NOMINATIONS BEFORE THE SENATE
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,
FIRST SESSION, 110TH CONGRESS

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
NOMINATIONS OF
LT. GEN. DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA; ADM WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN; GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA; ADM TIMOTHY J. KEATING, USN; LT. GEN. VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF; LTG ROBERT L. VAN ANTWERP, USA; CLAUDE M. KICKLIGHTER; JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., S. WARD CASSCELLS, M.D., WILLIAM C. OSTENDORFF; LTG DOUGLAS E. LUTE, USA; MICHAEL G. VICKERS; VADM ERIC T. OLSON, USN; HON. THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO; HON. PRESTON M. GEREN; ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN; GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC; ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, USN; GEN WILLIAM E. WARD, USA; GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF; LT. GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC; HON. JOHN J. YOUNG, JR., HON. DOUGLAS A. BROOK; MAJ. GEN. ROBERT L. SMOLEN, USAF; MARY BETH LONG; JAMES SHINN; CRAIG W. DUEHRING; AND JOHN H. GIBSON

JANUARY 23, 30; FEBRUARY 1, 6, 27; MARCH 8, 27; JUNE 7, 12, 19; JULY 31; SEPTEMBER 27; OCTOBER 4; NOVEMBER 15; DECEMBER 18, 2007

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
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NOMINATION OF LTG DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, TO BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER, MULTINATIONAL FORCES-IRAQ

TUESDAY, JANUARY 23, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room SR–325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, chief counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; David M. Morris, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Bryan D. Parker, minority investigative counsel; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Jill L. Simodejka, research assistant; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Fletcher L. Cork, and Jessica L. Kingston.

Committee members’ assistants present: Joseph Axelrad and Sharon L. Waxman, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Caroline Tess, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Lauren Henry, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson and Michael Sozan, assistants to Senator Webb; Nichole M. Distefano, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Richard H. Fontaine, Jr., assistant to Senator McCain; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Jeremy Shull,
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. The hearing will come to order.

General Petraeus' nomination to become the Commander of Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF–I) may be the single most important command in the Nation's defense establishment. The Nation will entrust him with the operational command and welfare of over 130,000 American servicemembers, many of whom will be deployed in Baghdad in the middle of a protracted and bloody sectarian battle over the future of Iraq. He will take over from General George Casey, who has served in this position since 2004.

General Petraeus is well known to this committee. In July 2004 and again in June 2005, General Petraeus provided the committee valuable insights from his experiences as an infantry division commander during and immediately after the invasion of Iraq and from his tenure as the commander of early U.S. efforts to train and equip Iraqi security forces, experiences that he no doubt will draw heavily upon in the days ahead.

General Petraeus is well-qualified for this command, widely recognized for the depth and the breadth of his education, training, and operational experience. Noteworthy is his recent leadership of the team that wrote the new counterinsurgency manual for the Army and Marine Corps. In addition to our interest in his assessment of current conditions and operations, many of our questions this morning will probe the theory and practice of counterinsurgency and their application in today’s Iraq, which is not experiencing a traditional insurgency, but rather a mixture of sectarian violence and an emerging civil war, as well as an insurgency against the government.

Prime Minister Maliki has acknowledged that the crisis in Iraq is a political crisis. President Bush says this troop surge and other increased U.S. commitments are based upon the Iraqi political leaders keeping their pledges to meet benchmarks on the military, political, and economic front. He says this even though Iraqi political leaders have not followed through on their pledges in the past.

Secretary Gates on January 12 described four categories of benchmarks that we would be monitoring. In the first are the military benchmarks, including deployment of effective Iraqi forces into Baghdad and access to all neighborhoods without political interference. In the second category of Secretary Gates are those benchmarks relating to the whole part of the strategy on how effectively Iraqi forces control an area once it is cleared. In the third are benchmarks relating to the economic recovery of a controlled area. In the fourth are benchmarks relating to the Iraqis reaching political compromises on outstanding issues, including provincial elections, power-sharing, and the distribution of oil revenues.
This morning we will probe General Petraeus’ assessment of the current situation in Iraq. We will want to understand his views on the importance of the Iraqis meeting their commitments and what pressure are we willing to place on the Iraqi leadership to meet the benchmarks that they have agreed to. We will ask for his assessment of the readiness of U.S. forces in and on their way to Iraq for counterinsurgency operations. We will want to hear how he intends to employ forces that are now surging into Iraq. We will want to know what timeline he has in mind to measure the pace and scope of Iraqi security forces’ assumption of the counterinsurgency fight.

We all appreciate General Petraeus’ service and his willingness to lead our forces at this critical and dangerous time. Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for your rapid consideration of this nomination. You and your staff have made this possible and I appreciate it very much. I hope we can, at the completion of the testimony today, move quickly forward to the vote on General Petraeus’ nomination. But again, I want to thank you for the rapid consideration of this important nomination.

General Petraeus, I join Chairman Levin in welcoming you here today and congratulating you. It is hard to imagine a more important military nomination than that of General David Petraeus. General, you know better than others the stakes in this war, the benefits of success, and the potential catastrophic consequences of failure. You, having literally written the book on counterinsurgency, understand the strategy and tactics that must guide the President’s increase in U.S. force levels. You, General, will have great responsibility for the course of future American actions in Iraq.

But to state the obvious, your job will be very difficult. We have made many mistakes in this war. From the initial invasion, we had too few troops in Iraq and we never redressed this deficiency. We played whack-a-mole instead of clearing and holding. We adopted an inadequate and unrealistic light footprint coalition strategy that focused on turning over to Iraqis missions that they were plainly unable to complete.

Administration officials frequently and repeatedly issued unjustifiably optimistic assessments and predictions about the situation in Iraq. We responded ineffectively to the hostile actions of Sunni, Shia, and foreign fighters alike and the vagaries of the Iraqi government.

Somewhat dismaying that only now, after nearly 4 years at war in Iraq, is the United States moving toward a traditional counterinsurgency strategy aimed first at the protection of the Iraqi population and supported by troop levels appropriate to their mission.

Whether the projected surge is sufficient to accomplish all that our leaders will ask of our troops remains an open question in my mind and I look forward, General, to your testimony on this score. But I believe that the fundamental components of the new strategy are needed in Iraq, and that they have been necessary for a long
time. By quelling the violence in Baghdad and with your leadership, improving our training and reinforcement efforts, we will allow the economic and political process to move forward and create a situation which will permit confidence and optimism.

While I believe that this will present a solid chance of success, I would note again that the new plan does not on its own guarantee success. Bringing down the violence in Iraq will help give Prime Minister Maliki and others the political space they need to pursue reconciliation. But it is up to the Iraqis to make these tough decisions. It is absolutely imperative that they seize this opportunity. It may well be their last.

We have needed a new military leadership in Iraq for some time and there is no one in the U.S. military better suited to implement the President’s new strategy than General Petraeus. I am confident that you will receive broad support in the Senate, as will Admiral Fallon, who has been nominated as the next head of Central Command. It is absolutely essential that the Senate act promptly on your nomination. I hope that following Senate action the President will direct you to take the next flight to Iraq and assume command. Your role is that important.

If confirmed, this will be your third assignment in Iraq since the war began in March 2003. You led the 101st Airborne Division with great distinction in northern Iraq in 2003. You were later recognized for making significant improvements in the training of the Iraqi security forces after a slow start and missteps during the early months of the Coalition Provisional Authority.

Most recently, as Commander of the U.S. Army’s Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, you led the development of the Army’s doctrine for military operations in a counterinsurgency environment. This revised doctrine is designed to merge traditional approaches to counterinsurgency operations with the realities of the 21st century.

Mr. Chairman, in the foreword to the new field manual General Petraeus wrote, “Conducting a successful counterinsurgency campaign requires a flexible, adaptive force led by agile, well-informed, culturally astute leaders.” I believe that this committee has just such a leader before it today and that he is someone we can look to for leadership in this, America’s final chance to prevail in Iraq.

General, I thank you and your family for the sacrifices you have made and your career of selfless service to our Nation. I look forward to your testimony today.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.

General Petraeus.

STATEMENT OF LTG DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, TO BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER, MULTINATIONAL FORCES-IRAQ

General Petraeus. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. I would like to begin this morning by briefly reviewing the situation in Iraq, explaining the change in focus of the new strategy, and discussing the way ahead. This statement is a bit longer than usual, but, as I discussed with you last week, Mr. Chairman, I believe it is impor-
tant that the committee hear it and I appreciate the opportunity to present it.

The situation in Iraq has deteriorated significantly since the bombing this past February of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, the third holiest Shia Islamic shrine. The increase in the level of violence since then, fueled by the insurgent and sectarian fighting that spiraled in the wake of the bombing, has made progress in Iraq very difficult and created particularly challenging dynamics in the capital city of Baghdad.

Indeed, many Iraqis in Baghdad today confront life or death, stay or leave decisions on a daily basis. They take risks incalculable to us just to get to work, to educate their children, and to feed their families.

In this environment, Iraq’s new government, fourth in 3½ years, has found it difficult to gain traction. Though disappointing, this should not be a surprise. We should recall that after the liberation of Iraq in 2003 every governmental institution in the country collapsed. A society already traumatized by decades of Saddam’s brutal rule was thrown into complete turmoil and the effects are still evident throughout the country and in Iraqi society.

Iraq and its new government have been challenged by insurgents, international terrorists, sectarian militias, regional meddling, violent criminals, governmental dysfunction, and corruption. Iraq’s security forces and new governmental institutions have struggled in this increasingly threatening environment and the elections that gave us such hope actually intensified sectarian divisions in the population at the expense of the sense of Iraqi identity.

In this exceedingly difficult situation, it has proven very hard for the new government to develop capacity and to address the issues that must be resolved to enable progress.

The escalation of violence in 2006 undermined the coalition strategy and raised the prospect of a failed Iraqi state, an outcome that would be in no group’s interest save that of certain extremist organizations and perhaps states in the region that wish Iraq and the United States ill. In truth, no one can predict the impact of a failed Iraq on regional stability, the international economy, the global war on terror, America’s standing in the world, and the lives of the Iraqi people.

In response to the deterioration of the situation in Iraq, a new way ahead was developed and announced earlier this month. With implementation of this approach, the mission of MNF–I will be modified, making security of the population, particularly in Baghdad, and in partnership with Iraqi forces, the focus of the military effort. For a military commander, the term “secure” is a clearly defined doctrinal task, meaning to gain control of an area or terrain feature and to protect it from the enemy. Thus, the task will be clear-cut, though difficult. Certainly, upcoming operations will be carried out in full partnership with Iraqi forces, with them in the lead whenever possible and with arm’s length when that is not possible.

Transition of Iraqi forces in provinces to Iraqi control will continue to feature prominently in the coalition plan and, as recommended by the Iraqi Study Group, the advisor effort will be substantially reinforced.
The primacy of population security in the capital will mean a greater focus on that task, particularly in the most threatened neighborhoods. This will, of course, require that our unit commanders and their Iraqi counterparts develop a detailed appreciation of the areas in which they will operate, recognizing that they may face a combination of Sunni insurgents, international terrorists, sectarian militias, and violent criminals.

Together with Iraqi forces, a persistent presence in these neighborhoods will be essential. Different approaches will be required in different locations. Whatever the approach, though, the objective will be to achieve sufficient security to provide the space and time for the Iraqi government to come to grips with the tough decisions its members must make to enable Iraq to move forward. In short, it is not just that there will be additional forces in Baghdad. It is what they will do and how they will do it that is important.

Some of the members of this committee have observed that there is no military solution to the problems of Iraq. They are correct. Ultimate success in Iraq will be determined by actions in the Iraqi political and economic arenas on such central issues as governance, the amount of power devolved to the provinces and possibly regions, the distribution of oil revenues, national reconciliation, resolution of sectarian differences, and so on.

Success will also depend on improvements in the capacity of Iraq’s ministry, in the provision of basic services, in the establishment of the rule of law, and in economic development. It is, however, exceedingly difficult for the Iraqi government to come to grips with the toughest issues it must resolve while survival is the primary concern of so many in Iraq’s capital. For this reason, military action to improve security, while not wholly sufficient to solve Iraq’s problems, is certainly necessary, and that is why additional U.S. and Iraqi forces are moving to Baghdad.

The way ahead is designed to be a comprehensive approach. Indeed, the objectives of helping Iraqis increase the capacity of their governmental institutions, putting Iraq’s unemployed to work, and improving the lot in life of Iraqi citizens require additional resources, many of which will be Iraqi. In carrying out the non-kinetic elements of the strategy, however, our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians downrange must get all the help they can from all the agencies of our Government.

There is a plan to increase that assistance and it is hugely important. This clearly is the time for the leaders of all our governmental departments to ask how their agencies can contribute to the endeavor in Iraq and to provide all the assistance that they can. Our military is making an enormous commitment in Iraq. We need the rest of the departments to do likewise, to help the Iraqi government get the country and its citizens working and to use Iraq’s substantial oil revenues for the benefit of all the Iraqi people.

Having described the general approach, I would like to offer a word on expectations. It will take time for the additional forces to flow to Iraq, time for them to gain an understanding of the areas in which they will operate, time to plan with and get to know their Iraqi partners, time to set conditions for the successful conduct of security operations, and of course time to conduct those operations and then to build on what they achieve.
None of this will be rapid. In fact, the way ahead will be neither quick nor easy, and there undoubtedly will be tough days. We face a determined, adaptable, barbaric enemy. He will try to wait us out. In fact, any such endeavor is a test of wills and there are no guarantees. The only assurance I can give you is that, if confirmed, I will provide MNF–I the best leadership and direction I can muster, I will work to ensure unity of effort with the ambassador and our Iraqi and coalition partners, and I will provide my bosses and you with forthright professional military advice with respect to the missions given to MNF–I and the situation on the ground in Iraq.

In that regard, I would welcome opportunities to provide periodic updates to this body. Beyond that, I want to assure you that should I determine that the new strategy cannot succeed, I will provide such an assessment.

If confirmed, this assignment will be my fourth year or longer deployment since the summer of 2001, three of those to Iraq. My family and I understand what our country has asked of its men and women in uniform and of their families since September 11. In fact, I would like to take this opportunity to thank the American people for their wonderful support in recent years of our men and women in uniform.

Tom Brokaw observed to me one day in northern Iraq that those who have served our Nation since September 11 comprise the new greatest generation. I agree strongly with that observation and I know the members of this committee do, too.

Over the past 15 months I have been privileged to oversee the organizations that educate our Army’s leaders, draft our doctrine, capture lessons learned, and help our units prepare for deployment. This assignment has provided me a keen awareness of what we have asked of our soldiers and of their families. In view of that, I applaud the recent announcement to expand our country’s ground forces. Our ongoing endeavors in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere are people-intensive and it is heartening to know that there will be more soldiers and marines to shoulder the load.

I recognize that deploying more forces to Iraq runs counter to efforts to increase the time at home for our troops between deployments. I share concerns about that. However, if we are to carry out the MNF–I mission in accordance with the new strategy, the additional forces that have been directed to move to Iraq will be essential, as will again greatly increased support by our Government’s other agencies, additional resources for reconstruction and economic initiatives, and a number of other actions critical to what must be a broad, comprehensive, multifaceted approach to the challenges in Iraq.

Many of the emails I have received in recent weeks have had as their subject line “Congratulations, I think.” I understand the message they are conveying. I know how heavy a rucksack I will have to shoulder in Iraq, if confirmed. I am willing to take on the position for which I have been nominated because I believe in serving one’s Nation when asked, because I regard it as a distinct honor to be able to soldier again with those who are part of the brotherhood of the close fight, and because I feel an obligation to help the “Shabil Iraq,” the vast majority of whom have the same desires of people the world over: security for themselves and their loved ones,
satisfaction of their basic needs, and an opportunity to better their lot in life.

In closing, the situation in Iraq is dire. The stakes are high. There are no easy choices. The way ahead will be very hard. Progress will require determination and difficult U.S. and Iraqi actions especially the latter, as ultimately the outcome will be determined by the Iraqis. But hard is not hopeless. If confirmed, I pledge to do my utmost to lead our wonderful men and women in uniform and those of our coalition partners in Iraq as we endeavor to help the Iraqis make the most of the opportunity our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines have given to them.

Thank you very much.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, General. Again, we thank you for your service. We thank you for your very eloquent testimony. Thank your family as well for us, if you would.

There are standard questions which we ask of nominees which we will put to you right now. Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

General Petraeus. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

General Petraeus. No, sir.

Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

General Petraeus. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

General Petraeus. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

General Petraeus. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Will you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?

General Petraeus. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree to give your personal views when asked before this committee to do so, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

General Petraeus. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

General Petraeus. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

We will have an 8-minute round to begin with.

General Petraeus, General Casey says that, “the longer that U.S. forces continue to bear the main burden of Iraq’s security it lengthens the time that the Government of Iraq has to take the hard decisions about reconciliation and dealing with the militias.” General Abizaid said recently, “I believe that more American forces
Do you agree with those two generals?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, my mission will be different than the mission that they had, if confirmed. In fact, I talked to General Abizaid and General Casey both in the past week and they both support the increase in U.S. forces as a way of helping the Iraqi government get the time and space that it needs to be able to come to grips with the difficult decisions that they in fact identified.

Chairman LEVIN. We will ask General Casey when he is before us as to whether or not he still stands with the statement which he has made and which General Abizaid has also made, along the line that the more American forces that we provide the less likely it is that the Iraqis will take responsibility for their own future.

On the question of benchmarks, General, President Bush says that the Iraqis have agreed to meet certain political, economic, and military benchmarks. Are you familiar with the President’s statement?

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Have you seen those benchmarks?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I have not seen lists of them. I am familiar with his statement and of course with the benchmarks that you outlined that Secretary Gates mentioned earlier.

Chairman LEVIN. Have you seen the actual benchmarks that the President referred to?

General PETRAEUS. If you are talking about the slides and the briefing, sir? I am not sure which you are actually referring to.

Chairman LEVIN. The President has referred to benchmarks. He has said that the Iraqis have agreed to benchmarks and that we will hold the Iraqis to those benchmarks. Have you seen the benchmarks the President referred to?

General PETRAEUS. Yes, that is correct. I know what you are talking about sir, in terms of what they have agreed to provide in terms of the military forces in Iraq, money for the reconstruction, money for foreign military sales, and so forth, yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Will you see to it that we get a copy of those benchmarks?

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

The requested benchmarks have been provided to the Office of the Secretary of Defense which is coordinating turnover of this information.
Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your recent letters regarding the way forward in Iraq and the role of benchmarks for political issues Iraq must solve. The President has also asked that I reply on his behalf to your December 12, 2006, letter to him concerning the importance of announcing a deadline for beginning a phased redeployment from Iraq.

I share your view that the Iraqi Government must meet the goal it has set for itself—establishing a democratic, unified, and secure Iraq. We believe the Iraqi Government understands very well the consequences of failing to make the tough decisions necessary to allow all Iraqis to live in peace and security. President Bush has been clear with Prime Minister Maliki on this score, as have I and other senior officials in discussions with our counterparts. We expect the Prime Minister to follow through on his pledges to the President that he would take difficult decisions.

In his January 10 address, the President stated that after careful consideration he had decided that announcing a phased withdrawal of our combat forces at this time would open the door to a collapse of the Iraqi Government and the country being torn apart. The New Way Forward in Iraq that the President announced on January 10 is designed to help the Government of Iraq succeed. This strategy has the strong support of General Petraeus and his commanders, and we must give the strategy time to succeed.

On your point about a political solution being critical to long-term success, I also agree. However, with violence in the capital at the levels we have seen since the Sadraca attack on February 23, 2006, extremists and terrorists have been able to hold the political process hostage. The President’s strategy is designed to dampen the present level of violence in Baghdad and ensure that Iraq’s political center has the security and stability it needs to negotiate lasting political accommodations through Iraq’s new democratic institutions.

The Honorable
Carl Levin, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services,
United States Senate.
At the same time, the President has made clear to the Prime Minister and other Iraqi leaders that America's commitment is not open-ended. It is essential that the Government of Iraq — with our help, but its lead — set out measurable, achievable goals and objectives on each of three critical, strategic tracks: political, security, and economic. In this regard, Iraq's Policy Committee on National Security agreed upon a set of political, security, and economic benchmarks and an associated timeline in September 2006. These were reaffirmed by the Presidency Council on October 16, 2006, and referenced by the Iraq Study Group; the relevant document (enclosed) was posted at that time on the President of Iraq’s website.

Beyond that, as the President said, Prime Minister Maliki made a number of additional commitments including:
- Non-Interference in operations of the Iraqi Security Forces;
- Prosecution of all who violate the law, regardless of sect or religion;
- Deployment of three additional Iraqi army brigades to Baghdad; and
- Use of $10 billion for reconstruction.

We will continually assess Iraq's progress in meeting these commitments as well as other initiatives critical to Iraq's development.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
Condoleezza Rice

Enclosure:
As stated.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree that we will hold the Iraqi government to the benchmarks that it has announced?

General Petraeus. We certainly will to the very best of our ability, sir.

Chairman Levin. How are we going to do that? What is the leverage on them?

General Petraeus. Sir, there are a number of different ways of leverage. Among them are providing assistance or withholding assistance in various forms of the lines of operation that are pursued in Iraq.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree that the success of the strategy is dependent upon the Iraqis carrying out their commitments?

General Petraeus. I do, sir.

Chairman Levin. Over the last several weeks, we have heard about rhetorical off-ramps that are built into the flow of 21,000 additional troops, which implies that the U.S. commitment is conditional. Secretary Gates said that there is plenty of opportunity before many of the 21,000 additional troops arrive to evaluate, “whether the Iraqis are fulfilling their commitments to us.”

Now, a story in this morning’s Washington Post indicates that you do not intend to use off-ramps to slow or cancel the deployment of additional U.S. forces to Iraq even if the Iraqis fail to meet their commitments. Is that story true?

General Petraeus. No, sir, it is not. I think that was, “a source close to General Petraeus” or something like that. What I would do in the event that the Iraqi benchmarks are not met is obviously discuss that with my boss at Central Command, with the Secretary of Defense, and then, frankly, determine what it is that we are going to do.

Chairman Levin. So as of this time, do you know whether the flow of additional forces is conditional upon the Iraqis keeping their political, economic, and military commitments?

General Petraeus. Sir, I do not believe that there are specific conditions that are established. I know again that there is certainly a keen awareness of the Iraqis and what it is that they are supposed to do. In fact, General Odierno has reported to me that three to four of the battalions, of the Iraqi commitment, actually are already in Baghdad, and that they came in at something like the 80 percent figure. That includes their leave numbers, however.

Chairman Levin. Do you believe that it is important that the Iraqis understand that they need to reach the political settlements which are essential to resolve the sectarian violence and to defeat the hard-core insurgents?

General Petraeus. It is very important, sir.

Chairman Levin. What forms would that pressure take?

General Petraeus. Sir, I think everything from moral suasion in meetings to again either giving additional or withholding assistance.

Chairman Levin. Could that also mean providing or not providing parts of the 21,000 troops?

General Petraeus. Sir, it could.

Chairman Levin. Now, we understand from columnist David Broder and from what you said here this morning that you are willing to provide a regular report every couple weeks on Iraqi progress on meeting the agreed upon benchmarks. Is that accurate?

General Petraeus. Sir, I would be happy to provide updates to this body on whatever basis. I would like to make sure it is long enough to make sure it is meaningful and yet certainly short enough so you can keep track of what is going on.

Chairman Levin. We appreciate that, and we also want you to not be bogged down with reports. We like them regularly, but we do not want you to be focusing on reporting to us. You have other duties to perform.

General Petraeus. Right, sir.
Chairman Levin. But we would then expect those regular reports, because for some of us and I think many of us it is critically important that that pressure be felt by the Iraqi government. They have not complied with previous commitments that they have made. I am very doubtful as one Senator that it is likely they are going to carry out the other commitments that they have made. I just think history should make us very dubious about the likelihood that they are going to carry out these critically important commitments in the political area as well as the military and economic area.

But those reports, to the extent that you will make those regularly, will be valuable to us in determining whether or not the Iraqi government is doing what only they can do, which is to work out the settlement of differences and to carry out their commitments. Reports do not constitute pressure by themselves. They are useful, but simply reporting that Iraqis have failed to achieve a benchmark does not mean much if there are no consequences to that failure. As I said, they have consistently failed to meet their commitments to increase forces in Baghdad, to stay on schedule for the drafting of their constitution, to hold a national reconciliation conference, or disarm the sectarian militias. So consequences need to be clear, real, significant, and used if pressure is going to make a difference in terms of Iraqi behavior. Would you agree with that?

General Petraeus. I would, sir.

Chairman Levin. General, will U.S. forces have unfettered access and complete freedom of action in all neighborhoods, without Iraqi political interference?

General Petraeus. I am told they already do, sir, but it is something I will certainly confirm, if confirmed.

Chairman Levin. Who will have the operational and tactical control of U.S. battalions that are partnered with the nine Iraqi brigades in the nine sectors of Baghdad?

General Petraeus. U.S. commanders, sir.

Chairman Levin. Who will have operational and tactical control of the nine Iraqi brigades themselves?

General Petraeus. I believe it is Iraqi commanders, sir, and to ensure unity of effort what General Odierno is already working on in fact is linkages at each of the levels of command, co-located command posts, terms of reference, and so forth.

Chairman Levin. What about the U.S. adviser teams that are embedded with Iraqi units that are operating in Baghdad? Who will have operational and tactical control of those teams?

General Petraeus. U.S. units, sir.

Chairman Levin. Who will be responsible for the force protection of U.S. adviser teams with Iraqi units?

General Petraeus. The unit in whose area they are located, sir.

Chairman Levin. The U.S. unit?

General Petraeus. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

My time has expired. Thank you.

Senator McCain.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Petraeus, in your view, since you have been intimately involved in Iraq from the beginning, suppose we announce tomor-
row that we would withdraw within 4 to 6 months. What are the results there in Iraq and in the region?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I think that sectarian groups would obviously begin to stake out their turf, try to expand their turf. They would do that by greatly increased ethnic cleansing. There is the very real possibility of involvement of countries from elsewhere in the region around Iraq entering Iraq to take sides with one or the other groups.

There is the possibility certainly of an international terrorist organization truly getting a grip on some substantial piece of Iraq. There is the possibility of problems in the global economy should in fact this cause a disruption to the flow of oil and a number of other potential outcomes, none of which are positive.

Senator M CCAIN. Eventually there is every likelihood of a scenario of chaos?

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely, yes, sir.

Senator M CCAIN. Suppose we send you over to your new job, General, only we tell you that you cannot have any additional troops. Can you get your job done?

General PETRAEUS. No, sir.

Senator M CCAIN. Suppose that we send you additional troops and we tell those troops that, we support you, but we are convinced that you cannot accomplish your mission and we do not support the mission we are sending you on. What effect does that have on the morale of your troops?

General PETRAEUS. It would not be a beneficial effect, sir. Obviously, a commander would like to go forward with as much flexibility as he can achieve. I was assured yesterday by the Secretary of Defense, by the way, that if we need additional assets, my job is to ask for them. If they are not provided in some case, my job is to tell my boss the risk involved in accomplishing the mission without the assets that are required. At some point, of course, you may have to go back and say that you cannot accomplish the mission because of the assets that have not been provided.

Senator M CCAIN. You are fairly familiar with the Iraqi leadership. You have known these individuals. Based on your experience with them, how effective do you think threats of withdrawal of U.S. troops are in achieving real progress in Iraq?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, there are certain elements in the government that might actually welcome withdrawal. There are others certainly that would fear it greatly. It certainly depends on which side of these various divides they’re on. I do not think that the responsible members of that government right now certainly want us to withdraw, and if it is levers that we are after, again withdrawing support from a specific organization or perhaps institution in my experience was more effective in trying to get a desired outcome.

Senator M CCAIN. Based on your knowledge of the Army and its state of readiness, how long do you believe the increased troop levels and tempo of operations can be sustained?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, my understanding is that there are contingency plans being developed to sustain the surge, the increased force levels, if that is required. Having said that, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I am keenly aware of the strain on our
soldiers and marines in particular, and on our families, certainly the other members of the military who are in positions that have been deploying, and it is for that reason that, as I mentioned, I applaud the increase in our ground forces in particular.

Senator McCain. You were a young officer following our defeat in the Vietnam War. Would you contemplate the effects of defeat in Iraq as compared with an additional, very difficult strain on our men and women in the military who are having to serve more than we would want them to?

General Petraeus. Sir, obviously what our men and women in the military want to do, I think, is to accomplish their mission and then to come home.

Senator McCain. I am saying it took us a long time to recover from losing the war, did it not?

General Petraeus. Yes, sir.

Senator McCain. Do you understand the command and control relationships between the American and Iraqi forces in this new plan? I am very concerned about unity of command.

General Petraeus. Sir, I share your concern. Again, on the one hand, though, we have pushed Iraqis to do more, to take charge in many cases, and so we have in fact almost a good news, bad news story. The good news is that the Iraqis are willing to take command in many cases. The bad news is that makes us have to achieve unity of effort rather than unity of command, and that is why we would have to have those relationships all the way up and down, with command posts co-located and so forth to assure that.

Senator McCain. We need to get that sorted out, General.

General Petraeus. Yes, sir.

Senator McCain. I know of no successful military operation where you have dual command.

In your judgment, what is a reasonable estimate of the time needed to demonstrate whether such efforts, these efforts, are having success?

General Petraeus. Sir, under the current plan as I understand it, the final brigade would be operational in Iraq at the end of May, giving them time to get established, to understand the situation on the ground. Other forces will have already certainly been moving into their areas of operation. I would think that we would have indicators at the least during the late summer of the ability to clear and hold and then build in the Baghdad area and to secure that population.

Senator McCain. Will all five brigades be massed simultaneously or is there some other plan to have all five brigades move more slowly into Baghdad?

General Petraeus. Sir, I have not——

Senator McCain. In other words, are you confident that they are getting them over there as quickly as possible?

General Petraeus. Sir, I have asked that those forces be moved as rapidly as possible, if I am confirmed.

Senator McCain. Are you confident that they will be?

General Petraeus. Sir, the Secretary and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs said yesterday that they are in fact scrubbing that, if you will, to determine how quickly they can in fact move those forces there.
Senator McCaIn. You were in Haiti and Bosnia and you are familiar with Kosovo. It took an overwhelming number of military boots on the ground in Kosovo and Bosnia in order to bring about the end of what was basically sectarian violence, Serbs killing Muslims, Muslims or in the case of Kosovo, Albanians, right?

General Petraeus. Yes, sir.

Senator McCaIn. Yet your numbers, by any estimate or formula that you use, you are receiving are either inadequate or bare minimum. Does that concern you?

General Petraeus. It does, sir. If you look at the counterinsurgency manual, for example, and you have the 1-to-50 ratio of counterinsurgents to citizens, you would say that, well, for Baghdad’s population you should have somewhere around 120,000 security forces. If you add all of the U.S. forces that will be on the ground when we have the full increase in forces, including Special Operations Forces, all the Iraqi forces, military and police, you get to about 85,000. Not all of those are as effective as we might want them to be, particularly in the police side. However, there are tens of thousands of contract security forces and ministerial security forces that do in fact guard facilities and secure institutions and so forth that our forces, coalition or Iraqi forces, would otherwise have to guard and secure, and so that does give me reason to believe that we can accomplish the mission in Baghdad with the additional forces.

Senator McCaIn. How is the morale?

General Petraeus. Sir, the morale is good. Troops in the field take it one day at a time, sometimes one foot in front of the other foot, and continue to move forward to accomplish their mission.

Senator McCaIn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Senator Kennedy.

Senator Kennedy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, General Petraeus.

General Petraeus, I have concerns about this policy, but I have every intention of voting for you. I think you are an outstanding military officer. Our soldiers really deserve the best and I think they are getting it with your service, even though we have some real reservations, I do, just generally on the policy.

I think Americans really are looking and asking about this timeline, these benchmarks which you referred to and responded to the chairman and also Senator McCain. They are really wondering now, with the announcement by the President about these additional kind of forces, what are the benchmarks and whether they can be met. I know this is an old issue, an old question, and it will be older before I am sure the end of the hearing. But you have talked about late summer in terms of the military aspect. With regard to the security, the President has even indicated in his speech that he believed that all the provinces, he thought, would be secured by the fall.

To establish its authenticity, the Iraqi government plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq’s provinces by November. That is security. We are talking about the political decisions that have been reached earlier. What are really the benchmarks that
you have established yourself, that they will have to be realized to really know whether we are making progress?

General Petraeus. Sir, I have general benchmarks in my mind. Obviously, until I can go over to Iraq, if confirmed, and sit down with the staff over there and work through the specific timing of which battalions and brigade headquarters arrive when, when they expect to get certain decisions to see what Iraqi resources are committed, and so forth, and what timeline.

Senator Kennedy. I am thinking now in terms of the non-military, I mean of the oil revenue law, the provincial elections, and the demilitarization of the militias. Do you have these benchmarks established now? I think Americans want to know when we are going to expect we can measure some progress. You have been very frank in indicating you would come back to the committee. You have been very frank in indicating that if this does not work as an operation you do not rule out moving in another direction.

But what is the best you can tell the American people as to what would be the benchmarks? You have given it to us with regard to security. Is there any additional information you can give us with regards to reaching the benchmarks on these other items which are so essential, obviously, in terms of the new direction of Iraq?

General Petraeus. Sir, I cannot give you dates at this point in time. Again, I can tell you, however, that I have in fact discussed some of this already just in passing with Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq Barham Salih and with others who have called to congratulate me on the nomination.

Senator Kennedy. You were kind enough to drop off a nice book when you were good enough to visit and I have gotten through a good part of it during the past few days and over the weekend. In that were these words, effectively: “Sometimes, the more force is used the less effective it is. Any use of force produces many effects, not all of which can be foreseen. The more force applied, the greater the chance of collateral damage and mistakes. Using substantial force also increases the opportunity for insurgent propaganda to portray lethal military activities as brutal.”

The manual talks about the importance of the decisive battle for the people’s minds. Many have argued that the overwhelming military force presence in Iraq actually will inflame the insurgency. What is your view on that?

General Petraeus. Sir, I think that at this point in Baghdad the population just wants to be secure and, truthfully, they do not care who does it. They would like it to be legitimate Iraqi security forces that are fair and impartial. I heard, for example, early feedback that a Kurdish unit that has moved into a mixed area in Baghdad was actually received well because in fact they provided some additional security that did not exist before.

Again, if confirmed, that is something I obviously have to see for myself on the ground, to walk the streets, to talk to the people, and to get a sense of that for myself. But that is my personal view right now from afar.

Senator Kennedy. Some have said, if you have 140,000 troops over there who are not able to gain security, why do you believe an additional 22,000 are likely to gain it?
General Petraeus. Sir, to some degree it has to do with how they are used. Again, if the mission is as it is now under the new approach, to focus on the security of the population, then forces must locate with and live with that population, certainly again link arms with Iraqi forces in this particular case, coordinating with all the others that might be in an area as well.

Senator Kennedy. The idea of tens of thousands of American troops in combat in downtown Baghdad, what is your reaction to whether that really helps win the hearts and minds of the people or whether it is perceived as increasing hostility by American soldiers? How do you measure that? This is also referred to in the book.

General Petraeus. Sir, obviously it depends literally on how those forces conduct themselves, how they carry out their missions, if they are both respectful and firm as required. Certainly there will be a need to kill or capture those bad elements that I talked about. On the other hand, what we want to do, of course, is to clear areas as quickly as possible to provide security for them of a persistent nature and then to enable the holding and the building piece that is the real key to achieving the support of the population.

Senator Kennedy. You have in your manual “Long-term success depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs, consenting to the government’s rule.” What is the time? The number of soldiers now that are being sent over there, how long are those soldiers going to be sent over there? We have heard words about escalation, we have words of surge. Is this going to be permanent? Is it temporary? What is the time limitation that you can tell us about?

General Petraeus. Sir, I do not know what the time limitation is at this point.

Senator Kennedy. At this point therefore we should assume that they will remain over there until we hear further from you?

General Petraeus. As they are needed for that particular mission, yes, sir. Senator, if I could, I think it is important to remember that this particular government, the Prime Minister Maliki government, has only been in office 8 months. They are the fourth Iraqi government in 3½ years and, given the situation in Baghdad, I think it is not wholly surprising that they have had a tough time getting their feet on the ground.

In fact, there are some signs certainly literally in recent days and weeks that there is a stiffer approach.

Senator Kennedy. I thank you, General. I think many of us are concerned that we have had surges in the past at Najaf, Fallujah, Baghdad, and after the Samarra temple, and they have not been successful, and there is concern, which I share, about the surge at the present time, whether this can really achieve the objectives which you have outlined. But in any event, I appreciate your service. Thank you for your willingness to lead.

General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, I think I do not recall anyone being so praised by all sides as you have been. I honestly believe you are the right person for this very difficult task before us. I have enjoyed being with you on three different occasions in Iraq and we got the very strong impression that you had a handle on things, and I appreciate what you are about to get into.

Let me voice a concern that I have, and I think that I am not going to ask you to respond to a question unless there is time at the end of my questioning. That is on the justice system that we hear so much about. I know there are several attorneys that will probably be addressing this in questions after I am completed.

But any time a top lieutenant to al-Sadr, one who has been involved in torture, assassinations, and then is just turned loose at the request of the Prime Minister, it is something that bothers me a great deal. I have heard Senator Sessions talk about analogies between Alabama incarcerations and what is happening over there. In Texas, some 170,000 people are incarcerated, while only 28,000 are in Iraq. We know it is a problem that needs to be addressed and if there is time I will ask you a question on that.

But I wanted to first, before doing that, get into the success story of Somalia. The train and equip program there—I had occasion to be in Ethiopia on numerous occasions while they were going through this program, and when they were called upon to go with us into Somalia it was a huge success.

I am wondering if there is anything you can draw on from that success that might have application to what your mission is going to be in Iraq?

General Petraeus. Sir, I will certainly look at it. I must be candid and say I have not seen something that is directly transportable so far. Certainly there are ways that the assistance has been provided there that has been unique and useful, I think, but that is something I will certainly look at.

Senator Inhofe. This authorization committee has been very straightforward in coming up with funds for train and equip, but also for the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP). I heard you say in your opening statement, you talked about more resources in the neighborhoods, things that you can do in the neighborhoods. I know that I have talked to General Chiarelli and you about CERP.

Tell us a little bit about how more effective it would be if you have more capability to respond to some of these needs immediately than going through the system that we are more accustomed to?

General Petraeus. Sir, in the counterinsurgency field manual there is actually a line in there that says “Money is ammunition,” and at certain points money can be the most important ammunition. There are certainly points when real ammunition is the best ammunition, but there are times certainly, once you have done the clear and hold, where you are trying to build, where the most important asset is that ability to help get streets cleaner, connect sewage lines, make small improvements in the lives of people that are very meaningful right off the bat. That has been aided enormously by CERP.
I would like to add, though, that as I have thought about the prospect of going back to Iraq, I have thought that our effort—and in fact there is an effort by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Paul Brinkley, Deputy Under Secretary for Business Transformation, to pursue this, to either reestablish or build sustainable, self-sustaining small businesses and industries in Iraq as being hugely important. Iraq does enjoy some enormous comparative advantages when it comes to the production of certain types of materials, among them asphalt, fertilizer, of course a variety of petroleum products and so forth, some agricultural products, and I think that we have to look very hard and fund those opportunities that are self-sustained vice those that are just of a Works Progress Administration (WPA)-type nature.

Senator INHOFE. On the WPA-type of deal, it was either you or General Chiarelli who told me about the fact that you had lines into Baghdad neighborhoods, but no grid to bring them in.

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, yes, sir.

Senator INHOFE. So they are climbing up with wire and electrocuting themselves trying to bring it in. This is the type of thing that can be done in my opinion immediately, and I would hope that you would tell us as we develop next year’s legislation if you think we need to have more attention to that program, to CERP.

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I certainly will, and I can assure the committee that I also intend to encourage the Iraqi government to use the substantial resources that it has. I have in fact also been in communication with the minister of finance, who is a former colleague there, through an interpreter, to encourage them very strongly to spend the oil revenues that they have. There are reports of as much as $10 to $12 billion that is available on the Iraqi side. I think it is very important that they use that and that they use it on the behalf of all Iraqis and not just in one area or another.

Senator INHOFE. That is good.

Senator McCain mentioned the experience in Bosnia. I can remember being up in Tuzla when they said that in terms of the ethnic violence that it would never be resolved, this was early on, and yet it was, as Senator McCain pointed out. So I think it showed in a very difficult area, that is a different culture—I understand that. But if it was resolved there, do you think it can ultimately be resolved in Iraq?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, that is certainly my hope. I must tell you that in my first year, really throughout the first 2½ years in Iraq, my sense was that this was a country in which the divides were actually less than those in Bosnia. Real ethnic hatred is what you find when you read Evo Andrich’s book, “The Bridge Over the Drina,” and some of the unspeakable acts that were inflicted upon each other in the centuries of ethnic violence in the fault lines in the Balkans.

There is great intermarriage in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad. Unfortunately, in the wake of the Samarra mosque bombing the ethnic divides have grown, and I think it is very important to secure the population, so that we can stop that kind of violence before it spirals farther and so that we do not have to do what hap-
pened in Bosnia, which is wait for the civil war to take place and then to come in.

Senator INHOFE. That is an excellent answer.

Senator McCain also talked about the morale, how is the morale. Your answer was fairly short, but I know from my experience over there that the morale is very good. Is this not reflected in the reenlistment numbers?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, the reenlistment numbers continue to be very substantial, and particularly by those who are in units serving in theater. They continually way outpace the goals for reenlistment. I am really talking on the Army. I believe it is the same situation in the Marine Corps, and that is actually a real heartening, continuing heartening development.

Senator INHOFE. It is. That is something I observed.

With just 1 minute left, let me just mention, in The Early Bird this morning they mentioned four things attributed to your statements: inadequate planning for the liberation, failing to recognize the emerging insurgency, not having enough troops in certain areas, and holding elections in such a way that it was divisive instead of unifying. Are there any one of these four areas that you would like to elaborate on?

General PETRAEUS. The fourth one is not correct, actually. If you look at the advance policy question, what I stated really was something that many other people have recognized and that was merely that the elections had to some degree the opposite effect of what we had hoped for, and that was that because of the voting along sectarian divides that they did not unify the country as much as we had hoped. It had nothing to do with the conduct of the elections. Frankly, I thought the conduct of the elections was admirable in each case and frankly quite heroic by the Iraqis who pulled that off.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much, General. I look forward to working with you in this new capacity.

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General Petraeus. Thank you for your willingness to serve. Your testimony this morning and your answers to our questions have been excellent. You have been candid and confident at the same time. You have been candid about the mistakes that have been made and about the challenges we face, but you have been confident about the way in which we can do better, and I appreciate that.

I also appreciate the fact that you have been to Iraq, that you understand not only its history but its present. There is a temptation, a danger that people just following the news of the suicide bombings and sectarian death squads will assume that everybody in Iraq is involved in sectarian violence or terrorists or the insurgency. You know that is not true. You have testified that it is not, that most of the people of Iraq, the overwhelming majority, as you have said, quite naturally want to live a better and freer life, and the question is whether we can help their government help them do that.
I want to ask you a series of questions which in some sense summarize what you have said, because I think it has been very compelling. General Petraeus, you have said this morning that serious mistakes have been made in the conduct of the war in Iraq since Saddam was overthrown in 2003. Is that right?

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, sir. I did provide a description of those in the advance policy questions.

Senator LIEBERMAN. You have also said that you understand and appreciate the disappointment of the American people and their representatives here in Congress about the lack of progress in the war in Iraq today.

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. You have also said that you fear that there would be disastrous consequences for Iraq, for the region, for the world economy, and for the United States in the war on terrorism if we exit Iraq prematurely.

General PETRAEUS. Correct, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. You have said that you believe this new way ahead for Iraq that has been presented, with military, economic, and political components, is in fact a new and different strategy for Iraq than what has been tried thus far; is that correct?

General PETRAEUS. I believe it is, yes, sir. There are cases in Iraq where this has actually been conducted in the past. Fallujah, which remains to this day since it was liberated and has become one of the better gated communities in that region, is an example of that. Tal Afar is another example, although again we have to continue to watch the hold and build piece on that.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Based on those examples that you have cited and your own expertise in counterinsurgency, am I correct to conclude that you believe that this new way ahead, this new plan for Iraq, can in fact work?

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. When you say work, I mean diminish the violence being carried out by the enemies of stability and progress in Iraq, so that the Iraqis can achieve a political and economic solution themselves; is that correct?

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, Senator.

Senator LIEBERMAN. You have said, General, in response to questions from Senator Levin, I believe, that you would agree to report regularly, perhaps by video conference, to Members of Congress about the progress or lack of said that you are seeing.

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. In fact, you have said that you would tell us quite directly whether we are succeeding or failing as your mission goes forward; is that correct?

General PETRAEUS. Correct, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. You also said, in response to a question from Senator McCain, that adoption of a resolution of disapproval, which is contemplated by our colleagues and probably will be on the Senate floor, disapproval of the new way ahead in Iraq, would not, if I remember your words, have a beneficial effect on our troops in Iraq.
But I want to ask you, what effect would Senate passage of a resolution of disapproval of this new way ahead that you embrace have on our enemies in Iraq?

General Petraeus. Sir, as I stated in my opening statement, this is a test of wills at the end of the day, and in that regard, speaking purely as a military commander, if confirmed, albeit one who frankly does understand enormously and treasures the value of free and open debate, free speech, who has put himself in harm’s way to protect those great features of our democracy, nonetheless, having said that, a commander in such an endeavor would obviously like the enemy to feel that there is no hope.

Senator Lieberman. A Senate-passed resolution of disapproval for this new strategy in Iraq would give the enemy some encouragement, some clear expression that the American people were divided?

General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.

Senator Lieberman. Based on the answers that you have given and on your extraordinary record of service to our country and your expertise in counterinsurgency, that you have literally written the book, and your belief that this new way ahead is in fact different from what we are trying right now, with the exception of the few cities that you cited where it worked, and your testimony that passage of resolutions of disapproval would not have a beneficial effect on our troops and on the enemy, I want to make a plea to my colleagues in the Senate. I understand that the trains are on the legislative track and they are heading toward a collision. But I want to urge my colleagues to consider your testimony this morning and to put the brakes on.

You will, in my opinion, receive unanimous or near-unanimous support, and you should. You deserve it, from this committee and from the Senate. But I fear that a resolution of disapproval will send you over there with us saying you are a good and great general, but we do not agree with what you believe we need to do in Iraq.

So I want to appeal to my colleagues to consider with regard to the resolutions of disapproval or the caps on troops or the cutoff of funds to step back for a moment and give you a chance and the 160,000 American soldiers you will be commanding a chance, perhaps a last chance, to succeed in Iraq. If, God forbid, you are unable to succeed, then there will be plenty of time for the resolutions of disapproval or the other alternatives that have been contemplated.

General Petraeus, I think you are being sent into one of the most challenging and important circumstances that a general in our history has been sent into. I was thinking it may be comparable to when President Truman sent General Matthew Ridgway to Korea to replace General MacArthur when things were bleak, and General Ridgway succeeded.

I pray that you will succeed similarly in Iraq. I believe you can and will succeed similarly in Iraq. I appeal to my colleagues today to give you this chance, again perhaps the last chance, to succeed and avoid the disaster that failure will bring.

All of my colleagues here—and we have different opinions on this question—no one is embracing failure. No one is suggesting defeat.
We have different ways that we believe we can do better. I believe you deserve the opportunity as the general we are going to send over to lead our effort, to carry out this way that you believe can and will succeed.

Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Sessions is next. Thank you.

[Audience interruption.]
Chairman LEVIN. We would appreciate, madam, if you would please sit down. Thank you very much.

Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General Petraeus, for your service, the years that you have spent away from your family serving your country, the efforts that you have expended in Iraq on two different tours. I visited you both when you were with the 101st in Mosul and commanding that unit also in Baghdad when you were training and working toward training those troops.

I do not think there is anyone more experienced on the ground than you. Thank you for being willing to go back again at this critical juncture in our Nation's history.

I would just like to thank Senator Lieberman for his comments. Senator Lieberman voted for this war, as over three-fourths of our Senate did, and he has worked hard to help us be successful. We want you to be successful. I think the comment I would make to my colleagues is that if a resolution is not going to help you be successful, why do we need it? I would just make that comment at this point.

General Petraeus, I would like to ask a few brief questions. A critical part of all of this for the American people is uncertainty about how things are going. I asked Secretary Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Pace if things got to the point where we could not be successful would they tell us so. You have indicated, I think, in your opening statement that you would. But I would like you to say that, so the American people would know that a person who knows that country, who has written a manual on counter-insurgency, if you believe it cannot be successful you will tell us so we can take a new action?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I firmly believe that I have an obligation to the great young men and women of our country that are putting themselves in harm's way and certainly to all Americans to tell my boss if I believe that the strategy cannot succeed at some point.

Senator SESSIONS. You would not be going if you did not think there was a realistic opportunity to succeed; is that correct?

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, sir.

Senator SESSIONS. General Petraeus, you talked about walking the streets. You used that phrase. I know you used it when we were in Mosul and visited with you. Do you think it is important for a commander and will you take every effort to determine what is actually happening on the streets and how the Iraqi people are responding to the conditions there, and do you consider that a critical part of your leadership?

General PETRAEUS. I do, sir.
Senator Sessions. You have written the counterinsurgency manual and it requires a number of steps and coordinated efforts to occur, but is it not true that a number of things that are necessary for success are required to be done by agencies other than the Department of Defense?

General Petraeus. It is, sir, and to perform them with a unity of effort.

Senator Sessions. There is a courtesy by departments, that we do not want to be critical of one another and agencies do not do that. But I hope that you will not hesitate to insist that you obtain in a prompt timeframe the resources, the support, whether it be electricity or water or police or jails, that you will ask for even if it means other agencies may take it critically.

General Petraeus. Absolutely, sir.

Senator Sessions. I think we are in a critical time. I believe the Defense Department fully understands it because their soldiers are at risk every single day. It is a matter of life and death to them, and we have to raise the level of support I think from other agencies and departments of this government.

Now, you have been there. I remember when you explained to us some difficulties, problems, errors that occurred. You talked about the de-Baathification program going so far as to have every professor at the Mosul University be terminated, causing an uproar at the whole university. You also talked about the need for more CERP money, that is the money that a commander could utilize immediately to fix a problem that is needed to be fixed, also gaining credibility for that commander.

Do you think, now that you are going back to command this operation, that you can help eliminate those problems based on your experience, and will you have the support necessary to do so?

General Petraeus. Sir, I will certainly do my very best. Just for accuracy's sake, Ambassador Bremer, in fact, gave me the authorization to perform a reconciliation process for Mosul University. There were actually about 120 professors that were affected in that case and we did, in fact, conduct a reconciliation process—no Baath Party members on the committee, judicial oversight, and so forth from the Iraqi side. Unfortunately, and contrary to what he wanted as well, because it was not just de-Baathification, it was also reconciliation that was planned, that was not able to be consummated when we delivered all the paperwork to Baghdad, it was never acted upon.

Senator Sessions. You used that word “reconciliation.” You used it when we were introduced to the city council that had been established in Mosul of Kurds, Christians, Shias, and Sunnis, as I recall. Tell us, is reconciliation possible in Iraq?

General Petraeus. Sir, it has to be possible for the goals to be achieved in Iraq as they are right now certainly, and we saw examples of that throughout time. We have also seen examples of the hardening of the ethnic differences and sectarian differences, certainly in the wake again of the Samarra bombing throughout the latter part of 2006.

Senator Sessions. Senator Inhofe mentioned my concern over the prisons and lack of ability to detain persons that have been arrested there. There is an article in the January-February Military
Review that is consistent with the point I have been making for some months. It notes that added together, 1 in 17 Iraqis are in jail. That is two to three times less than the percentage of people in jail in the United States. Yet the chances of a civilian being killed in Iraq are 20 times greater.

It goes on to note that if you cannot identify the insurgent and you cannot imprison him when you do arrest him, you are not going to prevail. That is a military reality, not an economic or a political one.

I feel strongly that this coordinating among agencies has not occurred sufficiently to get us a justice system that works. Do you share that concern, and if you need additional resources for prisons or courts, will you ask for that?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I will, and I do believe they are needed. I believe the rule of law has three pillars: police, judicial, and detentions. We have put a great deal of effort into the police. The results have not always been what we have wanted. We need to put considerably additional effort into the judicial side and into the detention side.

As Senator Inhofe mentioned, I think the prison capacity in Iraq is one-sixth that of the State of Texas, and they are not fighting an insurgency.

Senator SESSIONS. General Petraeus, thank you for your leadership. I believe we do have a realistic chance of success in Iraq. I believe changes in our policy were necessary to achieve that. I hope that you will utilize the leadership opportunity you have to insist that you get the support from the various agencies that are necessary to create a comprehensive and successful effort in Iraq.

I would just say to my friend, the President of the United States, whose heart I know is broken by the losses we have suffered, but who believes in the justness of this cause, that more than he would like it will be necessary for him to focus on the other agencies and departments of this government to ensure that they respond immediately to the requirements that you have to be successful. I believe he will do that, but it is going to take more of his personal time than he would like, I am sure his advisers would like him to give. But bureaucracies are not easy to move and in war, speed and decisiveness are key ingredients, and we need that.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General Petraeus. In response to the questions that Senator Sessions raised about coordination and also in your own testimony, which is a plea for further support, it is your opinion that the Secretary of State and the Department of State have failed to adequately support military operations in Iraq?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, it is my belief that the overall inter-agency effort needs to be substantially more robust than it is.

Senator REED. Do you have any indication it will?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, that was part of the plan that was laid out by the President. I have talked with some of the individuals involved in establishing that. There is a doubling of the Province Re-
construction Team (PRT) members as one of those areas, and it is certainly something that I will pursue because, as I mentioned, governmental capacity-building in Iraq is hugely important to the comprehensive effort.

Senator Reed. General, you served extensively in Iraq. We have all on this committee had the occasion to visit there. But we have heard repeated stories about building up the PRTs without any significant progress in that regard. This seems to me another one of these plans that never seem to get effected.

I think I agree with you. I agree with Senator Sessions. The Department of Defense, military officers, enlisted men and women, have been carrying the burden here without adequate support, and I do not see anything in this plan really that will augment your efforts, which I think undercuts your ability to perform your mission.

Let me go back to the heart of what you are engaged in. Under the counterinsurgency manual which you prepared and you have indicated, 120,000 troops is the doctrinal force size structure. There is about 85,000 troops total, you have indicated. Probably the 50,000 Iraqi forces, if there are 10,000 reliable troops, that is more than I think we can reasonably expect. So I am guessing or speculating you have 40,000 effective troops for a mission that requires 120,000.

So it is your best military advice that this increment of 20,000 American forces is adequate to do this job?

General Petraeus. Senator, I believe again that the additional forces, these tens of thousands of contract security forces and ministerial security forces, actually do relieve us of substantial burdens that otherwise coalition or Iraqi forces would have to bear.

Senator Reed. General, as I was out there I was shocked. Even Prime Minister Maliki told me that some of these ministerial forces are worse than the insurgents.

General Petraeus. Some indeed, yes.

Senator Reed. They are disreputable, they are involved with the sectarian killings. I do not know, but does Blackwater work for you now?

General Petraeus. Blackwater does not work for me, although they are under contract certainly to a number of organizations. But as you have seen on your trips, for example, the U.S. embassy is guarded by contract guards. My personal security on my last tour was actually contracted out to I think it was a British security firm so that we could free up the military police to secure my own officers who did not have security provided for them.

So again, that frees up our forces and it does that in numerous different places.

Senator Reed. General, that situation has existed before this surge. I find it hard to believe that you would give as your best advice to this committee that the differential, probably 40,000 troops in terms of doctrine, is going to be made up by ministerial forces of Iraq that are generally unreliable and by private American contractors or other contractors. Is that the differential that is being made up?

General Petraeus. Sir, again the additional U.S. forces will double the number of U.S. forces in Baghdad. The second, of course,
is how they are used. Again, to secure the population those forces have to be in the population and that will be critical.

Senator Reed. Let us talk about how they are used. First, as alluded to in other questioning, there is a real question of unity of command. You have a bifurcated command structure. It is the nature of this operation. You have a sovereign state. In any other counterinsurgencies, in Belfast, in Algeria, there was no lack of unity of command. It was essentially part of the country. So that is a problem.

Also, I would like to ask about enablers. One of the problems in any military operation is not so often ground combat forces, it is translators, civil affairs officers, people with the cultural sensitivities you talked about so eloquently. Do you have adequate enablers to do this new mission?

General Petraeus. Sir, that I do not know. Again, if confirmed, that is high on my list, to determine if we have not just those enablers, but also all the combat support and combat service support elements that you will recall from your own service are so critical to enabling the soldier who is on point.

Senator Reed. We are presenting this strategy as a new forward with a new plan, and a key element as you indicate that you are not quite sure we have those forces in place or can generate those forces.

General Petraeus. Sir, I have talked to General Odierno about this. Not to be presumptive, but in fact when people consulted me, in my current position, during the development of the strategy General Odierno assured me that they had been looking very hard at the enablers and that they think that they are going to be okay generally in the combat service support arena.

But again, that is something I have to confirm for myself, if confirmed, and once I get on the ground.

Senator Reed. Let me also ask, because this new tactical approach, this new strategic approach, has potential benefits, but it also has inherent difficulties. You will disperse American forces to small groups. You will have to supply those forces. The most significant attack against our forces are improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against convoys, which means you will be multiplying the convoys in Baghdad, exposing more of them to attack. Is that a fair estimate of the risks?

General Petraeus. There is certainly risk. Obviously, as we disperse soldiers you always want to make sure that they are capable over anything that they could confront out there. But certainly there will be soldiers literally on the road. There will be soldiers on the streets and so forth.

Senator Reed. The other issue, General, that has come up, I was out last fall. I talked to General Miegs, U.S. Army (Retired), and I talked to many other commanders on the ground, and they said in 6 months this situation will resolve itself one way or the other. Your timeframe for deployment takes you, as you indicate, to May when you will get your troops in country. You have a lot of work to do to prepare the battle space, to move the troops in.

We seem to be pushing quite close to that 6-month window, for what it is worth, before you will actually start taking concerted ef-
fective action on the ground. Just in terms of timing, is that accu-
rate?

General Petraeus. Sir, again, I really need to get into the plan
with Lieutenant General Odierno and to see how the forces will be
employed. I think you have to wait until you have a certain critical
mass of forces on the ground to take action so that you do not do
the whack-a-mole and all we do is go into this neighborhood and
then go into that neighborhood. So that you want to start with a
certain degree of critical mass. I do not know that that degree is
all five brigades having to be there and completely set before you
begin operations.

Senator Reed. In response to Senator McCain's question about
what happens if we announce some type of withdrawal, you indi-
cated that sectarian groups have been staking out turf. Are they
doing that now?

General Petraeus. In some cases they certainly are, yes, sir.
Certainly along the fault lines in threatened neighborhoods that
has been taking place.

Senator Reed. That is likely to accelerate or decelerate, regard-
less of what we do?

General Petraeus. Sir, I think if we secure the neighborhoods
that that will decelerate.

Senator Reed. But at this point it seems to you to be progressing
rapidly?

General Petraeus. No, sir, I am not so sure. Again, it is hard
from this distance to get the real granularity of what is going on.
There clearly is additional ethnic displacement, soft ethnic cleans-
ing, whatever term you want to use. How prevalent that is is hard
again for me at this distance.

Senator Reed. You mentioned ethnic cleansing. That I think is
happening and the description of whether it is deliberate, part of
a plan, or just spontaneous is something you will, I presume, deter-
mine when you get out there on the ground.

The other issue you raised is the involvement of other countries.
There is a significant involvement of the regional countries there
now, and one of the things that seems perplexing to me is that
there are leading figures in this government that have close, long-
time ties to Iran. I think that will continue regardless of what you
are able to do on the ground, I presume.

General Petraeus. It certainly presents challenges if in fact it
manifests itself in resisting actions against those who are helping
the enemies of the new Iraq, not just of the coalition forces but the
enemies of the new Iraq, in Iraq. As you are well aware, there have
been actions against Iranian elements in Iraq, and again that will
be one of the challenges that we will have to come to grips with,
and those ties clearly complicate matters.

Senator Reed. One final point. One of the consequences of what
you do, regardless of the ultimate level of success—and I wish you
success because the lives of a lot of young Americans are in your
hands and you know that, and you will perform I think magnifi-
cently taking care of those troops. But we could unwittingly be en-
trenching a government in Baghdad that has close and continuing
ties with Iran. That is a distinct possibility.
General PETRAEUS. Sir, I would have to do literally a leadership profile of that to make a reasonable assessment of that. My understanding is that Prime Minister Maliki certainly is under pressure in respects with that, but that he has also pushed back as well. So again, once I get on the ground, if confirmed, and can sort out these various dynamics and influences and how firm they are, then we can move forward.

Senator REED. Thank you.

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed.

Senator Collins.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Petraeus, first let me echo the sentiments of everyone here, that I am so grateful that you have agreed to undertake this enormous challenge. I have great confidence in you personally and I hope that you succeed.

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator.

Senator COLLINS. I have read a very interesting article that you wrote on counterinsurgency that was published a year ago in the Military Review. You offered 14 observations based on your previous tours of duty. As I look at those observations, observations that I think are insightful and that I agree with, I conclude that they are not consistent with the new strategy that we are about to embark on.

Your first observation, you quote Lieutenant Colonel T.E. Lawrence, British Army (1888–1935)—also known as “Lawrence of Arabia” in August 1917 and you say: “Do not try to do too much with your own hands.” You talk about the need for the Iraqis to step up to the plate. I worry that the strategy that we are about to pursue in this country relieves pressure on the Iraqis to do what must be done and that we are making the mistake that you caution against.

There is a big question here of what comes first. Do you need to provide the additional troops and the security in order to give Maliki and other Iraqi leaders the space to do the political moves that need to be undertaken, or in fact are you lessening the possibility they are going to do that? If Iraqi leaders had more fully integrated the Sunni minority into the government, if they had passed an oil distribution law that distributed the revenues more equitably, if they had amended the constitution, if they had held provincial elections, would we be where we are today?

General PETRAEUS. We would not, Senator. What you described really has been truly an intellectual tension, frankly, about the mission in Iraq all along. You do have in the back of your mind always the wisdom of Lawrence of Arabia about not trying to do too much with your own hands. We used to say what we want to do is we want to help the Iraqis get up on their feet, we want to be near them, we want to back them up. But there are times when they start to wobble and the question is when do you move back in and provide assistance.

In the wake of the bombing of the Samarra mosque and the violence that escalated throughout the latter part of 2006, I think we have arrived at a point where in fact we do need to help them a bit more in providing security in particular, with arm’s linked, with
them in forward, in front, wherever we can, for the Baghdad popula-
tion in particular.

Again, this of course is the fourth government in 3½ years and I think at times we probably have had expectations that were greater than they might have been, given the challenges. But I re-
member living through each of these transitions, and you would get a new government in and it seemed as if they were already facing an election for the next government or the next constitutional refer-
endum or what have you. It has been very difficult for them.

They do now have the permanent government, the elected gov-
ernment. It has only been in office for 8 months. It has been a very violent 8 months in a period of enormous pressure on the leader-
ship of Iraq. They do now have, according to Deputy Prime Min-
ister Barham Salih, the oil law nearing completion. There has been progress, incremental progress to be sure.

So again, I think you very accurately captured truthfully the intel-
lectual tension between the fear that our presence retards progress, holds it back, or that our presence can help. I do believe at this point that our presence can help and is needed.

Senator COLLINS. Your second observation is that: “A liberating force must act quickly because every army of liberation has a half-
life beyond which it turns into an army of occupation.” Again, this insight seems right on the money to me.

When I was in Iraq with several of my colleagues last month, we had a very interesting presentation by one of the British command-
ers in Basra. He described a declining consent line. He said origi-
nally when the coalition forces arrived that they were welcomed, but over time their presence has become resented and less and less tolerated.

You talk about this being a race against the clock, but I wonder if the clock has already run out, if we are already perceived by the vast majority of Iraqis not as liberators any more, but as occupiers.

General PETRAEUS. That is another great question, Senator. First, I would start by saying that every area of Iraq is different and unique, and that in some areas, interestingly, areas where we came to be seen as an army of occupation, we might now once again be seen as an army of liberation because we help provide the degree of security that has been lacking in their lives.

So I think it is important again to put your finger on the pulse of that neighborhood, of that muhallah, that district, that province, and then to act in accordance with that. The area in which the British are located, of course, is a much more cohesive area. It is a very predominantly Shia Iraqi area, and it is an area where, although there are certainly all kinds of internal differences and challenges, the Iraqis generally feel like they can get on without us over time, and that is why of course the British contingent has gradually been drawing down in Basra and the other southern, southeastern provinces.

Senator COLLINS. But that is why the British commander’s obser-
vations were so interesting to me. That is not an area where you have Sunni versus Shiite. It is a Shia area. Yet, despite that, we are seeing less and less tolerance for the presence of foreign forces, and that concerns me.
General Petraeus. I think that is understandable, Senator, if I may, because if you think about again any country that has another army on its soil, again at some point tires of that. That is really the essence of what that lesson was. In truth, what it was really getting at is that when you get into one of these things you have to know exactly what your transition plans are. You have to have the stability and reconstruction organizations, resources, concepts, and principles already in your back pocket as you go downrange.

Senator Collins. Finally, I have to comment on your answer to my very dear friend, Senator Lieberman, about the impact of the passage of a resolution and whether that would, I believe the words were, demonstrate to the enemy that the American people are divided. General, the American people are not divided in support of our troops. The American people are not divided in wishing you all the success in the world despite our disagreement with the strategy.

I must say that the resolution that I have been working on with Senator Ben Nelson and Senator Warner is very clear in expressing support for our troops. I do not think it is going to come as any surprise to the enemy that the American people are in fact deeply divided over this strategy, but nothing divides us in our common support of the brave men and women who are fighting in Iraq, and nothing divides us in our common support, that we hope we are wrong and that this strategy is a success, and we wish you well as you undertake this very dangerous and difficult mission.

General Petraeus. Thank you very much, Senator.

If I could just add, I very much appreciate Congress’ critical oversight responsibilities, I truly do, and I understand those very much as a student and as a one-time political science professor.

Senator Collins. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.

Senator Bill Nelson. I think that point of view is very important, Senator Collins, to get across, because the way the questions were framed before would cast some doubt on those of us who would support Senator Warner’s resolution. Certainly we hope and pray for success, but obviously the American people are divided about the conduct of this war. Is it any wonder? We were not told the truth about weapons of mass destruction, nor about troop strengths, nor about the cost of the war, nor about the sectarian violence. So is it any wonder that there is a huge division of opinion about the conduct of this war? That is the point that we are trying to get at here.

Now, you are going to be confirmed. Your reputation obviously precedes you and we hope and pray for your leadership being a success. There is a lot at stake for this country. I appreciate what you shared with me in our private visit.

I want to ask four questions for the record. When you come to testify before us again with the civilian leadership at your side, will you be silent if your civilian leaders provide false or misleading information?

General Petraeus. No, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you for that.

In 2004, you wrote an optimistic article about the progress of the Iraqi troop training. You praised their progress and how you were expecting their performance in the field. Well, those expectations were not fulfilled. For example, you cited in this article 100,000 Iraqi police and soldiers as trained and equipped, with tens of thousands more in the pipeline. It is 2½ years later. How many Iraqi soldiers and police are trained and equipped today, General?

General Petraeus. Sir, my understanding from the latest report of the Multinational Security Transition Commander-Iraq is that there are 325,000 or so that have completed the training, that met the requirement to be called trained, and have the basic equipment that we agreed upon as the metric to be called equipped.

Senator Bill Nelson. Are they reliable?

General Petraeus. They are not all reliable, sir. Again, and in fairness, if I could, in that article I also qualified it and pointed out the many challenges that were being faced in that mission as well. I tried to be quite realistic while also giving an accurate assessment again of those particular metrics which we subsequently developed into the more rigorous assessment, transitional readiness assessment and so forth.

Senator Bill Nelson. Can you put a percentage on it that are reliable?

General Petraeus. Sir, I cannot from this divide. I literally have only that particular report that was sent to me.

Senator Bill Nelson. Let me tell you about a conversation I had with our Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey. They both said—this was back before Christmas—that they would not support a surge unless there is a specific plan for success, and the ambassador even said, and I quote, that he did not want more American kids wasting their lives unless he had “a high degree of confidence in the plan.”

Do you have a high degree of confidence in this plan?

General Petraeus. Sir, I believe this plan can succeed if in fact all of those enablers and all the rest of the assistance is in fact provided. As I have mentioned several times here today, I am determined to make sure that people know that we have that. Again, in my periodic updates to this body I will be happy to report whether that has been forthcoming or not.

Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you for that.

My last question is, earlier in your testimony you stated that morale of our troops is high, something to that effect. You may have said good.

General Petraeus. I think “good” is actually the statement, yes, sir.

Senator Bill Nelson. Okay. We had a surge earlier this past summer and I am quoting from a Washington Post story on July 27. Army Staff Sergeant Jose Sistos said, “Think of what you hate most about your job, then think of doing what you hate most for 5 straight hours every single day, sometimes twice a day, in 120 degree heat. Then ask how morale is.”

Another member of that team, Specialist Tim Ivy, as quoted in the Washington Post said: “Honestly, it just feels like we are driv-
ing around waiting to get blown up. That is the most honest an-
swer that I could give you,” said the specialist.
General PETRAEUS. Sir, I remember that story.
Senator BILL NELSON. How do you respond?
General PETRAEUS. I would like to respond to that. First of all,
there is nothing easy about wearing body armor and kevlar in
harm’s way in 125 degree temperatures. It is hard physically, it is
hard mentally. It is a grind and it becomes a “Groundhog Day” ex-
istence. In fact, there were some units that had groundhog coins
that they handed out as unit coins to commemorate that type of ex-
istence.
On the other hand, the reenlistment rates, particularly in the-
ter, continue to remain so far above the requirements that clearly
there is some sense among those soldiers that serving their country
is something that they want to continue to do. They want to con-
tinue to serve in units with the individuals on their right and left
that they have soldiered with.
So again, nothing easy about it. By the way, the driving around
waiting to get blown up is something that, certainly there is driv-
ing around in a population protection strategy. There has to be.
But there needs to be a purpose to the presence of those soldiers
in those neighborhoods and it is to secure those neighborhoods
that should be the objective, as opposed to perhaps living outside
the neighborhood and entering it a couple of times a day with a ve-
hicular patrol, in which case a soldier could feel that he is doing
what that soldier told the reporter.
Senator BILL NELSON. Godspeed, General.
General PETRAEUS. Thank you, sir.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Graham.
Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, is it fair to say that one of the reasons that we have
the highest rate of reenlistment among those who have served in
Iraq is that they believe it is part of the global struggle, the war
on terror?
General PETRAEUS. Sir, I think again there are a lot of reasons
why someone raises his or her hand again and again. I mentioned
a couple of them, a sense that you are serving a cause that is larg-
er than self, serving one’s country. I personally have always felt
that the reason that I stayed in and many others have stayed in
is because we like the people we do what we do with. We feel privi-
leged to be around those who have these same concepts of selfless
service, the Army values that we embrace—the other services have
the same—and that is in fact a hugely important reason.
I would add certainly that the improvements that have been
made in quality of life—you are never going to get rich wearing the
uniform, but this body and our Congress and various administra-
tions have over the years certainly made it so that at least it is a
reasonable quality of life for our soldiers and for their families. We
should never forget that we enlist the soldier, but it is the family
that we often reenlist.
Senator GRAHAM. You are going back for the third time or the
fourth time? Third time?
General PETRAEUS. Sir, it is the third time to Iraq. It is the fourth year or longer deployment since 2001. The first one of those was in Bosnia from 2001 to 2002.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe that Iraq affects the overall war on terror or not?

General PETRAEUS. I do, sir. Clearly there are elements of the greater al-Qaeda network of international extremists that want something very different than the Iraq that most Iraqis want and want something very different in that region and in the world.

Senator GRAHAM. Who bombed the Golden Mosque?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I believe that it was from this extremist group. It may again have been insurgent elements, but certainly those who obviously did not want the new Iraq to succeed and wanted to ignite sectarian violence. If I could add, I think that there is some of that going on right now. I think they see the increases in forces. I think they see perhaps the Iraqi government showing some toughness. I think that they want to derail that before it gets any momentum.

Senator GRAHAM. That was part of Zarqawi’s hope before he was killed, to create a sectarian war; is that correct?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, that is correct.

Senator GRAHAM. Now, when it comes to trying to evaluate what to do and why we are doing whatever course we chart, I just want to associate myself with Senator Lieberman. No matter how well-intentioned, a resolution being opposed to this new strategy is a vote of no confidence in you. No matter how well-intentioned, the enemy will see it as a weakened resolve. No matter how well-intentioned, those people going to fight this war are going to say, well, I am going, but Congress says good luck but you are going to lose.

I just hope we understand that. I think it is the global struggle, and if you think it is Vietnam, if you really believe we are in Vietnam, you should cut off funding. Not one other person should die in this cause. Not one American should lose a limb. No one should get hurt and we should come home tomorrow.

General, is this Vietnam?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, Vietnam was Vietnam. As a student of lessons of history and someone who did a dissertation that focused on those, every case is unique, and Iraq is Iraq. It has lots of problems. There are a few of them that are certainly related or similar to those in Vietnam. There are a lot that are very different. I truly think that we have to be sensitive to the uniqueness of each situation.

Senator GRAHAM. Let me ask you this. The consequences of losing in Vietnam compared to a failed state in Iraq, how would you compare the two in terms of our overall national security?

General PETRAEUS. I think there is really no telling what could happen if Iraq fails. I explained some of the potential consequences of that, in a region that is hugely important to the rest of the world, on a fault line really between perhaps moderates and extremists, not just between different faiths within Islam and different ethnic groups, in a very volatile region.

Senator GRAHAM. Who is the biggest winner? Name some winners of a failed state in Iraq?
General PETRAEUS. Certainly al Qaeda, the greater al Qaeda network, states that embrace extremist ideologies, those states who wish the United States and perhaps the western world ill.

Senator GRAHAM. Would Iran be a big winner if you had a failed state in Iraq?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, it certainly could be. There are some who say that Iran could. I think perhaps they are torn, actually, because it could actually cause some real consequences for their own population.

Senator GRAHAM. Does Iran want a democracy in Iraq?

General PETRAEUS. I do not believe they do. Certainly, if I could add to the previous one, I do not mean to imply that Iran has not been meddling in Iraq, nor that it has not been providing training, sophisticated improvised explosives and other devices that have created casualties and huge problems in Iraq.

Senator GRAHAM. I am going to make a statement and see if you agree with it: One of the biggest nightmares of the dictatorship in Syria and the theocracy in Iran is to have a functioning democracy in Iraq. It threatens their regimes.

General PETRAEUS. I think that is true, sir. It would obviously depend on what that—

Senator GRAHAM. Do you believe it is remotely possible to have a democracy with this level of violence in Iraq?

General PETRAEUS. I think it is very challenging, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Some resolutions say that we go to Anbar but we leave Baghdad alone, that we do not put any troops in Baghdad. On my last trip to Iraq we met with a citizens group made up of Sunnis, Shias, I think a Kurdish person was there—I cannot remember—but they were all Baghdad residents. The one thing they told every member of our delegation is, if you leave there will be a bloodbath in Baghdad. Do you agree with that?

General PETRAEUS. I do, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. So if there is a bloodbath in Baghdad, are we going to sit on the sidelines and watch it happen? Is that in our national interest?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, that is not our strategy at this time.

Senator GRAHAM. Can you have a functioning democracy where the capital itself is not secure?

General PETRAEUS. No, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. General, when it comes time to do what you are going to be required to do, one of those things you are going to have to do unfortunately is tell some loved ones that their family member was killed as part of this surge. What are you going to tell them?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I am going to tell them that they served their country admirably in a mission that I believe is honorable. I have had to do this before, obviously, and it is the toughest duty of any leader.

Senator GRAHAM. IEDs, that is the biggest threat to our troops. 70 percent of our casualties are from IEDs, is that correct?

General PETRAEUS. I believe that is correct, yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Let me if I can very quickly explain how the new surge may affect that. One group of people involved in the
IEDs are people without a job and they do it for the money; is that correct?

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. So if you could improve the economy and have jobs available to people other than being in the IED business, hopefully that over time would help. That is part of the surge, right, create a better economy?

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, and it also could reduce the militias.

Senator GRAHAM. Second, there is another component to this. If the person down the street who was caught putting an IED in the ground to kill Iraqi troops and American troops, if they went to jail for 30 years or got executed that might deter IEDs; is that correct?

General PETRAEUS. Correct.

Senator GRAHAM. That is part of the surge.

Would you consider suggesting to your Iraqi counterparts to create a military tribunal to handle these type crimes?

General PETRAEUS. I would, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Finally, an increased double capacity, a military surge doubling the combat capability to hold areas cleared, the hope would be to put pressure on the IED makers militarily, economically, and under the rule of law, to go after them, so you are not driving around waiting to get blown up.

When we go, are the gloves off? Are we going to go wherever we need to go and get wherever we need to get to fight and win this war?

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham.

Senator Clinton.

Thank you very much for your lifetime of service and taking on this very difficult assignment. I want to begin by associating my remarks with those of Senator Collins. We are in a dire situation, using your adjective, in part because Congress was supine under the Republican majority, failing to conduct oversight and demanding accountability, and because the President and his team, particularly the former Secretary of Defense, refused to adapt to the changing circumstances on the ground.

If this hearing were being held 3 years ago, I would have a much higher degree of optimism. It has nothing to do with the loyalty, the warrior skills, and the leadership of our men and women in uniform. It has everything to do with the years of lost opportunities and the failures of the Iraqis to step up and take responsibility for their own future.

It appears also, General, that the strategy that is being put forward inspires skepticism for good reason. Your manual, the Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual, as we have already discussed, not only suggests a minimum force level of approximately 120,000, but the manual places great importance on building up internal institutions and training to provide security.

This escalation, despite the rhetoric about other goals, places primary emphasis on American military involvement, not Iraqi institutions. The manual makes clear the interconnections of political
and military progress, that one cannot be achieved without the other.

I have been quite gratified to hear all the positive references to Bosnia in this hearing. I can remember very well in 2001 and 2002 hearing nothing but derision about nation-building and about peacekeeping and about sufficient levels of force going in to back up whatever the political objectives might be.

You will take on a difficult role in Iraq at a time of peril, based on your leadership and expertise. But what those of us who are issuing resolutions and statements of disapproval fear is that you are being sent to administer a policy that frankly does not reflect your experience or advice or the experience and advice of our most recent example in dealing with ethnic violence, namely Bosnia.

You wrote the book, General, but the policy is not by the book. You are being asked to square the circle, to find a military solution to a political crisis. I among others on this committee have put forward ideas about disapproving the escalation, not because we in any way embrace failure or defeat, but because we are trying to get the attention of our government and the Government of Iraq.

On my recent trip to Iraq along with Senator Bayh, our interaction with the Prime Minister and his team did not inspire confidence. What I, speaking for myself, am attempting to do is to send a very clear message to the Iraqi government that they cannot rely on the blood and treasure of America any longer, that we are not going to go into Baghdad and embed our young men and women in very dangerous neighborhoods where we cannot possibly provide force protection because they will not step up and do what everyone knows they must do for themselves.

I very sincerely but wholeheartedly disagree with those who are trying to once again up the rhetoric about our position in Iraq instead of taking a hard look about what will actually on the ground change the behavior and actions of this Iraqi government.

In the absence of the kind of political full-court press that we put on in Bosnia—when I landed in Tuzla, I was briefed by Russians, French, Germans, and Americans. We had an international force, an international commitment. We had brought people to the point where they understood that success there was essential to their national security. I see nothing coming from this administration that it is willing to pursue such a policy now. They will not talk to bad people and it is bad people you talk to in order to try to further political goals, not your friends. They will not put the kind of pressure on a consistent basis on the government that is required in order to change their behavior.

I have said that I would never cut money for our troops when they are in harm’s way, but I sure would threaten to cut money for the Iraqi troops and for the security for the Iraqi leadership. I do not know how else to get their attention.

But one thing I am particularly concerned about is the failure of security for our troops. The incident in Kharbala over the weekend is scary. It raises questions that we do not have answers to.

So let me, beyond my statement of joining in the comments with Senator Collins and rejecting those of our other friends on the panel who think that statements of disapproval are somehow going to undermine our effort when I think they will send the clearest
message—we know this policy is going forward. We know the troops are moving. We know that we are not likely to stop this escalation. But we are going to do everything we can to send a message to our government and the Iraqi government that they had better change, because the enemy we are confronting is adaptable, it is intelligent, it learns. It got a hold of our military uniforms, went through those gates after having cleared all those police checkpoints, killed five of our soldiers in a meeting talking about security in Iraq.

I do not believe that we are playing with a team on the other side that understands the stakes as we described them. So one thing I would ask, General, is please do everything you can to get additional security. The Humvees are turning into deathtraps, as we see the sophistication of the IEDs. We do not have enough of the mine protection vehicles, we have not even ordered enough, and we have not put them into the theater.

If we are going to put these soldiers and marines into these very exposed positions, which this strategy calls for, please come to us, ask for whatever you need to try to provide maximum protection. I disapprove of the policy. I think it is a dead end. It continues the blank check. But if we are going to do it, then let us make sure we have every possible piece of equipment and resource necessary to protect these young men and women that we are asking to go out and put this policy forward, when we are not doing the political side of the equation that is necessary to maximize the chance for their safety and success.

General PETRAEUS. I will do that, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Clinton.

Senator Chambliss.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, you obviously have a great challenge in front of you. Having visited with you on the ground in Iraq on a couple of different occasions, watching you in action as you train the Iraqi troops and the Iraqi security police, I have all the confidence in the world that you are the right general at the right time to be going on this mission. Had you personally attracted the attention of the enemy and had this change in direction not attracted the attention of the enemy, I do not think we would have seen the statements coming out of al Qaeda that we have seen in the last couple of days. So I think the challenge is there, but, as I say, I am very confident that you are going to be up to it.

One comment I have made about this change in strategy from day 1 is that my support of the change would be only if the additional troops had a specific mission and at the time that mission is completed that those troops are redeployed. Now, I asked that question to Secretary Gates and General Pace a couple of weeks ago, if that is in fact the mission. Is it your understanding that those are the directions which you have relative to the increase in the troops?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, in my discussion with the Secretary of Defense yesterday he made it very clear that I should ask for what we need to accomplish any mission that is given to us, and of course you want to redeploy forces when they are no longer needed
for a mission. That is about as good as I can answer that particular question.

Senator Chambliss. This plan that is described as a change in strategy actually was in part developed by the Iraqi leadership, is that not correct?

General Petraeus. Sir, I have not been in on the planning in Baghdad and I am not in a position to comment on that. I have talked to General Odierno about aspects of the plan, but I did not ask him specifically the level of Iraqi involvement in it. I do know that the Iraqi headquarters for the Baghdad security operation is relatively new. The commander, as I think you know, was just appointed a few weeks ago. So I am not sure how much specific input that particular headquarters has had in this plan to date.

But again, obviously once I get on the ground, if confirmed, that is something I would have to dig into.

Senator Chambliss. I say that because Secretary Gates responded affirmatively to that question the other day. The reason I start with that is that I have some real concerns about the leadership in Iraq and their capability of carrying out their plans. While I disagree with my distinguished colleague from New York that this is going to require purely a political resolution, you are not a political person; you are a military person, and it is going to require a political resolution and a military resolution. Otherwise we do not need to send you over there.

I think we have to have confidence that the Iraqi leadership politically as well as militarily is going to be able to do what they say they are going to be able to do.

Now, I want to ask you two questions about that. First of all, knowing what you know about the political leadership in Iraq, do you have confidence that they are willing to make the commitment that they have said they are going to make to make sure that we can accomplish this mission that you have been given?

Second, you have been on the ground training Iraqi troops. You have been living amongst them, so to speak, for two different 12-month deployments. Do you have confidence that the Iraqi military can step up and do finally what we have been anticipating and hoping that they would do for the entire period of time that we have been inside of Iraq?

General Petraeus. Sir, in response to those questions, having not been in Iraq for some 16 months, and although I do know and have worked with a number of the Iraqi leaders in this government, I do not know Prime Minister Maliki personally, and I will have to determine for myself. We will obviously have to have a number of close meetings and develop a relationship.

That support from the Iraqi government is absolutely critical. As you mentioned, military force is necessary but not sufficient. The sufficient piece is the additional political component, and again that is something that I will have to determine the presence of as I get on the ground.

The same, frankly, with the Iraqi security forces. Again, having been out of Iraq for 16 months, one of the tasks I will have to undertake is in fact to assess their state at this point in time. The fact is that they have received reasonable training and they have received reasonable equipping. Both of those can always be im-
proved and the equipment does need to get more robust over time, although they have received thousands of up-armored Humvees to my understanding, as an example.

But what I will have to do again is to determine the will component of this. Military forces, to be effective have skill and will, and what we will have to determine is the presence of both. But the will component will be the most important.

Senator CHAMBLISS. One issue that I have had relative to this ongoing conflict is the fact that I have been disappointed that from an intelligence-gathering standpoint we have not in my opinion achieved the results that we should have been achieving at this point in time. I am pleased to see that you have already been down to Fort Gordon in the last few days to see what we are doing there relative to supporting the war in Iraq, and we are doing some great things.

But in comparing the level of intelligence that the 101st Airborne Division received in Mosul during your tenure as commander versus the level of intelligence that Task Force Olympia received after you departed, you noted that the lack of intelligence Task Force Olympia received played a significant role in the decreasing security situation in Mosul. I would appreciate your elaborating on why intelligence decreased under Task Force Olympia, what lessons MNF-I learned in this situation, and how these lessons are being incorporated in the current operations and intelligence activities.

General PETRAEUS. Sir, the 101st Airborne Division had its habitual division military intelligence battalion at that time, which is a very robust structure. We were fortunate to have partners from all of the intelligence agencies in our government and to have special mission unit elements working with us as well.

We were also fortunate to have a number of individuals who had served in Bosnia, where we created a joint interagency task force for counterterrorism, and that is really what you are doing when you are conducting targeted operations in a counterinsurgency environment. Putting all of that together when the insurgents did make a push in the area, and once we were able to get a grip on that push, our analysts were able to provide actionable intelligence that was very good. In one night alone, for example, simultaneously we took down 35 different sites at 2 o'clock in the morning in Mosul. Another time, we did 25 sites simultaneously, just in that one city, and in many cases there were others outside the city that we did simultaneously as well.

The night we did the 35, we got 23 of the individuals that we were after, with one shot fired. Most of those were knocks on the door rather than blowing the door down. That was the level of the refinement of both the process and the resourcing that we had at that time.

Task Force Olympia was not an existing organization. It was taken out of the I Corps headquarters at Fort Lewis, Washington, the tactical command post of that corps headquarters, and they did not have the normal robust military intelligence battalion that we had supporting them. We did anticipate problems with this, frankly, and did raise concerns about that. It took months for those to materialize, but in the wake of the assassination of the governor some 5 or 6 months after we left in a very fractious political proc-
ess that resulted in Sunni Arabs, many of them, walking away from the province council table, the insurgents were able to start putting roots down again.

As that happened, the intelligence elements of Task Force Olympia were not able to generate the same amount of actionable intelligence. You then enter into a spiral where, because there is more insurgent presence, there is greater intimidation of local security forces and your intelligence agents, your human intelligence agents, which means less intelligence, which means less effective raids, which means more bad guys, and you can see it spirals downward until in fact it did implode in November during the operation in Fallujah the enemy opened up a new front up in Mosul, building on the infrastructure that they had been able to establish there and also building on the fact that they had been able over time to intimidate very severely the police in Mosul in particular and their leadership.

That is really what I was getting at with that particular case. So it was both a substantially reduced amount of the intelligence analysis capability that was so important when we were conducting our operations and to some degree there was less of the joint interagency task force capability as well because that headquarters was not as robust as a division headquarters either.

I did feel at the time that they took over that they could maintain the security situation because of actually tens of thousands of Iraqi forces that were trained during our time. In fact, these forces did prove themselves in April 2004 when the rest of the country really experienced very substantial difficulties. But over time, as that spiral began, particularly in the late summer of 2004, it became increasingly difficult to keep pulling the roots out as fast as the bad guys were putting the roots down.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, General. As you accept this challenge, obviously our best wishes go to you for a huge success. Thank you.

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Pryor.
Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Petraeus, I want to say on the front end that I support your nomination very enthusiastically.

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, sir.

Senator Pryor. I think you are the right person for this. I have concerns, as we have discussed previously, about the surge or the augmentation, whatever you want to call it. Basically, I have three basic concerns. We have talked about these before, but first is the practicalities, and that is where you get into the thousand questions about where do our troops come from, how does it impact the National Guard component, and training and equipment. There is literally a thousand questions there that I have concerns about.

Second is, I am concerned that our best U.S. military minds are divided on this surge strategy. Again, I am basing that on press reports and just reading a lot of retired people mostly and their thoughts and their impressions of what the best next step is.

The third concern I have is I am very concerned that there is insufficient Iraqi buy-in. My sense is that this is not worth doing un-
less the Iraqis buy into this strategy because I think fundamentally that is what we are talking about here, is the Iraqi government, the leadership, military police, et cetera. They have to take over and take responsibility for their country, and we need to over time give that responsibility to them. I think most Americans would like us to do that sooner rather than later.

You have mentioned in some of your comments and just what you have said in the past several days that your perception is basically there is now a changed mission in Iraq. Is that fair?

General PETRAEUS. It certainly is, a change in mission where the focus will be on the security of the population as the foremost objective and transition is not foremost. Really, throughout much of 2006 transition has of course been foremost and frankly, I thought for a very long time myself that that was the right approach to take as well. It was in the wake of the violence, of course, of the fall of this last year and the winter that has proven to be undermined as the way ahead.

Senator P. RYOR. Let me follow up on one of Senator Kennedy’s questions a few moments ago when he asked about benchmarks. You said you had a set of general benchmarks in your mind, but it would take time to develop more specific and more particular benchmarks. I think that is a fair understanding of what you said.

My follow-up question on that is, it seems to me that the circumstances in Iraq have changed considerably over the last year, and as you are coming up with your set of firm benchmarks that we can measure success or failure using your benchmarks, what happens if the circumstances are continually changing and how much time do you need to get to the benchmarks so we can measure how successful we are being there?

General PETRAEUS. Senator, some of the benchmarks I think perhaps will exist on my arrival, if confirmed. Among those might be schedules of Iraqi troop deployments and the like. Some of those I think are fairly straightforward. I think it is more difficult when you get into some of the very difficult issues that the Iraqi government will have to come to grips with in determining what is the level of process toward decisions on some of these very challenging issues that obviously have to be resolved for Iraq to move forward in the direction that everyone hopes it will move.

Senator P. RYOR. That is one reason I have confidence in you, because I know that you are very focused on that and you are going to do your dead level best to make sure that you have a handle on the progress we are making, if we are making progress, and where we are not, trying to take steps to fix that.

In the manual that has been talked about today, the counterinsurgency manual, in fact the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette editorial page quoted a section of that today or several sections, and it said that: “Victory is achieved when the populace consents to the government’s legitimacy and stops actively and passively supporting the insurgency.” I think clearly that is a good definition of victory.

But what I would ask you to do, this is about keeping Congress more informed than in years past. If you can help us measure how we are moving toward victory, if you can give us objective criteria
that we can look at where we can measure if we are actually pro-
gressing the way we want to progress.

So whatever those metrics are, whatever those statistics are, you
are going to have to help us do that, because one of the frustrations
I think I have had is that it has been very difficult for me to gauge
whether we are moving forward or whether we are losing ground
in Iraq.

Also in your counterinsurgency manual, you give an equation
there that says there should be one counterinsurgent for every 50
inhabitants. I am wondering about the numbers in Baghdad. I be-
lieve Baghdad is about 6 million. Are we at that number, that 1
to 50 ratio? Are we there? Will we be there with the surge?

General PETRAEUS. Senator, we will. If you lump together all of
the existing U.S. forces and forces to deploy, existing Iraqi forces
and forces to deploy, you get to about 85,000. Certainly not all
those are equal. Some are much better than others.

You then should add in tens of thousands of additional forces
that are over there that provide, of all things, contract security for
our embassy. Myself, I was secured by contract security in my last
tour there, and that frees up uniformed forces to perform other
missions and those have to be factored in as well. The same with
the ministerial security forces, acknowledging certainly that some
of those ministerial security forces are part of the problem instead
of part of the solution. But they do in fact secure, again, facilities
and infrastructure that would otherwise have to be secured by U.S.
or Iraqi forces.

Senator PRYOR. Just for the sake of clarity, when you talk about
a counterinsurgent are you talking about anybody that is on our
side? I mean, it could be the Iraqi police, obviously the Iraqi army,
obviously other Iraqi security forces?

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, Senator.

Senator PRYOR. But it could also be contractors?

General PETRAEUS. If they are performing security functions, yes,
sir.

Senator PRYOR. So it is whoever it may be, just as long as they
are performing security functions?

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. Again, if you will, that is sort of a
modern evolution of counterinsurgency strategy, if you will, be-
cause certainly in Malaya and other places there were not contract
security elements in those days, although they certainly counted
their governmental security elements like the ministerial security
forces.

Senator PRYOR. What happens if you get in there and the Iraqi
forces, whether they be a police unit or a brigade, whatever size it
may be, what if they just fail to meet the obligations that they
have? What if they either just do not show up or they just do not
perform well? My suspicion is you will find them performing un-
evenly from area to area.

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir.

Senator PRYOR. What do you do when they do not meet the
standard?

General PETRAEUS. There will be some of that, there is no ques-
tion. In those cases we will have to go to their bosses and demand
corrective action. That is easier said than done. But it is something that we will have to do.

In my last tour in Iraq, on one occasion I went to the minister of interior and told him that we had withdrawn all logistical, funding, and equipment support for a particular element in the Baghdad police force and that would remain withdrawn until certain individuals who we caught mistreating detainees were apprehended and dealt with, and those individuals were apprehended and dealt with.

Senator Pryor. I just had one follow-up question to what Senator Bill Nelson asked a few moments ago. I think his question—I wrote it down; I think I have it right—Will you be silent if your civilian leaders provide false or misleading information? I think that is what he said, and you said, no, you would not remain silent, which is the right answer.

But if you find yourself in that situation where you have civilian leadership in this country that is not providing accurate and true information, what will you do?

General Petraeus. Sir, I will provide accurate and true information. I think the committee ought to know that. I would be very happy to stay on the banks of the Missouri River at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, instead of going back to the banks of the Euphrates River, and I am doing this out of a sense of service, again to those great young men and women who are over there, and because this is what the military does.

But this is not about being beholden to anyone. This is not about, again, being aligned with any party or anyone else. I will give you my best professional military advice, and if people do not like it, then they can find someone else to give better professional military advice.

Senator Pryor. I think that is why you are the right guy for the job.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Pryor.

Before we call on Senator Thune, let me just follow up on something that Senator Pryor said and give the Defense Department notice of a request that we are going to insist be complied with. It has to do with the benchmarks issue or the measurements which Senator Pryor made reference to. Back in November when the question of benchmarks came up, we asked both Secretaries of Defense and State, for copies of the benchmarks that were referred to by the President. The President has said specifically that we will hold the Iraqi government to the benchmarks it has announced.

We asked again. When we did not get those benchmarks, we asked the Secretary of Defense. We got a letter back from the Secretary of Defense on December 4th saying that the request for the benchmarks would be referred to the State Department. We have written the State Department again, Secretary Rice, saying we want the benchmarks. This was a January 16th letter.

Now, we are determined that we are going to get the benchmarks which the President says that the Iraqi government has announced it will follow. We are determined we are going to get those. I do not want to hold up your nomination. Nobody does. We are going to speed your nomination as quickly as we can because we think
that it should be speeded up, for all the reasons you have heard here today.

But there must be representatives here of the Defense Department and the State Department. Whether there are or not, we are going to make it clear that we are going to find a way to get copies of those benchmarks that you say you saw on slides. Now, I made reference in the letters just to political benchmarks, but we are going to insist—and I use the word “insist” and I think this will be a bipartisan insistence; this is not a partisan issue. This is information this committee is entitled to, that Congress is entitled to. I am looking at you, but I am talking to the people at the Defense Department and the State Department who are within earshot here.

We are going to insist that we get copies of the benchmarks on the political, economic, and military aspects that have been agreed to by the Iraqi government, which the President has said he is going to insist that they comply with.

Senator Thune.

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, thank you for being here today. Thank you for your extraordinary service to our country and for your willingness to undertake a very challenging and difficult task.

I want to follow up. You answered in response to a question Senator McCain asked earlier today about what would happen if the United States were to leave Iraq now or follow the advice of some up here and that is to begin withdrawing. You mentioned some of the things, ethnic cleansing, other countries interfering, terrorist groups moving in, disruptions in the flow of oil, a whole lot of consequences of that step or that action.

What I would like to have you do if you could is expand a little bit on that answer in terms of what it would mean to the United States and to our security interests, because I think too often people here in this country do not understand or make the connection between what is happening over there and what that means to national security here at home for the United States. Could you just expand on that answer a little bit and what the implications could be for people here at home and why this fight is so important, not just to that region but to U.S. interests?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, there is a number of broad categories, if you will, that I think deserve mention. One of those certainly is the potential—and all of these are potentials. As I said in my opening statement, no one really knows the consequences of a failed Iraqi state. But certainly regional instability could be a result of that if surrounding countries felt that they had to enter Iraq for some reason or other to safeguard one ethnic group or another.

Were some portion of Iraq to become truly a terrorist training camp, and the potential certainly exists for that in places like Anbar Province and other areas that are under more of the insurgent control, obviously that is a much shorter trip to countries of friends in that region, to other western countries, and to the United States than from other possible camps, say in the Afghan-Pakistan border regions or something like that.

I think you do have to consider U.S. standing in the world, if you will. I think that is an important factor. I think, as you mentioned
the international economy, one does not know if the oil flow would be disrupted, but certainly were that to happen, were there again to be regional instability that erupted, again there is the potential that that could erupt—that could degrade the availability of the energy resources in that area, the oil and natural gas.

Again, no one really knows what these consequences truly would be. They are all potential, and they all are certainly worrisome.

Senator Thune. Let me ask you, if I could, a follow-up question that has been posed a couple of times this morning, I think first by Senator Lieberman and a couple of others on the panel. It has to do with these resolutions that get put on the Senate floor, that I think in many cases are designed to respond to political conditions here at home rather than to conditions on the ground in Iraq. If thought were being given to the effect on the troops and the conditions on the ground in Iraq, I do not think you would probably see as many of these resolutions floating around here on Capitol Hill, and I know that they do not have the force of law when you are talking about a non-binding resolution. I think the real opportunity here for Congress to have a say in this, if they wanted to, would be with respect to the purse and the power that we have in terms of appropriations. At least nobody evidently wants to take that step.

But these resolutions are symbolic, in that I think they send a signal and a message to our troops. They obviously are perceived around the world as having some meaning. I do not happen to believe that our troops make the distinction between support for them and a lack of support for their mission. Would you comment on that as well, just as a follow-up to the questions that have been asked earlier?

General Petraeus. Sir, again, I am not a politician. I am a guy who wears a uniform and has for 32 years plus. I am, however, very sensitive, as I mentioned before, to Congress’ responsibilities in terms of oversight, accountability, and so forth. I understand also very much the frustration of the American people, of Congress, frankly of all of us, with the situation in Iraq.

I think, however, putting on the uniform and as a prospective commander, if confirmed, that the question has to be, I guess at least that I would ask myself, what message will the enemy take from this, what message will the soldiers and I take from it?

If I could, I would just really like to leave it at that, because, candidly, there are a number of resolutions out there, without actually getting into details, which I would just as soon avoid anyway, frankly, learning that mine fields are best avoided and gone around rather than walked through on some occasions. I would like to leave that one there, Senator.

Senator Thune. A very diplomatic answer. But I come back to that point because I think that the questions that have been asked earlier—what is most important in the debate that is occurring up here right now, in my view at least, is the impact that it has on the men and women who are wearing the uniform. You are a career military officer, someone who works day in and day out with the troops. Those of us who are up here obviously have constituencies back home that we respond to and clearly many of these
messages or resolutions are directed or targeted at some of those constituencies, who have a sense of frustration about this war.

But it seems to me that the bottom line concern that we have to have is that our troops understand that we are committed to them and support them and want to make sure that they have every opportunity to be victorious, to complete the mission. That is what soldiers do. I am very concerned about the mixed messages that are sent by statements that are made here, not so much again as they are directed to constituencies back in the States, but more importantly what impact that has on the men and women who are carrying out this responsibility in the theater where they could be in harm’s way.

What about the issue of the borders? There has been a lot made about Syria, Iran, troops coming in, foreign fighters. What steps are we taking to cut that off and what more can we do?

General PÉTRAËUS. Sir, that is not a subject that I have discussed in any detail at all, again, with General Odierno. Again, I was truly trying to avoid any kind of presumptive behavior, although at one point when I was being asked about—during the development of the strategy I thought that I did have to talk to our operational commander on the ground and confirm that his troops-to-task analysis did require all five of the brigades and the two additional battalions in Anbar Province, which he said that it did.

I do know that he shares the concern over the borders. We have very briefly discussed it in passing. But I do not know at this point in time what the plans are to strengthen the defenses, the security, along the Iranian border and along the Syrian border in particular.

Senator THUNE. I see, Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I am sorry I missed a good amount of your question and answer period. I was here for your testimony. I had two other hearings I had to go to.

I want you to know I appreciate your diplomacy as it regards my colleague Senator Thune’s question. The issue of the attitudes of people who are serving is in my view not wholly appropriate to the political debate. You and I had a discussion about that when you visited me. I think there are a number of polls out there. There was a poll last year during the campaign that showed more than 70 percent of the troops in Iraq believe we should be out within a year. There is a poll in the Service Times fairly recently that showed a majority of the people in the military no longer support the approach of this administration in terms of how the war should be fought. I think we up here and the senior military are the fiduciaries of the goodwill and the service of those people, and it is not always appropriate to be bringing them so directly into the process.

I also would like to say for the record that so many of these predictions that are being bandied about regarding the implications of a withdrawal, first of all, I think play to the worst case scenario of a precipitous withdrawal. The others, for instance an increase in terrorist activity, decrease in the United States standing around the world, and effect on the United States economy, the empower-
ment of Iran, are the exact conditions that many of us who were warning against going into Iraq were making, which would occur as a result, and in some cases have. I just think that is something that should be said for the record.

In your testimony, when you talked about your measures of success you mentioned the rule of law, and one of the strongest feelings that I have is that law and order is the first stepping-stone toward some sort of success here, but we have to go toward a point where law and order is being administered by the Iraqis, through the Iraqis, on behalf of the Iraqis. Otherwise you get a situation similar to Northern Ireland years ago, and just the notion of a British soldier on the street was enough to inflame the emotions of a lot of people over there.

That goes to one of the concerns that I have about the way that this strategy is being articulated. It is one thing to talk about the measurements of success, but I think what we really need to hear is a clear articulation of end point. My belief is that in terms of our national strategy with Iraq the successful end point would be a time when there are no longer United States combat forces on the streets of Iraq. Would you agree with that objective?

General Petraeus. Senator, I would. I think the condition the rest of the country is in would obviously pertain as well. If you achieved no more troops in Iraq but the whole thing just came apart at the seams, then I am not sure that that would be the objective that you would want to strive for.

Senator Webb. The removal of combat troops from the streets of Iraq?

General Petraeus. Certainly, over time that is where you want to be, yes, sir, again assuming that there is security on those streets in Iraq and that we have enabled and helped the Iraqis to get to that.

Senator Webb. Right, but that would be a doable articulation of where we want to end up?

General Petraeus. That is certainly where we want to end up militarily, yes, sir.

Senator Webb. I have another question regarding the training of Iraqi forces, and this is just a question from having participated in the Vietnam War and watching some very fine South Vietnamese soldiers get in many cases culturally conflicted by the type of training that the United States was bringing to them, and having spent time in Lebanon as a journalist and watching the difficulty that they had trying to build up a Lebanese army with all the difficult factions very similar to Iraq.

General Petraeus. Right.

Senator Webb. The question that I have is really asking for your observation, having done this. To what extent are these Iraqi forces less capable because of the training that they have not received from the Americans and to what extent are they less capable because of a lack of motivation, for instance a fear of affiliating with the central government that is so weak, or cultural issues, those sorts of things?

General Petraeus. I think it is probably more the latter than the former, in truth. I think that over time we did build a respectable training and equipping program. It was relatively comparable
to what we do for our own soldiers. Over time we have built institutions—military academy, staff colleges, basic training academies, branch schools, and all the rest—and again, this really does come back to the heart of the issue, as I mentioned in my opening statement, that there is not a military solution, there is a political solution. Military force is, again, necessary but not sufficient, and getting to that will component of this equation, what you talk about, who are we fighting for, what are we fighting for, is crucially important in this case, and that is again the ultimate kind of resolution of the problems in Iraq.

Senator Webb. Do you see that there is any sort of stigma associated to Iraqi units that are directly affiliating with Americans in different parts of the Iraqi society?

General Petraeus. Sir, again I would have to march my way around the country, but I do not really think that is the case. We have very small, relatively small, embedded teams, partnership programs, throughout the country with the military. I am not sure the same can be said of the police, which is a wholly different issue because they obviously are local. They come from the local neighborhood, and if you have a situation in which intimidation sets in over time, of course, then there can be a problem of affiliation between them and what can be seen, again, in some of those areas as occupiers.

You have seen it, I know, in Anbar Province, where it has gone back and forth, and right now there appears to be a trend in the positive direction where sheiks are stepping up and they do want to be affiliated with and supported by the U.S. Marines and Army forces who are in Anbar Province. That was not the case as little as perhaps 6 months ago or certainly before that.

So again, I think you really have to look around the country, and I think we have to be very sensitive and, frankly, nuanced in how we operate in those different areas.

Senator Webb. I wish you well and I look forward to hearing your observations after you hit the ground.

General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.

Senator Warner.

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, I would like to state unequivocally that I have great admiration personally for you and your professional accomplishments, and I express my thanks to you for leaving the banks of the Missouri and be willing to return, and do so out of a sense of deep patriotism and love for this Nation and the forces that you will eventually command.

If you succeed, and I hope you do, fervently I hope you do, you will have earned rightfully the gratitude of the people of this country, and indeed the people of much of the world, because hopefully that would bring stability to this government and allow it to exercise the full range of sovereignty.

But I have to tell you, and this is personal, I go back 35, 36, 37 years, when as Secretary of the Navy, I sat at that very table where you are in this very room on a number of occasions and in other rooms of this Congress, trying to explain, since I was a part of the civilian structure, governmental structure directing that war.
I heard the crossfire in the questions and in the debates, and this hearing today brought it all back.

There is no real parallel to the conflicts as such that we are experiencing today, but there is this situation of the Nation pulling back. How well I remember, with my friend Jim Webb here and John McCain bravely in uniform in those days, how they came back home to a public that did not greet them with the warmth, the respect, and the thanks that they deserved.

But today it is quite different. This whole Nation is in support of the men and women of the Armed Forces. I say to you I think every member of this committee—and I know every one of them well, on that side of the aisle, on this side of the aisle, having had the privilege of occupying that chair for some 6 years—we are not a division here today of patriots who support the troops and those who are making statements and working on resolutions that could be translated as aiding and abetting the enemy.

We are trying to exercise the fundamental responsibilities of our democracy and how this Nation has two coequal branches of the government, each bearing its own responsibilities.

I hope that this colloquy has not entrapped you into some responses that you might later regret. I wonder if you would just give me the assurance that you will go back and examine this transcript as to what you replied with respect to certain of these questions and review it, because we want you to succeed and I am not sure just how the reporting will come out of this hearing, nor at this moment am I fully able to judge how the people across this land seeing this hearing through the lens of that camera will interpret it.

But in defense of those colleagues—and I am one and I accept full responsibility for what I did yesterday in leading an effort with my distinguished colleagues, Senators Collins and Ben Nelson of this committee, in putting forth a resolution. But we did so in response to the President's comments to the Nation on the 10th of this month, and I read from his transcript:

"In the days ahead, my national security team will fully brief Congress on the new strategy. If members have improvements that can be made, we will make them. If circumstances change, we will adjust. Honorable people have different views and they will voice their criticisms. It is fair to hold our views up to the scrutiny of all involved and have a responsibility to explain how the path they propose would be more likely to succeed."

Since we just put in our resolution late yesterday—and we did so not to have a confrontation with the President, but following his advice we had some recommendations, which he may or may not accept. They were expressed by heartfelt beliefs held by the three of us and we think other members of the Senate.

I feel that we have performed our duty as we see it and that time will tell. We purposely did not file it. I am getting technical here. We put it in the record, but it is not filed before the Senate, and we will withhold any further action on our resolution until the Foreign Relations Committee, which has primary jurisdiction, reviews certain resolutions before it and responsible to the floor of the Senate. Then and at that time will we consider whether or not we should make any changes and whether we submit it as a resolution.
as a substitute for that promulgated by the Foreign Relations Committee.

I just urge you to go back and look at that, because I am very proud of this committee and I do not want an impression, certainly among the Armed Forces, that we are not all steadfast behind them, and that sort of a misimpression could create the very forces that I witnessed when I was in that chair and saw America pull back and eventually the funding problem, which I hope we never experience here as a means by which to exercise the authority of our equal branch, Congress.

Now, let us proceed to my point here. This resolution we put in looked at options that the President might consider using a force level somewhat less than the 20,500. We fully support, inferentially, the force levels the President wants to send to Anbar. There we are directly in combat with al Qaeda, which is so fundamental to this whole war on terrorism throughout the globe. But we looked at also the means by which the benchmarks could be made very clear to the American public most important and to Congress, and as you direct the operation, which will be sequenced, the first section of Baghdad that you begin to work the plan on, let us see if the Iraqis indeed reported for duty in full force, as the plan envisions, indeed took the lead, as they say, in the fight, which is primarily sectarian violence, and that the political structure will not try and abrogate the decisions made by the field commanders, both U.S. and Iraqi, as they move forward with the plan. Those are very critical to the success.

In my understanding—and you have been very forthright—you have not helped develop this plan. It has been entrusted to those commanders in country, understandably. But you in a sense, if confirmed, and in the written letter that you advised the President, you are accepting the responsibility to implement that plan. So I take my comments to my colleagues a step further and say, if there comes a time when you feel there should be a change to the plan and hopefully, as we recommend to the President, a lesser force level of U.S. forces is possible, you will address that to your superiors, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and hopefully implement that.

Am I correct in that?

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, Senator.

Senator WARNER. Now, finally this question of the sectarian violence which concerns me greatly. The root causes of that violence are almost incomprehensible. Here we have through great sacrifice of life and limb and an enormous sum of funds, not only the United States but coalition forces, given this nation its sovereignty, and all we ask in return is it take the full reins of sovereignty and exercise it.

My concern is why do we need to put such a heavy emphasis of U.S. forces into Baghdad when we have trained 188,000 Iraqi military? Why should they not take the preponderance of the responsibility to cope with the sectarian violence? They can understand the language. They have some comprehension of the root causes why a Sunni and a Shia who have lived side by side for many years are now at each other's throats and seek only to kill and destroy one another.
Why could not our forces be redeployed into areas where those 188,000 Iraqis are geographically in other regions and withdraw the Iraqi forces from those regions and put them into Baghdad to carry forward this mission, which is important, very important, to bring down, hopefully, lower that level, so that the people of Baghdad have some quality of life, so that the government has some sense of personal security and governmental security, so they can carry out the functions of sovereignty?

Those are the issues that we bring to you. Do you have a thought on that? Why could we not simply utilize the Iraqis to fight this sectarian violence and not the American GIs?

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. Sir, first of all, I think that the effort in Iraq, in Baghdad, will be predominantly Iraqi. I think that as we total up numbers of forces and various contributions that they will far outnumber U.S. forces in the Baghdad security plan. They are in fact moving forces from other places in the country where the troops-to-task situation allow that to happen. I happened to meet last night with the Iraqi chief of defense staff, their chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, General Babakar Zabbari, who is a long-time comrade starting up in northern Iraq, where he commanded the Pesh Marga that helped us liberate northern Iraq. He then eventually was elevated to be his country's senior military officer.

He stated that they are training additional forces—I believe it was in the order of 25,000 or 30,000 additional military forces—that will also be used to augment the elements that are going to Baghdad. Again, he also echoed what I mentioned earlier, that the initial battalions are actually in Baghdad, according to General Odierno as well, and are starting to get set again to contribute to that operation.

Senator WARNER. If they fail to live up to their commitments—and I hope they do not—if they fail to meet the benchmarks of the initial phases of the Baghdad operation, are you prepared to come back to your superiors, indeed the President and the Secretary of Defense and others, and say, we should not go forward until somehow we get not only the assurance but the actuality of their participating in successive phases of this Baghdad operation?

General PETRAEUS. I am prepared to do that, Senator.

Senator WARNER. I thank you. I wish you good luck and I wish you have success.

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator Bayh.

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to begin by saying, Senator Warner, how appropriate and moving I thought your opening comments were.

There has been a lot of commentary at this hearing this morning about the morale of the troops and about the need to defeat our adversaries. I think the best thing we can do to support the morale of our troops and defeat our adversaries is to have a policy that maximizes our chances for success. It would be ironic indeed if we remain silent in furtherance of a false unity, in deference to a policy unlikely to succeed. I do not see what that would do for either the morale of our troops or to defeat our adversaries. So, particu-
larly from your side of the aisle, I thought your comments were absolutely appropriate and indeed moving.

Senator WARNER. I thank the Senator.

Senator BAYH. General, I would like to follow up on that for a moment. I think Senator Webb was also right, being a military man, not to want to drag those of you in uniform into political debates. So I am not going to ask you about specific resolutions or all that kind of thing. But the issue of troop morale is something that you are an expert on and that has been raised here today. So I would like to ask you very plainly: Does a hearing like this, with the diversity of opinion that has been expressed here, undermine the morale of our troops?

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I seriously doubt that our troops are sitting watching C-SPAN 3 in Iraq right now.

Senator BAYH. Further testimony to the intelligence of our military men and women. [Laughter.]

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I do not know how much attention they are paying to this debate.

Senator BAYH. Well, the issue has been raised. It is a philosophical question, not a political one, but it is important because every American, as Senator Warner was saying, cares about the morale of our troops. So does diversity of opinion in our society about the right thing to do in Iraq, that maximizes our chances for success, does a healthy debate about the right course that maximizes our chance of this turning out well, does the freedom inherent to a democracy, does that make us weak?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I think I stated earlier how important I think free and open debate and the marketplace of ideas and all the other great qualities that our country has achieved are in fact to our country. I think some of the soldiers will be out there saying, yeah, go get them. Some will be saying, what is that all about. Some will just keep their head down and go about their mission.

Senator BAYH. So what you are saying, General, is that our men and women who wear the uniform really are a lot like Americans back at home? They have diverse opinions, too.

General PETRAEUS. Sir, that is where they come from.

Senator BAYH. They are probably sophisticated enough to take all this in and accept it for whatever it is worth.

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I think that is an accurate statement.

Senator BAYH. I thought so and I am glad to hear you say that. What is behind a lot of this—and you heard some of this also, I have heard there are concerns about micromanaging, and I think the Vice President said the other day you cannot run a war by committee. But there is a lot of history here—I think you have alluded to some of it—a history of mistakes by the civilian leadership, a history of the Iraqis, who you quite accurately indicated and it was universally the opinion that Senator Clinton and I heard when we were in Iraq that the Iraqis are essential to the success of this mission and yet they have been too often unable or unwilling to step up and do their part. There is that history we bring to this.

So to deal with both the mismanagement of this on our civilian side here and the lack of resolve on the part of the Iraqis there, many of us feel that it is our responsibility now to step up and to
provide better direction to this whole thing. That is what you hear going on.

So with that by way of background, you said a couple of interesting things that I think were both accurate, but I would like to combine them in a little bit different way. At one point in your testimony you said you thought that at the bottom of all this at its essence it was a test of wills; is that correct?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, that is correct. I think any such endeavor is a test of wills at some point with the enemy. Now, there are many factors in the test.

Senator BAYH. This is what I would like to get to. I think that statement is correct, but I want to combine it with another statement that you have made and I hear repeatedly from our military men and women, which is, look, no matter how long we stay or how hard we fight or how much we spend or how many of us die, it is ultimately up to them.

I think what you were about to say is it is not only a test of our will, that is a part of it, but it is also fundamentally a test of the Iraqis' intentions, whether they are willing and able to do what it takes ultimately to make this successful. Is that not also true?

General PETRAEUS. It is, and I have made that point, of course, several times today. This is at the end of the day up to the Iraqis.

Senator BAYH. I would like to ask a couple questions about that, because my strong impression is that the American people are willing to be constant and strong in support of a policy they believe is likely to work, but they can also understand when things are not working too well and when a change of course is in order, and that is when they begin to hesitate and withdraw their support.

So the questions I would like to ask today get to the heart of what do the Iraqis intend, why should we have confidence in them, and what steps can we take to maximize the chances that they will do what is in their own interests and maximize the chances that our efforts there will succeed in helping them.

I would like to get to what Senator Levin mentioned to you a couple of times. You have spoken about consequences. We have talked about benchmarks and timelines, but ultimately there have to be consequences. Otherwise I am afraid the Iraqis will not take us seriously and the American people will conclude without consequences this really is more of the same.

You spoke generally about, if things are not going so well we will have to look at what we can do for them and what we might withhold from them. That is a pretty general statement. Can you be more specific than that, because I am afraid without more specifics——

General PETRAEUS. Certainly, yes, sir. I can give examples of in fact what I did in the past. As the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq commander, the train and equip program commander, there was a case toward the end of my time in command where leaders of the major crimes unit in Baghdad were found mistreating detainees. So I went to the minister of defense with the evidence of this and announced that we were withdrawing all financial, logistical, adviser, and equipment support for that element until he arrested and tried those individuals. He did do that, and
we then over time resumed the assistance that we were providing to them. That is an example of that.

There are positive reinforcements, if you will. The Iraqi special operations force brigade is arguably the best special operations unit in the entire region. They are among the most experienced. They are the ones in many cases who have been conducting the operations in recent weeks and months to go after some of the senior leaders of the Jaysh al-Mahdi, Moqtada al-Sadr’s militia, and they have done so well that we continually reinforce that with increasingly better, more capable equipment, better facilities, better quality of life, a special operations bonus, and so forth.

So again, there are two ways of going at that and those are examples of those.

Senator Bayh. Those are the kind of specific consequences we are looking for, but that deals with the military side of things and a lot of this is going to depend on the Iraqi political leadership.

General Petraeus. Correct.

Senator Bayh. Which, when Senator Clinton and I met with the Prime Minister last week, he said to us what I understand is essentially what he said to the President last November, which is: Look, we do not want your brave soldiers dying here, either; I want you to leave Baghdad. Just give us heavier weapons, you guys withdraw to the periphery, and let us do what we need to do.

Now we have adopted a policy diametrically opposite to that. Why does he have such a different opinion about what needs to be done to secure Baghdad?

General Petraeus. Sir, I have not had a chance to talk to Prime Minister Maliki. I do not know what his view on this is. I had actually been told that he had supported it after conversations with the President.

I do not know. I will have to determine, if confirmed, once I get on the ground.

Senator Bayh. I think when you do talk to him, General, you will find that he will. When I pressed him and I said, “well, do you then think that our policy of adding more troops is the wrong one?” He started backing up and he said, “well, that is not exactly”—but you could tell what he really meant. If he had first choice, he would be doing things differently there.

The reason that is important to me is that I am looking for some insight into is he willing to do what needs to be done here. How can we ask them to make different political decisions in support of a policy they may not really embrace?

Let me give you a couple of other examples just quickly. We arrest people affiliated with Iran, Iranian agents, sometimes we think implicated in the explosive devices that are killing Americans. The message from the Iranian government is that we have to let them go. He has publicly resisted the setting of benchmarks and yet he endorses the steps that need to be undertaken. Well, if you really endorse the steps that need to be undertaken, why would you resist being held publicly accountable?

All that leads me to wonder, do they really have it in them to make the hard decisions that need to be done? So my question to you is, with the situation about the Iranians, his resistance to
benchmarks, and all that kind of thing, what leads you to be confident of these people?

General Petraeus. There have been some reasonably positive developments in recent weeks actually where they have hung tough, have not released one of the very senior Moqtada al-Sadr affiliates, where their forces have reported, where there are developments in Anbar Province and so forth. But again, I am with you in the fact that only time will tell, Senator. If confirmed, I need to get back to a country that I have not been to in 16 months and determine what the will is.

As I mentioned earlier, if I detect that they do not want it as much as we want it, I will report that to my boss.

Senator Bayh. That is why Senator Levin and I and others keep getting back to the notion of consequences, because all too often in the past they have said the right things, but they have not done the right things, what has led us to question the strategy of constantly reassuring them to try and build up their confidence so that they will have the security to do the difficult things. It has led some of us to conclude that perhaps a different approach to encouraging them to do the difficult things is in order.

So my time has expired, but my last question to you is, you said that, I think the words that you used were, “that the responsible elements did not want us to leave.” I think that is what I heard you say, “the responsible elements did not want us to leave.”

General Petraeus. There are thousands, actually tens of thousands, of Iraqis who have died actually defending their country, far more than our soldiers, each of which is a tragedy for that family.

Senator Bayh. Here is my parting question, and again it is by way of trying to figure out: What can we do to get them to do what is in their own best interests here, what needs to be done? So if you are telling me that the responsible Iraqis do not want us to leave precipitously, but at the same time you then said that if we talk about redeployment that would have an adverse consequence on them, so my question to you is: If they want us to stay, but then we say, look, if you do not do the right things we may not be able to stay, why would that not lead them to do the things necessary to get us to do what you are telling us they want us to do, which is to remain long enough for them to make a go of it?

How can we hold those two thoughts at the same time? They want something, but when we tell them we may take it away it does not have an impact on their thinking.

General Petraeus. Their challenge right now, Senator, I believe is that they are in a capital city that is insecure, in which citizens make life or death decisions on a daily basis, just trying to get to work, get their kids to school, get some food. You cannot come to grips with the tough decisions that a government has to resolve in a situation like that. Their security forces have not been able to deal with the rise in violence in the wake of the bombing of the mosque in Samarra, which unleashed a tremendous amount of tit for tat and back and forth violence. The objective is to get a grip on that, to provide improved security, to give the Iraqi government the space and the time to come to grips with these political decisions that will ultimately carry them forward.
Senator Bayh. General, I support your nomination and I wish you well.

General Petraeus. Thank you very much, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bayh.

Now, after Senators Martinez and McCaskill there will be a second round. The amount of time will not be as long as 8 minutes, but we will work through lunch. Do you have a problem with that?

General Petraeus. No, sir.

Chairman Levin. Or do you need a break for other purposes?

General Petraeus. No; ready to go, sir.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Senator Martinez.

Senator Martinez. Good morning, General. Congratulations on your nomination and thank you for your distinguished service and your willingness to undertake this very difficult assignment. I know I echo what all others have said, but I have never heard such unanimous praise here today and in other quarters of your service, your capacity, and your capability. So I thank you for your service and for your willingness to undertake this very difficult task.

Chairman Levin. Senator Martinez, forgive me for interrupting. But while we have as many folks with us as possible, I just want to inform all of us that the committee will be conducting a hearing next Tuesday, January 30, to consider the nomination of Admiral William Fallon to be Commander, U.S. Central Command, and will be conducting a hearing on Thursday, February 1, to consider the nomination of General George Casey to be Chief of Staff of the Army. I did talk about these dates with Senator McCain, so he knew those two dates would be used.

Forgive the interruption, but I wanted to get that out.

Senator Martinez. Getting back to the topic at hand, obviously the new plan for Iraq comes after months and months of political commentary and debate, much as has been discussed here today in the open democracy that we are, for there to be a different plan, a change in Iraqi policy. Now we do have a new plan for Iraq.

My understanding of the plan is that it is not just an increase in the number of troops, which I might point out when accomplished will not put us at a level of troops in Iraq which is even equal to the highest number we have had in the course of this effort; is that correct? I mean, our troop levels in Iraq have gone up and down.

General Petraeus. They have. I believe that there have been periods when we have had more than we will have at the end of this particular increase.

Senator Martinez. The focus has been on the troop levels, but there actually are more issues related to this new plan than just an increase in troops. To be clear now, the troops that are going into Baghdad are not going as American forces at the front end. My understanding from the President’s explanation of this new plan is that the Iraqis will be at the front and that they will not be taking a back seat; they will be in the front and center.

My understanding further is that troops have already begun to move into Baghdad and that the Maliki government has carried out the first benchmark, which is will the Iraqi troops report, and they have begun to report; is that correct?
General PETRAEUS. The initial elements, yes, sir. Again, I want to be clear that not all, but their schedule is not for all of them to be there by any stretch of the imagination either.

Senator MARTINEZ. But they have begun to be there?

General PETRAEUS. They have indeed, yes, sir.

Senator MARTINEZ. Second, that there are political as well as economic development, reconstruction elements to this plan.

General PETRAEUS. That is correct.

Senator MARTINEZ. Those are equally important and in fact you have emphasized, as I would emphasize, the fact that there needs to be a political settlement among the Iraqis the distribution of the oil revenues, amendments to the constitution. Those are important things.

General PETRAEUS. Correct, sir.

Senator MARTINEZ. So when some here might say that in fact we need a political settlement, we are all in agreement that there needs to be a political solution to the problems in Iraq. The question really is, can these political solutions take place in the midst of chaos, killing, and everyday violence at levels that are really unsustainable and unimaginable. So it seems to me that it is logical to suggest that we have to dampen down the violence so that we can give an opportunity for there to be a political settlement and an environment conducive to a political settlement. Secondary, it would seem to me to be fairly difficult to be involved in the business of reconstruction, water, sewer, electricity, garbage pickup, et cetera, when you in fact have a chaotic and disruptive situation. So it seems to me, frankly, no different than it would be in an American city if all of a sudden we had lawlessness and a breakdown in the rule of law. It would be rather difficult to have economic development programs in a neighborhood.

General PETRAEUS. Correct.

Senator MARTINEZ. One of the issues that has troubled me since I was in Baghdad in October was the fact that I saw a serious political division among those who are attempting to run the Iraqi government. Particularly, I was troubled by the fact that some ministries seem to be under the political control of Moqtada al-Sadr and that those ministries, particularly the ministry of health, are not only not cooperative, but would not even meet with Americans, would not even discuss the issues of the day with Americans.

Is there any sign or any indication that you have or do you share my concern that it would be impossible for us to see a united Iraqi government until issues like that are resolved?

General PETRAEUS. I share your concern, Senator.

Senator MARTINEZ. I have heard it repeatedly said by other distinguished Members of the Senate that the generals do not support this plan. Again, when the President was explaining this plan to me and others, he mentioned that General Casey has had a hand in the development of this plan. My understanding is clearly that you do support this plan and believe it has a reasonable chance of success.

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, sir.

Senator MARTINEZ. So when some would say that generals do not support it, I suppose one can find generals who might not support it, particularly maybe a retired general. But those of you in charge
with carrying out the mission do believe that it has a reasonable chance of success?

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, Senator.

Senator MARTINEZ. General—and I will conclude with this, Mr. Chairman—I have heard the importance of the Senate debate, that the Senate is a democratic institution where we all have a high degree of responsibility, and also I think sometimes an elevated self-importance. But I also have heard something that I find disturbing here today, which is the suggestion that civilian leaders of our Department of Defense at a time of war would either give knowingly false or misleading testimony to this Congress. I find that request of the General to stand up and speak to that issue to be frankly unnecessary. Just like I do not besmirch the opinions of those in the Senate who might differ with this current plan or question their patriotism, I also think it is unnecessary to question the veracity or the seriousness of purpose, the integrity or the honor of the people that we have confirmed to be the civilian leadership in the Department of Defense. I just found that troubling and not in keeping with the level of discourse that the colleague from Virginia was expressing about the issues of the day.

I too believe that if someone disapproves of this plan and believes it is a dead end that they too then have a responsibility to seek to stop the action and not just send a message. I think it calls for further and stronger action than just a message.

General, I wish you well. I believe, like you do, that this is a plan that has a reasonable chance of success. I agree and believe, like you do, that the consequences of failure in Iraq are serious and would do great harm to our Nation. So my best hopes and I know those of this Nation go with you in your new mission, and look forward to working with you to help you succeed as we all try to succeed in this very difficult struggle, but one which I think is inextricably tied to the overall global war on terror. I thank you for your patience today.

General PETRAEUS. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Martinez.

Senator McCaskill.

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I first have to comment on the irony of those who are critical of any resolutions that are being brought forward concerning this latest plan in Iraq. We are ostensibly spending hundreds of billions of dollars and sacrificing the most precious lives imaginable in this cause, to build a democracy. In November, I think something much stronger than a resolution came forth from this country. It was not a Senate resolution. It was an election, and that election confirmed the strong foundation we have in this country for the democratic process.

I think expressing our opinions through resolutions is exactly what keeps this institution and the people we represent living in a wonderful country because of the democratic institutions. I think it is ironic that we would criticize those resolutions in light of the fact that they merely reflect what the elections did in this country, and that was say to the government: We think what you are doing is not working and it is not what we think this country should be doing. So I wanted to comment on that irony.
I also wanted to talk to you a little bit, General. First of all, you and I had a chance to visit, and we will miss you on the banks of the Missouri.

General PETRAEUS. Even if it is on the wrong bank? [Laughter.] Senator MCCASKILL. Even though you are on the Kansas side. We will not go into that. We certainly claim Leavenworth in the greater Kansas City area and know the kind of work you have done at Leavenworth. I noticed your wife in the paper the other day working on the task force over in Topeka on the payday loan issue; please, thank her for that work with Governor Sebelius.

General PETRAEUS. I will, Senator.

Senator McCASKILL. I read in the paper this morning about Company C of the 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, that is in Gazaliyah and they have begun this work and there are 105 of them there, and this article talked about that they had a firefight the other night and, instead of moving on to another patrol, they stayed because they are there defending what is now their home. They have set up base there and they will be operating out of this neighborhood, a very dangerous neighborhood, where there is the fighting between the Sunnis and the Shia.

This article was very troubling to me for several reasons. I think one, it was on a human level where it discussed one of your observations of soldiering in Iraq in the Military Review article that Senator Collins referred to, I also read, and one of it was that you cannot do too much with your own hands. This article points out that right now our American military find themselves as jailers, doctors, construction workers, garbage men, guardians, and detectives. It points out with specificity that there is a young 4-year-old girl that was brought into the base and the reason she was brought there, she was terribly ill, was because her parents did not want her taken to the nearby hospital because it was Shiite and they feared that their entire family would be killed while their daughter’s life was being saved in this hospital. So as a result, our medic, our military medic, was caring for this 4-year-old girl.

Now, I think that brings home in a way that we cannot talk about in terms of military protocol the incredible, huge nature, the enormity in every sense of the word, of this problem. I think the part of the article that was most troubling to me was when they talked about “the soldiers also got their first glimpse of the green Iraqi forces who will share their mission and eventually, they hope, take it over. The soldiers talked about them with a mixture of bemusement, disdain, and mistrust.”

“You could talk about partnership, but you would be lying,” said one soldier who asked that his name not be used for fear of punishment by his superiors.”

When I read your article on counterinsurgency and your observations, no fewer than 6 of the 14 lessons learned deal directly with what we have talked about primarily in this hearing this morning, and that is what else is working over there besides the excellent work of the American military? What I would ask of you is your willingness to be very aggressive to report back on these six requirements that you state that are necessary to effectively fight counterinsurgency. I am going to briefly go through those six for the record:
“One, do not try to do too much with your own hands.”
“Two, increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to success.”

Number seven, the third one, “Everyone must do nation-building.”

“Help build institutions, not just units.”

Another one: “Success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations.”

Finally: “Ultimate success depends on local leaders.” That one really kind of sticks in my craw because that is where the rubber is going to meet the road in this plan. It is terribly unfair what you are being asked to do and what our military is being asked to do, because basically we are asking you to succeed basically ignoring six of your own lessons because they are not there now. We do not have the local leaders there. If we did we would not be getting the mixed signals we are getting from Maliki and we would see more confidence that our military would have in the green forces that ostensibly are going to be leading this.

I would like you to comment on what this soldier said and the fear I have that what we are going to hear in Washington is never going to match what really is happening on the ground in Iraq.

General PETRAEUS. First of all, in that case—again, you were reading an article. I did read that article this morning. It does not strike me as the application of, if you will, the objective plan when it is fully developed and when we have substantially more forces on the ground, in a case where you learn about the area in which you are going to operate, plan with the Iraqi forces with whom you will partner, determine how it is that you are going to secure that area, go in, do clear it, again understand the businesses, the local leaders, whatever else it is, the sectarian tensions and so forth, and then in fact ensure the security of that area so that you can do the hold and the build phases.

Certainly those subset of the observations from my own time soldiering in Iraq are observations that inform me as I contemplate going back over there, if confirmed. There are others actually that are also important in this. Again, the way we carry this out is hugely important so that you do not have just a company that is an outpost in an area that does not have perhaps adequate security, although it sounds to me as if the one thing they did do was certainly prepare their force protection for 3 days before they occupied that location.

So that is the first observation that I would offer. The second is, again as I have pledged several times already today, if I think that they do not want it as much as we do, at some point I will tell my boss that and I will tell you that if it happens to come in one of our updates or something.

Senator MCCASKILL. I do not have any time left, but let me briefly also talk a little bit about the money, the CERP. I discussed this with Secretary Gates and General Pace when they were here. The CERP I think is important, but the problem I have with it, it is a little bit good money after bad. We have spent so much money trying to build and so much of what we have spent—I will not even get into the incredible problems of contracting and no accountability. I will not even put on the auditor’s hat here.
I am just talking about how much that we have actually done that has been destroyed after we did it and the fact that if the Iraqi military is going to stand on its own and be lead in this that they should be the ones distributing CERP funds, not the American military.

Are you aware of any plans to train the green forces, the Iraqi forces, to begin to distribute some of the $10 billion in surpluses that the Iraqi government has to begin winning the hearts and minds of the people especially in these mixed neighborhoods, that they can look to the Iraqi military as a fair place to try to build neighborhoods regardless of what area of town they are in?

General Petraeus. I have actually heard that discussed. I do not know of plans to do that, though. Again, my discussions with folks over there have really been limited to just getting that amount of information that I needed to provide input when I was consulted during the development of the new strategy.

I think it is something that is very worthy of consideration. I think that certainly again they have to spend their money. One of the reasons we have to have a comprehensive effort is to help them build the capacity to spend their money, because they have not been able to spend all that they have on behalf of the Iraqi people.

If I could, with respect to CERP, CERP is great for the WPA types of programs, but we will also look very hard for self-sustaining types of businesses and industries and so forth that we can either help revive or build as well. I think those are very important in this endeavor, so that you do not just pay to have the streets cleaned again, which is a notable accomplishment, but again 6 months from now if you do not achieve what you need to achieve with the ministry of public works you will be back where you were before.

Senator McCaskill. Thank you and we all wish you, not just Godspeed, but success and health.

General Petraeus. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.

General, I think everybody in Congress and every American wants us to succeed, wants to maximize the chances of success. The question is how best do we do that. There is no difference, however, between people on that issue. So it seems to me for you or others to say how important it is for us to succeed, that is the point, which is that the course that we have been on is a course towards failure. The question is how do you change course. The importance of changing course, how do you maximize the chances of success. Are you with me so far?

General Petraeus. I am, Senator.

Chairman Levin. The next question then is how do you change course once you decide that the course you are on is not working, despite those claims of the Vice President that the insurgency was in its last throes—that was a couple years ago—despite the claim of the President just a few months ago that we are absolutely winning in Iraq, when it is clear now that even he acknowledges we are not winning in Iraq.

So for folks who talk about just we cannot fail, as though somehow or other that automatically means that we follow the President, it seems to me there is a totally illogical conclusion. We have
been following the President’s course. It has been a course that has led us towards failure and the President did not recognize that apparently until after the American people told him that.

So success is our goal and the question is how. There are two different approaches towards that. One is increased military commitment, that somehow or other giving the Iraqis more breathing space will make it more likely that they will reach a political settlement. The other approach is, no, they have had plenty of breathing space, 3½ years; they need pressure. They need to be told that it is not an open-ended commitment, as the President finally said, at least rhetorically, that it is not an open-ended commitment, that they must reach a political settlement if this thing is going to be resolved.

Now, does additional military presence contribute to the Iraqis reaching a political settlement or does embedding our troops in neighborhoods, number one, create a lot more targets, and does it take the Iraqis off the hook? Does it tell the Iraqis that we are going to increase our military presence, does that tell the Iraqis that somehow or other their future is in our hands rather than their own? That is an honest debate, it seems to me, which is the heart of the matter here.

So far would you agree with that?

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. So it is not a disagreement over whether it is important to succeed. It is not a disagreement over whether failure is going to hurt in a whole host of ways. The question is what are the Iraqis going to read into increased American presence in their neighborhoods? What will they take from that?

Now, my understanding is the Prime Minister of Iraq went to Jordan and proposed to our President that the Iraqis take over the security of Baghdad. Is that your understanding?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I have heard press reports of that. I do not have firsthand knowledge of that.

Chairman LEVIN. Have the Iraqis asked us for more American troops? I know they are supporting the President.

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I do not know.

Chairman LEVIN. You do not know if they have asked us for more?

General PETRAEUS. I do not, no, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. One of the many things that our troops deserve, it seems to me, beside all the equipment, all the training, everything we can give them to succeed, support for their families, it seems to me that one of the things that our troops deserve is our honest assessments, and that they make a distinction between supporting them and supporting the policies of the administration. Would you agree with that?

General PETRAEUS. Yes.

Chairman LEVIN. They make a distinction, because I have met with the troops I do not know how many times now in Iraq and I tell them, look, I have been a critic going in, I have been a critic of the way this thing has been run, but, folks, you have the support of every Member of Congress. We are not cutting your funding. We are going to support you as long as you are there. The question is how do we succeed so you can come home. That is the question.
General PETRAEUS. Right.

Chairman LEVIN. They welcome an honest debate. I have gotten so many letters and comments from troops saying, this is worthy of your debate, you are making an honest assessment, keep at it. So many of our troops have said that, and you have heard about public opinion polls so far.

I just want to make sure that you are not intending to be interpreted as supporting a resolution or opposing a resolution, number one, by your testimony. Is that correct?

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Number two, that you acknowledge that the goal of those who want to put pressure on the Iraqi leadership to step up and reach political settlements, is it the same goal that you have, which is that political settlement and political settlement alone by the Iraqis is our ultimate way of providing security and success in Iraq?

General PETRAEUS. Correct, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. Can we have a functioning democracy in Iraq without political leaders in Iraq making the compromises that they need to make?

General PETRAEUS. No, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. You made a reference to the fact that there has been incremental progress recently, that there has been apparently a draft of a——

General PETRAEUS. A couple of encouraging signs, I think would be a way to characterize it, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. That would be on the political front in terms of reaching apparently a draft on the oil revenue?

General PETRAEUS. A draft on the oil revenues, yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. So that they have been able to make at least that incremental progress without a surge; is that correct?

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. President Talabani of Iraq has said that American troops are going to be there as long as the Iraqis want us there. Is that accurate? Should that be our decision, not their decision, as to how long?

General PETRAEUS. I wonder if he—yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Are you familiar with that?

General PETRAEUS. I am not, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Is it our goal to pacify the militias or just to disarm them? Not “just”; let me restate that because it is not just to disarm. Is it our goal to pacify Baghdad or to disarm the militias, or both?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, the security in Baghdad can only be achieved by any extralegal individuals being off the streets. So it does not matter if they are international extremists, insurgents, Sunni Arab insurgents, violent criminals, militia members, or what have you. They all are those who violate the idea that the Iraqi government has the legitimate use of force.

Chairman LEVIN. If the militias merely reduce their visibility in Baghdad or move their operations to areas where Iraqi and U.S. forces are not present in strength, does that accomplish our goal?
General PETRAEUS. No, sir. In fact, there has been substantial discussion about the follow-on, the disarmament, the demobilization, and the reintegration (DDR) of various militia elements.

Chairman LEVIN. Prime Minister Maliki has asserted that U.S. refusal to provide the Iraqi security forces with weapons and equipment hurt their ability to secure Baghdad. Do you agree with that?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I need to look at that. I did actually look over the weekend at the list of weapons and equipment that has been provided by the U.S. and bought with Iraqi money as well. It is actually quite substantial at this point. There is certainly the need for more and as they do in fact train more obviously there will be an additional requirement for equipment.

There is a requirement for more robust and additional armor protection and heavier weaponry for some of their elements. But we have actually provided quite substantial weaponry so far.

Chairman LEVIN. Would you let us know about your assessment on that?

General PETRAEUS. I will, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Because that is quite a statement, when we have the Prime Minister of Iraq saying that the problem is that we have not given them the equipment so that they could secure Baghdad. That is quite an allegation.

General PETRAEUS. Sir, they have actually committed $1.5 billion to foreign military sales actually with the U.S., for what that is worth, and that should enable them also. This, I am told, will be the first year in which they spend more in their defense budget than we spend in our train and equip budget.

Chairman LEVIN. Are you going to plan for the redeployment from Iraq of U.S. forces beyond the surge as just part of the planning process?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, obviously you have to have contingencies. You are always looking at what you are doing. So the answer to that would obviously be yes.

Chairman LEVIN. With that qualification and understanding.

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Finally, I want you to go back in time. We have spent I think all of this morning pretty much talking about where we are at and where we are going, the differences that exist on that issue or those issues. I want you to go back to the time when Ambassador Bremer decided to disband the Iraqi army and to also deBaathify to the extent that he did.

Did you agree, if you can put yourself back in time, with those decisions?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I would like to qualify it. I will say no, but I would like to qualify it, because there is really some nuance to this. Ambassador Bremer is actually correct when he says, first of all, they had already disestablished themselves by and large. They had not done what in fact one of the assumptions, or at least you would hope that a number of them would remain in their own barracks, safeguard their equipment, turn the turrets or their tanks over to the rear, and just wait to be partners with us. That did not materialize and unfortunately a lot of their stuff was looted as they went out the door.
So there was really not a formally constituted military at that time, although it certainly could reassemble. It did reassemble. The challenge—and beyond that, it had vast numbers of very high-ranking officers. Arguably, it was to some degree Saddam’s jobs program for very senior officers. In Nineveh Province alone, there were 1,100 brigadier generals and above, for example, although there was only one army corps.

Having said that, the challenge was of course with this army that Iraq perhaps did not need in the long-term was now unemployed. It was really the issue of how long it took to announce the stipends, the follow-on opportunities for them, how they would be able to feed their families, and again what their future held, and to some degree a degree of disrespect, frankly, for an institution that in the Iraqis’ eyes was perhaps the one institution that had been the least corrupted. I am talking about the military now, not the Special Republican Guards or some of these other organizations.

That period between the announcement of the disestablishment and the announcement of stipends, was roughly 5 weeks or so. That was a difficult period in Iraq. All of the military commanders in Iraq at that time registered their concerns, because in fact the former Iraqi military did assemble and it made their views very clearly known, and eventually those turned into riots and eventually some were actually killed outside the Green Zone and so forth before the stipends were announced.

Crowds are a very big challenge when you are in an endeavor like that and you really do not like to see crowds because someone can shoot out of a crowd and then you have a real force protection issue on your hands, and that did in fact materialize during that time, and arguably that may have been where some of the initial elements of the insurgency began to gain strength.

With respect to the deBaathification policy, clearly Iraq had to have a deBaathification policy. There is no question about that. Ambassador Bremer did intend for there to be not just deBaathification, but in fact exceptions to that policy in substantial numbers that would amount to reconciliation.

In fact, when I had a conversation with him in Mosul in the summer of 2003 he gave the 101st the authority to allow the Iraqis to conduct a reconciliation process, for which we did provide judicial oversight. That was conducted initially for Mosul University and then some of the others. The key there was to get the paperwork down to Baghdad to the deBaathification committee, and unfortunately a process that had a fair degree of rigor to it—I think it was less than 60 percent would have been fully “reconciled,” and none of them would have gone to leadership positions. I had already personally fired the higher level Baath official who was the head of the university. But for these individuals, say 120 or so professors, many of whom were educated in western universities, which is one reason they had to be Baath Party members, to go overseas.

So that was a real challenge, and all the military commanders did register their concerns during that time, because it was a period when obviously many of those affected were Sunni Arab, perhaps most, although there were Shia in the fold as well. But in the areas where most of the U.S. commanders were, that affected
Chairman LEVIN. Our commanders then registered their concerns about that policy?

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. In the way you have discussed?

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

General PETRAEUS. Again, to be fair, there was an intent to do reconciliation. Ambassador Bremer himself has on several occasions noted that he had intended to do that, wanted to do that, and was just not able to get it done because of the committee.

Chairman LEVIN. Of what?

General PETRAEUS. The deBaathification committee of the Iraqi Governing Council.

Chairman LEVIN. Who was head of that committee?

General PETRAEUS. I think it was Ahmed Chalabi, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Who was head of that committee?

General PETRAEUS. Senator Lieberman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, General Petraeus. Your testimony has been very impressive. I must say that I was particularly impressed when, after 4 hours in the chair, Senator Levin offered you a chance for a personal break and you said it was not necessary. That is impressive. I am going to try to be brief.

I do want to first generally respond to something Senator Levin said and agree with him, in case there is any misimpression. The two of us have disagreed on some of the policies we have followed in Iraq, and we disagree today. But one thing we agree on is that both of us are looking for a way to succeed in Iraq. We just have different paths that we think will work better. I would say that is true of all the members of this committee, and I would add that insofar as some sensitivity was expressed earlier I am sure all the members of the committee support our troops who are there and would not do anything to oppose them.

Having said that, what I did earlier was two things. One is that, in response to questions Senator McCain and I asked about the possible impact of a Senate resolution of disapproval, I thought you were clear, which is that you really did not say much about the impact on the morale of the troops. You said in the negative almost, that you could not imagine there would be a beneficial effect. You did not say anything about a negative effect.

With regard to the impact of a resolution of disapproval on our enemies, you, I thought, expressed concern that in a war like this, which is in good part a test of wills, that it might give them hope. Clearly that is not the intention of the sponsors in the Senate of such a resolution, but that is part of what we have to ask ourselves, what are the consequences.

I made a different kind of plea to my colleagues here, and I repeat it, which is now at the end of this hearing everyone has expressed great respect for you, appreciation that you are taking on this mission, and as far as I could hear everyone on this committee is going to support your nomination. Yet, one question that I do remember—I did not ask it—you were asked whether you thought you could be successful in your new command without the addi-
tional troops provided and the additional economic and interagency support, political support, that the plan offers, and you said no.

So I worry that we are both going to confirm you and yet we are going to pass a resolution that says we are not in favor of what you need to succeed. Of course, the resolution will not cut off that aid, so that in a way is the reassuring part of it.

That is why I ask my colleagues again to think about holding back a while on such resolutions, to give you a chance to implement what you have said, and I believe most would agree, is a different policy, a new approach, in the dire circumstances that you will find in Iraq, because, as I think all of us agree on this committee certainly, the consequences of failure really I believe will be, some would say could be, disastrous for the United States, for Iraq, for the Middle East, for the war on terrorism, and for the world economy.

I want to just ask you two or three brief questions. The first is, I do want to thank you for resisting the temptation that some of my colleagues offered to you to offer pledges based on time. We will know by X date. I think the more honest and really responsive answer you gave was that you will report to us regularly and you will tell us regularly how it is going and what is working and what is not, and then we will make the judgments accordingly.

Two brief questions about what you will find. The deployment plan envisions the early deployment of three Army brigades and the alert of three more Army brigades to follow. Some have asked, why not all six at once? I am not going to ask you that question. I am just going to ask you if when you get there you find that you need more than the three brigades more quickly, is it fair to assume that you will request that expedited deployment of those troops?

General PETRAEUS. Sir, actually I have told the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense that we should flow all five brigades and the two battalions for Anbar Province as quickly as we can.

Senator LIEBERMAN. That is great. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. A final question. I wish that this was not just on C–SPAN 3, but on evening television, for the American people to see more broadly, because I do think, while your testimony is before this committee, you have answered today for members of the committee a lot of the questions that are in the minds of the American people. Look, they are disappointed with what they see. We are all disappointed. You are disappointed.

So the question that I think they would ask you: Is it worth it to now send 21,000 more troops? Is it possible to succeed? But the more specific question I want to ask, because I hear this all the
time: the Shia and Sunni Muslims have been fighting each other for more than a millennium. Why do we think we can possibly end this fighting? Why would we send more of our troops now, according to this new way forward, into the middle of that kind of violence, which is now called sectarian violence?

General Petraeus. First of all, there are countries in that region where there are one or the other majority. Iraq itself does have a history of actual substantial intermarriage, not just getting along well together. Unfortunately, some of the violence, some of the developments, again in particular in the wake of the bombing of the Askari mosque in February of this past year, in a sense magnified the sectarian divides that in some cases were nowhere near as large. That does give me hope that in fact Sunni, Shia, Kurd, Yizzidi, Shabback, Turkoman, Christian, and all of the other elements of Iraq can, in fact, get along together. It will not be easy, but if we could get them to where they are shouting instead of shooting that would be a very substantial improvement.

Senator Lieberman. Thank you very much. Godspeed.

General Petraeus. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Levin. General, just to clarify the issue of the pace of the 21,000 troop deployment.

General Petraeus. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. The National Security Adviser, Mr. Hadley, suggested that the pace will depend a lot on the Iraqis performing. Secretary Gates said there will be plenty of opportunity before many of the 21,000 additional troops arrive to evaluate, “whether the Iraqis are fulfilling their commitments to us.”

I believe it was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs who talked about off-ramps, in other words turning off the 21,000 flow somewhere in the middle, suggesting that that would depend upon whether the Iraqis come through with their commitments.

You seem to take a very different approach. Do you differ from Secretary Gates when he says that there is going to be plenty of opportunity, which is a plus, before many of the 21,000 additional troops arrive to evaluate, “whether the Iraqis are fulfilling their commitments to us”?

General Petraeus. No, sir, I do not. What I stated was that as the military commander who is given a mission, that is a different mission, to improve security in Baghdad for the population, what I have told the Chairman and the Secretary is that I would like to get those forces on the ground as quickly as possible. That is not, I do not think, contradictory with anything that they have said that is a force generation process issue.

Whether I come back to them at some point and somehow have so much of a sense that perhaps they are not living up to their side of the bargain, that we want to call a time out, I think that is a different issue actually from what you have to plan, what you have to assume when you are planning, and also what a commander asks for to try to improve the chances of success.

Chairman Levin. On that question of a time out, that is a time out that you might consider calling for under the circumstances? Is that right, given what you said this morning?

General Petraeus. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. I am not saying you are going to call for a time out.

General Petraeus. Right, sure.

Chairman Levin. I am saying you will consider calling for a time out. You want to leave that possibility open depending on whether the Iraqis carry out their commitments?

General Petraeus. That is correct, sir.

Chairman Levin. All of which points to the value of pressure on the Iraqis; would you agree with that?

General Petraeus. I would, sir.

Chairman Levin. I welcome Senator Lieberman’s comments, by the way. The only thing I think, it is right when you get to the end of your suggestion about what you need to succeed, and those of us who disagree that a deeper military involvement is not what you need to succeed, it is not because we do not want the Iraqis to succeed or us to succeed. It is because we believe it is up to the Iraqis to reach a political settlement and only then can there be a chance of success in Iraq.

That represents the issue, whether or not more military presence and involvement promote that goal of Iraqis achieving political settlement or not. That is where the difference is and, although you I think there is value in additional troops, that basically is a mission which has been given to you, is that correct?

General Petraeus. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. You have not decided that is the right policy. You agree with the policy, but the policy decision was not yours; is that correct?

General Petraeus. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. The letters that I referred to before asking for the benchmarks, the series of letters, we will make part of the record at this time. I want to clarify two things: one, that we talked about both benchmarks and timelines, because apparently the Iraqis have agreed on both. But whether that is true, whether it is just the benchmarks and not the timelines, whatever the Iraqis have agreed to in that regard we want to see.

Two, it is not just, as the letters refer to, the benchmarks for a political process; it is also benchmarks which they have agreed to on military commitments of theirs, on economic, financial commitments of theirs, as well as on political commitments that they have not yet carried out.

[The information referred to follows:]
November 14, 2006

The Honorable Condoleezza Rice
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Madam Secretary:

The top priority for the coming months must be finding a way forward to change course in Iraq. U.S. policy must include urging the Iraqis to make the necessary political compromises, which only they can make, to preserve Iraq as a nation. Our military commanders have made clear there is no military solution; only a political solution can restore security in Iraq.

The Administration announced last month that Iraqi leaders had agreed to a timeline and benchmarks for a political process over the coming months. On October 25, 2006, President Bush stated that the Administration and the Iraqi Government were developing benchmarks for determining whether the "hard decisions necessary to achieve peace" were being made. Earlier, on October 24, 2006, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad stated that Iraqi leaders had agreed to a timeline for making the hard decisions on outstanding issues and that President Talibani had made those commitments public. According to Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey, these included enactment of an oil law for sharing resources; a constitutional amendment on power-sharing that would guarantee democratic rights and equality to all Iraqis; reforming the de-Ba'athification Commission; and increasing the credibility and capability of Iraqi forces. However, on October 25, 2006, Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki stated publicly that no timetable has been set.

Please provide the agreed timeline and benchmarks (or the U.S. proposal for such) of political issues to be resolved by the Iraqi Government in the coming months. This information will be essential to the Congress' consideration of a way ahead on Iraq.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Carl Levin
Ranking Member

cc: The Honorable John Warner
Chairman
January 16, 2007

The Honorable Condoleezza Rice
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Secretary:

On November 14, 2006 I sent you a letter (attached) asking that you provide the agreed timeline and benchmarks (or the U.S. proposal for such) of political issues to be resolved by the Iraqi Government in the coming months. At that time I requested the same from Secretary Rumsfeld. On December 4, I heard from Under Secretary of Defense Edelman that the State Department had received my letter and had agreed to respond on behalf of the Administration. I have yet to hear from the State Department in this regard.

As I stated in my first letter, this information will be essential to the Congress' consideration of a way ahead on Iraq. Now that the President has announced his new strategy for Iraq, this information is even more vital. I am very disappointed that two months have gone by and you have not responded to my initial request. In view of the passage of time and the importance of this issue, I expect to receive the timeline and benchmarks by the end of this week.

Sincerely,

Carl Levin
Chairman
Chairman Levin. General, you have been very strong, steadfast in staying with us this morning. I am sure there would have been moments when you would have liked to have a few minutes off, not because the questions were too difficult for you to handle, but for other, more personal reasons. But in any event, we thank you for your sticking with us here so we could conclude this hearing in good order.
We will now stand adjourned and we will do our very best to get your nomination to a vote of this committee just as quickly as we possibly can. We thank you again and we now stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:36 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to LTG David H. Petraeus, USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Answer. The integration of joint capabilities under the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been a success. Our military forces are more interoperable today than they ever have been in our Nation’s history. This achievement has been remarkable. The next step is to ensure the ability of the military and civilian departments to work closely together. Counterinsurgency warfare requires a total commitment of the government—both military and civilian agencies—and unity of effort is crucial to success.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. One of the most pressing needs is for the creation of interagency doctrine for the prosecution of counterinsurgency and stability operations. The State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs has taken initial steps toward this end. During a conference hosted jointly by State and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, I proposed several actions that could help foster greater interagency capacity, and I recently seconded two majors from Fort Leavenworth (awaiting the start of the next School of Advanced Military Studies course) to the State Department to work this issue. Beyond development of doctrine in this area, there is discussion on creating an interagency Center for Complex Operations, which would be an intellectual clearinghouse for ideas and best practices in the many facets of irregular warfare. This appears to be a low-cost, but high-payoff, action that the committee should consider supporting.

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, Multinational Forces-Iraq (MNF–I)?

Answer. The Commanding General (CG) of MNF–I commands forces within Iraq and is the senior military representative to the U.S. Chief of Mission. MNF–I is a Combined Joint Task Force under Operational Control (OPCON) to the Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). MNF–I conducts operations in support of the Government of Iraq, U.S. Mission and other international organizations. The CG exercises Tactical Control (TACON) of non-U.S. Coalition Forces and OPCON of the Multinational Corps-Iraq (MNC–I) and the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC–I). This is a strategic level command.

Question. What are the differences between the duties and functions of the Commander, MNF–I and the Commander, MNC–I?

Answer. The Commanding General of MNC–I is the senior operational level commander in Iraq. He directly commands forces conducting operations to restore order and security in Iraq. The commander of the MNF–I has a wider responsibility which covers strategic issues and the political/military interface, working with the U.S. Ambassador and Government of Iraq to integrate all aspects of the campaign such as security, governance, economic development, communication, and transition.

Question. What background and experience, including joint duty assignments, do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these duties?

Answer. I believe that I have a good background for the duties of MNF–I CG, if confirmed. First, I have, of course, served in Iraq for some 2½ years and have a
good understanding of the country, its government, and many of its leaders from
different factions. Second, I have had a number of joint assignments at relatively high
level—as a temporary duty Special Assistant to Commander in Chief, Allied Forces
Southern Europe (North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)), as Military Assistant
to the Supreme Allied Command, Europe (NATO), as Operations Chief of the
United Nations (UN) Force in Haiti, as Executive Assistant to the Chairman, Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS), as Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations of SFOR in Bosnia,
and, of course, as the Commander of MNSTC–I and the NATO Training Mission in
Iraq. Third, I believe I have a reasonably solid academic/intellectual background,
having studied, as well as served in, major combat operations, counterinsurgency
operations, peacekeeping operations, and peace enforcement operations. Most re-
cently, in my current position, I oversaw the development of the new Army/Marine
Corps manual on counterinsurgency and also oversaw changes to other Army doc-
trinal manuals, our leader development programs, our combat training centers, and
a variety of other activities that support the preparation of our leaders and units
for deployment to Iraq. Finally, I believe I understand the requirements of strategic-
level leadership, which is what, after all, MNF–I is all about.

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to en-
hance your ability to perform the duties of the Commander, MNF–I?

Answer. Yes, and I will complete them before deploying, if confirmed. In particu-
lar, I need to establish initial personal relationships with the members of the JCS
I don’t know (I have done this with the Vice JCS and CJCS and key Joint Staff
members already); get briefings on the interagency’s support for the important “non-
kinetic” aspects of the new way ahead; meet again with the Secretary of Defense
and President—and certain interagency leaders; and discuss Iraq with several lead-
ers of the intelligence community with whom I have not yet been able to meet. The
most important, frankly, is getting an understanding of the level of interagency sup-
port that will be forthcoming. That will obviously be key to the comprehensive ap-
proach that is essential in Iraq.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next
Commander, MNF–I?

Answer. There are many challenges in Iraq, but I would point out four of particu-
lar concern. The top challenge is providing the security necessary to reduce the cycle
of violence in Iraq today. This will be a difficult mission and time is not on our side.
We must focus on population security, particularly in Baghdad, to give the Iraqi
government the breathing space it needs to become more effective. The second chal-
lenge is continuing the development of capable Iraqi security forces (ISFs), relatively
free of ethnic and sectarian bias. The Iraqi Army has made much progress, but is
uneven, and the police remain a challenge. The third challenge is the integration
of the interagency effort to ensure that progress is made along all lines of oper-
ation—not just security, but economic, governance, and the rule of law as well. That
is related to the fourth challenge, and that is the lack of capacity of the Iraqi gov-
ernment. Iraq has enormous natural resources and potential wealth. However, to
take advantage of its blessings, not only must security be improved, but critical na-
tional issues must be resolved by the Iraqis, on issues such as national reconcili-
ation, the devolution of power below Baghdad, the distribution of oil wealth, and so
on. Only through unity of effort of all—coalition and Iraqi, military and civilian—
can we bring the full weight of our effort to bear on the difficult situation in Iraq.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing
these challenges?

Answer. Population security is the top priority. We must clear and hold the neigh-
borhoods of Baghdad to break the cycle of violence that is preventing political
progress in Iraq. We can only do this by establishing persistent presence—coalition,
as well as Iraqi—in Iraqi neighborhoods. I plan to ensure that some of our forces
locate in the neighborhoods they protect and that they fight closely linked with their
Iraqi counterparts—with the Iraqis in the lead whenever possible—to secure the
population.

I will also work to improve the capability of the ISFs by augmenting the size and
capabilities of the embedded transition teams that advise these forces. Beyond this,
I will enhance the partnership between U.S. units and Iraqi units, which increases
the operating capabilities of both forces. The Iraqi units have greater cultural
awareness and linguistic capabilities, while U.S. forces bring greater military capa-
bilities to the battlefield. Iraqi and U.S. elements are more effective at population
security and preparing for gradual transition when working together.
To improve interagency cooperation, I applaud the recent efforts to embed the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) headquarters (HQs) for those provinces in which BCTs are the senior HQs, or in the division headquarters in areas where they are the senior HQs in a province. This will provide a synergy that will significantly enhance our ability to conduct stability and reconstruction operations in Iraq.

I will do all that I can, in partnership with the Ambassador, to ensure that our interagency is doing all possible to help develop capacity in the Iraqi government and to enable it to come to grips with the tough issues it must resolve.

*Question.* If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Commander, MNF–I?

*Answer.* As the military commander, my broad priorities would support the development of an Iraqi state that is a stable, reasonably representative democracy that respects the rights of all Iraqis and can provide for its own security, with Iraqi security institutions that act professionally and according to the interests of all Iraqi people. My more immediate priorities would address the challenges that MNF–I faces today—security of the population to enable political progress, enhancement of ISF capabilities to provide the Iraqi government a monopoly on the use of force, support for effective interagency cooperation to bring the full weight of our national resources to bear on the problem, and assistance to interagency elements as they work to help the Iraqi government build capacity and resolve the tough issues it confronts. Other priorities would include countering the threats posed by Iranian and Syrian meddling in Iraq, and the continued mission of dismantling terrorist networks and killing or capturing those who refuse to accept a unified, stable Iraq.

**LESSONS LEARNED**

*Question.* What were the major lessons you learned in your previous Iraq tours, both leading a division and leading the effort to establish, train, and equip security forces, that are the most applicable to the duties you are about to assume?

*Answer.* Perhaps the best way to answer this is to attach an article I wrote upon returning from Iraq after my last tour there. In it, I laid out the lessons I learned in the form of 14 observations, noted below; they are still valid, though they obviously require nuanced application depending on the specific situation in each case (which is explained in the article). The article attached explains them in detail.

1. “Do not try to do too much with your own hands.”
2. Act quickly, because every Army of liberation has a half-life.
3. Money is ammunition.
4. Increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to success.
5. Analyze “costs and benefits” before each operation.
6. Intelligence is the key to success.
7. Everyone must do nation-building.
8. Help build institutions, not just units.
9. Cultural awareness is a force multiplier.
10. Success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations.
11. Ultimate success depends on local leaders.
12. Remember the strategic corporals and strategic lieutenants.
13. There is no substitute for flexible, adaptable leaders.
14. A leader’s most important task is to set the right tone.
Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq

Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army

The Army has learned a great deal in Iraq and Afghanistan about the conduct of counterinsurgency operations, and we must continue to learn all that we can from our experiences in those countries.

The insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan were not, in truth, the wars for which we were best prepared in 2001; however, they are the wars we are fighting and they clearly are the kind of wars we must master. America’s overwhelming conventional military superiority makes it unlikely that future enemies will confront us head on. Rather, they will attack us asymmetrically, avoiding our strengths—firepower.

Soldiers and Observations

Writing down observations and lessons learned is a time-honored tradition of Soldiers. Most of us have done this to varying degrees, and we then reflect on and share what we’ve jotted down after returning from the latest training exercise, mission, or deployment. Such activities are of obvious importance in helping us learn from our own experiences and from those of others.

In an effort to foster learning as an organization, the Army institutionalized the process of collection, evaluation, and dissemination of observations, insights, and lessons some 26 years ago with the formation of the Center for Army Lessons Learned.

In subsequent years, the other military services and the Joint Forces Command followed suit, forming their own lessons learned centers. More recently, the Internet and other knowledge-management tools have sped the processes of collection, evaluation, and dissemination enormously. Numerous products have already been issued since the beginning of our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and most of us have found these products of considerable value as we’ve prepared for deployments and reviewed how different units grappled with challenges our elements were about to face.

For all their considerable worth, the institutional structures for capturing lessons are still dependent on Soldiers’ thoughts and reflections. And Soldiers have continued to record their own observations, particularly in recent years as we have engaged in so many important operations. Indeed, my own pen and notebook were always handy while soldiering in Iraq, where I commanded the 101st Airborne Division during our first year there (during the fight to Baghdad and the division’s subsequent operations in Iraq’s four northern provinces), and where, during most of the subsequent year-and-a-half, I helped with the so-called “train and equip” mission, conducting an assessment in the spring of 2004 of the Iraqi Security Forces after their poor performance in early April.
Observations from Soldiering in Iraq

1. "Do not try to do too much with your own hands."
2. Act quickly, because every Army of liberation has a half-life.
3. Money is ammunition
4. Increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to success.
5. Analyze "costs and benefits" before each operation
6. Intelligence is the key to success.
7. Everyone must do nation-building.
8. Help build institutions, not just units.
9. Cultural awareness is a force multiplier
10. Success in a counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations.
11. Ultimate success depends on local leaders.
12. Remember the strategic corporals and strategic lieutenants.
13. There is no substitute for flexible, adaptable leaders.
14. A leader's most important task is to set the right tone.

2004, and then serving as the first commander of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq and the NATO Training Mission-Iraq.

What follows is the distillation of a number of observations jotted down during that time. Some of these observations are specific to soldiering in Iraq, but the rest speak to the broader challenge of conducting counterinsurgency operations in a vastly different culture than our own. I offer 14 of these observations here in the hope that others will find them of assistance as they prepare to serve in Iraq or Afghanistan or in similar missions in the years ahead.

Fourteen Observations

Observation Number 1 is "Do not try to do too much with your own hands." T.E. Lawrence offered this wise counsel in an article published in The Arab Bulletin in August 1917. Continuing, he wrote: "Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not win it for them. Actually, also, under the very odd conditions of Arabia, your practical work will not be as good as, perhaps, you think it is. It may take them longer and it may not be as good as you think, but if it is theirs, it will be better."

Lawrence's guidance is as relevant in the 21st century as it was in his own time in the Middle East during World War I. Like much good advice, however, it is sometimes easier to put forward than it is to follow. Our Army is blessed with highly motivated soldiers who pride themselves on being action oriented. We celebrate a "can do" spirit, believe in taking the initiative, and want to get on with business. Yet, despite the discomfort in trying to follow Lawrence's advice by not doing too much with our own hands, such an approach is absolutely critical to success in a situation like that in Iraq. Indeed, many of our units recognized early on that it was important that we not just perform tasks for the Iraqis, but that we help our Iraqi partners, over time enabling them to accomplish tasks on their own with less and less assistance from us.

Empowering Iraqis to do the job themselves has, in fact, become the essence of our strategy—and such an approach is particularly applicable in Iraq. Despite suffering for decades under Saddam, Iraq still has considerable human capital, with the remnants of an educated middle class, a number of budding entrepreneurs, and many talented leaders. Moreover, the Iraqis, of course, know the situation and people far better than we ever can, and unleashing their productivity is essential to rebuilding infrastructure and institutions. Our experience, for example, in helping the Iraqi military reestablish its staff colleges and branch-specific schools has been that, once a good Iraqi leader is established as the head of the school, he can take it from there, albeit with some degree of continued Coalition assistance. The same has been true in many other areas, including in helping establish certain Army units (such as the Iraqi
Army’s 9th Division (Mechanized), based north of Baghdad at Taji, and the 8th Division, which has units in 3 provinces south of Baghdad) and police academies (such as the one in Fallujah, run completely by Iraqis for well over 6 months). Indeed, our ability to assist rather than do has evolved considerably since the transition of sovereignty at the end of late June 2004 and even more so since the elections of 30 January 2005. I do not, to be sure, want to downplay in the least the amount of work still to be done or the daunting challenges that lie ahead; rather, I simply want to emphasize the importance of empowering, enabling, and assisting the Iraqis, an approach that figures prominently in our strategy in that country.

Observation Number 2 is that, in a situation like Iraq, the liberating force must act quickly, because every Army of liberation has a half-life beyond which it turns into an Army of occupation. The length of this half-life is tied to the perceptions of the populace about the impact of the liberating force’s activities. From the moment a force enters a country, its leaders must keep this in mind, striving to meet the expectations of the liberated in what becomes a race against the clock.

This race against the clock in Iraq has been complicated by the extremely high expectations of the Iraqi people, their pride in their own abilities, and their reluctant admission that they needed help from Americans, in particular. Recognizing this, those of us on the ground at the outset did all that we could with the resources available early on to help the people, to repair the damage done by military operations and looting, to rebuild infrastructure, and to restore basic services as quickly as possible—in effect, helping extend the half-life of the Army of liberation. Even while carrying out such activities, however, we were keenly aware that sooner or later, the people would begin to view us as an Army of occupation. Over time, the local citizenry would feel that we were not doing enough or were not moving as quickly as desired, would see us damage property and hurt innocent civilians in the course of operations, and would resent the inconveniences and intrusion of checkpoints, low helicopter flights, and other military activities. The accumulation of these perceptions, coupled with the natural pride of Iraqis and resentment that their country, so blessed in natural resources, had to rely on outsiders, would eventually result in us being seen less as liberators and more as occupiers. That has, of course, been the case to varying degrees in much of Iraq.

The obvious implication of this is that such endeavors—especially in situations like those in Iraq—are a race against the clock to achieve as quickly as possible the expectations of those liberated. And, again, those expectations, in the case of Iraqi citizens, have always been very high indeed.

Iraqi workers hire to build steps beside the Research Triangle Institute Center in Dhi Qar Province, An Najaf, Iraq, 10 January 2004.

Observation Number 3 is that, in an endeavor like that in Iraq, money is ammunition. In fact, depending on the situation, money can be more important than real ammunition—and that has often been the case in Iraq since early April 2003 when Saddam’s regime collapsed and the focus rapidly shifted from reconstruction, economic revival, and restoration of basic services. Once money is available, the challenge is to spend it effectively and quickly to rapidly achieve measurable results. This leads to a related observation that the money needs to be provided as soon as possible.
sible to the organizations that have the capability and capacity to spend it in such a manner.

So-called "CERP" (Commander's Emergency Reconstruction Program) funds—funds created by the Coalition Provisional Authority with captured Iraqi money in response to requests from units for funds that could be put to use quickly and with minimal red tape—proved very important in Iraq in the late spring and summer of 2003. These funds enabled units on the ground to complete thousands of small projects that were, despite their low cost, of enormous importance to local citizens. Village schools, for example, could be repaired and refurbished for less than $10,000 at that time, and units like the 101st Airborne Division carried out hundreds of school repairs alone. Other projects funded by CERP in our area included refurbishment of Mosul University, repairs to the Justice Center, numerous road projects, countless water projects, refurbishment of cement and asphalt factories, repair of a massive irrigation system, support for local elections, digging of dozens of wells, repair of police stations, repair of an oil refinery, purchase of uniforms and equipment for Iraqi forces, construction of small Iraqi Army training and operating bases, repairs to parks and swimming pools, support for youth soccer teams, creation of employment programs, refurbishment of medical facilities, creation of a central Iraqi detention facility, establishment of a small business loan program, and countless other small initiatives that made big differences in the lives of the Iraqis we were trying to help.

The success of the CERP concept led Congress to appropriate additional CERP dollars in the fall of 2003, and additional appropriations have continued ever since. Most commanders would agree, in fact, that CERP dollars have been of enormous value to the effort in Iraq (and in Afghanistan, to which the concept migrated in 2003 as well).

Beyond being provided money, those organizations with the capacity and capability to put it to use must also be given reasonable flexibility in how they spend at least a portion of the money, so that it can be used to address emerging needs—which are inevitable. This is particularly important in the case of appropriated funds. The recognition of this need guided our requests for resources for the Iraqi Security Forces "train and equip" mission, and the result was a substantial amount of flexibility in the 2005 supplemental funding measure that has served that mission very well, especially as our new organization achieved the capability and capacity needed to rapidly put to use the resources allocated to it.

Observation Number 4 reminds us that increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to success. This insight emerged several months into our time in Iraq as we began to realize that more important than our winning Iraqi hearts and minds was doing all that we could to ensure that as many Iraqis as possible felt a stake in the success of the new Iraq. Now, I do not want to downplay the importance of winning hearts and minds for the Coalition, as that extends the half-life I described earlier, something that is of obvious desirability. But more important was the idea of Iraqis wanting the new Iraq to succeed. Over time, in fact, we began asking, when considering new initiatives, projects, or programs, whether they would help increase the number of Iraqis who felt they had a stake in the country's success. This guided us well during the time that the 101st Airborne Division was in northern Iraq and again during a variety of initiatives pursued as part of the effort to help Iraq reestablish its security forces. And it is this concept, of course, that undoubtedly is behind the reposition efforts of the U.S. Ambassador in Iraq to encourage Shi'ites and Kurdish political leaders in Iraq to reach out to Sunni Arab leaders and to encourage them to help the new Iraq succeed.

The essence of Observation Number 5—that we should analyze costs and benefits of operations before each operation—is captured in a question we developed over time and used to ask before the conduct of operations: "Will this operation," we asked, "take more bad guys off the streets that it creates by the way it is conducted?" If the answer to that question was, "No," then we took a very hard look at the operation before proceeding.

In 1986, General John Galvin, then Commander in Chief of the U.S. Southern Command (which was supporting the counterinsurgency effort in El Salvador) described the challenge captured in this observation very effectively: ""The... burden on the military institution is large. Not only must it subdue an armed..."
It is, after all, detailed, actionable intelligence that enables "cordon and knock" operations and precludes large sweeps that often prove counterproductive. Developing such intelligence, however, is not easy. Substantial assets at the local (e.g., division or brigade) level are required to develop human intelligence networks and gather sufficiently precise information to allow targeted operations. For us, precise information generally meant a 10-digit grid for the target's location, a photo of the entry point, a reasonable description of the target, and directions to the target's location, as well as other information on the neighborhood, the target site, and the target itself. Gathering this information is hard; considerable intelligence and operational assets are required, all of which must be pulled together to focus (and deconflict) the collection, analytical, and operational efforts. But it is precisely this type of approach that is essential to preventing terrorists and insurgents from putting down roots in an area and starting the process of intimidation and disruption that can result in a catastrophic downward spiral.

Observation Number 7, which springs from the fact that Civil Affairs are not enough when undertaking large reconstruction and nation-building efforts, is that everyone must do nation-building. This should not be taken to indicate that I have anything but the greatest of respect for our Civil Affairs personnel—because I hold them in very high regard. I have personally watched them work wonders in Central America, Haiti, the Balkans, and, of course, Iraq. Rather, my point is that when undertaking industrial-strength reconstruction on the scale of that in Iraq, Civil Affairs forces alone will not suffice; every unit must be involved. Reopening the University of Mosul brought this home to those of us in the 101st Airborne Division in the spring of 2003. A symbol of considerable national pride, the University had graduated well over a hun-
dred thousand students since its establishment in 1967. Shortly after the arrival of the interim Governor and Province Council in Nineveh Province in early May 2003, the Council’s members established completion of the school year at the University as among their top priorities. We thus took a quick trip through the University to assess the extent of the damage and to discuss reopening with the Chancellor. We then huddled with our Civil Affairs Battalion Commander to chart a way ahead, but we quickly found that, although the talent inherent in the Battalion’s education team was impressive, its members were relatively junior in rank and its size (numbering less than an infantry squad) was simply not enough to help the Iraqis repair and reopen a heavily-boosted institution of over 75 buildings, some 4,200 staff and faculty, and approximately 30,000 students. The mission, and the education team, therefore, went to one of the two aviation brigades of the 101st Airborne Division, a brigade that clearly did not have “Rebuild Foreign Academic Institutions” in its mission essential task list. What the brigade did have, however, was a senior commander and staff, as well as numerous subordinate units with commanders and staffs, who collectively added up to considerable organizational capacity and capability.

Seeing this approach work with Mosul University, we quickly adopted the same approach in virtually every area—assigning a unit or element the responsibility for assisting each of the Iraqi Ministries’ activities in northern Iraq and also for linking with key Iraqi leaders. For example, our Signal Battalion incorporated the Civil Affairs Battalion’s communications team and worked with the Ministry of Telecommunications element in northern Iraq, helping reestablish the local telecommunications structure, including assisting with a deal that brought a satellite downlink to the central switch and linked Mosul with the international phone system, producing a profit for the province (subscribers bore all the costs). Our Chaplain and his team linked with the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Engineer Battalion with the Ministry of Public Works, the Division Support Command with the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Corps Support Group with the Ministry of Education, the Military Police Battalion with the Ministry of Interior (Police), our Surgeon and his team with the Ministry of Health, our Staff Judge Advocate with Ministry of Justice officials, our Fire Support Element with the Ministry of Oil and so on. In fact, we lined up a unit or section with every ministry element and with all the key leaders and officials in our AOR, and our subordinate units did the same in their areas of responsibility. By the time we were done, everyone and every element, not just Civil Affairs units, was engaged in nation-building.

Observation Number 8, recognition of the need to help build institutions, not just units, came from the Coalition mission of helping Iraq reestablish its security forces. We initially focused primarily on developing combat units—Army and Police battalions and brigade headquarters—as well as individual police. While those were what Iraq desperately needed to help in the achievement of security, for the long term there was also a critical need to help rebuild the institutions that support the units and police in the field—the ministries, the admin and logistical support units, the professional military education systems, admin policies and procedures, and the training organizations. In fact, lack of ministry capability and capacity can undermine the development of the battalions, brigades, and divisions, if the ministries, for example, don’t pay the soldiers or police on time, use political rather than professional criteria in picking leaders, or fail
topay contractors as required for services provided. This lesson underscored for us the importance of providing sufficient advisors and mentors to assist with the development of the security ministries and their elements, just as we provided advisor teams with each battalion and each brigade and division headquarters.

Observation Number 9, cultural awareness is a force multiplier, reflects our recognition that knowledge of the cultural “terrain” can be as important as, and sometimes even more important than, knowledge of the geographic terrain. This observation acknowledges that the people are, in many respects, the decisive terrain, and that we must study that terrain in the same way that we have always studied the geographic terrain.

Working in another culture is enormously difficult if one doesn’t understand the ethnic groups, tribes, religious elements, political parties, and other social groupings—and their respective viewpoints; the relationships among the various groups; governmental structures and processes; local and regional history; and, of course, local and national leaders. Understanding of such cultural aspects is essential if one is to help the people build stable political, social, and economic institutions. Indeed, this is as much a matter of common sense as operational necessity. Beyond the intellectual need for the specific knowledge about the environment in which one is working, it is also clear that people, in general, are more likely to cooperate if those who have power over them respect the culture that gives them a sense of identity and self-worth.

