is closely following the ebb and flow of intra-factional Palestinian violence and Israeli response to both it and the anti-Israeli violence in the territories. The IC has a fairly good ability to predict trends; however, we cannot predict the timing of individual terrorist events, only that they are likely to trigger an extremely strong Israeli response. When the violence is intra-factional among Palestinians, Israel tends not to get involved. Also, regarding intra-factional Palestinian violence, the IC has high confidence when it predicts that other nations (for instance, Egypt) will not become militarily involved, though outside financial assistance is being provided by various parties to both sides and that could increase or decrease depending on circumstances that the IC would also be able to predict.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary Randall Fort by
Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV and Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond (#11d)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
January 11, 2007**

Question:

(U) What is the likelihood, the Intelligence Community's ability to predict, and the ramifications of the following:

- d) (U) An opening for President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert to make significant progress on peace negotiations?

Answer:

(U) The Intelligence Community is in a good position to assess what factors might give rise to the prospects of significant progress on peace negotiations and also provide analyses on whether these factors are likely to emerge.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Assistant Secretary Randall Fort by
Chairman John D. Rockefeller IV and Vice Chairman Christopher S. Bond (#11e)
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
January 11, 2007**

Question:

(U) What is the likelihood, the Intelligence Community's ability to predict, and the ramifications of the following:

- e) (U) A broader Middle East conflagration that puts Sunni states openly against Iran and its Syrian allies?

Answer:

(U) The Intelligence Community does not believe that it is likely that a wider Middle East conflict will erupt that pits Sunni Arab States in open conflict with either Shiite Iran or Syria. We further assess that if circumstances changed and increased the likelihood of this scenario, this would happen over an extended period of time, therefore providing adequate warning time to both predict the conflict and assess its ramifications. This assessment holds even as many Sunni-dominated Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, have become increasingly concerned with the threat of Iranian (Shia) hegemony and influence in the region—particularly in Iraq, Lebanon—and over the Saudi Shia population. However, all of these states also see Iran as a permanent part of the neighborhood and that its power—potentially nuclear or otherwise—must be addressed primarily through non-military means. These states likewise have expressed concern about Syrian regional behavior and its relationship with Iran. Dissatisfaction with president Bashar al-Asad, however, is generally outweighed by uneasiness over the potential for instability if the Asad regime were to collapse. Accordingly, Egypt and Saudi Arabia continue to focus on moderating Syrian behavior and detaching Damascus from Tehran's orbit.