In truth, many of us did a lot of “discovery learning” about such features of Iraq in the early months of our time there. And those who learned the quickest—and who also mastered some “survival Arabic”—were, not surprisingly, the most effective in developing productive relationships with local leaders and citizens and achieved the most progress in helping establish security, local governance, economic activity, and basic services. The importance of cultural awareness has, in fact, been widely recognized in the U.S. Army and the other services, and it is critical that we continue the progress that has been made in this area in our exercises, military schools, doctrine, and so on.

Observation Number 10 is a statement of the obvious, fully recognized by those operating in Iraq, but it is one worth recalling nonetheless. It is that success in counterinsurgency requires more than just military operations. Counterinsurgency strategies must also in
clude, above all, efforts to establish a political environment that helps reduce support for the insurgents and undermines the attraction of whatever ideology they may espouse. In certain Sunni Arab regions of Iraq, establishing such a political environment is likely of greater importance than military operations, since the right political initiatives might undermine the sanctuaries and assistance provided to the insurgents. Beyond the political arena, other important factors are economic recovery (which reduces unemployment, a serious challenge in Iraq), that leads some out-of-work Iraqis to be a guess for hire, education (which opens up employment possibilities and access to information from outside one’s normal circles), diplomatic initiatives (in particular, working with neighboring states through which foreign fighters transit), improvements in the provision of basic services, and so on. In fact, the campaign plan developed in 2005 by the Multinational Force-Iraq and the U.S. Embassy with Iraqi and Coalition leaders addresses each of these issues.

Observation Number 11—ultimate success depends on local leaders—is a natural reflection of Iraqi sovereignty and acknowledges that success in Iraq is, as time passes, increasingly dependent on Iraqi leaders—at four levels:

- Leaders at the national level working together, reaching across party and sectarian lines to keep the country unified, rejecting short-term expediency solutions such as the use of militias, and
- Leaders in the ministries building the capacity and capability necessary to use the tremendous resources Iraq has efficiently, transparently, honestly, and effectively;
- Leaders at the provincial level resisting temptations to pursue winner-take-all politics and resisting the urge to politicize the local police and other security forces; and
- Leaders in the Security Forces staying out of politics, providing courageous, competent leadership to their units, implementing policies that are fair to all members of their forces, and fostering loyalty to their Army or Police band of brothers rather than to specific tribes, ethnic groups, political parties, or local militias.

Iraqi leaders are, in short, the real key to the new Iraq, and we thus need to continue to do all that we can to enable them.

Observation Number 12 is the admonition to remember the strategic corporals and strategic lieutenants, the relatively junior commissioned or noncommissioned officers who often have to make huge decisions, sometimes with life-or-death as well as strategic consequences, in the blink of an eye.

Commanders have two major obligations to these junior leaders: first, to do everything possible to train them before deployment for the various situations they will face, particularly for the most challenging and ambiguous ones; and, second, once deployed, to try to shape situations to minimize the cases in which they have to make those hugely important decisions extremely quickly.

The best example of the latter is what we do to help ensure that, when establishing fast checkpoints, our strategic corporals are provided sufficient training and adequate means to stop a vehicle speeding toward them without having to put a bullet through the windshield. This is, in truth, easier said than it is done in the often chaotic situations that arise during a fast-moving operation in such a challenging security environment. But there are some actions we can take to try to ensure that our young leaders have adequate time to make the toughest of calls—decisions that, if not right, again, can have strategic consequences.

My next-to-last observation, Number 13, is that there is no substitute for flexible, adaptable leaders. The key to many of our successes in Iraq, in fact, has been leaders—especially young leaders—who have risen to the occasion and taken on tasks for which they’d had little or no training and who have demonstrated the correct initiative, innovativeness, determination, and courage. Such leaders have repeatedly been the essential ingredient in many of the achievements in Iraq. And fostering the development of others like them clearly is critical to the further development of our Army and our military.

My final observation, Number 14, underscores that, especially in counterinsurgency operations, a leader’s most important task is to set the right tone. This is, admittedly, another statement of the obvious, but one that nonetheless needs to be highlighted given its tremendous importance. Setting the right tone and communicating that tone to his subordinate leaders and troops is absolutely critical for every leader at every level, especially in an endeavor like that in Iraq.

If, for example, a commander clearly emphasizes so-called kinetic operations over non-kinetic operations,
his subordinates will do likewise. As a result, they may thus be less inclined to seize opportunities for the nation-building aspects of the campaign. In fact, even in the 101st Airborne Division, which prided itself on its attention to nation-building, there were a few mid-level commanders early on whose hearts really weren't into performing civil affairs tasks, assisting with reconstruction, developing relationships with local citizens, or helping establish local governance. To use the jargon of Iraq at that time, they didn't "get it." In such cases, the commanders above then quickly established that nation-building activities were not optional and would be pursued with equal enthusiasm to raids and other offensive operations.

Setting the right tone ethically is another hugely important task. If leaders fail to get this right, working at the mistreatment of detainees or at manhandling of citizens, for example, the result can be a sense in the unit that "anything goes." Nothing can be more destructive in an element than such a sense.

In truth, regardless of the leader's tone, most units in Iraq have had to deal with cases in which mistakes have been made in these areas, where young leaders in very frustrating situations, often after having suffered very tough casualties, took missteps. The key in these situations is for leaders to ensure that appropriate action is taken in the wake of such incidents, that standards are clearly articulated and reinforced, that remedial training is conducted, and that supervision is exercised to try to preclude recurrences.

It is hard to imagine a tougher environment than that in some of the areas in Iraq. Frustrations, anger, and resentment can run high in such situations. That recognition underscores, again, the importance of commanders at every level working hard to get the tone right and to communicate it throughout their units.

Implications

These are, again, 14 observations from soldiering in Iraq for most of the first 2 1/2 years of our involvement there. Although I presented them as discrete lessons, many are inextricably related. These observations carry with them a number of implications for our effort in Iraq (and for our Army as well, as I have noted in some of the footnotes).

It goes without saying that success in Iraq—which clearly is important not just for Iraq, but for the entire Middle East region and for our own country—will require continued military operations and support for the ongoing development of Iraqi Security Forces.

Success will also require continued assistance and resources for the development of the emerging political, economic, and social institutions in Iraq—efforts in which Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and General George Casey and their teams have been engaged with their Iraqi counterparts and have been working very hard.

Lastly, success will require time, determination, and resilience, keeping in mind that following the elections held in mid-December 2005, several months will likely be required for the new government—the fourth in an 18-month period—to be established.
and functional. The insurgents and extremists did all that they could to derail the preparations for the constitutional referendum in mid-October and the elections in mid-December. Although they were ineffective in each case, they undoubtedly will try to disrupt the establishment of the new government—and the upcoming provincial elections—as well.

As Generals John Abizaid and George Casey made clear in their testimony on Capitol Hill in September 2005, however, there is a strategy—developed in close coordination with those in the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and with our inter-agency, Coalition, and Iraqi partners—that addresses the insurgency, Iraqi Security Forces, and the other relevant areas. And there has been substantial progress in a number of areas. Nonetheless, nothing is ever easy in Iraq and a great deal of hard work and many challenges clearly lie ahead.\(^\text{12}\)

The first 6 months of 2006 thus will be of enormous importance, with the efforts of Iraqi leaders being especially significant during this period as a new government is seated and the new constitution enters force. It will be essential that we do all that we can to support Iraq’s leaders as they endeavor to make the most of the opportunity our Soldiers have given them.

Conclusion

In a 1986 article titled “Uncomfortable Ware: Toward a New Paradigm,” General John R. Galvin observed that “[i]n officer’s effectiveness and chance for success, now and in the future, depend not only on his character, knowledge, and skills, but also, and more than ever before, on his ability to understand the changing environment of conflict.” General Galvin’s words were relevant then, but they are even more applicable today. Conducting counterrorism operations in a vastly different culture is exceedingly complex.

Later, in the same article, noting that we in the military typically have our noses to the grindstone and that we often live a somewhat cloistered existence, General Galvin counseled: “Let us get our young leaders away from the grindstone now and then, and encourage them to reflect on developments outside the fortress-cloister. Only then will they develop leaders capable of adapting to the changed environment of warfare and able to fashion a new paradigm that addresses all the dimensions of the conflicts that may lie ahead.”\(^\text{13}\)

Given the current situation, General Galvin’s advice again appears very wise indeed. And it is my hope that, as we all take time to lift our noses from the grindstone and look beyond the confines of our current assignments, the observations provided here will help foster useful discussion on our ongoing endeavors and on how we should approach similar conflicts in the future—conflicts that are likely to be the norm, rather than the exception, in the 21st century. **MR**
Question. During your prior combat tours of duty in Iraq, were there any incidents of which you were aware within your command of alleged detainee abuse or abuse of civilians?

Answer. There was one specific case of alleged detainee abuse in the 101st Airborne that was brought to my attention in Mosul. I was aware of the situation and took action in that case, which included a general officer letter of reprimand and relief of the senior individual involved and lesser action on the part of the other officers involved. The incident involved a number of factors, including a lack of clear standards and inadequate training. I took it seriously, and we put in place better procedures to prevent similar incidents from occurring in the future.

In summary, I am committed to ensuring that our soldiers understand the importance of human rights and respect for all individuals, regardless of their status. We have a responsibility to uphold these values and to ensure that our actions are in line with our policies and values. I believe we can do better, and I am committed to working towards this goal.
tion against others. We very quickly then issued clear instructions to all elements in the 101st Airborne Division Task Force that all detainees would be treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention, ensured refresher education in what that meant, began a process of inspecting all detention facilities in the Division at least weekly, and started a process of having the Red Cross representative in the area and Ninevah Province Council members (including an Imam) visit our facilities on a regular basis, as well.

There was also at least one case of mistreatment of a civilian that I recall—in which a small element improperly confiscated a vehicle from a local citizen who was stopped at a checkpoint, with the element leader then not being forthcoming about the incident during subsequent inquiries. (The civilian was not physically mistreated.) We formally investigated, took nonjudicial action under UCMJ against those involved, and compensated the citizen.

There were numerous other cases of damage incidental to operations for which we compensated the citizens affected.

As the MSNTC–I Commander, we did not operate detention facilities; however, some of the Iraqi units we advised did do that, and we had serious challenges in a few cases in the summer of 2005 before I left Iraq. In each case, we documented possible cases of mistreatment, shared the evidence with the Minister of Interior and MNF–I HQs, helped the Minister and respective Iraqi units conduct remedial training, and, in at least one case, withdrew all financial/equipment/advisor support for an element (in that case due to actions by several leaders of the Baghdad Major Crimes unit) until individuals were removed and/or disciplined.

**Question.** If so, please explain the circumstances and describe the actions that you took in response to these incidents?

**Answer.** Answered above.

**U.S. MISTAKES**

**Question.** What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes the U.S. has made to date in Iraq?

**Answer.** First, there were a number of assumptions and assessments that did not bear out. Prominent among them was the assumption that Iraqis would remain in their barracks and ministry facilities and resume their functions as soon as interim governmental structures were in place. That obviously did not transpire. The assessment of the Iraqi infrastructure did not capture how fragile and abysmally maintained it was (and this challenge, of course, was compounded by looting). Additionally, although most Iraqis did, in fact, greet us as liberators (and that was true even in most Sunni Arab areas), there was an underestimation of the degree of resistance that would develop as, inevitably, a Shiite majority government began to emerge and the Sunni Arabs, especially, the Saddamists, realized that the days of their dominating Iraq were over. Sunni Arab resistance was also fueled by other actions noted below.

Beyond that, as noted recently by President Bush, there were a number of situations that did not develop as was envisioned:

- There was the feeling that elections would enhance the Iraqi sense of nationalism. Instead, the elections hardened sectarian positions as Iraqis voted largely based on ethnic and sectarian group identity.
- There was an underestimation of the security challenges in Iraq, particularly in 2006 in the wake of the bombing of the mosque in Samara, coupled with an over-estimation of our ability to create new security institutions following the disbandment of the ISFs—which was not helped by the planning issues described below.
- It repeatedly took us time to recognize changes in the security environment and to react to them. What began as an insurgency has morphed into a conflict that includes insurgent attacks, terrorism, sectarian violence, and violent crime. Our responses have had to continue to evolve in response, but that has not always been easy.

A number of mistakes were made by both political and military leaders during the course of Operation Iraqi Freedom:

- The very slow (if that) execution of the reconciliation component of de-Baathification left tens of thousands of former Baath Party members (many of them Sunni Arabs, but also some Shiite) feeling that they had no future opportunities in, or reason to support, the new Iraq. To be fair to CPA, Ambassador Bremer intended to execute reconciliation (or exceptions to the de-Baathification order) and gave me permission, e.g., to do so on a trial basis in Ninevah Province; however, when we submitted the results of the reconciliation commission conducted for Mosul University and subsequent re-
quests for exception generated by Iraqi processes with judicial oversight, no action was taken on them by the de-Baathification committee in Baghdad. As realization set in among those affected that there was to be no reconciliation, we could feel support for the new Iraq ebbing in Sunni Arab majority areas.

- Disbanding the Iraqi army (which was, to be sure, an army that Iraq did not need in the long-term as it had vastly more senior officers than were remotely required and was more of a jobs program than a competent military force) without simultaneously announcing a stipend and pension program for those in the Army, the future plan for Iraq’s defense forces, and provisions for joining those forces undoubtedly created tens of thousands of former soldiers and officers who were angry, feeling disrespected, and worried about how they would feed their families. (The stipend plan was eventually announced some 5 weeks after the disestablishment was announced, but it did not cover senior officers, who remained, therefore, influential critics of the new Iraq.) This action likely fueled, at least in part, the early growth of the insurgency and anti-coalition feeling.

- We took too long to recognize the growing insurgency and to take steps to counter it, though we did eventually come to grips with it.

- We took too long to develop the concepts and structures needed to build effective ISFs to assist in providing security to the Iraqi people.

- We had, for the first 15 months or more in Iraq, an inadequate military structure. With hindsight, it is clear that it took too long to transform V Corps HQs into Commander, Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF–7) HQs, and that even when we had CJTF–7 HQs, it was not capable of looking both up and down (i.e. performing both political-military/strategic functions and serving as the senior operational headquarters for counterinsurgency and stability operations). Moreover, it is clear that we should have built what eventually became MNSTC–I HQs and the TF–34 HQs (which oversees detainee/interrogation operations) much sooner, along with the other organizations that were eventually established (e.g., the Gulf Region Corps of Engineer HQs).

- Although not a problem in the 101st Airborne Division area of responsibility (AOR) during my time as 101st commander, it is clear that in certain other AORs there were more tasks than troops—especially in Anbar Province for at least the first year and likely in other areas as well.

- Finally, the strategy pursued in the wake of the bombing of the Al Askariya Mosque in Šammarra in February 2006 was unable to arrest the spiraling violence and rise of harmful sectarian activities. Repeated operations in Baghdad, in particular, to clear, hold, and build did not prove durable due to lack of sufficient Iraqi and coalition forces for the hold phase of the operations.

**Question.** Which of these mistakes, if any, are still having an impact, with which you will have to deal, if confirmed?

**Answer.** We continue to feel the effects of many of the issues stated above. If confirmed, I intend to work with the U.S. Ambassador to gain traction on a number of levels—security for the Iraqi people, establishment of effective local governance and economic development that will create stakeholders in the new Iraq, reconciliation, the continued establishment of effective ISFs, and establishment of rule of law to ensure effective justice to all Iraqis.

**MOSUL**

**Question.** When you commanded your division in Mosul in 2003 the city appeared to be relatively quiet and stable. That changed considerably in 2004 and later. Why do you believe that happened?

**Answer.** The situation in Mosul deteriorated significantly about 9 months after the 101st Airborne Division departed from Iraq. There were several reasons for this development. First, the insurgents made a concerted effort to open a new front as it became clear that the Coalition was going to conduct operations to clear Fallujah in the fall of 2004. Second, the Sunni Arab governor of Ninevah Province was assassinated in late June 2004 (the night of the transition of sovereignty, while on the road to Baghdad, south of Ninevah Province). In the fractious political process that
followed, many of the Sunni Arabs left the provincial council in protest over the way the replacement governor was selected. This left a Sunni Arab majority province without adequate Sunni Arab representation in the provincial council. Undoubtedly, this led to some of them and their followers no longer supporting the new Iraq and some others likely tacitly or actively supporting the insurgents as they sought to put roots down in Ninevah and began a concerted campaign of intimidation of Sunni Arabs who supported the new Iraq. Third, many level-4 Baath Party members lost hope over time that they would ever have a role in the new Iraq due to stalling over reconciliation in Baghdad, despite the special exemption given to the 101st Airborne Division by Ambassador Bremer in the late summer of 2003 to conduct a special reconciliation process in Ninevah Province and Ambassador Bremer’s encouragement to all to use the exception process in the CPA order. Finally, the forces that replaced the 101st Airborne Division—called Task Force Olympia—were only a little over one-third the size of the 101st Airborne (though they started out about half our size), had many fewer helicopters and other enablers, and one of their battalions was subsequently taken frequently to be used as the CJTF–7 Reserve. At the time TF Olympia replaced us in late January/early February, I believed its forces would be sufficient to secure Ninevah Province due to the presence of the tens of thousands of ISFs we had recruited, trained, and equipped, and with whom we operated closely on a daily basis. That was borne out by the Iraqis’ performance during the uprisings in April 2004 when Mosul was one of the few places in Iraq where Iraqi forces did well. Over time, however, the Iraqi forces slowly deteriorated following the Governor’s assassination, as the insurgents mounted a brutal campaign of intimidation. Ultimately, that degraded their effectiveness and began a spiral downward that didn’t end until during the Fallujah operation in November 2004, during which a concerted attack in Mosul revealed the police to be completely intimidated and overwhelmed many of the Iraqi Army elements involved (Regretably, although both BG Ham and I repeatedly requested replacement of the once-aggressive Police Chief in the fall of 2004, the Minister of Interior was never willing to make that action, despite clear signs that the Chief and his family had been severely attacked and intimidated.) Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Task Force Olympia’s HQs lacked the same robust intelligence structure that the 101st Airborne Division possessed, which proved a serious shortcoming in the intelligence-intensive business of counterinsurgency warfare. Where the 101st Airborne had largely been able to generate the precise intelligence that helped us tear out the “roots” of the insurgents almost as fast as they were established, this proved more challenging, particularly over time, for Task Force Olympia.

ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW IRAQ STRATEGY

Question. What role, if any, did you play in the development of the new Iraq strategy recently announced by the President?

Answer. I met with the Secretary of Defense a couple of days after he took office and before he left for his first trip to Iraq, and we discussed the situation there during that meeting. We subsequently talked after his trip, as well. I also talked to the CJCS several times during this period, noting that a population security emphasis, in Baghdad in particular, was necessary to help the Iraqis gain the time/space for the tough decisions they faced and discussing the general force levels that were likely to be required. As the strategy was refined, I talked on several occasions to LTG Ray Odierno to confirm that his troop-to-task analysis required the force levels that are part of the new strategy, and I relayed my support for those levels to the CJCS and the Secretary. I also supported the additional emphasis on the advisory effort and the additional resources for the reconstruction effort (both in terms of funding and personnel for PRTs and governmental ministry capacity development).

IRAQI ARMY REINFORCEMENTS

Question. The Iraqi government has agreed to send an additional three Iraqi Army brigades to Baghdad, two of which will apparently be predominately Kurdish. Do you know why Kurdish units were selected? Do you believe that Kurdish units will be more effective than other units in enhancing security in Baghdad? Why?
Answer. I have confidence in the expected performance of these units, though there are likely to be challenges due to language issues (few of their enlisted soldiers speak Arabic) and, possibly, due to operating away from predominantly Kurdish areas for the first time (though some of the battalions did serve in mixed-ethnic areas in the vicinity of Mosul). In considering other factors, there has been little in the way of corruption or other sectarian issues reported in these units. Additionally, because of their combat experience and predominantly Kurdish soldiers, there tends to be a higher level of unit cohesion in these formations. Because of their home locations, there is a lower likelihood these units will have issues with infiltration by anti-governmental entities. Finally, commanders involved in training these units, as well as their coalition advisors, assess that they are unlikely to be biased when conducting operations in the locations to which they are being assigned.

**Question.** How do you believe Sunni or Shiite Arabs will react to Kurdish troops in their neighborhoods?

Answer. I believe that in the end all parties will accept the presence of these forces in an effort to secure Baghdad. Initial feedback from a Lieutenant Colonel on the ground with whom I correspond is that one of the first battalions to arrive has been welcomed as it has brought improved security—though it is obviously still very early on in this effort.

**MNF–I** considered several aspects prior to making the decision to use these Kurdish-based forces. For example, MNF–I studied whether both the Sunni and Shiite leaders would consider this an attempt by Kurdish entities to expand their influence. While there have been some statements by radical Shiite leaders and some reservations offered by Sunnis, the assessment is that the people of Baghdad will adopt a wait-and-see position. In the end, if security is enhanced, all parties will benefit and likely will be grateful.

**Question.** How do you believe the Mahdi Army will react to Kurdish troops entering Sadr City?

Answer. I believe the reaction in Sadr City to any security forces, not just Kurdish ones (and it is not clear that Kurdish forces will operate in Sadr City), will vary depending upon the perception of the mission, size, and composition of forces, duration of operations, and response of key Shiite leaders.

This is, however, a very dynamic period, and actions taken in Sadr City will have to be carefully considered. While it is possible Muqtada al-Sadr will respond with harsh rhetoric that could escalate into violence, there is also the possibility that political engagement by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki will result in a tense, but calm entry of Iraqi forces into Sadr City. As a leader within the Shiite community, Muqtada al-Sadr must demonstrate the willingness to act constitutionally, responsibly, and within the rule of law, regardless of what kind of ISFs are involved. Having said this, again, any actions involving Sadr City will be very sensitive and will require considerable thought and preparation.

Answer. ISFs will be assigned areas of operations throughout Baghdad without regard to sectarian composition of the units. Brigades of the 6th and 9th Iraqi Divisions, each of which have a mix of Shiite and Sunni personnel (though predominantly Shiite in their makeup) will be employed in all nine administrative districts of the city. It is true that some districts in the city are predominantly Shiite, while others are predominantly Sunni. However, U.S. Army battalions will be partnered with these Iraqi brigades to reinforce the practice that all security forces operate in a professional, disciplined, and ethical manner, and in accordance with the rule of law, international humanitarian norms, and recognized international standards for enforcement and protection of human rights.

**Question.** What is your understanding of how Iraqi brigades which are predominantly Sunni or Shiite will be deployed—i.e., among their own sect or the other?

Answer. It is important to ensure no particular sect feels persecuted by the deployment of any ISF in their neighborhood. The partnering of a U.S. battalion with each ISF brigade will ensure that sectarian divisions and mistrust are kept to a minimum.

**COMMAND AND CONTROL**

**Question.** What do you understand to be the command and control relationships between American and Iraqi forces in the new Baghdad security plan?

Answer. This is an exceedingly important issue. Getting the relationship between our forces and the ISFs right is critical to operating together. At its simplest, U.S. commanders will command and retain OPCON of U.S. forces; Iraqi commanders will command Iraqi forces and exercise OPCON over them once transitioned from the tactical control of U.S. forces (this has taken place for the 6th Division and in the
case of many other Iraqi units in recent months). If confirmed, I intend to ensure that there is very close cooperation between U.S. and Iraqi headquarters to ensure unity of effort, careful coordination of operations, and clear knowledge of what each force is doing. Of necessity, this will include Iraqi and U.S. Special Operations Forces and Police Forces as well. As I understand it, the Baghdad plan is to be an Iraqi plan, devised by the Iraqis in consultation with, and supported by, MNF-I and MNC-I, and U.S. forces, under the command of U.S. commanders, will act in support of the Iraqi effort to establish security in Baghdad.

Question. Do you have any concerns?
Answer. Yes. MNF-I and MNC-I will need to carefully work out liaison arrangements, colocation of command posts, terms of reference that delineate respective responsibilities for various combat, combat support, and combat service support activities, communications to support all of this, and so forth. Having said this, coalition forces have been working with ISFs for some time and have developed an understanding of the relationships involved, and they will use that experience to inform the actions to be taken in this case.

CONFRONTING THE MILITIAS

Question. Based on your knowledge, is the Iraqi government taking the steps it must to confront and control the militias?
Answer. Militias and armed groups are a challenge with which MNF-I and the Iraqi government must contend. One reason the Iraqi government has not confronted militias in a meaningful way is that, regrettably, they fill a security need. Another reason is that some political parties derive their political strength from their militias, which provide both security and allow for the provision of basic services to the people.

Article 9 of the Iraqi Constitution prohibits militias and stipulates that “the Iraqi armed forces and security services will be composed of the components of the Iraqi people with due consideration given to their balance and representation without discrimination or exclusion. They shall be subject to the control of the civilian authority, shall defend Iraq, shall not be used as an instrument to oppress the Iraqi people, shall not interfere in political affairs, and shall have no role in the transfer of authority.” In short, the security forces of Iraq must be professional and apolitical, and they must have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force.

Once ISFs, backed by coalition forces, gain control of Baghdad and provide security to the people, the need for militias to protect local areas will cease to provide a justification for their existence. The Iraqi government can then work to execute a comprehensive disarmament, disbandment, and reintegration (DDR) program. Recent reports indicate that Prime Minister Maliki understands the need to deal with the militias.

Question. What role would you expect to play on this issue, if confirmed?
Answer. Iraqi government intermediaries, coalition leaders, and U.S. Embassy Baghdad personnel are involved in discussions to provide opportunities for militia groups to enter into a DDR process. If confirmed, I would support and be involved in these efforts.

Question. Under what circumstances, if any, would you recommend that American troops enter Sadr City?
Answer. American troops enter Sadr City regularly in response to operational needs. These operations are likely to continue. As the ISF’s transition into a leading role, I would expect to see a more prominent ISF presence in Sadr City and, as part of that, it is likely American troops will also be present, but principally in a supporting role and to ensure full situational awareness of the actions of the Iraqi forces.

Question. In your judgment, how effective will the addition of more U.S. troops be in securing Baghdad if Prime Minister Maliki continues to allow militias to exist and operate?
Answer. Prime Minister Maliki has indicated a willingness to deal with militias and this effort will be of central importance in securing Baghdad. Additional U.S. troops will be important in the overall effort by providing the necessary capacity to continue with clearing insurgent forces from contested areas while also partnering with Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police in order to bolster their capability to prevent sectarian violence, whether on the part of militias, terrorists, or insurgent groups.

COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE

Question. According to the new counterinsurgency manual, “20 (soldiers or police forces) per 1,000 residents” is often considered the minimum troop density required for effective counterinsurgency operations. Baghdad alone, according to doctrine, requires a force of 120,000–130,000 personnel to meet the minimum requirement.
However, when the planned increase in U.S. and Iraqi forces is complete, Baghdad would only have about 80,000 security forces.

Do you believe that 80,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops is sufficient and if so, why? What is your understanding of the status and adequacy of the risk assessment and mitigation plan associated with this deviation from doctrine?

Answer. Forces currently in or moving to Baghdad should be sufficient to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations given the anticipated political-military situation and planned phased operations.

Answer. The recommended force ratio is a “rule of thumb,” distilled for simplicity’s sake from numerous complex cases of counterinsurgency operations. These cases may differ significantly in terms of geography, urbanization, or enemy strength.

The counterinsurgency doctrine clearly states that host nation police and army forces are a key part of the equation, as are special operating forces and other security elements. Baghdad is a city of roughly 6 million people, so a 1:50 ratio of security forces to population would be equal to roughly 120,000 counterinsurgents. Iraqi Army, Police, and Special Operations Forces, together with the U.S. forces currently on the ground or deploying to Baghdad in the months ahead, total approximately 85,000—though, to be sure, not all of those are of the same levels of effectiveness, and some of the police undoubtedly are of limited effectiveness. However, we do not necessarily have to secure every part of Baghdad at once—this can be done in stages—and will have to be done that way given the way the forces are expected to flow into Iraq. Beyond that, tens of thousands of ministry security forces and tens of thousands of civilian (often third country) contracted guard forces protect key sites in Baghdad (including, for example, the U.S. Embassy, MNSTC–I HQs, the Ministry of Oil, etc.) that MNF–I and the Iraqi government would otherwise have to detail soldiers or police to protect. These forces, again, number in the tens of thousands—and although by no means all are of high capability and some are undoubtedly compromised, they do secure hundreds of sites that otherwise would require coalition or Iraqi military or police forces. Thus, with the addition of all five U.S. brigades under orders to reinforce Baghdad and the ISFs either in Baghdad or headed to the city, there should be sufficient military forces available to achieve our objective of securing Baghdad.

LENGTH OF IRAQI INSURGENCY

Question. General Casey has said that 20th century counterinsurgency efforts typically lasted 9 years.

Do you believe that the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq could last as long as 9 years, or even longer?

Answer. I agree with General Casey that the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq will continue for some time, but its duration will depend on a variety of factors that about which it is very difficult to make judgments. What I am clear about, however, is that the Government of Iraq must ultimately win this fight, with coalition forces in a supporting role. Thus, while it is possible that the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq could, indeed, last 9 years or more, that should not be taken to imply that U.S. forces would be involved in substantial numbers for the duration of that period.

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

Question. With the expected increase of U.S. troop levels in Iraq by over 20,000, do you believe there is sufficient combat service support in place or will that have to be augmented as well?

Answer. Generally, BCTs have their own combat service support units to sustain their soldiers and equipment; however, I am sure that one of the tasks being undertaken by MNC–I in recent weeks has been determination of requirements for any additional combat service support elements above brigade level. This will be an area on which I will focus following arrival in Iraq, if I am confirmed. Should additional so-called enablers be needed, I will request them.

Question. If so, by how much?

Answer. MNF–I reports that it has a mature theater base in place and does not anticipate a large requirement for augmentation of combat service support capabilities.

Question. Do you see any problems with the extent of reliance of U.S. forces in Iraq on contractor support?

Answer. No. The Army has always benefited from contracted non-military support in one form or another, though that reliance has grown substantially in recent years. Contractors allow the military a great deal of flexibility to meet sustainment and life support requirements; they also help with security in some cases. They
must be well-integrated, but over time MNF–I has developed mechanisms to ensure synchronization of contractor support and military activities.

**SUSTAINMENT**

*Question.* Based on your knowledge of the Army and its state of readiness, how long do you believe the increased troop levels and operations tempo can be sustained?

*Answer.* My personal sense is that the Army is stretched and is straining; however, the Army is making plans to sustain increased troop levels should that be required. Nonetheless, the strain on the Active and Reserve components is clear. Soldiers in some units are returning to Iraq in a year or less, and that is obviously difficult for them and their families, and it makes preparation of units challenging as well. My own family is well-acquainted with this challenge, as my return to Iraq, if confirmed, will be my fourth year-or-longer deployment since 2001. Reset of equipment is also a challenge—though additional funds received recently should help the Army considerably to meet the demand, though it is likely to take some time to ramp up the depots fully. Having said that, as MNF–I commander, it would be beyond my brief to determine the overall health of the Army and Marine Corps—though it would be something about which I would be concerned. It would be my job to determine the troops and resources required to accomplish the mission in Iraq, and to inform the CENTCOM commander and Secretary of Defense of those requirements. It is more appropriate for the Joint Staff and the Services to determine how long we can sustain a surge. I am encouraged, however, by Secretary of Defense Gates’ announcement that the end strength of our Army and Marine Corps will be increased. Clearly, the conflict in Iraq has been hard on our ground forces, and I support the Secretary’s efforts to ensure we have the forces needed we need for what are frequently very people-intensive operations.

**STATE OF TRAINING AND EQUIPPING OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES**

*Question.* What is your understanding of the state of training and equipping of ISFs?

*Answer.* My understanding is that, with some exceptions, the Iraqi Objective Counterinsurgency (COIN) Force and Iraqi Objective Civil Security Force (totaling approximately 325,000 personnel) were issued 100 percent of their pacing items of equipment (i.e. their most important items) and that 100 percent of their personnel were trained. The exceptions are for the remaining portions of the Navy and the Air Force and approximately 2,000 support troops, all of which have significantly longer training timelines and specialized training requirements. The Objective COIN Force units do, however, face challenges in sufficient fill of leaders, who take a long time to develop, and in development of higher-level staff skills and intelligence elements, which also take time to develop. The Iraqi government is addressing these shortfalls through a combination of former commissioned and noncommissioned officer (NCO) recalls and prospective policies to accelerate promotion to corporal and sergeant for recruits with requisite levels of civilian education. The ISFs have also experienced attrition due to combat losses and absences over the last 18 months. To address this attrition, MNSTC–I and the Iraqi government are generating some 30,000 replacements, 18,000 of which will address the attrition that has occurred over the last year and half, and another 12,000 to bring these units to 110 percent to address the effects of Iraqi leave policies and to provide some personnel flexibility to unit commanders. Over 6,500 of these soldiers have graduated and joined the force and the second cycle of almost 8,000 will graduate shortly.

*Question.* What concerns do you have about the ability of those units to participate in the implementation of the new Baghdad security plan?

*Answer.* Iraqi units, at all levels, continue to perform well when partnered with coalition forces. An immature logistics system, a shortage of mid-grade leadership, and the ultimate loyalty of select units/leaders remain my primary concerns. These concerns are currently being addressed through continued development of the ISF logistical structure, coalition force emergency logistical support, partner relationships between Iraqi and coalition force units (which are being strengthened), embedding of Transition (Advisor) Teams in Iraqi units down to at least the battalion level, and a variety of actions to foster loyalty and professionalism like a soldier’s creed, oaths of office, a Center for Ethics and Leadership, the Iraqi Military Academy, the Staff Colleges, and so on.
FORCE PROTECTION

Question. The new Baghdad security plan apparently envisions American units being colocated with Iraqi units spread out over approximately 30 mini-bases throughout Baghdad. In general, how could you, as Commander, MNF-I, accommodate and protect those forces and the forces which would have to resupply them on a daily basis?

Answer. As explained to me, under the Baghdad Security Plan, coalition forces will establish Joint Security Stations (JSSs) with the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, and the Iraqi National Police. The stations will be strategically positioned throughout the city to accommodate dispersed, joint patrols, and to provide CENTCOM and control hubs that ultimately feed back into the Baghdad Security Command. The establishment of JSSs will include enhancing force protection and developing essential sustainment and life support. Many of the JSSs are located at existing Iraqi Police Stations, but will require vulnerability assessments prior to occupation by coalition forces. Based on these assessments the necessary force protection enhancements will be completed to mitigate the risks of attack. Force protection enhancements will include improved entry control points, external barriers to redirect traffic flows and/or reinforce perimeters, increased protection from indirect fires, and guard posts/towers where required. Additionally, robust Quick Reaction Forces, as well as redundant and secure communications with parent Forward Operating Bases and with coalition patrols operating in the area, will enhance the force protection posture of each JSS.

Sustainment of our forces will be just as critical as their protection. Coalition forces patrolling from JSSs will have adequate levels of food, fuel, water, medical supplies, and ammunition on hand to preserve their combat capability. The JSSs will be resupplied as the forces rotate into and out of the primary Forward Operating Bases (FBOs), rather than through daily resupply convoys. Essentially, the forces operating out of a JSS will be self-sustaining for their period of operations, with replacements arriving with their own requisite supplies as forces rotate. The basic, enduring life support packages at each JSS might include tents, generators, and environmental control units which will be positioned within the site’s perimeter.

Question. What is your understanding of whether the security plan requires the contracting of additional U.S. bases and facilities?

Answer. Current planning does not anticipate the requirement to reopen previously transferred FOBs or the creation of new ones. MNF-I is using space on existing FOBs that have the capacity for the first three reinforcing BCTs, with basing requirements for the remaining two currently under development.

MILITARY TRANSITION TEAMS

Question. Do you believe that the size, structure, number, and operating procedures for U.S. Military and Police Transition Teams embedded with ISFs need to be changed in any way?

Answer. Yes. There is unquestionable linkage between ISF progression and the embedded transition team program. Despite the success achieved by the embedding of transition teams, the current Military Transition Team (MTT) size is insufficient to meet all operational requirements and permit an optimum level of support. The commander of MNC-I has initiated a plan to enhance MTTs to increase their effectiveness. Based on conditions within each multinational division (MND) area of responsibility, primarily relating to levels of violence and ISF capacity for independent operations, MTTs are being augmented by assets controlled by the respective MND Commanders. U.S. BCTs are the primary resource providers for these enhancements. Enhanced MTTs have the ability to advise ISF units down to company level.

The current size, structure, and number of Police Transition Teams (PTT) is appropriate for the missions they are assigned. There are three different types of PTTs: station, district, and provincial. The nucleus of all PTTs is a military police squad with additional U.S. Army personnel added at the district and provincial level. Because of the mission and scope of responsibility of an Iraqi Police provincial directorate, the typical PTT working at that level is larger and includes additional military and civilian members who possess other specialties and expertise such as operations, personnel, logistics, and maintenance management. The other two key and essential components of all PTTs are interpreters and International Police Liaison Officers (IPLOs). Multinational Corps-Iraq is currently providing PTTs at a ratio of one for every three police stations, one for every two police districts, and one for every one provincial police directorate. The current operating procedures have resulted in clear visibility on the effectiveness and capabilities of Iraqi Police, from station through provincial level, and helped improve the Iraqi Police ability to
conduct basic law and order missions. Upon arrival in Iraq, if confirmed, I will assess this again to see if augmentation is required.

**Question.** What do you recommend?

**Answer.** Throughout Iraq, the enhancement of the baseline MTTs will continue based on an assessment of the security situation in each MND area of responsibility. The estimate provided to me by the MNF–I staff is that it will take 6–12 months to move to enhanced MTTs throughout Iraq. Continuing and expanding the transition team program over time will energize ISF progression and eventually facilitate a change in relationship as the embedded transition teams move toward the advising role and less toward mentoring or even, to a degree, leading.

The current ratio of PTTs at the station, district, and provincial levels is adequate, but we also need to relocate some PTTs from provinces that have moved to Provincial Iraqi Control to provinces that have not achieved Provincial Iraqi Control. IPLOs and interpreters are absolutely essential to successful PTT operations. MNC–I continues to have difficulty recruiting and fielding new interpreters; additional emphasis and incentives need to be established to retain the qualified interpreters we currently employ. Additionally, if the IPLO program is ended too soon, the lack of this law enforcement expertise and experience would have a negative impact and adverse impact. A recommendation for making the IPLO program even better is to recruit law enforcement experts from other Middle Eastern nations (such as Jordan, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, etc.) into the program.

**Question.** What is your understanding of how the Army and Marine Corps are ensuring that U.S. troops are properly trained for this duty, to include dissemination of “lessons learned” to incoming teams?

**Answer.** Only qualified officers and NCOs are chosen to fill these critical positions, based upon their grade, skill, and experience match, balanced with dwell time. To facilitate and synchronize this effort, Army, Air Force, and Navy “external” transition team training was consolidated and is now conducted at Fort Riley, Kansas by the 1st Infantry Division. The two-star commander there, his staff, and a BCT now execute the full spectrum of tasks required to man, train, and equip external transition teams. The Marines are running a similar program at Twentynine Palms, CA. Transition team training is based on seven core competencies—combat skills, force protection, team support processes, technical and tactical training, adviser skills, counterinsurgency operations, and understanding the culture (which alone encompasses about 50 hours of training to empower the teams’ abilities to forge a positive relationship with their Iraqi counterparts). The lessons learned process is critical and is integrated before, during, and after a team embeds with an ISF unit. Throughout training, team members are in communication with the team they will replace so they may exchange information, pass back these lessons, and learn about their Iraqi unit prior to deployment. Additionally, programs like Fort Riley (60 days), Camp Buehring (Kuwait, 6 days), and the Phoenix Academy (Taji, Iraq, 8 days) undergo continuous review so that the training can remain relevant by adapting the training model as necessary based on input from the field and changing conditions in theater. Once in theater, teams execute a 60-day assessment of the training they received in preparation for their assignment as advisors, complete a formal end of tour assessment to codify lessons learned, and an assessment of the transition between their team and the follow-on team. The Iraq Assistance Group (IAG) has also compiled transition team lessons learned on the IAG website for all transition teams to utilize. The Combat Studies Institute and Center for Army Lessons Learned have captured lessons on transition team operations and techniques and published them as well.

The Military Police Brigade fully sources the PTTs and provides RSOI, implementation, execution, and mission oversight of the PTT Program. The brigade brings a cohesive and organic element to training, resourcing, and equipping PTTs which are actually military police squads already trained for law enforcement skills. These MP units are trained at home station to perform this mission. These teams are embedded with IPLOs who are trained, hired, and managed by the State Department.

Host nation police building and training is a doctrinal military police mission. Experiences and lessons learned at Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo all contribute to continued mission development and application. Lessons learned and up-to-date TTPs are disseminated back to the deploying units through direct contact with units on the ground, Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS), Mission Readiness Exercise (MRX), and then Relief-In-Place (RIP) Program during which the MP Brigade conducts a PTT certification. Additionally, lessons learned are disseminated through the Center for Army Lessons Learned Website, Senior Leader forums (many virtual), the Battle Command Training Program COIN Seminars, combat training center mission rehearsal exercises, the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance, and doctrine development efforts.
Question. If confirmed, what would you recommend in this regard?
Answer. First, it is necessary to retain the core transition team and ensure it continues to receive the best possible training in preparation for its mission of mentoring and advising the ISF unit. This core structure is the expertise upon which additional enhancement is placed. They are the subject matter experts within the transition team. Second, as conditions on the ground permit, I would expedite the enhancement of transition teams to capitalize on their contributions toward ISF development. This must be done in a manner that also balances other operational requirements, which will lessen as the levels of violence become more manageable for the ISF. Furthermore, leaders should direct the widest dissemination of lessons learned by our teams. The team in training as well as any team in theater must be alerted to newly developed tactics, techniques, and procedures that are proving successful in application. This is done through the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Combat Studies Institute, and the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance at Fort Leavenworth, among other agencies.

DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS

Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006 memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention?
Answer. Yes. The standards outlined in Common Article 3 should be the standard for U.S. and coalition forces to adhere to in regards to the handling of detainees at all levels. In fact, as I noted in responding to one of the earlier questions, after an early case of detainee mistreatment, I directed that detainees in the 101st Airborne Division area of responsibility would be handled in accordance with the Geneva Convention, as those were the standards our soldiers understood.

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes. I believe having one interrogation standard outlined in one document adds clarity. The new FM clearly articulates what is and what is not authorized and effectively identifies methods to ensure accountability.

Question. Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?
Answer. Yes.

Question. You oversaw the issuance of a new Army doctrine on counterinsurgency operations. Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention?
Answer. Yes. We can conduct effective interrogation and detention in wartime in a counterinsurgency environment and comply with the requirements outlined in Common Article 3; in fact, we had international human rights organizations participate in the COIN Seminar we hosted to discuss a very early draft of the manual. That conference, in fact, was co-hosted by Harvard’s Carr Center for Human Rights.

IRAQ STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES

Question. What is your understanding of the status of Department of Defense efforts to help restart Iraqi state-owned enterprises to increase employment in Iraq?
Answer. When the Task Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations-Iraq (TF BSO) arrived in Iraq, it expected to find a Soviet-style, aging State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) industrial base that was grossly uncompetitive. First-hand evaluations, however, reveal that some of these factories possess modern—even automated—equipment, and are capable of producing materials and manufactured goods that would be competitive in both Iraqi and world markets. Some facilities have deteriorated or suffered from a lack of recapitalization, and require varying amounts of refurbishment. Other SOEs are simply obsolete, either because they produce materials or finished goods for which there is little or no demand, or because they require cost-prohibitive investment prior to restarting operations. SOEs traditionally employ large numbers of Iraqis. Their closure still requires that the Government of Iraq address manpower costs, principally through retraining programs and job placement assistance. TF BSO is not advocating U.S. Government investment in Iraqi factories, and is committed to the long-term policy of economic privatization.
Beyond this, having helped Iraqi industries reestablish cement plants, small refineries, and asphalt plants, among others, while commanding the 101st Airborne Division, my view is that there are numerous industries that could be reestablished—ideally with Iraqi funds—and could be self-sustaining, as they enjoy a comparative advantage in some factor of production (e.g., Iraq has vast sulfur reserves, reportedly the largest in the world, which would be used to refine high-grade sulfur for industrial purposes and production of fertilizer; Iraq also has large deposits of “sour crude” that are ideal for asphalt production). I strongly support encouraging such initiatives.

Question. If so, what is your view of these efforts?

Answer. I strongly support the efforts of this task force. TF BSO is assessing Ministry of Industry and Minerals (MIM) SOEs as well as private factories. MIM is responsible for approximately 56 of the 190 or so SOEs nationwide. These 56 SOEs have approximately 200 factories. Within the 56 MIM SOEs, TF BSO has assessed 25 of these and is working closely with Deputy Prime Minister Salih and the MIM to revitalize the existing Iraqi industry base. Where competitive industrial capacity exists, TF BSO and DOD will do everything they can to support the ministries, the factories, and provincial leadership to restart operations, re-employing as many current workers as circumstances permit. Several of the SOEs visited are in relatively good shape and can be restarted with minimal investment in power restoration. Initial efforts identified 10 large factories, from Baghdad through Al Anbar Province, where $6 million provided by the Iraqi government can restart operations and re-employ 11,000 workers. The products that these facilities generate will help to meet local and DOD demands, and have the potential to serve broader U.S. and global markets.

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

Question. The Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR) conducts comprehensive audits, inspections, and investigations which are valuable to Congress. If confirmed, what steps would you take to support the audits, inspections, and investigations conducted by the SIGIR?

Answer. I should note that I also supported the activities of the Government Accountability Office during my time in Iraq and following return to the U.S., and I also invited the Army Audit Agency to audit activities of the 101st Airborne and MNSTC–I on two or three occasions while I was in Iraq.

MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENTS IN THEATER

Question. The Army’s Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) has made three separate assessments over the past several years detailing the immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S. soldiers deployed to Iraq. The most recent study, MHAT III, found that multiple deployments reported experiencing higher levels of acute stress, and that overall levels of combat stressors are increasing. These types of reports lend support to the fact that increasing numbers of troops are returning from duty in Iraq with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), depression, and other mental health issues.

What is your understanding of the key findings of the previous mental health assessments, actions taken by the Army to address key findings, and the effect of such actions?

Answer. The MHAT assessments looked at morale, mental health staffing, access to mental health care, stress from multiple deployments, and leadership issues. The general findings from the studies showed that multiple deployments and longer deployments were by far the leading factors that increased the incidence of mental health issues. The studies recommended redistribution of mental health staff to provide better coverage and the development of a suicide prevention program within theater.

The MHAT 4 study completed in October 2006 showed that the staffing was better, which improved access to mental health care for troops. In August 2006, the MNF–I Surgeon published behavioral health guidelines, which implemented recommendations from the MHAT III study. These included the establishment of a multi-disciplinary Suicide Prevention Committee, whose purpose is to address theater-specific issues related to military member suicides.

In addition there is a mental health web site for commanders on the MNF–I portal and there are mandatory pre- and post-deployment mental health assessments.
and reassessments (3–6 months post deployment). MNF–I has also created a working group consisting of G1 personnel, CID agents, chaplains, surgeons, and mental health professionals that meets not less than quarterly to assess the status of mental health in the AOR.

Question. If confirmed, would you support continuous mental health assessments of the U.S. forces in Iraq?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you have any views on how to best address the mental health needs of our troops, in terms of both prevention and treatment?
Answer. As explained above, I believe we are doing a considerable amount to support the mental health of the force in Iraq; having said that, we must continue to re-examine whether we are doing all that we can in this critical area. Iraq is a war zone and we can diminish but not eliminate mental health problems. MNF–I has the assets and capabilities to provide prevention measures and treatment throughout Iraq, to include teams that periodically perform outreach at main bases and remote sites to identify potential issues. If confirmed, I will monitor this area closely.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, MNF–I?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

IRAN AND SYRIA

1. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, during the President’s address to the Nation, he asserted that succeeding in Iraq also required defending its territorial integrity. He stated that Iran was providing material support for attacks on our troops, that we will interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria, and that we will seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq. I am concerned about how this will be done, and what potential it creates for a regional escalation. In particular, I want to make sure we have adequately planned for protecting our troops in the event of a regional escalation. I note that the recent deployment of another carrier strike group to the Persian Gulf area and the nomination of a Navy Admiral to head U.S. Central Command which seems to indicate an expansion of military focus beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. What do you believe is the potential for our efforts to interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syria to cause an escalation to a regional conflict?

General Petraeus. One of our broad priorities in Iraq will include countering the threats posed by Iranian and Syrian support to extremists in Iraq, along with the continued mission of dismantling terrorist networks in the country.

Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF–I) works closely with the developing Iraqi border security forces to interdict the trafficking of foreign fighters, weapons, explosives, and other contraband across the borders of Iraq. I will work closely with the Ambassador as he and the diplomatic community pursue actions to disrupt influence from external sources, while simultaneously working to prevent potential escalation.

MNF–I continues to take measures to ensure our troops’ protection from all identified threats, and we are keeping a close eye on evolving threats, both from within Iraq and from neighboring countries.
2. Senator A KAKA. Lieutenant General Petraeus, in your opinion, does the lack of diplomatic engagement with Iran and Syria increase the risk of an escalation?

General PETRAEUS. With respect, the conduct of diplomatic engagement with Iran and Syria is beyond my purview, though I have discussed ongoing and contemplated actions with various members of the State Department, and I know that they are carefully weighing the pros and cons of various initiatives.

3. Senator A KAKA. Lieutenant General Petraeus, have specific plans been developed to protect our troops if it does escalate?

General PETRAEUS. As I noted earlier, we constantly assess how to improve the force protection posture of our troops, while simultaneously working to ensure mission accomplishment. We have examined and continue to examine potential threats from all quarters, including greater outside involvement in Iraq, and we take appropriate measures in response—including constant upgrading of personal protective equipment, addition of surveillance assets, improvements to vehicular protection, improved weaponry, and so on.

NEW STRATEGY

4. Senator A KAKA. Lieutenant General Petraeus, it is my understanding that you are one of the Army's leading authorities on counterinsurgency. As such, I'm interested in your evaluation of the new strategy for the surge. Specifically, would you suggest any additional actions that were excluded from the new strategy (e.g., seek additional troops or other forms of assistance from our allies, coalition partners, or Iraq's neighboring nations)?

General PETRAEUS. The Army's new counterinsurgency manual makes clear that security of the population must be the priority in a situation like that in Iraq—and it will be our priority as we conduct the surge. We must, together with our Iraqi partners, clear, control, and retain the neighborhoods of Baghdad to break the cycle of violence that is preventing political progress in Iraq. We can only do this by establishing persistent presence—coalition, as well as Iraqi—in Iraqi neighborhoods. I plan to ensure that a portion of our forces locate in the neighborhoods they protect and that they carry out operations closely linked with their Iraqi counterparts—with the Iraqis in the lead whenever possible—to secure the population.

The enemies we face are adaptive and as requirements change, I will request additional support (the accelerated arrival of the 3d Infantry Division Headquarters is a result of this), if needed, and clearly outline the various risks to our strategy. We will also work closely with our interagency, coalition, and Iraqi partners to set the conditions for success in Iraq.

5. Senator A KAKA. Lieutenant General Petraeus, would you suggest improvements to any of the tactics that are included in the new strategy?

General PETRAEUS. I am pleased with the changes our military is making in training, manning, and equipping the force to fight this kind of conflict. Two big changes are being asked of our forces under this new strategy—the expanded use of enhanced and embedded transition teams and the renewed emphasis on positioning forces in the neighborhoods among the people. Our military has done a good job with the collection and dissemination of lessons learned and the practice of the latest tactics, techniques, and procedures in our training centers as troops prepare to deploy. Our troops and leaders are prepared for the implementation of the new strategy, though we undoubtedly will continue to learn as we carry out the new operations—and we plan to share lessons throughout the force as we do.

6. Senator A KAKA. Lieutenant General Petraeus, you recently were interviewed by Spiegel magazine, a German periodical. During the interview, you stated that much of counterinsurgency operations is counter-intuitive. You further called counterinsurgency operations "war at the graduate level" and "thinking man's warfare." You also said that we want our young officers to think, not memorize, because they cannot kill their way out of an insurgency. You indicated that you have to take out the elements that will never reconcile with the new government, or with the system, but then try to win over the rest of the population. This part is not done with tanks and rifles. How well-trained are the junior officers and troops in the counterinsurgency doctrine?

General PETRAEUS. Over the past 15 months, I have been privileged to oversee the organizations that educate our Army's leaders, draft our doctrine, capture lessons learned, and help our units prepare for deployment.
Our small unit leaders are increasingly well-trained for counterinsurgency warfare. The Army and Marine Corps' professional military educational institutions have institutionalized the new counterinsurgency doctrine recently published in Field Manual 3–24 (that process began well before the manual was finally published, based on articles and lessons learned). Furthermore, our combat training centers now focus on counterinsurgency operations during unit mission rehearsal exercises. Leaders are further honed by counterinsurgency seminars and training conducted in the United States, Kuwait, and at the Taji Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence in Iraq. This training has made our junior leaders and soldiers better prepared for counterinsurgency warfare and more adaptive to the situations they will face in Iraq. Learning continues, however, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned, Asymmetric Warfare Group, and other elements facilitate the collection and distribution of lessons that we continue to capture.

7. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, how prepared are they to implement the President’s new strategy for the surge?

General Petraeus. Our officers and troops are well-trained, well-equipped, and ready for the tactics asked of them in this new strategy—though it will represent a change in operating style for some units, and we will continue to learn new lessons as we carry out the surge.

8. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, how well-trained are the Iraqi security forces (ISFs) in counterinsurgency doctrine?

General Petraeus. The ISFs have made solid gains in professionalism and capability over the past 3 years, though they still have a long way to go in certain elements. They are especially effective when operating in concert with coalition forces at population security. The Iraqi units obviously have greater cultural awareness and linguistic capabilities, while U.S. forces bring greater military capabilities to the battlefield.

9. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Petraeus, given that the new strategy for the surge is heavily reliant on the Iraqis leading the security efforts, how can we be sure that they have correctly identified “the elements that will never reconcile with the new government” and will not just be utilizing their position to eliminate dissenters?

General Petraeus. In fact, there is work to be done in this area, and I have discussed it with the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Defense and Interior. Actions have already been taken against a number of leaders and units shown to be using their positions for sectarian purposes, and more will be taken—increasingly by Iraqi officials and elements. While we are generally encouraged by the slow growth in professionalism of the ISFs, we believe that a very robust partnering of coalition forces with the Iraqi Army and National Police elements will prevent any such sectarian bias in their application of force as we help the Iraqi government identify elements and leaders who need to be removed and, in some cases, brought to justice.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BEN NELSON

PRESIDENT'S NEW PLAN

10. Senator Ben Nelson. Lieutenant General Petraeus, obviously, a drop in violence is a benchmark, but that can be temporary as we have seen in Iraq. What should policymakers specifically be looking to see on the ground in Baghdad over the next 6 months with the President’s new plan?

General Petraeus. A reduction in violence as part of improving security for the people clearly is the top indicator. Over time, that is one that must be seen. But it will take time. We may or may not see a significant drop in violence at the beginning of the operation, but the key is the long-term improvement of security, public confidence, basic services, economic development, and government capacity. We will not eliminate violence from the streets of Baghdad on our watch, but we must help the Iraqis reduce the level of violence, intimidation of the populations of various neighborhoods, and so on. I believe that over a period of months there will be a reduction of violence, although it will be uneven and will differ from area to area. This achievement is nonetheless critical to allowing the other elements of national power to come to bear on the problem in Baghdad and Iraq as a whole, and for Iraq to resolve the political issues that are the true solution to its long-term problems.
11. Senator BEN NELSON. Lieutenant General Petraeus, how long will it be before the committee can be notified of the results of the plan?

General PETRAEUS. It will take several months at the least. That allows for the time for the additional forces to flow to Iraq, time for them to gain an understanding of the areas in which they will operate, time to plan with and get to know their Iraqi partners, time to set conditions for the successful conduct of security operations, and, of course, time to conduct those operations and then to build on what they achieve. Success, again, will occur over a period of months, not weeks or days.

None of this, in fact, will be rapid. The way ahead will be neither quick nor easy, and there undoubtedly will be tough days. We face a determined, adaptable, and barbaric enemy. MNF–I will work closely with our Iraqi ISF partners to secure the population and help to facilitate the enhancement of quality of life for the citizens, and I do believe we can do that. I will provide periodic updates when requested.

12. Senator BEN NELSON. Lieutenant General Petraeus, if the plan is tried, attempted, and is not successful, will you come back to Congress and explain what happened and why?

General PETRAEUS. I will provide you with forthright, professional military advice with respect to the missions given to MNF–I and the situation on the ground in Iraq. Should I determine that new strategy cannot succeed, I will provide such an assessment.

13. Senator BEN NELSON. Lieutenant General Petraeus, in my opinion, Iraq will not long survive as a nation with armed militias roaming the streets of Baghdad. We know the profound impact armed militias have had in Israel and Lebanon. I am, to say the least, skeptical about the Prime Minister’s desire to take on Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi army. Does Prime Minister Maliki have the will to engage Shia militias?

General PETRAEUS. I have already begun, together with the Ambassador, developing a relationship with Prime Minister Maliki. My early impression is that he is genuinely concerned with the future of Iraq and not just the interests of his sect or political coalition. He does appear to want to be Prime Minister for all Iraqis and has taken steps that confirm this. That is critical, as the Iraqi government dealing fairly with all sects and ethnic groups is critical for long-term political and military success. I will work closely with the Prime Minister and his commanders to help them enforce the law and secure the population. Prime Minister Maliki has already taken steps in this direction by ensuring that there are no safe havens in Iraq, and insurgents, terrorists, and criminals will be dealt with in accordance with the law regardless of sect or ethnicity.

14. Senator BEN NELSON. Lieutenant General Petraeus, if a decision is made not to engage Sadr at this time, what could that mean when American forces leave?

General PETRAEUS. I will work with the Iraqi government to engage all organizations within Iraqi society who are genuinely amenable to political negotiation and accommodation. A lasting peace can only be secured by the creation of a political compact that encompasses all parties willing to join such an enterprise. Those organizations that refuse to recognize the legitimacy of the government of Iraq will be neutralized to the extent that they will be unable to interfere with the governance of the country.

15. Senator BEN NELSON. Lieutenant General Petraeus, is it a good idea to leave an armed militia in Iraq’s capital?

General PETRAEUS. No. We want to see an Iraq in which the government, through its established and regulated police and army, maintains a monopoly on the possession and use of organized armed force.

16. Senator BEN NELSON. Lieutenant General Petraeus, could you see a scenario where the military and al-Sadr’s militia work together to further cleanse Baghdad of their Sunni presence?

General PETRAEUS. That is obviously one of the scenarios the surge is intended to prevent.
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

17. Senator BEN NELSON. Lieutenant General Petraeus, in your estimation, how many troops do ISFs have that are trained and capable of undertaking the President’s new plan?

General PETRAEUS. Iraqi Army, Police, and Special Operations Forces, together with the U.S. forces currently on the ground or deploying to Baghdad (and this is Baghdad-centric) in the months ahead, will total some 85,000—though, to be sure, not all of those are of the same levels of effectiveness. I have emphasized to the Iraqi government the necessity of ensuring that these forces deploy at 100 percent strength, and the Ministry of Defense is taking action to ensure that this happens. It did not, with some of the earlier deployers. With the addition of all five U.S. brigades under orders to reinforce Baghdad and the ISFs either in Baghdad or headed to the city, there should be sufficient military forces available to achieve our objective of securing Baghdad, which will improve security and set the conditions for U.S. Government and Iraqi government advances in the decisive areas of governance, economic development, and Rule of Law.

18. Senator BEN NELSON. Lieutenant General Petraeus, what confidence do you have in the capacity of these troops to both “clear” and “hold”?

General PETRAEUS. I believe this plan can succeed. We have to change the longstanding paradigm of clearing a neighborhood and then moving on in favor of a constant and active presence among the people. This will be a change for both coalition and Iraqi forces, but I am confident that they will adapt and perform admirably. The ISFs have received reasonable training and they’ve received reasonable equipping. Leadership on the ground with the soldiers and policemen will make the difference and we are seeing an increase in the professionalism, confidence, and capability of Iraqi leaders.

19. Senator BEN NELSON. Lieutenant General Petraeus, do you believe the Iraqis have accepted this plan as their own and not simply an American plan?

General PETRAEUS. Yes.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JIM WEBB

ACCOUNTABILITY

20. Senator WEBB. Lieutenant General Petraeus, you have stated that “money is ammunition” in Iraq; do you agree that immediate, full accountability is essential for money already appropriated and spent?

General PETRAEUS. Depending on the situation, money can be more important than ammunition in the counterinsurgency fight. Once money is available, the challenge is to spend it effectively and quickly to rapidly achieve measurable results. Money needs to be provided as soon as possible to the organizations that have the capability and capacity to spend it in such a manner. At the same time, the American public rightfully deserves to know that its funds are spent carefully and transparently. I believe that we have the processes in place to use money for its intended purposes without compromising the trust and confidence of the United States taxpayer. In the past, I personally requested assistance from teams of auditors from the Army Audit Agency. I also supported the activities of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG), and Government Accountability Office (GAO), and overseen corrective measures when areas needing improvement have been identified. I met with the SIGIR and DOD IG in Washington, in fact, and pledged continued support to them.

21. Senator WEBB. Lieutenant General Petraeus, if so, how will you assist this committee in providing such accountability and in assuring transparency in ongoing projects?

General PETRAEUS. We have fiscal oversight processes in place now in MNF-I. For example, the SIGIR reports provide valuable insight to the Force Commander, the Ambassador, and officials in Washington. Again, I supported the activities of the SIGIR as Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC–I) Commander and I will support them as the Commander of MNF–I. I should note that I also supported the activities of the GAO during my time in Iraq and following return to the U.S., and I also invited the Army Audit Agency to audit activities of the 101st Airborne and MNSTC–I on two or three occasions while I was in Iraq. It is important that Congress and the American people have confidence that we are diligently expending funds allocated to us.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ELIZABETH DOLE

COOPERATION

22. Senator Dole. Lieutenant General Petraeus, one of your predecessors, LTG Peter Chiarelli, has stressed the need for unity of command. Would you explain your views on the issue, first at it relates to the need for greater cooperation between the U.S. Ambassador and the Commander of the MNF-Iraq, than was the case with your predecessors, and then link those thoughts with the need for greater unity of effort both between U.S. organizations, primarily DOD and the State Department, and then with the Iraqi government.

General Petraeus. Only through unity of effort of all—coalition and Iraqi, military and civilian—can we bring the full weight of our effort to bear on the difficult situation in Iraq. You have my commitment that I will work closely with the Ambassador to fully coordinate our actions in Iraq. Only through the full application of all elements of national power, through the various agencies, will we have the chance to achieve success.

Our military is making an enormous commitment in Iraq. The integration of joint capabilities under the Goldwater-Nichols Act has been a success. Our military forces are more interoperable today than they ever have been in our Nation's history. This achievement is impressive. Over time, we need the rest of the departments to do likewise, to help the Iraqi government get the country and its citizens working, and to use Iraq's substantial oil revenues for the benefit of all the Iraqi people.

The next step is to ensure the ability of the military and civilian departments to work closely together. Counterinsurgency warfare requires a total commitment of the government—both military and civilian agencies—and unity of effort is crucial to success. Integration of the interagency effort to ensure that progress is made along all lines-of-operation—not just security, but economic, governance, and the rule of law as well—is a significant challenge. I applaud the recent efforts to embed the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) headquarters for those provinces in which BCTs are the senior headquarters, or in the division headquarters in areas where they are the senior headquarters in a province. This will provide a synergy that will significantly enhance our ability to conduct stability and reconstruction operations in Iraq.

I will do all that I can, in partnership with the Ambassador, to ensure that our interagency is doing all possible to help develop capacity in the Iraqi government and to enable it to come to grips with the tough issues it must resolve.

SUNNI/SHIITE RELATIONS

23. Senator Dole. Lieutenant General Petraeus, do you agree with the testimony of General Keane, U.S. Army (Retired), on January 25 that the catalyst that drives sectarian violence in Iraq is Sunni violence against the Shiite population?

General Petraeus. This is a very complicated situation. Sunni violence against Shia is just one aspect of violence in Iraq. There is also the continuing al Qaeda terrorism. Shia violence against Sunnis plays a part, as does Shia on Shia violence. Organized criminal violence is also an unsettling factor. To place full responsibility on the Sunnis misrepresents the complex threat environment in Iraq, though some of the catalysts for sectarian violence (such as the Samarra mosque bombing) were earned out by Sunni extremists.

24. Senator Dole. Lieutenant General Petraeus, what is your plan for the deployment of forces across targeted neighborhoods in Baghdad so as to avoid, to the fullest extent possible, any appearance of bias toward either Sunnis or Shiites?

General Petraeus. ISFs will be assigned areas of operations throughout Baghdad without regard to sectarian composition of the units. Brigades of the 6th and 9th Iraqi Divisions, each of which have a mix of Shia and Sunni personnel (though predominantly Shia in their makeup) will be employed in all nine administrative districts of the city. It is true that some districts in the city are predominantly Shia, while others are predominantly Sunni. However, U.S. Army battalions will be partnered with these Iraqi brigades to reinforce the practice that all security forces operate in a professional, disciplined, and ethical manner, and in accordance with the rule of law, international humanitarian norms, and recognized international standards for enforcement and protection of human rights.

It is important to ensure no particular sect feels persecuted by the deployment of any ISF in their neighborhood. The partnering of a U.S. battalion with each ISF brigade will ensure that sectarian divisions and mistrust are kept to a minimum.
[The nomination reference of LTG David H. Petraeus, USA, follows:]

**Nomination Reference and Report**

*As in Executive Session,*

*Senate of the United States,*

*January 16, 2007.*

Ordered, that the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for appointment in the United States Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

*To be General.*

LTG David H. Petraeus, 0000.

[The biographical sketch of LTG David H. Petraeus, USA, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

**Résumé of Service Career of LTG David H. Petraeus, USA**

*Source of commissioned service:* USMA.

*Military schools attended:*  
Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses,  
Arbor Officer Advanced Course,  
United States Army Command and General Staff College,  
Senior Service College Fellowship—Georgetown University.

*Educational degrees:*  
United States Military Academy—BS—No Major.  
Princeton University—MPA—International Relations.  
Princeton University—PHD—International Relations.

*Foreign language(s):* None recorded.

*Promotions:*

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*Major duty assignments:*

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Platoon Leader, C Company, later S–4 (Logistics), later S–1 (Personnel), 509th Airborne Battalion Combat Team, Vicenza, Italy.  
Assistant S–3 (Operations), 2d Brigade, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, GA.  
Commander, A Company, later S–3 (Operations), 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, GA.  
Aide-de-Camp to the Division Commander, 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Stewart, GA.  
Student, Command and General Staff Officer Course, Fort Leavenworth, KS.  
Instructor, later Assistant Professor, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY.  
Military Assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe, Belgium.
From | To | Assignment
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Jun 88 | Aug 89 | S–3 (Operations), 2d Battalion, 30th Infantry, later 1st Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (Mechanized), United States Army Europe, Germany.
Aug 89 | Aug 91 | Aide/Assistant Executive Officer to the Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC.
Aug 91 | Jul 93 | Commander, 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY.
Jul 93 | Jul 94 | G–3 (Operations)/Director of Plans, Training, and Mobilization, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY.
Aug 94 | Jan 95 | Senior Service College Fellow, Georgetown University, Washington, DC.
Jan 95 | Jun 95 | Chief Operations Officer, U.N. Mission in Haiti, Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti.
Jun 95 | Jun 97 | Commander, 1st Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC.
Jun 97 | Sep 97 | Executive Assistant to the Director of the Joint Staff, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC.
Oct 97 | Aug 99 | Executive Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.
Aug 99 | Jul 00 | Assistant Division Commander (Operations), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina and Commanding General, Combined Joint Task Force-Kuwait, Operation Desert Spring, Kuwait.
Jul 00 | Aug 00 | Acting Commanding General, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC.
Aug 00 | Jun 01 | Chief of Staff, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, NC.
Jun 01 | Jun 02 | Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, SFOR and Deputy Commander, United States Joint Interagency Counterterrorism Task Force, Operation Joint Forge, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Jul 02 | May 04 | Commanding General, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and Fort Campbell, Fort Campbell, KY, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.
May 04 | Sep 05 | Commander, Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq/Commander, NATO Training Mission-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Iraq.

Summary of joint assignments:

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<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun 97–Aug 99</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 99–Sep 99</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun 01–Jun 02</td>
<td>Brigadier General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 04–Sep 05</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U.S. decorations and badges:
- Defense Distinguished Service Medal
- Distinguished Service Medal
- Defense Superior Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Legion of Merit (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Bronze Star Medal with "V" Device
- Defense Meritorious Service Medal
- Meritorious Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Joint Service Commendation Medal
- Army Commendation Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Joint Service Achievement Medal
- Army Achievement Medal
- Combat Action Badge
- Expert Infantryman Badge
- Master Parachutist Badge
- Air Assault Badge
- Ranger Tab
- Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
- Army Staff Identification Badge

The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details
the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG David H. Petraeus, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   David H. Petraeus.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Commander, Multinational Force-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom.

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   7 November 1952; Cornwall on Hudson, New York.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Hollister Knowlton Petraeus.

7. Names and ages of children:
   Anne, 24; Stephen, 20.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    Council on Foreign Relations.
    Association of the United States Army.
    Association of Graduates, United States Military Academy.
    82d Airborne Division Association.
    101st Airborne Division Association.
    504th Parachute Infantry Regiment Association.
    Static Line Association.
    555th Parachute Infantry Regiment Association.
    187th Infantry Regiment Association.
SHAPE Alumni Association.
7th Armored Division Association.
Princeton Alumni Association.
United States Parachute Association.
Command and General Staff Foundation.

11. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
None.

12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

DAVID H. PETRAEUS.

This 16th day of January, 2007.

[The nomination of LTG David H. Petraeus, USA, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on January 24, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on January 26, 2007.]
NOMINATION OF ADM WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

TUESDAY, JANUARY 30, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; Christine E. Cowart, chief clerk; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel, Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, research assistant; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member; and Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: David G. Collins and Fletcher L. Cork.

Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Darcie Tokioka, assistant to Senator Akaka; Caroline Tess, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Benjamin Rinaker, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; Gordon I. Peterson and Michael L. Sozan, assistants to Senator Webb; Nichole M. Distefano,
assistant to Senator McCaskill; Vince Piperni and Jeremy Shull, assistants to Senator Inhofe, Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Adam G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody.

Today, we welcome Admiral William J. Fallon, USN, the President’s nominee for Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Admiral Fallon has distinguished himself in service to our country for over 39 years in a number of challenging and important assignments, including 24 years in naval aviation, logging over 4,800 flight hours, and then a succession of staff and command positions, culminating as the current Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).

We're particularly grateful for Admiral Fallon’s willingness to take on another, and probably the most challenging assignment of all as the CENTCOM Commander, following in the footsteps of General John Abizaid. One of the critical attributes that any geographic combatant commander must have is an ability to understand the geopolitical context of the region, as well as the political dynamics internal to the countries that comprise the region.

In his current assignment as Commander of the U.S. PACOM, Admiral Fallon has exhibited a keen understanding of political dynamics, successfully building renewed military-to-military relationships with China and Indonesia, two of the most important countries in the Pacific. His demonstrated ability in this regard will serve this Nation well when dealing with the complex politics of the Persian Gulf and understanding the interactions between the use of force and political dynamics in Iraq.

While the situation in Iraq will no doubt demand a large degree of his attention and time, the challenges in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR) are diverse, difficult, and, at times, seemingly intractable. They're also of immense importance to the security of this Nation. The U.S. CENTCOM is the U.S. military's most challenging combatant command. The threats the U.S. faces in the CENTCOM AOR go far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Somalia, and the Horn of Africa, among other locations, also pose significant potential threats to the United States. As the top military commander in this unstable region of the world, Congress and the President will be relying heavily on Admiral Fallon's advice.

The challenges in the CENTCOM AOR are complex and interrelated. As the Iraq Study Group stated, Iraq cannot be addressed effectively in isolation from other major regional issues, interests, and unresolved conflicts. His predecessor in the position to which Admiral Fallon has been nominated, General Abizaid, testified to this committee on August 3, 2006, saying, “Iraq sits at the center of the broader regional problem.” General Abizaid made a similar point in December, when he said, “You have to internationalize the problem. You have to attack it diplomatically, geostrategically. You can't just apply a microscope on a particular problem in downtown
Baghdad and a particular problem in downtown Kabul and say that, somehow or another, if you throw enough military forces at it, then you’re going to solve the broader issues in the region of extremism.”

This broader struggle against violent extremism extending throughout the region poses a significant challenge for the next Commander of U.S. CENTCOM. Ambassador John Negroponte, the Director of the National Intelligence (DNI), testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that al Qaeda remains the greatest terrorist threat to our security interests and those of our allies. He said that al Qaeda is operating from secure hideouts in Pakistan, developing stronger operational relationships that radiate throughout the Middle East, Northern Africa, and Europe. Ambassador Negroponte has also warned of the growing shadow of Iranian influence in the Middle East region. Iranian support for Shia militias in Iraq, their backing of Hezbollah in Lebanon, possible Iranian influence with Shiites in western Afghanistan, and Iran’s ongoing pursuit of a nuclear capability all pose risks to regional security and to international security. The next CENTCOM Commander will need to provide straightforward, independent advice on the most effective course of action for deterring Iran’s attempts to acquire nuclear weapons and to dominate its neighbors, and the likely consequences of escalating tensions with Iran.

Syria also poses a challenge to security in the region. Recently renewed violence in Lebanon is yet another example of the negative impact that Syria, as well as Iran, appears to be having on stability in the region.

Over the last month, the CENTCOM footprint in Djibouti has gone from largely unknown to the newest public front in the global war on terror. Two recent air strikes by AC–130 gunships in southern Somalia have highlighted a depth of U.S. concern for the potential impact of threats emanating from a highly unstable failed state. DNI Negroponte, in fact, in testimony before the House Select Committee on Intelligence, said that al Qaeda remains determined to exploit the turmoil in Somalia.

But, of course, the two great threats, Afghanistan and Iraq, are what we’ll probably spend most of our time on this morning and what Admiral Fallon will be spending, no doubt, most of his time on. The rising threat of a resurgent Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan: over the past year, there’s been a dramatic rise in violence, particularly in the southern and eastern regions of the country, and military experts anticipate a spring offensive by the Taliban that is likely to be even more violent. International efforts to combat opium production, a major source of insurgent funding, are failing, with opium production in Afghanistan at record levels. U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commanders in Afghanistan have indicated that additional troops are needed for the mission; and yet, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) remains about 15 percent short of the troop and equipment levels that NATO leaders have agreed to provide. In addition, ISAF operations are hindered by national caveats imposed by some NATO members on the movement or use of their troops in theater. The next CENTCOM Commander will have to
work to overcome these challenges, and others, to ensure success in Afghanistan.

The most daunting challenge will be Iraq. Admiral Fallon will be called upon to execute the President’s new strategy in Iraq. President Bush’s new approach is predominantly a military strategy, although Prime Minister Maliki himself has said that the only solution is a political solution, and that’s a sentiment that was expressed, as well, by our current top commanders, General George Casey and General Abizaid.

Admiral Fallon will have to determine how to pressure Iraqi political leaders to make the political compromises essential to a political solution. It will be most interesting hearing whether he intends to do so; and, if so, how. The Iraqi leaders made commitments about modifications to their constitution, taking over responsibility for security, only to break those commitments; and, so far, without consequences.

Admiral, we again thank you for your tremendous devotion to this Nation, and your service to our Nation. We thank your family, as well, for their support.

I now call upon Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I join the chairman in congratulating you, Admiral Fallon, on your nomination in this very important responsibility and in these very difficult times. You bring nearly 4 decades of military experiences to the challenge America faces, and obviously your performance at PACOM is the reason why you are here before us today and taking on these new responsibilities.

I think the chairman has covered the challenges that we face, and, while I would just like to re-emphasize, in Afghanistan, General Karl Eikenberry said, on January 16, “It’s going to be a violent spring, and we’re going to have violence into this summer.” Obviously our attention is focused on Iraq, but I think that it’s very clear that there’s going to be a very difficult time in Afghanistan very soon. One of the areas that you are going to need to work on is to get our allies to participate, not only in numbers, but also in terms of mission. Many of our allies who are there in Afghanistan are so restricted in their activities that they are far from as useful as they can be.

On January 10, the President proposed a new strategy for Iraq that has economic, diplomatic, and military components. We all have a new team of Secretary of Defense, senior military commanders, and a new Ambassador in Iraq. These are positive developments in a situation that can best be described as dire. This war has been mishandled. No one doubts that mistakes have been made in Iraq, and no one disagrees that the consequences of a failed state there are potentially catastrophic.

Admiral Fallon, the chairman will ask you one of the routine questions that we ask nominees to positions of higher command, and that is, “If asked your personal opinion, you will give a candid assessment.” I have to tell you, this committee did not get candid assessments in the past. I view that with deep regret, because I
think the American people and their representatives deserved better.

I want you to emphatically assure Chairman Levin when he asks you that question, that you will, indeed, give us your candid and best assessment of the situation. Too often, administration officials came before this committee and the American people and painted a rosy scenario, when it was not there. Yesterday, you and I, and Senator Clinton, were in San Antonio, and one of the most moving experiences of my life was to watch these young, brave soldiers who have been so badly injured and made such enormous sacrifice before us in that audience. We owe them more and better leadership and a better strategy than we have provided them with in the past, Admiral.

This is probably our last opportunity, this change in strategy, to salvage a very difficult situation. I hope you know, and will tell this committee, how difficult and arduous this task will be because of the hole that we have dug for ourselves, to a very large degree.

I, again, congratulate you. We look forward to working with you. I don’t think we can have a better person to fill this position of enormous responsibility.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Chairman Levin. Now, a quorum is present, we’re going to take this opportunity to consider the committee funding resolution and the committee rules.

The funding resolution is consistent with, and follows, the guidelines which have been stipulated in a January 18 letter from the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Rules Committee and the Joint Leadership Agreement on Committee Funding of January 12. It has been reviewed by majority and minority staff. I understand it is acceptable to everybody.

Is there a motion to favorably report the funding resolution?
Senator Kennedy. So moved.
Chairman Levin. Second?
Senator Reed. Second.
Chairman Levin. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
The resolution is agreed to.

On the rules, the proposed committee rules are identical to the committee rules from the 109th Congress, but for a single change. The Senate Rules provide that not less than one-third of the members of a committee constitute a quorum for the purpose of doing business. Because our committee has increased in size from 24 to 25 members, the proposed rules have been changed to reflect a quorum of 9 members rather than 8. Otherwise, these rules remain the same as they were in the 109th Congress.

They have been reviewed by majority and minority staff. I understand they are acceptable to everybody.

Is there a motion to approve the proposed rules?
Senator Kennedy. So moved.
Chairman Levin. Second?
Senator Reed. Second.
Chairman Levin. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
The rules are approved.
110TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES.

Authorizing expenditures by the Committee on Armed Services.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. LEVIN submitted the following resolution, which was referred to the Committee on

RESOLUTION

Authorizing expenditures by the Committee on Armed Services.

Resolved, That in carrying out its powers, duties, and functions under the Standing Rules of the Senate, in accordance with its jurisdiction under rule XXV of such rules, including holding hearings, reporting such hearings, and making investigations as authorized by paragraphs 1 and 8 of rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee on Armed Services is authorized from March 1, 2007, through September 30, 2007; October 1, 2007, through September 30, 2008; and October 1, 2008, through February 28, 2009, in its discretion (1) to make expenditures from the contingent fund of the Senate, (2)
to employ personnel, and (3) with the prior consent of the
Government department or agency concerned and the
Committee on Rules and Administration, to use on a reim-
bursable or nonreimbursable basis the services of per-
sonnel of any such department or agency.

SEC. 2. (a) The expenses of the Committee on Armed
Services for the period March 1, 2007, through September
30, 2007, under this Resolution shall not exceed
$4,073,254, of which amount—

(1) not to exceed $75,000 may be expended for
the procurement of the services of individual consult-
ants, or organizations thereof (as authorized by sec-
tion 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946, as amended); and

(2) not to exceed $30,000 may be expended for
the training of the professional staff of such com-
mitee (under procedures specified by section 202(j)
of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946).

(b) For the period October 1, 2007, through Sep-
tember 30, 2008, expenses of the Committee on Armed
Services under this Resolution shall not exceed
$7,139,800, of which amount—

(1) not to exceed $80,000 may be expended for
the procurement of the services of individual consult-
ants, or organizations thereof (as authorized by sec-
tion 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended); and

(2) not to exceed $30,000 may be expended for
the training of the professional staff of such com-
mittee (under the procedures specified by section
202(j) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946).

(c) For the period October 1, 2008, through Feb-
uary 28, 2009, expenses of the Committee on Armed
Services under this Resolution shall not exceed
$3,032,712, of which amount—

(1) not to exceed $50,000 may be expended for
the procurement of the services of individual consult-
ants, or organizations thereof (as authorized by sec-
tion 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946, as amended); and

(2) not to exceed $30,000 may be expended for
the training of the professional staff of such com-
mittee (under the procedures specified by section
202(j) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1946).

Sec. 3. Expenses of the Committee on Armed Serv-
ices under this Resolution shall be paid from the contin-
gent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the
chairman of the committee, except that vouchers shall not be required—

(1) for the disbursement of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate;

(2) for the payment of telecommunications provided by the Office of the Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper, United States Senate;

(3) for the payment of stationery supplies purchased through the Keeper of the Stationery, United States Senate;

(4) for payments to the Postmaster, United States Senate;

(5) for the payment of metered charges on copying equipment provided by the Office of the Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper, United States Senate;

(6) for the payment of Senate Recording and Photographic Services; or

(7) for payment of franked and mass mail costs by the Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper, United States Senate.

Sec. 4. There are authorized such sums as may be necessary for agency contributions related to the compensation of employees of the Committee on Armed Services from March 1, 2007, through September 30, 2007;
October 1, 2007, through September 30, 2008; and October 1, 2008, through February 28, 2009, to be paid from the Appropriations account for “EXPENSES OF INQUIRIES AND INVESTIGATIONS”. 
1. **Regular Meeting Day.** The Committee shall meet at least once a month when Congress is in session. The regular meeting days of the Committee shall be Tuesday and Thursday, unless the Chairman, after consultation with the Ranking Minority Member, directs otherwise.

2. **Additional Meetings.** The Chairman, after consultation with the Ranking Minority Member, may call such additional meetings as he deems necessary.

3. **Special Meetings.** Special meetings of the Committee may be called by a majority of the members of the Committee in accordance with paragraph 3 of Rule XXVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate.

4. **Open Meetings.** Each meeting of the Committee, or any subcommittee thereof, including meetings to conduct hearings, shall be open to the public, except that a meeting or series of meetings by the Committee or a subcommittee thereof on the same subject for a period of no more than fourteen (14) calendar days may be closed to the public on a motion made and seconded to go into closed session to discuss only whether the matters enumerated below in clauses (a) through (f) would require the meeting to be closed, followed immediately by a record vote in open session by a majority of the members of the Committee or subcommittee when it is determined that the matters to be discussed or the testimony to be taken at such meeting or meetings:

   (a) will disclose matters necessary to be kept secret in the interests of national defense or the confidential conduct of the foreign relations of the United States;
   (b) will relate solely to matters of Committee staff personnel or internal staff management or procedure;
   (c) will tend to charge an individual with a crime or misconduct, to disgrace or injure the professional standing of an individual, or otherwise to expose an individual to public contempt or obloquy or will represent a clearly unwarranted invasion of the privacy of an individual;
   (d) will disclose the identity of any informer or law enforcement agent or will disclose any information relating to the investigation or prosecution of a criminal offense that is required to be kept secret in the interests of effective law enforcement;
   (e) will disclose information relating to the trade secrets or financial or commercial information pertaining specifically to a given person if:
      (1) an Act of Congress requires the information to be kept confidential by Government officers and employees; or
      (2) the information has been obtained by the Government on a confidential basis, other than through an application by such person for a specific Government financial or other benefit, and is required to be kept secret in order to prevent undue injury to the competitive position of such person; or
   (f) may divulge matters required to be kept confidential under other provisions of law or
Government regulations.

5. **PRESIDING OFFICER.** The Chairman shall preside at all meetings and hearings of the Committee except that in his absence the Ranking Majority Member present at the meeting or hearing shall preside unless by majority vote the Committee provides otherwise.

6. **QUORUM.** (a) A majority of the members of the Committee are required to be actually present to report a matter or measure from the Committee. (See Standing Rules of the Senate 26.7(a)(1)).

   (b) Except as provided in subsections (a) and (c), and other than for the conduct of hearings, nine members of the Committee, including one member of the minority party; or a majority of the members of the Committee, shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of such business as may be considered by the Committee.

   (c) Three members of the Committee, one of whom shall be a member of the minority party, shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of taking sworn testimony, unless otherwise ordered by a majority of the full Committee.

   (d) Proxy votes may not be considered for the purpose of establishing a quorum.

7. **PROXY VOTING.** Proxy voting shall be allowed on all measures and matters before the Committee. The vote by proxy of any member of the Committee may be counted for the purpose of reporting any measure or matter to the Senate if the absent member casting such vote has been informed of the matter on which the member is being recorded and has affirmatively requested that he or she be so recorded. Proxy must be given in writing.

8. **ANNOUNCEMENT OF VOTES.** The results of all roll call votes taken in any meeting of the Committee on any measure, or amendment thereto, shall be announced in the Committee report, unless previously announced by the Committee. The announcement shall include a tabulation of the votes cast in favor and votes cast in opposition to each such measure and amendment by each member of the Committee who was present at such meeting. The Chairman, after consultation with the Ranking Minority Member, may hold open a roll call vote on any measure or matter which is before the Committee until no later than midnight of the day on which the Committee votes on such measure or matter.

9. **SUBPOENAS.** Subpoenas for attendance of witnesses and for the production of memoranda, documents, records, and the like may be issued, after consultation with the Ranking Minority Member, by the Chairman or any other member designated by the Chairman, but only when authorized by a majority of the members of the Committee. The subpoena shall briefly state the matter to which the witness is expected to testify or the documents to be produced.

10. **HEARINGS.** (a) Public notice shall be given of the date, place and subject matter of any hearing to be held by the Committee, or any subcommittee thereof, at least 1 week in advance of such hearing, unless the Committee or subcommittee determines that good cause exists for beginning such hearings at an earlier time.
(b) Hearings may be initiated only by the specified authorization of the Committee or subcommittee.

c) Hearings shall be held only in the District of Columbia unless specifically authorized to be held elsewhere by a majority vote of the Committee or subcommittee conducting such hearings.

d) The Chairman of the Committee or subcommittee shall consult with the Ranking Minority Member thereof before naming witnesses for a hearing.

e) Witnesses appearing before the Committee shall file with the clerk of the Committee a written statement of their proposed testimony prior to the hearing at which they are to appear unless the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member determine that there is good cause not to file such a statement. Witnesses testifying on behalf of the Administration shall furnish an additional 50 copies of their statement to the Committee. All statements must be received by the Committee at least 48 hours (not including weekends or holidays) before the hearing.

(f) Confidential testimony taken or confidential material presented in a closed hearing of the Committee or subcommittee or any report of the proceedings of such hearing shall not be made public in whole or in part or by way of summary unless authorized by a majority vote of the Committee or subcommittee.

(g) Any witness summoned to give testimony or evidence at a public or closed hearing of the Committee or subcommittee may be accompanied by counsel of his own choosing who shall be permitted at all times during such hearing to advise such witness of his legal rights.

(h) Witnesses providing unsworn testimony to the Committee may be given a transcript of such testimony for the purpose of making minor grammatical corrections. Such witnesses will not, however, be permitted to alter the substance of their testimony. Any question involving such corrections shall be decided by the Chairman.

11. NOMINATIONS. Unless otherwise ordered by the Committee, nominations referred to the Committee shall be held for at least seven (7) days before being voted on by the Committee. Each member of the Committee shall be furnished a copy of all nominations referred to the Committee.

12. REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS. Each member of the Committee shall be furnished with a copy of the proposals of the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, submitted pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 2662 and with a copy of the proposals of the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, submitted pursuant to 50 U.S.C. App. 2285, regarding the proposed acquisition or disposition of property of an estimated price or rental of more than $50,000. Any member of the Committee opposing to or requesting information on a proposed acquisition or disposal shall communicate his objection or request to the Chairman of the Committee within thirty (30) days from the date of submission.

13. LEGISLATIVE CALENDAR. (a) The clerk of the Committee shall keep a printed calendar for the information of each Committee member showing the bills introduced and referred to the Committee and the status of such bills. Such calendar shall be revised from time to time to show pertinent changes in such bills, the current status thereof, and new bills introduced and referred to
Chairman Levin. Admiral Fallon, welcome again and please proceed.

STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN, FOR RE-APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

Admiral Fallon. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, Senator Warner, Senator Kennedy, and distinguished members of the committee, good morning, and thank you for this opportunity to appear before you.

I'm honored by the confidence of the President and the Secretary of Defense in nominating me for this position, but I am under no illusion regarding the magnitude of the tasks and the challenges we face in this region of the world. From Beirut to Kashmir, conflict and areas of instability abound; yet, as you well know, this region, with some 630 million people, the cradle of Western Civilization, is of critical importance to our Nation and the world.

Last week, General David Petraeus provided a detailed evaluation of the situation in Iraq. I concur in his assessment, and I recognize this as the top priority for CENTCOM attention. The situation in Iraq is serious and clearly in need of new and different actions.

Earlier this month, President Bush outlined a new way forward for the United States in Iraq. General Petraeus described refocusing on the Iraqi population as the center of attention for security.

The situation in Iraq will not be resolved solely through military means. Security is but one aspect of what must be a comprehensive effort to address not only this issue, but economic development and a reinvigorated participatory political process in Iraq by Iraqis. In developing these new initiatives, we will need major and sustained assistance from other government agencies, and I would welcome volunteers, particularly in the areas of political and economic development.

The situation in Afghanistan, although much improved from the days of Taliban rule, is fragile. The Government of Afghanistan, with ISAF support, has made significant progress, but faces a resurgence of Taliban activity, particularly in the southern part of the country. Other security challenges include Lebanon, the Horn
of Africa, with several nations facing internal unrest and insurgent activity. Iranian support for terrorism and sectarian violence beyond its borders and its pursuit of nuclear capability is destabilizing and troubling.

In addressing these and other challenges in the region, I would, if confirmed, solicit the opinions and suggestions of our allies and partners in the region and the world. There is no doubt that other nations in the region could be helpful with this situation in Iraq.

I truly believe that most people in Afghanistan and Iraq seek peace and an opportunity to enjoy a decent life for themselves and their families. It has been my experience in the Asia-Pacific region that progress in advancing the aspirations and desires of people require stability and security. American military forces and their civilian counterparts have been performing superbly in their efforts to provide these essential needs in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. I am humbled by their service, dedication, courage, and sacrifice. It would be my high honor to serve in CENTCOM with these great Americans and our coalition partners.

I believe the situation in Iraq can be turned around. But time is short. There are no guarantees, but you can depend on me for my best effort. I pray for God’s help, and I draw confidence in the indomitable spirit and skilled dedication of our service men and women.

Thank you for your support.

Chairman LEVIN. Admiral, thank you.

Now, the standard questions which Senator McCain has referred to.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

Admiral FALLON. I have not.

Chairman LEVIN. Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record and hearings?

Admiral FALLON. I will.

Chairman LEVIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

Admiral FALLON. I will.

Chairman LEVIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

Admiral FALLON. They will.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify, upon request, before this committee?

Admiral FALLON. I do.

Chairman LEVIN. This is the question which Senator McCain referred to; it means a great deal to us. We’re deadly serious about it. We are about all the questions, but this one really becomes more and more important as we look at the recent history. Do you agree to give your personal views, when asked before this committee to do so, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir, I do.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Admiral. For starters, we'll do a 6-minute round of questions on an early-bird basis.

Admiral, there is not just a question of 21,000 troops that are going to go to Iraq under the President’s new policy, but there's also a different strategy for those troops. They will be holding Baghdad neighborhoods, not just inserted, not just clearing, but then remaining and holding neighborhoods in that city, presumably with Iraqi units, if they do what they’ve not done so far, which is to carry out their commitments to move into neighborhoods. They will be operating under 30-or-so mini bases in platoon- or company-sized units.

How do you foresee preventing incidences such as recently happened in Karbala, where five American soldiers were abducted and then killed while in a meeting with Iraqi security forces in a supposedly secure compound? In other words, our troops are going to be inserted into the most difficult areas imaginable, right into the neighborhoods, right in the face of the Iraqis. How are we going to avoid the increased risks that are created by that kind of face-to-face presence?

Admiral Fallon. Senator, there’s clearly going to be an increased risk in this area. I've spoken with General Petraeus. I have a lot to learn, much research to do, and a lot of dialogue yet to go on so that I have a better understanding of the detail of his intentions. I believe that he’s going to need some time, when he gets on the ground out there, to sort this out.

But it seems pretty obvious to me that what we have been doing has not been working. We have not been getting the results that we desire, and we clearly have to do something different. There is a significant body of evidence that indicates that approaching an insurgency such as we are facing now—and that wasn’t the case several years ago in Iraq, but it’s clearly the case now—there’s a body of evidence that indicates that to be successful in this endeavor, historically you’ve had to get in amongst the population to convince them that you really care about them and that you are able to provide security on-scene rather than just passing through an area.

I can give you my experience in the Asia-Pacific region. We have some ongoing insurgencies in Southeast Asia, as you're well aware. In the Philippines, there's been significant progress, particularly recently. Our approach to action in the Philippines to combat the insurgencies that are ongoing there has been multipronged; in fact, very similar to what has been outlined for us to pursue in Iraq. It involves being down with the armed forces with whom we’re working. In the Pacific, it’s with the Philippine armed forces. In Iraq, we're going to have to get with theirs. It involves getting our people in front of the population so that they can see that they're engaged and give them confidence.
Chairman Levin. Didn’t we intentionally keep our people out, away from the smaller units?

Admiral Fallon. In the Philippines, we have kept our people away from those small units going into combat, but an essential part of the security desire down there was to, in fact, engage with the population in a broad base of humanitarian engineering activities, so they actually see our people regularly.

Chairman Levin. Was there an interface as directly, as intimately, in the Philippines with the population, as it true in Baghdad?

Admiral Fallon. The situation is not nearly as dangerous, obviously, in Sulu as it is in Baghdad.

Chairman Levin. General Abizaid testified in November that he has talked with all the divisional commanders, with General Casey and General Martin Dempsey. They all talked together. He asked them whether or not, if we brought in more American troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq? They all said no. He went on to explain—and this is General Abizaid, just a few months ago—“It’s easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own future.”

Have you spoken with General Abizaid?

Admiral Fallon. I’ve spoken with General Abizaid, but not on this subject.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree with his testimony on that subject?

Admiral Fallon. I don’t know, Senator, but I’ll give you my opinion and assessment. What we’ve been doing is not working, and we need to be doing, it seems to me, something different. General Petraeus has outlined, in extensive detail before you, a proposal to try to enhance stability and security in Baghdad and the rest of Iraq, and I would be anxious, if confirmed, to work with him to try and implement this. General Petraeus has, in our discussions, made very clear to me that this will require more troops. I don’t know how many troops. Frankly, I aim to find out and have my own opinions.

Chairman Levin. Thank you. One of the issues on the number of troops was the testimony that we’ve received about off-ramps, that, as these brigades move in, perhaps one a month, or whatever the rate turns out to be, that there are off-ramps, that we don’t have to continue that flow, if the Iraqis do not carry out their commitments.

Stephen Hadley, the National Security Advisor, said U.S. force increases will be “pay-as-you-go, depending a lot on the Iraqis performing.”

Secretary Gates said there’s plenty of opportunity before many of the 21,000 additional troops arrive to evaluate, “whether the Iraqis are fulfilling their commitments to us.”

General Pace told us the Iraqis must “put action behind their words. Our flow of forces will allow us to modify what we do next.”

Now, what is the policy, do you know, in terms of off-ramps? Is this policy subject to change, as our brigades go in, if the Iraqis are not carrying out their commitments, as we’ve been assured before
this committee? Even General Petraeus, when he was here, said that he wanted all five brigades in Iraq as quickly as possible. He did say that. But then, he said their flow, not “would be,” could be tied to Iraqi military, political, or economic progress. What do you understand the policy to be? Could this flow change? Could it be slowed down, stopped, if the Iraqis do not carry out the commitment? My operative word there is, “could it” be slowed down?

Admiral Fallon. Senator, I have not gotten into the details of these plans. I have a full-time job in PACOM, and I've tried to stay away from the details of CENTCOM until such time as I might be confirmed; then I intend to dive into it.

General Petraeus, in our meeting before he left, indicated that he thought he needed these additional troops. I do not know the details of how he plans to use them. I'm sure he's going to have to consult with his generals on the ground once he gets into position, and then figure it out. I'd be happy to take that question and come back to you, if it's appropriate, at a later time.

Chairman Levin. If you would let us know, for the record, what is your understanding specifically on that issue, we would appreciate it.

[The information referred to follows:]

There is no policy on troop deployment and redeployment in correlation to Iraqi military, political, and economic progress/failure. Troop deployments and redeployments are based upon missions (requirements, needs, and conditions), the situation, the enemy, commander recommendations, and requests.

Chairman Levin. I'm surprised that you don't have that understanding going in, frankly. This is a policy issue which has been decided, presumably, by the policymakers.

Admiral Fallon. Yes, but I—

Chairman Levin. Nonetheless, if you say you don't know the policy in that regard, we have to take that as your answer.

Admiral Fallon. If I could, just a comment. I'm not sure that you can have a policy plan ahead of time that would dictate the intricacies of what forces move into what areas for what tasks.

Chairman Levin. I'm sure that's not true, either, but you could have a policy which says that we can modify this as these brigades show up if the Iraqis have not carried out their commitments. Could modify.

Admiral Fallon. Sure.

Chairman Levin. That's certainly, it seems to me, a credible policy.

Admiral Fallon. Seems pretty reasonable to me, sir. Obviously, as we're making modifications to what we've been doing in Iraq now, I would expect we'd do the same thing in the future.

Chairman Levin. Senator McCain.

Admiral Fallon. Thank you.

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to go back to Afghanistan for a second. We have plans to increase our troop strength there by some 2,500. Have you gotten into this issue enough to have a handle on how serious this spring is going to be and what's going to be required?

Admiral Fallon. No, Senator, I've been watching from a distance, just reading news reports. I have not talked with General
Eikenberry about this, although I’ve asked to have him come back through the Pacific, on his way back home, to get a better insight.

Senator MCCAIN. What is your degree of confidence that the Iraqi Government and military are up to the task that we are now embarking on in this new strategy?

Admiral FALLON. Critical question, particularly in the political arena, and I don’t have an assessment of that. I have not personally met any of the civilian political leadership in Iraq. I do have some knowledge of the Iraqi military, albeit just a slice, from a couple of visits to PACOM base forces that are serving in Iraq. I was out there last month to see some of them. My initial assessment is that there are some good troops and some that need a lot of work. There are some leaders that have impressed me as people that understood and “got it,” and were effective, and others that are probably less so. I would speculate—a danger here—that that’s not a dissimilar situation throughout the country.

The challenge I see is identifying those leaders that are going to be effective, those units that are trained, or can be trained, to do what needs to be done and to encourage them to pick up the load. If this is not successful, then we’re going to have problems.

But all of this is a backdrop to the kind of political backbone and tough decisionmaking that I believe is required of the leadership in Baghdad.

I think, to be fair to them, they have a tough row to hoe. This is not like, as you know much better than I, our country. In my reading, going back to 2003, we have hundreds of good ideas of things that we would like to see in Iraq that are more reflective of the kind of society and process that we enjoy here. It seems to me that we probably erred in our assessment of the ability of these people to take on all of these tasks at the same time. It seems to me that one of the things in the back of my mind that I’d like to get answered is to meet with the people that have been working this issue, particularly our ambassadors, our diplomats, to get an assessment of what’s realistic and what’s practical. Maybe we ought to redefine the goals here a bit and do something that’s more realistic, in terms of getting some progress, and then maybe take on the other things later.

Senator MCCAIN. Again, we would like a realistic assessment of the situation. On numerous occasions in the past, witnesses have told us that the training and equipping of the Iraqi military was going just fine.

Admiral FALLON. One of the challenges—and this is not unique to the situation in Iraq; I think we face it in all aspects of our lives—we tend to assess things in ways that are—you used the comment, or I think Senator Levin used the “rosy” word before—in terms that will not hurt people’s feelings, that will—whatever. The fact of the matter is, of all places, we need candid assessments, and you’ll get them from me.

Senator MCCAIN. I believe, Admiral, that it will be difficult, in the short-term, to determine the progress of the military side of this equation. I think it’s going to be difficult. It has taken us 3½ years, at least, to get into the dire situation that we are in today. But I do agree with Senator Levin that there are certain benchmarks that we could expect the Iraqi Government to comply with,
such as disarming individual militias, the number of Iraqi military
that will actually be deployed in Baghdad alongside ours. As you
may remember, in the past they promised six brigades, and only
two battalions showed up. Also legislation to ensure that the oil re-
sources benefit the Sunni, as well as the Shia. In other words, I
think that we could know fairly soon whether we are going to have
an Iraqi government that is truly committed to this overall process.
Would you agree with that?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I think there's an obvious need to
have actions taken by the Government of Iraq to get on their—
shouldn't use the word “timeline,” because I've never actually seen
a timeline, but they have stated a number of these objectives;
you've enumerated a couple of these now—and it's pretty clear to
me that they have to take these steps or we're not going to be effec-
tive in the security business. It seems to me that, again, from my
with the word “timeline,” because I've never actually seen
a timeline, but they have stated a number of these objectives;
you've enumerated a couple of these now—and it's pretty clear to
me that they have to take these steps or we're not going to be effec-
tive in the security business. It seems to me that, again, from my
glancing visit through that country last month, there is a lack of
confidence among the other sects—other than the Shia—within this
country, of the desire of the government to actually address issues
in the entire country. So, it seems to me—again, from a distance;
and this is politics—that an essential foundation to making
progress in this country is for that government to step up and start
making some of these tough decisions. I recognize it's difficult.
There's a lot of baggage in the legacy, which you're well aware of.
But unless this begins to happen, I doubt that we're going to be
effective in the military arena.
Senator McCain. I read, with some interest, the remarks of the
Iranian Ambassador, the last few days, and there are many who
think we ought to begin “a dialogue” with the Iranians. Do you
have any view on that issue?
Admiral Fallon. Senator, I think that Iranian activity, particu-
larly regarding Iraq, has not been helpful, to date. I would welcome
steps by the Iraqi government that would indicate that they are inter-
ested in long-term—
Senator McCain. You mean the Iranian Government.
Admiral Fallon. I'm sorry, Iranian Government—that would indi-
cate they really are interested in helping the situation. To date,
I haven't seen that. I think we need to see some of those kinds of
steps, again, then over to the political and diplomatic arena to see
what can be done.
Senator McCain. I thank you, Admiral.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Next would be Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Admiral, and welcome to your family. We are very
pleased to have you before this committee, and I thank you for
your years of distinguished service to our country.
I know that you are in the process of confirmation, and that it
may be difficult to give specific answers to some of these questions,
because you're not yet confirmed, and you haven't had the oppor-
tunity to really get a firsthand view for yourself. But, if I could, Ad-
miral, one of the issues that concerns me, and, I think, other mem-
ers of this committee, regards the lack of unity of command for
the Iraqi and U.S. forces that will be operating in and around
Baghdad. In fact, we’ve heard, from retired General Jack Keane and General Petraeus, their concerns about what this means. I’m having trouble getting to the bottom of this, because General Petraeus sounded somewhat surprised about it and reflected some of his concerns, and General Keane, who apparently was very active in helping to devise the plan the President has put forth, also said that it was very dangerous and frustrating not to have unity of command.

Can you shed any light on this decision for our committee?

Admiral FALLON. Senator, not yet, but this is clearly a very significant, critical item. We have to know exactly who’s reporting to whom, for what purposes. I would expect that General Petraeus will have this at the top of his list when he gets out there. There are ways to do this but we have to make sure that the lines are straight if we’re going to be effective.

Senator CLINTON. I would appreciate that. I welcome the openness that both you and General Petraeus have exhibited to the committee, and I hope that we could hear from both of you in short order about this. I hope we can hear that it has been fixed, because some of these stories coming out of the fighting on Haifa Street, the recent large engagement near Najaf, have certainly raised serious questions about the Iraqi military’s capacity to take actions which we thought they were capable of. Certainly, we don’t want to put our young men and women into harm’s way with that level of confusion.

Second, Admiral, I asked General Petraeus—this was really more of a plea; some have characterized it as a prayer—that we not send our new troops into Baghdad without being fully equipped and ready. There have been a number of articles in the last week, and there is one today in the Washington Post, about how equipment for the added troops is lacking. We are short thousands of vehicles, armor kits, and other equipment. We do not have the capacity to quickly turn around that equipment. In fact, Lieutenant General Speakes has said that we’re going to have to be, pretty much improvising, trying to share equipment, which I find deeply troubling. I’m also concerned that the United States has agreed to sell 600 up-armored Humvees to Iraq this year for its security forces, and, again, quoting General Speakes, saying that “such sales better not be at the expense of the American soldier or marine.” Again, Admiral, do you know anything yet about whether or not we’re going to have the equipment for these additional combat brigades?

Admiral FALLON. Senator, I do not know the details of that. I can tell you that, in PACOM, there’s been a request made for us to look at the equipment that we have in this region and to send some of it to the Middle East, equipment that might be appropriate to soldiers and marines that are headed in that direction.

I know, from my experience, that the units are not all equipped in the same manner, particularly the Army units, which have a diverse background. Some are light infantry, some are heavier, and they have different types and varieties of vehicles.

I found it interesting, from a professional side, when I was in Iraq, as I traveled around the country recently, to note the differences between the units. The thought occurred to me that it would be interesting—and I’d like to find out the answers of just
how one goes about using these different equipment sets in dif-
ferent situations—as we rotate troops from one area to another,
how effective they are, and so forth. So, I have it in the back of
my mind, and would like to take this up with General Petraeus to
do an assessment of what essential things are necessary to put our
people in the best possible position. We’ll do that as soon as we get
there.

Senator CLINTON. I appreciate that, Admiral, and I would hope,
perhaps, that the committee would send a very clear message to
Secretary Gates and the Pentagon that we want that assessment
done as quickly as possible, and that whatever actions need to be
taken in order to provide the necessary equipment be done so. I
know every one of us doesn’t want to hear stories about continuing
lack of equipment costing American lives and injuries such as those
we saw yesterday when we were both at San Antonio.

Finally, Admiral, this question about the diplomatic aspect of
this assignment that you’ve undertaken is one that I’m very inter-
ested in, because we all know there’s no military solution. There’s
no military solution in Iraq, and there’s no military solution in Af-
ghanistan. How do you see your role, and what tools do we have
at our disposal, on the one hand, to try to assess and rein in Ira-
nian influence in the region, and, on the other end of your AOR,
to create better relations and working conditions between Pakistan
and Afghanistan? Could you just briefly respond to those, please?

Admiral FALLON. Senator, very interesting area, I wouldn’t pre-
sume to dive too deeply into this pool yet, because I don’t know
enough detail. But a couple of observations from the outside:

There’s a lot that isn’t being done. In fact, I see an awful lot of
sitting, watching, by the neighborhood, and it’s high time that
changed. I would be very anxious to try to engage, and intend to
engage, with our Department of State, Secretary Rice and her
folks, to have a full understanding of this, and then maybe we can
figure out, collectively, how to proceed.

Regarding Pakistan/Afghanistan, having been operating on the
other side of the boundary, if you would, between theaters, I’ve had
a chance to watch the Indian/Pakistan dynamic now for a couple
of years. I see change, and it’s for the better. I believe that this
change could potentially be very helpful to the situation in Afghan-
istan, and perhaps even in Iraq, as Pakistan and India slowly are
taking steps to reduce tension along the border in Kashmir.

By the way, it’s pretty fascinating, and a shame for the world,
I believe, to note that there are almost 1.5 million troops facing
each other along this border. But steps are being taken in the right
direction, and I think the potential to have tensions continue to
ease ought to give us some opportunities to perhaps have the Paks
do even more than they’re doing. They’ve done a phenomenal
amount in this war on terror, but I think things could be done that
would be additionally helpful in Afghanistan. The Indian ties to
Iran and their energy needs, and ties in other places in the region,
I think, could potentially be exploited. I’ll be anxious to talk with
our State Department colleagues and to see what might be done in
this area.

Thank you, Senator.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Clinton, and thank you, also, for raising the equipment issue. I just talked to Senator McCain, we will be sending a letter to the Secretary of Defense this afternoon the matter that you raise and some of the other equipment studies, the shortfall studies which have been forthcoming. So, thank you for raising that.

Admiral FALLON. Senator, if I could put a p.s. on the equipment thing, there's a reality today that this is a fast-moving issue, in that the enemy that we face, particularly in Iraq, is very adaptive, very skilled at observing and changing their tactics and procedures. So, equipment that was, we thought, pretty effective in protecting our troops just a matter of months ago is now being, in fact, challenged by some of the techniques and devices over there. I'm learning, as we go in, that this is a fast-moving ball game and we'll have to be adaptable to try to stay ahead of it. Thank you, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. That's fine, but I think the equipment that Senator Clinton's talking is equipment that we know is needed by the troops that are going in.

Admiral FALLON. I understand.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator WARNER.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Admiral. Nice to meet with you again. I've had the privilege of working with you and knowing you for many years. I thank your family for joining you on this arduous task ahead of you.

I'd like to say just a word about General Abizaid. He served 3½ years in this position, came before this committee many times. There's been some suggestions that perhaps we have not, as a committee, received candid assessments from some our witnesses, and I concur in that. But I think, in General Abizaid's case, he has been very forthcoming. I think he deserves a lot of credit—and his family—for that contribution that he made in this most difficult situation for these many years.

Clearly, in your testimony today and that of General Petraeus, each of you have distanced yourself from the plan, as announced by the President on January 20. That's understandable, because both of you had your respective jobs—you, in the Pacific; he, here in the United States—and the plan was largely drawn up by those individuals—from General Abizaid, General Casey, and others—in the current positions that they hold. Juxtaposed against that is your own comment to the effect that you see there's clear requirement for new and different actions.

Now, the team that put the plan together are now moving out, and you're moving in and being handed this plan. I just hope that you will exercise your authority and responsibility to the President and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to point out those areas in this plan which you feel needs flexibility, options that can be pursued other than the rigidity of just 20,000 new troops right into the face of sectarian violence. Some of us here on this committee, and others—a group of 10, bipartisan—have tried to respond to the President's request for suggestions, and we have provided those suggestions in the form of saying, "Mr. President, look at all options by which you may not need that full complement, and, Mr.
President, look carefully at the rules of engagement, such that we minimize the injection of the U.S. GI right into the crossfire of sectarian violence.

We are reading about a successful operation, north of Najaf, where the Iraqi forces clearly, I think, took the lead and eliminated a substantial enemy. That’s the good news. The bad news is that fight was precipitated by religious quarrels between Iraqis, Sunni and Shia and others, that go back over a thousand years. Our group of 10, in making recommendations, simply say that the Iraqi forces, by virtue of their knowledge of the language, their knowledge of the culture, are far better qualified to try and go in and resolve that type of sectarian violence. I hope that you will take our suggestions in the spirit of not trying to embolden the enemy, but to conscientiously point out where we can take actions to save lives, and particularly those of our American GIs.

In no way do we try to cut forces, withdraw, set timetables. It’s simply, “Look at the options.” In there, we point out, also, the questions about the chain of command which was raised here by our colleague. I urge you to go back and look at the colloquy that I had with General Keane in this room last Friday in which we explored that very carefully. He, the former Vice Chief of the Army, clearly pointed out grave concerns that he and others have. I asked him, could he show any precedent whereby the United States forces, which always operated on a unified chain of command under American officers—have we ever tried to go into this joint operation, where there’s going to be Iraqi commander and American commander at the top and all the way down to the company level? We do not want fingerpointing if a action goes wrong between the American and the Iraqi, saying whose fault it was. That has to be clarified.

Finally, I point out, I think you have unique abilities to go into this very sensitive and equally important, if not greater important area, with regard to Iran. I support the President in his statements, of recent, of firmness of commitment to resolve that situation. But I say to you, drawn on the experience of how we maintained a ring of deterrence around the Soviet Union in the Cold War. I think the use of force in that situation is a very last resort. Should we not engage other countries in performing a ring of deterrence? Initially, that ring could be the age-old doctrine of seapower, what we call battleship diplomacy, the presence of our two carriers. Why should not the European nations send a ship or two to also add to the strength of the signal we’re trying to send to that country that we’re not going to permit them to go forward with nuclear power? I urge you to look at the history of NATO, its success in curtailing the Cold War, and use that as the initial steps to the extent that any military action should be used, because we have to curtail it. Does that have any interest or appeal to you, that concept?

Admiral FALLON. Senator, the whole idea is most appealing, because we have plenty to do right now with active combat operations ongoing in Iraq and Afghanistan. It’s clear to me that, to date, the Iranians have not been playing a constructive role in addressing any of these, and, in fact, are challenging us in other areas. I’ll be very anxious to work with our allies, friends, and colleagues around
the world, and open to any and every idea in how we might approach this situation.

Senator WARNER. I think it’s important. I draw your attention to a New York Times article, of January 30, in which they say, “The administration says that European governments provided $18 billion in loan guarantees for Iran in 2005.” It’s to their interest, as well as it is to the United States interest, to contain that country with regard to its aggressiveness and potentiality in building nuclear weapons.

My time is up.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner. As to the references made to benchmarks, I’m going to put in the record at this time a letter that Senator McCain and I wrote to Secretary Rice last week insisting that the benchmarks that the President referred to in his January 10 address to the Nation and that the Iraqi Government has agreed to be provided. If these benchmarks are not received by the end of today, Senator McCain and I will be consulting on what will be the next step to obtain these benchmarks. This is not something that you, Admiral, are going to be able to deal with. This isn’t an assignment for you. I’m just saying publicly that these benchmarks now have been requested three times and have not been received. The letter, as well as earlier letters of mine, will be made part of the record.

[The information referred to follows:]
November 14, 2006

The Honorable Condoleezza Rice
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Madam Secretary:

The top priority for the coming months must be finding a way forward to change course in Iraq. U.S. policy must include urging the Iraqis to make the necessary political compromises, which only they can make, to preserve Iraq as a nation. Our military commanders have made clear there is no military solution; only a political solution can restore security in Iraq.

The Administration announced last month that Iraqi leaders had agreed to a timeline and benchmarks for a political process over the coming months. On October 25, 2006, President Bush stated that the Administration and the Iraqi Government were developing benchmarks for determining whether the “hard decisions necessary to achieve peace” were being made. Earlier, on October 24, 2006, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad stated that Iraqi leaders had agreed to a timeline for making the hard decisions on outstanding issues and that President Talibani had made those commitments public. According to Ambassador Khalilzad and General Casey, these included enactment of an oil law for sharing resources; a constitutional amendment on power-sharing that would guarantee democratic rights and equality to all Iraqis; reforming the de-Ba’athification Commission; and increasing the credibility and capability of Iraqi forces. However, on October 25, 2006, Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki stated publicly that no timetable has been set.

Please provide the agreed timeline and benchmarks (or the U.S. proposal for such) of political issues to be resolved by the Iraqi Government in the coming months. This information will be essential to the Congress’ consideration of a way ahead on Iraq.

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Carl Levin
Ranking Member

cc: The Honorable John Warner
Chairman
January 16, 2007

The Honorable Condoleezza Rice
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Secretary:

On November 14, 2006 I sent you a letter (attached) asking that you provide the agreed timeline and benchmarks (or the U.S. proposal for such) of political issues to be resolved by the Iraqi Government in the coming months. At that time I requested the same from Secretary Rumsfeld. On December 4, I heard from Under Secretary of Defense Edelman that the State Department had received my letter and had agreed to respond on behalf of the Administration. I have yet to hear from the State Department in this regard.

As I stated in my first letter, this information will be essential to the Congress' consideration of a way ahead on Iraq. Now that the President has announced his new strategy for Iraq, this information is even more vital. I am very disappointed that two months have gone by and you have not responded to my initial request. In view of the passage of time and the importance of this issue, I expect to receive the timeline and benchmarks by the end of this week.

Sincerely,

Carl Levin
Chairman
United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-0050

January 25, 2007

The Honorable Condoleezza Rice
Secretary of State
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Secretary:

On November 14, 2006 Senator Levin sent you a letter (attached) asking that you provide the agreed timeline and benchmarks (or the U.S. proposal for such) of political issues to be resolved by the Iraqi Government in the coming months. At that time he also requested the same from Secretary Rumsfeld. On December 4, he heard from Under Secretary of Defense Edelman that the State Department had received his letter and had agreed to respond on behalf of the Administration. Having not heard from the State Department for two months, Senator Levin again wrote to you (attached) on January 16, 2007 reiterating his request and noting his expectation that you would be courteous enough to respond by the end of last week. Unfortunately, you have not done so, which necessitates yet another request.

In his January 10 address to the nation on his new strategy for Iraq, President Bush said that “America will hold the Iraqi government to the benchmarks it has announced.” It is essential that Congress have the information on those benchmarks to comprehensively consider as it addresses the way ahead in Iraq. It is both baffling and disturbing that the Administration will not provide the timeline and benchmarks, and it is our joint expectation that you will do so promptly, and by the end of this week at the latest. If the benchmarks to which the President referred include additional commitments beyond those initially agreed to by the Iraqi government, then our expectation is that you will make that clear in your response, and will clearly indicate which are new commitments.

Sincerely,

[Signatures]

Chairman LEVIN. I will call next on Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome, Admiral. Good luck as you engage in some very serious and responsible challenges in CENTCOM.

When you look at the plan that you're about to implement with General Petraeus, on paper it could be made to work if you have the right assumptions. One of those assumptions is that you're going to get all the support you need from the State Department, the Department of Agriculture, the Justice Department, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID). I don't think
that’s a very good assumption, since we have never gotten that, in the last 3 years. How many real extra bodies are going out to accompany these 20,000 extra troops and civilian agencies?

Admiral FALLON. Senator, I don’t know. I am aware——

Senator REED. Isn’t that important for you to know, sir?

Admiral FALLON. I intend to find out. It’s clear that we will have to have agreement between the interagency on formulating the appropriate human resources to go address this problem. I do not have that kind of detail. I’ve not engaged in that conversation.

Senator REED. Admiral, I appreciate that, but the new strategy sounds a lot like the old strategy to me. We were going to clear, hold, and build. The President was talking about that 2 years ago. We had examples of this in Tal Afar and other places, and we were clearing. The question was, could we hold? Maybe we can hold now, but the build part never seemed to arrive.

Admiral FALLON. Absolutely critical. If we’re going to be successful, we have to have the follow-up economic activity and development to enable these people to stand on their own feet. It doesn’t happen, then it’s not going to work.

Senator REED. Again, General—Admiral—excuse me, forgive me my background. [Laughter.]

I’m projecting. Forgive me.

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir.

Senator REED. We’ve gone down this road so many times. We’ve heard—and I don’t think this is a question of lack of candor, this is a question of people saying, “If I get all I need, I can do this.” We never get what we need on the nonkinetic side of the equation.

Admiral FALLON. Senator, if I could, a couple of thoughts. One, in my experience, we’re always asking for more than we’ll usually get, and we’ll have to figure out how to do the best we can. But I think that the situation here is that clearly the President recognizes the need for change in this situation in Iraq. He’s made some decisions. Some of those decisions involve military forces and leadership positions. He’s asked, through the Secretary, for me to be considered for this position. General Petraeus has already been here. These are part of the resources being applied. I think we need—General Petraeus, myself, if I’m confirmed—to sit down with our colleagues in the interagencies and to figure out the details of these plans, which I am not aware, but very anxious to get into, because it seems to me that if I’m supposed to be the CENTCOM Commander, we clearly have to have an understanding and be joined at the hip in what we agree is the way to go forward. We are not there yet. We are going to need some time to figure out the steps and to lay this out in the kind of detail that’s going to actually give us some results.

Senator REED. Let me also suggest some other areas that are more directly within your purview. This strategy implies a significant increase of translators, a significant increase of civil affairs officers. What we’ve heard, in terms of this surge, is 20,000 combat brigades. The question is, where are these translators coming from? If you’re going to send—and I’d go back to Senator Levin’s comments—you’re sending a platoon of young Americans into the middle of the neighborhood, from all over this country, and they cannot speak to their neighbors, you’re just asking for trouble. How many
translators? Again, Admiral, out of the last 3 years, whenever you talked to a senior commander out there, and you ask him, “What do you need?”—it was never, “Give me some more combat brigades.” It’s “Give me translators, give me AID people, give me agriculture people.” It was “gimme, gimme,” but nothing ever happened.

Admiral Fallon. I’ll be at the head of that list, because, unlike General Abizaid, I am not fluent in Arabic, and so, I’m going to need some help, as well. I recognize this is a big challenge.

Senator Reed. As I look at this proposal, there are some obvious shortcomings that we know about right now and we haven’t reconciled. Yet, we’re touting this as the last best chance that this will work, “We wargamed it on the ground, we have everything we need.” I don’t think we have everything we need. The issue that Senator Warner raised about unity of command, and General Keane, who spoke to that it is a grave concern. It’s an obvious flaw, or an obvious shortcoming in this plan, we know of right now, and yet, we’re embarking into this situation.

I was trying to think—you might be able to help me—is there an applicable example of a significant urban insurgency that was successfully defeated with a divided command? I can’t think—Algeria, with the French? Belfast, the British were in charge. I can’t think of any other significant urban insurgencies.

Admiral Fallon. Senator, you, better than most, understand the necessity for having clean and clearly recognizable chain of command, and if you could allow us some time to figure out the details of this plan, there’s a lot of talk about “the plan, the plan.” In my mind, we have a plan when we have the details for each level in the chain of command to carry out the specific functions that are going to be necessary to achieve success. I have not even begun to see a significant outline of that, so I need to do some work. If confirmed, it’ll be a prime order of business.

Thank you, sir.

Senator Reed. Admiral, your patriotism serving the Nation is remarkable. You are well qualified to assume a very daunting task. I would associate myself with Senator Warner’s comments about General Abizaid. I think he, also, gave himself to the last measure to serve this country.

The final point I’d make is, you need time, but time is quickly running out. It’s not what we’re doing, it’s what the American people are doing. They have listened for 3 years, and they have formed very strong conclusions, which don’t allow you much time at all.

Admiral Fallon. I understand, sir.

Senator Reed. Thank you.

Admiral Fallon. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Fallon, everyone’s been blowing smoke at you. You’ve had a great career. You and I have fought together, for 3 years, what I called the Battle of Vieques, and you were there at the time. I do believe that resulted in a lack of unified training that we weren’t able to keep that live range open. I just wanted to publicly thank you for the leadership you showed. You had the Pace-Fallon
report, and you stayed in there and did everything you could. I enjoyed those 3 years of battling on your side.

As we look from this point forward, I think it might be worthwhile—no one has asked you this—you'll be working with General Petraeus, and you could take a number of different approaches. You could take the 30,000-foot view and largely defer to General Petraeus on Iraqi matters, or would you anticipate having more of a hands-on approach? How do you think you'll work with General Petraeus?

Admiral Fallon. I look forward to working with General Petraeus. We have not had an extensive history together, but I've been anxious to work with him. I have followed his career. I've read some of his work. I think he basically has a very firm understanding of what's required, plus he has this extensive experience.

We have different jobs and different responsibilities, Senator. General Petraeus is going to be our commander of the multinational forces on the ground for Iraq. I view my responsibilities as much wider than that. I have a strong obligation to support him and his work, and will do that to the maximum extent possible. But it seems to me that there's an expectation that I be working outside the borders of Iraq to try to get the neighborhood, for example, to help us, and to continue to work these other issues, like Afghanistan.

I'd be looking to work in a complementary manner, but, I'll tell you, I'd love to stay up here, but I'm not going to hesitate to dive down and to ask the tough questions—love to stay up here, but I'm not going to hesitate to ask the tough questions if I don't think we're getting results, and that's the key thing that's missing in this entire program, of late, is the results that are absolutely necessary if we're going to be able to wrap this up and get our troops back.

Senator Inhofe. Since we have shorter rounds than we normally have, for the record I'd like to have you look into the successes. We've been real big on the train-and-equip program here, and it's been successful. I think probably the best model for that would have been us with the Ethiopians and how they came along to Somalia in a very successful operation. I'd like to have you think about that and maybe, for the record, respond as to what lessons we have learned there that might be worth getting into.

[The information referred to follows:]

The United States military has provided training and equipment to Ethiopia and other countries in the Horn of Africa (HOA) that have been integral partners in the global war on terrorism. While difficult to quantify, this security cooperation and the resulting strong bilateral relationship contributed positively to Ethiopia's operations in its recent military intervention in Somalia. However, it is the close Ethiopian-U.S. military relationship which substantiates the potential benefit of regional security cooperation programs (e.g. International Military Education and Training and Foreign Military Financing with Ethiopia, Kenya, and other HOA partners. The United States should continue to train and equip forces partnering with the U.S. in order to further their military's training professionalism and capabilities, while supporting the global war on terrorism. U.S. theater security cooperation programs require increased priority, emphasis, and support in order to promote similar successful cooperation stories, and further U.S. national security interests in the HOA.

Senator Inhofe. I would also say, even though this would be more General Petraeus than you, but on the CERP program, there's been a consistency of the combatant commanders and everyone, from the bottom to the top, that that is a program where we
can get a lot more for our money if we give greater authority in the field to use that program.

General Keane, when he was here last week, he talked about the same thing, on the troop levels in Afghanistan. It’s kind of interesting to me, because I’ve been over there 12 times—my last trip was with General Jones in Afghanistan. It was my clear view, at that time, that the military part of that was pretty near over, and now it’s the rebuilding and assisting in that type of thing. Have you had a chance to look into where we are right now and to assess whether or not we do need to have—that you would agree with General Keane that we need to have enhancement of the troop level in Afghanistan?

Admiral FALLON. I don’t have a fair enough assessment to give you an honest answer. I can give you impressions from my last visit. I saw things that were really good. I saw security in some areas that looked like it had the situation under control. I saw political activity. I saw functioning governments in some areas. But everything that I’ve heard from reports that I’ve read indicates that we need a pretty significant push now on the economic side to move this country along.

Senator INHOFE. I think some of the questions asked of you might not be totally fair, in that you’ve been in PACOM. This is new to you. You don’t have all the answers. On the other hand, there could be an advantage to that. You don’t go in with a prejudiced perspective. I know when I was there, and talked to people like Abdul Jazim, Dr. Rubaie, and Prime Minister Maliki.

Do you have any outside impression as to whether you think that the Prime Minister is going to change his behavior from the past?

Admiral FALLON. I don’t know, Senator. I haven’t met him. I look forward to it.

Senator INHOFE. All right. Senator Clinton brought up this thing about the up-armor. You mentioned something about PACOM might have equipment that could be used over there. The fact that you recognize this is a moving target, it’s a changing game, and what was appropriate 6 months ago may not be appropriate now. I think it’s very important that you do take an assessment of what is in the other commands that can be transferred there, and also try to evaluate what is going to be needed there. I think you have indicated you will be doing that.

Finally, Admiral Fallon, I was critical, back during the Clinton administration, when I expected that the North Koreans had a lot greater delivery capability for missiles than everybody else did, and I asked—in writing, in a letter—and I’m going from memory now—I think it was August 20, 1998, as to, when would it be that the North Koreans would have the capability of reaching the United States with a multistage rocket? The answer came back: between 5 and 10 years. Seven days later, on August 28, 1998, they fired one that had that capability. Now, this morning, in the Early Bird, it says that North Korea and Iran are cooperating in developing long-range weapons, and it says Iran is likely to develop capability of reaching the United States before 2015. To me, that’s not very well informed, and it wouldn’t be that long.
How concerned are you over this relationship between North Korea and Iran and their potential capability, in terms of having long-range weapons that could reach the United States?

Admiral FALLON. Senator, I'd note that, although the North Koreans tried that launch in 1998, they also tried another one last year, still unsuccessful, which is some measure of consolation, I'd expect, although they appear to be pushing very hard to achieve this capability. There’s no doubt that there's been an interaction between North Korea and Iran, in exchanging technology.

It seems to me that the scrutiny of the world has greatly intensified on North Korea, particularly in this past year, and so, we're all watching very carefully to try to mitigate any attempt to proliferate technology that they may have. I don’t know what the timelines are. I haven't studied the Iranian situation to the extent that I have the North Korean. The North Koreans are clearly threatening in their capabilities to their neighbors, not yet to us. We're going to have to watch it, and I'll be anxious to learn more about the Iranians.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Admiral. My time is expired. But I have every confidence that the team of Fallon and Petraeus will be very successful.

Thank you.

Admiral FALLON. Thank you, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Senator Akaka.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Fallon, aloha and welcome to the Hill and to the U.S. Senate. I also want to add my aloha and welcome to Mary and the family here, gathered and to tell you folks that you've been a great family for Hawaii and for our Nation. Admiral, you've served us so well as PACOM Commander, and I look forward to your confirmation here.

I think that it is fitting, on this day, the 145th anniversary of the launching of the Navy's first ironclad warship, the U.S.S. Monitor—that, if confirmed by the Senate, Admiral, you will be the first Navy admiral to command the United States Central Command. This speaks well of your leadership in the Pacific and Asia and of your accomplishments as an officer in our Nation's military. I thank you for your nearly 40 years of dedicated service already to our country. I also want to say thank you to Mary, too, because without her support, it would have been very difficult for you and for us.

Admiral, I have some questions that I want to ask you. CENTCOM has never been commanded by a Navy flag officer in its entire history. Your nomination by the administration is, I guess you can look at it, somewhat unique. It raises the question of, why now, in the war on terror, during a time when we have two ground conflicts ongoing simultaneously in the CENTCOM AOR, is a Navy admiral the best choice to head CENTCOM? So, my question, Admiral Fallon, to you is, did Secretary Gates or any other administration officer explain to you the reasoning behind their decision to nominate you to be the next Commander of CENTCOM?

If so, what was their basis? If not, why do you believe that you are
the best choice for the job, given the current operational environment in the CENTCOM AOR?

Admiral?

Admiral FALLON. Senator, in my conversation with Secretary Gates, the color of my uniform wasn’t the issue. I believe that what they’re looking for is someone with experience, which I have been fortunate to have acquired in these 40 years, and someone who is already familiar with the workings of a regional command and the requirements of that position. We have very highly-qualified ground officers, Army officers, that are designated to lead our forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and I believe that the administration is looking for someone with experience and a willingness to work with these people.

I’ve found, in the Pacific, that the opportunity to engage with nations throughout the region was beneficial to moving us forward in the areas of security and stability, and I look forward to doing the same thing in CENTCOM.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you.

From what you’ve done in the Pacific—for me, there’s no question, I’m proud of you and what you’ve done, and know that you can deal with the situations that are ahead of us.

Admiral, the New York Times published an article on Sunday describing an ambitious plan outlined by the Iranian Ambassador to Baghdad. Specifically, Iran plans to greatly expand its economic and military ties with Iraq, including an Iranian National Bank branch in the heart of the capital. News reports yesterday described the President’s response. Specifically, he was quoted as saying that, “We will respond firmly.” If Tehran escalates its military actions in Iraq and threatens American forces or Iraqi citizens, I’m concerned about the possibility of the Iraq conflict as escalating to a regional conflict. I am particularly concerned, because the administration is not engaging the Iranians in diplomatic discussions, which may limit our “firm” response to military options only. In this January 10 speech regarding the surge, the President stated that we will, “interrupt the flow of support from Iran and Syrian,” and that we will seek out and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq. It is clear, from this committee’s discussion with Secretary Gates and General Petraeus, that the U.S. does not have sufficient troop levels in Iraq to secure the borders from Iran and Syria while maintaining our counterinsurgency activities in Baghdad and Anbar.

Admiral, do you believe that we can interrupt Iranian and Syrian support from within the borders of Iraq? What options do you believe our military has to provide the firm response to Iran indicated by the President without causing an escalation to a regional conflict?

Admiral FALLON. Senator, as I stated earlier, I believe that the Iranians have yet to play a really constructive role in the Iraqi situation. There’s a lot of history here. You’re certainly aware of the Shia relationship in southern Iraq with the Iranians. Yet, from what I’ve read and been led to believe, this is not a totally onesided issue, that, in fact, there are many people that have historically recognized Iraq as a separate entity than Iran, and so forth.
Regarding the insurgency, if we're going to be effective in quelling the violence and establishing some sense of stability, we're going to have to move to isolate these insurgents and the militias from their supplies of weapons and other materials. How we're going to do that remains to be seen, to me. I'm going to have to work with General Petraeus and our commanders to figure out how to make an effective strategy, and then implement this to get the results we want on the ground.

But it seems to me, in the entire approach to Iran, that we'll be looking for help from the region, and to look at the full range of options that are open to us diplomatically and every other way. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Admiral. My time is expired.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.

Senator Dole.

Senator Dole. Admiral Fallon, let me once again welcome you to this committee, and your family, as well, and thank you for your outstanding service to our country. I look forward to working with you in the months and years ahead.

What do you believe are Iran's military and political intentions in the region, particularly regarding the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz? Do you believe that one of Iran's long-term objectives is to control the flow of oil through the strait?

Admiral Fallon. Senator, it's difficult for me to ascertain what's in the minds of the leadership in Tehran in this regard. We can only make judgments, I believe, based on the behavior that we've seen to date. They have not been helpful in Iraq, and it seems to me that, in the region, as they grow their military capabilities, we're going to have to pay close attention to what they do and what they may bring to the table.

Now, the U.S. has been, as you well know, playing a significant role in this part of the world for many decades. I believe it's in our interest to remain engaged in this region.

My historical discussions with our allies and cooperating nations in this region indicate a longstanding concern about Iranian intentions and their influence in the Gulf. It seems to me that, based on my read of their military hardware acquisitions and development of tactics and so forth, that they are posturing themselves with the capability to attempt to deny us the ability to operate in this vicinity.

But I would note that this is not a one-sided situation, in that Iran is, I believe, critically dependent on its exports of petroleum products for its economic vitality, and those exports, of course, go through the same Strait of Hormuz that they would potentially seek to deny us access to.

So, it seems to me that there are lots of issues here, there are many things that ought to be considered as we approach our engagement in the region. I'll be very anxious to, particularly, consult with the Gulf-region nations to see what's new, what's learned, because it's been a number of years since I actually engaged in this area.

Senator Dole. What do you consider to be the implications for the United States, for our allies in the region, if the President's lat-
If deployment fails, if Iraq descends into civil war? Could you also reflect on implications for Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, the Gulf states, Afghanistan, and Pakistan?

Admiral Fallon. You've given me a long list of challenges here to deal with.

Senator Dole. Right. It's a broad question.

Admiral Fallon. I believe there are relationships between many of these, in a number of areas. I don't know exactly what the timelines are, but I believe that we have a real challenge and very little time to start effecting results on the ground. But it's been my experience that if one can actually see results in an effort, that people tend to key in on those results and take heart and move forward. Nowhere has this been more apparent to me than recently in the southern Philippines, where the longtime engagement of the U.S. in helping the Philippine Government and the Armed Forces in trying to build their capabilities and in working with the population, has been slowly but surely gaining success, and now, with the recent military successes of the Philippine army, you can almost see this thing start to really gain momentum.

The key thing, in my mind, is to arrest this continuing spiral of violence, to start making some steps in a positive direction, and then we'll have to assess, on a regular basis—honestly assess where we are and see how we move forward. I don't think there's any magic here. I don't have any idea what the timelines may be, how many months or weeks it's going to take, but it's very clear that we have to do something different. We have a prescription for a number of capabilities that we're going to bring together, and hopefully we'll come up with the right recipe here to start making progress.

Senator Dole. Let me ask you, in Afghanistan, about the opium trade, the profiting that's occurring, immensely profitable, for the Taliban, at this point, actively engaged in this area. Eradication, obviously, is the necessary first step, but it has to be complemented by other programs so that Afghan farmers can make a living, so that they have sufficient long-term security to ensure that they're not terrorized into replanting these drug-producing crops.

The President's proposal calls for about $10.6 billion. Is this sufficient to both cover the increased security issue, as well as the necessity of the alternative crop programs? Could you just comment on how you see this situation?

Admiral Fallon. Senator, to be honest, I don't have the details. I will tell you that, from my most recent visit there, I got a sense, at least in the eastern part of the country, that there was a governing structure, an Afghan governing structure, that was in place. It was young. It was immature. They were keen to develop themselves in economic ways that were not reliant upon the drug trade. I believe this is a real challenge with lots of issues. There's a tradition here that goes back many centuries for this kind of activity. I'll be very curious to see what options we may have available. It seems to me that there's a reasonable degree of security in most areas, except the south, and if that's the case, then a strong economic injection of realistic activities would be what's really needed here. But I'll be happy to get back to you after I get a better assessment of the situation.
Senator DOLE. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Dole.
Senator Kennedy.
Senator KENNEDY. Thank you.
Thank you, Admiral Fallon, for your service.
Mr. Chairman, I'd appreciate being included on the letter about
the equipment for those that are going to be deployed abroad.
Chairman LEVIN. We'd be happy to do that.
Senator KENNEDY. Admiral, as has been mentioned during the
course of the questioning, Iran has become an increasingly more
powerful player in the Middle East, but its nuclear ambitions and
support for international terrorism are a threat to the regional sta-
tility and to our national security, and the question is what to do
about it. Senator Akaka mentioned the President said, on January
10, that Iran is providing material support for attacks on American
troops and that we'd disrupt the attacks, destroy the networks pro-
viding weapons and training to our enemies, and the next day we
raided the Iranian Government office in Iraq. Last week, President
Bush authorized U.S. forces in Iraq to kill or capture Iranian
operatives inside Iraq. Yesterday, the President further raised the
temperature by saying if Iran escalates its military actions in Iraq
to the detriment of our troops and/or innocent Iraqi people, we'll re-
spond firmly.
Some have suggested that your nomination, because you'd be the
first naval officer to hold this command, plus the fact that the U.S.
recently sent an additional aircraft carrier battle group to the Gulf,
might be a sign the administration is preparing for military action
against Iran. I certainly hope this is not the case. Obviously, Con-
gress must be involved in any decision to broaden war to Iran.
Have you been asked to update war plans for Iran?
Admiral FALLON. No, sir. In fact, I'm not familiar with any of the
CENTCOM plans.
Senator KENNEDY. You'd brief the committee, the chair or the
ranking member, if you were asked to do so?
Admiral FALLON. Senator, I'd be happy to come back and answer
questions you might have.
Senator KENNEDY. Okay.
You were well known, during the years in PACOM, for dialogue
with countries in the region. As Pacific Commander, you gave a
speech in Beijing, where you talked about the need to increase our
interactions with China. You said, “If we're open with one another,
if we share information and ideas, I think my experience has been,
the tendency is to reduce anxiety, to reduce the fears of the un-
known and the suspicions that come from lack of knowledge and
doubt.” Do you see merit to that approach in CENTCOM?
Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir, Senator. To the extent that we can un-
derstand better the thoughts and actions of others reduces substan-
tially, in my experience, the danger of miscalculation. So, I strongly
endorse that approach.
Senator KENNEDY. Would you include Iran in that, as well?
Admiral FALLON. I think that in the Iranian situation, I have to
get a better assessment of exactly where we stand.
Senator KENNEDY. But you don't exclude that possibility.
Admiral FALLON. I wouldn't exclude that.

Senator KENNEDY. Yes.

Admiral FALLON. I'd note that, in China, for example, we had extensive interaction in almost every other area, aside from mil-to-mil, so we had a strong foundation. I'm not quite sure where we stand with Iran and those other areas.

Senator KENNEDY. Has the President told you not to talk to the Iranians?

Admiral FALLON. He has not.

Senator KENNEDY. I think, as you point out, there's no dialogue—exchange of information that would seem to—we would lack the opportunity, I think, to get the true motivations.

Can you tell us what is your assessment of the Iranian naval capabilities, and how the U.S. would neutralize these capabilities?

Admiral FALLON. My understanding of their capabilities is that they are trying to grow an anti-access force that I believe would be intended to try to deny us access to the Gulf, if a situation arose that they might feel compelled to do that. We are well aware of their capability.

Senator KENNEDY. Could you elaborate a little bit on the anti-access? What does that mean in layman's terms?

Admiral FALLON. They are well aware that the United States Navy, all of our forces—and, in fact, we operate jointly, as you well know, in all of our endeavors today. We have very strong capabilities in many areas. My read of Iranian investment and training activities tells me that they are aware of our strike capabilities, for example, they're aware of our aircraft carrier and submarine strengths, and that they would try to come up with ways to neutralize us, or keep us as far away as they could from the scene of action.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you believe that they have the ability to close the Straits of Hormuz?

Admiral FALLON. I would be happy to take that one for the record. Maybe we could have that in a closed hearing.

Senator KENNEDY. Okay.

[The information referred to follows:]

Iran continues to spend a significant portion of its defense budget on naval forces. Iran’s strategy in part centers on their ability to control and/or close the Strait of Hormuz. In addition, Iran maintains the capability to interdict sea lanes of communication throughout the Arabian Gulf and selectively target one or more Gulf countries’ off-shore infrastructure, commercial transit lanes, and anchorages throughout the region.

Iran maintains a large inventory of naval mines, an expanding coastal defense force equipped with a mix of Chinese manufactured anti-ship cruise missile launchers, an extensive mix of high speed fast attack craft equipped with torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missiles and at least 3,000 smaller patrol boats equipped with a mix of heavy machine guns, rocket propelled grenade launchers, shoulder launched surface-to-air missile launchers, and anti-tank guided missiles. Iranian leaders likely realize their naval forces cannot win a conventional force-on-force naval engagement with U.S. naval forces, and have therefore developed a strategy that uses their geographic advantage to put into play a layered defense strategy that relies on waves of near-simultaneous attacks against maritime targets to overwhelm the defenses of the target.

Given Iran’s current naval forces capability, Iran could attempt to temporarily close the Strait of Hormuz for a short period, principally using naval mines and coastal defense forces.

By regional standards, Iran has a well-equipped and professional navy. Diplomacy and deterrence are our primary means of maintaining access through the Strait of
Hormuz. Should our relationship with Iran deteriorate to the point of hostilities, we are capable of neutralizing the military threat to U.S. naval vessels and preserving access through the strait for commercial traffic.

Senator KENNEDY. Finally, Admiral, there was a reference to an earlier question that was about benchmarks and reaching a time-frame for benchmarks. Could you comment on that? Do you think it’s necessary to have measurable benchmarks and timetables set, and, if those benchmarks are not met, that they have consequences? Or do you believe that this should be open-ended in terms of reaching benchmarks?

Admiral FALLON. Senator, clearly, not open-ended. I’m not sure that’s the right term. I’ve heard this now for the last week, since I’ve been in town.

Senator KENNEDY. Okay.

Admiral FALLON. We have to see progress. We’re going to have to assess the steps. For example, the Iraqi Government has a significant list of actions that they have stated their intention to implement. I’d sure like to see some of these occur.

Senator KENNEDY. Okay. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Kennedy.

I believe Senator Thune is next.

Senator Thune.

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, thank you for a lifetime of service to your country, and thank you, as well, for undertaking what is yet another challenging task so vital to the security interests of the United States.

During the first Gulf war, you commanded a carrier air wing on the U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt. Since you’ve previously commanded combat operations in the Gulf region, can you comment on how you believe the CENTCOM AOR has changed since Operation Desert Storm?

Admiral FALLON. First of all, Senator, the boundaries have changed. There are other nations now in the CENTCOM area that were not part of the AOR before, so it’s a broader domain, probably more challenges, certainly more active issues ongoing now than were the focus of attention at that time. I will be very interested to getting, now, to the next couple of layers down to see exactly what people are thinking about and why they’re thinking in those matters, as I get out there. But lots of changes, of course. There are still lots of historical issues that remain, from my understanding, and I’ll be anxious to get into these and see what we can do to improve, collectively, the security of this area.

Senator THUNE. Do you think that an increased naval presence in the region will act as a force multiplier to our ground forces there?

Admiral FALLON. That’ll be something I’ll be interested to find out. My understanding today is that the majority of the activities and the capabilities that are being used are ground. But I would note that I’ve seen news reports, have not seen any intelligence reports this last couple of days, but it’s my understanding, at least from the news media assessments, that air support was used. The extent to which this is the case and what’s necessary, I just don’t know. I’ll have to wait until I get there.
Senator THUNE. Do you think that the Navy can maintain a two-carrier presence in the region indefinitely without overstretcher the Navy?

Admiral FALLON. I don’t know. I think I’d go back and have the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) field that question. I can tell you that I’m an advocate of the flexibility of our forces, particularly our maritime and air forces, that we ought to use these in ways to achieve multiple goals, not just deterrence, which is clearly one of the objectives here, but to engage in the regions in which we operate, to help support our alliances and our relationships with people. At the same time, we gain valuable experience for our own people in training in different areas. So I think I would let the CNO handle that one, as far as an internal Navy issue goes.

Senator THUNE. One of the things that you had said in your answer to the advance policy questions regarding your assessment of the current situation facing the United States in Iraq, you stated that, “Sectarian-motivated violence now inhibits political progress, effective governance, and economic development. Many other factors, including poor infrastructure, corruption, and lack of experience at governance, have exacerbated widespread mistrust between sectarian groups within Iraq.”

Do you believe that the situation, as you’ve described it, can improve if the current security situation in Iraq remains as it is?

Admiral FALLON. Unlikely.

Senator THUNE. If confirmed as CENTCOM Commander, do you believe that the Iraqi security forces will benefit from an increased U.S. troop presence, thereby helping them to secure Baghdad and lay the foundation for a proper withdrawal of American troops from Iraq?

Admiral FALLON. Senator, I think that’s a really complex equation, and what I am very interested in finding out is the extent to which these Iraqi troops are really capable and are willing, and have the leadership, to stand up and actually do the things that we would like to have them do. Numbers are interesting, but it’s what they get for results that matter. So, I’ll be very curious—part of the proposal, as I understand it, is to also substantially ramp up the number of U.S. embeds in training for these forces. I’m anxious, if confirmed, to have my own assessment of how we really stand with these forces. I suspect we’re going to see a wide range of capability and competence. Clearly, the intention is to raise that level of competency to the maximum extent possible so that we can do what we really desire to do here.

Senator THUNE. It’s been stated that America’s commitment is not open-ended. What do you think the consequences should be if the Iraqi Government fails to step up and follow through on its promises?

Admiral FALLON. I think those are questions that are probably best left to the political and diplomatic levels, but I will make a couple of observations.

I am anxious to see the kind of demonstrated leadership that I believe is essential for the Iraqi Government to make progress with its people, but I’m also sensitive to the fact that this is a very challenging situation to put someone in, to have a nation newly emerging from decades of totalitarian abuse, if you would, from a leader-
ship that was corrupt and very damaging to individuals and organizations.

There is—my understanding—little in the way of tradition. There's very little in the history here that lends itself to the kinds of expectations we would like to have from a pluralistic democratic society. I am not a particularly patient man. You could probably get some verification of that from my staff and from my family. But I believe that in this situation, we're going to have to have some degree of willingness to give them some time. Nonetheless, we have to see some action, we have to get some results.

Senator Thune. We are anxious, Admiral, to get you confirmed and over there so you can begin to make those assessments and undertake this very important responsibility. Thank you, again, for your service, and we look forward to moving you through the process.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Fallon. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.

Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral, I want to congratulate you and your family for all the sacrifices that you've made and for this new assignment, and also express my condolences that you will soon be relocating from Hawaii, which probably the best command that anyone can have.

Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.

Senator Webb. You have a remarkable diversity of experiences you are bringing to the table here. You have a lot of operational experience, you have time in the other building over there, you have a lot of experience working with Congress, and, most importantly, you have high-level command experience. I want you to know at the outset that I've been really impressed with the depth and the quality of your answers. I intend to support you fully.

I have a couple of questions that I would like to put to you.

First, you've spent a good bit of your career operationally deployed as a naval aviator. You know the costs of deployment on family life and just the wear and tear on individuals. There are people who are calling this situation a new strategy. I've said, a number of times, I don't believe that. I can't see a new strategy here, in terms of national strategy. What I see is a sort of an operational adjustment. The possibility here is that we're going to end up with continued deployment cycles until the situation can be figured out. We're working from a pretty fixed baseline, particularly of soldiers and marines, of people that are available, and units that are available, for these tasks. On the one hand, the increase of our troop levels, in the short term, is going to put additional strain on the Army and the Marine Corps force structure; in the mid-term, particularly, it is going to place a hardship on the rotational cycles of units, possibly even further down the line. I couple that with a concern that's been stated many times on the Foreign Relations Committee and in this committee as we've had these hearings over the last month, that was also stated in the Iraq Study Group Report, that adding more American troops “could conceivably worsen those aspects of the security problem that are fed by the view that the United States presence is intended to be a long-term occupa-
tion.” So, on the one hand, we have the wear and tear on the troops, and on the other, we have the perceptions in Iraq that might actually cause this to be a countervailing influence. I’m wondering if you have any comments about that.

Admiral FALLON. Senator, I certainly share your concerns, particularly regarding the impact on our forces. I’ve watched this very carefully from my current position, because we, as you well know, have been rotating Pacific-based forces, particularly Marine and Army forces, into the CENTCOM region. So, I stay very close to our commanders, and then make my own assessments, as well. While the Army and Marine Corps have different constructs in the way they approach their combat units and their people, there is a common denominator here, and that is the mid-level leadership, both enlisted and officer, is in the mode now of repetitive visits to Iraq and Afghanistan. There is certainly some tremendously good experience being gained, but I am highly sensitive to the wear and tear on them, and their families, in particular.

Clearly, this is not going to be something that we would like to continue for an extended period of time. I will tell you that I’m going to watch it very closely. Again, I believe that the potential for success in Iraq—and I truly believe that we can be successful, or I wouldn’t take this job—a lot of this depends on our ability to actually use the resources in an effective manner. The numbers, again, interesting, but doesn’t really tell the tale.

What are we really going to do with these people, and how are we going to measure the results, seems to me to be the real issue here.

Senator WEBB. You have earned a reputation, and you’ve increased that reputation over the past hour or so, as someone who is willing to pursue diplomatic approaches, not in the sense of backing away from military issues, such as deterrence, but as someone who’s willing to work to develop the right kind of harmonious relationships, or at least reduce the level of hostility in relationships. You’ve done that with China, you’ve done that, to a certain extent, with North Korea. I would like to point out, we did engage Iran, as everyone knows, after the initial invasion of Afghanistan. We brought them into the formula when we were looking at the formation of the Karzai government. It also should be pointed out that the Iraqi Government itself is engaging Iran. You’ve made a few statements in the recent past about wanting to encourage Iran to play a constructive role.

An overwhelming percentage of the people who have testified in the Foreign Relations Committee, and a good percentage of the people who have testified here, the experts on the region, say that, in terms of a true national strategy here, unless we have a robust diplomatic effort of some sort that goes hand in hand with what we’re doing, we’re not going to reach a solution to this problem that will increase the stability of the region and do the other things that we want to do.

How are you looking at that, in terms of Syria and Iran?

Admiral FALLON. Philosophically, I believe in having all the cards available to put on the table, as the potential might exist to play them. My approach to PACOM was to go and ask questions and listen extensively to every voice that I could find that I
thought had the experience and wisdom to provide me some good advice before I set out on a project to try to help us engage in a manner that might be useful on security and stability. I'd like to pursue the same thing in the Middle East. I have a lot to learn. It seems to me that we make progress when we are willing to be open and to use every means at our disposal to try to achieve the ends. But this, of course, requires reciprocal actions from the other parties. I don't know the extent to which those endeavors have been undertaken in the Middle East, but I am very anxious to find out and to try to play a constructive role in that.

Obviously, we have a Department of State that is the lead entity for diplomatic engagement with nations. We're seeing that play out in the Pacific, with Korea, for example. But there are roles that we, as military commanders, can play, as well, and I'll be anxious to have a conversation with the Secretary of State and her principals in this matter so we can see what the right way ahead is.

Senator Webb. I appreciate your answers, and wish you good luck.

Admiral Fallon. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.

Senator Martinez.

Senator Martinez. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Good morning, Admiral. I thought I might differ with my colleague from Virginia on something or another, but I never thought I would differ more deeply than to suggest that you now have a hardship assignment, being stationed in Tampa, Florida. I want to welcome you and your family to our State, and I know, on behalf of Governor Charlie Crist, we're delighted that you'll be coming, upon your confirmation. I do trust and hope that, during your time there, if there's anything we can do to make your stay better, or your mission easier to accomplish, that you will not hesitate to call on us. We consider Tampa to be a welcoming and friendly place. I know you know our State. You've been in Jacksonville before, and we look forward to having you.

Recently, I had the opportunity to speak to a high-ranking official of the Iraqi Government, in fact, a couple of days ago—and one of the things that he stressed with me was the regret of the lack of, and the need for, a security agreement with the United States Government, between the Iraqi and the U.S. Governments. Apparently, to his way of thinking, it is essential for there to be such an agreement in place, for the Government of Iraq to then fully be able to carry out the type of things that we anticipate that they should be doing in this new way forward. Are you aware of the status of that? If not, would you address that issue, upon taking your command?

Admiral Fallon. Senator, I don't have any knowledge of it, but I'd be happy to take a look at it, if confirmed.

Senator Martinez. Perhaps you and General Petraeus could look at that. I did not realize that this was an issue, but I——

Admiral Fallon. It's probably not surprising, since we're basically starting from the ground floor and building a defense and security structure in that country.
Senator MARTINEZ. I think the concern was the lack of flexibility for them to be able to act and direct their own forces, and things of that nature.

Admiral, turning us to Afghanistan, and, of course, to Iraq, as well—the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) seems to be a key part of our strategy of reconstruction and rebuilding, which I think is so essential to political acquiescence, and, I think, particularly in southern Afghanistan, this is of great importance. I was wondering whether you have faith in these PRTs and this approach, and what you might do to enhance their success?

Admiral FALLON. Thank you, Senator. I'll be anxious to get more detailed understanding of what they've been able to accomplish. It seems to me that it's a great idea. It looks terrific on paper. I've actually visited with a couple of these PRT entities in Iraq and Afghanistan. It seems to me that this is an issue, in fact, that I'd like to discuss with General Petraeus, because I think that the effectiveness of these PRTs is going to be significantly related to the degree of security of the environment in which they operate. If you were able to maximize the capabilities of the individuals that are assigned to these teams, then we need to ensure that they're actually being able to engage in the population issues that are desired.

So, I don't have enough detail yet. I'm favorably inclined to this kind of a construct, and look forward to finding out how we're really doing.

Senator MARTINEZ. One of the issues in Afghanistan, of course, under NATO command, is the commitment of our NATO partners to doing all that is necessary. I know the chairman, in his opening remarks, touched upon the limitations upon the use of some of our allies forces. How will you be addressing that issue?

Admiral FALLON. That's one area in which I do have significant experience, having worked with NATO and been a commander in NATO before, and spent a couple of years in the policy shop, working in and out of Brussels. There's some phenomenal goodness that's come out of the NATO alliance, and I'll tell you frankly that I've learned a lot from our NATO allies. But it is challenging to have an operational construct in which you have a long list of caveats that our commanders have to deal with. I don't know enough yet to really be making any public statements on it. I'll be interested to consult with our folks in Afghanistan. I think there's a tremendous amount of goodness in having the NATO nations step up and to be a part of the solution in Afghanistan. Exactly how we figure out how to optimize this contribution is probably a challenge that we need to undertake. But I do have familiarity with the process and a pretty good understanding of the background and how nations work together in this alliance, so I'll look forward to working with them.

Senator MARTINEZ. On the issue of Iran, I understand that there's been some concern raised by the President's comments; however, I find them to be consistent with the responsibilities of the Commander in Chief. I think what he said was that if Iran operatives are causing harm and death to our troops, that we will deal with them forcefully and that we will come after them and arrest them or otherwise deal with them. Do you find anything troubling about that policy? Does it immediately suggest some more ag-
gressive actions against Iran, other than dealing with their incursions into Iraq and creating conditions that will cause harm to our troops?

Admiral FALLON. Seems to me we need to take every step that’s reasonable in the circumstances to try to provide this atmosphere of security and stability. The Iranian international behavior has drawn the attention and response from the international community. This isn’t, I believe, just the President seeing a problem with this country’s behavior, the leadership in this country’s behavior. These are issues that I’m anxious to get a better understanding of, particularly as it pertains to activity inside of Iraq, and to work, to the maximum extent possible, to try and find the right solutions.

Senator MARTINEZ. Admiral, my time is expired, but I want to thank you for your service, your family’s sacrifice, and your willingness to undertake this difficult assignment, and wish you well.

Thank you.

Admiral FALLON. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Martinez.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Fallon, thank you. It’s great to be able to listen to you today. I must say—you couldn’t see this, because you were looking at the committee—when you said that you’re not a patient man, I would describe the response of your family as a benign smile, which is to say, I think they agreed with that, but, nonetheless, continue to love you. [Laughter.]

That’s a good way to go off to this assignment. We’re going to need your impatience here, as well as the thoughtfulness that you’ve shown the committee this morning.

Earlier, in response to a question from one of my colleagues, you, I think, gave an interesting and important answer about the extent to which, as I heard it—and I want you to confirm whether I heard it right—you would be involved in what might be called the day-to-day command of Multi-National Forces in Iraq. I thought I heard you say—and, of course, that’s General Petraeus’s job; obviously, you’d be watching what’s happening, asking questions, as presumably you would with General McNeill, when he takes over the NATO forces and American forces, because you have a lot else to do in that AOR. Did I hear you right?

Admiral FALLON. I believe you did, from your description of my comments. I have a regional responsibility, and will be working hard in those lanes. I will rely on our commanders in the field, the subordinate commanders, to carry out their jobs. But I believe that’s the responsibility of command to make sure that I understand what they’re doing and how they’re doing it. The key issue for me and for this Nation in Iraq is to be getting results. So, those are the kinds of questions I’m going to be asking and the expectations that I’ll have for General Petraeus and other commanders are that they have a plan, they understand what we’re trying to do, and they can show me—the term “benchmarks” has been used here—I’d like to see a plan of action and milestones to actually get somewhere, and I will be tracking those results. To the extent that I have to be engaged with them on a day-to-day level, I will, to assure me, give me the confidence so that I can come back and assure
the leadership of this Nation that we're actually making progress in the endeavors we've undertaken.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that answer. Personally, I believe it's the right one. We have good commanders on the ground that we've sent there. Obviously, you have broad responsibilities in the region. It seems to me—and I think no matter how we feel, particularly about what's happening in Iraq now here on this panel, and what we think should happen, that most everybody agrees that what's happening in Iraq has regional implications and, I would say, is part of a larger regional conflict playing out. So, to the extent that you have time to deal with that regionally throughout CENTCOM, the Middle East generally, which, as you've said, has always been an area of priority concern for American foreign policy interested in stability, both politically and because of the economic importance to our country, of oil, and now facing an enemy of the larger war against Islamist extremism and terrorism, an enemy which has, generally speaking, emerged from that region, I think it's critically important that you have the time to help our Nation make progress on those larger concerns.

I want to ask this question. It has struck me, at various times when I've traveled around to meet our commanders on different commands, that, in a way that most people don't appreciate, PACOM from which you've come, but also CENTCOM to which you're going—the military leader that we put in charge there is, in my ways, the most prominent American representative in the region. Sometimes people call for a special representative to the Middle East. I think you're going to be the special representative to the Middle East. I think it's critically important that you have the time to help us make progress, not only in our military relations, but in our diplomatic relations, with our allies and others in the region. I just wanted to ask you whether, as you go off, you consider that to be one of your priorities.

Admiral Fallon. Senator, thank you for your confidence. I'll be happy to play any role that would be constructive in this area. In the Pacific, the far Pacific and Asia are, of course, a long way from Washington, D.C., and so, we have the opportunity to engage, to a greater extent, probably than might be the case in other areas that are closer to the U.S.

There's also a longstanding tradition of good work by many of my predecessors out there who have established relationships and expectations with these nations that continue to this day. So, it was a real joy to actually get out and visit these countries, and not just the military people, but their political, diplomatic leaders, as well, and to get folks to engage on issues of common concern. It's worked out there, and I've seen it work in other areas. I'll be anxious to do whatever I can, and to play as helpful a role as possible here in this region, as well.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I think there is an enormous role that you can play. The fact is that in many parts of the world where people
on the ground may not have friendly thoughts toward us, generally, today, unfortunately, they continue to have a lot of respect and appreciation for the American military. Your ability to build on that in your relations with the indigenous militaries in the region, but also with the political leadership, I think can be very important at this critical moment in our relations with the command you’re about to take.

I thank you very much, and wish you all the blessings as you go forward with your family.

Admiral FALLON. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, we do all wish you well. Just the 30,000-foot view of things—and if you’ve been asked these questions before, I apologize—but from the big things, in terms of this new command that you’re taking on, General Petraeus said that he believed that Iraq was part of the overall war on terror, that it was a central battlefront. Do you concur in that?

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir, I certainly do.

Senator GRAHAM. So, the outcome in Iraq would affect the overall war on terror positively or negatively. It’s not a neutral event. You agree?

Admiral FALLON. Absolutely not.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. There’s a debate here on the role of Congress as to what we should do and how we should do it, and that’s part of democracy. General Petraeus said that a resolution passed by Congress disapproving of the mission that he’s about to embark on, in his opinion, would be detrimental to morale. What’s your opinion?

Admiral FALLON. Senator, I think these issues are being discussed in the political realm, and I’d prefer to keep them there. I’ll be honest with you, I haven’t even looked at the wording of any of these proposals. I have a very significant military task to do, if confirmed, and I’d much prefer to focus on that activity to try to effect some results that we could all be happy with.

Senator GRAHAM. Is Iraq winnable, militarily?

Admiral FALLON. Not militarily. But could this situation in Iraq be turned around? I firmly believe it can, if we have the engagement of the capabilities that are necessary to help——

Senator GRAHAM. I agree, we’re not seeking a military victory in Iraq, we’re trying to turn around the situation, in terms of security. That’s the goal, right?

Admiral FALLON. Security and stability, so that the government has a chance to stand up on its own. But this is not a “do this, and then maybe you can do this.”

Senator GRAHAM. What would be “winning” in Iraq?

Admiral FALLON. I don’t know what “winning” is. This is one of the things that I’d be working with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State to lay out, with our subordinate commanders. But it seems to me that what we’re trying to do here is to give this young government an opportunity to be representative of its people and to govern this country in a manner that people could be happy.
Senator GRAHAM. Can I suggest what “winning” might be? That you have a stable, functioning democracy in Iraq out of the ashes of a dictatorship that’s an ally in the war on terror, where women have a robust role in society? Would that be a good definition of “winning”?

Admiral FALLON. I think there are a lot of aspects there that would be pretty positive, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Could you envision a democracy emerging in Iraq with this level of violence at the current state?

Admiral FALLON. I would have two comments. One, clearly not much in the way of progress is going to occur with the current levels of violence and instability, but I think that we would probably be wise to temper our expectations here, that the likelihood that Iraq is suddenly going to turn into something that looks close to what we enjoy here in this country is going to be a long time coming. But, first things first. Get some stability and security for the people and then——

Senator GRAHAM. Well, that’s the question. What is the first thing first? Is the first thing for us to start withdrawing, so the Iraqis will step up to the plate and do more? Or is the first thing to help the Iraqis get control of the violence so they can solve their problems politically? What’s your view of the first thing?

Admiral FALLON. My view is that there are several first things, but there’s a fundamental understanding of——

Senator GRAHAM. Well, what’s the first of the first things?

Admiral FALLON. We have help to increase security and stability in that country.

Senator GRAHAM. That’s going to take, partially, military involvement.

Admiral FALLON. Sure.

Senator GRAHAM. Let’s walk through the whole idea of the surge. It’s on more than one front. The 21,500 troops are designed to help provide a better security environment militarily, is that correct?

Admiral FALLON. The troops that are going in are to try to enable us to effect a different operational construct on the ground. As General Petraeus outlined in his visit here last week, the idea is to try——

Senator GRAHAM. What does that mean? We’re trying to send more troops to help the Iraqis control the violence, with them out front. We’re having a better ability to hold. Is that correct?

Admiral FALLON. Some of the Iraqis have demonstrated an ability to be effective, and some have not. It’s a work in progress.

Senator GRAHAM. The problem we’re trying to send troops to correct is the ability to hold once we clear. Is that correct?

Admiral FALLON. If we are to be effective, we have to be able to secure some of these neighborhoods and some of these areas in the country so that the processes of democracy have a chance to succeed.

Senator GRAHAM. Do you think troops being sent in can help accomplish that goal?

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. The other thing that we’re trying to surge is economic ability of the country. Unemployment in Baghdad is at almost 40 percent in some regions. Part of the strategy
is to create jobs so people will not be tempted to take money from militias to attack our troops. Is that correct?
Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir.
Senator G RAHAM. Okay. Another part of the strategy is to have a rule of law so that any group, regardless of background, if they engage in actions against our troops or to topple the government, they will pay a heavy price. Is that correct?
Admiral FALLON. My understanding is that aspect of society, government in Iraq, is very poorly developed.
Senator G RAHAM. So, we need to develop along three fronts: a better rule of law, a better economy, and a better security environment. That's the plan of the surge, right, on three fronts?
Admiral FALLON. Senator, I think there are many tasks in Iraq, and the biggest challenge right now is to get the level of violence down, to establish baseline security that will enable us to move forward on some of these other areas.
Senator G RAHAM. You would support sending more troops to accomplish that goal?
Admiral FALLON. I don't know how many troops are going to be necessary to effect the outcome that we want, but General Petraeus, in my conversations with him, communicated that he believes he needs these troops now to get moving——
Senator G RAHAM. If he said he needed more, you would support him?
Admiral FALLON. I don't know, sir. I haven't been there yet, and I'm not in a position to make that judgment.
Senator G RAHAM. Well, is his judgment about 21,500—does it make sense to you?
Admiral FALLON. I will better be able to give you an informed answer when I understand the situation better.
Senator G RAHAM. From the Iranian point of view, if you were informed, early on in your tenure here, that there was a sanctuary being provided by the Iranian Government for terrorists who are killing American soldiers and military personnel in Iraq, is that in our National interest to allow that sanctuary to continue?
Admiral FALLON. That doesn’t sound like a good idea to me. It’s one of the things that I’ll be interested in learning if I get the opportunity to get the intel briefs from CENTCOM.
Senator G RAHAM. Finally, last question, from the Iranian point of view, do you consider, based on what you know now, that the Iranian involvement in Iraq is counterproductive to developing a democracy in Iraq?
Admiral FALLON. Senator, I’m not sure what the Iranian viewpoint is here, but it seems to me that, from my observations from the outside, that we have not seen a constructive role in Iraq from Iran. I would be interested to find out if, in fact, this is the case or not.
Senator G RAHAM. Good luck, Admiral.
Admiral FALLON. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator BILL NELSON. Admiral, you can tell by the comments that have been made that there is a difference of opinion on this committee as to the effectiveness of the President’s decision on an
additional 21,000 troops. Senator Warner mentioned that there are 10 Senators that have joined him. I am one of the 10. It is my personal feeling that the 21,000 troops, most of which are to go into Baghdad, will not help in the middle of the situation of sectarian violence that we find, which Senator Warner correctly noted, goes back a thousand years. It actually goes back almost 1,500 years, right after the death of Mohammed, when his son-in-law split off, and that became the Shiite sect, born of rebellion and revenge. It's been going on ever since. It's going on there right now.

I want you to know how much I appreciate your candor and your openmindedness in approaching this, because good intentioned, well-informed Senators at this table have a different opinion about this. Personally, I think that additional troops in Anbar province would help. The Marine generals there convinced me that it would help. But not in Baghdad, and certainly not 20,000. Maybe 200,000, maybe 300,000 in Baghdad, but not 20,000.

So, I approach my comments and my questions with that as a background. I also want to say that this Senator, along with several others, including numbers that have mentioned it here today, appreciate the candor with which General Abizaid has come to that table over and over again. Personally, I hate to see him step down. But he has given his full measure in a very difficult situation. As I said to General Petraeus, I would say to you, Godspeed, Admiral, as you embark on this enormously important duty, taking over, with the goal of stabilizing Iraq.

I appreciate the fact that you took a risk stepping out, with regard to China. What can we expect with regard to Iran? What kind of reach-out? I know you can’t answer it, but just, kind of, give me a flavor of your attitude as we approach this difficult thing and in that Baker-Hamilton Report—and, by the way, they are testifying this afternoon to our Senate Foreign Relations Committee. They said an aggressive diplomatic effort in the entire region, including Syria and Iran.

But give me the state of your mind, if you would.

Admiral FALLON. Senator, I will be very anxious to consult with colleagues in the Department of State and in the region to gain a better appreciation than I have of the situation in Iraq. But I believe that there are some significant differences, just right off the bat, in the situation I encountered in China. First and foremost, I believe, is the extent to which the relationship between the U.S. and China had developed on many fronts prior to my arrival. In fact, there were things that we were able to do in our engagement that had been done by some predecessors. My understanding, from this vantage point, of the situation in Iran is that we are not at that level at all. There is activity that’s occurred on the part of the Iranian government that has been seen by the international community as not only not helpful in the region, but in the world, and particularly in regard to the potential to develop nuclear weapons.

So, I believe we have to be cautious and careful in our approaches to this country, but I am quite anxious to find out, to the best of my ability, the lay of the land, and then work with colleagues at State to see what the best way forward is.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you for your comments, and thank you for your openmindedness.
I want to ask you about the training and equipping of Iraqi troops. I don't want to concentrate on just the number of Iraqi troops trained, but, rather, your assessment of how reliable they are. The reason I want to raise this issue with you is that I raised this with General Petraeus. The number, 325,000 had been thrown out in an answer to my question from General Petraeus. I asked, “Are they reliable?” He said, “They are not all reliable, sir,” and then went on to modify and qualify that. Then I said, “Well, can you put a percentage on it of how many of them are reliable?” He says, “Sir, I cannot, from this divide.” Can you give us any sense of what you think that we would have some greater degree of comfort with regard to a plan that the President has of going into Baghdad, on a dual command structure in the operation of “clear” and then “hold,” before you ever get to “build,” having the Iraqi army and the U.S. military side by side?

Admiral FALLON. Senator, I'd go back, first, to a comment on dual command structure. I have no idea what the structure is that the ground commanders over there have in mind, but whatever it is, it has to be one in which we can effectively employ our forces and we have the confidence that we can safeguard their well-being. I cannot tell you, with any degree of accuracy, what percentage of troops, or what the numbers are, that are effective. I believe that this is pretty judgmental, it's pretty subjective, in my opinion, my experience, and it's one that I am very anxious to gain an appreciation for from our ground commanders.

I've always been someone who felt more comfortable in smaller numbers of very effective capabilities than a large number of whatever is decorating the landscape. So, I will be very interested in trying to find out where we really stand with these forces.

Because we're going to depend on them to carry the water. This is the objective here, is to turn this over to them so they can effectively safeguard their country.

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I want to make one other comment.

It's hard for me to understand how we can come to the table and support a surge that is predicated on the fact of the reliability of the Iraqi army, when nobody can answer if, in fact, the Iraqi army is reliable, and that we're asking 20,000 more Americans to go in there to fight alongside Iraqi troops, when we, in fact, don't know. Nobody has been able to answer. These are questions that Senator Warner, Senator Levin, and I and others have been asking.

I'll just finish, Mr. Chairman. How would you go about measuring the reliability of the Iraqi troops?

Admiral FALLON. Senator, from my experience, we observe them training. This is how we measure and conduct our assessments of our own troops. We watch them in their training, and then we put them in situations in which we can actually see them perform, and then we make an assessment of their ability to measure up to the expectations that we have. I would expect to have our commanders doing the exact same thing with the Iraqi forces, with an understanding that, first and foremost, these are Iraqi forces working for an Iraqi command structure and Iraqi Government. I think this is an issue in which we have to be a little careful, here, about putting pretty heavy fingerprints. Certainly, we have to have confidence
that the security structure in Iraq is going to be able to carry its end of the bargain up, or clearly we're not going to be successful.

Senator BILL NELSON. In the spirit of candor, you will come back to us and report on your measurement of whether or not they're reliable.

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

Senator Chambliss.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, welcome to the committee today, and thank you for being the great soldier that you are. We appreciate your service to our country and your taking on this very daunting challenge which you have ahead of you at CENTCOM. But knowing that you spent—although it be a very brief time at Glenco, we know that you're well trained to take on this task ahead of you.

Admiral FALLON. Five years in “Albenny,” too, sir.

Senator CHAMBLISS. “Albenny,” huh? I can tell you were, when you say it that way.

First of all, let me just say that I think you're going to be working with another truly great American in General Petraeus, and this is going to be the first time in a while that we've had a Navy CENTCOM Commander and an Army general in theater. Any dynamics there that you think are advantageous to us, from the standpoint of having two branches represented?

Admiral FALLON. I think you have tremendous potential for synergy. General Petraeus, widely respected for his expertise and thoughtful approach to land warfare, and I've been operating in a different environment, but anxious to collaborate in any way we can.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Good.

I just have one question for you, and it really relates to Afghanistan. Last week, I had the privilege of meeting with the Assistant Minister of Defense for Afghanistan, Mr. Mohibullah. While he discussed the progress of the Afghan national army is making in growing and training their forces, he reiterated to me the importance of a strong and continuous commitment by the United States to the security of Afghanistan. At the same time, one of his priorities is to train and equip Afghan forces in order to lessen the Afghans' reliance on U.S. forces.

I believe that this is an extremely important priority, since, in the end, it's the Afghan forces who can best defend and secure Afghanistan, and because U.S. forces are increasingly stretched thin due to commitments in Iraq, as well as elsewhere. I'd appreciate you discussing, a little bit, how the United States and NATO forces in Afghanistan are partnering with the Afghan army to facilitate this training and equipping, and explain what you will do to ensure that this training proceeds as quickly and efficiently as possible.

Admiral FALLON. Senator, I am also anxious to get into this and find out the details. I don't have the appreciation I'd like for this. I'm told that the Afghan national army is making progress, and not just in numbers, but in competence. The anecdotals that I hear from our people are pretty favorable. We have more work to do with the police, but I think I can understand that.
So, I'll be anxious to see just how we're doing, and I'd be happy to report back to you when I have an assessment of that.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, that's all I have.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much.

Senator McCaskill.

Senator McCASKILL. Thank you.

Like others, I want to thank you for your service, and thank your family.

I am very aware, as I think many Americans are at this point, of the serious problems that we have in the area of acquisition and contracting in Iraq. Frankly, I sat in on a hearing last week in a subcommittee of this committee, where I realized that this problem is not limited to the conflict in Iraq, that there are serious and significant issues with the way the Department of Defense is purchasing and contracting for services.

Who should be held accountable within the military when there is serious problems with the way money is being misspent or in cases of actual fraud and bribery?

Admiral F ALLON. Senator, I'm not familiar with the details of this issue. We hold commanders accountable. In my experience, the responsible individuals measure up to our expectations, and particularly the applicable laws and regulations, and, if they don't, then they pay the consequence.

Senator MCCASKILL. I guess what I'm trying to get at is we're not in a moneymaking operation in the Government. There is no bottom-line pressure. We don't need to worry about whether we're making a profit. So, the only way we have of controlling the way money is spent is who's held accountable. I'm beginning to get information that is just, frankly, mind-numbing about the lack of accountability within the Department of Defense as it relates to problems with acquisition and purchasing. An example of the Inspector General's (IG) warning that they are violating the Antideficiency Act, and then they did it a hundred more times, after warned by the IG that what they were doing, in terms of the way they were purchasing things, was violating the law. I understand the rub between urgent and compelling, and you want to go quickly and get necessary equipment. I think what I'm worried about is that I noticed, over the weekend, somebody was found guilty of bribery, the person who was in charge of comptroller on the ground with the Provisional Reconstruction Authority in Iraq, and evidently, a couple of Reserve officers were co-conspirators. But when does it move up the food chain? I took the seat of an American figure in history that had a favorite saying about "The buck stops here." Where does the buck stop for these problems? Who, within the military command, takes responsibility for the problems beneath their command as it relates to acquisition and contracts?

Admiral FALLOn. Ma'am, my experience, if I'm the responsible commander, I'll take responsibility for it. I don't know any detail of the accusations or of the issues. I'll be happy to try to find out. I believe that it's a key component of our responsibility, as leaders, to be accountable, to be efficient, as well as effective, with the resources that the American people, the taxpayers of this country, give to us. I think there should be little doubt in the minds of our
commanders that they're going to be held accountable for that, and I'd be happy to look into it, if you'd give me some specifics.

Senator McCaskill. Are you aware of any time under your command while you've been serving your country—so well, by the way, in many different capacities—are you ever aware of anyone under your command being found either administratively or legally liable under the Antideficiency Act?

Admiral Fallon. I don't think I can answer that question honestly without a little bit of research.

Senator McCaskill. Okay. As it relates to the rub, when it comes to that—and that is, equipment for the men and women who are serving us—I want to briefly tell you a true story.

Last February, there was an article in the Monett, MO, newspaper about this community coming together because a young National Guard member who was serving in Iraq had written home and asked his mom to go down to the local tool and die shop. He said, "Mom, we've gotten the armor for vehicles over here in our unit, but we don't have any tools to put them on. Would you see if the man that owns the local tool and die shop would send us the tools we need to put the armor on our vehicles?" After that was published a lot of people at Monett were really proud of what they had done, because, of course, they sent them the tools to put the armor on their vehicles. My sister and I went down to the basement and dug out the letters from my dad, who served in World War II in Europe, and he wrote home for peanut brittle and for new socks. He didn't write home for tools to put the armor on his vehicle.

With the National Guard being stretched as they are, and with all the stories we've read of equipment they're leaving behind that is no longer operable, how are we taking steps to make sure that we don't have these young men and women having to write home for the tools to put the armor on their vehicle?

Admiral Fallon. Ma'am, all I can tell you is that, if I'm confirmed, I'll do everything in my power to ensure that our forces are the best-equipped, best-trained, and best-prepared to conduct the operations we ask them to do.

Senator McCaskill. In terms of before a Guard or Reserve unit is sent over, is there some internal process that would help me understand that someone has to check off that all the equipment they need is ready and available before they're sent? Or is it, you send them and then try to figure it out later?

Admiral Fallon. No, that's certainly not the way it is. There are all kinds of processes that are in place to try to make sure that we have the appropriate equipment and so forth. But I think a reality of life is that there are going to be many issues and many cases of desires for things, and the ability of the system, if you would, be it the Army or the other Services or the Guard, to meet those demands is something that has to be worked and negotiated. I think, my experience, one of the challenges of command is to try to determine what the appropriate balance is between the desire and the need. I can tell you from my experience, there's an endless desire. If I listened to all the demands that were asked of me, there's not enough money in the world to cover these things.

Senator McCaskill. Sure.
Admiral Fallon. So, you, I would hope, would rely on the judgment and experience of those in command to try to make the best determination as to where we are with these things.

I can tell you that, if I get out into this command, I'll certainly be happy to take a look at it, and would make it a priority, to the best of my ability, to make sure that our folks are as well prepared as we can make them for whatever we ask them to do.

Senator McCaskill. I would appreciate it if you would try to follow up with the committee and with my office about the question I asked about violations of the Antideficiency Act and what accountability there is.

[The information referred to follows:] While reporting and remedial action of Antideficiency Act (ADA) violations are the purview of the Services under title 10, I am committed to ensuring component commanders meet their fiscal responsibilities. Also, understand this committee requested ADA violation data from the Office of the Secretary of Defense Comptroller during her February 6, 2006, testimony, thus defer to her response on the number of violations.

Senator McCaskill. Second, I didn't have time for this, but I would like to know, and, once again, this could be in a follow-up later. Is there a plan for what happens if this doesn't work, if the Iraqi brigades don't show up, if the police personnel don't stand up, if this is not successful—is there a plan, going forward?

[The information referred to follows:] Adjustments to our force posture and strategy are conditioned based. As we identify changes to both the friendly and enemy situation, modifications and adaptations to our tactical plans will be made and should be expected. As the Iraqi's deploy forces to the Baghdad area, we will be able to evaluate their effectiveness and progress. Simultaneously, we will continually evaluate our effectiveness on the ground. Our contingency planning for the way forward will be based on such assessments and we will adjust our plans accordingly.

Senator McCaskill. I think you've been very candid today. I think we all value that highly. Thank you. I think you've done a great job today, and I wish you the very best and safety.

Admiral Fallon. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.

Senator Sessions.

Senator Sessions. Thank you, Chairman Levin.

Admiral Fallon, you've had, by all accounts, an excellent tenure in the Pacific. You've been out on that blue water, and now you have some brown sand to spend your time on. It'll be quite a change, I think. But your abilities are well recognized. You're known as a strong leader, a person who's willing to stand up, say what he believes, and insist that things happen that ought to happen, and when they should happen.

I know the equipment situation is not perfect, but I don't believe any military has ever been better equipped, better supplied than this one has. In this very distant theater, and very hostile, and remote areas, I'm sure there have been some times when equipment and things were not what we needed.

They're entitled to the best equipment, the best strategy—that's important, a good strategy—and execution of that strategy. My former Deputy Attorney General in Alabama, General Richard Allen, a retired Army Reserve general, used to quote Patton as say-
ing—I think it was like this—“A poor plan violently executed today is better than a good plan tomorrow.”

What I want to tell you is that there is an intense interest in this area. We do not have a lot of time. When General Petraeus says, “I need this kind of equipment, I need the State Department to do this, I need improvement on electricity, or I need more this or that,” I mean, somebody has to get it. The time is short. This is a matter of high national importance, important for the national security of this country, our foreign policy, our credibility as a Nation, and our safety, that we be successful in Iraq. I still believe firmly that is a realistic possibility that we can achieve. But we don’t have much time, and we don’t need to wait around a lot of time.

First let me ask you—I know you’ve talked with General Petraeus, and he spoke to me, and I asked him about you, and he was very complimentary of you. Since he’s going back now for his third tour, he has helped train the Iraqi army. He knows, I assume, almost all of their leaders personally. Do you think you have the kind of relationship that can be effective? How can you help him be effective in Iraq?

Admiral FALLON. Senator, I’ll look forward to working with General Petraeus. We have only recently met and had several conversations, not nearly enough to be where we want to be, but, hopefully, in due course, that’ll occur.

I think we’re tremendously advantaged having his experience on the ground. His successive tours over there, although clearly very demanding on himself, and, particularly, his family, should give him the insight to be able to pretty quickly assess where we are, because he’s seen this now from several years back, the year before last, and now today. I would think this would be immensely valuable as we try to really find out where we are.

I hope to be of assistance to him, using my experience in other areas and in this region of the world, as well, to try to put his work in Iraq in the perspective of the region. I think that, while he’s going to be hard at work inside the country, working those details, I might be of benefit to him around the periphery to try to set the conditions that might be favorable for him to execute his actions inside the country.

Senator SESSIONS. I think that’s a good answer, and it has potential to be a good relationship, and I hope that you will work on that.

Senator Reed and, I think, a number of Senators on both sides of the aisle, have been concerned about the interagency process. In one of our briefings, I asked, about the State Department, who’s in charge of economic development, and the answer is the State Department. Who’s in charge of infrastructure improvement? The answer, fundamentally, is the State Department. Who’s in charge of intergovernmental relations? The answer is the State Department. Who’s in charge of building a court system? Justice and State. Who’s in charge of a lot of these things? Other departments and agencies. All of those matters I just mentioned, would you not agree, are critical to a stable and peaceful Iraq—improvement in those areas?
Admiral FALLON. Senator, of course. We need to make progress in each of these areas. I can tell you, from my experience in the Pacific, we had what I consider a terrific working relationship with the Department of State—with our Ambassadors in the region, with Secretary Christopher Hill, the East Asia Pacific Assistant Secretary. We worked issues every day, from a regional perspective, individual ambassadors working within the countries, to try to work with each other to set the conditions to enable us to be successful. I could probably spend half an hour on that.

Senator SESSIONS. I'm not demeaning the State Department. I'm just talking about this problem. You're going in an area, and we need things done now. We don't need to be waiting for months and months to get negotiations and go through some bureaucratic process to get a power plant in some area of Iraq that's critical to gaining stability for the local mayor, who wants to be on our side, and we have to ask it, and it goes around, and, a year later, it occurs. I'm pretty worried about that. Frankly, the State and the other departments, who also need to contribute more, are having a hard time getting people to come. They're not as willing to go out in dangerous areas as the military is. So, I think some of the matters need to be turned over to the military, more than perhaps in the past, and that the other agencies of our Government need to be more responsive to the legitimate needs of our soldiers, who are placing their lives at risk.

Are you willing to use the courage and determination that you're famous for to stand up for our soldiers there, to make sure this whole interagency process works, and, if need be, call the President of the United States? He's in charge of this thing. He's the one that can direct any agency to do anything to make these things happen.

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir, and I believe he's anxious to do whatever is necessary to enable us to achieve success. We're going to work this, hard. Recognize the need to have these folks, but also recognize that the military is an expeditionary organization, we're geared to working overseas and at long distances. The Department of State certainly is not, except in their ambassadors. But I recognize the issue. We're going to do everything we can.

Senator SESSIONS. It's something to work on. But, for example, if you conclude that we need 2 to 3 times the number of prison bed spaces as I believe we do in the immediate future, and probably 5 to 10 times in the long term, will you push the bureaucracy to get moving on it? Because, truthfully, we have a catch-and-release policy there now, catching dangerous people and releasing them, because there's no way to get them housed. Are you willing to take an aggressive action on that if need be?

Admiral FALLON. You bet, sir.

Senator SESSIONS. You've also confronted the question of missile defense in the Pacific with North Korea. Now we see the danger with the Iranians, who move that up. I think you've said that our defenses for missile defense capabilities should keep pace with the threat. It seems that the threat is stepping up its pace. Do you think that we need to keep pace with that as we develop our defense budgets?

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir, Senator. I believe we need to stay ahead of the power curve, and I believe we've made substantial
progress in this country, in the past year, in missile defense. We might want to discuss that in a different setting. But there's been a lot of progress made, and a lot of lessons that we've learned in the Pacific, that I think would be applicable here, in other regions of the world, as well.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

We'll have a 3-minute second round.

Admiral, in the advance policy questions, you were asked, "What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders to make the political compromises necessary for a political solution?" What leverage does the U.S. have in this regard? Your answer, "Current levels of suffering experienced by the Iraqi population should motivate the political leaders to make progress."

Admiral, that hasn't happened. They've had 3½ years-plus of suffering. It hasn't motivated the Iraqi political leaders to make the compromises, which everybody says are essential to be made if there's going to be an end to the violence. I don't know of anybody, no matter what side of this issue they are, or who does not say there must be a political solution if there's going to be an end to the violence. The Iraqis have not reached those political compromises. It seems to me what pressure will be put on them and will make them reach those compromises is the issue which divides so many of us. But I don't think your answer, frankly, is satisfactory, "The suffering experienced by the Iraqi population should motivate the leaders." Of course it should, but it hasn't. So, my question is, what other leverage, since that hasn't worked, does the U.S. have in this regard?

Admiral FALLON. Senator Levin, you're aware that the Iraqi Government has outlined a series of steps that have been called benchmarks in some quarters——

Chairman LEVIN. Most of which they've not taken.

Admiral FALLON. —and they need to take these steps.

Chairman LEVIN. But what's the leverage?

Admiral FALLON. We need to hold them accountable.

Chairman LEVIN. How?

Admiral FALLON. By, I believe, having a very firm dialogue with the leadership. Some of that, I believe, has already occurred. We have given them some time——

Chairman LEVIN. What are the consequences if they fail again?

Admiral FALLON. If there's no progress, then I don't believe we're going to be successful in the military actions. There has to be a commensurate movement forward in political background that's going to give these people the confidence that they can actually effectively move forward as a country.

Chairman LEVIN. How important, Admiral, are clear, real, significant consequences on the Iraqi politicians if they fail to keep these military commitments, political commitments, and economic commitments? Must there be clear, real, significant consequences that they understand will follow, if they continue to fail to keep their commitments?

Admiral FALLON. Senator, I believe that there will have to be a firm understanding that we are not in an open-ended situation where we're just going to sit around and wait forever for things to
happen. But I also believe that it’s not going to be particularly constructive right now to tape an edict of a number of actions and give deadlines. I believe in giving them some time. How much time? I don’t know. But time is running out. Clearly, I think there’s a pretty broad understanding, certainly in my mind and others that I’ve talked to, that they are going to need to take actions.

Chairman LEVIN. Let me just ask if you agree with General Richard Zilmer, who’s the commanding general of our Multi-National Force-West in Iraq—a Marine general, and head of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. He responded to a question the other day about the impact on morale of discussions of various resolutions in the U.S. Senate. I’m not asking you to comment on the resolutions. You’ve indicated, I think, very properly, may I say, that you’re not going to get involved in the political side of the debate. You’re going to focus on the military missions. Here’s what he said, though, about morale, which is very much a matter within your concern. He was asked, “Is there an impact on morale about these—all these debates that are going on?” “Well,” he said, “between television and all the rest, and the Internet—marines, sailors, and soldiers, they know what’s going on, not only in the United States, but around the world, so they have an opportunity to see and view the news, as anyone else does.” He said that, “Yes, we understand there’s a debate back home about the direction of the war and where it’s going.” He says, “But the morale remains very high out here. Our marines understand what their mission is. We watch what happens back home, but I’m not concerned about losing sight of the focus.” Then he said, “I’m very comfortable that, despite the debate that goes on back there, our folks over here are staying true to the mission.”

Have you heard anything to the contrary?

Admiral FALLON. I’m not familiar with that statement. I can only tell you, Senator, what I observe from my interaction with our forces there. As General Zilmer is said to have indicated, they are very focused on their mission. I think the things that affect their morale most directly are their confidence in one another, in the training they’ve received, and, most importantly, their ability to be successful in their mission. If they feel that they’re actually making progress, then their morale is going to be good. If they feel that they are being given necessary tools to accomplish their mission and—be they equipment and otherwise—if they feel that they’re being led by competent, responsible leaders, then their morale is going to be good. So, my observation was that, in most of the places that I visited, my assessment was that our people were feeling that they had the tools and that they were working hard. I think it’s our responsibility, as leaders, to give them these necessary capabilities so that they can be successful.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Admiral.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, I looked at your distinguished biography and the sentence in here, “Admiral Fallon began his naval aviation service flying in an RA–5C Vigilante with a combat deployment to Vietnam.” That was about the time that I was in the Pentagon, as you recall, and you were a young lieutenant JG about that time?
Admiral Fallon. Yes, sir.

Senator Warner. Both of us remember very clearly the tragic circumstances here at home of the American public pulling back of giving the support of the people to the men and women of the Armed Forces. I think it was misfortune. A lot of your generation, when they got back home, having served courageously and at enormous sacrifice, did not return to the welcome arms that they were entitled to. Today, it's quite different. I find the American people are solidly behind our uniformed members and their families, the greatest respect and the heartfelt feelings for the losses and the sacrifices, and the respect the families have for what their service-persons are doing. So, it's a changed situation. But I think it's essential that we continue to work with the American public so that they better understand what are our goals, and are they realistic, and how those young people are going to be employed in the new strategy.

Today, I have to say, with the greatest respect—I've been privileged here, with my dear friend Carl Levin, 29 years on this committee, with many officers coming before us in engagements of our forces overseas and the problems associated, and when I add that to my own years in the Pentagon, having been associated with fine persons like yourself, it's a continuing learning experience for me. I learn greatly from each day of the association with the men and women in uniform. My sincere respect and affection for them is just there, and always will be. But the point I wish to make is that I think you've handled yourself today with a seasoned wisdom that you've gained through these many years, and you very carefully stuck to the role of a military professional, and, no matter the questions that were put to you, no matter the political differences we have—and I respect my colleagues on both sides of the arguments—you steadfastly did not let yourself get entrapped into that political discussion. You clearly impressed upon this committee, and, indeed, the Senate, and, I think, the public that have followed this hearing, you're going out to this job with the experience we need for that new CENTCOM Commander, with an open mind and a willingness to look at all aspects of it and to recognize that the buck stops on your desk, no matter how many fine subordinate commanders you have—the buck stops on your desk. You've shown the flexibility, the openness of mind, to look at the plan as it now is, and to decide what is best to achieve the mission.

As I say, my concern is on this question of the unified chain of command, not departing from time-tested tradition. My concern rests with the American GIs being injected into these situations which go back, as we say, 1,400 years in disagreements. I have no disrespect for the Muslim religion, but it is hard to understand and follow, and how, today, Muslim is falling upon Muslim with the animosity and the bitterness that leads to the killing and the instability.

I wish General Petraeus the very best. I'm reassured by your coming as the overall boss, that you will infuse into your command that seasoned wisdom that you have, and that, together, collectively, you can work on this plan and try and make it work, but make it work in such a way as more and more responsibility goes to the Iraqis, as recommended by the Baker-Hamilton Commission.
I do hope that you’ve had an opportunity to look through this. Their reports, and what they’ve done, and how you assess particularly their recommendations with regard to the diplomatic offensive that we have to take in that region, bring those countries of that region together, because the adverse effects—and I totally agree with the President—a loss of this situation will implode that region into such strife that it will impact not only the region, but the entire world, and peace, stability, and the ability of the free nations to do what we can to eliminate this terrorism, which is on the growth, unfortunately, and spreading.

I wish you well, but I would just want to remind people that you bring to this office—and I commend the President for selecting you—the depth of wisdom that you’ve exhibited here today, and you will work with your commanders to get the violence down, but hopefully to do it in such a way that more and more of the Iraqis take the lead—that’s a phrase we haven’t heard in this debate—take the lead, which means getting out there in front. They understand the language, they understand the culture. Our youngsters are doing the best to support them to take that lead. To that extent, I hope we could lower the level of Americans involved directly in that Baghdad situation. There are 6 to 7 million people, and there’s only so much a military force of an additional 20,000, if we have to put the whole complement in there, can do together with the Iraqis, unless the Iraqis step up and continue to augment their participation.

We have trained, over a period of 2½ years, at an enormous expense to this country, upwards of 200,000 of these individuals. What perplexes me, why they can’t take over the principal responsibility, and that our rules of engagement can be drawn up in such a way as if they’re charged with the sectarian violence. In al Anbar, our resolution says, “Mr. President, you’re correct, full force,” because there we’re engaged with al Qaeda, the very organization that precipitated the problems that we’re experiencing in that region today.

I thank you very much, but, Mr. Chairman, I believe this is an opportunity for our committee to get on record your concerns about a very important development in our overall national security, and that is now the recognized capability of China to interdict satellites above. We have a tremendous dependence on the use of our satellites for a variety of reasons, and now there’s concrete evidence that they have the capability, from a ground station to that high altitude, to bring down and incapacitate those missiles. Those hearing devices that we have up there, the platforms that are so essential to our overall security—can you just give us a general assessment of that situation and how best we are going to cope with it in the future?

Chairman LEVIN. I wonder, Senator Warner, if he could do that for the record, because we are at the tail end of a vote here now, and I want to give Senator Sessions a few minutes.

Senator WARNER. Well, I guess you’re right.

[The information referred to follows:]

As you are no doubt aware, China’s action evoked strong protests from other countries with space-based assets, and rightfully so. This event is being perceived as a major setback for international space cooperation which over the years has yielded
enormous benefit to the world in the commercial and scientific arenas. Unfortu-
nately, this event is reminiscent of the "Cold War" thinking that fueled the arms
races of that period of history and is counterproductive to future cooperation pro-
grams and objectives. How we should react to this development must be decided
upon after intense national-level study and in collaboration with the international
community.

Senator WARNER. Could I impose, Mr. Chairman, by suggesting
that your letter that you received from the Secretary of State on
the matter of benchmarks—I'm all in favor of benchmarks, but if
we try, here in Congress, to legislate too many benchmarks, really
beyond the assessment of the Secretary of State, who has the prin-
cipal responsibility, we could force this Government to go tilt, and
we'd better know what's going to take their place if it goes tilt, be-
cause I'm not one to sign on to this as the last step, this augmenta-
tion in Baghdad, the last chance. I come back to the President's
phrase, "We cannot let this region implode." So, if, for some reason,
this program in Baghdad is not successful, we have to press on
with some other program, and I hope that we don't gravitate—Con-
gress—to such a detailed outline of benchmarks and the con-
sequences—there should be consequences for failure, but I don't
want those consequences so heavy that they could literally topple
this government, because we don't know what might come along
and replace it.

Chairman LEVIN. We'll have more to say about the Secretary of
State's letter later.

Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you.

Admiral Fallon, as I understand the difficulty we have in Iraq in
achieving a political settlement which ultimately what we need and
will be essential, as Senator Levin has so ably and often pointed
out, but sometimes it's hard to reach an agreement if one side or
the other feels like they're winning or making progress through vio-
lence and military action. General Keane suggested that some in-
telligence indicated that the Sunnis thought they were prevailing,
that they were winning. Then it's hard to negotiate, is it not, with
them? That to really achieve a negotiated political settlement in
which this new government participates in an effective way, we
have to have a certain level of security and stability for that to
occur in. Is that sort of the challenge we have here?

Admiral FALLON. Senator, you know certainly better than I that
the business of politics is about compromise. The level of violence,
particularly recently, in Iraq, I can't believe that this is encourag-
ing any one of the factions to think that they're winning, because
clearly people are losing lives and an awful lot of blood and treas-
ure along with it.

If this endeavor of a pluralistic democratic entity in Baghdad is
going to survive, it's going to require political courage and leader-
ship, I believe, to stand up and make decisions that can be helpful
to people. It's going to be tough, because they all have baggage.
The degree to which any of them believes they're winning now is
pretty much of a stretch.

Senator Sessions. It's obvious, from our perspective, they're all
losing, the whole country and the region is losing, and it's sad, be-
{}
goals. All I’m saying to you is, you have to have somebody to nego-
tiate with, you have to have somebody to have agreements with, and if they’re now prepared to sit down with you and negotiate ef-
effectively, I’m not sure we need to blame it all on the existing gov-
ernment and the Shia majority, when they are being consistently attacked by the Sunni/al Qaeda/Baathist group. That’s why my un-
derstanding is that we have to maintain a military presence now to try to stabilize the area so these negotiations can occur.

Admiral FALLON. Yes, sir. There’s lots of bad and lots of blame to spread around. My suggestion would be—if I were in a position to have a discussion with the leaders in Iraq—would be to do their best to leave as much of the past behind and just focus on the po-
tential and the consequences if they fail to take this opportunity and step forward.

Senator SESSIONS. I think that’s correct. Of course, I believe, in Colombia, for example, it became pretty clear that oppressing the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia aggressively with military force was the only way that it was going to reach some sort of peaceful settlement in Colombia. I think they’ve made progress by increasing their military effort. We wish that wouldn’t happen, we wish we could talk our way out of all of these things, but some-
times people are so determined that it takes military force, unfor-
tunately.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

Admiral, thank you. We wish you all the best. We thank you and your family. We will hope, now, that we’ll be able to report this nomination quickly and get this to the floor. You’re well qualified. I think all have expressed our support of you. Your candor and your objectivity is important to us. We’re going to continue to rely and count on that. We just wish you the best of luck.

Admiral FALLON. Thank you very much, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to ADM William J. Fallon, USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied fol-
low:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readi-
ness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and au-
thorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant com-
manders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. I have no recommendations for amending Goldwater-Nichols at this time. However, if confirmed, I would not hesitate to offer proposals in the future that I would consider helpful.
Question. Do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you see a need for any change in those roles, with regard to the resource allocation process or otherwise?
Answer. No.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to the following offices:

The Under Secretaries of Defense.

Answer. Commander, U.S. CENTCOM coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretaries of Defense as needed to set and meet U.S. CENTCOM priorities and requirements for support.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. The Chairman is the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense. Section 163 of title 10, U.S.C., allows communication between the President or the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders to flow through the Chairman. As is custom and traditional practice, and as instructed by the Unified Command Plan, I would normally communicate with the Secretary through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. I would communicate with and coordinate with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as required and in the absence of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Director of the Joint Staff.

Answer. I would also communicate and coordinate with the Director as necessary and expect the Deputy Commander, U.S. CENTCOM or Chief of Staff, U.S. CENTCOM would communicate regularly with the Director of the Joint Staff.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments.

Answer. The Secretaries of the military departments are responsible for the administration and support of forces assigned to the combatant commands. Commander, U.S. CENTCOM coordinates closely with the secretaries to ensure that requirements to organize, train, and equip CENTCOM forces are met.

The Service Chiefs.

Answer. Commander, U.S. CENTCOM communicates and exchanges information with the Service Chiefs of Staff to support their responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping forces. Successful execution of the U.S. CENTCOM mission responsibilities requires close coordination with the Service Chiefs. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the Service Chiefs of Staff to understand their service capabilities and to effectively employ those capabilities in executing the U.S. CENTCOM mission.

Other combatant commanders.

Answer. Commander, U.S. CENTCOM maintains close relationships with the other combatant commanders. These relationships are critical to the execution of our National Military Strategy, and are characterized by mutual support, frequent contact, and productive exchanges of information on key issues.

The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq.

Answer. I would necessarily have a close working relationship with the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq in order to ensure unity of effort between U.S. military and all other U.S. Government activities in Iraq.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. If confirmed, you will be entering this important position at a critical time for the U.S. CENTCOM.

What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?
Answer. I have benefited from a broad range of assignments during my nearly 40 years in uniform, from tactical to operational command, and have considerable experience with joint and coalition operations, including combat operations. I was privileged to command Carrier Air Wing Eight in U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm. In 1995, as a flag officer, I served as Commander, Carrier Group Eight and Commander, Battle Force, U.S. Sixth Fleet during North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Operation Deliberate Force in Bosnia. During these operations, I worked closely with joint U.S. and combined forces in planning, coordinating, and executing sustained combat operations. I also served as Deputy Director for Operations, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, directing air operations in the Iraqi No-Fly Zones. I have additional experience in joint and combined planning and operations at both the operational and strategic levels through assignments as Assistant Chief of Staff, Plans and Policy, for the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic and as Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff for the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and the former U.S. Atlantic Command, the predecessor to U.S. Joint Forces Command. For nearly 3 years, I served as Commander, U.S. Second Fleet and NATO Striking Fleet Atlantic, working directly with all U.S. armed services as well as those of our NATO allies in training and in developing and testing joint and combined tactics for the entire spectrum of combat operations. As Vice Chief of Naval Operations from 2000 to 2003, I worked in close cooperation with OSD, the Joint Staff, and the other armed services developing transformational strategies and joint requirements. As Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command and U.S. Atlantic Fleet from October 2003 to February 2005, I served as Naval Component Commander to U.S. Joint Forces Command, and supported U.S. Northern Command and U.S. Strategic Command. In my current assignment as Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), I have gained extensive experience in the largest combatant command AOR, with more than 60 percent of the world’s population and four of the five largest economic GDPs. This area has presented several challenges, including the maintenance of sensitive alliances, insurgencies in southeast Asia, the situation in North Korea, and the U.S. relationship with the People’s Republic of China. The widely varied opportunities I have had during my career have given me a deep appreciation of, and experience with, all branches of our Armed Forces, the interagency, and many of our allies and partners.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Commander, U.S. CENTCOM?

Answer.
- Combatting the insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan and directing the restoration of security and stability in these nations.
- Countering the extremist threat which destabilizes governments in the region, commits attacks on the U.S. and numerous other nations, and continues to threaten the U.S. Homeland.
- The relationship with Iran and its support to insurgents and destabilizing activities in regional nations.
- Protecting vital lines of commerce in the region.
- Continuing instability and humanitarian crises in Africa.

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges? Specifically, I intend to:
- Support U.S. national interests and policies.
- Work closely with our ambassadors and military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan to address the critical need for security and stability in these countries.
- Work in close consultation with U.S. agencies and military commanders, and with our friends in the region to develop a clear understanding and appreciation of U.S. national interests and the issues facing the Nations in the U.S. CENTCOM region.
- Signal the strong resolve of the United States to protect its national interests and to enhance regional stability.
- Posture U.S. forces to deploy and respond rapidly to regional security concerns.

MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of Commander, U.S. CENTCOM?
Answer. Clearly, the most serious problems are the ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Question. What management actions and timelines would you establish to address these problems?

Answer. My intention is to gain a full appreciation of the situation in the region as quickly as possible and then to provide appropriate direction and guidance to our military forces.

IRAQ

Question. What is your assessment of the current situation facing the United States in Iraq?

Answer. Significant progress has been made in developing Iraqi security forces and governing institutions since the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime. The Iraqi people have approved a new constitution and elected a permanent, multi-party government. The Iraqi government has recognized the requirement for security and has identified steps to improve the prospects for political reconciliation and economic growth.

However, the insurgent bombing of the Al Askariya Mosque in February 2006 reversed the momentum that followed the successful Iraqi elections. Sectarian-motivated violence now inhibits political progress, effective governance, and economic development. Many other factors, including poor infrastructure, corruption, and lack of experience at governance have exacerbated widespread mistrust between sectarian groups within Iraq.

Levels of violence perpetuated by al Qaeda terrorists, insurgents aligned with the previous regime and competing sectarian death squads have increased steadily during the past year. Al Qaeda operatives and their allies target U.S. and Iraqi security forces and innocent civilians in an effort to discredit the U.S. and Iraqi governments and incite sectarian violence wherever possible. Their goal is instability and chaos. Other insurgents and sectarian entities are pursuing their own murderous agendas, receiving support from within Iran and Syria.

Although growing in number and confidence, much of the Iraqi security force has not yet demonstrated an ability to stand on its own in the face of multiple onslaughts to stability. U.S. military strategy of having the Iraqi security forces lead most of the security effort has not been as successful as anticipated.

Question. From your perspective, what are the top lessons learned from our experience in Iraq?

Answer. U.S. forces in Iraq remain disciplined, spirited, and adaptable in the face of difficult battlefield conditions. Our forces have been training and have partnered with Iraqi security forces to establish a secure environment for the newly elected government of Iraq. This endeavor has proven more challenging than expected with many assumptions either incorrectly drawn or unfulfilled. Our ability to correctly assess the political, economic, and security situation in Iraq has been lacking. While successful in clearing areas of insurgent and terrorist activity, we have relearned the need to hold these areas secure until Iraqi security forces and local political and economic activity have provided essential confidence to the population.

Question. From your perspective, what are the top lessons learned from our experience in Iraq?

Answer. President Bush, in his 10 January address to the Nation, highlighted the key mistakes:

• Miscalculating that initial elections would bring Iraqis together;
• Believing that as we trained Iraqi security forces, we could accomplish our mission with fewer U.S. troops;
• Underestimating the ability of al Qaeda and Sunni insurgents to provoke sectarian conflict; and
• Failing to anticipate the extent of the response of radical Shia elements and death squads.

The issues cited here are still effecting the situation but actions are underway by the Iraqi and U.S. Governments to address them.

Question. What do you believe are the most important steps that the United States needs to take in Iraq?

Answer. The most important step we need to take in Iraq is to work with the Iraqi government to improve security. We also need to facilitate economic and infrastructure development while helping the Iraqis establish and maintain a viable representative political process.

Question. What role, if any, did you play in the development of the new Iraq strategy recently announced by the President?
Answer. In my position as Commander U.S. PACOM, I have not directly participated in the development of the new Iraq strategy.

Question. Do you believe that there is a purely military solution in Iraq, or must the solution be primarily a political one?

Answer. Although the military effort is critical to progress, a successful Iraq strategy will require coordinated economic, diplomatic, and political as well as security development.

Question. Do you believe that political compromise among Iraqi political leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution?

Answer. A successful political process requires compromise. The three principal factions in Iraq must find a way to cooperate on essential issues.

Question. Do you believe that quelling the current level of violence is a necessary condition for a political solution?

Answer. Substantially reducing the level of sectarian violence is essential to facilitate improved political process.

Question. What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders to make the political compromises necessary for a political solution? What leverage does the U.S. have in this regard?

Answer. Current levels of suffering experienced by the Iraqi population should motivate the political leaders to make progress. President Bush has clearly stated the need for a partnership between Prime Minister Maliki, Iraqi moderates, and the United States where all parties are clear on expectations and responsibilities. The Iraqi government has cited a number of actions it considers essential to national political progress. We should carefully monitor and assess the progress in these actions.

Question. What do you see as a reasonable estimate of the time it will take to demonstrate success in securing Baghdad?

Answer. I would not speculate on the amount of time or levels of success which might be possible from my current position. But the urgent need to make progress is obvious.

Question. In the fiscal year 2007 Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts Congress prohibited the use of funds to seek permanent bases in Iraq or to control the oil resources of Iraq. Do you agree that it is not and should not be the policy of the United States to seek permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to exercise control over Iraq’s oil resources?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If you agree, what are your views on the construction of any additional facilities inside Iraq for use by our military forces?

Answer. Operational commanders may request construction of temporary sites to facilitate necessary operations, and I would give appropriate consideration to such requests.

Question. For the past several years, the Army and Marine Corps have had separate areas of responsibility in Iraq, with Marine forces assigned to the Anbar province. The two services have different logistics systems, and the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) appears to now focus almost exclusively on Army requirements. Do you believe the Army and Marine Corps forces operating in Iraq have an appropriate degree of jointness?

Answer. From observation during my visits to Iraq and through discussion with various commanders, I believe the Army and Marine Corps forces operating in Iraq have demonstrated an adequate degree of Joint cooperation, both operationally and logistically. The 3rd Army Headquarters serves both as the CFLCC and as the Army Forces (ARFOR) command with title 10 logistics responsibilities. As the ARFOR Commander, 3rd Army conducts joint and combined logistics operations, including support for Marine Expeditionary Unit rotations. At the tactical level, an Army Brigade Combat Team is deployed with the Marine Expeditionary Force operating in Anbar Province. An Army Corps Support Group, also deployed to Anbar Province, integrates logistic support for Marine units within the Theater Logistics Architecture. If confirmed, I will assess all aspects of jointness and ensure collaboration on operational and logistic matters between the Services.

Question. Do you see any problems with the extent of reliance of U.S. forces in Iraq on contractor support?

Answer. I do not have sufficient knowledge to address this question.
AFGHANISTAN

Question. More than 4 years after securing a military victory against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, that nation remains a place with areas of unrest. What is your assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan?

Answer. Much progress has been achieved in Afghanistan. The expansion of the International Security and Assistance Force and transition of the counterinsurgency mission to NATO command are positive steps. The resurgence of the Taliban in some areas of the country is a concern and must be addressed if political progress and economic development are to be sustained.

Question. What is the status of efforts to develop and field an effective Afghan Army and national police force?

Answer. The Afghan National Army (ANA) is becoming more professional and growing in confidence. As of this month, approximately 32,000 of the 70,000 planned ANA soldiers have received training and equipment and now routinely engage the enemy alongside U.S. and coalition forces.

More than 60,000 of the planned 82,000 Ministry of the Interior police officers have received training and equipment. Although they are not as professional or capable as the ANA, improvement has been noted. Continued focus on Afghan Police training and education will be critical to the future of Afghanistan, and close attention must be paid to ensure progress is being made in the effectiveness of the force.

Question. In your view, what additional military or other assistance is required to ensure the transition of Afghanistan to a stable, democratic, and economically viable nation?

Answer. Continued military assistance to expand security will be the critical enabler of success. Support to the ANA and police must continue as well as economic assistance and expanding good governance throughout Afghanistan.

Question. In October 2006, British LTG Richards, Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, warned that coalition forces may be running out of time to show measurable progress in Afghanistan. He stated that if there is no progress in improving conditions for the Afghani people, they may choose “the rotten future offered by the Taliban” over the hopeful future which coalition forces have taken too long to deliver.

Do you agree with LTG Richards’ assessment that coalition forces have a limited window of opportunity in which to show improvements in the lives of the Afghani people?

Answer. I would not speculate on the resilience of the Afghan people, although I would note they have endured the trauma of war for almost 30 years.

Question. What steps do you believe coalition forces can take to improve the lives of the Afghani people in the near term?

Answer. We should strive to provide enhanced security in areas where the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and international aid agencies are assisting reconstruction efforts. We should look for economic development opportunities to offset the opium production.

We should support ISAF Afghan Development Zone (ADZ) initiatives, with security efforts in key regions setting conditions for reconstruction and governance. ADZs complement the Afghan Government’s National Development Strategy for security, governance, rule of law, and human rights, and economic and social development. This overarching strategy deserves our support.

Question. Military intelligence officials have stated that Taliban and al Qaeda attacks across the Afghan-Pakistan border have increased fourfold since September when the Pakistan Government signed an agreement with tribal elders in the border region ceding control over some border areas in western Pakistan.

What more can be done to prevent cross-border incursions by the Taliban and al Qaeda from Pakistan into Afghanistan?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to study the situation in Afghanistan and consult with the military leadership there to determine the best way to address this issue.

Question. In your view, should the Pakistan Government be doing more to prevent these cross-border incursions?

Answer. Yes. I believe that more could be done, and I will focus attention on this issue to determine what recommendations I will forward in this regard.

Question. What role do you believe U.S. forces should play?

Answer. We can enhance the capacity of Pakistan’s Frontier Corps through our security assistance program. We will continue to provide intelligence support as well.

Question. Afghanistan is in the CENTCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR). U.S. European Command (EUCOM) oversees the NATO ISAF force in Afghanistan.
In your view, does this “seam” present any problems for the coordination and effectiveness of the ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) missions in Afghanistan?

Answer. I do not foresee any issues with the CENTCOM–SHAPE Relationship. NATO involvement in Afghanistan has been closely coordinated with CENTCOM. Throughout the process, measures to ensure synergy, maintenance of momentum, and reliable deconfliction of operations were painstakingly considered. I have extensive personal experience with the NATO military and political processes, which should facilitate my interaction and effectiveness with the NATO–CENTCOM relationship.

PAKISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the current status of U.S.-Pakistan military cooperation?

Answer. U.S.-Pakistan military cooperation has progressively improved since 11 September 2001. We coordinate military activities through a U.S. liaison team in Islamabad and the Pakistani military presence in Tampa, Bahrain, and Afghanistan.

Question. What is your assessment of the level of cooperation we have received from Pakistan in the war on terrorism?

Answer. Pakistan is an effective and vital partner in the war on terror. Pakistan has captured or killed more suspected AQ and Taliban than any other coalition member.

Question. What is your assessment of the current situation with regard to Pakistani-Indian relations?

Answer. Relations between India and Pakistan have improved through confidence building measures and dialogue during the past 2 years. Kashmir remains the core issue, but progress is being realized through incremental steps.

FORMER SOVIET UNION STATES

Question. Several former Soviet states have played roles in supporting the U.S. and coalition forces in the global war on terrorism. What is your assessment of current U.S. military relationships with these nations, including Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan?

Answer. Contributions from former Soviet states in Central Asia have been significant and helpful. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan have provided basing and overflight from the beginning of the global war on terror. Other former Soviet states including Latvia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Georgia, and Estonia have provided troops in support of the coalition in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military relationship with many of the former Soviet states continues to develop incrementally. Much of our interaction is focused on building the capacity of these nations to ensure regional stability and security.

Question. What security challenges do you see in this portion of the CENTCOM AOR?

Answer. The security challenges in the Central Asian states are of concern because of the impact of extremism and criminal activity on economic development and the fragility of the governments. Additionally, the harsh environmental legacy of Soviet weapons and industrial programs, combined with severely restricted supplies of fresh water, further hobble legitimate economic growth.

IRAN

Question. Ambassador John Negroponte, Director of National Intelligence, recently testified before the Senate Select Intelligence Committee about Iran’s growing influence in the Persian Gulf region. He stated, “Under the Ahmadinejad government, Iran is enhancing its ability to project its military power, primarily with ballistic missiles and naval power—with the goal of dominating the Gulf region and deterring potential adversaries.”

Do you agree with Ambassador Negroponte’s assessment to the Senate Select Intelligence Committee regarding Iran’s goals in the region?

Answer. Yes. In addition to these conventional means, Iran is attempting to enhance its power through asymmetric means, such as support to international terrorism and the pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability.

Question. What options do you believe are available to the United States to counter Iran’s growing influence in the region?

Answer. We should continue to work through the United Nations Security Council to enjoin the Iranian regime to halt its enrichment of uranium and its pursuit of nuclear weapons.
We should continue to develop a regional security framework with our partners in the Gulf to deter Iranian aggression and protect our common interests. This framework can include security assistance, missile defense, joint exercises, and information sharing.

**Question.** What is the view of U.S. allies in the region with regard to the threat posed by Iran?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I intend to speak with our allies in the region about this issue. From my perspective as PACOM commander, I sense that our allies in the region are more concerned about the potential threat posed by Iran now than at any time since the Iran-Iraq War.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the prospects for political reform in Iran?

**Answer.** Iran’s political system is slowly changing as its people increasingly participate in representative processes. However, the unelected institutions of the Iranian regime are well entrenched, hold the preponderance of political power in Iran, and control Iran’s military forces and intelligence services.

**Question.** Do you believe that a protracted deployment of U.S. troops in Iraq, if the situation on the ground in Iraq does not improve, could strengthen Iran’s influence in the region?

**Answer.** The protracted deployment of U.S. forces in Iraq would not necessarily strengthen Iran’s influence in the region.

**IRAQI REFUGEES**

**Question.** The United Nations estimates that approximately 2.3 million Iraqis have fled the violence in their country; 1.8 million have fled to surrounding countries, while some 500,000 have vacated their homes for safer areas within Iraq. What is your assessment of the refugee crisis in Iraq?

**Answer.** There are some refugee problems inside Iraq, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is currently working the situation in the Northern Kurdistan Region. A greater refugee challenge exists in neighboring countries, which are dealing with the situation with their own resources and the support of the International Community. Once Iraq is stable and secure, I believe that a majority will return. The larger problem in Iraq is Internally Displaced Persons who affect regional demographics and pose a potential threat to long-term security and stability.

**Question.** Beyond working to improve the security environment in Iraq, do you believe that the U.S. military should play a role in addressing this crisis?

**Answer.** The U.S. military’s role in providing humanitarian relief for these persons will depend on the needs of the mission in Iraq and the availability of U.S. forces.

**HORN OF AFRICA**

**Question.** One of CENTCOM’s significant sub-regions is the Horn of Africa (HOA). Until a new African Command is stood up, CENTCOM will continue to be responsible for this region, which will likely experience continued instability and humanitarian crisis as demonstrated by recent events in Somalia. What is the strategic importance of this region to the United States?

**Answer.** HOA sits astride one of the most critical sea lines of communication in the world. It is imperative that we maintain freedom of navigation to ensure strategic maritime access to the CENTCOM AOR and freedom of movement of ocean-borne commerce. We must remain engaged in HOA to deny terrorist organizations the ability to operate freely by building host nation capacities and governance capability to reduce ungoverned spaces. Commander, Joint Task Force-HOA has been engaged with key partner countries in the area, conducting humanitarian and civil military operations, as well as building host nation capabilities.

**Question.** Over the last few weeks, the U.S. military has had a very public presence in Somalia. What is your understanding of the U.S. Government’s policy for Somalia and how U.S. military action there supports that policy?

**Answer.** The U.S. has three principal goals in Somalia: 1) support the establishment of a stable government based on genuine national reconciliation; 2) promote security and stability on the ground; and 3) respond to the humanitarian needs of the Somali people.

**AFRICA COMMAND**

**Question.** Over the last year or so, the U.S. Government has mobilized more of its resources to focus on the strategic importance of Africa. The Department of Defense has played an important role through two Combatant Commands—EUCOM
via the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Program and CENTCOM via the creation of the Combined Joint Task Force—HOA. There are 53 countries in Africa—42 are in the EUCOM AOR and 11 are in the CENTCOM AOR.

Do you support the proposal to create a new unified command for Africa and to transfer responsibility for operations in the HOA to that new command?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed as Commander, USCENTCOM, I will support the standup of AFRICOM by doing whatever we can to implement this new command.

Question. What impact would such a transfer have on the conduct of antiterrorism and other operations in that region?

Answer. I would not anticipate any degradation in our antiterrorism efforts.

Question. What will you do to ensure a smooth transition and to manage the seams between CENTCOM and the new African Command?

Answer. To ensure a smooth transition, AFRICOM will be established incrementally with the support of EUCOM, which is responsible for military operations in most of Africa. This phased approach should minimize turnover concerns as mission sets are transferred from EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM to AFRICOM.

With respect to seams between CENTCOM and AFRICOM, we will manage these situations through direct coordination between commands, just as we have done previously with EUCOM and continue to do with PACOM.

DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS

Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006 memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that standards for detainee treatment must be based on the principle of reciprocity, that is, that we must always keep in mind the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be captured in future conflicts?

Answer. I believe that we should pay careful attention to ensuring that standards for detainee treatment comply fully with the law and reflect American values. We also should be aware of the risk that the manner in which we treat our own detainees may have an effect on the manner in which U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are treated should they be captured in future conflicts. U.S. Armed Forces policy is to treat all detainees, no matter their status, humanely and in accordance with the law of war. However, as you well know, the enemy we are currently fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq have repeatedly demonstrated their absolute disregard for the law of war, including the provisions of Common Article 3.

Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. Yes.

Question. How will you ensure that U.S. forces in the CENTCOM AOR comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?

Answer. I will continue to emphasize law of war training and specific training for those involved in interrogation. I will also ensure U.S. operational commanders comply with all applicable regulations and law, including the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005.

SCIENTIFIC ADVISORS FOR COMBATANT COMMANDERS

Question. Scientific advisors to combatant commanders have been effectively utilized as a means of technology transition and providing operators’ solutions to warfighter challenges.

If confirmed, how would your command make use of the technical expertise available in the Services and their laboratories in order to provide scientific and technical advice to the warfighters?

Answer. If confirmed, I will task the Science Advisor to work closely with the broader scientific community—particularly the Service laboratories and the Office of
the Director, Defense Research and Engineering—to ensure that U.S. CENTCOM benefits from the best technical advice our Nation has to offer. Routine interaction with these organizations would also help U.S. CENTCOM shape the Department's research and development effort to match up with command requirements.

**BANDWIDTH ON THE BATTLEFIELD**

**Question.** Unmanned assets, such as persistent unmanned aerial vehicles, require tremendous bandwidth capacity. Command and control, blue force tracking and movement of intelligence products also use significant amounts of bandwidth. What challenges do you anticipate in fully utilizing these important assets with the limited bandwidth currently available to the warfighter?

**Answer.** The chief challenge is efficiently managing the bandwidth to achieve maximum impact from intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the bandwidth available during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)?

**Answer.** My initial assessment is that bandwidth is sufficient for intelligence product dissemination and situational awareness. However, as the requirement for additional full-motion video ISR assets and other bandwidth intensive systems come online, the current bandwidth could become a limiting factor, but I would push hard for increased efficiency of utilization.

**MISSILE AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THREATS**

**Question.** Iran continues to develop short- and medium-range ballistic missiles and could develop ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States in the relatively near-term. The Intelligence Community assesses that Iran could test such a missile later this decade and will “likely” pose an ICBM threat to the United States by 2015. Iran also has a significant naval presence in the Persian Gulf, and shore-based antiship cruise missiles. The Intelligence Community also assesses that Iran is actively pursuing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and could have nuclear weapons within the decade.

How do you evaluate Iran’s current capability to use ballistic missiles and WMD against U.S. forces, allies and friends, and what is your projection of Iran’s future capabilities?

**Answer.** Iran can employ ballistic missiles up to 1,300 km with little/no advance warning and with greater accuracy and effectiveness than Iraq demonstrated in 1991 and 2003. Iran has expanded ballistic missile forces and capabilities, but remains dependent on foreign technical support. Tehran can employ CW via missile, artillery, and aerial weapons, although it is unclear if a standing CW stockpile exists. Iran is unlikely to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon until mid-next decade.

**Question.** How do you evaluate Iran’s cruise missile capabilities, and Iran’s ability to threaten U.S. naval forces and commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf, the Straits of Hormuz, and the Arabian Sea?

**Answer.** Iran can threaten undefended commercial shipping and create a tactically challenging environment for naval forces in constrained waters of the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf region. However, Iran also has operational and tactical weaknesses that can be effectively exploited by U.S. forces.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you protect the troops and allies under your command from these threats?

**Answer.** After consulting with select nations in the CENTCOM AOR and confirming their support, I would use a combination of U.S. and Coalition Ballistic Missile Defense and Early Warning (EW) capabilities to protect both U.S. and Coalition critical military and geopolitical assets.

**SEXUAL ASSAULT**

**Question.** If confirmed as Commander, U.S. CENTCOM, you will be responsible for ensuring compliance with DOD policies on prevention of and response to sexual assaults throughout the CENTCOM AOR.

What lessons did you learn in implementation of sexual assault training, reporting protocols and command awareness during your tour as Commander, U.S. PACOM, that can be applied in the U.S. CENTCOM?

**Answer.** As PACOM Commander, I observed that training—both pre-deployment and response personnel training—is essential in preventing and effectively responding to allegations and incidents of sexual assault. Additionally, I believe that the Department of Defense Sexual Assault Prevention Program has provided commanders clear, proactive sexual assault response protocols.
Question. What are the unique issues that you believe need to be addressed to ensure that policies on prevention, reporting, medical treatment and victim support are available in the operational environments of Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. We should maintain sexual assault awareness in the operational environment by conducting recurring in-theater training. We should also continue to ensure that supplies, trained personnel, and transportation resources are readily accessible and available to deployed personnel.

Question. If confirmed, how would you assess the current adequacy of such resources in the CENTCOM AOR?

Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure that CENTCOM sexual assault policy and practice align with current Department of Defense policies as prescribed in DODD 6495 and DODI 6495. I would maintain command emphasis on these policies and the Sexual Assault Prevention Program.

MENTAL HEALTH IN THEATER

Question. The Army’s Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) has made three separate assessments over the past several years detailing the immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S. soldiers deployed to Iraq. The most recent study, MHAT III, found that multiple deployers reported experiencing higher levels of acute stress, and that overall levels of combat stressors are increasing. These types of reports lend support to the fact that increasing numbers of troops are returning from duty in Iraq with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, depression, and other mental health issues.

Please summarize for the committee your understanding of the key findings of each of the previous mental health assessments, actions taken to address key findings in each, and the effect of such actions.

Answer. I understand these studies concluded that multiple or long deployments can lead to increased incidents of mental health issues. The level of combat and quality of noncommissioned officer leadership directly affect servicemembers’ mental health. The Military Services have established an array of assessment, prevention, and treatment programs that provide mental health support before, during, and after deployments.

I understand that CENTCOM policy requires pre- and post-deployment mental health assessments and reassessments. MNF–I has created an expert working group to assess the status of mental health in the AOR. CENTCOM has also redistributed mental health staff to provide better coverage for deployed personnel.

Question. If confirmed, would you support continuous mental health assessments of the U.S. forces in Iraq, to include naval forces on the ground?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you have any thoughts on how we can best address the mental health needs of our troops and their families, in terms of both prevention and treatment?

Answer. We must continue to re-examine whether we are doing all we should to meet the mental health needs of deployed personnel. Where possible, I will work with the Service Chiefs to ensure they have adequate programs and support systems at their respective installations to support servicemembers and their families back home.

Question. If confirmed, will you request additional behavioral health resources from all three Services, if needed, to meet the needs of current and future units deployed to Iraq?

Answer. Yes. If additional Mental Health Forces are requested in support of OIF/ OEF and global war on terrorism, I will work with the Joint Staff and the Global Force Manager, Joint Forces Command, for additional mental health resources.

Question. The DOD Mental Health Task Force recently received testimony that the U.S. military does not have enough adequately trained mental health professionals to meet the growing needs for mental health support in the military.

Do you share this concern about the adequacy of mental health professionals to support members of the Armed Forces, especially those in deployed and operational environments, and their families?

Answer. I am always concerned about the welfare of our servicemembers, our DOD civilians, and their families. If confirmed, I would expect commanders to leverage all resources—morale, welfare, religious support, and family support programs as well as health professionals—to meet the mental health needs of our servicemembers and their families. I believe that if additional capabilities were needed in the CENTCOM AOR, the Services would provide them.
Question. As commander of the U.S. PACOM, what steps have you taken to ensure adequate mental health support for deployed military members and their families?

Answer. As PACOM Commander, I have worked with my subordinate commanders to regularly assess our mental health requirements and the adequacy of available mental health resources.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure the adequacy of mental health support and resources in the CENTCOM AOR both in general, and specifically in combat zones?

Answer. The mental health of deployed forces in theater is a major responsibility of the leadership of the Armed Forces. It is a responsibility to the individual soldier, sailor, airman, and marine, to the fighting force as a whole, to their families, and to the Nation. The military Services have in place a broad array of assessment, prevention, and treatment programs. Medical conditions that may limit or disqualify deployed servicemembers are continually assessed, while screening, assessment, and educational programs take place across the entire deployment cycle. A spectrum of prevention, stress control, and mental health care is available in theater. Pre- and post-deployment health assessments are conducted. Each branch of Service has specific combat stress and deployment mental health support programs available before, during, and after the deployment cycle. These provide support tailored to the Service’s mission and risk factors their personnel might face. In addition, cross-functional planning teams bring together subject matter experts from across the Services, the Joint Staff, and DOD.

I support a very robust program of mental health prevention, assessment, and treatment. I have not had an opportunity to be briefed on the Army’s MHAT assessments, nor to develop a specific action plan to address any needed strengthening of the current program. If I am confirmed, I will look to both our health care professionals and command leadership to help me assess the needs, and will seek support from the military and civilian leadership of the Department. If I am confirmed and if I determine additional mental health professionals are needed in theater, I will ask for them.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. I agree.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. I agree.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U.S. CENTCOM?

Answer. I agree.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. I agree.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. I intend to cooperate fully with Congress to ensure an appropriate and timely response from U.S. CENTCOM to all congressional requests.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON

LEVERAGE ON IRAQI LEADERS

1. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, Iraqi political leaders have demonstrated little progress in decreasing the increased levels of sectarian violence over the past year. On page 9, of responses provided to the advance policy questions, specifically
“What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders to make the political compromises necessary for a political solution? What leverage does the U.S. have in this regard?" The answer provided stated, “Current levels of suffering experienced by the Iraqi population should motivate the political leaders to make progress." Does the U.S. have any other leverage over the Iraqi political leaders?

Admiral Fallon. There are a number of economic, political, and military options that could offer a degree of leverage. General Petraeus is working directly with officials in the Government of Iraq to ascertain the best combination of U.S. policies to expedite national reconciliation.

2. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, many of us believe that beginning a phased redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq will force the Iraqis to make the tough political compromises to make progress. Do you think adjustments in our force levels offer potential leverage with the Iraqis?

Admiral Fallon. The Government of Iraq is under tremendous pressure from the U.S. Government and the Iraqi people to produce tangible results. Decreasing our troop levels at this time would weaken Prime Minister Maliki and embolden the insurgents.

Although our support for the Government of Iraq is not open ended, it is imperative that we provide Prime Minister Maliki and his government time and space to establish the institutions of governance, after decades of totalitarian rule.

PRIVATE CONTRACTORS

3. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, many of us on the Committee have been concerned about the extent to which we have relied on private contractors in Iraq. On page 10, of responses provided to the advance policy questions, specifically "Do you see any problems with the extent of reliance of U.S. forces in Iraq on contractor support?" The answer provided stated, “I do not have sufficient knowledge to address this question.” Will you look into this issue once you are confirmed?

Admiral Fallon. Yes.

IRAQI GOVERNMENT LEGITIMACY

4. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, a main tenet of counterinsurgency doctrine is that victory is achieved when the populace consents to the government’s legitimacy and stops their active and passive support to the insurgency. Do you believe that the current government in Baghdad is currently governing in a way that enhances its legitimacy?

Admiral Fallon. Yes, the current government is focused on quickly restoring basic services to increase populace support. Establishing reasonable security is of primary importance in this endeavor.

5. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, is the fighting in Baghdad the result of an insurgency or a sectarian civil war?

Admiral Fallon. Iraqi society’s growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security forces and the state in general, and all sides’ ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress during the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate at rates comparable to the latter part of 2006. Extremists—most notably the Sunni jihadist group al Qaeda in Iraq and Shia oppositionist Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM)—continue to act as very effective accelerators for what has become a self-sustaining inter-sectarian struggle between Shia and Sunnis.

The Intelligence Community judges that the term “civil war” does not adequately capture the complexity of the conflict in Iraq, which includes extensive Shia-on-Shia violence, al Qaeda and Sunni insurgent attacks on coalition forces, and widespread criminally motivated violence. Nonetheless, the term “civil war” accurately describes key elements of the Iraqi conflict, including the hardening of ethno-sectarian identities, a sea change in the character of the violence, ethno-sectarian mobilization, and population displacements.”

6. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, how will you tailor the best practices of counterinsurgency to quell the continued sectarian blood letting?

Admiral Fallon. I will provide General Petraeus the strategic guidance and resources he needs to execute an effective counterinsurgency campaign. General
Petraeus and I will continuously assess the progress and adjust as required to ensure success. Additionally, I will work in concert with the State Department to remove outside support for insurgents and militias in Iraq.

**IRAN’S STRATEGIC POSITION**

7. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, the Washington Post published an article on January 30, 2007 about Iran’s ascendance titled “With Iran Ascendant, U.S. is Seen at Fault: Arab Allies in Region Feeling Pressure.” It points out that prior to our invasion of Iraq, Iran was bordered by two unfriendly countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, but now seems to be ascendant in the region. What is your evaluation of Iran’s strategic position in the region since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2002?

Admiral Fallon. Iran is actively seeking to expand influence in the region. Coincidentally, the fall of the Taliban and Saddam regimes removed a strategic counterweight to Iranian influence. However, regional nations with U.S. support are working together diplomatically to reduce this influence. Additionally, the security and stability provided by the U.S. military presence serves to counterbalance Iran’s military power.

8. Senator Clinton. Admiral Fallon, do you have an opinion as to the desirability of the U.S. engaging in a dialogue with Iran about their activities in Iraq? About the Iranian nuclear program?

Admiral Fallon. Engaging Iran is a policy decision. President Bush and Secretary of State Rice have offered to hold talks with Iran’s leaders on Iraq, regional security, and nuclear issues, after they suspend uranium enrichment. Engagement and dialogue with Iran to discuss Iraq would be desirable if Iran demonstrates a willingness to support international efforts to stabilize Iraq.

In regards to the Iranian nuclear program, the international community, with the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1737, clearly agreed that the world does not want a nuclear-armed Iran. U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) continues to engage with regional partners to facilitate counterproliferation activities and enhancement of regional security.

**QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN**

**SEA-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**

9. Senator McCain. Admiral Fallon, as U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) Commander, you are aware that the Department of Defense plans to equip 18 Pacific Fleet Aegis-class destroyers and cruisers by 2010 with a sea-based ballistic missile defense capability to defend against the ballistic missile threat posed by North Korea. In your response to an advance policy question, you write: “Iran can employ ballistic missiles up to 1,300 kilometers with little/no advance warning and with greater accuracy and effectiveness than Iraq demonstrated in 1991 and 2003.” Given your recognition of the ballistic missile threat posed by Iran, would it not make strategic sense to accelerate efforts to similarly equip our Aegis ships in and near the CENTCOM area of responsibility with a ballistic missile defense capability?

Admiral Fallon. Yes.

[The nomination reference of ADM William J. Fallon, USN, follows:]

**Nomination Reference and Report**

As In Executive Session, Senate of the United States, January 16, 2007. Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for appointment in the United States Navy to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be Admiral

ADM William J. Fallon, 0000.
30 December 1944 - Born in East Orange, New Jersey.
16 September 1963 - Midshipman, U.S. Naval Reserve, Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps.
15 May 1967 - Ensign to rank from 7 June 1967.
01 July 1968 - Lieutenant (junior grade).
01 July 1970 - Lieutenant.
01 July 1976 - Lieutenant Commander.
01 April 1982 - Commander.
01 September 1988 - Captain.
23 August 1993 - Designated Rear Admiral (lower half) while serving in billets commensurate with that grade.
01 October 1994 - Rear Admiral (lower half).
01 January 1997 - Rear Admiral.
20 September 1996 - Vice Admiral.
01 October 2000 - Designated Admiral while serving in billets commensurate with that grade.
01 November 2000 - Admiral, service continuous to date.

Assignments and Duties:

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<tr>
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<td>Naval Air Basic Training Command, U.S. Naval Air Station, Pensacola, FL</td>
<td>May 1967</td>
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<td>Commander, Reconnaissance Attack Wing ONE (Administrative Officer)</td>
<td>Oct. 1970</td>
<td>July 1972</td>
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<tr>
<td>Staff, Commander Fleet Air, Jacksonville, FL (Flag Lieutenant/Flag Secretary)</td>
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<td>DEP COMNA V ARLANT/CAIR (Admin/Administrative Officer)</td>
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<td>Jan. 1986</td>
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<td>Commander, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia (Deputy Staff Operations Officer, 1–3)</td>
<td>Aug. 1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander, U.S. Pacific Command</td>
<td>Feb. 2005</td>
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**Medals and awards:**
- Defense Superior Service Medal
- Legion of Merit with three Gold Stars
- Bronze Star Medal with Combat "V"
- Meritorious Service Medal with two Gold Stars
- Air Medal with Bronze Numeral "6", Gold Star, and Combat "V"
- Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal with one Gold Star, and Combat "V"
- Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal
Joint Meritorious Unit Award
Navy Unit Commendation with two Bronze Stars
Meritorious Unit Commendation with one Bronze Star
Navy "E" Ribbon with two Es
Navy Expeditionary Medal with one Bronze Star
National Defense Service Medal with one Bronze Star
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with two Bronze Stars
Vietnam Service Medal with two Bronze Stars
Southwest Asia Service Medal with two Bronze Stars
Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with one Silver Star
NATO Medal
Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross Unit Citation
Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal with Device
Kuwait Liberation Medal with Device (Saudi Arabia)
Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kuwait)

Special qualifications:
BA (Social Science) Villanova University, 1967
MA (International Studies) Old Dominion University, 1982
Graduate of Naval War College, 1978
Graduate of National War College, 1992
Designated Naval Flight Officer, 1967
Designated Joint Specialty Officer, 1995
Language Qualifications: French (Knowledge)

Personal data:
Wife: Mary Elizabeth Trapp of Scarsdale, New York
William P. Fallon (Son), Born: 31 July 1976.
Christina A. Fallon (Daughter), Born: 4 March 1983.

Summary of joint duty assignments:

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<td>Capt.</td>
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<td>SACLANT (Assistant Chief of Staff for Plans and Policy)</td>
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<td>Commander, SECOND Fleet/Commander, Striking Fleet Atlantic</td>
<td>Nov. 97–Oct. 00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander, U.S. Pacific Command</td>
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<td>ADM</td>
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* Desert Storm

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by ADM William J. Fallon, USN, in connection with his nomination follows:]
PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
William J. Fallon.

2. Position to which nominated:
Commander, United States Central Command.

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
30 December 1944; East Orange, New Jersey.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
Married to Mary E. Trapp Fallon.

7. Names and ages of children:
Susan K. Fallon, 35; Barbara L. Fallon, 33; William P. Fallon, 30; and Christina A. Fallon, 23.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
Occidental College Global Affairs Advisory Board.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
American Automobile Association
American Meteorological Society
Army & Navy Club
Association of Naval Aviation
Deer Run Condominium Owners Association Board (Big Sky, MT)
Bishopsgate (Virginia Beach, VA) Civic League
Hampton Roads World Affairs Council
Knights of Columbus
Mercedes Benz Club of America
National Geographic Society
National War College Alumni Association
Navy Federal Credit Union
Old Dominion University Alumni Association
Smithsonian Institute
Our Lady Star of the Sea (VA Beach, VA) Catholic School Board
Tailhook Association
U.S. Naval Institute
Veterans of Foreign Affairs
Villanova University Alumni Association
Villanova University Varsity Club
Villanova University Wildcat Club.

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
Villanova University Alumni Loyalty Award
Old Dominion University Distinguished Alumnus Award
National War College Distinguished Alumnus Award
Camden Catholic High School Distinguished Alumnus Award
Business Executives for National Security Eisenhower Award
USO of Philadelphia/South Jersey Liberty Award.
12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate? 
   Yes.

13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
   Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

ADM WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN.

This 17th day of January, 2007.

[The nomination of ADM William J. Fallon, USN, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on February 6, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on February 7, 2007.]
NOMINATION OF GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room SR–325, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, chief counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, research assistant; Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Ambrose R. Hock, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Micah H. Harris and Jessica L. Kingston.

Committee members’ assistants present: Joseph Axelrad, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Caroline Tess, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; Lauren Henry, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson and Michael Sozan, assistants to Senator Webb; Nichole M. Distefano, assistant to Sen-
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning. Today we welcome General George Casey, the President's nominee to replace General Peter Schoomaker as the Chief of Staff of the United States Army. We are also pleased to welcome General Casey's family, who we will ask him to introduce in a moment, and we all know just how vitally important families are to the men and women who serve in the military and we thank them for their service as well as you for your service, General.

General Casey is well known to members of this committee and to the American people as Commanding General, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF–I), in which capacity he has served for over 2½ years. Prior to that command he was Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, which was preceded by an assignment as Director of the Joint Staff, and before that as Director of Strategy, Plans and Policy, J5, on the Joint Staff.

General Casey is an infantryman, having commanded at all levels up to and including division command. As an assistant division commander he served in Bosnia and earlier in his career he served in Cairo as an United Nations (U.N.) military observer with the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization. He also served a tour of duty as a congressional liaison officer.

As commander in Iraq, General Casey is of course identified with the administration's Iraq strategy. His focus was on training and equipping Iraqi security forces to bring them as quickly as possible to a level where they could relieve American forces from the burden of providing the security that Iraqis should be providing for themselves.

In this strategy, he was joined by his boss, U.S. Central Command Commander General John Abizaid, and his subordinate, the corps commander, Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli. General Casey put it this way, “The longer we in the United States forces continue to bear the main burden of Iraq's security, it lengthens the time that the Government of Iraq has to take the hard decisions about reconciliation and dealing with the militias. The other thing is that they can continue to blame us for all of Iraq’s problems, which are at base their problems.”

General Casey and other commanders had to deal with the consequences of the myriad of flawed policies, including having insufficient forces at the outset of the operation, failing to properly plan for the postwar stability operations, disbanding the Iraqi army, and an overly extensive de-Baathification program, to name but a few. How well he carried out his responsibilities will be one of the topics this morning.
We also need to understand what role he played in the development of the new strategy and his expectations for the new approach, what has changed that he now apparently believes that more U.S. troops will help reduce sectarian violence when he did not seem to believe that before, how would he deal with the sectarian militias if they are going underground and hiding weapons instead of directly confronting coalition forces in the short term; what are their future goals; how long is it expected that they will stay underground; should coalition forces seek to disarm the Mahdi Army so they cannot come out from underground at a later time; what are his concerns about the lack of unity of command between U.S. and Iraqi forces; what should be done about it; who will really be taking the lead down at the small unit level in the neighborhoods; and how will the U.S. platoons and companies living with and operating with the Iraqi security forces in these small neighborhood minibases not become involved in violent interface with Iraqis; what benchmarks would he be looking for the determine whether Iraqi commitments are being kept; if the Iraqi government fails to deploy the additional units to Baghdad according to the benchmarks to which it has agreed, what does he believe should be the consequences; what progress has there been on Iraqi leaders meeting the political commitments they have made; and does he believe there should be consequences for failures to meet those commitments?

We also need to inquire as to how long General Casey believes the increased troop level can be sustained by an army whose non-deployed units are suffering from significant readiness problems, as has been testified to by the current Chief of Staff, as well as to what he considers to be his greatest challenges should he be confirmed as the next Army Chief of Staff.

Again, we welcome you, General. We look forward to your testimony.

I now call upon Senator McCain.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Casey, welcome. I am grateful for your extraordinary service and personal sacrifice throughout your career. In addition, I would like to express my appreciation to your family for their support of your service, as well as the support they have provided to the men and women in uniform and their families.

You have been nominated to be the 37th Chief of Staff of the Army. The ranks of previous Army chiefs of staff are filled with such distinguished officers as General of the Armies John J. Pershing, George C. Marshall, Dwight D. Eisenhower, and Omar N. Bradley, as well as General J. Lawton Collins, Matthew B. Ridgway, and Maxwell D. Taylor. This nomination is a great honor and an even greater responsibility.

While I do not in any way question your honor, your patriotism, or your service to our country, I do question some of the decisions and judgments you have made over the past 2½ years as Commander of MNF–I. During that time things have gotten markedly and progressively worse and the situation in Iraq can now best be
described as dire and deteriorating. I regret that our window of opportunity to reverse momentum may be closing.

The bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra last February sparked sectarian violence throughout Iraq and Baghdad in particular. Yet in the face of this dramatic change in the Iraqi security environment, our military strategy remained essentially unchanged. Instead of conducting a traditional counterinsurgency campaign, our troops focused on training and equipping Iraqis, hoping in vain that they could do the job.

After repeated elections and political events demonstrated that the democratic process would not on its own bring down the level of violence, our troops did not begin focusing on protecting the population. Instead, coalition and Iraqi forces launched Operation Together Forward in June 2006. This operation, aimed at securing Baghdad, failed. Yet the coalition launched Operation Together Forward 2 in August in a very similar fashion. The result, predictably, was a similar failure.

The result of these and other missteps have been unprecedented levels of violence in Iraq and a pervasive lack of security that inhibits political and economic activity. In the 3½ years after the initial invasion, we finally turn toward a strategy that implements all three elements of the clear, hold, and build approach, focuses on protecting the population, and is carried out by, I hope, a sufficient number of additional U.S. forces.

I am not certain five additional brigades in Baghdad and one more in Anbar Province are sufficient to do the job. I am certain, however, that the job cannot be done with just two additional brigades, as you, General Casey, had advocated.

General Casey, you were one of the individuals who has been the architects of U.S. military strategy in Iraq over the last 2 years. While there are very pressing questions about the future of the Army, you will of course in this hearing be asked to review the mistakes in American strategy in Iraq during your command, how the previous Iraq strategy was formulated, why it failed, why there were not changes sooner, and the lessons that were learned. You will also be asked to comment on progress in training and equipping the Iraqi security forces, to include your previous statements about their readiness. In addition, you will be asked to respond to questions about the President’s new strategy, to include the troop increase and the command and control of American forces in Baghdad.

You should expect questions about your role in planning and execution of the initial invasion of Iraq and post-Saddam Iraq, while you were assigned to key positions on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon from 2002 to 2004. You will need to explain why your assessment of the situation in Iraq has differed so radically from that of most observers and why your predictions of future success have been so unrealistically rosy.

During my trip to Iraq in early 2005, you predicted a significant decline in violence over the remainder of the year as the democratic process took hold and as more Iraqi troops were trained. One year later during another visit to Iraq, I heard nearly the same predictions, with the time line simply pushed back by a year. In December during a trip that several other Senators and I made to
Iraq, you stated that we were winning in Iraq and that every day we are making progress toward meeting our strategic objectives. Just this month, you predicted publicly that there would be progress, “gradually over the next 60 to 80 days,” and that people in Baghdad would probably feel safe in their neighborhoods by the summer.

In light of these remarks and decisions, I have expressed serious concerns about your nomination as Chief of Staff of the Army. My strong reservations persist. I look forward to your testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.

General Casey, would you please proceed with your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

General Casey. I will, Senator. Thank you very much.

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished Senators. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today on my nomination to serve as the Army Chief of Staff. I am honored that the President nominated me to this important post and I thank you for considering the nomination.

I also want to thank the members of the committee for the support they have provided to America’s Army over the past years. We could not do what we are doing around the globe today without your support, so thank you for that.

Let me begin by paying tribute to our troops and their families, the real heroes of the war on terror and the campaign in Iraq. The American people should be tremendously proud and grateful of the magnificent job the men and women of their Armed Forces are doing in a tough and demanding environment in Iraq. Over 3,000 men and women have given their lives to build a new Iraq, to bring liberty and democracy to 27 million Iraqis, and to ensure security for the United States of America. They will not be forgotten.

I also want to acknowledge the families who make tremendous sacrifices on behalf of their loved ones a half a world away. They shoulder a heavy burden and we are blessed with their unwavering support. Courage is not reserved for the battlefield.

I especially want to thank my bride of 36 years, Sheila, for her courage, grace, and support over the last 2½ years. She, like all our families of our deployed men and women, epitomizes the core values of duty and selfless service. So let me just say thank you, dear. My wife Sheila. [Applause.] My son, Ryan, and his wife, Laura; my son, Sean; and my brother-in-law, Dick O’Brien. That is the family.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to assure you that I have thought hard about what it means to be the Chief of Staff of the Army and want to assure you that I am aware of the tremendous responsibilities associated with this office. I firmly believe in the Army’s vision to remain the world’s preeminent land power, relevant and ready to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

In Iraq I have been in the unique position to watch a transformed Army deal with the challenges of 21st century warfare and
I would like to share with you just three preliminary thoughts. First, the quality of the men and women of the U.S. Army are the best that I have seen in 36 years in service. They blend intellect, drive, compassion, courage, and commitment to succeed daily in a very difficult environment. Our soldiers and families are our most precious resource and they will be my top priority.

Second, I see the power of the Army's transformation on the streets of Iraq every day. The enhanced capabilities of the modular units allow them to handle the complexities of the Iraqi environment. If I am confirmed you should expect to see continuity in the transformation initiatives that General Peter Schoomaker has put into action.

Third, the men and women of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve have been indispensable to our efforts in Iraq and we must contemplate and implement policies and procedures that recognize two facts: one, that we are approaching a point where about half of our Guard and Reserve soldiers will be combat veterans; and two, we require the continued participation of the Guard and Reserve in our operations around the world. While I know the Army has been aggressively working these issues, Guard and Reserve issues will have my full attention.

I have seen our Army at war in the 21st century and believe my experience in that regard will be valuable to the Army. I am also conscious that Iraq is not the only future and as Chief of Staff of the Army, I will take a broader view.

Next, Mr. Chairman, I would like just to say a few words about Iraq. Just 2½ years ago, Iraq was totally dependent on coalition forces for security. Today Iraqis are poised to assume responsibility for their own security by the end of 2007, still with some level of support from us. The path that brought us to this point has not been easy, but it has been part of a concerted effort to build an Iraq that can secure, sustain, and govern itself.

Sectarian violence is the greatest threat to Iraq's ability to accomplish this objective and to move forward. Since February with the bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, the sectarian violence in Iraq has greatly complicated our ability to accomplish our strategic objectives. It makes it harder for the population, traumatized by 3 decades under Saddam Hussein, to make the compromises necessary to equitably resolve what is the fundamental conflict in Iraq, the division of political and economic power among Iraqis.

This is a challenge we can help them address, but one they must ultimately resolve themselves. I continue to firmly believe that enduring strategic success in Iraq must be achieved by Iraqis.

I know there are questions in people's minds about where I stand on troop levels, particularly with respect to the most recent deployment of troops to Baghdad. There are no questions in my mind. I can tell you that I have been doing what I told you I would do 2½ years ago at my confirmation hearing. I told you I would ask for the troops I believed I required to accomplish the mission and I believe I have.

Over the course of the mission I have asked for and received more troops at least six times: in support of the operation in Fallujah in late 2004; in support of the January 2005 elections; to
implement the transition team, the embed concept, in the spring of 2005; to support the October referendum and December elections in 2005; to support the Baghdad security plan in 2006; and again in December 2006 to reinforce Iraqi efforts in Baghdad. I have also sent troops home once, following the December 2005 elections as a result of improvements in the Iraqi security forces over the course of the year.

Now, with respect to my most recent request for forces, the planning began in November shortly after we changed out the Baghdad division. There was a normal rotation of divisions in Baghdad in the middle of November. The corps commander and I at that time sat down with the new commander and gave him our intent and told him to take a blank sheet of paper and tell us what it would take to help the Iraqis restore stability in their capital.

This is part of a continuous assessment process that we have ongoing there. We are constantly looking at how we are doing, what we should be doing differently.

Around the same time, the Iraqis came forward with their own approach, and together we developed the coordinated plan that we are now implementing. My commanders told me that they needed two brigades to implement this plan and I asked for those forces. At the same time we worked with the Iraqi prime minister to ensure that there was political commitment to the Baghdad effort.

In a series of addresses following his meeting with the President in Amman and continuing through his Army Day address on January 6, Prime Minister Maliki announced the political commitments that we were looking for. We will continue to monitor the delivery on these commitments, but so far the results have been heartening.

Now, some will ask, why cannot the Iraqi security forces do this by themselves? The Iraqi security forces are 2 1⁄2 years into a 3 1⁄2-year developmental process. They are not quite ready to assume security responsibility in Baghdad or Iraq. But they are increasingly ready and willing the take the lead in these security operations with our support.

They are also challenged by sectarian tensions and actions that have shaken the confidence of some of their populations in their security forces. For the Iraqis to successfully assume and sustain the security responsibility, their security forces must emerge as the dominant security force in the country. To do this, political and militia influence over the security forces must be eliminated and levels of sectarian violence, particularly in the capital, must be brought down substantially, brought down to the point where the people in Baghdad can feel safe in their neighborhoods.

This is what we are working toward in Baghdad. It will take time and the Iraqis do need our help.

What we and the Iraqis are doing in Iraq is a hard, tough business. Fighting this type of campaign while rebuilding a dilapidated infrastructure, building a representative government where none existed before, and reconciling ethnic and sectarian differences makes it even more difficult and complex. The struggle in Iraq is winnable, but it will, as I have said before this committee, take patience and will.

Mr. Chairman, in closing I would like to go back to the Army. I am a soldier. My roots are in the Army and I know the pride of
wearing this uniform. You can say I have been part of the Army all my life. I was born in an Army hospital in Japan where my father was a member of the occupation forces. I am an Army brat that went to four high schools in three countries. Sheila and the boys grew up in the Army and my youngest son joined the Army Reserve as a private at age 34 because he too wanted to serve.

I have devoted my life to the Army. I took hard jobs around the world because they were important to our country. I must admit I am amazed when I hear comments to the effect that I am being nominated as a reward. Mr. Chairman, the members of the committee know full well the challenges and the multitude of challenges facing the Army over the next 4 years. Service as Army Chief of Staff is not a reward; it is a duty. It is about service and it is about personal commitment to the men and women of the United States Army.

If confirmed, I acknowledge the hard work ahead to maintain our position as the greatest army on the planet. I will need and ask for your help, and I pledge to work in partnership with you, Mr. Chairman, and the rest of the members of the committee and to consult with you frequently and candidly.

Thank you for your attention. I look forward to taking your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. General, thank you.

We have a series of standard questions which we ask of all nominees. First, have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

General CASEY. I have.

Chairman LEVIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

General CASEY. I have not.

Chairman LEVIN. Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

General CASEY. I will.

Chairman LEVIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

General CASEY. I will.

Chairman LEVIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

General CASEY. They will.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree if confirmed to appear and testify upon request before this committee?

General CASEY. I will.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to give your personal views when asked before this committee to do so, even if those views differ from the administration?

General CASEY. I will.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

General CASEY. I will.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
We will have a 6-minute first round of questions.
General, we understand you support the President's strategy, the new strategy which involves a surge of troops into Iraq. You were asked for your recommendation and you apparently recommended two brigades, as you just testified to, based on your commander's recommendations to you?
General Casey. That is correct.
Chairman Levin. We asked General Abizaid back in November of last year when he appeared before this committee whether we needed more troops or he supported more troops going to Iraq. He said that he met with every divisional commander, General Casey, the Corps Commander, General Dempsey, “We all talked together and I said, in your professional opinion if you were to bring in more American troops now does it add considerably to our ability to achieve success in Iraq? They all said no, and the reason is because we want Iraqis to do more. It is easy for the Iraqis to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more American forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more responsibility for their own future.”
General Abizaid said that he spoke to you and that his opinion reflected your opinion and that of all the other commanders. Was that true when he said it?
General Casey. I am not exactly sure when in November it was, but it was.
Chairman Levin. So you have changed your view since November?
General Casey. As I described in my opening testimony, Senator, in mid-November was when the reevaluation of the plan was taking place. I suspect John and I talked before that. That does reflect my general view on additional U.S. forces in Iraq.
Chairman Levin. It reflects a general view, but then there was some kind of a reevaluation which took place in mid-November?
General Casey. That is right, Senator. We are constantly re-evaluating how we are doing and what we need.
Chairman Levin. But that position that General Abizaid stated was your position when you spoke to him in early November presumably still remains your general view?
General Casey. That is correct.
Chairman Levin. If that is your general view, what has changed? Why are you modifying your general view for this surge?
General Casey. What has changed, Senator, is several things. One, the development of a plan, a new plan that was conceived by the Iraqis and worked in concert with us. So there is a plan that laid out requirements for those forces. So just to say do you need more forces is one thing. To say do you need more forces to execute this plan is quite another. We do need two additional brigades to implement that plan.
Chairman Levin. The Iraqis came in with a plan that said they did not want any additional American forces inside of Baghdad; is that not true? That was their plan that was presented to the President in Amman?
General Casey. I think that is a misunderstanding. I have read those newspaper reports. That was not the case. I was in Amman and that issue was never raised.

Chairman Levin. So the Iraqis did not say that they did not seek American forces in Amman?

General Casey. They did not.

Chairman Levin. Did they seek American forces in Baghdad?

General Casey. There was not a large, long discussion about the plan that they presented. They basically passed it across the table and there was actually quite a short discussion.

Chairman Levin. Did the plan that they passed across the table include additional American troops?

General Casey. It broadly identified the requirement for additional troops. I do not believe that it specified Iraqi or coalition. Now, for Prime Minister Maliki, he would generally rather not have additional coalition forces. That is his position. But he has listened to recommendations from his commander and from me about the need for these forces and he is accepting those forces on an as-needed basis.

Chairman Levin. Basically he felt that more security forces were needed inside Baghdad? He did not specify that any coalition forces would be needed as part of that, but it came from you and others that if there are going to be additional forces inside of Baghdad that coalition forces would be needed to provide some supplementary support; is that fair?

General Casey. That is fair, Senator.

Chairman Levin. There is an article in this morning’s Miami Herald which says the following: Jafari, when he was prime minister, recollected some meetings with U.S. officials and he said that in the meetings held twice a week he urged coalition forces to take action against the militias. In attendance, he said, were Army General George Casey, then the top U.S. commander in Iraq, the U.S. ambassador, the British ambassador, and a British general.

Jafari said he asked the officials to force police and army recruits to pledge loyalty to the government and to consider a military strike against the militias while they were still isolated from the public. “They were not cooperating with us,” Jafari said.

A former Jafari aide said he believed U.S. officials did not take action because they did not want to get involved in a political dispute between Jafari’s Dawa Party and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Iraq’s largest Shiite political party.

Was that request made of you by Jafari when he was prime minister and is it true that we rejected that request, and if so for what reason?

General Casey. I just want to make sure I have the specific request right. Could you please repeat what he said?

Chairman Levin. He asked officials—that is you; you are the only named one by name; he mentioned the ambassador and so forth. But by name he said that he asked you and the others to, “force”—this is not a quote. This is the article that says this: that Jafari asked you to force police and army recruits to pledge loyalty to the government and to consider a military strike against the militias while they were still isolated from the public. Jafari then is quoted as saying “They”—you—“were not cooperating with us.”
Could you comment on that?

General CASEY. I have not seen the article, Senator, but there is some strongly revisionist history going on there by the former prime minister.

Chairman LEVIN. Strongly? I am sorry?

General CASEY. Revisionist history going on there by the former prime minister.

I do not recall the request to force the police and army to pledge, but we have done that several times over the course of the last year both in the army and in the police, where the soldiers and the police have taken a loyalty pledge to the government. But I do not remember getting that request from the prime minister.

Quite the contrary to him asking me to make a military strike, which I do not ever recall him asking me to take any action, particularly a military strike against militia, that government was an impediment to our action against the militia. He was working very hard on the political side of things to keep the Sadrists under control. But frankly, I went to him with a group several times to get him to take action and allow us to take military action against the militia, and was denied.

We had difficulty getting him to even issue a statement on a weapons ban that his police and army officers wanted so that they could enforce the weapons ban on the streets of Iraq. He dragged his feet on that.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General.

Senator McCain.

Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, I was interested in your opening statement, which continues to be optimistic. In recent days the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Abizaid's designated successor Admiral Fallon have all stated we are not winning and we had a failed strategy. Now, those are clearcut statements for the record.

Do you agree with that assessment?

General CASEY. Do I agree that we have a failed strategy?

Senator MCCAIN. We had a failed policy and we are not winning.

General CASEY. Senator, I do not agree that we have a failed policy. I believe the President's new strategy will enhance the policy that we have.

Senator MCCAIN. So you view this change in strategy as just an enhancement of the previous policy?

General CASEY. It is a significant shift, but I believe it will be an enhancement over the current policy. The policy of training and equipping Iraqi security forces and gradually passing security responsibility to them as they are ready is still an important element of the current strategy and it is part of the Amman agreement.

Senator MCCAIN. So you disagree with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Admiral Fallon that we had a failed policy?

General CASEY. I do, Senator. I do not believe that the current policy has failed.

Senator MCCAIN. I would like to give you a quote. There are many quotes, but one I would be interested in your response to. A Pentagon press conference on December 16, 2004, "My view of winning is that we are broadly on track to accomplishing our objec-
tives, with Iraqi security forces that are capable of maintaining domestic order and denying Iraq as a safe haven for terror, I believe we are on track to get there by December 2005.’’

Was that statement accurate that you made in 2004?

General CASEY. I do not recall the specifics of—

Senator MCCAIN. I have given you a direct quote from your statement.

General CASEY. It said that what would be ready by the end of 2005?

Senator MCCAIN. ‘‘My view of winning is that we are broadly on track to accomplishing our objectives. With Iraqi security forces that are capable of maintaining domestic order and denying Iraq as a safe haven for terror, and I believe we are on track to get there by December 2005.’’

You made that statement in December 2004.

General CASEY. That obviously has not panned out. We have projections that we work on with the development of the security forces. Again, I do not remember the context of that, but the institutional aspects of building these security forces has always been programmed to take longer than that. So I am not quite sure what I was focusing on there. But it obviously has not panned out, Senator.

Senator MCCAIN. I do not want to belabor it, but there is a series of quotes. As short a time ago as October 11, 2006, ‘‘‘The idea that the country is aflame in sectarian violence is just not right,’ Casey said. ‘I do not subscribe to the civil war idea.’’’

September 30, 2005: ‘‘We have a strategy and a plan for success in Iraq and we are broadly on track in achieving our goals.’’

General Casey, almost everybody that I know that has testified before this committee and talked to, has said we had a failed policy, we are not winning; those are the judgments, and ‘‘serious mistakes were made.’’ That is in the comments made by the President of the United States.

Last year, in the month of December, we had the third highest number of American servicemen deaths in Iraq, as you well know.

Do you believe that this job, this change in strategy or, as you call it the new job, can be done with less than five brigades that General Petraeus says he needs?

General CASEY. I believe that the job in Baghdad as it is designed now can be done with less than that. But having the flexibility to have the other three brigades on a deployment cycle gives General Petraeus great flexibility. It allows him to make assessments on whether the plan is working or not and to either reinforce success, maintain momentum, or put more forces in a place where the plans are not working.

I believe that this five brigade plan gives great flexibility to General Petraeus at a very important time in the mission.

Senator MCCAIN. This is a time when almost all of our major concerns and military experts’ major concern is whether five brigades are enough, and a very short time ago you simply asked for two brigades. We just have a fundamental disagreement, General Casey, with facts on the ground and with what has happened in Iraq over now one of the longest wars in our history and where we are today.
I believe it is abundantly clear that we are at a point in Iraq where we are going to have to succeed within in the coming months or we are going to have to experience catastrophic consequences associated with it. It took us a long time to get where we are today. I do not believe that from the beginning when General Shinseki’s testimony before this committee was repudiated and he was removed from his job because he said we needed a sufficient number of troops that would have done the job, throughout we have paid a very heavy price in American blood and treasure in what the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the new Commander of Central Command (CENTCOM) say is a “failed policy.”

I regret that we were not given better and more accurate information as these past years unfolded.

I could ask you to respond to an abundance of quotes I have here in front of me that painted a very optimistic and rosy scenario, which did not comport in the view of many of us with the actual conditions on the ground and that many of us who greatly feared that we would be in the critical situation that we are in today.

So General, as I say, I do not question your honorable service. I have the most respect for you, your family, and their service to our Nation. I question seriously the judgment that was employed in your execution of your responsibilities in Iraq. We have paid a very heavy price in American blood and treasure because of what is now agreed to by literally everyone is a failed policy.

I would be very happy to hear your response, General.

General CASEY. Senator, I do not think there is any question that the situation in the center of the country, particularly in the capital, is bad, and we are working very hard to rectify that. As I mentioned in my opening statement, the bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in February added a completely new dimension to our challenges in Iraq, and dealing with the sectarian violence and helping the Iraqis deal with sectarian violence has been a very significant challenge.

As I also mentioned, the country will not be able to move forward with their security forces and it will not be able to move forward politically or economically until they come to grips with that situation.

I recognize we have a fundamental disagreement and in my mind the question has always been should we do it or should they do it. “It” being restore security. What I have tried to do in my time there is strike the right balance that allowed the Iraqi security forces and the government to keep moving forward, but at the same time having enough coalition presence there so that we could get the job done.

The situation in the capital, as you point out, is not good. It requires additional forces and I believe the flow plan to support that puts the forces in the right position and gives General Petraeus great flexibility.

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Casey, good morning. Let me pick up on something you said to Senator McCain, which is that you do not agree that our policy in Iraq has been a failure. I want to ask you why you think it has not been a failure.

General CASEY. The policy that I have been following has always been designed to do two things: to bring the insurgents and terrorists, the levels of violence, down to levels that could be contained by increasingly capable Iraqi security forces. That is happening in the better part of the country. It is not happening in Baghdad. It is not happening in Anbar. It is not happening in Diyala Province.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So you would say—and do not let me put words in your mouth—that while there have been failures, disappointments, in Baghdad as of today, that the policy that you followed has succeeded in other parts of Iraq?

General CASEY. There are three provinces in southern Iraq that are already under provincial Iraqi control. The fight that took place earlier this week in Najaf Province took place in a province that was under Iraqi control.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

General CASEY. It worked just like we had laid out in the memorandums of understanding. The police found it. It was too much for them. They called the Iraqi army. The Iraqi army came, it was too much for them, they called us. But the Iraqis dealt with it with our support.

There are three provinces in the north, the Kurdish provinces, that once they resolve some disagreements with the government over budget they will also fall under Iraqi control, and other provinces are projected over the course of the rest of this year to assume responsibility for their own security.

That process is working. It is working slowly, but it is working.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So if you were asked a different kind of question, which is whether you believe the situation in Iraq is deteriorating, is it fair to say that you would say it is not deteriorating in most of the country, but is in Baghdad?

General CASEY. I would say the situation is definitely deteriorating in Baghdad, in the center of the country. It is not necessarily deteriorating across Iraq. I want to say 14 of the 18 provinces have 10 or less incidents of violence a day. Baghdad has 30 or 40 incidents a day, to give you some comparison.

The levels of violence in the capital are significant. Now, it is the capital of the country and we should not discount the impact that not being able to control their capital has on the government and has on the rest of the country. That is really our challenge.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Am I correct to conclude from what you have said earlier this morning that you support the new military, economic, and political plan for Iraq as the President has announced it?

General CASEY. I do, Senator, and I was consulted on that. I participated in the development of the strategy.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Do you believe that it will succeed?

General CASEY. I believe that it can work.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

General CASEY. As I have said, in war there are no guarantees. But this plan, I believe it is the appropriate strategy and it has the
appropriate levels of resources attached to it. So I believe the plan can work.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I presume you are saying that you believe it has a higher probability of working than any other plan you have heard described?

General CASEY. That is a fair statement, Senator.

Senator LIEBERMAN. One of the other alternatives being discussed by some of our colleagues is to mandate the beginning of a withdrawal within a set period of months. How would you evaluate that as an alternative path to success in Iraq?

General CASEY. As the commander, I would resist any type of mandated timetables that would limit my flexibility to deal with the situation on the ground.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Do you fear that if we in fact began to withdraw that the situation in Iraq would deteriorate even further, in other words withdraw on a deadline as opposed to based on improved conditions there?

General CASEY. As I said, I do not believe that a mandated timetable not tied to conditions on the ground would be helpful. My sense is people on the ground would take advantage of that.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Understood.

Let me ask you a few questions actually about the job for which you are being nominated, Chief of Staff of the Army. Would you say, based on the Army's involvement in Iraq and other circumstances, that the U.S. Army today is broken?

General CASEY. No, Senator, I would not. I came in the Army 36 years ago and I saw a broken Army. The first platoon I walked into as a lieutenant in my first assignment in Germany had nine people in it and four of those people were pending discharge. We did not have money to train, we did not have money to fix our vehicles. I can remember guys painting over bumper numbers, the vehicle identification number on a vehicle, because they only had one that worked and when they had an inspection they changed the number and take that vehicle up because it was the only one that worked. It was broken badly.

Senator LIEBERMAN. But it is not now?

General CASEY. I see in Iraq every day a splendid Army. Now, I know that General Schoomaker has problems with the forces yet to deploy and some of the strategic elements that will deploy later, but from what I see in Iraq, Senator, the Army is far from broken.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I agree with you, of course. It is the best in the world, and I believe the best we have ever had.

I want to ask you a final question about the increase in end strength that the President and Secretary Gates are recommending to take the Army up to 540,000. Is that adequate?

General CASEY. Senator, in the short time I have been back and plugged into Army issues, I am being told by the Army Staff that that is in fact adequate now. However, they have an analysis process that they repeatedly run and they will continue to look at whether it is sufficient to meet their needs over time. But right now I am being told it is sufficient.

Senator LIEBERMAN. My time is up. Thank you, General Casey. Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. Senator Warner.
Senator WARNER. General Casey, thank you for reciting your commitment personally and that of your family to the United States Army. You did not make reference to your father and the fact that he was a very brave soldier. He was a two-star general commanding the First Infantry Division in Vietnam and lost his life in the line of duty. I think it is important that we look at the total of the individual that is before us today and that is an important factor, because you have to inspire. One of your major responsibilities as the Chief of Staff of the Army is to inspire your people, to set the example to continue on so that America can enjoy the finest Army of any in the world.

I want to go back to your comments just now about your participation in this new plan and particularly the comments of my colleagues, which are accurate, about the ever-widening circle of individuals talking about a failed policy, certainly during calendar year 2006. Having served in the Pentagon myself as a part of the civilian team, I know full well how under our Constitution ever since George Washington civilians are in charge of our military. They devise the policy, they issue the orders, and our military individuals carry out those orders, or at times I have seen senior officers respectfully disagree and, frankly, resign rather than carry out a policy which they feel is wrong.

I judge that the policy and the orders that you carried out were consistent with those traditions and that you were given orders, and in this instance we should bear in mind that you were subordinate to CENTCOM Commander, General John Abizaid, whom I have a great deal of confidence in as a military commander. Is that not correct?

General CASEY. That is correct, Senator.

Senator WARNER. That he in turn received his orders from the President, transmitted in some respects through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; is that not correct?

General CASEY. That is correct, Senator.

Senator WARNER. Now, did you feel free at any time to reach out and question the orders that you were given to carry out?

General CASEY. I did, Senator. In fact, there was a strong dialogue about the policy between both our civilian leadership and General Abizaid and myself. I believe in the policy that I am implementing, Senator Warner. Did I not believe in it, I would have taken other actions, as you suggested.

Senator WARNER. It seems to me that as we assess the accountability for the past that where—and I think you today indicated you accept your share of the responsibility——

General CASEY. I do.

Senator WARNER.—an equal if not a greater share falls upon the civilians that devised the policy and issued the orders.

Now, we come down to this very critical point you made here, and I copied it down pretty carefully. You said that when you were working on the new strategy, the plan enunciated by the President on January 10, that you felt two brigades; I expect you changed that to “brigades”—were sufficient to carry it out, with an augmentation of the marines of a battalion or two in Anbar; is that correct?
General CASEY. That is correct. I do not want to put too fine a point on this, but what you are talking about, are requirements for the Baghdad security plan.

Senator WARNER. That is correct.

General CASEY. I would differentiate that from the President's strategy. But the Baghdad plan is part of that strategy.

Senator WARNER. At what point did you say to someone that you need two more brigades and an additional battalion in Anbar? Was it not a part of the planning phases of the January 10 plan or was it separate?

General CASEY. Around right before Christmas is when I asked for the additional forces.

Senator WARNER. Was it to implement the plan that the President announced or a plan that you were devising with regard to increasing the level of security in Baghdad?

General CASEY. The latter, Senator. It was asked for because of the Baghdad security plan.

Senator WARNER. I see. So it was a part of your input into the thinking for a new plan to raise the level of security in Baghdad?

General CASEY. That is correct, Senator.

Senator WARNER. Then you say: “well, I recognize that if you give the higher figure which is in the plan now, 20,500, that would give the new commander more flexibility.” Had you remained as the commander would not you have wanted the additional flexibility of the additional increments of two more brigades?

General CASEY. I would have welcomed the flexibility of having access to three more brigades if I remained there.

Senator WARNER. But why did you not ask for the full complement of the four to five brigades, rather than just the two? Could it have been because of your concern and that of General Abizaid that the bringing on of additional troops was going into the face of a rising resentment among the Iraqi people for more and more troops?

General CASEY. Senator, my general belief is I did not want to bring one more American soldier into Iraq than was necessary to accomplish the mission. So what I asked for was the two brigades and the ability to maintain a reserve in Kuwait in case I needed additional flexibility.

Senator WARNER. All right. Let me go to the question of the extent we can use the trained Iraqi forces—and that training was done largely during your 2½ years—or turn in and bring in more U.S. forces, it is a constant balance. That is where, speaking for myself and I think some others who have associated with me on a resolution, we urge the President to look at all options to charge the Iraqis with a greater and greater degree of the new plan in Baghdad.

They understand the language. They understand the culture and are better able to cope with this sectarian violence, which is so difficult to comprehend, and the killing. Why are we not putting greater emphasis on the utilization of Iraqi forces and less on the U.S. GI being put into that cauldron of terror generated by mistrust between the Iraqis and the Sunnis that goes back 1,400 years?
General CASEY. I would say, Senator, that we are relying more on the Iraqis and forcing the Iraqis to take a more leading role in resolving the situation in Baghdad. They came up with the plan. They will lead the plan. I agree with you, they are much better at understanding what is going on on the streets of their own country than our soldiers are.

One of the challenges we have, though, I mentioned in my opening statement. It is the confidence of all the population in the different elements of their security forces. Largely, the Sunni population of Baghdad do not trust the police. So one of the schemes that will be used as part of this plan is joint manning with police, army, and coalition forces to do that. That is where the coalition comes in, because when they see us operating with the Iraqi police particularly the population has a greater level of confidence that the forces will treat them properly.

Senator WARNER. My time is up. My hope and my prayers are this plan succeeds, but it succeeds by a greater and greater reliance on the Iraqi forces and we will not have to use the full 20,500 Americans to implement this. Let the Iraqis step forward. We have trained them for 2 1/2 years, invested a lot of time and money, and they should be the ones that carry the burden in Baghdad.

General CASEY. They are willing to do that.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator Ben Nelson.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Casey, thank you for your many years of service and your family’s service to our Nation.

Over the last 2 years I have been advocating benchmarks, measurable goals, to measure progress in Iraq. I know you have heard me say this previously. What benchmarks does General Petraeus need now to measure the military progress that we hope to be made in Iraq? What goals and how will we measure that?

You have your own view about whether we have been successful in Iraq and you have stated that. You have General Jack Keane saying something different and others also saying it is a failed policy. How can we get something clear going in with a new plan, would that be benchmarks? How would we measure them and how could we tell whether they are a success and to what degree a success?

General CASEY. That is something that we have been working already in Baghdad here and I will just run down a few points. These are the things that we are thinking about as important elements to measure so that we can get some sense of progress.

First of all, pretty simply a reduction in the lawlessness and the level of sectarian killings. We track that over time and I will say that over the last 5 or 6 weeks we actually have seen a gradual downturn in sectarian incidents. Now, there has been an upturn in the high profile attacks, the car bombs and suicide attacks. But in general there has been a downturn over the last 5 or 6 weeks.

Second, we set as a goal, as I mentioned in my opening statement, we want to continue to work the security situation in Baghdad with the Iraqis until the people of Baghdad can feel safe in their neighborhood. We are seeing a systematic effort, primarily by the Shia militia, to move Sunni population out of mixed neighbor-
hoods. We see it to a smaller scale in the Sunni neighborhoods. We have to help the Iraqis reverse that.

Third, we believe that the Iraqi security forces have to emerge as the dominant security force with the confidence of the people of Baghdad. We measure that by polls over time and by our observations.

Fourth, we think there needs to be improvement in the basic needs in Baghdad, we and the Iraqis are supporting economic plans to raise the level of services.

Fifth, we think it is important to turn the population against violence in general, and we measure that, their feelings on that, through polls.

Finally, we think it is important that political and religious leaders actively engage in efforts to lessen the tensions, and so we would measure that by the active engagement of the leaders.

So those are some of the metrics that we are thinking about, using, and will use to measure progress in Baghdad.

Senator Ben Nelson. With this plan, this looks like these are now conditions for staying. I have been advocating conditions for staying as opposed to dates for withdrawal or mandated troop reductions or other programs of that kind. If we measure against these benchmarks that you just identified and we are not succeeding, are there consequences or is it just the opportunity to now change plans and come with a new plan?

Are these benchmarks conditions for staying or are they just benchmarks for evaluating a plan?

General Casey. Senator, I am sorry. I am not quite sure what you mean about conditions for staying.

Senator Ben Nelson. If these benchmarks all end up with a failing grade do we just change the plan or do we begin to say, these are conditions now for leaving. In other words, I understand you have to modify plans along the way. Are we just modifying the plan along the way or are there true consequences if the Iraqis do not step forward, if they do not stand up their forces, if they cannot quell the violence in their neighborhoods, if they cannot take the lead? Do we consider that just the consequences that mean we will have to change the plan or does it mean we begin to think about withdrawing?

General Casey. I understand now, Senator. The metrics I described to you are metrics to measure progress in the plan. They are not anything beyond that. Now, you ask are there consequences of the plan not progressing or the Iraqis not meeting their commitments. That is a political judgment that we would work with the government.

We review these metrics. We review these metrics with the government and tell them what they are doing or not doing as a means of continuing to move the plan forward.

Senator Ben Nelson. We understand the problem that any democracy or attempted democracy has with militias involved in their military or in their government. If the Iraqis are unwilling to move forward in Sadr City against Moqtada al-Sadr and the Mahdi Army, would that be a pretty good indication that the plan is not succeeding or would that be a reason to believe that maybe our commitment to Iraq should be reevaluated?
General CASEY. It is a hypothetical, Senator, but if we were denied access to Sadr City, I would consider that a significant breach in the commitments that the prime minister has already made and we would have to have serious discussions with the government.

Senator BEN NELSON. But have we not already been denied access to certain political leaders? Have we not already been denied access to take certain actions against the militias or other instances where they have told us no for political reasons or for other reasons?

General CASEY. In the past they have, Senator. But I will tell you, in the past probably 2 months we have not been denied access to any target and the prime minister is doing what he said he was going to do. He was going to target everyone who is breaking the law.

Senator BEN NELSON. Have we asked for access to the Mahdi Army and al-Sadr?

General CASEY. We are actively working our plans for Sadr City with the Iraqis.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me first say how difficult this is because it seems as if each time I have been in the area of responsibility (AOR), which has been 12 times, I have come back with great success stories. I can remember when General Madhi Hashim took over in Fallujah. He, at one time, was Saddam Hussein’s brigade commander and became really very close and enamored with our Marines up there, and they have done a great job. In fact, he later on was moved down to Baghdad to perform security there. I can remember a trip shortly after that where this general was in charge of, I believe, the entire eastern one-third of Baghdad. We did not have any of our boots on the ground. The security was all provided by the Iraqis. Yet, after that it changed.

I agree with Senator Warner, as everyone agrees, that we want to get to the point where these guys can take care of their own security.

We have seen it moving around. But I want to spend my time on a couple of the real serious problems we have in the new job, if you are confirmed, that you will be facing. First one—and you cannot wait until the change of command on this one because it is critical today and I think the most critical thing that you better be thinking about. I know that General Peter Schoomaker is. I had dinner with him a couple nights ago. He is most concerned about that, and that is the required implementation of the base realignment and closure (BRAC) that we passed.

It is interesting for me to bring this up because I was one of those who was opposed to having this BRAC round. The reason, General Casey, is because I said on the Senate floor: Yes, it may be true that this BRAC round will save $20 billion, but that is not going to be immediate. It is going to cost us money in the mean time.

Now, the Continuing Resolution (CR) that the majority has, and hopefully the Democrats will massage this a little bit and correct
this problem, shorts the account for military construction under the BRAC by $3.1 billion. Now, in the event that that is not done, can you explain the implementation or the problems that we are going to be facing if we do not properly fund that BRAC account in terms of our troops’ rotation and the things that will not be done as a result of that shortage of $3.1 billion?

General CASEY. I could not talk about the specifics of that, but as you suggest a cut of that magnitude would have a huge impact on our ability to manage the installations across the Army, at a time when we are rotating soldiers back and forth to combat zones. But I have not been into the specifics on that.

Senator INHOFE. I think it is time that you are. I think it is time that you are. What I would like to ask you is by tomorrow, have for the record an outline of the problems that you will be facing in your new job, if you are confirmed, if we do not adequately fund that BRAC account. I do not know how you are going to do it. How can you plan in the future?

Right now we have come up with good plans to start rotating troops and bringing them back. We have very carefully designed this as to what the housing is going to be, and how we are going to implement that. That is going to be a serious problem.

So I would like to have that—after you have consulted with General Schoomaker and other people—so I can be talking about this.

[The information referred to follows:]

Executive Summary

**FY07 Continuing Resolution Impacts to the Army**

- Army will not begin ~$2.0 B of our BRAC program which is a key enabler to grow and position the Army
- This leaves more than half of our FY07 BRAC program (56%) unexecutable

**FY07 Continuing Resolution Consequences for the Army**

- Operational Impact on the Training, Mobilization, and Deployment of Forces in support of the Global War on Terrorism
- Unravels the Army’s synchronized stationing and BRAC plan – *puts growth of the Army, stationing, and BRAC at risk*
- Delays transformation of Reserve Component – *has operational consequences* –
- Breaks the Nation’s obligation to provide Soldiers and Families adequate quality of life – *affects the All Volunteer Force*
- Delays capital investment and inhibits economic development – *affects local jobs and growth across the U.S. (over 80,000 jobs)*
- Limits predictability and military construction acquisition efficiencies – *results in higher construction costs*
Senator INHOFE. Now, of all the jobs, the tough jobs, I know you had the toughest job in the world over there, but for right now I would like to have you forget about that and think about the job that you would be facing as the Chief. You have title 10 respon-

Operational & QOL Impacts

- Examples of FY 07 BRAC with urgent operational links
  - Training Ranges, Command & Control, Training Barracks – 19 projects (~$560M) including training facilities at Fort Bliss; maneuver training at Fort Benning; Air Defense Artillery at Fort Sill; and Battlefield Trauma Lab at Fort Sam Houston.

- Cannot start Communications/Electronics RD&E Ctr Ph 1 at APG (to close Fort Monmouth and support GWOT) ($145M)

- Cannot start on Human Resources Command at Fort Knox; Recruiting facilities at Redstone Arsenal; Power Projection Platform at Fort Riley or other operational projects at Shaw AFB, Benning, Leavenworth (~225M)

- Armed Forces Reserve Centers - 27 projects (~$700M) in 16 states

- Examples of FY07 BRAC QOL requirements – 8 projects ($60M)
  - Youth and Child Development Centers, Benning, Riley, Bliss, Sam Houston
  - Dental Clinics, Bliss, Sam Houston
  - Medical Clinic at Riley

- All fiscal year 2007 BRAC projects and follow-on MILCON (2008-2013) are synchronized with modular force build, operational rotations, BRAC, and GDP

Capital Investment and Economic Development Impacts

- FY 07 MILCON delayed totals ~$2.0B capital investment

- Affects economic investment and jobs in 19 States
  - The Association of General Contractors report that for every $1B in construction 40,000 direct and indirect jobs are created

- Delaying 56% of FY 07 BRAC military construction to FY 08 will increase aggregate cost by at least $40M due to inflation

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sibilities as the Chief to provide the required troops and equipment. You have the BRAC problem that we are talking about now. If I wanted to discourage you, I would remind you that the Army is facing equipment hurdles in bringing the troop surge to Iraq. It needs 1,500 more up-armored trucks. The Army is going to have to draw on prepositioned stocks and it will take months, probably the summer, to outfit the new vehicles. I had some conversations with General Schoomaker recently.

I want to read something from his testimony before this committee. He said: “To meet combatant commanders' immediate needs, we pulled equipment from across the force to equip the soldiers deploying in harm’s way. This practice, which we are continuing today, increases risk of our next-to-deploy units. It limits our ability to respond to emerging strategic contingencies.”

The Army National Guard right now has only 40 percent of their required equipment. Then we have the Future Combat System (FCS), and every time we need money we move that FCS to the right and delay its implementation. Until we finish that, we are sending our kids out to battle in equipment that is not as good as our potential adversaries could have.

These are huge problems. I am not going to ask you to solve the problems this morning, but I would just like to have you address: What background and unique characteristics do you have to meet these, these really critical problems that you will be facing?

General CASEY. Thank you, Senator.

These are the basic resource modernization challenges and trade-offs that I think that I faced as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army when we were working on the FCS system back then.

Senator INHOFE. You have always been a real strong supporter of that. I am talking about from this point forward with these new competitions for funds; how are we going to do this and you have already said, in the previous position that you held you did face these problems.

General CASEY. Right. It is standard operational requirements: strategy, modernization, and resources. One of my jobs as the Chief of Staff of the Army will be to strike the appropriate balance between current demands and current readiness and our ability, as you suggest, to field the type of force that we are going to need in the next decade. That I think in a nutshell is what I will be doing as the Chief of Staff of the Army.

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate that. So if you would for the record bring back what I was asking for tomorrow, that would be very helpful to me and to many of us on this panel, bringing to the surface the serious problem that is there.

I would say, in response to that last question that I asked you, that it is going to be a real tough job and I think you are the man for the job. Thank you for your service.

General CASEY. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Senator Clinton.

Senator CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to you, General Casey, for your years of service, and thanks also to your family because they have served along with you, and we are grateful to all of you.
I want to follow up on the line of questioning Senator Inhofe was pursuing because I have been concerned about the readiness level of units being deployed to Iraq, and in last year’s National Defense Authorization Bill, I authored an amendment that was included in the final act, that would require the Government Accountability Office to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the readiness of our ground forces within the Army and Marine Corps no later than June 1 of this year.

But even before that report is completed, there have been a series of disturbing reports that our troops do not have the equipment they need as they are being deployed to Iraq. At a January 23, House Armed Services Committee hearing, General Schoomaker stated, “We are in a dangerous, uncertain, and unpredictable time,” and reiterated his concerns about the readiness levels of non-deployed combat units.

Five combat brigade teams are deploying to Iraq to support the proposed escalation of U.S. forces there. These units are part of the pool of nondeployed combat units. General, I want to ask a series of questions that follow up on our conversation yesterday in my office, because I know this is a grave concern to you and to all of us.

Are you at this point able to assert with a 100-percent level of confidence to this committee that every soldier being deployed to Iraq as part of this escalation will have all the necessary personal equipment?

General CASEY. Senator, that is my goal and I know that is General Pete Schoomaker’s goal, and we work very hard to ensure that that happens.

Senator CLINTON. Can you similarly assure us that every soldier being deployed as part of this escalation will receive all the necessary training for this dangerous assignment?

General CASEY. Again, that is the objective that both General Schoomaker and I have stated to our organizations.

Senator CLINTON. Finally, will each and every soldier being deployed as part of this escalation have all the necessary force protection available to them to perform their mission?

General CASEY. As I mentioned to you yesterday, I gave that guidance several weeks ago, that that would in fact be the case.

Senator CLINTON. Now, according to yesterday’s Business Week summary of a new Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General (IG) report, the IG is concerned that the U.S. military has failed to adequately equip soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially for nontraditional duties such as training Iraqi security forces and handling detainees.

The equipment shortages were attributed to basic management failures among military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. CENTCOM lacks standard policies for requesting and tracking equipment requirements for units to perform their duties.

General, have you seen this IG’s report?

General CASEY. I have not, Senator.

Senator CLINTON. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that the committee request a copy of the IG’s report that was referred to in the Business Week story and that it be made available to the committee as soon as possible.
Chairman LEVIN. It will be requested and will be shared with everybody.

Senator CLINTON. General, as commander of U.S. forces in Iraq were you aware of the IG’s investigation?

General CASEY. This is the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s (SIGIR) report?

Senator CLINTON. Yes.

General CASEY. I am aware of a continuing IG process going on. I was not aware of this specific investigation. I know they are out there all the time doing a range of investigations.

Senator CLINTON. Do you know if any member of your command cooperated with this particular report?

General CASEY. I do not, but I assume they do because they routinely work with the SIGIRs in doing that reports.

Senator CLINTON. Could you report back to the committee what your find about the level of cooperation with this report, please?

General CASEY. I will, Senator.

[The information referred to follows:]

The information requested was provided by General Casey on February 16, 2007, in the attached letter.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
1777 NORTH KENT STREET, SUITE 4413
ARLINGTON, VA 22209

February 16, 2007

The Honorable Hillary Clinton
The United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Clinton:

During my testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 1, 2007, you asked that I provide you feedback on the level of cooperation provided by the Multi-National Forces Iraq to the Department of Defense Audit team that visited Iraq in June 2006 to determine if Soldiers deploying to Iraq had been equipped in accordance with mission requirements.

The team conducted a ten day assessment at Camp Victory in Baghdad and at Logistical Support Area Anaconda in Balad. They were provided unit readiness reports, property records and a broad cross section of combat and support Soldiers to interview.

On behalf of all our service members and Coalition partners, thank you and the Committee for your continued steadfast support to our mission in Iraq.

Sincerely,

George W. Casey, Jr.
General, United States Army
Senator CLINTON. Thank you.

Are you aware of the problems that are apparently cited in this report, as set forth in press accounts of it?

General CASEY. I am not. I am actually a little surprised. I think you said it was the equipping of transition teams, I spend a lot of personal time making sure that these teams have the best equipment because they operate relatively independently, and we have gone to great lengths to make sure they have the equipment. I go up and talk to each group as they come through and I have not heard any mention of the transition teams being shortchanged on equipment.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Clinton, if I could just interrupt. We did receive that IG report that you referred to, apparently last night, and it is now in our files. It is classified Secret, so when you read it if there are parts of it that you feel should be declassified we will make those requests.

Sorry for the interruption.

Senator CLINTON. No. I would appreciate that, Mr. Chairman, because earlier this week I questioned Admiral Fallon about an article in the Washington Post titled “Equipment for Added Troops Is Lacking, New Iraq Forces Must Make Do, Officials Say.” Mr. Chairman, I would like that article to become a part of the record of this hearing as well.

Chairman LEVIN. It will be part of the record.

[The information referred to follows:]
Equipment For Added Troops Is Lacking
New Iraq Forces Must Make Do, Officials Say

By Ann Scott Tyson
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, January 30, 2007; A12

Boosting U.S. troop levels in Iraq by 21,500 would create major logistical hurdles for the Army and Marine Corps, which are short thousands of vehicles, armor kits and other equipment needed to supply the extra forces, U.S. officials said.

The increase would also further degrade the readiness of U.S.-based ground forces, hampering their ability to respond quickly, fully trained and well equipped in the case of other military contingencies around the world and increasing the risk of U.S. casualties, according to Army and Marine Corps leaders.

"The response would be slower than we might like, we would not have all of the equipment sets that ordinarily would be the case, and there is certainly risk associated with that," the Marine Corps commandant, Gen. James Conway, told the House Armed Services Committee last week.

President Bush's plan to send five additional U.S. combat brigades into Iraq has left the Army and Marines scrambling to ensure that the troops could be supported with the necessary armored vehicles, jamming devices, radios and other gear, as well as lodging and other logistics.

Trucks are in particular short supply. For example, the Army would need 1,500 specially outfitted — known as "up- armored" — 2 1/2 -ton and five-ten trucks for Iraq for the incoming units, said Lt. Gen. Stephen Speakes, the Army's deputy chief of staff for force development.

"We don't have the [armor] kits, and we don't have the trucks," Speakes said in an interview. He said it will take the Army months, probably until summer, to supply and outfit the additional trucks. As a result, he said, combat units flowing into Iraq would have to share the trucks assigned to units now there, leading to increased use and maintenance.

Speakes said that although another type of vehicle — the up- armored Humvee — continues to be in short supply Army-wide, there would be "adequate" numbers for incoming forces, and each brigade would receive 400 fully outfitted Humvees. But he said that to meet the need, the Army would have to draw down pre-positioned stocks that would then not be available for other contingencies.

Still, U.S. commanders privately expressed doubts that Iraq-bound units would receive a full complement of Humvees. "It's inevitable that that has to happen, unless five brigades of up- armored Humvees fall out of the sky," one senior Army official said of the feared shortfall. He expects that some units would have to rely more heavily on Bradley Fighting Vehicles and tanks that, although highly protective, are intimidating and therefore less effective for many counterinsurgency missions.
After the hearing, the chairman and ranking member sent a letter to Secretary Gates asking about the readiness of our troops. In that article were very specific and disturbing questions from Lieutenant General Stephen Speakes and others about the lack of equipment, the lack of readiness. Among the concerns were the proper level of armor for vehicles, prepositioned sets issued in Kuwait are the add-on armor type and do not provide adequate protection, insufficient add-on armor kits for logistics trucks and prime movers, insufficient and incomplete electronic countermeasure devices designed to defeat improvised explosive devices, insufficient force protection materials for the outposts we are building in Baghdad and throughout Anbar Province, insufficient training sets of equipment and vehicles at home station for units to train on in preparation for deployments.
I am very concerned that we are pursuing a policy that, regardless of what one thinks about it or how one evaluates its chances for success, certainly raises the fears that so many of our young men and women are going to be put into very dangerous situations in neighborhoods in Baghdad, dependent upon their Iraqi counterparts who may or may not be reliable. Mr. Chairman, I believe that because of these disturbing reports about equipment shortages we should as we begin to debate the Warner-Levin proposal include provisions that require that adequate equipment and training be mandated so that we do not send any young American into this dangerous mission without knowing that they are as well-prepared, as ready and equipped as they deserve to be to try to fulfill this mission.

General CASEY. I do not think anyone feels stronger about that than I do, Senator.

Senator CLINTON. Thank you, General.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Clinton.

Senator Chambliss, going according to the list that I have is always a little bit awkward, but we have an early bird rule and I just follow what our clerk tells me, is the earliest birds get the worm.

Senator CHAMPLISS. I do think Senator Sessions was here before I was, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to go, but he was here.

Senator SESSIONS. I was here when you gavled this hearing.

Chairman LEVIN. I am going to call on Senator Sessions. If you would share this with Senator Sessions. Unhappily, you are not even listed on here. Our clerk is going to get a raise—get a rise out of me. [Laughter.]

Thank you, and I appreciate that very much, Senator Chambliss.

Senator Sessions, forgive the error.

Senator Sessions. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. You are very gracious as always.

Let me just ask you this, General Casey. You have been leading men in combat for some time now. As Chief of Staff of the Army, will you take every effort and utilize every power you have to ensure those soldiers when they hit the ground in Iraq are properly equipped and supported?

General CASEY. And trained, I will.

Senator SESSIONS. With regard to the soldiers that are going there, they are fully equipped with their $17,000-plus worth of equipment and all that goes for each soldier; is that right?

General CASEY. Yes.

Senator Sessions. We had testimony the other day that two or three of the brigades would be ready to go fully equipped and a couple of brigades may lack some uparmored vehicles or transport vehicles and that they were working on that. But if you can confirm you will utilize every power you have to make sure those brigades are fully equipped?

General CASEY. I will, Senator. In fact, I gave instructions several weeks ago in Iraq that we would not bring anybody in who was not prepared.

Senator Sessions. So if they do not send them to you properly equipped you are not going to put them on the street?

General CASEY. Right.
Senator Sessions. General Casey, thank you for your leadership and service to our Nation for 37 years. You were born in an Army hospital in occupied Japan, son of an Army man. I do not know if he was an officer or not. My father served in occupied Japan and I guess one of the great things in the history of the world is MacArthur and our military’s efforts to create a prosperous, free Japan today. It is one of the great things that happened in our world. We have invested a lot of effort now in trying to bring Iraq to some such level as that. That would be our dream.

You now have a son in the military. So I know that many of us are frustrated about troop levels and strategies and plans. I would just say this. I liked it a while ago when you said you did not want to ask for one more soldier to be sent to Iraq than you believed was absolutely needed. I think that is where most of the American people are. That is where the people are who are dubious of this war. That is where the people are who support our efforts, like I do.

I do not want to send a single person there that is not necessary. I want to add this in as part of my thanks to you. You were Vice Chief of Staff of the United States Army. They asked you to go to Iraq for 18 months to deal with the challenges there. You accepted that responsibility. You went and you have stayed now 30 months away from your family, giving your every waking moment to a successful policy there. I thank you for that.

I cannot see how that can do anything but help you be a more effective, sensitive, knowledgeable Chief of Staff of the Army. So I think I wanted to say that.

General Casey. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Sessions. I think it was a general in the German army that said few strategies exist beyond the first shot of the war. Things change. They really change rapidly, do they not, in an asymmetrical insurgency type situation we are facing in Iraq?

General Casey. They do, Senator. It is interesting, the threat has changed three times in the 2½ years I have been there at my level, and at the tactical level it changes faster than that.

Senator Sessions. General Petraeus wrote the counterinsurgency manual. It is filled with so many subtleties and demands on the military to alter and change tactics, strategies, and initiatives constantly in a struggle like this, would it not?

General Casey. It is. In fact, in the summer of 2005 I was getting a sense that our soldiers were not really effectively applying what counterinsurgency doctrine that we have, and I sent a team out to check. What they came back and said is, they generally understand it, but not everybody has all the tools, and if the commander gets it, the unit gets it. So we established a counterinsurgency academy in Iraq where every brigade commander brings his battalion and company commanders through a week-long course to work on the subtleties and the nuances of counterinsurgency operations inside Iraq. It has proved very effective. Over 5,000 leaders have actually been through that course already and we are expanding it now to bring Iraqis in so that they can pick up the counterinsurgency operations.

Senator Sessions. General Abizaid in a private conversation several years ago in Iraq on a C-130 when only the two of us could hear one another, and hardly that, explained to me his personal be-
lief as to why we ought not to bring in more troops than necessary to do the job. There is a real tension there and you have touched it. I do not know, maybe Senator McCain is right. I do not know.

But I have always adhered to his view, and I think you share it, that we want to keep the pressure on the Iraqis to step up their capability so it is their country and their nation that they are defending. If you bring in too much support it could erode or lessen the pressure on them to assume responsibility.

Is that part of your analysis?

General CASEY. That is exactly right. I saw this in Bosnia myself as a brigadier general. I remember watching myself going out and trying to solve the problems of Bosnia and as a result my sense was that they became dependent on us and they did less.

Senator SESSIONS. What about the Lawrence of Arabia quote? What is that? Can you recall that for us?

General CASEY. “Better they do it imperfectly with their own hands than you do it perfectly with yours.” I use that quote with each of the classes in the counterinsurgency academy.

Senator SESSIONS. He was expert in the Arab culture, and that is I think good advice.

It has been a struggle and it has been tough, and we are disappointed that it has not gone smoother. We all wish it had. But war requires leadership. Leaders make hard decisions. They accept responsibility for their decisions and we live with those decisions. You have made some tough decisions. I think you have done a good job. But whether or not we agree or disagree with every decision you have made, I believe we can all agree that your career as Vice Chief of the Army and this experience now, 30 months extended tour in Iraq, will help you to be even more effective as Chief of Staff of the Army, and I intend to support you.

General CASEY. Thank you, Senator.

Senator SESSIONS. My time is up.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions, and I again apologize for the mistake here.

Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for having had to step out. I am trying to be in two places at once this morning. We had a Foreign Relations Committee hearing as well.

General, I want to express my best wishes to you and to your family. My congratulations to you and my appreciation for the service that you have given. I would like in several different ways to associate myself with the comments that my fellow Senator from Virginia made. I do not think it is a consequence of the honor of representing Virginia so much as the fact that we both served in the Marine Corps, we both had the privilege of serving in that Pentagon as Secretary of the Navy, and I think it brings a little bit different focus on some of the questions that have been asked of you this morning.

I think that a few of the questions that have been asked of you—I am not going to ask you to comment on this, but I think it bears saying—are evidence that your situation this morning represents the classic conundrum of military service at the highest level. In this administration it has not been unheard of for officers who spoke too loudly very often to have lost their jobs, and at the same
time to speak too softly often causes the military leader in historical situations rather than the civilian boss to be blamed when things go wrong.

I believe strongly that military leaders should be held accountable, but certainly in this situation today from a lot of people’s perspectives, including my own, the consequences of what I believe has been a failed strategy should be shared at a far higher level.

I have a question with respect to your assumption of your new responsibilities that I would like to ask of you, and it relates to the fact that we currently have an estimated 100,000 civilian contractors working in Iraq. On the one hand, I have heard comments from many senior military leaders that clearly we could not do it without them—I hear this over and over again—because of force structure deficiencies that have been built into the end strength levels, particularly in the Army.

At the same time, I have a concern about the cost of these people and also the accountability that pertains to this concept of, for lack of a better phrase, renting an army. This is a rent-an-army out there. The costs in many ways are obvious, particularly in the short-term. There are so many stories of individuals leaving Active Duty who are making maybe $20,000 and they can go over and work for five to nine times that and doing quasi-military work in the same country, pretty much doing the same kinds of things.

The notion of accountability is deeply troubling. I am not aware of any cases where misconduct—and I am not talking about the contracting situation, which we are trying to get our arms around, but human misconduct—shooting Iraqis out in the villages, these sorts of things. I am not aware of any incident where that sort of misconduct has been brought to proper justice. There may be. There may be one or two, but I am not aware of it.

So my question really is, would it not be better for this country if those tasks, particularly the quasi-military gun-fighting task, were being performed by Active-Duty military soldiers, in terms of cost and accountability?

General CASEY. In terms of cost, I am not sure, Senator. We talked yesterday on this, the notion of what is the long-term cost to take a soldier, bring him in, train him to do this logistical task, and take care of his family, when you compare that to the cost of the logistics contract. I have not seen the figures on the cost-benefit on that.

Senator WEBB. I would be interested in having those as you assume your new job. I think it is something worthy of discussion on the costs.

General CASEY. I think the other part of this, though, it is important that these contractors are used for logistics type skills and not necessarily the combat skills I think you mentioned there earlier. We have I want to say about 20,000 armed security contractors there that we have worked with and coordinate with. Those are the ones that we have to watch very carefully.

Senator WEBB. Another factor in this, and it does go into the way that our force structure levels have oscillated and the way that they are going to now, is the disruption of the rotational cycles and the hardship that puts on planning, on morale, particularly in the
mid-term, of the Army and the Marine Corps to continue operating in Iraq. Do you have a comment on that?

General CASEY. By disruption in the rotation cycles, you mean extensions?

Senator WEBB. Extensions and accelerating deployments. We ideally want a two for one, let us say, cycle and we have been operating on one for ones, and I know the new Commandant has mentioned he very much wants to get back to a two to one for a lot of reasons, including morale.

General CASEY. I think it is clear that those extensions and accelerations place additional stress on the force. I do not think there is any question about that. I believe that is exactly what this increase in Army end strength is designed to alleviate. That will not happen overnight. It takes a while to build those forces.

But I think it is interesting. I have already seen a brigade, one of these transformed brigades, that did not exist when I was the Vice Chief of the Army, has already been to Iraq and left. So it is not a long-term process, but it does take some time.

Senator WEBB. I am certainly hopeful that we can reduce the force structure so that we can have a different discussion regarding the end strength numbers that have been proposed. But certainly in the short-term we have a real problem here.

If I may—my time has expired—I would just like to say one other thing. I would like again to associate myself with something that Senator Warner said and express my gratitude to your father for the service that he gave our country and for all of us to remember that he did give his life in service to our country.

I grew up in the military as well. When you were sitting there talking about your schools, I counted. I put on a piece of paper, I went to nine schools in 5 years at one point traveling around in the career military. I know what that does to a family, and you and your family have my gratitude. Thank you very much.

General CASEY. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Webb.

I think Senators Warner and Webb speak for all of us in referring to your father for his service and the way in which you have continued that tradition. It is important that we all recognize that legacy and that gift which he gave to his country.

General CASEY. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Chambliss.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As Mr. Webb was saying, he spent 5 years and went to nine schools. Senator Graham said he spent 9 years in the fifth grade. [Laughter.]

Chairman LEVIN. Do you want equal time, Senator Graham? You can have equal time if you need that. [Laughter.]

Senator GRAHAM. I cannot rebut it. [Laughter.]

Senator CHAMBLISS. General Casey, first of all let me just echo the sentiments of all of us in thanking you and your family for the terrific commitment that you have all made to the service to our country and to tell you how much we appreciate that commitment. I know it is a family commitment, too. It is not just you. You are correct, without the support of your wife and your sons you would not be where you are today. So we do appreciate that.
General, what is the role of the Army Chief of Staff in the decisionmaking process concerning the war in Iraq today?

General Casey. As the Army Chief of Staff, I would sit as a member of the Joint Chiefs and have a direct role in formulating military advice to the Secretary of Defense and to the President.

Senator Chambliss. So is there a difference in what you would do as Chief of Staff relative to the war inside of Iraq and outside of Iraq?

General Casey. If I think I understand the direction here, Senator, inside Iraq I would be looking primarily inside Iraq and looking at the appropriate strategies to apply in Iraq. As a member of the Joint Chiefs, I believe I would be looking at a broader context and how the war in Iraq fit broadly into our overall security strategies of the United States.

Senator Chambliss. You have been Commander of the MNF–I for 2 1/2 years. We cannot say that it has been a successful 2 1/2 years. The situation over there is very dire right now. What do you bring to the table as potentially the next Chief of Staff of the Army that you did not bring to the table as Commander of the MNF–I?

General Casey. That is a good question, Senator. I agree with you, the situation in Iraq is certainly not where I thought it would be when I was going out the door, and I am no more comfortable with the situation in Iraq than you or anybody else is.

I will tell you that the experience I have gained in 2 1/2 years in a very difficult environment has seasoned me in ways I probably do not even fully understand now. I have had to deal at the highest levels of our Government. I have mentored three Iraqi prime ministers in political-military interactions. I have dealt with three different ambassadors, four coalition corps commanders.

I have learned an awful lot about strategic leadership and I believe that will help me greatly as the Chief of Staff of the Army. I mentioned some of the more narrow insights that I received in terms of people, transformation, and Guard and Reserve matters. But I think the big thing that I will bring back from Iraq is the seasoning and strategic leadership skills that I gained over 2 1/2 years.

Senator Chambliss. General, you and I have had a couple of private conversations about troop strength in Iraq, and obviously you did not think we needed additional troops early on and you have now come to the realization that you think we do. At a press conference in October 2006 when you were asked if more troops are needed, “Maybe, and, as I have said all along, if we do I will ask for the troops that I need, both coalition and Iraqis.”

Now, some time after October 2006 into November-December, apparently you concurred in the fact that an additional two brigades originally were needed. The President has made a decision to send an additional four brigades into Iraq and you concur in that decision. Take me through that process. What changed your mind? How do you decide now that you concur, that in October we did not need troops, November we need two brigades, now you agree we need four brigades?

General Casey. I laid a little bit of that out in my opening testimony, Senator, but let me just review the bidding. We are constantly looking at the situation in Baghdad, looking for ways to im-
prove it. In the middle of November, the Baghdad division changed and we had a new commander in there, so it was an opportunity for us to take a fresh look at the situation with a new set of eyes.

I sat down with him and the corps commander and said: Take a blank piece of paper and look at this hard and tell us what you need to help the Iraqis stabilize their capital. At the same time, the Iraqis came forward with their plan, and this is the plan for nine districts with an Iraqi brigade and a coalition battalion in each district. We worked that with the Iraqis and have continued to develop that over time.

As my commanders and the Iraqis worked that plan, they came back and said: We are two brigades short; we need two additional coalition brigades and three Iraqi brigades to make this plan work. That evolution went from about the middle of November until the latter part of December, and right before Christmas I asked for the additional two brigades.

Now, there were three other brigades that were offered and they were flowing on a time line that allowed us to make assessments on whether or not they would be needed. As I said, my bias is that I do not want to bring one more soldier in there than we need. I was okay with having those forces basically in reserve to be called forward if necessary. Now that I am leaving, having those forces in reserve and prepared to come I think gives General Petraeus, the new commander there, great flexibility to do what he thinks he needs to do. He will probably look at things differently than I do.

That is how my thinking has evolved. But I always again go back to my base case, which is I do not want to bring one more American soldier or marine in there than I think we need to do the job.

Senator CHAMBLISS. If General Petraeus comes to you as the Army Chief of Staff and said, I need additional assets, including additional troops, if we are truly going to successful in this operation, are you going to give them to him?

General CASEY. I will, Senator. In fact, I will tell him the same thing that Pete Schoomaker told me when I went to Iraq 2 1/2 years ago, and that was: Ask for what you need; we will figure it out.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.

Senator McCaskill.

Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

We are now aware that about $38 billion of taxpayer money has been spent on what was proposed to be a reconstruction effort in Iraq. I think it would be kind to say that most analyses of those expenditures would indicate that all or most of it appears to not have been effectively used, since if you look at the measures of electricity produced and oil and the stocks of gasoline, are at all-time low levels.

Since you were there, General Casey, I am frustrated by what I have learned from the IG’s report in terms of contracting processes at DOD. I am even more frustrated at the idea that we have spent $38 billion while the Iraqis are sitting with surpluses that they “are unable to spend appropriately.”

Can you give us a ground view of how we could have made this large a mistake in terms of the moneys that have been spent and
ended up with the kind of failure we have had in terms of meaningful reconstruction?

General CASEY. I have not seen the report that you are mentioning here, Senator. The reconstruction effort has, no question, been challenging and we worked very hard with the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office, the ambassador, and our engineers to ensure that the money that was allocated for the reconstruction of Iraq was appropriately spent. That, as you suggest, has not always been the case.

The other issue that you mentioned is a challenge, and that is the Iraqis' ability to spend their own money. It is a combination of poor or nonexistent contracting procedures and fear of corruption. The result has been that we have to do some fairly significant work with them, particularly on the security side, to get them, to help them, spend their money. The work that Lieutenant General Robert Dempsey has done getting a foreign military sales program going for them allows us to spend their money and it lessens some of the burden on that.

When I got there there were less than 250 of the Iraq Reconstruction Fund projects started. We have now started over 3,000 of the 3,400 projects as part of that. But I think probably about 75 percent of those things are done and the rest of them will be done here over time.

It is a tough environment both in terms of contracting and in terms of getting the appropriate materials for the projects to be done and then to secure the sites.

Senator MCCASKILL. Perhaps we are just getting all the bad news and we are not getting any of the good news on reconstruction. But I think it would be important for this committee to know your view of what successes there have been. I am frustrated that the person who is supposed to help Iraq spend their $10 billion they have made supposedly a commitment to spend under this new strategy, that that person was selected the day before the plan was announced by the State Department.

It is a little unfair for me to be questioning you in this regard because I think the military has done an incredible job. But I keep hearing that it is the economic infrastructure and the political infrastructure that is going to make the difference in terms of long-term success in this country, and it appears to me that we are so focused on what we are doing militarily that we are—and I hate to be flippant, but from what I have read I am not sure we are the right people to advise the Iraqis on how to spend their money, if we spent $38 billion and we cannot point to any success in terms of improvement of the infrastructure.

I would like your input on that as you take your new position because we know there is going to be more money asked of the American people in this regard, and I think we need to be able to explain to them how that many billions of dollars could have been spent with some real horror stories, and how we can possibly chase that money with more money until we have more assurances that there is going to be meaningful progress made. I would really appreciate your input on that as you take this position.

General CASEY. Thank you, Senator. Your point that the progress on the economic and political fronts must accompany military and
security progress is exactly right. They all must go forward together, as you point out.

Senator McCaskill. The other area I wanted to ask you about briefly before my time expires is about recruitment. We have another incident that has occurred in St. Louis that I believe will be made public in the coming weeks, about inappropriate things being said by recruitment officers to potential recruits about the potential danger and other things. I know there has been some national stories in this regard.

Could you address the pressures that the Army feels about recruitment and what you think you can do to make sure that there are not any abuses occurring in the recruitment process?

General Casey. I am not aware of the specific incident that you are talking about. My sense is we are doing fairly well in all three components in recruiting. Everyone met their December objectives. The Army and the National Guard are ahead for the fiscal year in terms of recruiting and the Reserves are about 90 percent of where they need to be for the year.

Recruiting is always a tough challenge and there are always pressures there. You raise a good point. I am sure that the Army has quality control measures to ensure that those pressures do not cause people to overstep their bounds, as you suggest has happened in St. Louis.

Senator McCaskill. I think you are going to see this around the country, unfortunately, or fortunately, depending on your perspective, that these news outlets are going to be sending hidden cameras in to record recruitment conversations, and when there are things said that are inappropriate, I think they are going to become very high profile.

I support the President’s call for a larger active military and I understand that is going to mean there is a great deal of recruitment pressure, hopefully, as far as the eye can see. I think what we face those pressures to increase the size of our military. I think it is really important that you get a handle on what is being said person to person in these recruitment appointments and make sure that there are not any young men or women that are being misled.

Thank you very much.

General Casey. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.

Senator Graham.

Senator Graham. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General, my compliments to you and your family for a very long career of distinguished service. But this is about a war that cannot be lost, and it is almost like I am hearing two different wars being described here. When you hear General Petraeus testify and Admiral Fallon, there is a general belief—let me just put it this way. General Petraeus said: “Senator Graham, this is not double down; this is all in.” Do you agree with that?

General Casey. It is not double down, it is all in?

Senator Graham. All in. This new policy is all in. This is our last best chance to get this right.

General Casey. I agree with that. As I described in my opening testimony, the Iraqis are in a position to assume responsibility for
their security by the end of the year if we can get the sectarian situation in the capital under control.

Senator GRAHAM. The point I am trying to make has nothing to do with the Iraqis. To all of my colleagues who believe we cannot lose in Iraq, this is our last chance. The public is going to break against us big time.

The Army is broken. You have asked for more troops to clean out Fallujah and Fallujah got reoccupied. There has never been a willingness on your part during your time as commander in Iraq to accept the idea that maybe General Eric Shinseki was right. Was General Shinseki right?

General CASEY. My boss, General Abizaid, has said he agrees with that, and he was there on the ground——

Senator GRAHAM. For 2 1/2 years everybody that has come before us has fought the idea that General Shinseki was right. Everybody that has come before in the last 2 1/2 years, including General Abizaid, says the Army is doing fine, and December 14, 2006, General Schoomaker went to the House and said the Army is broken.

This is the last best chance and the question is, the last hand to be played, should you play it? Have you been fighting for the last 2 1/2 years a counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq?

General CASEY. We have, Senator. In fact, in August 2004 when we first came in, Ambassador John Negroponte and I——

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General CASEY. We have, Senator. In fact, in August 2004 when we first came in, Ambassador John Negroponte and I——

Senator GRAHAM. Have you had the troop levels consistent with a counterinsurgency program as described by General Petraeus for the last 2 1/2 years?

General CASEY. We have. It varies with the security situation around the country, and we have had the ratios that we needed when we needed them. Fallujah is a good example. I guess I question your——

Senator GRAHAM. Could I go to Fallujah tomorrow? Could I go downtown to Fallujah tomorrow as a Senator?

General CASEY. You could.

Senator GRAHAM. I asked to go and they would not let me.

General CASEY. I actually took Senator Robb down there. If you had asked me I would have——

Senator GRAHAM. I asked to go to Ramadi and they would not let me.

General CASEY. Ramadi is a little tougher, Senator.

Senator GRAHAM. The point I am trying to make is it is clear to me that we have never had the force levels to be claiming we have been fighting a counterinsurgency.

What percentage of the population is contained in the four provinces that are out of control in Iraq?

General CASEY. I would not characterize the provinces as out of control in Iraq. Baghdad and Anbar are very difficult. Diyalah and Sal-a-Din are not out of control.

Senator GRAHAM. What percentage of the country would it be impossible for an American to walk down the street without being afraid of getting shot at or killed?

General CASEY. Probably, about half actually, Senator.

Senator GRAHAM. Well, here we are 2 1/2 years later. Half the country, no American can walk down the street. We are talking about sending 21,500 more as our last best chance. I asked why
21,500. I have been told that is all we have, that if we wanted to send 50,000 we could not get them. Is that true?

General CASEY. I do not know that to be true, Senator. I have not heard that.

Senator GRAHAM. That is something we need to know from the Chief of Staff of the Army. I believe that is all we have. The reason we are not sending 31,500 is we just cannot get them.

I share Senator Warner’s view, I do not know if this is going to work or not. But I know now we are in a mess and this is the last best chance. The question I have is, the advice you have given—I mean, you are saying we need more troops because the Iraqis have changed their plan. I have never been told by an Iraqi prime ministerial official that they want 21,500 more troops. Have you?

General CASEY. No, I have not, Senator.

Senator GRAHAM. No further questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham.

Senator Bill Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator Graham, no one would say that General Shinseki was right because Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was not going to let them say that. You and I come to the same conclusion, that there is nothing magic about the 21,000, it ought to be a lot more. I suspect what you have just said is correct, that we do not have the ability to produce a lot more.

But the question for me is will this 21,000, 17,000 of which will go into Baghdad, will it do any good? I personally believe that the troops going into Anbar will do some good, and I was convinced by the Marine generals there that was the case.

But it is a sad commentary, and I did not plan to say this, but you certainly laid the groundwork, that when we have a career 35-year general as the head of the Army and he gives an honest and straightforward answer to Senator Levin in front of this committee, to occupy how many troops and how long do you need, he said “Several hundred thousand for several years.” Of course, I think what is concerning Senator Graham is the fact over the last several years that nobody in the uniformed military would challenge the Secretary of Defense.

General, you have my admiration for your career and as I look at your little family back there they have sacrificed, and yet it is an honor also for them in this public service that people give in the service to their country.

I wanted to ask, since so much of the success of this plan is predicated on the fact that the Iraqi army is going to be reliable, I have asked and other Senators have asked all of the witnesses that have come here—Secretary Gates, General Petraeus, Admiral Fallon—is the Iraqi army reliable and how much? No one has given a straight answer and, as you and I talked in my office, I indicated that I was going to ask you that question.

Would you share for us what you think about the reliability?

General CASEY. As I said yesterday, Senator, it is a mixed bag and there are good units that are fairly reliable and there are other units that are less reliable. About a couple of months ago I directed that we add a reliability index to the normal monthly readiness report. For some time now we have been doing a readiness report with the Iraqis on their units—the people, equipment, training,
those standard things. What we were not getting was your point. We were not getting at the reliability.

What we were finding is you could have all your people, you can have all your weapons, your vehicles can all work, but if we cannot depend on you it is a different problem. I have yet to get my first report back on that, Senator. But I think your point is exactly right.

Senator BILL NELSON. Let me run this by you then. I have checked and I have it in writing that what I am about to state is unclassified. A senior officer on the Joint Staff with significant military experience has testified to the Senate that, of the 325,000 Iraqi army and police, that about 130,000 are actually army trained and equipped, and of that 130,000 half of them approximately are geographically located and half of them, or about 65,000, are nationally recruited and more reliable; and that of that 65,000, they are expecting, of the Iraqi army, 30,000 to be in Baghdad.

That same senior officer, when I asked the question how many are reliable, gave an astoundingly high percentage of 80 percent of that 30,000 in Baghdad.

Your comments?

General CASEY. 80 percent in Baghdad reliable of those forces, that does not strike me as an unrealistically high number. Knowing the units that we have in Baghdad on the army side, that is probably about right.

Just on the point on geographically located units versus nationally recruited, what we have, I think people know, that 5 of the 10 Iraqi divisions are the former National Guard units that were recruited locally, and they are fairly reliable in their local areas. But what we have found, when we wanted to move them someplace else we have had challenges with them. The Iraqis have put in a deployability scheme where they work their way through this, and we have actually seen that that has made a difference.

The other ones, the nationally recruited ones, as you say or as you suggest, they are more mobile, but I guess what I am going to say is it is not a reliability issue just because the one happens to be geographic and one happens not to be.

Senator BILL NELSON. You can understand the concern that we have when we ask over and over on a plan that is predicated on the reliability of the Iraqi forces, putting more of our men and women in Baghdad in a combat situation, where in the doctrine of clear, hold, and build that you are going to clear with the Iraqi forces and it is going to be more Iraqi forces than American forces that will go in and clear an area. So naturally we as the Senate Armed Services Committee need to know what is the professional military’s judgment of what is the reliability of those forces that are going in.

Yet we cannot get anybody to give us a consistent or even an answer. Would you please do that when you have taken over the reins as Chief of Staff?

General CASEY. I will actually do it before that. I will give you some feedback from the reliability assessment that I have asked for from my units.
Senator Bill Nelson. Twenty percent unreliable, if those statements by this senior officer are correct. Then report back to us, why is it that they are unreliable? Do they not show up? Are they criminals? Have they been infiltrated by the militia? Of course, that is a high number and would certainly undermine the mission of the Iraqi army in Baghdad.

General Casey. I would not get fixed on 80 percent. I do not know where he got that number. I said it did not strike me as artificially high. The reasons you mentioned why people would be unreliable are exactly right, and if you add poor leadership to that you would have about the four or five things that make these units unreliable.

The fact of the matter is, and one of the reasons we are partnering these coalition units with the Iraqi units, is they fight better when they are with us. We have demonstrated that time and time again. So we put a little steel in their spine when they are standing next to an American soldier or an American marine.

Senator Bill Nelson. General, over and over this committee we have been told by the Secretary of Defense that he had hundreds of thousands that were trained and equipped Iraqi army that were reliable. That was incorrect information, and that leads us to this point. What we want is the truth and we will look forward to receiving that from you.

[The information referred to follows:]

The information requested was provided by General Casey on February 16, 2007, in the attached letter.
General CASEY. Thank you.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Dole.
Senator DOLE. General Casey, let me also thank you and your family for your outstanding service to our country, and I look forward to our continued work together in the future.

The Congressional Budget Office in its most recent long-term assessment of the DOD budget estimates that the shortfall between anticipated funding levels and what is required is a minimum of an additional $52 billion per year across the Future Years Defense Program and well out into the future. My understanding of the fiscal year 2008 budget request at this point is that the top-line figure keeps pace with inflation, but there is no real growth.

Given the cost of the war, the cost of reset, the cost of increasing active duty end strength, the cost of developing and procuring FCSs, it is apparent that there is an appreciable risk, measure of risk, in the budget. What areas of the Army budget give you the greatest reason for concern as we look out over the next few years?

General CASEY. I will rapidly expend my knowledge on this, so I will give you just a couple of thoughts, Senator. I think my greatest concern is our ability to equip, provide the soldiers that are deploying with the best equipment in time for their training, so that they can be successful in whatever combat mission they are going on.
I think the second main concern I have is the reset, the recapitalization of the force as it comes back out of Iraq. We need to ensure that we have an appropriate level of funding so that we can fix what we have that is broken.

Then, as Senator Inhofe was talking about earlier, we cannot take our eye off modernization and the FCSs. So I will balance the challenges of near-term readiness with long-term modernization over time. But those are the three things I think that come to mind.

I will add one more and that is having enough money to ensure that we provide the soldiers and families of the Army who are going through this very difficult and stressful period with a quality of life befitting them.

Senator Dole. I am a strong proponent of increasing the Active Duty Army’s end strength. This increase is necessary to have the forces to respond to major regional threats, to meet critical homeland security, defense, and peacekeeping needs, and to accommodate the increasing number of long-term deployments connected with the war on terror.

Every brigade in the North Carolina-based 82nd Airborne Division has deployed three times since the fall of 2001. In short, today’s high operational tempo is driving home the point that end strength is too low. The next Army Chief of Staff will confront difficult budgetary pressures. Give me your assurance that you will not jettison the proposal to increase Army end strength in pursuit of funds to pay for other pressing needs.

General Casey. I will certainly work to sustain the new end strength addition here. I guess never say never, Senator, but I agree with you that we need to increase that end strength and we need to build the forces that will come from that end strength for exactly the reasons that you suggest.

Senator Dole. North Carolina is home to the Joint Special Operations Command, the Army Special Operations Command, and the new Marine Special Operations Command. I as much as anyone want our special forces to grow, but we need to grow the forces in a manner that does not sacrifice quality in pursuit of quantity. Would you share with us your thoughts regarding the expansion of the special operations community over the next several years and particularly the pace of that expansion?

General Casey. I could not comment on the specifics of the plan, Senator. But I can tell you that working with the special forces in the past 2½ years in Iraq and watching the value that they bring to these types of counterinsurgency missions that we will be facing here in the 21st century, I am a big proponent of special forces myself.

We have been working on this for a while and, again as you suggest, increasing the size of these forces without impacting their quality and the experience that they have is critical. But I could not tell you now what the specifics of the Army’s plan are for growing the special forces.

Senator Dole. Let me ask one other question. The United States has enormous resources and expertise in a number of non-DOD departments and agencies that could be better utilized to help us achieve our national security objectives in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
elsewhere. It is fair to say that today most, if not all, national security objectives pursued by the United States are fundamentally interagency in nature. Do you believe it is time for Congress to consider Goldwater-Nichols II type legislation to improve interagency coordination?

General Casey. I think it is something that ought to be looked at. You are exactly right. I have watched this now in Bosnia, I have watched it in Kosovo, and I have watched it in Iraq, and it really is an area where we keep relearning the same lessons again. I think some type of program that would leverage the skills from across all of the interagency in a sustained way I think would be very helpful to us all.

Every time we have done it we have said we will never do this again and so we forget the lessons, and then we do it again. I think your notion is exactly right.

Senator Dole. Thank you, General Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Reed [presiding]. General Casey, Senator Levin has indicated I am the next in order.

First, let me thank you for your devoted service to the Army and the Nation and that of your family. We appreciate it and respect it. You are someone who has inspired a lot of soldiers with your dedication and I thank you for that.

You assumed command in Iraq in 2005, is that correct?


Senator Reed. 2004, excuse me. At that time, I think you could properly say that you were assigned to manage some of the consequences of failure: insufficient forces—many of my colleagues have spoken about that—despite General Shinseki’s prescient comments to this committee; a de-Baathification policy that alienated the Sunnis; an Abu Ghraib incident which further endangered our status in that region and in that country; emerging sectarian violence, which was already evident when you took command.

I think the record should show that as you assumed this command there were significant and serious failures already with our approach and endeavor in Iraq. The policy and the strategy that I understood that you were pursuing based upon the President’s comments was described as clear, hold, and build; is that an accurate description?

General Casey. It is, Senator.

Senator Reed. Let us try to take that apart. Clearing was done on numerous occasions by American forces, operating sometimes with Iraq security forces. But there has been criticism lately that the Iraqi security forces were incapable of holding terrain and we had insufficient forces to do that. Is that a valid criticism of the strategy?

General Casey. Not necessarily. In Baghdad it is probably a valid criticism. The August Baghdad plan where we went in and cleared focus areas, as we called them, specific areas of Baghdad where the sectarian strife was the greatest, we went in and cleared those, established basically a perimeter around them, and then gradually backed ourselves out as the Iraqi security forces were more able to take charge.
By and large, they did not prove capable of holding onto those areas without continued support from us.

Senator Reed. Did you inform the Secretary of Defense and the President that aspect of the strategy was not working at that time?

General Casey. I told them that the holding on the focus areas was not working. In fact, now that you are asking me about it, I recall specifically saying that we were having challenges with the reliability of the Iraqi security forces in the focus areas. So yes, I did.

Senator Reed. Did they direct in any way or did you request an increase in forces, American forces? How were you preparing to compensate for this noted deficiency?

General Casey. As we looked at the sectarian violence over time, we asked for more forces in the June time period as we saw a spike in the sectarian violence, and that is when the Stryker Brigade was extended and we basically put two more brigades into Baghdad.

What we did not get when we put those forces in was the political commitment from the Iraqis to target anyone who is breaking the law, not to have any safe havens, not to have political influence on the security forces, the commitments that Maliki has since made and is delivering on. That was the difference, and I was reluctant throughout the fall to ask for additional forces when I knew I did not have the political commitment of the Iraqis to let us do our jobs.

Senator Reed. What you seem to be saying, General, is that in terms of the decisive factor it is not the size of our forces there, but the political commitment of the Iraqi government, and that with adequate political commitment our forces are either adequate or do not require significant increase; is that fair?

General Casey. I think that is a fair statement. In counter-insurgency operations, the political and the military have to go forward together.

Senator Reed. Let me take on the third leg of this strategy, build. I would note, as you probably might be aware, that yesterday the SIGIR essentially examined the Iraqi government and said all the ministries are dysfunctional, with some exceptions. You are responsible for two of these ministries, interior and defense. My experience is that they are probably more capable than the others.

But the other responsibilities are borne by the Department of State. Have you communicated at all to the President the inability of other government agencies to complement this policy?

General Casey. We talk about that regularly. I think one of the things that has caused us problems is the fact that the government has changed three times in 2 years, and so we are on our third set of ministers right now and third set of ministries. So the growth of the ministries has not been straight line. As a matter of fact, it has been sporadic.

Senator Reed. What I find puzzling is that if the strategy is clear, hold, and build and it has been evident, not only yesterday but ever since we have been there, that the Iraqi government is dysfunctional, our complementary agencies—Agency for International Development, Departments of State, Justice, Agriculture, and Treasury—have not provided the resources necessary, why did this not—and you communicated it to the President—why did this
not cause a reevaluation of our strategy by the President and the Secretary of Defense?

General CASEY. I think what you are seeing in the President's——

Senator REED. We are seeing it after an election. We are not seeing it a year ago or 2 years ago, when in fact on the ground this was evident.

General CASEY. One of the other things I have seen with the three governments is it takes everybody about 6 months to get their legs under them and start governing. These folks are not experienced ministers. They have not served in government before. So it takes them a while to understand and develop their governing skills.

Maliki's government did not take over until about May 20 and he did not get his defense ministers until early June. Now we are talking maybe 8 months that he has been in charge. They make, what I have seen, in most of the ministries gradual progress. There are others that are just so corrupt they are not going to make any progress.

Senator REED. My time has expired, but I understand, and I think you feel the same way, is—and we say it repeatedly, but the question is do we mean it—that a military strategy alone without a functional Iraqi government and without the support of non-DOD agencies cannot effectively prevail in Iraq. Is that accurate?

General CASEY. That is accurate.

Senator REED. I have not seen a lot of commitment outside of DOD to succeeding in Iraq. This government is still dysfunctional and, as you point out, some of these problems are beyond the next 6 months or a year because it is corruption, it is political advantage, it is the existential struggle between Shia and Sunnis, that are not resolved by a consultant from McKinsey.

I just wonder again—I do not wonder now, after this dialogue—but that clear, hold, and build never was a strategy that was working because we were not building, and this strategy of a surge I think is probably compromised by the same factors.

General CASEY. The clear, hold, and build has worked for us locally, in Fallujah for example. The build phase takes a long time because of the inefficiencies within the different ministries, but it has worked for us locally.

Senator REED. My time is up. One point if I may. I have traveled out, as you have, to Fallujah a number of times, and the times I have been there there has been one State Department officer out there trying to make this happen, a 36, 37-year-old, brave, courageous State Department official.

General CASEY. Dale Weston.

Senator REED. Dale.

General CASEY. He is a fine young man, yes.

Senator REED. He has needed help for 2 or 3 years and it has not arrived.

Thank you.

General CASEY. There is actually a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) out in Anbar that is part of that effort.

Chairman LEVIN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Reed.

Senator Thune.
Senator THUNE. General, let me echo what has been said repeatedly here and express my appreciation for your service to your country under extraordinarily difficult circumstances, and also to your family. I recall running into your wife at a function almost 2 years ago and at that time she was anxiously awaiting your arrival back here, and then it was extended. So I know there is a tremendous sacrifice on the part of your family as well, and we appreciate what your commitment and dedication to this country and its national security entails for your family as well.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Thune, I hate to interrupt you. The roll call vote has begun. I think you will have time to finish your questions.

Senator THUNE. Right.

Chairman LEVIN. Are you going to be able to stay? If you could turn this then over to Senator Bayh after your time is up, and then I will be back by the time you are done. Thank you and sorry for the interruption.

Senator THUNE. Thank you.

I agree with some of what my colleague from Rhode Island just said. I think a critical component in the clear, hold, and build strategy is the build part of it, and my impression is, having visited Iraq several times, that is a component that has been very deficient in terms of our strategy. I believe the same thing has been true to some degree in Afghanistan, having visited there.

I have been over to Iraq several times. I have visited with you there in theater, as well as when you have been in front of this committee. One of the things that we often hear in front of this committee is about the Sunni and Shia extremists. I mentioned this to you in a private meeting, that it seems to me at least that a lot of times people forget when we talk about the duration of this fight how things have changed and how we have had to adapt to the changes on the ground.

There was a lot of talk a little over a year ago about being able to transition out and start pulling our troops out, and then the Samarra mosque was bombed in February 2006 and everything changed. The paradigm changed entirely and the sectarian piece of this puzzle began to really rage and has ever since.

I think oftentimes we forget that we would like to see progress. I think we were seeing some progress up to that point. But the scenario has changed entirely.

There has been a lot of focus on Sunni and Shia extremists. Based on your last 2½ years in Iraq, is there a growing concern among the moderate population of Baghdad and Iraq, both Sunni and Shia, that time is not on their side and that it is in their best interest to secure the future before it descends further? Do you see a sense of urgency among the moderate elements in the country?

General CASEY. Senator, there is no question that the moderate elements would like to see the country move forward. But what we are seeing is—and Baghdad is a great example of this—you have the extremists on both sides attacking each other's populations, and that creates fear and intimidation among the moderates, that makes them unwilling to compromise until they see that they have some chance of surviving this.
That is why it is so important now to bring security, to help the Iraqis bring security to Baghdad, so that we can get on with the rest of the progress.

Senator Thune. You have probably spent more time with the prime minister than anybody else in the military, or DOD for that matter. What is your assessment of his reliability and do you believe that, despite these sectarian differences, he has the commitment level now to see this through?

My impression at least in the last visit over there is that they are getting it, they understand that the clock is working against them, that public support in the States, that our willingness to continue to provide military support to their effort is on the wane. What is your sense about his level of commitment?

General Casey. I think the prime minister is committed to bringing stability to Baghdad and to the rest of the country. As we agreed on the Baghdad security plan and agreed on the Iraqi commander for that, there was no question in my mind that he did not understand that this was the last best chance to succeed.

So I put him in the very-committed-to-this column. As I mentioned earlier, he made a range of commitments in several speeches and he is delivering so far on those commitments.

Senator Thune. So much of what this strategy, its success, depends upon his commitment as well as the commitment of the military there. It seems to me at least that they are stepping up. So far what we are seeing, I am encouraged by that, as you are as well. But the real focus, of course, is security in Baghdad and the willingness of the Iraqi military and the Iraqi political leadership to take on these militias and do what needs to be done to bring that kind of security.

Do you think—and I know this question has been batted around a lot here this morning and for the past several weeks—that with the force, the additional troop strength that we are bringing into Baghdad, that we can get this done? The question is could you use 30,000 or 50,000? I know you have had a lot of input in the formulation of this current plan.

I guess I just want to hear you say that, your assessment of whether we can get it done with this number.

General Casey. I believe we can, Senator. I believe that the commitment, the political commitment of the Iraqi government to the success of this plan, is probably more important right now than the additional troops. But I believe that with the troops that are in the pipeline this plan can work.

Senator Thune. I am out of time Mr. Chairman, I have a question which I will submit for the record, and I know that Senator Bayh probably wants to get in here before the vote.

I appreciate your answers. Our hopes and prayers are with our troops and our efforts, and with your leadership. The other challenge that we face is the Army transitions, both in doctrine and equipment, from a Cold War posture to a more lethal and agile force, which this current conflict has certainly shown a light on the need for. I will submit those for the record and I thank you again for your service.

I yield back my time.

General Casey. Thank you, Senator.
Senator BAYH [presiding]. General, thank you for being here today. I am going to have to run to make this vote. I just have three quick questions. I will just move through them very rapidly.

I think what you have heard here today is everyone expressed their admiration for you as an individual and for your family and for your family’s service. The problem that we face, the dilemma in some of our minds, is that the policy in Iraq has gone terribly wrong and there needs to be some accountability for that, and who is responsible. That is the question that many are asking. Are you responsible or are others responsible for some of the mistakes that have been made?

So my first question to you is, were you given everything by the civilian leadership that you requested to make this policy that you devised a success?

General CASEY. I was, Senator. All of the requests that I talked about earlier in my opening statement were filled by the Department. I would just like to say, you are exactly right. I am responsible for the military aspects of this campaign and to the extent that people have problems with the way that has been conducted I am the one who is responsible.

Senator BAYH. Were you in a position of actually authoring the policy or implementing a policy derived in large part by others, specifically the Secretary of Defense?

General CASEY. We shaped the policy in Iraq and worked it up and presented it to the chain of command. The Secretary of Defense and the President discussed it and it was then given back to us.

Senator BAYH. Was it altered in material part by the civilian leadership or did they adopt your policy pretty much as you presented it to them?

General CASEY. I would not say it was adopted pretty much as presented, but it was hard questions asked, adjustments made. I would not say it was rubber stamped, if that is where you are going.

Senator BAYH. Well, but they did not put constraints upon your policy that prevented you from doing what you thought needed to be done? It was your policy?

General CASEY. It was in fact my strategy.

Senator BAYH. Your strategy.

General CASEY. My strategy, better word.

As I said to Senator Warner earlier, if I disagreed with that I would have done something completely different.

Senator BAYH. I think Senator Warner asked questions about that.

Here is part of the dilemma that we face as well, General. Many have felt that the civilian leadership has made some tragic errors in judgment. Under our system we cannot replace some of those civilians, particularly the Vice President and the President of the United States. So we have to ensure that those under the civilian leadership are competent, wise, and are willing to differ with the civilian leadership when that is in the best interests of the United States.

So my final question to you, and then just one brief comment before I have to go, is can you give us an example of where you dif-
ferred with the civilian leadership and were willing to speak out and say, look, this just is not right, you need to take a different course here? I know in the military chain of command it is a difficult thing because you have obligations to follow orders and that kind of thing. But I guess what I am looking for here is some sense of independence, of your willingness to speak your own mind and not just take direction from on high, given the fact that many of us have concluded that the civilian leadership has not pursued a very wise course here.

General CASEY. An example of, as you said, differing with civilian leadership was on the PRTs. General Abizaid and I felt very strongly that these things were necessary if we were going to build the capacity at the provincial level so that the provinces could succeed. Others in the Department disagreed with that and did not want to go forward with that. But General Abizaid and I continued to work through the Department and with the ambassador and the Department of State and we ultimately prevailed and gained the PRTs.

I will say I was heard, Senator. I do not feel like I was constrained in any way from expressing my opinion, and I did. The strategy that I articulated here today is my strategy and I believe in it. It may not have produced the results on the timelines that people expected or wanted, but I do believe that it has laid the foundation for our ultimate success in Iraq. But it was mine.

Senator BAYH. I appreciate your candor in that regard. It is not uncommon around this town that people try and deny responsibility or shift responsibility, so I appreciate your willingness to accept responsibility.

My final comment has to do with something that Senator Clinton mentioned, and it is not a question so much as it is just an observation. One of the most shameless things that has happened in the course of this undertaking was that incident in—I cannot remember whether it was Kuwait or Baghdad; maybe it was Kuwait—involving the hillbilly armor, where the soldiers had to stand up and say, look, we have to find scrap metal to weld onto the side of our vehicles. So some of these reports that she alluded to and some others were, it looks like there may be a shortage of uparmored Humvees and other things.

We just cannot allow this to happen again. I personally, since I have taken an interest in the Humvees, have asked the Pentagon over and over again, do we have enough, are we doing enough. Frankly, they were just dropping the ball on this. Now, it is understandable, although lamentable, maybe once. But it is not acceptable when it happens over and over and over again. So I really encourage you to get to the bottom of this.

Then there is just one last observation. There is a report that says, "Adding to the crunch, the U.S. Government has agreed to sell 600 uparmored Humvees to Iraq this year for its security forces. Such sales 'better not be at the expense of the American soldier or marine,' Speakes"—you know who I am referring to—"‘told defense reporters recently.’"

Look, if there is a shortage our guys have to come first, right?
General CASEY. They do. They do. But the flip side of that coin is the Iraqi security forces are out there on the street fighting themselves.

Senator BAYH. You have to be candid and aggressive in telling us what you need. Frankly, the Pentagon, for reasons that just mystify me, was saying they had enough when it was pretty clear they did not have enough. So let us know what is really necessary and we will provide it.

General CASEY. Thank you, Senator. I will.

Senator BAYH. Thank you, General.

Senator WARNER [presiding]. Senator, you have about a minute to make the vote. I am going to miss it because I think staying here is more important than the vote.

I listened carefully over the last few days about comments made by a number of colleagues with respect to the very serious questions that are facing us today. On a weekend talk show a colleague said the following: “I say this is the last chance for the Iraqis to step up and do their part.” This morning a colleague said this is the “last best chance.”

In the resolution that I put before the Senate I drew on the President’s comments. This is paraphrasing what I believed he said and something I firmly believe and support the President in this conclusion. The resolution says “The Senate believes a failed state in Iraq would present a threat to regional and world peace and the long-term security interests of the United States are best served by an Iraq that can sustain, govern, and defend itself and serve as an ally in the war against extremism.”

I said clearly in here I support the President. I find those statements clash. I am hopeful that General Petraeus can carry forward with the plan. I think the plan could be modified to employ fewer than 21,500 troops and place greater emphasis on the Iraqis carrying the burden of elevating the security, improving it in Baghdad, that security being the consequence of ever-increasing sectarian violence. I have already made that speech.

If that plan for some reason does not measure up to the goals of success, I have to believe that prudent military commanders such as yourself have a follow-on situation to support the President’s goal as I enunciated. Can you advise the committee as to the state of that planning and to the extent you can such elements of such a plan that you can share without violating any classification?

General CASEY. The contingency planning that is going on now is for the employment of the last three brigades, and so the planners are actively looking at what happens if we do not get security in this district of Baghdad and so they are working through that right now.

Senator WARNER. Can you speak up a little louder?

General CASEY. They are working through those things right now at the tactical level.

What I said earlier was that the political commitment of the Iraqis is more important here than the additional troops. So that has to come and it has to be sustained. So one of the things that I will be working with the ambassador on and I know he is already working on is to not only sustain the level of political commitment we have, but to move forward with reconciliation efforts so that we
gradually bring the different ethnic and sectarian groups together and get on with building a representative government that respects all of their rights.

Senator WARNER. But do you agree with the President with regard to we have to have a measure of success, we cannot let this government fail?

General CASEY. I do. We definitely need to support this government.

Senator WARNER. Fine.

General CASEY. They have to bring something to the table as well, and they are doing that.

Senator WARNER. I understand the contingencies. I fully appreciate the importance of the Iraqi government living up to its commitments in benchmarks and in other ways. I do not question that. I draw on Senator Reed's point, and I brought this up in earlier hearings of this committee this past week. A chain is no stronger than its weakest link and you have three, I think really four—it is the political commitments of the Iraqi government to be fulfilled; it is the other departments and agencies of our Government that have to fulfill; it is the military plan; and it is the diplomatic plan. So it is all four links and really the failure of one could bring down the total. Would that not be correct?

General CASEY. I agree with that, Senator. All four of those things need to go forward together.

Senator WARNER. Then I come back. You can assure the committee that there is some fallback if this Baghdad surge concept in nine areas does not meet whatever goals that you as the commander have set, and that this would not be the last chance, this campaign in Baghdad?

General CASEY. I think that is a fair way to put it. I do not think it is the absolute last chance, but it certainly is the best chance right now that we have.

Senator WARNER. Then you and I are in concurrence that we cannot portray to our brave forces that have made these enormous sacrifices that in any way our will is going to waver to carry forward as best we can to achieve that measure of success that the President has set forth here.

I come to another issue that has caused this Senator great concern. It has been my privilege to have had some long association with the U.S. military. My own career in uniform is very modest and of little consequence, but I have had the benefit of learning through these years of my association with the military. I am concerned about this concept of the dual command structure for, let us call it, the Baghdad plan as announced by the President.

In his announcement he made reference to the Iraqis will have a commander, a senior commander, in each of the nine provinces, and presumably a commander above each of the nine Iraqi commanders; that the United States will likewise have a chain of command in each province. As I understand it you will have a battalion level force assigned with, working in support of, the Iraqi forces, which hopefully will be on the point, and they have their reporting chain of command.

My concern is when you have this duality, dual concept, that you come down to the company level and the Iraqi company commander
or platoon commander in all probability is saying that this mission we have before us, we have to maneuver to the left, the American platoon commander says, oh no, my calculations, we have to maneuver to the right. If whichever they follow does not succeed then you precipitate a finger-pointing right down at the tactical level between two commanders who exercised their best judgment.

Is that a potential that could occur under this plan and what assurances do we have that that will not happen?

General CASEY. Senator, if you put two military guys in a room they are going to disagree on tactics. So I do not think there is any question that, what you are describing could happen.

But let me take you back to the beginning on this thing. There is a parallel chain of command and, as you know better than anyone, U.S. forces operate under U.S. command and that will happen. Now, the command structure for the Iraqis is a significant improvement over what we have been working on with them in the past iterations of the Baghdad security plan. It finally gets unity of effort of the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police and the national police under a single commander.

The way they have set it up is there is a Baghdad commander, there are two commanders, one for each side of the river, and then there are nine district commanders. In that district, each district, will be an Iraqi brigadier. All of the Iraqi security forces, the local police, the national police, and army, will report to that one commander. That is a big difference.

It is not a natural thing, I think, for police and the military to work together. There has always been friction in that with the Iraqis. This is a great step forward. I have been working for some months here and I have told my subordinate commanders, I want to be able to put my finger on a map of Baghdad and I want you to be able to tell me who, what Iraqi, is responsible for security in that area. We can do that now and that is important.

Now, your concerns are correct ones. They come from the, okay, how do the Americans and the Iraqis work together. At each level from General Ray Odierno, the Baghdad commander, to General Fill with the two district commanders, to the brigade commander and the battalion commander in each of the districts, they are partnered at every level and they work very closely together. We still have our transition teams working with these Iraqis.

Senator WARNER. The embedded, the embedded.

General CASEY. I am sorry, the embedded.

Senator WARNER. Correct.

General CASEY. So they are linked and have close liaison at every level. I just talked to General Odierno this morning. He was out visiting with each of his commanders and they are comfortable with the arrangements that are being worked out.

Senator WARNER. Heretofore we have had a unified command of the American structure and you are assuring me that has not been changed?

General CASEY. No, it absolutely has not changed.

Senator WARNER. The American GI is accountable for the orders he gets from the American chain of command right up to your successor; is that correct?

General CASEY. That is correct, Senator.
Senator WARNER. Now, therefore that has been the way we have operated in Iraq and more or less we have devised the plan by which the joint operations to the extent we have had them with the Iraqi forces have been carried out.

General CASEY. That started to change in September as we gradually returned Iraqi forces from my operational control to Iraqi operational control. In September, you may recall we stood up the ground force command, that headquarters is now directing Iraqi operations.

Senator WARNER. In our meeting in my office here a day or so ago, I urged that you look at the testimony of General Keane, former Vice Chief of the United States Army, now retired, a very valued and knowledgeable individual. He had concern with this plan. Did you read that testimony?

General CASEY. I did.

Senator WARNER. You read the colloquy that I had with him?

General CASEY. Yes.

Senator WARNER. He concluded that he is going to urge General Petraeus once he takes over to get this thing straightened out. Now, can you translate for us what that means and what you hope to achieve, because I also asked General Keane, did he know of any precedent where our forces operating with others have had the type of command structure that this new strategy plan of the President as announced on the 10th envisions. He said he did not know of a precedent.

General CASEY. My sense is—and I probably need to talk to Jack, but my sense was from reading that is Jack did not have all the details of how this was going to actually be implemented. It is a non-standard arrangement.

Senator WARNER. You are breaking new ground.

General CASEY. We have been. Actually, we have been operating in smaller operations like this around Iraq for some time. As we are transitioning to Iraqi security force lead, there are non-standard arrangements as we go through the transition period, and that is really kind of what is happening now.

Senator WARNER. Is there not an element of risk now that is somewhat greater for our forces operating with the Iraqis? Unfortunately, we continue to get more factual evidence that the Iraqi forces, some components are not ready to do certain things. Yet we are going forward in reliance on their professional capability. I am just wondering, does this chain of command increase in any way the risk of the American GI participating in these operations?

General CASEY. I do not think so. As I said, General Odierno was out. He has visited all the brigade commanders in Baghdad and had the conversation with them, and he reported to me this morning that he is comfortable with this arrangement.

Now, is it as good as having everybody lined up and working for us? No. There will be more friction than that. But I do not think that it significantly increases the risk to our forces.

Senator WARNER. My time is up. Colleague, why do you not just take charge?

Senator CORNYN [presiding]. General Casey, thank you very much—
General CASEY. If we all leave before they come back, I will buy you both coffee. [Laughter.]

Senator CORNYN. I appreciate your patience, but more than that I appreciate your service to our country. As I told you in my office, as a military brat myself I understand the impact of the service by the uniformed member on families, and I appreciate your family being here with you today and the support they have given you in allowing you to perform so well in the service of your country.

I want to ask you about the Iraqis. One of the earliest signs we will see if the Iraqis are living up to their commitment is whether they are providing additional forces as promised. What has been the experience? Have they followed through on their promises or have they been lacking in follow-through?

General CASEY. They are in the process of following through on those promises. They are actually pretty close to being on schedule, pretty close to being on schedule with the deployment of the brigades to Baghdad. I think we are now, with two of the three brigade headquarters and four of the seven battalions have moved to Baghdad.

Now, they are coming in with the range of 55 to 65 percent strength because of people they left back. We are working with them to increase the strength of the forces that they have in Baghdad. But they are delivering so far on what they said they would do.

Chairman LEVIN [presiding]. Senator Cornyn, forgive the interruption, but I understand there is a second vote on now, if I am correct. Is that correct? I would ask you, when you are done would you recess, because we will come back into session. There are more questions to be asked.

Senator CORNYN. Certainly.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I believe you said earlier when it came to the prime minister’s commitment to take on lawbreakers without regard to ethnicity or religious affiliation that for the last 2 months at least you have seen a commitment by the Iraqi government to take on all lawbreakers and those who are exacting violence against the population. Did I hear that correctly?

General CASEY. You heard that correctly, Senator.

Senator CORNYN. I read with some interest an article in this morning’s Washington Post. It was excerpted from your written comments, but the headline of it said “General: Shiite Militia Leaders Leaving Baghdad Strongholds.” From what this article suggests—and I would like for you to confirm it or explain it—it is the threat even of our building our forces and not only clearing but actually holding areas that are currently occupied by militias and others seeking to generate chaos there, it is even the threat of force is causing the Shiite militias to actually leave some of these areas, and it is having an impact.

Could you explain how that is possible or what your understanding is?

General CASEY. This is a phenomenon that we saw in August as well. Just the announcement of the extension of the Stryker Brigade had a dampening effect on the levels of sectarian violence.
The same thing is happening again. Actually, it has been a combination of things this time. As we have announced the deployment of the additional troops, we have seen, as I said, in about 5 or 6 weeks a downward trend in ethnosectarian incidents.

The other thing that has been happening, though, is we have been putting strong military pressure on the death squads and the death squads' leadership, and we have in fact picked up five or six of their key leaders here in the last several weeks. So that has had a big impact on them.

The newspaper I think is reporting on reports from us that we are actually seeing some of these senior leaders move out of Sadr City and into safer places. That is good news, bad news. We will continue to target them wherever they might go within Iraq.

Senator CORNYN. The bad news portion would be if they would simply lay low somewhere else and then come back once perhaps the forces were not deployed there to hold the area and come back and do the same old thing again?

General CASEY. Right. That has been one of the challenges with the militia. They blend away. They do not stand and fight. They see us coming, they just blend into the background.

Senator CORNYN. General Casey, I do not want to embroil you in the political debates here in Congress and I promise you I will not do that. But I will ask your professional military judgment if in fact in this test of wills, as General Petraeus has called it, the enemy sees us lacking in will or believes we will not follow through on our commitments to not only clear areas in Baghdad but hold them, to allow the building to go forward, what sort of consequences, practical consequences, does that have to a commander on the ground?

General CASEY. If the enemy sees that we are not following through on our commitments?

Senator CORNYN. If the enemy believes that, notwithstanding our statements, that we ultimately, that Washington, that the political leadership, says we do not believe we can win, so we are not going to follow through, what kind of consequences does that have as a practical matter on the ground?

General CASEY. It certainly strengthens the enemy and with the particular enemy that we are dealing with, I think they would use it with their information campaigns as a recruiting tool. I have already seen it starting to come out, that the Americans are beaten, they are defeated, come to Iraq now if you want to be involved in beating the Americans.

Senator CORNYN. You have seen that, used that for their own propaganda pieces?

General CASEY. I have seen it in the al Qaeda propaganda.

Senator CORNYN. Some have suggested that we continue to fight the insurgency in al Anbar, but not send reinforcements to deal with the Shia militias in Baghdad. What would be your military assessment of the impact of such a plan?

General CASEY. As I have said throughout the course of the hearing today, Senator, we have to help the Iraqis secure Baghdad if the country is going to go forward and if they are going to credibly assume responsibility for their security this year. We have to lower the levels of sectarian violence in their capital. We have to help
them do that. So that is, in my view, a much higher priority than what is going on in Anbar.

Now, Anbar is important because al Qaeda is trying to establish a safe haven there from which they can export terror, and we have enough forces to keep the pressure on both in Baghdad and in Anbar.

Senator CORNYN. If we fail to send additional reinforcements to deal with the Shia militia and the ethnic violence, is it your military judgment that our chances of success would be markedly diminished?

General CASEY. Absolutely. In Baghdad it is not just Shia militia. It is both Sunni and Shia extremists, and we have to deal with both and we need the forces in both Baghdad and Anbar.

Senator CORNYN. Let me ask you just a last question, about the consequences of our leaving Iraq before the Iraqis are able to sustain, govern, and defend themselves. Some have suggested that regional conflict would almost surely ensue, with Iranian Shia taking advantage of the opportunity to support the Shia in Iraq to the detriment of the Sunnis, perhaps engage in even greater ethnic cleansing against the Sunnis, perhaps then precipitating an entry by the Saudis and other Sunni-majority countries to come in and protect the Sunnis.

That is one of the suggestions that I have heard. The other is that Iraq could well become another failed state and thus a platform for terrorist organizations like al Qaeda to train, recruit, and launch future terrorist attacks.

In your view are either one or both of those plausible outcomes if in fact we leave Iraq before it is able to sustain, govern, and defend itself?

General CASEY. I think both are entirely plausible.

Senator CORNYN. Thank you very much.

Senator COLLINS [presiding]. Thank you.

General Casey, first let me explain that I ran into Chairman Levin, who told me to go ahead and proceed with my questions. So for the next 10 minutes I get to be chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, a position I have always coveted. [Laughter.]

General CASEY. I will make you the same offer I made Senator Cornyn. If we both leave now before they come back, I will buy you coffee. [Laughter.]

Senator COLLINS. No such luck. [Laughter.]

Let me, however, start with my very sincere appreciation for your dedicated service to your country and to the United States Army.

I want to bring up three issues with you today. The first is the impact of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan on our National Guard and reservists. Just last week former Secretary of Defense William Perry testified before this committee that the agreement with our citizen-soldiers had been shattered. Similarly, the adjutant general of the Maine National Guard has expressed to me grave concern about the impact of the recent change in policy that says that National Guard forces may now be involuntarily mobilized more often than once every 5 years. He has stated that if the 24-month, total month policy changes and Maine National Guard troops are involuntarily called up for a second time or in a few cases a third time
in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, that the Maine National Guard will not be able to sustain its current force structure, and he is very worried about the impact on recruitment and retention.

General Casey, I have had two members of my own staff called up, so I know personally the impact this has on employers, on families, and on the citizen-soldiers themselves.

Are we not asking too much of our National Guard? That is my first question to you, and a related question: Are you concerned about the long-term impact on retention and recruitment of our National Guard members that this policy will have?

General CASEY. It is certainly something that warrants all of our attention, Senator. I would agree with you on that. The numbers on recruiting and retention for the Guard seem to be right now okay, but we certainly keep our eyes on the impacts of this change in policy.

As I mentioned in my opening testimony, one of the three things I would make a priority as the Chief of Staff of the Army is the Guard and Reserve. I know the Army is working on it, but as the Vice Chief we were working on building a system that would get the Guard units more predictability in what they were doing and to leverage the fact that almost half of them now are going to be combat veterans and they do not need to have 90 to 120 of post-mobilization training. We have to be smarter about how we treat them and how we use them so that when we do have to call them up, we have maximum time on mission and minimum time on preparation, so there is less time away from their families.

Lots to do here, and I very much agree with your base point that we need to watch the impact of this policy change here on recruiting and retention.

Senator COLLINS. Should we also be looking at improving the benefits for National Guard and reservists? For example, I am thinking of the educational benefits under the Montgomery GI Bill. Should we try to more thoroughly align the benefits for Guard members to make them more parallel with Active Duty, given the increased demands that we are making on them?

General CASEY. I definitely think that is something to be looked at, but I think you know the resource tradeoffs of those. But I think that is exactly right. Benefits as incentives to continued service in the Guard, I think that needs to be looked at.

Senator COLLINS. General, the second issue that I want to bring up to you is one that we discussed in my office yesterday. That is my tremendous concern about reports that we will be sending troops into Iraq without adequate protection and equipment. I want to follow up on the line of questioning that some of our members have already raised with you.

It actually was not a report by the Special Inspector General on current troops' equipment. It was the unclassified executive summary of an audit done by DOD's own IG. It is dated January 25 of this year, so it is a very new report. It is titled "Equipment Status of Deployed Forces Within U.S. Central Command."

The findings of this audit trouble me greatly. The IG performed the audit to determine whether units deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan were equipped in accordance with mission requirements. The
IG's office received responses from approximately 1,100 service-members, so this was a significant sample, and its report states that these individuals, “experienced shortages of force protection equipment such as up-armored vehicles, electronic countermeasure devices, crew-served weapons, and communications equipment.” As a result, servicemembers were not always equipped to effectively complete their missions.

This troubles me terribly. I think it is simply wrong for us to send troops into harm’s way without fully equipping them, without giving them uparmored vehicles. I understand why in the early days of the war this was a problem and many of us worked very hard to increase funding for up-armored Humvees, for example. But I do not understand why this is still a problem, according to the DOD IG, and I am extremely concerned that if it is a problem for some troops serving now that we are not prepared to fully equip the troops that will soon be on their way.

General CASEY. I agree with you, Senator. I have not seen the report, but I am concerned about what you just read to me. When I get back tomorrow I will take a hard look at that and find out what the heck is going on, because I have not heard in my visits to the units complaints about equipment shortages, in fact quite the contrary. So it needs some looking into.

Senator COLLINS. It does. You and I discussed the equipment for troops on their way to Iraq or who will soon be on their way to Iraq, and I was pleased for your assurances that this is a high priority for you and that you have already in fact issued a directive to ensure that the troops do not go if they are not equipped.

But here is a report from DOD's own IG that says that current troops do not have what they need. So I would ask you to look at this report and to report back to the committee on your findings, because this really is troubling. It is such an obligation.

General CASEY. I have a long airplane ride.

Senator COLLINS. So you have plenty of time to look into it.

[The information referred to follows:]

The information requested was provided by General Casey on February 16, 2007, in the attached letter.
Senator COLLINS. Finally, General, you have said many times that you do not want to send one more American soldier to Iraq than is necessary to perform the mission. You have also very candidly testified that when you looked at the Baghdad security plan you asked for two brigades and that is what you felt was adequate. You have also, however, said today that you support the President's plan for five brigades. Does that not violate your principle, based on your earlier assessment that only two brigades are needed, that you should not send one more American soldier to Iraq than is necessary?

General CASEY. Not really, because, as I said, in my mind the other three brigades should be called forward after an assessment has been made of the situation on the ground and whether or not there has been success in the mission in the Baghdad area. So it is one thing to say all five brigades are going into Baghdad. It is another to say you have two, we have a decision point here for the third; we will assess to see what is going on, if we need it we will bring it in, if not we will not. The same thing for the fourth, the same thing for the fifth.
So I think the way the force flow is arranged gives the new commander lots of flexibility to either use the forces based on his assessment of the need or not use the forces.

Senator COLLINS. I understand your deferring to the new commander, to General Petraeus’s view. But I need to ask you outright, if you were still in Iraq would you be happy with just two brigades?

General CASEY. I would still want a reserve that I could call forward if things did not work out the way we had hoped or to take advantage of an opportunity that presented itself.

Senator COLLINS. But you would start out with two brigades? That assessment has not changed?

General CASEY. That is where we are, that is right.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN [presiding]. Thank you.

Senator Warner had to cut short his questions because of the vote, so I am going to call on Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I have received information that the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which was in some large part generated by members of this committee, will soon be released in a classified form and made available to the committee. For those following the hearings, that is the evaluation of a subject by our entire Intelligence Community. This particular one is to be focused on Iraq.

General, were you asked to make a contribution to that NIE? I am just going to talk process.

General CASEY. I have seen the executive summary and offered comments.

Senator WARNER. That is fine. All I want to know is that you were a part of the process and you had an opportunity to get your evaluation in before it went into final print, I presume?

General CASEY. I did.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, because that is an important document. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that it be put in S-407 of the Capitol where traditionally we—or whereever—and we urge members to read that, because in the context of this very important broad issue before the Senate today and certainly into the next week, I think it would be valuable to get the assessment of the Intelligence Community about their own evaluation of the situation in Iraq today and most particularly Baghdad.

Now, General, the Congress of the United States over many years has funded the National War College, the Navy War College, and Carlisle Barracks. We also have this new command now that studies the overall operations of our forces, that is located down in Virginia, the one that Admiral Edmund Giambastiani put together.

Do you have any knowledge of the traditional practice of wargaming plans having been done in those various forums, wargaming being, for those that are following the hearing, where you establish an A team, a B team, or a blue team, a red team, and they try to assess the likelihood of success of the plan or what modifications should be made to the plan? In other words, it is a professional good exchange. It is very important we do it in many situations.
Do you have knowledge of it having been done in the preparation of this plan as enunciated by the President on 10 January?

General CASEY. I do not have any knowledge one way or the other, Senator.

Senator WARNER. All right. I have to tell you, there is testimony in the record by other witnesses before this committee that teams were sent to your AOR for the purposes of conducting such an evaluation. I accept your answer you do not have knowledge, which means you certainly did not see any work product. But I would ask that the record be left open so that you can go back into your command and see what, if any, type of wargaming might have been done.

General CASEY. Oh, I thought you were speaking of war colleges and Joint Forces Command.

Senator WARNER. In other words, Congress funds a whole number of military institutions for the purpose of doing wargaming, to make assessments of the likelihood of success of a plan or how a plan should be modified.

General CASEY. We routinely do it in our planning process. I would be surprised if that was not done in Iraq.

Senator WARNER. Well then, was it done within your command? Did you have a sort of a structure that looked at the plan as it was unfolding and presumably just before the President announced it to determine on a professional basis between young men and women officers looking at it and giving their best judgment as to the strength of the plan, the likelihood of success, or the likelihood it would not succeed unless certain corrections are made?

General CASEY. The actual wargaming of the Baghdad plan would have been done at the corps level. You are asking me whether we wargamed the overall strategy. No, we did not.

Senator WARNER. All right. So it would have to be done up at corps level and that would be General Abizaid?

General CASEY. General Odierno.

Senator WARNER. Odierno.

General CASEY. It is a tactical level plan.

Senator WARNER. He is a subordinate commander to you, is he?

General CASEY. Right.

Senator WARNER. So you do not know whether he did it and what the results?

General CASEY. I cannot tell you conclusively he did it. I tell you that we do wargaming as part of all of our planning. I would be surprised if some level of wargaming was not done, but I cannot tell you conclusively that it was.

Senator WARNER. All right. Could you then supply that for the record?

General CASEY. I will.

[The information referred to follows:]

During my testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 1 February 2007 you asked if we had done any wargaming as part of the formal planning process used to develop the current Baghdad security plan. I replied that during operational planning we routinely conduct such wargaming and that I would confirm for you that we had.

The Multi-National Corp-Iraq conducted a detailed wargame from 22–24 December 2006 to examine several courses of action. They followed that up on 24 December with a course of action brief to the commander that included the results of the
wargaming. The commander used the results of that wargaming as he developed his operations order.

On behalf of all our servicemembers and coalition partners, thank you and the committee for your continued steadfast support to our mission in Iraq.

Senator WARNER. In September 2006—and Chairman Levin, it was just before you and I made that trip together in the region in October, and we visited the Marines, you will recall. While it was classified, I think I can make reference to in September 2006 the Washington Post reported that “The chief of intelligence of the Marine Corps in Iraq filed a report concluding that the prospects for securing Anbar Province are dim.”

That report was classified, so I will not ask you to comment on it. But we actually had the opportunity to have a colloquy with that colonel and his commanding officer and others. I then asked questions about al Anbar.

What is the state today of the power of the al Qaeda elements of this insurgency? Is it growing? Is it strengthening? Do we have sufficient forces in your judgment to repress that organization?

General CASEY. I would say that the strength of al Qaeda in Anbar Province is diminishing. I talked to General Zumer, the commander in Anbar, right before I left. He told me that for the first time since the war there are Iraqi police in every district in Anbar Province. That is a big step. They have had very good success recruiting police. They have trained over 9,000 police, on their way to about 14,000 police.

So that is a big success. The real major success has come on the political level with a group of tribal leaders who banded together and started to take on al Qaeda on their own, and then, with the assistance of Prime Minister Maliki, they were able to merge some of these leaders into the provincial council run by the governor. So when this report, the intelligence report you spoke of, there was not a political track in Anbar. There is now. There were not many police in Anbar. There are now.

Senator WARNER. But as a part of your plan, that is the January 10 plan which you worked on, you do recommend additional forces in al Anbar?

General CASEY. I did.

Senator WARNER. Was that for the purpose of further diminishing the influence of al Qaeda?

General CASEY. Absolutely, it was to maintain the momentum that they already had. I actually went out there in October. I was getting a briefing from the commander in Ramadi and he was describing what was happening. I said: “It looks like you have an opportunity here; what could you do with another battalion?” He said: “I could clean out Ramadi.” So we asked for the Marine Expeditionary Unit and brought it in in November, and he has used that. These other units now are to backfill that Marine Expeditionary Unit so that we maintain pressure on these guys throughout Anbar Province.

Senator WARNER. My final question. You in the earlier responses described really the enormity of your task as the Multi-National Commander. Among it was dealing with, I think you said, three successive prime ministers; is that correct?

General CASEY. It is, Senator.
Senator WARNER. We have an ambassador there. I am trying to determine the degree of responsibility that you have with respect to the political side. Remember we said this new plan has four components. One of them is dealing with the Iraqi government.

Is under the new plan there to be more State Department officials, more emphasis put on the ambassadorial role to deal with that? Or is your successor to continue to have to find time apart from his military responsibilities to handle much of the intergovernmental relationships?

General CASEY. Ambassador Zol Kollazaid handles the political business with the prime minister. What I work with him is the political-military aspects: what type of commitments do I need from the prime minister to support the military plan? What do I need from the government in terms of economic support for the plan? Those are the types of interactions that I have. I do not get involved in the strictly political stuff. Zol takes care of that.

Senator WARNER. So if, for example, in the forthcoming Baghdad surge campaign, the Iraqis fail to keep their commitments, benchmarks as we call them, and the most specific one and the one which I have included in my resolution, and you have alluded to it today, it is that commitment that no longer will the political structure of the prime minister and his subordinates be reaching out and telling tactical commanders, this is what you will have to do, and then calling up and saying, what you have already done on your own initiative, undo it and pull back.

Whose responsibility will it be to make sure and certain that the Iraqis are living up to that and other benchmarks? Is it the United States ambassador, now filled by another individual, a very able person—I have dealt with him through the years—and his team, or is it back on the commanding officer of the MNF—I, your successor?

General CASEY. I would look after the military aspects. For example, if we had a call to a unit to undo something that was done, I would get that report back up to my chain and Zol and I would go see the prime minister.

Senator WARNER. He is now to be succeeded by another individual?

General CASEY. Right.

So basically, Senator, I would deal with the military commitments, and I have a system already set up for monitoring those. Zol would deal with the political commitments.

Senator WARNER. Then if that fails it is part of your responsibility and the failure of those commitments by the Iraqi political structure then would fall in other words, the buck stops on your desk and not the State Department?

General CASEY. For example, if they did not deliver on a commitment to pass the electoral law or to pass the oil law, that is Zol's business.

Senator WARNER. Correct.

General CASEY. If they are not delivering on their commitment not to allow safe havens and are restricting our operations in an area, that is on me. So we work it together.
Senator WARNER. Now, that last phrase is important, you “work it together.” So you are really working in partnership with the U.S. ambassador?

General CASEY. Oh, absolutely.

Senator WARNER. I see. I would think that primary responsibility for the enforcement of those benchmarks should be primarily with the Secretary of State and her ambassadors. I think you should think through and have some clarification.

General CASEY. The benchmarks absolutely fall under Zol’s purview. Again, it is the military-related commitments that I keep an eye on.

Senator WARNER. There I think you would be in the role of an expert adviser to the United States ambassador, rather than one that——

General CASEY. What happens is we go over together.

Senator WARNER. All right. All I am saying is there could be a subsequent assessment of what went right and what went wrong here, and I think that having again unified commands with various responsibilities, whether it is on the diplomatic side or it is on the military side, would be beneficial.

I thank the chair.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.

General, the Iraqis have agreed to benchmarks before, is that not correct?

General CASEY. They did.

Chairman LEVIN. Did they not agree in October to benchmarks?

General CASEY. September-October, I think you are right.

Chairman LEVIN. Did they live up to those benchmarks?

General CASEY. Not in all cases.

Chairman LEVIN. How about in most cases?

General CASEY. They did, they made progress on some things.

Chairman LEVIN. Did they deny that they had agreed to benchmarks? Let me read——

General CASEY. I think there was some discussion by the prime minister that he——

Chairman LEVIN. Some discussion? He flat out—according to the Washington Post on October 25, “Maliki lashed out today at the United States, saying his popularly elected government would not bend to U.S.-imposed benchmarks,” and denied that he had agreed to the benchmarks. Were you aware of that?

General CASEY. I am aware of that——

Chairman LEVIN. No, but is it true that he denied that he agreed to them?

General CASEY. It is.

Chairman LEVIN. Does that not make you nervous, when he did agree to them and then a day later or 2 days later denies that he agreed to them?

General CASEY. I do not know that he did agree with them. Other members of the presidency council—they have this policy council for national security and that was the group that it was discussed with. I do not know whether the prime minister was actually there or not.

Chairman LEVIN. I see. So when Khalilzad said “Iraqi leaders have agreed to a time line for making the hard decisions needed
to resolve these issues”—that is his quote—you are not sure that Maliki was involved among the Iraqi leaders that had agreed?

General CASEY. I am not, but Zol would know that.

Chairman LEVIN. All right, so you are not sure that Maliki ever agreed to the ones that everybody else says he agreed to?

General CASEY. I am not.

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, that is fair. That is a straight answer.

We have talked a little bit about what General Shinseki said here about needing more troops and about the way he was treated. Do you have any feelings about the way he was treated after he spoke honestly about his opinion?

General CASEY. I do not think he was treated well.

Chairman LEVIN. You have indicated on a number of occasions that your efforts were thwarted by Iraqi leaders.

By the way, I could not agree with you more relative to Shinseki. I think he was treated miserably and that message I think was an insult to everybody in uniform. But I will leave it at that. You gave me an answer which is perfectly consistent with what I just said, although perhaps not as purple in its prose.

General, you have indicated this morning that you raised a number of problems when, a number of times you were thwarted, more accurately when Prime Minister Jafari objected to something you were trying to get done and Prime Minister Maliki I believe did not insist that his troops act without political interference, indeed involved himself. He would not allow certain things to happen.

You objected to that because you were trying to make things happen. Did you tell your chain of command? Did you take that to the higher level in those cases and tell either General Abizaid or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs or whoever you would have been reporting to, probably General Abizaid, that you were having those problems?

General CASEY. Yes. I would not write a report or something, but in my discussions with them, which were frequent, I would highlight the difficulties I was having. But I will tell you, Senator, I have watched Prime Minister Maliki grow over the last 8 months and over the last several months there have been no restrictions on what we are doing. That has changed over time and I think changed for the positive.

Chairman LEVIN. You were asked in your prehearing questions what were the most significant mistakes the United States has made to date in Iraq, and you had quite a long list of mistakes. You did not list among those mistakes some of the most commonly agreed to mistakes. I will not say that everyone has agreed to these, but these have been noted and they are significant.

General CASEY. I kind of stuck to the things on my watch.

Chairman LEVIN. I see.

General CASEY. I tried not to go back to the beginning.

Chairman LEVIN. One of the things which has affected you was the disbandment of the Iraqi army. That was before your watch, but nonetheless, do you have any feelings about that action as to whether that was a wise course, to not bring the Iraqi army back from their homes? Not the top level officers, but most of the people who were in the army. Was that a mistake in your judgment?
General Casey. Looking back, the Iraqi army was suspect to 80 percent of the country, the Kurds and the Shia.

Chairman Levin. Even though the Shia made up most of the army?

General Casey. Right, but it was the leadership.

Chairman Levin. The leadership was suspect. I am talking about 80 percent of the army, not the leaders.

General Casey. Right.

Chairman Levin. The people who were thrown out of work with guns and no pay.

General Casey. I understand.

Chairman Levin. Was that a mistake?

General Casey. I cannot talk to the timing of how it was done, but my sense is something would have had to have been done with that Iraqi army that was the instrument of repression by the Saddam Hussein regime. The other thing I will tell you——

Chairman Levin. Would the removal of the top leadership have sent the right signal?

General Casey. It certainly could have.

Chairman Levin. What about the de-Baathification program?

General Casey. It did. It still is.

Chairman Levin. What about the failure to adequately plan for the occupation, looking at a worst case scenario or a more complex occupation? Was that a mistake?

General Casey. It certainly was, and it was compounded by the execution.

Chairman Levin. Now, what the President himself said is that he had a choice to make—he just said this a couple weeks ago—“to do what we were doing, and one could define that maybe a slow failure, or change what we were doing.” So the President has described what was happening before he made his change of strategy—regardless of whether we think it was a significant change or not; that is not the point at the moment—he defined what was happening as, “maybe a slow failure,” and that we needed to change strategy.

Do you agree with that description of what was happening?

General Casey. Slow failure? Do I agree that Iraq was moving toward a slow failure?

Chairman Levin. That maybe what was happening—I am using the President’s exact words because he did not say it was. He said maybe was a slow failure. You have said that you did not think it was a failure. I am asking you, since the President described what was happening as “maybe a slow failure,” do you——

General Casey. It is not lost on me that the Commander in Chief was not satisfied with what was going on.

Chairman Levin. But his description—even he came to the point after all these years of not having what everybody wanted, which is success in Iraq, he finally described mistakes were made, and then he said, yes, one could define that, doing what we are doing, as “maybe a slow failure.”

I am just wondering whether you would agree with that.

General Casey. I actually do not see it as slow failure. I actually see it as slow progress.
Chairman Levin. All right. My time is up and I think Senator Sessions is next. Senator Sessions, we did not pass over you this time.

Senator WARNER. Senator, would you yield just for a moment?

Senator SESSIONS. I would be pleased to.

Senator WARNER. I want to catch this last vote.

General, I have been here throughout this hearing and it has been a good tough one and a thorough one. But your testimony today has reinforced my earlier opinion when I arrived here at the beginning this morning that you are the President’s choice for Chief of Staff of the Army. The institution of the Army is really involved in this, that wonderful institutional tradition of the Army, and you will have my support.

General Casey. Thank you very much, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Senator Sessions. General Casey, I am not comfortable with this insistence on trying to work the word “failure” into what is happening. I think we are all uneasy. I think the American people are uneasy. They are troubled. Things have not gone as well as we would like, and you have said that several times. But “failure” suggests a doomed event, and you have been through that now 30 months. You have worked with the Iraqi government and I am sure have been frustrated many times on the difference of cultural responses and the different leaderships they have had there and all.

Do you feel like under the plan that has been proposed and we intend to carry out that we can be successful in Iraq?

General Casey. I do. I believe, as I said in my testimony, the situation in Iraq is winnable. It is very winnable. It is hard, though.

Senator Sessions. It is hard and it is slow, and there are good days and bad days, good months and bad months. Would you say it that way?

General Casey. There are.

Senator Sessions. Senators Levin and Warner and I, and I believe Mark Pryor, were in Ramadi. We were briefed by the Marine colonel, intelligence officer in the command, and we were troubled by the reports that we got at that time. I had the opportunity to talk with General Peter Pace, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, last night for a good while and I asked him about that. He said that same briefer briefed him several months later and had seen some significant steps for progress being made. You seem to be saying the same thing.

So in this kind of counterinsurgency operation that we are in, is it not a mistake to go into any one particular area of the country at a given day, whether it is up or down, and try to express a total evaluation of our entire effort?

General Casey. Absolutely. One of the things that I do that most people do not is I look at the whole country and I travel about the whole country. I have been to every province, visit the units there. I get assessments from the guys and gals that are out there on the ground dealing with the Iraqis every day.

A lot of what comes out of Iraq is Baghdad-centric and it comes out of the Green Zone, and you really have to get out and around Iraq to get a full appreciation of what is going on there. Again, I am not sugar-coating the situation in Baghdad. It is bad.
Senator SESSIONS. You do agree that since such a large percentage of the population is there and it is the capital, that Baghdad must be secured? That is a critical event for us right now?

General CASEY. It is, Senator.

Senator SESSIONS. We have around 23,000 troops in Afghanistan. They have almost the same population as Iraq. I think a lot of us hoped that we could keep the numbers down. But Iraq has turned out to be more complex and difficult and more violent and it has required us to maintain troops longer than I would have liked. Hopefully, this will be a surge that can lead to progress and we can get back on the path that you tried to get us on, which is a downward drawing of our troops and continuing to push up the Iraqi troops.

I am concerned, General Casey, about our prison and law enforcement system there. To follow up on Senator Warner's comment first, if we need more prison beds to place people who have been convicted and arrested by Iraqi forces, is that the U.S. military or is that the State Department ambassador's role to find the money for that?

General CASEY. That is the State Department.

Senator SESSIONS. If we need to create a new trial system, which I strongly think should be a military trial system, because we are in such a state of disorder, and try those people who are threats against the state in an Iraqi military court system, would that be the State Department's responsibility to get such a court system up or the military?

General CASEY. The State Department is responsible for the rule of law and for assisting the Iraqis in developing the rule of law institutions.

Senator SESSIONS. They bring in the Department of Justice and others?

General CASEY. Yes.

Senator SESSIONS. I just want to tell you, I am not happy with that. I do not think we have gotten nearly far enough along. As I have noted, we have one-ninth as many bed spaces and prisoners in custody in Iraq per capita as we have in Alabama. I saw another military writer in a military journal write that on a per capita basis there was about six times as many in prison in Vietnam during that conflict.

It just indicates, objectively looked at, that we have a lot of dangerous people out there, and if they are not arrested, apprehended, and removed, then you cannot have credibility in a city like Baghdad. They need to know that when somebody bad is caught they are gone, it is not a revolving door.

Are you aware of the complaints in that regard and will you take steps as Chief of Staff to support efforts to improve the law enforcement system there?

General CASEY. In Iraq?

Senator SESSIONS. Yes.

General CASEY. We work closely with the embassy on the rule of law program. As you suggest, it is something that needs an awful lot more work.

Senator SESSIONS. General Casey, that is what we hear over and over again. But it is your soldiers that are out there day after day
being shot at, sometimes by the same people that were caught and released. I am glad you say it is the State Department’s responsibility, but really it is the United States’ responsibility. It is our soldiers there, our policy that we need to execute.

I guess I want you to say that you will break some china if need be to get this thing moving, if we have to get on the State Department or have it transferred to the military to get it done.

General CASEY. I will.

Senator SESSIONS. That is good.

General CASEY. Can I just say, though, that we also have our own detention system where we have about 15,000 Iraqis, and that does not operate in a catch and release program, and we are actually expanding our capacity by another 4,000 or 5,000 so that we can continue to hold the Iraqi security detainees and not have to put them back out on the street. So we work that and watch that very closely.

Senator SESSIONS. One final brief question. Prime Minister Maliki is elected. He is a politician like we are. He has constituencies. His people have pride and he has some pride. Would you say we want him to assume responsibility, we want him to declare it is his responsibility to run Iraq, and we ought to be somewhat sympathetic and understanding if he takes the position he does not need help and his people can do it?

You express that better than I. But I sense a tension there between his desire to be a strong leader for his country and to create an independent Iraq that is not run by the United States, at the same time they are just not able to do everything there.

General CASEY. I would say that that is an accurate description of his desires. He does want to be in charge, not only of the government but of his security forces, and we are working with him to enable him to do that. But that is a good thing. That is a good thing.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Sessions, thank you.

Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you, General. It has been a long morning, but I have a couple of points I would like to raise with you.

In your written submission you suggest that, in response to our operations in Baghdad, that the Shia militias would likely lie low, perhaps at the behest of their colleagues in the government, who have been urging them to do that, but that the Sunnis would tend to hunker down in the neighborhoods because they are connected to the neighborhoods, which raises I think in my mind at least the question that the effect of our operations or the perception of our operations at least initially would be that we are conducting generally attacks against Sunni forces at the behest of the Shia government, which could be exploited and, frankly, the opposition has been much more adroit than we have in the information warfare, as a way of showing us that we have thrown our lot in with the Shia, we are attacking the Sunnis.

That I think will harden the resistance in the Sunni community to reconciliation and it certainly will create a regional dynamic where Sunni governments, sympathizers in the region might be compelled to, if not enter, at least to provide increased support.
Is that a concern of yours?

General CASEY. It is a concern and it is something that both we and the Iraqis are concerned about. That is part of the prime minister’s commitment, is evenhanded enforcement of the law against anyone who breaks it. So we are working with the Iraqi planners to ensure that the operations that are conducted are conducted in a balanced fashion.

Senator REED. But it seems again, and I tend to agree with your assessment of the likely at least initial reaction, that the Shia militia are deliberately avoiding contact with us. If the Sunnis are in such position where they can—and you and I have both had conversations with the prime minister and when you talk about the insurgency it is a Sunni insurgency. The sectarian violence is something that does not register as forcefully in his mind as it does in ours. It is a Sunni insurgency, and we are going after that Sunni insurgency. Those are literally his words to me.

I think this is potentially a very serious consequence of this operation. But let me ask you an additional question. Let us assume there is a period of remission, but the cancer still exists. The cancer is militias, both Sunni and Shia, with the capacity to quickly assume the battle. The other part of the cancer I think is a dysfunctional Iraqi government, not just its security services but its whole governmental apparatus.

If we do have this period of remission, what do we do? Is that a justification to withdraw forces, or do we have to continue to stay there at a very substantial force level because these capacities still exist? The bottom line is, how long do you think we will be keeping roughly 140,000 troops in Iraq, but more precisely 20,000-plus, 30,000 American forces in Baghdad, maneuver forces? I am not talking about anything but maneuver forces.

General CASEY. I mentioned the metrics earlier about we have some ways of trying to figure out are we making progress in Baghdad or are we not. There certainly is a chance that people will leave town, lie low. What I said in my opening testimony is for this to be successful the Iraqi security forces have to emerge as the dominant security force. So in addition to the security operations, in addition to establishing these bases that will maintain, allow them to maintain security force presence in these areas to prevent a return, it also needs to be worked on the political side to remove political support from the militia.

So that takes time. Now, my sense is, as I have said publicly, we will start seeing an impact in 60 days or so, I think. One way or the other, we will start seeing an impact. Assuming things continue to progress positively, it will probably be the end of the summer before Baghdad is at a level of security that people are more inclined to feel comfortable with.

What happens with respect to our forces after that, it is up to somebody else to figure out. But I would look at the results on the ground and decide what I needed and what I did not need.

Senator REED. Just a final comment. One of the unfortunate aspects of this whole operation is what progress we have made has been reversed in some cases. I think, as you suggested, before the Samarra bombing we thought we had made real progress, that things were going our way, and then it was quickly and suddenly
reversed. That is a concern I have going forward, that we might get a remission, but unless we make fundamental changes—and I think what you also suggested is that—and this goes I think to the focus of the difference between your approach and those who have criticized you, is that, at what point will the Iraqi forces be capable of taking a lead and sustaining that leadership.

In the past you have thought they were and it turned out that they did not have that capacity, or at least that is the perception. I think going forward that is going to be one of the critical issues that we all have to address. You will not be doing that job. You will be Chief of Staff of the Army. But I think we will be still considering that issue.

I do not know if you have a final comment, but I thank you for your patience and your testimony.

General CASEY. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. General, I think you have said that a political settlement is essential if there is going to be an end to the violence in Iraq; is that fair? Does that represent your view?

General CASEY. Political reconciliation, yes.

Chairman LEVIN. Right. That is going to require an agreement on power sharing, resource sharing, autonomy issues, on the political side.

General CASEY. Right.

Chairman LEVIN. Is that correct?

General CASEY. That is where those benchmarks come from.

Chairman LEVIN. Right.

General CASEY. Those benchmarks are the key political agreements they have to happen.

Chairman LEVIN. Those are benchmarks, those promises have been made long ago. There was supposed to be a commission which would look at proposed changes to the constitution that was supposed to come into existence 90 days after the assembly took office; is that not correct?

General CASEY. They formed the commission. The commission is meeting, I am told.

Chairman LEVIN. Have they followed their benchmark for reporting to the assembly, do you know?

General CASEY. I think my recollection is there is a benchmark coming up here in January.

Chairman LEVIN. For reporting to the assembly?

General CASEY. I believe so. I think they have 4 months to come back.

Chairman LEVIN. I think the original law of Iraq was that 90 days after they took office they were supposed to report back in 4 months, 120 days after, that they were supposed to report back. That was not met, is that accurate? They did not do that in 120 days?

General CASEY. They are reporting back I think about 4 months after they formed the commission.

Chairman LEVIN. But not 4 months after the assembly was created; is that correct?

General CASEY. I think that is right.

Chairman LEVIN. You have talked about the training and you made a couple references here, one to the length of time it was sup-
posed to take to train the Iraqi security forces. You said this was a 3-year program at one point, but that does not mean that for each of the troops in the Iraqi security forces it would be a 3-year training program. It is like a 6-week training program.

General CASEY. Exactly. I am speaking about the institutions of the military and police forces.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. But in terms of the numbers that have been trained and equipped to take the lead, that number is now at?

General CASEY. Over 300,000.

Chairman LEVIN. 300,000.

General CASEY. About 330,000.

Chairman LEVIN. About half of those are army?

General CASEY. 135,000 army, 190,000 police.

Chairman LEVIN. So 135,000 army are now trained and equipped and 190,000 police are now trained and equipped?

General CASEY. We have trained 135,000 army soldiers and equipped them. Okay, now, of that group—both army and police, there have been 26,000 Iraqi security forces that we have trained that are killed or wounded to the point where they cannot work.

Chairman LEVIN. So there is 130,000 roughly army that have been——

General CASEY. Been through the country.

Chairman LEVIN. Through our program.

General CASEY. Right.

Chairman LEVIN. Trained, equipped, and ready to take the lead, theoretically?

General CASEY. No.

Chairman LEVIN. No?

General CASEY. Three steps. Trained and equipped: they are formed, they are given their uniforms, they are organized into units, and they have had some basic level of training, step one. Step two, in the lead: They begin to function with our transition teams and they grow as units so that they get to the point where they can do counterinsurgency operations with our support. Step three: independence.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, step two; how many of the 135,000 have finished step two?

General CASEY. We look at units.

Chairman LEVIN. How many units?

General CASEY. Right now, 8 out of 10 divisions are in the lead.

I want to say 30 out of 36 brigades, and probably 90 or so of the 112 battalions are in the lead.

Chairman LEVIN. So now translate that into people? Roughly how many of the 135,000 are in those units you just described that are in the lead, roughly?

General CASEY. Right. What I will do is I will take off the air force and the navy, and so I would say probably around 120,000.

Chairman LEVIN. 120,000, okay.

General CASEY. That is a SWAG, but——

Chairman LEVIN. No, that is fine.

You have indicated that the piece of paper which was delivered by Mr. Maliki to our President in Amman probably did not say that
they needed American troops; they probably would have said they needed additional or they needed troops; is that correct?

General CASEY. That is my recollection.

Chairman LEVIN. Why would he not have used those troops that you just referred to that were trained and equipped to do the Baghdad job? Or did he, or do you not know?

General CASEY. No, he did. But the rest of the country still requires security forces, and we are drawing——

Chairman LEVIN. But the rest of the country is pacified more. You said the big problem is Baghdad. Why would he not move enough troops to Baghdad to do what needs to be done in Baghdad since the rest of the country is calmer?

General CASEY. He is doing that, and he has moved two brigades, moving another brigade from the west, from the north, into Baghdad.

Chairman LEVIN. So how many troops of his would then be in Baghdad after he makes the move?

General CASEY. Of his?

Chairman LEVIN. Yes.

General CASEY. Total I would say somewhere between 60,000 and 70,000.

Chairman LEVIN. Which leaves about another how many, 60,000 that are trained and equipped and able to take the lead?

General CASEY. Armed forces throughout the rest of the country?

Chairman LEVIN. Right.

General CASEY. Ballpark.

Chairman LEVIN. What we are going to do is request the White House to tell us what apparently you are not sure of, which is whether Maliki was more specific as to whether he wanted or did not want American troops to be part of the Baghdad operation. You said you think he just said troops in that piece of paper that he dropped——

General CASEY. But I think I also said that he leans toward not wanting to have to bring in more coalition forces, and when we have gone to him in this particular case with his commanders and the ministers and said, this is what we need for this mission, he has said okay.

Chairman LEVIN. This is what we need.

General CASEY. Right.

Chairman LEVIN. This is what we need. What America needs?

General CASEY. We collectively, Iraqis and coalition forces, three Iraqi, two coalition.

Chairman LEVIN. Then he accepted that?

General CASEY. He accepted that.

Chairman LEVIN. But that was our proposal?

General CASEY. That was a joint proposal from the Iraqi ministers and us.

Chairman LEVIN. You got together with the Iraqi ministers and then went to the prime minister and made a statement to him that, we believe this mission requires coalition forces?

General CASEY. That is correct.

Chairman LEVIN. Would you say the Iraqi military that were involved in the statement to the prime minister were persuaded of that? Did they initiate the idea or did we initiate the idea?
General CASEY. It came out of our planning, but they accepted and even endorsed the idea.
Chairman LEVIN. So it came out of our—I will not repeat what you said. I think that addresses the question in an adequate way.
My time is up. Senator Sessions.
Senator SESSIONS. No, thank you.
Chairman LEVIN. I think the only other question that I have——
General CASEY. Do I have Dan Cox to thank for all these questions? [Laughter.]
Chairman LEVIN. No. No, he shares the load. [Laughter.]
Senator SESSIONS. While you are looking——
Chairman LEVIN. Yes.
Senator SESSIONS. To follow up now on our soldiers and what they have there, you have issued orders—I believe it is you—that Humvees and vehicles should not be outside protected areas that are not up-armored to specifications; is that correct?
General CASEY. That is correct, sir.
Senator SESSIONS. Is any soldier being sent out on patrol or duty without kevlar, the vests that they have, the equipment that they are authorized and expected to have?
General CASEY. I hope not.
Senator SESSIONS. That would be against policy and procedure?
General CASEY. Absolutely.
Senator SESSIONS. You believe you have in theater sufficient equipment and that day after day when they are out there doing their duty they have the specified equipment, protective gear, and that kind of thing? I guess I want to say to American mothers and fathers and family members, we keep hearing this talk about shortage of equipment. Can you tell us, are they not pretty well-equipped?
General CASEY. They are very well-equipped. The discussion today about this report about a lack of equipment is not something that I have heard as I have gone out and visited the soldiers, and I rarely if ever get comments from soldiers about things they do not have, and I ask.
Senator SESSIONS. If you become Chief of Staff, do you understand it is your responsibility to make sure that equipment—ultimately it is your responsibility to see that equipment gets to the soldier in the field so that General Petraeus or whoever is commanding them can have it if they need it?
General CASEY. I do.
Senator SESSIONS. You will accept that responsibility?
General CASEY. I go after it hard.
Senator SESSIONS. I know we have shortages here and there, but I do believe that when I have been there that the equipment is there and we have done a pretty darn good job of doing it in a very distant, difficult land.
General CASEY. I think so, too.
Chairman LEVIN. This is a question which Senator Reed raised and I want to just press you a little bit harder on it. That has to do with the militias going underground, which apparently they are going to do, and taking their arms with them. Is that troubling for you?
General CASEY. It is something we have to watch. As I said, before we go the militias are going to have to be dealt with, and we need to deal with them in a security way and in a political way. But at the end of the day the Iraqi security forces have to be the dominant force in Iraq, and right now they are not, without our help.

Chairman LEVIN. Can they be dealt with without dealing with the political issues which are there?

General CASEY. No. They can, but it would be much more violent.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree that there is usefulness to political pressure being placed on the Iraqi leaders to reach settlements?

General CASEY. Absolutely. But if I could comment on that, it is not just Prime Minister Maliki that people need to pressure. There is a political base in the United Alliance that is very responsible for the policies that he is following. So pressure along a range of leaders from Iraq is in my view much more productive than just squeezing the prime minister.

Chairman LEVIN. No, I agree. That is why I always say Iraqi political leaders, not just the prime minister. But that is a necessary ingredient if there is going to be a solution in your opinion?

General CASEY. It is. The other thing that I think it was useful in pushing Iraqi leaders toward a reconciliation, is the discussion about accountability. Saddam Hussein was just hung for his crimes against the people of Iraq. But thousands of Iraqis have died over the past year at the hands of death squads. There has to be an accountability for that, too, and I think the Iraqi political leaders need to understand that.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Sessions, I think, has focused on what is essential if there is going to be accountability, which is that there not be a catch and release program. We thank him for his leadership in this area. He has really focused on something that is important in terms of accountability and justice being dispensed in Iraq.

General, unless there are additional questions, we will stand adjourned. We thank you for your stamina. I know it is nothing probably in terms of your experience wearing that uniform; this stamina is probably pretty mild, at least in terms of how much time you sat there. But in any event, we thank you for your service and we thank again your family.

General CASEY. Thank you very much, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. We will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:34 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follows:]

QUESTIONs AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the com-
batant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Answer. Goldwater-Nichols has significantly improved our ability to conduct joint operations. I have no specific recommendations for modifying the act itself.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. There is good reason to consider the development of Goldwater-Nichols Act-like legislation to delineate roles and responsibilities of Federal agencies in support of contingency operations.

Question. Do you believe that the role of the chiefs of staff under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?

Answer. Yes.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Chief of Staff of the Army to the following offices:

Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Secretary of Defense, as the head of DOD and the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to DOD, issues guidance and direction to the military departments. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary of Defense and his Deputy, through the Secretary of the Army, for the operation of the Army in accordance with such directives. As a member of the JCS, I will serve as a military adviser to the Secretary of Defense, as appropriate. I will cooperate fully with the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the Army properly implements the policies established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). In coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with the Secretary of Defense in articulating the views of the Army.

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.

Answer. Acting on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretaries perform responsibilities that require them, from time to time, to issue guidance—and in the case of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, direction—to the military departments. If confirmed, in coordination with the Secretary of the Army, I will communicate with the Under Secretaries in articulating the views of the Army. I will work closely with them to ensure that the Army is administered in accordance with the guidance and direction issued by OSD.

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense have functional responsibilities that, from time to time, require the issuance of guidance to the military departments. If confirmed, I will, in coordination with the Secretary of the Army, communicate with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense in articulating the views of the Army. I will cooperate fully with them to ensure that the Army is administered in accordance with guidance promulgated by OSD.

Question. The Chairman of JCS.

Answer. The Chairman of JCS is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman plans the strategic direction and contingency operations of the Armed Forces; advises the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets identified by the commanders of the combatant commands; develops doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces; reports on assignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the Armed Forces; provides for representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations; and performs such other duties as may be prescribed by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense.

In conjunction with the other members of the Joint Chiefs, the Chief of Staff of the Army assists the Chairman in providing military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, as a member of JCS, it would be my duty to provide frank and timely advice and opinions to the Chairman to assist him in his performance of these responsibilities. If confirmed, in addition, upon request, I will as a member of JCS provide my individual military advice to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. As appropriate, I will provide advice in addition to or in disagreement with that of
the Chairman. I will establish and maintain a close and professional relationship with the Chairman and will communicate directly and openly with him on policy matters involving the Army and the Armed Forces as a whole.

**Question.** The Vice Chairman of JCS.

**Answer.** The Vice Chairman of JCS assists the Chairman in providing military advice to the Secretary of Defense and the President. If confirmed as a member of the Joints Chiefs of Staff, it would be my duty to ensure that the Vice Chairman is provided my frank views and opinions to assist him in his performance of his responsibilities.

**Question.** The Secretary of the Army.

**Answer.** If confirmed, my relationship with the Secretary of the Army would be close, direct, and supportive. My responsibilities would also involve communicating the Army Staff’s plans to the Secretary of the Army and supervising the implementation of the Army’s decisions through the Army Staff and Army commands and agencies. In this capacity, my actions would be subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army. In my capacity as a member of JCS, I would also be responsible for appropriately informing the Secretary of the Army about conclusions reached by JCS and about significant military operations, to the extent such action does not impair independence in the performance of duties as member of JCS. I anticipate that I would at all times work closely and in concert with the Secretary of the Army to establish the best policies for the Army in light of national interests.

**Question.** The Under Secretary of the Army.

**Answer.** The Under Secretary of the Army is the Secretary’s principal civilian assistant and performs such duties and exercises such powers as the Secretary of the Army prescribes. His responsibilities require him, from time to time, to issue guidance and direction to the Army Staff. If confirmed, I will be responsible to the Secretary of the Army, and to the Under Secretary through the Secretary of the Army, for the operation of the Army in accordance with such directives. I will cooperate fully with the Under Secretary of the Army to ensure that the policies established by the Office of the Secretary of the Army are properly implemented. I will communicate openly and directly with the Under Secretary of the Army in articulating the views of the Army Staff, Army commands, and Army agencies.

**Question.** The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.

**Answer.** The Assistant Secretaries of the Army have functional responsibilities that, from time to time, require the issuance of guidance to the Army Staff and to the Army as a whole. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain close, professional relationships with each of the Assistant Secretaries to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork between the Army Staff and the Army Secretariat as we deal together with the day-to-day management and long-range planning requirements facing the Army.

**Question.** The General Counsel of the Army.

**Answer.** The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the Department of the Army. His duties include coordinating legal and policy advice to all members of the Department regarding matters of interest to the Secretariat, as well as determining the position of the Army on any legal questions or procedures other than military justice matters assigned to The Judge Advocate General. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the General Counsel to assist him in the performance of these important duties.

**Question.** The Judge Advocate General of the Army.

**Answer.** The Judge Advocate General serves as the Chief of Staff’s principal legal advisor. He provides legal advice concerning the organization, powers, duties, functions and administrative procedures of the Army. The Judge Advocate General also advises the Chief of Staff on military justice matters, environmental law, international law issues arising from deployment of U.S. forces overseas and implementation of the DOD Law of War Program. The Chief of Staff does not appoint The Judge Advocate General, and does not have the personal authority to remove him. This enables The Judge Advocate General to provide independent legal advice to the Chief of Staff.

**Question.** The Chiefs of Staff of the other Services.

**Answer.** If confirmed, as a member of JCS, it would be my duty to engage in frank and timely exchanges of advice and opinions with my fellow Service Chiefs in their roles as members of JCS. I look forward to developing strong working relationships with these colleagues, many of whom I know from previous service.

**Question.** The combatant commanders.

**Answer.** Subject to the direction of the President, the combatant commanders perform their duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and are directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the preparedness
of their commands to carry out missions assigned to them. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, the military department secretaries assign all forces under their jurisdiction, except those forces necessary to perform the missions of the military departments, to the combatant commands to perform missions assigned to those commands. In addition, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and the authority of combatant commanders under title 10, U.C.S., section 164(c), the military department secretaries are responsible for administering and supporting the forces that they assign to a combatant command. If confirmed, I will cooperate fully with the combatant commanders in performing these administrative and support responsibilities. I will establish close, professional relationships with the combatant commanders and communicate directly and openly with them on matters involving the Department of the Army and Army forces and personnel assigned to or supporting these commands.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

Answer. I have a fundamental grounding and practical experience in Army, joint, and coalition organizations from the tactical through the strategic level. I spent 21 years in the Army learning my craft in tactical organizations or tactically-focused schooling including one-third of that time in command of soldiers and numerous training and operational deployments. I served in a variety of command and staff positions where I gained experience in strategic and combined operations including a tour as a military observer in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Jerusalem, a tour of duty in the Army’s Office of Legislative Liaison, service on Army, Joint Forces Command, and the Joint Staffs, and as Commander of the Multinational Force Iraq deployed in Iraq for the last 30 months. I also served as the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, and I believe this has provided me broad knowledge, experience, and insight into the business of running the Army in support of the requirements of the national security strategy. In particular my tour of duty in Iraq has caused me to recognize the quality of our service men and women and the need to focus on them and their families if we are to sustain the magnificent force we have today.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Chief of Staff of the Army?

Answer. Growing the Army by 65,000 over 5 years in a manner that balances current warfighting requirements, responsible allocation of resources, and future strategic needs.

- Recruiting and retaining quality soldiers, civilians, and families.
- Resetting units, equipment, and personnel following deployment so they can respond to strategic requirements as rapidly as possible.
- Maintaining readiness appropriate to mission requirements while continuing to fight a war on terror.
- Balancing future investment strategies with resource realities.

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, my first priority will be to get out and assess the situation first-hand by talking to soldiers, civilians, and families as well as the combatant commanders they serve.

My second priority will be to develop effective plans to maintain our position as the finest Army in the world in a manner consistent with future requirements and resources. I intend to work closely with appropriate agencies in both executive and legislative branches to develop and execute these plans.

MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Chief of Staff of the Army?

Answer. Management of an Army at war while preparing that Army for the long-term challenges of the global war on terror, as well as for as-yet unforeseen requirements in service to the Nation in the future.

Question. What management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the other Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of the Army and, through him, the Secretary of Defense to quickly develop balanced and realistic approaches to solving these problems.
VISION FOR THE FUTURE

Question. What is your vision for the Army of the future?

Answer. The current Army Vision is well-accepted and relevant. If confirmed, I intend to assess the current state of the Army and its expected operating environment in the future; identify major issues, challenges, and opportunities; assess existing plans and programs; and confirm if current initiatives conform to the proper strategic direction. Where I believe change is warranted, I will, in consultation with the Secretary of the Army, propose refinement and/or resource reallocation.

Question. What roles do you believe the Army should play in contingency, humanitarian, and peace operations?

Answer. The Army provides relevant and ready forces to the combatant commanders and it develops soldiers, leaders, equipment, and organizations for the future. To do this the Army must be resourced appropriately to accomplish these tasks consistent with the strategic direction of the Nation’s civilian leadership.

Question. Do you see any unnecessary redundancy between Army and Marine Corps ground combat forces, particularly between Army light divisions and Marine Corps divisions?

Answer. No. The entire DOD force structure must be looked at in terms of combatant commander requirements. Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) provide capabilities as unique to the Army as U.S. Marine Corps formations do for the Marines. Some IBCTs are specially trained in airborne operations, others through habitual association with assault helicopter organizations, are specially trained for air assault operations. At the same time, U.S. Marine Corps forces are specially trained for amphibious operations.

ARMY ROLE IN THE JOINT FORCE

Question. The U.S. military fights as a joint force and strives to achieve realistic training for military operations. The Army provides trained and equipped forces for joint military operations. How do you believe the Army can best contribute to improved joint military capabilities while preserving its service unique capabilities and culture?

Answer. The Army exists to serve the American people, to protect vital national interests, and to fulfill national military obligations. The Army’s title 10 responsibility to the Nation is to provide responsive and ready land power—the best manned, trained, equipped, and led forces this Nation can produce—to combatant commanders in support of national strategies. It is also charged with providing combat enabling capabilities and support to facilitate the other Services to accomplish their missions. The Army brings to the fight several capabilities to improve joint warfighting effectiveness.

First and foremost, the Army deploys and employs Army soldiers—boots-on-the-ground (BOG)—a clear demonstration of our Nation’s resolve to protect and defend our national interests and protect the interests of our allies. Over the past 4 years, the Army has become more expeditionary, changing from its traditional divisional structure to a modular brigade-based force. This change has been extraordinary; particularly given the global force demand and the fact that we have essentially been developing and institutionalizing these capabilities while we are at war. This change is producing a rapidly deployable, power projection Army that is part of a joint team. It is of unprecedented campaign quality, with agile and adaptive leaders that are comfortable executing throughout the entire spectrum of conflict. The Army is able to achieve decisive outcomes across the full spectrum of operations. It is characterized by strategic agility, mobility, speed, survivability, lethality, sustainability, and network enabled situation awareness and connectivity. Recent operations validate that the Army either possesses the right capabilities, or is developing the right capabilities and capacities, to complement and balance the joint force. The Army is forward looking—a “learning” and adaptive organization that is focused on producing future capabilities to support Joint Force Commanders. Army capabilities ensure tactical and operational networked interoperability with the U.S. Marine Corps, as well as the interdependence on seamless air and naval fires and joint close air support. Army logistics systems have and will continue to provide superb campaign quality support to multiple services. Our future force combat systems are being designed to maximize interdependencies and interoperability requirements based on lessons learned and future operating concepts developed by the Joint Planning Community. Army systems and capabilities will enable us to seamlessly integrate with other Services to address traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive threats to our Nation and achieve desired outcomes.

Our modular formations provide the joint force with the right mix of light, medium and heavy Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) as well as the key enabling forces.
The Army will also continue to invest heavily in Special Forces, and is aggressively providing these forces today to joint commanders for worldwide employment. Army transformation improves the capabilities of soldiers engaged in the long war against terrorism and improves the capability of the joint force to defend the homeland, deter conflict in critical regions, respond promptly to small-scale contingencies, and swiftly defeat the enemy in major combat operations—all designed to support the needs of the combatant commanders and our Nation.

JOINT EXPERIMENTATION

Question. The Army has conducted a wide range of experiments to identify the path forward toward a digitized force, but has done much less with regard to transformation to the Objective Force. In the arena of joint experimentation, while the Army has participated in a few joint experimentation activities over the last couple years, it is clear that more joint experimentation is necessary to meet future operational challenges.

What is your view of the need for joint experimentation and how do you see the Army participating in future joint experimentation activities as we move further into the 21st century?

Answer. There is no question as to the need for joint experimentation; our National Security Strategy clearly establishes our method of employing coherently joint forces to achieve our security objectives. The Army fully engages with the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) in the planning, development, execution, and assessment of experiments—examples include the cosponsored Unified Quest wargame as well as the Urban Resolve series of experiments. In the latter case, the Army recently embedded our major annual concept development experiment—Omni Fusion—within JFCOM’s Urban Resolve experiment. We also devote significant effort to conduct even our smaller scale experiments with a robust joint context. The Army also partners with JFCOM in the area of interagency and multinational experimentation. In support of the latter, we have developed or are developing project arrangements with our key multinational partners to enable full participation in our experimentation programs.

Question. Do you believe that Army experimentation has been sufficient in support of transformation to the Objective Force?

Answer. Yes, the Army has conducted a great deal of experimentation over the last several years. These include: technical prototype experiments such as the C4ISR On the Move Test Bed annual experiments and a vast array of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations; field experiments such as the Air Assault Expeditionary Force and those conducted by the Unit of Action Maneuver Battle Lab; large scale live, virtual, and constructive experiments, specifically, the annual OMNI Fusion experiments. The Army continues to increase its experimentation capabilities as we stand up our latest experimentation asset, the Army Evaluation Task Force, which will be available for conducting future FCS experiments.

MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. Do you consider missile defense to be one of the Army’s core missions?

Answer. Yes, I consider missile defense to be one of the Army’s core missions and competencies—as it has been for 51 years. As the world’s preeminent land power, providing land-based missile defense to the homeland, our deployed forces, and our friends and allies is an essential core capability the Army provides our Nation. It supports the President’s direction in NSPD–23. The Army presently operates two ballistic missile defense capabilities—the Patriot Advance Capability-3 system and the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system—and we will continue to expand our role as additional capabilities are deployed such as the Theater High-Altitude Area Defense system.

Question. What is your view of the proper relationship between the Army and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)?

Answer. I view the relationship between the Army and the MDA as a critical partnership in a unique mission area in the defense of our Nation. The Army, through our Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Army Service Component Command, and in coordination with STRATCOM, plays a key role in representing the warfighters’ missile defense required capabilities to the MDA. This input helps to define and frame the missile defense capabilities that the defense of our homeland, our deployed forces, our friends, and allies require. In general, the MDA should be a supporting agency to each of the Services.

Question. What do you think the Army’s responsibilities are or should be with respect to development, procurement, and operation of missile defense systems?
Answer. The Army provides land warfighting capabilities, including force and asset protection, to the combatant commanders. These enduring responsibilities result in the Army serving as a principal contributor to the development, procurement, doctrine, operational integration, execution, and assessment of land-based missile defense capabilities. The Army has a strong history over the past half century of assisting in the development of missile defense technologies and systems including the current Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) used as the interceptor on the currently fielded Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) and the Multiple-Kill Vehicle that will replace the EKV on the GBIs when fielded.

MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes the U.S. has made to date in Iraq?

Answer. As articulated by the President of the United States, there are a number of areas that did not turn out as envisioned.

Question. There was the feeling that Iraqi elections would bring a sense of nationalism for all of the population and would bring the Iraqi’s together. Unfortunately, the results seem to have promoted increased sectarian divisions within the country instead.

We underestimated the ability of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and Sunni insurgents to provoke sectarian conflict and failed to preempt the attack against the Golden Mosque in Samarra.

We thought that as more Iraqi security forces (ISFs) were trained and equipped, we would be able to gradually shift ever increasing security responsibilities to them and thus reduce our forces proportionately. This is occurring slower than we originally projected.

We were slow to anticipate the extent of the radical Shia death squads.

We did not have enough Iraqi and coalition forces to continue to secure neighborhoods that had been previously cleared of terrorists and insurgents.

We allowed too many restrictions to be placed upon our forces.

Which are still having an impact?

Answer. The impact focused efforts by both Shia death squads and AQI and Sunni insurgents to provoke sectarian violence is still being felt in the greater Baghdad area. The Prime Minister's recent commitments to provide additional ISFs, enforce the law against all violators, not to allow safe havens, and to eliminate political interference should ensure the conditions exist to successfully provide security for the capital while reducing sectarian violence.

Question. You have said that 20th century counterinsurgency efforts typically lasted 9 years.

Do you believe the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq could last as long as 9 years? Could it last even longer?

Answer. Counterinsurgency is an extremely complex form of warfare that, at its core, is a struggle for the support of the population. Progress is measured by effects, not time. I agree that the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq will continue for some time.

"SURGE" OF U.S. TROOPS IN IRAQ

Question. What is your best estimate of how much the surge in troops the President has proposed is going to cost the Army during fiscal year 2007?

Answer. I understand that Army commands and supporting agencies are working now to refine initial estimates. Several major factors are still in play, including additional equipment requirements and final determination of the support force mix, that may be needed to support additional combat brigades. It will also be necessary to augment theater support capabilities to provide for the increased Army and Marine Corps presence.

Question. Can the Army deploy an additional five brigades to Iraq with only about 21,000 additional people, or will additional military, civilian, or contractor support personnel be required on top of the direct increase of 21,000 military personnel?

Answer. Counterinsurgency is an extremely complex form of warfare that, at its core, is a struggle for the support of the population. Progress is measured by effects, not time. I agree that the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq will continue for some time.
Given the Army’s state of readiness, how long do you believe the increased troop levels and operations tempo can be sustained?

Answer. Over the past 4 years the troop levels in Iraq have varied based on conditions on the ground, and we have experienced surge periods before. In December 2004, 20 BCTs provided enhanced security for national elections and again in November 2005, when 19 BCTs enabled the final round of national elections. The current effort to provide five additional BCTs and enablers from the Army represents an additional conditions-based force increase. This effort cannot be indefinitely sustained without increased resources and policy support.

Question. Have you done any planning for the redeployment from Iraq of U.S. forces beyond the surge?

Answer. I believe the Army can sustain the increased force levels in Iraq through the remainder of this fiscal year. We’ve extended several units in Iraq beyond their scheduled rotation dates and we’ve returned units to Iraq with less than 12 months at home station in order to meet the requirements on the ground. However, this pace exacts a toll on the force—on equipment, on soldiers, and on their families. As the President announced, an end strength increase will help; we’ll be able to field additional BCTs over time. Additionally, we’ll continually review and adjust our force generation model to ensure no soldier deploys without the proper training and equipment. The Reserve component (RC) is invaluable as a part of the total force, and I believe recent policy changes on mobilization timelines will also enhance overall readiness.

Question. What are the stages you would envision in such a redeployment?

Answer. When conditions permit and requirements call for fewer BCTs, we would adjust the force flow to redeploy those units whose tours had been extended, while meeting BOG durations (of 1 year) for other deployed units. We would also support dwell times (of 1 year) for units available to deploy from continental United States (CONUS) back into Iraq. I would additionally make a priority of either keeping a brigade in a Reserve status in Kuwait or keeping a brigade in a heightened alert status, prepared to deploy from CONUS, which would give the commander the flexibility needed to address an unexpected escalation of violence. If the requirement for fewer brigades came to pass, we would redeploy forces, or hold forces in CONUS, until we achieved the required number of brigades needed in Iraq. We would also reduce in an appropriate manner combat support, combat service support, headquarters strengths, and contractors. We would shrink our basing footprint to meet the needs of the operational commander. All of this would be a deliberate process synchronized with the transfer of security responsibility to the Iraqis.

Question. In testimony on January 23, Lieutenant General David Petraeus, nominated to become Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, said that he would prefer to accelerate the flow of the five additional combat brigades to Iraq as quickly as possible. The current plan calls for the deployment of roughly one brigade per month through May. Do you believe that this acceleration is practicable? By how much can it reasonably be accelerated?

Answer. The Army has rotated forces into the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) for the past 5 years. Infrastructure and procedures in the AOR, enhanced over time, enable the timely deployment of forces. The Army continuously plans force rotation and prepares next to deploy forces. As such, the BCTs designated to deploy this spring have been preparing for the past 8 to 10 months and are approaching full mission readiness. Accelerating the deployment of these BCTs decreases preparation and training time by 45 to 60 days. As we accelerate, we will not send soldiers without proper training and the best equipment possible. Even with the short timeframe to execute this mission, the Army will be able to execute this reinforcement; and all of the BCTs will receive required training and equipment prior to employment in theater. Further, no accelerated BCT will fall below a 1:1 deployment to dwell ratio. The current schedule of accelerated deployments is feasible and the Army today is on track to meet the required arrival dates established by the theater commander for all four remaining BCTs. The theater commander will decide on any new requirement to further accelerate the force flow. The current plan of deployments represents the most practicable acceleration. The lead time required to provide each BCT with an appropriate mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) precludes deploying faster without increasing risk. U.S. Army Forces Command continues to refine training and equipping schedules to maximize unit readiness for deployment and counterinsurgency operations.

Question. What are the most acute manning, training, equipping, and transportation problems that you see in trying to accelerate the deployment of all five brigades?
Answer. All five BCTs will deploy manned, trained, and equipped to perform their mission. The Army will not deploy any BCTs that are not ready for combat. The Army will deploy all five brigades fully manned. All five BCTs will be trained to perform their assigned mission. The greatest training challenge is available training time prior to deployment. The Army is accelerating the execution of some of the MREs. The Army will use a combination of organic unit equipment, TPE, APS stocks, and cross-leveling to equip the deploying BCTs. All will be equipped to perform their mission before they enter Iraq. The most acute equipping challenge is add-on armor for medium and heavy tactical wheeled vehicles. Units will cross-level as an interim solution until new production can fill the complete requirement. If I am confirmed, I will work to ensure that no soldier deploys to Iraq without adequate force protection equipment. The increased demand for operational equipment will have a longer-term impact on the Army’s equipment retrograde and reset program.

Question. In your view, could accelerating the “surge” of forces reduce our leverage with the Iraqi leaders to keep their military, political, and economic commitments?

Answer. No, it should not. The Government of Iraq is eager to assume greater security responsibility from the coalition and understands the need to make military, political, and economic gains during this period to maintain positive momentum and continue the decrease in violence. The increased flexibility to support Iraqi led stability operations provided by the increased force level of U.S. forces can help establish the conditions necessary for the political process to go forward.

Question. Do you believe that quelling the current level of violence is a necessary condition for a political solution in Iraq?

Answer. Reducing the levels of sectarian violence in the capital is key to our efforts to stabilize Iraq. The central challenge facing us is how we can best apply all of the elements of power to break the cycle of sectarian violence; this must be resolved for us to succeed. Reduction in violence will set the conditions for reconciliation to occur which will, in turn, set the stage for transition of security responsibility to the Government of Iraq and the adaptation of coalition presence within the country.

Question. Do you believe that it is feasible for current and projected U.S. forces in Iraq, in conjunction with available Iraqi forces, to achieve this objective?

Answer. I believe this plan can work. I believe the ISFs, in conjunction with U.S forces assistance, can achieve stability in Iraq. The increase in U.S. forces is a key piece of our new strategy to secure Baghdad. These additional forces will work alongside the ISF to help the Iraqis secure neighborhoods, protect the local population, and ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security that Baghdad needs for recovery and reconciliation. Additionally, Prime Minister Maliki has given us his pledge that political or sectarian interference will not limit Iraqi and American forces in pursuing all those who break the law.

IRAQI SECURITY FORCES

Question. For more than 2 years, you have served as Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq. Prime Minister Maliki asserted that U.S. refusal to provide the ISFs with weapons and equipment hurt their ability to secure Baghdad. Do you agree with the Prime Minister’s assertion?

Answer. No, and we have recently briefed him on the status of equipping his forces. We’ve entered into an agreement on the size, equipment, and capabilities of the ISF with each of Iraq’s three governments and met the obligations consistent with those agreements. We have adequately trained and equipped a 325,000-man security force which I believe will become capable of defending Iraq from internal threats.

Question. What is your view of the state of training and equipping of ISFs and whether they have what they need to meet the military commitments of the Iraqi leaders?

Answer. The objective counterinsurgency and civil security forces are adequately sized, balanced, and equipped to counter Iraq’s internal threat with our support. With continued training and experience they will be capable of independent counterinsurgency operations.

Question. What concerns, if any, do you have about the ability of those units to participate in the execution of the new Baghdad security plan?

Answer. The ISF have demonstrated their increasing capability at the tactical level; however, the synchronization of unit movements, the application of enablers such as aviation and intelligence systems, and the ability to work the full spectrum required to include civil-military operations require additional training. I remain
concerned about the reliability of some of the local and national police. We will watch them carefully.

*Question.* The Iraqi government has agreed to send an additional three Iraqi Army brigades to Baghdad, two of which will apparently be predominately Kurdish.

*Answer.* The forces assigned to each/any operational area, including Baghdad, are determined by a deliberate planning/estimate process. The level of forces currently identified for operations in Baghdad are assessed as being what is required for the tasks, when balanced, militarily and politically, against the need for forces elsewhere within Iraq. This decision is made by the Prime Minister (and Commander in Chief) informed by his principal advisors; both Iraqi and coalition.

*Question.* Do you believe that these units have a greater loyalty to the central government than other units?

*Answer.* I believe these units are loyal to the central government.

*Question.* How do you believe Sunni or Shia Arabs are likely to react to Kurdish troops in their neighborhoods?

*Answer.* All parties will accept the use of Kurdish forces. In the end, if stability is enhanced, the central government will be seen as providing a secure environment, and this is what all sides desire.

*Question.* How do you believe the Mahdi Army is likely to react to Kurdish troops entering Sadr City?

*Answer.* It is not clear Iraqi units will enter Sadr City as part of the Baghdad security plan. If they were to do so, the reaction in Sadr City would likely vary, depending upon the perception of the mission, size and composition of forces used, duration of operations, and reaction to the political situation of the moment.

*Question.* What is your understanding of where Iraqi brigades that are predominately Sunni or Shia are likely to be deployed—among their own sect or the other? What do you see as the implications either way?

*Answer.* The forces that will be employed in Baghdad are a mixture of ethnic groups and religious sects. It is one of the tenets of the Baghdad security plan that the ISF in general must gain the trust and confidence of the Iraqi people. Therefore, it is the intention of Lieutenant Aboud to intermingle all components of the ISF so that together they can be seen as a positive force in providing security.

*Question.* The performance of the Iraqi government has been uneven. The new way forward calls for the ISFs to do more, especially in Baghdad. Are you personally confident that the ISFs can meet this challenge?

*Answer.* I believe the ISF can meet this challenge with our support.

*Question.* Do you believe Prime Minister Maliki can achieve the benchmarks that the President has discussed? Have you seen those benchmarks? If so, please describe them for the committee?

*Answer.* I believe that Prime Minister Maliki will sincerely and aggressively try to achieve the benchmarks. He has also made commitments to ensure the ISF and coalition have the freedoms of action and authority to accomplish their mission.

1. Military commander given all authorities to execute his plan.
2. No political interference in security.
3. No militia controlling local security.
4. Even handed enforcement of the law.
5. No safe havens.

*Question.* In October 2006, the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction released three reports. One found that nearly one of every 25 weapons the U.S. military bought for ISF was missing. A second report found that “significant challenges remain that put at risk” the U.S. military's goal of transferring all logistics operations to the Iraqi defense ministry by the end of 2007. Are you familiar with these reports?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* What actions if any have you taken in response to their findings?

*Answer.* We have had a very positive and productive relationship with many organizations that have helped us assess the status of the train and equip mission to include the Government Accountability Office, SIGIR, and DOD Inspector General. In every case, the recommendations of these groups have been acted upon, and accountability continues to improve. We believe that it is both our aspiration and the aspiration of the MoD and MoI to be largely self-reliant in logistics by the end of 2007 and the 2007 ISF budget is adequate to the task; however, our ability to achieve that is assessed monthly and adapted as necessary.
U.S. OPERATIONS WITH ISFS

Question. What is your understanding of the command and control relationships between American and Iraqi forces in the new Baghdad security plan?
Answer. U.S. forces will operate under U.S. command and support ISF operations in each of the nine districts of Baghdad. They will work closely with the sector brigade commander who will have command of all ISFs in that sector.

Question. Do you have any concerns about these relationships?
Answer. I believe these relationships are adequate but will require close coordination and liaison. The fact that the majority of forces operating in Baghdad have been working together for sometime should assist these relationships. In order to mitigate against potential problems close liaison will be required at all levels of command.

Question. The new Baghdad security plan apparently envisions American units being co-located with Iraqi units spread out over approximately 30 mini-bases throughout Baghdad. What is your understanding of how those forces and the forces which will have to resupply them on a daily basis will be protected?
Answer. Under the Baghdad security plan, coalition forces will establish Joint Security Stations with the Iraqi Army, Iraqi Police, and the Iraqi National Police. The stations are strategically positioned throughout the city to accommodate dispersed, joint patrols, and to provide a CENTCOM and control hub. The establishment of Joint Security Stations includes enhancing force protection and developing essential sustainment and life support packages at each Joint Security Station. Many of the Joint Security Stations are located at existing Iraqi Police Stations. Force protection enhancements will include improvements such as entry control points, external barriers to redirect traffic flows and/or reinforce perimeters, increased protection from indirect fires, and guard posts/towers where required.

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend in the size, structure, number, or operating procedures for U.S. forces embedded with ISFs?
Answer. There is unquestionable linkage between ISF progression and the embedded Transition Team program. The current Transition Team size is insufficient to permit an optimum level of advisement to their respective ISF unit. In recognition of this, Multi-National Forces-Iraq has initiated the enhancement of transition teams to increase their effectiveness while balancing other operational requirements. Based on conditions within each MND’s AOR, primarily relating to the levels of violence and ISF capacity for independent operations, transition teams are undergoing enhancement.

THE MILITIAS AND THE INSURGENTS

Question. What are your views on how the Iraqi government should confront the militias?
Answer. There are numerous militias in Iraq; each has its own goals and motivations. The Iraqi government must make clear that armed groups operating outside the law will not be tolerated. As some militia members will not be interested in reconciling with the Iraqi government, the ISFs will have to deal with them militarily or treat them as criminal elements. In order to deal effectively with these illegal armed groups, the Iraqi government should also engage in substantive dialogue with militia leaders in order to identify their motivations and concerns. The Iraqi government must also provide for militia members in order that they might support their families while being fully reintegrated into civil society.

Question. Do you believe that the Iraqi government is likely to do so in a timely manner?
Answer. The Iraqi government is already confronting militias in order to curtail sectarian violence. As ISFs gain strength and confidence, their ability to confront the militias will improve as well. Success against one group could have a cascading positive effect, and place additional pressure on other illegal armed groups to terminate hostilities. However, success against militias will not be achieved on our timetable, but on Iraq’s.

Question. How effective do you believe the addition of more U.S. troops will be in securing Baghdad if the Iraqi government fails to take effective, timely action to confront the militias?
Answer. Absent a concerted effort by the Iraqi government to curtail militia activity, an increase in U.S. troop strength may reduce sectarian violence in the short-term, but at the cost of increased attacks against coalition forces and reduced confidence in the capabilities and trustworthiness of the ISFs.

Question. There have been some recent news reports that the Shiite political elite are advising Moqtada al Sadr to “lay low”—much as was done after confrontations...
with the U.S. military in Najaf in 2004, and that he and his militia are heeding that call. The fear is that they will simply re-emerge after the so-called surge of U.S. troops is over.

Do you believe this is a real concern, and if so, what should be done about it?

Answer. Shia political and religious leaders are advising Muqtada al-Sadr to rein in his militia and play a constructive role in the political process. These warnings are coming from individuals Sadr respects—and who themselves have concluded past mistakes should not be repeated. Furthermore, we have seen what we assess to be a qualitative difference in the Iraqi government's willingness to take on extremist elements—including al-Sadr's militia.

A situation where al-Sadr's militia attempted to resurge after "laying low" would clearly present a challenge the Iraqi government would need to confront, which is why our current operations must focus on having the ISF emerge as the dominant security force in the country.

Question. What are your views on whether American troops should enter Sadr City, and if so, under what circumstances?

Answer. If we are to provide security for the people of Iraq it is important that we do not allow safe havens for militias or terrorists. As a result American troops already regularly enter Sadr City when operational needs dictate it. I expect this to continue in the future and anticipate that, as further progress is made, American troops will be stationed in Sadr City alongside Iraqi Army and Iraqi NF units.

Question. How do you believe the Mahdi Army or the Iraqi residents of Sadr City would react to American troops entering Sadr City and staying there?

Answer. American troops already enter Sadr City regularly in response to operational needs, which is likely to continue. The Mahdi Army largely follows Muqtada al-Sadr's current public directives to refrain from directly engaging coalition forces entering Sadr City or other predominately Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad. Though we are still assessing the sincerity of recent statements by Sadr City leaders supporting the Baghdad security plan, it is a positive sign residents are willing to work with the Iraqi government to improve their security.

Question. Do you expect to see Sunni insurgents and Shia militia members leaving Baghdad as a result of increased U.S. and Iraqi troop presence?

Answer. We are already seeing it. Sunni extremists such as AQI will likely replicate their response to previous security operations. Their leadership is likely to relocate outside the immediate area of Baghdad to areas northwest and south of Baghdad, leaving lower level fighters in the city to continue high-profile attacks when and where possible against civilians, Shia militias, ISFs, and coalition forces. Sunni resistance fighters are locally based and will attempt to go to ground within their general areas, preparing for future operations following coalition forces departure. We have seen numerous indications Shia militia leaders will leave, or have already left, Sadr City to avoid capture by Iraqi and coalition security forces. The effectiveness of recent detainment operations is likely causing these actions.

Question. If so, do you believe that this could result in a higher level of violence in the rest of the country?

Answer. Robust security operations in Baghdad and a resulting movement of antagonists and weapons into the Baghdad belt areas could result in heightened levels of confrontation in these urban belts. It is unlikely the limited displacement of insurgents and Shia militia from Baghdad will cause a significant increase in violence in other areas of Iraq. Baghdad is the center of gravity. The movement of fighters to foment violence in other areas would diminish capabilities focused on the central struggle. However, to mitigate pressure on militias and extremists in Baghdad and the surrounding areas, other elements within these organizations may increase attacks along the southern lines of communications.

Question. What are your views on how we should address that possibility?

Answer. This is an operational consideration that is addressed in contingency planning prior to commencing operations. Since any significant increase in violence is unlikely to spread beyond the areas surrounding Baghdad, the key is to control lines of communications into and out of Baghdad and as well as to secure the main supply routes, especially those to the south. Increased use of Iraqi Army and national police to protect the lines of communications and establishment of regional reaction forces to respond to threats external to Baghdad are prudent measures to implement. A number of other options could be used to counter the dispersion of violence to areas surrounding the city. These include exerting positive control over entry-exit points and increased patrolling and intelligence collection in areas of concern.
Question. Do you believe that the extended pace and scope of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan create higher levels of strategic risk for the United States based on the availability of trained and ready forces for other contingencies?

Answer. A fundamental challenge impacting Army readiness and strategic depth is the need to establish a proper balance between strategy and resources. Current demands exceed the strategy outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and exceed the resources provided to execute the QDR-based strategy. While the U.S. Army can still meet its commitments in support of approved contingency plans, our concern is with our capacity to provide sufficient next to deploy forces capable of surging to meet other contingency requirements as they arise and to deter potential aggressors. The immediate challenge lies in the readiness of these currently non-deployed, next to deploy forces. The Army’s requirements, particularly to reset, recapitalize, and replace damaged equipment must be fully funded to restore the strategic depth of our Army necessary to respond decisively to potential strategic contingencies. Full, timely, and predictable funding is critical for the Army to sustain the growing global commitments of our force. The recent decision to grow our ground forces and to assure access to the Reserve component will increase the strategic depth to sustain the high levels of demand for Army forces. The size of our Army has a deterrent effect on potential enemies.

If so, how would you characterize the increase in strategic risk in terms of the Army’s ability to mobilize, deploy, and employ a force for a new contingency? In your view, is this level of risk acceptable?

Answer. The current pace of operations has reduced the time between deployments, exacerbated equipment shortfalls that impact nondeployed forces and pre-positioned stocks, and degraded training for full spectrum operations. Currently, Army units focus their training on preparing for counterinsurgency operations. To meet combatant commander’s immediate wartime needs, the Army is pooling equipment from across the force to equip soldiers deploying into harm’s way. This practice continues today, increasing risk to our next to deploy forces and limits our ability to respond to emerging strategic contingencies. The Army continues efforts to operationalize the Reserve component, which includes a large portion of the Army’s key enabling capabilities, to improve our ability to respond to new contingencies. Fully and continuously integrating the Reserve and National Guard balanced capabilities into ongoing operations is critical to our effectiveness and enhances the readiness of non-deployed forces by allowing more time to reset, re-equip, and conduct full spectrum training in order to be prepared for contingency operations at home and abroad. The Department is updating Reserve governance and employment policies in accordance with the Secretary of Defense’s new mobilization policy, to allow for greater access to these forces. These policy goals include managing mobilization on a unit, instead of an individual, basis. The recently completed Chairman’s Risk Assessment provides specific detail to the strategic risk of the military in meeting the National Military Strategy and risk mitigation efforts.

Question. What is the impact of the decision to increase Army forces committed to Iraq on our ability to meet our security obligations in other parts of the world?

Answer. Increasing force commitment to Iraq does have an impact on our capabilities. However, that the Army still has combat capability and will meet its obligations, clearly, we must plan for and address future challenges in this dangerous and uncertain time. I agree with General Schoomaker’s concern about our strategic depth and assessment against many of our contingency plans—it could take longer to execute some of those plans in terms of the timelines that are expected. In such cases, joint capabilities will mitigate those ground force capabilities delayed by the force generation timelines. The approved increase in Army end strength, though not a near-term solution, will help restore this capacity and provide us with a deterrent capability. It should also be noted that the enemies that we face are not ours alone, they threaten many others as well. As such, the Army and the DOD are working hard to build the security capacity of willing partners, through its security cooperation efforts, which in the long-term should enable regional deterrence and greater self-defense.

Question. How and over what period of time, in your view, will increases to Army end strength reduce or mitigate this risk?

Answer. I would refer you to the Chairman’s Risk Assessment for the specifics which are classified. However, as has been publicly announced, the recent decisions by the President and Secretary of Defense to grow our ground forces and to assure access to all components of our force will help to establish the balanced inventory required to meet and sustain demand for Army forces. It will require time and resources to man, train, and equip this force. We must continue to leverage through
building partnership capacity and security cooperation efforts, the development of the security capacity of our global partners. The current plan calls for increasing the size of the Active Army. The complete benefit of this growth will not be realized until the 2012 timeframe. The Army plans to increase both BCTs and key enabling units in our Active component (AC), Army National Guard, and Army Reserve. This growth will expand our rotational pool to 76 BCTs and more than 200 enabling organizations in the operational force of the total Army. Our goal is to provide a continuous supply of BCTs to meet approved global commitments. Our immediate challenge lies in the readiness of the next to deploy and surge forces. Generating whole, cohesive units that are fully manned, trained, and equipped will ensure that they are fully ready for the strategic and operational demands of the combatant commander. This will require a national commitment to sustain predictable resourcing over time and to build our force in a balanced, coordinated fashion while providing adequately for the needs of our All-Volunteer soldiers and their families.

**Question.** What additional actions, in your view, are necessary to reduce or mitigate this strategic risk?

**Answer.** Congressional support for increased total obligation authority for the Army and timely wartime supplemental funding remain key elements of reducing strategic risk. Expansion of the Army, continued transformation, assured access to the Reserve components, recapitalization, and increased funding are some of the key means essential to reducing overall strategic risk. We must be able to harness the other elements of national power to shape the strategic environment and reduce the likelihood of crisis. Fully resourcing our security cooperation activities, increasing the security capacity of strategic partners, strengthening our unity of effort within our interagency, and improving and increasing our Nation’s expeditionary advisory and assistance capabilities are also essential to mitigate strategic risk.

**ROTATION CYCLES/SCHEDULES**

**Question.** The Active Army’s ratio of time spent deployed to time at home station is already approaching 1:1—that is for each year deployed a soldier spends 1 year at home station. The Active Army objective is 1:2 where soldiers can expect to be home for 2 years for each year deployed. The Reserve component objective is 1.5 where soldiers can expect to be home for 5 years for each year deployed. Despite the desired deployed to “dwell” ratio, the increase in forces committed to Iraq is likely to drive this ratio even higher.

What impact do you expect the proposed troop surge in Iraq to have on the so-called “dwell time” of Army soldiers? Is it possible that this surge could drive the Army past the 1:1 level?

**Answer.** Over the past 5 years very few units have not met the 1:1 ratio between rotations, though the Army minimum goal for Active component units at surge is a 1:2 ratio and objective steady state goal it is a 1:3 ratio. Currently, most Active component BCTs as well as combat support and combat service support are averaging about 1:1. Reserve component units have mostly been mobilized only once, so Army National Guard and for Army Reserve rotation goals have not been exceeded. Ultimately, the decision rests with the theater commander to determine his requirements. I understand that the Army is finalizing the force rotation set for the rest of this year and for 2008 in order to ensure that we continue to provide the required capabilities to the combatant commanders. No units in the plus-up will break the 1:1 rotation level. For the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) force rotations for fiscal years 2007–2009, the recent change in mobilization policy for the Reserve component begins to provide to the Army predictable access to required capabilities. During the implementation to resume proportional contributions to the theater some units, particularly Active component BCTs, certain Active component enabling capabilities (military police, engineers, and others) and Reserve component military police and engineers, will be asked to rotate at a ratio that exceeds policy goals. The Army will identify these units as soon as possible in order to maximize time for their training, manning, and equipping. The Army will deploy only trained and ready units.

**Question.** How do you think a deployed to dwell ratio of 1:1 is likely to impact the readiness of deployed and non-deployed units?

**Answer.** When units redeploy from Iraq and Afghanistan, their reset periods at home station are truncated due to the short time before they redeploy next. It increases the challenge to ensure units are reset and trained for their next deployment equipment and people. Stress is increased on soldiers and families.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the impact of the decision to increase Army end strength on the rotation schedule and how long will it take for this impact to make a difference?
Answer. The decision puts us on a path to enhance the depth and breadth of capabilities, yet will require several years, considerable resources, and a sustained national commitment to bring it to fruition. Although it will not immediately alleviate strategic risk as we assess it today, it will better posture us to meet sustained levels of force deployment for the long war. If we grow the Army to 547,000 Active/358,000 ARNG/206,000 USAR, have recurrent, assured access to the Reserve component, rotate at surge with the Active component at 1:2 and the Reserve component at 1:4 with a 12-month Reserve component mobilization (9-month BOG), the Army will be able to generate about the same capacity as with today’s programmed force by fiscal year 2013.

Question. How will the proposed surge impact the ability of the Army National Guard to respond to homeland security and other disaster response missions?

Answer. It is my belief that the surge will not materially impact on the ability of the Army National Guard to respond to missions here at home. The surge is composed primarily of Active component units. One National Guard BCT (1–34th MNARNG) already deployed in theater was extended 120 days as part of the surge but will return home this August. The Guard will continue to be able to support the Southwest Border Mission. The Chief, National Guard Bureau, together with the Army leadership, has committed to the goal of having at least 50 percent of a Governor’s National Guard forces available to respond to State missions.

EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY

Question. Both deploying and non-deploying Active component and Reserve component Army units are training without all their required equipment. Deploying units do not receive some of their equipment until late in their pre-deployment training cycle or as they arrive in theater.

In your view, is deploying additional brigades to Iraq likely to increase the strain on maintenance systems and further reduce equipment availability for training?

Answer. I would agree that additional brigades will increase workload, but we have demonstrated we have the depth of capacity to meet requirements. With adequate funding and lead time, we can leverage our organic capability, public and private partnerships, and contracts to meet these requirements.

Question. Do you believe that the Army has enough equipment to fully support the pre-deployment training and operations of surging units?

Answer. The Army’s number one priority, and one that I would maintain if I am confirmed, is to ensure soldiers going into the warfight have the equipment they need. Units will use a combination of organic unit equipment, theater provided equipment, Army prepositioned stocks, and cross-leveling to equip the deploying BCTs.

Question. What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls for training and operations?

Answer. Due to theater requirements, some equipment is unavailable for units to train with prior to deployment. The most common shortfall occurs with force protection equipment, where equipping solutions are developed to meet specific theater threats, and production of these items go straight into theater to meet demand.

Question. In terms of shortfalls for training items, some key pieces of equipment include uparmored HMMWVs, engineer route clearing equipment, and counter rocket artillery and mortar fire system. In terms of shortfalls for operations, all units are fully equipped to meet operational demands.

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these shortfalls and ensure that units have what they need to train and operate?

Answer. The most important element of ensuring units have what they need is ensuring sufficient, predictable, stable funding. Stable and predictable budgets that are enacted early with distribution of both base and bridge supplemental funding within 30 days of the start of the fiscal year allow us to deliver the right equipment, on-time.

EQUIPMENT REPAIR/RESET

Question. Congress provided the Army with $17 billion in fiscal year 2007 to help with the reset of non-deployed forces and accelerate the repair and replacement of equipment.

What impact do you expect the increased funding to have on the readiness of our ground forces, and how soon do you expect to see this impact?

Answer. Based on what I know now, I believe equipping the force will take time. We must fill the historical holes in our force, transform the Army, and modernize. The $17.1 billion has a minor impact on equipment on hand quantities, and the procurement dollars provided pay back the Reserve component for equipment left in
theater and to replace battle losses. The $17.1 billion has the greatest impact on the equipment serviceability status which is realized when depot and field level reset is completed during the 180 day reset window for redeploying units.

Further, as the $17.1 billion for reset was available at the beginning of the fiscal year, the Army was able to synchronize resources, people, and materiel to align with the flow of equipment from returning units into the reset process. For instance, timely funding has allowed depots to order parts in advance of equipment arrival, thus speeding the reset process.

**Question.** Is it your understanding that our repair depots are operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for reset?

**Answer.** Executing the $17.1 billion reset program does not exceed the maximum capacity of our depots. I understand that the Army’s depots have the capacity and are on track to execute all funding associated with the reset dollars.

As the $17.1 billion for reset was available at the beginning of the fiscal year, the Army was able to synchronize resources, people, and materiel to align with the flow of equipment from returning units into the reset process. For instance, timely funding has allowed depots to order parts in advance of equipment arrival, thus speeding the reset process.

The Army’s organic depots have steadily increased their capability while simultaneously increasing efficiencies. For example, Red River Army Depot, will see work increase from 400 items a month in October 2006 to 700 a month in September 2007. The Anniston Army Depot will increase from 1,000 items a month in October 2006 to 3,000 per month in September 2007.

**Question.** What additional steps do you believe could be taken to increase the Army’s capacity to fix its equipment and make it available for operations and training?

**Answer.** As I indicated previously, I believe that the most important element of ensuring units have what they need is ensuring we have sufficient, predictable, stable, funding. Stable and predictable budgets that are enacted early with distribution of both base and bridge supplemental funding within 30 days of the start of the fiscal year allow us to deliver the right equipment, on-time. The Army needs continued congressional help in passing the 2007 main supplemental funding early this spring to properly sustain the Army.

**Question.** What impact do you believe the President’s proposal to send an additional five brigades to Iraq is likely to have on the pool of equipment available for non-deployed units to train with at home?

**Answer.** The additional brigades will increase the need for equipment as units intensify training for deployment. Some of the deploying units will take equipment with them which will require the Army to realign available equipment for non-deploying units to train with. The Army will need to better manage the equipment to ensure proper distribution.

**Question.** What impact is it likely to have on the ability of Army National Guard units to respond to homeland security and disaster relief missions?

**Answer.** This increase in deployed forces could only affect the Army National Guard’s ability to respond to homeland security and disaster relief missions to the degree that we deploy Army National Guard units. I understand that the Army does not plan to transfer any Army National Guard equipment to other components. However, as demonstrated with last season’s hurricane preparedness, the Army can provide necessary disaster support through mutual aid compacts, equipment loans, and forces from the Active component and Army Reserve components.

### Reserve Deployment and Mobilization

**Question.** In recent years, Reserve Force management policies and systems have been characterized as “inefficient and rigid” and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies. What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve component forces in meeting combat missions?

**Answer.** Today’s Strategic Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) has mandated a transition of the Reserve components of our Army from a Strategic Reserve to an integrated, vital, and resourced Operational Force. Since September 11, the Reserve component has been used judiciously and prudently in support of the global war on terror, both here and abroad, and will continue to help meet the global force requirements given the Army.

**Question.** What is your opinion about the sufficiency of current Reserve Force management policies?

**Answer.** The changes in Reserve component mobilization policy will facilitate consistent access to Reserve component units. Most importantly, these changes will also
provide greater predictability of deployments for our soldiers, their families, and employers.

Question. Do you support assigning any support missions exclusively to the Reserve?

Answer. No. The Reserve component will be routinely assigned directed missions as part of ARFORGEN. The first days of any conflict or contingency response pretty much demands an Active component course of action. Support capabilities are needed across both the Active components and Reserve components. The distribution of what capabilities exist in what components will be the result of carefully developed and coordinated plans.

LOW DENSITY/HIGH DEMAND FORCES

Question. In your professional judgment, how would you address the Army's management of low density units such as military police, civil affairs, and others which are in extremely high demand in this new strategic environment?

Answer. The Army is aggressively rebalancing its formations to reduce structure we do not need, mitigate high-demand/low-density shortfalls, and redistributing soldiers to increase the size of the operating force by reducing the Institutional Army. We've identified well over 100,000 of capabilities to rebalance and have already rebalanced over 57,000 of that. I understand that the Army plans to reduce the Institutional Army from over 104,000 in fiscal year 2003 to 80,000 by fiscal year 2013. The Army must, however, maintain Institutional capacity to generate and sustain the force growth. As a result, we've reduced armor, field artillery, and headquarters to grow the capabilities that you've identified: infantry, special forces, civil affairs, psyops, MPs, MI, engineers. Just as importantly, the Army is changing the way it develops leaders and trains soldiers. The Army is building pentatheletes who can operate in an ambiguous environment and perform a broader range of tasks in addition to their core competencies. They are much more culturally aware, the Army has emphasized language proficiency, moreover broadening our leader's experience through advanced civilian schooling. The cumulative effects of this are leaders equally adept at non-kinetic solutions.

Question. Are there functional changes among the Active components and Reserve components that you believe should be made?

Answer. The Army must continue to balance the force across all three components and maintain recurrent, assured access to the Reserves. Our Reserve components are now an integral part of our operational force. They are organized in modular formations and will be manned, trained, and equipped to deploy. I believe our Army is better integrated today than we have been for a long time. The Army will continue to grow the modular force across all three components to build strategic depth; provide rotational capability for steady state levels; and bring a campaign quality to our Army that will meet the global strategic demands of the long war.

ARMY READINESS

Question. On January 23, General Schoomaker testified before the House Armed Services Committee that Army readiness was even worse now than it was last June. He said: "I testified in June that I had concerns about the strategic depth of the Army. That was about 7 months ago. Since that time, we have increased stress on the Army. We are using the supplemental funding to reset the Army as fast as we can but, there's latency in delivery. We have it moving very quickly, but the delivery is yet to be taken. So my concerns are increased over what they were in June, in terms of what the pressure is on our force, both in terms of dwell time, in terms of equippage, in terms of time available to train and all the rest of it."

Do you share General Schoomaker's assessment that Army readiness has declined over the past 6 months?

Answer. Yes, I do. The forces in theater are the best trained, best led, and best equipped before crossing the berm to execute the combat missions which they have been assigned. However, ensuring units in theater are properly resourced and trained has come at the expense of those units that are not deployed. To meet the combatant commander's immediate needs we have pooled equipment from across the force. Although absolutely necessary to support soldiers deploying into harm's way, this practice has increased the un-readiness in our next-to-deploy forces and limits our ability to respond to emerging strategic contingencies. The 2007 supplemental will arrest the decline of the readiness in the force that General Schoomaker described. However, since that time operational demand has obviously increased and only serves to accentuate the fact that operational demand still exceeds strategy, which still exceeds resources.
Question. To what degree would the proposed surge exacerbate the readiness problems identified by General Schoomaker?
Answer. Intuitively, this increase in demand will exacerbate the stress on soldiers, leaders, families, and equipment. Any shortfalls for units which are deploying will be met using our “pooling concept” to ensure these units can meet their operational missions. More importantly, to actually achieve the surge force levels we must not only accelerate the deployment of five BCTs, but must also extend five BCTs already in Iraq. Finally, the Army must pull forward the deployment of five future BCTs to replace the BCTs that were accelerated in the rotation plans.

Question. Do you believe the current state of Army readiness is acceptable?
Answer. I am concerned that the operational demand continues to exceed the QDR strategy and available resources. America’s Army remains at war and we will be fighting this war for the foreseeable future.

Question. How do you see the war in Iraq and operations in Afghanistan impacting the readiness of Army forces that may be called upon to respond to an attack or other incident or disaster inside the United States?
Answer. It is my understanding that the National Guard Bureau, working with the Governors and State Adjutants General, have identified the baseline equipment requirements so each State’s units are capable of meeting their homeland defense and homeland security requirements. Additionally, the Army leadership has request $20 billion over the program to ensure the Army National Guard is properly equipped to respond to an attack or other incident or disaster inside the United States.

PERMANENT BASES IN IRAQ

Question. Last year’s defense authorization and appropriation acts prohibited the use of funds to establish permanent bases in Iraq.
Do you agree with that prohibition, or do you think the United States should reserve the right to seek permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq?
Answer. Yes, I agree with the Iraq basing prohibition on permanent facilities.

Question. If you agree, what are your views on the construction of any additional facilities inside Iraq for use by our military forces?
Answer. All current U.S. funded facilities and infrastructure for coalition forces in Iraq are of temporary construction, as directed by CENTCOM policy. It is built to a “good enough” standard which I have consistently instructed all OIF commands and construction agents to implement. The plus up of forces may require the construction of additional facilities. If necessary, these will be temporary in nature and built to the same “good enough” standard.

JOINTNESS OF ARMY–MARINE CORPS OPERATIONS

Question. For the past several years, the Army and Marine Corps have had separate areas of responsibility in Iraq, with Marine forces assigned to the Anbar province.
Do you believe the Army and Marine Corps forces operating in Iraq have an appropriate degree of jointness?
Answer. Unequivocally yes. U.S. and coalition forces are planning and conducting joint operations everyday spanning from the platoon to MNF-I level throughout Iraq. Fundamental to all military operations is a clear delineation of three dimensional boundaries. While the land boundaries of MND–W may appear to specify a Marine only operation, I assure you they operate jointly incorporating multiple USA BCTs, USAF CAS and multiple Service and Interagency Special Operations Forces and Information, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets.

END STRENGTH INCREASES

Question. The President recently announced the administration’s intent to increase the Army’s end strength by 65,000 soldiers. First, the administration intends to make permanent the 30,000 temporary increase in end strength now in effect. Second, the administration intends to add 35,000 new soldiers over the next 5 years, including an additional 6,000 new soldiers in 2007; 7,000 additional new soldiers per year through 2011; and 1,000 additional new soldiers in 2012.
What is your understanding of why the Department is now proposing a permanent increase in end strength that it has resisted in the recent past?
Answer. General Schoomaker asked for permission to grow by 30,000 and Congress supported it. The Army has taken advantage of that temporary authority given in National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2005 to grow its Active Force by 30,000—we are currently at 505,4k and are now on a ramp toward 518,000 by the end of fiscal year 2007. The Army has received considerable
support to execute current operations, to reset our forces, to rebalance our components, and to build a modular Army. However, the demand has exceeded both the “supply” posited in the strategy, and the resources provided. We will need continued support to close the gap between requirements and resources, particularly as we maintain an extraordinarily high operational pace while growing the Army. The decision by the President and the Secretary of Defense to grow the ground forces will build the strategic depth and capacity necessary to meet the global demands of the long war.

Question. In your view, are the administration’s proposed end strength increases achievable in the timeframe stated?

Answer. Yes. The Army will get to 518,000 in the Active component by the end of fiscal year 2007. I understand that the Army will be able to meet a recruiting goal of 80,000, and the additional Military Occupation Skill goal of over 3,000. The Army will grow by at least 7,000 each year over the next 5 years on a ramp to achieve an end strength of 547,400 by fiscal year 2012.

Question. Is it your understanding that these increases are consistent with the Army’s requests?

Answer. Yes, this end strength increase is consistent with the Army’s request, particularly with respect to growth in its operating force.

Question. To what extent do you believe the Army will have to rely on stop loss to achieve the increases in end strength?

Answer. The Army does not rely on stop loss to achieve the strength increase. We use targeted stop loss to ensure unit cohesiveness in combat zones. Approximately 1 percent of the total force is affected by stop loss and only for a finite time period. I understand the Army is currently reviewing its use of stop loss at the request of Secretary Gates. The Department’s initial assessment is that accessions of 1,500 per year will be needed if targeted stop loss is terminated.

Question. Has the Army conducted a comprehensive and forward-looking assessment of its end strength requirements? If so, please describe the assessment, its assumptions, and its conclusions.

Answer. I am confident that the Army has been and will continue to be forward looking in determining its force structure. We have a mature analytical process that’s based on strategic direction from the National Military Strategy, from OSD, and the Joint Staff. It builds toward future requirements at the end of the program and beyond. The process is adaptive, however, to rebalance capabilities to meet operational demands. The underlying assumption was the requirement to fight two major combat operations, nearly simultaneously with one a win—decisively; and the other a swiftly defeat the effort. During QDR it was determined that a force designed to support 70 BCTs was sufficient. This enabled the Army to provide 18–19 BCTs per rotation to meet global demands.

The recent assessment by the Joint Staff that the Army’s enduring requirement to provide up to 23 BCTs to meet strategic, global demand requires continued growth to 76 BCTs and the growth of requisite combat, combat support, and combat service support units to provide operational and strategic flexibility. This capacity is needed to sustain the long war.

Question. What is your understanding of the estimated steady-state annual costs of increasing the Army’s end strength to 547,400 as proposed by the administration?

Answer. My best estimate is $8.2 billion, which includes both the increased cost to military pay and operations and maintenance.

Question. Historically, increasing operating and personnel costs often crowd out spending for modernization programs. If confirmed as Chief of Staff, would you be prepared to recommend curtailing or cancelling modernization programs to pay for this increase in end strength?

Answer. If I am confirmed, my role as Chief of Staff will be to provide ready forces to combatant commanders. Those forces must be ready today and in the future. My commitment is to apply my judgment to maintain that balance and provide ready forces consistent with resources provided.

Question. If not, where do you anticipate the additional resources would come from?

Answer. If confirmed, my role as Chief of Staff is to provide ready forces to combatant commanders. Those forces must be ready today and in the future. My commitment is to apply my judgment to maintain that balance and provide ready forces consistent with resources provided.

Question. Do you believe that this end strength increase would continue to be needed even if our deployment of troops to Iraq ends or is significantly reduced, or do you believe that this increase is driven in significant measure by our troop requirements in Iraq?
Answer. I believe that the end strength increase must continue. The future security environment is dangerous and uncertain and the Nation must continue support to the long war; increase commitment to security cooperation; increase deterrence in key areas of the world; reduce the deployment stress on the force; and to fully prepare for future challenges. Both the superior capabilities and the size of the force combine to enable sustained global engagement, deterrence, and response in order to fully protect national interests, prevent aggression, and prevail when called upon. The Army Campaign plan to develop and field capable units and systems is producing the optimum mix of land capabilities for the joint force; it is both affordable and essential for the Nation in order to win the war today and prepare for an uncertain future. Joint ground forces are proving to be the primary military instrument for creating favorable and enduring security conditions in many crisis regions around the world. Presence, or BOG, sends a message of commitment and intent to our potential adversaries. Since 1989, the Army has supported 43 joint operations, many of which require a continuous rotation of forces to support our allies and attain the desired national strategic effects.

The Army is on a very much needed acceleration plan to grow six new BCTs and enabling organizations in our Active component and other key enabling organizations in our Army National Guard and Army Reserve. This will expand our rotational pool to 76 BCTs and more than 200 enabling organizations in the operational force of the total Army. Our goal is to provide a continuous supply of BCTs and key enabling capabilities to meet approved global commitments. Today, the Nation has over 258,000 American soldiers deployed in 89 countries engaged in deterrence operations, theater security cooperation, and joint and multi-national operations in support of national strategic objectives. Joint ground forces bear the heaviest burden fighting simultaneous campaigns, primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq. Over 740,000 Active and Reserve soldiers have served overseas in support of the Nation’s war on terrorism. Active component BCTs deploy to combat at a rate of 1 year deployed for 1 year training at home station. This accelerated pace of deployment is 1 full year faster than the Army’s surge goal of 1 year deployed for 2 years training at home station and 2 years faster than our sustainable steady state rate. We must reduce this stress on the force by building our strategic depth. The end strength increase, coupled with assured Reserve component access is critical to achieve a steady state that affords predictability and sustainable deployment effort for our soldiers. Completion of the 76 BCT and 200 plus enabling units will provide a sustainable supply of military capabilities that meet the requirements of worldwide Joint Force Commanders now and in the future.

RECRUITING

Question. The ability of the Army to recruit highly qualified young men and women is influenced by many factors and is critical to the success of the All-Volunteer Force.

What do you consider to be the most important elements of successful recruiting for the Army?

Answer. The most important elements for recruiting success are the support of the Nation’s citizens and Congress in providing the soldiers and resources required to maintain our ability to guard our freedom against those who desire otherwise. Successful recruiting for the Army requires us to recruit qualified men and women in the numbers required to man our units.

Question. What are the Army’s recruiting goals for fiscal years 2007 and 2008? Have these goals been adjusted in light of the increased end strength?

Answer. The recruiting missions for fiscal years 2007 and 2008 will remain 80,000. In fiscal year 2007, we have an additional requirement to support the acceleration of two BCTs. We anticipate this MOS precision requirement will result in a mission over-achievement of 3,000 to 4,000. Given the current planning assumptions and manpower models, these recruiting goals support the increased end strength goal for 2012.

Question. What is your assessment of the Army’s ability to reach its Active-Duty recruiting goal in fiscal years 2007 and 2008?

Answer. Recruiting an All-Volunteer Force will continue to be a challenge due to high employment rates, the improving economy, the decreasing qualified market, and the war. Given continued congressional support and funding, however, the Army can achieve the mission.

Question. Is it your understanding that the Army will have to change its enlistment standards to achieve these recruiting goals?

Answer. The ability to meet and maintain the DOD quality marks (90 percent HSDG/60 percent Mental Category I–IIIA/≤4 percent Category IV) in the current
and future recruiting market will be the greater challenge. The Army has and will continue to implement measures to reduce this challenge through programs and policies that lower attrition rates, increase the potential market, and utilize creative incentives. However, the Army will only enlist soldiers who are qualified and volunteer to serve this Nation.

**Question.** What is your view about the appropriate assignment and overall numbers, if any, of “Category IV” recruits in the Army, i.e., those individuals who score below the 31st percentile on the Armed Forces Qualification Test?

**Answer.** As with all recruits, the Army assigns “Category IV” recruits to military occupational specialties that they are qualified to fill. The Category IV issue is a question of “trainability”. The Army has and will continue to implement measures to reduce this challenge and prepare all soldiers for future combat and duty requirements. These soldiers, when properly trained and led, are fully capable of supporting and defending the Nation. I do not see the Army exceeding the current DOD standard of 4 percent even though the congressional limit is 20 percent.

**Question.** What is your understanding of trends in the Army with respect to incidents of recruiter sexual misconduct with potential recruits?

**Answer.** Any recruiter misconduct is unacceptable. Recruiters are the first to contact this country’s most sacred and precious resource—the men and women who volunteer to serve in the Armed Forces of this great country. Sexual misconduct, with or without consent, is not and never has been acceptable. We will continue to take the appropriate action against those few who believe that they can use their position for personal gain. We have zero tolerance for this type of conduct. The recruiting leadership reviews reports of recruiter conduct and establishes policies to prevent this and other forms of misconduct.

**Question.** If confirmed, what actions, if any, would you take to prevent such incidents?

**Answer.** Sexual misconduct in the recruiting process or in the Army is unacceptable—as it is in the rest of American society. For the Army, the consequences can be far more damaging to unit effectiveness; commanders at all levels through values based education and corrective action to enforce the standards. If I am confirmed, I will act to implement policies that decrease the possibilities of this type of misconduct. I support the use of all processes, administrative and judicial, against those who willing choose to commit these acts of misconduct.

**MOBILIZATION AND DEMOBILIZATION OF NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES**

**Question.** In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, the National Guard and Reserves have experienced their largest and most sustained employment since World War II. Numerous problems have been identified in the past in the planning and procedures for mobilization and demobilization, including inadequate health screening and medical readiness monitoring, antiquated pay systems, limited transitional assistance programs upon demobilization, and medical holdovers. What is your assessment of advances made in improving mobilization and demobilization procedures, and in what areas do problems still exist?

**Answer.** Mobilization processes are vastly improved since 2001. The Army has automated its mobilization request process. These efforts are responsible for alerts/notifications that are occurring 90–180 days in advance of mobilization and ensure that individual orders are in the hands of soldiers at least 45 days prior to their mobilization date. The objective of the Army in ARFORGEN FOC is that units will be alerted 1 year in advance of possible mobilization. The recent change in Reserve component mobilization policy will enable unit versus individual mobilization and enhance cohesion. There are now significant efforts that are underway to move a great deal of training from a post-mobilization timeframe to the left of the mobilization date. This will require additional training and resources to be made available to Reserve component units in the year prior to a potential mobilization.

**Question.** What do you consider to be the most significant enduring changes to the organization and policies affecting the Reserve components aimed at ensuring their readiness for future mobilization requirements?

**Answer.** A key to success for ensuring our Reserve components are ready for future mobilizations is to provide sufficient equipment and resources, especially in the year prior to mobilization. With Congress’ continued assistance, the Army can provide Reserve component forces that are in a higher state of readiness upon mobilization to execute missions around the world.

**INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE RECALL POLICY**

**Question.** A July 2006 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) recommended that the Army revitalize its Individual Ready Reserve
(IRR) program by culling existing IRR databases and ensuring that the Army has valid contact information on IRR members who may be recalled to serve.

What has the Army done to clarify the mobilization policy that applies to both officer and enlisted members of the IRR?

**Answer.** The Army’s concept plan for increased IRR readiness centers on the IRR Transformation Plan which was approved for execution in November 2005 by the Secretary of the Army. Programmed initiatives are:

- Changing the culture of the IRR,
- Managing individual expectations, and
- Improving readiness reporting.

Additionally, the execution of a DOD IRR Decision Point Policy mandates the removal, within 2 years, of IRR officers who have fulfilled their Military Service Obligation (MSO) unless they positively elect to remain in the IRR. To date approximately 4,000 or more soldiers have been transferred to the inactive status list and ultimately separated. Culling these programmed initiatives and aligning the IRR with the Army Force Generation Model—Reset/Train; Ready; Available, adds more predictability in mobilization rotations. These model enforces positive contact, refresher training as individual skills degrade, and ensures the deployable readiness of the IW.

**Question.** What has the Army done to update its IRR mobilization database?

**Answer.** The Army has two primary transformation initiatives which are data reconciliation and establishing a control IRR population. These initiatives address methods to reset the force by conducting a systematic screening of all data records; determine disposition of individuals; and process for final resolution those soldiers who no longer have further potential for useful military service if mobilized by a recommendation for separation. The Human Resources Command processed over 17,000 existing bad addresses through a credit bureau agency to provide last known addresses of soldiers. Additionally, the Human Resources Command has identified non-mobilization assets that includes soldiers passed over for promotion, with security violations, physical disqualifications, documented hardship, and adverse characterizations of service. Where appropriate, these soldiers are being separated. Through these efforts the current IRR population of 82,000 has been reduced by 25 percent and could potentially be reduced down to approximately 60,000 soldiers.

**SUPPORT FOR SEVERELY WOUNDED SOLDIERS**

**Question.** Improved body armor and combat casualty care have enabled many thousands of soldiers to survive wounds received in OIF and OEF. As a result far more soldiers survive with injuries which, in previous conflicts, would have resulted in death.

What are your views on the Army’s commitment and responsibility for severely injured members and their families?

**Answer.** Our Army is committed to and accepts the responsibility for our severely wounded warriors and their families. In April 2004, the Army established the U.S. Army Wounded Warrior (AW2) program. AW2’s guiding principle is part of our Army’s Warrior Ethos, “I Will Never Leave a Fallen Comrade”.

Wounded warriors who are not part of the AW2 program have access to robust resources and an array of support, from our hospitals, the Army Career and Alumni Program, Army Emergency Relief, Veterans Affairs, and a myriad of community support programs. These great American heroes will also benefit from the recently opened Center for the Intrepid at Brooke Army Medical Center, Fort Sam Houston, TX.

Our Army is committed, and I am personally committed, to caring for our severely wounded warriors and their families who have sacrificed selflessly for our Army and our Nation.

**Question.** What suggestions do you have for improving the Army’s support for severely wounded soldiers?

**Answer.** The AW2 program has grown and will continue to expand as needed to accommodate our wounded warriors, placing more soldier Family Management Specialists in Military Medical Treatment Facilities and Veterans Affairs Medical Centers as the need arises. I believe that the Army must continue to make this a high priority and if I am confirmed, I will work to ensure it is resourced appropriately.

The AW2 program began with 2 soldier family management specialists and now currently has 43 on board. The AW2 program has a soldier family management specialist at 16 Veterans Affairs Medical Centers and at 8 military medical treatment facilities. Two more soldiers family management specialists are planned at other military medical treatment facilities and five more are planned at additional Veterans Affairs Medical Center.
**Question.** Section 588 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005 contains a provision intended to ensure that other than appropriate medical review and physical disability evaluation, there should be no barrier in policy or law to an opportunity for a highly motivated member to return to Active-Duty following rehabilitation from injuries incurred in military service.

How would you assess the Army’s compliance with this provision to date?

**Answer.** Our Army supports the provisions of NDAA 2005 regarding allowing our highly motivated wounded warriors to return to serve on Active-Duty.

We recognize the value of keeping the expertise and experience of our severely wounded warriors in our Army. We have made business process and regulatory changes to assist these highly motivated warriors to stay in the fight. The first priority for our severely wounded warriors and their families is their recovery and rehabilitation. After treatment, our warriors are afforded the opportunity to remain on active-Duty, should they so desire.

The Army develops a 5-year plan that encompasses all aspects of the severely wounded warrior’s life and career such as: location of assignment, professional schools, duties, and health care access for their particular needs—focused on a professionally and personally fulfilling career.

**Question.** If confirmed, would you continue to support the efforts of members who wish to return to Active-Duty following recovery and rehabilitation from injuries received in military service?

**Answer.** Support for our wounded warriors is and would remain a top priority. We take care of our wounded heroes. The AW2 program’s vision is that our wounded warriors and their families become self-sufficient, contributing members of our communities; living and espousing the Warrior Ethos, knowing our Army and Nation remembers.

**MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENTS IN IRAQ**

**Question.** The Army’s mental health assessment teams have completed three comprehensive assessments of the immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S. soldiers in the Iraq theater. The most recent study, MHAT III, found that overall levels of combat stressors are increasing. In sum, increasing numbers of troops are returning with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), depression, and other mental health issues. According to the Army’s MHAT III report, the Armed Forces Medical Examiner also reported 22 suicides by Army soldiers in Iraq in calendar year 2005—a rate nearly twice that reported for the previous year.

What do you see as the greatest challenges being faced by the Army in terms of identifying and meeting mental health needs of soldiers and their families?

**Answer.** I understand that the Army has implemented most of the recommendations of the MHAT reports, including the further redistribution of mental health staff to provide uniform coverage and the further development of suicide prevention efforts in theater. However several challenges remain. We need to ensure access to care, and reduce stigma associated with behavioral health treatment. Availability of mental health professionals remains a national problem and this shortage effects the Army’s ability to recruit and retain these professionals and it effects TRICARE’s ability to expand networks of civilian mental health providers. Training our soldiers, leaders, and families on the long-term signs of stress-related behavioral disorders is the best way to combat stigma and ensure that soldiers who need help seek help.

If confirmed, I would fully support the development of innovative training programs for soldiers, families, and leaders that address this important issue.

**Question.** If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to ensure the adequacy of mental health resources both in the theater and in CONUS for U.S. soldiers and their families?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would continue to support the existing programs developed by the Army and DOD. The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER) and The Army Surgeon General (TSG) share responsibility for the prevention and screening for PTSD for both Active component and Reserve component soldiers. The DCSPER manages the Deployment Cycle Support Program aimed at soldiers and family members and TSG has policy oversight of the Combat and Operational Stress Control program aimed at soldiers serving in the global war on terror. TSG also has command responsibility for behavioral health services at Army medical treatment facilities around the world providing treatment for all Army beneficiaries. I also will continue to support the continued development and expansion of new programs such as Battlemind training and the Respect.MIL program. Battlemind provides scenario-based training for soldiers and families in all phases of the deployment cycle. Respect.MIL trains primary care providers to diagnose PTSD and other combat stress problems and manage treatment of those disorders.
in the primary care clinic, improving access and further reducing the stigma associated with seeking behavioral health care.

**Question.** According to the MHAT III study, fewer soldiers report that they received sufficient training to identify other soldiers at risk for suicide. If confirmed, what actions will you take to reassess the adequacy of suicide prevention programs within the Army?

**Answer.** An updated suicide prevention program has already been implemented, which has numerous initiatives. The DCSPER is revising suicide prevention training and planning in direct response to this MHAT finding. There will be specific education provided during initial entry training and throughout the soldier’s tenure in the Army. If confirmed, I will continue to support these initiatives. One of the major emphases of the revised training is the importance of taking care of one’s buddies. Small unit leaders must encourage help-seeking behaviors, recognize warning signs of suicidal behavior, and refer for care if needed. The most common motives for suicide in our soldiers are difficulties in intimate relationships, and occupational/legal/financial difficulties. Leaders must consider a referral to the chaplains, combat stress control teams or other behavioral health specialists anytime they see a soldier struggling with these problems.

**Question.** Based on your experience in theater, what additional resources do you think are necessary to prevent suicides in the Army?

**Answer.** The Army’s senior leaders are already behind the push to decrease stigma and improve access to behavioral health care. However, there is no simple solution to decreasing the suicide rate. Army’s behavioral health providers are very busy, but they rely on soldiers seeking help or the soldier’s buddies or chain of command recognizing symptoms and intervening to get the soldier help. Our health care providers are supplemented by chaplains, counselors, and TRICARE network providers. The Army needs to keep doing everything possible to recruit and retain military behavioral healthcare providers and seeking additional authorities to enhance retention when necessary. If confirmed, I would also encourage civilian providers to join the TRICARE network to demonstrate their support for the sacrifices our soldiers and families make on behalf of the Nation.

**OFFICER SHORTAGES**

**Question.** A report issued by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in July 2006 found that the Army projects an officer shortage of nearly 3,000 in fiscal year 2007, with the most acute shortfalls in the grades of captain and major with 11 to 17 years of service. Unless corrective action is taken, CRS found that shortages will persist through 2013 unless accessions are increased and retention improves. What is your understanding of the reasons for the current shortfall, and what steps is the Army taking to meet this mid-career officer shortfall?

**Answer.** The current shortfall of officers is a result of the rapid increase in force structure (modularity and end strength increases). Since 2002, the Army has grown over 8,000 officer positions; roughly 88 percent of this growth is in the ranks of senior captain and major. Since it takes 10 years to grow/develop a major, to grow the officer force we need to retain more of our “best and brightest” officers and increase our officer accessions.

**Question.** If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure adequate numbers of highly qualified captains and majors are serving on Active-Duty over the next 10 years?

**Answer.** The Army is continuing to explore other options for retaining more of our best officers. Some of these options include offering captains who are completing their initial Active-Duty service an officer critical skills retention bonus of $20,000 in exchange of 4-years of Active-Duty service. The Army is also preparing policy to implement provisions in existing law that will enable lieutenant colonels and colonels to serve an additional 5-years past their Mandatory Retirement Date (MRD) as long as they haven’t reach age 62. The Army expects this policy to be published within the next couple of months and is confident that it will be able to meet future manning needs.

**MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION**

**Question.** The Army is facing significant shortages in critically needed medical personnel in both Active components and Reserve components. The committee is concerned that growing medical support requirements, caused by the stand-up of BCTs, potential growth of the Army, and surge requirements in theater, will compound the already serious challenges faced in recruitment and retention of medical, dental, nurse, and behavioral health personnel. Moreover, the committee under-
stands that the Army continues to direct conversion of military medical billets to civilian or contractor billets.

Will you assure the committee that, if confirmed, you will undertake a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army, incorporating all new requirements for 2008 and beyond?

Answer. I fully support a quality medical force that can meet the Army's medical readiness requirements and can maintain our commitment of quality health care for Army families and retirees. If confirmed, I will support a comprehensive assessment of current Army manpower strategies on medical military/civilian conversion to ensure these plans remain relevant to bolstering Army operational readiness, and further, are in sync with plans to grow Army end strength.

Question. What policy and/or legislative initiatives do you think are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to fulfill medical support requirements as its mission and end-strength grow?

Answer. Critical to our success are adequate and appropriate funding for necessary recruitment programs such as Active and Reserve Health Professions Loan Repayment Program, Health Professions Scholarship Program, Specialized Training Assistance Program for Medical and Dental School Stipends Program, and the other Accession Bonus programs all of which we have current legislative authority. As we develop Army wide initiatives to retain our quality and battle hardened soldiers, we must ensure that the Army Medical Department requirements are met. Elimination or modification of the 8-year MSO, replaced with a more flexible scale, will assist us in the recruiting efforts of qualified medical professionals. We need a comprehensive review of the Medical Special Pays and should consider restructuring our current system to include all health care providers. This will be fundamental toward eliminating the shortages experienced in our Dental and Nurse Corps. Legislative initiatives which provide greater flexibility to transfer between Army components must be explored and enhanced. This is especially true with regard to the currently required scrolling process. The current process has created impediments to the rapid accession of health care professionals into all components of our force. Our civilian workforce has become increasingly important as the medical force is reshaped. Adequate and appropriate funding is needed to support the backfill of converted military billets.

NATIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL SYSTEM

Question. Congress enacted broad changes in the DOD civilian personnel system in 2004 to provide the Department with more flexible tools for the management of its civilian workforce in support of our national security. Although the Department is presently enjoined from implementation of a new labor-relations system, the Department is planning to move ahead in the implementation of a new pay-for-performance system for its non-union employees.

Based on your experience, what are the critical factors for successful implementation of a total transformation of workforce policies and rules, including performance-based pay?

Answer. Among the factors I consider critical are leadership commitment and support and an educated and knowledgeable workforce. The Army must focus on a pay for performance system that is consistent, fair, equitable, and recognizes our top performers. The Army has successfully completed the first performance management payout which has demonstrated a clear linkage between employee performance and organizational goals. The Army's approach includes an incremental deployment schedule that allows supervisors and employees to be adequately trained and the application of lessons learned from earlier workforce conversions. If I am confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that the Army workforce is trained and ready for this new system.

Question. If confirmed, how would you monitor the acceptance of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) and what role would you expect to play in managing the NSPS implementation in the Army?

Answer. I strongly support the need for transformation in civilian management—particularly pay for performance—and will set that tone for the leadership in the Army as we implement NSPS. The Army has established an NSPS Program Management Office that recommends Army NSPS policy, provides guidance, monitors implementation, and will keep me informed of progress and any issues that require my attention. In addition to the inclusion of NSPS-specific questions in Army's annual workforce survey, on-site evaluations to assess program effectiveness are being performed which will provide additional implementation feedback and lessons learned. Finally, Army is leading the way in the monitoring of NSPS DOD-wide. Our Civilian Personnel Evaluation Agency has been designated by DOD to evaluate
the NSPS performance management system for deployment to the entire Department.

MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE

Question. The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward thinking management of senior executives.

What is your vision for the management and development of the Army senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and technical fields?

Answer. I support the Secretary of the Army’s approach to Senior Executive Service (SES) management within the Army and share his vision of a senior civilian workforce that possesses a broad background of experiences that will have prepared them to move between positions to meet the continually changing mission needs of the Army. I recognize the value of our senior workforce, and if I am confirmed, I will be committed to providing for the professional development and management of civilian executives in ways similar to the management of Army General Officer Corps. If I am confirmed, I would support the Secretary’s goals to strengthen the senior executive corps contributions to leadership team and to promote and sustain high morale and esprit de corps within our civilian workforce.

SEXUAL ASSAULT

Question. On February 25, 2004, the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Personnel conducted a hearing on policies and programs of the DOD for preventing and responding to incidents of sexual assault in the Armed Forces at which the Service Vice Chiefs endorsed a “zero tolerance” standard. Subsequently, in response to congressional direction, the Department developed a comprehensive set of policies and procedures aimed at improving prevention of and response to incidents of sexual assaults, including appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault.

What is your understanding of the practices currently in use in the Army to ensure awareness of and tracking of the disposition of reported sexual assaults?

Answer. Since 2004, the Army has implemented a comprehensive Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program. A key element of this program is the awareness training developed and taught at every level of the Army’s institutional training—from initial entry to the Army War College. Additionally, unit refresher training is an annual requirement for all Army units. Also, as part of this program, the Army collects and analyzes selected sexual assault incident data, which is provided for quarterly and annual reports to DOD for consolidation into the Secretary of Defense annual report to Congress.

Question. What progress has been made in ensuring that adequate numbers of sexual assault victim advocates are available in Army units worldwide?

Answer. The Army has taken significant steps to improve the assistance to victims of all sexual assaults, with enhanced recognition of the special circumstances that apply to deployments. A key element of the Army’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program is the victim advocacy component which is led by Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARCs) at every Army installation. These SARCs are supported by a cadre of full-time, professional Victim Advocates or appointed Unit Victim Advocates (UVA) who interact directly with victims of sexual assault.

Additionally, Deployable SARCs (DSARCs) and UVA provide advocacy services in a deployed environment. DSARCs are soldiers trained and responsible for coordinating the sexual assault prevention and response program (as a collateral duty) in a specified area of a deployed theater. Army policy requires one deployable SARC at each brigade level unit and higher echelon, UVA are soldiers trained to provide victim advocacy as a collateral duty while deployed. Army policy requires two UVA for each battalion sized unit.

Question. If confirmed, what oversight role would you expect to play?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure compliance with established policies and procedures at all levels of command, including those in the Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserves.

RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE ARMY

Question. What is your assessment of policies within the Army aimed at ensuring religious tolerance and respect?

Answer. I believe that Army regulations provide commanders and other leaders ample guidance regarding the free exercise of religion, religious tolerance, and respect in the Army. AR 600–20, Army Command policy; AR 165–1, Chaplain Activi-
ties in the United States Army; and DOD directive 1300.17, Accommodation of Religious Practices Within the Military Services, provide detailed guidance on the important responsibilities of commanders and leaders in this regard. It is my understanding that these policies are consistent with the Constitution and I believe they foster religious tolerance and respect within our Army.

WOMEN IN COMBAT

Question. Section 541 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2006 required the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress on his review of the current and future implementation of the policy regarding assignment of women in combat. In conducting the review, the Secretary of Defense is directed to closely examine Army unit modularization efforts and associated personnel assignment policies to ensure their compliance with the DOD policy on women in combat that has been in effect since 1994.

What is your view of the appropriate combat role for female soldiers on the modern battlefield?

Answer. The study requested by Congress and underway within the DOD will help the Department understand the implications for, and feasibility of, current policies regarding women in combat, particularly in view of the Army's transformation to a modular force and the irregular, non-linear nature of battlefields associated with today's conflicts.

It is my understanding that the Army's transformation to modular units is expected to be based on the current policy concerning the assignment of women. Women have and will continue to be an integral part of our Army team, performing exceptionally well in all specialties and positions open to them. Women make up about 14 percent of the Active Army, 23 percent of the Army Reserve, and 13 percent of the Army National Guard. Approximately 10 percent of the forces deployed in support of the global war on terrorism are women soldiers. Today, almost 13,000 women soldiers—10 percent of the force—are serving in Iraq and Afghanistan.

These women, like their male counterparts and the Army's civilians, are serving honorably, selflessly, and courageously. If confirmed, I would ensure that the Army complies with laws and regulations in this matter.

Question. In your opinion, is the current and planned future Army personnel assignment policy for women consistent with the DOD ground combat exclusion policy in effect since October 1994?

Answer. The Army completed a thorough review of our policy late in 2005. The Secretary of the Army determined that our policy is consistent with that of DOD. I agree with the Secretary's assessment.

Question. How do you anticipate you will participate in the review of the policy required by section 541?

Answer. The OSD has undertaken to complete the comprehensive review requests by this committee and Congress. It is an important study of complex issues critical to the Department. The Army will support the OSD to complete this review. The Army, DOD, and Congress must work closely together on this issue. If confirmed, I will endeavor to provide the Secretary with cogent advice regarding implementation of this policy. If in the future the Army determines that there is a need to seek a change to the policy, I will, if confirmed, comply fully with all notification requirements in title 10, U.S.C.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRANSFORMATION ROADMAP

Question. A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by the Department on March 30, 2005, directed a series of actions aimed at transforming the Department's foreign language capabilities, to include revision of policy and doctrine, building a capabilities based requirements process, and enhancing foreign language capability for both military and civilian personnel.

What is your understanding of steps being taken within the Army to achieve the goals of the Defense Language Transformation roadmap?

Answer. The Army is actively engaged in all 43 tasks identified in the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap and has undertaken many initiatives to achieve the roadmap goals of: 1) Create Foundational Language and Regional Area Expertise; 2) Create the Capacity to Surge; 3) Establish a Cadre of Language Professionals and Address Language Requirements at Lower Skill Levels; and 4) Establish a Process to Track the Accession and Career Progression of Military Personnel with Language Skill and Foreign Area Officers.

Question. What is your assessment of an appropriate time frame within which results can be realized in this critical area?
Answer. The Army is already achieving results as envisioned in the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap. Pinpointing the time frame when we will fully realize all of the goals of the roadmap is difficult to do with precision, since language training takes time, and many of the roadmap initiatives are dependent on availability of adequate resources. The Army is improving the number, quality, and management of its foreign language speakers, and actively pursuing programs which provide all soldiers appropriate linguistic skills to support current operations. Much has been accomplished but there is more to be done—within available resources and operational requirements, we are taking the appropriate steps to achieve the results envisioned in the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap in the shortest time possible.

MILITARY QUALITY OF LIFE

Question. In May 2004 the Department published its first Quadrennial Quality of Life Review, which articulated a compact with military families on key quality of life factors, such as family support, child care, education, health care, and morale, welfare, and recreation services.

How do you perceive the relationship between quality of life and your own top priorities for recruitment, retention, and readiness of Army personnel?

Answer. Strengthening the mental, physical, spiritual, and material condition of our soldiers, civilians, and their families enables them to achieve their individual goals while balancing the demanding institutional needs of today's expeditionary Army. The well-being of our people and their quality of life are my top priorities.

Army Well-Being and Quality of Life programs are extensive. They range from pay and compensation, medical, and morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) to housing and family readiness programs. Our recruiting efforts must be competitive with private industry. Our ability to reach out and gain access to our young men and women is critical. The retention of each soldier is directly related to the value of their achievements and maintaining the vital support of their families. As we bring our soldiers and their units to their peak readiness, we must enable the readiness of our Army families.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to assess the adequacy of family support programs for both the Active components and Reserve components?

Answer. The adequacy of family support programs is assessed annually by Installation Status Report Services rating. In addition, the Active component accreditation program ensures that Active component centers worldwide maintain the level of quality performance specified in the MWR program standards set by the MWR Board of Directors. The family support programs are also assessed using customer feedback at the installation level and through the MWR Needs and Leisure Survey. The Multi-Component Family Support Network, a seamless array of family support services accessed by the soldier and family—Active, Guard, and Reserve, regardless of their geographical location, will also be significant means of collecting customer feedback and improving support programs.

In addition, each year, the Active Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve will assess requirements for global war on terror funding and request the additional funds as necessary.

Question. What actions do you think are necessary in order to support best practices for support of family members of deployed forces, and would you attempt to replicate such practices throughout the Army?

Answer. There are many programs and support systems that I categorize as best practices. Deployment Cycle Support (DCS) is a comprehensive process that ensures soldiers, DA civilians, and their families are better prepared and sustained through the deployment cycle. It provides a means to identify soldiers, DA civilians, and families who may need assistance with the challenges inherent with extended deployments. The goal of the DCS process is to facilitate soldier, DA civilian, and family well-being throughout the deployment cycle. Services for DA civilians and families are integrated in every stage of the process, and they are highly encouraged to take advantage of resources provided.

The Army Information Line is an integrated system consisting of a toll-free phone service, a dynamic Web presence, and on-line publications. This system provides accurate information, useful resources, and problem resolution tailored for Army soldiers and their families to include the extended families of our soldiers. This service includes a Web presence (Our Survivors) uniquely configured to support the survivors of our fallen soldiers. An experienced staff answers the Army information line and provides responses to inquiries received through the Army Families Online Web site (www.armyfamiliesonline.org).
A great example is the Strong Bonds Program administered by our chaplains. The Chaplain Corps gives our soldiers and families the skills needed to thrive in Army life by conducting a series of marriage strengthening retreats and training events. Recognizing that even our single soldiers are in or are beginning relationships, in fiscal year 2005 this program was expanded to provide training to single soldiers in how to build life-long relationships. In fiscal year 2006 the chaplains led over 600 of these events attended by nearly 25,000 soldiers and family members in all Army components. This and other family support programs represent a solid network that allows our soldiers to build great lives and effectively serve their country through full careers.

**Question.** In your view, what progress has been made, and what actions need to be taken in the Army to provide increased employment opportunities for military spouses?

**Answer.** The Army continues to work with the Nation’s business community to support spouse employment opportunities. Since 2003, the Army has signed statements of support with 18 Fortune 500 companies. These firms pledged their best efforts to increase employment opportunities for our spouses by connecting them to new and existing jobs, portable jobs, and other methods of pursuing lifetime career goals. During the past 2 years, these companies have employed over 11,000 Army spouses.

**RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND ACQUISITION PROCESSES**

**Question.** Are you familiar with the Army’s resource allocation and acquisition processes?

**Answer.** Yes, I have familiarity with and played a role in the PPBE process during my tenure as the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

**Question.** What recommendations, if any, do you have for improving those processes?

**Answer.** QDR 06 continued us on the path of linking resources to joint capabilities. The Army provides a variety of capabilities to joint forces, and I look forward to working with OSD and the Joint Staff to continue improvement of management by capability portfolio as noted in the QDR 2006 report.

**Question.** Do you see a need for any change in the role played by the Army Chief of Staff in the resource allocation and acquisition processes?

**Answer.** If I am confirmed, my role as CSA is to recommend balanced allocation of resources to provide ready forces today and for future challenges. While specific processes within OSD continue to evolve, my role in focusing on readiness of forces remains constant.

**ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY**

**Question.** The Army invests in science and technology (S&T) programs to develop advanced capabilities to support current operations and future Army systems. The Army’s budget request has included a declining level of investment in S&T programs over each of the last 4 fiscal years.

What do you see as the role that Army S&T programs will play in continuing to develop capabilities for current and future Army systems?

**Answer.** The Army’s S&T program is the investment that the Army makes in our future soldiers. This program must be adaptable and responsive to our soldiers in the field. The Army’s S&T strategy should be to pursue technologies that will enable the future force while simultaneously seizing opportunities to enhance the current force.

**Question.** Do you believe that the Army should increase its level of investment in S&T programs?

**Answer.** The Army’s planned S&T investments will mature and demonstrate the key technologies needed to give our soldiers the best possible equipment now and in the future. Given the current environment and priorities, I believe our level of investment is appropriate.

**Question.** What metrics will you use to judge the value of Army S&T programs?

**Answer.** The real value of S&T programs is measured in the increased capability of the force achieved when new technologies are inserted into systems and equipment. While programs are still in S&T, we use the standard Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) to determine when technologies are mature enough to transition.

**Question.** What role should Army laboratories play in supporting current operations and in developing new capabilities to support Army missions?

**Answer.** From my vantage point, I believe that the S&T community can support current operations in three ways. First, soldiers are benefiting today from technologies that emerged from past investments. Second, the Army should exploit tran-
position opportunities by accelerating mature technologies from ongoing S&T efforts. Third, we should also seek to leverage the expertise of our scientists and engineers to develop solutions to unforeseen problems encountered during current operations. To enhance the current force, Army S&T should provide limited quantities of advanced technology prototypes to our soldiers deployed to the current fight.

Question. How will you ensure that weapon systems and other technologies that are fielded by the Army are adequately operationally tested?

Answer. The Army should not field systems that are not safety-certified nor rigorously tested in an operational environment. Current systems undergo an operational evaluation conducted by an independent organization that reports to the Army Chief of Staff. These evaluations ensure first that every system fielded to our soldiers is safe to use, and then provide an assessment of system effectiveness, suitability, and survivability. If I am confirmed, I would work with the Army testing community to ensure vigorous compliance with applicable testing standards, including those set forth in Army Regulation, AR 70–1, Army Acquisition Policy, and DOD Directive 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System. I would also work closely with the Army acquisition workforce, to ensure weapons systems are tested and determined to be suitable, feasible, safe, and validated to meet the current threat.

Question. Are you satisfied with the acquisition community’s ability to address the operational needs of deployed forces?

Answer. Yes, from my experience it takes more than the acquisition community to quickly respond to our soldiers’ needs in a wartime environment. The Army is addressing those needs through a process of requirements validation, funding allocation, and acquisition activities. The Army has streamlined the acquisition process by reducing the time required to validate requirements, approve funds, and develop solutions to meet those requirements. This change in culture has required all facets of the acquisition process—requirements, resources, development, test, production, and fieldings—to reduce the time necessary to complete their tasks. For example, the Army has addressed our soldiers’ need for better Individual Body Armor capability. It was quickly validated as a requirement and prioritized for funding to ensure successful systems development and procurement. To date, the Army has fielded seven versions of the Individual Body Armor Suite, each better than the last.

Question. What recommendations would you have to speed the ability for the Army to provide operational forces with the specific systems and other capabilities that they request?

Answer. If I am confirmed, I will continuously monitor the process from requirements generation, funding, and through the acquisition process, to provide the soldiers what they need as quickly as we can in a safe, feasible, suitable, manner within acceptable risk tolerance. The Army needs to closely examine the emerging threats and operational requirements of soldiers in theater. I would continue the Army’s commitment to providing our troops the best equipment possible and work with industry partners to pursue research development and procurement of the most advanced capabilities available. Finally, I would ensure that the Army does not purchase or field any system that is not proven, tested, and validated as operationally ready and safe.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Chief of Staff, Army?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted com-
juries, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

CONTRACT SECURITY FORCES

1. Senator AKAKA. General Casey, if confirmed as the Army Chief of Staff, one of your responsibilities will be to provide independent military advice to the Secretary of Defense, the President, and Congress. As such, I am interested in your views regarding reliance on contractor security forces in Baghdad. When General Petraeus testified before this committee last week, he indicated that he thought the surge troop levels would be sufficient even though they are significantly less than the levels recommended by the Army’s counterinsurgency doctrine. General Petraeus reasoned that because there are tens of thousands of civilian contract security forces protecting key sites in Baghdad, the Multi-National Force-Iraq and the Iraqi government would not have to detail resources to protect these sites. Thus, the addition of all five U.S. brigades under orders to reinforce Baghdad and the Iraqi Security Forces either in Baghdad or headed to the city should provide sufficient military forces to achieve our objective of securing Baghdad. Since you are the General who is probably most familiar with the current situation in Baghdad, can you tell us your assessment of how much we can rely on contract security forces to support our new mission of making Baghdad more secure? In your answer, please address the level of operational and tactical control we have on these contractors, as well as how well-equipped and well-trained they are.

General CASEY. We rely on coalition forces and Iraqi security forces to make Baghdad more secure. They are the ones patrolling the neighborhoods, interacting with the population, manning the checkpoints, and responding to crises. Contract security personnel support this effort by protecting certain fixed sites and key personnel. Their service is important in the overall effort. They are trained and equipped by the respective contractor firms. Control is exercised by their supervisory structure which is guided by the tenets of the agreed upon contract. My impression has been that they are prepared for their tasks and that they perform well.

2. Senator AKAKA. General Casey, what are the rules of engagement for the contract security forces relative to insurgents?

General CASEY. [Deleted.]

3. Senator AKAKA. General Casey, how likely are these contract security forces to become primary targets for the insurgency as we implement the President’s strategy?

General CASEY. I do not believe it is likely that, as we implement the President’s strategy, contract security forces will become primary targets for the insurgency. Ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Baghdad and elsewhere in Iraq are designed to reduce levels of violence. Over time, I would anticipate that we will see gradually improving conditions with reductions in sectarian violence and attacks on coalition forces. Contract security personnel accept certain risks inherent in their responsibilities but they are no greater than those run by members of the coalition forces or the Iraqi security forces. They are trained and equipped for their missions where they apply risk mitigation based on their experience and their understanding of the complex environment. I believe they will continue to face dangerous situations and periodic attacks, but I do not see them becoming the primary target of the insurgents.

[The nomination reference of GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA, follows:]
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for appointment as the Chief of Staff, United States Army, and appointment to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 3033 and 601:

To be General

George W. Casey, Jr., 0000.

[The biographical sketch of GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

RéSUMÉ OF SERVICE CAREER OF GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA

Source of commissioned service: ROTC.

Military schools attended:
- Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Course
- Armed Forces Staff College
- Senior Service College Fellowship—The Atlantic Council

Educational degrees:
- Georgetown University—BS—International Relations
- University of Denver—MA—International Relations

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

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<td>GEN</td>
<td>1 Dec. 03</td>
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Major duty assignments:

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<tr>
<td>Apr. 71</td>
<td>Sep. 72</td>
<td>Mortar Platoon Leader, later Liaison Officer, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2d Battalion, 509th Infantry (Airborne), 8th Infantry Division, United States Army Europe, Germany.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sep. 72</td>
<td>Jun. 73</td>
<td>Platoon Leader, A Company, 2d Battalion 509th Infantry (Airborne), 8th Infantry Division, United States Army Europe, Germany.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun. 73</td>
<td>Oct. 74</td>
<td>Mortar Platoon Leader, later Executive Officer, A Company, 1st Battalion, 509th Infantry (Airborne), United States Army Southern European Task Force, Italy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 74</td>
<td>Dec. 75</td>
<td>Student, Ranger School and Infantry Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 75</td>
<td>Apr. 77</td>
<td>Assistant S–4 (Logistics), later S–4, 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr. 77</td>
<td>Apr. 78</td>
<td>Commander, C Company, 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr. 78</td>
<td>Dec. 78</td>
<td>Commander, Combat Support Company, 1st Battalion, 11th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 78</td>
<td>May 80</td>
<td>Student, International Studies, University of Denver, Denver, CO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 80</td>
<td>Jun. 81</td>
<td>Student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, VA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb. 82 ......</td>
<td>Feb. 84 ......</td>
<td>S–3 (Operations), later Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 10th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb. 84 ......</td>
<td>May 85 ......</td>
<td>Secretary of the General Staff, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 85 ......</td>
<td>Jul. 87 ......</td>
<td>Commander, 1st Battalion, 10th Infantry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, CO.</td>
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<td>Aug. 87 ......</td>
<td>Jul. 88 ......</td>
<td>Student, United States Army Senior Service College Fellowship, The Atlantic Council, Washington, DC.</td>
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<td>Jul. 88 ......</td>
<td>Dec. 89 ......</td>
<td>Congressional Program Coordinator, Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison, Washington, DC.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 89 ......</td>
<td>Jun. 91 ......</td>
<td>Special Assistant to the Chief of Staff, Army, Washington, DC.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 91 ......</td>
<td>May 93 ......</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 93 ......</td>
<td>Mar. 95 ......</td>
<td>Commander, 3d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, TX.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 95 ......</td>
<td>Jul. 96 ......</td>
<td>Assistant Chief of Staff, G–3 (Operations), later Chief of Staff, V Corps, United States Army, Europe and Seventh Army, Germany and Operation Joint Endeavor, Hungary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul. 96 ......</td>
<td>Aug. 97 ......</td>
<td>Assistant Division Commander (Maneuver), later Assistant Division Commander (Support), 1st Armored Division, United States Army, Europe and Seventh Army, Germany and Task Force Eagle, Operation Joint Endeavor Bosnia-Herzegovina.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul. 99 ......</td>
<td>Jul. 01 ......</td>
<td>Commanding General, 1st Armored Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul. 01 ......</td>
<td>Oct. 01 ......</td>
<td>Commander, Joint Warfighting Center/Director, Joint Training, J–7, United States Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, VA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 01 ......</td>
<td>Oct. 03 ......</td>
<td>Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, J–5, later Director, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 03 ......</td>
<td>Jun. 04 ......</td>
<td>Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC.</td>
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**Summary of joint assignments:**

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<td>Jul. 01–Oct. 01</td>
<td>Major General</td>
<td>Commander, Joint Warfighting Center/Director, Joint Training, J–7, United States Joint Forces Command, Suffolk, VA.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 01–Jan. 03</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, J–5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jan. 03–Oct. 03</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
<td>Commander, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC.</td>
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**U.S. decorations and badges:**

- Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Legion of Merit (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Defense Meritorious Service Medal
- Meritorious Service Medal
- Army Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Expert Infantryman Badge
- Master Parachutist Badge
- Parachutist Badge
- Ranger Tab
- Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
- Army Staff Identification Badge

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   George W. Casey, Jr.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   22/07/48, Sendai, Japan.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Sheila Lynch Casey.

7. Names and ages of children:
   Sean Patrick Casey, 35; Ryan Michael Casey, 34.

8. Government experience:
   List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   There are no positions other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

9. Business relationships:
   List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   None.

10. Memberships:
    List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    Association of the United States Army.

11. Honors and Awards:
    List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    There are no honors or awards other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
    I do.
13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

I do.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

_____ SIGNATURE AND DATE _____

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

George W. Casey, Jr.

This 15th day of January, 2007.

[The nomination of GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on February 6, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on February 8, 2007.]
TO CONSIDER THE NOMINATIONS OF ADM
WILLIAM J. FALLON, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO
BE COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND;
GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMY; AND TO VOTE ON PENDING MILITARY NOMINATIONS

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:13 a.m. in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearing clerk.

Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, minority counsel; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, research assistant.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: David G. Collins, Fletcher L. Cork, and Jessica L. Kingston.

Committee members’ assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to
Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Caroline Tess, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce and Benjamin Rinaker, assistants to Senator Ben Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; Lauren Henry, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Nichole M. Distefano, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; D'Arcy Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Adam G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; and Stuart C. Mallory and Bob Taylor, assistants to Senator Thune.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. We have a quorum, and I ask the committee now—and we’ve all been notified—to consider the nominations of 2 general officer nominations and a list of 37 pending military nominations.

First, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of Admiral William Fallon for reappointment to the grade of admiral and to be Commander, U.S. Central Command. Admiral Fallon testified before the committee on his nomination last Tuesday.

Is there a motion to favorably report Admiral Fallon’s nomination?

Senator Kennedy. So move.

Chairman Levin. Is there a second?

Senator McCain. Second.

Chairman Levin. The Clerk will call the roll.

The Clerk. Mr. Kennedy?

Senator Kennedy. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. Byrd?


The Clerk. Mr. Lieberman? [No response.]

Mr. Reed?

Senator Reed. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. Akaka? [No response.]

Mr. Nelson of Florida? [No response.]

Mr. Nelson of Nebraska?


The Clerk. Mr. Bayh? [No response.]

Mrs. Clinton? [No response.]

Mr. Pryor? [No response.]

Mr. Webb?


The Clerk. Mrs. McCaskill?

Senator McCaskill. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. McCain?

Senator McCain. Aye.

The Clerk. Mr. Warner?


The Clerk. Mr. Inhofe? [No response.]

Mr. Sessions?
Senator Sessions. Aye.
The Clerk. Ms. Collins?
Senator Collins. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Ensign?
Senator Ensign. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Chambliss?
Senator Chambliss. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Graham? [No response.]
Mrs. Dole?
Senator Dole. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Cornyn? [No response.]
Mr. Thune?
Senator Thune. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Martinez?
Senator Martinez. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Levin. Aye.
The Clerk. Sixteen ayes, no nays.
Chairman Levin. The motion carries, 16 to 0, and the record will be kept open for the others. The motion carries.
Next, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of General George Casey for reappointment to the grade of general and to be Chief of Staff of the Army.
Is there a motion to favorably report General Casey's nomination to the Senate?
Senator Kennedy. So move.
Chairman Levin. Second?
Senator Collins. Second.
Chairman Levin. Clerk will call the roll.
The Clerk. Mr. Kennedy?
Senator Kennedy. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Byrd?
The Clerk. Mr. Lieberman? [No response.]
Mr. Reed?
Senator Reed. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. Akaka? [No response.]
Mr. Nelson of Florida? [No response.]
The Clerk. Mr. Nelson of Nebraska?
The Clerk. Mr. Bayh? [No response.]
Mrs. Clinton? [No response.]
Mr. Pryor? [No response.]
Mr. Webb?
The Clerk. Mrs. McCaskill?
Senator McCaskill. Aye.
The Clerk. Mr. McCain?
Senator McCain. No.
The Clerk. Mr. Warner?
The Clerk. Mr. Inhofe? [No response.]
Mr. Sessions?
Senator Sessions. Aye.
The CLERK. Ms. Collins?
Senator COLLINS. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Ensign?
Senator ENSIGN. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Chambliss?
Senator CHAMBLISS. No.
The CLERK. Mr. Graham? [No response.]
Mrs. Dole?
Senator DOLE. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Cornyn? [No response.]
Mr. Thune?
Senator THUNE. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Martinez?
Senator MARTINEZ. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman LEVIN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Lieberman?
Senator LIEBERMAN. Aye.
The CLERK. Fourteen ayes, three nays.
Chairman LEVIN. Fourteen ayes, three nays, the motion carries.
The record will be kept open for those who are missing. The motion
will be favorably reported.
Finally, I ask the committee to consider a list of 37 pending mili-
tary nominations.
Is there a motion to favorably report those 37 nominations?
Senator KENNEDY. So move.
Chairman LEVIN. Second?
Senator WARNER. Second.
Chairman LEVIN. Is there a second?
Senator WARNER. Second.
Chairman LEVIN. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
Opposed, no. [No response.]
The ayes have it, the motion carries.
Thank you all.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the commit-
tee follows.]

MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE’S CONSIDERATION ON FEBRUARY 6, 2007.

1. GEN George W. Casey, Jr., USA, to be general and Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (Reference No. 177).
2. ADM William J. Fallon, USN, to be admiral and Commander, U.S. Central Command (Reference No. 181).
3. LTG James M. Dubik, USA, to be lieutenant general and Commander, Multi-
National Security Transition Command-Iraq and Commander, NATO Training Mis-
ion-Iraq, U.S. Central Command (Reference No. 179).
4. BG Thomas W. Travis, USAF, to be major general (Reference No 195).
7. In the Air Force Reserve, there are 16 appointments to the grade of major gen-
eral and below (list begins with Frank J. Casserino) (Reference No. 198).
8. In the Air Force, there are six appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel
and below (list begins with Michael D. Jacobson) (Reference No. 200).
9. In the Air Force, there are 11 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel
and below (list begins with Stuart C. Calle) (Reference No. 201).
Total: 39.

[Whereupon, at 10:15 a.m., the executive session adjourned.]
TO CONSIDER CERTAIN PENDING MILITARY NOMINATIONS

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:54 a.m. in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff member; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; and Michael J. Noblet, research assistant.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Micah H. Harris, and Jessica L. Kingston.

Committee members’ assistants present: Joseph Axelrad and Sharon L. Waxman, assistants to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Richard Kessler and Darcie Tokioka, assistants to Senator Akaka; Sherry Davich and Caroline Tess, assistants to Senator Bill Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; Lauren Henry, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; John A. Bonsell, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Adam G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. We now have a quorum, so I would ask my colleagues to consider a list of 1,281 pending military nominations.
They have all been before the committee the required length of
time. We know of no objection to any of them. Is there a motion
to favorably report these 1,281 military nominations to the Senate?
Senator THUNE. So moved.
Chairman LEVIN. A second?
Senator INHOFE. Second.
Chairman LEVIN. All in favor say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
Opposed, no? [No response.]
The ayes have it. The motion carries.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the commit-
tee follows:]

MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE'S CONSIDERATION ON FEBRUARY 27,
2007.

1. In the Marine Corps there are 11 appointments to be brigadier general (list
begins with David H. Berger) (Reference No. 189).
2. In the Air Force Reserve there are 30 appointments to the grade of major general
and below (list begins with Shelby G. Bryant) (Reference No. 210).
3. Col. Tracy L. Garrett, USMCR to be brigadier general (Reference No. 214).
4. In the Air Force there are 14 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins
with Gino L. Auteri) (Reference No. 216).
5. In the Air Force there are 15 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins
with Brian E. Bergeron) (Reference No. 217).
6. In the Air Force there are 35 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins
with Brian D. Affleck) (Reference No. 218).
7. In the Air Force there are 24 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel
(list begins with William R. Baez) (Reference No. 219).
8. In the Air Force there are 151 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel
(list begins with Kent D. Abbott) (Reference No. 220).
9. In the Air Force there are four appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel
and below (list begins with Anthony J. Pacenta) (Reference No. 221).
10. In the Air Force there are 51 appointments to the grade of major (list begins
with Tansel Acar) (Reference No. 222).
11. In the Air Force there are 287 appointments to the grade of major (list begins
with Brian G. Accola) (Reference No. 223).
12. In the Army Reserve there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Todd
A. Plimpton) (Reference No. 224).
13. In the Army Reserve there are two appointments to the grade of colonel (list
begins with Perry L. Hagaman) (Reference No. 225).
14. In the Army there are 84 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with
David W. Admire) (Reference No. 226).
15. In the Army there are 129 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with
James A. Adamec) (Reference No. 227).
16. In the Army there are 26 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with
Dennis R. Bell) (Reference No. 228).
17. In the Army there are 157 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with
Ronald J. Aquino) (Reference No. 229).
18. MG Benjamin C. Freakley, USA to be lieutenant general and Commanding
General, U.S. Army Accessions Command/Deputy Commanding General for Initial
19. In the Air Force there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel
and below (list begins with Jeffrey M. Klosky) (Reference No. 256).
20. In the Army Reserve there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Miyako
N. Schanley) (Reference No. 257).
21. In the Army there are 72 appointments to the grade of major (list begins with
Anthony C. Adolph) (Reference No. 258).
22. In the Army Reserve there are 26 appointments to the grade of colonel (list
begins with Andrew W. Aquino) (Reference No. 259).
23. In the Marine Corps there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel
(list begins with Donald E. Evans, Jr.) (Reference No. 261).
24. In the Marine Corps there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel
(Jorge L. Medina) (Reference No. 262).
25. In the Marine Corps there are two appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Douglas M. Finn) (Reference No. 263).
26. In the Marine Corps there are three appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Charles E. Brown) (Reference No. 264).
27. In the Marine Corps there are four appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Steven P. Couture) (Reference No. 265).
28. In the Marine Corps there are 94 appointments to the grade of colonel (list begins with Jonathan G. Allen) (Reference No. 266).
29. In the Navy there is one appointment to the grade of commander (Mark A. Gladue) (Reference No. 268).
30. In the Navy there is one appointment to the grade of captain (Terry L. Rucker) (Reference No. 270).
31. In the Army there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Susan M. Osovitzoien) (Reference No. 273).
32. In the Army there is one appointment to the grade of major (Tom K. Stanton) (Reference No. 274).
33. In the Army there is one appointment to the grade of major (Evan F. Tillman) (Reference No. 275).
34. In the Army there are three appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Michael A. Clark) (Reference No. 276).
35. In the Army there are seven appointments to the grade of colonel and below (list begins with Edward W. Trudo) (Reference No. 277).
36. In the Marine Corps there are two appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Charles E. Daniels) (Reference No. 278).
37. In the Marine Corps there is one appointment to the grade of major (Brian T. Thompson) (Reference No. 279).
38. In the Marine Corps there is one appointment to the grade of major (Michael R. Cirillo) (Reference No. 280).
39. In the Marine Corps there are two appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Vernon L. Dariso) (Reference No. 281).
40. In the Marine Corps there are four appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Leonard R. Domitrovits) (Reference No. 282).
41. In the Marine Corps there are nine appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Samson P. Avenetti) (Reference No. 283).
42. In the Marine Corps there are seven appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Jason B. Davis) (Reference No. 284).
43. In the Marine Corps there are six appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Darren L. Ducoing) (Reference No. 285).
44. In the Marine Corps there are four appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Robert T. Charlton) (Reference No. 286).

Total: 1,281

[Whereupon, at 10:56 a.m., the business meeting adjourned and the committee proceeded to other business.]
NOMINATIONS OF ADM TIMOTHY J. KEATING, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND; LT. GEN. VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF, FOR APPOINTMENT TO BE GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND; AND LTG ROBERT L. VAN ANTWERP, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS/COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Joseph M. Bryan, professional staff member; Evelyn N. Parkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; and Michael J. McCord, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork and Kevin A. Cronin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Today, the committee considers the nominations of three distinguished senior military officers: Admiral Timothy Keating, the nominee for Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM); General Victor Renuart, the nominee for Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD); and General Robert Van Antwerp, the nominee for Chief of Engineers and Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. We welcome each of you, congratulate you, and we also welcome your families, who we will ask you—those of you who have family members with you—to introduce them later on because we know that the long hours and the hard work that is put in by our senior military officials requires commitment and sacrifice not only from those officials and from our nominees, but also from their family members, and we greatly appreciate their willingness to bear and share your burden and responsibility.

Each of our nominees has served his country in the military for more than 30 years. Admiral Keating has served as Commander of the Fifth Fleet, Director of the Joint Staff, and Commander of U.S. NORTHCOM. General Renuart has flown more than 60 combat missions, has served as Director for Strategic Plans and Policy on the Joint Staff, and Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense. General Van Antwerp has served as Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army for Installation Management and Commandant of the U.S. Army Engineers School at Fort Leonard Wood. He has an even higher qualification, however. He is a native Michigander who grew up in Benton Harbor and St. Joseph and received his master's degree in engineering from the University of Michigan.

If confirmed, each of our nominees will be responsible for helping the Department of Defense (DOD) face critical challenges. Admiral Keating, if confirmed, will take command of U.S. PACOM, the command which encompasses nearly 60 percent of the world's population and over half of the Earth's surface and includes six of the largest military forces, several of the biggest economies, and the two largest Muslim and democratic countries. This assignment comes at a time when we face complex challenges from China and North Korea as well as the continuing threat of terrorism in Indonesia, the Philippines, and elsewhere in the region.

General Renuart, if confirmed, will take over U.S. NORTHCOM, the command which was established after September 11, 2001, to provide for the defense of the United States and, when directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, for providing military support to civil authorities. The mission of this command includes
responding to natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina and man-made disasters such as incidents involving weapons of mass destruction here at home.

Finally, General Van Antwerp will assume command of the Army Corps of Engineers. This command is responsible for both military works, including contracting for Iraq reconstruction, and civil works, such as repairing levees that have been damaged, destroyed, or unacceptably maintained in New Orleans and elsewhere.

I know that our nominees are up to these challenges. They look forward to assuming these challenges and we look forward to having them answer some of our questions and then hopefully a prompt confirmation by the United States Senate.

Senator Sessions.

Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I agree that these are men of extraordinary ability. It is impressive, frankly, to see the educational level and the talent level we have throughout our military. I do not think it has ever been higher, but particularly in our general officers. They have had extraordinary experiences and education.

So I welcome you here. I'm glad to see my former chairman, Senator Warner. I would be pleased to defer to him, but look forward to a few questions, Mr. Chairman. I think all of us are impressed with these nominees and we appreciate your leadership for America.

Chairman Levin. Senator Warner, would you like to add anything?

Senator Warner. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know all these gentlemen quite well and we are fortunate as a Nation to have them and their families make this continued contribution to public service.

Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Before I call on you for any opening statement that you each might have and to introduce your families, let me ask you the standard questions which we ask of all nominees.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.

General Renuart. Yes.

General Van Antwerp. Yes.

Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

Admiral Keating. No, sir.

General Renuart. No, sir.

General Van Antwerp. No, sir.

Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.

General Renuart. Yes, sir.

General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
General Renuart. Yes, sir.
General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
General Renuart. Yes, sir.
General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
General Renuart. Yes, sir.
General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to give your personal views when asked before this committee to do so, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
General Renuart. Yes, sir.
General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.
General Renuart. Yes, sir.
General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Now, Admiral Keating, let me call on you for an opening statement and introductions.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, could I ask that a statement by the distinguished ranking member, Senator McCain, be placed in the record following yours?
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Thank you, Senator Levin. I join you in welcoming Admiral Keating, Lieutenant General Renuart, and Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, and their family members, and congratulating them on their nominations.
Admiral Keating, you have had a distinguished career as a naval aviator, on the Joint Staff, and culminating in your assignment as Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). Your nomination to be Commander of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) comes at a time of great challenge and opportunity in the Pacific area of responsibility. North Korea's nuclear and missile programs continue to pose a threat to its neighbors and to America's interests in East Asia.

Last week's agreement might be a first step on the path to a denuclearized Korean peninsula, but that is far from certain. It is unclear whether North Korea is now truly committed to real verification, a full accounting of all nuclear materials and facilities, both plutonium- and uranium-based, and the full denuclearization that must be the essence of any lasting agreement. As we observe in the weeks ahead whether Pyongyang is taking initial steps toward disarmament and sealing its Yongbyon reactor, let us proceed cautiously. In the meantime, PACOM plays a vital role in providing stability and deterrence in support of this diplomatic effort.

It also plays a critical role in sustaining and expanding the U.S.-Japan strategic alliance, the cornerstone of our security umbrella in northeast Asia. PACOM and the Commander of U.S. Forces Japan must keep up the robust level of dialogue and ensure elements of our relationship, such as the Defense Policy Reform Initiative,
are on track. There are a number of ideas circulating about the ways in which we can strengthen our already robust bilateral ties with Japan, and I’d note that the “Armitage II” report, which was recently released, addresses this in some detail.

With respect to China, if confirmed, you will have the important task of taking the measure of a rapidly modernizing military. Cross-strait relations are relatively calm at the moment, but history suggests that this delicate relationship, which remains at the core of U.S. interests in the region requires our close attention. Beijing’s regional and global aspirations are growing, and properly managing this relationship is vital.

Fortunately, the United States does not face these challenges alone. One of the vital responsibilities of the PACOM Commander is to work closely with our key allies in the region—Japan, South Korea, Australia, to name a few—to strengthen bilateral relations and to develop multilateral approaches and responses to the challenges and opportunities that we face in the U.S. PACOM.

General Renuart, you have had an impressive career in the Air Force and in joint assignments, and I congratulate you on your nomination. U.S. NORTHCOM is now looked to as the military command that will defend against another attack on United States soil. If confirmed as Commander of U.S. NORTHCOM, you will be responsible for defending the Nation against attacks by hostile forces and for providing critical support to civil authorities in responding to domestic emergencies, terrorist attacks, and for designated law enforcement activities.

As our Armed Forces contend with a rigorous tempo of operations abroad, the Commander of U.S. NORTHCOM must ensure that the command has the capability to perform its important homeland defense and civil support missions.

General Van Antwerp, the Corps of Engineers is faced with an unprecedented level of interest and pressure from Congress and all Americans in the range of activities this Nation will ask you to carry out over the next 5 years.

In reviewing your answers to this committee in preparation for this hearing, I am struck by the magnitude of your mission—providing emergency repairs to our national levee and dam systems which have suffered from years of neglect; responding to the engineering needs of our military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan; and providing the facilities and infrastructure required for the United States Army to transform and grow its forces. I trust you will be a Chief of Engineers who will be able to accomplish all this while ensuring a transparent, competitive contracting environment provides our taxpayers with the best value in construction and services.

I thank each of our nominees for their service and look forward to their testimony today.

Chairman LEVIN. Admiral Keating.

STATEMENT OF ADM TIMOTHY J. KEATING, USN, FOR RE-APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND

Admiral Keating. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee: It is a great honor to be nominated by the President to command the United States Pacific Command and I am grateful for his confidence and I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this morning.

With me this morning is a woman who brings so much joy to all of our lives, my wife Wanda Lee Keating. Who cannot be with us this morning, our son Daniel, who is an F–18 pilot, lieutenant commander in the Navy down at Virginia Beach, VA. With us, our daughter Julie and her husband, Commander Paul Camardella, he too is an F–18 pilot in Virginia Beach, and their daughter, our granddaughter, Lauren Joy Camardella. My brother Danby Keating is also with us.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask our senior enlisted adviser, Sergeant Major Scott Frye, United States Marine Corps, to stand if I could Mr. Chairman, if it pleases you, I would like to recognize Sergeant Major Frye, who will retire at the end of this month, with 32 years of service to his Corps, our command, and our country.

Thank you, Sergeant Major Frye.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Sergeant Major.

Admiral Keating. In my current role, Mr. Chairman, as Commander of NORAD and NORTHCOM, I would also like to express my appreciation to your committee for your abiding support of our men and women in uniform. During my career I have enjoyed many deployments on our aircraft carriers to the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Wanda Lee and I lived in Hawaii during an earlier assignment at PACOM headquarters, and we lived in Japan for over 2 years while I had the privilege of commanding our forward deployed carrier battle group.

During those years I have developed a keen appreciation for the vibrancy and complexity of this vast region. Today the healthy alliances, positive economic trends, and potential for U.S.-led regional cooperation make it clear to all of us that opportunity is abundant in the Pacific.

Japan is a good example of a key United States alliance that benefits our Nation and the region. The U.S.-Japan relationship continues to mature and agreements such as the Defense Policy Review Initiative illustrate the progress we are making.

PACOM's emphasis on the war on terror, on security cooperation with allies and partners, on the readiness and posture of our forward deployed forces, and on our operational plans seems appropriate to me. If confirmed, I intend to use these principles as the foundation during my tenure. I am committed to ensuring the men and women of the command are ready and are resourced to sustain peace and stability in the region and to contribute appropriately to U.S. global commitments.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, if confirmed as Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, I will seek the counsel and insights of our allies, partners, and Members of Congress. I will collaborate with our ambassadors in the region to execute and advance United States policy goals throughout the Asia Pacific theater.

Mr. Chairman, thank you and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman Levin. Admiral, thank you. I know how much of her middle name your granddaughter brings to the family. Lauren Joy's middle name I am sure is very appropriate and we are delighted to have your granddaughter and her mother and her grandmother—she never want to leave out grandfathers—here with us this morning.

Admiral Keating. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. General Renuart.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF, FOR APPOINTMENT TO BE GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND/COMMANDER, NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND

General Renuart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. I too am honored to be here today as the President's nominee to become Commander, NORAD, and Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM. If confirmed, I look forward to serving in these key critical roles.

I appear before you knowing that the missions of both of these commands are demanding and that challenges are great. Having the homeland as the mission of NORTHCOM and NORAD is truly
a sacred honor and it dictates adherence to the highest standards of vigilance, service, and integrity, and it is expected to be such by all of our citizens all of the time.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to recognize the superb leadership of my good friend, Admiral Tim Keating, NORTHCOM’s current commander. He has forged a really great team and leaves a legacy as he completes his tour and, I might add, big shoes to fill.

But I look forward, if confirmed by the committee, to this challenge. My service on the Joint Staff and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense has reinforced the value of close working relationships among the combatant commands, the military Services, defense agencies, the interagency community, this committee, and Members of Congress, and, importantly in this job, the Governors and Adjutants General of the States across our country.

If confirmed, I will join the men and women of NORAD and NORTHCOM in dedicating ourselves to the defense of the homeland. We will continue to work collaboratively with the other combatant commands. We will work closely with our Federal and State partners, our interagency partners, the National Guard, and the countries of Canada and Mexico, with whom we maintain a close relationship. We will continue to train hard to execute our mission and we will work hard to ensure that we never let the country down.

Given the guidance of the President and the Secretary of Defense, it is a very challenging road ahead, but I look forward to the opportunity to travel that road.

Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not publicly recognize my wife, Jill, present here today, for her nearly 36 years of service to our Nation as a military spouse. We are the proud parents of two sons. Our oldest is a three-tour combat veteran of Afghanistan and Iraq, a combat rescue helicopter crew member; and our younger son has served the Nation for 27 months in the Peace Corps and is currently a medical student at the University of Pennsylvania.

Our military families bear a heavy burden during these difficult times and it is important always that we honor that commitment at every opportunity we have.

Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear here today and I look forward to your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General.

General Van Antwerp.

STATEMENT OF LTG ROBERT L. VAN ANTWERP, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS/COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

General Van Antwerp. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I, too, am honored to appear before you today as the President’s nominee for the Chief of Engineers and the Commanding General of the Corps of Engineers.

This summer, I will have served 35 years as a soldier and as an engineer, 34 of those have been with my wife, Paula. She is not here today because she is with my granddaughter down in Florida. We have five children: two beautiful daughters, Julia and Catherine, and three sons. My oldest son, Jeff, is a major in the Army
at West Point. He is an infantry guy. My next son is Luke and he is a Special Forces captain. Both of them just came out of Iraq recently for combat tours. My youngest son, Rob, is a Purple Heart recipient for what he sustained in combat in Iraq. He is doing well and he is settling near the Fort Campbell area.

I am a registered professional engineer. I commanded an engineer battalion in combat, commanded the Los Angeles District during the Northridge earthquakes and the floods in Arizona, and commanded the South Atlantic Division of the Corps of Engineers. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, I was the installation manager for the Army and then I went and commanded one of those installations, so I got to grade my own paper. Finally, right now I am the Commanding General of Accessions Command, so I am responsible for recruiting and initial military training for the Army.

The Nation looks to the Corps to meet the engineering needs of today and have the capability to meet those needs tomorrow. The Corps is deeply engaged, as you are all aware, now rebuilding the vital infrastructure in Iraq and Afghanistan and also in the reconstruction and renovation of the Gulf Coast.

The integrity and professionalism of the Corps is essential to the confidence of the American people. If I am confirmed as Chief of Engineers, I will work closely with the administration, stakeholders, and Congress as I discharge my leadership responsibilities. I look forward to working closely with this committee and with other committees that have oversight in addressing the missions and challenges ahead. If confirmed, I pledge to provide strong and decisive leadership for the Corps in its important civil works and military missions.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement.

Chairman LEVIN. I thank each of you and again your families, particularly those in your family who carry on the military service that you have so nobly and professionally followed in your own lives.

Admiral Keating, let me begin with you. The Quadrennial Defense Review identifies China as a likely competitor. Is it a foregone conclusion that China and the United States would be at odds over security in the Pacific?

Admiral KEATING. I do not think it is a foregone conclusion, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. How do you believe we could minimize that possible outcome that nobody would like to see?

Admiral KEATING. If confirmed, I would intend to pursue a series of robust engagements with principally the People’s Liberation Army of China, not just in terms of frequency but in terms of complexity. We would engage in exercises of some sophistation and frequency and we would pay close attention to the development of their weapons systems and their capabilities, with a weather eye on whether they intend to use those against Taiwan.

Chairman LEVIN. Given the possibility of political or military miscalculation between China and Taiwan, what role do you think the United States military can play in trying to reduce cross-strait tensions?

Admiral KEATING. It goes to the heart of transparency, Mr. Chairman. I would say that if we deal with some frequency at sev-
eral levels with the Chinese, if we exercise with them, all Services, if we ensure they are aware of our capabilities and our intent, I think we will go a long way to defusing potential strife across the Straits of Taiwan.

Chairman Levin. Relative to the Philippines, Admiral, our military mission in the southern Philippines since 2001 has been aimed at helping the Philippine military to defeat the Abu Sayyaf group and to deal with other terrorist groups. Your predecessors have assured this committee that, “U.S. participants will not engage in combat,” in the Philippines, without prejudice, of course, to their right of self-defense. Are you committed to continuing that policy?

Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. I have one other question on that relative to the Philippines. During hearings before this committee, General Myers, Admiral Fargo, and Admiral Fallon stated that U.S. troops would conduct training at the battalion level and assured us that if there were a decision for U.S. teams to work at the company level that this committee would be notified, and they have kept their word. Is that your intent as well?

Admiral Keating. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Relative to Korea, Admiral, give us your assessment, if you can, from your perspective of the agreement that we apparently reached with North Korea last month?

Admiral Keating. From what I know, Mr. Chairman, it is positive and beneficial. We need to have the access to verify North Korea is upholding their side of the agreement, if you will. But it appears to be a positive step toward denuclearization of the peninsula, and that would lead to stability and peace on the peninsula and that is a worthwhile goal.

Chairman Levin. General Renuart, NORTHCOM has operational responsibility for the ballistic missile defense of the United States. One of the concerns that we have is that deployed ground-based midcourse defense systems show that they are operationally effective and reliable. Do you agree, first of all, that it is essential that any ground-based system be operationally effective and reliable?

General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, yes, sir, I do.

Chairman Levin. If you are confirmed and you learn or believe that this system is not operationally effective and reliable, will you take prompt steps to inform the committee?

General Renuart. Yes, sir, I will.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree that it is important that we use operationally realistic flight tests to demonstrate the operational capability of the ground-based system?

General Renuart. Yes, sir, I do.

Chairman Levin. If confirmed, will you work with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to understand his view of the operational capability and any limitations on the ground-based midcourse system?

General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, I will do that.

Chairman Levin. One of the problems, General Renuart, that we had before the September 11 terrorist attacks was a lack of information-sharing among relevant Government agencies. Congress addressed this problem in our intelligence reform legislation in 2004
and we want to ensure that information is being shared as needed to protect our Nation against terrorists.

Now, I understand that NORTHCOM withdrew its representative to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) last year because NORTHCOM and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) found that it was just too hard to get information and cooperation from the NCTC. It sounds like an unacceptable situation and it is a problem that would need to be fixed.

If confirmed, how do you plan to address this problem and to ensure that there is good information-sharing and cooperation between NORTHCOM and the NCTC?

General Renuart. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question because it is critically important that we have the right amount and level of intelligence sharing among all the relevant agencies. I am aware of the move a few months ago to withdraw a portion of the intelligence elements that were assigned from NORTHCOM and the DIA. I am aware also that General Maples, the Director of the DIA, has undertaken now a process to put that back in place, and if confirmed, I will continue to press hard for that because I believe that is critically important. The NCTC really is one of those opportunities we have for transparency among the Intelligence Community.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

My time has expired.

Senator Sessions.

Senator Sessions. Admiral Keating, thank you for your service. You were NORTHCOM Commander, which General Renuart will soon be taking over. In that capacity, you had the responsibility to manage and launch, if need be, our ground-based missile defense system; is that correct?

Admiral Keating. That is correct, sir.

Senator Sessions. On July 4, the North Koreans announced or we identified their launch and saw their launches occur, which ended up not to threaten the United States. In your opinion, were we capable of executing a launch of our missile defense system that, had they had a missile that could have reached the United States, we could have knocked that down?

Admiral Keating. We were capable. We had exercised and we were ready that day, Senator.

Senator Sessions. So you were actually prepared to launch, if need be, and had confidence that, even though we were early in the process, had a missile threatened the United States, it could have been knocked down?

Admiral Keating. It is a small point, Senator. The short answer is yes, sir. I would not have been the authorizing official that day. The Secretary of Defense was on the line with us, so I am confident it would have been his decision. But we were prepared to launch if he had given us the direction.

Senator Sessions. Do you think that experience will be valuable to you as you, in the Pacific, deal with the theater missile defense systems that we have on so many of our ships and other areas?

Admiral Keating. Most assuredly, yes, sir.

Senator Sessions. General Renuart, you made a comment about our testing of last year, September 1 believe, the last major test
that we had. It was a successful operational test. How would you evaluate the complexity of that test and its validity as to establishing that we have a system that will actually work?

General Renuart. Senator, I am far from an expert on the technical aspects, but I was able to observe from my position within the Joint Staff. It is my view that the capabilities of the system evident in that test would allow us, as Admiral Keating mentioned, to be effective against a North Korean type threat.

I think it is important to ensure that if we are going to fully field the system that we ensure that it has the capability to be effective against some variety of threats. Clearly it is not an umbrella and I, if confirmed, will continue to work for an active operational test process as we continue to field the system.

Senator Sessions. I agree. I think for a lot of people, they may not have realized just how much good work has been done for quite a number of years that would bring us to the point of being able to knock down an incoming missile. It is hard for most of us to believe that is possible, but once again you say it is. We have seen the tests that have been successful. This last test was a very realistic, whole entire system test. I think that is important.

General Renuart, as NORTHCOM Commander, you explained to me as we chatted about your belief that you need to relate effectively with the National Guard. Would you explain your mission with regard to homeland security and how you envision your relationship with the Guard and Reserve?

General Renuart. Thank you, Senator. I think it is important to understand that in NORTHCOM—its mission principally is to provide support initially to State and Federal agencies as they respond to disasters that might occur throughout the country. But when directed by the President or the Secretary, we could assume a more active role. So it is important to ensure that on a day-to-day basis NORTHCOM has good visibility as the principal combatant command on the readiness of potential forces that could come to it from both the Active and the Reserve component, the command must also understand carefully how the individual States view their capabilities to respond to a disaster or an emergency; and given that information, then maintain a close relationship with the States, the Guard, and the Active component to ensure that we do have the tools to connect, communicate, and be effective.

Senator Sessions. Thank you and I look forward to your service and working with you in that regard.

General Van Antwerp, the Corps is an important part of our Nation’s defense and really civil strength. You have a tremendous background and I know you are going to be successful in that office. I appreciate the opportunity to chat with you recently. I am glad to know that you do not feel you have a legal mandate to write any new manual at this point and that you understand the sensitivity of the water situation between the three States in the southeast. Our Governors are working hard to get an agreement that would be wonderful, and I believe they can do that and I think it is important that the Corps of Engineers be a neutral but supportive agency in that process. Would you agree with that?

General Van Antwerp. I agree, Senator.
Senator SESSIONS. General Van Antwerp, tell me about, briefly if you would, how much the Corps has contributed to Iraq and Afghanistan? I have a very positive impression of their effectiveness. I believe they responded, maybe because of their military association and background, in great ways in those countries, and wonder if there is a possibility in the years to come that we might expand the Corps in a way that could help us in these kind of rebuilding efforts, these nation-building efforts or stability operations that might occur around the world.

Have you had any thoughts about that?

General VAN ANTWERP. Yes, sir, I do agree. I think the Corps has contributed greatly. We have the Gulf Region Division with four different elements of it. We have the northern, central, and southern divisions, and there is an Afghani district. They have done wonderful things. What I know is, of the 4,500 projects in Iraq totaling about $8 billion, that the Corps has executed 3,400 of those already. Another 900 are in construction and 200 are in planning and design, so moving well on their way to completing those. So the Corps has contributed very much.

To your second part——

Senator SESSIONS. How much of that do you utilize Iraqi or Afghani contractors or workers that you supervise, rather than just do the work yourselves?

General VAN ANTWERP. That is an excellent question. Today about 75 percent of the contracts I am told are with Iraqi contractors and their employees. So the supervision over it is by the Corps of Engineers, but many of the contractors, the majority, are Iraqi contractors today.

Senator SESSIONS. I interrupted you, I think.

General VAN ANTWERP. Senator, I was just going to address the second issue of how do we prepare for this for the future, how do you make sure there are enough emergency management people and people that could respond quickly. I think it means you have to keep the expertise in the Corps to do that, and then you have to have some ability to have people that are tracking and watching that could deploy without degrading the rest of your work that you are doing elsewhere.

I think it is something that we need to look at in the future, for other contingencies how do we have that group of young people that can get there quickly and get it moving on the ground.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, we have always known that the military families are the ones that provide so many of the young men and women who continue to follow your careers in the military. But I cannot recall, Mr. Chairman, when we have had three before us with more outstanding contributions than each of you men in that. So I again join the chairman and others in commending you and your respective spouses for providing much-needed quality talent for our Armed Forces.

Admiral, it is just a pleasure to see you advance to this position. I think it is no secret for those of us who have had associations
with the United States Navy, it is a tossup between every officer’s
desire to be in the position to which you have been nominated by
the President or Chief of Naval Operations. I will not ask you
which you prefer because you are going to get this one. [Laughter.]

Admiral Keating. My wife has what is called the peanut butter
theory, Mr. Secretary. She says: Put peanut butter in your mouth,
put your tongue against the peanut butter, and do not talk.

Senator Warner. That is correct. Good advice.

The chairman asked you some questions on North Korea. I would
like to follow up. Apparently the President of South Korea most re-
cently said that the two nations, if this current detente with North
Korea goes forward and we are able to achieve the goals that the
Six-Party Talks laid down, I mean all the goals, would like to see
the exploration of a peace treaty to replace the armistice which has
been in effect since 1953. It is hard to believe that for over a half
century we have not been able to forge a treaty to once and for all
put to rest that conflict.

Have you had an opportunity to explore that, and do you have
any initial thoughts on the advisability and how it would impact
on the need to continue certain security relationships with South
Korea even if a peace treaty were put in place?

Admiral Keating. Senator, I have not gone into that in any de-
tail with either Admiral Fallon, his staff, or General Bell and his
staff. If confirmed, that would be something we would clearly de-
vote considerable interest to if our State Department were able to
table the issue. I am hardly opposed to it, but, as you say, we have
been in an armistice situation for half a century and it would take
some very prudent discussions within our Government and with
our allies in South Korea to go forward with such a consideration.

Senator Warner. I'm going to let Senator Inhofe go ahead of me.

Senator Inhofe. Senator Warner, I appreciate it very much. I
just received a notice I have to go to another committee. There are
a couple of things real briefly if I could just mention——

Senator Warner. Go ahead, take your time.

Senator Inhofe. First of all, General Renuart, Senator Sessions
was talking before we came in, so I do not know how far you got
into this. I have talked to you about this, personally I think one
of the greatest responsibilities you are going to have is the ballistic
missile defense. I just guess I would ask you if you believe that we
are adequately at a level that is a comfort level for you in terms
of threats from North Korea, China, Russia, or wherever they
might come from?

General Renuart. Senator, I would be careful to say at a comfort
level because I am still really just learning all of the breadth of the
capability. If confirmed, I would really dive into that in much
greater detail. But my initial impression is that, and based on the
capabilities that we saw over the July 4 weekend when we had the
intention to defend, I think we have a very good capability for the
threat we see today, but I think that threat is growing and it is
important to continue the testing to ensure that the system when
fielded is capable of meeting all the goals.

Senator Inhofe. What I would like, and I know Senator Sessions
and maybe some other members of this committee, have always
been very interested in this. When you are entrenched, when you
get in there and have a chance for a total evaluation, just come forth, be very honest with us as to what resources you need, because I think that is one of the greatest threats that we have out there.

By the way, Senator Warner and I were talking about all three of you having kids in there and you, General Van Antwerp, with three, and one was injured. We are just very proud of you. To me, I look at the three of you and I think of that as being kind of an American tradition that goes from generation to generation. We are very proud.

With the 92,000 or so increases that are going to be coming in the new combat units, you are going to have to have new support. Are you satisfied with the resources and of being able to accommodate that?

General Renuart. I am sorry, Senator? For me?

Senator Inhofe. No, I am talking about General Van Antwerp right now.

General Van Antwerp. Accommodate?

Senator Inhofe. The new responsibilities that come with the increased number of combat units that are going to come with the 92,000 increase.

General Van Antwerp. Right. The Army's portion of that is 65,000, and part of that is in our restationing plan. Of course you have to have the facilities and everything that goes with this, and it is very much linked with base realignment and closure as far as movement of people. But we do have a plan for the stationing of all those units and the building of those units through 2012.

Senator Inhofe. I want you to repeat the numbers that you used in response to Senator Sessions' question. I was kind of impressed with that when you talked about the number of projects and the amount of money and where you are with that.

General Van Antwerp. This is in Iraq. The Corps was assigned 4,500 projects for the tune of about $8 billion. Thus far they have completed 3,400 of those projects. Then the rest of them, there are 900 projects that are under construction and another 200 projects that are in some stage of planning and design.

Senator Inhofe. Using the Iraqis for a lot of this work?

General Van Antwerp. Right, for about three-quarters of it.

Senator Inhofe. The only other thing I wanted to—and I told General Keating I would do this—we have been very active in both the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program and the section 1206 and 1207 train and equip programs. The IMET program at one time had the restriction on it, which we have now lifted, because we were assuming that the international officers were the ones who were benefiting from such a program. It appears to me as I see people coming over here in droves for training that is the best money that we can spend, particularly in your new area of responsibility.

I would like to know your level of interest with the IMET program and also the train and equip program, because that will continue to be a discussion of this committee.

Admiral Keating. Senator, we are vitally interested in the IMET program. Since our discussion, we went back and there are over 20 heads of service or chiefs of defense who are in position or who
have recently retired in foreign militaries who have attended just the National War College. That is a dramatic dividend on a relatively small investment. The understanding of tactics, techniques, and capabilities that is developed as those officers attend our school is profound.

As far as train and equip, you have given PACOM the authority, in collaboration with the State Department, to expend money in a fairly short timeline to countries in the particular area of maritime security, Malaysia and Sri Lanka. The benefits of that investment can perhaps be measured by Lloyd’s of London reducing premiums for ships transiting the Straits of Malacca from wartime premiums to something below that. We think that is a direct reflection of the investment we have made under section 1206.

Senator INHOFE. I can only say, and I say this also to my friends on the committee, that if we do not really utilize the advantages that come with an IMET program, China is doing it.

Admiral KEATING. Right.

Senator INHOFE. They have an exhaustive program right now that—I would just like to beat them to the punch.

Senator Warner, thank you for allowing me to infringe upon your time.

Senator WARNER. No, not at all. I am going to be here throughout the hearing.

I want to associate myself with my distinguished colleague’s support for the IMET program. All of us who have had many years on this committee—and the three here have been here for a couple of decades—recognize as we travel and visit other nations, which is our responsibility, particularly on the Armed Services Committee, how proud some of these foreign officers are to step up and say: I am a product of America’s IMET educational system. It is a sense of confidence that we have in that officer and his ability to hopefully strengthen the ties between his nation or her as the case may be, and the United States.

Senator INHOFE. I would say particularly now also in Africa, they are so proud to be a product. It is a great program.

Senator WARNER. Senator, there is no one here that has logged more time traveling in those distressed areas of Africa than you. Mr. Chairman, I think I will pick up if I may. One of your colleagues appeared, but then disappeared.

Chairman LEVIN. Please.

Senator WARNER. Admiral Keating, your predecessor worked very closely with the committee through the years and we anticipate no less on your part. But one of the things that I always admired was his initiatives to do the proactive approach to advancing U.S.-Chinese military-to-military relations. This is extremely important, particularly as China now is, in a very strong and forceful way, increasing its military capabilities and spreading its influence throughout the world.

I look back on the days when we were dealing in the Cold War and we always had the feeling that the senior military and the Soviet Union at that time were individuals that would carefully think through all options for initiating certain actions, most particularly anything related to the strategic use of those assets. I just hope that you will carry on in that context.
Do you feel there is an opportunity to pick up where he left off and expand?

Admiral Keating. You bet, Senator. A huge potential here and, if confirmed, we will do our best to capitalize on that opportunity.

Senator Warner. In the most intense chapters of the Cold War, there was always a sense of confidence in the quality, the ability, and the judgment of the senior military. We simply, at least from my perspective, I do not know that we have that insight into China. There seems to me such a veil of secrecy and withdrawal that it is going to take some forceful initiatives on your part.

Which brings me to, when you and I visited most recently we talked about the history of the Incidents at Sea, the agreement that we have between, in this case, the Navy of the United States and the navy of the former Soviet Union. Currently that agreement is still in effect, because there was a tragic event when we had the clash of the aircraft and that confrontation. Had that framework been in place, I think we would have been able to work our way through that situation more expeditiously, and indeed we may well have prevented it, because that concept of agreement is to recognize the potential and the requirement of both militaries, to do surveillance, but do it in a way that those assets, be they ships or aircraft, are not likely to have actual contact and confrontation.

Will you continue to take a look at that?

Admiral Keating. Yes, sir. If confirmed, we will undertake an aggressive, but measured and reasonable, approach as we can to the senior military leadership, and not just the senior military leaders, but at as many levels as we can with the Chinese military, and it goes to IMET, so as to develop relationships, an understanding, and a common bond and to continue the exercises that PACOM has underway. They have done two search and rescue exercises within the past couple years. As you say, Senator, those would likely have led to a different outcome of the EP–3 incident if it were to occur now, and it is unlikely that it would occur.

Senator Warner. General Renuart, this committee had a great deal to do with the establishment of the legislation which created the 55 Weapons of Mass Destruction–Civil Support Teams to ensure that each State and territory of the United States has at least one team. Some of the larger States have more than one. To date 47 of these teams have been certified by DOD as mission capable. States will also depend on the National Guard, the chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear high yield explosive (CBRNE) enhanced weapons response force package, and the CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package teams available to each in the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) areas.

You are going to pick up from Admiral Keating and we are fortunate today that he is present, because we know full well of the achievements that he had. But I do hope that you continue to provide strong support for these concepts.

For those following this hearing, all these acronyms are confusing, but these are teams that can come in and work with the local community with regard to the first response on an incident which is hard to ascertain exactly how it imperils the local citizens and the first responders, particularly chemical, biological incidents. It is just not possible for each of the States to have all the complex
equipment that can go in, and can go in on the spot and make the necessary analysis.

So I do hope that is one of your high priorities as you proceed.

General RENUART. Yes, Senator, it will be, and if confirmed, we will continue to pursue the funding and the training and equipping of all of those units.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I will return in a second round.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

By the way, Admiral Keating, I think you are probably aware of this fact, that Senator Warner is an expert on literally negotiating agreements and treaties on incidents at sea or otherwise to deconflict or avoid conflict with countries with whom we are truly adversaries. He personally negotiated the Incidents at Sea Treaty with the Soviet Union. I believe he was Secretary of the Navy at that time. It is one of the many proud moments in his career. But if you want some advice as to the wisdom and the methods of such discussions, you are looking at an expert right here.

Admiral KEATING. We are aware, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much.

Senator WARNER. I thank the chair. Days long past.

Admiral KEATING. The agreement is still in place.

Chairman LEVIN. It was a great moment, and I have been in his office and there is, as I remember, a picture or a plaque on the wall about that event.

Senator Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Generals and Admiral, I enjoyed my visit privately with each one of you and would only reemphasize here in open session some of the things that I had discussed with you when we visited earlier.

General Renuart, you know the concerns that we have with regard to the National Guard when there is a major natural disaster such as a hurricane. I can tell you that our Florida Guard is experienced and they know what to do, and NORTHCOM should not be coming in there and telling them what to do, which is part of the problem that we got into over in Louisiana with Hurricane Katrina.

You were very receptive to those ideas about letting the experts make decisions instead of somebody coming in and telling the experts how they should do it and then getting all balled up.

Admiral Keating, you clearly have quite a challenge in your area of responsibility with North Korea, and hopefully the first little step of progress that we have seen is going to bear more fruit. If China will concentrate more, instead of putting a bunch of space debris through their anti-satellites, threatening everybody's satellites, everybody's in the world, and instead concentrate more on using their friendly persuasion with North Korea to at the end of the day do what China wants, which it does not want a nuclearized Korean peninsula, then that is all to the good for the entire world. That is in your bailiwick.

General Van Antwerp, congratulations on your success in recruiting. I hope under these difficult circumstances it is going to continue. Now, of course, you and I visited about the Everglades restoration, which is so critical, not only to Florida but to the delicate environmental balance throughout the world.
I would just point out one other thing that I did not get to point out in our personal conversation. It is particularly acute in Florida, where in the Florida Department of Environmental Protection, they have a permitting process. It is almost exactly a mirror image of the same permitting process of the Army Corps of Engineers. As a result, what you get is a great deal of frustration by someone seeking a permit, that they go through all of this and then they go and do the very same thing with you, and where the two of you administratively can combine the efforts, since at the end of the day what we are trying to do is protect the environment, but make that administrative process an easier one, not a more relaxed one, just a more administratively smooth one.

It is going to take somebody like you making sure that the folks down the line are doing it. Now, your new colonel down there in Florida, Colonel Grosskrueger, is sensitive to this and if you would give some signals from up high on Mount Olympus I think that would be very much appreciated.

The other problem that we have in a growth State like Florida—and by the way, all my colleagues just could not believe it when I told them. I said, “do you know what the number of new registered voters between the two presidential elections are in Florida, between 2000 and 2007?” My colleagues in the Senate could not believe me when I told them it was 3.9 million new registered voters within a 4-year period.

That is the kind of growth that we have going on, and that is just reflective in registered voters. We are getting a net growth of close to 400,000 per year. In 2012, Florida will overtake New York and become the third largest State.

General, you do not have enough people in the Jacksonville District to handle this growth, and as a result there are delays and frustrations. Your people are working just as hard as they can work. They are great public servants. They just need some more in a growth State that is highly environmentally sensitive like Florida.

Mr. Chairman, I had a wonderful visit with all three of them and that would be my additional exclamation point. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

General Van Antwerp. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Senator Thune.

Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our distinguished panel for your service to our country and for your continued service and I look forward very much to getting you into these new posts and positions and to the good work that you will do there. Let me just add a couple questions.

Admiral Keating, I would like to follow up on—and this line of questioning maybe has already been pursued this morning, but with regard to China. China is investing a vast amount of resources into its naval capabilities and I am interested in knowing, if confirmed as PACOM commander, what steps you will take to ensure that U.S. forces in the Pacific region can meet these threats, particularly the threat from China’s growing submarine fleet.

Admiral Keating. Sir, if confirmed, we will continue PACOM’s current policy of paying very close attention to China’s development. In gross numbers it is impressive; in percentage of their
budget, if reports are fairly accurate. They are well behind us technologically. We enjoy significant advantages across the spectrum of defensive and offensive systems.

In particular, undersea warfare is an area of concern. We will pay close attention to it, if confirmed. I have had the pleasure of cruising throughout those waters on considerable regularity in my earlier career, Senator, and I can assure you that we are not unfamiliar with the challenges and we have significant advantages now and we are not going to yield those advantages.

Senator Thune. A question for General Van Antwerp and this has to do with, there are two divisions dedicated to the war effort. One is the Gulf Region Division, which is focused on rebuilding operations in Iraq, and that was activated in January 2004; and the other is the Afghanistan Engineer District, which was activated in March 2004. One of the many projects the Corps is involved in is the award of several contracts for repair of Iraq’s oil infrastructure.

How has that contract that was awarded in 2004 improved the production of oil in Iraq?

General Van Antwerp. Senator, I am going to have to study that. That is a great question. I am familiar with the contracts in that, but as far as the improvement that they have made, I will have to take that and get back to you. But I certainly would study that and, if confirmed, that would be a priority, to get into those contracts and what their production is, because in the end game that is what it is all about.

Senator Thune. I appreciate that and if you could answer it for the record it would be great, because that is such an important part of our success there, making sure that the oil infrastructure is intact, they are able to produce, and then to divide oil revenues in a way that enables each of the various sections of the country to prosper. That clearly is a focus of our strategy there at the current time and I am just curious to know to what extent the work that has been done there may have aided in moving that process along.

[The information referred to follows:]

The purpose of the oil infrastructure program in Iraq was to restore production capability existing prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom. At the beginning of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) Oil program, a goal of 3 million barrels per day (MBPD) production capacity was set and projects were selected that would support achievement of that goal. Key projects included providing materials for 20 Gas Oil Separation Plants, refurbishment of an offshore export terminal, and an oil well logging and work-over program. This investment of capital, while minimal in terms of what is needed on an annual basis to maintain consistent oil production, has allowed the production of oil and associated gas to be maintained at a reasonable level until Iraq can execute the level of investment required to increase its annual output of crude oil and associated gas.

As the Gulf Region Division Oil Sector Reconstruction program concludes in May 2007, it is my understanding that the 3 MBPD capacity objective will be achieved. However, I also understand that this capacity is not yet reflected in actual crude oil production volume, which is currently in the range of 2.1 MBPD. This is due primarily to the interdiction of a crude oil stabilization plant in the north and repeated interdiction of the Iraq-Turkey export pipeline by insurgents. Even though the capability to produce 3 MBPD is expected to be achieved, actual production will only reach this level when the Government of Iraq is successful in curtailing the insurgent activity that affects the transport of the crude oil out of Iraq.

Senator Thune. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for your service. I look forward to getting you confirmed.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Thune.
Let me pick up now on a second round of questions. First, General Renuart, one of the lessons from Hurricane Katrina was the need for better planning, coordination, and integration among NORTHCOM, the National Guard, and the Federal and State emergency response agencies in the event of a domestic disaster. We saw delays and confusion among State and Federal officials that made a horrible situation even worse.
How would you have NORTHCOM improve the planning and coordination among the various Federal and State response entities in the event of a domestic disaster, so we do not have a repeat of the post-Katrina problems?

General RENUART. Mr. Chairman, in the aftermath of all that there was a great deal of effort put to the lessons learned process to try to determine where there were seams and gaps among all the participants. I know Admiral Keating had in preparation for last year's hurricane season put in place a very detailed review, a process of creating pre-scripted mission orders, if you will, for all of the responding agencies, prepositioning equipment in key areas in the southeast such that they can be used on short notice and brought to bear.

I think all those efforts are critically important. I know NORTHCOM has just completed a similar preparation process for this hurricane season and, if confirmed, I am completely committed to continuing that effort, with a special effort on the command and control communications such that they are interoperable, not just among the Guard and the Active Force, but among the various Federal agencies who would respond. I do know that there has been some effort in that regard already and we would continue to do that.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

General Van Antwerp, the Army Corps' handling of a large contract with Halliburton for the reconstruction of the Iraqi oil industry has been widely criticized. Before the war, Halliburton was given the assignment to study the Iraqi oil industry without competition under an existing contract. The Army Corps then awarded Halliburton a sole source contract with a value of up to $7 billion over a period of up to 5 years.
The senior contracting official for the Army Corps was so disturbed by that contract award that she wrote a note on the approval document itself cautioning against extending the contract beyond a 1-year period.

Now, in your responses to pre-hearing questions you agreed that “competition is the very foundation of government contracting and in general the term of a contract awarded under the urgent and compelling exception to competition should not ordinarily exceed the time reasonably required to award a follow-on contract.”
A 5-year contract—does that not exceed the “time reasonably required to award a follow-on contract”? Would you make every effort, if confirmed, to ensure that the Corps avoids awarding sole source contracts of comparable duration in the future?

General VAN ANTWERP. Senator, those are great points. As I stated in my response there, I do believe in competition. I think it is
what gives you best value. I think there are times when you need a bridging contract, an early one, but I agree in concept with the timelines established there.

Chairman Levin. Established where?
General Van Antwerp. Established that it should be a short duration and then as soon as possible and practicable you ought to go and do a competitive bid.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

You stated, General Van Antwerp, in response to the pre-hearing questions, that you were not aware of major failures of the Army Corps contracting for reconstruction and relief in the wake of major hurricanes in 2005. I recognize you are not personally responsible for the particular contracting I am going to ask you about. But there were press reports that described several cases in which work was passed down from the Army Corps to a prime contractor, then to a subcontractor, and then to another subcontractor, with each company charging the government for overhead and profit, before finally reaching the company that would actually do the work.

In one such case the Army Corps reportedly paid a prime contractor $1.75 per square foot to nail plastic tarps onto damaged roofs in Louisiana. That is $1.75 a square foot. The prime contractor paid another company, a subcontractor, 75 cents to do that same work, per square foot that is. The subcontractor then paid a third company 35 cents per square foot to do the work, and that subcontractor reportedly paid yet another company 10 cents per square foot to do the work.

In a second such case, the Corps reportedly paid prime contractors up to $30 a cubic yard to remove debris and the companies that actually performed the work were paid from $6 to $10 a cubic yard.

So would you agree that it would be a contracting failure if the Corps paid $1.75 per square foot for work that cost only 10 cents per square foot to perform?

General Van Antwerp. Sir, I would agree in concept with your supposition there. I also believe that if there is proper competition that it will eliminate a lot of that tiering. So again, it goes back to that competition is very important.

Chairman Levin. Would you take strong action, if confirmed, to ensure that the Corps does not pay such excessive pass-through charges in the future?

General Van Antwerp. I will, sir.

Chairman Levin. I just have one additional question and then I will be done. I do not want to go over my time, Senator Warner.

Senator Warner. Why don't you go ahead?

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much. One of the great challenges in the Great Lakes for the Corps is the dredging that is done in the Great Lakes and the significant backlog of dredging that exists. The Corps estimates a backlog of 16 million cubic yards at commercial harbors that need to be dredged and that backlog is expected to cost about $192 million. It has had real impacts on our shipping. Several freighters have gotten stuck in Great Lakes channels. Ships have had to carry reduced loads and many shipments have just simply ceased altogether.
The dock in Buena Vista Township reported a reduction of 25 percent in ship tonnage. Tugboats have been needed to turn boats around because channels have not been dredged, at a cost of $15,000 to $20,000 each week. In one case, a freighter ran aground at Saginaw last year and the ship’s rudder was torn off.

This problem stems in part from the way the Corps’ budget is prepared using metrics such as cargo tonnage and ship miles. But the performance metrics treat the Great Lakes like a river system, which results in funding inequities. The Corps spent about 5 cents per ton of cargo carried in the Great Lakes. That should be 52 cents per ton, 52 cents per ton of cargo carried in the Great Lakes, but the Missouri River received about $15 per ton of cargo carried. So that is about 30 times as much per ton for the Missouri River as was the case for tonnage that was carried in the Great Lakes.

Will you take a look at those budgeting guidelines if you are confirmed, to assure equitable funding allocations for the Nation’s shipping infrastructure?

General VAN ANTWERP. Yes, Senator, I will.

Chairman LEVIN. I have a couple more questions. Senator Warner, let me turn to you.

Senator WARNER. Why do you not go ahead? I am going to be here for a while.

Chairman LEVIN. Let me try to wind this up. I thought I only had one more, but there were two additional questions I did not realize I had.

The Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee’s investigation of Hurricane Katrina found that the problems with the New Orleans hurricane protection system could be attributed in part to “infrastructure elements being designed and maintained by multiple authorities.” The team leader of the National Science Foundation’s Katrina investigation testified before that committee and stated that “No one is in charge. You have multiple agencies, multiple organizations, some of whom are not on speaking terms with each other, sharing responsibilities for public safety. There is a need to coordinate these things.”

General, as Chief of the Engineers, how would you improve the Corps’ operation, maintenance, and inspection activities in order to avoid that kind of multiplicity and in order to better protect our people and our investments?

General VAN ANTWERP. Mr. Chairman, I believe firmly in communication. It starts there, and then there needs to be a very fixed responsibility for the asset, and there needs to be joint inspections, so that when you go through and you determine what needs to be done and then you fix responsibility for that and then there is a procedure to determine how it is paid for and what the cost-sharing ratios are.

But a lot more joint work, as you alluded to, and much better communications. I think it will be something that I will definitely get into early on as a priority.

Chairman LEVIN. We have major problems in the Great Lakes and in the Mississippi River watershed from the spread of invasive species. Congress authorized a dispersal barrier demonstration project in the National Invasive Species Act of 1996. It is not the permanent barrier that we need, particularly against a species
called the Asian carp, and so we need to have a permanent protection from that particular invasive species, because it poses huge threats to our fisheries and our ecosystems, and we just have to have a permanent barrier, not just a demonstration barrier.

The health and the economic vitality of the Great Lakes depends on a lot of stakeholders. It is a huge issue for those of us who are in Great Lakes States. The Army Corps plays an essential role in that protection and in that health and economic vitality. I just want to point it out to you. I know that you are sensitive to it because of your background and where you were born and raised. But I just want to just keep that front and center if you would.

General Van Antwerp. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Finally, my last question has to do with a fund called the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund. It has a $3 billion surplus and it is growing every year. Yet there are waterways and small harbors, including harbors of refuge in Michigan, that are silting due to the lack of sufficient funds for dredging, as I have mentioned before. Will you take a look at these budgets and will you make sure that the Office of Management and Budget is aware both of the Harbor Maintenance Trust Fund and of the dredging needs of the Great Lakes when they develop the administration's future budget requests?

General Van Antwerp. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Senator Webb, you are next, but should I call on Senator Warner?

Senator Webb. If you would, Mr. Chairman. I will be right with you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Senator Warner.

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Keating, in your response to the committee's advance questions you very forthrightly, and I stress "forthrightly," addressed a continuing challenge for those who have preceded you and for you, and that is, and I quote your own language, "influencing cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan."

How do you propose to carry on Admiral Fallon's very adroit and skillful handling of that issue, and what would you hope to add to it? Certainly here in Congress at the present time there is complete respect and adherence to the framework of laws we have there and our policy towards the two Chinas, so to speak. But I would like to have for the record your own perspective on this challenge and how you propose to deal with it, because I am, speaking for myself here, very concerned from time to time at some of the rhetoric that emanates from sources that are well known to you and the inflammatory nature of that rhetoric. I would hate to see it spark a conflict.

Admiral Keating. Senator, if confirmed, those relations and sustaining the calm that appears the pervade today across the Straits of Taiwan will be a principal goal of ours at PACOM. I know you are very familiar with the Taiwan Relations Act. We understand that act.

Senator Warner. Yes, that is what I was referring to.

Admiral Keating. Yes, sir. In dealing with the People's Republic of China and with the Government of Taiwan, we would emphasize
that China has to be very careful in the development of offensive weapons. We want to sustain Taiwan's notion of a defensive front from their military capabilities. We would encourage increased dialogue between those two countries on an informal basis, and we are not unaware of the burgeoning economic engine that is trade across the Straits of Taiwan. So we would encourage all those positive signs. We would do our best to make sure that both sides were aware of our close observation of developments, and we would do our best to sustain the harmony that does appear to be the situation across the Straits of Taiwan today.

Senator WARNER. I thank you. I wish you support in that endeavor.

Admiral KEATING. Thank you, sir.

Senator WARNER. General Van Antwerp, I have had the privilege of working with many of your predecessors during the years, and I say this part in humor, but part in reality. You probably have one of the most political appointments to be found in DOD. Looking over your background, which has been a magnificent accomplishment of a professional military man, I suggest you begin to take a tutorial, if you have not already done so, as to how to deal with this.

I have found through the years one of the core problems that arises between Congress, which understandably has a need to be very closely advised with regard to the work that you do, given that so much of that work impacts our States—but you stated in your advance questions—and I always go through these rather carefully. You said as follows: "The integrity of the Corps of Engineers rests on the objectivity, transparency, and scientific validity of its analytical processes."

Let us focus on the word "transparency." It means a sharing with the public, with Congress, and others the nature of your challenges and how you best think you can address it.

General VAN ANTWERP. Senator, I agree with that word. I believe that should be in the communications strategy. We need to let America know of the risks as we are working for the public safety. The problem always is where you identify the risks, until the studies have been finished you do not know the full extent. But I believe in going with as much transparency as you can. In the Army we call it "go ugly early," so you get it out there and get the discussions going. That helps frame a lot of times the solution. So I believe in that transparency.

Senator WARNER. I thank you.

I would like to take a cue from my distinguished colleague's line of questioning here about the Great Lakes. I would like to return to a very simple matter in my State, since we are going to deal with our States here for a little bit. I have been on this committee 29 years and I think about 20 of those years I have been trying to work with the Corps on building a much-needed dam in Virginia. You and I discussed it yesterday, but I would like to put a little bit on the record—which through the years, given the growing nature of that geographic area of Virginia, namely the Newport News area, is absolutely essential to maintain the health and safety of the people of that community, all the people, not just those that live right in particular areas, but a lot of the Indian tribes...
that we are very proud to have in our State are co-located there, understandably, and I respect greatly their desire to preserve their heritage. But we still have some lingering problems related to that, which I hope we can resolve.

You have studied a little bit on it and without getting into too many specifics for the future, do you think that project can go forward? Because I think we have in 20 years gotten it to the point where all of the basic steps to be performed by the Corps have been done and done carefully. The environmental steps have been taken care of. Do you project that project can now go forward in the near future?

General VAN ANTWERP. Senator, I believe it can go forward. I think we have to have this engagement strategy with our Indian tribes to make sure we have dealt with their objections and looked for possible mitigations. But I believe everything else is in place, from what I have read, to move forward.

Senator WARNER. Coming back to Admiral Keating and General Renuart, let us talk about the fact that how our law, with regard to the security of our Nation, puts a great deal of emphasis on how in the aftermath of a calamitous terrorist attack or other national catastrophe that the Department of Homeland Security and other State and local agencies have the primary initial responsibility, and NORTHCOM’s mission is to provide support to civil authorities when directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense, which means you have to keep a constant assessment of what you have available in the Active and Reserve components of our military to meet these unanticipated and often very quick demands.

As you pass these authorities over to the General, Admiral, fortunately on your watch you have not had a major situation, but we have to always plan for it. Given the extraordinary contribution of the Guard and Reserve in the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, I think it is generally recognized that the Guard and Reserve require some very special consideration in the coming years to first resupply their equipment and second to work on their rotations so that they can continue to be a civilian as well as a military guardsman or reservist.

It has gotten to a critical situation, this Guard and Reserve. As you pass off, perhaps you can address your concept of the criticality. Maybe you are aware of the Commission on the Guard and Reserve and their report. Why do you not start with that report, which seemed to indicate that perhaps as you pass this challenge over to your successor you will have to answer that report.

Admiral KEATING. Yes, sir. I was given the privilege of testifying before Chairman Punaro’s committee and I am aware of the report. I have seen the executive summary. I have not read the report in its entirety.

Senator WARNER. Let me read the one sentence here which I find somewhat troubling. The report by the Commission on the roles and missions of the National Guard and Reserve finds that the Commander of NORTHCOM “does not sufficiently advocate for the full range of civil support requirements affecting the National Guard and Reserves.”

Why do you not pick up from that?
Admiral Keating. I disagree with that assessment, Senator. We have on two occasions in the 2 years that I have had the privilege of being at NORTHCOM gone forward with an official submission to DOD, an integrated priority list and a program objective memorandum input for the fiscal year 2008 budget in which we recommended specifically advocacy for certain Guard programs, including their civil support teams and joint headquarters in each State.

So I disagree with that assessment and so testified in my original testimony before Chairman Punaro’s committee. We have, as you may know, Senator, a full-time Active-Duty title 10 two-star Air Guardsman as our chief of staff. That billet has always at NORTHCOM been filled by a National Guard or Air Guardsman. We have 5 other flag or general officers who are assigned to our staff and we have over 100 Guardsmen or Air Guardsmen who serve full-time on our staff. I think we are adequately represented and, more importantly, we are critically aware of the importance of a firm understanding of National Guard capabilities and their essential role in executing our military mission of providing support to civil authorities. We are very conscious of it and we support the Guard in many ways on the record and in conversations with the Guard Bureau.

Senator Warner. I wanted to give you this opportunity to put that in the record.

Admiral Keating. Thank you, sir.

Senator Warner. As you pass over these responsibilities, I think we all agree that the criticality of the Guard and Reserve at this time as a consequence of their very courageous and forthcoming contribution to procuring the goals both in Iraq and Afghanistan have left it in some rather unusual circumstances. I am not suggesting it cannot continue to carry out its missions, but it needs help. Given the fact that it needs help, it seems to me that impacts you, General Renuart, as you pick up this responsibility. I hope that one of your first priorities is to fully acquaint yourself with the status of the Guard and Reserve, its ability to respond to orders that you will get from the President and/or Secretary of Defense as a consequence of a catastrophe that the local authorities, State authorities, and the Department of Homeland Security simply cannot deal with and therefore has to look to the resources of DOD. You are the coordinator on that.

Do you have any view?

General Renuart. Senator, thank you for that, and I want to underline the work that Admiral Keating and the staff at NORTHCOM have done advocating for the Guard. If you look at the current supplemental request that is being worked as well as the fiscal year 2008 budget, there is a substantial portion of the budget put in to re-equip some of these shortfalls in the Guard and Reserve.

If confirmed in this position, it will be one of my principal priorities to not only establish a better understanding on my behalf of the requirements for the Guard and Reserve, but to continue to be the strong advocate in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council process for those requirements and to work towards getting them funded and resupplied.
Senator WARNER. One last question, Mr. Chairman. It relates to a subject that I have followed very closely. I will never forget, on September 11, Chairman Levin and I went over to the Pentagon. You remember that day?

Chairman LEVIN. I do indeed.

Senator WARNER. We went down with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs into the tank and periodically with the Secretary of Defense we went back to the scene and watched the various elements of first responders dealing with a situation I will never forget as long as I live. Extraordinary bravery and courage.

But we also saw the failure of interoperability between segments of those first responders and other important areas where they were receiving information and instructions. That seems to continue to be somewhat of a problem; is that correct, Admiral, as you step down?

Admiral KEATING. There is work to be done, yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. There is work to be done. Have the two of you had a chance to carefully outline your perspectives on the volume and the nature of that work that has to be done?

Admiral KEATING. We have.

General RENUART. Yes, sir, we have.

Senator WARNER. I find that reassuring, that you will do that, because that has to be the highest priority. The next time you appear before this committee, God willing, if I am back up in this chair that is the first question I am going to ask you, General Renuart: What is the status of that interoperability of communications?

General RENUART. Senator, thank you, and I, if confirmed, look forward to the chance to speak with you further about it.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator Webb, I just want to thank Senator Pryor. He technically, a technicality, he was next. I bypassed Senator Webb once and I appreciate Senator Pryor allowing me to call on Senator Webb at this time.

Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Also I would like to thank my colleague for allowing me a few minutes here.

I would like to first apologize to the witnesses. This is one of these situations, I am on four committees and all four of them called hearings this morning, plus the Leader called a meeting of the new Senators on the budget issue. So I literally had to be five different places at the same time.

I wanted to come by and first of all pay my respects to all of you for the service you have given and to your families for the contributions that you have made. I had the opportunity to have pretty extensive one-on-one visits with Admiral Keating and with General Renuart and most of the questions that concern me were asked in that forum. I am not going to repeat them here. I do not think there is any real necessity to put anything into the record, but I think we all know where the issues are. I have great confidence in both of you in terms of the operational experience that you are
bringing to the positions, which I think is vital in terms of how the American military works.

Admiral Keating, as I said when I met with you, I think you have the position that historically is probably the most revered position for any naval officer. It is not only a position of great historical esteem; also right now it is I think one of the most important positions that anyone could have regarding the future of our country.

One of the things that I have been greatly concerned about as the national attention has become so focused on the Iraqi involvement and the way that we have approached that issue is that we are taking our eye off the ball in terms of where our long-term strategic challenges are. Those are heavily in your region. I have long experience in that region as a military person, as a journalist, as a businessman, and in the Government. I am looking forward to working with you on those issues as a member of this committee and also as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee.

General, I wish you well.

General Van Antwerp, I did not get a chance to visit with you personally. I have examined your credentials and I am obviously going to support you. I have one issue that I would like to address for today to hear your views on, but also as something that I want to mark for the future. I have a great deal of concern about what happened at Hurricane Katrina. When I examine that tragedy, it had three different components to it. One is the potential that we had with proper planning to actually have prevented the failure of the levee system and so much of the catastrophic effect from when the levees broke. The second was the management of the crisis itself. The third is the aftermath, in which I think the Corps of Engineers has done a really marvelous job.

But with respect to planning and also with respect to the next evolution of attempting to prevent a similar situation, I do have some concerns. Maybe you can clarify something for me. I have read in a number of places that the Corps of Engineers was recommending funding levels at far higher levels than actually were put into place with respect to—I do not know what the right engineering term would be, but revitalizing the levee systems. I cannot say repairing them because from what I am reading they were sort of flattening out; but that there was an estimate done by the Corps of Engineers saying that these levee systems needed to be dramatically invigorated. I can choose the word. You see what I mean.

But is that not so, that the Corps of Engineers was warning before this incident that there should be funding for a different sort of approach to the levee system?

General Van Antwerp. My understanding, Senator, is that there is a number of design things that were looked at and one of the solutions is what they call a T-wall. You have basically two things you can do. You can spread it out over a larger piece of ground and shape it differently and make it higher, or you can have internal parts of that structure. So I believe you are correct in that. I do not know all the budget figures, but if confirmed I would certainly get into that and look at what we are doing on those repairs.

Senator Webb. What I would like is to have a better understanding of that. I do not think this is simply retroactive. If you could
provide for us what the recommendations were from the Corps of Engineers with respect to the health of the levee systems in, say, the 6 or 7 years before this incident, because I would like to be able to either validate what I read or understand that it was not true, because what I have been reading is that the Corps of Engineers was specifically warning that a certain level of funding would be necessary in order to preclude what exactly happened.

Just anecdotally, I can tell you—my wife is from New Orleans. We were down there a little less than a year ago. I went down into one of these areas that had been wiped out, where the levee had broken. Everyone has their stories, but it was kind of illuminating to me. I was just trying to find somebody to talk to. Everyone is gone. You had the little trailers out front. I did not want to just impose myself on somebody walking along the street, but I was driving along one of these burned-out areas and I saw a Marine Corps flag in somebody's back yard and I figured, well, that person I could at least open up a discussion with.

There was a gentleman there who had lived in the same house for 51 years and lost everything, gone completely. I asked him during the course of a conversation what his thoughts were about the prevention of this. He told me he had been on one of the commissions for 20 years before this happened and that they had been saying over and over again that these levees were flattening out. So maybe it is this T system you are talking about, but they could measurably see that they were flattening out, and as a result it would be much easier for the water to broach them than they would have been perhaps even at the same height if they were straight, just the angle of flow and this sort of thing.

I really would like to know: (A) what the Corps of Engineers was saying about this. I think this is important for the historical record, and then (B) what are the recommendations now? Because one thing that we have been seeing in terms of the debate is to what extent are these levees going to be rebuilt, to what level of the next hurricane are they going to be able to withstand?

I cannot think of any more important function that you would be doing in your job than helping us make sure we get that right. I would appreciate your thoughts on both of those in as timely a manner as you could provide them for us.

[The information referred to follows:]

The Corps recognized the urgency to complete construction of the ongoing levee projects, as well as the design and approval for new levee projects for the Greater New Orleans Area. The Corps' annual budget request included funding for the ongoing hurricane protection projects. The West Bank and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project was budgeted annually at a funding level to complete the first level of protection as quickly as possible. The ongoing study to evaluate higher levels of protection in several parishes in southeastern Louisiana was proceeding to the feasibility phase. Several areas were identified for evaluation for raising current levee systems, construction of barriers that may prevent storm surges from moving inland, and wetlands construction and restoration.

The Corps of Engineers is committed to designing and constructing the best hurricane protection system for people and the environment within the resources provided and remains focused on restoring levees and floodwalls to the authorized heights and completing all planned projects in conjunction with the ultimate goal of providing 100-year protection for the system, as directed by Public Law 109–234. Additionally, several measures to provide higher levels of protection are now being reviewed under the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Act evaluation requested by Congress following Hurricane Katrina. This evaluation includes non-
structural measures and coastal restoration as a way to provide comprehensive hurricane protection.

Senator Webb. I have run out of time and I wish all of you gentlemen the best in your new positions.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.

Senator Pryor.

Senator Pryor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for having to be in two places at once, not five places at once like some people here. But anyway, I have had to come and go, and I have not had a chance to listen to all the nominees’ answers. But I really appreciate the panel being here today.

General Van Antwerp, let me start with you and follow up on a conversation we had in my office a few days ago. We hear a lot of comments in my office from communities on the Arkansas border riverways about the levee system. Apparently FEMA has come out with this in order to modernize their flood insurance rate maps, they feel like we need to inspect all our levee systems, et cetera, et cetera. This has a huge impact on the cost of that and who bears that cost, and the cities, et cetera, are very concerned about that; and second, on insurance rates for people living in those areas.

Do I understand it correctly that the Corps of Engineers’ role in this is to conduct these certifications?

General Van Antwerp. That is correct, Senator.

Senator Pryor. Do you pay for that or do you require the owners of the levees to pay for that?

General Van Antwerp. Senator, I am not sure of the answer to that question. It is possible that it could be cost-shared, but I believe it is borne by the Corps. But I will have to reply to you on that.

[The information referred to follows:]

In accordance with Corps of Engineers guidance issued in August 2006 and FEMA regulations, in general, the levee owner is responsible for certifying the levee and paying the associated costs. In this particular instance however, these levees in Arkansas are owned and operated by the Corps of Engineers as part of the Mississippi Rivers and Tributaries project. Therefore, the Corps of Engineers is responsible for certifying and paying the costs, provided that funds are appropriated for this work.

Senator Pryor. In terms of the evaluation of these levees and also repairing the levees if they need to be repaired, obviously that is very important. It is going to be very difficult the smaller the entity is for them to bear that cost. I am not picking on anybody, but St. Louis probably has a better budget to handle that than, say, Little Rock. Little Rock is going to have a better budget than, say, Russellville, AR, and Russellville is going to have a better budget than just a levee district probably will, all things being equal.

That is something that is very important to us. So as you take this post, I would just encourage you to remember the practical ramifications of this and work with Congress and work with local people on cost-sharing and spreading that cost and making that as painless as possible. Please do that.

The other thing about our transportation needs in this country, when you look out over the future we know right now already that we have a lot of rail corridors that are clogged, overused, and there is a lot of congestion. We also know that our highways are con-
gested with big trucks. By the way, those numbers are fairly alarming, about how many more big trucks will be on the road over the next 20 years. We have seen some statistics on that in the Senate Commerce Committee and it is something that we obviously need to invest in infrastructure there.

We also need to invest in our river infrastructure. This is very important, not just for a State like mine, but really States all over the Union. In fact, Mr. Chairman, you might be interested to know that a few years ago I went to one of our steel mills. We have some steel mills in Arkansas. Most of them, not all but most of them, are on the Mississippi River. What they do is they recycle steel. A few years ago, it was cheaper for them to go to Europe and buy the steel, ship it, barge it up the Mississippi River, and get it to us in Arkansas than it was to pay the freight via rail through Chicago.

It was cheaper to come from Europe on the water than it was rail from Chicago. Obviously, they have a lot of scrap metal in Chicago that we could be using, but they look at the cost.

So having good waterways and that good infrastructure on water, they are very important to the economy of this country. I just wanted to make sure you understood that.

General VAN ANTWERP. I agree. The statistics I have seen is for large growth, both in the navigable waterways, but also in our ports and harbors.

Senator PRYOR. Yes. To me it just seems that we cannot forget about our waterways as we look at infrastructure needs. A lot of the locks and dams are old. They were engineered and built a long time ago. Do you have any sort of plan to modernize those or upgrade those, or are we just going to do that as needed?

General VAN ANTWERP. I understand there has been a comprehensive look and we know what the risks are out there. Of course, in many cases it is a matter of authorization and dollars. But I am told that the Corps has a good understanding of what needs to be repaired and those surveys have been done.

Senator PRYOR. There was plenty of blame to go around after Hurricane Katrina happened and everybody probably shares a little bit of the blame and deserves a little bit of the blame. But one of the groups that was singled out specifically for a lot of blame was the Corps of Engineers and how they designed and did some of their work down in New Orleans and down in the southern Louisiana area.

Do you think that criticism is justified?

General VAN ANTWERP. Senator, I agree, I think, as you take a look back, there is always a lot of contributing factors. In many cases it is projects that were done years and years ago with the best of intentions, things that impacted wetlands or the outlets into the Gulf. Certainly the levees are an integral part. I believe it has to work as a system and so you have to look at all aspects.

It is also a fairly difficult area to construct and there was some settling, from the reports I have read, of some of the levees, which meant that they did not have the height to be able to take the storm as it came, so they really did not provide the 100-year protection. I think we all have a responsibility in that.

Senator PRYOR. The last question I have is, I know you have a huge commitment in Iraq. Given the relatively new commitment
for you in Iraq, do you have the resources necessary to meet your domestic obligations?

General Van Antwerp. Since we had our discussion in your office, I have looked into that some. Right now we are doing fine as far as I understand it. Actually, there is still good competition for positions that take critical skills. The longer we go here, there will be impact. We have almost 400 people in Iraq and 160 in Afghanistan, civilians. That is not counting about the 100 military that are there.

That is something we really have to keep our eye on and whether there is another source of those critical skills. You cannot just take anybody and have them supervise a project. They have to know what they are doing. So, if confirmed, I would take a close look at what those skills are and what is in the pipeline to keep those.

Senator Pryor. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you. Senator Pryor, do you have any additional questions?

Senator Pryor. I do not. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

I have no additional questions. Again we commend you all and we thank you and your families for your service.

We will stand adjourned and hope that we can promptly get to your confirmations.

[Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to ADM Timothy J. Keating, USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

**Question.** The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

**Answer.** I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

**Question.** If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

**Answer.** I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

DUTIES

**Question.** What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM)?

**Answer.** The Commander, U.S. PACOM is responsible for deterring attacks against the United States and its territories, possessions, and bases, to protect Americans and American interests and, in the event that deterrence fails, to fight and win. The Commander is also responsible for expanding security cooperation with our allies, partners, and friends across the Asia-Pacific region.

**Question.** What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

**Answer.** Thirty-six years of military training and experience, to include previous combatant command of the North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), have prepared me for assuming command of...
the U.S. PACOM. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, I planned and executed coalition and joint warfighting missions. As Director of the Joint Staff, I have gained invaluable insights into the conduct of joint operations, the duties of a combatant commander, and interagency cooperation. In addition, I gained regional experience as Commander of Carrier Group Five in Yokosuka, Japan and, additionally, on several operational deployments to the Pacific theater.

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, U.S. PACOM?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to take every opportunity to enhance my knowledge of our relationships with our allies and partners across the Pacific. I look forward to engaging with senior leaders within the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State, and military and civilian leaders throughout the Asia-Pacific region in order to improve my understanding of U.S. interests in the region.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S. PACOM, to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Commander, U.S. PACOM, performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. He is directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the ability of the Command to carry out its missions.

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense performs duties as directed by the Secretary and performs the duties of the Secretary in his absence. The Commander, U.S. PACOM, ensures the Deputy has the information necessary to perform these duties and coordinates with him on major issues.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Answer. Under secretaries are key advocates for combatant commands’ requirements. The Commander, U.S. PACOM, coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on strategic policy issues involving the Asia-Pacific region.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

Answer. The Commander, U.S. PACOM, coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as needed to set and meet the Command’s intelligence requirements.

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. While the Chairman is not in the chain of command that runs from the President and the Secretary of Defense to combatant commanders, his role as the senior uniformed military advisor is critical. The Commander, U.S. PACOM, supports the chain of command as directed in title 10 and communicates with the Chairman to enable him to perform his duties as the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense.

Question. The secretaries of the military departments.

Answer. The secretaries of the military departments are responsible for the administration and support of forces assigned to combatant commands. The Commander, U.S. PACOM, coordinates with the secretaries to ensure that requirements to organize, train, and equip PACOM forces are met.

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.

Answer. The Commander, U.S. PACOM, communicates and exchanges information with the chiefs of staff of the Services to support their responsibility for organizing, training, and equipping forces. Successful execution of U.S. PACOM’s mission responsibilities requires coordination with the Service Chiefs. Like the Chairman, the Service Chiefs are valuable sources of judgment and advice for combatant commanders.

Question. The other combatant commanders.

Answer. The Commander, U.S. PACOM, maintains close relationships with the other combatant commanders. These relationships, which are critical to the execution of our National Military Strategy, are characterized by mutual support, frequent contact, and productive exchanges of information on key issues.
MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

**Question.** In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, U.S. PACOM?

**Answer.** Traditional security challenges include ensuring peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and influencing cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan. We must also address other security issues, especially the threat of terrorism, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation, and transnational crime such as narcotics and human trafficking and piracy.

**Question.** Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will posture our military forces to dissuade, deter, or defeat any potential adversary. I will work with other DOD organizations, agencies of the U.S. Government, and our many friends and allies to assure the region of our strong resolve and lasting commitment to stability, security, and prosperity throughout Asia and the Pacific.

HOMELAND DEFENSE

**Question.** What is your understanding of the role and responsibility of U.S. PACOM in homeland defense?

**Answer.** U.S. PACOM’s responsibility is to deter attacks against the Homeland as early and as far away as possible, defend the U.S. PACOM domestic area of responsibility (AOR), and work with and provide support to civil authorities when requested. Additionally, U.S. PACOM’s homeland defense plan complements and is integrated with planning for the ongoing global war on terrorism, combating WMD, homeland security, and other relevant activities.

**Question.** What is your understanding of how U.S. PACOM and U.S. NORTHCOM work to ensure that their overlapping missions in this area do not create “seams” that might be exploited by our adversaries and how this process might be improved?

**Answer.** In October 2003, Commander, U.S. PACOM and Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM signed a Command Arrangement Agreement, to “establish procedures and delineate responsibilities” between the two commands. This agreement also prescribes employment of U.S. PACOM forces in support of U.S. NORTHCOM missions and the control of forces operating in NORTHCOM’s AOR. In my experience, the agreement between combatant commands has been highly effective. If confirmed, I intend to continue the close working relationship between the two commands.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the Regional Maritime Security Initiative, and what steps should be taken to improve upon it?

**Answer.** The Regional Maritime Security Initiative was developed to foster coordination among participating states to address transnational threats collectively. The themes and goals of the initiative continue to gain momentum in the Asia-Pacific region as the “Global Maritime Partnership.” Its effectiveness can be increased through better information sharing and investing the time and effort to improve understanding of the challenges and needs of the partner nations. U.S. PACOM should continue to encourage multilateral and interagency approaches to the challenges.

**Question.** How could U.S. PACOM forces and expertise contribute to more effective homeland defense capabilities?

**Answer.** U.S. PACOM’s military and intelligence activities in the western approaches to the continental United States contribute to the Nation’s active, layered defense and enhance situational awareness. Improving our capabilities in this regard will require continued efforts to collect actionable intelligence, exercise and train our forces, and engage actively with nations of the Asia-Pacific.

GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE REVIEW

**Question.** Perhaps more than in any other combatant command, military exigencies in the U.S. PACOM are subject to the “tyranny of distance” in getting forces to points of conflict.

In your view, how important is the forward basing strategy to the ability of U.S. PACOM to execute its operational contingencies, and did the Global Posture Review appropriately take this into account?

**Answer.** Forward basing is essential to the U.S. PACOM shaping and warfighting strategy. Forward presence in the AOR assures friends and allies and dissuades potential adversaries. Because posture changes resulting from Global Posture Review shift forces away from a garrison orientation and toward a more flexible force, I believe U.S. PACOM is well-positioned to respond with necessary military forces in the event of crises or contingency.
Question. What do you see as the implications of the proposed global force structure changes with respect to U.S. PACOM’s AOR, particularly in Korea and Japan?

Answer. I support alliance transformations currently underway in Japan and the Republic of Korea. In general, I see the changes as effective from a mission perspective and an example of the healthy state of our alliance with both nations.

Question. What impact, if any, do you expect the proposed changes in posture will have on our ability to defend South Korea and Japan, and to react to a crisis in the Taiwan Strait?

Answer. I do not anticipate any reduction in the command’s ability to meet commitments to our allies.

Question. The Army is proposing to add 65,000 personnel to its permanent force structure over the course of the Future Years Defense Program, including the creation of six additional active-duty combat brigades. The Marine Corps is proposing to add 27,000 personnel over the same period. Do you believe that any of these additional personnel and units should be assigned to commands located in the U.S. PACOM’s AOR in order to meet PACOM’s your requirements?

Answer. The proposals to expand the Army and Marine Corps allow us to reexamine our basing options and ensure that we have the optimum mix of forces to execute the National Military Strategy. If confirmed, I intend to study where force increases in the Pacific theater might be appropriate to enhance mission accomplishment and to share our analysis with DOD.

Question. If so, to what extent do you believe these additional forces should be forward-deployed, as in Korea or Japan, or deployed in the United States, such as Hawaii or Alaska?

Answer. If confirmed, I will study the options and consider the evolving situation in the Pacific, as these expanded forces are brought online. Once I have formed my assessment, I will provide my views to the Secretary of Defense.

NORTH KOREA

Question. North Korea represents one of the greatest near-term threats to U.S. national security interests in Asia. What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and the diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program?

Answer. The missile launches and nuclear test conducted last year underscore the gravity of the North Korean threat. If confirmed, I will support diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program. I am encouraged by the progress made at the Six-Party Talks in Beijing last month. I believe one of the key roles of U.S. PACOM is to work closely with the countries in the region to facilitate the ongoing diplomatic efforts aimed at addressing the threat, while maintaining a credible deterrent posture.

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States and its allies by North Korea’s ballistic missile and WMD capabilities and the export of those capabilities?

Answer. North Korea’s development of WMD and ballistic missile capabilities and potential proliferation pose a serious threat to the U.S. and our allies.

Question. In your view, what, if anything, should be done to strengthen deterrence on the Korean peninsula?

Answer. If confirmed, my focus will be on preserving the strength and resolve of our alliances. We must leverage relationships with other nations in the region to shape the strategic environment aimed at deterring aggression in Northeast Asia.

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH KOREA (ROK)

Question. Since the end of World War II, the U.S.-ROK alliance has been a key pillar of security in the Asia-Pacific region. This relationship is currently undergoing significant change. What is your understanding of the current U.S. security relationship with South Korea?

Answer. The U.S.-ROK security relationship is an enduring partnership that has been the key to deterrence for over 50 years. Our alliance has evolved to become a global partnership with the ROK military’s contributions to the war on terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the upcoming deployment of ROK troops in support of the U.N. mission in Lebanon.

Question. If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take, in conjunction with the Commander, U.S. Forces Korea/Combined Forces Command, to improve the U.S.-South Korean security relationship?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander of United States Forces Korea/Combined Forces Command to ensure there is no degradation in readiness or deterrence. I will ensure that U.S. PACOM supports the ongoing U.S. Forces Korea transformation initiatives that are vital to enhancing the capabilities of our combined forces and facilitating the eventual transition of wartime operational control to the ROK military.

Question. Do you support expanding the number of personnel assigned to Korea for 2 or 3 years of duty and the number of military and civilian personnel authorized to be accompanied by their dependents for these longer tours of duty?

Answer. I have not yet studied the proposal in detail, particularly with respect to affordability. However, in general, I believe longer tours and more troops having their families accompany them are in the best interests of our alliance and our readiness on the Korean peninsula.

CHINA

Question. Many observers believe that one of the key national security challenges of this century is how to manage China’s emergence as a major regional and global economic and military power. How would you characterize the U.S. security relationship with China?

Answer. From my vantage at NORTHCOM, I was encouraged by China’s role in facilitating North Korean return to the Six-Party Talks. I see this as constructive and responsible. I also am aware of the lack of transparency regarding Chinese military modernization, which is a concern.

Question. What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military relations, and do you favor increased military-to-military contacts with China?

Answer. Our military-to-military relationship is improving in terms of quality and quantity of events. If confirmed, I intend to advocate for an engagement program involving numerous events with measured but increased levels of sophistication. I believe this approach would help us learn more about the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), break down barriers to understanding, and reduce potential for conflict.

Question. How do you assess the current cross-Strait relationship, and how can we help to prevent miscalculation by either side?

Answer. I assess the situation as stable. However, I am also mindful of miscalculation is possible. If confirmed, I will remain particularly attentive to any military quantitative and qualitative gap between China and Taiwan.

Question. China’s economy is growing by as much as 10 percent per year, and China is using that economic growth to fund a substantial military modernization. In your view, what is China’s intent in pursuing such a rapid military modernization?

Answer. I believe it is clear China is seeking capabilities beyond those needed for a Taiwan situation, but the lack of transparency makes intent difficult to discern. If confirmed, I would seek to continue improvements with U.S.-PLA military-to-military interaction to better understand Chinese intentions.

Question. On April 1, 2001, a Chinese jet collided in mid-air with a U.S. Navy EP-3 aircraft endangering the U.S. personnel and resulting in the death of the Chinese pilot. Describe the steps that have been taken to prevent incidents of this nature in the future. What additional efforts, if any, do you believe may be necessary?

Answer. I understand that under Admiral Fallon’s watch, PACOM conducted the first two Search and Rescue Exercises with People’s Republic of China (PRC) forces. Such events—which stress language independent protocols, fixed wing maritime patrol craft, and “free play”—increase safety of all sailors and airmen. I recognize this will be a long-term educational process. If confirmed, I would continue similar efforts in the future to expose as many PLA sailors and airmen as possible to these fundamental and inherently stabilizing procedures.

Question. On January 11, 2007, China used a ground-based missile to hit and destroy one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test creating considerable space debris and raising serious concerns in the international community.

Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to prevent incidents? If confirmed, I would consider an international agreement similar to the “Incidents At Sea” protocols we developed with the Soviet Union.

Question. On January 11, 2007, China used a ground-based missile to hit and destroy one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test creating considerable space debris and raising serious concerns in the international community.
What is your view of China’s purpose in conducting this test?

Answer. I do not know China’s purpose. However, the test was unfortunate and inconsistent with their stated peaceful policy. Chinese actions endangered international satellites, which support the world’s economy, and created considerable debris that increase the risk to human spaceflight.

Question. What do you see as the implications of this test for the U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for U.S. interests in space?

Answer. The foremost implication is confirmation that Chinese anti-satellite capabilities can be a threat to international space assets.

Question. What are your views regarding the potential weaponization of space?

Answer. Consistent with U.S. policy and international understandings, I support the rights of states to have unhindered passage through, and operations in space without interference. I also support our ability to defend and protect our space systems.

TAIWAN

Question. What are the priorities, in your view, for U.S. military assistance to Taiwan?

Answer. If confirmed, I will remain fully committed to the U.S. obligation to provide Taiwan with the necessary capabilities for its defense. I would continue to focus on efforts to modernize Taiwan’s defensive capability and improve the joint operating capacity of the Taiwan armed forces.

Question. What is your view of the relationship between the type of assistance we offer Taiwan and regional stability?

Answer. PACOM should focus on Taiwan’s capability to defend itself and avoid characterizing the Taiwan military’s modernization as offensive. A Taiwan that can defend itself enhances regional stability.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Question. What is your view of the current state of U.S.-Philippine military-to-military relations?

Answer. Our relationship is good, and our long and consistent military engagement with the Philippines is bearing fruit in the form of Philippine counterterrorism performance and success in the field.

Question. What is your view of the effectiveness of the Special Operation Forces assistance being provided to the Philippine military in its fight against terrorist groups?

Answer. My initial assessment, based on recent successes on the island of Jolo, is the advice and assistance of Special Operations Forces have been effective in helping Philippine Security Forces (PSF) fight local and international terrorist groups over sustained periods in harsh environments.

Question. What measures or guidelines will you employ, if confirmed, to ensure that U.S. personnel do not become involved in combat in the Republic of the Philippines?

Answer. U.S. Forces are not authorized by either the U.S. or the Republic of the Philippines to conduct combat operations in the Republic of the Philippines nor to accompany PSF to locations where contact with the enemy by U.S. forces is anticipated. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure current restrictions prohibiting a combat role for U.S. forces are well understood by our personnel at all levels. I will confirm in place procedures are sufficiently rigorous.

INDONESIA

Question. Indonesia is a key Asian power, and is the largest Muslim country in the world. Consequently, it is important to build on opportunities to improve and expand U.S. relations with Indonesia where possible.

What is your understanding of the extent to which the Indonesian Government is cooperating with the United States in the global war on terrorism?

Answer. The Indonesian Government is cooperating with the United States in the global war on terrorism. President Yudhoyono has enabled Indonesian law enforcement to form a successful counterterrorism center and make important arrests of terrorist operatives. I also view the Indonesia Government’s approach to religious tolerance as helpful.

Question. Is it your understanding that the Indonesian Government is cooperating in the investigation into the murder of two American school teachers and one Indonesian school teacher in an ambush in Papua in August 2002?

Answer. Yes.
Question. What is your view of the current state of military-to-military contacts with Indonesia?

Answer. U.S. PACOM military-to-military relations with the Indonesian armed forces continue to mature and improve. U.S. support during the 2004 tsunami and 2006 earthquake responses triggered new engagement opportunities for U.S. PACOM.

Question. Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military contacts? If so, under what conditions? Why?

Answer. As a democracy with a moderate and modernizing vision of Islam, Indonesia is a natural partner with the U.S. It is important to assist with the development of their military. Engaging in areas of common interest while minding the political landscape, the U.S. and Indonesia can engage in a consistent programmed manner that does not outstrip Indonesia’s ability to absorb U.S. assistance.

Question. What is your view of the commitment of the Indonesian military leadership to professionalization of its armed forces, adhering to human rights standards, improving military justice, and cooperating with law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute those military personnel accused of human rights abuses?

Answer. I believe the Indonesian military is committed to education and training to improve adherence to human rights standards and enforcement of same.

Question. If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for human rights and accountability in the Indonesian military?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure U.S. PACOM engagements with the Indonesian military continue to encourage respect for human rights, accountability, leadership development, and legal education. I will also look for opportunities to expand bilateral education exchanges, research grants, and language training to help the present and future elites of the military.

INDIA

Question. What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-India military-to-military relationship?

Answer. President Bush has emphasized the U.S. partnership with India as among the most important in the region. If confirmed, I would seek to complement strategic initiatives with a military-to-military program characterized by increased dialogue and more frequent and sophisticated exchange and exercises.

Question. If confirmed, what specific priorities would you establish for this relationship?

Answer. If confirmed, my priorities for the U.S.-India military-to-military relationship will be increasing the scope of exercises and exploring opportunities for expanded cooperation in peacekeeping, disaster response, and maritime security. Our militaries need to continue to build trust and confidence and become more interoperable. We should establish agreements and procedures that will allow us to build shared doctrine and communications architectures.

Question. What relationship, if any, do you believe exists between the armed groups conducting terrorist attacks in India, and the armed groups conducting attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan?

Answer. There are reported organizational relationships between armed groups conducting attacks in India and Afghanistan, specifically among Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taïyiba (LT/LeT), al Qaeda, and the Taliban. However, I have not sufficiently studied the situation to determine relationships between the groups.

MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. What is your understanding of the current relationship between U.S. PACOM, U.S. NORTHCOM, and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) with respect to ballistic missile defense deployment and operations?

Answer. Commander, U.S. PACOM supports Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM for defense of the homeland. Commander, U.S. PACOM is also responsible for providing regional missile defense for U.S. forces forward deployed in the U.S. PACOM AOR. Commander, U.S. STRATCOM has overarching responsibility for planning, integrating, and coordinating global ballistic missile defense. U.S. PACOM coordinates with U.S. NORTHCOM and U.S. STRATCOM in the performance of both the regional and global missile defense mission.

Question. What is your understanding of the arrangement whereby Aegis-class destroyers and cruisers of the U.S. Pacific Fleet will be made available, or dedicated, to ballistic missile defense missions, and what impact will this arrangement have on the capability of U.S. PACOM and U.S. Pacific Fleet to fulfill their other missions involving Aegis-class ships?
Commander U.S. PACOM and Commander U.S. NORTHCOM have established clear command relationships regarding Aegis support to the Ballistic Missile Defense mission. Using a system of readiness conditions, both Commanders ensure the Aegis ship requirement is properly managed to support both the missile defense mission and other missions in the Pacific theater.

Over the past year, these relationships have been tested in several challenging real world and exercise scenarios involving regional and homeland missile defense missions.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you propose to strike an appropriate balance between missile defense and non-missile defense missions for ships of the U.S. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT)?

**Answer.** Missile defense is one of many missions tasked to the Commander, PACFLT. If confirmed, I will solicit recommendations from Commander, PACFLT, to posture the U.S. PACFLT to execute the missions we expect the Fleet to perform. Additionally, I will continue U.S. PACOM efforts to integrate Patriot Advance Capabilities-3 (PAC–3), Forward Based X-Band Radar Transportable (FBX–T), and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to improve theater-wide capability and reduce the reliance on Aegis platforms.

**SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**

**Question.** What is your understanding of the requirements for coordination and cooperation between Special Operations Command (SOCOM) teams working to fulfill the global terrorism mission, U.S. PACOM, and the Ambassadors in the relevant countries?

**Answer.** Coordination and cooperation between U.S. PACOM, Ambassadors, and SOCOM teams remains essential to success in the global war on terror. Commander, U.S. PACOM, assumes Operational Control (OPCON) of Special Operations Forces once those forces enter the AOR. In all cases, Ambassadors remain responsible for activities in their respective country, to include Theater Security Cooperation activities involving Special Operations Forces. As a result, the military commander exercising OPCON is required to coordinate activities with the respective Ambassador.

Additionally, coordination with U.S. SOCOM and Country Ambassadors continues even after OPCON has been assumed by Commander, U.S. PACOM. In certain circumstances, U.S. SOCOM may retain OPCON of forces conducting specialized missions or crossing geographic combatant commander boundaries.

**Question.** If confirmed, would you seek to change any aspects of these requirements?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I do not foresee recommending changes in the current command and support relationships.

**Question.** Do you see the need for any changes in the assignment and OPCON of Special Operations within the SOCOM area of operations?

**Answer.** The Commander, U.S. SOCOM developed and the Secretary of Defense recently approved the Global Special Operations Forces Posture initiative, which significantly changes assignment and OPCON of current regionally based Special Operations Forces to a continental United States-based, forward rotational presence model. Commander, U.S. SOCOM, assesses this will provide geographic combatant commanders with better trained Special Operations Forces while maintaining their regional expertise and reducing the current high personnel tempo. At this time, it would be premature for me to recommend changes.

**TECHNOLOGY PRIORITIES**

**Question.** U.S. PACOM has been active in the Advanced Concept Technology Development process and currently has several projects on the transition list, including the future tactical truck system and theater effects-based operations.

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will support efforts to strengthen the relationship between the command and the Science and Technology (S&T) community to ensure the availability of needed equipment and capabilities in the long-term.

**Question.** If confirmed, what steps would you expect to take to make your requirements known to the department’s science and technology (S&T) community to ensure the availability of needed equipment and capabilities in the long-term?

**Answer.** If confirmed, PACOM would help researchers better understand operational problems and the command would gain better insight into solutions maturing through Service efforts. I plan to use the Integrated Priority List as the foundation for these discussions. JCTDs will continue to be an important part of meeting S&T requirements but I plan to expand the approach. In particular, I will explore new relationships with S&T programs worldwide to meet requirements. I expect these efforts will include cooperative technology development with countries in our AOR; participation of
EXERCISES AND TRAINING

Question. What is your assessment of the current U.S. PACOM training and exercise program, including those designed to train personnel for peace and stability operations?

Answer. My initial impression is the U.S. PACOM exercise program has been highly effective as evidenced by successful disaster relief operations, responsive support to war on terror operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the improvements in the quality and capacity of regional peace support operations forces through the Global Peace Operations Initiative.

I recognize the importance of a rigorous training and exercise program. In U.S. PACOM, training and exercises will continue to receive emphasis because of their value in maturing U.S. readiness and capabilities and improving our ability to operate with allies and partners in the region.

Question. Do you believe that the PACOM’s training and exercise program currently has adequate funding and personnel resources?

Answer. I do not yet have a full appreciation of the funding and resource status of the U.S. PACOM training and exercise program. If confirmed, I will ensure resources are effectively used and advocate for additional resources, when necessary.

Question. What are your views on how the PACOM, in concert with the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), could improve its training and exercise program, including training and exercises for peace and stability operations?

Answer. I view collaboration with U.S. JFCOM and the continuous assessment such interaction fosters as central to improving the command’s training program. I also anticipate the new Pacific Warfighting Center, when integrated into JFCOM’s global grid of warfighting centers, will allow PACOM and JFCOM to continue to cooperatively develop transformational training concepts for traditional warfighting as well as peace and stability operations.

PRISONER OF WAR (POW)/MISSING IN ACTION (MIA) ACCOUNTING EFFORTS

Question. The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC), U.S. PACOM, is critical to the recovery and identification of remains of missing military members. Recovery of remains of U.S. servicemembers from World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War continue to be a very high priority.

What is your understanding of the responsibilities of JPAC, U.S. PACOM, and its relationship to the Defense Prisoner of War and Missing Personnel Office?

Answer. JPAC conducts operations to support accounting of personnel unaccounted for as a result of hostile acts. U.S. PACOM provides higher headquarters support and direction, and interface between JPAC and the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) exercises policy, control, and oversight within DOD. DPMO and JPAC coordinate directly on routine POW/MIA issues.

Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to enhance POW/MIA recovery efforts in the AOR of the U.S. PACOM?

Answer. JPAC resources and accounting efforts are focused not only in the PACOM region, but throughout the world. If confirmed, I will encourage full cooperation by the host nations where we conduct POW/MIA activities and continue to reinforce U.S. Government priorities and commitment in our accounting and recovery efforts with leaders of these countries and respective U.S. Ambassadors.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take, if any, to assess the adequacy of resources available for this work?

Answer. If confirmed, I will provide JPAC the full support of the U.S. PACOM in the conduct of their mission, and continuously assess the adequacy of resources in the performance of this critical and important mission. I will also ensure existing resources maximize mission accomplishment.

Question. What is your understanding of the status of the report due March 1, 2007, relating to the JPAC, pursuant to Senate Report 109–254?

Answer. I understand the report has been drafted and is currently being staffed. If confirmed, I will review the draft document and will be prepared to provide comment.

QUALITY OF LIFE

Question. Combatant commanders are responsible for establishing and sustaining a high quality of life for military personnel and their families assigned within their AOR.
If confirmed, how would you define and ensure appropriate resources are available for quality of life programs for military members and their families within the U.S. PACOM?

Answer. Quality of life (QoL)/Quality of service (QoS) for our men and women is one of my top priorities.

QoS means providing high quality operating facilities, tools, and information technology necessary for our personnel to execute their missions and achieve their goals. Achieving and sustaining QoL, however, will require both QoS initiatives and a continuous assessment of our facilities and our programs—housing, schools, commissary and exchange services, medical/dental facilities, Morale, Welfare, and Recreation programs/facilities, pay and entitlement programs, and family and childcare programs. If such assessments identify QoS/QoL conditions that are less than our people deserve, I will work with DOD to solicit support and garner required resources to rectify the deficiencies.

Question. What is your view of the challenges associated with global rebasing on the quality of life of members and their families in the U.S. PACOM AOR (including adequate health care services and DOD schools)?

Answer. The biggest challenge will be preserving the QoS/QoL for our service members and their families while we realign our forces in theater. Throughout the transition process, we should focus our efforts on maintaining quality housing, DOD schools, commissary and exchange services, medical/dental facilities, higher education, work life, and family and community support programs for our people. We should sustain current levels of service during the transformation ‘out’ phase and ensure these systems are in place before families arrive in the area.

Question. What steps do you believe need to be taken in Guam to ensure that adequate services are available to U.S. personnel and their dependents?

Answer. As we plan for increased military development in Guam, we must ensure that organizations and agencies that provide services to U.S. personnel and their dependents are included in the planning process, and adequate funding for expansion of these services is provided. The Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO), established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and tasked with executing this comprehensive redevelopment effort, is leading the planning process and is engaging DOD components and other stakeholders to program and budget for adequate services for U.S. personnel and their dependents in Guam. If confirmed, I will ensure JGPO is fully informed of U.S. PACOM QoS/QoL requirements on Guam.

POLICIES REGARDING SEXUAL ASSAULT

Question. As a result of deficiencies in DOD and Service policies regarding sexual assault in the Armed Forces, the Department and the individual Services are required under section 577 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 to develop comprehensive policies aimed at preventing and responding to sexual assaults involving members of the Armed Forces and ensuring, among other things, appropriate law enforcement, medical, and legal responses, integration of databases to report and track sexual assaults, and development of victim treatment and assistance capabilities.

Question. If confirmed as Commander, U.S. PACOM, what steps would you take to ensure the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps forces under your command are appropriately implementing policies aimed at preventing sexual assaults and appropriately responding to victims of sexual assault?

Answer. I am strongly committed to ensuring we make every effort to protect our people from assault and offer direct, consistent, and appropriate responses to victims of sexual assault. If confirmed, I will ensure commanders at all levels continue to implement comprehensive measures to prevent sexual assault, provide responsive care and treatment for victims of sexual assault, and hold accountable those who commit the crime of sexual assault.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, U.S. PACOM?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

HAWAIIAN SECURITY NEEDS

1. Senator AKAHA. Admiral Keating, the relationship between Pacific Command (PACOM) and Northern Command is somewhat unique when it comes to homeland security. Now that you are nominated to replace Admiral Fallon to be the next Commander of PACOM, what assurances are you able to give me that Hawaii’s needs will be met in an emergency situation?

Admiral Keating. I have designated Joint Task Force Homeland Defense, under the leadership of United States Army Pacific Commander, with responsibility for support of Hawaiian civil authorities. Over the last 18 months the U.S. PACOM plan for support of Hawaiian civil authorities has been exercised three times. Positive feedback from these interactions coupled with the expectation for regular exercises in the future give me confidence our plans for defense support of civil authorities are both current and credible.

2. Senator AKAHA. Admiral Keating, in addition, what plans do you have to ensure that these lines of communications remain open and visible in the future?

Admiral Keating. Joint Task Force Homeland Defense will continue to conduct monthly meetings to ensure plans and coordination channels are effective. Meeting participants include representatives from the military Services and Federal, State, and local governments.

[The nomination reference of ADM Timothy J. Keating, USN, follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

As In Executive Session,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for appointment in the United States Navy to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be Admiral.

ADM Timothy J. Keating, USN, 0000.

[The biographical sketch of ADM Timothy J. Keating, USN, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

RÉSUMÉ OF CAREER SERVICE OF VADM TIMOTHY J. KEATING, USN

Date and place of birth: November 16, 1948; Dayton, Ohio.
Medals and awards:

Defense Distinguished Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters
Distinguished Service Medal and one Gold Star
Legion of Merit with three Gold Stars
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal with one Gold Star
Air Medal with Second and Third Strike/Flight Awards
Naval and Marine Corps Commendation with Combat "V" and two Gold Stars
Naval and Marine Corps Achievement Medal with one Silver Star
Joint Meritorious Unit Award
Navy Unit Commendation

Meritorious Unit Commendation with two Bronze Stars
Navy "E" Ribbon with two "E"s
Navy Expeditionary Medal
National Defense Service Medal with two Bronze Stars
Vietnam Service Medal with three Bronze Stars
Southwest Asia Service Medal with three Bronze Stars
Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal

Assignments and duties:

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<tr>
<td>Naval Aviation Schools Command, Naval Air Station, Pensacola, FL (DUINS)</td>
<td>Jan. 1972</td>
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<td>Training Squadron ONE NINE (DUINS)</td>
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<td>Training Squadron TWO TWO (DUINS)</td>
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<td>Training Wing TWO, NAS Kingsville, TX (Staff Training Records/Stats Officer)</td>
<td>Aug. 1975</td>
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<td>Attack Squadron ONE SEVEN FOUR (Ready Replacement Officer)</td>
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<td>Attack Squadron EIGHT TWO (Assistant Aircraft Officer)</td>
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<td>Attack Squadron EIGHT TWO (Landing Signal Officer/Navigation Phase Instructor)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander, Carrier Air Wing ONE FIVE (Landing Signal Officer/Assistant Safety Officer)</td>
<td>May 1981</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attack Squadron NINE FOUR (Administrative/Operations/Maintenance Officer)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (Flag Lieutenant)</td>
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<td>Commander, Carrier Air Wing SEVEN (Deputy Air Wing Commander)</td>
<td>May 1985</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Studies Group Fellow</td>
<td>Aug. 1991</td>
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<td>Commander, Carrier Air Wing NINE</td>
<td>Dec. 1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO, Strike Warfare Center, Fallon, NV</td>
<td>Nov. 1994</td>
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<td>Bureau of Naval Personnel (Director, Aviation Officer Distribution Division (PERS-43))</td>
<td>Sep. 1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Staff (Director for Operations (Current Operations))</td>
<td>Aug. 1999</td>
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<td>Commander, Carrier Group FIVE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Central Command/Commander, FIFTH Fleet</td>
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<td>Joint Staff (Director)</td>
<td>Oct. 2003</td>
</tr>
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<td>Commander, Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
<td>Nov. 2004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Promotions:

- Midshipman, U.S. Naval Academy
- Ensign, U.S. Navy
- Lieutenant (junior grade)
- Lieutenant
- Lieutenant Commander
- Commander
- Captain
- Rear Admiral (lower half)
- Designated Rear Admiral while serving in billets commensurate with that grade
- Rear Admiral
- Designated Vice Admiral while serving in billets commensurate with that grade
- Vice Admiral
- Designated Admiral while serving in billets commensurate with that grade
- Admiral, service continuous to date

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Distinguished Service Medal and one Gold Star
Legion of Merit with three Gold Stars
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal with one Gold Star
Air Medal with Second and Third Strike/Flight Awards
Naval and Marine Corps Commendation with Combat “V” and two Gold Stars
Naval and Marine Corps Achievement Medal with one Silver Star
Joint Meritorious Unit Award
Navy Unit Commendation

Meritorious Unit Commendation with two Bronze Stars
Navy “E” Ribbon with two “E”s
Navy Expeditionary Medal
National Defense Service Medal with two Bronze Stars
Vietnam Service Medal with three Bronze Stars
Southwest Asia Service Medal with three Bronze Stars
Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Humanitarian Service Medal with two Bronze Stars
Armed Forces Service Medal
Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with one Silver Star and two Bronze Stars
Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal
Kuwait Liberation Medal
Pistol Marksmanship Medal with Silver "E"

Special qualifications:
BA (Physics) U.S. Naval Academy, 1971.
Designated Naval Aviator, 3 August 1973.

Personal data:
Wife:
Wanda Lee Keating of Alexandria, VA.

Children:
Daniel Patrick Martin (Stepson); Born: 6 February 1969.
Julie Cathryn Martin Camardella (Stepdaughter); Born: 7 December 1972.

Summary of joint duty assignments:

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<th>Rank</th>
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<td>Commander, Northern Command/Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
<td>Nov. 2004–To Date</td>
<td>ADM.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by ADM Timothy J. Keating, USN, in connection with his nomination follows:)

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Timothy John Keating.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Commander, United States Pacific Command.

3. Date of nomination:
7 February 2007.

4. **Address:** (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. **Date and place of birth:**
   16 November 1948; Dayton, Ohio.

6. **Marital Status:** (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Wanda Lee Doerksen Keating.

7. **Names and ages of children:**
   Stepson: Daniel Pratt Martin, 38.
   Stepdaughter: Julie Cathyn Camardella, 34.

8. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   None.

9. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution.
   None.

10. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    Association of Naval Aviation.

11. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    None.

12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
    Yes.

13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
    Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

**Timothy J. Keating.**

This 2nd day of February, 2007.

[The nomination of ADM Timothy J. Keating, USN, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 15, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on March 19, 2007.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Lt. Gen. Victor E. Renuart, USAF, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]
QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Answer. I do not see a need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act at this time. The fact that several non-military organizations are seeking to improve their coordination and mission execution through the introduction of reform measures modeled after the Goldwater-Nichols Act is a tribute to its enduring success.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. Not applicable.

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM)?

Answer. The Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM, is responsible for conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories and interests within the assigned area of responsibility. As directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, the Command is also responsible for providing defense support of civil authorities, including consequence management operations.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these duties?

Answer. More than 3½ decades of experience including operational combat service in Operations Desert Storm, Deny Flight, both Southern and Northern Watch, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom; command of a North Atlantic Treaty Organization support group, two fighter wings, Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia and 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Southwest Asia; service as the U.S. Central Command Director of Operations; and Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces provide a solid foundation for assuming command of U.S. NORTHCOM. Additionally, my previous assignment as the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Staff has reinforced the value of teamwork and having a close working relationship with other combatant commands, the military Services, National Guard Bureau (NGB), defense agencies, other U.S. Government organizations, and international organizations.

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continuously seek to further a better understanding of and effective information exchange with the other combatant commands and our international, Federal, State, and interagency partners to increase our ability to work collaboratively together in the areas of homeland defense and civil support.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM, to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM, is responsible to deter, prevent, and defeat threats to the United States as directed by the Secretary of Defense and the President. Under the authority and control of the Secretary and as directed by the Secretary, the Commander is also responsible for defense support of civil authorities. The Commander is directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the ability of the Command to carry out its missions. While serving as the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, I have participated in frequent and cooperative interactions between the Secretary of Defense and the Commander of U.S.
NORTHCOM. If confirmed, I intend to continue the close working relationship between U.S. NORTHCOM and the Secretary of Defense.

*Question.* The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

*Answer.* The Deputy Secretary of Defense is delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense and to exercise the powers of the Secretary on any and all matters for which the Secretary is authorized to act pursuant to law. The Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM, ensures the Deputy has the information and support he requires.

*Question.* The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

*Answer.* The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy duties include formulating defense planning guidance and forces policy, Department of Defense (DOD) relations with foreign countries, and DOD's role in interagency policymaking. The Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM, works closely with the Under Secretary coordinating and exchanging information on strategic policy issues involving homeland defense and defense support of civil authority issues.

*Question.* The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

*Answer.* The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the Secretary's principal advisor on intelligence matters. Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM, works closely with the Under Secretary in order to provide predictive and actionable threat estimates and timely warning of worldwide threats against North America using fused, all-source intelligence and law enforcement information that characterizes the threat and provides strategic warning to support informed decisionmaking.

*Question.* The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.

*Answer.* Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM, works routinely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)) on homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities issues.

*Question.* The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

*Answer.* The Chairman serves as the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council. The role of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) in the chain of command of the combatant commands is threefold: communications, oversight, and spokesman. Communications between the President, Secretary of Defense, and the combatant commanders may pass through the CJCS. The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 permits the President to place the Chairman in the communications chain and the President has in fact directed that such communications pass through the Chairman. Oversight of the activities of combatant commands may be delegated by the Secretary of Defense to CJCS. Finally, CJCS is the spokesman for the combatant commanders on the operational requirements of their commands. Having been a Director on the Joint Staff, I have first-hand knowledge of communications between the CJCS and the Commander of U.S. NORTHCOM.

*Question.* The secretaries of the military departments.

*Answer.* Each military department is separately organized under its own Secretary and functions under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The military departments are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping forces for assignment to the Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM, and other combatant commanders. Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM, works closely with the Secretaries to ensure homeland defense and civil support requirements are met.

*Question.* The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.

*Answer.* The Chiefs of Staff are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping forces for assignment to combatant commands. The Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM, is responsible for communicating the needs of U.S. NORTHCOM to the Chiefs of Staff.

*Question.* The other combatant commanders.

*Answer.* The other combatant commanders exercise command authority over forces as directed by the Secretary of Defense. Having served in U.S. Central Command, the Joint Staff, and also for the Secretary of Defense, I helped facilitate the multiple and valuable interactions that occur between combatant commanders. If confirmed, I intend to maintain open lines of communication with the other combatant commanders, and to provide support and mutual cooperation whenever possible.

*Question.* The Chief of the National Guard Bureau.

*Answer.* The relationship with the Chief of the NGB is integral to the success of U.S. NORTHCOM. U.S. NORTHCOM has regular dialogue on issues of the utmost importance to the Nation. There are 43 Army National Guard and Air National Guard Title 10 National Guardsmen assigned to U.S. NORTHCOM as permanent party. There are also 23 of 30 authorized Army National Guard personnel that are assigned to U.S. NORTHCOM as “drilling guardsmen.” Last month, I had the op-
portunity to attend The Adjutants General Conference in Washington, DC, and if confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the Chief of the NGB.

Question. If confirmed, in carrying out your duties, how would you work with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Homeland Security Council, and other Federal agencies, as well as State and local authorities and representatives from the private sector?

Answer. In fulfilling its civil support role, the military is an active member of the Federal response community. However, throughout any crisis or consequence management scenario, civilian authorities remain in charge and U.S. NORTHCOM’s participation is almost always in support of a designated primary agency. If confirmed, I will ensure U.S. NORTHCOM continues to coordinate and conduct military efforts to provide support to save lives, reduce suffering, and restore critical infrastructure, while respecting the individual liberties and human freedoms guaranteed to all Americans by our Constitution.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM?

Answer. Our enemies continue to seek new means of achieving their goals and attacking our homeland. Countering asymmetric attacks and being prepared to respond to the possible use of a weapon of mass destruction on American soil, should our deterrence and prevention efforts fail, will continue to be major challenges in the future.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that U.S. NORTHCOM continually reviews and evaluates its plans and operations to effectively address the dynamic nature of the threats aimed at its area of responsibility. U.S. NORTHCOM will continue to expand a robust exercise and information sharing program with its DOD, National Guard, interagency, Federal, State, tribal, and local partners to ensure the command is able to collectively meet any challenges that arise.

MISSION OF U.S. NORTHCOM

Question. What is the mission of U.S. NORTHCOM?

Answer. Two missions:

• Conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility.

• Provide defense support of civil authorities including consequence management operations, as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense.

Question. How does U.S. NORTHCOM’s mission relate to DHS’s mission?

Answer. DHS has overall responsibility for the concerted, national effort to prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the Nation. U.S. NORTHCOM’s primary mission is to deter, prevent, and defeat threats to the homeland and provide defense support of civil authorities when directed by the Secretary of Defense or President. Conducting both missions requires close collaboration throughout planning and exercise phases, and of course, during real-world operations to include pre-incident, crisis, and post-incident stages. Ultimately, the capabilities of DHS and U.S. NORTHCOM are complementary, focusing on “unity of effort.”

Question. Under what circumstances, if any, would you anticipate U.S. NORTHCOM would have the lead role in responding to a terrorist incident?

Answer. In accordance with the Maritime Operational Threat Response for The National Strategy for Maritime Security, U.S. NORTHCOM will assume the lead role for DOD to interdict vessels at sea as part of the U.S. Government’s active, layered defense of the United States. In addition, U.S. NORTHCOM will be responsible for responding to an attack on a DOD installation within its area of responsibility. U.S. NORTHCOM has a family of plans that detail its support to primary agencies, as well as additional plans that direct action in the event that DOD and U.S. NORTHCOM takes the lead for the response inside the United States.

Question. What responsibility, if any, does U.S. NORTHCOM have with respect to the Critical Asset Assurance Program?

Answer. The DOD Critical Asset Assurance Program (DOD Directive 5160.54) has been superseded by the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) (DOD Directive 3020.40). Under the DCIP, U.S. NORTHCOM is responsible for establishing a command program for matters pertaining to the identification, prioritization, and protection of Defense Critical Infrastructure. In coordination with the military de-
partments, the defense agencies, DOD field activities, and defense sector leads, U.S. NORTHCOM is working to identify and assess critical assets and associated infrastructure interdependencies within its area of responsibility. Under the DCIP, U.S. NORTHCOM is additionally charged with acting to prevent or mitigate the loss or degradation of DOD-owned critical assets within its area of responsibility. The Command will only take action to prevent or mitigate the loss or degradation of non-DOD-owned critical assets at the direction of the Secretary of Defense or President.

**ORGANIZATION AND AUTHORITY**

**Question.** U.S. NORTHCOM has been assigned responsibility for force protection and antiterrorism within its area of responsibility. What actions would you take, if confirmed, to mitigate force protection vulnerabilities, and what force protection challenges do you anticipate you would face within U.S. NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will continue to place emphasis on executing a synchronized and coordinated antiterrorism program and force protection mission throughout the area of responsibility. I will focus actions on efficient employment of resources for vulnerability mitigation and promote procedural steps that enhance antiterrorism programs and improve security postures for installations and facilities. One challenge will be harnessing new technologies.

**Question.** What actions would you take, if confirmed, to ensure efficiency in the use of funding for force protection and to prevent unnecessary duplication of efforts between U.S. NORTHCOM, the military Services, and the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will continue enhancements of the Core Vulnerability Management Program to eliminate redundancies by mandating force protection vulnerabilities be entered into a single database. In addition, I will be actively involved in the ASD(HD&ASA) DCIP, which is focused on ensuring availability of networked assets essential to project, support, and sustain military forces protecting against and mitigating the effects of attacks on critical infrastructure and key resources.

**Question.** What specific forces, if any, have been assigned to U.S. NORTHCOM?

**Answer.** Day-to-day operations are conducted by four subordinate commands:

- **Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region** located at Fort McNair in Washington DC and is responsible for land-based homeland defense, civil support, and incident management in the National Capital Region.
- **Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF–CS)** located at Fort Monroe, VA, and commands and controls DOD forces that respond to catastrophic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive (CBRNE) events.
- **Joint Task Force Alaska** located at Elmendorf Air Force Base, AK. Military forces in Alaska are under U.S. Pacific Command for normal operations. If Alaska-based forces are needed for homeland defense, consequence management, or civil support operations in Alaska, U.S. NORTHCOM will command and control the forces through Joint Task Force Alaska.
- **Joint Task Force North** located at Fort Bliss, TX. They support law enforcement agencies in counterdrug, counterterrorism, and border patrol operations along the United States-Canada and southwestern U.S. border.

U.S. NORTHCOM has few permanently assigned forces. Whenever mission requirements dictate, U.S. NORTHCOM requests additional forces from the Secretary of Defense, and if approved, receives them from the following DOD force providers: U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Pacific Command.

Additionally, the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps have established Service components for U.S. NORTHCOM. These commands are:

- **U.S. Army North,** located at Fort Sam Houston, TX.
- **U.S. Air Forces Northern** located at Tyndall Air Force Base, FL.
- **U.S. Marine Forces North** located in New Orleans, LA.

The Commander Fleet Forces Command, located at Naval Station Norfolk, VA, is designated as the Navy’s supporting commander to U.S. NORTHCOM.

**Question.** How has the assignment of forces to U.S. NORTHCOM changed since U.S. NORTHCOM was established on October 1, 2002?

forces have been apportioned many times for defense support of civil authorities missions, such as for hurricane support.

**NORAD**

**Question.** What is the mission of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)?

**Answer.** NORAD’s missions are aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning. Aerospace warning consists of detection, validation, and warning of an attack against North America and aerospace control consists of air sovereignty, air enforcement, and air defense of United States and Canadian airspace. Maritime warning is a new mission, which consists of processing, assessing, and disseminating maritime intelligence and information, and warning of maritime threats to or attacks against North America.

**Question.** How has NORAD’s mission evolved since the creation of U.S. NORTHCOM?

**Answer.** Since the creation of U.S. NORTHCOM, the NORAD mission set has expanded to include maritime warning, which in turn enables the U.S. NORTHCOM operation activities. With respect to ballistic missile defense, NORAD now provides ballistic missile warning to U.S. NORTHCOM to support its ballistic missile defense mission. To support these changes, NORAD has improved its sensor input, command and control systems, and ability to respond quickly.

**Question.** How does NORAD’s mission relate to U.S. NORTHCOM’s mission?

**Answer.** NORAD conducts the aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning missions. The warning provided by NORAD enables U.S. NORTHCOM to respond with regard to ballistic missile defense and maritime defense.

**Question.** How does NORAD’s mission relate to the mission of the DHS?

**Answer.** NORAD supports the DHS by providing aerospace warning and maritime warning of threats in the approaches to North America and supporting enforcement when called upon by civilian agencies.

**Question.** Do you believe that NORAD should have a separate operations and planning staff from U.S. NORTHCOM? Why or why not?

**Answer.** I am aware of the current initiatives at Headquarters NORAD and Headquarters U.S. NORTHCOM to achieve efficiencies through staff reorganization. If confirmed, I will analyze and structure the commands to achieve these efficiencies in accordance with the law and guidance from senior authorities.

**NORTHCOM JOINT TASK FORCES**

**Question.** Since the establishment of U.S. NORTHCOM, several multi-service task forces, e.g., JTF–CS, Joint Task Force–North (JTF-North), have been placed under its authority. What is the current status of the Joint Task Force organizations under U.S. NORTHCOM in terms of organization, planning, personnel allocation, and capability?

**Answer.** Multi-service units with task force capability under U.S. NORTHCOM’s authority are Joint Task Force–Alaska, JTF–CS, Joint Task Force–North, Standing Joint Force Headquarters North, and Joint Force Headquarters National Capital Region. These task forces are currently working with U.S. NORTHCOM on further plans development and refinement to enhance execution of existing and emergent homeland defense and civil support missions.

**NORTHCOM COUNTERDRUG RESPONSIBILITIES**

**Question.** What role does U.S. NORTHCOM play in the Defense Department’s overall counterdrug mission and organization?

**Answer.** U.S. NORTHCOM has execution authority for DOD’s priority counterdrug activities throughout its area of responsibility. Specific tasking is in three broad categories: providing support to civilian law enforcement, creating a shared network of intelligence and information support, and leveraging theater security cooperation activities, specifically with Mexico, to reduce the impact of illicit narcotics trafficking on the homeland.

**Question.** How are counterdrug operations coordinated across combatant command boundaries, particularly with U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and U.S. Pacific Command?

**Answer.** Per the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict Memorandum dated 21 August 2003, Joint Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF-South) will execute counterdrug detection and monitoring missions in a Joint Operations Area (JOA) covering operationally significant portions of the U.S.
NORTHCOM and U.S. Pacific Command areas of responsibility. JIATF-South coordinates counterdrug operations throughout its JOA with forces under the operational control of U.S. SOUTHCOM. A Memorandum of Understanding between Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM, and Commander, U.S. SOUTHCOM, delineates procedures to further coordinate counterdrug-related intelligence, information, and operations.

**Question.** The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 included a provision (section 1022) that authorizes forces providing support to law enforcement agencies conducting counterdrug activities to also provide, subject to all applicable laws and regulations, support to law enforcement agencies conducting counterterrorism activities.

How has this authority been implemented, and what financial resources do these task forces have to conduct counterterrorism missions?

**Answer.** Joint Task Forces under U.S. NORTHCOM have been granted authority to make incidental use of counternarcotics resources, capabilities, and structures to detect and interdict terrorists through a 26 April 2006 Deputy Secretary of Defense policy memorandum, titled “Use of Counternarcotics Funding for Counterterrorism.” Further, with prior Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics approval, Joint Task Forces can make non-incidental use of this authority. I understand U.S. NORTHCOM appreciates the inherent flexibility provided by section 1022 authority, but has not yet encountered the need to implement the authority through its primary counternarcotics task force, Joint Task Force North.

**SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH MEXICO**

**Question.** The U.S. NORTHCOM area of responsibility includes the land areas of the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The bi-national NORAD Command ensures close cooperation between the United States and Canada on security and homeland defense matters.

Do you believe it is important to improve our security cooperation with Mexico?

**Answer.** Yes. Increased security cooperation among U.S. NORTHCOM, SEMAR (Mexican Navy) and SEDENA (Mexican Army) would significantly improve national security.

**Question.** If so, what would be your goals as Commander of U.S. NORTHCOM for such improved relations with Mexico, and how would you plan to achieve them?

**Answer.** If confirmed, improved relationships with Mexico will be a priority. In fact, I hope to visit Mexico by the end of April. I will emphasize mutual security interests addressing counterdrug, counternarcoterrorism, and border issues through training and equipping. Combined exercises to expand cooperative opportunities in support of the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America are critical.

**CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, NUCLEAR, AND HIGH YIELD EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE CAPABILITIES**

**Question.** U.S. NORTHCOM has Homeland Defense and Defense Support to Civil Authorities missions, including preparation for and response to an incident or attack involving CBRNE materials or weapons, in the U.S. NORTHCOM area of responsibility.

If confirmed, how would you approach the challenge of ensuring adequate forces, capabilities, and plans to respond to such incidents in support of civil authorities?

**Answer.** There is nothing more important than defending the homeland. If confirmed, I will ensure U.S. NORTHCOM continues to coordinate closely with the DOD, the military Services, and the force providers to identify military capabilities needed to respond to both homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities missions. Through a rigorous, realistic program that exercises all facets of the National Response Plan, U.S. NORTHCOM will continue to refine processes and plans in support of its mission sets.

**Question.** There are currently a variety of organizations and units intended for CBRNE response and consequence management, including JTF–CS, the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force, the U.S. Marine Corps Chemical-Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (WMD–CST), and National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Package teams.

If confirmed, how would you plan to manage this mix of capabilities to ensure the best possible response force in the event of a CBRNE incident, and to avoid unnecessary duplication?

**Answer.** Many of the capabilities referenced in fact work together under current concepts of operation. The National Guard capabilities are designed to respond to local and regional incidents that may be for smaller CBRNE incidents and/or ahead
of a Federal response. If confirmed, I will take a close look at all of the military capabilities to ensure we have the appropriate capabilities, in the appropriate numbers, in the right locations and States to provide the necessary flexibility, agility, and depth of the military response.

Question. The U.S. Marine Corps CBIRF has not had regular or stable funding programmed or budgeted since its creation. Do you believe this unit should have regular and stable funding to ensure its ability to accomplish its assigned missions?

Answer. Yes. The United States Marine Corps CBIRF is a unique capability for Federal response in the event of a CBRNE incident.

NORTHCOM-STATE RELATIONS

Question. U.S. NORTHCOM has the primary military responsibility to provide defense support to civil authorities when directed by the President and the Secretary of Defense, including consequence management operations. Such military assistance would often support State and local emergency response units. Do you believe it is important for NORTHCOM to understand the emergency response capabilities and plans of the various States before a crisis arises, in order to optimize U.S. NORTHCOM’s consequence management support?

Answer. Yes. As directed, U.S. NORTHCOM will provide support in an emergency when the requirements are beyond the capabilities of civil authorities in accordance with the National Response Plan. Understanding the capabilities and plans of the States is imperative in order to optimize U.S. NORTHCOM planning and operations. State plans enhance U.S. NORTHCOM’s situational awareness and expedite response to incidents.

Question. If so, how would you plan to ensure that U.S. NORTHCOM has sufficient knowledge of State emergency response capabilities, including capabilities of National Guard units, and a good working relationship with State emergency response leaders?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure U.S. NORTHCOM continues to work with its interagency partners to strengthen the overall Federal response to a State emergency or disaster. In response to the February 2006 White House report, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina, Lessons Learned, which recommended DOD better integrate its capabilities with the State National Guard and the overall Federal response plan, U.S. NORTHCOM has taken the initiative to get a more in-depth understanding of State response capabilities. This past year, U.S. NORTHCOM, through its Army Service component, U.S. Army North, assigned and embedded Defense Coordinating Officers with each of the 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency regions. Their full-time mission is to build relationships and understand the capabilities of both the emergency response communities and National Guard of the States in their regions. Every day, U.S. NORTHCOM is linked to the National, State, and National Guard operations centers to synchronize planning and execution of the military contribution to response efforts.

FORCE PROVISION FOR U.S. NORTHCOM

Question. U.S. NORTHCOM has the mission of conducting military operations for homeland defense and, when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, for providing military assistance to civil authorities, including consequence management for natural disasters and CBRNE incidents. Yet U.S. NORTHCOM has relatively fewer military forces assigned to it on a permanent basis. What is your understanding of how forces are planned to be allocated to U.S. NORTHCOM for its full range of mission requirements, and what role U.S. Joint Forces Command plays in that process?

Answer. U.S. NORTHCOM possesses detailed and flexible plans to respond and conduct military operations in the homeland, provide assistance to primary agencies, or to lead the effort. These plans provide comprehensive troop and capability lists to source the plans as the Command prepares for an event or response to a no-notice incident. U.S. NORTHCOM is closely partnered with U.S. Joint Forces Command and other force providers, at all levels, to ensure the capabilities listed in U.S. NORTHCOM’s plans are trained and ready to respond.

Question. If confirmed, how do you intend to ensure that U.S. NORTHCOM will have sufficient forces available to it, properly trained and equipped, to accomplish its assigned missions, including its Quick Reaction Forces and Rapid Reaction Forces?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to continue U.S. NORTHCOM’s excellent working relationship with U.S. Joint Forces Command and other force providers. These relationships are synergized as the Command works through the challenges of Global
Force Management (GFM). I will ensure through refinement of plans and requirements, as well as participation in the monthly GFM process, homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities mission sets are appropriately prioritized, sourced, and sourced forces are trained and prepared to respond as described in U.S. NORTHCOM plans.

Question. If confirmed, how will you monitor the personnel, equipment, and training readiness of U.S. military forces (Active and Reserve) for homeland defense mission-essential tasks in support of U.S. NORTHCOM’s contingency plans?

Answer. It is the responsibility of the Services to provide trained and ready forces for combatant commands. If confirmed, I will continue to ensure trained and ready forces are incorporated into the U.S. NORTHCOM exercise program.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. One of U.S. NORTHCOM’s missions is the ballistic missile defense of the United States. You were Director of Operations for U.S. Central Command during the early phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom, during which the Patriot missile defense system demonstrated it was operationally effective in combat against ballistic missiles.

Do you agree that it is essential that our deployed ballistic missile defense systems are operationally effective?

Answer. Yes. An operationally effective ballistic missile defense system, employed in a layered defense approach, is essential to defeating threats ranging from short-range ballistic missiles using Patriots and the U.S. Navy’s Standard Missile Block 3s to long-range ballistic missile threats using the currently deployed Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system operated by U.S. NORTHCOM.

Question. Do you agree that it is important to conduct operationally realistic flight tests to demonstrate operational capability and reliability of the GMD system?

Answer. Yes. It is important to conduct operationally realistic flight tests to demonstrate and verify the operational capability and reliability of the GMD system. The successful GMD flight test of September 1, 2006, FTG–02, was the most operationally realistic, end-to-end flight test performed to date.

U.S. NORTHCOM-DHS RELATIONSHIP

Question. DHS is still a relatively new Federal agency, and is continuing to improve its ability to meet its homeland security missions. As DHS improves and matures its homeland security capabilities, do you expect that will reduce the requirements on U.S. NORTHCOM to provide defense support to civil authorities?

Answer. As U.S. NORTHCOM continues to improve coordination with DHS, the Command may capitalize upon efficiencies in order to reduce defense support of civil authorities. If confirmed, this is an area I will monitor closely.

Question. What do you consider to be DOD and U.S. NORTHCOM’s appropriate role vis-a-vis DHS and State authorities in identifying and validating the equipment and other requirements associated with homeland security missions?

Answer. If confirmed, I believe DOD and U.S. NORTHCOM should work toward a full integration of capabilities and coordinate acquisition efforts with all mission partners to ensure unity of effort. Identification of equipment and other requirements should be synchronized to enhance interoperability and reduce duplication of effort.

NATIONAL GUARD

Question. There is still considerable debate about the role the National Guard should play in defending the homeland.

Do you believe that defending the homeland should become the National Guard’s primary mission?

Answer. I believe defending the homeland is the most important mission for the military, regardless of component status: Active, Guard, or Reserves.

Question. What is the current status of the working relationship between U.S. NORTHCOM, the NGB, and individual State National Guard headquarters?

Answer. My understanding is that the working relationship between U.S. NORTHCOM, the NGB, and individual State National Guard headquarters is strong and growing stronger. U.S. NORTHCOM routinely hosts visits by NGB leadership and conducts conferences that bring together The Adjutants General (TAGs) of many States for planning, exercising, and training exchanges. Additionally, the current commander visits TAGs and State leadership during his travels around the country. If confirmed, I intend to continue to work closely and personally with the TAGs and Governors and strengthen current relationships.
Question. If confirmed, what type of liaison relationships for planning and operational purposes would you advocate between U.S. NORTHCOM, DHS, Federal, State, and local first responders, and National Guard units under State authority?

Answer. Throughout U.S. NORTHCOM’s history, the Command has worked closely and continually with DHS, Federal, State, and local first responders, and National Guard units under State authority in capacities ranging from planning and exercising to conducting and collaborating on real-world operations. Recent progress in such relationships has been exponential and if confirmed, I intend to ensure this momentum continues.

Question. Recent changes to the Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. section 333, included in section 1076 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 clarified the President’s authority to call up the National Guard to perform Federal service under circumstances resulting in the inability of State government’s to maintain public order.

What is your view of these changes?

Answer. I have reviewed the changes to the former Insurrection Act. From my perspective at the execution level, if confirmed, I will carry out the orders of the President, just as I would have done under the previous authority.

Question. Do you believe that the foregoing changes have enhanced the ability of Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM to respond to emergency situations? If so, how?

Answer. Please see the above answer.

Question. Do you believe that changes to the "posse comitatus" doctrine under section 1385 of title 10, U.S.C., and implementing DOD and Service regulations, are needed for U.S. NORTHCOM to accomplish its mission?

Answer. No, I do not believe that the Posse Comitatus Act is an obstacle to the performance of any U.S. NORTHCOM mission. The various statutory exceptions to this act provide sufficient authority for the command’s support to civil authority, as directed by the President and Secretary of Defense.

Question. The National Guard is presently assisting DHS on the southern U.S. border in a mission known as Operation Jump Start. The administration proposed last year that up to 6,000 members of the National Guard would be deployed on a temporary basis until DHS could add additional personnel.

Do you believe that border security is primarily the responsibility of DOD or DHS?

Answer. Border security is the primary responsibility of DHS.

Question. In your view, is border security an appropriate mission for the National Guard or other DOD forces?

Answer. I support the President’s determination, in consultation and coordination with Governors, that it is appropriate for the National Guard under command and control of the Governors to conduct this mission in support of U.S. Customs and Border Protection.

Would you support the deployment of National Guard personnel for this mission beyond the 2-year period currently proposed, to include the rotation of National Guard personnel to support this mission on an enduring basis?

Answer. Since these National Guard forces remain under the commands of their respective Governors, I defer to Governors on this issue.

**WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION–CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS (WMD–CSTS)**

Question. In recent years, legislation has been enacted to establish additional WMD–CSTs with the goal of ensuring that all 54 States and territories have a WMD–CST within their borders. To date, 47 of the 55 planned WMD–CSTs have been certified by the DOD to be mission capable.

Question. Do you believe the WMD–CSTs are appropriately organized, sized, trained, and equipped to accomplish their assigned missions?

Answer. Yes, WMD–CSTs are a critical resource to the State response and offer the State leadership great flexibility when responding to an incident within their areas of responsibility. If confirmed, I will ensure U.S. NORTHCOM, through U.S. Army North, continues to validate and certify these unique capabilities.

Question. If not, what changes do you believe are needed?

Answer. Not applicable.

Question. What is your view about proposals that the Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM, or the Deputy Commander, by law must be a National Guard officer?

Answer. I believe the process to hire the Commander and Deputy Commander should allow for the best-qualified officers to compete for each of these positions. There are already two National Guard general officers serving in U.S. NORTHCOM in positions that are not mandated by law to be filled by National Guard officers. Specifically, there is a two-star Air National Guard officer serving as the Co-
mander of U.S. NORTHCOM's Air Forces Northern in a position that is not mandated by law to be a National Guard officer. Similarly, there is a two-star Army National Guard officer serving in U.S. NORTHCOM's Army North as the Operational Command Post Commander. Manning these positions has been done without a legal mandate and selection of each individual was made based on each officer being best qualified for the job.

In addition, the two-star Chief of Staff position in U.S. NORTHCOM's headquarters is filled by a two-star Air National Guard officer; this billet is a “Chairman’s 10” position, designated to be filled by an officer in the Reserve component, in accordance with 10 U.S.C. 526 and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.

Thus, given that the Chief of Staff position (one of the top three positions in U.S. NORTHCOM) already is filled by a member of the Reserve component, as well as U.S. NORTHCOM's success in hiring the best-qualified officers from the Active and Reserve component, I believe the U.S. NORTHCOM Commander and Deputy Commander positions should not be mandated by law to be filled by National Guard officers.

I also believe that the officer development process for both the Guard and the Reserve Forces needs to be reviewed. We must ensure that select Reserve component officers receive appropriate joint and operational exposure earlier in their career such that, at the appropriate points in their career, there would be a pool of senior leaders that could compete on a best-qualified basis.

INFORMATION SHARING

Question. On June 9, 2004, an incident involving a private aircraft entering the National Capital Region airspace led to the evacuation of the U.S. Capitol. The emergency apparently resulted from shortfalls in the ability of various Federal Government agencies, including the Federal Aviation Administration, DHS, and DOD to share information. The mission of U.S. NORTHCOM requires rapid, secure, and effective communication with a variety of Federal, State, and local entities.

What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that rapid communication is ensured with other Federal agencies and with State entities?

Answer. The information-sharing capabilities and protocols practiced by U.S. NORTHCOM and NORAD have improved significantly over the last few years. Plans, exercises, and continual information-sharing exchanges have all helped to identify weaknesses and refine operations. Additionally, U.S. NORTHCOM has procured state-of-the-art communications equipment to best effect communications and interoperability with partners during a crisis.

Question. Are there any legal impediments that exist that slow or prevent the rapid dissemination of information gained by military components with other Federal, State, or local entities, or the private sector?

Answer. I am unaware of any legal impediments that slow or prevent the rapid dissemination of information to external agencies.

INTELLIGENCE SHARING/NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER (NCTC)

Question. What is the U.S. NORTHCOM's role and involvement in developing intelligence assessments regarding terrorist threats?

Answer. U.S. NORTHCOM draws upon foreign intelligence, intelligence derived from law enforcement agencies, and open source information to assess the foreign terrorist threat to the area of responsibility. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency (NSA), and DHS are the primary sources of intelligence and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), NCTC/Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, DHS and FBI-finished threat assessments are furnished to U.S. NORTHCOM elements as appropriate. Threat assessments are provided to the Commander and senior staff, as well as U.S. NORTHCOM component commands.

Question. What intelligence agencies are involved in providing input to U.S. NORTHCOM's staff for the development of intelligence assessments?

Answer. U.S. NORTHCOM terrorism analysts rely on a broad collaborative network of counterterrorism organizations when developing terrorist threat assessments. Terrorism analysts from NCTC, FBI, DIA, DHS, and its components (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Coast Guard), NSA, and the other combatant commands all provide inputs to the threat assessment process.

Question. What is the current nature of the relationship between U.S. NORTHCOM and the NCTC, and what will that relationship be in the future?
Answer. U.S. NORTHCOM receives NCTC-finished intelligence and the U.S. NORTHCOM Operational Intelligence Watch participates in a daily NCTC Operations Center video teleconference regarding new terrorism reporting. U.S. NORTHCOM is participating jointly with U.S. Central Command and DIA in an NCTC process improvement initiative to optimize the information-sharing environment. In addition, the NCTC plays a critical role in supporting NORAD’s aerospace control mission. For Operation Noble Eagle responses, the NCTC participates in Noble Eagle Conferences and provides real-time intelligence as applicable. If confirmed, I will continue to support a strong relationship with NCTC.

**Question.** Does U.S. NORTHCOM have representatives located at the NCTC on a daily basis? If so, what are their functions and responsibilities? If not, why not?

Answer. U.S. NORTHCOM has a billet for a representative to NCTC. The individual assigned is currently working at DIA. I understand he will return to NCTC after the successful completion of the process improvement initiative noted above, which will determine his new duties.

**Question.** How do posse comitatus, privacy restrictions, and other laws and regulations concerning the collection of intelligence within the U.S. affect the way U.S. NORTHCOM receives and uses intelligence?

Answer. U.S. NORTHCOM can accomplish its intelligence mission within the framework of existing laws and policy and is vigilant in ensuring all intelligence activities conducted in support of its mission comply with intelligence oversight laws and policy. All intelligence activities conducted in support of U.S. NORTHCOM operations are reviewed by legal staff to ensure they are conducted in accordance with law and policy.

**CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE**

**Question.** How serious do you believe the cruise missile threat is to the United States and its territories?

Answer. I believe the immediate threat is from high-speed commercial aviation flying in a low-altitude profile, similar to a cruise missile; or possibly an unmanned aircraft system that can be built in one’s garage. That said, the threat from cruise missiles launched by a terrorist organization or rogue nation is also a real and increasing, though currently somewhat limited, threat.

**Question.** If confirmed, what capabilities would you prioritize to address this threat?

Answer. The key capability to counter this threat is persistent wide area air surveillance, which provides timely identification, classification, and assessment of tracks of interest critical in the defense against cruise missiles. If confirmed, I will advocate for continued research and for demonstration of promising technologies to enhance our capabilities and support the ongoing Homeland Air and Cruise Missile Functional Solutions Analysis. Upon completion, this analysis will provide a recommended family of systems to meet our wide area air surveillance requirements.

**CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE**

**Question.** How has the continental air defense mission changed since the end of the Cold War and the events of September 11, 2001?

Answer. The Command’s mission has expanded since September 11 to protect against domestic airborne threats. NORAD’s defense posture is now aligned to counter the new threat.

**Question.** Do you believe that current U.S. continental air defense capabilities are adequate to meet national security needs?

Answer. Yes. NORAD has adapted to counter the terrorist threat posed to the United States and Canada through improvements to surveillance and communications systems and through better coordination and information sharing with the interagency community.

**Question.** If confirmed, what capabilities and programs would you prioritize to address any identified deficiencies?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure NORAD continues to enhance the capabilities it has under Operation Noble Eagle to respond to a terror event and quickly increase air defense posture during a crisis. Future program priorities include Homeland Air and Cruise Missile Defense, wide area air surveillance, and improving the North American air surveillance picture not only for DOD, but also for our interagency partners—notably the National Capital Region Coordination Center and U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Commander, U.S. NORTHCOM, and Commander, NORAD?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

HAWAIIAN NATIONAL SECURITY

1. Senator AKAKA. Lieutenant General Renuart, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) works with U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to address issues of national security. However, my State of Hawaii falls under the jurisdiction of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). While I have asked this question before to your predecessor, Admiral Keating, who did understand and assured me that PACOM’s interest and that of the Pacific were being addressed, I have also asked this question to Secretary Chertoff of DHS and he was unaware that NORTHCOM did not include Hawaii and that it was under PACOM. In this regard, what efforts will you make to ensure that Hawaii’s interests are heard?

General RENUART. The first priority of every combatant commander is to protect the homeland. To that end, U.S. PACOM has developed plans for homeland defense and civil support of Hawaii, which falls into Commander, U.S. PACOM’s area of responsibility. U.S. NORTHCOM has coordinated on U.S. PACOM’s plans to ensure seamless coverage for homeland defense and civil support across the United States and its territories.

STATE ASSISTANCE

2. Senator AKAKA. Lieutenant General Renuart, as you probably know, it has been reported in the media that the U.S. Government’s response to Hurricane Katrina was not adequate or quick enough. What assurances can you give State and local officials that NORTHCOM will be prepared to respond should a State Governor request military assistance during a disaster?

General RENUART. U.S. NORTHCOM is prepared to support a designated primary Federal agency in the wake of disasters with specialized skills and assets that can rapidly stabilize and improve the situation in the event that the President approves a State Governor’s request for Federal assistance. All Department of Defense (DOD) support is provided at the direction of the President or Secretary of Defense and in accordance with the National Response Plan. When requested, U.S. NORTHCOM will be fully engaged in supporting operations to save lives, reduce suffering, and protect the infrastructure of our homeland.

U.S. NORTHCOM has taken significant steps to improve our response capabilities based on lessons learned and findings in the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina report titled “A Failure of Initiative,” the White House Report titled “The Federal Response to Hur-
U.S. NORTHCOM has incorporated the Joint Staff standing execution order (EXORD) for Defense Support of Civil Authorities into operational planning for the upcoming hurricane season. The EXORD provides the U.S. NORTHCOM Commander authority, in coordination with supporting commands and military departments, to: deploy Defense Coordinating Officers (DCOs) and their staffs; establish operational staging areas, Federal mobilization centers, and DOD base support installations in support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA); and deploy airborne fire fighting systems upon receipt of a request for assistance from a Federal primary agency. In addition, the U.S. NORTHCOM Commander can place the following assets on 24-hour prepare to deploy orders: medium and heavy lift support helicopters, fixed-wing search aircraft, communications support packages, patient movement capability, a Joint Task Force for command and control of federal military forces, a forward surgical team, and a deployable distribution operations center.

To further improve our response capability, we have:

- Integrated full-time DCOs and their staffs into all 10 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions.
- Developed pre-scripted requests for assistance for FEMA, in collaboration with DOD and DHS, based on anticipated capability requirements.
- Purchased, in conjunction with DHS, cellular network packages that include portable cell towers, over 100 cell phones, over 40 laptop computers, a satellite terminal, and radio bridging. U.S. NORTHCOM also procured 300 satellite phones for distribution per request of the primary agency in support of State officials.
- Identified a series of deployed communication options from each Service that can quickly adapt to support FEMA's pre-scripted mission assignments and the needs of a request for forces from a joint task force, in addition, we drafted communications request for forces and identified assets from the Services and Joint Communications Support Element (e.g., voice, video, and data packages to support a small command post or large joint task force).
- Conducted Exercise Vigilant Shield 06 from 4–14 December 2006. This exercise tested U.S. NORTHCOM's command and control capability to provide defense support to the Nation during a variety of simulated scenarios to include a potential limited ballistic missile attack, a maritime domain threat, and support to a lead agency in response to a simulated nuclear weapons accident.
- Conducted Exercise Ardent Sentry 06 from 8–19 May 2006. This exercise focused on both homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities and included a Category 3 hurricane striking the Gulf Coast in the vicinity of New Orleans.
- Hosted or participated in more than 140 conferences or tabletop exercises since Hurricane Katrina.
- Developed procedures with Air Forces Northern to increase visibility and provide deconfliction of airborne rescue assets.
- Coordinated on a damage assessment concept of operations with DHS and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Collaboration is ongoing on pre- and post-hurricane imagery collection processes between DOD and interagency partners, as well as dissemination methods for imagery products.
- Deployed information management mobile training teams to demonstrate and instruct the use of collaborative tools and information sharing processes to our DOD and interagency partners. Our teams have trained National Guard Bureau Joint Operations Center personnel and the staffs of 28 National Guard Joint Force Headquarters-State, 11 of which are located in hurricane regions. We are also coordinating with U.S. Army North to train DCOs and Defense Coordinating Elements on the use of collaborative tools, process and procedures to facilitate greater information sharing. This initiative started in late 2003 and is an ongoing process.
- Coordinated with the U.S. Coast Guard and National Guard Bureau on a Joint Search and Rescue Center for large-scale operations.

3. Senator Akaka, Lieutenant General Renuart, how will you ensure that the needs of State and local officials are addressed in NORTHCOM's disaster relief plans?
General RENUART. U.S. NORTHCOM and its component commands coordinate with State and local authorities, including the National Guard, to gain situational awareness of their civil support and consequence management efforts. For example, Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF–CS) is U.S. NORTHCOM’s subordinate component for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive consequence management operations. To develop specific plans for specific events, JTF–CS used the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici cities as a baseline to evaluate all levels of emergency response to estimate the scope and magnitude and expedite U.S. NORTHCOM’s supporting response. U.S. NORTHCOM, in its planning for homeland defense and defense support of civil authorities, takes into consideration the role of the National Guard as first responders for any crisis.

[The nomination reference of Lt. Gen. Victor E. Renuart, Jr., USAF, follows:]

Nomination Reference and Report

As in Executive Session,

Senate of the United States,


Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for appointment in the United States Air Force to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be General


[The biographical sketch of Lt. Gen. Victor E. Renuart, Jr., USAF, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Lt. Gen. Victor E. Renuart, Jr., USAF

Lt. Gen. Victor E. Renuart, Jr., is the Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC. He serves as the principal immediate office adviser to the Secretary in all matters pertaining to the department. In addition to accompanying the Secretary on his travel and coordinating support to these trips, he serves as the Senior Military Liaison to the military Services, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the combatant commands. He also ensures timely execution of taskings as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

The general entered the Air Force in 1971 following graduation from Indiana University. He was commissioned through the Officer Training School in 1972. He has commanded a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support group and two fighter wings. He served as Commander of the 76th Fighter Squadron during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and supported Operation Deny Flight as Director of Plans for the NATO Combined Air Operations Center at Headquarters 5th Allied Tactical Air Force. In addition, he commanded Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia and 9th Air and Space Expeditionary Task Force-Southwest Asia, responsible for control of Operation Southern Watch. The general has served as the U.S. Central Command Director of Operations, wherein he oversaw the planning and execution of all joint and allied combat, humanitarian assistance and reconstruction operations for Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. He also served as Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces, where he was responsible for Air Force and Air Component Command activities for the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. The general has flown combat missions in Operations Desert Storm, Deny Flight, Northern Watch, and Southern Watch.

Prior to assuming his current position, General Renuart was the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy, the Joint Staff. He provided strategic direction, policy guidance, and planning focus to develop and execute the National Military Strategy in support of worldwide national security operations, politico-military affairs, international negotiations, and organizational issues through coordination with the combatant commands, the Services, Office of the Secretary of Defense, defense agencies, other U.S. Government agencies, and international organizations.
Education:
1971 Bachelor of Science degree in production and industrial management, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.
1975 Master of Arts degree in psychology, Troy State University, Troy, AL.
1977 Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), AL.
1979 Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, AL.
1992 Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
1997 Senior Officers in National Security Program, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD.

Assignments:
January 1972–March 1973, student, undergraduate pilot training, Laredo AFB, TX.
July 1976–September 1979, Assistant Professor of Aerospace Studies, University of Notre Dame, South Bend, IN.
September 1979–April 1980, student, AT–38 and A–10 training, Holloman AFB, NM, and Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ.
June 1982–July 1984, operations officer, Detachment 2, 81st Tactical Fighter Wing, Detachment 2, Leipheim Air Base, West Germany.
September 1986–July 1991, Chief of Wing Inspections, 23rd Tactical Fighter Wing, later, Operations Officer, later, Commander, 76th Tactical Fighter Squadron, England AFB, LA.
July 1992–March 1993, Director of Assignments, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Headquarters U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein AB, Germany.
March 1993–October 1994, Commander, Headquarters Support Group, Allied Air Forces Central Europe, NATO, Ramstein AB, Germany.
April 1996–June 1998, Commander, 52nd Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem AB, Germany.
December 2003–August 2005, Vice Commander, Pacific Air Forces, Hickam AFB, HI.
August 2005–August 2006, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, the Joint Staff, Washington, DC.
August 2006–present, Senior Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC.

Flight information:
Rating: Command pilot.
Flight hours: More than 3,800, including 60 combat missions.

Major awards and decorations:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
 Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
Meritorious Service Medal with four oak leaf clusters
Air Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Aerial Achievement Medal with three oak leaf clusters
Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster
Air Force Achievement Medal with oak leaf cluster

Effective dates of promotion:
First Lieutenant, Jan. 12, 1974.
Captain, Jan. 12, 1976.
Lieutenant Colonel, May 1, 1987.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Lt. Gen. Victor E. Renuart, Jr., USAF, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Victor E. Renuart, Jr.

2. Position to which nominated:

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   26 Nov. 1949; Miami, FL.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Jill Jenner Renuart.

7. Names and ages of children:
   Ryan Victor Renuart, 32.
   Andrew John Renuart, 29.
8. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the Service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

None.

9. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.

None.

10. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.

Life Member — Sigma Chi Fraternity.

Member — U.S. Professional Tennis Association.

11. **Honors and awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the Service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.

Significant Sig Award—Sigma Chi Fraternity.

12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes.

13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

VICTOR E. RENUART, JR.

This 1st day of February, 2007.

[The nomination of Lt. Gen. Victor E. Renuart, Jr., USAF, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 15, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on March 19, 2007.]

**Questions and Responses**

**Defense reforms**

**Question.** The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations. Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?
Answer. No. The goals of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation are as important today as when the act passed 30 years ago. I continue to support these reforms and will be guided by the objectives of this important legislation, which promote the effectiveness of military operations, strengthen civilian control, provide for more efficient and effective use of defense resources, and improve the management and administration of the Department of the Army and Department of Defense (DOD).

*Question.* If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

*Answer.* Not applicable, in view of my previous answer.

**RELATIONSHIPS**

*Question.* Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Chief of Engineers to the following offices (for the purpose of these questions, the term "Chief of Engineers" should be read to include Commanding General U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)):

The Secretary of Defense.

*Answer.* As head of DOD, the Secretary of Defense has full authority, direction, and control over all its elements. The Secretary exercises this power over the Corps of Engineers through the Secretary of the Army, whose responsibility for, and authority to conduct all affairs of the Army is subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will cooperate fully with the Secretary of Defense in fulfilling the Nation's national defense priorities and efficiently administering the Corps of Engineers in accordance with the policies established by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Joint Staff.

*Answer.* The Joint Chiefs of Staff serve as military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out the Chairman's responsibilities of providing for the strategic direction, strategic planning, and contingency planning; advising the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs, and budgets identified by the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands; developing doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces; providing for representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations; furnishing certain reports to the Secretary of Defense; and performing such other duties as may be prescribed by law or by the President or the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will cooperate fully with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the performance of their responsibilities.

The Secretary of the Army.

*Answer.* As head of the Department of the Army, the Secretary of the Army is responsible for, and has the authority to conduct, all affairs of the Department of the Army, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of the Army may assign such of his functions, powers, and duties as he considers appropriate to the Under Secretary of the Army, as well as the Assistant Secretaries of the Army, and require officers of the Army to report to these officials on any matter. If confirmed, I will support the Secretary in the performance of the Secretary's important duties. I will strive to establish and maintain a close, professional relationship with the Secretary of the Army, based on full and candid communication with the Secretary on all matters assigned to me.

The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works.

*Answer.* The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works is principally responsible for the overall supervision of the Army's civil works functions, including programs for conservation and development of the national water resources, including flood control, navigation, shore protection, and related purposes. Carrying out the Army's civil works program is a principal mission of the Corps of Engineers and the complex issues that arise in this area demand a close, professional relationship between the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works and the Chief of Engineers, based on mutual respect, trust, cooperation, and full communication. If confirmed, I am committed to establishing and maintaining such a relationship.

The General Counsel of the Army.

*Answer.* The General Counsel of the Army is the chief legal officer of the Army. The General Counsel serves as counsel to the Secretary of the Army and other Secretariat officials and is responsible for determining the position of the Department of the Army on any legal question or procedure. If confirmed, I will ensure that my Chief Counsel maintains a close and professional relationship with the General Counsel and actively seeks the General Counsel's guidance in order to ensure that
Army Corps of Engineers policies and practices are in strict accordance with the law and the highest principles of ethical conduct.

Question. The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Army Staff.

Answer. The Chief of Staff of the Army performs the Chief of Staff’s duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army and is directly responsible to the Secretary. The Chief of Staff also performs the duties prescribed by law as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Army Staff assists the Secretary of the Army in carrying out the Secretary’s responsibilities, by furnishing professional advice and operations expertise to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and the Assistant Secretaries of the Army, and to the Chief of Staff of the Army. Under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army, the Army staff prepares for and assists in executing any power, duty, or function of the Secretary or the Chief of Staff; investigates and reports on the Army’s efficiency and preparedness to support military operations; supervises the execution of approved plans; and coordinates the action of Army organizations, as directed by the Secretary or Chief of Staff. As a statutory member of the Army Staff, the Chief of Engineers assists the Secretary in carrying out the Secretary’s responsibilities and furnishes necessary professional assistance to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries of the Army, and the Chief of Staff of the Army. Specifically, the Chief of Engineers is the principal adviser to the Army Staff on engineering and construction matters. In discharging these responsibilities, the Chief of Engineers must develop positive, professional relationships with the Chief of Staff, the Vice Chief of Staff, the Deputy and Assistant Chief of Staff, the Surgeon General, the Judge Advocate General, the Chief of Chaplains, and the Chief of the Army Reserve, in order to ensure that the Army Staff works harmoniously and effectively in assisting the Army Secretariat. I am committed to establishing and maintaining such relationship with the members of the Army Staff.

Question. The combatant commanders.

Answer. The combatant commanders are responsible to the President and to the Secretary of Defense for the performance of missions assigned to the commands by the President or by the Secretary with the approval of the President. Subject to the direction of the President, the combatant commanders perform their duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and are directly responsible to the Secretary for the preparedness of the commands to carry out their assigned missions. These missions include providing humanitarian and civil assistance, training the force, conducting joint exercises, contingency activities, and other selected operations. If confirmed, I will support the combatant commanders in the performance of these important duties by providing any necessary engineering and construction services required from the Corps of Engineers to the combatant commanders’ component commands.

Question. The U.S. Ambassador to Iraq.

Answer. The Corps of Engineers is providing a broad array of engineering and construction-related services in Iraq generally to either the Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander or the State Department. In the first situation, the CENTCOM Commander has the primary relationship with the U.S. Ambassador and my involvement with the Ambassador would be in support of the CENTCOM Commander through my Gulf Region Division Commander. In the second situation, my representative, the Gulf Region Division Commander, would have a direct relationship with the Ambassador, but would coordinate with the CENTCOM Commander nonetheless.

Question. The State Governors.

Answer. The execution of the Corps of Engineers civil and military missions often demands a balancing of diverse interests. The proper reconciliation of these interests requires an understanding of the Corps’ authorities and legal responsibilities and open communication among all parties. I am committed to working cooperatively with the Governors of the States for the public interest. If confirmed, I pledge to establish and maintain a full dialogue with the Governors of the States on all issues we must cooperatively address.

Question. Please describe the chain of command for the Chief of Engineers on: (a) military matters; (b) civil works matters; (c) operational matters; and (d) any other matters for which the Chief of Engineers may be responsible.

Answer. Military Matters

The Chief of Staff presides over the Army Staff and assists the Secretary of the Army in carrying out the Secretary’s responsibilities. The Vice Chief of Staff has such authority and duties with respect to the Army Staff as the Chief of Staff, with the approval of the Secretary of the Army, may prescribe for him. As a statutory
member of the Army Staff, the Chief of Engineers reports to the Chief of Staff, through the Vice Chief of Staff, with respect to military matters.

Civil Works Matters

The supervisory duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works extend to all civil works functions of the Army, including those relating to the conservation and development of water resources. The Chief of Engineers reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works on civil works functions.

Operational Matters

The Chief of Engineers serves as a member of the Army Staff and as Commander of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. In this latter capacity, the Chief of Engineers commands nine engineer divisions and one engineer battalion. When employed in support of military contingency operations, these engineer assets fall under the command and control of the combatant commander designated for the particular operation.

Any other matters for which the Chief of Engineers may be responsible

The Chief of Engineers reports to each of the Assistant Secretaries within their areas of functional responsibility. For example, in the areas of installation and real estate management, the Chief of Engineers reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations and the Environment. Similarly, the Chief of Engineers reports on procurement matters to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA–ALT).

Question. Who is responsible for providing direction and supervision to the Chief of Engineers in each of the four areas listed above?

Answer. In each of these areas, the Chief of Engineers acts under the overall authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Army. With respect to military matters, the Secretary has assigned to the Chief of Staff the authority to preside over and supervise the Army Staff, including the Chief of Engineers. With respect to civil works functions, the Chief of Engineers reports to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works. In operational contexts, command and control of engineer assets is exercised by the combatant commanders designated for the particular operation.

Question. In your view, are there any areas of responsibility where it would be inappropriate for the Chief of Engineers to provide information to the Secretary of the Army or the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works? If so, what areas and why?

Answer. No. Certain information may require protection from disclosure, as in the case of certain procurement sensitive information, however, even this information may be shared if appropriate steps are taken to protect sensitive and proprietary aspects of the information. The relationships between the Secretary of the Army and the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works and the Chief of Engineers must be founded upon information sharing, and full and open communication about all matters. If confirmed, I will ensure that all Secretariat officials are informed about issues and provided with all information pertinent to their functional areas of responsibility.

Question. What is your view of the relative authority of the Chief of Engineers, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, the Secretary of the Army, the Army Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense with regard to the civil works functions of the Army Corps of Engineers?

Answer. As head of DOD, the Secretary of Defense has full authority, direction, and control over all elements within DOD. Similarly, as head of the Department of the Army, the Secretary of the Army has the authority necessary to conduct all affairs of the Department of the Army. Therefore, either Secretary could personally intervene in an issue involving the civil functions of the Corps of Engineers. However, the principal responsibility for overall supervision of the Corps civil works functions has been assigned to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works by statute and various directives. Generally speaking, this supervisory responsibility includes the responsibility for setting program policies and for coordinating with the Department of the Army, DOD, Office of Management and Budget, and other executive branch officials on the Corps budget, legislative program, and other matters of program interest involving the Corps civil functions. In general, the Chief of Engineers is the engineering and construction expert responsible for carrying out the civil functions of the Corps and for conducting the various program, project, or study activities that comprise the civil works program. Typically, the Chief of Engineers does not interact with the Chief of Staff of the Army on a regular basis with respect to matters involving the Corps civil functions.

The work of the Chief of Engineers often involves issues of great significance to the States and localities and their elected officials in Congress.
Question. If confirmed, what would be your role in addressing such matters with Congress?

Answer. I agree this work often does involve issues of great significance to the States and localities and their elected officials in Congress. In fulfilling its statutory requirements, the Corps must interact positively to define an appropriate Federal role in addressing these issues that recognizes fiscal realities, environmental, and other societal considerations. The challenges the Corps faces are complex, and there are many difficult decisions to be made. It is important that all interests be brought to the table and that they be given a voice in the development of solutions to our Nation’s problems. The Corps must be responsive to these interests and must engage in an open, constructive, and cooperative dialogue with the States, localities, and elected officials to ensure issues are resolved in a manner that maximizes the public interest.

Question. What is your understanding of the role of the civilian and military leadership of the Army Corps of Engineers in developing goals for Army Corps of Engineers programs and presenting these goals to the legislative branch?

Answer. The civilian and military leadership of the Corps of Engineers plays an important role in developing goals for Corps programs and in presenting these goals to the legislative branch. These goals are guided by the leaders’ technical knowledge and understanding of Corps capabilities and by information gleaned from a variety of sources inside and outside the Corps of Engineers. The leaders’ goals must promote the public interest, be affordable, and comport with existing law. Ultimately, the leadership’s goals will set the direction and tone for the execution of the Corps missions, if embraced by the administration and Congress. Military and civilian leaders within the Corps play a pivotal role in shaping these goals, and in ensuring that the goals are supported by the executive branch and Congress. These leaders may be asked by Congress to give testimony on the goals or to answer questions about the goals. They must be prepared to enter into a full and constructive dialogue with Congress to ensure that the goals are understood by and endorsed by Congress as promoting the public interest.

Question. Sections 3031, 3032, and 3036 of title 10, U.S.C., prescribe some of the duties and responsibilities of the Chief of Engineers. Other civil works related responsibilities are described in title 33, U.S.C. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

Answer.

Background:
- Undergraduate - Bachelor of Science with concentration in Engineering from West Point (majors not offered at that time);
- Graduate - Masters Degree in Mechanical Engineering from University of Michigan and Masters Degree in Business Administration from Long Island University;
- Registered Professional Engineer in State of Virginia;
- Associate Professor of Mechanical Engineering at West Point.

Experience:
- Commanded Combat and Combat Heavy (horizontal construction) units at the Platoon and Company level;
- Commanded 326 Engineer Battalion, 101st Airborne Division during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm - built Camp Eagle II;
- District Engineer, Los Angeles District during Northridge Earthquake and Arizona Floods - military and civil works responsibilities;
- Chief of Staff, Corps of Engineers;
- Executive to the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff;
- Division Engineer, South Atlantic Division;
- Special Assistant to Chief of Staff for privatization and best business practices;
- Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management overseeing construction, operations, and maintenance of all Army Installations;
- Commanding General, Maneuver Support Center and Commandant of the Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood, MO, in charge of engineer training, doctrine, and future systems;
- Commanding General, Accessions Command responsible for Army recruiting and initial military training for officers and enlisted soldiers.
MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Chief of Engineers?

Answer. If confirmed, my first priority would be to meet with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, Corps Leaders, Army, DOD, and administration leadership, as well as Members of Congress to seek their input into the major challenges confronting the next Chief.

In my view, the next Chief—and probably the next several Chiefs—must be concerned with the following issues.

Maintaining the technical competence and professionalism of the Corps. Attracting and retaining the most talented employees is key. The Corps must train, equip, and challenge its people properly, and continue to move forward as a recognized leader in developing and implementing the best technology. The integrity of the Corps of Engineers rests on the objectivity, transparency, and scientific validity of its analytical processes.

Meeting the Army’s infrastructure transformation needs stemming from the base realignment and closure (BRAC) decisions, the re-stationing of troops, and the ongoing increase in the size of the Army. This is coupled with a need for meeting future water resources needs as the Nation grows and demographics change. I believe the refurbishing of our civil infrastructure (in which the Corps of Engineers shares responsibility) as highlighted in the American Society of Civil Engineers Report Card on the state of the Nation’s infrastructure will be a major issue.

The Corps, working with other key players, must help create a joint and inter-agency stability, security, transition, and reconstruction doctrine and process. This may include the creation of a civilian deployment force to support the kind of contingency operations we have undertaken in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, and in Iraq. I foresee a need for more comprehensive water resources and infrastructure solutions with new and innovative approaches. The Corps, as a member of a team, will play a role in determining the strategic direction essential to success.

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I would need to complete a thorough assessment of the needs, challenges, and opportunities. I am familiar with the military construction (MILCON) transformation efforts that the Corps has already undertaken. These efforts should speed up the design and construction of military facilities, and promote lower costs by leveraging the capabilities of the private sector. I believe this work will need to be monitored very closely over the next several years to ensure continued success. I have also reviewed the 12 actions for change first announced last June in New Orleans by Lieutenant General Strock, in the wake of the Hurricane Katrina disaster. I would also track these to ensure they achieve the desired results.

It is the responsibility of the Chief of Engineers, and the Corps as a whole, to provide the most professional advice possible to the administration and Congress. I see a need to assure that the Corps has a vigorous and continuous strategic planning process, as well as a systematic and effective way of engaging the broad array of stakeholders.

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Chief of Engineers?

Answer. Many of the Corps’ missions require balancing disparate interests. The Corps must further the public interest while executing the assigned missions.

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would you establish to address these problems?

Answer. As previously discussed, if confirmed, my first priority will be to meet with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, Corps leaders, Army and DOD leadership, others in the administration, as well as with Members of Congress to seek their input in preparation for developing a plan to meet the various challenges. I believe that the Corps must continue to transform its business processes in order to become more efficient and effective in the execution of its missions. I would go to the most critical areas with the greatest challenges to make a personal and thorough assessment of the needs and to meet with stakeholders and officials.

Question. In your view, does the Army Corps of Engineers need to make any changes in the way it operates? If so what changes would you recommend?

Answer. Historically, the Nation’s rich and abundant water, and related land resources provided the foundation for our successful development and rapid achievement of preeminence within the international community. Since the beginning of our Nation, the USACE has been a great asset, providing engineering support to the military, developing our Nation’s water resources, and restoring and protecting our environment. The Corps has improved our quality of life by making America more prosperous, safe, and secure. The Corps must be flexible and continue to
evolve if it is to continue to make important contributions to the Nation and respond to today's and future challenges. If confirmed, assessing the need for changes would be a top priority. Typically there are opportunities for improvements in any organization. I am confident that, in consultation with Congress, Corps partners, and others within the administration, we could determine what, if any, changes are needed.

CONTRACTING FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

Question. For the past 4 years, the Army Corps of Engineers has played a major role in Iraq reconstruction contracting. What do you see as the major successes of the Army Corps of Engineers in Iraq reconstruction contracting?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Corps of Engineers has successfully completed almost 3,400 Iraq reconstruction projects valued at over $4 billion out of a planned total of almost 4,500 projects with a total value of $8 billion. These projects have:

- increased power generation benefiting 1.3 million homes,
- provided 834 new grade schools serving 325,000 students,
- provided 250 border forts helping to secure more than 2,000 miles of Iraq’s borders,
- provided for new and restored water treatment facilities benefiting 1.9 million Iraqis, and
- provided 11 renovated hospitals serving approximately 5,500 patients per day.

Currently, 900 reconstruction projects are under construction and scheduled for completion by the end of next year with an additional 200 projects in the planning phase. These projects employ, on average, 22,500 Iraqis each week. Currently 75 percent of the Corps’ contracts are awarded to Iraqi contractors who not only employ thousands of Iraqis but also gain the expertise, capability, and experience needed to continue the reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure once the Corps of Engineers’ mission is complete.

Question. What is your understanding of the major failures?

Answer. According to the Special Inspector General for Iraq (SIGIR) over 80 percent of the reconstruction projects audited by the SIGIR met project requirements. I’ll list a few of the more significant factors, as I understand them, that contributed to project those difficulties:

- Some contractors and their subcontractors failed to complete projects to an acceptable level of quality or in a timely manner due to security issues. Due to the hostile and dangerous environment, contractor supervision and contractor quality control was not always adequate.
- Construction management and quality control for some projects had to be managed at a distance due to the inability for the project engineers, and the quality control and quality assurance personnel to physically visit the site.
- Due to security issues, prime contractors had difficulty in managing subcontractors. This was a problem where local subcontractors did not have the same quality standards as the prime contractor.

Question. What changes, if any, do you believe that the Army Corps of Engineers should make to improve its processes for reconstruction contracting?

Answer. From my understanding, the procedures used by the Corps of Engineers for reconstruction contracting in Iraq are the same as those used by other executive agencies. They are grounded in public law and the Federal Acquisition Regulation. I believe improvement in the processes for reconstruction could be made. For example, the procurement processes and practices followed for Iraq reconstruction were peacetime practices. The Army and DOD, in consultation with Congress, should determine whether alternate processes are necessary during contingency operations. If confirmed, I will further consider this issue and determine what potential changes I might recommend to the Army and DOD to improve the overall process.

Question. The Army Corps of Engineers has been criticized for the process by which major contracts for the reconstruction of the Iraqi oil industry (the “RIO I” and “RIO II” contracts) were awarded.

The RIO I contract was awarded on a sole-source basis to the company that helped the DOD assess the status of Iraq’s oil infrastructure—an apparent organizational conflict of interest. Although the Army Corps of Engineers has maintained that this contract was a temporary “bridge” contract, intended to last only until a fully competitive contract could be awarded, the contract had a term of up to 5 years
and a value of up to $7 billion. By the time that follow-on contracts were awarded more than a year later, DOD had already spent more than $2 billion on a sole-source basis.

Do you believe that the Army Corps of Engineers did all that it should have done to ensure competition for this major reconstruction effort?

Answer. While I have not been personally involved with this mission, it is my understanding that when the Army was assigned the responsibility for executing the Contingency Support Plan, the mission was still classified. Under the circumstances in which the Army was operating, and given the requirements of the mission, the Corps of Engineers determined that KBRS was the only contractor who could have provided the required services within the required timeframe. A written justification prepared by the Corps of Engineers requesting authority to award a sole-source contract was reviewed and approved by the ASA–ALT. It is my understanding that the Corps was always planned to convert to a competitive contract as soon as practical, and that the successive RIO contract was awarded competitively. Competition is always preferable, and the more competition the better. Circumstances and mission requirements sometimes dictate procurement methods. The Corps must comply with all procurement laws and regulations to include satisfying the requirement to provide a justification for limiting competition. I understand that there were several independent reviews of the award of the sole-source contract and those reviews found the award to be proper.

Question. If confirmed, what, if anything, would you do differently if faced by a situation like this in the future?

Answer. Not applicable, in view of my previous answer.

Question. The RIO II contract was awarded to two different contractors, including the RIO I incumbent. The RIO I incumbent was rated as excellent in areas including past performance, experience, business management, and contract administration despite the fact that the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) found systemic deficiencies in the company's estimating and financial management systems that raised serious concerns about overpricing and advised the Army Corps of Engineers to exercise extreme caution in contracting with the company.

Do you believe that the Army Corps of Engineers did all that it should have done to identify and address problems and deficiencies in the performance of the RIO I contractor?

Answer. I am not personally familiar with the details of this specific contractor issue. DCAA is an extremely important partner in the execution of our mission and, if confirmed, I will continue to work with DCAA as we move forward with our reconstruction mission. It must be recognized however, that DCAA is only an adviser. In making a decision regarding what to do in any given situation, the contracting officer must take the information received from DCAA, along with the information from all other sources.

Question. Do you believe that the Army Corps of Engineers appropriately took these problems and deficiencies into account in making its award decision on the RIO II contract?

Answer. I am not personally familiar with the details of this award decision. However, in accordance with law and regulation, it is ultimately the responsibility of the Source Selection Authority to make an independent award decision based on the identified selection criteria and facts and information available.

Question. On June 27, 2005, Bunnatine Greenhouse—then the senior civilian(147,638),(999,994) at the Army Corps of Engineers responsible for contracting—testified before the Democratic Policy Committee about the problems that she saw with the RIO I and RIO II contracts. Ms. Greenhouse alleged that these contracts were symptomatic of an "old boys" approach to contracting, more directed to achieving specific outcomes than to compliance with contracting requirements, which she asserted was pervasive at the Army Corps of Engineers.

Do you believe that the Army Corps of Engineers, in its contracting, has focused too much on achieving specific outcomes and not enough on compliance with contracting requirements?

Answer. In my experience, the Corps of Engineers is an agency with a strong focus on complying with contracting requirements, while still accomplishing the difficult and challenging missions it is assigned. If I am confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Corps of Engineers complies with all applicable contracting requirements.

Question. The SIGIR has reported on a series of Iraq reconstruction projects that appear to have been spectacular failures. For example, the SIGIR has reported that: (1) the RIO I contractor spent the full $75 million allocated for the construction of a pipeline river crossing, but achieved only 28 percent of the planned pipeline throughput, resulting in the loss of more than $1.5 billion a year in potential oil
What is your assessment of the SIGIR's evaluation of these projects?

Answer. SIGIR provides a valuable service to the coalition force in Iraq and the U.S. taxpayers. The feedback and assessment provided in consultation with SIGIR has helped identify areas of concern and improve processes during the reconstruction effort. SIGIR has stated that the problem projects are not indicative of the overall reconstruction effort in Iraq. Obviously, the three specific projects mentioned fall into the category of problem projects.

SIGIR identified the Baghdad Police College as not having adequate quality assurance oversight. The Corps of Engineers acknowledged that quality assurance was inadequate to monitor all phases of construction for each building given the size of the project. Communication failures between quality control, quality assurance representatives, the prime contractor, and the project engineers also contributed to the situation. During the deficiency correction period, the Baghdad Police College is continuing daily operations and normal training functions.

It is my understanding that the Corps of Engineers terminated the original contract for the primary health care centers. The Corps of Engineers has awarded subsequent contracts and is making steady progress in the completion of the primary health care centers. It is my understanding that the Corps of Engineers has completed 31 primary health care centers and has 124 under construction.

Question. What is your understanding of the major reasons for the failures of these and other major reconstruction projects in Iraq?

Answer. There are a number of reasons some projects were not successful. A few of the more significant factors are:

- Some contractors and their subcontractors failed to complete projects to an acceptable level of quality or in a timely manner due to security issues. Due to the hostile and dangerous environment, contractor supervision and contractor quality control was not always adequate.
- Construction management and quality control for some projects had to be managed at a distance due to the inability for the project engineers, and the quality control and quality assurance personnel to physically visit the site.
- Due to security issues, prime contractors had difficulty in managing subcontractors. This was a problem where local subcontractors did not have the same quality standards as the prime contractor.

Question. What lessons do you believe the Army Corps of Engineers has learned from its experience in Iraq reconstruction contracting?

Answer. I believe the Corps of Engineers could benefit from the following changes:

- Consideration of new contingency contracting procedures that balance the requirements to immediately provide needed supplies and services in contingency situations with the need to obtain competition.
- Reduce over-reliance on large design-build and cost-plus contracts in favor of smaller firm-fixed price and indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts.
- Implementation of the President's proposed Civilian Reserve Corps.

Question. What additional lessons, if any, do you believe the Army Corps of Engineers should learn from this experience?

Answer. I think the Corps of Engineers learned from the Iraq reconstruction mission that for future similar missions, a common and consistent theater construction management and oversight organization is necessary to synchronize all construction activities. During the Iraq reconstruction mission, multiple and overlapping organizations stressed the limited volunteer pool for expertise and brought a layer of inefficiency to the process. Quality assurance and quality control could be better executed with a lead construction agent clearly defined early in the effort. It is difficult and expensive to execute major reconstruction efforts in a wartime environment.

Question. Outside experts reviewing U.S. reconstruction contracts in Iraq have suggested that: (1) the Army Corps of Engineers and other responsible agencies were not adequately staffed to award and oversee these contracts; (2) the effort to hire one set of contractors to oversee the work of other contractors was misguided; (3) instead of bringing in U.S. contractors to undertake major reconstruction projects, the reconstruction effort should have relied upon Iraqi companies to under-
take much smaller projects; and (4) U.S. reconstruction goals were unrealistic, given the security situation in the country.

What is your opinion on these issues?

Answer. (1) It is my understanding that providing personnel to oversee contractors was difficult because of the limited number of government civilian volunteers and the ability to provide them with adequate security.

(2) In some cases, due to the limited number of government civilians available, an additional layer of contractor oversight was needed. Ultimately, however, oversight of U.S. Government responsibilities was performed by U.S. Government civilians.

(3) Immediately after hostilities in 2003, it was necessary to bring in U.S. contractors to perform reconstruction work because of the unknown capabilities of the Iraqi construction industry. As the Iraqi construction companies geared up, the Corps of Engineers began to initiate the Iraqi First Policy. Currently, 75 percent of the Corps' contracting actions are for Iraqi contractors. One of the Corps' primary missions is capacity development within the Iraqi government to raise the management, execution, operations and maintenance, and other skill sets needed for the Iraqi government to assume the reconstruction mission.

(4) The U.S. reconstruction goals were ambitious, but I would not characterize them as unrealistic. It is my understanding that out of a total of 10,600 Iraq reconstruction projects, over 8,500 have already been completed. The remainder are either under construction or planned. Also, the SIGIR in his most recent quarterly report identified that 80 percent of the projects audited during the last quarter were quality construction.

NAVIGATION MISSION

Question. The Army Corps of Engineers has built and maintains an intracoastal and inland network of commercial navigation channels, locks, and dams for navigation. The Corps also maintains 300 commercial harbors and more than 600 smaller harbors. What do you view as the greatest challenges facing the Army Corps of Engineers with respect to the execution of its navigation mission?

Answer. I expect one of the greatest challenges with the execution of the navigation mission to be the maintenance and modernization of aging infrastructure. Maintaining our ports and waterways is critical to our economic well-being. An equally significant challenge to the navigation mission is the management of hundreds of millions of cubic yards of dredged material removed from our Nation's marine transportation harbors and waterways. My understanding is that the Corps is continually working to make dredging and placement of dredged material environmentally safe and acceptable. I believe that the Corps should continue these efforts and look for innovative ways to increase harmony between the critical need for navigation improvements and our precious aquatic environment.

Question. What do you see as the most significant navigation projects planned for the next 10 years by the Army Corps of Engineers?

Answer. Many ports, gateways to domestic and international trade and overseas military operations, are operating at the margin in terms of channel depths. Segments of the inland waterway system are congested and are in need of rehabilitation. Clearly we must sustain the efficiency of our major ports to assure our competitiveness in world trade. I believe that the Corps must be poised to meet these needs.

Question. What role, if any, do you believe the approval or disapproval of navigation industry groups should play in decisions made by the Army Corps of Engineers about specific projects?

Answer. Decisions regarding Corps of Engineers projects are the responsibility of officials in the executive and legislative branches. For its part, the Corps should listen to all interested parties and stakeholders and fully integrate economic and environmental values. The Water Resources Development Act of 1986 established the Inland Waterways User Board and charged this board to report to the President and Congress on priorities for investment in the inland system.

Question. In November 2000, the Army Inspector General found that three Army Corps of Engineers officials had manipulated data in a cost-benefit analysis in order to justify a $1 billion project. What is your understanding of the steps that the Army Corps of Engineers has taken since 2000 to ensure that projects are appropriately analyzed and justified?

Answer. My understanding is that the Corps has made substantial changes to assure that projects are appropriately analyzed and justified. The Corps has strengthened its own procedures for internal peer review and adopted procedures for exter-
nal peer review under guidance issued by the Office of Management and Budget. The Directorate of Civil Works now houses an Office of Water Project Review that is separate from project development functions. It is my understanding that a significant program of planning improvement is being undertaken that includes training, model certification, and centers of planning expertise.

**Question.** If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that technical analyses conducted by and for the Army Corps of Engineers are independent and sound?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would evaluate the current process and be guided by the principle that Corps technical analyses be absolutely sound and the project evaluation process be transparent. The Chief of Engineers must be trusted with the technical discretion essential to meeting our Nation’s water resources needs. External reviews can contribute to reducing controversy and risk, but these reviews must be integrated into the project development process not added at the end of the process. Integration of external review will improve projects and will assist the Corps in meeting urgent needs in a timely manner.

**NATIONAL LEVEE SAFETY PROGRAM**

**Question.** The Army Corps of Engineers has been criticized for its failure to do more to protect New Orleans from catastrophic hurricane damage. The alleged failures of the Army Corps include: (1) the construction of a shipping channel that acted as a “superhighway” funneling the storm surge from Hurricane Katrina directly into New Orleans; (2) the failure to properly account for the soil structure under the New Orleans levees; (3) the failure to adequately maintain the levees; and (4) the failure to construct levees sufficient to protect the city in the event of a direct hit by a strong hurricane.

What is your view of these criticisms?

**Answer.** While I, like the rest of the Nation, am generally familiar with the tragedies and widespread damages associated with Hurricane Katrina, I am not personally familiar with the specific issues raised above. I understand that the Corps of Engineers has initiated and been involved with several ongoing analyses and studies of the potential causes and effects of the hurricanes and the status of the hurricane storm damage reduction projects in the New Orleans area. I understand and appreciate the importance of this issue and, if confirmed, will immediately learn more about the past, present, and future work and issues associated with the ongoing efforts in the New Orleans area. Speaking generally, I support, and would welcome thoughtful and independent analysis of Corps activities such as those undertaken after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. A full and complete understanding of what happened in both the technical and decisionmaking arenas is an essential component of assuring it does not happen again.

**Question.** Do you see the need for any changes to the structure, processes, or priorities of the Army Corps of Engineers as a result of the events in New Orleans?

**Answer.** I have not developed a position on the structure, processes, or priorities of the Corps as a result of the events in New Orleans. However, if confirmed, one of my first priorities will be to thoroughly examine the issues in New Orleans and to determine if potential changes to the Corps of Engineers structure or processes would be beneficial. It is essential, in my view, that such an examination be made in cooperation with Congress, others within the administration, and a broad array of stakeholders.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the steps that the Army Corps of Engineers is taking in the reconstruction of the New Orleans levees to protect the city from a recurrence of the tragic events of August 2005?

**Answer.** I know that the Corps of Engineers is involved in many ongoing reconstruction efforts in the New Orleans area, including improvements to the hurricane storm damage reduction projects. I know that the Corps is working towards designing and building an integrated system that will provide protection from a 100-year storm event. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to learn about all ongoing efforts in this area.

**Question.** The Army Corps of Engineers recently completed a nationwide river levee inspection process and identified numerous unacceptably maintained levees. Media reports quoted Corps of Engineers officials as acknowledging that past inspections were not documented adequately and that a lack of resources has made it difficult for periodic inspections to be performed. The operation and maintenance of levee systems is a shared responsibility of State and local sponsors, however, there is enormous dependence on the Corps of Engineers for inspection, identification of problems, risk assessment, and where required, rehabilitation.
What is your opinion of what the Corps of Engineers and Federal, State, and local authorities need to accomplish in order to ensure that existing deficiencies in the national system of levees are addressed?

Answer. The management of the Nation’s levees is a shared responsibility among local, State, and Federal Government. I believe that the Corps should maintain a leadership role in this management responsibility and ensure that all parties are fulfilling their responsibilities. This includes thorough, joint inspections by the Corps and the levee owners, followed by immediate maintenance action by the levee owners. The Corps possesses administrative options to require proper operation and maintenance of the Corps. I believe the Corps should exercise those options when necessary in order to ensure that the projects will perform as expected. Public safety must be the priority.

Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that those levees representing the highest risk of failure and loss of life and property are rehabilitated?

Answer. Protecting the public from catastrophic flooding is a key part of the Corps’ mission. The Corps is currently in the process of developing an assessment methodology to identify levees which represent the highest risk of failure and loss of life and property. I believe the Corps should, after identification, work with levee owners and other key stakeholders to determine a rehabilitation plan using the available processes and programs. The Corps must work closely with the Federal Emergency Management Agency, States, local governments, and other stakeholders to ensure an understanding of risks and to develop comprehensive solutions that best address the need to improve system performance and reduce future flood damages.

HURRICANE KATRINA RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCTION CONTRACTING

Question. The Army Corps of Engineers played a major role in contracting for reconstruction and relief in the wake of the major hurricanes of 2005. What is your understanding of the major successes of the Army Corps of Engineers in relief and reconstruction contracting?

Answer. The Corps of Engineers has a long tradition of providing disaster response assistance. Most recently, the Corps was a major player in the Federal response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005. In addition to deploying over 8,000 Corps employees to provide disaster support, it leveraged the expertise, capacity, and capabilities of the private sector to provide relief assistance.

It is my understanding that a major contracting success is that of the Corps’ program which utilizes “Pre-Awarded” contracts. This initiative provides the Corps with the ability to rapidly and effectively respond in order to execute major relief missions. After Hurricane Katrina, the Corps employed this initiative to rapidly provide emergency services. These contracts allowed the Corps to provide the initial assistance, while follow-on contracts could be competitively awarded to provide additional capabilities and capacity.

Question. What is your understanding of the major failures?

Answer. I am not aware of any specific major failures; however, if confirmed, I will look into the overall response to this, and other emergencies, and look for ways to improve the Corps’ processes.

Question. What changes, if any, do you believe that the Army Corps of Engineers should make to improve its processes for reconstruction and relief contracting?

Answer. From my experience with the Corps of Engineers, it is an organization that is constantly looking for ways to improve. I believe it is important that the Corps work closely with the Department of Homeland Security, and other Federal and non-Federal partners, to improve the collective abilities to deliver required commodities and services in a timely, efficient, and cost-effective manner. The work that the Corps performed during Hurricane Katrina has been and will continue to be extensively audited and, if confirmed, I would look forward to continue to work with these agencies to implement corrective actions and improvements to the Corps’ processes.

Question. Recent press articles have described a process in which work was passed down from the Army Corps of Engineers to a prime contractor, then to a subcontractor, then to another subcontractor—with each company charging the government for profit and overhead—before finally reaching the company that would actually do the work. In one such case, the Army Corps of Engineers reportedly paid a prime contractor $1.75 per square foot to nail plastic tarps onto damaged roofs in Louisiana. The prime contractor paid another company $75 cents per square foot to do the work; that subcontractor paid a third company 35 cents per square foot to do the work; and that subcontractor paid yet another company 10 cents per
square foot to do the work. In a second such case, the Army Corps of Engineers reportedly paid prime contractors $28 to $30 per cubic yard to remove debris. The companies that actually performed the work were paid only $6 to $10 per cubic yard.

What is your understanding of the payments made under these contracts?
Answer. While I am not personally familiar with these particular contracts, it is my understanding that the Corps of Engineers entered into competitive contracts in order to complete its mission. Under such contracts, the Corps would have no contractual relationship with subcontractors that any prime contractor might engage. From my experience, the Corps is an agency that expects all subcontractors to be compensated for the work they perform and at the rate that their contract requires. If confirmed, I will examine this issue in detail.

Question. What steps do you plan to take, if confirmed, to ensure that the Army Corps of Engineers does not pay excessive “pass-through” charges of this kind on future contracts?
Answer. I believe that the Corps should take steps to minimize the tiering in the future. This could possibly be accomplished by awarding more, smaller contracts to achieve the mission.

Question. The Federal agencies, including the Army Corps of Engineers, have been criticized for awarding sole-source contracts on the basis of “urgent and compelling circumstances” in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, even though some of these contracts were awarded long after the hurricane took place or extended long beyond what could be justified on the basis of that disaster. Would you agree that the “urgent and compelling” exception to competition requirements should be used to award a contract only on the basis of an event, or series of events, that is reasonably proximate in time to the contract award?
Answer. Yes, in general I believe that the “urgent and compelling” exception should be used only in the immediate wake of the disaster. I understand that the law requires competition except in very limited circumstances and believe that competition is vitally important. However, any determination regarding the specific use of an “urgent and compelling” exception to competition should be looked at on a case-by-case basis. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that the Corps judiciously uses the “urgent and compelling” exception in compliance with the applicable statutes and regulations.

Question. Would you agree that the term of a contract awarded on the basis of the “urgent and compelling” exception to competition requirements should not ordinarily exceed the period of time the agency reasonably believes to be necessary to award a follow-on contract?
Answer. Yes, I agree that in general, the term of a contract awarded under the “urgent and compelling” exception to competition should not ordinarily exceed the time reasonably required to award a follow-on contract. I understand that the law requires competition in all but a few limited circumstances and I believe that competition is the very foundation of Government contracting. However, the determination to use the “urgent and compelling” exception and the duration of the resulting contract must be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the specific facts of the situation. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that the Corps complies with the applicable statute and regulations when using the “urgent and compelling” exception to competition.

COMPETITION IN THE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT OF MILITARY PROGRAMS

Question. The USACE has historically been designated as the primary contracting agent for military construction (MILCON) projects carried out by the Department of the Air Force. However in recent years, due to the perception of excessive overhead costs associated with the Corps of Engineers, the Air Force has sought to establish an organic contracting agency through the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence in San Antonio, TX. Currently, the Air Force is limited by DOD policy to be able to contract a maximum of 5 percent of its MILCON projects organically, but in light of their success in achieving construction savings, has requested approval for a higher percentage.

What is your view of the request by the Air Force to be allowed to carry out a larger percentage of MILCON contracts?
Answer. The Corps of Engineers has successfully accomplished the Air Force military design and construction mission since the Air Force was established. I do not have an opinion on this specific issue at this time. If I am confirmed, I will review the matter and will work with DOD, the administration, and Congress to develop a position on this matter.
**Question.** In your opinion, what would the impact be to the Army Corps of Engineers by allowing the Air Force to serve as their own contracting agent without limitations?

**Answer.** Congress passed a law in the early 1950s that designated the Army and the Navy as the DOD construction agents and specific certain assessments that needed to be completed prior to allowing another agent to execute the DOD construction mission. If I am confirmed, I will review the matter and will work with DOD, the administration, and Congress to develop a position on this matter.

**EFFICIENT MANAGEMENT PRACTICES IN THE ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS**

**Question.** In a report to Congress dated February 1, 2007, and titled “U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Response to Senate Report 109–254, Management of Military Programs in the United States Corps of Engineers, January 2007,” the Commander of the U.S. Corps of Engineers (USACE) stated that “through MILCON Transformation, USACE will gain economic efficiencies through design standardization of Army facilities, centralization of design activities in USACE Centers of Standardization, and focused business line contracting with regional acquisition strategies.” The report also forecasted that savings from these efficiencies would be experienced by customers in later years after full implementation of transformation initiatives, possibly affecting rates charged by the Corps for supervision, inspection, and overhead.

Do you support the goals of the Corps’ current plan for MILCON Transformation?

**Answer.** Yes. With the dramatic increase of construction that must be accomplished in support of Army Transformation and the most recent Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 2005), I believe that the changes in the Corps of Engineers’ MILCON process are on target to assist the Army to provide quality facilities less expensively and faster than the legacy processes. The current construction environment dictated the need to move from very prescriptive requirements to more performance-based requirements in order to allow contractors to utilize industry best practices and meet the Army’s needs within the limited funds allotted.

**Question.** If confirmed, would you recommend any changes or improvements?

**Answer.** As MILCON Transformation is implemented, I expect the Corps to collect lessons learned on MILCON Transformation projects as they are completed and to make course corrections in the MILCON Transformation process or wholesale changes if needed. I believe that the strength of any successful process is continual assessment and improvement.

**Question.** When do you expect the Corps’ customers would begin to see the real benefits of MILCON transformation in terms of decreased costs for supervision, inspection, and overhead and improved delivery times for construction products?

**Answer.** I understand that as a result of the greater use of standard designs and “adapt-build” acquisition, the Army is expecting a reduction in required design funds, over the Future Years Defense Program fiscal years 2008–2013. Design fund savings is expected to be $255 million which will be used to acquire high priority projects. With the utilization of alternative construction methods such as modular or pre-engineered structures and use of more industry best practices, delivery times are expected to be shorter. Decreased costs in supervision, inspection, and overhead should occur once both the Corps and the contractors become more accustomed to the use of the new processes.

**USE OF INDEFINITE DELIVERY INDEFINITE QUANTITY (IDIQ) CONTRACTS FOR CONSTRUCTION**

**Question.** The Army Corps of Engineers plans to use IDIQ contracts for a wide range of construction projects to support requirements of Army modularity, the 2005 round of base realignments and closures, and to implement the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy.

In your opinion, what are the pros and cons to the use of IDIQ contracts for MILCON in the United States?

**Answer.** I believe that the use of regional IDIQ contracts for MILCON will help the Army execute its program by allowing the Corps of Engineers to use standardized adapt-build designs. In my opinion, some advantages of utilizing IDIQ contracts may be:

- Providing for a significantly shortened procurement timeline for award of individual projects.
- Allowing the Corps to award standardized facility projects to contractors that have previous experience in building with similar materials and methods.
- Allowing the Corps to meet significantly shortened project execution schedules.
- Allowing the Corps to develop a “Continuous Build” program on standardized building types and to capture the potential cost and schedule savings that may accrue as a result.

The potential disadvantages to the use of regional IDIQ contracts may occur if the MILCON program changes significantly or the number of similar projects is reduced or funding disruptions occur in given regions. Any of these changes may affect the “Continuous Build” program and the benefits associated with it.

Question. In your view, what would be the impact to the Corps of Engineers if the use of IDIQ contracts were curtailed or limited by Congress?

Answer. The most significant impact would likely be the Corps’ inability to meet the Army's execution schedules for re-stationing and BRAC commitments. The curtailment or limiting of these types of contracts would lengthen project procurement timelines and cause project schedule delays that would ripple through the Army’s execution plans for re-stationing and BRAC.

BUNDLING OF CONTRACTS BY THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS

Question. The Army Corps of Engineers is faced with the significant challenge of carrying out construction requirements over the next 5 years imposed by the combination of force structure changes due to Army modularity, the 2005 round of Base Realignments and Closures, the implementation of the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy, and most recently, the Army's initiative to grow the force. In response, the Corps plans to allow construction contractors to propose alternate types of construction, including pre-manufactured and modular buildings, to bundle projects for multiple buildings into one delivery order, and to rely on design-build acquisitions, which requires one contractor to provide both design and construction services. The net effect of these proposals will be to reduce the pool of qualified contractors able to bid on such large and complicated projects.

Question. In your view, what benefits, if any would be gained by these initiatives?

Answer. I believe that there will be reduced costs based on the experience gained from performing similar projects on a repetitive basis. It stands to reason that the more projects that a single contractor completes, the less costly each project becomes. For example, a contractor may need only one management team to oversee the construction of several buildings. Combining multiple projects should also lead to efficiency savings due to shortened learning curve and implementation of lessons learned, as well as material savings as contractors buy in bigger quantities.

Question. What are the risks to increasing the size and range of services required by these contracts?

Answer. It is a possibility that increasing the size of the contracts and decreasing the pool of contractors could result in reduced competition and an increase of costs. Large contracts may cause the contractors to become overburdened. However, I believe that the risk may be minimized through a thorough best value source selection process. From my experience, the Corps has a very good track record when it comes to construction source selection.

Question. In your opinion, how can the Corps of Engineers ensure a healthy bid climate that allows for a full range of small and mid-range businesses to compete for construction contracts?

Answer. I believe that the Corps must ensure that businesses of all types may compete for construction contracts. Some ways in which to achieve this goal would be to emphasize small and disadvantaged business subcontracting goals, and to hold national and regional industry days and technical forums. Additionally, requirements should be developed so that small and mid-sized businesses are able to compete and opportunities provided to disadvantaged contractors.

Question. In your opinion, what are the benefits and costs resulting from the Corps of Engineers’ decision to accept a less permanent type of construction?

Answer. While developing the national acquisition strategy, it is my understanding that the Corps has partnered with industry and identified changes that may allow it to operate more efficiently. The MILCON program uses technical performance criteria that rewards innovative construction methods throughout the United States. Among these innovative construction methods are offsite prefabricated modular assemblies, tilt-up construction, panelized assemblies, the use of combinations of different material types and others. The expected benefits are an improvement in completion schedules and reduced costs.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS

Question. If confirmed, you will take charge of the largest construction program in the country. Virtually every major civil works project of the Army Corps of Engineers raises environmental concerns. What is your view of the appropriate balance between the missions and projects of the Army Corps of Engineers and the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) and other environmental statutes?

Answer. I believe that the Corps can and must carry out its missions in an environmentally responsible manner. In fact, one of the Corps’ three main civil works mission areas is Aquatic Ecosystem Restoration. The Corps has a long record of coordinating its missions and planning its projects in compliance with the provisions of NEPA and other environmental statutes, which has led to better and more environmentally sensitive projects. If confirmed, I am committed to ensuring that they are planned and constructed in such a manner as to avoid or minimize environmental impacts.

Question. The Army Corps of Engineers is responsible for environmental restoration projects at DOD Formerly Used Defense Sites (FUDS) and at Department of Energy Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) sites. What do you view as the greatest challenges facing the Army Corps of Engineers with respect to the execution of its environmental restoration mission?

Answer. It is my understanding that continuing to execute the vital cleanup mission while always protecting the health and safety of workers and the public is perhaps the biggest challenge for the FUDS Program and FUSRAP. Restoration standards and stakeholder expectations are continuing to increase. The Corps must continue to apply good science and management practices that will help to increase remediation efficiency and to continue to meet the commitments made to stakeholders.

Question. Do you believe that goals established for environmental cleanup (including cleanup of unexploded ordnance) under these programs are realistic and achievable?

Answer. The Corps does and should have aggressive goals for these programs and meeting those goals will be a challenge. Most all of this work is conducted on private property and involves numerous stakeholders, many espousing conflicting agendas. If confirmed, I will continue to press for ways to perform the mission in the most efficient and effective manner possible.

Question. In the past, the Army Corps of Engineers has not always been required to meet State’s water quality standards in constructing and operating its water resources projects. Do you believe that the Army Corps of Engineers should be required to meet State water quality standards in constructing and operating Army Corps of Engineers projects?

Answer. Yes. I believe that the Corps should be a leader in the environmental arena and, in most circumstances, should meet State water quality requirements.

Question. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act requires landowners or developers to obtain USACE permits to carry out activities involving disposal of dredged or fill material into navigable waters of the United States, including wetlands. For almost two decades, the stated goal of the Federal Government has been “no net loss of wetlands.” Do you support the goal of “no net loss of wetlands”?

Answer. Yes. Wetlands are important to human health, the environment, and our economy.

Question. Do you believe that we are currently meeting that goal?

Answer. From what I understand, I do believe that the Corps is meeting the goal of “no net loss.” This is an area I will explore if confirmed.

Question. What specific steps do you believe that the Army Corps of Engineers should take to move us closer to the goal of “no net loss of wetlands”?

Answer. I believe there are two principal measures that could be implemented to assure that the Corps is meeting the goal of no net loss. First, I believe the Corps must continue to improve its program to verify that required mitigation is being furnished to replace lost wetlands. Second, the Corps should develop a database to improve the tracking of wetland impacts and mitigation. The combination of increased review of mitigation with this new database will increase the Corps’ capability to confirm that it is meeting the goal of “no net loss of wetlands.”

RECRUITING AND RETENTION OF ARMY ENGINEERS

Question. In recent years, competition among employers for the services of highly-qualified engineers has greatly increased.
What is your understanding of the Army's success in recruiting and retaining for careers sufficient numbers of highly-qualified officers and civilian employees for service in the Army Corps of Engineers?

Answer. From what I understand, the Corps is generally successful in filling positions and usually has multiple highly-qualified candidates for each position announced. The only area where the Corps has experienced some recurring challenges is in filling requirements for Iraq and Afghanistan and the large mission in the New Orleans area. Many of the Corps' employees, both civilians and military officers, have either professional engineering degrees or project management skills experience. As I have previously indicated, recruiting and retaining talented employees is key and is an area of great interest to me.

Question. What do you view as the Corps of Engineers greatest challenge in meeting its manpower and training and education requirements?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Corps does not have a problem meeting manpower requirements. The biggest challenge in training and education is funding and being able to divert the employees from their vital missions to obtain necessary training and development. As the vast majority of Corps employees are project funded, paying salaries during training periods has been and continues to be a challenge.

Question. What steps would you take if confirmed to ensure that the Army improves its attractiveness to highly-qualified individuals for service in both the Active and Reserve components and in the civilian workforce?

Answer. Recently, legislation was enacted providing additional benefits for Corps employees willing to deploy in support of national security missions. For example, a provision has been enacted in the last several National Defense Authorization Acts that raises the pay cap for overtime pay to civilians deployed in support of missions that fall under the CENTCOM Commander's purview. Similar legislation has been proposed for those employees deployed within the United States who are supporting the ongoing reconstruction and restoration efforts in New Orleans.

NATIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL SYSTEM

Question. The Army Chief of Engineers has responsibility for a Federal civilian workforce of more than 35,000, portions of which are in the process of transition to the National Security Personnel System (NSPS). NSPS implementation efforts to date have underscored the essential requirement for senior leadership understanding and oversight in various NSPS features including employee perception of fairness, rewards of performance based on merit, transparency in the development of pay bands and pay pools, and adequate training for supervisors and employees at all levels in the organization.

What is your understanding of the Corps of Engineers progress to date in implementing NSPS, and, if confirmed, how would you ensure that the Army Corps of Engineers transition to NSPS is successful?

Answer. It is my understanding that the Corps is in the process of converting to NSPS. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that this system will be successfully implemented within the Corps of Engineers.

HUMAN CAPITAL PLANNING FOR THE CIVILIAN WORKFORCE

Question. DOD is developing a comprehensive human capital strategic plan for its Federal civilian workforce which is intended to identify critical skills and competencies needed in the future civilian employee workforce, as well as a plan of action for developing and reshaping the Federal civilian workforce.

If confirmed, how would you approach the task of identifying gaps in needed skills in the Army Corps of Engineers workforce and ensuring that adequate resources, training, and professional development efforts are undertaken to achieve the Corps' workforce goals?

Answer. I understand that the Office of Management and Budget has given the Corps of Engineers the highest rating for progress and status made in implementing the human capital initiatives under the President's Management Agenda. If confirmed, I will strive to ensure that the Corps continues to develop the workforce and achieve appropriate goals.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Chief of Engineers?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED

ARMY ENGINEERING RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT AND ENGINEERING CENTER

1. Senator Reed. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, how do the research and development (R&D) programs of Army Engineering Research Development and Engineering Center (ERDC) currently support the mission of the Corps of Engineers?

General VAN ANTWERP. ERDC's R&D programs support the full spectrum of Corps missions from peace to war. The ERDC's scientists and engineers support effort cuts across all five of the Corps' broad mission areas: Water Resources, Environment, Infrastructure, Homeland Security, and Warfighting. Their capabilities are complementary, and reinforcing and are critical to the mission of the Corps.

2. Senator Reed. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, how will you work to enhance the leveraging of the engineering and technical skills of ERDC to assist in the performance of the Corps' mission?

General VAN ANTWERP. If confirmed, I will continue to fully support the entire spectrum of research, development, technology infusion, and sustainment within the Corps of Engineers. I look forward to meeting with the ERDC leadership, lab directors, and scientists to learn more about their efforts.

3. Senator Reed. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, how will you work to ensure that the ERDC continues to maintain and improve its technical workforce and facilities in order to best perform its mission?

General VAN ANTWERP. The Corps in its "12 Actions for Change," highlighted its commitment to a competent, capable workforce as well as a commitment to investing in R&D. If confirmed I intend to continue that commitment and will make it a priority to visit the ERDC facilities and assess the current status of the workforce and their facilities.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

RECONSTRUCTION DURING CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

4. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, it was a pleasure to meet with you prior to your hearing, and I was pleased to hear that one of the first things that you will do is to visit the Pacific Region. In my State of Hawaii, the Army Corps of Engineers is very important in particular for its work pertaining to shore protection, water resources, and dam safety. In your response to the advance policy questions, you mention that you "believe improvement in the processes for reconstruction could be made [in the area of reconstruction contracting during contingency operations]." While I understand that you wish to discuss this matter with the Army and Department of Defense (DOD), if there was one recommendation that you would suggest that would improve the process for reconstruction contracting, what would you suggest to change?
General Van Antwerp. Given the unique nature of the reconstruction mission, I believe improvements in the processes for reconstruction can be made. Specifically, the process for reconstruction contracting could be improved by the consideration of new contingency contracting procedures that balance the requirements to immediately provide needed supplies and services in contingency situations with the need to obtain competition. This type of change would most likely require changes to the Federal Acquisition Regulations. If properly done, this could allow Federal agencies such as the Corps of Engineers greater flexibility in contracting in contingency operations.

IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

5. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, in your response to the advance policy questions for this hearing, you listed as major Army Corps’ successes in Iraq “increased power generation benefiting 1.3 million homes.” Are you aware that during the week of February 22–28, electricity availability averaged 6.2 hours per day in Baghdad and 9.7 hours nationwide? Electricity output for the week was 6 percent below the same period in 2006. Since the beginning of 2004, we have been unable to provide and sustain a significant increase in electrical generation and distribution capacity to meet the Iraqi power demands. I believe the chances of success in Iraq would be significantly enhanced if critical and highly visible infrastructure projects, such as the restoration of electrical power to the Iraqi citizens at a level meeting or exceeding the demand by the Iraqi population, were to be successful. What do you believe we can do to build on the Army Corps’ successes in Iraq to increase generation and distribution capacity and sustain it at a higher level with a goal of meeting the needs of the Iraqi population?

General Van Antwerp. I inquired about the electricity availability in February. A significant portion of the generation capacity was taken off-line for planned maintenance because demand is relatively low during that timeframe. Demand has increased an average of around 10 percent per year since 2003. Last summer the Iraqi’s reached a peak generation of 5,700MW, and we expect they will exceed that this summer.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers was allocated about $4.3 billion to improve Iraq’s electricity infrastructure. The World Bank estimated in 2003 that it would take more than $20 billion to bring Iraq’s electrical system to the point where it could supply power to all of Iraq for 24 hours a day and 7 days a week. That number is now estimated to be as high as $40 to $50 billion. The Iraq reconstruction program is just a stepping stone on the way to improving Iraq’s electrical infrastructure. It is my understanding that it will take several years and significant international and Government of Iraq investment to completely upgrade Iraq’s electrical infrastructure and give Iraqis power 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, nationwide.

6. Senator Akaka. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, in your advance policy questions responses for this hearing, you stated that many of the Iraq reconstruction projects in Iraq had problems with contractor supervision and quality due to the hostile environment. You further stated that quality control had to be managed at a distance due to the inability for project engineers and quality assurance personnel to physically visit the site. Lack of appropriate oversight on contracting in Iraq has been a major problem, and it seems to me that these types of problems you described were predictable given the operational environment in Iraq. What do you suggest we could have done, or should do in the future, to prevent these types of problems, and to ensure that the American people get the full value for their tax dollars?

General Van Antwerp. In his most recent quarterly report, it is my understanding that the Special Inspector General for Iraq (SIGIR) found that 87 percent of the Iraq reconstruction projects reviewed by the SIGIR during the last quarter met contract standards. While the goal would obviously be 100 percent of the projects, I think an 87-percent success rate in this difficult environment is encouraging.

The Iraq Reconstruction program is carried out in a hostile environment with an inherent high risk and formidable security challenges. Violence and hostile activity against United States and Iraqi personnel does impede reconstruction efforts by slowing progress on projects, restricting the movement of personnel, and diverting resources from reconstruction to security. However, the customary practices for the Corps’ Quality Assurance that apply in a peacetime environment are still relevant to the Iraq reconstruction effort. It is my understanding that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Division, does everything it can to see that U.S. Government personnel make timely visits to construction sites to ensure project quality,
enforce financial responsibility, and ensure that the end product is constructed to meet the contract requirements. When U.S. personnel are not able to visit a project site due to security concerns, I understand the Corps’ Gulf Region Division has Iraqi nationals conduct site visits and assist U.S. personnel in providing quality assurance oversight. I think including local nationals in the reconstruction team has worked well and should be considered in future operations.

7. Senator AKAKA. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, do you feel the Army Corps has been given all of the resources it needs to do the job in Iraq?

General VAN ANTWERP. Yes. Following combat operations the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers provided Forward Engineer Support Teams to begin the process of restoring the electrical and oil infrastructure to provide essential power and funds for the people of Iraq. As the mission unfolded, the Corps became an important asset in the reconstruction of Iraq which necessitated the establishment of the Corps’ Gulf Region Division in January 2004. In addition to its own staff, the Gulf Region Division is supported by the Joint Services and has the ability to hire critical Federal employees and specialized contractors. Also, the Gulf Region Division has supplemented its staff by directly employing over 500 Iraqi citizens as engineers, architects, and planners. These individuals are deeply involved in the reconstruction effort and will be instrumental in continuing the reconstruction program once the Corps’ mission is complete. In addition, the Corps contracts construction work directly to Iraqi contractors who in turn employ thousands of Iraqis through their construction firms. Finally, the Corps has, through reachback support, been able to make available the technical expertise from a workforce of over 30,000 employees, 9 research laboratories, 10 divisions, and 41 districts. The Corps’ forward units involved in the Iraq reconstruction efforts are able to reach back and tap the resources of the entire U.S. Army Corps of Engineers which greatly assists them in their ability to accomplish the reconstruction mission.

8. Senator AKAKA. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, in your response to the advance policy questions, you indicated that “attracting and retaining the most talented employees” is a key challenge facing the next Chief of Engineers. Has the Army Corps had problems with recruitment and retention of highly-qualified engineers?

General VAN ANTWERP. The Corps has generally been able to recruit, train, and retain sufficient engineers and scientists to meet current mission requirements. However, the Corps does face challenges in meeting requirements in some selected areas, because we are relying on voluntary temporary deployments to overseas areas and major post-disaster reconstruction efforts. I expect that the Corps, along with the rest of the public and private sector, will share in the future challenge of having sufficient engineers and scientists enter the workforce to meet the Nation’s long-term needs.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JIM WEBB

LEVEE SYSTEM IN NEW ORLEANS

9. Senator WEBB. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, it is my understanding that a Corps of Engineers estimate said that levee systems in New Orleans needed to be dramatically invigorated before Hurricane Katrina. Can you confirm whether the Corps of Engineers warned before Hurricane Katrina that a different approach to the city’s levee system should have been funded?

General VAN ANTWERP. It is my understanding that prior to Hurricane Katrina, Congress had authorized work on a reconnaissance-level report for category 4 and 5 protection for southeastern Louisiana and that these efforts were underway when Hurricane Katrina struck. The report was completed and it was recommended to proceed to the feasibility phase. The Corps had worked with State and local governments to advance the completion of this work and advised that the current hurricane protection measures did not provide protection for category 4 or 5 storms.

10. Senator WEBB. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, what recommendations were advocated by the Corps of Engineers during the 7 years prior to Hurricane Katrina with respect to the levee system, including budgetary, safety, and structural aspects?
General VAN ANTWERP. The Corps recognized the urgency to complete construction of the ongoing levee projects, as well as the design and approval for new levee projects for the greater New Orleans area. The Corps’ annual budget request included funding for the ongoing hurricane protection projects. The West Bank and Vicinity Hurricane Protection Project was budgeted annually at a funding level to complete the first level of protection as quickly as possible. The ongoing study to evaluate higher levels of protection in several parishes in southeastern Louisiana was proceeding to the feasibility phase. Several areas were identified for evaluation for raising current levee systems, construction of barriers that may prevent storm surges from moving inland and wetlands construction and restoration.

11. Senator WEBB. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, what are the recommendations now?
General VAN ANTWERP. The Corps of Engineers is committed to designing and constructing the best hurricane protection system for people and the environment within the resources provided and remains focused on restoring levees and floodwalls to the authorized heights and completing all planned projects in conjunction with the ultimate goal of providing 100-year protection for the system, as directed by Public Law 109–234. Additionally, several measures to provide higher levels of protection are now being reviewed under the Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Act evaluation requested by Congress following Hurricane Katrina. This evaluation includes nonstructural measures and coastal restoration as a way to provide comprehensive hurricane protection.

12. Senator WEBB. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, there are reports that the pumps installed as part of a new pump-and-floodgate system to control flooding from Lake Pontchartrain may not be working properly. What is their status, and what is the status of the Corps’ other major repair and improvement projects for the levee system in New Orleans?

General VAN ANTWERP. It is my understanding that the Corps has completed modifications on approximately one-half of the pumps and continues to modify the remainder as quickly as possible. Additionally I believe that there are plans to install additional pumps at the 17th Street Canal and London Avenue Canal in the near future.

The Corps of Engineers completed its mission to restore levels of protection to that which existed before Hurricane Katrina struck. The Corps has repaired the 220 miles of damaged levees (approximately 213 of the 325 miles of the total levee and floodwall system).

The Corps of Engineers is preparing for the start of the 2007 hurricane season by focusing on improvements that will significantly reduce risks for critical areas. This includes increasing the level of protection at the three outfall canals. At the three canals, temporary floodgates have been installed to prevent storm surge from entering the outfall canals providing more effective storm and flood management.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

BALANCING DISPARATE INTERESTS

13. Senator MCCAIN. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, in the advance policy questions provided to you in preparation for this hearing, we asked what you considered to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Chief of Engineers. You responded, “Many of the Corps’ missions require balancing disparate interests.” Can you elaborate on that answer? Specifically whose or what range of interests?

General VAN ANTWERP. First, the Corps of Engineers has many varied responsibilities including military construction (MILCON) in support of our Armed Forces, infrastructure improvements in Iraq and Afghanistan, support to other Federal agencies such as that provided to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in its Superfund program, emergency response activities, and the large water resources-based civil works program, among others. This work is being carried out by a combined force of Corps employees and contractors working throughout the United States and in over 90 countries around the world. Each of these missions is vitally important, each has distinct authorization and funding sources and each has its own constituency and stakeholder interests. The Corps’ organization and focus must be balanced in such a way as to successfully accomplish all of these missions concurrently.
Further, each of the separate missions has disparate interests internal to the mission or program. For example, the Corps civil works program includes projects having the primary benefit categories of navigation, flood damage reduction, and environmental restoration. Quite often, economic and environmental uses of water in these categories are in direct competition requiring a balanced approach to assure that both the Nation’s economic strength and environmental health are properly considered. To further complicate matters, solutions to water resources problems today—especially in urban areas—frequently come into conflict with other challenges which are not within Corps missions areas such as providing efficient transportation systems, urban economic redevelopment, providing recreation opportunities, and so forth. It has become increasingly apparent that it is inappropriate to optimize a solution for any one of these challenges in such a way as to result in a sub-optimal solution to the full range of problems confronting an area. Here again, balance is required as a minimum, and “win-win” solutions should be actively sought.

14. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, if confirmed, how do you propose to balance those interests? What guiding principles will you use in the process?

General Van Antwerp. The underlying guiding principles that must be used in carrying out the Corps missions are those provided by the administration and Congress through policy and legislation applicable to those missions. If confirmed, I would expect to engage both the administration and Congress on a regular basis to assure we are proceeding appropriately.

Beyond that, and internal to the Corps, there are great opportunities to use knowledge and experience gained in one Corps program to inform and otherwise benefit the others. As you might expect, the same Corps people who are working on one program one day are often assigned to another program on another day. My observation is that the Corps has always found this diversity of experience to be very beneficial, both in terms of individual professional development and in cross-fertilizing ideas among programs. I would expect to continue in that mode if confirmed.

Externally, the fundamental prerequisite for identifying the appropriate balance among disparate interests is continuous pursuit of open and candid communications with all interested parties—both listening carefully and offering information freely—and effective partnerships with a wide range of stakeholder groups, other Federal agencies, and State and local governments.

TRANSPARENCY IN CORPS ACTIVITIES

15. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, you have stated in your responses to our advance policy questions about the Corps’ challenges that “the integrity of the Corps of Engineers rests on the objectivity, transparency, and scientific validity of its analytical processes.” Are you committed to complete transparency in all contracting activities carried out by the Corps of Engineers?

General Van Antwerp. Absolutely. If confirmed I will see that the Corps of Engineers keeps the public advised of new contracting opportunities, emphasizing and utilizing the tools provided by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Army Source Selection Manual. The Army Source Selection Manual is an excellent resource for contracting officers. The Source Selection Evaluation Team prescribes best practices for source selections. This will allow the Corps to conduct objective evaluation and source selection of contractors. I commit to finding ways to improve the Corps transparency in regard to our contracting procedures.

16. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, if confirmed, what will you do to improve the objectivity and transparency of the Corps’ processes, particularly as they relate to open competition and contract awards?

General Van Antwerp. I will reach out to industry through conferences and workshops, ensure advertisement of all contracting opportunities on the Army Single Face to Industry and Federal Business Opportunities Web sites and make certain that the Corps’ contracting officers have the best and most current information on contracting best practices for competition.
USE OF "COST-PLUS" CONTRACTS FOR CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES

17. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, to what extent does the Corps of Engineers rely on the use of "cost-plus" contracts for construction activities?

General Van Antwerp. The Corps of Engineers only employs "cost-plus" contracts when required in accordance with statute and regulation. The preferred contract type is always a firm fixed-price contract. Unfortunately, circumstances do not always allow the use of fixed-price contracts.

18. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, does the Corps currently have any guidance or policies in place related to the use of these contracts?

General Van Antwerp. The Corps of Engineers' contracting officers follow FAR Part 16, "Types of Contracts" as supplemented by the Defense FAR Supplement and the Army FAR Supplement in determining the appropriate contract type.

19. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, in your opinion, what are the advantages and disadvantages to the use of "cost-plus" contracts?

General Van Antwerp. In accordance with FAR Part 16.301–2 cost reimbursement contracts should be utilized "only when uncertainties involved in contract performance do not permit costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract."

In many situations the Corps faces projects where the uncertainties are such that a cost-type contract is the only method available to ensure successful completion of the project. If the site conditions, the technology required, or the type of structure to be built are complicated and the good result of the project is at risk, it is necessary to use cost-type contracts as prescribed by FAR Part 16.

One of the disadvantages of cost-plus contracting is the lack of "market forces" as an incentive to control costs. This requires increased contract surveillance and cost reviews in accordance with statute and regulation. Use of effectively designed "cost-plus" incentive structures will allow the Corps to negate issues caused by the contractor's lack of cost control. It is not to the contractor's benefit to incur excessive costs, because a cost-plus incentive contract will not result in increased fees and could lead to reduced fees.

Cost-reimbursement contracts do have a number of unique limiting characteristics. Specifically, the FAR places three limits on their usage. First, the contractor's accounting system must be adequate for determining applicable costs. Second, government surveillance during performance must provide reasonable assurance that efficient methods and effective cost controls are employed by the contractor. Third, a determination must be made that a cost-reimbursement contract is likely to be less costly than any other type or that obtaining the needed supplies or services without the use of a cost-reimbursement contract is impracticable. FAR 16.301–3.

The Corps of Engineers contracting officers will continue to be encouraged to use the tools the FAR has provided for limiting cost risk when cost-type contracts are utilized.

20. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, if confirmed, what will be your policy on the use of these types of contracts?

General Van Antwerp. If confirmed, I will assure that Corps of Engineers contracting officers are charged with carefully considering the project, risk of performance, and advantages and disadvantages of the contract type when determining whether a cost-type contract is appropriate for the project.

HEALTHY BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT FOR SMALL- AND MEDIUM-SIZE COMPANIES

21. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, I wanted to follow up on a question we posed to you about maintaining a healthy bid climate that allows for a full range of small- and mid-size businesses to compete for construction projects. It seems that we have programs established for small and disadvantaged businesses and that the large multi-national companies will most be able to take advantage of the Corps bundling strategy for construction contracts. That leaves the entire mid-range of businesses without a competitive advantage. You mentioned that "requirements should be developed so that small and mid-sized businesses are able to compete." If confirmed, how do you propose to develop these requirements?

General Van Antwerp. When possible, I would assure that the Corps breaks up requirements into sizes that are manageable by the small business community wherever possible. Additionally, I will explore ways in which contracts may be broken out such that they might not be true small business set-asides, but would be
of such sizes that could be more easily accessible to mid-range businesses, i.e. those that do not qualify as small businesses, but are not equipped to adequately compete for very large contracts.

22. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, how can the Corps ensure that mid-range companies will have a selection of projects in which to bid on?

General Van Antwerp. Regarding mid-size firms, unfortunately this is not a recognized business designation in Federal contracting. A business is either small or large. Once a small business construction firm exceeds its size limits to be considered as small business (revenues ranging between $13 million–$31 million depending on its size standard code), it now has to compete against large businesses with revenues in the hundreds of millions of dollars or even in the billion dollar range. This is not a level field of competition. Therefore, as mentioned above, I would explore ways to offer contracting opportunities for mid-range businesses.

QUALITY OF CONSTRUCTION

23. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, you mentioned in answers to advance policy questions submitted by this committee that the Corps is using prefabricated modular and tilt-up construction in an effort to save costs for the tremendous amount to new construction required to satisfy requirements related to base realignment and closure (BRAC), Army modularity, and the Army's increase in end strength. As a professional engineer: what are the eventual costs of using such construction methods versus the traditional Army Corps—use of permanent type 5 construction methods?

General Van Antwerp. Traditionally, the Government has required type 1 or 2 construction, which is construction comprised primarily of steel and concrete. By allowing private contractors to propose a broader range of construction types, the Army is allowing industry innovations and construction techniques that maximize methods for both cost and schedule reduction. Commercial techniques such as prefabricated modular and tilt-up construction methods provide levels of quality that are comparable to traditional construction methods. The Corps of Engineers believes that by allowing the use of innovative methods and materials, initial facility construction costs will be reduced and that future facility maintenance costs will be similar to costs experienced by the private sector where similar methods have been used. It is recognized that life cycle maintenance costs associated with commercial construction standards that are less robust than traditional Corps standards may be higher. Nonetheless, the mission timeline requirements necessitated the use of such standards.

24. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, what is the design life of these new facilities versus type 5 construction methods?

General Van Antwerp. All facilities are built for a 50-year design life whether they are type 5, which is a residential type standard, or whether they are type 1 or 2, which is construction comprised primarily of steel and concrete. In addition, the MILCON transformation strategy provides additional flexibility to facility commanders by providing a means by which the Army can more easily refurbish or re-adapt a facility with a 50-year design life after only 25 years, a timeframe similar to the life-cycle used in private industry.

25. Senator McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, by accepting a lower design life for these new buildings in order to keep costs down, are we building a legacy of “World War II wood” where entire bases of failing buildings will have to be torn down and replaced in 30 years?

General Van Antwerp. The Army’s MILCON transformation strategy is built on constructing facilities with a 50-year design life that can be built under compressed time schedules by using private industry methods, materials, and techniques. The MILCON transformation strategy uses industry innovations such as pre-fabrication, modular solutions, pre-engineered facilities, and the standardization of facility designs, to reduce costs while maintaining quality. The cost savings the Army expects to realize are from improved methods, materials, and the use of innovative techniques, not from accepting a lower design life. The Army expects to get a minimum of 50 years out of facilities built with a 50-year design life.
LAND ACQUISITIONS IN ARIZONA

26. Senator M. McCain. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, the Army Corps of Engineers is in the process of carrying out an Air Force requirement to purchase, or otherwise acquire, private property in aircraft accident zones around Luke Air Force Base, AZ. I have recently been briefed that the Corps of Engineers may have to rely on land condemnation or Federal seizure proceedings with four landowners in order to preclude unsafe development in critical airfield zones. While I understand and support the need for the Air Force to conduct safe flying operations, I am concerned that the rights of private landowners are preserved to the maximum extent possible. Can you look into this matter and report back to this committee within 30 days on the Corps plan to complete the land acquisitions for the Air Force, the process the Corps will pursue to ensure fair and equitable treatment of these landowners, and all other actions considered or conducted by the Corps, including the use of restrictive easements, to preclude as a last resort the seizure or condemnation of the properties?

General Van Antwerp. It is my understanding that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is acquiring restrictive easements and that landowners will not be displaced. Also, none of the landowners are being forced to change their current use of the land which is predominantly unoccupied cropland. There is one landowner, Arizona Motorsports, whose non-agricultural use of the land is being grandfathered in.

I understand that the Corps of Engineers has concluded negotiations for the majority of the necessary transactions, but anticipates having to utilize condemnation for several of the transactions. The Corps of Engineers is coordinating very closely with APTC and Luke Air Force Base and intends to continue to work with owners to conclude the transactions. If confirmed, I will ensure that the subject landowners are treated fairly and that all laws and regulations governing the taking of private property are followed.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

27. Senator Sessions. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, in 2004, Florida denied the Corps' application for a section 401 water quality certification to dredge the Apalachicola River, which cut off congressionally authorized navigation to the upstream States. Since then, the Corps has failed to exercise its Federal preemptive authority, including that contained in section 404(d) of the Clean Water Act, to dredge the river despite being requested to do so. If you are confirmed as Chief of Engineers, what will you do to restore navigation to Alabama and Georgia?

General Van Antwerp. I understand that in connection with the operation of any system of Corps multiple purpose reservoir projects, such as those in the ACF Basin, the Corps must consider many factors and interests in the operation of those projects to accomplish their congressionally authorized purposes. The Corps must consider factors such as navigation channel depths, drought conditions, and availability of water to release or hold back in order to accomplish the various multiple purposes of the projects, and such factors as the needs of endangered species, fisheries, and shellfish; available funding or lack thereof for dredging; and other maintenance activities. The Corps will always exercise its best efforts to balance all of these factors in the public interest and to fulfill all project purposes including navigation to the greatest possible extent in order to maximize the benefits of the projects.

THE CORPS' MISSION

28. Senator Sessions. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, the Corps' mission continues to expand while its budget contracts, all at the expense of the Corps' traditional programs such as navigation and flood control. Recognizing the Corps is the only Federal agency with national responsibilities for water resources development, how will you manage the Corps to avoid taking on more nontraditional projects and programs—which should be the responsibility of other Federal agencies such as the Department of Interior and the Environmental Protection Agency—and ensure the Corps focuses its limited resources on its own established mission?

General Van Antwerp. The Corps' mission responsibilities and assignments come through the policy oversight and guidance provided by the administration and specific project and activity authorizations in laws passed by Congress. In contrast to most other Federal agencies, the Corps doesn't have a great deal of discretion in
the specific activities it undertakes. The Chief of Engineers can—and should—fully inform decisionmakers in both the administration and Congress as to the impacts on its traditional missions of proposals for the organization to take on work outside of its traditional mission areas. Working with the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works, I would expect to be proactive in offering such information if confirmed.

Beyond that, it seems to me that the best avenue for dealing with this problem is through comprehensive, collaborative, integrated approaches to problem solving. This is often referred to as a watershed approach. One element of such an approach is to seek ways to look more comprehensively at the full range of problems in a region or watershed before concentrating on site specific solutions to narrower problems. To accomplish this effectively, interagency partnerships and actionable memorandums of agreement among agencies are essential. Too often in the past, we have seen Federal agencies focus exclusively on their own discrete missions and tools without understanding the authorities and capabilities of sister agencies, or attempting to partner with them. If effective collaborations among relevant Federal agencies—and State and local governments as well—were created and each partner were to bring its respective authorities and resources to bear in solving intersecting problems in a complementary manner, the need seen by some for Corps mission expansion might be obviated.

FUNDING ALLOCATION

29. Senator Sessions. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, in fiscal year 2007, the Senate Appropriations Committee unanimously rejected the administration’s proposed “regional allocation” of operations and maintenance (O&M) funding because of its encroachment on the Constitutional prerogatives of Congress. Do you concur with this proposed budget policy which has again been included in the fiscal year 2008 budget request for the Corps? If so, please explain what influence, if any, would I or other Members of Congress have on the eventual funding levels for individual waterways in my State, if Congress should approve the administration’s proposal?

General Van Antwerp. The O&M program is seen more and more as a very dynamic program, with needs and priorities changing at a moments notice. In a performance-based context, the Corps would manage the funds in that account and in the basin, only moving funds to the highest priority activities within that basin. The criteria used to move funds would be those that were used to develop the overall O&M program, which reflect a rigorous analysis to make best use of limited funding.

Tentative, draft individual funding levels were placed on the Corps’ Web site when the 2008 budget request was introduced. From what I understand, there are strict guidelines for reprogramming funds at this time, so Members of Congress have significant influence over funding levels for individual waterways. Traditionally, Congress has appropriated funds by project and not by regional allocation and the Corps executes the program accordingly.

WATER RESOURCES STUDY

30. Senator Sessions. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, it has been over 30 years since Congress authorized a National Water Resources Study Commission. Would you support congressional authorization in Water Resources Development Act of a Presidential Commission to: (a) assess the Nation’s water resources needs; (b) ascertain the performance or benefits of current Federal programs and projects; (c) evaluate the effectiveness of present policies, principles, and performance/measurement standards in making resource allocation decisions; and (d) recommend needed changes pertaining to those Federal water resources needs, policies, principles, standards, and programs?

General Van Antwerp. Depending on how it was constructed and charged, such a commission could be very useful in raising awareness of national needs and approaches to meeting them. The pressure on water resources brought about by an increasing population and shifts in population distribution argue for a National Water Resources Commission and study. However, I don’t think that waiting on the formation of a commission and results from its inquiry should delay us from doing today what we already know must be done. Existing policies, principles, standards, and programs are broad and flexible enough so that much can be done under them as they now exist. In the case of the Corps, a continuing review and updating of agency rules and procedures developed to implement current policies, procedures,
and laws could go a long way to addressing current and projected needs. If confirmed, I am committed to such a continuing review.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN ENSIGN

PROPER USE OF FUNDS FOR FACILITY REPAIRS

31. Senator ENSIGN. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, in our review over the past 2 weeks into the facility conditions at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, I have come to the conclusion that the appalling conditions in Building 18 were the result of a failure in leadership to respond to and correct identified deficiencies. We heard witnesses testify earlier this week that the Army and Defense Health Affairs had adequate resources from Congress, despite the pending BRAC decision to close Walter Reed by 2011, to maintain this facility at an acceptable level. In fact, over $670,000 was spent on renovations for this facility between 2000 and 2005. What struck me is that in order for this money to have been spent in Building 18, a military engineer needed to have walked through the facility, talked to building residents, and identified problems. Then funds must have been approved at some level of command within the Army and provided to award a contract for the two renovations. So, this wasn’t necessarily an issue of lack of oversight, it was an issue of misplaced priorities. My question to you as a former Assistant Chef of Staff for Installation Management, and now the potential Commanding General of the Army Corps of Engineers—what happened? Did we waste $670,000 by, to use a little known veterinary term, putting “lipstick on a pig”?

General VAN ANTWERP. Funding for construction, sustainment, repair, and maintenance of medical facilities—including all buildings at Walter Reed Army Medical Center—is funded through the Defense Health Program appropriation and managed by the TRICARE Management Activity and the U.S. Army Medical Command.

It is my understanding that prior to the BRAC decision, the former Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (Bldg. 40) and the Walter Reed Inn (Bldg. 18) were considered as part of the Enhanced Use Lease project. A lease was signed for Building 40. The destruction of Building 18 and development of a new parking structure was not pursued for two reasons; WRAMC students occupied the facility with no place to relocate and the BRAC closure announcement. A large portion of the $670,000 was used for minor renovations prior to Wounded Warriors occupying the Walter Reed Inn (Bldg. 18) in late 2005.

32. Senator ENSIGN. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, is the Army using its scarce O&M resources to fix up finishes rather than addressing seriously deteriorated facility systems?

General VAN ANTWERP. The Army works very hard to get the most out of every facility sustainment dollar. The Army’s Installation Management Command (IMCOM) manages the facility sustainment program for the Army and has adequate oversight in place. For example, any repair project estimated over $3 million must be reviewed and approved by the Army Secretariat and any repair project over $7.5 million is reported to Congress before a project can be awarded.

As one of the organizations supported by the Corp of Engineers, it is my opinion that the U.S. Army Medical Command is not wasting scarce resources on finishes rather than addressing deteriorated systems within its medical facilities. The U.S. Army Medical Command has a rigorous system for prioritizing facilities for sustainment, repair, and modernization requirements to ensure that the Army’s medical facilities comply with the rigorous life-safety standards established by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO). The Army’s healthcare facilities consistently achieve high scores on JCAHO surveys which suggests the Medical Command’s Facility Management Program is making good use of scarce O&M resources.

33. Senator ENSIGN. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, the Army has already spent over $30,000 in the past 2 weeks to paint walls and patch holes in Building 18. They are also in the process of conducting an engineering survey of Building 18, which I am confident will result in the need to replace a failed roof, replace a leaking plumbing system, and upgrade an antiquated heating, air conditioning, and ventilation system—all the root causes of mold infestation which will again emerge on newly painted walls. So, who decided to spend money on drapes, carpet, and ceiling tiles while ignoring the basic problems of Building 18?
General Van Antwerp. The U.S. Army Medical Command receives separate funding for the construction, sustainment, restoration, and maintenance of medical facilities from the Defense Health Program. The decision to take immediate action to repair problems in Building 18 was directed by the Army. Funding was provided by the U.S. Army Medical Command.

The Corps of Engineers has developed, at the request of the U.S. Army Medical Command, a phased repair plan for Building 18. The Corps has already awarded a contract to replace the roof on Building 18, and is preparing to award the necessary contracts for interior repairs should the U.S. Army Medical Command decide it wants to continue to use Building 18 for housing soldiers in the future.

34. Senator Ensign. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, Congress provides O&M funds to the military Services with the understanding that these funds will be applied wisely by military leaders to address the most urgent requirements. I realize that public works for the Army falls under the Army's Installation Management Agency, but does the Commanding General of the Corps of Engineers—responsible for the programming and design of major facility repairs—have a responsibility to customers to provide expertise and counsel on the use of these funds?

General Van Antwerp. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is indeed responsible for providing planning, engineering, design, and construction expertise and counsel at the request of Army customers or other military Services. However, responsibility for the programming and approval of major facility repairs rests with the respective military Services. Specifically, for the Army, the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (OACSIM) plans and programs sustainment, restoration, and modernization requirements. The Corps works very closely with OACSIM on both O&M funded repair projects and MILCON funded projects to provide expertise and counsel on how to best use the funds allocated. Ultimately, OACSIM approves and prioritizes facilities for repair or construction and the Corps provides design and construction services to complete the repairs or new construction.

35. Senator Ensign. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, what policies does the Corps have in place, or do you propose, to ensure this expertise is provided?

General Van Antwerp. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has in place a major program to provide quality, responsive, and cost-effective installation support services for Army garrisons (to include the capability to provide expertise and counsel on facility repair projects). This program focuses on enhancing mission support capabilities, supplementing inherent technical capabilities, and extending manpower capacity at garrisons when needed. This support to garrisons is normally fully reimbursable, meaning the garrisons seek the Corps support when it is determined it is appropriate, and pays the Corps for providing the services.

Standard Corps engineering, design, and construction criteria and procedures are changed and adapted to IMCOM requirements when Corps of Engineer districts conduct garrison support work. Supporting districts comply with quality standards, including the Installation Design Guide, the Army Installation Design Standards, and maintenance and repair operational procedures. Health, life, safety, fire, or other statutory or regulatory requirements are not compromised. In the event of disagreement on the appropriateness of engineering and construction criteria or procedures for installation support work, the issue is raised through IMCOM channels and the Corps of Engineers district's channels for quick resolution.

If confirmed, I will continue to seek improvement in Corps of Engineers policies, processes, and procedures to optimize our support to installations worldwide.

36. Senator Ensign. Lieutenant General Van Antwerp, what can Congress do to ensure the military Services fix the problems as opposed to painting them over and wasting funds?

General Van Antwerp. I believe the Army has a strong program in place for making the most of scarce O&M funds in repairing and maintaining Army installations. However, in any process, improvements can always be made and I appreciate your willingness to help the Army in improving our processes. Congress can significantly help the Army improve our program by approving the legislative proposal, “Streamlining Military Construction to Reduce Facility Acquisition and Construction Cycle Time,” contained in the fiscal year 2008 budget request: (Section 2932, which would amend section 2805 of title 10).

This proposal would raise the following thresholds: O&M from $750,000 to $1.5 million; Unspecified Minor Construction from $1.5 million to $3 million; and Life-Health-Safety from $3 million to $7 million.
Increasing these cost limits would allow DOD to: (1) respond more effectively to urgent and unforeseen requirements with properly sized and scoped facilities; (2) reduce the recapitalization rate faster by allowing facility projects under $3 million to be funded from the unspecified minor MILCON account instead of the normal MILCON programming and budgeting process; and (3) allow the DOD health care community the same level of spending authority as the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), allowing DOD to easily partner with the VA on health care projects.

Additionally, providing annual authorization and appropriations prior to the start of the fiscal year allows Army installations to receive sustainment and construction funds when needed and allows the Army to execute its program in a more timely and efficient manner.

[Letter requested by the committee follows:]

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY ACCESSIONS COMMAND  
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL FOR INITIAL MILITARY TRAINING  
90 INGALLS ROAD, BUILDING 100  
FORT MONROE, VIRGINIA 23651-1045  

23 April 2007  

Honorable Carl Levin  
Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510  

Dear Senator Levin:  

During the 19 April Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the Department of Defense’s management of costs under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Programs, you and Senator Warner requested that I provide an assurance that, if confirmed, I would look into the removal of Ms. Greenhouse from her Senior Executive Service position as the Principal Assistant for Contracting at the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.

My understanding is that Ms. Greenhouse has filed an action in U.S. District Court. If I am confirmed, I will undertake a review of this matter. I also will ask the Army’s attorneys to take a hard look at the record to ensure that the Government’s positions are supported by the facts and consistent with applicable law and regulations.

Additionally, I would like to emphasize my support for the Army’s Equal Employment Opportunity program and my commitment to the goals and ideals of the Whistleblower Protection Act. I believe that, if confirmed as the Chief of Engineers, my duty will be to ensure that employees are treated fairly and in accordance with all laws and regulations. I assure this Committee that I will take that duty very seriously.

Sincerely,

R. L. Van Antwerp  
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army  
Commanding  

[The nomination reference of LTG Robert L. Van Antwerp, Jr., USA, follows:]
Nomination Reference and Report

As in Executive Session,

Senate of the United States,


Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for appointment as the Chief of Engineers/Commanding General, United States Army Corps of Engineers, and appointment to the grade indicated in the United States Army, while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 601 and 3036:

To be Lieutenant General

LTG Robert L. Van Antwerp, Jr., 8468.

[The biographical sketch of LTG Robert L. Van Antwerp, Jr., USA, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of LTG Robert L. Van Antwerp, Jr., USA

Source of commissioned service: USMA.

Military schools attended:
- Engineer Officer Basic and Advanced Courses.
- United States Army Command and General Staff College.
- United States Army War College.

Educational degrees:
- United States Military Academy — BS — No Major.
- Long Island University — MBA — Business Administration.

Foreign languages: None recorded.

Promotions:

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<tr>
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Major duty assignments:

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<td>Feb. 73...Apr. 74</td>
<td>Platoon Leader, 76th Engineer Battalion, (Construction), Fort Meade, MD.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 74...Apr. 75</td>
<td>Aide-de-Camp to the Assistant Commandant, United States Army Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, VA.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 75...Dec. 75</td>
<td>Student, Engineer Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Engineer School, Fort Belvoir, VA.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 75...Jun. 76</td>
<td>Executive Officer, 65th Engineer Battalion, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, HI.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 76...Apr. 79</td>
<td>Assistant Division Engineer, 65th Engineer Battalion, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, HI.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 79...May 81</td>
<td>Student, Department of Mechanical Engineering and Applied Mechanics, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.</td>
<td></td>
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<td>May 81...Jun. 82</td>
<td>Instructor, Department of Mechanics, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY.</td>
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<td>Assistant Professor and Executive Officer, Department of Mechanics, United States Army Military Academy, West Point, NY.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun. 84...Jun. 85</td>
<td>Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun. 85...Jun. 87</td>
<td>Executive Officer, 84th Engineer Battalion, 45th General Support Group, Schofield Barracks, HI.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun. 87...Apr. 88</td>
<td>Chief, Military Engineering and Construction Division, United States Army Western Command, Fort Shafter, HI.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 88...Apr. 89</td>
<td>Executive Officer, Office of the Chief of Engineers, United States Army, Washington, DC.</td>
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From To Assignment

Apr. 89 ... Jun. 91 Commander, 326th Engineer Battalion, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, KY, and during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, Saudi Arabia.

Jun. 91 ... Jun. 92 Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

Jun. 92 ... Jun. 94 District Commander, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Los Angeles District, Los Angeles, CA.

Jul. 94 ... Jan. 95 Chief of Staff, United States Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, DC.

Jan. 95 ... Mar. 96 Executive Assistant to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC.

Mar. 96 ... Jul. 98 Commanding General, United States Army Division, South Atlantic, Atlanta, GA.

Jul. 98 ... Jan. 99 Director, Office of Competitive Sourcing, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research, Development, and Acquisition), Washington, DC.

Jan. 99 ... Jul. 02 Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, United States Army, Washington, DC.

Jun. 02 ... Sep. 04 Commanding General, United States Army Maneuver Support Center and Fort Leonard Wood/Commandant, United States Army Engineer School, Fort Leonard Wood, MO.

| Summary of joint assignments: Joint duty requirement waived due to promotion and projected utilization based primarily on scientific and technical skills. |
| Assignment | Dates | Rank |
| Executive Assistant to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC (Cumulative joint credit awarded) | Jan. 95–Jun. 96 | Colonel |

U.S. decorations and badges:
- Distinguished Service Medal
- Defense Superior Service Medal
- Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Bronze Star Medal
- Meritorious Service Medal (with four Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Army Achievement Medal
- Parachutist Badge
- Air Assault Badge
- Ranger Tab
- Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
- Army Staff Identification Badge

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Robert L. Van Antwerp, Jr., USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.
PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Robert L. Van Antwerp, Jr.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Chief of Engineers/Commanding General, United States Army Corps of Engineers.

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   January 27, 1950; Benton Harbor, MI.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Paula Eberly Van Antwerp.

7. Names and ages of children:
   CPT Jeffrey Van Antwerp, 31.
   CPT Lucas Van Antwerp, 29.
   Mrs. Julia Tobias, 27.
   Ms. Kathryn Van Antwerp, 24.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civil, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    - Society of American Military Engineers.
    - American Society of Civil Engineers.
    - Officers Christian Fellowship, Past President.
    - Great Dads, Past Chairman.
    - Association of the United States Army.

11. Honors and awards: List scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    None.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
    Yes, I agree.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
    Yes, I agree.

   [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

Robert L. Van Antwerp, Jr.

This 7th day of February, 2007.

[The nomination of LTG Robert L. Van Antwerp, Jr., USA, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 15, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on May 17, 2007.]
NOMINATIONS OF CLAUDE M. KICKLIGHTER TO BE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE; S. WARD CASSCELLS, M.D., TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS; AND WILLIAM C. OSTENDORFF TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

TUESDAY, MARCH 27, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Committee staff member present: Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Gabriella Eisen, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff member; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Benjamin L. Rubin.

Committee members’ assistants present: Darcie Tokiola, assistant to Senator Akaka; Eric Pierce and Benjamin Rinaker, assistants to Senator Ben Nelson; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Jason D. Raunch, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Jeremy Shull, assistant to
Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee meets today to consider the nominations of James R. Clapper, Jr., to be Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; Claude M. Kicklighter, to be Inspector General (IG) of the Department of Defense (DOD); S. Ward Casscells, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs; and William C. Ostendorff, to be Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

We welcome our nominees and their families to today’s hearing. We know the long hours that senior DOD officials put in every day. We appreciate the sacrifices that our nominees are willing to make to serve their country. We know that they are not going to be alone in making these sacrifices, so we, in advance, thank the family members of our nominees for the support and the assistance that we know that they are going to need to provide.

Each of our nominees will be called upon, if confirmed, to make important contributions to our national defense.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence carries the heavy responsibility of ensuring that military forces and policymakers receive objective and accurate intelligence information and assessments. The Under Secretary for Intelligence is also responsible for oversight of DOD intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning that is the policy—and is, in addition to all that, the policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense on DOD intelligence interrogations.

The DOD IG is responsible for keeping the rest of DOD honest through independent review of the activities of the Department and the conduct of senior officials. IG audits and investigations have addressed a series of controversial and important issues in recent years, from the Air Force tanker lease to the intelligence activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy prior to the Iraq war. This is a position which demands the highest standards of ethics and independence.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs is responsible for the health care of military personnel, including Active-Duty, National Guard, Reserve, and retired personnel, and their families. The care provided, from the battlefield through intermediary facilities in Germany to our premier medical facilities in the United States, has been extraordinary, saving the lives of troops with grievous wounds who would not have survived in prior conflicts. On the other hand, recent revelations at Walter Reed make it clear that we have a long way to go with regard to the care and treatment of these wounded warriors, particularly when they move from inpatient to outpatient status, and that care for mental health issues and traumatic brain injury must be significantly enhanced.

Finally, the position of Administrator of NNSA is currently vacant, so the Principal Deputy Administrator, if confirmed, will act as Acting Administrator. The NNSA faces many challenges, including maintaining adequate security at NNSA sites, ensuring that
workers have a safe environment in which to work, managing projects to be on time and on budget, and ensuring that both the nonproliferation and the weapons programs are executed efficiently.

These are all extremely important positions that we're considering this morning, and they merit the attention which this committee is going to be giving to them.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that we allow our two colleagues from the Senate and our distinguished good colleague from the House of Representatives, Representative Everett—he is the ranking member on the Strategic Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, and you and I have dealt with him many times in the course of conferences—go ahead and then I'll say a few words, following them.

Chairman LEVIN. That's a very fine idea. We thank you for that, Senator Warner.

Now, Senator Akaka, whenever he comes in, if our colleagues would excuse this interruption in their introductions, we would call on Senator Akaka, who has to chair his Veterans Affairs Committee hearing this morning. So, we may be interrupting you, or interfering with the flow of events here.

Senator Hutchison, I think we'll call on you first to introduce Dr. Casscells.

Senator WARNER. I'd like to note that Senator Cornyn was also here with Senator Hutchison earlier this morning.

Chairman LEVIN. And still is.

Senator WARNER. Oh, he still is here. Excuse me, Senator.

Senator CORNYN. I'm still down here, Senator. Down here with the cheap seats. [Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. We have a lot of players out there.

Chairman LEVIN. We will call upon Senator Cornyn after Senator Hutchison, if that's okay.

Senator Hutchison.

STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Senator Hutchison. Absolutely. Thank you, Senator Warner, for allowing me to go first. I certainly appreciate it.

I am always happy to introduce people to this committee, but this is a particularly special introduction because it's a true friend, someone who I have known, along with his family, for years. Today, I introduce Dr. Samuel W. Casscells—"Trip" Casscells—to the committee for his confirmation. I also want to acknowledge his wife, who is one of my friends also, and their three children—his wife, Roxanne, and their three children, Lily, Henry, and Sam. They are an incredible family. As Senator Levin said earlier, when someone volunteers for public service of the type that these four are going to do, their families make a sacrifice, too, and they have certainly been wonderful support for Dr. Casscells throughout his life.

Dr. Casscells has an incredible record of accomplishment. He graduated summa cum laude from Yale, and then magna cum laude from Harvard Medical School. He spent 6 years at the National Insti-
tutes of Health (NIH). He is one of America’s leading cardiologists. He's a distinguished professor at the University of Texas Health Science Center in Houston, and Associate Director for Cardiology Research at the world-famous Texas Heart Institute. He is the first civilian recipient of the Army’s Maxwell Thurman Award for his work in using new technologies to improve military emergency medicine.

When you look at his life as a whole, there is one overriding theme, and that is service to others. I recall the day that he came to my office, nearly 6 years ago, and told me that he had a very serious case of prostate cancer. His doctors had told him the prognosis might not be good, and told him to get his affairs in order. Like everyone else, I said, “Slow down, take care of yourself, and do everything you can to beat this.” He did not take my advice. He sped up. He kept on going and fought this cancer ferociously. At the same time, he continued his work in trying to protect the ports of Houston against terrorism, to use technology to improve emergency medical care for soldiers, to protect America from the avian flu, and studying the connections between flu and cardiovascular disease. While fighting for his life, he didn’t slow down a minute in his commitment to our country.

Then, the great news came. At the age of 53, he had defeated the cancer. So, he sped up and continued to do more.

His father served as a doctor in World War II. While cleaning out his father’s closet, he decided that it was time for him to serve as well. So, at the age of 53, with forces deployed to Iraq, he began a campaign to convince the Army that he should sign up for the Army Reserve and to try to go to Iraq, which is exactly what he did. He is now a colonel in the Army Reserve, and he went to Iraq for 3 months last year.

He is now volunteering to take on another very tough job, and one that is very timely. But I think that because of his commitment and the experience and what he has shown he wants to do for our country, he is the perfect person for a very tough job to make sure that we are giving the quality medical care, in the field and after service, to our military personnel. I cannot think of a better person who can do that job.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hutchison, for your very eloquent and your very personal introduction. I know it makes a great deal of difference to Dr. Casscells and to us.

Senator Cornyn.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN CORNYN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I’d like to join Senator Hutchison in introducing Dr. Casscells to the committee. I won’t repeat the fascinating story of his life, really, and what brings him here today, except to say that, as a physician, and especially as a soldier, Dr. Casscells has proven his commitment to not only health care, generally, and improving it for all Americans, but particularly for improving health care services for the men and women serving in the Armed Forces.
As you noted, Mr. Chairman, the recent revelations of outpatient care at Walter Reed have caused all of us to raise some very important questions and to look for ways that we can improve what is already largely a very good record of health care for our military, how we can help them cut red tape and improve their transition—particularly seriously wounded warriors from the DOD health care system to the Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA)—with a minimum of delay and red tape, as I say. I think that Dr. Casscells will be uniquely qualified to help us as we work through that process.

I’m pleased to commend him to the committee, and hope, along with Senator Hutchison, that his nomination is voted out promptly to the floor and by the Senate so he can get to work.

Thank you very much.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn.

Representative Everett, we’re delighted to have you here to introduce our next nominee.

STATEMENT OF HON. TERRY EVERETT, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE STATE OF ALABAMA

Mr. Everett. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and members of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

I certainly appreciate the opportunity to introduce a man who’s shown great loyalty and served this Nation for many years. He’s a man of high character and integrity. It is my hope that this panel will confirm Bill Ostendorff as the next Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration.

Since 2003, Bill has served as the staff director for Strategic Forces Subcommittee, which I chaired for 4 years and am now the ranking member. In working with Bill over the last 3½ years, he’s become one of my closest advisors, due to his professionalism and comprehensive understanding of some of the most challenging issues facing the Departments of Defense and Energy.

After graduating in 1976 from the U.S. Naval Academy with a bachelor’s of science degree in system engineering, he served on six different submarines. Bill displayed tremendous leadership when he commanded the attack submarine U.S.S. Norfolk. In 1993, he led the U.S.S. Norfolk on the Mediterranean deployment with the Roosevelt battle group. Bill’s ship was recognized by the commander of Submarine Force Atlantic as having achieved the greatest improvement in combat readiness among the 53 attack submarines in the Atlantic Fleet in 1993, and was awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation by the Secretary of the Navy. In 1995, he was recognized by the Commander of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet as a finalist for the Vice Admiral James Stockdale Award for Inspirational Leadership in Command. During his tour of duty he received four awards of the Legion of Merit and other numerous campaign and unit awards. In 1996, due to a large part of his outstanding service at sea, Bill brought his expertise to the classroom to train submarine commanders as the Director of the Submarine Force Atlantic Commanding Officer School. He then served as Director of the Division of Mathematics and Science at the United States Naval Academy from 1999 to 2002, at which point he retired from the Navy as a captain.
Perhaps the only thing that could rival Bill’s service to his country is his devotion to his family. His wife, Chris, and his three children, Becky, Chuck, and Jeff, have enjoyed his constant love and support. I’m pleased that Chris and Becky are here with us today. It is without prejudice that I sit before you today and introduce to you who I hope will be the next Deputy Administrator of NNSA, Bill Ostendorff.

Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Congressman Everett, very much.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On behalf of the ranking member, Senator McCain, I ask unanimous consent that his statement appear following your statement.

Chairman LEVIN. It will, indeed.

I’ll now place the opening statement of Senator McCain into the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Thank you, Senator Levin. I join you in welcoming General Clapper, General Kicklighter, Doctor Casscells, and Mr. Ostendorff and their families. I congratulate them on their nominations, and thank them for their willingness to serve in these important positions.

General Clapper, as Senator Levin indicated, you had a very distinguished career in the Air Force, culminating in your assignment as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency from 1991 to 1995. After retirement, you returned to the Intelligence Community, serving as Director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency from 2001 through 2006. We appreciate your willingness to serve in this critically important position as the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Obviously, the attacks of September 11 were a massive intelligence failure. As the fight continues in Iraq and Afghanistan, no one underestimates the role that rapid, accurate, and detailed intelligence plays in combat operations. In addition, if you are confirmed, you will be asked, in concert with Admiral John McConnell, to continue efforts to change and reform the Department of Defense components of the national intelligence enterprise. In your responses to the committee’s advance policy questions, you wrote that “neither the Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence nor the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence are organized optimally to promote efficient collaboration and coordination.” You will be asked to expand on that comment. It may be the most critical aspect of intelligence reform.

General Kicklighter, welcome, and thank you for accepting the challenge of serving as the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General (IG). I want to underscore the importance of the DOD IG’s functions and urge you, if you are confirmed, to consider this appointment as a mandate to strengthen the independence and effectiveness of that office. The Office of the DOD IG has contributed positively in the past to acquisition reform, and, if confirmed you need to continue that positive record of curtailing abuses in acquisition and in providing timely, well-documented investigations in situations in which the Services cannot be looked to for an independent, objective inquiry. You have a wealth of experience from your service as a senior commander in the Army, as an Assistant Secretary of Veterans Affairs, and as a Special Assistant to the Secretaries of Defense and State in planning the establishment of the new U.S. Mission in Baghdad and are well-qualified for this important position.

Doctor Casscells, thank you for your willingness to serve as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. I won’t attempt to list your extraordinary accomplishments today, but I do want to acknowledge your decision to seek and accept a commission in the Army Reserve in 2005 and your active-duty deployments following Hurricane Katrina to assist in relief efforts and again from August through December 2006 in Iraq serving as liaison to Ambassador Khalilzad.

As Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, you will be confronted with some very difficult challenges including how to maintain high quality health care, at home and on the battlefield, while being challenged to achieve greater efficiencies. Solutions to the problems we have seen at Walter Reed in outpatient care must be identified and implemented.
Mr. Ostendorff, congratulations on your nomination to become the Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The NNSA was established in the aftermath of continued security lapses at the Department of Energy’s (DOE) nuclear weapons laboratories, and what appeared to be an indifferent attitude on the part of DOE towards the safety of its own workers and the reliable operation of its own facilities. It is now 7 years later, and the serious security lapses that occurred at Los Alamos just last fall suggest that NNSA has not yet succeeded in creating the culture and discipline around these national security missions that the act had intended to foster.

If confirmed by the Senate, you will confront a variety of management and operational challenges. You have an impressive background of accomplishments in the Navy, however, and I know you will bring great energy and commitment to the task. I look forward to hearing your views of what is working, what is not, and how you would tackle these challenges head on if confirmed.

I thank each of our nominees for their service and look forward to their testimony today.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator WARNER. In order to achieve brevity here in this proceeding this morning, I'll just briefly comment.

First, General Kicklighter, I thank you for stepping up, once again. What an extraordinary career and a wealth of wisdom and experience that you bring to this job of IG. You have to fight hard, and there will be times when you will be in an adversarial position with some of your former colleagues and respected peer groups in the military, but that’s the job that you understood and that you’ll take on.

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. We have a magnificent, I think, Secretary of Defense now, in Bob Gates, and he will look to you, as will the Deputy and others in that Department for fair, objective, and independent analysis of some of the very difficult decisions that the Department from time to time must make.

I'll say a few words for you, Dr. Casscells, that my father also served as a military doctor in World War I, and I know the pride that you take in your father’s service, as I took very humbly in my father’s service. I’m not sure that, in all the years I’ve been here, I’ve known of a 53-year-old individual volunteer to enter the military service, but that may be one of the first around here. But well done to you.

How was boot camp, by the way? [Laughter.]

With that marvelous family of yours that has given you support, you’ll do just fine in this new position.

I also would say that we’ve spent some time here on this committee with the problems, as Senator Cornyn said, associated with Walter Reed. You’ll be thrust into the center of that situation. Just for what it’s worth, I strongly believe that we should focus our attention on accelerating the funding of the new parts to go into Bethesda, and, likewise, the new hospital that has been planned for many years to go at Fort Belvoir. Those two bricks-and-mortar programs could move together very quickly, and then eventually the fate of this historic institution, Walter Reed, can be decided.

At this time, I would hope we do not try to amend the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) law because that would break a precedent. Senator Levin and I have been on this committee for 29 years. We have handled all five of the BRAC pieces of legislation. To my knowledge, we’ve never amended the law. I think it’s in our
interest to maintain the integrity of that process, but, at the same time, recognize that, when the time comes for the transition, assuming it does take place, to the newer institutions at Bethesda and Belvoir, decisions can be made with regard to that property. It may well be that the Veterans Administration might wish to pick it up for one of their institutions.

To you, Skipper, well done. I think Admiral Rickover would be very pleased to know that you're here today, carrying on the institution and the training that he brought forth in your specialized career in the United States Navy. Well done, and thank you, to you and your family, stepping up for public service.

I see our colleague here. Why doesn't he proceed, and then I'll say a few words.

Chairman LEVIN. That would be great, thank you.

Senator Akaka.

Senator AKAKA. Thank you, Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Due to my chairing another hearing scheduled at this same time, I appreciate you and other members of this committee, Mr. Chairman, agreeing to accommodate my request to introduce Lieutenant General Mick Kicklighter.

Mr. Chairman, it's a great honor for me today to present to you and the distinguished members of this committee the President's nominee to be the next Inspector General of the Department of Defense, General Mick Kicklighter.

General Kicklighter is one of our Nation's most precious kind of resources, a public servant who has dedicated his life in service to our country. He has personally provided our Nation with over 50 years of combined military and public service. Following his retirement from the Army in 1991, after a distinguished 35-year military career, he continued to answer the call of duty to service to our country in various civilian positions wherever his leadership was needed.

I met General Kicklighter through my brother, Reverend Dr. Abraham Akaka, pastor of Kawaiahao Church, known as the Westminster Abbey of Hawaii. We became close and personal friends with General Mick Kicklighter and his wife, Elizabeth, who's here today, and also the family, since he commanded the 25th Infantry Division at Schofield Barracks in Hawaii from 1984 to 1986. From that time, I have always known him to be an honorable and selfless public servant who has always sought opportunities to serve our great country.

General Kicklighter's accomplishments are many. I will not go through all of them here, but I would like to note some of the highlights.

As a public servant, he has served in a number of positions in the Departments of State, Defense, and Veterans Affairs. Most recently, he led, at the request of Secretaries of State and Defense, the establishment of the Iraq/Afghanistan Joint Transition Planning Group, a joint Department of State and DOD team that provides analysis and recommendations for coordinating efforts to address transition challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In prior assignments, he served as the Chief of Staff for the VA; Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of State for Stabilization...
and Security Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; Director of DOD's Iraq Transition Team; and Assistant Secretary for Policy, Planning, and Preparedness in the VA. He also served 5 years on the board of directors for Habitat for Humanity International, 3 of which were as chairman.

But, Mr. Chairman, Mick Kicklighter's public service is not even half of the story. As a member of our armed services for 35 years, General Kicklighter served as a leader in all levels of military, from platoon to theater command, completing his career as Commander of the U.S. Army Pacific. He also held senior-level staff assignments with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of the Army. A combat veteran, General Kicklighter served two tours in Vietnam.

His list of awards is as long as his service to our country. He has been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal three times, the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit four times, the Bronze Star, the Meritorious Service Medal twice, as well as a number of foreign decorations.

As a civilian, he has been awarded the Presidential Citizen Medal, the Eisenhower Liberation Medal, the Decoration for Exceptional Civilian Service, and has twice been awarded the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service.

Mr. Chairman, I believe, if confirmed by the Senate, that Mick Kicklighter will continue to give our country the high-quality service and dedication that have been characteristic of his service throughout his entire career, during which he was supported by his wife, Elizabeth.

I would like to thank you, Elizabeth, and your family, for all you have given and sacrificed for our country.

At this time, I would like to welcome General Kicklighter to this committee.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to introduce my close and personal friend, General Mick Kicklighter.

Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Akaka, thank you so much.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have the privilege of introducing General Clapper. I believe I had that privilege once before, and I'll mention that in his long, distinguished career of over 4 decades involved in the Intelligence Community, it's remarkable all the experience that you've had in this area.

I also note that he served as a senior intelligence officer for the U.S. Forces in Korea, the U.S. Pacific Command, and then Strategic Air Command. He was the Air Force Chief of Staff for Intelligence at Headquarters, U.S. Air Force Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. In 1991, General Clapper was nominated to serve as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, when I first had the occasion to meet him and work through a confirmation process at that time.

He served honorably in that position for 4 years, during the ever-shifting period following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Together with other members of this committee, I worked closely with the General and
others to ensure our intelligence forces would not be cut too steep-
ly. Clearly, we saw our intelligence forces as the first line of de-
fense and a force multiplier. We saw the necessity of maintaining
a robust and capable intelligence effort.

More recently, the General served as head of the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) retiring from that position in
2006. At NGA, he led the continuing transformation from the Na-
tional Imagery and Mapping Agency from its legacy missions to be-
come the leading agency for the creation and exploitation of
geospatial intelligence.

Under General Clapper’s leadership, the NGA routinely provided
global intelligence and information security services to the White
House, Cabinet officials, and Congress, in addition to a broad array
of military, civil, and intelligence customers.

General Clapper was also one of the first senior officials in the
U.S. Government to identify geospatial intelligence as major strate-
gic issues in our increasingly imagery-dependent intelligence oper-
ations.

I’ll put into the record his long achievements in the private sec-
tor and the many awards and distinctions that this famous man
has received.

I congratulate you, General, and thank you for once again step-
ing up to public service with the support of your family.

At this time, perhaps you’d take a moment to introduce your
family.

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir.

I’m pleased and proud to do so. First, my wife, Sue, of 42 years,
herself a former National Security Agency employee; our daughter,
Jen, who’s an elementary school principal in Fairfax; her husband,
Jay, who’s a high-school teacher; our oldest grandson, Ryan; and
our granddaughter, Erin. I also have a son and daughter-in-law,
who are also schoolteachers, with two boys, who live outside of Ro-
anoke, VA.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

General CLAPPER. Obviously, I’m very proud of them, and
couldn’t contemplate this without their support.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

One question, General, before I proceed. I understand you start-
ed your distinguished career in the United States Marine Corps.

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. It concerns me how that departure occurred
and the Air Force got you. Would you please clarify that for the
record?

General CLAPPER. Sir, I’m very proud of that, and proud to note
that both Senators from my home State of Virginia, Senators War-
ner and Webb, and I all served in the Marine Corps. I’m a proud
graduate of the Platoon Leader Course, Quantico—spent a wonder-
ful summer at Quantico Marine Corps Station, way back in 1961.
My family still reminds me I never got over it. I elected to move
to the Air Force, since I grew up in the intelligence business, as
sort of the family business, and I had more opportunities to pursue
that line of work in the Air Force.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.
Senator WARNER. You’re not suggesting the Marines in any way fail to have a high intelligence quotient.

General CLAPPER. Absolutely not, sir. [Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much. I want that clear for the record.

General CLAPPER. I’m pleased and proud, sir, to be a straight man for you anytime. [Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. That’s right. Perhaps the others could introduce their families?

Chairman LEVIN. They will. As we call on them for their testimony, they could do that, at that time.

First let me proceed, though, with the standard questions which we ask all of our witnesses, and we’ll ask all of you at one time.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

General KICKLIGHTER. I have.

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir.

Dr. CASSCELLS. Yes, sir.

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

General KICKLIGHTER. No, sir.

General CLAPPER. No, sir.

Dr. CASSCELLS. No, sir.

Mr. OSTENDORFF. No, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir.

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir.

Dr. CASSCELLS. Yes, sir.

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir.

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir.

Dr. CASSCELLS. Yes, sir.

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir.

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir.

Dr. CASSCELLS. Yes, sir.

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify, upon request, before this committee?

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir.

General CLAPPER. Yes, sir.

Dr. CASSCELLS. Yes, sir.

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to give your personal views, when asked before this committee to do so, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner, when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

General Kicklighter. Yes, sir.

General Clapper. Yes, sir.

Dr. Casscells. Yes, sir.

Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Let us, again, invite you to introduce your families as we call upon you. I think we'll just go in order, from left to right here.

General Kicklighter, let's start with you.

STATEMENT OF LTG CLAUDE M. KICKLIGHTER, USA, (RET.), TO BE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

General Kicklighter. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. To the distinguished members of this committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear here today.

I'd also like to thank Senator Akaka, who took time away from chairing the Veterans Affairs Committee to come and introduce me.

My thanks also to President Bush for nominating me for this very important position. Also a special thanks to Secretary Gates for his support.

I'd like to introduce my college sweetheart, who's been my wife for the past 52 years, Betty. She is truly the wind beneath my wings, the toughest critic I have, and also the strongest supporter, the love of my life. I thank Betty also for three wonderful children, one of which is here, two could not be here, but, even more, five even more wonderful grandchildren.

I'd like to also introduce my son, Rick, and his wife, Yvonne, and I know that the other two children and their spouses are here in spirit, as well.

My military career actually began when I was a college student and I enlisted in the Army Reserves while also enrolled in the Reserve Officer Training Program on campus. I spent almost 2 years as an Army reservist, and was honorably discharged as a Sergeant E–5 when I graduated from college and was commissioned a 2nd Lieutenant.

I spent almost 36 years on active duty, and, as I was retiring, I was asked to plan and oversee the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of World War II, and assist our Nation in thanking and honoring the men and women, the Greatest Generation, who saved not only this Nation, but literally saved the world. This led to other jobs in the Departments of State, Defense, and Veterans Affairs, for accumulation of about 15 additional years.

This past December, when I was asked to consider being nominated for this position, which I knew as a very tough position, I was in Afghanistan, leading an assessment team for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Having been on the ground a number
of times in Iraq and Afghanistan with these magnificent men and women fighting this global war against terrorism, it is impossible for me not to want to do all I can to support this, another great generation of Americans.

If confirmed, I will bring leadership, management skills, and a broad-gauge approach to the Office of the Inspector General. There's no doubt there's much that I have to learn and relearn. But, if confirmed, I look forward to joining the IG family and together will continue to build the IG team that our troops, their families, the DOD, this Congress, and the American people have a right to expect. We will remain independent and objective, and we will keep the Secretary of Defense and Congress fully and currently informed.

Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman and the members of this committee, for giving me the opportunity to appear, and also to respond to your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General.

General Clapper.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR., USAF, (RET.), TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

General CLAPPER. Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, and distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, it is, indeed, an honor for me to appear before you today as the nominee to serve as the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

Being nominated for this position is, for me, an unexpected turn of events. When I left government, at the end of last September, after serving for almost 5 years as Director of NGA, I was convinced that was absolutely the end of my government service. But when Secretary Robert Gates, for whom I have the highest respect, asked if I would be willing to serve again, in this position, I could not say no.

If I can leave one message with you today, it is this. My compelling motivation now is what it has been in every position in which I have served for over 43 years, not to do just what's best for a Service, agency, department, or Intelligence Community, it's do what's best for the Nation.

I regard the position of the Under Secretary of Intelligence in DOD as a sacred trust, particularly now, with so many of our magnificent men and women in uniform in harm's way in Iraq and Afghanistan. I served two combat tours during the Southeast Asian conflict, so I do know what it's like to get shot at, and I understand how intelligence can literally be a matter of life and death.

In the quarter century or so that I have dealt with Congress in various capacities, I've come to believe strongly in the need for congressional oversight particularly over intelligence activities, which, for obvious reasons, cannot be fully transparent to the public at large. That places, I think, an even greater burden on intelligence leaders to ensure that Congress is appropriately informed.

If confirmed, it would be my intention not to merely come to Capitol Hill when summoned, but, rather, to keep you informed and seek out and listen to your advice and counsel.

It's the highest distinction of my professional career to have been asked by Secretary Gates and to have been nominated by President
Bush for this extremely critical position, particularly at this difficult time.

This concludes my statement. I welcome your questions.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.

Dr. Casscells.

STATEMENT OF S. WARD CASSCELLS, M.D., TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS

Dr. Casscells. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity today. I am honored to be here to answer your questions and to learn from you.

This is, for me, the honor of a lifetime, and I take it very seriously, as someone who is just back from the conflict and who lost friends there, and who, himself, was a patient there and a doctor there. So, this position is a position of enormous personal significance to me, and you can be sure that, if confirmed, I will work closely with you. While I have a lot to learn, I will give it everything I have.

Mr. Chairman, if I may take the liberty of introducing these four redheads who mean the world to me, my wife, Roxanne; my son, Sam; my daughter, Lily; and my son, Henry. This will, if we are confirmed, be a big move for us, and they are well aware that this will be a cut in their allowance. So, this is something I thank them for, for their support, and I'd look forward to you——

Chairman Levin. They're all shaking their heads, saying that was not part of the deal. [Laughter.]

We'll have to negotiate that later, but you have all the Senators on your side, kids, on this one.

Dr. Casscells. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Doctor, very much.

Mr. Ostendorff.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. OSTENDORFF, TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Ostendorff. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and members of the committee, I'm honored to be considered as the President's nominee for the Principal Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration.

I'm grateful to President Bush and to Secretary Bodman for their confidence in me.

I want thank Congressman Everett for his very kind introduction today.

I'd also like to thank my family and introduce my wife, Chris, of 29 years, and my daughter, Becky, who is a law-school student down in Charlottesville. We have two sons who couldn't be here, one who is in college down at William and Mary, and another who is serving as a 2nd lieutenant with the 2nd Stryker Regiment, over in Vilseck, Germany. I also have my in-laws, Pat and Lee Miller, my dear sister-in-law, Karen Fales, and her husband, John, and their sons, Mark and Johnny. I'm very grateful for their support and encouragement over many years.
I’d like to thank this committee for their strong support of the NNSA mission. If confirmed, I’ll look forward to working closely with the members of this committee and the staff to carry out the duties and responsibilities of the Principal Deputy Administrator.

I’m excited about the opportunity, if confirmed, to serve in a senior leadership position. The core missions of maintaining the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile, providing safe propulsion for our Navy, and of reducing the global danger of weapons of mass destruction are absolutely critical. I am humbled by the importance of the task, and, if confirmed, commit to work tirelessly and professionally to execute these vitally important missions.

I’ve been privileged to serve my country in the past. Selected by Admiral Hyman Rickover back in 1975 to serve in the Navy’s Nuclear Propulsion Program, I served on six submarines, and had the honor of commanding the U.S.S. Norfolk and Submarine Squadron 6. I’m confident that my nuclear reactor and nuclear weapons operational background, as well as leadership experience, will serve me well, if confirmed.

My past 3 1/2 years as a counsel and staff director to the Strategic Forces Subcommittee on the House Armed Services Committee has given me the opportunity to work very extensively and closely with this committee and its staff, and has also instilled a deep appreciation for the role of congressional oversight of the executive branch.

The NNSA national security laboratory’s and production plant’s workforce, both Federal and civilian, comprise a vital national asset, one critical to our future national security. If confirmed, I intend to provide the strong leadership and management required for NNSA to continue to execute its national security missions.

If confirmed, I’ll also look forward to working with the members of this committee and its staff. I commit to you communications founded on integrity and responsiveness. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today and look forward to your questions.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. Ostendorff.

Again, we want to thank all the families for coming today. We know how important it is that you be here for these nominees. As a father and a grandfather, I particularly know how important it is for the younger kids to be here, what a boost that gives to our nominees.

Let’s have an 8-minute round, if that’s all right, Senator Warner, for our first round.

Let me start with you, General Kicklighter. The question of the IG’s independence is, of course, critically important to Congress, to the Nation, and not just to this committee, by the way; other committees that have responsibility relative to IGs look very closely and intensively at the operations of the IGs to be certain that there’s no intrusion on the independence and objectivity of the IGs.

In your response to pre-hearing questions, you stated that, if confirmed, you would fight to maintain the independence of the Office of Inspector General. We asked you a series of questions about the circumstances under which you thought it might be appropriate for senior DOD officials to request that the DOD IG not investigate a particular matter or not issue a report on a particular matter. Your response was that only the Secretary of Defense had the authority
to make such requests to the DOD IG, and that such authority exists only with regard to sensitive matters within the scope of section 8 of the Inspector General Act, and that the authority has never been exercised. Is that your understanding?

General Kicklighter. Yes, Mr. Chairman, that is my understanding.

Chairman Levin. You also stated that any such request outside of the authority given to the Secretary of Defense under section 8 would be inappropriate and that you would reject such a request and report it as a “particularly serious or flagrant problem, abuse, or deficiency,” under section 5(d) of the Inspector General Act. Is that correct?

General Kicklighter. That is correct, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you. Is it your understanding that the Secretary’s authority under section 8 is personal to the Secretary, and that it cannot be exercised informally by members of the Secretary’s staff or anyone else?

General Kicklighter. That is my understanding, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. You also indicated, in response to our pre-hearing questions, that it is appropriate for the IG to consult with officials in DOD before issuing an audit report “to ensure that the information in the report is factually accurate and to resolve or minimize disagreements, where appropriate.” Would you agree that that process must be transparent? In other words, that the report in the IG working papers should reflect the comments made by DOD officials and any changes that were made in response to those comments?

General Kicklighter. I would, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Relative to Walter Reed, deficiencies in housing and administration of injured soldiers, marines at Walter Reed, have focused attention on an overly bureaucratic, adversarial, and confusing physical disability evaluation system in DOD. The officials have testified that they’re committed to improving the system to make it easier and fairer to disabled servicemembers. In your view, what role should the DOD IG have in improving the DOD disability evaluation system?

General Kicklighter. Mr. Chairman, I don’t have knowledge of what skill sets and staff we have, but I certainly would strive to ensure we have the expertise we need to provide the oversight to ensure that system is working as it should and we’re taking care of those wounded men and women coming back off the battlefield. That would certainly be a very high priority.

Chairman Levin. Finally, General, at the request of the Armed Services Committee, the Office of Inspector General has provided us with copies of source documents from the IG’s review of the DOD-directed investigations of detainee abuse. We’ve requested source documents from the IG’s review of the activities of the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy prior to the war in Iraq. These documents have also been requested by the Select Committee on Intelligence. Will you pass along to the folks from the Department with whom you are now working that the commitment of the acting IG to provide those documents to the committee is important to us? We’ve, again, asked for these documents, and we
need to know when those documents would be presented to us. Would you ask your coordinator to get us that date?

General Kicklighter. Mr. Chairman, I will certainly pursue that and try to get you that date. If confirmed, I will pursue that as the IG.

[The information referred to follows:]

The requested source documents from the Inspector General’s review of the activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy prior to the war in Iraq were provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on March 30, 2007. The Acting Inspector General informed staff from the Senate Armed Services Committee of the transfer.

Chairman Levin. We hope that those documents are provided immediately.

General Kicklighter. I will certainly proceed down that line, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

General Clapper, under the DOD directives, the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence has primary responsibility for DOD intelligence, interrogations, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning, and serves as the policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense regarding intelligence interrogations. If confirmed, will you ensure that DOD interrogations comply with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the Detainee Treatment Act, and the Army Field Manual?

General Clapper. Absolutely. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

The Under Secretary is responsible for overseeing the production of substantive intelligence, on the one hand, and for ensuring that detainees are treated humanely, on the other hand. Is it right that we put both jobs in the hands of one official, or would it be better, in your view, to split them, for example, by having the Under Secretary for Policy to be responsible for policy regarding detainees?

General Clapper. Mr. Chairman, I actually haven’t considered that. I just think that though it would be difficult to split that oversight responsibility, since the two are so inextricably bound, so I guess my going-in position right now, sir, this would be my personal view, is that should remain the province of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

General, in your answers to the committee’s advance questions, you indicated that you thought a major challenge in the Intelligence Community is to “clarify roles and responsibilities in clandestine activities.” Can you explain what you meant by that?

General Clapper. Sir, for my own part, I think it is essential that there be clarity between covert operations, which is a term that is statutorily defined, has a specific purpose, to elicit change in the political, economic, military, or diplomatic behavior of a target. In that context, covert activities are normally not conducted, I don’t believe, by uniformed military forces.

As contrasted with clandestine activities, at least in my mind, the important distinction is that which is passive intelligence-collection, information-gathering, no matter how—which may be conducted, albeit true, under very risky, hazardous conditions. Of course, there is the connection between when you are doing clan-
destine collection as an enabler, in support of a covert activity. I believe that, to the maximum extent possible, there needs to be a line drawn from an oversight perspective, as well as a risk perspective. The important consideration here is whether if such an activity is revealed inadvertently, or an adversary nation, in which such an activity is being conducted, discovers it, that, in the case of military forces, the Government would have the option of acknowledging that, which then entitles those military forces proper treatment under Geneva Conventions, et cetera; whereas, that is not the case with covert activity as statutorily defined. That’s why I think there’s a distinction between activities conducted by DOD and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

Chairman Levin. Just to conclude that point, since my time is up, the Department has been ambiguous, at times—or ambivalent, at times—about how military personnel, who might be captured conducting clandestine operations, would be treated, and whether their military status would be acknowledged. You indicated there is an option of acknowledging them. My question, I guess, would be this. Should it generally not be the policy to acknowledge the status of military personnel in such a situation? Should that not be the going-in assumption?

General Clapper. Sir, obviously, you would prefer that—I'm speaking theoretically here, or hypothetically—the particular operation would not be revealed; but, if it is, I personally think it's better that you be in a position, and be prepared to, and have planned for, acknowledging the operation if it involves military personnel, the expectation is that they could be accorded treatment in accordance with the Geneva Convention. If you don't do that, then you put them in jeopardy for not being accorded those privileges.

Chairman Levin. It is the expectation of our military personnel, is it not, that they will have those protections if, in fact, they are captured or detained?

General Clapper. Yes, sir, I believe so.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Senator Warner.

Senator Warner. Thank you.

I'll yield to Senator Inhofe, and then I'll be here for the balance of the hearing.

Chairman Levin. Senator Inhofe.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Senator Warner. We're working on the other committee that you and I are privileged to serve on today, so I have to do some of those duties.

Let me start with you, General Clapper. When you first came into my office, I could tell I hit a sensitive note when I told you that, for so many years, I've been, in both the House and the Senate, concerned about the process for getting security clearances. We've seen the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports that talk about this, and so, it's like a lot of things in this system here in Washington. We all know it's wrong, we all know it doesn't work, we all know it's antiquated, we all know that there are new technologies that can be used, and we all express our concern, and then nothing's done. Is something going to be done?
General CLAPPER. Sir, it’s certainly my intent, in the time that I have—if I’m confirmed, I would have remaining to do something about a system that is an anachronism.

Senator INHOFE. Yes.

General CLAPPER. We basically do security clearances the same way we’ve done it since I first came in this business, 40-plus years ago. Having recently gone through this once again for this confirmation process—and I know I’ve spoken with Director McConnell about this; he feels the same way, having endured the same process—we absolutely have to do something to change direction.

Senator INHOFE. Yes.

General CLAPPER. I believe there is great potential in researching the social sciences for determining other ways of gauging the trustworthiness—and that’s really what this is about—the trustworthiness and reliability of people, other than pounding on people’s doors. I think if I am confirmed and I have the wherewithal to do that, I’d like to pursue research for that.

In the meantime, the position of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence does oversee the Defense Security Service, which clearly has management challenges of longstanding. It’s been explained to me, I think they have a good strategy for trying to get well, but it’s going to take money and attention.

Senator INHOFE. Yes, this is the information age. There are so many things that are automated. I can’t imagine anything, as you said, not changing in 40 years. So, what I would request of you—and you and I talked about this—there are a lot of technologies out there I’d like to have you exposed to, and I think you already have been, to some of them. But maybe in another, oh, let’s say, a couple of months, if we could have a conversation about this to see if there’s any progress being made—is that reasonable? We could kind of stay on top of this?

General CLAPPER. Absolutely, sir. I’d be pleased to do that, sir.

Senator INHOFE. Good. Good.

General CLAPPER. I appreciate your interest.

Senator INHOFE. All right. Good, thank you.

Mr. Ostendorff, you have a tough job ahead. I’ve been concerned about keeping the secrets—I was quite outspoken, back during the 1990s, when the energy labs were just opened up. They did away with color-coded badges because they said, “Well, that’s demeaning to people with a lesser clearance than others might have.” Background checks, wire-tapping, all these things, I just want no holds barred. I want to have security. I just want to know if you have any new ideas on implementing any new systems where we can keep our information secure.

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator, I’m aware, as I know you are, of the recent events at Los Alamos National Laboratory, associated with the loss of classified material.

Senator INHOFE. That’s specifically what I had in mind.

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes, sir. There have been several investigations by the Department of Energy IG and by other independent bodies, looking at those security practices, procedures, and compliance culture. I would commit, if confirmed, to taking a hard look at what is the Federal oversight force at the site doing to ensure that the security standards are being met, that there are rigorous
processes that are being followed, and would come back to the committee, and yourself, and provide you with feedback from that review.

Senator INHOFE. That’s good.

General Kicklighter, I have the greatest respect for Senator Akaka, but he dropped the ball in his introduction of you, and forgot to mention the most significant thing, and that is the fact that you were destined for greatness when you started your career at Fort Sill, OK.

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir.

Senator INHOFE. In your new relationship, I think you will be inundated with requests, not just, as the chairman said, you’ll be getting from the Secretary, but also Members are going to have requests. I would hope that you would keep in mind and evaluate these as they come in, because sometimes you’ll get legitimate requests, sometimes they’ll be politically inspired requests. I think you’re the person who can make those determinations and keep that in mind.

General KICKLIGHTER. Yes, sir, I certainly will.

Senator INHOFE. Good. Good.

Dr. Casscells, four redheads. I can’t believe that. [Laughter.]

That’s great. I understand that when you were over there, you were injured, so you kind of went through the process. We’ve all watched the television series M*A*S*H over the years. How similar was that to your experience?

Dr. CASSCELLS. Senator Inhofe, I wasn’t badly injured. It was a small injury, but it was just enough to get me into the system as a patient. We were coming back from visiting an Iraqi hospital, and the convoy had to swerve because of a tripwire in the road to avoid an improvised explosive device (IED). We went up on the curb, and I was thrown into the side of the Humvee and got a bloody elbow that got infected. I had that drained at the 10th Combat Support Hospital (CSH) in Baghdad. It gave me an interesting insight, because, as the major was draining my elbow, an Army captain who was a nurse came in and said, “Heads-up, everybody, we have three birds coming in with about six Iraqi victims, bad IEDs. Everybody who hasn’t given blood lately, roll up your sleeves.” Even though I was the senior health policy guy for the country, I didn’t realize that all the Iraqi blood transfusions came from our soldier volunteers. Then she caught sight of me and said to the major, “What’s that colonel doing here? Get him out in the hall. I need that bed.” [Laughter.]

Senator INHOFE. I think that answers the question.

Dr. CASSCELLS. But then, when I got back, I did face the bureaucracy that has been in the news lately, and that is very frustrating. If it’s frustrating for a colonel, you can imagine how frustrating it is for a sergeant or corporal, particularly if they’ve had a head injury or their family is 1,000 miles away and can’t be advocates for them. So, sir, we have to fix that and make it fair and fast.

Senator INHOFE. Yes. One of your biggest problems is going to be that you probably won’t have the resources that you think are really necessary to get this done. You’re going to have to be very inno-
vative. It's going to be difficult to take care of all the needs. But I know, with your background, you'll do a great job.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator McCaskill.

Senator McCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to speak to the new IG for probably most of my time. I have been trying to get a handle on the number of people that we currently employ in DOD to look over the shoulders of the way we're spending our money in DOD. I'm wondering if you have any idea of the total number of employees that are currently on the payroll in all of the auditing and investigation different parts of DOD.

General KICKLIGHTER. Senator, I do not have that data. I've certainly looked at the numbers that they have in the IG's office, but that's only a small portion of the numbers that go all across DOD. If I am confirmed as the IG, I would certainly dig into that for you and report back to you what those numbers are and what I think we may be getting as a return on our investment.

Senator MCCASKILL. I think it's close to 20,000 people, from best I can tell. That's a lot of people—20,000 people. Now, the interesting thing about it is, the organization chart is not pretty. You have the IG's office, which you, of course, will head; then you have defense contracting; then you have the IGs in each of the Services.

General KICKLIGHTER. Right.

Senator MCCASKILL. In each of those instances, there are performance audits being done, with the exception of the Defense Communications Agency (DCA). There are not performance audits there. Of course, understanding that performance audits—if any part of auditing could be called exciting, it's performance auditing; and I'm kind of one those weirdos that thinks it's all exciting. But the number of performance audits that are done—one of my concerns is, who's consuming these products? Could you tell me your view on—you've been in the military a long time—how many IG reports have you read since you have been in the military?

General KICKLIGHTER. I can tell you that each time I was in a command position or a management position and the IG wrote a report, I read it very carefully. I think, generally speaking, that the IG reports are considered very seriously at very high levels. I would hope that's true. I certainly would look into that.

Senator MCCASKILL. I'm curious about the audit products from the other IGs, because I think they would, obviously, be instructive, regardless of which Service you're in. I'm wondering who consumes those, the ones that are produced by the IG in the Army, the IG in the Marine Corps, the IG in the Navy, and the IG in the Air Force.

General KICKLIGHTER. I am certainly not an expert in that arena right now, but I think one of the responsibilities of the DOD IG's office is to provide oversight for all of the audits, to make sure that, to the extent possible, you're not duplicating and overlapping, and, also, you're not leaving a lot of gaps out there that nobody's looking at. So, what I believe you have to do—and I certainly have a lot to learn in this arena, and I know you know an awful lot in this
area—is that we have to look at that to make sure it is an integrated effort and we are using that data, to the best of our ability and not wasting resources.

Senator McCaskill. I have looked into how many Antideficiency Act (ADA) violations have actually been punished in DOD, and the ADA obviously is just one of the tools, but a very important tool to get in contracting abuses as it relates to spending money you shouldn’t be spending, spending it in ways you’re not supposed to be spending it, and spending it when you’re not supposed to be spending it.

General Kicklighter. It is very important.

In fiscal year 2005, there were seven ADA violations that resulted in punishment. Seven. Billions and billions and billions of dollars and 20,000 auditors and investigators, and we got 7 cases that resulted in punishment. In fiscal year 2006, there were nine.

Now, part of the problem here is, of course, that the military wants what they want when they want it, and, for all the right reasons, they believe the purposes for which they want it is noble. I can’t imagine the amount of money we’re spending looking into ADA violations, because when you look at the process by which these are looked into, it involves hundreds of people. I mean, first somebody has to look at it, and then somebody else looks at it, and then somebody else looks at it, and then there’s an opportunity to correct it. If the money is there—this is what I think a lot of people don’t understand, that the ADA violations, when it’s discovered, if you can go back and find the money that is appropriate to spend on that, it’s like “no harm, no foul.” It’s as if you didn’t do anything wrong. Now, that’s not exactly how we deter behavior.

I’d like your view on how we get accountability. I mean, DOD has been on the high-risk list for GAO since 1990. There’s a sense that everybody kind of throws up their hands and says we’re not going to do any better, this is just the way it is. I’d like your commitment today. There’s the realization that in government you don’t have bottom-line pressure, it’s not as if there is an issue of profit or not-profit. That’s the discipline in the private sector. In government, the discipline is the rules and whether or not people are held accountable. I would like your view on this ADA process and how in the world we are ever going to deter behavior if we are coming up with fewer than 10 people a year that are punished for violating that law.

General Kicklighter. Senator, let me respond to that. I certainly agree with your comments.

I really don’t feel qualified to give you an answer today, but I’d like to get back to you on the antideficiency violation. I think the things that you pointed out that are occurring internally, I think the fact that we are doing so many things with other Federal agencies, also have problems with antideficiency violations when we’re exchanging funds between Federal agencies.

Senator McCaskill. Right. Interagency contracts. That’s a whole problem.

General Kicklighter. Yes. But if you would allow me—if confirmed, I would very much like to look into this in great detail, because I think your points are extremely valuable, and I’d like permission to come back and report back to you on this.
Senator McCaskill. That would be great. Thank you very much. Doctor, I certainly am impressed with your background and your experience. I'm wondering how you feel about going into a job where your primary frustration isn't going to be your skill as a doctor; your primary frustration is going to be how you begin to get a handle on a system where things are so complicated. I will tell you that one of the soldiers I talked to at Walter Reed, his narrative summary, which, as you are aware, is very important to these soldiers that have been wounded, because it really sets almost in stone, how they're going to be treated, then, whether they'll remain on active duty or whether they're going to be retired, militarily, or whether they're going to be transitioned to VA. It took his narrative summary 2 1/2 weeks to go across the hall after the doctor had done it—literally 2 1/2 weeks, literally across the hall. I would like your view on what kind of tenacity do you bring to this, in terms of arm-wrestling the reality that these systems have become so bogged down with paper. There is technology, by the way, that's other places in the military where a soldier can pull up his record on any computer in the world, but the medical part, the part that really is causing the stress in these soldiers' families about how they're going to be treated the rest of their lives. It's very difficult for them to get information in a way that would reflect the fact that we're in 2007.

Dr. Casscells. Senator McCaskill, your points are very well taken, and I have a major awareness that I will need a lot of help, including this committee's help, in getting things done that actually cut outside the lane of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health, because these problems do involve a very inefficient and, to some extent, unfair disability determination system, a very complex health care system that has numerous controversial issues in it. The latter, I am more comfortable with.

I will say that the directions that Dr. Winkenwerder has been heading and pushing for an electronic medical record, numerous efforts to improve efficiency and accountability, are things that I would, if confirmed, naturally want to accelerate, if that can be done. I don't know whether they're at top speed or not. I do know that when I was in Iraq, it amused me to look up my record on Army Knowledge Online, one of our Web sites, and to find that my deployment status was amber, which means I was not fit to be deployed, and yet, there I was. So, clearly there are issues like that.

We have primarily a paper record. There are errors in paper records. There are so many questions that are being addressed now by these various task forces and hearings that are going on that one would want to wait and study them carefully, if confirmed, because, to date, I just know what I've read in the papers. I've driven by the Armed Forces Retirement Home, walked around there, same with Building 18. I've called the Soldier Hotline, the 800 Hotline. It's clear that the military is taking this very seriously. I've read the President's statement, and Secretary Gates and Acting Army Secretary Pete Geren, and it sounds like there's a lot of support for improving things to take a system which is very good and make it absolutely superb.

Senator McCaskill. Thank you all for your service. I appreciate it very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.

Just on that one point of interagency contracts, talking to my staff back here, we, back in the early 1990s, with a little subcommittee over at what was then called the Governmental Affairs, now the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, got into what we then called "offloading," which is the same thing as "interagency contracts." The best estimate we can get is that there's probably 10 to 20 times more money funneled through those contracts now, minimally, than was then. There's been legislation that's been adopted to try to stop it. We're going to review more legislation. I think there's been two hearings now, in a subcommittee of this committee, on these interagency contracts. The opportunity for abuse is real, there's no accountability, there's very little oversight, and there's no competition, frequently. But Senator McCaskill's interest and passion in this area is going to help us get over the goal line. We very much thank you for your interest in these issues which are very dry sometimes. It's very few Senators, frankly, that are willing to really sink their teeth into these issues; and so, your willingness to do so with such gusto, I must tell you, is really a terrific boost.

Senator McCaskill. You should know, Mr. Chairman, I visited the temporary building, the Army Materiel Command at Fort Belvoir, yesterday, so I'll be anxious to share with you how temporary it felt. It was the one that's 230,000 square feet.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator.

Senator McCaskill. You're welcome.

Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

To follow on our distinguished colleague's questions to Dr. Casscells, you mentioned his primary management skills would be heavy, but, in my conversations with the good doctor, he assured me that he's going to do a little hands-on medicine while he's in this position, not unlike our distinguished former majority leader, Bill Frist, would intermittently leave the Senate, put the frustration of the Senate behind him, and go out and do heart operations. I always admired him for that.

I hope that these management burdens—you'll handle it, but, at the same time, keep your skills up, and a little hands-on medicine, I think, is good for the heart and the soul, and to show the troops that you still know how to do it.

The TRICARE program, something that this committee has taken great pride in—and you noted in one of your replies to the committee's advance questions, that one of the TRICARE strengths is that it is very inexpensive for the beneficiary, compared to other health care plans. "This statement may well be inconsistent with the views of senior leaders in the Department who have described TRICARE as unsustainable in its present form." So, therein rests a challenge for you to sort that out. I don't presume, at this point in time, that you can give us a great deal of insight into how you would treat TRICARE, but it's viewed by the men and women of the Armed Forces and their families as a very essential part of the contract America makes with these families when they undertake
their role in the military. So, I hope you give us your assurances you’ll do the best you can to strengthen that program.

Dr. CASSCELLS. Yes, sir. Senator Warner, I share your concern. If I understand you correctly, sir, that increasing copays and deductibles, particularly at this time, run the risk of making it harder for us to recruit and retain the very best, because people value enormously the health care given in the military. They are willing to sleep in tents, on cots, they don’t demand the writs, but they would like, and deserve, the very best medical care. This is true for their families, and their budgets are lean. I know that the copays and the deductibles have been flat for 12 or 13 years, and there’s understandable interest in raising them, because the private sector is raising theirs, to decrease utilization. But, sir, there are other efficiencies which can be sought. As Dr. Winkenwerder has told this committee, and told us, as soldiers, the more we get involved in our care, taking ownership of our care as patients, the more we utilize electronic records, the more we utilize disease management tools, Web-based discussion groups, confidential chat groups, the more people help themselves and help each other—these are often low-cost opportunities for savings and health.

Finally, sir, I think, as part of our pay-for-performance, we need to include pay-for-prevention. It has to be possible to incentivize people better to engage in prevention for themselves and to incentivize caregivers.

Senator WARNER. I think that’s a point well taken.

Moving on to another mission—and maybe you haven’t really had this brought to your attention fully, but the recruiting and retention of doctors, nurses, dentists, and other health care professionals is a source of great concern, and we must keep the best and the finest in the ranks of the uniform; at the same time, acquire, where necessary, civilians to work under a contract arrangement in our medical system. As one of the heads of personnel put it, we are failing in these areas right now. I hope that you can put this as one of your top priorities. You have an impressive career in the civilian sector, and a strong basis of knowledge about military medicine, and you have to go out and get the finest and the brightest to keep the ranks filled.

In that context, two things. We, here in Congress, years ago—as a matter of fact, I was in DOD when the very eminent Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, had the idea to establish our own medical college. That’s been done, the Uniformed Services University of the Health Care Sciences. That came under scrutiny here recently in the BRAC process. A number of us really went to bat and dissuaded the BRAC Commission from discontinuing that. It has provided an extraordinary number of very capable individuals, and they not only fulfill their initial obligation, which they serve to pay back the Federal Government and the taxpayer for their education, but they continue on, and they have a very high percentage of those physicians and others being trained becoming careerists in the military. I would hope you’d take a good look at that.

If I might say, we are fortunate here in Congress to have a very able retired submariner, now an admiral in the medical corps, Dr. Eisold, who’s our physician, and he cares for all of us and disciplines all of us pretty well, I might add. He’s tough. But he’s
often come to me, particularly when I was chairman of this committee for 6 years, and addressed questions regarding the medical fraternity throughout the Services, was a helpful advisor to me. I would hope you’d find the opportunity to meet him—I’d be happy to arrange that—just to draw on his many years of experience in military medicine, and, having come from the ranks of a submariner before he took his medical training, he actually was in the Navy, then took his training as a doctor, and then went into the medical sciences of the military, and now cares for us here. He really is an extraordinary individual.

I was going to suggest, also, that you focus on the question of the Gulf war illnesses. That frequently comes before this committee, illnesses that could have been associated with service in those areas of responsibilities during that period of time.

So, I'll conclude my questions. I wish you well. I think you're eminently qualified, and I know that you'll do a splendid job, together with your family.

To you, Mr. Ostendorff, I thank you for your service. I want to start off with the question of the nuclear stockpile. That's a program that this committee has worked on for years and years. It's to go back and assess what is the status of the stockpile today, its availability in the time, should it—hopefully never be needed—but, if it were needed, we need to know whether that stockpile can meet the contingency required. How familiar are you with the program?

Mr. OSTENDORFF. I'm fairly familiar, Senator, based on my experience with the oversight committee.

Senator WARNER. So, you full well know Congress's concern.

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. I'm anxious to continue to support that program, and the tremendous amount of money, billions of dollars we've invested in it. But, in the absence of actual testing—and I support the absence of actual testing—and, therefore, this is the alternative, to determine the viability and capability of the stockpile. Do you have any particular thoughts you want to share with the committee at this time?

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Senator Warner, in the context of that question, I think the ongoing Stockpile Stewardship Program run by NNSA that has its life-extension programs to look at the surveillance of aging effects on existing weapons that, in some cases, have been around for 30 years or more, that those ongoing research and development efforts are crucial, not just to maintaining the existing stockpile, but to other efforts, to learn more about materials in the context of some proposals for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) Program. It's all part of one integrated program.

Senator WARNER. Let's go to that very point, the RRW. Earlier this month, the Nuclear Weapons Council, a joint body of the Departments of Defense and Energy, announced the selection of a design team for a possible replacement warhead. This RRW would, if developed, replace a portion of the Nation's seabased nuclear weapons. Based on your knowledge of the program to this point, do you believe it will be possible to develop and field a replacement warhead without requiring underground nuclear testing?

Mr. OSTENDORFF. Yes, sir. I have been a participant, along with some of the staff who are behind you, in a number of briefings by
NNSA, including the laboratory directors at Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, and Sandia. We have received very strong technical assurances that the RRW design selected earlier this month can be pursued without the need to resume underground nuclear testing. The various tools in the Stockpile Stewardship campaign are viewed as being robust and sufficient to the task to make sure that that can proceed. Next year, there'll be a design, definition, and cost study. Of course, any future plans to actually build an RRW weapon would require congressional authorization in a future budget.

Senator WARNER. I thank you. I wish you well.

General Kicklighter, in my opening statement, I expressed to you some of my concerns. You answered it, in terms of the independence that you must have to successfully operate. I would, however, draw your attention to this tragic case of Corporal Pat Tillman, which was just handled, but only from the context that—how long it took the IG to do this. We had another case here—it was a pressing case of the Air Force Academy, and certain questions regarding, unfortunately, a multitude of issues. Hopefully, the Academy's on a straight and true course now, but, for a while, it was in stormy seas. I would hope that you'd feel free—and, really, I ask that you come back before the committee, at least inform the staff, in about 90 days—do you have enough resources to operate that office as you see appropriate?

General KICKLIGHTER. Senator Warner, I certainly will be glad to do that. In fact, my intention is to, if confirmed, take a look at the mission resources available, and see what’s really needed in the way of structure and staff. I certainly will be back to this staff and to this committee within 90 days with my findings and recommendations.

Senator WARNER. All right.

General Clapper, I've also covered—and others—most of the questions that were of concern to me, but I want to bring one to your attention, because I, fortunately, with other members of the committee, have spent a lot of time here in these many years working on unmanned vehicles. As a matter of fact, I think it was 8 or 10, 12 years ago, I challenged the private sector and the forces to each of them to get up to a certain percentage of unmanned vehicles into their system. Now, there's a lot of programs out there right now and, that's fortunate. A lot of these programs are being developed jointly. I would ask that you look at this Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Program, because it is an intelligence-gathering system, and come back to the committee if you feel that there's just too much duplication and effort out there, and other areas where we have a shortfall. Do you have any particular points you'd like to add about the unmanned vehicles here this morning?

General CLAPPER. Other than to say, sir, that, from my NGA experience, I think it has a tremendous potential, and I think I share your concern about management, proliferation, overlap, and duplication. I would commit to you to look into that, sir, if confirmed.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, General. Also, through the years, and particularly once Congress put in a new framework of laws about our intelligence system—both Senator Levin and I have had years of experience on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
and we were part of drawing up those laws—there's still a process to bring DOD into conformity with—I'm not suggesting they're in violation now—but still, to bring it into conformity with the overall goals of trying to establish a system which comes up under the National Director for Intelligence. But I feel very strongly—I just say for myself, at this point in time—historically, the military have had their own responsibility to develop that intelligence, primarily tactical, which they need for daily operations of those forces. In this push, pull, and reorganization, we've done our best to preserve that. But that's something I want you to keep a watchful eye on and make certain that it does not fall below that level, drawing on your extensive experience, that these operational commanders demand, and must have, to effectively handle the missions that they are assigned. Do you have a view on that?

General CLAPPER. Senator Warner, I think you're exactly on target to raise that issue. It is a concern. Having served in combat at the tactical level, having served as a J–2 three times, having served as service intelligence chief once, and having served as the director of a national agency embedded in DOD, as well as the Defense Intelligence Agency, I think I have some background and experience to examine all dimensions of that issue.

When it comes down to it, it's a balance that has to be struck between the competing fiefdoms, if you will. But I share your perception on that.

Senator WARNER. Welcome to the arena, and fight hard for your troops.

General CLAPPER. I will, sir. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. Because balance is fine, but, if there's a tilt, tilt a little towards the troops.

General CLAPPER. Sir, there is absolutely no——

Senator WARNER. You don't have to answer that question.

[Laughter.]

General CLAPPER. Okay, sir. No ambiguity about that.

Senator WARNER. Yes, no ambiguity about that.

Mr. Chairman, I think that concludes all the questions that I would have for this distinguished panel of witnesses. What an extraordinarily well-qualified group of nominees. I think the President and his team are to be congratulated on that.

I wish each of you well. It's a challenge. Many of you have been before this committee and other committees of Congress to accept positions, but this is a new chapter in your life, and that of your families, and I wish you well.

Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Let me ask you, first, General Clapper, about the Counter-Intelligence Field Activity (CIFA). There's been a suggestion, I think, in last week's Newsweek, that there's a review going on of the activities of CIFA, out of concern about CIFA's collection and retention of information about U.S. citizens. Also, it's heavy reliance on contractors. This was the question of Talon, and this is the question of the database being maintained with names and information, improperly. Do you believe that CIFA itself should be engaged in counterintelligence collection and analysis, or should it be focused on coordinating the activities of the military Services?
General Clapper. Sir, my inclination is probably the latter, more of an overseer, coordinator, orchestrator, if you will, of counterintelligence activities. There may be cases where DOD departmental equities and security facilities or people are in jeopardy and where the CIFA would have to play a lead role. With respect to the Talon database program, that’s something I have had the opportunity to delve into, and there’s no question that there were, in the initial creation of that database, which was sort of a neighborhood-watch sort of thing, of some 13,000 records, approximately 186 of them involved reporting on U.S. citizens principally demonstrating against recruiting stations or educational institutions in support of the military. Since about July 2005, it’s my impression that CIFA has cleansed the database of those records. They are in retention in a general counsel repository, for oversight purposes. Since that time, there have been mechanisms in place to preclude the inclusion of such data.

It would be my intent, sir, if I’m confirmed, though, to look at whether the candle’s worth the flame here, to see whether the output of this database is really worth having it and if some other arrangement could be made to capture the data that’s important for DOD equities.

Chairman Levin. Would you let us know about that? Because there’s been some abuses and excesses here, which is troubling to many of us.

General Clapper. I will, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

Sir, my sense of the Talon database issue, albeit without the advantage of being fully immersed in the details, is that OUSDI and CIFA leaders have taken appropriate steps to both cleanse the database and prevent recurrence of similar problems. Nonetheless, if confirmed, I will get back to you and the committee with a more informed read of whether the database provides value-added, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

General, your predecessor pledged to the committee to refrain from getting involved in the substance of intelligence, the production and the analysis of substantive intelligence. What Dr. Cambone said is that he saw the role that he was occupying as one of policymaking and providing resources for intelligence components. Do you agree with that?

General Clapper. Yes, sir, I do. In general terms, I think that the position of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, and, for that matter, his predecessor form, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, should play an important resource and policy and oversight role, but should not engage in substantive analysis issues.

Chairman Levin. Now, in response to the committee’s advance questions, you gave us the answer to this, but I want you to do this again for the record, if you would. Give us your view on the propriety of nonintelligence organizations engaging in intelligence analysis.

General Clapper. Sir, I agree with the commentary that Secretary Gates made about this, that intelligence analysis, particularly in an all-source context, should be done, conducted by those organizations, institutions, officially charged with doing so; meaning, in our case, for example, the Defense Intelligence Agency or
CIA. I think special analytic cells that are established for one reason or another, I think they bear watching, scrutiny. In prior incumbencies, I've encountered those kinds of efforts, and if I were the responsible intelligence official, I would want to engage with them to determine what the purpose was and what it is that was not being satisfied by the established intelligence institutions.

Chairman Levin. Should the established intelligence institutions be aware if and when such a cell is created?

General Clapper. Yes, sir. Absolutely.

Chairman Levin. Aware of their activity so that they can comment, in turn, on those activities?

General Clapper. Exactly, sir. I would also like to add, sir, if I may, that, at the same time, we have questionable intelligence activities, and there are also, I think, valid red-teaming and this sort of thing. I think it's entirely appropriate and necessary, for that matter, that policymakers, commanders, whomever, question, probe, push back from intelligence. That is certainly a legitimate, appropriate, and necessary activity. To a certain extent, there's judgment here involved in and it's kind of like pornography, you know it when you see it. So, you have to be very vigilant as to the existence and purpose of such activities.

Chairman Levin. When such activities exist, should they be open, transparent to the folks that they are red-teaming?

General Clapper. Absolutely, sir. Absolutely.

Chairman Levin. Okay, thank you.

Dr. Casscells, let me ask you about the conversion of military medical billets to civilian positions. In a briefing to the committee staff last week, General Gale Pollock, the Acting Surgeon General of the Army, and Major General Eric Schoomaker, who's the new Walter Reed commander, said that they believe we've gone too far in converting military medical billets to civilian positions and that they're unable to hire or contract civilians to fill converted positions in a timely manner. General Pollock said that she would request relief from the continuing requirements to convert military positions to civilian positions, and I'm wondering, what are your views regarding conversion of medically-related billets?

Dr. Casscells. Mr. Chairman, I have not had a chance to talk to General Schoomaker or General Pollock, but I'm aware of the general issue, and it's a critical one now, because so many providers—nurses, doctors, therapists, psychologists—have been deployed overseas, so the backfill issue is on everyone's mind. It seems that there are not quite enough in some specialties to backfill from the Reserves, and there has been a strong interest, of course, in converting some billets to civilian status in order to accept volunteers, for example, from the public health service or from the private world. I've been contacted by a number of private doctors who want to serve, asking if they have the right training and are the right age and so forth. That's something that, if confirmed, I would want to look into very closely. But I would certainly not want to see critical specialties contracted completely to the private sector, because if you contract all your neurosurgery to the private sector, then when you have a head-injured soldier, sailor, airman, or marine, you won't have a neurosurgeon. We had only one neurosurgeon in Baghdad at the 10th CSH, a person who was well trained, but that
person’s on call 24/7. So, there are some billets, both in the continental United States and overseas, that we struggle to fill, and the combination of attention by me to recruitment, I think, to get some docs like me to sign up in mid-career, as well as judicious use of assistance offered from public health service and the private practice of medicine and nursing, these should enable us to provide these critical services.

So, there is a balance. Sir, if confirmed, I will look at that very closely and be honored to work with you on it.

Chairman Levin. Thank you. You made reference to electronic medical records, and I’m wondering whether you could give us some idea as to how you would accelerate the effective implementation of a DOD electronic medical records system.

Dr. Casscells. Mr. Chairman, I haven’t been in a management role with these records, but I have used electronic medical records for some 20 years. I’ve seen them evolve with painful slowness, first at Mass General Hospital and Beth Israel Hospital in Boston, at NIH, and Harvard Community Health Plan. Everywhere I’ve worked, we have struggled to implement these records, making them more user-friendly, providing incentives for doctors to use them, and the like. The same, of course, applies to nurses, psychologists, and other medical professionals. So, there is no easy answer to this, but I am heartened by the fact that DOD and the Veterans Administration recently signed an agreement—I think it was in January—to create a single in-patient medical record, which would not just be an interoperable seamless transition of two records, but would be one record.

There is a lot of commitment to this, a lot of dollars that have been spent. It’s been a little frustrating to all the clinicians. I do know that Armed Forces Longitudinal Technology Application is our showpiece right now in DOD health care. There are plenty of providers who find it a little bit slow and difficult to use. These are motivated, computer-savvy young doctors, nurses, therapists, and so forth. So, we need to do more to make this more user-friendly and provide better incentives, sir.

Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Doctor, there’s a recent report that injured soldiers from the 3rd Infantry Division were sent to the training center at Fort Irwin, even though their injuries prevented them from participating in training, and, in some cases, prevented them from receiving prescribed physical therapy. The article quotes military experts as saying that they suspect that the deployment to Fort Irwin of injured soldiers was an effort to pump up the manpower statistics used to show readiness of Army units. During the Army posture hearing recently, we asked Acting Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker to look into similar allegations about the 3rd Infantry Division changing medical profiles of soldiers so that they could be deployed to Iraq. Both Secretary Geren and General Schoomaker testified it would be improper to change a profile for the purpose of making the soldier deployable. Do you agree that it is improper to change a medical profile for the purpose of making a servicemember deployable?

Dr. Casscells. Yes, sir, I certainly agree. While I’m not familiar with the reports you’ve gotten concerning Fort Irwin and Fort Ord,
I do know that we’ve had many soldiers who have asked to be deployed, despite a profile. They’ve really asked that it be set aside and that there be a waiver so that they could be deployed. That’s quite a different thing from changing a profile and basically forcing a soldier to duty. I would look very seriously at that.

Chairman Levin. Okay. We’ll look forward to your very thoroughly checking this out, because it would be very disturbing if, in fact, it’s being done for that reason.

General Kicklighter, if you are confirmed as the IG, will you ensure that these allegations, now from two different sources, are thoroughly investigated by either the Army or by your office?

General Kicklighter. Mr. Chairman, I will assure you that will be the case.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Mr. Ostendorff, the NNSA has started a review of the nuclear weapons complex—I think you’ve made reference to this already—to determine the complex’s future—“the future” being defined as 2030. Are you going to be involved in making decisions with respect to the complex of the future? Is it your understanding that you would be involved in that?

Mr. Ostendorff. Chairman Levin, it’s my understanding that, if I am confirmed, I would be involved in assisting the Administrator in those decisions, yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Would you agree that the following elements are necessary to make decisions with respect to that complex of the future? I’m going to read them all at once, and then you can tell me if there’s any that you don’t believe are necessary. The anticipated size of the nuclear weapons stockpile, both deployed and non-deployed warheads; the number of different types of weapons in the stockpile; whether a RRW is feasible; if the RRW is feasible, what percentage of the stockpile will be comprised of those warheads, and what of conventional warheads; and what quantity of fissile materials would be required to support the stockpile in 2030? Would they all be needed to be considered?

Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. The NNSA has announced that it will make a decision on the future nuclear weapons complex in December 2008, at the latest, will all of the items that I just read off be known at that time?

Mr. Ostendorff. Mr. Chairman, I am not currently aware of the status of discussions between the Department of Energy, DOD, and the rest of the administration on the size of the future stockpile. That is an area that you’ve highlighted that certainly is a factor, and such things as, future pit production requirements, and what number of warheads we have for diversity in the stockpile. If confirmed, I would take a hard look to make sure that those discussions are transparent and are communicated back to Congress.

Chairman Levin. If those items have not been resolved, then tell us what’s going to be used as the basis for decisions regarding the future nuclear weapons complex. Okay?

Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Would you agree that if the RRW is feasible, that a new warhead for use in existing delivery systems—that it could be used for that purpose?
Mr. Ostendorff. It’s my understanding, Mr. Chairman, that the RRW concept studies and design definition studies which are underway right now, to date have demonstrated that they could achieve those characteristics and purposes.

Chairman Levin. Could they then, if it is feasible, be usable in existing delivery systems?

Mr. Ostendorff. It is my understanding that the Air Force and the Navy nuclear weapons directorates have reviewed the existing reentry vehicle technologies and have not determined that there would need to be any significant changes to the delivery platforms.

Chairman Levin. Senator Thune, are you ready to go?

Senator Thune. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Senator Thune.

Senator Thune. Thank you. You look like you need a break.

Chairman Levin. I don’t want to hold you here, because I have a few more questions.

Senator Thune. Okay.

Chairman Levin. But I’m going to be here anyway, so let me call on you, if you’re ready.

Senator Thune. All right, thank you.

I thank the panel for their willingness to serve. I just have a couple of questions I’d like to ask a couple of our nominees.

First, for Dr. Casscells, in your advance policy questions, you state that TRICARE key performance measures have improved dramatically. Among those are claims processing and customer satisfaction. What I would like to share with you are some concerns I’ve heard from my constituents regarding TRICARE and customer satisfaction.

South Dakota has approximately 7,000 military retirees who are TRICARE-eligible. On more than one occasion, constituents have indicated to me that health care providers are not accepting TRICARE because of the time it takes to process claims and because TRICARE is not reimbursing the health provider enough. If confirmed, can you inform the committee as to what steps you would take to improve the relationship between TRICARE and private health care providers?

Dr. Casscells. Senator Thune, thank you. Yes, I have been looking into that as a TRICARE patient and as a TRICARE provider, not as a possible Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs. I have learned what I think most people have already come to understand, which is that the TRICARE contracts are not very generous financially to the providers. It is a little bit too onerous in signing up for them and maintaining them, given the relatively small number of patients that most doctors in most towns would have, or most hospitals. So, while I’m a TRICARE provider and patient, I’m at the University of Texas, where there’s a big staff to negotiate these contracts and to help doctors with the regulations. The guys and gals in private practice throw up their hands when they get yet another complex contract. Some of them have said, “It’s more difficult than Medicare, and, heck, I have billions of Medicare patients, but hardly any of TRICARE.” So, we have to make it simpler, and, if confirmed, I would work to do that.

In addition, sir, because the finances aren’t so generous, it has to be cast in a light that people get recognition for taking on...
TRICARE patients. There has to be a sergeant or a general from the local National Guard to come by and present a plaque and to call the local newspaper and say, “Thank heaven for some doctors who are willing to step up and help with TRICARE,” because it is not the most remunerative, it's not the easiest, but it’s a way that they can help the country. We need to recognize the doctors that way.

Senator THUNE. In a follow-up to that, one of the other concerns that I’ve heard is the lack of clarity of when and under what circumstances TRICARE is the primary payer. This is a confusing area, I think, of the health care industry, and especially for seniors, who may be carrying multiple policies and have multiple needs, like long-term care. Could you inform the committee, as well, of any steps you believe need to be taken to increase the level of education that TRICARE can provide to its beneficiaries so that this confusion that exists out there among those who are carrying multiple policies can be eliminated, or at least reduced?

Dr. CASSELLS. Senator, I'm going to school on that, myself, now. I can say, again, just as a TRICARE patient and provider, that the Web site is getting better. The Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations has been happy with the way it's gone so far. The ratings tend to be higher than the average civilian hospital. But I'm sure we can do better, and I do think that from the military leaders I've spoken with, there is a commitment to do better in this regard. But, as to the details, I'm still going to school on them.

Senator THUNE. I hope that as you go through that, you can get some clarity and be able to communicate that with the many retirees who are using the program, because it does seem to be an issue on which there is great agreement that there is a lot of confusion and that there needs to be some better explanation of the various programs, particularly for seniors. Obviously, we're dealing with this on other issues, like Medicare Part D, as well. There is some confusion about the payer.

I have a question for General Kicklighter, I'm coming back to the issue of health care—about the increasing cost of DOD health care and the Department’s plan to pay for it. DOD statistics on total medical spending indicate a growth of $17.5 billion in fiscal year 2000, to an estimated $39 billion in fiscal year 2007. I guess the question has to do with any thoughts that you might have about addressing what is a growing part of the DOD budget and any way that cost savings can be achieved in that. It's sort of endemic in health care generally, but that is a very substantial growth in one area of your budget over a relatively small period of time. So, any thoughts on that?

General KICKLIGHTER. Senator Thune, I don't know exactly what the health care capability is inside of the DOD's IG's office, but I certainly will take a look at what our skills are. If we don't have the skills we need to look at the growth of health care budgets, and what impact that is, and what care our recipients, both active and retired, are getting, I certainly would be glad to look into that, and would like to get back to you on that.

[The information referred to follows:]
If confirmed, I will review the skills sets within the DOD OIG and the associated oversight requirements regarding health care. Upon completion of my review, I will provide the committee with my conclusions and recommended actions.

Senator Thune. I guess the reason I raise it is one of the suggestions of the problem has been increasing accountability and oversight for funds that get budgeted at the Department. I know that health care is a cost, in any organization right now, that is out of control. But if there are ways in which we can, through greater accountability and oversight help address that. We find that to be true in private health care, as well, that there sometimes is, in any government program, folks that figure out how to game the system. We want to make sure none of that’s happening with regard to health care provided by the military.

General Kicklighter. What I’d like to do, Senator, is to look into that, if confirmed, and get back to you as soon as I possibly can, in a very short period of time.

Senator Thune. I appreciate that.
Thank you all very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.

Mr. Ostendorff, over half of the nonproliferation program funding at NNSA is devoted to the mixed oxide (MOX) project which is aimed at turning 34 tons of excess weapons-grade plutonium into nuclear power reactor fuel. Several reports have indicated that the cost for the project has increased substantially. I'm wondering, if confirmed, whether you would look into the cost and the schedule for that program, and ensure that an independent cost estimate is available for the project.

Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir, I will.

Chairman Levin. Before construction activities begin for the MOX facilities, would you report back to the committee also on the status of the Russian companion effort to dispose of the same amount of excess weapons-grade plutonium?

Mr. Ostendorff. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. That winds up the questioning of members.
We'll keep the record open for the usual length of time.
Again, we want to thank you for your service. We want to thank your families. We particularly want to single out these younger kids who have sat here so patiently all morning long. I can't imagine, when I was their age, sitting still for as long as they have sat still. So, this new generation is not only computer literate, they are incredibly patient. I know their fathers, their grandfathers—are very grateful to them and all the family members for coming here again today.

With that, we will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Claude M. Kicklighter, USA (Ret.), by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]


QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Answer. Having served in the Armed Forces before and after the Goldwater-Nichols Act, I have seen the very positive benefit of more civilian control. The Goldwater-Nichols Act greatly strengthened the role of the Joint Chief of Staff and greatly enhanced the warfighting ability of the combatant commanders through jointness. If confirmed, I would work with the Department and Congress to recommend policy for activities designed to promote combat readiness, economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the future. At this time, I do not know of the need for any modifications to the act.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. Please see response above.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. Section 3 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 provides that Inspectors General shall be appointed on the basis of their “integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public administration, or investigations.” What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform the duties of the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General (IG), particularly in the area of oversight, audit, and investigation?

Answer. In a career of over 35 years of military service, followed by 15 years in the Senior Executive Service of the civil service, I have had extensive executive responsibility and experience working with issues related to public administration, management analysis, accounting, auditing, financial analysis, law, and investigation. I obtained a Masters of Management degree to further develop a number of these skills.

I have learned what to expect from an IG in terms of their duties and responsibilities; my career has required that I maintain a close professional relationship with the IG in each military and civilian organization in which I have held senior management positions. I have been part of and led several high-level government investigations and have conducted numerous inspections intended to strengthen planning and implementation of policies, programs, and performance at the Departments of Defense, Veterans Affairs, and State.

During my years of public service, I have gained a broad-based understanding of the functioning of DOD, in particular. I have made an enduring commitment to the welfare and development of its civilian and military personnel, and strive to set an appropriate example for them in my personal conduct, integrity, and loyalty.

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform these duties?

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to become more familiar with statutes and regulations applicable to government contracting in general and defense procurement, in particular. I also plan to meet with a broad cross-section of officials and personnel within DOD, including members of the Armed Forces here and overseas, to listen to their concerns and identify issues that might merit action by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG). Also, I plan to spend time listening to the concerns of the Members of Congress and their staffs.

If confirmed, I plan to engage the members of the Defense Council on Integrity and Efficiency and the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency to better understand their effective roles.

I also intend to spend time with all elements of the DOD IG Office to learn and benefit from their invaluable grass roots level insights.

Question. Based on your background and experience, are there any changes that you would recommend with respect to the current organization or responsibilities of the DOD IG?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to examine how the OIG is organized to determine if any structural changes in the office are appropriate. I also plan to determine whether the office is meeting the full range of its statutory responsibilities within the context of the resources available. It would be premature to offer any recommendations for change in these areas until I have an opportunity to conduct the necessary thorough evaluations.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. If confirmed, what would your working relationship be with:

The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. Section 8(c) of the act states that the IG shall "be the principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense for matters relating to the prevention and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse in the programs and operations of the Department . . . ." If confirmed, I will seek to establish a strong and effective relationship with the Secretary of Defense that enables me to carry out my statutory duties with the independence required under the act, while enabling the Secretary to exercise his statutory supervisory authority. I will consult directly with the Secretary as necessary and appropriate, especially with respect to matters governed by section 8(b)(1) of the act. I also expect to continue the current practice of providing weekly updates on ongoing issues to the special assistants for the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense, monthly meetings with the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and quarterly briefings to the Under Secretaries on matters warranting their attention.

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Answer. Section 3(a) of the Inspector General Act states that "each IG shall report to and be under the general supervision of the head of the establishment involved or, to the extent such authority is delegated, the officer next in rank below such head." DOD Directive 5106.01, dated April 13, 2006, states that "the IG of the DOD shall report to and be under the general supervision of the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense . . . ." Accordingly, if confirmed, I would expect my relationship with the Deputy Secretary of Defense to almost mirror my relationship with the Secretary of Defense.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer) (USD(C/CFO)).

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the USD(C/CFO) on areas of concern within the financial management arena which, I am told, the OIG has identified as a major management challenge for Department. I will conduct and supervise audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations of the establishment in order to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. I would continue to work with the USD(C/CFO) to formulate the OIG's portion of the annual President's budget for submission to Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Office of Management and Budget (OMB), as well as request required resources to conduct the IG's mission.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).

Answer. I am informed that the OIG has also identified acquisition processes and contract management as a major management challenge for DOD. It is therefore essential for the IG to maintain an effective working relationship with the USD(AT&L). If confirmed, I anticipate to work particularly closely with the Under Secretary concerning the allocation of OIG resources in the acquisition area, and how best to implement audit recommendations pertaining to acquisition processes.

As IG, I would also recommend policies, in coordination with the USD(AT&L) and the USD(Comptroller), to ensure that audit oversight of contractor activities and financial management are coordinated and carried out in an efficient manner to prevent duplication.

Question. The General Counsel of DOD.

Answer. The OIG has extensive legal expertise and resources that are valuable to the OIG and, if confirmed, I will work as closely as possible with the Counsel without compromising, or creating the appearance of compromising, the independence of the OIG.

It is my understanding that the former DOD Office of the Deputy General Counsel (Inspector General) was re-designated as the OIG Office of the General Counsel. The nine positions that comprise the office were transferred, with associated funding, from OSD to OIG. The OIG is the appointing authority for all personnel and is responsible for budgeting, personnel services, and other administrative support for the OIG Office of General Counsel.

Question. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to examine how the OIG is organized to determine if any structural changes in the office are appropriate. I also plan to determine whether the office is meeting the full range of its statutory responsibilities within the context of the resources available. It would be premature to offer any recommendations for change in these areas until I have an opportunity to conduct the necessary thorough evaluations.
Answer. I am advised that the IG and the Director of Operational Tests and Evaluation have a common interest in ensuring that equipment and weapons systems allocated to the warfighter perform effectively and as planned. If confirmed, I would expect to consult as appropriate with the Director concerning the initiation of oversight efforts in these areas.

Question. The Inspectors General of the military departments, defense agencies, and the Joint Staff.

Answer. Section 8(c)(2) of the act states that the IG of DOD “shall . . . initiate, conduct, and supervise such audits and investigations in the DOD (including the military departments) as the IG considers appropriate . . . ” Section 8(c)(9) adds that the IG “shall . . . give particular regard to the activities of the internal audit, inspection, and investigative units of the military departments with a view toward avoiding duplication and ensuring effective coordination and cooperation . . . ”

As I understand it, the DOD oversight community uses internal coordination mechanisms to de-conflict potential duplicative efforts. In addition, DOD directives implementing statute govern certain programs in which the Inspectors General of the military departments participate. If confirmed, I will ensure that the DOD IG continues to coordinate and avoid duplicative efforts and works as a team.

Question. The Inspectors General of subordinate commands.

Answer. My relationship with the Inspectors General of subordinate commands will be based on the OIG role described above in part G. If confirmed, I will work closely with the other DOD Inspectors General to carry out applicable policies and guidance; avoid duplication, overlapping, and gaps; and work to build a strong team.

Question. The Criminal Investigative Services of the Military Departments.

Answer. Under the act, the IG has the authority to initiate, conduct, and supervise criminal investigations relating to any and all programs and operations of the DOD. In addition, the IG is statutorily authorized to develop policy, monitor and evaluate program performance, and provide guidance regarding all criminal investigative programs within the Department. It is my understanding that the DOD IG works frequently in close coordination with the Military Criminal Investigative Organizations (MCIOs) on joint investigations.

If confirmed, I will work closely with each of the MCIOs to ensure that investigative resources are used effectively.

Question. The audit agencies of the military departments.

Answer. Section 4(a) of the act establishes broad jurisdiction for the IG to conduct audits and investigations within DOD, and section 8(c)(2) states that the IG “shall . . . initiate, conduct, and supervise such audits and investigations in the DOD (including the military departments) as the IG considers appropriate.”

If confirmed, I will continue to work with the audit agencies of the military departments.


Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to work with DCAA, as prescribed in the Inspector General Act. Although DCAA reports to the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), it operates under audit policies established by the IG.

Question. The Defense Acquisition Regulatory Council.

Answer. As I understand it, the DOD OIG regularly provides comments to the Defense Acquisition Regulatory Council on proposed changes to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation System, and also recommends changes as a result of DOD OIG work. If confirmed, I would expect to continue these practices.

Question. The Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy.

Answer. It is my understanding that the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy is responsible for oversight of a large segment of the Department’s acquisition and contracting operations and, accordingly, is a major recipient of reports provided by the OIG. If confirmed, I would expect to continue the current practice of working with the Director.


Answer. It is my understanding the DOD OIG works very closely with the Comptroller General and the GAO to coordinate planned and ongoing audits and inspections to avoid any duplication of efforts. It is my further understanding that the DOD OIG also has a GAO affairs office that serves as the central liaison between GAO and DOD management during GAO reviews of DOD programs and activities. If confirmed, I would work to maintain this cooperative relationship between the Comptroller General and GAO.

Question. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR).

Answer. It is my understanding that the DOD OIG has supported the operations of the SIGIR and its predecessor, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Inspector General. In accordance with the IG Act and Public Law 108–106, title 3, section
the DOD OIG coordinates activities with the SIGIR as well as other oversight community members, to avoid duplicating oversight efforts and to minimize disruption to military operations.

As I also understand it, the DOD IG scope of oversight authority encompasses all DOD funded operations and activities in Iraq and the global war on terror, which today amounts to about $463 billion in supplemental appropriations. The SIGIR focuses his oversight effort only on funds designated for Iraq reconstruction, which has been appropriated at about $30 billion. If confirmed, and in keeping with the IG Act, I will work to ensure that the DOD OIG collaborates effectively with the SIGIR to ensure that we protect the public expenditures in Iraq for which we have oversight.

**Question.** The President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE).

**Answer.** If confirmed, I plan to be a very active participant in the PCIE. As a Presidential-nominated and Senate-confirmed IG, the DOD IG is a member of the PCIE which meets on a monthly basis. It is my understanding that the DOD OIG currently serves on the PCIE Audit Committee and chairs the Information Technology Committee. I intend to participate fully and actively in the meetings of the PCIE and its committees.

**Question.** The Defense Council on Integrity and Efficiency (DCIE).

**Answer.** If confirmed, as its chairperson, I would organize meetings with the established members to discuss issues of common interest and reinforce close working relationships.

Sections 2 and 3 of the DCIE Charter state that, in accordance with section 2(2) of the IG Act, the DOD IG, who is the DCIE Chairman, is responsible to provide “leadership and coordination (in) activities designed: (A) to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of, and (B) to prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such programs and operations.”

**Question.** The Office of Management and Budget.

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will work with the Deputy Director for Management of the OMB, who is the Chairperson of the PCIE.

**MAJOR CHALLENGES, PROBLEMS, AND PRIORITIES**

**Question.** In your view, what are the major challenges and problems facing the next DOD IG?

**Answer.** Currently, I do not have sufficient knowledge to respond to this question. However, if confirmed, it will be my top priority to learn what challenges and problems the DOD IG office needs to address and to ensure the adequacy of resources required to accomplish its mission.

**Question.** If you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges and problems?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will focus audit, investigative, and inspection efforts on the challenges identified in the Semiannual Report, while working to identify new issues in consultation with senior DOD officials and Congress. I will also work with senior DOD IG officials to determine what additional resources the OIG may need to fulfill its statutory responsibilities.

**Question.** If you are confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the DOD IG?

**Answer.** It is difficult as a nominee to formulate priorities because I have not had access to the full range of information and considerations that should inform them. Promoting efficiency and preventing fraud in defense acquisitions will obviously be a high priority—as well as effective support for the men and women of our armed services serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. I will also ensure that the OIG pursues aggressive oversight of contracting issues. There undoubtedly are several other key matters that will merit prioritization. If confirmed, I look forward to consulting with senior officials of the DOD and OIG, and with Congress, in establishing broad priorities.

**Question.** Are there any areas currently under investigation or review by the OIG which you do not believe are appropriate for investigation or review by the DOD IG? If so, why?

**Answer.** I have no knowledge of any inappropriate areas at this time.

**DUTIES**

**Question.** What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the DOD IG?

**Answer.** The duties and functions of the IG of DOD are those specified in sections 3, 4, and 8 of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. Additional duties and responsibilities of the IG are specified in DOD Directive No. 5106.01, which was signed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense on April 15, 2006.
By statute, the IG conducts and supervises audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations of DOD. The IG also provides leadership and coordination, and recommends policy, for activities designed to: (1) promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of DOD programs and operations; and (2) combat fraud, waste, and abuse. In addition, the IG is responsible for keeping both the Secretary of Defense and Congress fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies in defense programs, the need for corrective action, and the status of such action.

**Question.** Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I expect that the Secretary of Defense will prescribe for me the full range of duties and functions set forth in the Inspector General Act, as amended, as well as the additional duties and responsibilities specified in DOD Directive No. 5106.01. I also anticipate he would provide specific areas that he is concerned about and would like reviewed. I believe he would also expect me to protect the independence and objectivity of the office.

**Question.** Section 2 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 states that its purpose is to create independent and objective units to conduct and supervise audits and investigations; to provide leadership and coordination and recommend policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; to prevent and detect fraud and abuse; and to provide a means for keeping Congress and agency heads fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations and the necessity for and progress of corrective action. Are you committed to maintaining the independence of the DOD IG, as set forth in the IG statute?

**Answer.** Yes. If confirmed, in accordance with section 2(3) of the act, I will be committed to keeping the Committee on Armed Services “fully and currently informed” and, if so, what steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that this responsibility is carried out?

**Answer.** Section 2(3) of the act states that it is to create independent and objective units to conduct and supervise audits and investigations; to provide leadership and coordination and recommend policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; to prevent and detect fraud and abuse; and to provide a means for keeping Congress and agency heads fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations and the necessity for and progress of corrective action. I will do so through the dissemination of OIG products such as the Semiannual Report to Congress and audit reports. In addition, I will provide briefings for Members and staff, and testimony at hearings, when requested, with the intent of maintaining a close relationship.

**Question.** Section 3 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 provides that the head of an agency shall exercise “general supervision” over an IG, but shall not “prevent or prohibit the IG from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation, or from issuing any subpoena during the course of any audit or investigation.” What is your understanding of the supervisory authority of the Secretary of Defense over the DOD IG with respect to audits and investigations, in view of the independence provided by sections 2 and 3?

**Answer.** Section 2 of the act creates independent and objective units . . . to provide a means for keeping the head of the establishment and Congress fully and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the administration of such programs and operations and the necessity for and progress of corrective action. Section 3 states that each IG shall report to and be under the general supervision of the head of the establishment involved or, to the extent such authority is delegated, to the office next in rank below such head, but shall not report, or be subject to supervision by, any other officer of such establishment. Moreover, neither the head of the establishment nor the office next in rank shall prevent or prohibit the IG from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation, or from issuing any subpoena during the course of any audit or investigation.

**Question.** If confirmed, what action would you take if a senior official of the Department sought to prevent you from “initiating, carrying out, or completing” any audit or investigation within the jurisdiction of the OIG?

**Answer.** If the action was taken outside the authority given to the Secretary of Defense in section 8 of the IG Act, I would notify the Secretary and request his assistance in ensuring compliance with the IG Act by the senior official involved. Failure to resolve the issue, would, in my view, constitute a “particularly serious or flagrant problem, abuse, or deficiency” under section 8(d) of the IG Act. Under this section, the IG is required to report the matter to the head of the establishment, who is then required to transmit the IG’s report to Congress within 7 days.

**Question.** Section 8 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 states that the DOD IG shall “be under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense with
respect to certain audits or investigations which require access to information concerning sensitive operational plans, intelligence matters, counterintelligence matters, ongoing criminal investigations by other administrative units of the DOD related to national security, or other matters, the disclosure of which, would constitute a serious threat to national security.

What is your understanding of the procedures in place to effect the authority and control of the Secretary of Defense over matters delineated in section 8 of the act?

Answer. To my knowledge the procedure in place is to follow the IG Act of 1978. Under 8(b)(1) or 8(b)(2) of the Inspector General Act, the Secretary has the “authority to stop any investigation, audit, or issuance of subpoenas, if the Secretary determines that such a prohibition is necessary to preserve the national security interests of the United States.” I am informed that this provision has never been exercised. However, in the event that the Secretary exercises this authority, I would submit an appropriate statement within 30 days to this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress, as required under section 8(b)(3).

Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which the IG has, as a matter of practice, initiated and conducted audits or investigations covered by section 8 independently from other audits or investigations?

Answer. It is my understanding that the practice of the DOD IG with respect to the initiation and conduct of audits and investigations covered by section 8 is the same as for other audits and investigations.

Question. What changes, if any, do you believe are needed in the practices of the DOD IG for initiating and conducting audits or investigations covered by section 8?

Answer. None to my knowledge.

Question. Sections 4 and 8 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 set forth various duties and responsibilities of IGs beyond the conduct of audits and investigations. What is your understanding of the supervisory authority exercised by the Secretary of Defense with regard to these issues?

Answer. Beyond the conduct of audits and investigations, section 4 directs the IG to “review existing and proposed legislation and regulations” and make related recommendations in semiannual reports; recommend policies to promote economy and efficiency in the administration of Department programs and operations, and to prevent and detect fraud and abuse; keep the Secretary of Defense and Congress fully and currently informed about fraud and other serious problems, abuses, and deficiencies; recommend corrective actions for such problems, abuses, and deficiencies; and report on the progress made in implementing such corrective actions. Section 8(c)(1) adds that the IG shall “be the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense for matters relating to the preventing and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse.

It is my understanding that the operations above specified in sections 4 and 8 come within the general supervisory authority of the Secretary of Defense established under section 3(a).

INDEPENDENCE

Question. The DOD IG must ensure that the independence of the OIG is maintained, that investigations are unbiased, particularly those involving senior military and civilian officials, and promptly and thoroughly completed, and that the highest standards of ethical conduct are maintained. Based on your background and work experience, are there any matters currently under investigation or review by the DOD IG from which you may be required to recuse yourself if confirmed? If so, why?

Answer. None to my knowledge.

Question. What is your understanding of the methods currently in place to address incidents of alleged misconduct by the DOD IG? Do you believe that these methods are adequate?

Answer. It is my understanding the PCIE Integrity Committee, chaired by a representative from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, has been established to ensure that administrative allegations against IGs and certain staff members of the OIGs are appropriately and expeditiously investigated and resolved. The results of Integrity Committee investigations are provided to the Chair of the PCIE who may forward the findings to the IGs agency head. The agency head is required to respond to the Integrity Committee within 30 days regarding the actions taken or planned to be taken in response to the investigative findings. I also note that the President has the authority to remove an IG.

To the best of my knowledge, these methods are adequate. I believe this process, if properly applied, can be an effective means to investigate alleged misconduct by IGs. However, I have not reviewed specific cases referred to the Integrity Committee to determine if those procedures are working effectively.
Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for the DOD IG to consult with officials in the OSD (or other DOD officials outside the OIG) before issuing a report, regarding the findings and recommendations in the report?

Answer. In regards to audits, inspections, senior official investigations, and reprisal investigations, it is the current practice for the OIG to consult with officials in the OSD, or other DOD officials before issuing a report to ensure that the information in the report is factually accurate and to resolve or minimize disagreements on conclusions, findings, and recommendations. However, for criminal investigations, it is not appropriate to discuss the results of ongoing investigations.

Question. To the extent that you believe such consultation is appropriate, what steps, if any, do you believe the IG should take to keep a record of the consultation and record the results in the text of the report?

Answer. I believe it is necessary to consult with all parties to gather the facts to develop findings and recommendations. I am advised that the facts that are relevant should be included in the text of the report. A written record of all interviews and consultations are maintained in the working papers. The procedures are in place to redact certain information from reports in the appropriate circumstances.

Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for senior officials to request that the DOD IG not investigate or review a particular matter?

Answer. Under section 8 of the Inspector General Act, the Secretary of Defense has the authority to prohibit the IG from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation. That authority may be exercised when the audit or investigation requires access to information concerning: sensitive operational plans, intelligence matters, counterintelligence matters, ongoing criminal investigations by other administrative units of DOD related to national security, or other matters the disclosure of which would constitute a serious threat to national security. As noted previously, the Secretary of Defense has never exercised his authority under section 8.

Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for senior officials to request that the DOD IG not issue a report on a particular matter?

Answer. No one has the authority to ask the DOD IG not to issue a report on a particular matter unless it is the Secretary of Defense, under the provisions delineated in section 8.

Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for senior officials to request that the DOD IG alter findings, recommendations, or other pertinent material in a report on a particular matter?

Answer. In the course of conducting audits, inspections, and senior official investigations, the OIG practice is to consult with officials in the OSD, or with other senior level DOD officials, before issuing a report to ensure that the information in the report is factually accurate and to resolve or minimize disagreements where appropriate. However, for criminal investigations, it is not appropriate to discuss the results of ongoing investigations. The final decision on the content of reports rests with the IG.

Question. If confirmed, how would you react to a request, which you believed to be inappropriate, to not investigate a particular matter, not issue a report on a particular matter, or alter findings, recommendations, or other pertinent material in a report on a particular matter?

Answer. With respect to the initiation or completion of an audit or investigation, if the request was inappropriate and made outside the authority given to the Secretary of Defense in section 8 of the IG Act, I would reject the proposal. If and when necessary, I would notify the Secretary and request his assistance in ensuring compliance with the IG Act by the senior official involved.

Failure to resolve the issue, would, in my view, constitute a “particularly serious or flagrant problem, abuse or deficiency” under section 5(d) of the IG Act. Under this section, the IG is required to report the matter to the head of the establishment, who is then required to transmit the IG’s report to Congress.

Question. What is your understanding of the corrective measures that were taken by the OIG in response to the report of the independent assessment team tasked by the DOD IG in 2002 to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the Office?

Answer. I know of the report and have read the Executive Summary. If confirmed, I plan to review the report and the response in detail and determine if corrective action were appropriate and effective.

Question. Do you believe that these corrective actions were appropriate and effective?

Answer. Please see my response to the previous question.
Question. What is your view of the professionalism and expertise of the career staff of the OIG?
Answer. During the briefings I have received, I have found the staff at the DOD IG to be knowledgeable and professional.

Question. What relationship, if any, do you see between the career staff of the OIG and the independence of the Office?
Answer. The credibility and effectiveness of IGs require a well-trained and professional staff that is aware of the agency’s unique role and whose conduct and work products will be accepted as both independent and objective.

Question. What role, if any, do you believe that the senior leadership of the DOD should play in personnel decisions within the OIG?
Answer. In personnel matters, section 6 of the IG Act provides the IG the authority to “select, appoint, and employ such officers and employees as may be necessary for carrying out the functions, powers, and duties” of his office.

Question. The OIG currently relies upon legal advice provided by the DOD Office of General Counsel. The Inspectors General of many other Federal agencies have their own lawyers. Do you believe that reliance on the legal advice of the DOD Office of General Counsel has the potential to compromise the independence of the OIG?
Answer. I would expect to work with the DOD General Counsel on a variety of matters. However, I would rely on the OIG General Counsel legal advice for internal work products and processes.

Please also see my answer to the earlier question concerning the relationship with the DOD General Counsel. See section G of Relationships.

CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTS

Question. The OIG frequently receives requests from congressional committees and Members of Congress for audits and investigation of matters of public interest. What is your understanding of the manner in which the OIG handles such requests?
Answer. It is my understanding that the DOD IG receives many requests from congressional committees and Members of Congress for oversight reviews, but adheres to the same principles of independence in responding to those requests.

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that the OIG continues to respond to congressional requests for audits or investigations in a manner consistent with past practice?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it would be appropriate for the OIG to redact the contents of any information contained in a report it provides to Congress?
Answer. It is my understanding that consistent with the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), the practice of the DOD IG is to provide unredacted copies of reports to oversight committees of Congress. The DOD IG redacts information in reports released to the public in accordance with the FOIA and the Privacy Act.

SENIOR OFFICIAL INVESTIGATIONS

Question. The OIG plays a key role in the investigation of allegations of misconduct by senior officers and civilian employees of the DOD. The Committee on Armed Services has a particular interest in investigations concerning senior officials who are subject to Senate confirmation, and relies upon the DOD IG, as well as the OSD, to ensure that these investigations are accurate, complete, and accomplished in a timely manner.

If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that the investigations relating to senior officials are completed in a timely manner and that the results of investigations are promptly provided to this committee?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the investigations relating to senior officials to include those who are subject to Senate confirmation are completed in a timely manner and that the results of investigations are promptly provided to the committee.

Question. Do you believe that the current allocation of responsibilities between the DOD IG and the IGs of the military departments is appropriate to ensure fair and impartial investigations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the current allocation of responsibilities between the DOD IG and the IGs of the military departments is appropriate to ensure fair and impartial investigations.
RESOURCES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE DOD IG'S OFFICE AND INVESTIGATORS

**Question.** Do you believe that the DOD IG’s office has sufficient resources (in personnel and dollars) to carry out its audit and investigative responsibilities?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will attempt to ensure that the DOD IG’s office has sufficient resources to carry out its audit and investigative responsibilities.

**Question.** If confirmed, will you communicate any concerns that you may have about the adequacy of resources available to the OIG to Congress and this committee?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will.

**Question.** Some Federal agencies have reacted to limited IG resources by using contractors to perform some audit and investigative functions. What is your understanding of the DOD IG's role in determining whether the use of contractor resources to perform audit or investigative functions is appropriate?

**Answer.** For the audit function, the Inspector General Act, section 4(b)(1)(B) establishes the authority of each IG to establish guidelines for determining when it shall be appropriate to use non-Federal auditors. In addition, section 4(b)(1)(C) of the act states that the IG shall take appropriate steps to ensure that any work performed by non-Federal auditors complies with the standards established by the Comptroller General.

With regard to the criminal investigative function, it is considered inherently governmental and therefore contractors do not perform such functions.

**Question.** Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that the use of contractor resources to perform such functions would be appropriate?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that there is specific guidance in DOD Directive 7600.2 on when it is permissible to use contractor resources to perform audit functions. It specifically permits DOD components to contract for audit services when applicable expertise is unavailable, if augmentation of the audit staff is necessary to execute the annual audit plan, or because temporary audit assistance is required to meet audit reporting requirements mandated by Public Law or DOD regulation. However, the directive includes an approval process to ensure the appropriate use of non-Federal auditors and that they comply with the Government Auditing Standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States.

**Question.** In recent years, the DOD IG has sought and obtained increased authority to issue subpoenas, carry weapons, and make arrests. Do you believe that the authorities of the OIG and its agents are adequate in these areas, or would you recommend further changes in the law?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will review the IGs current authorities for adequacy.

DOD FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND AUDITS

**Question.** The performance of mandatory statutory duties, such as the performance of financial audits, has consumed a growing share of the resources of the IG’s office, crowding out other important audit priorities. What is your view of the relative priority of financial audits, and the resources that should be devoted to such audits?

**Answer.** Financial audits will continue to be a high priority consistent with the President’s Management Agenda Initiative, the Secretary of Defense's top priorities, the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, and the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1994. It is my understanding that the OIG has received sufficient resources to conduct financial statement audits under the current departmental approach. However, as the Department improves audit readiness and the requirements for financial statement audits increase, a reevaluation may be necessary. If confirmed, I will work with the Department and Congress to ensure that the appropriate level of resources continues to be dedicated to financial audits. I will also seek to ensure that resources committed to financial audits do not come at the expense of other audit priorities.

**Question.** Do you believe that resources currently directed to the audit of financial statements that are generally acknowledged to be unreliable would better be directed to other objectives?

**Answer.** Without the benefit of first-hand knowledge of resource challenges faced by the DOD IG, I am not currently in a position to determine whether resources would be better directed to other objectives.

**Question.** Do you see any need for legislative changes to give the IG greater flexibility to target audit resources?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I am prepared to work with the Department and Congress to assess whether legislation in this area is appropriate.

**Question.** What is your view of the role of the DOD IG in evaluating and contributing to improvements made in the Department’s financial management processes?
Answer. The role of the DOD OIG is to serve as a catalyst for improvements in the Department’s financial management processes. That role should be consistent with the President’s Management Agenda Initiatives, the Department’s top priorities, and statutory requirements. If confirmed, I will ensure that the DOD OIG continues this vital function.

OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

Question. Problems with procurement, acquisition, and the ability of the Department and the military departments to effectively oversee acquisition programs have called into question the capability of existing DOD oversight mechanisms. What are your views on the need for reform in how the DOD procures property and services?

Answer. I am informed that recent IG audit reports have identified contracting and acquisition problems and that the auditors are working with DOD management to correct those problems. If confirmed, I will work with the Department to address ways to improve acquisition procedures.

Question. What role, if any, do you believe the OIG should play in achieving acquisition reform?

Answer. The role of the DOD OIG is to serve as a catalyst for improvements in the Department’s acquisition processes and contract management. That role should be consistent with the President’s Management Agenda Initiatives, the Department’s top priorities, and statutory requirements. If confirmed, I will ensure that the DOD OIG continues this vital function.

Question. Do you believe that the DOD IG and the various Defense auditing and contracting management activities have the resources needed to conduct effective oversight over the Department’s acquisition programs?

Answer. If confirmed, conducting effective oversight over the Department’s acquisition programs will be among our top priorities in the IG office. The men and women of our Armed Forces, and our Nation’s taxpayers, have a right to expect that the funds appropriated by Congress for defense acquisitions are being utilized with cost-efficiency and integrity.

Based on the information made available to me thus far, I am concerned that the audit resources of the OIG have not kept pace with the growth in contract expenditures for defense acquisitions. I am also concerned that the current trend, if unchecked, will significantly increase the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse in acquisition programs.

Therefore, if I am confirmed, it will be vital for the OIG, the Department, and Congress to work together in a timely way to assess whether the OIG has adequate resources to conduct this essential oversight.

Question. Over the last 15 years, the DOD IG has gone from having one auditor for every $500 million on contract by the DOD to one auditor for every $2 billion on contract. Do you believe that the DOD IG has the resources it needs to conduct effective oversight over the Department’s acquisition programs?

Answer. If confirmed, I am prepared to work with the Department and Congress to assess whether the OIG has adequate resources to conduct this essential oversight.

Question. The DOD IG has played an important role in advising the DOD and Congress on the sufficiency of management controls in the Department’s acquisition programs and the impact that legislative and regulatory proposals could have on such management controls. How do you see the DOD IG’s role in this area?

Answer. The DOD IG has an important role in helping the Department to effectively and efficiently manage acquisition resources dedicated to the support of the Department’s mission, and in accounting for the management of those resources to the taxpayer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the DOD OIG continues its important advisory role.

HUMAN TRAFFICKING

Question. The DOD has adopted a “zero tolerance” position against abuses of human trafficking and modified its policies to ensure that United States military commands and activities and their personnel are informed about factors contributing to human trafficking and take preventative measures against behavior that contributes to this problem. The DOD IG has investigated allegations of human trafficking in Korea and the Balkans, and posted a survey on its Web site designed to obtain information about potential human trafficking abuses from DOD personnel. What is the role of the DOD IG with respect to human trafficking?
Answer. It is my understanding that the IG strongly supports the Department’s “zero tolerance” policy against human trafficking by evaluating programs and compliance, and by investigating allegations of human trafficking that have a DOD nexus. Over the last 2½ years, the DOD IG has been called upon to testify before Congress three times and has also addressed international forums on its efforts regarding trafficking in persons.

Question. What is your understanding of the actions that have been taken by the OIG to prevent human trafficking abuses and the current role of the DOD IG in formulating and enforcing the Department’s policies?

Answer. As referenced above, it is my understanding that the OIG has evaluated DOD programs and compliance in Korea, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

On November 21, 2006, the OIG published its report titled “Evaluation of the DOD Efforts to Combat Trafficking in Persons.” The objective of the evaluation was to determine if DOD Directives, implementing instructions, organization, metrics, and resources were adequate for the DOD components to develop implementing programs. The report made 14 major recommendations in the areas of coordination, training, policy, and metrics. It is my understanding that the Department published DOD Instruction 2200.01, “Combating Trafficking in Persons,” on February 16, 2007, incorporating recommendations from the November 2006 DOD IG report. It is my further understanding that it is the responsibility of DOD management to formulate and enforce policies regarding trafficking in persons.

It is my understanding that the DOD IG continues to encourage use of the Defense Hotline to report human trafficking abuses. In October 2004, the OIG distributed over 17,000 Defense Hotline “Trafficking in Persons” (TIP) posters to military and DOD civilian activities worldwide.

Question. In April 2006, the Commander, U.S. Multinational Forces, issued an order titled “Prevention of Trafficking in Persons in MNF-I,” aimed at preventing human trafficking abuses by contractors involving possibly thousands of foreign workers on U.S. bases in Iraq. Media reports about the problem of abuses in Iraq among contractors stated that allegations had been raised as early as 2004 with the DOD IG, but that lengthy delays occurred before a response.

What is your understanding of the role the DOD IG has played in investigating human trafficking allegations in Iraq?

Answer. It is my understanding that the OIG has worked closely with other human trafficking “stakeholders” within the DOD, and with other executive departments such as the Department of State. I also understand that the IG conducted an inquiry, based on a February 2006 request from the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)), that reviewed allegations of involuntary servitude occurring under the auspices of DOD contractors in Iraq. In its response to USD(P&R) in April 2006, the OIG concluded that it did not have the authority to investigate foreign nations or foreign companies inside countries which are the sources of laborers. Based on its review, the IG made several recommendations:

• DOD should continue to prosecute military members who become involved in TIP or TIP-related activities, in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
• DOD should ensure that all new contracts incorporate the anti-TIP clause required by a proposed change to the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation (DFAR), once it is approved.
• DOD should evaluate rewriting existing contracts to incorporate the language of the anti-TIP DFAR clause, once it is approved.
• Military department and combatant command IGs should continue their involvement in DOD efforts to combat TIP, within the limits of their authority.

The DOD IG supported changes to the DFAR to provide additional controls regarding TIP for DOD contracts performed outside of the United States. It is my understanding that an interim rule implementing the change to the DFAR was published in October 2006.

Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed as the DOD IG, to investigate and prevent the incidence of human trafficking abuses in connection with DOD activities?

Answer. If confirmed, I would promote compliance with the DOD “zero tolerance” policy by periodically evaluating DOD programs to combat human trafficking in coordination with other IGs throughout the Department.

OVERSIGHT OF DOD ACTIVITIES IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

Question. What is the relationship of the DOD IG to the SIGIR?
Answer. It is my understanding that the DOD IG has supported the operations of the SIGIR and its predecessor, the CPA Inspector General. In accordance with the IG Act and Public Law 108–106, title 3, section 3001(d)(4), the DOD OIG coordinates activities with the SIGIR as well as other oversight community members, to avoid duplicating oversight efforts and to minimize disruption to military operations. See Section O in Relationships.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the responsibilities and activities of the OIG in investigating and preventing fraud, waste, and abuse of U.S.-provided resources for reconstruction and other purposes in Iraq?

**Answer.** If confirmed, it is my goal to ensure that the oversight provided by the DOD IG of ongoing DOD activities in Iraq and Afghanistan is consistent with the responsibilities contained in the IG Act and is sufficient to provide assurance to Congress, the Secretary of Defense, and to both the American taxpayer and the warfighter that funds supporting DOD activities are expended appropriately and effectively.

**Question.** The SIGIR has jurisdiction over contracts for the reconstruction of Iraq, however, the Special IG does not have jurisdiction over contracts to support our
troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. What role do you believe the DOD IG should play in the oversight, audit, and investigation of such contracts?

Answer. The DOD IG office should have an active role in ensuring stewardship of taxpayers’ dollars and effective contract support for our troops through diligent oversight of the contracting function. This would include audits, inspections, and investigations, as required.

Question. Do you believe that a significant on-the-ground presence in Iraq is necessary to perform this role?

Answer. As noted earlier, the DOD OIG has established an office in Qatar as its in-theater base of operations for entry into Iraq as well as Afghanistan. Additionally, the OIG has established a forward operating presence at Camp Victory in Baghdad, and is in the process of initiating efforts to establish a forward deployed presence in Afghanistan.

Question. You have served as director of the Iraq-Afghanistan Joint Transition Planning Group and a special adviser to the State Department on stabilization and security operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Director of the DOD’s Iraq Transition Team.

Please describe the role that you have played in U.S. reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Answer. As Director of the Defense Department’s Iraq Transition Team, I served as part of a joint team with the Department of State to develop a plan for closing down the CPA and standing-up the U.S. Mission in Baghdad. We focused on two reconstruction objectives: (1) transforming CPA’s Reconstruction Project Management Office into the State Department-run Iraq Reconstruction Management Office; (2) establishing initial requirements for Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq with respect to staffing, location, and security.

As Special Advisor to the State Department on Stabilization and Security, the office looked at the structure, location, and security of PRTs in Afghanistan and also recommended that the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers increase its support for U.S. Agency for International Development’s reconstruction effort in that country. With the departure of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of State our mission was ended, and we did not have the time to focus on Iraq.

The Iraq/Afghanistan Transition Planning Group (IATPG), for which I am Director, focused on assessing planning coordination of U.S. Government activities in these two countries, as directed by the Secretaries of State and Defense. In the specific area of reconstruction, we provided an assessment of PRTs in Afghanistan and made recommendations for improvement in the areas of planning, integration of effort, and staffing.

Question. What is your view of the major successes of those efforts?

Answer. Standing up the U.S. Embassy, Baghdad, and closing out the CPA was accomplished on time and was successful in establishing the initial framework for integration of our diplomatic and military activities. It also provided the foundation for the development of the PRT program initiative in Iraq. In Afghanistan, the IATPG advanced the planning and evolution of the PRT effort, with special emphasis on the merging of the U.S. PRT initiative with that of the International Security Assistance Force.

Question. What is your view of the major failures of those efforts?

Answer. We should have pushed harder and sooner to combine police and military training in a strong State and Defense Department partnership in both countries. In the early stages of a counterinsurgency war, when the police have to have both police and paramilitary skills to be effective, I believe that DOD should have the lead role in training the police and the military, as is the case currently. When the situation is more permissive, then the lead can be shifted. In any event, DOD, State, and Justice need to have a strong partnership for police training to succeed rapidly.

To advance reconstruction activities, requires security and stability, which depends on effective Rule of Law. There should have been more of an integrated interagency effort on establishing a Rule of Law system from the very start of our engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I wish we could have made more progress in getting the PRTs staffed with a balanced team of both military and especially civilian skill sets required to achieve their mission.

Question. Do you see any potential for conflict between your previous role in these efforts and your new role as DOD IG, if confirmed?

Answer. I do not.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to address any such conflict?

Answer. I do not believe this will present any conflict. However, if there was every any doubt, I would recuse myself on any potential conflicts of interest.
Question. Recent press articles have criticized the decision by U.S. officials in 2003 and 2004 to shut down Iraqi state-owned enterprises, resulting in the loss of employment for thousands of Iraqis. What is your view of this issue?

Answer. At the time, I was not aware of this decision. But, one of the most critical problems faced today in Iraq is employment and economic development. We should assist the Iraqi Government to increase employment for the Iraqi people to the extent possible.

Question. Did you play any role in this decision?

Answer. I did not.

OVERSIGHT OF MEDICAL FUNCTIONS, INCLUDING OUTPATIENT ADMINISTRATION

Question. Reports of medical cases from military treatment facilities involving tragic outcomes and allegations of medical malpractice have raised questions about the adequacy of existing reporting, investigatory, and readiness systems within the Defense Health Program and military treatment facilities. The ability of those outside the military medical system to fairly evaluate individual cases and overall quality of care is affected by such factors as the tort claim laws and adversarial litigation against the United States, reliance on privileges from the release of documents and information associated with such litigation and separate quality assurance systems, patient privacy requirements, and concern about the reputations of individual providers in the housing and administration of severely injured soldiers and marines in a medical hold status at Walter Reed Army Medical Center have raised questions about the adequacy of oversight into the care of outpatients and members involved in the disability evaluation system.

Do you have any views about the role the DOD IG should play in improving visibility into and objective assessments of the quality of care provided through the military medical system?

Answer. It is my understanding that health care is a major management challenge identified in the last DOD IG Semiannual Report to Congress. In particular, the DOD IG noted that the frequency and duration of military deployments further stresses the military health system in both the Active and Reserve components.

If confirmed, I will ensure that the DOD IG continues to provide the independent review and oversight necessary of the military health system. Without the benefit of detailed information on DOD oversight efforts, I am not currently in a position to offer specific views about actions the DOD IG might take to improve its oversight of medical functions.

My belief is that the DOD IG and the Service IG have a major role to play in ensuring that these great American heroes and patriots are receiving the health care they and their families have a right to expect. But, I don’t think it stops there. DOD and Department of Veterans’ Affairs (VA) should be working hand in glove to ensure the transition between DOD and VA health care system is seamless. DOD should work with VA to ensure that the best possible treatment and care continues throughout recovery and in some cases, the rest of their life. It does not stop there— I think they should do everything possible to bring as many of our injured troops back to military duty, commensurate with their ability. We should also find civilian positions in DOD and other Federal agencies for these men and women.

Question. What resources and expertise does the DOD IG currently have—or lack—to play a more prominent role in assessing the performance of health care providers in the DOD?

Answer. I do not know the answer. If confirmed, this will be a top priority for me to ensure that DOD IG has the resources and expertise to play a prominent role in assessing and ensuring that the wounded troops coming off the battlefield are getting the care they deserve.

INTELLIGENCE

Question. What is the role of the DOD IG with regard to intelligence activities within DOD?

Answer. I am informed that the IG, through the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence, has responsibility for oversight of DOD intelligence activities and components as identified in DOD Directive 5240.1, “DOD Intelligence Activities,” dated April 25, 1988. These include all DOD components conducting intelligence activities, including the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the military department intelligence and counterintelligence activities, and other intelligence and counterintelligence organizations, staffs, and offices, or elements thereof, when used for foreign intelligence or counterintelligence purposes. Other organizations and components under the IG’s oversight not specifically
identified in DOD Directive 5240.1 include the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Responsibilities and functions of the IG as outlined in DOD Directive 5106.1, “Inspector General of the Department of Defense,” include the responsibility to audit, evaluate, monitor, and review the programs, policies, procedures, and functions of the DOD Intelligence Community to ensure that intelligence resources are properly managed.

The DOD IG performs an oversight and coordination role through the Joint Intelligence Coordination Working Group (JIOCG). The JIOCG is a DOD working group chaired by the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence and includes representatives from the Service audit agencies, military department IGs, and Defense Intelligence Agencies IGs. The primary goal of the JIOCG is to avoid duplication of effort and enhance coordination and cooperation among IGs and Auditors General inside the DOD and promote information-sharing among IGs whose functions include audits, inspections, evaluations, or investigations of their respective departments and agencies.

**Question.** What is the relationship of the DOD IG to the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight?

**Answer.** DOD Directive 5106.1 requires that intelligence-related actions be coordinated, as appropriate, with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight) (ATSD(IO)) to determine respective areas of responsibility in accordance with DOD Directive 5148.11, “Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight,” dated May 21, 2004. (DOD Directive 5148.11 contains similar language for the ATSD(IO) to coordinate with the IG, as appropriate.) I am advised that the ATSD(IO) is a charter member of the JIOCG, and that the OIG has a long history of coordination and cooperation with the ATSD(IO).

**Question.** What is the relationship of the DOD IG to the IG of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)?

**Answer.** The DOD IG's primary relationship with the DNI IG concerns participation in the Intelligence Community (IC) IG Forum. The IC IG Forum promotes information-sharing among the IGs of the departments and agencies of the IC whose functions include audits, inspections/evaluations, or investigations of their respective departments and agencies. The IC IG Forum also strives to avoid duplication of effort and enhance effective coordination and cooperation among IC IGs. The DNI IG chairs the IC IG Forum.

In addition to the IC IG Forum relationship, the DOD IG participates in various projects and initiatives undertaken by the DNI IG. The DNI IG also coordinates with the Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Intelligence on all ongoing projects relating to DOD organizations and activities.

**Question.** What is the role of the DOD IG with respect to detainee matters?

**Answer.** According to my reading of the Inspector General Act, the IG’s statutory responsibility for oversight extends to oversight of detainee and interrogation matters. In that regard, I am advised that the OIG recently issued two final reports regarding detainee abuse.

**Question.** What is the role of the DOD IG with respect to interrogation matters?

**Answer.** Please see my response to the previous question.

**Question.** Do you have any concerns about whether investigations and reviews conducted by the DOD IG with regard to intelligence activities are or have been appropriate?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that all investigations and reviews conducted have been within the IG's statutory authority.

**INVESTIGATION INTO ACTIVITIES OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY**

**Question.** The OIG recently completed an investigation into the activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy related to pre-war intelligence on Iraq and the purported links between Iraq and al Qaeda. This investigation was conducted in response to requests from the Senate. The OIG has been criticized for conducting this investigation and for the findings of the investigation.

What is your view of the OIG’s investigation into the activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

**Answer.** I have no knowledge of this case except a few news clips on the evening news.

**Question.** Do you believe that the OIG should have conducted this investigation?

**Answer.** Please see my response to the previous question.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the IG of the DOD?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

CHALLENGES

1. Senator Byrd. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, what do you see as your most significant challenge as the Department of Defense (DOD) Inspector General (IG)?

General Kicklighter. My top priority will be to learn what challenges the DOD IG office needs to address and to ensure the adequacy of resources required to accomplish its mission.

Promoting efficiency and preventing fraud in defense acquisitions will obviously be a high priority—as well as effective support for the men and women of our armed services serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. I will also ensure that the OIG pursues aggressive oversight of contracting issues. There undoubtedly are several other key matters that will merit prioritization. If confirmed, I look forward to consulting with current OIG management, the Department, and Congress, in establishing broad priorities.

CONTRACTOR WASTE

2. Senator Byrd. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, there have been many investigations and reports of contractor waste, fraud, and abuse at DOD. How do you plan to address these issues, particularly as they relate to government contractors?

General Kicklighter. Conducting effective oversight over the Department’s contracts will be among our top priorities in the IG office. The men and women of our Armed Forces, and our Nation’s taxpayers, have a right to expect that the funds appropriated by Congress for defense are being utilized with cost-efficiency and integrity.

MEDICAL SYSTEM DEFICIENCIES

3. Senator Byrd. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, recently, the military medical system has been exposed as having serious deficiencies. What do you feel that the role of the IG is in investigating these issues?

General Kicklighter. It is my understanding that health care is a major management challenge identified in the last DOD IG Semiannual Report to Congress. In particular, the DOD IG noted that the frequency and duration of military deployments further stresses the military health system in both the Active and Reserve components.

I will ensure that the DOD OIG continues to provide the independent review and oversight necessary of the military health system. Without the benefit of detailed information on DOD oversight efforts, I am not currently in a position to offer spe-
specific views about actions the DOD OIG might take to improve its oversight of medical functions.

My belief is that the DOD IG and the Service IG have a major role to play in ensuring that these great American heroes and patriots are receiving the health care they and their families have a right to expect. But, I don't think it stops there. DOD and Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) should be working hand in glove to ensure the transition between the DOD and the VA health care system is seamless. DOD should work with VA to ensure that the best possible treatment and care continues throughout recovery and in some case the rest of their lives.

MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS

4. Senator BYRD. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, what do you see as the most pressing systemic problems to be addressed within DOD?

General KICKLIGHTER. In the Semiannual Report to Congress, the OIG lists the most serious management and performance challenges faced by the DOD based on the findings and recommendations of audits, inspections, and investigations conducted during the year. In addition to the global war on terrorism, the most recent Semiannual Report to Congress lists the following challenges:

- Joint Warfighting and Readiness
- Human Capital
- Information Security and Privacy
- Acquisition Process and Contract Management
- Financial Management
- Health Care

5. Senator BYRD. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, are there other situations on the order of the Walter Reed situation that need attention before they become national media scandals?

General KICKLIGHTER. Currently, I do not have sufficient knowledge to identify such situations. It would be my goal to proactively identify programs within DOD that require the attention of management to either prevent fraud or abuse or to improve their efficiency and effectiveness.

MISSING FUNDS IN IRAQ

6. Senator BYRD. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, what do you feel is the role of the DOD IG in connection with identifying the whereabouts of billions of dollars in missing funds in Iraq—funds that might be being used by insurgents to fund operations against U.S. forces?

General KICKLIGHTER. Currently, I am not familiar with the details regarding the missing funds in Iraq. I will look at the relevant information and determine what action would be required by the Office of the Inspector General.

7. Senator BYRD. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, what do you plan to do to identify the location of and seize those funds?

General KICKLIGHTER. Please see my response to the previous question.

FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS

8. Senator BYRD. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, do you intend to further investigate the conclusions of the report prepared by Acting Inspector General Thomas Gimble regarding the pre-Iraq war activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

General KICKLIGHTER. I am not aware of any outstanding issues that require further investigation at this time. I will work with Congress to consider any further concerns and what additional work by the DOD IG would be appropriate.

9. Senator BYRD. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, do you believe that further investigation of these “inappropriate activities,” in the words of the report, is warranted?

General KICKLIGHTER. Please see my response to the previous question.

10. Senator BYRD. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, do you believe that reforms should be enacted to ensure that these activities do not take place in the future?
General Kicklighter. As stated in the DOD OIG report, the creation of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the aggressive efforts of the Director of National Intelligence's National Intelligence Council and analytic integrity and standards have contributed to a more favorable operational environment.

INVESTIGATING THE PROCUREMENT SYSTEM

11. Senator Byrd. Lieutenant General Kicklighter, as the IG for DOD, how will you identify and investigate counterfeit material and other forms of unauthorized product substitution into the procurement system?

General Kicklighter. As I understand it, the introduction of counterfeit material and other forms of unauthorized product substitution into the procurement system has historically been and continues to be one of the Office of the Inspector General's Defense Criminal Investigative Service's highest priority for deterrence, investigation, and prosecution. Product substitution investigations comprise a major part of the Defense Criminal Investigative Service inventory. We will continue the efforts already underway within the Defense Criminal Investigative Service and expand if required.

[The nomination reference of LTG Claude M. Kicklighter, USA (Ret.), follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT


Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Claude M. Kicklighter of Georgia, to be Inspector General, Department of Defense, vice Joseph E. Schmitz, resigned.

[The biographical sketch of LTG Claude M. Kicklighter, USA (Ret.), which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF CLAUDE M. "MICK" KICKLIGHTER

Claude M. Kicklighter has served his country for over 50 years, first as an Army officer for over 35 years, retiring as a Lieutenant General, followed by over 15 years as a distinguished public servant. Most recently, in October 2005, he was selected by the Secretaries of State and Defense to establish and direct the Iraq/Afghanistan Joint Transition Planning Group, a joint Department of State and Department of Defense team that has provided analysis and recommendations for coordinating efforts to address transition challenges in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In addition to serving in this position, since his retirement in 1991, Mick Kicklighter has held a number of senior positions in the Departments of Defense, State, and Veterans Affairs. Prior to his current assignment, he was the Chief of Staff, Department of Veterans Affairs. In 2004, he was designated as Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of State for Stabilization and Security Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2003, he was Director of the Department of Defense’s Iraq Transition Team that, together with the Department of State’s Iraq Transition Team, planned the inactivation of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the establishment of the new U.S. Mission Baghdad.

Prior to this, Mick Kicklighter was nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, in 2001, as Assistant Secretary for Policy and Planning, Department of Veterans Affairs, which later became the Office of Policy, Planning, and Preparedness after the attacks on September 11, 2001. In this role, he was senior advisor to the Secretary on strategic planning, policy research and analysis, program evaluation, emergency operations, preparedness, and security and law enforcement.

Previously, he served as Deputy Under Secretary of the Army for International Affairs. LTG(R) Kicklighter also was Director of our Nation’s commemorative activities in the United States and around the globe that thanked and honored our World War II veterans and their families during the 50th Anniversary of World War II.
During his more than 35-year career as a military officer, LTG(R) Kicklighter commanded units at every level from platoon through Army Division, and then commanded a theater Army. Senior level commands included serving as Commander, U.S. Army Pacific, 25 Infantry Division (Light), and the U.S. Army Security Assistance Command. He also held senior level staff assignments with the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Department of the Army, including being the Director of the Army Staff, and Chief of Staff at the Army Material Command.

During his military service, LTG(R) Kicklighter received the Distinguished Service Medal (3 awards), the Defense Superior Service Medal, the Legion of Merit (4 awards), and the Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medal (2 awards), Army Commendation Medal (5 awards) as well as various foreign decorations; Argentina Order of May, French Order National Du Merite; Korean Order of National Security Gugseon Medal; and the Silver Honorary Order of Freedom of the Republic of Slovenia.

His civilian awards include the Presidential Citizen Medal, the Eisenhower Liberation Medal, the Decoration for Exceptional Civilian Service, and the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service (twice).

While a public servant, he served on the Board of Directors for Habitat for Humanity International and as its Chairman for 3 years.

Born and raised in Glennville, GA, Mick Kicklighter graduated from Mercer University with a Bachelor of Arts Degree in biology and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in Field Artillery. He earned a Master of Arts Degree in Management of National Resources from the School of Business Administration, George Washington University, and is a graduate of the United States Army Command and General Staff College, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. His overseas tours include France, Germany, the Netherlands, Iran, and two tours in Vietnam.

Mick Kicklighter is married to the former Elizabeth Exley and they have three adult children—Elizabeth, Claude Jr., and Richard—and five grandchildren.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Claude M. Kicklighter, USA (Ret.), in connection with his nomination follows:

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. **Name:** (Include any former names used.)
   Claude M. Kicklighter, Sr.

2. **Position to which nominated:**
   Inspector General for the Department of Defense.
3. **Date of nomination:**

4. **Address:** (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. **Date and place of birth:**
22 August 1933; Glennville, GA.

6. **Marital Status:** (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
Married to Elizabeth Exley Kicklighter.

7. **Names and ages of children:**
Elizabeth Jane Kicklighter Palmer, 10/12/55; Claude Milton Kicklighter, Jr., 10/01/57; Richard Van Kicklighter, 10/14/58.

8. **Education:** List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
- **George Washington University, Washington, DC.**
  Dates attended: 09/73–08/04
  Degree: Masters of Arts Degree in Management of National Resources from the School of Business Administration, George Washington University
  Date Degree Received: 08/74
- **Mercer University, Macon, GA**
  Dates Attended: 01/53–06/55
  Degree: Bachelor of Arts/Biology
  Date Degree Received: 06/55
- **University of Georgia, Athens, GA**
  Dates Attended: 09/52–12/52
  Date Degree Received: N/A
- **Georgia Military College (Junior College), Millageville, GA**
  Dates Attended: 09/51–06/52
  Date Degree Received: N/A
- **Emory-At-Valdosta (Junior College), Valdosta, GA**
  Dates Attended: 08/50–05/51
  Date Degree Received: N/A
- **Glennville High School, Glennville, GA**
  Dates Attended: 09/46–05/50
  Diploma: High School Diploma
  Date Diploma Received: 05/50
- **Military Schools as shown on Enclosure**

9. **Employment record:** List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
- Director, Iraq/Afghanistan Transition Planning Group, Department of Defense, 1401 Wilson Blvd, Suite 400, Rosslyn, VA, 10/2005–Present.
- Chief of Staff, Department of Veterans Affairs, 810 Vermont Ave., NW, Washington DC, 02/2005–10/2005.
- Special Advisor, Department of State, 2201 C St., NW, Washington, DC, 10/2004–02/2005.
- Director, Acting, Assistant Secretary, Public and Intergovernmental Affairs, 01/2001–08/2001.
- Principal Deputy Under Secretary, Memorial Affairs, Department of Veterans Affairs, 810 Vermont Ave., NW, Washington, DC, 04/2000–01/2001.

10. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.
When I left Federal service in July 1999, I was asked to be a consultant with the Department of the Army, without compensation, and I accepted the position. I was never asked to perform any service. This appointment began in October and expired in October.
11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.

None.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.

I served on the Vestry of The Falls Church (Falls Church, VA). I am soon resigning on the Board of Enterprise Development.

13. Political affiliations and activities:
   (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.

None.

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.

None.

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

Political contributions of Elizabeth and Claude Kicklighter from March 2002 until March 2007:

2002:
16 April 2002 ................................................. Republican National Committee ................... $125.00
4 September 2002 ......................................... RNC Presidential Victory Team ..................... 125.00

2003:
31 January 2003 ............................................. Republican National Committee ................... 150.00
13 March 2003 ................................................. Republican National Committee ................... 150.00
7 July 2003 ..................................................... National Rep. Senatorial Committee ................ 100.00
9 September 2003 .......................................... Republican National Committee .................... 150.00
19 September 2003 ........................................... National Rep. Senatorial Committee .............. 100.00
12 December 2003 .......................................... National Rep. Senatorial Committee .............. 100.00

2004:
11 March 2004 ................................................ Bush-Cheney 2004 ...................................... 350.00
29 August 2004 ................................................. Bush-Cheney 2004 ...................................... 100.00
29 August 2004 ................................................. Republican National Committee ................... 150.00
31 October 2004 .............................................. Republican Presidential Trust ..................... 300.00
28 December 2004 ............................................ Republican National Committee .................. 450.00

2006:
13 February 2006 ............................................. Republican National Committee ................... 500.00
10 July 2006 ..................................................... Friends of George Allen ............................. 145.00
12 October 2006 ............................................. Republican National Committee .................. 125.00

2007:
None to Date.

My wife decides on our political contributions and signs all the checks. Even though I rarely am consulted of these contributions, I support her decisions and the right to make these contributions.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognition for outstanding service or achievements.

Presidential Citizen Medal, 1995
Eisenhower Liberation Medal (presented by the U.S Holocaust Memorial Council)
Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award, 1999
Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, 2006
Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, 1996
Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, 1994
Declaration for Exceptional Civilian Service presented by Secretary of the Army, 1998
Distinguished Service Medal with two Oak Leaf Clusters
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit with three Oak Leaf Clusters
Bronze Star Medal
Meritorious Service Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster
Army Commendation Medal with four Oak Leaf Clusters
Secretary of Defense Identification Badge
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army General Staff Identification Badge
Order of Aaron and Hur, awarded by the Chaplain's Corp
Argentina Order of May
French Order National du Merite
Korean Order of National Security Gugseon Medal
Silver honorary Order of Freedom from the Republic of Slovenia

15. **Published writings**: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.

Wrote an article for Jane's Magazine describing NATO's Central European Pipeline operation in 1981. Received a check for $200, which I returned to the publisher.

16. **Speeches**: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years of which you have copies and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

None.

17. **Commitment to testify before Senate Committees**: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

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**SIGNATURE AND DATE**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

_Claude M. Kicklighter._

This 14th day of March, 2007.

[The nomination of LTG Claude M. Kicklighter, USA (Ret.), was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 28, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on April 12, 2007.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, USAF, (Ret.), by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

**QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES**

**DEFENSE REFORMS**

**Question.** The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations. Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

**Answer.** By any measure, the Goldwater-Nichols legislation has been a resounding success. I see no need for modification at this time; if confirmed, I will be alert to the need for change.

**DUTIES**

**Question.** What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I))?
Answer. If I am confirmed for this position, my primary responsibility will be to support the Secretary of Defense in discharging his intelligence-related responsibilities and authorities under title 10 and title 50, U.S.C. This includes:
- Serving as the principal intelligence advisor to the Secretary of Defense.
- Exercising authority, direction, and control on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, over all intelligence organizations within the Department of Defense (DOD).
- Ensuring that intelligence organizations in DOD are manned, organized, trained, and equipped to support the missions of the Department.
- Ensuring that intelligence organizations in the Department which are part of the National Intelligence Community are responsive to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), in the execution of the DNI’s authorities.
- Ensuring that the combatant forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the civilian leadership of the Department are provided with appropriate intelligence support.
- Ensuring that counterintelligence activities in the Department are conducted and managed efficiently and effectively.
- Overseeing DOD personnel, facility, and industrial security to ensure adequacy, efficiency, and effectiveness.
- Serving as the Program Executive for the Military Intelligence Program (MIP), and ensuring that the Defense components of the National Intelligence Program (NIP) are robust, balanced, and in compliance with guidance and direction of the DNI.
- Ensuring the Department provides the U.S. Congress with intelligence-related information sufficient to execute its oversight responsibilities.

**Question.** What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

**Answer.** I have spent over 43 years in the profession of intelligence—in the military, in civil service, in the private sector, and in education. I have had the privilege and distinction of serving for a total of over 8 1/2 years as Director of two of the national intelligence (and combat support) agencies, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) (1991–1995) and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) (2001–2006).

I retired as a Lieutenant General in 1995, after a 32-year career in the United States Air Force. My assignments prior to my 4 years as Director of DIA almost exclusively focused on intelligence and included the Chief of Air Force intelligence during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm and as Director of Intelligence (J–2) for three combatant commands (COCOMs): U.S. Forces, Korea; Pacific Command; and Strategic Air Command. I commanded an airborne Signals Intelligence unit in combat, a national-level scientific and technical intelligence center, and an Air Force Electronic Security Wing. I served two year-long combat tours during the Southeast Asian conflict; during the second, I flew 73 combat support missions in EC–47 aircraft over Laos and Cambodia.

During my 6 1/2 years in the private sector, I served as an executive in four professional service companies in which my focus was on the Intelligence Community as a client. I both led business units, and served as a subject matter expert. I have served on numerous government boards, commissions, panels, advisory groups, and task forces, addressing intelligence-related issues. I was a member of the Downing Assessment Task Force which investigated the Khobar Towers bombings in 1996; was vice chairman of a congressionally-mandated commission chaired by former Governor Jim Gilmore of Virginia on the subject of homeland security; and was a member of the National Security Agency Advisory Board for over 4 years. I am currently the Chairman of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) External Advisory Board, and am the Intelligence and National Security Alliance Distinguished Professor of Intelligence at Georgetown University.

I have worked with the Departments of State, Justice, Energy, and Homeland Security in the course of my career, and served for a total of 11 years in the Pentagon for administrations of both political parties. I understand intelligence at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, having served in all three.

In sum, I believe I have the length, breadth, and depth of professional experience in intelligence at all levels, functions, and dimensions which distinctly qualifies me to serve as the USD(I).

**Question.** Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the USD(I)?

**Answer.** Yes. If confirmed, and if the Secretary of Defense concurs, I would restructure the organization of the USD(I) staff along functional lines, and patterned
after the DNI staff, as Director McConnell intends to restructure it. This would help synchronize the DOD intelligence components with the DNI.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?

Answer. First and foremost, I believe the Secretary would expect me to discharge the duties and functions—both explicit and implicit—outlined in the response to the previous question under “Duties.” Second, the Secretary is committed to fully supporting the DNI, and ensuring that the DNI has visibility and authority over the full range of intelligence activities in the Department, without abrogating his statutory obligations.

Third, given the magnitude of the responsibilities of the USD(I), he will look to me to transfer any non-intelligence functions and activities now residing with the position of the USD(I), to the appropriate staff element.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the following:

The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. I will attempt to relieve the Secretary of as many burdens in the intelligence domain as possible, will keep him informed, and seek his guidance and direction when appropriate.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Answer. I would endeavor to keep the Deputy fully informed, seek his guidance and direction when appropriate, and support him in his role as the alter ego of the Secretary.

The Under Secretaries of Defense.

Answer. Each of the other four under secretaries has broad-gauged responsibilities and authorities, which impact on intelligence in DOD, and vice-versa. I intend to promote dialogue, understanding, and mutual support.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Network and Information Integration (ASD(NII)).

Answer. My approach with the ASD(NII) would be the same as with the under secretaries. The relationship here needs to be especially close, since this office represents key enablers for the conduct of intelligence activities.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs.

Answer. I am not directly familiar with this office, since I did not have occasion to interact with it in my former capacity as Director of NGA. I would expect to foster close collaboration, particularly with respect to oversight of detainee interrogation policy and procedures.

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict.

Answer. In the current world environment, the importance of Special Operations has grown. There are pervasive interactions between intelligence and special operations which entail mutual support and clear lines of responsibility and oversight. I intend to pay close attention to this relationship.

The Service Secretaries and the Service Intelligence Directors.

Answer. Having served as a Service Intelligence Director, I believe I understand their perspectives and responsibilities to man, organize, train, and equip the intelligence forces in each of the Services. As such, I intend to support their needs, and work with them to address these needs primarily through the management of the MIP. I would also maintain an open dialogue with the Service Secretaries, providing guidance and direction in intelligence and related issues, when appropriate.

The General Counsel of the DOD.

Answer. I am acutely aware of the crucial role the DOD General Counsel plays, particularly because of the many complex legal issues that arise in intelligence, security, and counterintelligence. I have worked closely with this office as an Intelligence Agency Director twice, and as Chief of Air Force Intelligence. I am very interested in maintaining the current superb level of support from the Office of the DOD General Counsel, particularly the senior “embedded” attorney assigned to Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)), for liaison and requisite legal guidance.

The Commanders of the Combatant Commands.

Answer. I believe it is a prime obligation of the USD(I) to ensure that the intelligence needs of the COCOMs are fulfilled. I have served as the Director of Intelligence in three of these commands, and have visited all of them many times during the course of my career. I believe I have an informed perspective on each of them. I intend to have an open dialogue with them, and, when possible, travel to each of
the commands to understand current needs and concerns. I would anticipate working closely with the respective Directors of Intelligence (J–2s) on a routine basis.

**Question.** The Directors of the Defense Intelligence Agencies.

**Answer.** Having served as Director of two of these agencies (DIA and NGA), spent 8 years at National Security Agency (NSA), and worked closely with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) for over 30 years, I believe I have a reasonably sound grasp of the cultures, capabilities, and shortfalls of each of them. I intend to work closely with the agency directors to: (1) stay informed as to what they are doing; (2) assist them when possible; (3) and provide direction and guidance when appropriate.

**Question.** The Under Secretary of the Air Force.

**Answer.** This relationship will be different than it was when I most recently served as Director of NGA. Traditionally, this position has been dual-hatted as the Director of NRO; currently, these two positions are separate. I believe this is a much sounder arrangement. The Under Secretary's remaining responsibilities still intersect with those of the NRO, so I would anticipate coordination and collaboration.

**Question.** The Director of National Intelligence.

**Answer.** I would anticipate a very close relationship with the DNI. The Secretary of Defense wishes to synchronize DOD intelligence with the DNI. Eight of the 16 components of the Intelligence Community are embedded in DOD, which constitute a substantial portion of the Nation's intelligence capabilities and resources. I believe there are efficiencies that can be made by clarifying this relationship institutionally, and partnering with the DNI to manage intelligence as a seamless enterprise. I agree with Admiral McConnell's priorities, and intend to work cooperatively with the DNI to bring them to fruition, without compromising the Secretary's statutory responsibilities and authorities. On a personal level, Admiral McConnell and I have been professional colleagues and personal friends for over 20 years. I anticipate a very close, productive relationship with the DNI.

**Question.** The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).

**Answer.** I worked with the Director of the NCTC when I served as Director of NGA. I was committed to the success of the NCTC then, and would, if confirmed, continue to support the mission of this crucial organization. I know and greatly respect Vice Admiral Redd, having worked with him when he was a member of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission.

**Question.** The Deputy Directors of National Intelligence.

**Answer.** I would intend to foster a collaborative relationship with the DDNI's, as well as with designated counterparts on the USD(I) staff. It would be my intent, if confirmed, to pattern the USD(I) staff after the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), as Admiral McConnell intends to restructure it. This, we are both convinced, will promote closer coordination with counterparts. I have known and worked with all the Deputy Directors of National Intelligence, and would leverage these past productive working relationships, as the USD(I).

**Question.** Officials in the Department of Homeland Security with intelligence responsibilities.

**Answer.** I would intend to bolster the close relationship I had with these officials when I served as Director of NGA. I am familiar with these elements, since NGA provides dedicated support to them, particularly during national security special events, and in the wake of natural disasters such as Hurricanes Rita/Katrina. I have known the current Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, Charlie Allen, for over a quarter of a century; he is a respected professional colleague and close personal friend, and I would anticipate a continued close and collaborative relationship.

**MAJOR CHALLENGES, PROBLEMS, AND PRIORITIES**

**Question.** In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the USD(I)?

**Answer.** Since I am nominated but not confirmed, I do not have an inside perspective, but believe there are sets of issues that are virtually perpetual, which I would outline as follows:

- **Internal to USD(I):** There are organizational, structural, and personnel issues that will have to be dealt with arising from a change in leadership.
- **Internal to DOD:** Collectively, there are challenges confronting all of the eight intelligence components of the Department. Similarly, each has component-centric issues and challenges. If confirmed, I will have to select and rank those which merit the attention from the USD(I) level. This includes—by way of example, but not exhaustion—acquisition challenges at NSA, NGA, and the NRO; human capital issues across all components; programming and financial management issues; oversight concerns involving the
nexus of the needs of national security and civil liberties; the balancing of resources to satisfy many competing requirements, et cetera. Above all, of course, are the continuing challenges involved in ensuring intelligence support to our forces in harm’s way, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan. This includes—again, by way of selected examples—intelligence support to thwarting improvised explosive devices, sharing intelligence with coalition forces, ensuring the flow of intelligence to and through the “last tactical mile” (or, perhaps more aptly, the “first tactical mile”); countering the adversary use of the internet; and substantially improving foreign language capabilities.

- Intelligence Community: A major challenge (and an opportunity, as well) is to crystallize the relationship with the DNI. Challenges here include sharing and collaboration between and among the “stovepipes;” overhauling security policies; improving acquisition; clarifying roles and responsibilities in clandestine activities, building on the success of the National Clandestine Service; and transforming analysis.

**Question.** What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the USD(I)?

**Answer.** This question infers to me “what are the internal obstacles to optimum performance of the USD(I) staff in the discharge of its functions and responsibilities?” It appears to me that the current organizational structure of the USD(I) is neither optimized for the missions it must perform, nor postured for the relationship that should exist with the DNI. The lack of a designated full-time deputy has hindered internal coordination. Moreover, I do not believe the current staff is large enough to fulfill their existing responsibilities.

**Question.** Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

**Answer.** See answer below.

**Question.** What management actions and timelines would you establish to address these problems?

**Answer.** See answer below.

**Question.** What broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the USD(I)?

**Answer.** I would cite the organizing principles of General Templar, the successful architect of the British counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya:

- Get the priorities right
- Get the instructions right
- Get the organization right
- Get the right people into the organization
- Get the right spirit into the people
- Get out of the way so they can get on with it.

If confirmed, I would intend to use the short tenure I will have as an advantage, by focusing on the issues I have outlined in the responses to the earlier question on major challenges, and driving progress with a sense of urgency.

Accordingly, I anticipate promulgating a “Campaign Plan”—a concise, yet comprehensive statement of strategic intent, in which I would describe objectives, priorities, and instructions, to reinforce those of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary. This will be the vehicle I would use to articulate a common understanding, and to elicit a common commitment by all DOD intelligence components, to a shared set of goals.

I would hope to roll out this “Campaign Plan” very early in my tenure. In doing so, I intend to consult with the four Agency Directors and the four Service Intelligence Chiefs to gain their “buy-in.” I would intend to capitalize on the initiative already underway to build integrated ground architecture, and to harmonize that with similar efforts underway by the DNI. This will form the basis for real-time collaboration and data dissemination to the warfighter. I would intend to empower the component heads by delegating the authorities necessary to lead their components, and in so doing ensure that USD(I) is an enabler, not an impediment, to their success.

I would rely upon them. I have “been there, done that,” both as an Agency Director (twice), a Service Intelligence Chief, and a J–2 (three times), so I know their respective perspectives. I would demand that they lead and manage their respective components as part of the enterprise—and then hold them accountable—just as I wanted to be treated when I held these positions.

I would particularly engage the active participation of the Service Intelligence Chiefs—who these days are understandably consumed with operational issues—in
the dynamics of DOD intelligence. Their tactical military perspectives are crucial. I would plan to engage actively with the Military Intelligence Board, and to invigorate the Senior Military Intelligence Officer Conferences as a forum to engage all the component leadership.

Staff members who are expert only in DOD must be rotated to the agencies, Services, or COCOMs to gain “life experiences,” (in accord with the emphasis on “joint duty” for the entire Intelligence Community). Overseers must be at least as knowledgeable as those whom they oversee. Similarly, other experts need to be brought in to deal with new and changing challenges, to replace dedicated but out-dated bureaucrats.

Where appropriate, I would intend to travel to commands with component heads or their senior representative, involving them in problem identification and resolution.

I would look for ways to implement small, quick-reaction capabilities, which often get lost in the wake of the “big ticket” programs.

I would impose a “Ten-Day Rule” for staffing issues and making decisions, acknowledging that many issues are complex and perpetual.

I would intend to conduct an in-progress review of human intelligence activities, both within the Department (to include the involvement of Special Operations), and externally with the CIA and the National Clandestine Service.

In sum, I would quote from LTC John Nagl’s landmark book, “Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife.” While nominally a comparison of the British experience in Malaya to that of the American effort in Vietnam, it is really about cultural change, or more precisely, about the manner in which organizations fail to adapt to change. Nagl cites an instructive exchange between Field Marshal Montgomery and Colonial Secretary Lyttelton, as they contemplated the way ahead in Malaya:

“Dear Lyttelton:
Malaya.
We must have a plan.
We must have a man.
When we have a man with a plan, we will succeed.
Not otherwise.
Montgomery.”

I trust the committee, and in turn the full Senate, will support this man with a plan.

INFORMATION SUPERIORITY

Question. One major criticism of the creation of the Office of the USD(I) was the separation of intelligence from the Department’s other information-intensive functions (such as command, control, information systems, Chief Information Officer, and cyberspace defense) and the creation of a new Assistant Secretary position to manage the latter (the ASD(NII)). Critics argued that it was unwise to split these functions, since they are inherently closely related and should be integrated as part of a strategy for achieving “information superiority.” The counterargument was that the intelligence function had become so important and complex after September 11 that it required full-time attention at the under secretary level.

Do you believe that the USD(I) and ASD(NII) positions should remain separate?

Answer. Yes. I regard the establishment of the position of USD(I) as long-overdue recognition of the importance, magnitude, and complexity of intelligence. There is no more rationale for subordinating intelligence to the stewards of the means for conveying and protecting it, than for any other form of information. Virtually any endeavor in DOD—operations, logistics, acquisition, medical, personnel, as well as intelligence—are all information-intensive. The ASD(NII) now has a holistic perspective to all forms of information, not just intelligence. It is in a better position to look across all information domains, and promote integration, robust networking, and security.

Question. If you do think the positions should remain separate, do you think that there are adequate mechanisms in place for coordination and integration of the two broad functions?

Answer. Again, I do not have the “insider” perspective, but it is my impression that sufficient coordination and integration mechanisms for the two functions do exist. If confirmed, I would certainly plan to verify that this is so, and would take appropriate action if I see need for improvement.
INFORMATION SHARING

**Question.** There are still strong barriers to sharing, or allowing access to, the mass of intelligence data that has not been included in finished reports or analyses and approved for dissemination within the Intelligence Community.

In one response to the problem, Congress mandated an “information sharing pilot” program between the NSA and the DIA’s Joint Intelligence Task Force for Combating Terrorism (JITF–CT), which provided access for JITF–CT analysts to some NSA databases containing unevaluated or “raw” intelligence. This pilot program demonstrated that U.S. persons’ privacy can be fully protected by giving non-NSA analysts the same training that NSA analysts receive in minimization procedures, subjecting the non-NSA analysts to the same auditing procedures, and ensuring that non-NSA analysts would be disciplined the same as NSA analysts for any transgressions. Since this pilot concluded, NSA and DIA have negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) making access permanent. This MOU is now available to other intelligence agencies as a model agreement for broadening access to NSA terrorism information (but not information collected under the Terrorist Surveillance Program).

**Question.** Do you support extending the access that DIA’s JITF–CT has gained to NSA databases to other organizations?

**Answer.** Like the NSA/DIA “information sharing pilot” mandated by Congress, NSA and NGA embarked on a similar arrangement whereby NGA employees were given access to selected NSA “raw” databases in the interest of collaboration between the disciplines of signals intelligence (SIGINT) and GEOINT. The centerpiece for this relationship was the GEOCELL, but the approach was expanded to other collection and analytic challenges. The agreement I struck with General Hayden, then Director, NSA, was that any NGA employees who were given (selected) access to SIGINT data had to abide by the same rules as NSA employees, i.e. training, compliance with U.S. Signal Intelligence Directive 18, auditing, and accountability for any transgressions. This program enjoyed great success, and is still extant. So, yes, absolutely, I would support selectively extending such access to other agencies and other issues, under the same ground rules.

**Question.** If this model can work for NSA’s sensitive SIGINT information, do you believe it would also work for CIA’s human intelligence databases?

**Answer.** Yes, I do, with the provision of analogous ground rules.

**Question.** Do you support the concept of cross-agency and cross-discipline analytic collaboration, either virtually or through physical co-location, on the basis of common missions or targets where all the analysts have common access?

**Answer.** Yes, I do, when such arrangements make sense and hold the promise of better intelligence products, services, and solutions. My only reservation about such arrangements is that in the rush to proliferate and “universalize” them, tradecraft considerations are compromised. That is, one of the great strengths of our system of intelligence is the championing of the respective tradecraft by each of the intelligence disciplines. We must be careful not to homogenize all analysis; each form brings complementary attributes to the table, which serves to promote competitive analysis.

**Question.** Do you support the paradigm that the information gathered by the various collection agencies, such as CIA, NSA, and DIA, is not “owned” by those agencies, and those agencies not control decisions about who should get access to collected information?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Should the DNI, rather than individual agencies, decide who should get access?

**Answer.** Yes. The DNI should have benefit of input from each of the data “owners,” but the rule sets should be established by the DNI.
**HOMELAND DEFENSE**

*Question.* With the establishment of the positions of USD(I), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and the Commander of Northern Command, DOD has been fundamentally reorganized to better address the critical homeland defense mission.

In your view, what challenges lie ahead in integrating the intelligence capabilities of DOD with those of the Department of Homeland Security and other associated Federal, State, and local agencies?

*Answer.* I believe there are two dimensions to this question. One relates to intelligence support to military forces which are under the aegis of Northern Command (NORTHCOM). The relationship is straightforward and conventional—that is, intelligence support is rendered to NORTHCOM and its subordinate components, just as it would be rendered to any other COCOM.

The second relates to the support which may be rendered to the Department of Homeland Security, or some component of the Department, directly. This is primarily, but not exclusively, an issue for the agencies. In NGA’s case, for example, virtually all of its products, services, and solutions traditionally employed in a foreign intelligence context can be applied in a domestic context. Two issues are relevant here: (1) legal constraints on domestic surveillance, and (2) potential competition for resources. It has been my experience that both concerns are manageable.

I think the Department of Homeland Security has a very important role to play, to broker, validate, and prioritize requirements from all of its constituents, particularly at the State and local levels. I do not believe it prudent to allow, for example, direct tasking of Intelligence Community components by State and local officials. There must always be a “lead Federal agency” to vet and sponsor such needs.

*Question.* Does DOD’s existing requirements process adequately support the establishment of intelligence requirements for the homeland defense mission?

*Answer.* I do not have current information about how the process works now, but from my NGA experience, I thought it worked well.

*Question.* As a former Director of the NGA, do you believe that you had sufficient latitude and resources to assist domestic authorities in emergency situations, such as existed in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks?

*Answer.* Yes, I did.

*Question.* Are you satisfied that there is adequate oversight within the DOD on the domestic activities of the U.S. NORTHCOM?

*Answer.* I have no evidence to the contrary, but if confirmed, would be vigilant to concerns about domestic surveillance activities.

**TRANSFORMATION**

*Question.* Secretary Rumsfeld established transformation of the Armed Forces to meet 21st century threats as one of his highest priorities.

In your judgment, what is the role of intelligence in the overall transformation process?

*Answer.* Intelligence is a key enabler for transformation. I can think of no military capability or doctrinal tenet that would not be heavily dependent on and influenced by intelligence.

*Question.* Specifically for the Defense Intelligence Community, what do you believe transformation should mean?

*Answer.* I believe there are two meanings implied in this question. As indicated in the response to the previous question, intelligence is a key enabler for transformation writ large. While it is enabling department-wide transformation, intelligence must transform itself as well. This means transformation of policies, tactics, techniques, procedures, and technology.

*Question.* In your view, what transformational capabilities does our Intelligence Community require?

*Answer.* One could name a long list; some illustrative examples follow: We should ultimately acquire the global “god’s eye” and “god’s ear” collection and surveillance capability for foreign intelligence needs. We need a robust integrated ground architecture that is secure, consistent, reliable, and has multi-level security. We need much more automation to relieve analysts of tedious “grunt” work that can be done by computers (e.g., automatic target recognition, automatic feature extraction, to name two specific cases I am familiar with). We must improve collaboration and information sharing both internally within the Intelligence Community, and externally with partners and customers. We need to vastly improve language capability and proficiency.
THE ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

Question. The defense intelligence structure has evolved over the years, most recently with the creation of the Defense Human Intelligence Service in 1996, the establishment of the NGA in 1997, the formation of the Counterintelligence Field Activity (CIFA) in 2002, the creation of the Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, and the evolution of the Joint Intelligence Centers at the COCOMs into Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs).

Answer. One is the current organizational structure of defense intelligence the best structure to support military and national intelligence needs?

Question. If not, what changes would you recommend to the current structure?

Answer. I have given this matter a great deal of thought. At this point in time, I have no major recommendations for change. Both the DNI and the USD(I) are works in progress. I think we would be well served to allow them to mature before mandating yet more change.

In the future, however, it may be worth considering the stand-up of a cabinet-level Department of Intelligence, composed of the major "engines of intelligence." Such a construct would provide products, services, and solutions in common to a wide variety of customers. Even after the IRTPA, we still have the basic organizational framework that has been built piecemeal since 1947. I believe that intelligence is so crucial to the safety and security of this Nation, that it could merit the stature and prominence represented by a full-fledged cabinet department. This is not to suggest that, under such a construct, the other cabinet departments—most notably DOD—would not still require robust organic intelligence capabilities. However, I see no prospect that such a radical change is feasible, so it is not something I would recommend at this time.

Question. Do you think that DOD and the ODNI are effectively integrated operationally?

Answer. No, I do not; this is not a criticism necessarily, but rather a function of a new arrangement and new relationships maturing. As stated previously, both organizations are works in progress. I have every confidence that integration, coordination, and collaboration will continue to improve.

Question. Do you believe that the ODNI is organized properly to enable efficient joint planning and execution of intelligence operations and activities?

Answer. I believe that neither the ODNI nor the USD(I) staffs are organized optimally to promote efficient collaboration and coordination. Both need restructuring; if confirmed, I intend to pattern the USD(I) staff after his reorganized DNI staff. Doing so will facilitate staff interactions and promote synchronization.

Question. For example, is there an analog to the DOD JIOC under the DNI? Should there be?

Answer. One component of the DNI structure, the NCTC, is "JIOC-like." Otherwise, the DNI's missions and responsibilities are not "operational" in the classic DOD sense.

HUMAN INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Question. Former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld emphasized enhancing the human intelligence capabilities of the DOD both within the Defense HUMINT Service and Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Military forces, and especially SOCOM forces, have been assigned the mission to conduct military operations against terrorists abroad. This mission requires that the military be prepared to act against terrorist targets in a wide variety of situations abroad. It has been asserted that DOD personnel have deployed to foreign countries and engaged in counter-terrorism activities without the approval or knowledge of the cognizant Ambassador or the State Department. Concerns have also been raised that some military activities constitute covert actions that under the law require a presidential finding.

Do you think that military activities in the areas of intelligence gathering, preparation of the battlefield, and the use of force, conducted pursuant to the counter-terrorism mission, constitute covert actions under the law?
Answer. The term “covert action” is statutorily defined to mean “an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly. . . .” Conversely, as I understand it, Congress also statutorily stipulated certain categories of activities which would not constitute covert action. They include acquiring intelligence, traditional counterintelligence, traditional operational security, traditional military activities, or administrative activities. Clandestine activities—a term that is not statutorily defined—are those activities conducted in secret, but which are, in an intelligence context, passive in nature. For me, the crucial distinction lies in whether an activity is “passive” (which is the case with intelligence activities) or “active” (which is the case with covert action). It is my understanding that military forces are not conducting “covert action.”

Question. Do you think that the (U.S.) ambassador in a country should always be informed of all military activities taking place in that country?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would only have jurisdiction over DOD intelligence activities. My cardinal rule when I was the Director of DIA was that all military intelligence activities under DIA’s purview would be made known to, and approved by, the respective Ambassador and Chief of Station. I would, if confirmed, continue that policy.

Question. Do you think that coordination and cooperation among the DOD, the State Department, and the ODNI have been adequate regarding sensitive military operations abroad?
Answer. I am not in a position to answer this question authoritatively. If confirmed, I would certainly be attentive to this concern.

Question. To your knowledge, what is the Department’s policy with respect to acknowledging that the U.S. military personnel involved are members of the U.S. Armed Forces in the event that they are taken into custody by a foreign nation in which they are conducting these activities?
Answer. Assuming “these activities,” are “clandestine” (as opposed to “covert actions”), the operative DOD policy is to acknowledge the affiliation of military members in such a circumstance.

Question. What are your views regarding the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission that DOD take over responsibility for all so-called paramilitary missions?
Answer. I am personally opposed to this proposal. I think it would remove an “arrow from the quiver” of potential capabilities available to the President.

NEED FOR INDEPENDENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS

Question. Intelligence analysis should be independent and free of political pressure that it reach a certain conclusion, including a conclusion that fits a particular policy preference.
If confirmed, would you ensure that all intelligence analysts within DOD, including those who may be seconded to offices that are not part of the defense intelligence structure, is free from such pressure?
Answer. Yes. Absolutely.

Question. What is your position on whether intelligence officers and analysts should be able to testify to Congress on their professional conclusions regarding a substantive intelligence issue even if those views conflict with administration positions?
Answer. I have hard-won personal experience in this regard. Accordingly, I have a very strong conviction that intelligence officers should be free to speak their mind before Congress. This is regardless of whether their views comport with administration positions or not, so long as it is made clear that such views are personal, not those of the administration.

CONTROL OF INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES WITHIN THE DOD

Question. The IRTPA of 2004 granted the DNI control over the preparation and execution of the NIP budget and tasking of national intelligence operations. However, IRTPA also contained language asserting that nothing in the act should be construed as to impair the authorities of secretaries of cabinet departments, and the Secretary of Defense has delegated “direction, control, and authority” over the national intelligence organizations within DOD to the USD(I)—the highest form of authority in the executive branch.
What are your views on the balance of authorities accorded in IRTPA to the DNI and to cabinet secretaries, particularly the Secretary of Defense?
Answer. In a sense, they appear to be evenly balanced. On one hand, Title I of the IRTPA ascribes extensive authorities over the Intelligence Community to the
DNI, on the other hand, section 1018 stipulates that these authorities are to be executed “... in a manner that respects and does not abrogate the statutory responsibilities of the heads of departments. . . .”

Question. What are your views on the extent of the grant of “authority, direction, and control” to the USD(I) over DOD national intelligence organizations?

Answer. The phrase “authority, direction, and control” is the highest expression of executive branch power and influence. The dictionary definitions of these terms are quite inclusive and encompassing. In practice, however, policies, practices, and procedures have evolved since 1947 so that the exercise of “authority, direction, and control” virtually always comports with the requirements of the (now) DNI, based upon mutual understanding. I have served as Director of two Combat Support Agencies, which also have national intelligence responsibilities. There is an art form to balancing both obligations. The more time I have spent in the Intelligence Community, the more I have come to appreciate the importance of both personal relationships among senior leaders and the value of established ways of conducting business. These factors are almost as influential as statutes and their interpretation.

Question. Do you believe that the relationships, authorities, processes, and structures in place between DOD and the DNI provide sufficient influence for the DOD to ensure that the intelligence capabilities DOD will need in the future to prepare and conduct military operations will be developed and acquired through the NIP?

Answer. Yes. There is a long history of the NIP (in its previous form as the National Foreign Intelligence Program) satisfying military requirements. I have seen no degradation in this practice. The USD(I) is in a strong position to influence such support. Moreover, the newly created MIP in DOD is much more coherent, and a better parallel to the NIP, than was the combination of the predecessor program, the Joint MIP and the aggregation of what was called Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities. These two programs (the NIP and MIP) provide a congruent programmatic basis for improved intelligence capabilities.

PERSONNEL SECURITY

Question. The Washington Post reported on February 7, 2007, that Admiral McConnell, in testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, expressed the intention to alter the rules governing the granting of security clearances to U.S. citizens who are naturalized or born here to immigrant parents. Under existing rules, it is difficult for these citizens to gain security clearances if any of their family members live abroad or are not citizens. This hurdle makes it very difficult for the Intelligence Community to hire American citizens with much-needed language skills, cultural knowledge, and physical characteristics to assist in the war on terrorism, counterproliferation, counternarcotics, and other critical missions.

Do you agree with the view attributed to the DNI regarding the need to re-examine the rules and processes for clearing U.S. citizens in light of the pressing needs of the Intelligence Community for the skills our citizens possess?

Answer. Yes.

JOINT DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Act mandated joint-duty tours for military officers as a condition for promotion and instituted processes intended to ensure that personnel serving in joint-duty billets are promoted at the same or higher rates as those who did not serve in joint-duty assignments. This measure was enacted in order to raise the quality of personnel serving in joint assignments, such as on the Joint Staff, COCOM staffs, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and to instill a joint perspective in the officer corps across the Armed Forces. By any measure, this requirement has paid enormous dividends. The 9/11 Commission urged adoption of similar requirements for Intelligence Community civilian personnel, to achieve the same goals—improving the quality of staff serving in community positions, and nurturing joint perspectives. The IRTPA of 2004 did not actually mandate the adoption of this reform, and, to date, the Office of the DNI has not acted on the 9/11 Commission recommendation.
The new DNI has indicated a strong desire to establish an ironclad joint tour requirement for Intelligence Community civilians. If confirmed, would you support this decision?

Answer. Philosophically, I am in agreement with Intelligence Community civilian employees diversifying their professional horizons through joint duty. I spent 9 years on active duty after the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and experienced (endured) the evolution of the rules governing joint duty, particularly which billets “counted” for joint duty credit, and which ones didn’t. As in all such initiatives which potentially have a profound impact on employees’ careers and lives, the “devil will be in the details” of implementation. I would hope that the components of the Intelligence Community are granted some latitude to manage this program in a “crawl-walk-run” manner to achieve the objective.

Question. Would you support legislation in this area if the DNI judges it to be necessary?

Answer. Yes, but I would hope the program could be developed and executed without legislation.

ACQUISITION OVERSIGHT

Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 and the IRTPA of 2004 mandated that Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) could no longer be delegated to, or exercised by, the Director of the NSA. Congress took this action because of serious deficiencies in NSA’s systems acquisition capabilities that prevented the Agency from effectively modernizing SIGINT capabilities to meet new threats. Since Congress first acted to stimulate better executive branch oversight of NSA systems acquisition, NSA’s transformation program, Trailblazer, has been terminated because of severe management problems, and its successor, Turbulence, is experiencing the same management deficiencies that have plagued NSA since at least the end of the Cold War.

What is your view of the seriousness of the acquisition management problems at NSA?

Answer. While I have some familiarity with acquisition issues at NSA, I am not sufficiently informed about current challenges to comment authoritatively.

Question. What are your views about the ability of current NSA personnel to effectively execute a transformation program?

Answer. I have the highest regard for the NSA workforce. I have no doubt about their ability to execute a transformation program.

Question. Do you think that the Turbulence activity should remain disaggregated and not managed as an integrated major program?

Answer. Again, I am not informed about the Turbulence activity. If confirmed, I would intend to become familiar with it, and then, in consultation with Director, National Security Agency and the DNI, decide what action should be taken.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to strengthen oversight of NSA’s transformation efforts?

Answer. If confirmed, I would first determine what oversight is currently underway, and work with the DNI staff to establish a coherent, systematic, and joint DNI/USDI (in conjunction with USD(AT&L) oversight program.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE FIELD ACTIVITY (CIFA)

Question. The DOD has established an organization called the CIFA. CIFA is reportedly charged with protecting military facilities and personnel and carrying out intelligence collection, analysis, and operations within the United States. Do you believe that it is appropriate that DOD has such an organization (CIFA)?

Answer. Yes. It is imperative that foreign collection efforts against the Department are aggressively detected, and then neutralized. CIFA fulfills the counterintelligence mission at the strategic (in contrast to the operational or tactical) level. This is an inherent responsibility of the Department which I feel cannot be abrogated. It is equally important that the proper balance be struck between the counterintelligence mission on one hand, and the protection of civil liberties on the other.

Question. What is the appropriate division of functions and responsibilities between such a DOD organization and the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX) within the Intelligence Community?

Answer. CIFA’s focus is on DOD equities, whereas the NCIX has a broader, national perspective. NCIX promulgates broad strategies; reaches out to industry, academic institutions, and other non-military entities; and it oversees the counterintelligence functions in other government agencies and departments. If confirmed, I will look for opportunities to promote closer collaboration between CIFA and the NCIX.

Question. Are you comfortable with CIFA reporting to the USD(I)?
CIFA is responsible for the TALON data base that was found to have inappropriately included information on U.S. persons, including reports on peaceful civilian protests and demonstrations inside the United States, in contradiction of Executive orders and the rules published by DOD.

Answer. Yes, I am comfortable with the current reporting chain, but if confirmed, I will explore other options.

Question. What are your views on the steps that should be taken to preclude the possibility that CIFA or any other DOD organization deals inappropriately with information on U.S. persons?

Answer. I am strongly supportive of protecting civil liberties. The history of the Intelligence Community is replete with instances of abuse of civil liberties—well intended, but abuse nonetheless. The requisite elements of a program to prevent such abuse are: (1) clearly articulated and widely publicized policies; (2) training, both basic and refresher; and (3) a mechanism to verify compliance independently. I am given to understand that in the instant case, corrective actions have been taken to preclude the collection and inclusion of such inappropriate information. If confirmed, I would plan to familiarize myself in more detail with the corrective actions taken and underway, and their effectiveness. I will be particularly interested in determining how compliance is monitored independently.

ROLE IN ACQUIRING SPACE SYSTEMS

Question. If confirmed, what role do you anticipate you would have in the requirements process for, and in oversight of, the acquisition of space systems, including space systems for which milestone decision authority rests with either the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics or the DOD Executive Agent for Space?

Answer. I am not informed on exactly which space reconnaissance systems are under the milestone decision authority of either of these officials. If there are such systems under their purview, I would, if confirmed, expect to be heavily involved in these management processes, particularly the exercise of milestone decision authority.

INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT

Question. On February 9, 2007, the DOD Inspector General (IG) issued a report titled "Report on Review of the Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy." That report concluded that the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) "developed, produced, and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al Qaeda relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decisionmakers." The DOD IG concluded that these actions were "inappropriate," and that "this condition occurred because the OUSD(P) expanded its role and mission from formulating Defense Policy to analyzing and disseminating alternative intelligence."

What are your views of the IG's report?

Answer. I have read both the DOD IG report on this matter and the OUSD(P) rebuttal. I think this episode is a regrettable example of apparent lack of trust in the analyses performed by the Intelligence Community. I note that this occurred before the establishment of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. If confirmed, and if such a situation were to arise again, I would hope to be involved, to ensure that: (1) policymakers and decisionmakers are fully supported; (2) that all potential intelligence alternatives are thoroughly explored and vetted; and (3) that any differing viewpoints are made known to all involved parties.

As a general comment, I am strongly opposed to any misrepresentation or distortion of intelligence.

Question. If you are confirmed, how would you ensure that DOD intelligence elements, as distinct from policy offices, engage in intelligence activities?

Answer. The first priority in this context is vigilance. Intelligence officials must be alert to attempts by those outside the Intelligence Community to engage in intelligence analysis. There are, however, no empirical criteria for determining whether intelligence is being distorted or misrepresented, or is simply being tested and subjected to alternative points of view. One man's legitimate "red team" is another man's inappropriate intelligence activity. To some extent, this is in the realm of beauty (or lack thereof) being in the eye of the beholder.

DOD INTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION POLICY

Question. DOD Directive Number 3115.09 assigns the USD(I) responsibility for providing oversight of intelligence operations, detainee debriefings, and tactical
questioning, and ensuring overall development, coordination, approval, and promul-
gation of DOD policies and implementation of plans related to intelligence interroga-
tions, detainee debriefings, and tactical questioning.

Do you support the policy set forth in the July 7, 2005, memorandum issued by
Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regu-
lations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article
3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. Yes. I fully support this policy.

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the re-
vised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006,
and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program,
dated September 5, 2006?

Answer. Yes. I fully support these standards.

Question. If confirmed, will you ensure that all DOD policies promulgated and
plans implemented related to intelligence interrogations, detainee debriefings, and
tactical questioning comply with the Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
and the Army Field Manual on interrogations?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that all relevant DOD policies and plans com-
ply with applicable U.S. law and international obligations, including Common Arti-
cle 3.

Question. Do you share the view of the Judge Advocates General that standards
for detainee treatment must be based on the principles of reciprocity, in which we
treat our own detainees may have a direct impact on the manner in which U.S. sol-
diers, sailors, airmen, or marines are treated, should they be captured in future con-
licts?

Under DOD Directive Number 3115.09, the USD(I) is responsible for developing
policies and procedures, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Ac-
quision, the DOD General Counsel, and the appropriate DOD components, to en-
sure that all contracts in support of intelligence interrogation operations include the
obligation to comply with the standards of DOD Directive Number 3115.09 and ex-
clude performance of inherently governmental functions in accordance with DOD Di-
rective 1100.4 and that all contractor employees are properly trained.

Answer. I strongly hold the view that the manner in which the United States
treats detainees may well impact how captured U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, or ma-
rines are treated in future conflicts. I believe that the Department’s policies must
be documented accordingly.

Question. What do you believe is the proper role of contractors in intelligence in-
terrogation operations?

Answer. I believe it is permissible for contractors to participate in detainee inter-
rogations, as long as they comply with the policies and guidance which govern DOD
military and civilian interrogators. As I understand it, DOD contractors who con-
duct government-approved interrogations must be properly supervised and closely
monitored throughout the interrogation process, and may not, themselves, approve,
supervise, or monitor interrogations.

Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that intelligence in-
terrogation operations are performed in a manner consistent with the requirements
of the manpower mix and that contractors involved in such operations do not per-
form inherently governmental functions?

Answer. If confirmed, I would ensure compliance with relevant DOD directives.
These require that DOD contractors be trained and certified to the same standard
as DOD military and civilian interrogators, that contract interrogators be properly
supervised when conducting interrogations, and that contractors do not approve, su-
ervise, or oversee interrogations. I would review, approve, and ensure coordination
of all DOD component plans, policies, orders, directives, and doctrine related to in-
telligence interrogation operations, to include the role of contractors.

INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES

titled “Review of DOD-Directed Investigations of Detainee Abuse” included the fol-
lowing finding: “The USD(I) in coordination with the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces
Command, should develop and implement policy and procedures to preclude intro-
ducing survival, escape, resistance, and evasion (SERE) techniques in an environ-
ment other than training.”

Do you agree with the recommendation of the DOD IG that SERE techniques
should not be introduced into an environment other than training?
Answer. Yes. I fully agree with the DOD IG’s recommendation and support the U.S. Joint Forces Commander’s policy prohibiting Joint Personnel Recovery Agency personnel from participating in any aspect of the intelligence interrogation process.

Question. Has this finding been implemented by the USD(I)?

Answer. I am given to understand that the USD(I) fully supports the U.S. Joint Forces Commander’s policy prohibiting Joint Personnel Recovery Agency personnel from participating in any aspect of the intelligence interrogation process. The OUSD(I) has requested that U.S. Joint Forces Command restate this prohibition in its interrogation policy.

Question. If confirmed, would you ensure that policies and procedures are developed and implemented to preclude the introduction of SERE techniques in an environment other than training?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the Commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command interrogation policy prohibits Joint Personnel Recovery Agency personnel from participating in any aspect of intelligence interrogation operation.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the USD(I)?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents.

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK Pryor

INFORMATION SHARING

1. Senator Pryor. Lieutenant General Clapper, what policies would you plan to implement to secure a more effective information sharing relationship to prepare State and local first responders to a terrorist event or natural disaster?

General Clapper. As a result of my experience on the Gilmore Commission, as well as my time as Director of National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), I have become a strong proponent of sharing as much information as possible with first responders, within the constraints of law. If confirmed, I would work with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and the appropriate officials of the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of Information Sharing Environment to promote more timely and pervasive sharing of intelligence-related information to this constituency. As well, I would ensure that any requirements that Northern Command has in this area would be addressed.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. Inhofe

OPEN SOURCE INTELLIGENCE

2. Senator Inhofe. Lieutenant General Clapper, when you were Director of the NGA, you were a champion for using open source information, including commercial imagery to support the intelligence mission. Given the changing nature of the threats we face and the availability of open source information, do you plan to continue the work you did at NGA to encourage and expand the use of open source data within the broader defense intelligence mission? The committee is aware of
agency initiatives to enrich classified information with open source, but unfortunately they have suffered from inconsistent funding and support.

General CLAPPER. If confirmed, I would most definitely emphasize the utility and more pervasive use of open source information in the broader defense intelligence context. If a DOD Coordinator of Open Source information has not been designated, I would move to so designate someone at a senior level to serve as the parallel with the DNI’s Director of Open Source.

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[The nomination reference of Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr., USAF, (Ret.), follows:]

**Nomination Reference and Report**

**As In Executive Session,**

**Senate of the United States,**


Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

James R. Clapper, Jr., of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, vice Stephen A. Cambone.

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[The biographical sketch of Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr., USAF, (Ret.), which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

**Biographical Sketch of Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr., USAF, Retired**

James R. Clapper, Jr., has devoted over 4 decades of service to the Nation in the profession of intelligence—in the military, in industry, in civil service, and in education.

He has the distinction of having served as director of two national intelligence agencies for a total of over 8½ years—the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) 1991–1995, and the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA) 2001–2006.

He retired as a Lieutenant General in 1995, after a 32-year career in the United States Air Force. His assignments prior to his 4 years as Director of DIA almost exclusively focused on intelligence and included the Chief of Air Force intelligence during Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm and as (another singular distinction) Director of Intelligence for three combatant commands: United States Forces, Korea, Pacific Command, and Strategic Air Command. He previously commanded an airborne Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) unit in combat, a national-level scientific and technical intelligence center, and an Air Force SIGINT Wing. He served 2-year-long combat tours during the Southeast Asian conflict; during the second, he flew 73 combat support missions in EC–47s over Laos and Cambodia.

During his 6 years in industry, he was an executive in three successive professional services companies, where his focus was on the Intelligence Community as a client. He both led business units and served as a subject matter expert, expanding business and increasing revenue in all three cases.

He has served as a consultant and advisor to Congress and the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security, and as a member of many government panels, boards, commissions, and advisory groups. He was a member of the Downing Assessment Task Force which investigated the Khobar Towers bombings in 1996, and was vice chairman of a congressionally-mandated commission chaired by former Governor Jim Gilmore of Virginia on the subject of homeland security. He has testified in Congress numerous times, and in Federal court as an expert witness on intelligence tradecraft.

He holds a bachelor’s degree in government and politics from the University of Maryland, a master’s degree in political science from St. Mary’s University in San Antonio, TX, and an honorary doctorate in strategic intelligence from the Joint Military Intelligence College, where he taught as an adjunct professor. He now occupies the Intelligence and Security Alliance Chair at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, as Distinguished Professor of Military Intelligence.

His military awards include two Defense Distinguished Service Medals, the Air Force Distinguished Service Medal, and a host of other United States military and foreign government awards and decorations. His civilian awards and recognition include designation as one of the Top 100 Information Technology Executives by Federal Computer Week Magazine in 2001 and receipt of the NAACP National Distin-
guished Service Award. He has received three National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medals, the Department of Defense Distinguished Civilian Service Award, the Coast Guard's Distinguished Public Service Award, and the Presidentially-Conferred National Security Medal. He was the 2006 winner of the prestigious William Oliver Baker award in recognition of lifetime achievement in the National Intelligence Community.

He now is the Senior Vice President/Chief Operating Officer of DFI-International Government Services, Washington, DC.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr., USAF, (Ret.), in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   James Robert Clapper, Jr., (Nickname: Jim).

2. Position to which nominated:
   Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   14 March 1941; Fort Wayne, IN.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Susan Terry Clapper.

7. Names and ages of children:
   Jennifer Coakley, 40; Andrew Clapper, 35.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Sep. 95–Mar. 97: Executive Vice President, Vredenburg, 1835 Alexander Bell Drive, Ste. 400, Reston, VA.

Mar. 97–Nov. 98: Principal, Booz-Allen-Hamilton, 8283 Greensboro Drive, McLean, VA.

Nov. 98–Aug. 01: Vice President, Intelligence Programs, SRA International, 4350 Fair Lakes Court, Fairfax, VA.

Sep. 01–Jun. 06: Director, National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), 4600 Sangamore Road, Bethesda, MD.

Jun. 06–Sep. 06: Special Assistant to the Deputy Director, NGA, 4600 Sangamore Road, Bethesda, MD. (CIA Retiree Transition Program).

Aug. 06–Present: INSA Distinguished Professor of Intelligence, Security Studies Program, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, 3600 N St., NW, Washington, DC.

Oct. 06–Present: Senior Vice President & COO, DFI International, Government Services, 1717 Pennsylvania Ave, NW, Ste. 1200, Washington, DC.

10. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.

   None currently.

11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.

   Member, Board of Directors, GeoEye, 21700 Atlantic Blvd., Dulles, VA.

   Member, Board of Directors, 3001 Inc., 10300 Eaton Place, Suite 340, Fairfax, VA.

   Member, Senior Advisory Board, Sierra Nevada Corp, 444 Salomon Circle, Sparks, NV.

   Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic & Intl Studies (CSIS), 1800 K Street, NW, Washington, DC, (unpaid).


12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.

   United States Geospatial Intelligence Foundation—Advisor to the Board of Directors.

   Intelligence & National Security Alliance—Member.

   Armed Forces Communications Electronics Association—Member of Intelligence Committee.

   National Cryptologic Foundation—Member.

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**

   (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.

   None.

   (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.

   None.

   (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

   None.

14. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.

   Principal Military Decorations and Awards:

   - Defense Distinguished Service Medal (2)
   - Air Force Distinguished Service Medal
   - Defense Superior Service Medal
   - Legion of Merit (3)
   - Bronze Star Medal (2)
   - Defense Meritorious Service Medal
   - Air Force Meritorious Service Medal
   - Air Medal (2)

   Civilian Awards and Recognition:

   - National Security Medal (Presidentially-conferred)
   - National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal (3)
   - DOD Distinguished Civilian Service Award
Coast Guard Distinguished Public Service Award
NAACP Meritorious Service Award
William Oliver Baker Award for lifetime achievement in intelligence

Foreign Decorations:
Republic of Korea, France, Norway, and Canada

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.
Have written or by-lined many articles which were “in-house” professional treatises—nothing for the broader public domain.

16. **Speeches:** Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.
As Director of NGA, I gave many briefings, speeches, talks, and presentations. I do not have copies.

17. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**SIGNATURE AND DATE**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR.

This 6th day of February, 2007.

[The nomination of Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr., USAF (Ret.), was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 28, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on April 11, 2007.]

[Prepared questions submitted to S. Ward Cassells, M.D., by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

**QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES**

**DEFENSE REFORMS**

**Question.** The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.
Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?
Answer. No, only to enhance it where we might find an opportunity to do so.

**Question.** If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?
Answer. N/A.

**DUTIES**

**Question.** What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA))?
Answer. The ASD(HA) assists the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Secretary of Defense in promoting and safeguarding the health
of military personnel and their families, retirees, and others eligible for DOD health benefits. The role is primarily one of setting health policies, in consultation with other ASDs, the Services, and their Surgeons General, and Service ASDs. These health policies include deployment health, both physical and mental. The ASD also has an important, though less direct, role in health education and research. Health Affairs is directly responsible for managing TRICARE, and the Uniform Services University.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer. As a practicing doctor, teacher, researcher, university administrator, and Army Reserve colonel with two tours of duty in the last 2 years, including most recently in Iraq, I have an appreciation of the breadth, complexity, and urgency of DOD health issues. As I have had limited management experience I will need the guidance of DOD civilian and military leaders, and input from the troops and their families. In addition I will ask for help from colleagues at Center for Disease Control (CDC), National Institute of Health (NIH), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), State, the World Health Organization, Red Cross, industry, and others who can help. In particular, I will seek guidance from Senate and House Members and their staffs whose expertise and dedication I have come to appreciate in working with them on military health research since 1995.

As a doctor, as a patient, I know that good medical care is comprehensive, coordinated, compassionate, efficient, preventive, and respectful of patient's privacy, time, and authority.

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the ASD(HA)?

Answer. Yes, I need to learn more about DOD regulations and finances, in order to accelerate decisionmaking so as to get benefits and answers to injured troops and other beneficiaries.

Question. If confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?

Answer. In addition to force protection, readiness, deployment health, and TRICARE, the Secretary of Defense may call on the ASD(HA) for advice on civil/military operations and global health issues. The DOD has played an increasingly frequent and important role in disaster readiness and response, both in the U.S. and abroad. Health care is a critical part of this effort, and indeed the provision of health care and assistance in capacity-building (education and facilities) is proving to be a bridge to peace and a currency of diplomacy.

Question. In carrying out your duties, how will you work with the following:
The Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness,
The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
The Assistant Secretaries for Manpower and Reserve Affairs of the Services,
The ASD for Reserve Affairs,
The Surgeons General of each of the Services,
The TRICARE Lead Agents,
The TRICARE Support Contractors,
The Designated Providers' Chief Executive Officers (i.e., Uniformed Services Treatment Facility CEOs),
Beneficiary Groups,
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.

Answer. If confirmed as ASD(HA) I will have the opportunity and duty to work closely with, and learn from, leaders in all the offices and organizations listed above. I know many of them, and will request meetings with the others, in person. Like most people, I have learned that most problems arise from poor communication. Success requires regular, frank meetings with partners and those we serve, consensus on near-term and long-term goals, simple, fair and transparent processes, and accountability. I am not embarrassed to ask for help, but also not afraid to stand up for the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and their families.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the ASD(HA)?

Answer. The office is tasked, with continuously improving the quality of health services while also reducing inefficiencies. The challenges range from finding better ways to prevent and treat battlefield injuries to better ways to assess and treat subtle, complex, important conditions like post-traumatic stress and head injuries. Also
important is our readiness for potential threats such as epidemic diseases, especially as troops increasingly work and live in areas such as Asia and Africa where emerging infectious diseases often arise. Other important issues are safety (in the hospital, at work, and at home), obesity, and autism.

Administrative issues include the challenges of joint medical command, BRAC, the role of outsourcing, interaction with other DOD offices, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, and the Veterans Administration. Finally, the office must assist with the recruitment and retention of dedicated and talented health care personnel. Every satisfied military medical professional can be encouraged to tell our story, safety in the hospital at work and at home, obesity and autism.

**Question.** If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?
**Answer.** My limited experience to date with DOD health care needs input from a broader group of providers, administrators, and especially beneficiaries. I need to review the data the office has gathered, ask for briefings, and get out in the field to ask questions and see for myself. But it seems likely that there are opportunities for improving services such as care of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and traumatic brain injuries (TBI), disability determination, extremity injuries and prosthetics. There may also be ways of improving, simplifying, and safeguarding electronic medical records, and making them portable—for care by private physicians or by the Veterans Administration. It may also be important to do more to foster innovation, to encourage and empower self-care, and to protect whistleblowers.

**Question.** What do you consider to be the most serious problems confronting the ASD(HA)?
**Answer.** The most important immediate issue is identifying the extent, causes, and correction of the problems that have been brought to light at Walter Reed Army Hospital. I also understand that the important work of the Mental Health Task Force has recommendations due in May, and the task force on the future of military health care will have their work completed late this year.

**Question.** If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?
**Answer.** Several commissions are addressing these issues and if confirmed I will do all I can to assist them and to be guided by their reports. If confirmed I plan to be a strong influence in ensuring our wounded warriors and families are well cared for after they receive care and in ensuring swift implementation of improvements recommended.

**PRIORITIES**

**Question.** If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish for policy and program actions which must be addressed by the ASD(HA)?
**Answer.** The rank order of priorities of the problems noted above, and others I may be become aware of, needs to be determined once I have had the opportunity—if confirmed—of studying the issues from the inside.

**WALTER REED ARMY MEDICAL CENTER**

**Question.** Concern over outpatient facilities and care for severely wounded service-members at Walter Reed Army Medical Center has been a highly-visible issue over the past several weeks.

Based on your experience, do you believe the issues raised about care and facilities at Walter Reed could be occurring at other military medical hospitals or facilities?

**Answer.** I do not know. I visited Walter Reed’s main hospital to see patients and attend conferences several times over the past 2 years but did not see Building 18. What I did see there, and at the naval hospitals at Bethesda, Balboa, and Portsmouth, and Army hospitals such as Beaumont and Evans, and at our facilities in Hawaii, Bangkok, Cairo, Doha, and Kuwait, and when I was a patient in Ibn Sina (the 10th Combat Support Hospital) in Baghdad, is excellent inpatient care and satisfied patients. The areas were clean but not deluxe, or even very cheering. I did not see or hear about the very real, intolerable problems in Building 18. That shows how management issues and priorities can be missed unless you look systematically, and listen carefully.

I did experience firsthand some errors and delays with my benefits, but not the unacceptably slow, complex, and stingy disability system outlined in recent press accounts. Ongoing patient and family surveys, a vigilant press, staff reports up the chain of command and outside it when justified, are critical to our providing the care our troops deserve.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to examine care for the wounded from the battlefield until discharge from DOD medical treatment?

Answer. Battlefield care is excellent. I know that from the data, from what I have seen as a doctor and as a patient in Iraq. The civilian trauma and public health doctors are learning from lessons we learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. Still, it requires vigilance, innovation, and incentives for continuous improvement.

Question. What would you expect your role to be in support of ongoing study of these issues by the Presidential Commission and the DOD Independent Review Group?

Answer. To assist them in any way they request, and if not, then to ask to be involved. It is important for the groups to hear from my office, if confirmed, to provide perspective, and for us to hear from them.

TRICARE

Question. If confirmed, what would be your short-term and long-term goals for TRICARE?

Answer. TRICARE is the best health plan in the country and it must only get better. My plan would be to look for opportunities to make the link stronger between the direct care system and our vast purchased care network even stronger in order to make the benefit better, more seamless, of higher quality, and look for opportunities to make it more affordable. One of TRICARE’s strengths is that it is very inexpensive for the beneficiary compared to other health plans. I believe we need to look for ways to leverage the best public and private sector ideas to make our system an example the beneficiaries and our Nations’ taxpayers can be proud of.

Question. If confirmed, how would you strengthen the partnership between the Department and the TRICARE support contractors that is necessary for the successful delivery of health care within the TRICARE Program?

Answer. I will have a wholehearted commitment to TRICARE. In the past few years, key performance measures for TRICARE have improved dramatically—for example, claims processing and customer satisfaction. Enrollment, especially for our retiree population has also increased. A key feature of my commitment will be to seek further improvements in the program, building on its many successes. There may be even more opportunities to learn from commercial health plan experience by building even stronger bonds with our many contract partners, to coordinate TRICARE with other Federal health care programs, and to better capitalize on the unique capabilities of military medicine for the good of the Nation and the world.

Question. Do you have any views on how health care support contracts could be restructured to incentivize effective disease management programs and cost-efficient delivery of health care services?

Answer. It is a good example of how the opportunities with the private sector can be leveraged. Future TRICARE contracts will continue the triple option health benefit package. We will continue to use an outcome-based approach where the government states the desired outcomes and the bidders are to determine how to meet these outcomes using, where possible, commercial best business practices. The time-frames for implementation of the contracts should assume that no significant benefit changes will occur during the procurement cycle. While the contracts will be designed, awarded, and administered centrally, regional oversight of health care will be delegated to the Regional Directors affirming the principle that health care is best administered and monitored locally. In structuring our support to the military, we cannot diminish the capabilities of the direct care system—and those skills that only military medical providers can and should do.

Question. There continues to be concern expressed by TRICARE beneficiaries about the adequacy and availability of health care providers in some areas of the country. While health care support contracts have access standards and timeliness requirements to ensure beneficiaries have access to appropriate providers within a reasonable period of time, this does not always happen. In addition, many beneficiaries who choose the TRICARE Standard option report a lack of availability of health care providers willing to accept new TRICARE patients.

Answer. From all reports, the TRICARE contracts are working well and have very robust networks. If a local problem exists, I will work to understand what it is and take steps to ensure network adequacy is improved.

Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for improving the number and adequacy of providers under the TRICARE program?

Answer. I would begin by asking why some doctors are reluctant to contract with TRICARE. As a recent TRICARE provider at the University of Texas, I think the contracts can be simplified. I would take aggressive steps to appeal to health sys-
tems in the States through both our networks managers, our TRICARE regions, and through our Governors. I would also appeal to professional associations to help educate those provider networks on the service they could be providing for our Nations' men and women in uniform. We may also be able to do more to recognize and welcome new providers, such as presentations of awards by local servicemembers. In general, the average participation rate of providers accepting the TRICARE reimbursement rate is 96 percent. Our managed care support contractors are aggressively recruiting additional providers to join our networks. Where there are areas that are lacking certain specialties, the contractor together with the TRICARE Regional Offices initiates an action plan to address the concerns of those providers in the locality. In addition, TMA is in the process of implementing legislation to provide for locality-based reimbursement rates for those Services that are lacking in certain areas. This authority will improve health care access for all beneficiaries by targeting providers who are currently not participating in the TRICARE program.

COMMITMENT TO MILITARY RETIREES

Question. By law, DOD and the military departments must provide health care through the Military Health Care System to those who have retired from the uniformed services and their eligible family members.

What is your view of the importance of delivering health care services to military retirees and their family members in ensuring the overall readiness of U.S. Forces?

Answer. The commitment to delivering the highest quality care to all of our over 9 million beneficiaries is paramount. The retired servicemembers and their families, which is the vast majority of those we care for, are an integral part of clinical experience base that our providers and staff require in our Medical Treatment Facilities and in our Graduate Medical Education programs to develop, maintain, and advance their clinical skills.

Of course, military facility health care is a finite resource. The entitlement to payment for civilian health care services under TRICARE, now available to retirees over 65 as well as under 65, provides assurance of comprehensive coverage for our retirees even when military providers are not available.

RESOURCING MEDICAL BENEFITS

Question. Last year, DOD proposed an initiative referred to as “Sustain the Benefit” aimed at achieving savings in the Defense Health Program. This proposal would have phased in significant increases in TRICARE fees for military retirees under the age of 65 and increased copayments for prescriptions filled in retail drug stores for all categories of beneficiaries. A substantial portion of the projected savings were based on the assumption that retirees would elect to use their civilian employer’s or some other health care plan in lieu of TRICARE.

If confirmed, would you support initiatives designed to save costs by discouraging retired military personnel from using their military health benefit?

Answer. The increasing cost of health care for the department is of great concern as it reduces its ability to fund other high priority capabilities. Congress directed the Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care which is now well into its deliberations and I have reviewed their charter. A key area of their review is the health care cost share structure between the beneficiaries and the government and I will carefully review their recommendations as we develop future initiatives along with other key stakeholders in the Department, in Congress, and with our coalitions and associations.

Question. Do you have other ideas to achieve savings in the Defense Health Care Program?

Answer. As I have reviewed the Military Healthcare System, there may be continuing efforts we can take to find cost savings. I will continue to work to improve the large TRICARE contracts to assure we are getting best value and, I believe, as all other health care systems have found, that we can incrementally improve our pharmacy benefits management to assure we are providing the most effective drugs at the best possible price. I also think that advancing the concept of “shared services” between the Services’ medical departments and the Health Affairs/TRICARE Management Activity, as outlined in Secretary England’s governance improvement memo makes sense. I see value in making incremental, sensible, and reasonable steps to improve governance, provides an excellent opportunity to reduce administrative duplication, create more effective partnerships and services, and be more efficient.

I strongly believe that faster and more effective implementation of our electronic health record, Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application, can also
Question. Adequate financing of the Defense Health Program has long been an issue. The President’s budget request for fiscal year 2008 includes $486.3 million in efficiency savings from military hospitals. The Surgeons General have testified that they cannot achieve savings of this magnitude. These so-called “efficiency wedges” have been used over the past 2 years by the Department in an attempt to force savings in military hospitals.

Do you feel that these efficiency wedges remain an acceptable financing approach?

Answer. If confirmed, I will examine the financing of the Defense Health Program in detail to determine the best way forward and the mechanisms we can use to assure that we adequately fund all elements of our system. I strongly believe that efficiencies can be promoted if we provide incentives for operating jointly, more efficiently, and with higher quality.

Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to more accurately project the cost of, and appropriately resource, both the military hospitals and private sector care contracts within the Defense Health Program?

Answer. If confirmed, I fully understand my responsibilities to oversee the Defense Health Program appropriation. Since 2001, the Military Health System has not required emergency supplemental appropriations or reprogrammings (with exception of hurricane recovery, global war on terror, the war on terror, and Avian Influenza)—which I believe clearly demonstrates that we have benefited from congressional and departmental financial support. Looking to the future, I do understand that in the fall of 2006, the department as well as Office of Management and Budget and external actuarial experts, did a thorough analysis of the private sector care requirements for the Department. I will review that effort. In addition I will continue to evaluate the Services’ financial requirements to make sure that they are provided adequate resources to accomplish their complex and demanding missions.

CONVERSION OF MILITARY MEDICAL BILLETS TO CIVILIAN POSITIONS

Question. Conversion of certain military billets to civilian positions has been a key objective of the Department’s transformation objectives. The committee has been concerned that in the area of medical services, which are needed in wartime and peacetime, such conversions could place both the quality and the effectiveness of military health care including care of the battlefield wounded, at risk.

What is your understanding of the extent to which civilian substitution for military medical billets has taken place in the Army, Navy, and Air Force?

Answer. In all efforts to become more efficient we must balance appropriate numbers of providers and medical personnel against the mission. We must also ensure a proper mix of specialists and military providers and support personnel. At the same time we need to avoid waste while maintaining depth in our forces for handling contingencies. It is my understanding that the military-to-civilian conversion effort was a consequence of a long and detailed examination, called appropriately, the Medical Readiness Review of the military medical force structure and billets. This review was done with the military departments as well as other Office of the Secretary of Defense activities. The analysis included an rigorous assessment of the cost of conversions, availability of civilian replacements with proper requisite skills and credentials, and the potential impact on the quality of and access to healthcare. Experience has shown that the Army successfully converted a considerable number of its military medical billets in the 1990s and today their civilian staffing at the MTFs often exceeds 50 percent civilians. The Navy and Air Force have done fewer conversions in the past. Currently, the secretaries of the military departments are certifying their fiscal year 2008 conversions to Congress in accord with the provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. If confirmed, I will oversee this conversion process, in collaboration with the service surgeons to assure that we do this effectively.

Question. If confirmed, will you examine the extent to which military-to-civilian conversions played a role in the understaffing of critical support positions at Walter Reed Army Medical Center, as well as a revaluation of conversion goals for all three Service medical departments?

Answer. I am unaware of any shortage in critical clinical positions but if confirmed I will work closely with the Army Surgeons General to assure that any such issues are effectively and immediately addressed.

MILITARY HEALTH PROFESSIONAL RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. DOD is facing severe shortages of military medical professionals needed for its peacetime and wartime missions. The Department relies on a combination of
bonuses and incentives to recruit and retain military health care professionals to provide care to military members and their families.

What are your views on the adequacy of existing bonus and pay incentive programs for both Active and Reserve components?

Answer. There is a delicate balance between being a steward of the taxpayers' money, in which role we must justify every increase in spending with proof that the increase will have a payback, versus being a champion for the uniformed health care providers. As we analyze the effects the Warfight war has on our professional population, we need to be able to use effective, competitive, and fair financial tools to be able to fill our gaps in the Active and Reserve Forces. The importance of balancing efforts to recruit and retain the right numbers of qualified individuals professionals to meet mission requirements is enormous. Having less than the optimum number of uniformed health care professionals may result in increased private sector care costs and lower medical force morale. It is important to properly manage recruiting, pay, and retention programs to ensure appropriate balance for Department missions and beneficiary needs. As a provider in the Reserve Force, I will bring a unique and current perspective to this issue.

Question. Based on your service in the Army Reserve, do you have any recommendations about the effectiveness of incentives for medical personnel to join the Reserve Forces?

Answer. I am not aware of barriers to recruiting and retention, especially in my current status. If those circumstances arise and I see shortfalls or barriers, I will work to understand what they are and take action to fix them.

SEAMLESS TRANSITION OF DISABLED SERVICEMEMBERS

Question. Recent hearings in both the House and Senate have examined the challenges faced by servicemembers who are undergoing disability evaluation and transitioning from the DOD to the Department of Veterans' Affairs (VA) for health care services.

What are the critical elements necessary for a seamless transition of health services from one agency's responsibility to another?

Answer. The critical elements for a seamless transition of health services from one agency to another are: a full understanding of medical care capabilities within both agencies by all medical providers involved; clear communications of the transition plan between providers in each agency and with the patient and patient’s family; timely transfer of all pertinent medical records before or at the time of transfer of the patient; and, ongoing communication after the transfer of the patient between the medical providers in each agency and with the patient and patient’s family.

Question. How can the transition for disabled servicemembers between DOD and the VA be improved, especially in the area of health care?

Answer. Improvements in the transition of health care between DOD and VA can be achieved by early and concise communications to servicemembers and their families about DOD and VA benefits and programs they are entitled to based on their military status and service. Two efforts would facilitate the early and concise communication we desire. The first would be to establish a program that assigns a specific DOD–VA team comprised of medical staff from both DOD and VA to support each patient and his/her family during the transition process. The second initiative would be to establish a single, user friendly disability evaluation system that is evidence based, medically endorsed, and most importantly, consistent with the civilian disability system.

Question. Do you have any views about improvements that can be made quickly to the Physical Disability Evaluation System, specifically the medical evaluation board process?

Answer. DOD’s Physical Disability Evaluation System is designed to evaluate an individual’s loss of capability to function once the medical condition has reached maximum benefit from continued medical care. The period of time necessary to make that assessment varies widely from person to person, and is dependent on individual rates of healing and response to restorative therapies. The medical evaluation board process requires that maximum benefits of medical care be completed. A change that would streamline the process would require care providers to make an early, initial medical prediction of capability after maximum benefits of medical care are complete, and once the patient’s medical condition is stable, then proceed with the disability benefits determination based on that assessment. This would require frequent re-evaluation of medical capability as the healing process is continuing, and possible redetermination of benefits.
TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY

Question. In Iraq and Afghanistan, our troops are facing the threat of improvised Explosive Devices (IED). Because of improved body armor, troops are surviving IED blasts, but frequently suffer TBI from the concussive effects of the blasts.

What tools are needed by medical personnel to adequately diagnose and treat TBI on the battlefield, and do you think the Services have the capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. Our medical personnel are doing a superb job identifying and treating the severe TBI incidents on the battlefield. Far forward surgical care is saving lives, and neurosurgical care is a significant contributor. In August 2006 we started using the Military Acute Concussion Assessment (MACE), along with a clinical practice guideline, to help identify and document mild and moderate TBI. Educating troops and their leadership about the importance of this evaluation as soon as possible after even a mild injury, as well as educating medical providers on this new tool, is our current challenge.

Question. What is your understanding of the ability of medical personnel to diagnose and treat TBI in the continental United States medical facilities?

Answer. One constant in medicine is “to make a diagnosis, the doctor must consider it.” Our medical personnel are very aware of the potential for TBI in our personnel, both at home and on the battlefield. There is no easy, definitive test, (such as a blood test) available today to quantify the nature and extent of injury associated with TBI. However, we are extending the use of the MACE as a tool used throughout the DOD system, and it will certainly help identify patients who had TBI and determine if they still have symptoms. The majority of mild TBI does not require specific treatment other than time to heal, but we now believe we must document the incident and an assessment of acute signs and symptoms as close to the time of injury as possible. Treatment for persistent symptoms is available in our neurology clinics.

Question. Should DOD have a comprehensive plan for prevention, diagnosis, and treatment of TBI, and if confirmed, what actions would you take to develop such a plan?

Answer. DOD is implementing a comprehensive plan to identify and treat TBI. Use of the MACE whenever a servicemember is dazed, stunned, or knocked out will document these events and trigger education for the patient and medical follow-up. DOD will be asking individuals if they experience any trauma to the head on the annual Periodic Health Assessment. These questions will also be added to the Post Deployment Health Assessment and the Post Deployment Health Reassessment. Understanding what the causes of these injuries are will direct a comprehensive preventive program.

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of the DOD physical evaluation system and its ratings to fairly address the conditions that result from TBI?

Answer. The DOD Physical Evaluation Board evaluates impaired function and rates individuals against established criteria for disability compensation. When that disability is severe, the system works very well. As we shape a comprehensive DOD/VA system to assess, diagnose, and treat mild and moderate TBI, we may need to modify the disability evaluation system.

POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER

Question. Army leaders testified recently that some military doctors are reluctant to diagnose servicemembers with PTSD because of their concern that it could stigmatize them, resulting in possible harm to careers.

What is your understanding of the scope of the problem of diagnosing and treating PTSD in the Armed Forces?

Answer. The biggest problem with diagnosing and treating PTSD in the Armed Forces is the same as that in the civilian world—having the individuals recognize they have a problem and to then seek care. DOD is educating its personnel about PTSD. DOD also assesses servicemember concerns and symptoms of PTSD and related mental health issues upon return from deployments and again 3 to 6 months later. Individuals who identify symptoms are medically evaluated and referred for further diagnosis and treatment if needed. PTSD and other mental health conditions are treatable.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure that health care providers are appropriately trained and guided in diagnosing PTSD?

Answer. DOD and the VA have developed clinical practice guidelines for the diagnosis and treatment of PTSD. Continuing Medical Education is a requirement for all practicing physicians and DOD has many educational resources available to not
only ensure our providers have the expertise to diagnose PTSD, but that our servicemembers and their families will be educated.  

**Question.** What steps would you take, if any, to help destigmatize PTSD and other mental health conditions?  

**Answer.** The first step to destigmatize PTSD and other mental health conditions is education of our military population. A major next step would be to validate that those who seek and receive mental health care are successful in continuing their military careers. Concerns about loss of status with peers, leaders, and family members, and loss of military career are the two major causes for individuals not seeking care for PTSD and other mental health conditions.  

**Question.** The Army's Mental Health Advisory Team (MHAT) has made three separate assessments over the past several years detailing the immediate effects of combat on mental health conditions of U.S. soldiers deployed to Iraq. The most recent report, MHAT III, found that multiple deployed reported experiencing higher levels of acute stress, and that overall levels of combat stressors are increasing. Some reports allege that the DOD is deliberately underdiagnosing PTSD due to a shortage of resources.  

**Answer.** Acute stress and combat stress are very different conditions from PTSD. The fact that DOD has been consistently evaluating the mental health concerns and symptoms of its deployed forces is important. Military departments have deployed mental health providers in theater to provide the prevention and treatment needed for combat stress and for mental health conditions. Resources have not driven mental health care availability. Identifying needs for mental health providers has driven the provision of mental health care capabilities.  

**Question.** Based on your experience, do you believe that PTSD is underreported and underdiagnosed?  

**Answer.** I believe PTSD is underreported by the individuals who have it because of the stigma in our society about mental health. I also believe that it is therefore under diagnosed because these individuals are not seen by medical providers. However, I do believe that medical providers are appropriately diagnosing PTSD, perhaps even over-diagnosing PTSD, because the diagnostic criteria have not changed for over a decade.  

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you assess whether we currently have the resources needed to address the mental health needs of servicemembers during deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan and after their return?  

**Answer.** I would assess the adequacy of mental health resources by reviewing the data from assessments in theater and after deployment (post-deployment health assessment and post-deployment health reassessment), and by reviewing the medical care being provided in-theater and after return home in our DOD system and the VA system. Additionally, I would survey the servicemembers and their families for their evaluation of the adequacy of our programs to meet their mental health needs.  

**Question.** Do you believe that the DOD disability ratings fairly address the disabilities that result from PTSD?  

**Answer.** The DOD disability rating system is designed to evaluate an individual's functional capability. A diagnosis of PTSD requires that the individual have some impairment, along with other symptoms. With early diagnosis and treatment, it is believed that the impairment will resolve, while other symptoms may persist or become intermittent. Therefore it is difficult to definitively respond if the system “fairly” addresses disabilities that may no longer be present.  

**RESEARCH ON GULF WAR ILLNESS**  

**Question.** Both DOD and VA have conducted research on Gulf War Illness stemming from health concerns of veterans. What is your assessment of the evolution of research in this field to date?  

**Answer.** More research has been done to understand the health concerns of veterans of the Gulf War than on any other war. The recent Institute of Medicine review of the medical literature from this research has stated that while there is no unique syndrome that has been identified, the Gulf War veterans experience a wide spectrum of symptoms at a rate nearly double that of military personnel who were on active duty at that time but did not deploy. The medical challenge is to better understand the causes of symptoms in our patients, particularly for the subjective symptoms.  

**Question.** Do you believe that the DOD disability ratings fairly address the disabilities that result from neurologic damage due to chemical exposures?  

**Answer.** Medical science is developing a better understanding of brain function and brain physiology due to better tools and better understanding from research
that has been ongoing in the fields of mental health, traumatic brain injury and the spectrum of neurological diseases like Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s disease, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, and others. Research focused on relating symptoms to specific brain functions, insults, or neurotransmitter changes would have major importance, not only to Gulf War veterans, but to humanity.

Question. If confirmed, what approach would you take to assess the core biomedical research programs of DOD to ensure that the objectives and resourcing of such research is consistent with future potential threats to U.S. Forces?

Answer. The core biomedical research programs in DOD are requirements driven, and those requirements are based on military unique issues. The governance of the biomedical research is through the Armed Services Biomedical Research Evaluation and Management Committee which the ASD(HA) co-chairs.

QUALITY OF DOD MEDICAL CARE

Question. Please describe your knowledge of quality improvement programs in the civilian sector, and comment on how they would compare to military health care quality programs.

Answer. Dr. Casscells, please comment herefrom 30 years of experience with quality improvement processes at university, community, and government hospitals, and health maintenance organizations, I have seen these processes improve. They work best where there are electronic medical records, and committed leadership that fosters a sense of teamwork and energy, not intimidation. From my limited (2 years) experience in Army Medicine I believe the process is taken very seriously. From my service on GE Healthcare’s Advisory Board, I am keen to assist the Lean/Six Sigma initiative and process now underway at DOD.

Question. If confirmed, what role would you take in the monitoring of quality and patient safety throughout the military health care system?

Answer. There has been an increasing awareness of the need to improve the quality of care and patient safety in our medical facilities across the Nation. The Institute of Medicine’s reports “To Err is Human” in 1999 and “Crossing the Quality Chasm” in 2001 sounded the alarm regarding the scope of the problem and the opportunities for improvement. Improving Quality and Patient Safety have been high priorities for the health systems with which I have worked, and finding solutions to the problems we confront requires a multifaceted, team approach: Quality care begins with well-trained and qualified professionals who work together as a team. These professionals must be provided appropriate ancillary support services and facilities to create a safe “environment of care” focused upon the needs of patients and their families. We must have automated systems for documentation of care, surveillance, supply support, and to meet the information needs of the health care team. Periodic assessment of organizational programs and procedures by the Joint Commission and other certifying organizations is important. Finally, senior leaders must be committed to supporting health care quality and safety by establishing strategic objectives and providing the resources necessary to achieve them.

I am aware that the military health system has been engaged in addressing quality and safety along with its civilian counterparts. Military professionals, graduate medical education programs and facilities also meet the same standards as those established for civilian sector professionals and organizations. If confirmed, I can assure you that providing high quality, safe health care for the men and women who serve, their families and all other beneficiaries of the Military Health System will be one of my highest priorities.

DENTAL BENEFITS

Question. The committee has increasingly heard complaints that DOD dental benefits are less attractive than those offered by other employers. Also, DOD beneficiaries, especially members of the Reserve components, have shown a reluctance to use their dental benefits.

If confirmed, what action would you take to evaluate the effectiveness of dental programs for the active duty, reservists, and retirees and their dependents?

Answer. I would expect my staff to evaluate the benefit on an ongoing basis, including analysis of enrollment and utilization, and surveys of members to determine their satisfaction. I would expect to work with Congress to make any necessary changes to the program.

ROLE OF PHYSICIANS IN INTERROGATIONS

Question. Under current DOD policies, a physician is authorized to participate in the interrogation of a detainee with the approval of the ASD(HA).
If confirmed, what criteria would you use for deciding to allow a member of the medical profession to participate in interrogations?

Answer. I have not yet been briefed on this issue. In the civilian sector, I am aware that law enforcement agencies often use medical professionals to assist them with their investigations. Medical professionals also assist the courts in assessing the mental health of those accused or convicted of crimes. However, I am not familiar with the current role of military medical professionals in interrogations. If confirmed, I will review the use of military medical professionals in interrogations.

Question. National and international medical organizations have taken positions in opposition to DOD policy on this matter. Do you think that DOD should have a different ethical standard for its physicians than those adopted by recognized national and international bodies?

Answer. I believe that military physicians and other medical professionals should adhere to the same high level of ethical standards that we expect of our physicians in civilian practice. Based upon my experience as an Army reservist, and having observed military providers firsthand in Iraq, I can tell you that military medical professionals are exceptionally high in both clinical quality and ethical standards. I am also aware that even national and international professional bodies may disagree about what constitutes the ethical course of action for some of the more controversial ethical issues facing healthcare professionals, such as support for individuals at the end of life, certain types of medical research, or involuntary treatment of the mentally ill or others trying to harm themselves.

Question. If so, why?

Do you think that DOD’s current policy needs to be re-evaluated?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review DOD’s policy on use of medical professionals in interrogations.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the ASD(HA)?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

FIXING THE MILITARY MEDICAL SYSTEM

1. Senator Byrd. Dr. Casscells, you are about to take charge of a bureaucracy that many would describe as broken. Our service men and women, now more than ever, are depending on your leadership to put the military medical system on a new track. How do you intend to examine the operations of the elements under your office to make changes as appropriate?

Dr. Casscells. In the past year, the Military Health System took several important steps in the multi-year transformation that will prepare our military forces and our military medical forces for the future. Our focus has been to develop greater joint capabilities and joint operations. I am committed to achieving jointness, interoperability, greater efficiency, improved outcomes, and world-class education, research, and medical care.
2. Senator BYRD. Dr. Casscells, what do you see as your greatest challenges?
   Dr. CASCELLS. First, we must ensure that our wounded warriors receive the care and treatment that they expect and deserve. The Department is aggressively addressing weaknesses and looks forward to considering recommendations of the various groups and task forces which are reviewing the system at present. Second, the Department faces a tremendous challenge with the growing costs and long-term sustainability of the Military Health System. We need important changes in our great health benefit program. TRICARE, to ensure a superior benefit for the long-term. We need the help and support of Congress to achieve this goal.

3. Senator BYRD. Dr. Casscells, if you encounter resistance to making changes, are you prepared to report honestly to Congress about the problems that you encounter?
   Dr. CASCELLS. Yes. The Department is firmly committed to working closely and openly with Congress in order to protect the health of our servicemembers and to providing world-class health care to more than 9 million beneficiaries.

4. Senator BYRD. Dr. Casscells, there have been a number of efforts by the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness to reduce the cost of military medical functions. The Service Chiefs and the Surgeons General have testified that the first year cuts were difficult, but possible. They have also testified, however, that in the current and future years, these so called "efficiency wedges" will affect essential services. How are you going to deal with the pressures to reduce spending from your boss, an economist, and the medical needs of the individual soldiers?
   Dr. CASCELLS. The foremost responsibility that I share within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Service Surgeons General is to provide quality care to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their families. No one in the Department believes we can measure the quality of care, or the compassion with which it is delivered by a financial yardstick alone. The Department, working with our beneficiary support activities and Congress, must continue to challenge itself to find innovative and effective solutions to excel in that stewardship.

5. Senator BYRD. Dr. Casscells, the exchange of information regarding military and veterans' medical and service records between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) has never been particularly good. It is a continuing source of problems for individual service men and women, and frustrating for their families as well. How do you intend to approach this issue, and what solutions do you propose to fix it?
   Dr. CASCELLS. I recognize that the programs and benefits earned by servicemembers could not be delivered without cooperation between DOD and VA in the area of information sharing. I am also aware of the concerns regarding the time it has taken to establish the desired level of interoperability, and the resulting frustrations of providers, servicemembers, and their families.

   In the last several years, DOD and VA have made impressive progress, and are leading the Nation in many ways in the sharing of electronic health information, but there is room for improvement. I intend to accelerate the efforts of DOD to achieve an even greater degree of electronic health information sharing with VA.

   In the short term, I will focus on our most critically injured servicemembers by ensuring that the VA Polytrauma Centers receiving inpatient transfers from Walter Reed Army Medical Center, the National Naval Medical Center, and Brooke Army Medical Center also receive the radiology images and medical records for these patients electronically.

   Another immediate focus will be ensuring the data we capture electronically in theater on injured and ill servicemembers is being made available to the VA for patients that present to VA for care. This will include information on inpatient and outpatient pharmacy and allergy data, laboratory and radiology results, and encounter notes.

   I will also focus on including more data in the current bi-directional sharing of health information between DOD and VA for shared patients. My aim is to share data at the most critical points first, such as, the DOD medical records to the VA Polytrauma Centers, and then to leverage these efforts, and accelerate the extent of electronic health information sharing DOD and VA-wide.

   I also intend to personally monitor, and be engaged in, to the extent necessary, the efforts recently started to determine the right approach for a joint inpatient electronic medical record application for DOD and VA. Done right, this will support the needs of both Departments and help ensure continuity of care. The timing is right for an initiative such as this. With the full deployment of DOD's electronic health record—Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application—across the Military Health System accomplished, DOD is poised to begin focusing on incor-
porating documentation of inpatient care into AHLTA. My understanding is that VA needs to modernize the inpatient portion of their electronic health record. I will ensure we do not lose this opportunity to continue building on our significant achievements in sharing electronic health information across department lines in support of the men and women who serve and have served this country.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK PRYOR

AID ORGANIZATIONS

6. Senator Pryor. Dr. Casscells, as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, you will be working closely with organizations dedicated to our wounded soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. What is your understanding of organizations like the Army Emergency Relief and Air Force Aid Society, and what roles do you see them playing with Veterans Affairs issues?

Dr. Casscells. The Army Emergency Relief and the Air Force Aid Society are two incredibly beneficial organizations. Both are privately funded, non-profit organizations that exist to help with the emergency financial needs, such as food and rent, of their respective Service active-duty personnel, retirees, and family members. Because of the legal ramifications, I do not see a direct link with them in the Department’s interface with the VA. However, in the course of advising personnel on making a transition to veteran status, the existence of such organizations would certainly be present in the discussion, especially in dealing with short-term financial issues.

[The nomination reference of S. Ward Casscells, M.D., follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
S. Ward Casscells of Texas, to be Assistant Secretary of Defense, vice William Winkenwerder, Jr., resigned.

[The biographical sketch of S. Ward Casscells, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF S. WARD CASSCELLS, M.D.

Samuel Ward Casscells III, was born March 18, 1952, in Wilmington, DE. He received the B.S. in biology cum laude from Yale in 1974, and the M.D. magna cum laude from Harvard Medical School in 1979, winning the Reznick Prize for his research with Nobel Laureate Bernard Lown, M.D.

His residency in medicine was at the Beth Israel Hospital and Harvard Community Health Plan, and his cardiology fellowship at Massachusetts General Hospital, with a Kaiser Fellowship in clinical epidemiology at the Harvard School of Public Health.

From 1985 to 1991, Dr. Casscells served in the Cardiology Branch at the National Institutes of Health, followed by a sabbatical year at Scripps Institutes of Medicine and Science in La Jolla, CA, working under Nobel Laureate Roger Guillemin, M.D., Ph.D.

Dr. Casscells joined the University of Texas at Houston in 1992. From 1994 to 2000 he served as the Levy Professor and Chief of Cardiology at UT-Houston Medical School and Hermann (now Memorial Hermann) Hospital and Associate Director for Cardiology Research at the Texas Heart Institute/St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital.

Dr. Casscells established the President Bush Center for Cardiovascular Health in 1997. In November 2000 he was awarded the John Edward Tyson Distinguished Professorship of Medicine. In 2001 the university added the titles of Professor of Public Health and Vice-President for Biotechnology. In 2004 the Texas Heart Institute named him Director of Clinical Research.
Dr. Casscells is primarily involved in patient care, teaching and research on vulnerable atherosclerotic plaque (detection and prevention of heart attack and stroke) with James T. Willerson, M.D. He was the first to identify influenza as a cause of heart attacks. In addition, he is known for his work in growth factors, web-based health education, disaster medicine, and the costs, ethics, and policy implications of new technologies.


He was a co-founder of Selective Genetics, Inc., and Volcano Corporation, and currently serves on the board of Volcano, and SpectraCell, Inc. He served on the board of Lifeline Systems, Inc., until its acquisition by Philips in 2006. He serves on advisory boards for GE Healthcare, Pepsi, GlaxoSmithKline, RediClinics, and Roche.

His current nonprofit activities include board service at BioHouston, the Yes Preparatory School, and the Prostate Cancer Foundation.

In 2004, Dr. Casscells established the Alliance for NanoHealth with Rice University, UT MD Anderson Cancer Center, Baylor College of Medicine, Texas A&M, and the University of Houston. He is also a director of the UTHSC–M.D. Anderson-G.E. Center for Advanced Biomedical Imaging.

Dr. Casscells has served since 1992 on the Board of Directors or Advisory Board of the American Heart Association’s Houston affiliate. He was President of the Houston Cardiology Society from 1995 to 1996. Dr. Casscells has also served on the boards of the Society of Vascular Medicine, the Association of Professors of Cardiology, and the University of Houston Law School’s Institute of Health Law and Policy, and the International Center for Medical Technology. Since 1996 Dr. Casscells has been listed in Who’s Who in Medicine, in Science and Engineering, . . . in Education, . . . in America, . . . in the world.

In 1997, Dr. Casscells was elected to the Association of University Cardiologists, and in 2000 to the American Clinical and Climatological Association. In January 2001, Dr. Casscells was appointed to President Bush’s Health Care Advisory Committee. In 2001, he received the first CIMIT award from Harvard Medical School, Massachusetts General Hospital and MIT. In 2002, he was named a Hero of the Flood by the Memorial Hermann Hospital. In 2004, he received the American Telemedicine Association’s General Maxwell Thurman Award.

The founding chairman of Defense of Houston, which won the 2002 Best Practice Award from the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Dr. Casscells also leads the U.S. Army’s T5 program (Texas Training and Technology against Trauma and Terrorism). He and his team have assisted in many major disasters from the Oklahoma City bombing and Tokyo sarin gas attack to Hurricane Katrina. In January 2005, he organized a tsunami relief effort and conducted a technology needs assessment in Phuket. Dr. Casscells has served on numerous local, State, and national commissions on biosecurity. In 2004, he established the UT-Zogby poll on health issues.

In 2005, he organized the medical honoree of the 2005 American Heart Association’s Heart Ball in Houston.

A colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve, Dr. Casscells was mobilized in 2005 and assisted in the Army’s response to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, for which he was awarded the Army Achievement Medal. For guiding the Army’s avian influenza preparedness, he received the Meritorious Service Medal. From August to December 2006, he served in Iraq as liaison to the U.S. Ambassador, Zalmay Khalilzad, receiving the Iraq Campaign Medal, Armed Forces Reserve Medal with M Device, and Joint Service Commendation Medal.

He and his wife, Roxanne Bell Casscells, a leader in historic preservation, have three children, and are members of Christ Church Cathedral.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by S. Ward Casscells, M.D., in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR-228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Samuel Ward Casscells, M.D., (Col., USAR).

2. Position to which nominated:
   Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs.

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   March 18, 1952; Wilmington, Delaware.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Roxanne Bell Casscells.

7. Names and ages of children:
   Sam, 04/18/92; Henry, 03/26/96; Lillian, 09/09/97.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
   Harvard Medical School (Boston, MA), 7/74–05/79, M.D., magna cum laude.
   Beth Israel Hospital (Boston, MA), 7/79–5/83, residency in Internal Medicine (Primary Care Track) and board certification.
   Massachusetts General Hospital (Boston, MA), 7/82 to 06/85, Cardiology Fellowship and Board Certification.
   National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (National Institutes of Health, Bethesda, MD), 6/85–6/91, Senior Staff Fellow, Chief of Clinical Service, then Senior Investigator.
   Whittier Institute (Scripps Institutes of Medicine and Biology, La Jolla, CA), 6/91–6/92, Molecular biology fellowship.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
   University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, 6431 Fannin, Houston, TX, 1992–current.
   Vice President for Biotechnology (2001 to present).
   John E. Tyson Distinguished Professor of Medicine (1999 to present).
   Professor of Public Health (2001–present).
   Director, Clinical Research, Texas Heart Institute (2004–present).
10. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.

- **1985–1992** Senior Investigator, Cardiology Branch, National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute
- **1992–1998** Training Mentor-NIH Grant “Molecular and Cellular Mechanisms of Heart Disease”
- **1993–1998** Principal Investigator-NIH Grant “Molecular Atherectomy Using FGF Receptors”
- **1994–1998** Co-Investigator, NIH Grant “Genetically Enhanced Cardiovascular Devices”
- **1997–2003** Disaster Relief and Emergency Medical Services—DOD Grant #DAMD17–98–1–8002
- **1998** NIH/NHLBI/FDA panel on Biomarkers
- **1997** FDA Advisory Panel on Circulatory Devices
- **1998–2000** Houston Task Force on Counterterrorism (appointed by Mayor Lee Brown)
- **2001** Bush-Cheney Transition Health Care Advisory Committee
- **2001** Mayor Lee Brown’s Medical Advisory Committee to the Emergency Medical Strike Team
- **2004** Mayor Bill White’s Homeland Security Policy Advisory Group
- **2005** Delegate, White House Conference on Aging
- **2005** Member, Congressman John Culberson’s Science and Research Advisory Committee
- **2005** Army mobilization for pandemic influenza readiness
- **2006** Army deployment to Iraq

11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.

See SF278.

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.

- American Heart Association
- American College of Cardiology
- City Tavern Club (Washington, DC)
- Texas Heart Institute Cardiac Society
- Christ Church Cathedral
- Association of University Cardiologists
- American Clinical and Climatological Association
- Metropolitan Club (Washington, DC)
- Reserve Officers Association
- Association of Military Surgeons of the U.S.
- Association of the United States Army
- Dancers
- Allegro
- Coronado Club
- Harvard Club of Houston
- Yale Club of Houston
- Aesculapian Club (Harvard Medical School)
- The American Legion
- (NB: excludes sports clubs)

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.

None.

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.

- **2004** Finance Committee, Rep. John Culberson Campaign
- **2004** Mayor Bill White’s Homeland Security Policy Advisory Group

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

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<td>McCain, John</td>
<td>2007</td>
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14. **Honors and Awards**: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.

1978 Class Day Speaker, Harvard Medical School
1979 Leon Reznick Prize for Research, Harvard Medical School
1984–1985 Chairman, Committee on Scientific Affairs, Massachusetts Medical Society
1988 NHLBI Surgery Branch Teaching Award
1991 AHA Nation's Capital Affiliate Heartthrob Award
1995–1996 American Heart Association Central Research Review Committee
1996–2001 Theodore and Maureen O'Driscoll Levy Professor of Medicine
1996–2000 Dean’s Excellence Award, UT Houston
1996–2000 President’s Citation for Outstanding Achievements in Clinical Service, UTHSC
1998–2003 Advisory Board, University of Houston Health Law and Policy Institute
1998 Board of Directors, Association of Professors of Cardiology
1998 Houston Task Force on Counterterrorism
1999 American Heart Association Operation Heartbeat Committee
2001 Bush-Cheney Health Care Advisory Committee
2001 Founding Director, International Center for Medical Technology
2001–present John Edward Tyson Distinguished Professor of Medicine CIMIT (Harvard & MIT) Research Achievement Award
2001 Tropical Storm Allison Hero Award from Memorial Hermann Health Care System
2001–2007 Board of CAPCure, The Prostate Cancer Advocacy Group (Now called The "Prostate Cancer Foundation")
2001–2002 Mayor’s Medical Advisory Committee to the Emergency Medical Strike Team
2001 Co-Founder, Volcano Therapeutics, Inc.
2002 Member, CSIS Panel on Bioterrorism
2002 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Best Practice Award for Defense of Houston
2003  Director, Texas Training and Technology Against Trauma and Terrorism
2004  General Maxwell Thurman Award, American Telemedicine Association
2004  Mayor Bill White’s Homeland Security Policy Group
2004–2006  Zogby International Poll on Biotechnology
2005–2007  Cardiology Advisory Board, GE Healthcare
2005  American Heart Association’s Heart Ball—Medical Honoree
2005  Delegate to The White House Conference on Aging
2005–2007  Member, Congressman John Culberson’s Science and Research Advisory Committee
2005  Army Achievement Medal
2005  Army Meritorious Service Medal
2006  Advisory Board, RediClinics
2006  Advisory Board, YES Preparatory School in Houston
2006  Medical Journal Houston’s Physician Spotlight
2006  Physician Spotlight for “O” Magazine “Avian Influenza” (February)
2006  Prostate Cancer Foundation’s Honoree at Honor your Father event with the Houston Astros, Minute Maid Park, Houston (June)
2006  Texas Medical Center’s Pandemic Flu Committee
2006  The Meritorious Achievement award presented by Iraq’s Surgeon General and induction as honorary member of the Iraqi Military Medical Regiment
2006  Joint Service Commendation medal; Iraq Campaign medal; Armed Forces Reserve medal with M Device.

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.

**PUBLICATIONS:**


499

1996 Feb;78(2):196-204.


501


77. Casscells SW, Hassan K, Vaseghi M, Siadaty MS, Naghavi M, Kirkeeide R,


88. Madjid, M. Casscells SW. Influenza as a bioterrorist threat: the need for


91. Mohammad Madjid, MD; Ali Reza Zarrabi, MD; Silvio Litovsky, MD; James T. Willerson, MD; Casscells SW. Finding vulnerable atherosclerotic plaques: Is it worth the effort? Arterioscler Thromb Vasc Biol. 2004 Oct;24(10):1775-82.


504


106. M Madjid, SW Casscells. The timing of the effect of statins on cardiovascular death: How fast can we save our patients? (Submitted to Expert Opinion on Pharmacotherapy)

107. Amany Ahmed, Saeed Payvar, Ibrahim Aboshady, SW Casscells, Anita Deswal. Falling body temperature predicts early rehospitalization in congestive heart failure. (Submitted to European J Heart Failure)
108. Madi Bidyn Sagar, Bujin Guo, S Ward Casscells, Yong-Jian Geng. Oxysterol-induced cholesterol crystallization, apoptosis, and ABCA1 expression in vascular smooth muscle cells. *(Submitted to Am J Path)*


**ABSTRACTS:**


5. Casscells SW, Speir E. Effects of vasoactive drugs on fibroblast proliferation. Clin Res. 1987; 35;266A.


   Speir E, Zhou YF, Lee M, Shrivastav S, Casscells SW. Fibroblast growth factors are present in adult cardiac myocytes, in vivo [corrected and issued with original paging in Biochem Biophys Res Commun 1988 Dec 30;157(3)] Biochem Biophys Res Commun. 1989 Mare 31:159(3)-1396-49.


18. Casscells SW, Wai C, Shrivastav S, Tanner VA, Fu YM, Yu Z-X, Gonzales AM, Lappi DA, Baire A. Smooth muscle cell proliferation in vessel injury is
characterized by expression of fibroblast growth factor receptors and is inhibited by a toxin-fibroblast growth factor conjugate. Circulation. 1990: 82:III-825.


20. Casscells SW. The bFGF system is involved in vascular development and can be manipulated to inhibit smooth muscle proliferation. J Cell Biochem. 1991: 5C:98.


atherectomy specimens by heating. Am J Cardiol. 1998;82 (Suppl 7A):106S.


Am J Cardiol. 1999; 84 (Suppl 6A): 22P.


69. Naghavi M, Siadaty S, Willerson JT, Casscells SW. Thermosensor catheter:


86. Madjid M, Asif M, Naguib S, Siadaty S, Willerson JT, Casscells SW, Naghavi M. Hot and acidic atherosclerotic plaques are more vulnerable to rupture. J Am Coll Card. 2001:37 (Suppl A);1A-648A.


100. Madjiz M, Litovsky S, Cassells SW, Willerson JT, Naghavi M. Interleukin 1 beta (IL-1β), tissue necrosis factor alpha (TNF-α), and interferon gamma (IFN-γ) increase superparamagnetic iron oxide (SPIO) accumulation in atherosclerotic plaques of Apo E deficient mice. Am J Cardiol. September 2002, 90 (Suppl. 6A): 166H.


22. Mohammad Madjid, Mir Siadaty, Imran Awan, Casscells SW. Statins fail to significantly improve survival during their first year of use: A meta-analysis
518

of 61,000 subjects from seven randomized placebo-controlled clinical trial. Am J Cardiol. 2005, 96 (Suppl 7A): 113H.

123. Mehran Haidari, Philip R. Wyde, Igor V. Stupin, Muzammil Ali, Casscells SW, Mohammad Majdidi. Influenza A virus infection increases the expression of chemokines and C-reactive protein by human coronary cell lines and this effect can be inhibited by an antioxidant. Am J Cardiol. 2005, 96 (Suppl 7A): 112H.


128. MS Munir, AH Ahmed, KJ Shankar, IV Stupin, AM Brewer, G Poulia, SW Casscells, RM Delgado. Correlation of temperature with common prognostic markers of heart failure. (Submitted to XIX World Congress of the ISHR for publication in J of Molecular and Cellular Cardiology)

129. MS Munir, D Lai, Ah Ahmed, KJ Shankar, AM Brewer, IV Stupin, SW Cassells, RM Delgado. Routine laboratory variables may be used to predict imminent hospitalization in congestive heart failure (CHF) patients. (Submitted to XIX World Congress of the ISHR for publication in J of Molecular and Cellular Cardiology)
EDITORIALS, CASE REPORTS, LETTERS, AND CHAPTERS:


15. Cassells SW. Role of bFGF in smooth muscle proliferation in the embryo


41. Casscells SW. “To-do” list for “can-do” Houston to better deal with terrorism.


47. Casscells SW. Give the gift only a nation can give. Houston Chronicle. 9 May 2004.


64. Joseph L. Malone, Casacells SW. Assessment of knowledge and attitudes about pandemic influenza from an online focus group: Potential tool for public health emergency response and preparation. Submitted to Emerging Infectious Diseases.


16. **Speeches**: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

- **Sept 2002** Lecture: “Medicine in the year 2010” Bayou Club, Houston, TX
- **Sept 2002** Lecture: “Houston Preparedness and Bioterrorism” Intercontinental Hotel, The Houston Yale Club, Houston, TX
- **Apr 2003** Luncheon Lecture: “Medicine in 2010: The Triumph of Technology?” University of Houston, Houston, TX
- **Mar 2004** Lecture: “Nano-biotechnology” Bio/Medical Technology Club of Houston, Houston, TX
- **Oct 2004** Lecture: “Reengineering Medicine” Biolink USA-Ireland Biotechnology Meeting, Houston, TX
- **Feb 2005** Cardiology Grand Rounda “Tsunami Disaster Relief Efforts and Influenza”, UT Health Science Center, Houston, TX
- **Feb 2005** Participant in Baker Institute (Rice University) Student Mock Congressional Hearing on NanoMedicine
- **Apr 2005** Milken Institute Global Conference Faster Cures Panel Member, “Starting Over with the FDA: Designing a Drug Approval System for the 21st Century”, Beverly Hills, CA
- **Apr 2005** Milken Institute Global Conference Panel Member, “Emerging Diseases: Interdependence and Innovation”, Beverly Hills, CA
- **Apr 2005** Presentation to the Houston World Affairs Council “Disease, Disaster and Political Instability: A Status Report on Tsunami Relief Efforts”
- **Nov 2005** Moderator “Preparing our Community for Influenza: A Multi-disciplinary Approach to Preparedness” – Hosted by Houston City Council, Texas Medical Center, and UT School of Public Health’s Center for Bioscience and Public Health Preparedness
- **Nov 2005** Guest Speaker at the Italian Embassy, Office of the Scientific Attaché in Washington, D.C. “A future without cancer”
- **Nov 2005** Keynote dinner speaker at the Massachusetts’ Prostate Cancer’s “7th
Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

S. WARD CASSCELLS.

This 20th day of March, 2007.

[The nomination of S. Ward Casscells, M.D., was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 28, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on March 29, 2007.]
Question. Section 3213 of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) act states that the Principal Deputy Administrator shall be appointed "from among persons who have extensive background in organizational management and are well qualified to manage the nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and materials disposition programs of the administration in a manner that advances and protects the national security of the United States."

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer. My background and experience are well suited for the performance of duties as Principal Deputy Administrator. In 1975, I was personally selected by Admiral Rickover to serve in the nuclear power program and did so for over 20 years as a career submarine officer. I have served on six nuclear submarines, with 16 years of sea duty, with significant responsibilities for both the operation and maintenance of nuclear reactors and for the operational readiness of both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Having served as the engineer officer and commanding officer of nuclear attack submarines, I have years of experience in dealing with complex nuclear issues, a background that is directly relevant to the technical duties of the Principal Deputy Administrator.

In the area of organizational management, I have had two significant leadership positions in the Navy that are relevant to the Principal Deputy Administrator position. First, I have served as the commanding officer of a nuclear attack submarine squadron with responsibilities for 8 nuclear attack submarines, a floating drydock, and a support staff encompassing over 1,200 individuals. Working with my staff, our job was to help the individual submarine commanding officers and their crews achieve success by providing tailored training, mentoring, and maintenance support. Second, I served as Director of the Division of Mathematics and Science at the United States Naval Academy, responsible for 5 academic departments and over 160 faculty, over two-thirds of whom had Ph.D.s in mathematics or science. Both assignments required the clear articulation of policy and effective, routine communications on many fronts, a role I see as integral to the Principal Deputy Administrator position.

Finally, for the past 3½ years, I have served as counsel for the House Armed Services Committee as the staff director for the Strategic Forces Subcommittee where I have gained a deep appreciation for the issues facing both the NNSA and the Department of Energy (DOE), as well as the role of congressional oversight.

Question. Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Principal Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs?

Answer. While I am confident that my experience has prepared me for the duties of Principal Deputy Administrator, I recognize that if confirmed, I will have much to learn. From day one on the job, I would spend a significant amount of time learning about both the organization and its people, at headquarters and at the site offices, in order to become a better leader and manager. One concrete action that I intend to focus on if confirmed would be to establish and sustain clear and unambiguous communications with a number of entities: the NNSA Federal workforce; the contractors who operate the production plants and the national security laboratories; DOE; other Federal agencies; State and local governments and communities; and Congress. I have spent years at sea "walking around" talking to sailors in my crew—I expect to build upon that practice if confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator.

Question. Section 3213 also states that the Principal Deputy Administrator "shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the administrator may prescribe, including the coordination of activities among the elements of the administration."

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you expect that the Administrator of the NNSA would prescribe to you?

Answer. If confirmed, my overarching responsibility would be to work with the Administrator to provide solid leadership and management within NNSA. As Principal Deputy, there are a number of duties that I anticipate the Administrator would assign to me:

- Serving as the Chief Operating Officer of NNSA, responsible for the day-to-day operations of its staff both at headquarters and at the site offices,
including leading the Federal workforce in overseeing the administration of the management and operating contracts for the nuclear weapons production facilities and national security laboratories.

- Serving as the first line manager for NNSA senior managers in headquarters and the field.
- Leading the Management Council (senior headquarters and site managers) and working with the council to coordinate activities between headquarters and site offices.
- Serving as the Central Technical Authority for NNSA.
- Serving as the senior NNSA liaison with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. What is your understanding of the role that you will play in the overall administration of the NNSA, in the event that you are confirmed?

Answer. In the event that I am confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator, I would expect to run the day-to-day operations of NNSA for the Administrator, working with the NNSA headquarters and site office personnel to execute NNSA's mission. I see an essential aspect of that role as working directly with NNSA's Deputy and Associate Administrators, and with the NNSA site office managers.

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Principal Deputy Administrator?

Answer. The first is the leadership challenge of ensuring that NNSA management works together as a smooth, effective team on a daily basis to execute NNSA's national security mission. This requires both the clear articulation and consistent execution of the role of Federal oversight at headquarters and in the field. I believe it essential for senior NNSA leaders to continually invigorate the highly talented Federal workforce with a purposeful sense of mission and esprit de corps.

Second, the recurring safety and security incidents in the complex are of significant concern. One significant component of this problem is directly related to the first challenge, which is exercising the role of Federal oversight as intended when NNSA was created. Other factors have been noted in a number of both internal and external reviews. The protection of special nuclear material and nuclear weapons design information against physical and cyber security threats goes to the core of NNSA's mission and is an ongoing challenge.

The third challenge is advancing the transformation of the NNSA nuclear weapons complex. Complex 2030, the plan to modernize the nuclear weapons complex infrastructure, is critical to national security. The process is currently underway to complete a Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for Complex 2030 in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The Nuclear Weapons Council also recently announced their selection of a design for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW). RRW design definition and cost studies will help inform the administration and Congress as to how to proceed for the future in a manner consistent with the RRW program objectives contained in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006. I would expect to thoughtfully evaluate the results of both the Complex 2030 NEPA process and the RRW design definition/cost studies as NNSA moves forward with plans to transform the complex.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. If I am confirmed, I would seek to instill a sense of enthusiasm and dedication to the NNSA mission as Principal Deputy Administrator. NNSA, both at headquarters and at the site offices, has a tremendously talented workforce. I see my role as working with the NNSA leadership team to ensure that there are clear standards and expectations for the Federal workforce in performing its oversight function and then to get out and "look and listen" to see how things are going based on both my observations and those of the Administrator.

With respect to safety and security, I have already noted the importance of Federal oversight. I will also add that careful, objective monitoring of the performance of the management and operating contractors is critical to improvement in these areas. Holding contractors accountable for adherence to standards is integral to the responsibilities of the Principal Deputy Administrator. In the area of protecting our nuclear weapons design and other sensitive national security information, I would expect to carefully evaluate Federal staffing at the site offices to ensure they have personnel with the requisite technical and security backgrounds to perform effective oversight of security practices. I would also anticipate reviewing NNSA security policies to see where they may be improved.
With respect to working with NNSA leadership on advancing complex transformation, if confirmed, I would work to ensure the PEIS and RRW evaluations were thorough and kept on schedule. I would also work to ensure that the processes evaluating Complex 2030 transformation (including the associated NEPA process) and the RRW are transparent (consistent with security requirements) and that the communications strategy is both precise and closely coordinated with the Department of Defense. This strategy requires ensuring that the congressional committees are kept informed and that NNSA is responsive to questions and concerns.

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the Principal Deputy Administrator?

Answer. I believe that being successful as the Principal Deputy Administrator will require clearly communicating to the Federal workforce what is expected of them and ensuring that they have the right cadre of skills and appropriate resources to perform their oversight mission. I also consider as essential the building of a work environment where all personnel feel that they are part of a team performing a mission vital to national security.

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and timelines would you establish to address these problems?

Answer. If confirmed, I would immediately work to establish myself as an effective leader within NNSA. A first step here would be to meet with the Federal workforce, both at headquarters and in the field, to learn more about NNSA and how it executes its mission. Another critical management step is to foster clear and effective communications, both within NNSA headquarters and with the field offices, to establish an environment where all are working together as a member of an integrated team. Reviewing the safety and security posture and associated corrective actions underway is an urgent task and one that I would hope to have a firm grasp of within 3 months of assuming responsibilities as Principal Deputy Administrator.

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues that must be addressed by the Principal Deputy Administrator?

Answer. If confirmed, my broad priorities would be to focus on ensuring that the Federal workforce is effectively performing its oversight mission throughout the complex. Effective oversight of the contractor is critical to ensuring that the complex is properly executing its mission, especially in key mission areas such as physical and cyber-security. I would anticipate reviewing how the site offices assess contractor performance as well as how this assessment and other contractor performance information is communicated to and evaluated by headquarters. This review also would require a careful evaluation of whether the resources within the Federal workforce, especially in technical and security areas, are adequate to perform the oversight mission. Along with the review of site office oversight, I would expect to assess how clearly headquarters communicates its expectations on what is expected of oversight to the site offices as well as what headquarters can do to better mentor and support the site offices.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Principal Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs with the following officials:

The Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Energy.

Answer. Under the NNSA act, the Secretary, acting through the Administrator, can direct the activities of NNSA. In addition, the Secretary sets policy for NNSA and NNSA implements it. Under the DOE Organization Act, the authority of the Secretary may be delegated to the Deputy Secretary of Energy. As Principal Deputy Administrator, I expect the Administrator would rely upon me to work directly with the Secretary and Deputy Secretary on issues in their areas of responsibility. Although the NNSA act establishes a clear chain of command between the Administrator and the Secretary (or Deputy Secretary), it does not limit my ability or responsibility to communicate, cooperate, and coordinate with the Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and other senior officials in DOE.

Question. The Administrator of the NNSA.

Answer. The Administrator is the direct supervisor of the Principal Deputy. He sets priorities for the Principal Deputy and serves as the common superior to resolve any disputes between the Principal Deputy and the other Deputy Administrators. He is also responsible for ensuring that NNSA achieves the missions and priorities set by the Secretary.

Question. Other Deputies in the NNSA.
Answer. The other deputies are direct reports to the Principal Deputy who is their first line supervisor providing coordination, integration, and oversight of their performance.

Question. The Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.

Answer. The Principal Deputy works with the Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management (EM) in ensuring that NNSA supports and facilitates the cleanup of legacy waste and contamination at NNSA sites. The Principal Deputy coordinates EM’s work at NNSA sites with the Assistant Secretary for EM.

Question. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs.

Answer. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs also serves as the Executive Secretariat for the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC). The NNSA representative to the NWC is the Administrator and, if confirmed, I will, along with the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, provide support to the Administrator in this critical role. The Assistant also chairs the subordinate committee to the NWC known as the Standing and Safety Committee which reviews nuclear weapons safety issues and makes recommendations to the NWC. The NNSA Office of Defense Programs has personnel who serve on the Standing and Safety Committee.

Question. The Chairman of the NWC.

Answer. The NWC is a joint DOD–NNSA body established to facilitate cooperation and coordination between the two agencies in fulfilling their dual responsibilities for nuclear weapons stockpile management. The Administrator is NNSA’s representative to the NWC, which is chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The Principal Deputy supports the Administrator in his role as a member of the NWC and may act on his behalf with the Chairman of the NWC in the Administrator’s absence. As Chief Technical Authority within NNSA, the Principal Deputy may interact with the NWC on technical issues.

Question. The Commander of United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM).

Answer. The Commander of STRATCOM is the central customer at the Department of Defense for the work of NNSA. Along with the three national security laboratory directors, he provides his judgment annually on the certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile along with the NWC to the Secretary of Defense. I expect the Administrator would direct me to support routine interactions with the Commander of STRATCOM and his staff regarding military requirements and stockpile size and composition.

Question. The nuclear directorates of the Air Force and Navy.

Answer. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Requirements is the Air Force directorate with responsibility for policy and strategy for Air Force nuclear weapons operations and requirements, including arms control activities ranging from treaty negotiation support to implementation and compliance. The current incumbent is Lieutenant General Carrol Chandler. This office is the Air Force lead for activities to counter the proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.

The nuclear weapons directorate of the Navy is divided into policy and technical organizations. The policy organization is the Strategy and Policy Branch within the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Rear Admiral Philip Cullom is the current incumbent. He serves as the principal advisor on national security matters and National Security Council (NSC) policy issues; and to advise and implement national policies with respect to nuclear weapons, strategic programs, and arms control initiatives. The Navy’s nuclear weapon technical organization is Strategic Systems Programs (SSP), currently led by Rear Admiral Stephen Johnson. The Director of SSP is responsible for all research, development, production, logistics, and support of the Navy’s Trident Missile Weapons Systems.

I would expect to have ongoing working relationships with these Service offices, primarily through the NWC’s Standing and Safety Committee.

Question. The Associate Administrator of NNSA for Facilities and Operations.

Answer. The Principal Deputy is the first line supervisor for this Senior Executive who is responsible for the corporate management and oversight of NNSA’s facilities management policies and programs, project management systems, and office of environmental projects and operations. I would expect daily interaction with this Associate Administrator to provide oversight and to resolve any issues that may arise between headquarters and site managers, and to ensure the vitality of the industrial and laboratory infrastructure of NNSA. The Principal Deputy performs the annual performance appraisal of this Senior Executive, including the establishment of the performance plans and recommendations for compensation and awards.

Question. The Associate Administrator of NNSA for Management and Administration.
Answer. The Principal Deputy is the first line supervisor for this Senior Executive who is responsible for the overall business management aspects of the NNSA enterprise by providing for the financial, procurement and acquisition, human resources, information technology, and day-to-day business operations of NNSA. The information technology function also includes certain responsibilities for cyber-security practices within NNSA. I would expect daily interaction with this Associate Administrator to provide oversight, address concerns, and resolve any issues that may arise between headquarters and site managers. I would expect to work closely with this Associate Administrator on staffing of the NNSA headquarters and site offices with properly qualified individuals as well as management of the Future Leaders Program. The Principal Deputy performs the annual performance appraisal of this Senior Executive, including the establishment of the performance plans and recommendations for compensation and awards.

Question. The DOE Director of Health, Safety, and Security.

Answer. The Chief Health, Safety, and Security Officer advises the Deputy Secretary and Secretary on all matters related to health, safety, and security across the DOE complex. This office is responsible for policy development and technical assistance, safety analysis, corporate safety and security programs, education and training, and conducts independent oversight and investigations. With these broad responsibilities, if confirmed, I would expect to have regular contact with the chief of this office. For instance, this office conducts comprehensive assessments of the security posture, both physical and cyber-security, at individual NNSA sites. I would anticipate a very close working relationship with the chief in order to gain an external, professional perspective of how NNSA is doing in those areas he oversees and equally as important, how can NNSA improve its own internal practices in these vital areas.

Question. The Under Secretary of Energy for Science and the Director of the Office of Science.

Answer. I believe it is important to have a proactive working relationship with the Under Secretary of Energy for Science and the Director of the Office of Science. The DOE Office of Science is the single largest supporter of basic research in the physical sciences in the United States, and manages 10 world-class laboratories. If confirmed, I would expect to cooperate with the Under Secretary to leverage work between the science and national security laboratories on disciplines of common interest such as high speed computing, high energy physics, and materials sciences. As Principal Deputy Administrator and Chief Technical Authority, I expect the Administrator would rely upon me to work directly with the Under Secretary of Energy for Science on issues in his area of responsibility.

Question. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.

Answer. If confirmed, I would expect that the Principal Deputy would be the senior liaison with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Board on all management issues with NNSA. The board serves a vital statutory oversight function for the NNSA complex, a role that I have come to value as a congressional staff member conducting oversight of NNSA. I would expect to have a very close relationship with the board and to foster a positive sense of cooperation between senior NNSA management and the board.

MANAGEMENT OF THE NNSA

Question. What is the role of NNSA’s Management Council and, if confirmed, what would be your relationship with the council?

Answer. The NNSA Management Council provides a formal mechanism to help NNSA top managers deal promptly with crosscutting issues and to identify opportunities for synergy across NNSA. If confirmed as the Principal Deputy Administrator, I would be the lead official for all Management Council activities, and as such, would strive to ensure that all NNSA programs and activities are carried out in the most efficient and effective manner possible. In this capacity, I would keep the Administrator fully informed on all council activities and make sure that the work of the council is carried out in full consonance with his overall management objectives and policies.

WEAPONS PROGRAMS WORKforce

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend for the NNSA to retain critical nuclear weapons expertise, particularly design capabilities, in the NNSA workforce?

Answer. If confirmed, working to retain and develop critical nuclear weapons expertise will be one of my highest priorities. The design and most other aspects of nuclear weapons require highly specialized skills that are not found outside the nu-
clear weapons complex but must be built on a foundation of advanced education. NNSA sites often invest years in additional training of employees. The applied use of these unique skills has proven to be the best method for both developing and then maintaining the skills within the workforce. NNSA must continue to develop its future workforce through knowledge transfer. The most efficient and reliable approach to achieve this objective is by having new hires work side-by-side with experienced specialists.

With respect to design capabilities, the laboratories have had efforts in place for some years to develop newly hired physicists and specialists in related fields into designers. For a few years, the new hires are integrated into existing teams, staffed and led by experienced designers. My understanding is that this approach has been successfully employed to develop a new cadre of designers as evidenced by the successful participation of early career designers in the RRW designs at the laboratories.

**Question.** If confirmed, what specific steps would you recommend for the NNSA to ensure that adequate and appropriate technical skills are maintained in NNSA?

**Answer.** In 2006, NNSA committed to re-establishing an interagency effort to identify critical skills as a step towards gaining a clearer picture of the relative supply and demand for these highly-trained personnel. NNSA has reached out to other agencies and to the private sector for data on these critical skills. The emphasis is on identifying those skills that are at highest risk and which, if lost, would have the greatest consequences for the ability of the laboratories and plants to carry out their missions. If confirmed, I will work within NNSA to continue and expand on this work.

**Question.** In your view, what are the critical skills that are needed in the NNSA?

**Answer.** I understand from the NNSA that there is concern regarding the majority of the critical skills needed to support the nuclear weapons program. In 2004, the National Science and Technology Council Interagency Working Group on Critical Workforce Needs, led by the NNSA, collected data across the defense, homeland security, and intelligence communities on hundreds of critical skills and the expected difficulty in finding U.S. citizens with those skills over the next 5 to 10 years. NNSA identified almost 400 critical skills across all laboratories and plants. NNSA has continued to make progress in developing a methodology to use in identifying those skills likely to be at risk in the future due to shortages of appropriately educated and trained U.S. citizens.

NNSA experts in the field expressed some degree of concern regarding about 80 percent of the skills identified by NNSA, and significant concern regarding 50 percent of the skills identified. The concerns arise from the anticipated retirement of critically skilled workers, mainly scientists and engineers, over the next few years and the declining number of American citizens seeking graduate degrees in relevant fields. Earning a Ph.D. in these fields takes 7 to 10 years, and laboratories and plants often invest another 2 to 3 years in on-the-job training. These long lead times complicate the hiring of replacements for retiring specialists.

**SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY**

**Question.** One of the biggest initiatives of the DOE and the NNSA over the past several years has been to implement the various changes to the design basis threat (DBT) standard. If confirmed, what recommendations would you make to help ensure the NNSA meets the new DBT in a timely fashion?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will work to ensure NNSA meets its commitment to stay on the approved schedule for DBT compliance, stay focused on finding innovative security solutions, and continue to make progress in meeting the complex transformation goals. Meeting the new DBT will require proactive steps to work with the Department to consolidate special nuclear material in a timely and responsible manner, to complete construction projects on time and on budget, and to fully understand the impacts of any security related funding shortfalls at individual sites.

**Question.** How should the NNSA maintain an appropriate balance between adding security personnel and investing in force multiplying technologies and infrastructure in this area?

**Answer.** NNSA has maintained its security police officer staffing at about 2,400 persons in spite of significant increases in the DBT Policy in 2003, 2004, and 2005. This is due to the deployment of early warning and detection systems around key facilities, the use of barriers to delay adversaries, providing hardened structures for key materials, and providing its protective forces with more reliable and lethal weapons systems and improved training. I think the real key to achieving further efficiencies in the NNSA physical security mission rests in the ability to reduce the
overly large footprint of the nuclear weapons complex and to make strategic investments in new facilities that are built with today's security requirements in mind. One of my primary endeavors, if confirmed for this position, will be to help lead NNSA in its efforts to make the Complex 2030 vision a reality.

**Question.** In your opinion, what are the biggest safety and security threats to the facilities and materials in the nuclear weapons program?

**Answer.** At this point, I think NNSA has made reasonable progress in developing robust physical security programs to defend against outside attacks. Continued investment in infrastructure security upgrades and complex transformation efforts will further enhance the physical security posture of the complex. The “insider threat” is one I would want to explore more fully. I understand that the Department will focus the 2008 DBT policy review on the insider threat and if confirmed, I will ensure NNSA is a strong contributor to this review.

From my congressional committee oversight work, I have concluded that there are perhaps more “unknown threats” in the cyber area than in that of physical security. I have been aware that NNSA is reviewing cyber security protection requirements and using a risk-based approach to determine what is the necessary amount of funding for cyber protection. If confirmed, I intend to work closely with the NNSA Chief Information Officer and the Department to evaluate the NNSA readiness and required funding to counter current and future cyber security threats.

**STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM**

**Question.** What is your view of the Stockpile Stewardship Program's progress towards its goal of being able to continuously certify the U.S. enduring nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, without the need for underground nuclear testing?

**Answer.** The fact that there has not been a technical need to recommend a nuclear test since 1992 is a testament to the success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program to date. However, one cannot overstate the importance of ensuring that the annual process to certify the nuclear weapons stockpile is based on a solid scientific foundation involving robust peer review and uncompromising integrity. If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator, I would work hard to ensure that the key programs supporting the Stockpile Stewardship Program receive top-level management attention so as to stay on cost, on schedule, and meet program requirements.

**Question.** In your opinion, what are the greatest challenges confronting the Stockpile Stewardship Program?

**Answer.** In my opinion, the greatest challenges confronting the Stockpile Stewardship Program all lead back to meeting commitments, both near-term and long-term. Near-term, I see that NNSA has an ambitious set of goals such as resuming tritium production, accelerating warhead dismantlements, and delivering First Production Units for the B61 and W76 Life Extension Programs. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to ensure resources are balanced to keep our commitments to the Department of Defense, Congress, and the public. Long-term, the NNSA has a serious challenge in keeping the right set of skilled workers at the laboratories, production sites, and in the Federal workforce. Keeping the workforce engaged and exercised will be essential in sustaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent without underground nuclear testing.

**Question.** Do you fully support the goals of the Stockpile Stewardship Program?

**Answer.** Yes, I fully support the goals of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, which are: 1) to sustain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile; 2) to maintain a fully capable, agile, responsive nuclear weapons complex infrastructure; and 3) to conduct research and development activities to ensure U.S. leadership in science and technology. If confirmed, I look forward to playing a key role in shaping the future of the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

**Question.** The NNSA and the Department of Defense have recently made a decision to explore the feasibility of a new design for use as a RRW. Do you support the idea of a RRW and in your view how would such a program further nonproliferation goals of the United States?

**Answer.** Yes, I fully support the goals of the RRW program, and believe it furthers nonproliferation objectives of the United States in a number of ways. RRW should reduce the likelihood that the U.S. would have to resort to nuclear testing in the future. Additionally, RRW could allow further significant reductions in the number of total U.S. nuclear warheads. A strong U.S. nuclear deterrent will also assure our allies that are not nuclear weapons states that the U.S. can provide their nuclear deterrent, obviating their need to develop and deploy nuclear weapons.
NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW AND THE FUTURE COMPLEX

Question. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which was released in January 2002, contained the administration’s plan to reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 by 2012. These reductions were included in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in 2003, known as the Moscow Treaty.

Will any nuclear warheads be dismantled as a result of the NPR and the Moscow Treaty?

Answer. The Department of Defense and DOE have developed a plan that achieves President Bush’s goal of 1,700–2,200 operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads by 2012. The President’s direction results in dramatic cuts to the stockpile that existed when he took office, and leads to a significant increase in total weapons available for dismantlement. While there are no provisions in the NPR or the Treaty of Moscow mandating specific dismantlement of warheads, the NNSA has significantly increased dismantlements.

Question. With the large number of refurbishment and other life extension program activities planned over the next 6 years, including the possibility of a RRW, is there enough facility capacity and are there sufficiently qualified personnel in the NNSA workforce to also take on a large increase in dismantlement during the same time period?

Answer. Last year, the NNSA provided a dismantlement plan to Congress that identified for dismantlement warheads that were in excess of stockpile requirements. Through efforts such as the Pantex Throughput Improvement Plan, the NNSA has significantly increased weapon activities using available capacity. This has ensured the critical enduring stockpile work for life extensions and surveillance can be completed while significantly accelerating dismantlements. The NNSA has determined that it can successfully achieve this goal. If confirmed, I will evaluate how well the complex achieves its dismantlement objectives and work to ensure the sites are properly resourced for this key task.

Question. In your view, would NNSA be able to manage an accelerated implementation of the Moscow Treaty if directed to do so?

Answer. The Moscow Treaty does not specifically identify a required dismantlement rate; it only addresses limits on the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads. The NNSA has already significantly accelerated dismantlements. However, there are limitations on how many operations can be done at Pantex. The current workload plan that factors in surveillance, life extension programs, dismantlements, pit packaging, and other required operations at Pantex maximizes available throughput during the next several decades. Significantly increasing the dismantlement rates at Pantex would impact accomplishment of the critical work that supports the safety, security, and reliability of the enduring stockpile. Additionally, there are capacity limits across the complex on shipping, storage, component dismantlement, and material disposition that constrain total dismantlement throughput. If confirmed, I would work with Defense Programs to optimize the workload across the nuclear weapons complex, to include evaluating possible further acceleration of dismantlements.

Question. The NPR stated as one of its priority goals achievement of a reinvigorated infrastructure across the nuclear weapons complex. With competing budget priorities for the Stockpile Stewardship Program, such as directed stockpile work, safety and security, and maintenance and recapitalization, what steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure the infrastructure continues to be consolidated, revitalized, and well-maintained?

Answer. I support the NNSA’s “Complex 2030” transformation goals. If confirmed as the Principal Deputy Administrator, I would work with the Administrator in optimizing the NNSA budget to achieve complex modernization and consolidation. If confirmed, I will demand accountability of NNSA personnel, both contractor and Federal, as we meet near-term commitments and I would work with Congress to ensure appropriate funding for nuclear weapons complex and stockpile transformation. As Counsel to the House Armed Services Committee, I am well aware of the limited resources available and the need to make tough decisions on competing priorities.

Question. What recommendations, if any, would you make to improve management of the facilities in the nuclear weapons complex?

Answer. I am aware generally of NNSA’s initiatives to improve management of the nuclear weapons complex primarily through transforming the contract relationship with its management and operating contractors. If confirmed, and after conducting my own review of these initiatives, I would expect to continue efforts to include greater uniformity and accountability in contracts, include multi-site incentives in contracts that enhance total enterprise objectives, and provide for more ef-
fective integration across the nuclear weapons complex. As the complex is transformed to be smaller, more efficient, and more affordable, accurate, and timely communication of expectations, progress, and issues is essential. I see one of the key roles of the Principal Deputy Administrator is to ensure that the NNSA contracts with the sites throughout the complex are well-managed and professionally executed.

**Question.** The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board recommended several options to consolidate the weapons complex of the future.

If confirmed, would you commit to reviewing the consolidation options being evaluated by NNSA, to ensure that modernization of facilities is being complemented by consolidation of materials and facilities as appropriate?

**Answer.** I am familiar with the nuclear weapons complex transformation options and material consolidation initiatives being considered by both the NNSA and the Department. If confirmed, I commit to continue to review these options as part of NNSA management; successful complex transformation and consolidation of both materials and facilities are fundamental to the success of the nuclear weapons program, and I would make them among my highest priorities as Principal Deputy Administrator.

**Question.** Do you have any views on additional options that the NNSA could or should consider or evaluate that would ensure the most efficient complex of the future?

**Answer.** Many decisions on complex transformation must await completion of the NEPA process and the formulation of detailed cost studies for various transformation alternatives. I understand that during the recently completed scoping process, NNSA received nearly 33,000 comments on its environmental impact statement (EIS) for complex transformation and is considering those comments in preparing the draft EIS, which, when issued, will provide another opportunity for public review and comment. If confirmed, I would commit to conducting a thorough review of the EIS process and outcomes to ensure that decisionmaking going forward is well-informed and transparent. I would anticipate working closely with the NNSA staff to carefully review the cost studies and the underlying assumptions associated with the various transformation options.

**Question.** There has been some criticism that the options being considered by the NNSA, as part of the Complex 2030 EIS, will result in modernization in place and no facilities consolidation.

If confirmed, and after you have a chance to review the options in the EIS, if you believe that there are additional options that should be included in the EIS, would you inform the committee?

**Answer.** Yes, if confirmed, and if I believe there are additional options for Complex 2030 that should be included in the NEPA process, I will inform the committee. My understanding is that, based on comments it received, NNSA is expanding the range of transformation alternatives it will analyze in the EIS.

**FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE**

**Question.** Upon its creation, NNSA inherited an infrastructure in need of significant repair and modernization, particularly at the nuclear weapons plants. At the request of the DOE, Congress, in section 3133 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 2002, established the Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP).

Although FIRP appears to be making good progress in revitalizing the nuclear weapons complex infrastructure through elimination of maintenance backlogs, what recommendations would you make to ensure that current and future maintenance activities, under the Readiness in the Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) program, are in line with industry benchmarks when FIRP is terminated, so that no additional extensions of FIRP are required?

**Answer.** I understand that the NNSA is committed to maintaining its facilities and infrastructure consistent with industry best practices. The RTBF program has taken some significant steps to better align facility operations and maintenance activities with industry practices in preparation for the end of the FIRP. RTBF and FIRP are working on enhancing the corporate facility condition performance measure to formalize new sustainment strategies for both categories of facilities which includes a national Work Breakdown Structure. One key aspect of efficiently allocating maintenance resources is having a clear understanding as to what happens to individual facilities as the complex is transformed—NNSA cannot afford to refurbish outdated buildings that may not be part of the future complex. If confirmed, I commit to working with the various offices within NNSA to fully integrate facility maintenance plans and priorities with transformation plans.
Question. The DOE and the NNSA have begun to explore the possibility of using third party or other alternate financing options for construction projects. If confirmed, would you commit to carefully review any NNSA proposal to undertake construction projects with funding approaches that deviate from the traditional line item funding approach?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will ensure that NNSA conducts a rigorous, detailed, and formal review and analysis of any third-party or other alternative financing proposal for construction in accordance with the procedures established by the Deputy Secretary for such proposals. To be approved, these proposals must demonstrate that they represent a sound business decision and are in the best interest of the Department and the taxpayer.

Question. In addition, would you commit to keep Congress fully informed of any such proposals, to fully coordinate any proposal with the Office of Management and Budget, and to ensure that any such proposals demonstrate that any alternative financing approach is in the best interest of the taxpayer?

Answer. Yes. I will keep Congress fully informed of any such proposals and fully coordinate any proposals with the Office of Management and Budget, in accordance with the Department’s policies. I will ensure that such proposals represent a sound business decision in the best interests of the NNSA and show a clear financial advantage to the taxpayer.

Question. One of the goals of the effort to modernize the nuclear weapons complex is to reduce the number of square feet of building space. As the NNSA proceeds with construction projects in the future, would you commit to support the goal and work to include in the total project cost of any new facility the disposition of any buildings or facilities that are being replaced?

Answer. If confirmed, I will commit to work within NNSA to keep Congress fully informed of plans for Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D) of old facilities being replaced by new facilities, or for D&D of an equivalent amount of excess space if the replaced facilities can be refurbished in a cost-effective manner. Reducing the footprint of the NNSA nuclear weapons complex is an important component of the Department’s preferred approach to complex transformation known as Complex 2030. I understand that current NNSA practices do not include disposition costs for old buildings in the total project costs for new replacement facilities. If confirmed, I commit to reviewing NNSA practices in this area.

ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AND WASTE MANAGEMENT

Question. What responsibility do you believe the NNSA should have for funding, managing, and disposing of its current and future hazardous waste streams and environmental restoration?

Answer. Environmental restoration at the NNSA sites addresses cleanup of legacy contamination and waste. This work is funded and overseen by the Office of EM, and performed by NNSA contractors. It is NNSA’s responsibility to assure that this work is performed in a safe, cost-effective manner that meets regulatory requirements, and to ensure that such activities are appropriately integrated with other ongoing site mission activities.

As to future waste streams, these are the responsibility of NNSA. NNSA is also responsible for ensuring that current operations comply with all environmental requirements.

Question. What specific steps do you believe the NNSA should take to negotiate programmatic responsibilities for environmental activities between the NNSA and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for EM?

Answer. Presently, DOE’s Office of EM provides funding to NNSA sites for the EM work scope. This work includes legacy cleanup activities and the disposition of legacy waste. EM defines the scope of work and budget for projects at NNSA sites based on input and recommendations from NNSA. However, NNSA maintains authority, direction, and control as the landlord and contracting authority for EM work conducted at NNSA sites. NNSA directs and executes the program through its management structure and management and operating contractors. NNSA then reports to EM on project performance against the baseline and milestone schedules. This approach is consistent with the NNSA act and budget direction from Congress.

I remain committed to successful execution of the EM-funded activities at the NNSA sites and effective integration of this work scope with our ongoing mission.

Question. If confirmed, what role do you anticipate you will play in this process?

Answer. If I am confirmed, my role would be to ensure that NNSA and its contractors perform EM work at our sites in an effective and expeditious manner. It is my expectation that both my NNSA staff at Headquarters and at the NNSA sites will be able to work within the existing agreements and protocols to effectively exe-
cute the work. However, in those instances where there are issues that cannot be easily resolved, I expect to be fully engaged in resolution. To that end, I will work both with NNSA, DOE, and State and Federal regulators to develop appropriate solutions.

DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

Question. In your view, are any policy or management improvements needed in the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs? If so, what improvements would you recommend?

Answer. In the policy area, I fully support NNSA's expansion of nuclear nonproliferation program activities outside the former Soviet Union and if confirmed, would work with the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to advance these efforts. In the area of program management, I am aware of concerns from NNSA related to the challenges that arise from having to deal with two separate funding mechanisms—one for program activity and the other for program direction. I understand that NNSA believes the current funding arrangement creates an impediment in terms of personnel management, training, travel, and information technology support. If confirmed, I would work with the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to gain a better understanding of this management concern and develop proposed corrective action.

Question. NNSA has significantly expanded its work in the Megaports program in cooperation with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

If confirmed, would you commit to keeping Congress fully informed as to the success of, as well as any problems with, this cooperative relationship?

Answer. During my time working for Congress, I have received briefings on the Megaports program. As for the Megaports program's cooperation with the DHS, I understand that NNSA has developed a close working relationship with DHS and its various components, including Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). NNSA has worked closely with CBP in coordinating the implementation of the Megaports Initiative with their Container Security Initiative. With DNDO, NNSA is working closely in the development of the global nuclear detection architecture and in their evaluation and procurement of next generation radiation detection technologies. NNSA's success is clearly linked to that of DHS in these important areas. If confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator, I would work with NNSA and DHS leadership to foster a close cooperative relationship.

If confirmed, I would commit to keeping Congress informed about the status and health of NNSA's relationship with DHS.

Question. The NNSA has responsibility for the bulk of the Federal Government's basic research on radiation detection technologies as well as other nuclear technologies, such as those used in nuclear forensics.

If confirmed, would you commit to undertake a review of the nonproliferation research and development program to ensure that it is adequately funded and fully coordinated with the activities of other Federal agencies?

Answer. I understand that NNSA's nonproliferation research and development work has potential applicability to a number of Federal agencies. Should I be confirmed as Principal Deputy Administrator, I commit to reviewing the NNSA funding as well as coordination with other Federal agencies in the area of nonproliferation research and development.

MATERIALS DISPOSITION PROGRAM

Question. The NNSA is responsible for implementing the United States commitment to the Russian government to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons grade plutonium. There are many issues and challenges facing the program including the fact that it is substantially over budget. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress directed DOE and NNSA to undertake an independent cost estimate for the plutonium disposition program and facilities.

If confirmed, would you ensure that the congressional direction is followed?

Answer. Yes. It is my understanding that DOE will submit its response to this requirement in the near-term. If confirmed, I will do my best to ensure that the NNSA complies with the congressional direction on the plutonium disposition program in a timely fashion.

NATIONAL IGNITION FACILITY

Question. The National Ignition Facility (NIF) is scheduled to achieve ignition by 2010. In order to accomplish this goal under current funding, much of the experimental work has had to be postponed.
If confirmed, would you commit to examining any opportunities that may exist to restore experimental work at the NIF in advance of ignition?

Answer. Yes, I support the goal of ignition at the NIF and appreciate the value of NIF pre-ignition experimental work to the Stockpile Stewardship Campaign. I understand that the NNSA is working to increase opportunities for experimental work at NIF prior to ignition consistent with completion of NIF on its current baseline, the ignition 2010 experimental campaign, and available budget. If confirmed, I will examine opportunities to restore experimental work in advance of NIF ignition.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING

Question. Do you support the current moratorium on testing?

Answer. Yes, I support the current moratorium on nuclear testing. Supporting a vigorous Stockpile Stewardship Program and the RRW program should reduce the likelihood in the long-term that the U.S. would have to resort to nuclear testing in the future.

Question. Do you believe that there is a need at the present time to resume underground nuclear weapons testing to support the current stockpile or to support new or modified nuclear weapons?

Answer. No. I understand from the NNSA and the Department of Defense that there are no foreseeable requirements that would lead to a recommendation for a nuclear test for technical issues, either to support the enduring stockpile or to support the RRW program.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Principal Deputy Administrator?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees in a timely manner?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Question for the record with answer supplied follows:]

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK PRYOR

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

1. Pryor, Mark. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has said that the acquisition of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction capabilities, technologies, and expertise by rogue states or terrorists stands as one of the most potent threats to the United States and international security. What is your plan to address these threats?

Mr. OSTENDORFF. The mission of NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) is to detect, prevent, and reverse the proliferation of nuclear materials, technology, and expertise. DNN’s programs are structured in support of multiple layers of defense against nuclear proliferation and terrorism. NNSA’s first line of defense is to secure nuclear materials in place at vulnerable materials, facilities, and sites worldwide. In this area, NNSA is working to complete site security upgrades at Russian sites by the end of 2008 as agreed to by the U.S. and Russia under the Bratislava Initiative. NNSA’s second line of defense is the deployment of radiation detection monitors at border crossings and major seaports. In this area, NNSA has equipped 88 land border crossings and 8 major seaports with radiation detection equipment. This layered defense strategy is bolstered by NNSA’s efforts...
to reduce quantities of nuclear materials, to develop cutting-edge proliferation detection technologies, and to strengthen the nonproliferation regime.

If confirmed, I will continue and, where possible, accelerate work in all of these areas to ensure that NNSA is doing all that it can to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction capabilities, technologies, and expertise by rogue states or terrorists. In addition to the work NNSA does, I plan to work closely with other agencies of the U.S. Government as well as with international partners through the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism to coordinate national and international efforts to meet the serious threat posed by nuclear proliferation and terrorism.

[The nomination reference of William C. Ostendorff follows:]

Nomination Reference and Report

As in Executive Session,

Senate of the United States,


Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

William Charles Ostendorff, of Virginia, to be Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, vice Jerald S. Paul, resigned.

[The biographical sketch of William C. Ostendorff, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Bill Ostendorff

A native of Shreveport, LA, Bill Ostendorff graduated from the United States Naval Academy with merit in 1976 with a B.S. in Systems Engineering. Following initial nuclear power and submarine training, he served on six submarines, including command of U.S.S. Norfolk (SSN 714) from 1992–1995. During this tour he conducted highly successful classified overseas deployments to the Mediterranean and the North Atlantic. U.S.S. Norfolk was recognized by Commander Submarine Force Atlantic as having achieved the greatest improvement in combat readiness among the 53 attack submarines in the Atlantic Fleet in 1993 and was awarded the Meritorious Unit Commendation by the Secretary of the Navy. In 1995, he was recognized by Commander, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, as a finalist for the Vice Admiral James Stockdale award for inspirational leadership in command.

From 1996–1998, Bill was Director of the Submarine Force Atlantic Prospective Commanding Officer School. From 1998–1999, he commanded the 1,200 men and women of Submarine Squadron Six in Norfolk, responsible for the operations, maintenance, and training of 8 attack submarines and a floating drydock. From 1999–2002, he served as Director of the Division of Mathematics and Science at the United States Naval Academy.

Bill’s awards include four awards of the Legion of Merit and numerous campaign and unit awards. His education includes a JD from the University of Texas (Order of the Coif), an LLM in International and Comparative Law from Georgetown University Law Center (with distinction), and graduate work in policy studies at the University of Maryland. He is a member of the State Bar of Texas.

Upon retiring from the Navy in 2002 in the grade of Captain, Bill joined the Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, VA. In 2003, he joined the staff of the House Armed Services Committee where he assumed duties as staff director for the Strategic Forces Subcommittee which has oversight responsibilities for the Department of Energy’s Atomic Energy Defense Activities as well as the Department of Defense’s space, missile defense, and intelligence programs. Bill and his wife Chris, reside in Oakton, VA, and have three children—Becky, a third year law student at the University of Virginia; Chuck, an Army Second Lieutenant stationed with the 2nd Calvary Regiment in Germany; and Jeff, a second year student at the College of William and Mary.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the
advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details
the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee.
The form executed by William C. Ostendorff in connection with his
nomination follows:

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF
NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more
space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the ques-
tion number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part
of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior
to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made
available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   William C. Ostendorff, Nickname: Bill.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration.

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive
   files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   October 22, 1954; Shreveport, LA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Christina Lee Miller Ostendorff.

7. Names and ages of children:
   Rebecca Lee Ostendorff, 26; Second Lieutenant William Charles Ostendorff, Jr.,
   USA, 22; Jeffrey Thomas Ostendorff, 19.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended,
   degree received, and date degree granted.
   University of Texas School of Law, J.D., 1984.
   Georgetown University Law Center, LLM International Law, 1992.
   University of Maryland School of Public Policy, Graduate Certificate In Policy
   Analysis, 2005.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years,
   whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location
   of work, and dates of employment.
   August 2003–Present, Counsel, House Armed Services Committee.
   August 2002–August 2003, Research Staff Member, Institute for Defense Analy-
   ses, Alexandria, VA.
   August 1999–July 2002, Director of Division of Mathematics and Science, United
   States Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD.
   April 1998–August 1999, Commander Submarine Squadron Six, Norfolk, VA.
   December 1995–March 1998, Director, Submarine Prospective Commanding Offi-
   cer School, Submarine Force Atlantic, Norfolk, VA.

10. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.
   None.

11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   None.

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
   - Member State Bar of Texas (admitted 1984).
   - Life Member, United States Naval Academy Alumni Association.
   - Church of the Holy Comforter, Vienna, VA.
   - Grachur Club—a family summer retreat with a religious heritage on Magothy River south of Baltimore, MD—President (started 2-year term October 2005).

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**
   (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
   None.
   (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
   Republican National Committee member.
   (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
   Republican National Committee contributions:
   - January 2007 - $30
   - October 2006 - $40
   - August 2006 - $30
   - January 2006 - $30
   - September 2005 - $25

14. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
   **Military:**
   - Legion of Merit (four awards)
   - Defense Meritorious Service Medal
   - Meritorious Service Medal
   - Navy Commendation Medal (four awards)
   - Other Navy unit awards
   - Finalist 1995 Vice Admiral Stockdale Award for Inspirational Leadership in Command
   **Law school:**
   - Order of the Coif
   - Gene Woodfin Prize for Leadership
   - National Patent Moot Court Finalist
   **College:**

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.
   None.

16. **Speeches:** Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.
   None.

17. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
   Yes.
The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.

Signature and Date

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

William C. Ostendorff.

This 7th day of March, 2007.

[The nomination of William C. Ostendorff was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on March 28, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on March 29, 2007.]
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. We welcome this morning Lieutenant General Douglas Lute, whom President Bush
has named as his choice for what the President called the “full-time manager” for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lieutenant General Lute has been serving as the Director of Operations on the Joint Staff since September 2006. Immediately prior to this assignment, he served for more than 2 years as the Director of Operations at the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), overseeing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and other operations in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR).

General Lute is accompanied by his wife, Jane Holl Lute, herself a retired Army officer, who is currently Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations at the United Nations; and we welcome you, Mrs. Lute.

General Lute is an accomplished senior officer with a distinguished record and great experience in both military tactics and national security strategy and policy. He’s been nominated for an unenviable position. He’ll be responsible for bringing coherence to an incoherent policy, a policy that is still floundering after more than 4 years of war in Iraq.

We asked General Lute several advance policy questions prior to the hearing, one of which was what authority he will have to fulfill the responsibilities of the position to which he is nominated. In his written reply he said that: “The position is an advisor and coordinator, without directive authority beyond a small staff.” He further said that the ability to move policy forward had to do with such factors as “presidential direction and support, acceptance by other policy principals, broad commitment to a common cause, cultivated interpersonal relationships, personal integrity, and meaningful results.”

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, described as a close personal friend of the President, almost a family member, was either not able to get that presidential direction and support or not able to employ it to bring coherence to the President’s policy, and one has to wonder, how does one expect that General Lute can be more successful.

It is no secret that several retired four-star general officers were offered the position and turned it down. According to media reports, one reason given by one of the generals was that the administration remains fundamentally divided on how to carry out the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Retired Marine General Jack Sheehan, who declined to be considered for the position, was quoted as saying, “The very fundamental issue is the administration doesn’t know what the hell or where the hell they’re going.” General Sheehan reportedly expressed concern that the hawks within the administration, including Vice President Dick Cheney, remain more powerful than the pragmatists looking for an exit in Iraq. That does not bode well for General Lute.

It is no secret that General Lute himself questioned the so-called “surge” strategy for Iraq before its announcement by the President last January. The results of the surge are not very promising. Nearly 5 months after it began, the surge is nearly complete, with the last U.S. combat brigade now being deployed in Iraq. However, American casualties are at some of the highest levels of the war; sectarian violence is rising again after a short reduction, and the insurgency is as active as ever, especially in the use of mass cas-
ality-producing car bombs against Iraqi civilians and the improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against U.S. and Iraqi forces.

Iraqi units are reporting to Baghdad with an average of only 70 percent strength and, while American soldiers have been extended or deployed on 15-month tours with 12 or fewer months between rotations, Iraqi soldiers are on 3-month tours to Baghdad with no plan that we are aware of to return Iraqi units back for another rotation once they depart. Those are the words of Major General William Caldwell, the Multi-National Force-Iraq spokesman, as quoted in the Washington Post.

Apparently the first Iraqi troop rotation was completed in March, the second will be completed this month, and the third is in preparation. Sooner or later, the Iraqis will run out of troops for these rotations.

Just as troubling, with little continuity in Iraqi troop presence, it’ll be the Americans who will have to continue to lead the constantly changing Iraqi forces in the Baghdad neighborhoods. With no stable Iraqi troop presence in those neighborhoods, there’ll be little intelligence gleaned from the Iraqi people and it will be the Americans who will be forced to continue to take the lead in holding those neighborhoods.

In fact, media coverage of the weekly reports by American brigade commanders indicates that only 128 of 457 neighborhoods are under control and that insurgents have been cleared out in those 128 and the population can be protected.

Now, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki promised that there would be no political interference with the operation, but there have been recent disturbing press reports of a department of the prime minister’s office, the office of commander in chief, “playing a major role in the arrest and removal of senior Iraqi army and national police officers, some of whom had apparently worked too aggressively to combat violent Shiite militias.”

That report in the Washington Post quoted Brigadier General Dana Petard, Commanding General of the Iraq Assistance Group, which provides the military transition teams advising Iraqi units, as saying: “Their only crimes or offenses were that they were successful,” meaning successful against the Mahdi Army. Then he goes on to say—and this is our general—“I’m tired of seeing good Iraqi officers having to look over their shoulders when they’re trying to do the right thing.”

The surge is now nearly complete. The stated principal purpose of the surge was to give space and time for the Iraqi politicians to make progress on important political reconciliation benchmarks, such as implementing legislation for the equitable distribution of revenues from oil sales, de-Baathification, and constitutional amendments that would lead to reconciliation among the three main Iraqi groups. Progress is not apparent in that all-important area of political reconciliation.

I was dismayed to see a report in yesterday’s Los Angeles Times that Prime Minister Maliki’s top political advisor, Sadiq al-Rikabi, said that he doubts the prime minister will be able to win passage of key legislation so ardently sought by U.S. officials and quoted him as saying “We hope to achieve some of them, but solving the
Iraqi problems and resolving the different challenges in the next 3 months would need a miracle.” Those are his words.

How much more time should we give after 4 years in Iraq? Baghdad is burning while the Iraqi politicians avoid accepting responsibility for their country’s future. I believe the only chance to get Iraqi politicians to stand up is when they know we are going to begin to stand down. Our soldiers risk their lives while Iraqi politicians refuse to take the political risks and make the necessary compromises to promote reconciliation. We cannot continue to have the lives of American servicemembers held hostage to Iraq political intrigue and intransigence.

Now, I’m going to put the balance of my statement in the record—it relates to Afghanistan—because Senator Inhofe needs to leave immediately for another important assignment. So, with Senator Warner’s concurrence, I’m now going to call upon Senator Inhofe for his opening remarks.

[The information referred to follows:]

The Balance of Senator Levin’s Opening Statement

Another challenge of the new position for which General Lute has been nominated will be to ensure that even as we’re focused on Iraq that we don’t neglect the mission of bringing security and stability to Afghanistan. This is a pivotal time for our efforts there. In 2006, the security trends were in the wrong direction—attacks on coalition forces, roadside bombs and suicide bombers were all up compared to the year before. In response, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) launched military operations to counter an anticipated Taliban spring offensive. Last week, Secretary Gates during his visit to Kabul was guardedly optimistic that coalition forces are making progress against a Taliban resurgence. As British General David Richards, former ISAF Commander, recently wrote, there may be a “window of opportunity,” thanks to ISAF and the Afghanistan security forces, for the Afghan government and the international community to promote governance and development for the Afghan people.

One of the main tasks of the position for which General Lute has been nominated will be to ensure that the entire Government, both the military and civilian components, are providing the necessary resources to succeed in Afghanistan. Militarily, it is essential that our troop levels, and those of our NATO allies and the Afghan security forces, are sufficient to both clear areas of Taliban influence and then hold those areas.

But, as General Lute states in his answers to pre-hearing advance policy questions, “the solution in Afghanistan will be political, not military.” To succeed, we, along with the international community, must also commit the financial resources and civilian expertise to the other components of the Afghanistan mission—improving governance and bringing economic development through the joint military-civilian Provincial Reconstruction Teams; fighting corruption; and countering the scourge of the illegal drug trade. With more than 60 countries on the ground in Afghanistan, as well as the United Nations, the European Union and NATO, and the Afghan Government, the person coordinating this effort will have his work cut out for him.

Senator WARNER. I concur.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate your accommodating this. We have an Environment and Public Works Committee hearing that is very significant, as Senator Warner knows, and I must be there.

Let me quickly say, General Lute, as we’ve discussed in my office, I was one of those who didn’t think this position was necessary. However, I would say this, that if the position is necessary and we’re going to do it, you’re the ideal person for the job.

Let me just give you a different perspective from our chairman, because I don’t agree with his statement. After having returned
from my 14th trip in the AOR, not always in Iraq but in the surrounding area, this is the first time that I saw some results. This was just 2 weeks ago and I am really excited about it. I think it’s a combination of three things, and what I’ll ask you to do is respond to this in the record, to find out what your feelings are about them.

One is, it appeared to me you had coinciding at the same time the surge, the appearance of General David Petraeus, and the concern of the Iraqis, primarily the clerics, over this idea that we had all these cut-and-run resolutions here and that all of a sudden they realized maybe they’re going to have to do this on their own, I think that actually provided something very positive.

My experience there was mostly in the Anbar Province, I remember, it was only a year ago that al Qaeda made the announcement, this is going to be the capital of terrorism, if you would, in Ramadi. Ramadi is now under control and the whole Anbar Province does look very good.

In Fallujah, I’ve been there many times and I’ve watched the progress—that’s a place that we all have these visions of this World War II type of door-to-door marine activity. It is now virtually under the control of the Iraqi security forces, something we did not expect could happen this soon.

I want to ask you to study this a little bit and tell me if I’m wrong on this. We’ve heard a lot about Prime Minister Maliki, Defense Minister Jassim, Dr. Rubaie, and all these people we’ve met. But these are the political leaders. It appeared to me that the progress being made is really being made through the mosques. It’s my understanding—and correct me if I’m wrong in the record—that we’ve been monitoring the messages that come from the mosques on a weekly basis. Up until February, about 80 percent of these were anti-American messages. They started dwindling down so that in the month of April there was not one anti-American message coming out of the mosques.

I’ve come to the conclusion the clerics, the imams, are really the leaders and the reasons for the real progress I have seen.

[The information referred to follows:] It is true that there has been an overall decline in anti-American rhetoric coming out of the mosques; despite this decline, however, the coalition remains the overall primary target of insurgent and militia attacks. Specifically in al Anbar, the dramatic decrease in violence comes mainly from the actions of Sunni tribal leaders.

The second thing I’m going to ask you to respond to is on two programs. One is what we in this country would call the neighborhood watch program. Where somehow—and I assume it’s coming from the clerics—we’re getting individuals, unarmed, who are volunteering to go out with spray cans and spray paint around the undetonated IEDs—cooperating just as we would in this country on some of our anti-crime efforts.

[The information referred to follows:] There are 9 District Councils and 88 Neighborhood Councils that represent over 5 million citizens of Baghdad. Members of these councils are selected from their peers, represent local citizen interests, and provide interface with coalition forces and Iraqi security forces (ISF). Because reconstruction and community governance are such a key component of the Baghdad security plan, ISF, and Multi-National Division-Baghdad are working very closely with these councils to address neighbor-
hood security concerns, restore essential services, and facilitate civil-military projects designed to improve the quality of life in each neighborhood.

The third thing I noticed, it was actually in Baghdad, was called joint security stations, where our guys go out and instead of coming back to the Green Zone after their missions, they actually stay out in the neighborhoods with the Iraqi security forces, developing very intimate relationships. To me, this is the reason for that success and I see these successes there.

The last thing I would ask you to talk about for the record is, I've heard from people a lot of them don't even want this to succeed over there—that the same model and the activity you have in the Anbar Province is not something that would work in the rest of Iraq. I'd like to know your feeling about that and why these programs that I see as greatly successful would not work in other parts of Iraq. That would be for the record, and thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner, for allowing me to get my words in.

[The information referred to follows:]

The political progress in the past several months in al Anbar province has dramatically improved the security situation there. Essentially the Sunni tribes are standing up together to oppose al Qaeda. We are beginning to see signs of similar Sunni tribal opposition to al Qaeda in Diyala and Saladin provinces, and in some areas of Baghdad. Some experts suggest that al Anbar is a special case because it is so predominately Sunni and that similar tribal-based progress is not likely in other areas that are mixed Sunni-Shia. My assessment is that it is too early to tell whether this pattern will play out beyond al Anbar, but it represents a potential for improving security that we should support based on assessments of our leaders on the ground.

General Lute. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Senator Warner, we've changed the procedure a little bit here to accommodate Senator Inhofe, but we don't want to shortchange you on your opening statement, so let me call on you.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator Warner. First, I extend a very warm welcome to you, General and Mrs. Lute, and thank you and your family for many years of loyal and dedicated service in the United States Army, and most importantly to our Nation.

You are taking this position at the request of the President of the United States. It's not one that you sought. You are very, I think, happily and exceptionally good at delivering the responsibility as Chief of the Staff of the Joint Staff. As you well know, I've had the occasion on a regular basis to come over and visit with you and other members of the Joint Staff and observe you and the manner in which you, with extraordinary professional capability, manage those responsibilities on behalf of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense.

I commend you for all your posts, and I further reflect on a trip that we took, again this time at the request of the President on my behalf. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) commander at that time, General James Jones, asked you to accompany me, and we went into Africa to examine some of the areas that were experiencing civil strife and a turnover in government. I saw firsthand how you handled yourself, both as a soldier in a
situation that was not entirely secure by any measure and also with the heavy influx of diplomacy. So I have the highest professional regard for you as a person and you have my full support in this position.

Now, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman—and you and I have been on this committee together many years, 29 to be exact—there are strong divisions within the committee regarding policies as it relates to Iraq and to a lesser extent to Afghanistan. The chairman has expressed his. I most recently, together with a number of other Senators, 52 to be exact, put a measure through the Senate, which measure was eventually taken almost verbatim and incorporated in the most recent appropriations bill, in which in a bipartisan way we discussed the need for benchmarks, an independent examination to be performed by a private sector entity and a retired group of military officers as to the professional capabilities today and projecting into the future of the Iraqi security forces.

Of course everyone is free to discuss policy, but in my judgment this hearing is about General Lute, his background, his experience, his ability to fulfill this position. Now, this position has been the subject of some characterizations by certain retired officers who allegedly were invited to consider it. I was somewhat struck—I have known several of those officers very well—about their condemnation of it.

But that’s not General Lute’s problem. He didn’t participate in that, and I just don’t think that those comments by those officers are germane to this hearing. This hearing is on whether or not this officer has the professional credentials to fulfill this assignment requested by the President of the United States, a nomination submitted to the Senate for confirmation. I, for one, feel ever so strongly, based on personal work with him over a period of several years, on his extensive biographical material, this officer is more than qualified to handle those positions.

I think one of the most important aspects of this assignment, if not the most important in my judgment, in addition to your credentials, is will you provide the President your own impartial, straightforward personal advice on a range of issues relating to these two AORs? That’s it. I’ve come to know you. In my dealings with you, you have always said to me, even though perhaps knowing I didn’t fully share those views, these were your professional views, these were your assessments.

There’s been throughout the history of our country a number of military officers who’ve stepped up to take on these positions with our Presidents, remaining on active duty, but assigned to the president. As this description of your job lays out very clearly, you’re reporting to him and reporting to him only. For military career purposes, you do have your normal chain of command, but that in no way is going to obstruct or impede your ability to give the President your impartial assessment of situations. Many of these situations we cannot foresee on this date at this time, because this is an ever-changing scenario, particularly in Iraq, politically, economically, and militarily.

I was impressed. I’ve gone through very carefully the responses that you’ve given to the questions propounded by the committee, which we do as a matter of routine here for officers coming forward
for this type of position. But the question is very interesting: “What role, if any, did you play in the development of the new Iraq strategy announced by the President earlier this year, January 10? Press reports indicate that you opposed the surge strategy during policy deliberations prior to the President's decision. Is that true? If so, why? Have events to date validated or invalidated your concerns?”

This is your reply, very straightforward I find: “I participated in the policy review prior to the President's decision to adjust course in January 2007. During the review I registered concerns”—your personal, professional concerns—“that a military surge would likely have only temporary and localized effects unless it were accompanied by counterpart surges by the Iraqi Government and the other non-military agencies of the U.S. Government. I also noted our enemies in Iraq have in effect a vote and should be expected to take specific steps to counter our efforts. The new policy took such concerns into account. It's too soon to tell the outcome.”

I think that’s a very straightforward answer, and that’s what I say is clear evidence of how you’re going to handle this important assignment with the President.

So I congratulate you and I think the President has chosen well, and I’m happy to participate in this hearing this morning.

I thank the chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.

Now, before we call upon you, General, pursuant to the long-standing tradition of this committee, we ask all of our nominees, military and civilian, to answer a series of advance policy questions, which Senator Warner has referred to. These questions and the nominee’s responses will be made part of the record.

There are also certain standard questions that we ask of every nominee who appears before the committee. These are the questions and we would appreciate your answers:

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

General LUTE. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

General LUTE. No, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

General LUTE. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to Congressional requests?

General LUTE. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

General LUTE. Absolutely.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, the next question is one which you have answered for the record in a way which is more complicated. I want to alert you to that and make sure we’re on the same wavelength here. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?
General LUTE. Senator, I think, as I’ve demonstrated in the past in my current position as the Director of Operations, I fully respect the Senate’s responsibilities for oversight, and I have demonstrated that by quick, responsive appearances before this committee a number of times. In this new position, I’m advised that I may not be in such a position as I have in the past. However, I’ll do as directed by the White House.

Chairman LEVIN. I think we all understand the situation. This has been a similar position that others have been in before, and your answer will be made part of the record.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, on that, could we request that the responses, which were somewhat more at length than what the General just said, be placed in the record at this point, taken out of the responses to the committee and put here for ease of reference by those studying the record?

Chairman LEVIN. Yes, that’s a good suggestion, and what we will do is take that answer—we’ll leave that in the questions and answers which are already made part of the record. But in addition, what Senator Warner is suggesting is that we will take your answer to this particular question and, since it is more complete than the one you just gave, understandably—

General LUTE. Certainly.

Chairman LEVIN. We will make that part of the record at this point.

[The information referred to follows:]

Congressional Oversight

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Response. During my service as the J–3 to Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have always honored my obligations to this committee to offer testimony when requested. With this new assignment, if confirmed, I am advised that as an Assistant to the President, principles designed to ensure that the President is provided with candid advice and to protect the autonomy of the office would apply to me as they do to preclude the testimonial appearances of other senior advisors to the President, especially as they concern matters of national security. I understand that these principles have applied to all other Active-Duty military officers who have served as senior advisors to the President, including those serving as National Security Advisor and Deputy National Security Advisor, in prior administrations.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to give your personal views when asked before this committee to do so, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

General LUTE. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Response. During my service as the J–3 to Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have always honored my obligations to this committee to offer testimony when requested. With this new assignment, if confirmed, I am advised that as an Assistant to the President, principles designed to ensure that the President is provided with candid advice and to protect the autonomy of the office would apply to me as they do to preclude the testimonial appearances of other senior advisors to the President, especially as they concern matters of national security. I understand that these principles have applied to all other Active-Duty military officers who have served as senior advisors to the President, including those serving as National Security Advisor and Deputy National Security Advisor, in prior administrations.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to give your personal views when asked before this committee to do so, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

General LUTE. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

General LUTE. Senator, I think the answer there is very similar to the previous one: As directed by the White House.

Chairman LEVIN. Well, here, though, it’s a little different question because we’re asking you if you have a good faith basis for denying the request will you give us the basis for your denial.

General LUTE. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Now, we would be delighted to hear from you, General. Again, we thank you for your willingness to take this position at the request of the President. We know that you did not seek this position. You have always performed your duties in a most professional manner. You have been somebody who has provided great service to this Nation and we are grateful for that, and we welcome you and we look forward to your opening statement.

STATEMENT OF LTG DOUGLAS E. LUTE, USA, TO BE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR FOR IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

General Lute. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to at the outset join you in recognizing my wife Jane, who's sitting here behind me and has been a constant source of support for me, even while she contributes in a very senior position at the United Nations. It's a real pleasure for me and a great source of support that she's here today.

Senator Warner. We share those views.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much. Again, our thanks to you, Mrs. Lute.

General Lute. It's an honor to come before you today for this confirmation hearing. I want to express my sincere thanks to you, Mr. Chairman, to Ranking Member Senator McCain, and to Senator Warner for your prompt consideration of this nomination, especially given the other pressing demands before this committee.

Also, to the members of the committee with whom I have met over the past several weeks, thank you for taking time to discuss this position and my nomination.

To a person, those with whom I have spoken conveyed two clear messages: first, a message of concern for the wellbeing and safety of our men and women in harm's way; and second, that we would all like to see us pursue a course of action that makes our country safer while safeguarding our national interests in the region. Surely we could call this the common ground.

America is at war, and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan represent what we in the military call the main effort in the long war. The stakes for these two countries are certainly high, as they are for all the countries in the region. But the stakes for the United States are also high. This region, where America has vital national interests, will not succeed if Iraq and Afghanistan do not succeed. The U.S. plays a vital role in this cause.

Where are we today? Not where any of us would like. Especially in Iraq, progress has been too little and too slow. No one is satisfied with the status quo, not the Iraqis, not the key regional partners, not the U.S. Government, and not the American people.

To change this, we are in the midst of executing a shift in course, as announced by the President in January. Early results are mixed. Conditions on the ground are deeply complex and likely to continue to evolve, meaning that we'll need to constantly adapt. Often in an environment as complex as Iraq, measures that fix one problem in turn reveal challenges elsewhere.

But one factor remains constant: the dedication and sacrifice of our men and women, military and civilian, serving in these combat
zones. They're a continuing source of inspiration to me and to my family.

The position for which I have been nominated is designed for one fundamental purpose, to advise the President on how to provide our troops and civilians in the field with increased, focused, full-time, real-time support here in Washington. It will do so in two basic ways: by executing policy decisions comprehensively; and by developing policy adaptations to meet changing needs on the ground.

If confirmed, I will report directly to the President. I will brief him daily and act on his instructions in fulfilling my duties. I will work closely with National Security Advisor Steve Hadley to clarify priorities, establish milestones, provide follow-through, and set the policy development agenda. The aim is to bring additional energy, discipline, and sense of urgency to the policy process. Our troops deserve this support.

Mr. Chairman, I'm a soldier and our country is at war. It's my privilege to serve. This position represents a major personal challenge and I'm humbled by the responsibility it entails. If confirmed, I will give the President my straightforward, candid professional advice. I ask for the support of this committee for my nomination. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, General.

We'll have an 8-minute round to begin.

You stated both in your answers to the questions for the record and publicly that you were skeptical about the surge at the time it was decided upon. You and I talked about this next question yesterday in my office. Were the reasons for your skepticism you believe justified by the events that have occurred?

General LUTE. Senator, I'd reply by saying I think the bidding is still out. I expressed concerns in the policy development phase, as you mentioned in your opening remarks, that this not simply be a one-dimensional surge, that is a military-only. We have taken steps on other dimensions inside the U.S. Government and the Iraqi Government has taken some steps to demonstrate that it understands that it must surge, if you will, alongside of us.

I'd assess at this point that the Iraqi participation in the surge has been uneven so far, and I think we're in the early days and time will tell.

Chairman Levin. Do you still retain some of your skepticism overall about the chances of the surge succeeding?

General LUTE. Senator, I think as a military planner and an operations officer, skepticism is a bit of a genetic setting. We are constantly looking at what's happening on the ground——

Chairman Levin. I'm not sure what that means.

General LUTE. What I mean by that is it comes naturally. We are constantly looking at developments on the ground, assessing them and asking, what if this, what if that. So I think we're very much in that phase of this operations, where we're still assessing.

Chairman Levin. During the last few years, General, what other differences have you had with U.S. policy on Iraq?

General LUTE. Senator, I'm trying to recall. I believe that the policy review that we've just discussed was really the first time I had an opportunity to participate first-hand in the policy process.
Chairman Levin. My question’s a little different, though: What other differences have you had, not as part of the policy process, but you personally? What other differences have you felt?

General Lute. Senator, I believe that as I’ve watched this for 3 years I’ve come away with three personal lessons, if you will, that reflect my observations over those 3 years. One is that there’s no purely military solution to this fight; second, that there’s no American-only solution or purely American solution to this fight; and then third, that we can’t look at Iraq and Afghanistan and the problems there without seeing them through the lens of the region in which they exist. I’d suggest that any differences or concerns I’ve had in the past 3 years can be logged under those three categories.

Chairman Levin. Would you say that the way you’ve described them reflects the differences that you felt during those 3 years?

General Lute. I think that’s right, yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Now, the report in the Washington Post a few weeks ago said the following: that in an interview with Charlie Rose of PBS in January 2006 that you said that the military wanted “to see a smaller, lighter, less prominent U.S. force structure in Iraq, both to undercut the perception of occupation and to prevent” what you called the “dependency syndrome, the notion that U.S. forces will do what is necessary and therefore local forces do not need to step up.”

Is that an accurate statement of your feelings at the time?

General Lute. It is, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Does that remain your feeling?

General Lute. It remains to the extent that those two factors, the perception of occupation and what I called at the time the dependency syndrome, are still factors to be taken into account as we plot the way forward in Iraq.

Chairman Levin. Do you worry that the Iraqis might have a dependency syndrome?

General Lute. Senator, I worry any time that we charge young Americans to go out and work alongside an emerging security force, like the Iraqi force, but like others we’ve worked with across this region and beyond, that the sorts of people we recruit and train into our Armed Forces are can-do, positive, very affirmative and aggressive individuals, and it’s not always easy for them to step aside and let their hosts or their local counterparts, step forward. So I think that’s a concern.

Chairman Levin. That’s a concern that you have about our professionalism. I’m talking about the Iraqis’ dependency syndrome. Are you worried that they might have a dependency syndrome?

General Lute. That’s a concern, Senator, and it’s largely based, as I said, on how we approach our duties alongside the Iraqi forces.

Chairman Levin. In the last year and a half since January 2006, we have not had a smaller, lighter, less prominent U.S. force in Iraq to undercut what you call the “dependency syndrome.” Would you agree we have not carried out that goal in the last year and a half?

General Lute. Senator, I agree that we have not. However, I believe that statement was made in January 2006. In February 2006, of course, we saw the Golden Mosque bombing in Samarra, which dramatically changed the conditions on the ground.
Chairman Levin. You've said, I think, that you don't believe that there's a military solution for the violence, that Iraqi politicians must work out reconciliation issues in order for Iraq to have a successful outcome. Is that a fair statement?

General Lute. It is.

Chairman Levin. What leverage does the United States have to get the Iraqi political leaders to make the political compromises which are necessary for a political solution? For instance, do you think that U.S. troops' presence and the protection that we offer to the Iraqi Government in the Green Zone provides leverage and that therefore at least the possibility of reducing U.S. troop presence needs to be considered as a leverage method?

General Lute. Senator, I would look at the current state of affairs slightly differently. I will come to the question. I think that this isn't solely a question of leverage. I believe that the Iraqi Government is committed to the sorts of benchmarks that Senator Warner mentioned and that are now in the most recent bill.

The question in my mind is not to what extent can we force them or lever them to a particular outcome, but rather to what degree do they actually have the capacity themselves to produce that outcome and, if produced or if pressed too hard, will we in turn end up with an outcome that isn't really worth the paper it's written on? So I take that slightly from a different perspective.

Chairman Levin. You indicate it's not solely a matter of leverage. Is it at least partly a matter of leverage?

General Lute. I believe that we have asserted leverage to the extent that the Iraqi Government officials clearly understand that we're providing critical stability for them and critical security for them, especially in the face of this 5-brigade plus-up in Baghdad proper. We're giving them a golden opportunity that they must seize to make progress on the political front. I don't think there's any doubt in the mind of any Iraqi politician that this is an opportunity they have to seize.

Chairman Levin. Should there be consequences if they don't seize it?

General Lute. I accept that might in some views increase the leverage on these Iraqi officials, and it ought to be a dimension of future policy consideration.

Chairman Levin. When you say “in some views,” is that your view?

General Lute. Senator, only to the extent that, as I just indicated, I have reservations about just how much leverage we can apply on a system that is not very capable right now.

Chairman Levin. Is it your view that to some extent at least that leverage may be useful?

General Lute. Senator, I agree that it ought to be considered, that it may be useful.

Chairman Levin. My time is up. Senator Warner.

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to pick up on your last statement, which I found to be a very profound one, and I think it's one that the chairman and I and others agree with. Right now you said, your words were, yes, there is a measure of leverage we have, but your concern is about the capacity of the current elected government to do those things
that we set out in the benchmarks. I think you said that at this
time they're not capable.

Would you like to amplify that, because that goes to the very
heart of what we're faced with in this situation in Iraq?

General LUTE. Senator, what I meant by the government of
Iraq's capacity is simply that I think it's useful for all of us to re-
member that this government was formed for the first time just a
year ago. They're at the 1-year mark. Further, this is the first gov-
ernment of its kind, duly elected, founded on a constitution which
was endorsed by the Iraqi people, in the history of Iraq.

So in these very early days of capacity-building inside the Iraqi
Government, I just caution that we should be aware that this is a
very immature, still emerging government.

Senator WARNER. But I say to you—and you know more about
this than I do—we're paying a very heavy price to allow them to
grapple with seizing the reins of sovereignty. We're losing brave
soldiers, their lives, every week. Many more wounded seriously for
life every week. It is a balance that this Congress, this President,
and the American public must look at each and every day. Put
aside the enormity of the money. There's nothing more precious to
us than our military and their families, and they have given a full
measure.

When I listen to witnesses that say, yes, the government's only
been in business a year, yes—wake up. We're paying a heavy price
for them to establish this government.

General LUTE. Senator, if I may.

Senator WARNER. Yes.

General LUTE. Those young men and women walking the streets
of Baghdad, Ramadi, Kirkuk, and other places today, Kabul,
Kandahar, and so forth, are foremost in my mind, and they're abso-
lutely behind my motivation to seek this appointment, seek this
nomination, your confirmation of this nomination, and try to make
a difference here in Washington. I share your concern for those
young men and women.

Senator WARNER. I think we're progressing. Congress has now
required the President to come back up here by July 15 and give
us a current assessment, not wait until September. September ob-
viously is a critical period of time, but we need an interim report.
I look forward, as do other members, to receiving that from the
President. But foremost in our mind is the price that we're paying
to allow this government to constitute itself.

Now, the question is—I've looked at the history of a number of
your predecessors and they had various ranks. I personally am not
concerned that simply you're a three-star as opposed to a four-star,
yet you will be dealing with four-stars almost on a basis of equal-
ity. But they must recognize, those four-stars that deal with you,
that you are the Assistant to the President and in many ways
speaking for him and advising him.

Do you see any impediment by virtue of the disparity in rank
that you have with the seniors that you will be dealing with?

General LUTE. No, Senator, I don't.

Senator WARNER. I'm confident that is the case.

Now, interagency. This committee has spent a good deal of
time—actually, we passed some provisions into law to enable the
various Cabinet officers, secretaries, administrators, and the like, to induce their employees, more and more of them, to take up responsible positions in Iraq. In our discussions that you and I have had over the years, we recognize and are in full agreement this cannot be resolved solely by the men and women in uniform, together with our coalition partners. It has to be an all-out effort across the board by our Federal Government, and I think we have to acknowledge that has not occurred, and even to the satisfaction of the President. In conversations that I’ve had with him, and I’ve been in meetings where he, in the presence of his senior Cabinet officers, has urged that cooperation.

Now, that is part of your portfolio. Can you give us some insight into how you intend to approach the need to get further participation, whether it’s the Department of Agriculture trying to help restore agriculture in Iraq, whether it’s trying to restore a judicial system, or maybe not restore, create a judicial system in Iraq? What are the criteria and how do you intend to go about it?

General LUTE. Senator, if confirmed my plan would be to open, re-open actually because these communication channels exist now, but re-open, based on this new position, open communication channels with General Petraeus in Iraq and General Daniel McNeil in Afghanistan and Ambassador William Wood in Afghanistan and Ambassador Ryan Crocker in Iraq, and ask them for their priorities for the sorts of interagency support that you’re suggesting here.

So rather than base it on old priorities, perhaps priorities that linger from the past, I’d ask them for a fresh assessment of what their priorities are and then focus like a laser on meeting those commitments.

Senator WARNER. If you see and learn from the various Cabinet officers that there’s a deficiency in the law, I would hope that you would ask the President to promptly send to Congress such legislative requirements as may be needed to make certain all America is in this operation.

Now, of recent there’s been a great deal of focus on the Baker-Hamilton report. I personally have the highest regard for those two individuals and the committee that put together that report. I had a small hand in creating the situation which gave rise to that report. I thought the report was very constructive.

But in the light of the lack of progress with this surge in the minds of many Members of Congress and the American public, and other deficiencies that the chairman and myself pointed out that we see as far as the execution of our policy, some members are turning to that report—bills were filed this week in the Senate—as a redirection of efforts.

I personally think we should certainly give the President through July before we act on trying to put any additional direction as to change of policy. That’s my view. I’d like to have the President’s review in July. But it seems to me that report is about 7 or 8 months old. It was written and put together in the fall of 2006, and some of the assumptions in that report—for example, I think they made a valid assumption that this government, duly elected, was proceeding to become more of a unity government, had set for itself benchmarks of achievement of certain legislative steps that would bring about reconciliation of the differences. That simply has not
happened. So that assumption to me, which gave rise to their findings in that report, should go back and be reexamined before the report is embraced.

Likewise, one of the assumptions is that the Iraqi security forces, which have been in training now for some several years, were gaining strength. I personally, just speaking for myself, am not entirely satisfied with the measure of their participation in the surge. We hear reports now that their units are rolling over, as the chairman said, in a period of 90 days, when our troops are there for a year or more, and this is causing friction.

Their table of organization is well below what is constituted as needed for a viable fighting force. Today I understand some of their units are marginally at 50 percent of their full strength. Now, that's another assumption made by Baker-Hamilton which I feel, no criticism to Baker-Hamilton, but the assumption just hasn't proven out over time.

So as we go forward and await the President's assessment of this program on July 15, I think we should forestall any direction of Congress to try to dictate or suggest or in any other way to the President what's to be done, until we get his report on those issues.

I yield the floor.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator Lieberman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Lute and Mrs. Lute, thank you very much for your service. We welcome you here today.

I was just thinking as I've had the chance to get to know you, General, and hearing you today that some of the most impressive people I have met in my lifetime wear the uniform of the U.S. military, and you're one of them. It's really quite remarkable and we all have a lot to be grateful for. This goes from the military police who are walking the beat in Baghdad right to the top. I thank you very much for your service.

What I really mean to say is, I haven't met anybody in the private sector who's any better than the best that we have to offer, that you offer your country, and the others you serve with in the military. I thank you for it.

I was struck—you said some very important things in your opening statement and your answers to the questions asked by the chairman and by Senator Warner. Just in your closing paragraph you said quite simply: "I am a soldier and our country is at war. It is my privilege to serve." That's a real sense of personal ethics and also national purpose, that really continues to distinguish our military. I thank you for saying that.

Again, I just went to Iraq last week and that's exactly—even in the midst of dissent, even when soldiers tell you, I'm not sure it was right for us to be here, or they wonder about how it's going now—most of them don't, but some do—there's a tremendous commitment to try to make it work and a pride in being in service. It should be, and it is I believe, an inspiration to us all.

I appreciate your opening statement because in a couple of your paragraphs you put this in context. I think it's very important for us to look at Iraq and Afghanistan as not isolated. You said—I'm going to quote because these are strong words—"America is at war
and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan represent what we in the military call our ‘main effort in the long war.’” I presume, parenthetically, we’re talking here about the war we’re engaged in against the Islamist extremist terrorists who attacked us on September 11. Am I right about that?

General Lute. That’s right, Senator.

Senator Lieberman. Then you go on to say: “The stakes for these two countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, are high, as they are for all the countries in the region.” That’s what I found last week when I was there. I visited three of our best Arab allies and Israel, and there is a profound sense of a conflict there between the extremists and everybody else, in some sense more directly between al Qaeda and Iran and in the rest of the region, and that is part of what’s going on in Iraq and Afghanistan.

“But the stakes for the U.S. are also high,” you say. “This region, where America has vital national interests, will not succeed”—the region won’t succeed—if Iraq and Afghanistan do not succeed, and the U.S. plays a vital role in this cause.”

So you have quite powerfully, directly put what’s happening in Iraq and Afghanistan in what I believe is the correct larger context of the war against Islamist extremism and of an entire region in which, and I quote you again, “the U.S. has vital national interests.” I think it’s very important as we go forward that we understand all of that.

Let me just ask you this briefly as my time is limited. You say the stakes for the U.S. are high in what happens in Iraq and Afghanistan. You use the word “succeed.” What are the negative consequences for the U.S. if we don’t succeed in Iraq and Afghanistan and what are the positive consequences if we do?

General Lute. Senator, thank you for those comments. I think the long-term, and I would even say the most vital interest at stake in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the regions in which these countries exist begins with defeating al Qaeda. It is very clear that al Qaeda has made it a matter of priority to reestablish a physical safe haven, which they lost when they were driven from Afghanistan. They’d like to retake Afghanistan and move back to that safe haven. But they now have declared their main effort to be in Iraq. So first of all, we have this interest of denying safe haven.

Senator Lieberman. Excuse me a moment. I thank you again for that comment. So therefore I presume you would say that anyone who says that we should pull out of Iraq so we can focus on fighting al Qaeda has missed the point that, in fact, al Qaeda today is our main enemy in Iraq?

General Lute. I’d argue that that’s correct, yes, sir.

Senator Lieberman. Thank you. Please continue.

General Lute. Second of all, there are longstanding, enduring relationships, security partnerships that we have in the region, some of the countries that you visited. We have an obligation to them in an effort to build longstanding stability or enduring stability in the region.

That of course is linked as well to another interest, and that is access to key natural resources. Then finally, I think over the last years there’s an increasingly important national interest with regard to our future strategies toward Iran.
So at least in those four areas, I think there are things that should draw our attention to the regional dimensions of what's happening in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Senator Lieberman. Therefore, how important it is to do everything we can, within reason obviously, to succeed and avoid failure there?

General Lute. I agree, Senator.

Senator Lieberman. General, I appreciate, I know there has been some media interest in the fact that in some sense you've been portrayed as an opponent of the surge. But I think in your answer to the question that you submitted to the committee you again were right on target. "I participated"—I quote from you—"in the policy review prior to the President's decision to go into the surge. I registered concerns that the military surge would likely have only temporary and localized effect unless it were accompanied by counterpart surges by the Iraqi Government and by the other non-military agencies of the U.S. Government. The new policy took such concerns into account."

I can tell you that I certainly saw that when I went over there last week. On one occasion I was briefed by one of our brigade combat teams that has jurisdiction over a large area in Baghdad, including the Haifa Street area, which was a scene of terrible street combat and now is totally calm. I believe the colonel in charge. He was most impressive. Colonel Roberts, I believe, was his name. It was most interesting to me that they made a presentation of what their goals are. They had eight goals for the area of their responsibility. The first one was military. The other seven were non-military. So I think the position you argued for is being reflected on the ground, and I believe with some success.

This gets to the point, which is the question always raised, do we, those who support the policy, somehow think that there's a strictly military solution to the violence in Iraq? I can tell you I don't. I know you don't. I'll ask you, do you agree that the President of the United States, the Commander in Chief, doesn't think that there is a strictly military solution to the problem in Iraq?

General Lute. Senator, I believe the President stated that very clearly and certainly the policies that are in place right now reflect that.

Senator Lieberman. I know that the same is true, but I'll ask you, of General Petraeus, who's now commanding our forces there?

General Lute. I believe that's a strongly held belief by General Petraeus as well.

Senator Lieberman. My time is up, but I thank you for your service. The final word I would say is this. The U.S. military is carrying out an enormous range of responsibilities with great effect, including mostly responsibilities that are non-military. I saw the beginning of some of the provisional reconstruction teams with personnel from other agencies there. Frankly, I don't think the other agencies of the U.S. Government are carrying a fair share of the responsibility today in Iraq, and I hope you will do everything you can to push them to do that. I'd say our military is in some sense involved in the most ambitious, important effort of national reconstruction that America has made since the Marshall Plan. But they need some help from the non-military sections of our Government.
Thank you.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Reed.
Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
General, welcome. For the record, let me say there's no one in
the uniform of the United States Army I admire more, respect
more. I've had the privilege of knowing you not only as a profes-
sional, a colleague, but also as a friend. I have known your wife
longer and as someone who has distinguished herself as an Army
officer, and we have similar ties to West Point.
I am certainly going to support you, couldn't do otherwise. But,
to be blunt, I don't think I'm doing you a big favor.
My sense is, if you step back, your appointment represents a dev-
astating critique of the national security apparatus of this White
House, because all you're being asked to do was what Stephen
Hadley and Dr. Condoleezza Rice were supposed to be doing for the
last several years—identify problems, coordinate resources, bring it
to the attention of the President, and get presidential direction.
That has been abysmal.
I think also, I'm afraid that your position will be someone who's
there to take the blame, but not really have the kind of access to
the President and the resources you need to do the job. I presume
you will be reporting to Mr. Hadley?
General LUTE. No, sir. I'll be reporting to the President and co-
ordinating with Mr. Hadley.
Senator REED. Mr. Hadley will be reporting to the President
independently?
General LUTE. On matters outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, yes,
sir.
Senator REED. That I find interesting. Frankly, Afghanistan,
Iraq, and, related to that, Iran, are the most critical foreign policy
problems we face, and the National Security Advisor of the United
States has taken his hands off that and given it to you? Is that
your understanding?
General LUTE. Sir, that's the design, yes.
Senator REED. Well, then he should be fired, because, frankly, if
he's not capable of being the individual responsible for those duties
and they've passed it on to someone else, then why is he there?
That's my view.
In fact, I think if the President was really serious he should re-
place Mr. Hadley, appoint you as a civilian, not as an Army officer.
Also, if he didn't choose to do that, replace General Pace with you,
because we do need a change in direction and policy.
I just fear that you're going to be placed in an impossible situa-
tion. I know why you're doing this job. It's because at the core
you're a soldier, because you understand what those young men
and women are doing out there, so you couldn't do anything less.
But I am very concerned that this is not going to work. It is an-
other political, public relations ploy, rather than a significant
change in strategy.
My respect for you is such that certainly I'll support you. I wish
you well, and if there's anything that you think I can do to assist
you please call upon me.
General LUTE. Thank you, Senator.
Senator REED. Thank you.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Let me just clarify one thing. Your answer is so critically impor-
tant here. Is there a written description of your job which states
what you have just said to Senator Reed, that you are going to re-
port to the President on Afghanistan and Iraq and that Hadley
does not have that any longer in his portfolio? Is that in your writ-
ten description?
General LUTE. It is, sir. The best written description is perhaps
the response to the first policy question, which is an extract of the
job description itself.
Chairman LEVIN. But it excludes Hadley reporting.
General LUTE. No, sir.
Chairman LEVIN. The way you described it, though——
Senator WARNER. The way you described it, you indicated——
Chairman LEVIN.—you have that chunk of his portfolio.
General LUTE. I believe that's right. It does not exclude him from
also advising, but the responsibilities for advising for Iraq and Af-
ghanistan, if confirmed, will be mine.
Chairman LEVIN. I agree with Senator Reed. I view that as an
astounding indictment and a bifurcation of the national security
job. Now there's two national security advisors to the President,
one on Iraq and Afghanistan and one on everything else, despite
all the relationship between Iraq-Afghanistan and everything else.
I think that Senator Reed has put his finger on a very decisive
point here and I find it, with him, kind of astounding that that has
been done.
That's not your doing, by the way. This is not in any sense a crit-
icism of you. It's quite the opposite.
I also agree with what Senator Reed said about you and why
you're doing this, because you're a patriot. It's that simple, and we
thank you for that.
Senator Bayh is next.
Senator BAYH. General, I understand you're from Michigan City.
General LUTE. I am, Senator.
Senator BAYH. Well, you come from good roots, but you've been
given a tough assignment. I share my colleagues' concern that a
good man has been put in a very difficult spot. I'm going to be for
you, just as Senator Reed said, but I do have some questions I'd
like to ask you your view.
I think it's important for the American people to get as clear an
understanding about the state of affairs in Iraq and Afghanistan
as we possibly can. I also serve on the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, so I hear from the intelligence world, as well as the
military world. I've been struck over the years about the disparity
sometime in the view of events and the state of affairs between the
two different communities, and I'd like to ask you about that.
We had a briefing in the intelligence world on Iraq last week and
I'd like to share with you the consensus view of the Intelligence
Community and get your reaction to that. Their overall consensus
was that the trend in Iraq is negative. There are occasional bright
spots—for example, some developments in al Anbar Province—but
that those positive developments are within the context of an over-
all negative trend.
Do you share that assessment?

General LUTE. I think, Senator, when you consider beyond simply the security setting, but also looking at the opportunities presented to the Iraqi Government to make progress on important political and economic measures along with the intent of reconciliation, that I share that at best the progress has been uneven.

Senator BAYH. Let me follow up on that. There may be some convergence of opinions here. Their assessment was that the prospect for political steps in Iraq toward meaningful reconciliation among the different parties, that those steps toward reconciliation, the political steps, would be marginal at best through the end of this calendar year. We all agree that political reconciliation is sort of the key to this ultimately working out.

I was interested in your colloquy with Senator Warner about your belief that they have the right intentions in terms of embracing the benchmarks, but don’t have the capacity. I would encourage you to retain a healthy level of skepticism about that. I mean, these folks were thinking about taking 2 months off this summer. Now they've gone back on that, but where's the sense of urgency? Their country's at risk of falling apart and they just don't seem to grasp the need to move forward here in material ways.

My question would be: Do you share the Intelligence Community's assessment that the political steps toward reconciliation are likely to be marginal at best through the end of this calendar year?

General LUTE. Senator, my assessment would be that they have a very full agenda and have shown so far very little progress.

Senator BAYH. We were also told that the state of the insurgency, the level of violence and that sort of thing, was in all likelihood going to be about where it is today a year from now. Do you have an opinion about that?

General LUTE. Senator, in the absence of the kind of political and economic steps that are before the Iraqi Government now, if they don't make progress on those sorts of reconciliation measures, I'd share the view that we're not likely to see much difference in the security situation.

Senator BAYH. You said our leverage was limited and that they are sort of feeling their way along here. As Senator Warner pointed out, I think many Americans are deeply concerned about asking our brave soldiers, who I know you care deeply about, to sacrifice themselves while a group of Iraqi political leaders get their act together. I think the American people understand the need for some degree of patience and resolve, but where’s the evidence that they’re doing their part?

I would encourage you to focus on whatever leverage we have. Some of us have concluded—I think Senator Warner, perhaps others, will take a look at September and that timeframe—but they’re just not doing enough. Trying to build up their confidence doesn’t seem to have worked too well, and that perhaps the opposite strategy of saying, look, you’re either going to do this or not, but you need to get on with it here, that perhaps that sort of approach might be more fruitful, because the other avenue just hasn’t worked.

General LUTE. Senator, I'd just add, if I may, that while it's important for us to focus on the results coming out of the government
of Iraq for the good of Iraq, that whatever those results the United States in my view retains long-term, enduring interests in the region, which has us with a national interest in the outcome in Iraq. So we have to balance what’s good for Iraq with what’s good for the United States in the region.

Senator BAYH. I agree with that.

General LUTE. There’s a careful balance here.

Senator BAYH. But we have to pursue our interests in the most intelligent way.

With regard to your colloquy with Senator Lieberman, my dear friend, about al Qaeda and that sort of thing, we cannot let al Qaeda define how most intelligently to pursue our national security interests. Which leads me to something else that the Central Intelligence Agency’s top expert on radical Islam had to say last week. In his opinion our presence in Iraq is creating more members of al Qaeda than we are killing in Iraq. Do you have an opinion about that?

General LUTE. Senator, again, I think we have to balance those sorts of assessments, which I think have some credibility, with a gross adjustment in the other direction, which might feature leaving Iraq to al Qaeda. There has to be a policy balance struck here between what’s good for Iraq and what’s good for the region and what’s ultimately good for America.

Senator BAYH. A group of us just returned from Turkey last week and they’re very concerned about attacks emanating from the Kurdish parts of northern Iraq. They feel that there are some camps there occupied by radical Kurdish groups. They had an attack in Ankara that killed several people and wounded dozens more. About half a dozen police officers were just killed, I think last week, in eastern Turkey.

This is a legitimate concern for them. They feel that northern Iraq is being used as a safe haven for terror groups to launch attacks on them. They would like our cooperation in doing something about that. Otherwise they feel that they might be forced to take direct action, which could be very destabilizing in Iraq and probably not very successful in cleaning out the camps.

Do you have any thoughts about what we can do to restrain those radical groups?

General LUTE. Senator, two thoughts on that. First, the Kurdish situation and the potential that Kurdish terrorists in northern Iraq may be influencing events inside Turkey demonstrates well, I think, this notion of needing to put the events in Iraq into a regional perspective. Usually when we talk about regional perspective we’re talking about east to Iran or west to Syria or south to the Gulf States. I think north to Turkey is a very important dimension of the regional impact of Iraq.

The other thing that strikes me is, to go back to my opening statement, this point of, in such a complex setting as Iraq, as we make a policy adjustment to take on a new dimension or adapt our policy towards a particular element of the problem, we have to be careful that that’s viewed in the overall picture, because one adjustment may cause two or three other perhaps unintended consequences. I think the situation with the Kurds in the north is in that category.
Senator BAYH. I would encourage you to look at that, because if the Turks for domestic political reasons feel that they're forced to take more overt action that could have consequences. My point simply was there are ways to deal with the fallout in Iraq that's not going well that might in fact be more effective than our current strategy there. This is something that we're going to ultimately have to make a decision about, whether the Iraqis have it within them to reconcile in a way that this is going to work. Ultimately, if we conclude that they don't, no matter how much we sacrifice, no matter how long we stay, we better have a backup strategy for dealing with the fallout of all of that as we begin to recalibrate our presence there, because it is important to the region, but many of us have concluded that our current way of pursuing our interest is just not very intelligent and is in fact harming our national security interests rather than buttressing them.

My last question for you would be shifting gears a bit to Afghanistan. Pakistan is going through a turbulent time here. That tribal area along their western border has become, unfortunately, a safe haven for al Qaeda. You said they're searching for one in Iraq. They have one now in western Pakistan.

President Musharraf has an election coming up, so he has to deal with that. But look, we have a right to expect them to be more aggressive and vigorous in dealing with those lawless tribal areas. I'd like to ask you, what is it reasonable for us to expect Pakistan to do to try and secure those areas, and how do we strike a balance between the worry of destabilizing Pakistan as they get more vigorous, or perhaps we might have to get more vigorous for them if they just can't do it, on the one hand, versus not doing enough or doing nothing and destabilizing Afghanistan?

There's this tension there between destabilizing two countries, both of which we want to try and stabilize. How do you strike that balance? What specifically should we expect the Pakistanis to do, because they've more or less pulled back from those areas and that's led to an upsurge in Taliban activity?

General LUTE. Senator, if confirmed, this would be very high on my priority list, to deal with the unhelpful influences both by way of the al Qaeda safe haven, but also I'd mention the Taliban safe haven that exists in these border regions of Pakistan. My sense is that Pakistan has done a lot as a key ally in the war on terror, but I couple that view with the impression that they have to do more.

I think there are things that we can do and that we're beginning to undertake now by way of making their tribal-based forces in the frontier regions more capable. I think that has some promise, but that will be a long-term effort.

I think, more fundamentally, the key to the tribal regions in Pakistan have to be viewed in a tribal perspective, and that is essentially that the Pashtun people who reside there and who are giving safe haven to al Qaeda and the Taliban don't only reside there, and we have to look at this problem as the Pashtun community at large, which also includes vast areas of eastern and southern Afghanistan. So I'd look at it tribally in a more regional take and then see what we can do in a targeted way to improve the capacity of the Pakistani forces.
Senator Bayh. Thank you, General. I wish you well. I'm going to vote for you. I would encourage you to have—and I'm sure you will—a particularly realistic view of the Iraqi political leadership, and constantly focus on what we can do to leverage them in the right direction. Ultimately we're going to have to conclude, are they capable of doing this? Not us, but them, with our assistance. Can they reconcile, make the hard political decisions, or are they just kicking the can down the road constantly and the situation is deteriorating, and at some point you reach the point of no return. I for one have concluded that a greater sense of urgency is in order here on their part or it's just not going to work.

Thank you.

General Lute. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bayh.

Senator Webb.

Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, welcome to the process. I'd like to also give my regards to your family. As someone who grew up in the military, I know the sacrifices that they've had to go through to help you reach the position that you're in.

Actually, my concerns here are twofold and they're not related directly to your credentials or to the issues of Iraq and Afghanistan per se. They first of all are related to how this position was created and second to my concerns, and they've been long-held concerns, about the possible confusion of civil-military relations when we have active duty military people over in political positions in an administration.

The first thing—and I hope you will help clarify this for me—we hear that this position was created and at the same time—I spent 5 years in the Pentagon and the way this description is read and your description of it in your testimony about advising the President on these matters, helping to develop policy and these sorts of things, I don't see how that is not redundant to what we are expecting General Pace to do, what the Secretary of Defense ought to be doing, what the National Security Advisor should be doing if he were fully competent, the kind of advice that would be given from Admiral Fallon, for whom I have a high regard.

Can you clarify for us the distinction there?

General Lute. Senator, you're right. As you list those other principals in the policymaking team, the policy development team—the Secretary of Defense, General Pace as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Fallon as the combatant commander for these two combat zones—that all of them participate in the policy development process.

This position is slightly different in that I would advise directly the President of the United States in both execution matters and policy development matters on a full-time, 24–7 basis. This is a very focused, limited portfolio position, while the Secretary of Defense, General Pace, and others who sit at the table at the principals committee in the policymaking table have responsibilities much broader than that.

Senator Webb. I would submit—and this is not a knock in any way on your credentials—but I would submit that if those other in-
individuals were properly doing their job, this position wouldn’t be necessary.

The second question that I have is, from the way that I read your statement and also from past experiences with people who are in uniform who move over into policy advisory and policymaking positions inside an administration, that’s a real strain on the notion of civil-military relations, when you have a uniformed military individual making political judgments and giving political advice to a political administration.

I’m interested in hearing your thoughts about that.

General LUTE. Senator, in my mind the key distinction is advice versus decisionmaking. I’m not in the decisionmaking chain. On the execution side, I’m not in the chain of command. I am simply one of a number of assistants to the President, and in this case I advise him on a relatively narrow portfolio.

Senator WEBB. Wouldn’t that also describe Mr. Hadley’s position? He’s not a decisionmaker.

General LUTE. I think it does describe Mr. Hadley’s position——

Senator WEBB. But in the decisions that are developed and in the advice that is developed there are political considerations.

General LUTE. Senator, I believe the President will turn to me, based on my background, my experience, and my expertise, and weigh most heavily on me or expect most heavily from me professional, candid, military advice.

Senator WEBB. Yes, but in terms of policy formulation political considerations have to come in play.

General LUTE. That’s correct.

Senator WEBB. There will come a time, more than likely, history shows there will come a time when you will return to the military, I would assume.

General LUTE. Senator, we’ll have to see how that goes, but that’s my intent, yes.

Senator WEBB. So then you will return to the military, to the uniformed military, as an individual who has had a policy advisory position inside a political administration.

General LUTE. If I return to the military, yes, Senator, that’d be right. I’d return fully aware of the military chain of command into which I’m returning.

Senator WEBB. But also you would return as someone who—for instance, similarly, when I was Assistant Secretary of Defense I had a political position and an advisory position, but I was a part of an administration and I was identified with that administration. That concept with respect to civil-military relations has concerned me for a long time. I just want to put that on the table, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you for your testimony.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Clinton.

Senator CLINTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, thank you. Thank you for your years of service to our country. I agree with my friend and colleague Senator Reed. I don’t know why you would put yourself in this position, but I’m grateful that you saw that this was a way to continue your service. I wish you well in a position that many of us believe is an impossible one.
We can only hope that perhaps you might be listened to where others have been ignored for some years now.

General, one of my concerns is that there is growing pressure here in Congress, and it certainly is reflected around the country, that at some point in the not very distant future we will begin to withdraw our combat troops when it becomes abundantly clear, as I believe it already is, that the Iraqis are not yet done killing each other, they have no intention to reach political resolution, and there is no one in the Iraqi Government nor on the scene who appears able to emerge to try to force those political settlements that are absolutely essential to any kind of stability or security in Iraq.

We may, as I have said, have remaining missions that will be concerned with al Qaeda, with the difficult position that we find ourselves in vis-a-vis the Kurds, the Turks, and the increasing pressure on the Kurds from the Sunnis to the south, as well as perhaps a continuing training and logistical role if the Iraqis get their act together, as well as protecting our interests and attempting to figure out what to do about Iran going forward.

I do not foresee a long-term role for our combat brigades in the midst of this sectarian civil war. So to that end, since we know it will be difficult, timeconsuming, and dangerous to withdraw our troops and our equipment, I wrote to Secretary of Defense Gates on May 23, and gave a copy of my letter to General Pace, asking for briefings on what exactly the planning was with respect to future, maybe even imminent, withdrawals of U.S. forces from Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that my letter to Secretary Gates be made a part of the record.

Chairman LEVIN. It will be made part of the record.

[The information referred to follows:]
The Honorable Robert M. Gates  
Secretary of Defense  
The United States Department of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Suite 319  
Washington, D.C. 20301  

Dear Mr. Secretary:  

Given the express will of the Congress to implement a phased redeployment of United States forces from Iraq and the importance of proper contingency planning to achieve that goal, I write to request that you provide the appropriate oversight committees in Congress – including the Senate Armed Services Committee – with briefings on what current contingency plans exist for the future withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. Alternatively, if no such plans exist, please provide an explanation for the decision not to engage in such planning.

The seeds of many problems that continue to plague our troops and mission in Iraq were planted in the failure to adequately plan for the conflict and properly equip our men and women in uniform. Congress must be sure that we are prepared to withdraw our forces without any unnecessary danger.

At a Department of Defense operational update which you hosted earlier this month, you were asked whether contingency plans were being developed in the event that a future assessment concludes the surge is not working. In response, you noted that efforts at the Department of Defense included detailed planning and consideration of operational alternatives, but that “it’s more of just broader conceptual thinking.” General Pace reiterated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not received orders to prepare contingency plans.

Yesterday, however, it was reported that your Iraqi counterpart, Defense Minister Abdul-Qader al-Obeidi, is preparing plans in the event that the United States and its forces departed Iraq quickly, reviewing worst-case scenarios, and conducting meetings with Iraq’s political leadership on this issue.

In light of growing violence and insecurity in Iraq, the continued lack of political progress by Prime Minister al-Maliki, the Iraqi Defense Ministry’s level of contingency planning, and the will of the American Congress to begin withdrawing troops from Iraq, it is imperative that the Department of Defense prepare plans for the phased redeployment of U.S. forces. As you well know, any military operation requires contingency planning so that the
Senator CLINTON. Certainly while sitting on this committee both in public and in private encounters and conversations it has disturbed me that there seems to have been only the most general of contingency planning with respect to withdrawal. I believe that withdrawal will be extraordinarily dangerous for our troops. There are basically two ways out: up through the north, assuming the Turks let us come out, and they didn’t let us come in, so that’s a challenge—perhaps they will see their interests differently—or through the south, along highways that will be very difficult to control and protect. We know that a great number of our casualties and injuries occur because of the IEDs and now the more powerful explosives that attack our convoys.

General LUTE, I hope that among your many responsibilities that you have assumed that you will look at this. May I ask you, if you will, please turn your attention to this issue, determine what level of planning has taken place, whether the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs have been briefed about the level of planning, what kind of timeline would exist if a decision for either military or political reasons were taken to begin withdrawal, and that you would assume this to be part of your responsibility in your new position.

General LUTE. Thank you, Senator. I do think such an adaptation, if the conditions on the ground call for it, will be part of this position.

Senator CLINTON. Thank you very much, General.

I think that among the many concerns that we have expressed to you are the confusion over responsibilities and chain of command. In fact, I think that has been an unfortunate hallmark of this administration’s policy toward Iraq from the very beginning. It was unclear who was in charge after the invasion. It certainly was opaque at best as to the extent of authority exercised by Ambassador Paul Bremer. There’s been a tremendous amount of difficulty and lack of accountability up and down the chain of command because there have been so many detours and other actors that have been involved.

I think that one of your challenges will be trying to sort all that out. It is certainly my opinion that the Vice President’s office has played a major role, continues to play a major role, and runs a par-
allel operation. What is your understanding of your responsibilities vis-a-vis the Vice President?

General LUTÉ. Senator, as I've said, I'll work directly for the President. But of course the Vice President is on the policy council, if you will, the principals committee of the National Security Council, and as such is an important participant in policy development considerations. So as I work with the President to set the agenda for that council, I'll be working with the Vice President and his staff.

Senator CLINTON. I wish you well, because certainly that's turned out to be a difficult situation for many. I don't know quite how we ever really determine what the chain of command inside the White House is. But certainly I think it's important that whatever your advice is, it be given directly to the President on a regular basis, and it would be my very strong recommendation, if you haven't already negotiated that, that you certainly try to obtain that assurance that you will be working with and directly reporting to the President.

Finally, the question that Senator Bayh raised about Turkey I think is increasingly critical. During the past few weeks there has been an increase in tension between Turkey and the Kurds, with the Turks bitterly complaining about continuing Kurdish separatist attacks. I don't know that we've had a very good briefing on that, Mr. Chairman. I can't figure out what is and isn't really happening. We know that there's a great deal of enmity between these forces. I'm told by the Kurds that they've tried to put a stop to the separatist actions. I don't know whether that's true. So I think it's important that we try to sort it out.

Turkey is a very important ally of ours and I know that, given some of the internal discontent and political upheaval going on in Turkey, that there is tremendous nationalist pressure on the Turkish military to respond to these attacks. It's been reported that there was last Sunday an ambush and killing of eight Turkish military personnel inside Kurdish territory. Yesterday there were unconfirmed reports that some Turkish military units crossed over the border to conduct raids and limited clearing operations in suspected militant camp locations.

I just urge, General, that you pay immediate attention to this. I know that General Joseph Ralston was appointed as a presidential envoy some time ago to the Turkish government. I think this demands the highest and most urgent attention. Clearly it is not in anyone's interest that the Turks cross the border en masse and the Kurds need to understand that it is not in their interest. But I would not be surprised to discover that there were agents, provocateurs within the Kurdish area either operating outside of the two principal Kurdish lines of military command or in some back room deal involved with a few people in Kurdistan, that needs to be reined in, if possible.

This situation is dangerous and difficult enough. We certainly don't need to see it explode in the north.

General, I too will be supporting you because of my high regard for you, what I know of your record, for those like Senator Reed who are incredibly admiring of your service, which I share. I hope that you, since you will be confirmed by the Senate, will see it as
part of your continuing responsibility to keep Congress apprised of what is happening with your work.

General LUTE. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Clinton.

Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, General. We appreciate your willingness to take on this difficult and important task. For some time I have believed that we needed more intensive management from the President to really make sure that all the various agencies and departments that are involved in Iraq and Afghanistan are operating at the highest level of cooperativeness and effectiveness.

For several years now, I have pointed out that responsibilities such as the economy, oil production, water, electricity, and others are the responsibility of the State Department or other Government departments than the military. My personal view is the military has performed extraordinarily well. I believe, however, that they probably could have done more in these other areas, but because other departments were given that responsibility there's been some confusion about responsibilities.

In areas involving the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the legal system, in my view there are too few personnel there. Likewise, there are areas in which the State Department has not functioned well because they do not have enough people in the country, and at times the level of coordination has not been effective.

I have recommended that the President appoint someone like yourself to be his personal representative, his personal advisor, who can identify the problems that are not getting addressed and report them to him immediately so that he can use his power, his decisionmaking authority, to make it happen. Sometimes it takes an absolute direct decision by the President to end logjams and uncertainties about responsibilities and in a life and death situation like Iraq I don't think we've been getting that done sufficiently. I think you can really help. I think it would be a really positive step.

I believe Mr. Hadley has a tremendous challenge. He has a worldwide challenge. He's with the G–8 and the President today I think. He has China, he has South America, he has Africa, he has Russia, all of those things on his plate that the National Security Council does; and I'm not sure they are configured or ever were considered to be an entity to really get into the details of managing the difficulties that we are facing in Iraq today. I think the President has done well in choosing a military person who has real background in that area who has the gumption to identify problems and confront them and help him solve them. So I want to say that to you first.

Now, as I understand this you won't have a team that would actually execute any proposal. Basically what you would do is if there's a conflict in responsibility or disagreement, let's say about how to establish a court system in Iraq, which I think is way behind its schedule, you would figure out what you thought was a solution and make a recommendation to the President to help him issue the directives that could solve that problem. But you wouldn't have people on your own staff to go out and operate a court system. You would use the personnel that are already there for that. Is that correct?
General LUTE. That’s correct, Senator. The execution will continue to reside with the executive departments, as it does today.

Senator SESSIONS. About how many staff personnel do you expect to have?

General LUTE. I have a small staff of about 10 or 12 people, sir.

Senator SESSIONS. So really it will be your personal leadership and your personal determination that will get to the bottom of these things and to give the President the best possible advice. I mean, you’re not going to be depending on a big staff. You’re going to be doing this personally.

General LUTE. That’s correct, Senator.

Senator SESSIONS. I think that’s important. I think we need some person of your stature, of your experience, to personally get involved in these matters.

For example, on the question of creating an effective legal system in Iraq, I concluded that Iraq has one-ninth as many prison bed spaces as they have in my State of Alabama, which isn’t much different than the national average, and they have a real problem with violence. I’ve been told DOJ is adding some more prosecutor advisors. I’ve been told we are adding some bed spaces and that we’re doing some of the things that I had previously suggested, which is sending judges out to try cases in distant areas of Iraq so that the local judges’ families wouldn’t be threatened.

I guess what I’m saying is I think somebody needs to look at this and say, adding just a few more DOJ personnel and adding another 10,000 bed spaces may not be close to enough, and that we need to do 3, 4 times as many and do it promptly. Would you be willing to make those kind of decisions and say, status quo is not enough; we need to make dramatic change here?

General LUTE. Senator, I think the key here is to go to General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, get from them sort of the ground truth in terms of where our priorities should fall, and then once the President is advised of this assessment, renders a decision, oversee and coordinate the policy execution. I think I agree with everything you’ve said. I would only add that I think that General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker are the key inputs to which issues should be priorities.

Senator SESSIONS. You spoke wisely there. That’s certainly true. But I guess what I have perceived is that with regard to other agencies than the Defense Department, that people will tell you they’re making progress, but if you look at the entire picture it’s not nearly enough. I know that Senator Levin and all of us believe that infrastructure, governmental improvements, political improvements, are necessary, and the military can’t carry this ball alone.

Would you agree that one of the key components of any success we might have in Iraq is to make progress in those areas other than just the military?

General LUTE. Absolutely. I think the military performs or provides a necessary contribution to this picture, but by itself it’s insufficient.

Senator SESSIONS. You served, I believe, on the staff of General John Abizaid?

General LUTE. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. What was your position and how long did you do that?

General Lute. For 2 years I was General Abizaid's operations officer, his J–3 as we call it.

Senator Sessions. He always expressed concern—and I believe it was persuasive to me—that there was a danger in overcommitting American troops in what could be perceived as an occupation mode and not a supportive role, a temporary action. Share your thoughts about that concern? Would you articulate the tension between using military force and being an occupation force?

General Lute. Senator, I think this goes right to the heart of the question of are we in the lead or are the Iraqis in the lead and are we supporting. I think at this point in this fight, increasingly we need to take every opportunity to put the Iraqis in the lead across the security, governance, and economic dimensions of this struggle. If we fail to do that and we retain the lead, I think there is a real risk that we'll be seen as occupiers.

Senator Sessions. Now, there are some superb generals, colonels, and all out there trying to do their job every day. Do you think there's a danger that sometimes they may want to do too much, just out of patriotism and commitment to mission?

General Lute. Senator, I think we recruit people and advance people in our Armed Forces who see no problem too great for their efforts and their dedication. That's simply the sort of people we put on the battlefield. But we have to temper that with a realization in this instance in particular that the local Iraqi solution will be the enduring one.

Senator Sessions. Well said.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

We have a few minutes before we're going to have to run. We'll have maybe a 2-minute round now to get a couple of us in before we have to run and vote. We will come back after two votes.

General, do you agree that the main purpose of the surge was to give space to the Iraqi politicians to reach a political settlement involving reconciliation?

General Lute. Yes, Senator.

Chairman Levin. Therefore the measure of success of the surge will be whether or not it has led to significant progress towards political reconciliation?

General Lute. That's right, Senator.

Chairman Levin. It seems to me your answer raises a number of questions that you doubt the capacity of the Iraqi Government to reach a political reconciliation. I mean, if the purpose of a surge is to give them breathing space to do something they're incapable of doing, then it seems to me we have a real double problem with this surge. We're losing a lot of lives there during a surge whose purpose is to give breathing space to an Iraqi Government which you have grave doubts about the capacity to reach the very purpose of the surge, which is to give them breathing space to reach the political reconciliation.

By the way, I think they lack will, not capacity, so I don't agree with you particularly on that. But taking your argument, how do you then justify a surge whose purpose is to give breathing space
to a government that by your testimony you doubt has the capacity to make the political reconciliation compromises?

General Lute. Senator, I am concerned about the capacity of this government, but I haven’t passed final judgment on them. I think it is possible that they can muster the will and enough capacity to show progress and maybe by passing measures of reconciliation, break this cycle of violence and this sort of winner-take-all attitude that we sometimes see. So I am concerned, but I’m not yet convinced that they’re incapable or unwilling.

Chairman Levin. I think there’s an inconsistency there. I’ll just leave it at that.

Do you believe, General, that the debate that we’ve had in Congress on amendments that call for troop reductions starting at a certain point, that those debates undermine the troops?

General Lute. Senator, I know of no evidence of that. I believe the sort of people that are serving in the American Armed Forces today understand the democratic process, and in fact that’s what we’ve sworn to protect and defend. When they see it play out here in Washington they understand that, and they’re driving on with the mission they were given.

Chairman Levin. So is it your answer then that you do not believe that——

General Lute. I don’t believe that it undercuts their morale.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Senator Warner.

Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I think the colloquy between Senator Reed and the General—I’d hope in the few moments while we’re voting maybe we can get some clarifications as to actually what was said, because I don’t want reporting out of this hearing—it just concerns me. I’ve known Steven Hadley. I’ve worked with him for 25 years and I have the highest regard for him. I don’t share my colleague’s personal observation.

But the more important thing is, in any way has Mr. Hadley’s role with respect to Iraq and Afghanistan been diminished by your now, presumably subject to confirmation, joining as an advisor to the President on those two specific AORs?

General Lute. Senator, I see my role as Steve Hadley’s teammate on Iraq and Afghanistan. Because Iraq and Afghanistan must be viewed, as we’ve talked about here this morning, in a regional context, where Steve Hadley does have primacy for execution and policy development, it’d be very difficult to draw a line between us or separate us on matters inside Iraq and Afghanistan. But it is clear that, if confirmed, this appointment will hold primary execution and policy development for those two countries.

Senator Warner. But in no way is Mr. Hadley’s role diminished?

General Lute. Sir, he’s not cut out of the process in any way, and in fact there are two key lines, if you go to the conventional wire and block diagram, for my position if confirmed. One would be a direct line to the President; a second would be a dotted, parallel line to Mr. Hadley for coordination.

Senator Warner. Correct. I think that puts in perspective my understanding.

Now, there have been announced two resignations from Mr. Hadley’s staff, very competent individuals. One was Meghan O’Sullivan
and another J.D. Crouch. Will you be picking up some of their responsibilities?

General LUTE. Almost none of J.D. Crouch’s responsibilities, but to a large extent Ms. O’Sullivan’s, in addition to others.

Senator WARNER. I see. So you’ll be picking that up.

But again, Hadley’s operating and going to continue to operate, I think as a very strong, professional advisor to the President. In the history of national security advisors, he’s done a fine job. But his role has not been changed by virtue of your addition, subject to confirmation?

General LUTE. Senator, my view is that, if confirmed, Steve Hadley will have a new teammate.

Senator WARNER. Fine. But his role will not be diminished?

General LUTE. That’s not how I read it, correct.

Senator WARNER. It’ll be augmented.

General LUTE. That’s correct.

Senator WARNER. I thank the witness.

Chairman LEVIN. We have asked for your testimony to be transcribed in response to Senator Reed’s questions, in response to my questions on this subject.

Senator WARNER. And mine.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Warner’s as well. I think it will speak for itself and we can get back into it.

Senator WARNER. Give the witness a chance in the course of this hearing, before there’s reporting made on this hearing, to review that and confirm or advise the committee about how he stated it.

Chairman LEVIN. Very good.

Senator Sessions, if you would recess as soon as you’re done, we’d appreciate it.

Senator SESSIONS. I would be pleased.

With regard to schools, oil production, electricity, the legal system—will you be digging into those in more depth than Mr. Hadley could ever have time to do? I mean, won’t that be your responsibility, to figure out how these things are coming along, get right in there with the authority of the President behind you to see what the problems are and make advice on how to fix it?

General LUTE. That’s the essence of the design of this position, yes, sir.

Senator Sessions [presiding]. I don’t think the National Security Advisor can have the time to do all those things with every other responsibility. I think it’s going to enhance his ability to be effective. Agencies I think have begun to drift sometimes in these kind of situations, and by being a representative of the President you have the authority to shake things up, get things moving in a way that would be helpful to us, and actually could make things safer for those superb soldiers we have on the ground.

We will stand in recess.

General LUTE. Thank you, sir.

[Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the committee recessed, then reconvened at 11:58 a.m.]

Chairman LEVIN [presiding]. General, I know you understand how these things go, so I won’t apologize too much. But nonetheless, thank you for your patience. We’re now back in session.
I think that Senator Lieberman has not had his second round. Senator Warner and I have. Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. A very short round, I want to alert you. It's like 2 or 3 minutes.

Senator LIEBERMAN. It's not a long count. It's a short round, okay.

Very briefly, I understand that this is an unusual position you've been appointed to, but I must say, contrary to my friend Senator Reed, I don't think your appointment suggests that Steve Hadley should go. I think this is a recognition and a kind of exercise of sound management that the advice to the President on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are so substantial that one person, the National Security Advisor, can't do it all. Either he's going to spend all his time or too much of it on Iraq and Afghanistan and ignore the rest of the world in his advice to the President, or he's going to do the opposite. Either one is not a good idea.

I note that your title is that you've been nominated to be Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan and Assistant to the President. Why Assistant to the President? Because history tells us that nations do better when the commander in chief is directly involved day to day in the management of a war, and you're going to be his conduit to do that.

I just wonder if I have it right. I guess the other point is internal—this is real inside baseball—that you will chair the so-called deputies committee when it comes to Iraq, but obviously Mr. Hadley will continue to be involved in the National Security Council overall, the principals.

General LUTE. Right. Senator, let me be very clear about this, because I don't want to leave any doubt based on the earlier session.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes.

General LUTE. Steve Hadley remains in all of his capacities the National Security Advisor. He's responsible for national security affairs across the global spectrum. His role is not diminished by this appointment or this designed position. If confirmed, I'll join him as a teammate, and I'll augment him by providing him and the President 24–7 dedicated coverage of policy execution and policy development for Iraq and Afghanistan.

If I was confusing earlier, I'd like to set that straight. To your specific point, yes, I will be, if confirmed, chairing the deputies-level sessions inside the National Security Council process, and Steve and I will be seated together at the principals level.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. To me that clarifies it, and I think your appointment, the creation of the position, particularly putting you into it, is going to move us toward better management both of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars and of the rest of our foreign policy. It's going to require a real sense of mutual respect and, as you said, a sort of team spirit between you and Mr. Hadley. That's where the problems can occur.

But I know both of you and I think I know your skills, your personalities, and your commitment to the higher national purpose, and I don't have any doubt that the two of you will make it work.

General LUTE. Thank you, Senator.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you for clarifying that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

We'll start our third round here. We'll just go maybe 3 minutes each because another vote has started. But I'm hoping that we'll be able to finish up before we all leave this time.

General, there's been a report in yesterday's edition of the New York Times that the Iraqi parliament voted to require the government of Prime Minister Maliki to bring the matter of how long American troops can stay in Iraq before lawmakers—to bring that matter before the lawmakers, of how long American troops can stay in Iraq, in order for any additional extensions to occur.

Are you familiar with that?

General Lute. I read the same report, Senator.

Chairman Levin. How do you interpret that vote?

General Lute. Senator, I interpret that as an indication that their council of representatives, the Iraqi parliament, does want to assume control completely of Iraqi affairs. I think this can be viewed as an expression of desired full sovereignty on behalf of the Iraqi representatives. I think that as we approach the fall and look at the current authorizing resolution, which is a U.N. Security Council resolution, and whether or not it will be extended or adapted in some way, that the expression of the parliamentarians, the elected representatives of Iraq, will be heard.

Chairman Levin. Secretary Gates has said that the votes here in Congress that set a timetable, while he doesn't agree with them, nonetheless perform a useful function in that they put pressure on the Iraqi leaders to recognize that there is a diminished congressional support for the President's policies and that the American people are no longer, since at least November, supporting the policies as well.

Do you agree with Secretary Gates that there's a useful purpose to these votes, even though he disagrees with the substance of the amendment; that when Congress does pass amendments saying we'll begin to reduce troops as of a certain time that does have a useful aspect to it?

General Lute. I think that the policy debate back here, first of all, is watched very carefully by the Iraqi officials. I agree with Secretary Gates that it helps them draw the right conclusion, which is that our commitment to Iraq is not open-ended.

Chairman Levin. Do you know if the Iraqi parliament has finally decided whether it’s going to take a 2-month summer recess?

General Lute. Senator, we watch this pretty carefully in my current position on the Joint Staff. We have reports, but I don't yet have a confirmation that they’ve changed their schedule.

Chairman Levin. On the question of your relationship to the President and Mr. Hadley, the daily brief that you made reference to—did you say a daily brief on Iraq?

General Lute. I said I expect to engage with the President daily.

Chairman Levin. Is that something that you and Mr. Hadley will do jointly or is that something you're going to be doing?

General Lute. I think I will, and my staff, will craft it and then we'll coordinate it closely with Steve and his—

Chairman Levin. Who will actually be briefing the President?

General Lute. Sir, as I have—
Chairman Levin. As far as you know.
General Lute. As far as I know, I will, and I fully anticipate that Steve Hadley will be right there alongside of me.
Chairman Levin. Will be there?
General Lute. Alongside.
Chairman Levin. Physically?
General Lute. I believe so, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Warner. [Pause.]
Senator Warner. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. We have a rough handwritten transcript of what the earlier statement was. I would simply say that I would hope that the witness could have the opportunity to review his earlier statement in the transcript in the context of his reply to our colleague from Rhode Island's question, and if there's any further clarification that you be given the leeway to so state that in the record.
General Lute. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Warner. Fine.
Chairman Levin. On that matter, I would suggest that we get the transcripts of all of the questions of any of us on the subject that you're referring to, to the General, and that he add whatever he wishes for the record.
Senator Warner. That's it precisely.
Chairman Levin. So we want to thank our reporter as well, because he's done yeoman service in trying to transcribe this during our recess.

[The information referred to follows:]

General Lute. I'd like to clarify that Steve Hadley retains all his responsibilities as National Security Advisor. So he's responsible for national security affairs across the spectrum of global issues. His role is in no way diminished by this appointment or this designed position. If confirmed, I'll join him as a teammate and I'll augment him by providing him and the President 24–7 dedicated coverage of policy execution and policy development for Iraq and Afghanistan. I have the highest regard for Steve Hadley and, if confirmed, look forward to working with him.

I'd like to clarify that the responsibilities for Iraq and Afghanistan are not exclusively mine. The new position does not exclude Steve Hadley and many others also from advising.

Chairman Levin. Senator Warner.

Senator Warner. Thank you. Now, Senator Lieberman brought up an important thing about how General Lute, subject to confirmation, would be conducting a certain segment of the meetings on Iraq in the procedure of the NSC. It's my understanding that was a function that Meghan O'Sullivan did. Am I correct in that?

General Lute. Senator, not at the deputies or principals level.

Senator Warner. But below that, yes, sir.

General Lute. That's the chairing that you will do, is that correct?

General Lute. I'll actually chair at the deputies level and participate at the principals level.

Senator Warner. So there's two levels of hearings or review processes that regularly go on within the NSC. What was it that Meghan O'Sullivan had?

General Lute. Senator, that's just below the deputies level.
Senator WARNER. Correct. But didn’t you say you would be picking up her responsibilities?

General LUTE. Some of her responsibilities.

Senator WARNER. Some of hers.

General LUTE. Then additional responsibilities, and among the additional are the roles on the deputies and principals committee.

Senator WARNER. Correct. But did she not conduct meetings of a certain level?

General LUTE. She did.

Senator WARNER. Will you be continuing conducting those meetings?

General LUTE. Senator, I suspect I won’t be doing those myself, but rather one of my assistants will.

Senator WARNER. I think that we’ve done our very best then to try and get the record straight. I believe your response to our colleague from Connecticut’s question clarified it for my purposes, that there is no diminution; as I stated in my earlier question, that Mr. Hadley will carry on as he has always done, and that you will be in a support role, and directly—of course, for your own initiative, you have free access to the President to, quite frankly, and I hope there are occasions where you will be at variance to the National Security Advisor in terms of some of his observations and opinions. I anticipate that. Wouldn’t you?

General LUTE. That may well happen.

Senator WARNER. You would have no reluctance to so speak?

General LUTE. No, Senator, no reluctance.

Senator WARNER. Therein is what this hearing is all about, to hopefully assure this committee that you’re going to be an independent individual, and that is why the President selected you, because you’ve manifested a certain measure of independence in your previous positions as it relates to Iraq and Afghanistan, and that you will continue to do so.

General LUTE. That’s exactly right, Senator. I don’t intend to change now.

Senator WARNER. Now we go to the subject of Afghanistan, which is of great concern to all of us. We tend to spend a great deal of time, understandably, on Iraq. But this is a situation that bears close attention. There are two difficult things. One, I must say I read through carefully all your answers to the advance policy questions, but I would hope that you could go back and look at your answers and refine with more specificity what you feel is the U.S. role as a part of the NATO organization, as a part of our independent operations with U.S. forces over there, as it relates to this insidious and tragic situation of the growing dependence on drug revenues indeed by the economy of Afghanistan and how that impairs, in my judgment, the ability of the Karzai Government to go forward.

Maybe quickly, what is the U.S. role? At one time Great Britain, as roles were divided up, was given that responsibility. Has that changed now in any way?

General LUTE. The United Kingdom still retains the international lead, based on the Bonn Conference of several years ago, for counternarcotics in Afghanistan. We play a supporting role in
two fundamental ways: first, as one of the 26 member nations of NATO——

Senator WARNER. Correct.

General LUTE.—and then second of all, in a U.S.-only role, if you
will, because we retain some U.S.-only missions in Afghanistan as
well. In both of those capacities, as part of NATO and U.S.-alone,
we provide military support on an in extremis and as-available
basis to the U.K. and increasingly the Afghan counternarcotic ef-
fort.

Senator WARNER. But the direct responsibility rests with the Af-
ghan government?

General LUTE. It does, that’s correct.

Senator WARNER. We’re in there in a supporting role. When
called upon, we have the discretion to give that support or not.

General LUTE. That’s correct.

Senator WARNER. Because I don’t want to see the American GIs
tasked as the principal persons that have to go in and clean up this
situation.

General LUTE. That’s right, Senator. This is fundamentally a law
enforcement and governance role, not a military role.

Senator WARNER. That is correct.

Next I’d like to ask a question just quickly on the national cave-
ats, which are troublesome. There are some nations that are in
that NATO force which have a caveat on the use of their forces,
which caveat in many respects precludes them from participating
in active combat. Now, what do you hope to bring about by way of
a change in that situation?

General LUTE. Senator, you’ll appreciate that the NATO com-
mmand structure already and the political authorities in NATO al-
ready understand what you’re saying with regard to caveats, which
fundamentally restrict the flexibility of our commanders on the
ground, because he can’t go to everyone and ask them to do every
task. He has to sort of keep a chart as to who agrees to do what.

It’s a major effort by General Bantz Craddock in his role, both
his NATO role and his U.S. role, to reduce those conditions or
those caveats, and I’ll certainly do everything possible to support
that effort.

Senator WARNER. Finally, in response to questions by my col-
leagues here—and I copied down what you said—the council of rep-
resentatives are going to assume control of Iraqi affairs. I believe
that’s what you said. But I did not interpret that to say that
they’re going to preempt the prime minister. Or how do you take
your response and tie it to the fact that the government consists
of the council of representatives and the prime minister and his
ministers?

General LUTE. Yes, Senator. What I meant by that earlier re-
response was their constitutional role, which is defined in the con-
stitution and has, of course, the parliament, if you will, working
alongside the prime minister and other government officials.

Senator WARNER. Right. So it’s to foster stronger reins of sov-
eignty within the framework of the constitution, which outlines
their roles as legislators and that of the prime minister and his
ministers.

General LUTE. That’s exactly right.
Senator WARNER. Not in any way interpreted they’re marching off——

General LUTE. This is in accordance with the constitution.

Senator WARNER. Understood.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one question. I know time is going.

This is in some sense a question, in some sense an appeal, and it goes back, General, to something we talked about when you came to my office. The American public's understanding of what we're trying to do in Iraq and how we're doing it is critically important to whether we succeed or fail there. I think you'd agree that ultimately the enemy, al Qaeda, Iran, can't defeat us in Iraq, but we can be defeated by an absence of public support or understanding for what we're doing.

You are a very credible, straightforward communicator, an effective communicator. You're now going to be Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan. National Security Advisor Steve Hadley has regularly gone before the press, gone onto television, answering questions. I don't know whether the President has asked you to do this as part of the job definition, but I really appeal to you in the interest of your own sense of service to be willing to spend some of your time, not much because you have a big job to do, going out and speaking to people about what we're trying to do and telling them honestly how you think it's going. Will you do that?

General LUTE. Senator, I'm, with you, concerned about the full range of responsibilities and making sure I meet those responsibilities as essentially an inside player. But I also take your point that our ability to explain what we're doing and where we're going is absolutely critical to the overall success of this mission, and I take your point. Thank you.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

I think you were asked before about an exit strategy and planning pursuant to an exit strategy. Have you seen such planning?

General LUTE. I have not been privy to planning that has any label such as that, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Do you know if it exists?

General LUTE. I do not know that it exists.

Chairman LEVIN. Could you try to find out and let us know for the record whether that planning exists and what the state of it is and when did it begin?

General LUTE. I understand the question, Senator, and I will do so.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. Would the chairman's question be enlarged to say—you used "exit strategy." There could well be some planning with regard to some variance to the strategy announced on January 10.

Chairman LEVIN. However the General wants to answer. He understands the question and I think he——
General LUTE. I think I do take Senator Warner's point, that there's constant planning going on in terms of what might happen, sort of what-if drills, if you will. That planning is going on all the time. It could feature more troops in Iraq, fewer troops in Iraq, troops in Iraq doing something else.

Chairman LEVIN. If you could just tell us what planning there is for fewer troops in Iraq or the removal of troops from Iraq and under what circumstances that would occur and how it would be implemented. Okay?

General LUTE. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. If you could do that for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

The focus of planning now is on how to achieve our objectives in Iraq. To my knowledge, no orders have been issued to begin planning for an “exit strategy,” although military contingency planning at multiple levels of command takes place continuously and routinely in an effort to have options prepared to respond to changing conditions on the ground.

Chairman LEVIN. In your opinion, would it be advisable for the United States to maintain permanent military bases in Iraq?

General LUTE. Senator, it's U.S. policy that we don't seek this, and we also have no desire for control of resources. These are two things that have been discussed with the Iraqi Government. I believe the position there is very clear. We simply don't seek long-term bases.

What we do seek is a more normalized nation-to-nation relationship with the Government of Iraq, with the state of Iraq.

Chairman LEVIN. Anything further, Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. No.

Chairman LEVIN. The record's going to stay open for your answers, but also for questions of members of the committee. We will keep the record open for 2 days. I have a number of questions on Afghanistan which I didn't have time here to ask you, and those will be some of my questions.

Again, we thank you very much for your presence, for your willingness to take a very difficult job under circumstances which are extraordinarily difficult, to put it mildly. From everything we know about you, it is part of your character that you would respond to this kind of a request from the President of the United States.

We will now stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to LTG Douglas E. Lute, USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

RESPONSIBILITIES

Question. What are the responsibilities of the position for which you have been nominated? What will be your responsibility for analyzing and evaluating requirements and policies and making recommendations to the President about:

- increasing, sustaining, or reducing U.S. force levels in theater; deployed force readiness, manning, equipment availability/cross leveling/prioritization, modernization, and supply;
- operation and maintenance funding levels, prioritization and cash flow necessary to support continued operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF);
Answer. Position description:

Goal:
Establish a full-time senior manager for implementation and execution of the President’s strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan and to manage the interagency policy development process for Iraq and Afghanistan and to help develop our ongoing strategy for these two theaters in close coordination with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Mission:
• To support our civilian and military leaders in the field, in turning the President’s new strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan into a prioritized set of defined implementation and execution tasks with clearly assigned responsibility, deadlines, performance metrics (as appropriate), and a system of accountability to ensure progress toward accomplishing those tasks.
• To manage the process of implementation and execution of those tasks among Washington departments and agencies working through the appropriate cabinet secretaries and agency heads to help ensure full and prompt Washington support for accomplishing the prioritized tasks established for Iraq and Afghanistan.
• To manage the interagency policy development process for Iraq and Afghanistan policy and to help develop our ongoing strategy for these two theaters in close coordination with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Authority:
Report directly to the President as the Assistant to the President/Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan and coordinate with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs as the Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan. He is charged by the President to:
• Request and receive from cabinet secretaries and agency heads information, personnel, and additional resources/assistance needed to carry out successfully the President’s strategies for Iraq and Afghanistan.
• Receive and obtain fulfillment of requests from civilian and military leaders in the field for assistance and support in accomplishing the prioritized tasks established for Iraq and Afghanistan.
• Provide “quick look” assessments on the issues identified by the President, reporting back to the President, and carrying out any guidance given by the President working through the appropriate cabinet secretaries and agency heads.
• Investigate implementation/execution issues and problems on his/her own authority to identify and remedy the problems identified working through appropriate cabinet secretaries and agency heads.
• Manage interagency policy development and helping to develop our ongoing strategy for these two theaters in close coordination with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

In summary, work at the direction of the President to execute policy and assist in the development of future policy within the established National Security Council (NSC) process for both Iraq and Afghanistan, in direct support of the U.S. officials in the field. In policy execution, emphasize setting priorities, focusing resources, following through, and adapting as conditions change.

AUTHORITY

Question. What authority will you have to fulfill the responsibilities of the position to which you are being appointed? What will be the process for translating your analysis or evaluations of requirements, policies, and recommendations to the President into executable directives or orders for cabinet level officials and Federal agencies to carry out? What is your authority to direct Federal departments or agencies to provide personnel or resources in support of U.S. operations and activities in Iraq and Afghanistan? Will you be responsible for monitoring and ensuring compliance with those directives and orders within the Executive Branch, and, if so, by what process will you do so? Do you believe that the authority of this position will be commensurate to the responsibilities and the objectives it is being given?
Answer. See position description above. The position is an advisor and coordinator, without directive authority beyond a small staff. In such a role, the ability to move policy forward has less to do with than other factors, such as: Presidential direction and support, acceptance by other policy principals, broad commitment to a common cause, cultivated interpersonal relationships, personal integrity, and meaningful results.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the position to which you are being appointed to the following offices:

The Chief of Staff to the President.

Answer. As one of several Assistants to the President, this position requires close coordination with the Chief of Staff.

The National Security Advisor.

Answer. This position calls for close coordination with the National Security Advisor to ensure policy development and execution for Iraq and Afghanistan are integrated effectively with regional policies. Further, as a Deputy National Security Advisor, this position is part of the NSC structure and can call on the resources of the NSC staff.

The Deputy National Security Advisor.

Answer. This position calls for close coordination with the Deputy National Security Advisor to ensure policy development and execution for Iraq and Afghanistan are integrated effectively with regional policies.

The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. This position coordinates both policy development and execution with these principals of the NSC.

The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS).

Answer. When the VCJCS stands in for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as a principal of the NSC, this position coordinates both policy development and execution with the VCJCS.

The Commander, U.S. Central Command; the Supreme Allied Commander Europe; the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command; the supporting combatant commanders; the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq; and the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan.

Answer. This position is designed to support U.S. military and diplomatic missions in Iraq and Afghanistan primarily by coordinating with the department secretaries and employing the existing chains of command and authority between Washington and the field.

The Service Secretaries and the Service Chiefs.

Answer. This position is not intended to interact routinely with these officials. Any interaction would be through the Department of Defense.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. You will be entering this important position at a critical time for the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

Answer. Throughout my 32-year military career, I have served repeatedly in operational assignments requiring interagency coordination including three tours on the Joint Staff in Washington, two tours in the Middle East, and peacekeeping duties in the Balkans. I have studied complex international crises over the past 20 years including taking an advanced degree from Harvard University and serving on the faculty at West Point with teaching assignments in this area.

I have recent operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, including 2 years (2004–2006) as the operations officer (J3) for U.S. Central Command and the last year as Director of Operations (J3) on the Joint Staff.

I am professionally and personally committed to our troops and civilians in the field.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Assistant to the President/Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan? What plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. The key challenge is to harness and integrate the resources of the Government to meet the needs of our leaders in the field, in both policy execution and policy development.
**MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS**

*Question.* What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the inter-agency process that the Assistant to the President/Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan is intended to correct? What management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

*Answer.* The purpose of this position is to build on the collective desire to promote our national security interests in the region being mindful of the challenges facing the men and women on the ground. In practical terms, this will mean taking a sober view of where we are now and focusing fully on the needs of Iraq and Afghanistan, even though there is a full range of competing global commitments. This position brings senior, full-time, dedicated focus on these two wars within the NSC staff.

**APPROPRIATE GRADE**

*Question.* Do you believe that serving in the position to which you are appointed as a lieutenant general makes it more difficult to perform the functions of the office when dealing with cabinet officials and higher ranking officers? How do you intend to fulfill your responsibilities when dealing with officials of higher positions?

*Answer.* See earlier answer.

**IRAQ**

*Question.* What is your assessment of the current situation facing the United States in Iraq? From your perspective, what are the top lessons learned from our experience in Iraq?

*Answer.* One year into the Maliki Government we face persistent violence, insufficient progress in governance and the economy, and unhelpful influences from Syria and Iran. I believe it is too early to draw up a list of strategic lessons from this ongoing experience; time will judge. This position is designed to focus on where we are now and how to forward to secure U.S. interests.

*Question.* What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes the United States has made to date in Iraq? What do you believe could be done now to mitigate such impact? What do you believe are the most important steps that the United States needs to take in Iraq?

*Answer.* I believe we must put the conflict in Iraq in a broad, regional context centered on long-term U.S. interests, including defeating al Qaeda, supporting our key regional partners, and containing regional threats.

*Question.* What role, if any, did you play in the development of the new Iraq strategy announced by the President earlier this year? Press reports indicate that you opposed the “surge” strategy during policy deliberations prior to the President’s decision. Is that true, and if so, why? Have events to date validated or invalidated your concerns, if any?

*Answer.* I participated in the policy review prior to the President’s decision to adjust course in January 2007. During the review I registered concerns that a military “surge” would likely have only temporary and localized effects unless it were accompanied by counterpart “surges” by the Iraqi Government and the other, nonmilitary agencies of the U.S. Government. I also noted that our enemies in Iraq have, in effect, “a vote” and should be expected to take specific steps to counter from our efforts. The new policy took such concerns into account. It is too soon to tell the outcome.

*Question.* Do you believe that there is a purely military solution in Iraq, or must the solution be primarily a political one? Do you believe that political compromise among Iraqi political leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution? Do you believe that quelling the current level of violence in Baghdad is a necessary condition for a political solution?

*Answer.* There is no purely military solution in Iraq, nor is there a purely American solution. Ultimately the outcome depends on a political solution to rejecting violence and sharing power among all the parties within Iraq. Improved security is a necessary but not sufficient condition for this to happen. Suppressing violence in Baghdad can provide time and space for a political solution.

*Question.* What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders to make the political compromises necessary for a political solution? What leverage does the United States have in this regard?

*Answer.* What do you believe are the prospects for Iraqi political leaders to make those compromises and, if made, what effect do you believe that will have toward ending the sectarian violence and defeating the insurgency?
What is the present status of the Iraqi Government’s efforts to meet the political
benchmarks, including the Constitutional Review Committee’s recommendations;
legislation on de-Baathification; legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of
hydrocarbon resources; legislation to ensure that the energy resources of Iraq ben-
fit Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner; legislation on procedures to form semi-au-
tonomous regions, legislation establishing an Independent High Electoral Commiss-
ion, provincial elections law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provin-
cial elections; legislation addressing amnesty; and legislation establishing a strong
militia disarmament program?

What is the present status of the Iraqi Government’s efforts to meet the political-
military benchmarks, including ensuring that Iraq’s political authorities are not un-
dermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi security forces;
establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in sup-
port of the Baghdad security plan; and allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi
revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an
equitable basis?

Will you be doing an ongoing assessment of the level of political progress made
by Iraqi leaders? Do you believe that the above listed political and political-military
benchmarks are appropriate for that purpose?

What is the present status of the Iraqi Government’s efforts to meet the military
benchmarks, including providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support
Baghdad operations; providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute the
Baghdad security plan and to make tactical and operational decisions without politi-
cal intervention, to include the authority to pursue all extremists, including Sunni
insurgents and Shiite militias; ensuring that the Iraqi security forces are providing
even handed enforcement of the law; reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq
and eliminating militia control of local security; establishing all of the planned joint
security stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad; and increasing the number of
Iraqi security forces units capable of operating independently?

Will you be doing an ongoing assessment of the level of the progress made by
Iraqi leaders on the military benchmarks? Do you believe that the above listed mili-
tary benchmarks are appropriate for that purpose?

Progress towards publicized benchmarks in the past 5 months, however, has been
uneven. On the security front the Iraqis have made substantial progress on their
commitments, while political and economic steps have lagged behind. This position
is designed to keep us all focused on the same benchmarks, integrate the political-
economic-military dimensions of the policy, and plan far enough in advance to ac-
count for various potential outcomes. Policy execution and policy development, of
course, will rely heavily on inputs and assessments from the field.

Question. With regard to the recent "surge strategy," what role will you have in
proposing or recommending changes to the strategy? What role will you have in de-
ciding or recommending when U.S. troops can begin to draw down/redeploy? What
do you see as a reasonable estimate of the time it will take to demonstrate success
in securing Baghdad? How would you craft an "exit strategy" for U.S. forces in Iraq?

What is the present status of the Iraqi Government’s efforts to meet the military
benchmarks, including ensuring that Iraq’s political authorities are not un-
dermining or making false accusations against members of the Iraqi security forces;
establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in sup-
port of the Baghdad security plan; and allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi
revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential services, on an
equitable basis?

Will you be doing an ongoing assessment of the level of political progress made
by Iraqi leaders? Do you believe that the above listed political and political-military
benchmarks are appropriate for that purpose?

Answer. I believe the Iraqi Government intends to meet its commitments.

Question. With regard to the recent "surge strategy," what role will you have in
deciding or recommending when U.S. troops can begin to draw down/redeploy? What
do you see as a reasonable estimate of the time it will take to demonstrate success
in securing Baghdad? How would you craft an "exit strategy" for U.S. forces in Iraq?

Answer. This position includes advising the President during the development of
policy in Iraq as well as Afghanistan. This process will involve the principals of the
NSC and will be informed by assessments from the field.

Question. Will you be doing an ongoing assessment of the capability of Iraqi secu-
rity forces to take on more of the security responsibilities? What considerations will
be factored into a decision regarding whether (and if so, what kind and how much)
U.S. military equipment currently in Iraq should be left behind for use by the Iraqi
Army?

Answer. Given the central role of development of the ISF in our strategy, I expect
to monitor closely progress in its ability to assume increased responsibilities for the
security of Iraq. This progress will rely heavily on assessments from MNF–I and its
subordinate, MNSTC–I, as well as from other outside experts such as the independ-
ent commission called for in recent legislation.

Question. In the National Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts for Fiscal
Year 2007, Congress prohibited the use of funds to seek permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to control the oil resources of Iraq. Do you agree that it is not and should not be U.S. policy to seek permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to exercise control over Iraq’s oil resources? If you agree, what are your views on the construction of any additional facilities inside Iraq for use by our military forces?
Answer. Is it not U.S. policy to seek permanent military bases in Iraq or to control Iraq's oil resources, which belong to the Iraqi people. The United States may, however, discuss a long-term strategic relationship with the Iraqi Government, as it does with many governments in the region and around the world.

AFGHANISTAN

**Question.** What is your assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan?

**Answer.** Overall progress is steady, but slow, and in parts, uneven. The Government of Afghanistan has limited capacity to influence events outside Kabul. The security situation is stable in some parts of the country, despite increased Taliban activity elsewhere, including the use of suicide bombings. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces have set back the Taliban efforts to gain momentum in the south this year by preemptive offensive operations and the killing of the top Taliban commander, Mullah Dudallah Lang. Yet, the Taliban enjoy relative safe haven in the border regions of Pakistan.

**Question.** What is the status of efforts to develop and field an effective Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) force? What is your assessment of the readiness of these forces to conduct independent operations?

**Answer.** Progress with the ANA is steady with a number of ANA battalions fighting effectively alongside NATO and U.S. forces; however, they are not yet ready to operate independently. The ANP lag behind the ANA in all areas.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the progress of counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan?

**Answer.** Our counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan are effective. Yet, we know that this is only one dimension of this complex situation. An over-reliance on one measure—for example, precise counterterrorist strikes—will not solve the problem. We must bring together the multiple strands of effective policy to have a sustainable, enduring impact.

**Question.** Are NATO members providing a sufficient level of troops and equipment for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to carry out its security mission throughout Afghanistan? What can be done to address any shortfalls in troops or equipment needed to carry out NATO’s Afghanistan mission and to eliminate any national restrictions on the use of troops contributed to this mission?

**Answer.** The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) has identified shortcomings in NATO forces and national restrictions that inhibit the flexibility of NATO commanders to employ forces across Afghanistan. These issues are being addressed as priorities within NATO channels. While these shortcomings need to be eliminated, they do not jeopardize the mission.

**Question.** Do you believe there is a military solution to the situation in Afghanistan, or does success in Afghanistan depend on a political solution? In your view, what additional military or other assistance is required to ensure the transition of Afghanistan to a stable, democratic, and economically viable nation? What steps do you believe coalition forces and the international community need to take to improve the lives of the Afghani people in the near-term?

**Answer.** As in all counterinsurgencies, the solution in Afghanistan will be political, not military. Most important at this stage is to bring increased coherence to the multiple dimensions of the mission—governance, economic, and security—by better integrating the NATO mission, the U.S. missions, and the efforts of the international community.

**Question.** Military intelligence officials have stated that Taliban and al Qaeda attacks across the Afghan-Pakistan border have increased two-fold, and in certain areas threefold, since last September when the Pakistan Government signed an agreement with tribal elders in the Waziristan region ceding control over some border areas in western Pakistan. What more can be done to prevent cross border incursions by the Taliban and al Qaeda from Pakistan into Afghanistan? In your view, should the Pakistan Government be doing more to prevent these cross-border incursions? What role do you believe U.S. forces should play in preventing cross-border incursions?

**Answer.** Pakistan is one of our strongest allies in the war on terror, but it must do more to control the regions along the border with Afghanistan where both the Taliban and al Qaeda have relative sanctuary. This should be a priority policy issue for this new position.

**Question.** Afghanistan is in the Central Command's area of responsibility. EUCOM oversees the NATO ISAF force in Afghanistan. In your view, does this "seam" present any problems for the coordination and effectiveness of the ISAF and OEF missions in Afghanistan?
Answer. The division of responsibilities between CENTCOM and NATO are clear. Coordination measures are in place and working.

Question. News reports indicate that there is growing Afghan resentment over civilian deaths during the past few months resulting from U.S. airstrikes or counterterrorism operations. It has also been reported that these civilian deaths have become a Taliban propaganda tool and generated tensions between U.S. commanders and NATO commanders who do not want to be blamed for deaths resulting from U.S. operations. Are you concerned that these reports of civilian deaths may be undermining efforts to win the support of the Afghan people for the mission in Afghanistan? What steps, if any, do you believe should be taken to address this issue?

Answer. This is a serious issue that is central to the counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan which intends to protect the people of Afghanistan. The NATO and US commands in the field take every measure to minimize the potential for civilian casualties; however, these measures cannot eliminate the risks completely. Also, the enemy employs deliberate tactics such as seeking refuge among civilians that complicate our efforts.

COUNTERDRUG STRATEGY

Question. In November 2006 the U.N. and World Bank released a report on the drug industry in Afghanistan. In February, the Center for Strategic and International Studies released a report on Afghanistan, which included recommendations regarding the counterdrug policy. Have you read these reports? What is your opinion of their conclusions and recommendations as they relate to the effectiveness of international efforts to help Afghanistan combat illegal drug production and trafficking? Do you believe that eradication is effective? Should international military forces have an explicit counterdrug mission? If so, should its focus be on interdiction, capturing drug lords and destroying drug facilities? If not, what is the appropriate role for the military?

Answer. The counterdrug effort is an integral part of our strategy in Afghanistan, not only because the narcotics trade helps to finance the insurgency but because it undermines progress in nearly every dimension of our governance-economic-security strategy. I have reviewed the reports mentioned here and agree that a long-term, comprehensive approach is required. If confirmed, I will consider the counterdrug aspect of the campaign in Afghanistan as one element leading to overall success and seek to improve its integration with the other pillars of the strategy.

Question. If the U.S. military were to take on the mission of capturing drug lords and dismantling drug labs in Afghanistan, what would be the impact on the drug trade in Afghanistan? What would be the impact on the drug trade in Afghanistan? What would be the impact on the counterinsurgency effort? What can DOD and the military do—via the Provincial Reconstruction Teams or other means—to support the counterdrug efforts of other agencies in those areas? What is your view regarding the desirability and feasibility of licensing poppy cultivation to produce legal opiates, similar to programs in Turkey and India?

Answer. The tactics involved in countering the narcotics trade—eradication, targeting the drug lords, alternative crops, employing the PRTs, licensing cultivation, etc.—must derive from the strategy that takes into account all dimensions of the campaign. Our challenge is to integrate more effectively these dimensions given the international division of responsibilities within Afghanistan. There is much work to be done here, mainly by civilian agencies rather than the military.

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS

Question. In your view, what is the appropriate source of funding for the activities of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan? Which department or agency in the Executive Branch should administer the funding and oversee the activities of the PRTs? Are current staffing levels for the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan sufficient? What will be your responsibility with regard to ensuring that U.S. departments or agencies are providing the appropriate military and civilian personnel to fully staff PRTs?

Answer. As PRTs are a cornerstone of interagency integration at the tactical level in Iraq and Afghanistan, their priorities, manning, funding and effectiveness will be a matter of concern to this new position. They represent a key means of extending support for governance and economic progress to the provinces and deserve priority attention.

Question. In your estimation, how should determinations be made for PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan regarding what types of projects should receive the highest priority for development and reconstruction activities? Should PRTs give priority to small-scale efforts to repair and develop infrastructure which bolster short-term employment?
Answer. Project priorities should be set in the field to ensure close integration with the other elements of the campaign plan and account for local conditions that can vary widely from one province or district to another.

PAKISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the current status of U.S.-Pakistan military cooperation? What is your assessment of the level of cooperation we have received from Pakistan in the war on terrorism?

Answer. Pakistan is one of our strongest allies in the war on terror, but it must do more to control the regions along the border with Afghanistan where both the Taliban and al Qaeda have relative sanctuary. This should be a priority policy issue for this new position.

IRAN

Question. What options do you believe are available to the United States to counter Iran’s growing influence in the region? Do you believe that a protracted deployment of U.S. troops in Iraq, if the situation on the ground in Iraq does not improve, could strengthen Iran’s influence in the region? Do you believe it is important to continue to engage Iran in discussions regarding improving the security situation in Iraq and to seek Iran’s cooperation with respect to the situation in Iraq?

Answer. Iran is one of the most important regional actors with regard to Iraq and Afghanistan and therefore must be taken into account as we execute current U.S. policy and develop future policy. This new position will require close coordination with other elements of the NSC and across the Departments to ensure our policies take a regional perspective that includes Iran.

IRAQI REFUGEES

Question. The United Nations estimates that approximately 2.3 million Iraqis have fled the violence in their country; 1.8 million have fled to surrounding countries, while some 500,000 have vacated their homes for safer areas within Iraq. What is your assessment of the refugee crisis in Iraq? Beyond working to improve the security environment in Iraq, do you believe that the U.S. military and/or civilian agencies should play a role in addressing this crisis? Should the U.S. be doing more to track the movement of Iraqis who worked on weapons of mass destruction programs and to help them find legitimate scientific employment in Iraq or elsewhere?

Answer. Refugees are a major concern because of the human suffering involved, the potential for destabilizing neighbor states, and the drain of talent from Iraq. Primary responsibility for refugees lays with international organizations to which the U.S. provides support.

DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS

Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006 memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. Yes.

Question. How will you ensure that U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?

Answer. Compliance by U.S. forces with appropriate laws and directives is the responsibility of the U.S. military chain of command. If confirmed, I would raise any issues of concern at the highest levels for appropriate action.
Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. During my service as the J-3 to the JCS I have always honored my obligations to this committee to offer testimony when requested. With this new assignment, if confirmed, I am advised that as an Assistant to the President, principles designed to ensure that the President is provided with candid advice and to protect the autonomy of the Office would apply to me as they do to preclude the testimonial appearances of other senior advisors to the President, especially as they concern matters of national security. I understand that these principles have applied to all other active duty military officers who have served as senior advisors to the President, including those serving as National Security Advisor and Deputy National Security Advisor, in prior administrations.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes. If, consistent with the limitations indicated in response to the question above, I were to testify before any duly constituted committee of Congress, any response I provided to a question, including a question seeking my personal views, would be truthful.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed for this position, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan? Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Please refer to the answer above addressing the principles generally applicable to senior advisors to the President.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM IN IRAQ

1. Senator LEVIN. LTG Lute, I have been contacted by a company—CHF International—that has done extensive work on community infrastructure projects funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development in Iraq through a program known as the Community Action Program. These projects are identified and overseen by the Iraqis themselves, contributing to Iraqi employment and making the projects themselves more sustainable. CHF International believes that a dramatic expansion of this approach would yield significant dividends for stability in Iraq. If confirmed, will you review the Community Action Program and determine the feasibility of the expanded approach recommended by CHF International?

General LUTE. Yes.

COORDINATION OF EFFORT IN AFGHANISTAN

2. Senator LEVIN. LTG Lute, in your answers to pre-hearing questions, you stated that the most important step that needs to be taken in Afghanistan at this time is to bring “coherence” to the various aspects of the mission—governance, economic development, security—by improving integration of the missions of the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the international community. As retired General Jim Jones testified to the committee, there are currently over 60 countries with a presence on the ground in Afghanistan, as well as NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations (U.N.). What will be the responsibilities of the position for which you’ve been nominated for bringing coherence within
the U.S. Government to the military and civilian components of the Afghanistan mission?

General LUTE. If confirmed, I will be in a position to contribute in two basic ways. First, we in the U.S. Government must ensure that U.S. initiatives in Afghanistan are coordinated as part of a coherent U.S. approach to the complex problems there. Second, as one of the 26 members of the NATO alliance, we must continue to contribute to the NATO effort and aim to move it and other international actors toward a more comprehensive approach that includes governance and economic development as well as security. Both of these responsibilities entail coordinating across the departments of the U.S. interagency in support of our military and civilian leaders in the field, in both the policy development and the policy execution arenas.

3. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, what will be the responsibilities of this position for integrating efforts at the international level to bring stability and security to Afghanistan?

General LUTE. Success in Afghanistan has international and national dimensions. If confirmed, I will assist the President and the other statutory members of the National Security Council to develop and execute those parts of our strategy for Afghanistan that may require integration of international and coalition matters.

4. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, will you have staff dedicated to coordinating this international effort?

General LUTE. If confirmed, I will have access to the staff resources of the NSC—including staff with a primary focus on the international dimensions of Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. I will also work with Principals to ensure adequate focus, attention, and resources are provided for our international engagement efforts in support of Afghanistan.

WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY IN AFGHANISTAN

5. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, according to British General David Richards, former Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), there may be a limited “window of opportunity” for ISAF, the Afghan Government, and the international community to increase the focus on governance and development to benefit the Afghan people. Last fall, General Richards spoke about the need for the Afghan people to see “demonstrable improvement” in their lives over the next 6 months, or else an increasing number might choose “the rotten future offered by the Taliban” over the “hopeful future” promised by coalition forces but not delivered. What steps do you believe need to be taken in the near term to make a demonstrable improvement in the lives of the Afghan people?

General LUTE. In the near-term I believe we need to focus on security, roads, and electricity. Security includes addressing the Taliban safe haven in Pakistan. These are not short-term-only projects, however; they require a long-term, coordinated approach that over time extends the positive influence of the central government of Afghanistan out to the provinces. In the end, the struggle in Afghanistan is about governance.

CIVILIAN DEATHS

6. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, a series of incidents involving U.S. airstrikes or attacks by U.S. Special Operations Forces are reported to have resulted in the deaths of at least 90 civilians over the past several weeks. According to news reports, the issue of civilian deaths is also leading to resentment among the Afghan people and tensions between American commanders and NATO commanders who are concerned NATO forces are being blamed for deaths resulting from U.S. counterterrorism operations. In early May, Afghan President Karzai declared that his government can “no longer accept” the civilian casualties resulting from U.S.-led operations. Are you concerned by these reports of growing Afghan resentment and NATO tension over civilian deaths?

General LUTE. Yes, I am concerned, as are the military and civilian leaders in the field and here in Washington. The commands investigate every incident to determine if procedures were followed and whether procedures need to be revised. The commands also continuously reevaluate our tactics to ensure that the benefits of our operations outweigh the potential damage to our overall strategic-level goals that could result from civilian casualties.
7. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, are these reports of civilian deaths undermining our efforts to win the “hearts and minds” of the Afghan people for the coalition’s mission? What steps, if any, are you taking in response?

General Lute. A rise in civilian deaths could certainly lead to erosion of public support for the NATO mission among Afghans and if such a rise continued unabated, then it could jeopardize the mission. I believe our civilian and military leaders are fully aware of the potential for adverse effects and are taking all prudent steps to prevent civilian casualties. We should appreciate that these incidents are not all accidents, however; some are deliberate acts attributable to the enemy who hides among civilians and even uses them as shields against NATO and coalition operations. In any case, all steps must be taken to abide by the rules of engagement and avoid civilian casualties.

8. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, according to one news report, a U.S. military official said that some civilian casualties in Afghanistan over the past year are the result of a reliance on air power to compensate for a shortage of troops. Do you agree with this assessment? Are additional coalition troops needed in Afghanistan?

General Lute. The senior NATO commander reports he has sufficient troops to accomplish his combat mission. More forces are required to train and advise the Afghan army and police.

COUNTERDRUG STRATEGY—SHIFT FROM ERADICATION TO INTERDICATION

9. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, in November, the U.N. and World Bank released a report on the drug industry in Afghanistan that concluded that international efforts to combat opium production—which would include almost $400 million in Department of Defense counternarcotics funds—have failed. The report recommended focusing on interdiction, and targeting opium refining facilities and wealthy drug lords. Last month a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) on Afghanistan also recommended shifting the effort from eradication to interdiction and paying farmers for poppy, and not to grow poppy. Your written response to the committee’s pre-hearing policy questions indicates that you have read these reports. Do you agree with the recommendations made by the U.N./World Bank and CSIS reports—that international forces should focus more on interdiction, capturing drug lords, and destroying drug facilities? If so, should the U.S. military help with interdiction?

General Lute. The counterdrug dimension of the overall mission in Afghanistan must be part of a coherent campaign plan for Afghanistan, with priorities established, responsibilities assigned, progress measured, and follow-up conducted. There is much work to be done to place counterdrug actions in this larger context, both within U.S. policy and within the international effort. Within such a comprehensive approach, I believe that the counterdrug mission is mainly a law enforcement role, with international and U.S. military in support. The current U.S. counternarcotics policy is a solid foundation and has five pillars: public information, alternative livelihoods, eradication and elimination, interdiction and law enforcement operations, and justice reform and prosecution.

10. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, my understanding is that the U.S. military does not currently have a counternarcotics mission in Afghanistan. U.S. forces have been instructed to seize narcotics and destroy labs that they come across during the course of their normal operations, but they do not have an explicit order to seek and seize or destroy narcotics, drug lords, or narcotics labs. Should U.S. forces have an explicit counterdrug mission in Afghanistan?

General Lute. No, in my view the counterdrug mission is mainly a law enforcement effort, with international and U.S. military in support. The U.S. military support role includes intelligence sharing, in extremis medical and fire support, and logistic support, when available.

11. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, if confirmed, would you review the military role in drug interdiction in Afghanistan to see if there is more that NATO and U.S. forces can do?

General Lute. Yes.

12. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, would you work to ensure that NATO and U.S. forces have the same counterdrug policies, especially towards eradication?

General Lute. Yes.
13. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, critics of drug eradication efforts in Afghanistan, such as the World Bank and U.N., have stated that eradicating poppy hurts small, low-income farmers and turns them away from the Afghan government and into Taliban supporters, thereby undermining our counterterrorism efforts. Yet, the State Department Coordinator for Counternarcotics and Justice Reform in Afghanistan briefed to committee staff recently that only 15 percent of Afghans grow poppy and that the majority of new cultivation is not being conducted by small farmers, but by powerful drug dealers. Do you agree with the State Department Coordinator’s assessment regarding who would be impacted by eradication efforts in areas that have seen the greatest expansion of poppy cultivation?

General Lute. I am not an expert in this field, but if confirmed I will aim to place counterdrug measures such as eradication into the context of a broad, comprehensive strategy that addresses all the dimensions of the challenges in Afghanistan.

14. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, what is your view on the tradeoff between eradication and counterterrorism efforts?

General Lute. I believe that in complex environments such as Afghanistan measures that fix one problem often reveal challenges elsewhere. So, there may well be a trade-off between eradication on the one hand and grassroots support for the Taliban on the other (although this may vary from region to region depending on other issues). This sort of interrelationship highlights why a comprehensive policy approach is required, rather than a set of discreet approaches to individual challenges.

15. Senator Levin. LTG Lute, how should eradication be implemented or targeted to address counterterrorism concerns?

General Lute. I do not have a fixed opinion on this matter, but if confirmed I would rely on the expert assessments from the field that account for the complexities on the ground.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

FIGHTING TERRORISM

16. Senator Akaka. LTG Lute, a recent State Department report found that terrorists are changing their tactics. Specifically, the report states that “Early terrorist attacks were largely expeditionary. The organization selected and trained terrorists in one country, then clandestinely inserted a team into the target country to attack a pre-planned objective.” The report further states that “We have seen a trend toward guerrilla terrorism, where the organization seeks to grow the team close to its target, using target country nationals.” Finally, the report states that there is a “shift in the nature of terrorism, from traditional international terrorism of the late 20th century into a new form of transnational non-state warfare that resembles a form of global insurgency. This represents a new era of warfare.” This report suggests that the battlefield for the war against terror is not limited to Iraq and Afghanistan. This concept of terror turns the entire world into a battlefield. It seems to strengthen the argument that we need to attack al Qaeda directly in Pakistan rather than use Iraq as a surrogate battlefield. How do you think this change in terrorist strategy should affect our military strategies in Iraq and Afghanistan?

General Lute. I agree that the war against terror is not limited to Iraq and Afghanistan. I believe we need to strike al Qaeda wherever we find them and seek to deny them safe haven from which they can marshal resources for international attacks. Al Qaeda has declared and demonstrated its intent to establish safe havens in both Iraq and Afghanistan and we should continue to take all steps to ensure they are defeated in this effort.

17. Senator Akaka. LTG Lute, it seems that our strategy should include doing more to attack the roots of terrorism to minimize the sources of new terrorist recruits. Do you agree? If so, what strategies do you suggest we use to attack the roots of terrorism?

General Lute. I agree that comprehensive counter-terror strategy takes into account the root causes of the problem, not just the symptoms. The current U.S. national plan is founded on a multi-faceted approach and will require long-term commitment of the U.S. Government to gain the effects required. Important components include information operations to counterterrorist propaganda, measures to counter
terrorist financing, and steps to improve the counterterrorist capacities of key partners, especially those which are most susceptible to terrorist threats.

AL QAEDA IN IRAQ

18. Senator AKAKA. LTG Lute, it is my understanding that most of al Qaeda in Iraq’s (AQI) funding and training support comes from regional sources, including Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. I also understand that it gets some financial support from Tehran (despite the fact that AQI is a Sunni organization), according to documents confiscated last December from Iranian Revolutionary Guards operatives in northern Iraq. However, it is my understanding that the bulk of AQI’s financing comes from smuggling and crime. You stated during the hearing that al Qaeda’s main focus is now on Iraq. What evidence (other than al Qaeda propaganda statements) is there that supports your belief that al Qaeda is primarily focusing its resources in Iraq?

General LUTE. AQI draws resources from both within Iraq and from across the region. I believe that AQI is largely self-sustaining and, aside from propaganda and public statements of support, does not require substantial financing or other forms of tangible support from al Qaeda leaders outside Iraq. AQI is a decentralized element of al Qaeda; the relationship is not strictly hierarchical. I conclude that the al Qaeda movement’s main effort is Iraq because that is what their senior leaders declare and the scale of effort in Iraq dwarfs all other operations. Much of al Qaeda’s focus is on Iraq. Al Qaeda senior leaders recognize the importance of Iraq as the central battlefield for the return of the Islamic Caliphate. Both Bin Ladin and Zawahiri have a keen interest in success in Iraq, and have encouraged AQI to use Iraq as a platform for spreading the Islamic caliphate and for conducting external attacks.

19. Senator AKAKA. LTG Lute, clearly in the past couple of years, al Qaeda has launched high profile attacks in other countries while seemingly not really being involved in Iraq. One could argue that they have successfully bogged down our resources in Iraq with minimal investment on their part. It seems that al Qaeda’s main focus really has been reconstituting itself in Pakistan and supporting Taliban efforts to retake Afghanistan. Do you agree? If not, why not?

General LUTE. I agree that al Qaeda is reconstituting in the western border regions of Pakistan and that they support the Taliban’s efforts to reestablish safe haven in Afghanistan. I disagree regarding al Qaeda’s role in Iraq. While we have seen some high-profile attacks outside Iraq in the past 2 years, we have seen nearly 1,000 suicide attacks within Iraq in 2005–2006. While these attacks were directed by AQI itself and not directed centrally by al Qaeda senior leaders, this level of effort represents the main front for the movement at large. While the fight in Iraq continues under AQI, the broader al Qaeda continues to seek safe haven wherever it can and continues to plot against the U.S. and our allies globally. Al Qaeda and AQI are bound together loosely by common ideology, not so much by shared resources. The diversity and steady flow of foreign jihadists to Iraq indicates the conflict is central to al Qaeda recruitment efforts.

20. Senator AKAKA. LTG Lute, during your confirmation hearing, Senator Bayh pointed out that we cannot let al Qaeda define how most intelligently to pursue our national security interests. In addition, he stated that the Central Intelligence Agency’s top expert on radical Islam believes that our presence in Iraq is creating more members of al Qaeda than we are killing in Iraq, to which you replied that “we have to balance those sorts of assessments, which I think have some credibility, with a gross adjustment in the other direction, which might feature leaving Iraq to al Qaeda.” Is it your professional opinion that if the United States were to begin phased redeployment of our troops out of Iraq, then al Qaeda in Iraq would likely defeat all other parties in Iraq and assume control of the country, creating a terrorist state? If so, why?

General LUTE. I believe it is in the U.S. interest to defeat AQI, denying them a safe haven in Iraq. I do not believe it is likely that AQI will take control of Iraq, but they could establish safe haven without controlling the entire country, and we and our Iraqi partners must prevent this from happening. As long as AQI has a presence in Iraq, either overtly or in clandestine cells, AQI will continue attempts to sow instability, and the larger al Qaeda movement will seek to leverage the group’s capabilities for transnational attacks. I also agree with the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq (January 2007), which recognized that: “AQI would attempt to use parts of the country—particularly al Anbar province—to plan increased
attacks in and outside of Iraq” in the event of a rapid Coalition withdrawal. The best way to prevent a terrorist safe haven in Iraq is to help the democratically elected Iraqi Government establish an Iraq that can sustain, govern, and secure itself, and serve as a U.S. partner in the war on terror.

21. Senator A KAKA. LTG Lute, do you think the al Qaeda takeover scenario is very likely if we were to pull our troops out—more likely than a regional conflict or the emergence of a Shia-dominated state?

General LUTE. I believe that if we were to leave Iraq before the Iraqis were able to govern themselves, then al Qaeda would win in two ways: first, they would be able to establish safe haven within under-governed spaces in Iraq, and second, they would declare that they had defeated America in the main fight, giving the larger AQ movement a huge propaganda victory. I agree with the assessment of the Baker Hamilton Iraq Study Group: “Al Qaeda will portray any failure by the United States in Iraq as a significant victory that will be featured prominently as they recruit for their cause in the region and around the world.” This is not to say that AQI would seize control of all of Iraq; I do not believe that is likely because the vast majority of Iraqis themselves do not support AQI’s vision of the future. Today there are indications that anti-AQI sentiment is spreading in Iraq. This sentiment has in some cases translated into anti-AQI action, and groups that oppose AQI have formed in Al Anbar province, Baghdad, and increasingly in parts of Salah ad-Din and Diyala provinces. It will be important in the coming weeks to sustain these efforts, with coalition and, most important, Iraqi Government support.

INSURGENCY GROUPS IN IRAQ

22. Senator A KAKA. LTG Lute, during a hearing last month, Admiral Fallon stated that insurgency groups in Iraq have multiple and often competing motivations for perpetuating violence; however, they are united by two things: opposition to U.S. and coalition forces and refusal to accept the legitimacy of an inclusive, representative government. Do you agree with the admiral’s statement, and if so, what strategies would you recommend we use to try and bring these groups to the table to discuss their differences, and potentially address the underlying problems causing their resistance?

General LUTE. I agree with Admiral Fallon’s statement. I support the ongoing, near-term effort to suppress sectarian violence, especially in Baghdad, in order to provide time and space for Iraqi political and economic progress that addresses underlying causes. An important part of this effort is to attack and root out extremist networks, both Sunni and Shia, which serve as a primary accelerator of sectarian violence. We must also address the unhelpful influences of Syria and Iran in Iraq. While we support the government and continue to press for progress, I believe political solutions must be essentially Iraqi. Only the Iraqis can move toward a meaningful sharing of political and economic power that will undercut effectively the sources of violence. Beyond the near-term, we need to set intermediate objectives that move us toward a more sustainable, normalized relationship with Iraq that addresses our long-term interests in the region.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK PRYOR

ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT

23. Senator PRYOR. LTG Lute, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 established the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to act as an advisor to the President of the United States. Admiral Fallon, General Petraeus, and General Casey, for example, are also avenues of information for which the President may rely on for advice. How will the advice provided from you differ or have more significance than the advice from these military leaders?

General LUTE. This position would supplement and not replace the advice the President receives on Iraq and Afghanistan from his principals. If confirmed, the advice I would offer would focus on the execution of policy decisions and on the coordination of our efforts in meeting our objectives. I would also help facilitate policy development and ensure that all elements of national power are working together to advance our national interests in these critical theaters.

24. Senator PRYOR. LTG Lute, if this position separates you from other military leaders by the fact that you would have 24-hour access to personally provide advice to the President, then how would your advice be more significant than those mili-
tary leaders providing advice whose information comes from having 24-hours-a-day of "boots on the ground" like General Petraeus?

General LUTE. If confirmed, I do not believe my advice would be “more significant” than the advice the President receives from leaders in the field who are in closest contact with the day-to-day challenges and potential solutions. My advice would focus on U.S. interagency coordination in Iraq and Afghanistan and on the execution of policy. This is a different perspective, not necessarily a competing perspective. I would also help ensure that our leaders in the field receive the full support and dedicated resources from the many Federal agencies and departments of the U.S. Government to help prosecute their missions.

INFORMATION GATHERING

25. Senator PRYOR. LTG Lute, with the current high operational tempo in the war in Iraq, how will you gather information and prepare your assessments from the field, but do so in a transparent way as to not interrupt a deployed military commander’s ability to prosecute the war?

General LUTE. If confirmed, I would draw mainly on existing reporting arrangements and supplement these with routine personal contact with leaders in the field and with counterparts in the interagency. I would seek to avoid new requirements for information or timeconsuming reports, while ensuring the U.S. interagency is focused on the field leaders’ priorities.

IRAQ STUDY GROUP

26. Senator PRYOR. LTG Lute, what is your opinion of the recommendations made by the Iraq Study Group?

General LUTE. I believe the Iraq Study Group recommendations represent significant contributions to our ongoing policy execution and to future policy development.

IRAQI GOVERNMENT

27. Senator PRYOR. LTG Lute, do you believe the government of Iraq can achieve certain comprehensive security, political, and economic milestones to transition the United States’ mission from one of combat to support?

General LUTE. Yes, with our assistance and support from the region.

[The nomination reference of LTG Douglas E. Lute, USA, follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment in the United States Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be Lieutenant General
LTG Douglas E. Lute, USA, 2691.

[The biographical sketch of LTG Douglas E. Lute, USA, which was transmitted to the committee at the time of the nomination was referred, follows:]

TRANSCRIPT OF SERVICE OF LTG DOUGLAS E. LUTE, USA

Source of commissioned service: USMA
Military schools attended:
Army Officer Basic and Advanced Courses.
British Army Staff College.
Senior Service College Fellowship-The Atlantic Council.

Educational degrees:
United States Military Academy—BS—No Major.
Harvard University—MPA—Public Administration.

Foreign language(s): Spanish.

Promotions:

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<th>Dates of appointment</th>
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<tr>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>4 Jun. 1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>4 Jun. 1977</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>18 Nov. 1979</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>1 Jan. 1986</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>1 Feb. 1992</td>
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<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>1 Sep. 1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>1 Oct. 2002</td>
</tr>
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<td>MG</td>
<td>1 Jan. 2006</td>
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Promotions Dates of appointment

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<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Assignment</th>
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<tr>
<td>May 1976</td>
<td>May 1978</td>
<td>Platoon Leader, later Troop Executive Officer, 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry, VII Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1978</td>
<td>Dec. 1980</td>
<td>5–1 (Adjutant), later Commander, C Troop, 1st Squadron, 2d Armored Cavalry, VII Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1981</td>
<td>July 1981</td>
<td>Student, Armor Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1983</td>
<td>Sep. 1986</td>
<td>Instructor, later Assistant Professor, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 1986</td>
<td>Dec. 1987</td>
<td>Student, British Army Staff College, United Kingdom.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1989</td>
<td>June 1990</td>
<td>S–3 (Operations), 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1990</td>
<td>Nov. 1990</td>
<td>Special Assistant to the Vice Chief of Staff, Army, Washington, DC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1992</td>
<td>July 1994</td>
<td>Commander, 1st Squadron, 197th Cavalry Regiment, Fort Hood, TX.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1997</td>
<td>Aug. 1998</td>
<td>Executive Assistant, Office of the Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Gulf War Illnesses, Washington, DC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 1998</td>
<td>Aug 2000</td>
<td>Commander, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fort Polk, LA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 2000</td>
<td>Oct 2001</td>
<td>Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 2001</td>
<td>Jan. 2003</td>
<td>Assistant Division Commander (Support), 1st Infantry Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany and Commander, Multinational Brigade (East), Task Force Falcon, KFOR, Camp Bondsteel, Kosovo.</td>
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Summary of joint assignments:

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<tr>
<td>July 1994–June 1996</td>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 1997–Aug. 1998</td>
<td>Colonel</td>
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U.S. decorations and badges:
- Defense Distinguished Service Medal
- Defense Superior Service Medal (with 3 Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Legion of Merit (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Bronze Star Medal
- Defense Meritorious Service Medal
- Meritorious Service Medal (with 4 Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Joint Service Commendation Medal
- Army Commendation Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Army Achievement Medal
- Parachutist Badge
- Ranger Tab
- Office of the Secretary of Defense Identification Badge
- Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
- Army Staff Identification Badge

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by LTG Douglas E. Lute, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Douglas E. Lute.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Assistant to the President/Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan.

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
3 Nov. 1952; Michigan City, Indiana.

6. **Marital Status:** (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
   Married to Jane Holl Lute (maiden name: Holl).

7. **Names and ages of children:**
   Amy Kyleen Lute, 20; Adellyn Polomski, 19; and Kamryn Lute; 2.

8. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   None.

9. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   None.

10. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    - Member, Association of United States Army.
    - Member, Second Cavalry Association.
    - Member, USMA Association of Graduates.

11. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    None.

12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
    During my service as the J–3 to the JCS I have always honored my obligations to this committee to offer testimony when requested. With this new assignment, if confirmed, I am advised that as an assistant to the President, principles designed to ensure that the President is provided with candid advice and to protect the autonomy of the Office would apply to me as they do to preclude the testimonial appearances of other senior advisors to the President, especially as they concern matters of national security. I understand that these principles have applied to all other active duty military officers who have served as senior advisors to the President, including those serving as National Security Advisor and Deputy National Security Advisor, in prior administrations.

13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
    Yes. If consistent with the limitations indicated in response to Question 12, I were to testify before any duly constituted committee of Congress, any response I provided to a question, including a question seeking my personal views, would be truthful.

    [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee's executive files.]

    ______

    **Signature and Date**

    I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete. D.E. Lute.

    This 18th day of May, 2007.

    [The nomination of LTG Douglas E. Lute, USA, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination
was confirmed by the Senate on June 28, 2007, by a roll call vote of 94–4, with 1 voting present.]
NOMINATIONS OF MICHAEL G. VICKERS TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT; VADM ERIC T. OLSON, USN, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADmiral AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND; AND HON. THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO TO BE UNDER SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AND ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

TUESDAY, JUNE 12, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed, presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Reed, Webb, Warner, Inhofe, Thune, and Martinez.

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; and Peter K. Levine, general counsel.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin and Micah H. Harris.

Committee members’ assistants present: Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh and Michael D. Zehr, assistants to Senator Martinez.

(603)
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Senator REED. Let me call the hearing to order. Today the committee considers the nominations of Michael G. Vickers to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC); Vice Admiral Eric T. Olson, United States Navy, to be Commander, United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM); and the Honorable Thomas P. D’Agostino, to be Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, Department of Energy (DOE), and Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

I also note that the Secretary of Energy, Secretary Samuel W. Bodman, is here. Mr. Secretary, welcome. In a moment we’ll ask you to make a comment if you’d like.

We welcome our nominees and their families to today’s hearing. We know the long hours that senior Department of Defense (DOD) and DOE officials put in every day and we appreciate the sacrifices that our nominees are willing to make to serve their country. We know that they will not be alone in making these sacrifices, so we thank in advance the family members of our nominees for the support and assistance that we know they will need to provide.

Our committee has a longstanding tradition of asking our nominees to introduce family members who may be present. Mr. Vickers, if you would like to introduce your family members that are here we’d be delighted.

Mr. VICKERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Behind me is my wife Melana Vickers and my three oldest daughters, Natasha Vickers, Alexandra Vickers, and Sophia Vickers; and then in the row behind them is my mother-in-law, Oksana Bashuk Hepburn, and my brother-in-law, Roman Zyla. We have two other daughters that could not be here today with their dad. They’re 5- and 2-years-old and they would have stolen the show.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Vickers.

Admiral Olson, I understand your family, who served the Navy and the Nation with great energy over many years, are taking a little respite. So do you have any of your other family members here today?

Admiral O LSON. Mr. Chairman, I regret and my family regrets that they’re not here with me today. My wife and partner of 25 years Marilyn, my 20-year-old son Daniel, my 17-year-old daughter Alyssa are off on a long-delayed and much anticipated trip. But I know that I would not be here today without their enduring love and support.

Senator R EED. We thank them, Admiral, for their service to the Navy and the Nation also.

Admiral Olsen, do you have family members present?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to introduce my mother, Dr. Annie-Claude D’Agostino, and to her left, my father, Thomas Salvatore D’Agostino. My wife, Beth, and children, Anne and Tommy, unfortunately are out of town and unable to participate in the hearing. But I do owe them a great debt of gratitude for allowing me to spend the time and energy that’s important for these positions.

Thank you very much, sir.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. D’Agostino.
Each of our nominees will be called upon, if confirmed, to make important contributions to our national security. Michael Vickers has been nominated for the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD–SO/LIC). He has served as an Army Special Forces noncommissioned officer and officer and as a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operations officer and is regarded as an expert on special operations.

Mr. Vickers has been nominated at a time when the position of ASD–SO/LIC may change substantially as a result of the planned reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. If that reorganization goes forward as contemplated, the ASD–SO/LIC will be responsible not only for special operations issues, but also for strategic forces policy, transformation, and the major force program budgets.

This committee has expressed concern that this new span of responsibility may impede the ability of the Assistant Secretary to maintain special operations as his principal duty, as required by section 138 of title 10.

Vice Admiral Eric Olson is the first Navy SEAL ever to be nominated for a fourth star and also the first naval officer to be nominated to command SOCOM. Admiral Olson has served for the last several years as Deputy Commander of SOCOM. He has commanded at every level from SEAL platoon to the Navy’s Special Warfare Force Commander. He has served in several conflicts and operations, including as a United Nations (U.N.) military observer in Israel, Egypt, and in Asia.

If confirmed, Admiral Olson will take command of our Special Operations Forces (SOF) at a time of significant expansion in mission, size, and budget and when operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and personnel tempo are at historic highs, threatening to jeopardize long-term readiness.

Mr. D’Agostino has been nominated to be the Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security and the Administrator of the NNSA. If confirmed, he will have responsibility not only for the nuclear weapons programs, but also for the nonproliferation programs. We hope that Mr. D’Agostino will be as strong an advocate for these programs as his predecessors have been.

NNSA has focused its efforts on securing and consolidating nuclear weapons and nuclear radiological material so that they are not stolen or lost to become nuclear weapons or dirty bombs and to detect any such materials should an attempt be made to move them from country to country. One of the most significant challenges facing NNSA is detection capability, as the most dangerous materials, plutonium and highly enriched uranium, are the most difficult to detect.

These are all critically important positions and I look forward to the testimony of our nominees. At this time I’d like to call on Senator Warner for any comments he may have. Senator?

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming these three distinguished individuals, each of whom have indicated a willingness to continue their long public service, and I commend the President for having chosen very wise-
ly. Also, I thank all family members who are present here today and those in absentia. The nominees each duly acknowledged that their careers are highly dependent upon the family members for the support needed to carry out the responsibilities, which often involve many long hours.

Mr. Chairman, you gave a very thorough biographical sketch of each of these nominees. I will not go into more detail. I'll just ask that the remarks of Senator McCain, the ranking member, be placed in the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Thank you, Senator Reed.
I join you in welcoming Admiral Olson, Mr. Vickers, Mr. D’Agostino, and their families and congratulating them on their nominations.

The importance of the United States Special Operations Command and the pivotal role our Special Operations Forces play in national defense cannot be overstated.

The origins of the Special Operations Command can be traced to the aborted Desert One operation of April 25, 1980. Largely due to the efforts of this committee and our former colleagues, Senator William Cohen and Senator Sam Nunn, 7 years later in April 1987, the Special Operations Command was formed. Our Nation is indebted to these highly trained and dedicated special operators who have to undergo such rigorous training to prepare themselves for the duties they perform.

Admiral Olson, having served as the Deputy Commander of the Special Operations Command since August 2003, you are well prepared to relieve a great soldier, General Bryan Brown. If confirmed, you will be the first Navy SEAL to lead the Special Operations Command and to achieve 4-star rank. You will follow in the steps of some superb officers, including General Brown, General Hugh Shelton, General Wayne Downing, General Peter Schoomaker, and others. I congratulate you on this achievement.

Michael Vickers is a Senior Vice President for Strategic Studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a public policy research institute located in Washington, DC. Mr. Vickers served on active duty as an Army Special Forces Officer and CIA Operations Officer from 1973 to 1986. Mr. Vickers has been involved in numerous special forces operations, and more recently, has worked with senior officials on the Quadrennial Defense Review and ongoing operations. I consider the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict to be one of the most important in the Department, and thank you for your willingness to serve in this capacity.

Mr. D’Agostino last came before the committee in February 2006 and was confirmed for his current position as Deputy Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration for Defense Programs shortly thereafter. As a result—at least in part—of his Navy service under the leadership of Admiral Rickover and his experience in the NNSA and the Stockpile Stewardship Program, Mr. D’Agostino has a clear vision for the future of this organization, which, once again, this committee was so involved in creating.

I thank each of our nominees and look forward to their testimony.

Senator WARNER. I would say, though, Admiral Olson, I take a special pride in seeing you occupy this position as the first sailor to take over this very important segment of responsibility of our Armed Forces. I go back to Desert One in April 1980. I was then serving on this committee as the ranking member, and Senator Bill Cohen and myself and Senator Nunn literally took on the Pentagon and the establishment to create the structural and legislative framework to provide for the magnificent force we call the Special Operations Force today, which have earned, once we laid the cornerstone, the dedication and sacrifice of the men and women and their families. I want to come back to that momentarily. They have built this force into what it is, as have the succession of commanders that have preceded you.
I'll never forget one time going down with General Bryan D. Brown to attend a funeral service where we lost quite a number of SOFs in a helicopter crash in an operational status in a combat zone. One of the widows of one of the lost Special Operations personnel addressed an audience in a building I estimate housed 400 or 500 with another 400 or 500 outside, watching on a TV screen.

It was one of the most riveting and most magnificent statements I ever heard by an individual on the occasion of the loss of a loved one. She explained the dedication of the wives of SOFs, be they officers or enlisted. Of course, that's throughout our military services, but I always remember that.

Also, Mr. Chairman, I want to recognize General Brown's service. I've had the privilege of working with him these many years and he has a little picture in his office of a skinny little second lieutenant operating a helicopter in Vietnam, where he flew many combat missions. He's of a generation of that war of which very few are left now, that has really proven you can come all the way up through the ranks and take on these major commands and finish it with great distinction.

So my salute to General Brown and his family on the occasion of, I anticipate, your Senate confirmation.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.

As I've noted, Secretary Bodman is here. Mr. Secretary, if you want to make a comment.

Senator WARNER. Mr. D'Agostino, would you yield your seat for a moment.

This a wonderful occasion for you to come up, Mr. Secretary. We're pleased.

Secretary BODMAN. I'm here really as a symbol of my support for Mr. D'Agostino and the fine job that I expect that he will do in the future.

Senator REED. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much for that.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Before we begin and take your opening statements, there are standard questions which I will pose to all of you. I will ask the question and then in turn from Mr. D'Agostino, Admiral Olson, and Mr. Vickers get a response.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Mr. D'Agostino?

Mr. D'AGOSTINO. Yes.

Senator REED. Admiral?

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir.

Senator REED. Mr. Vickers?

Mr. VICKERS. Yes, sir.

Senator REED. Thank you.

Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

Mr. D'AGOSTINO. No, sir.

Admiral OLSON. No, sir.

Mr. VICKERS. No, sir.
Senator Reed. Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including requests for the record in hearings?

Mr. D’Agostino. Yes, sir.

Admiral Olson. Yes, sir, I will.

Mr. Vickers. Yes, sir, I will.

Senator Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to Congressional requests?

Mr. D’Agostino. Yes, sir.

Admiral Olson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Vickers. Yes, sir.

Senator Reed. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

Mr. D’Agostino. Yes, they will.

Admiral Olson. They will.

Mr. Vickers. They will, sir.

Senator Reed. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?

Mr. D’Agostino. I agree, sir.

Admiral Olson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Vickers. Yes, sir.

Senator Reed. There are two questions reserved for serving military officers. Admiral Olson, I’ll direct them to you. Do you agree to give your personal views when asked before this committee to do so, even if those views differ from the administration in power, Admiral?

Admiral Olson. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator Reed. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Admiral Olson. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator Reed. Thank you very much.

Gentlemen, I have been informed that the last question is for everyone. I need not repeat it. I think you understand the question, Mr. Vickers. Do you agree?

Mr. Vickers. Yes, sir, I do.

Senator Reed. Mr. D’Agostino?

Mr. D’Agostino. I agree, sir. Yes, sir.

Senator Reed. Now, Mr. Vickers, if you have an opening statement.

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL G. VICKERS, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

Mr. Vickers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to come before you today for this confirmation hearing. I am deeply honored by and grateful to President Bush for his trust and confidence in nominating me for Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC at this very difficult time in our Nation’s history.

I had the honor of serving with Secretary Robert Gates at the CIA during the 1980s. I am deeply honored and grateful to have been asked once again to serve under his leadership. I want to ex-
press my sincere appreciation to you, Senator Reed, and to you, Senator Warner, for your consideration of this nomination. If confirmed, I will consult with you often, seek your counsel, and take it seriously.

I would be remiss if I did not thank my wife Melana and my daughters Alexandra, Natasha, and Sophia and my other daughters who couldn’t be with us today, Oksana and Kalyna, for their love and support. I could not contemplate a return to government service without it.

Our Nation and DOD face a number of extremely serious challenges, at the forefront of which are the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, with other very serious challenges gathering on the horizon. If confirmed by the Senate, under the reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy I would have responsibility, as you noted, Senator Reed, for oversight of the Department’s core warfighting capabilities, from SOFs to general purpose forces to strategic forces. I regard this responsibility as a sacred trust. If I am confirmed, I will do my best to prove worthy of that trust.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This concludes my opening remarks.

Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Vickers.

Admiral Olson?

STATEMENT OF VADM ERIC T. OLSON, USN, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Admiral Olson. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and Senator Inhofe, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I’m deeply honored by my nomination to serve in this position. As Senator Warner mentioned, SOCOM was created by this body just over 20 years ago, and the wisdom included in the language that established the command has been proven many times in and between many conflicts since then.

This Nation expects to have forces that can respond to the sound of guns with speed, skill, and discipline whenever and wherever they are needed. The Nation also expects to have forces that can operate with knowledge and wisdom well ahead of the sound of guns in order to prevent violence from erupting. The Nation expects to have forces that can silently emerge from darkness with precision and daring to conduct missions that are especially demanding and sensitive.

If confirmed, I will train, organize, equip, deploy, and, when directed, employ this force in balance across the spectrum of traditional and irregular warfare missions. I will plan and lead DOD activities in the global war on terror as directed by the Secretary of Defense. I will also work to maintain balance in the lives of our people, providing the quality support that they and their families deserve.

I’ve been privileged to serve in SOFs for nearly all of my 34 years of commissioned service. I am awed by the dedication, the courage, and the sacrifice of these great service men and women, and I am humbled to be considered for assignment as their commander.

Thank you, sir.
Senator REED. Thank you.

Mr. D'Agostino?

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO TO BE UNDER SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AND ADMINISTRATOR OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Mr. D'AGOSTINO. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and members of the committee, I'm both humbled and honored to be the President's nominee for Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the NNSA. I appreciate the confidence placed in me by Secretary Bodman, who's taken time out of his very busy schedule to be here today. If confirmed, I'll work closely with Congress and the administration as we continue to assure the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile and to further our nonproliferation and naval reactors goals and objectives.

I have a personal attachment to the NNSA and considerable affection for the people that make up the organization. I have worked with many of them over the years and have great respect for all the things that they've accomplished. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to work with Congress on national security missions of the NNSA.

I've been with the DOE’s nuclear weapons program now for over 14 years and have witnessed remarkable changes. I'm particularly proud of the steps taken to fulfill the President's direction to reduce the stockpile to nearly one-half by 2012. As a result of dramatic improvements in procedures, tools, and policies, we've also increased the rate of nuclear weapons dismantlement by 50 percent over last year's level and will continue at that highly sharper rate for the rest of the year. We're ensuring that these weapons will no longer be used again and thus demonstrating that the United States is serious about our nonproliferation leadership role in the global community.

Increasing the dismantlement rate of excess warheads is also a key part of the NNSA’s future plans to transform and reduce the nuclear weapons stockpile and develop the supporting infrastructure that is modern, smaller, more efficient, and more secure to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

Moving forward to evaluate whether or not we should pursue a strategy of reliable replacements to our Cold War nuclear warheads is also pivotal to realizing this vision. Increased confidence in our stockpile from reliable replacement warheads (RRWs) may result in even greater dismantlement rates, sending a strong message to the rest of the world that we're taking meaningful steps to developing the right size nuclear weapons stockpile.

Our continued investments in nuclear deterrent will also assure our allies and obviate any need for them to develop and field their own nuclear forces. Finally, the improved security features of the RRW will prevent unauthorized use should a warhead ever fall into the hands of terrorists.

In the area of nonproliferation, NNSA now works with over 100 international partners to secure and reduce the quantity of nuclear and radiological materials, bolster the border security overseas, and strengthen the international nonproliferation and export con-
trol regimes. We’re conducting cutting edge research and development into nuclear detection technologies to provide the tools we need to detect and prevent proliferation.

Meeting our commitments in the Bratislava Agreement to conclude security upgrade activities at Russian nuclear sites by the end of 2008 is also one of our highest priorities. As a result of our efforts to accelerate this work, we’re well positioned to successfully reach this milestone on schedule.

Service to the Nation is very important to me. I have over 29 years of military service in the United States Navy and over 17 years of civil service in the Department of Navy and in the DOE. As an officer in the Navy, I was selected by Admiral Hyman Rickover, and trained as a nuclear submarine officer, and in this capacity I managed technically complex, high hazard operations on board nuclear submarines. This training instilled in me a commitment to safety, quality, discipline, and integrity that are so important when dealing with nuclear operations.

For all of my professional life, I’ve focused service in support of our Nation’s security. I’m privileged to have been able to serve my country and am confident that my experience will serve me well, if confirmed.

If confirmed, I’ll bring integrity and perseverance to the administrator position and to the men and women of the NNSA who work so hard on the important task of preserving our Nation’s security. With your approval, it would be my great privilege to lead NNSA as we meet our challenges to work towards a better future.

Thank you for your consideration.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. D’Agostino.

I would propose 8-minute rounds and I presume we’ll have several rounds.

Senator WARNER. I’ll yield my time to the colleague from Oklahoma.

Senator REED. Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, if I could. I’m ranking member of Environment and Public Works Committee. We’re having a hearing that starts right now and I’m going to have to be there. I’d like to ask just a couple questions maybe for the record.

Senator REED. Yes, sir.

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate it very much.

First of all, Mr. Vickers. I’ve been very interested and somewhat instrumental in the 1206 and 1207 and, of course, 1208 sections of the U.S. Code, as it refers to Special Operations, the train and equip funding. Section 1206 is about a $300 million program that allows people to train and equip nations. Section 1207 is a lesser amount and that has to do with civilian activities. But section 1208 is only $25 million and that is there for Special Operations.

I’d like to know your feelings about the adequacy of that account and how significant the section 1208 funds are and maybe get some comments from the other nominees, too.

Mr. VICKERS. Yes, sir. All of the accounts and authorities provided in them are very important. The sections 1206 and 1207 authorities are primarily for stability and reconstruction operations so that we can move rather rapidly to train and equip foreign security
forces; and the section 1208 authority is for dealing with irregular forces.

During Operation Enduring Freedom when we went into Afghanistan, DOD did not have these authorities, which the CIA has historically had, and we were, therefore, at a disadvantage. Thanks to congressional action on this, DOD now has a very important capability, which in my personal opinion should be extended.

Senator INHOFE. Is the section 1208 adequate, though? That’s the question.

Mr. VICKERS. Sir, my understanding is SOCOM in the past few years has spent most of the funds, I believe about $15 million or so. As we move to give greater emphasis to an indirect approach for the war on terror and to a global unconventional warfare campaign, that level may need to be revisited.

Senator INHOFE. That’s my thinking here. Special Ops used to be rather small. Right now it’s growing more rapidly than any other element out there.

Do you agree with that, Admiral Olson?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I can’t say absolutely that they’re growing more rapidly than any other, but we are certainly growing rapidly.

Senator INHOFE. Why don’t you do this. You look at the adequacy of the section 1208 and let us know if it looks like it might be a problem.

[The information referred to follows:]

The original $25 million amount for section 1208 authority was the result of an initial estimate made almost 4 years ago, based on early experiences in Afghanistan with the Northern Alliance and our sense of what future unconventional warfare requirements might look like. At that time, assumptions were that 1208 operations would be of relatively short duration. In fact, most 1208 operations cross fiscal years and require sustained or increased funding in the follow-on years. Consequently, at the beginning of each fiscal year, the amount of unobligated 1208 authority available to conduct new operations is less than $25 million.

It is very important to extend the 1208 authority in fiscal year 2008. There are operations planned in fiscal year 2008 and approximately half of the 1208 authority is projected to pay the costs of operations already approved by the Secretary of Defense. The current $25 million is adequate for fiscal year 2008. However, as Mr. Vickers noted during the hearing, the greater emphasis on the indirect approach in the global war on terror may require this amount be revisited.

Senator INHOFE. Admiral Olson, we hear a lot about OPTEMPO, we hear about the Guard and Reserve and the problems that they’re having right now. We don’t hear that much about Special Operations Forces in terms of their recruiting, retention, morale, and the impact on those of OPTEMPO. Where are we on that now?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, generally speaking the OPTEMPO of SOF’s is on par with the Army and the Marine Corps that we have heard so much about. We are programmed, if the budgets are approved, to grow about 13,000 people over the next 5 years. That’s a rate at which we can absorb the growth. Our recruiting is matching that. Our pipeline training is matching that. Our retention is matching that. So we are on par to execute that growth.

Senator INHOFE. Very good.

Mr. D’Agostino, in your statement you discuss nuclear non-proliferation programs in the states of the former Soviet Union and identify North Korea as the greatest unmet nonproliferation problem. Chinese companies have been sanctioned for selling weapons
technology to countries, including Iran. Is China an unmet non-proliferation problem?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. In my view, at this point no, they are not. We’re working with China on a number of activities. Particularly we like to engage them in bolstering what we call our second line of defense program, which is the put nuclear detection capabilities at borders, and they’re working with us on that, as well as looking at warhead safety and security. There’s a lot more that we can do with China and I would say we’re in the early stages of engagement in that area.

Since it’s not an area that I deal with in my current job, it is something that I’ll be looking at in particular as we move forward.

Senator INHOFE. On the no nuclear testing program, for as long as they have had that I’ve been concerned whether or not we’re actually keeping a credible nuclear deterrent. I’m sure that other members will be asking the same question. What is your feeling now?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Sir, one of my primary responsibilities is to ensure that we annually assess the stockpile using the tools that have been authorized and appropriated over the past number of years. We feel we have significant confidence in our warheads. That doesn’t mean to say that we don’t worry about it, because every year they do get 1 year older on average, and therefore, as we do know, materials change over time.

However, the tools that we have right now have allowed us to actually address some problems that we wouldn’t be able to address in the days when we had testing. So we have some new insights.

Senator INHOFE. So you think that you have new tools now that you didn’t have before that would give us some level of confidence that we have something that works?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. The tools we have now compared to the tools we had a decade ago are significantly different. Computing tools for modeling and simulation, experimental tools to extract a tremendous amount of data about how materials change over time, have literally increased by orders of magnitude.

Challenges remain. We are in the final stages of bringing all of these tools on line and that will be completed when we get into experimentation on the National Ignition Facility. That doesn’t mean to say we won’t uncover a technical problem in the future, but I feel very comfortable now with where we are in our stockpile.

Senator INHOFE. Good. Let me just echo what the chairman and Senator Warner said. I just think the world of all three of you and look forward to working with you in your new capacities.

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, Senator.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.

Mr. Vickers, you come to this job with an extraordinary range of both operational and analytical experience in special operations. Yours will be a job that has the principal responsible duty for oversight of special operations. The reorganization is proposing to give you this breathtaking range of responsibilities, from strategic weapons systems to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), to the RRW, to transformation issues, and to major program functions.
Do you believe that it's within the letter and the intent of the law that this new responsibility—since the current law says it's the principal duty for oversight of special operations-low intensity conflict, do you see it as a conflict with title 10?

Mr. VICKERS. Sir, I agree that it is a very expanded portfolio in terms of capabilities of the Department. But in terms of span of control, counternarcotics and detainee affairs were moved out and strategic capabilities and transformation and with that oversight of conventional forces were moved in. I think that very much depends upon the background of the nominee as to which would pose the greater challenge.

I believe section 138 of title 10 is explicitly clear on the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC, which is the primary duty of that ASD will be oversight of SOFs, both policy and resources. I do believe that under the reorganization that law can be adhered to in both letter and spirit.

Senator REED. The more I hear about this, the more skeptical I become, frankly, because there is a sort of correlation between detainee operations and Special Operations, between counternarcotics and Special Operations. But you're going to be asked, potentially, to opine upon whether we'll have a replacement warhead, whether we'll enter into the START negotiations—a whole host of issues which are complex. It begs the question whether or not, even though you will try your best to be the principal or devote your time, but you'll be pulled in several diametrically opposing directions. I must say, given your experience in Special Operations, you're clearly prepared for the existing role of the SO/LIC. I don't know if anyone can fill the role that's been proposed by this reorganization.

Do you have apprehension about your ability to weigh in effectively on issues like strategic programs, space warfare, missile defense, and at the same time devote yourself with great energy to what is the most critical issue we face while we're at war today, which is special operations against the global war on terrorism?

Mr. VICKERS. Sir, I believe the background that I have enables me to weigh in and to use this reorganization to accomplish very important things for this and future administrations. For the past 15 years, I have spent a large portion of my time focused on space operations, information operations, and how they might evolve in the future, transformation of strategic strike operations, and transformation of the broad portfolio of DOD, and have been a high-level advisor since 1997 to DOD on those issues.

I realize this is a very broad portfolio, but I believe it will also strengthen SOFs by having, frankly, more clout in the Pentagon. I would like to note that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who if I am confirmed would be my immediate supervisor, has responsibility for all those capabilities plus homeland defense plus global security affairs and regional and global defense policy. So if he can handle that span of control, I believe I can assist him in doing that, sir, and if confirmed I would certainly do my best to do so.

Senator REED. One of the presumptions we have is that he has all this control because he has good subordinates like yourself who are focused laser-like on Special Operations.
Admiral Olson, you’re sort of looking from SOCOM up to DOD. Do you have any concerns, not because of Mr. Vickers or anyone else’s capability, but just the fact that there’ll be so many different missions in that office, that you won’t get the attention you need?

Admiral Olson. Sir, if I’m confirmed as the Commander of SOCOM I would consider it essential that the Assistant Secretary continue to serve as a member of the board of directors of United States Special Operations. The voting members are only six and the Assistant Secretary obviously is a key vote.

Second, I would consider it essential that careful and personal oversight of Major Force Program 11 funds be maintained at the Assistant Secretary level. I would be concerned about a dispersion of responsibilities regarding Special Operations across the Deputy and Assistant Secretaries of Defense. But in conversation with the office, we’re assured that that won’t happen, that the right level of attention will be paid to Special Operations issues.

So at this point we’re optimistic and looking forward to working with the new organization.

Senator Reed. Thank you.

Admiral Olson, there have been reports of detainee abuse by special operators before Abu Ghraib, which raises the question of essentially what are the rules of engagement or interrogation that our special operators apply? Can you give this committee assurances, as military officers and noncommissioned officers, that they operate within the very strict purview of the Geneva Convention?

Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. SOFs adhere to the same policies, regulations, and laws as all the other forces operating in the theater. The policies are set by the commander, in Iraq and Afghanistan are set by the Commander of Central Command and adhere to the Detainee Treatment Act, and SOFs fall under the same provisions.

Senator Reed. So you would claim no special exception given the nature of their operations? They would follow the same guidance as regular forces, conventional forces?

Admiral Olson. Sir, there are no exceptions granted to SOFs regarding interrogations.

Senator Reed. Mr. Vickers, your view?

Mr. Vickers. I agree with Admiral Olson, sir.

Senator Reed. Thank you.

Mr. D’Agostino. Let me ask a question about the stockpile stewardship program. It has been operating now for 14 years. What additional assets are planned for the program to enhance its capabilities?

Mr. D’Agostino. Mr. Chairman, the focus over the next few years will be to fully realize the capabilities of the machines that are coming on line right now and will be over the next year and a half or so, particularly the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test machine, which is at Los Alamos. That machine will allow us to take a look at imploding materials and see how they change over time and to use that data for our computing codes.

We’ll continue to need investments in our simulation and modeling program, as we put forth in our President’s budget request. We’ll continue to move forward on our National Ignition Facility and fully realize that. I feel pretty comfortable with that suite of tools. Then of course what it will really take is experiments work-
ing on those machines and extracting that data. That will keep us busy for a number of years to come in the near future.

Senator REED. Thank you.

I have additional questions, but let me now yield and turn to Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I’d like to return to your question regarding the detainees. I did not hear either of the witnesses—I think it was just that they used the name of the statute, but I’d like to have you reply about the Army Field Manual. That will be the guiding document for the actual hands-on by the troops in the field; is that correct, Admiral Olson?

Admiral OLSON. That’s correct, sir. It’s Army Field Manual 2–22.3. It is the operative manual and our forces follow it.

Mr. VICKERS. That is correct, sir.

Senator WARNER. I think it’s extremely important that we have that in the record.

I think you’ve covered, Mr. Chairman, the question of the reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and how that leaves your portfolio. But you’re confident, Mr. Vickers, that at this point in time one man can handle the whole realm of responsibilities; is that correct?

Mr. VICKERS. I do believe that is correct, Senator Warner, and I believe that it is important to set priorities within these areas, particularly in the last year and a half of an administration. But I believe that important things can be done in each area, and I would be happy to discuss those other areas, some of which Senator Reed mentioned—RRW, missile defense, and transformation of conventional forces as well.

Senator WARNER. Again, your segment of overall DOD responsibility was pretty well carved out and created by Congress. I would like to have you provide for the record hopefully your commitment that you will come back to Congress, in due consultation with the Secretary of Defense, a magnificent man, that you will not only advise the Secretary, but also Congress, so that it can take any legislative action as necessary. Do we have that commitment from you?

Mr. VICKERS. You do, sir.

Senator WARNER. Good, all right.

Mr. Chairman, I was handed a note by one of our able staff that our committee in the military construction commitment, which I believe you have a hand in, plans to include in the mark on Wednesday a cut to a SOCOM project. I’d like to get the Admiral’s view about that project. It is the Naval Special Warfare Command Facility at Dam Neck, VA. That’s curious; it’s in my State. I can’t imagine how that coincidence is coming about. [Laughter.]

It’s in the President’s budget for $94.5 million, construction of a SEAL team operation facility. Could you tell us a little bit about that project, Admiral Olson?

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. Thank you, sir. One of our major units is stationed at Dam Neck in Virginia Beach, VA. That is a unit that is scheduled to grow in its operational capability by about 33 percent over the next 5 years. That is an essential facility. It is a $94 million facility because it supports both staff and operational aspects of what that unit does.
Senator WARNER. I thank you. I have a detailed letter here, which incidentally arrived on your desk this morning, Mr. Chairman. At your opportunity would you take a look at it and so advise me as to how you feel about that project?

Senator REED. I'd be delighted, Senator.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Admiral, for that little bit.

Now to Mr. D'Agostino. I enjoyed very much our visit yesterday reminiscing about Admiral Rickover.

Mr. D'AGOSTINO. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Indeed, I had and still will always have the highest regard for him. You're a survivor of that system.

Mr. D'AGOSTINO. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. As a matter of fact, he, in your own words, threw you physically out of his office twice, saying that he was doubtful that you were up to submarine standards. But somehow you managed to win his confidence and went on to have a very extraordinary career in the United States Navy in the submarine force, and now you take on this responsibility.

Let me draw to your attention that in 2000, Congress created the NNSA as an outgrowth principally of concerns about the security of the nuclear weapons labs. NNSA used to have somewhat of an independence within the DOE.

Are you cognizant of that background?

Mr. D'AGOSTINO. Yes, sir, I am.

Senator WARNER. You studied under your predecessor for some period of time, did you not?

Mr. D'AGOSTINO. Yes, sir, I did.

Senator WARNER. Did the concept of some sort of unwritten but nevertheless de facto independence work to your satisfaction?

Mr. D'AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. I think it has worked and I think it will continue to improve our relationships. The way I look at the relationship with the rest of the Department, we particularly rely on the office led by Glenn Podonsky, who provides an independent oversight element to our program and gives me direct input. I talk to Mr. Podonsky at least once a week, sometimes twice a week, as he has folks that are looking not only within the NNSA but across the rest of the Department. That independent look at the program, as well as my own security organization, allows me to provide and do that balancing and risk management that's so important.

I do think one of the areas that I'll be spending some time on over the next 18 months or so, the acting Administrator right now, Bill Ostendorff, has worked up a set of special focus areas, and the area that Bill and I both believe needed additional attention, me in my responsibility as the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, is how we do oversight of security, how we do oversight of nuclear safety, and how we do oversight of cyber security.

So our relationship with the Department will allow us an opportunity to really improve on that.

Senator WARNER. You're fortunate to have a Secretary at the head of your Department who understands this and has made it work since the day he took over this job. You're fortunate in that capacity. To have you here, Mr. Secretary, attending this morning is a special honor to the committee.
I’d like to have, at this point in time, your own assessment of the security at the various laboratories. They’re national assets, those labs, and this committee has taken a special interest in them through the years while the DOE and indeed the Committee on Energy in this Congress has sort of joint responsibility. We each year as a rule have the lab directors up to talk with them.

Give us your current assessment of the security arrangements at the labs today and whether or not you feel in your tenure you have to take some initiatives to strengthen it.

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Absolutely. Right now, I’m fairly comfortable with the physical security element of where we are with our laboratories, as well as our production sites. These organizations get a fairly rigorous review by the security organization within the NNSA, as well as Mr. Podonsky’s organization. There are clearly areas that need improvement across the complex. We know what those areas are and we’re going to be focusing on those particular areas, as I mentioned earlier.

I think there is an area that the Secretary and I and Mr. Ostendorff will be spending more time on. I don’t want to speak for the Secretary, but I do know that the area of cyber security is an area that concerns us greatly, because it’s not just the materials that we worry about, it’s the information about what to do with those materials that is something we need to protect almost with the same level of rigor and attention.

Senator WARNER. I want you to provide for the record further details. I have but a minute left for the last question on my first round to Mr. Vickers.

[The information referred to follows:]

What progress has NNSA made in improving physical security of the Nuclear Weapons Complex?

One of the major challenges facing the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) has been, and remains, ensuring nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials (SNM) in our care are well protected, while at the same time, accessible for use in meeting the critical work activities of our national security missions—maintaining a safe, reliable, and credible nuclear deterrent, supporting the Nation’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts, and advancing energy security. I am pleased to report that tremendous progress has been made to improve the capability and readiness of our sites in meeting the post-September 11 terrorism threat. Over the past several years, in response to the Department’s 2003 Design Basis Threat (DBT) Policy, NNSA has taken significant and sustained actions to improve the physical security at each of the sites within the complex. Our upgrades have focused on hardening our facilities from outside attack, employing security technologies that provide us stronger defenses, and improving the survivability and lethality of the protective forces we rely on to defeat the terrorist threat. The net effect of the upgrades, which are outlined below, is a robust and well-defended security posture across the NNSA’s diverse set of facilities and operations. I am particularly pleased to report that our success in meeting the 2003 DBT Policy has been independently confirmed by the Department’s Inspector General and by staff from the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Health, Safety, and Security. While I am pleased with the work that has been accomplished, there is more to do. The next challenge is to take this strong physical security foundation and begin to implement upgrades necessary to meet the requirements of the 2005 DBT Policy. We have committed to the Department that we will meet these new requirements by the end of fiscal year 2011.

NNSA PHYSICAL SECURITY UPGRADES

Upgrades Completed to Meet the 2003 Design Basis Threat Policy

The aggressive action taken by the NNSA field staff, both Federal and contractor, has changed the face of security at each of the sites. Over the past 3 years, we have invested over $277 million in security upgrades at NNSA sites. Completed upgrades include:
• Implemented a denial protection strategy designed to ensure that adversaries are prevented from completing an on-site in-situ improvised nuclear device (IND). All of our Category I SNM sites moved from a strategy of containment and now have in place denial strategies that seek to interdict and destroy an enemy attack before adversaries can gain access to a nuclear weapon or complete the assembly of an on-site IND. Recapture/recovery plans are also in place to ensure our security forces do not allow an adversary to escape with SNM.

• Provided the DOE security police officers with armored vehicles and heavy caliber weapons that significantly increase their survivability and lethality. Armor-penetrating ammunition and ballistically protected fighting positions also contributed to improving their effectiveness. The increased security police officer survivability has made site defenses stronger, while reducing the need to hire more security officers to account for the expected attrition that would be a natural result of the increased adversary force. Greater firepower also enables the protective forces to defeat the adversary before they can accomplish their mission.

• Improved training capabilities by expanding training ranges and support facilities: developing additional tactical training courses, hiring instructors, and beginning the shift to the “Elite Forces” model. This initiative will transform our protective forces into a tactically oriented force, well trained in the small team and weapons tactics needed to fight in the current environment.

• Used highly effective low-tech measures to upgrade the physical security features of our sites. We installed physical barriers around key approaches to sites and critical facilities to provide increased standoff distances and to delay vehicle and personnel movement. The standoff barriers also serve to mitigate the effects of a vehicle bomb attack against key facilities.

• Worked to aggressively reduce the footprint associated with SNM storage and processing operations. We removed Category I SNM from Technical Area at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), greatly improving the effectiveness of the security mission at LANL. We made great strides in reducing the number of SNM target locations at Y–12 and the ongoing construction of the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility (HEUMF) will drive even further target area reductions.

**Upgrades Planned to Meet the 2005 Design Basis Threat Policy**

The 2005 DBT Policy represents an increase in the terrorist adversary force of as much as 75 percent over the 2003 DBT levels. While this is a large increase in threat capability, the 2003 DBT upgrades outlined above have greatly improved the defenses at our NNSA nuclear facilities. From this strong foundation, NNSA plans to invest in physical security upgrades that will keep our sites among the best-defended and most secure facilities in the world.

• Construction of high security facilities, such as HEUMF at Y–12 and the Nuclear Materials Safeguards and Security Upgrades Project at LANL.

• Implementation of Complex 2030 as the long-term configuration for a modernized Nuclear Weapons Complex. Complex 2030 to continue storage and processing consolidation efforts, while also pursuing purpose-built facilities with built-in high security features.

• Continued SNM consolidation, particularly the continuation of efforts at Y–12 to reduce the number of SNM targets and elimination of Category I/II SNM from Sandia National Laboratories by the end of fiscal year 2008.

• Facility and target location hardening through installation of standoff barriers and other physical upgrades.

• Additional utilization of technology to augment the detection, delay, and attrition of attacking forces.

  • Achieve detection further from our traditional security boundaries.
  • Channel the adversary to pre-determined choke points.
  • Mitigate the effects of vehicle borne improvised explosive devices.
  • Engage the threat at longer distances and with greater efficiency.
  • Increase the survivability of site protective forces.
  • Fail-safe lethal denial systems.
  • Compartmentalization of vital planning information.
  • Enhance command, control, and communication.
- Enhance the tactical response capabilities of the protective force.
- Where necessary, hire additional protective forces to counter the increased adversary force sizes.

Senator WARNER. I don't know whether you had the opportunity, Mr. Vickers, to read in the New York Times today an article by Michael Gordon. Mr. Gordon was accompanying Admiral William Fallon, the Central Command Commander, on a visit to Iraq. All too often we focus our attention on General David Petraeus. In no way do I suggest anything but the highest regard for the General, but this Admiral is the top boss in that region.

I presume in consultation with our President he made this special trip down to meet with Prime Minister Maliki to, as described by this article, realistically assess the situation as of today and to remind Prime Minister Maliki that Congress just a few weeks ago enacted and the President signed into law a requirement that the President report to Congress on July 15 with regard to the situation in that AOR, specifically Iraq.

Of course, integral to that report will be the President's assessment with regard to his January 10 surge situation. Now, as I and others look at the surge, it is too early to say exactly the measure of success, but in terms of the performance of the men and women of the military, I think the surge has demonstrated absolutely superb dedication and sacrifice on their part. There's no doubt about that.

But the underlying purpose for the surge was to provide a security situation in the capital of Iraq such that the government could begin, with greater vigor, strength and conviction, exercise the reins of sovereignty.

Now, I want to make a careful separation. The Armed Forces are doing their job, but only a third of Baghdad has really been subjected to the January 10 doctrine of the President. Currently, the military is proceeding to do the balance as additional troops have been added. But the thing about it is the military is doing its job; the missing element is that the government is not taking advantage of such increased security as brought about by the surge to date and it's failing, in my judgment, to exercise the degree of sovereignty necessary to begin to pull Iraq out of this abyss it's sinking into.

This is set forth very clearly in this article. I'm going to ask that part of the article be placed in today's record if that's possible, Mr. Chairman.

Senator REED. Without objection.

[The information referred to follows:]
June 12, 2007

U.S. Warns Iraq That Progress Is Needed Soon

BY MICHAEL R. GORDON

BAGHDAD, June 11 — The top American military commander for the Middle East has warned Iraq's prime minister in a closed-door conversation that the Iraqi government needs to make tangible political progress by next month to counter the growing tide of opposition to the war in Congress.

In a Sunday afternoon discussion that mixed gentle coaxing with a sober appraisal of politics in Baghdad and Washington, the commander, Adm. William J. Fallon, told Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki that the Iraqi government should aim to complete a law on the division of oil proceeds by next month.

Iraq's Shiite-dominated government, Admiral Fallon added in the meeting, has consolidated power and should have the confidence to reach out to its opponents. "You have the power," Admiral Fallon said. "You should take the initiative."

The admiral's appeal, which was made in the presence of Ryan C. Crocker, the American ambassador to Iraq, a senior political adviser to the command and this reporter, elicited an assurance from Mr. Maliki that he hoped to make some progress over the coming weeks. But he also offered a lengthy account of all the tribulations facing the Iraqi government, including tenuous security, distrustful neighboring Sunni states and a complex legal agenda.

"There are lots of difficulties that are not well understood from outside," Mr. Maliki said. "Still, we're trying hard."

Admiral Fallon, who is in charge of the United States Central Command, used a whirlwind trip to Iraq to reinforce Washington's public and private message that political progress was lagging. It is a message that has been delivered by several other American officials, but the deadlines have often been allowed to slip. This reporter, who is accompanying Admiral Fallon on his trip to Iraq, was allowed into the meeting. It was only at the end of the meeting that American officials agreed that it could be on the record.

At times, the two sides appeared to be operating on two different clocks. While Admiral Fallon emphasized the urgency of demonstrating results, Mr. Maliki cast the political process as a long journey from dictatorship to democracy. "The end result will be marked in history," said Mr. Maliki, who was flanked by Mowaffak al-Rubaie, his national security adviser, and two other aides.

When President Bush decided in January to increase American troop levels in Iraq, the purpose was not to win a military victory but to improve security so the Iraqi leaders could carry out a program of political reconciliation. But now that the troops are in place, the Iraqis have little to show by way of political progress.

In some ways, this summer does not seem like an auspicious period for a political breakthrough. Some Maliki
sides fear that Sunni members of the government are conspiring against them with the support of Sunni Arab states. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, the leader of the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council, an important Shiite group, is being treated for lung cancer. Kurdish leaders seem preoccupied by Turkish threats to intervene militarily in northern Iraq.

Iraqis are aware that the Bush administration has promised to report to Congress in September on what its new Iraq strategy has accomplished. Indeed, the Bush administration is obliged by Congressional legislation to issue an interim report in July on Iraqi developments.

In the meeting, Admiral Fallon focused on Iraq's oil law, assuming it was closest to completion. "Is it reasonable to expect it to be completed in July?" he asked. "We have to show some progress in July for the upcoming report."

Mr. Maliki said that the Kurds had raised concerns about revenue sharing arrangements, but he indicated that some progress on the oil law would be made. Ambassador Crocker pointed out that it was important that progress include the resolution of that thorny issue.

At one point, Mr. Maliki wondered aloud whether Congress would really give the Iraqis credit for tackling tough issues if they completed the oil law. Admiral Fallon reassured him that most Americans wanted the Iraqi government to succeed.

At another point, Mr. Maliki asserted that there was already some good news to report. "The September report should list the accomplishments," he said. "There are lots of positive developments. Our spirit is not broken. Another success is that no one is above the law."

Admiral Fallon brought up the question of Iraq's security forces. Fielding an army and police force was not just a matter of training troops and providing equipment, he said. Iraqis had to be confident that some units were not carrying out a sectarian agenda, a major problem over the past year. Mr. Maliki agreed with him that troops driven by sectarian passions were a threat.

The Iraqi prime minister has often indicated that he shares many of Washington's goals, leaving American officials to wonder if some of the lack of progress reflects a lack of follow-through by lower-ranking officials, the inherent difficulties of managing the country with a government under siege or a hidden agenda.

The meeting also touched on Iraq's neighbors. The American military has charged that Iran is providing arms to militant groups in Iraq, including advanced roadside bombs that have caused a disproportionate number of American casualties, and Admiral Fallon asked the Iraqis to press Iran to cut off such deliveries. The instability the Iranian arms shipments are fueling, Admiral Fallon said, is diverting American forces from vital security tasks.

That prompted Mr. Maliki to ask what the Americans were doing to persuade Syria to stop the flow of foreign fighters, which have included suicide bombers, across the border. Ambassador Crocker said that Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had raised the matter with her Syrian counterpart. But so far there has been no resolution.

"We need the cooperation of Iran and Syria," Mr. Maliki said. Sunni Arab states, he added, needed to be reassured that a Shiite-dominated Iraq would not be a threat. "We won't allow the Iranians in," he said. "Nor will we allow it to become a safe haven for terrorists."

Waxing philosophically, Mr. Maliki suggested that building trust with Iraq's neighbors would not be easy. "There are two mentalities in this region," he said. "Conspiracy and mistrust."

Senator WARNER. Did you have an opportunity to read the article?

Mr. VICKERS. I did, sir, and I concur with your assessment.

Senator WARNER. Could you advise the committee, drawing on your many years of experience in dealing with that region and un-
derstanding of the culture and the nature of the people of Iraq? It’s rather unique. What do you portend for the future? Is there a likelihood that the people are going to come to the realization that we are there making these enormous sacrifices for their benefit?

Mr. VICKERS. We certainly hope so, Senator Warner. As you pointed out, we are making enormous sacrifices to give them the opportunity to do just that. But ultimately it must be the Iraqis who decide what the future of Iraq will be. One of the worrisome signs right now, besides the lack of progress on the essential political front, is that sectarian identities are hardening and have continued to harden, and therefore the link between military operations and political outcome is not having the full effect at this point in time that we would all hope for.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator Martinez.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.

I wanted to first of all commend all of you gentlemen for your willingness to serve our country and thank you for doing so. I look forward to your confirmation.

I am delighted, Admiral, that we'll be keeping you in Florida. As I told you when we had an opportunity to visit, we're delighted that you're at SOCOM. We are so pleased that you're housed at MacDill Air Force Base, where we hope that if at any time we can be of assistance to you in making sure that the State is being as hospitable as it can be that you would let us know. We're very proud of our facilities there and happy to be working with you.

My questions to you, Admiral, would be in the vein of how do we help you make things better for SOCOM? I know that we're facing a time in this situation that we are in the world where increasing demands are being placed on your forces. My question to you is how are you transforming and utilizing the resources that you have to ensure that there is a SOCOM that is fully capable to meet the asymmetric or irregular warfare that we're in today?

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, Senator Martinez. We are growing significantly. We are growing a little bit over 13,000 people in our force over the next 5 years. Continued support for the budget request is the most helpful thing that this body can provide SOCOM. We are programmed to grow at about the rate we can absorb the growth. We are on track to do that. But it will take continued careful monitorship and careful management of our growth.

We are continuing to assess the very careful balance that has to be sustained between direct and indirect actions in this new world in which we live. We understand well that it is the indirect actions that will be decisive, but the direct actions are very important in order to enable the indirect actions to have time to take their decisive effect. So continued support for all of our components who are engaged in both direct and indirect activities and support for our major platforms, equipment items, to enable them to do the extremely demanding things that we ask them to do is how this body can best serve SOCOM.

Senator MARTINEZ. On the issue of the budget, is the President's budget request adequate in your opinion to meet your needs?

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator MARTINEZ. We're looking at equipment as well as manpower, and I wanted to ask a question on each of those things. On the equipment front, I know that fixed wing aircraft has been something that you have needed. Mr. Vickers, please feel free to comment if you would like. Where are we in terms of meeting your needs for fixed wing aircraft? Explain to the committee, if you would, why you have such a need and what, if anything, we should be doing to help you?

Admiral OLSON. Thank you, sir. The primary fixed wing aircraft in Special Operations' inventory consist of several variants of the C–130 Hercules aircraft, an old design that's been upgraded over the years. But we are flying some that are quite old, and a modernization program, a recapitalization program, for our older model C–130s is essential. We are working very closely with the Air Force to enable that.

The Air Force provides our fixed wing platforms and then we invest our MFP–11 dollars to modify them to accomplish their Special Operations-peculiar tasks. So this is a very carefully negotiated acquisition process with the Air Force in fixed wing aircraft, and with each of the Services, for those platforms that are in common service within the Services, but for which we have a Special Operations-peculiar modification requirement.

We have an immediate requirement for 37 modernized aircraft. In working with the Air Force, we have in our budget request enough funds to accommodate 20 of those across the future years development plan and to deliver 12 within that plan. Ideally there would be more rapid growth, but that is a satisfactory growth rate for us.

Senator MARTINEZ. In terms of manpower needs, one of the things that I know you need is language and cultural training, as well as simply just the manpower needs. In other words, is recruitment up to speed? Is it what you want it to be? Are we maintaining the level of folks coming into the force that you need for this growth? Can you touch on the issue of language and cultural training?

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. Our manpower is a combination of our recruitment efforts, our pipeline training efforts, and our retention efforts. All three of those are on track in order to accomplish the growth that we have requested and which has been programmed for us should the budget be approved.

We have made significant changes in our schoolhouse infrastructures in order to expand the pipeline opportunities. In some of our schoolhouses we have doubled and almost tripled our output of SOFs over the last couple of years. This body has supported retention benefits that have had a great deal of success in retaining our most senior and experienced people to stay beyond the point at which they may have retired, to extend them another 5 or 6 years of service, so that we are growing the force rapidly without paying too high a price in terms of making the force more youthful or less mature in its experience level by retaining these long-serving members of our force.

All that is on track, sir, and I'm very optimistic that we will meet our growth goals.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you, sir.
I'm finished, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Martinez.
Senator Webb.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome to the process, all of you. I'd like to say first of all to
the presiding Senator that he and I both have had the benefit of
military service and then transitioning into civilian policy. I think
that's a tremendous benefit. I was gratified, looking in the bios of
the individuals here, that all of them have spent time in the mili-
tary, understanding all the dimensions of that before moving into
the civilian side. I'd like to say that I think that's a great thing
when we're looking at the types of jobs that you will be doing.
I have had the opportunity to speak with Admiral Olson on more
than one occasion when he was testifying. I also enjoyed our visit
yesterday. I look forward to visiting with the other two of you at
some point. In the mean time, I'll be looking at your materials
here.
I'd like to congratulate Admiral Olson on becoming the first four-
star Special Operations Commander from the Navy side. It's a
great historical achievement.
I have one question that I would address to the Admiral, also to
Mr. Vickers, and it goes to an area of concern that we've been see-
ing a lot, expressed a lot in the media, and also from people who
have a good deal of experience over in Iraq and Afghanistan. That
is the seam that is sort of blurring between what our Special Oper-
ations people are doing and what activities are being contracted out
to private contractors, such as Blackwater, Triple Canopy, and
those sorts of companies.
Part of this concern is operational, but also a part of it is juris-
dictional in terms of who has responsibility for potential mis-
conduct and those sorts of things. I'd like to hear both of your per-
spectives on this.
Admiral Olson. Thank you, Senator Webb. I'll go first. United
States SOCOM employs a number of contractors in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan, but all of them are employed in providing services. They
are helping us repair small arms, they're helping with aircraft
maintenance, they are helping with our supply maintenance and
those sorts of issues. We do not have any contractors who are em-
ployed in any operational roles, sir.
Senator Webb. Do you work in conjunction with contractors who
are in operational roles?
Admiral Olson. Sir, I haven't been to the theater recently, so I
can't answer that with certainty. If confirmed, I will certainly look
into that. We have an informal relationship with many of those
contractors because we know who they are, having been a supplier
of many of the people who they hire. But in terms of a formal
working relationship with contractors in the theater in an oper-
ational capacity, sir, I would take that as a priority if confirmed
and study it.
Senator Webb. I think it's a serious problem in a lot of different
ways. One of them being how the civilian societies that we're work-
ing in view Americans. Over and over again I see these stories of
misconduct, and I'm not alleging widespread misconduct, among
these private contractors. But there are incidents and if you're on
the receiving end sometimes it’s difficult to see whether that person was actually an American military person or in many cases not even an American, but a foreigner using firepower without proper discretion, et cetera, et cetera.

I would be curious to see in what areas there are interactions and how that’s worked out.

Mr. Vickers?

Mr. VICKERS. I would underscore, sir, what Admiral Olson said and just add that this is not an area that I have studied in great depth, but what I have looked at, the American military relies very heavily on contractors for all sorts of things, logistics support and others, and there has been some migration into some operational tasks, principally protective security details that have been outsourced, which then carries a whole range of other implications.

The quality of private contractors varies substantially. Some are really first-rate and others less so as we move into this new world. But I firmly believe that, while contractors have a very useful role to play, it must be a confined role to avoid the confusion that you mentioned in your remarks, sir.

Senator WEBB. We’re seeing a continual blurring of the lines of an expansion of functions. We just voted out a bill in this committee that arguably would put civilian contractors under the Uniform Code of Military Justice if they are in an operational environment. There’s two strong concerns about that as it plays out in reality, if it were to play out in reality.

The first is how do you really do that? Having sat on a few court-martials in my life, how do you convene a court martial for a civilian with the sanctions that are in the Uniform Code of Military Justice? You can’t give them a bad conduct discharge. What are they accepting in that scenario?

The other thing is, what is the perception about these people who are wearing military uniforms, carrying arms, not really in the military, but they’re far enough into the military that they’re actually under the Uniform Code of Military Justice? This is a situation I don’t think we have ever been in before. Part of it’s driven by end strength concerns and that sort of thing. But it’s something that, particularly in your area of responsibility, I think bears very close watching.

I wish you the best and I’m happy to receive from all three of you any communications if you have concerns where you think we need to be taking a harder look at things.

Mr. VICKERS. Thank you, sir.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Webb.

We will have a second round.

Mr. D’Agostino, without overly simplifying your responsibilities, two major issues are the life extension program to ensure the reliability of the stockpile and consideration of a new RRW.

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. That’s right, sir.

Senator REED. Lurking in all those issues is this notion also of testing, to try to, if at all possible, definitely to avoid testing. So it raises the question, at least in my mind, if the life extension program can be maintained adequately and we can ensure the reliability of the existing weapons, what is the urgency for a RRW?
Mr. D’AGOSTINO. I think the urgency is a matter of urgency in being able to look into whether a RRW strategy is an appropriate strategy to proceed forward. What we’ve learned over the last few years, and particularly most recently in our life extension, which in a sense is a special type of a life extension—it’s a life extension that replaces components exactly the same way they were manufactured, in the exact same fashion they were manufactured 30, 40, 50 years ago, and designed 30, 40, 50 years ago.

What we’ve learned within the life extension program is this is very expensive. It’s very difficult to do technically because in many cases we’re bringing on manufacturing processes that have been dormant for over 2 decades. In many cases these are manufacturing processes, because we want to replicate them exactly the way they’ve been done in the past, that don’t have what I would call the respect for the environment and worker safety that we’ve learned over the last couple of decades in being able to build things in a much smaller, more modern way, with less impact.

So this has given us an opportunity to look at components, and essentially RRW is a life extension because it’s to replace a warhead that has the same form, fit, and function. It’s carried on the exact same delivery platform. The only difference is it is a different design and the design is going to emphasize safety, using an insensitive high explosive instead of conventional high explosives. It’s a design that will emphasize security. It will allow us to introduce high technology security into a warhead. Those are technologies that didn’t exist 20, 30, 40 years ago when these systems were designed and we are in a different security environment right now than we were 3 or 4 decades ago.

It’s going to allow us to introduce what we call performance margin, which is another way of saying increase the reliability of the components themselves to ensure that we don’t need to test that nuclear explosive package in the case of materials aging questions as they come up.

The stockpile stewardship program has given us an opportunity to study these, our existing Cold War stockpile, in a way that says, does it make sense to introduce more security into a warhead? I think the answer is yes. Does it make sense to add additional safety into a warhead? I think the answer is yes. So we take a look at that, and that’s why we would like to proceed forward, spend some money doing, not actually building a warhead in the next year or 2, but actually doing the cost, scope, and schedule studies necessary to determine whether it’s a good strategy or not.

Senator REED. With respect to testing, if you came to the conclusion that you could not produce this RRW without testing, your recommendation would be not to produce it?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. That would be my recommendation, sir. If confirmed, I would operate within a group called the Nuclear Weapons Council, and that’s how I’d like to move forward.

Senator REED. Thank you.

Admiral Olson, in your written testimony you said that the biggest challenges facing you would include management of Special Operations personnel and an unclear definition authority that makes it hard for SOCOM to plan and synchronize the war against terrorists. Can you elaborate on those two concerns?
Admiral Olson. Yes, sir. In terms of the authorities for management of the people, the Commander of SOCOM, in the language of title 10, is held responsible for the combat readiness of SOF, but he does not have full authority to manage how that force is promoted, how they are schooled, or how they are paid. So we have disparity across our force with the different Service components in terms of pay scales and promotion rates.

The language of the law says that the commander is responsible for monitoring the management of Special Operations personnel, but he has limited authority to actually execute management of personnel. So it would bear careful study and careful consideration and, if confirmed, I certainly would not want to replace the Service responsibilities with respect to personnel management, but I would seek a way by which the United States SOCOM could better influence the management of Special Operations personnel to achieve greater equity across the force.

In terms of the second point, the Commander of SOCOM is charged by the Secretary of Defense and by the President in the Unified Command Plan as the lead combatant commander for planning and synchronizing DOD activities in the global war on terror. We are in a process of coordinating closely with the Joint Staff, with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, with the other combatant commanders around the globe, on how actually to conduct the activities associated with those responsibilities.

This is a challenge, the solution for which resides within DOD. It is a new task, a new challenge for SOCOM, one that we are still growing into, but I don’t see any obstacles that we can’t overcome. It’s just a matter of taking the right actions in order to ensure that we are able to meet the expectations of the Secretary of Defense and the President.

Senator Reed. Thank you, Admiral.

Mr. Vickers, I sound like a broken record, but I am still highly skeptical of your newly expanded version of your job. I would presume that in this new version of the SO/LIC responsibilities you would have to coordinate with Air Force Space Command. Is that something you anticipate doing?

Mr. Vickers. As a component command of Strategic Command, yes, sir, much as with the Service Special Operations Commands. But the principal relationship would be with the Commander of Strategic Command.

Senator Reed. Again, I am skeptical because our assumption, at least my simple assumption, was your principal combatant commander that you talk to would be Admiral Olson and he’d be the one and only. I don’t want to wax poetic here, but you’re going to have a relationship now with Strategic Command. General Henry Obering, head of the National Missile Defense Agency, I assume you’ll now have to establish some type of working relationship there. Is that your view?

Mr. Vickers. Yes, sir, although the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Capabilities and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy are right now heavily engaged in missile defense negotiations and missile defense policy, and so I believe, if confirmed, I would have some relief in the missile defense area and my role would be more of a supporting one, because the missile de-
fense negotiations are very intense right now and, given the both letter and spirit of section 138 of title 10, one has to set priorities.

Senator Reed. I could go down a list of other major responsibilities you'll have. I see you putting yourself or volunteering to be put in perhaps an impossible situation where you can't serve all these different demands. To me, the clear intent of Congress was to make it clear that your principal—perhaps we should have said sole—responsibility would be for the Special Operations-Low-Intensity Conflict.

Mr. Vickers. If I may, Senator, since Congress established the ASD SO/LIC, various functions have moved in and out of there, some less demanding, some more demanding: Western hemisphere, regional policy toward South America, counternarcotics, detainees, humanitarian assistance, and de-mining. The difficulty of those has risen over time. Again, I think it somewhat depends on the qualifications and background of the nominee.

As I think Senator Warner pointed out, this reorganization is a work in progress. Future administrations may choose, as prior administrations have, to reorganize differently. But I think there are some synergies that can be had at a high level from having some oversight of other combatant commanders.

For example, SOCOM and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) now share responsibility for civil affairs and psychological operations oversight, SOCOM for overall proponency and support of SOF, JFCOM for the conventional forces. Both Strategic Command and SOCOM have large information operations missions. So I believe that some synergies can be achieved by working with both commanders, much as, if confirmed, my superiors in DOD do as well.

Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Vickers.

Senator Thune.

Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me express my appreciation to all of you gentlemen for your willingness to serve. We look forward to getting you through this process and confirmed. Admiral Olson, congratulations on being the first Navy officer to serve at SOCOM.

I do have a question regarding the global war on terror, which we all realize I think requires a different strategy for countering the enemy than what was required in previous wars, and SOCOM plays an integral role in that, and the need to attack political, economic, social causes in conjunction with the military effort that is ongoing. For that to happen, I think there has to be a close relationship between SOCOM and other government agencies that are essential for counterterrorism and to conduct ongoing operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other areas.

The global war on terror is not limited to the military and does require actions by other government agencies. I guess what I'd like to know is if you could discuss a little bit about how you might expand the effort to synchronize with other government agencies and departments with respect to fighting the war on terror.

Admiral Olson. Thank you, Senator Thune. That's a very good question. I think you've hit at the heart of something that's very important to ultimate success in Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States SOCOM does and will continue to coordinate very closely with other agencies of government. We understand that military
actions alone will not lead to success, that it needs to be a team effort. We are in the early stages of implementing what we have defined as an interagency partnership plan which will place over 100 liaison officers from SOCOM in other agencies, primarily in the Washington area.

At the same time, we wake up every day in our headquarters in Tampa with over 100 liaison officers from other agencies represented on our compound at every level, attending the morning meetings at a senior level and giving their personal and their organizations’ input in terms of advice to the commander on the way ahead.

So we do have access to other agencies’ ways of thinking. We have access to some of their databases. We have access to some of their plans and intent. All of this is very helpful in enabling SOCOM to perform its duties as the lead combatant command for planning and synchronizing the global war on terror.

Senator Thune. I’d like to ask Mr. Vickers to comment on that as well. You’re a former CIA officer and Green Beret. How would you expand interagency activities and synchronize efforts with other government agencies and departments, particularly CIA and State?

Mr. Vickers. Sir, I think the relationship between SOF’s and the CIA is a particularly important one for the global war on terror. It is certainly no accident since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, that the two organizations that have probably grown substantially, if not the most, as Admiral Olson has said, are the CIA and our SOF’s.

Both of course are having challenges managing that growth, but that growth is essential to a favorable outcome in this war. I believe there are things we can do to build that relationship further, to expand it to a larger portion of the SOF force than has been done before, and to synchronize our efforts better. We synchronize efforts from the national implementation plan of the National Counterterrorism Center, down through Admiral Olson as the lead combatant commander for the war on terror, and then down to our commanders in the field.

I believe we also need to make improvements at the sub-region level—where we have interagency joint task forces, for example, in the Horn of Africa, offering a model that can be built upon—and at the country-team level. Terrorism occurs globally, it occurs sub-regionally, and it occurs within countries, and we need to adapt our institutions to make that work.

In stability and reconstruction operations, we need to build capabilities in other parts of the Department, like the Department of State, and if confirmed I would work very hard on doing that as well, sir.

Senator Thune. I appreciate that and would encourage those efforts to continue. My impression, having been to Iraq several times and Afghanistan, is that one of the components that’s been missing, I think, in our overall efforts has been some of the “soft power” that we can bring. I even look at agricultural efforts. I come from an agricultural State and I look at the types of things that they could raise and grow in Afghanistan besides poppies and think that there is a real missed opportunity there.
In asking questions about what sort of involvement we have from our U.S. Department of Agriculture in Afghanistan, I was somewhat surprised that there wasn't more of an intensive effort being made to educate people there about the types of things that they could do for their economy and really create some economic opportunity for the agricultural sector outside of the things that they're growing today, which are a detriment, I think, to the things that they need as a country to move forward and things obviously we'd like to see accomplished there.

Mr. Vickers, I wanted to ask you a question about the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). CBO has recommended terminating the Airborne Laser (ABL) as a viable budget option. My question is do you support that recommendation and if not why do you believe that the ABL's continued development is important to our missile defense strategy and how will it enhance our capabilities?

Mr. Vickers. Sir, I do not support the CBO recommendation. I think, while the jury is still out on ABL, it is very important to progress through 2009, when we are scheduled to have our first lethal shot test. The ABL, which has been under development for some time, will provide an important boost phase intercept capability that currently we lack in our other portions of our layered missile defenses, and it will provide, assuming it's operationally effective, a magazine load of 40 shots, for approximately $10,000 a shot. By comparison, our lowest theater air defense rounds, the PAC–3, are about $5 million a shot. So it would be very effective potentially—providing speed of light response. As with most new weapons, once you develop them you find other uses for them that were not envisioned at the time. I think we ought to continue with research and development and go forward at least to 2009 so we can see just how well it works.

Senator Thune. I appreciate that.

Thank you all very much for your answers.

Mr. Chairman, thank you and I look forward to seeing that this process moves forward and we can get all these gentlemen confirmed. Thank you.

Senator Reed. Thank you, Senator Thune.

Senator Warner?

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to address this question jointly to Mr. Vickers and Admiral Olson. I draw to your attention a New York Times article this Monday, June 11, or at least it came into my possession today, written by John Burns out of Iraq, who's a very competent reporter. It's a marvel how he's lasted.

The title is “U.S. Arming Sunnis in Iraq to Battle Old al Qaeda Allies.” Now, given that the SOFs have had the primary mission of dealing with al Qaeda, I think it's important that we take a look at this thing. This is a very dramatic turn of events, at least in the judgment of this humble Senator, where we're going to now arm one side of this sectarian violence, i.e. Sunni, because there has been some progress made in the al Anbar Province, that the Sunnis are coming to the realization that they should be fighting al Qaeda as strongly as the coalition forces and principally the U.S. are fighting al Qaeda.
But as I’ve done my studies of this situation over now 5 years, I think some of these citizens of Iraq will turn on a dime and 1 day they’re your friend and the next day they’re your enemy. I don’t know the extent to which either of you looked at this, but I’m going to encourage you to do so and come back and provide for the record your own views on this policy.

To the best of my understanding, Mr. Chairman—I consulted with our senior staff—no one up here knew anything about this dramatic change of policy before it was published here in the press. It seems to me we ought to have some sort of a test case before we in a widespread manner begin to provide arms to certain segments of the Sunni population to purportedly fight al Qaeda.

I’m asking you to provide it for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]

Mr. VICKERS. Enlisting Sunni tribes in the fight against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) represents a major strategic success. Defeating AQI is a principal U.S. war aim, and the Sunni population and its tribal militias are the principal instruments through which the conflict must and will be fought. Enlisting former Sunni insurgents in the fight against AQI reduces, though by no means does it eliminate, risk to U.S. forces in the near-term, and it better positions the U.S. to secure its interests in Iraq over the longer-term. I support the limited policy of providing support to former Sunni insurgents in the fight against AQI. It would be preferable, in an ideal world, to not have armed militias, but not having them could result in much less effective operations against AQI in present-day Iraq. To be sure, providing support to former Sunni insurgents is not without risk. There is always the risk that former Sunni insurgents could use their weapons to attack U.S. forces, or they could provide weapons to AQI. I believe these risks are manageable, and that various measures—the provision of advisors and tracking of weapons—can be adopted to ensure compliance. I do not believe, moreover, that the policy of providing limited small arms support to Sunni tribal militias who join the fight against AQI will have a material adverse impact on the future stability of Iraq, or on strategic balances among sectarian groups in the event of a full-blown civil war in Iraq. Providing limited support to Sunni tribesmen and former Sunni insurgents can, however, tip the strategic balance against AQI, and secure the necessary cooperation of the Sunni population. Over time, it is imperative that Sunni militias be incorporated into legally constituted security forces.

Senator WARNER. I just wondered at this point in time to what extent either of you have had an opportunity to address this. First, Admiral Olson, from an operational standpoint, were you aware of this policy?

Admiral OLSON. No, sir, I was not aware of it as a stated policy.

Senator WARNER. Any consultation to your knowledge between the field commanders in Iraq and the SOCOM headquarters?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, not that I’m aware of.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Vickers?

Mr. VICKERS. Sir, I was not involved in the policy, but I would like to say that you’re absolutely correct that the turnaround with the Sunnis represents one of the most dramatic changes in Iraq in the last 12 months.

Senator WARNER. A positive one.

Mr. VICKERS. Absolutely, sir. As you may recall, last summer everyone was writing off al Anbar as lost. All the intelligence assessments reflected that.

Senator WARNER. If I could inject here, Senator Levin, now the chairman of the committee—I was then chairman—and I visited that province. When was it, August, September? We were told by the intelligence officers that things were very grim out there, and then suddenly a turnaround.
I think our field commanders, particularly the Marine Corps, are entitled to credit for that. But this is a very significant policy statement here. It looks as if it’s going to try to export the al Anbar model to other areas of Iraq.

It’s very hard for us here at home to fully appreciate the situation over there, even though we try to visit as often as we can. I have confidence in General Petraeus and his field commanders. But I see here a very dangerous situation, whereby if arms that we provide to certain segments of the Sunni population somehow slip through their hands and get into the hands of others and are then turned against our forces.

The American public is stressed. Talk about the military being stressed. The American public is stressed. To have their loved ones killed, wounded, or injured by the weapons coming out of the arsenals of America, filtering through the hands of certain elements of the Iraqi security forces or however they are transmitted to these Sunni groups, this is a problem. I think we better lay a very careful foundation, a thorough one, study it through, test it, and see what security situations that we can have.

I’ll admit, and I’m somewhat responsible myself, years ago when we were literally arming certain insurgent elements in Afghanistan, giving them these handheld ground-to-air missiles, and frankly we failed to put in a device by which it terminated the life of that instrument, such that they’re turning up in odd places of the world today still functioning as pieces of military equipment.

I’m not suggesting you can take a rifle and put in some mechanism to limit its life. Mr. Chairman, I have to tell you, I’m going to probe into this very deeply and try and make some further assessments.

Had you finished any response you wish to make, Mr. Vickers? I’ve asked you to provide it for the record and perhaps we better leave it at that point.

Do you have any further comment, Admiral? Is this a matter that you’re comfortable with? Your forces are on the point out there.

Admiral OLSON. Sir, with your permission I’ll respond for the record.

[The information referred to follows:]
Senator WARNER. All right. It’s a wise answer by both of the witnesses.

Back to the famous nuclear stockpile, to my good friend and former partner here. Since the cessation of full-scale nuclear weapons testing in 1992, the Stockpile Stewardship Program has been developed to give us confidence in the inventory. Yesterday during a very pleasant and informative visit we had together, I said at that very table we brought in all the lab directors at one time to assess the progress in this. Have you developed a high confidence in this system as being able to provide this country with the technical data it needs, one, to provide safety, and two, to test components for such future developments of nuclear weapons as this Nation may require?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir, I’m very comfortable with the system and with the Secretary we have now, who has a very strong technical background, he’s challenged us appropriately in ways and probed certain areas to make sure that we have in place the right way to look at the stockpile, particularly as we get well into our second decade of no nuclear weapons testing with our current stockpile.

Senator WARNER. I do not anticipate any change in the policy of nuclear testing. As a matter of fact, I think it’s important that we continue to lead as a Nation in terms of the nonproliferation efforts to strengthen that policy.

On the issue of attrition, Admiral Olson, while the U.S. Special Operations Command and its components are striving to recruit and certify additional operators through their qualification courses, are the SOF personnel of all ranks leaving the Service at rates that are troublesome to you or do you think it’s under control?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, thank you for asking the question about our experienced SOF operators, whom we value so highly. We do think it’s under control. Largely with the support of this body, we have offered retention incentives. They have had a very positive effect. We are retaining our people at a rate across the board above the Service average. They are choosing to stay with us.

Senator WARNER. That’s important. You’re above other Services’ average on retention now?

Admiral OLSON. That’s correct, sir.

Senator WARNER. I think that’s very reassuring.

Now, given the unusual nature of your operations, individuals that are posted abroad for short periods, perform missions, return, how does your rotation base at home versus overseas compare to what is being adopted by the greater Army?

Admiral OLSON. Sir, in general our rotation periods are shorter, overseas for a shorter period, back for a shorter period, maintaining about the same overall ratios as the Army and the Marine Corps. But because of specific skill sets that may deteriorate during overseas assignments, we need to get them back with a greater frequency in order to bring those back up.

So in general our force deploys for periods ranging from about 90 days at a time up to about 7 months at a time, with some staying as long as 12 months.

Senator WARNER. By the way, in our recent discussions, you promised to get me that framework of remarks by that extraor-
ordinary naval captain that is still in the system. I think he’s going to stay. What’s his name again?
Admiral OLSON. He’s Captain Pete Van Hooser, sir.
Senator WARNER. Yes. He’s overcome physical handicaps and other challenges to remain on the cutting edge of working with the organization. He’s going to remain with you for a period of time?
Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir.
Senator WARNER. That’s good. You’ll send me that speech that he gave on the occasion of the loss of those troops?
Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir.
Senator WARNER. I thank you very much. I wish you well. You have enormous responsibilities ahead of each of you.
Admiral OLSON. Thank you, sir.
Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator REED. Thank you, Senator Warner.
I have one additional question if I may, Mr. Vickers. The Principal Deputy to the Deputy Administrator of the NNSA is supposed to be an Active-Duty military officer, flag officer, assigned by DOD. This position has been vacant for more than 2 years. If you are confirmed will you look into why this position remains vacant?
Mr. VICKERS. I will, sir.
Senator REED. Thank you very much.
Senator Warner.
Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, we thank you for very capable services stepping in for Senator Levin this morning, who had duties that precluded him from attending. I shall report back favorably.
Senator REED. Thank you. I’ll be mentioned in dispatches.
Gentlemen, thank you very much, not only for your testimony this morning, but for your dedication and service to the Nation over careers of great distinction. Thank your families for us as well.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:03 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Michael G. Vickers by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follows:]

**QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES**

**DEFENSE REFORMS**

**Question.** The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders (COCOMs), and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the COCOMs.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?
If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?
**Answer.** Goldwater-Nichols has been a major success. I see no reason to modify it at this time.

**RELATIONSHIPS**

**Question.** If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:
The Secretary of Defense.
**Answer.** If confirmed, I will perform my duties under the direction and control of the Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I will
do my best to keep the Secretary well informed and will seek his guidance and direction and provide him with recommendations on policy matters within my purview.

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I anticipate working very closely with the Deputy Secretary on warfighting capabilities development and force transformation, among other matters. I will ensure that the Deputy Secretary has all the information he needs regarding my responsibilities to perform these duties.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
Answer. If confirmed, I will report to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and seek his guidance and direction on matters pertaining to special operations, stability operations, force transformation and resources, and strategic capabilities. I plan to provide him with regular advice and recommendations on such matters.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)).
Answer. Special Operations and intelligence demand extensive mutual support; therefore, if confirmed, I intend to foster a very close relationship with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. I also intend to work closely with USD(I) on strengthening our intelligence capabilities, including space and information operations capabilities.

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia-Pacific Security Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs (ASD(GSA)).
Answer. If confirmed, I expect to maintain a close working relationship with the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I anticipate working very closely with the three assistant secretaries who exercise regional oversight of defense policy by providing them, along with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary, with special operations and stability operations advice pertaining to ongoing operations and operations in the planning stage. I anticipate working very closely with the ASD(GSA) on several areas within ASD(GSA)'s portfolio, including force employment policy (e.g. security cooperation and contingency planning), partnership strategy, counterproliferation, and counternarcotics.

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. Successful policy oversight of special operations requires close coordination and collaboration with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I plan to maintain a close working relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on special operations capabilities, strategic capabilities, conventional capabilities, force transformation, and resource guidance.

Question. The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs.
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Service Secretaries and Chiefs to ensure that the requirements to organize, train, and equip Special Operations Forces (SOFs) are met. In addition, I will work closely with the Service Secretaries and Chiefs to ensure appropriate policy oversight of their capabilities development.

Question. Commander, United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM).
Answer. The relationship between the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander of U.S. SOCOM is critical. Therefore, I anticipate fostering and maintaining a close relationship with the Commander, characterized by mutual support, frequent contact, and dynamic exchanges of information and ideas in order to carry out the SO/LIC mission.

Question. Commander, United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM).
Answer. If confirmed, I will have responsibility for policy oversight of U.S. STRATCOM, and I plan to forge a strong relationship with the commander to ensure that we develop the strategic capabilities (e.g., missile defense, nuclear and conventional, global strike, information operations, and space capabilities) to meet a broad spectrum of emerging challenges.

Question. Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).
Answer. If confirmed, I anticipate a close working relationship with the Commander, JFCOM. Since JFCOM is the lead agent for force transformation and modernization, I will forge a strong relationship with the command to develop the future force.

Question. Commander, United States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM).
Answer. U.S. TRANSCOM is a key functional command that provides global deployment and sustainability for U.S. forces. If confirmed, I will maintain a close working relationship with Commander, U.S. TRANSCOM, to ensure that we maintain the most effective global deployment and distribution capabilities.

Question. The regional COCOMs.
Answer. The regional COCOMs are at the forefront of the war on terrorism and are responsible for maintaining a forward posture to deter and dissuade adversaries and assure our allies. If confirmed, I will work closely with the regional COCOMs to provide policy oversight for the operational employment of capabilities within the portfolio of ASD(SO/LIC). I will also ensure that the views of the regional COCOMs are taken into account with respect to capabilities requirements.


Answer. SOF activities are central to counterterrorism; these activities are being coordinated within the larger U.S. Government counterterrorism effort through the NCTC's National Implementation Plan (NIP). If confirmed, I will maintain ASD(SO/LIC)'s role as the primary OSD interface on SOF and counterterrorism matters with the NIP, continuing to coordinate and monitor OSD, Joint Staff, and combatant command entities whose capabilities support the NIP. SO/LIC also will continue to represent DOD in the interagency on relevant matters, including participation in the Counterterrorism Support Group (CSG) and other interagency processes.

Question. Central Intelligence Agency.

Answer. A close relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and SOF is essential to counterterrorism and to conduct ongoing operations in Afghanistan, and other areas. If confirmed, I anticipate working very closely with Director, CIA, and his key subordinates. I will seek Memoranda of Agreements and Understanding with the CIA to facilitate the effective employment of SOF and other capabilities within the ASD(SO/LIC) portfolio.

Question. U.S Department of State (DOS).

Answer. The DOS is a key partner in counterterrorism and stability and reconstruction operations. If confirmed, I will work with DOS to develop effective strategies, policies, and capabilities to conduct these types of operations. I will seek Memoranda of Agreements and Understanding with the Department of State to ensure the effective employment of SOF and other capabilities within the ASD(SO/LIC) portfolio. I will use DOD resources, as required and authorized, to assist the Department of State in developing its capabilities for stability and reconstruction operations. If confirmed, I anticipate working very closely with the Counselor to the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs on these matters.

Question. The commanders of the Service SOCOMs.

Answer. If confirmed, I expect to work closely with the commanders of the Service Special Operations component commands to ensure that they develop and provide the capabilities that the Commander, U.S. SOCOM, and the regional COCOMs require.

QUALIFICATIONS

Answer. For nearly all of the 34 years that have transpired since I enlisted in the Special Forces, I have devoted my professional life to the policy, strategy, operational, and resource aspects of the duties assigned to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (SO/LIC). My 13 years of experience as a direct Special Forces (SF) enlisted (1970s version of the 18X program), SF noncommissioned officer, SF commissioned officer and commander of SOF operational units, and Operations Officer with the CIA provided me with extensive operational experience across SOF mission areas and across a wide range of geographical and operational environments, in clandestine intelligence operations and covert action, in interagency policy formulation and execution at the U.S. mission, combatant command, subcombatant command, sub-cabinet, cabinet, and presidential levels, in congressional oversight of very sensitive and compartmented U.S. Government programs, and interaction with senior allied and partner foreign government officials. I have had significant operational experience across a wide range of irregular warfare disciplines, encompassing counterterrorism, unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense/counterinsurgency, and have served on both the “Black” and “White” sides of SOF. As a CIA officer, I played a key role in the Grenada rescue operation, for which I received a CIA award for valor. In the aftermath of the Beirut bombings in 1983, I was a core member of a CIA operational task force focused on identifying and retaliating against the perpetrators of the attacks. During the mid-1980s, I was the principal strategist for the largest and most successful covert action program in the CIA’s history: the successful effort to drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan, which contributed significantly to ending the Cold War and facilitating the collapse of the Soviet empire. Since the early 1990s, I have advised DOD on force transformation, and have written about and worked extensively on the Revolution in Military Af-
fairs, space warfare, information warfare, and the transformation of strategic warfare. I have been an advisor to the senior leadership of DOD on the global war on terrorism since September 12, 2001. I played a central, substantive role during the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) advising the senior leadership of DOD on the imperative of and strategies for rebalancing the warfighting capabilities of the Department for the challenges of the 21st century. With General Wayne Downing (USA, Retired) and Major General Bill Garrison (USA, Retired), I provided the Secretary of Defense with a comprehensive assessment of SOFs and their way forward. I have advised President Bush and his war cabinet on strategy in Iraq. I have received substantial graduate education in both management and in strategic studies. I have provided extensive testimony to Congress on the global war on terrorism, the Revolution in Military Affairs and force transformation. If confirmed, I believe this combined experience qualifies me to assume the duties of ASD(SO/LIC).

**DUTIES**

*Question.* Section 138(b) (4) of title 10, U.S.C., describes the duties and roles of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)).

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the ASD(SO/LIC)?

*Answer.* The ASD(SO/LIC) is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low-intensity conflict matters. After the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, the ASD(SO/LIC) is the principal special operations and low-intensity conflict official within the senior management of DOD. The ASD(SO/LIC) has as his principal duty overall supervision (to include oversight of policy and resources) of special operations and low-intensity conflict activities. These core tasks, according to U.S. SOCOM’s 2007 Posture Statement, include counterterrorism; unconventional warfare; direct action; special reconnaissance; foreign internal defense; civil affairs, information and psychological operations; and counterproliferation of WMD. Section 167 of title 10, U.S.C., provides a very similar but not identical list of SOF activities.

*Question.* Assuming you are confirmed, what changes, if any, in the duties and functions of ASD(SO/LIC) do you expect that the Secretary of Defense would prescribe for you?

*Answer.* The Secretary of Defense has reorganized his policy office. Pursuant to the reorganization, the ASD(SO/LIC) will become the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities (ASD(SO/LIC&IC)) will have, in addition to policy oversight for special operations and stability operations capabilities, policy oversight for strategic capabilities and force transformation and resources. As such, ASD(SO/LIC&IC), after the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, will be the principal official charged with oversight over all warfighting capabilities within the senior management of DOD.

*Question.* What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

*Answer.* As described above, given my experience in force transformation and strategic capabilities, in addition to my experience in SOF and irregular warfare, I believe that, if confirmed, I am qualified to assume the duties of ASD(SO/LIC&IC).

*Question.* In your view, are the duties set forth in section 138(b)(4) of title 10, U.S.C., up-to-date, or should changes be considered?

*Answer.* None at this time.

*Question.* What DOD activities are currently encompassed by the Department’s definition of special operations and low-intensity conflict?

*Answer.* Special operations and low-intensity conflict activities, as defined in title 10, U.S.C., section 167, include direct action, strategic reconnaissance, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, psychological operations, counterterrorism, humanitarian assistance, theater search and rescue, and such other activities as may be specified by the President or Secretary of Defense. U.S. SOCOM’s nine core tasks, as noted in Question 4, are similar but not identical.

*Question.* If confirmed, would you exercise overall supervision of all special operations and low-intensity conflict activities of DOD?

*Answer.* Yes.
Answer. I am not aware of other Assistant Secretaries who exercise supervision over special operations and low-intensity conflict activities. I believe Title 10 U.S.C., section 138(b)(4) is clear on this point. If an activity pertains to special operations and low-intensity conflict, then ASD(SO/LIC&IC) supervises and provides policy and oversight, and is the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on these matters. After the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) is the principal special operations and low-intensity conflict official within DOD. I recognize, however, that, if confirmed, I would need to work closely on special operations and low-intensity conflict matters with the regional and other functional ASDs in the OSD.

**SO/LIC ORGANIZATION**

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you fulfill your responsibilities related to combating terrorism?

**Answer.** SOFs are central to combating terrorism. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that SOF have clear policy guidance and sufficient capabilities and resources to carry out such missions. If confirmed, I also will work within DOD, with other government agencies, and in the interagency process to ensure that we have the most effective policies, strategies, capabilities, and operations for combating terrorism.

**Question.** How would you coordinate these responsibilities with the ASD for Homeland Defense, who has responsibilities for combating terrorism in the United States?

**Answer.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, as stipulated in section 902 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, will exercise principal responsibility for the overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning and execution, and allocation of resources for the Department's combating terrorism activities. If confirmed as the ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I will maintain oversight with regard to DOD's global combating terrorism activities and coordinate closely with the ASD(HD) on matters related to combating terrorism within the United States and the Western Hemisphere.

**Question.** How would you coordinate these responsibilities with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will report to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you fulfill your responsibilities related to peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance?

**Answer.** As a result of the policy reorganization, the responsibility for overseeing peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance now falls under the ASD for Government Security Affairs (GSA). The ASD(SO/LIC&IC)’s role is to ensure that U.S. forces have the capabilities they need to participate in these types of activities and to oversee Special Operation Forces and interdependent capabilities when they participate in such activities.

**POLICY OFFICE REORGANIZATION**

**Question.** The office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy is currently being reorganized. We understand that the proposed reorganization would place the following responsibilities under the ASD(SO/LIC) in addition to responsibility for Special Operations, combating terrorism, and stability operations: strategic capabilities, and forces transformation and resources. If confirmed, would these additional duties fall under your office?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** What do you believe would be the impact of placing such a broad span of issues under the ASD(SO/LIC)? Specifically, do you believe the ASD(SO/LIC) would be able to work within the letter and spirit of section 138(b)(4) of title 10, which states that oversight of Special Operations should be the ASD’s “principal duty”?

**Answer.** I believe that, if confirmed, I am qualified to assume the duties that would be assigned to me as ASD(SO/LIC&IC). I have significant experience in each of the areas for which I would have policy oversight, as well as significant experience in capability transformation and integration. I believe that the duties assigned to ASD(SO/LIC&IC) constitute a manageable span of control which is similar to that assigned to other ASDs. I will be assisted by a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, four DASDs and a substantial staff of directors and action officers. In previous assignments of similar scope and responsibility, I was able to accomplish the duties assigned to me with far fewer staff resources. In some key areas that fall within the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) portfolio, moreover, I will be assisted in policy over-
sight by other senior policy officials who have vast experience and expertise in these areas. The Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) (USD(P)), for example, is currently heavily engaged in missile defense negotiations, and I would expect him to continue to take a primary role in this issue area. The USD(P) has a much larger span of control than the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) and the USD(P), to my knowledge, is considered to have a manageable span of control. In addition to having oversight for all of the areas envisioned as falling under ASD(SO/LIC&IC), the USD(P) has oversight of global security affairs, homeland defense, and regional and global defense strategy and policy.

I believe that my recent experience in the 2006 QDR demonstrates convincingly that I am capable, if confirmed, of assuming the duties of ASD(SO/LIC&IC), and that the span of issues assigned to ASD(SO/LIC&IC) is not too broad. As a senior advisor to OSD for the 2006 QDR, I consulted intensively the development of new strategies and in facilitating decisions by the senior leadership of the Department to develop new capabilities and capacities in all of the areas that would be placed under ASD(SO/LIC&IC). In addition to serving as a senior advisor to the main QDR process, I was also asked to serve as Executive Director for an external QDR “Red Team” that reported directly to the Deputy Secretary. The membership of the Red Team included six retired four-star officers who collectively represented all of the Services, two regional combatant commands, SOCOM, and the Intelligence Community. Nearly all of the Red Team’s recommendations were subsequently adopted by the main QDR process and the senior leadership of the Department. I also was a core member of the team that developed the Downing Report for the Secretary of Defense, which assessed SOF policies, processes, organization, and capabilities. As was the case with the QDR Red Team report, nearly all of the recommendations of the Downing Report were subsequently adopted by the main QDR process and the senior leadership of the Department.

I believe that the duties assigned to ASD(SO/LIC&IC) pursuant to the reorganization of USD(P) will provide the Secretary of Defense with substantially improved oversight of the Department’s current and future warfighting capabilities, and that special operations and stability operations capabilities will be substantially strengthened by having a single senior defense official with oversight over all of the Department’s warfighting capabilities. SOF capabilities and capacities were substantially increased as a result of the QDR, which, as described above, provided a “proof of principle” for how an ASD(SO/LIC&IC) could function within the Department. Placing policy oversight for ground general purpose capabilities for irregular warfare and conventional campaigns under one senior policy official will, in my judgment, substantially improve the oversight of OSD. A single source of policy oversight of U.S. STRATCOM and U.S. SOCOM will enable more effective collaboration and coordination of strategic capabilities, specifically information operations and prompt conventional strike, that are critical to prosecuting the global war on terrorism.

If confirmed, I believe strongly that I will be able to work within the letter and spirit of section 138(b)(4) of title 10, U.S.C., and that oversight of special operations will remain the “principal duty” of ASD(SO/LIC&IC). I will remain a member of U.S. SOCOM’s board of directors, retain oversight of Major Force Program 11, and ensure that there is no dilution of focus on Special Operations—on my part, as well as within the organization which, if confirmed as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I would lead.

Question. If confirmed, under this new organization, how would you fulfill your responsibilities related to strategic capabilities? What would be the major challenges in this area, and, if confirmed, how would you address them?

Answer. If confirmed, I will assume oversight and management of issues related to strategic capabilities through oversight of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Capabilities. There are a number of challenges that fall within this portfolio. One is to ensure that the United States, its allies and friends, and its deployed forces are protected from attack by ballistic missiles, especially those that might carry weapons of mass destruction. Another is to protect U.S. interests in the global commons of space and cyberspace, particularly our freedom of action in these realms which are so critical to U.S. security. A third challenge is to continue to address U.S. deterrence needs for the 21st century, developing and implementing a sustainable strategy to ensure that U.S. forces, including nuclear forces and conventional global strike capabilities, meet the increased range of challenges we face due to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress and our allies to address these issues.

Question. If confirmed, under this new organization, how would you fulfill your responsibilities related to forces transformation and resources? What would be the major challenges in this area, and, if confirmed, how would you address them?
Answer. The major challenge in the forces transformation and resources area will be to facilitate the transformation of conventional capabilities, as directed by the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. This will require, over time, significant rebalancing of the conventional capabilities portfolio, including both substantial investment in new capabilities and capacities as well as divestment of capabilities and capacities whose strategic effectiveness is in decline. If confirmed, I anticipate being the Department's principal policy official for forces transformation and resources, and I would work closely with Congress to address the major challenges in this area.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the ASD(SO/LIC)?

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

What do you anticipate will be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of the ASD(SO/LIC)?

If confirmed, what management action and timelines would you establish to address these problems?

Answer. The overarching challenge that will confront the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) will be to implement the direction provided in the 2006 QDR across all of the Department's warfighting capabilities while providing policy oversight over their employment. Rebalancing the overall Defense portfolio over time will require significant reallocation of defense resources. There are challenges specific to each issue area. Growing SOF, as prescribed in the 2006 QDR, while maintaining quality standards, will pose a significant challenge. Securing the necessary authorities from the Department of State and the CIA to facilitate the effective global employment of SOF will pose a second challenge. Rebalancing ground general purpose force capabilities toward irregular warfare while maintaining their capability to conduct conventional campaigns is a third challenge. The tension between the need to recapitalize current capabilities while transforming and expanding the force to meet future threats will pose another major challenge. Providing policy oversight for ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, coupled with the omnipresent potential for strategic surprise in other areas, will pose a major challenge for senior policy officials. I do not know at this time, which, if any of these or other major challenges will pose the most serious problem for ASD(SO/LIC&IC). If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress to develop action plans that address these major challenges and any serious problems that emerge.

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the ASD(SO/LIC)?

Answer. If confirmed, my top priorities will be to implement the direction provided in the 2006 QDR across the Department’s warfighting capabilities, and to provide policy oversight of Special Operations, conventional, and strategic forces. I would seek to develop the capabilities that will be needed to win the global war on terrorism, shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, such as China, in ways favorable to U.S. interests, and deal with the challenges of a more proliferated world in which both more States, as well as non-State actors, have access to weapons of mass destruction. I strongly believe that while the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) must address key capability requirements in each of area assigned to him, it is imperative that the ASD place all his attention on his top priorities.

If confirmed as ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I would likely have two overarching priorities, and two to three top priorities in each capability area. By area, my priorities will likely be to:

Overarching Priorities:

- Ensure that the warfighting capabilities under my oversight are used in the most effective way possible to achieve favorable outcomes in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the broader global war on terrorism, and ensuring that all relevant capabilities are brought to bear to eliminate al Qaeda sanctuaries in Western Pakistan and other areas.
- Build a high morale, strategically effective organization in ASD(SO/LIC&IC) that is able to serve as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all DOD warfighting capabilities.
SOF Priorities:

- Ensure that the Department develops and expands SOF capabilities, capacities, and posture without diluting quality standards, to create a Global Counterterrorism Network capable of winning the global war on terrorism that could principally be waged in countries with which the United States is not at war. Doing this will require bringing SOF capabilities and operations into much closer strategic and operational alignment with other government agencies.
- Ensure that the Department develops the capabilities to locate, tag and track terrorists and other threats to U.S. interests and that future SOF have the capability to clandestinely infiltrate into, conduct operations within and exfiltrate from denied areas.
- Achieve an appropriate balance—in strategy, resources, and senior leader development—between indirect and direct approaches to irregular warfare.

Ground General Purpose Force Irregular Warfare and Stability Operations Priorities:

- Ensure that ground general purpose forces develop the required capabilities for steady-state and surge irregular warfare operations while maintaining their capabilities for conventional campaigns.
- Assist the Department of State and other government agencies and departments to develop stability operations capabilities that will enable a more effective whole-of-government approach to stability and reconstruction operations.

Strategic Capabilities Priorities:

- Ensure that the Department has space and information operations policy and capabilities to meet current and future challenges.
- Ensure that the Department has a prompt global strike capability to deal with the sudden emergence of extremely time-sensitive, high-value targets.
- Support ongoing efforts to develop an effective missile defense system and ensure that the Department develops a robust nuclear deterrent capability to meet emerging challenges.

Conventional Capabilities and Transformation Priorities:

- Redefine force transformation to bring it into much closer alignment with anticipated future challenges and defense strategy, and ensure that the Department develops the capabilities to conduct operations in a highly proliferated world.
- Ensure that sufficient resources are provided to enable the Department to field the next generation long-range strike system by 2018, that the potential for unmanned systems is fully exploited across the Department’s warfighting capabilities.
- Ensure that the Department develops the undersea warfare capabilities necessary to shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and hedge against the emergence of a potential near-peer competitor.

AFGHANISTAN

Question. About 5 years after securing a military victory against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, U.S. and international forces are still fighting Taliban forces and other opponents of the Afghan government.

What is your assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan? What are the weaknesses and shortcomings in the current effort to combat terrorism and insurgency in Afghanistan?

Answer. I am cautiously optimistic about the current situation in Afghanistan. The Taliban regime has been removed from power; al Qaeda no longer enjoys a safe haven in Afghanistan to plan and launch attacks against the United States; and Afghanistan is a democratic state. The Afghan government, with the support of the international community, is extending its reach throughout the country; the Afghan economy is growing; and more Afghans than ever before enjoy the benefits of education and health care.

Nonetheless, challenges remain. We face tenacious enemies in the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other extremist groups. The United States, under Operation Enduring Freedom, leads the international counterterrorism effort in Afghanistan. The NATO International Security Assistance Force’s mandate covers security and stability. We work closely with other U.S. agencies and with our Allies and partners to execute a counterinsurgency approach that combines military operations with other critical elements such as development, capacity-building, diplomacy, and communications. The lead for counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is the Afghan government. As such,
the most important defense-related effort in Afghanistan is the mission to train and equip the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which includes both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). The ANA appears to be taking increasing responsibility for planning and executing operations. Our focus now is to bring the ANP to the same level.

If I am confirmed, I would be pleased to discuss our efforts in this area, including our weaknesses and shortcomings, in greater detail in a closed hearing.

Question. If confirmed, what initiatives would you take to improve the military effort to combat terrorism in Afghanistan?

Answer. I believe that military counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan, led by the U.S., are succeeding. Of course, there is always room for improvement, and I would be pleased, if confirmed, to discuss such matters in greater detail in closed session.

What is crucial now is that we build on our successes. For example, the recent capture or death of senior Taliban and al Qaeda commanders, especially Dadullah Lang, is a significant blow against the enemy.

In addition to maintaining pressure on these groups and individuals, it is critical that we work with Pakistan and Afghanistan to expand cooperation and strengthen existing mechanisms for intelligence-sharing, military-to-military dialogue, and political discourse, and support Pakistan’s efforts to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries in West Pakistan.

Question. In your view, what is the appropriate role of SOFs in Afghanistan, and the proper relationship between direct action and counterinsurgency operations there? SOFs direct action and counterterrorism play key roles in Afghanistan, but they are only one part of our overall effort.

We work closely with other government agencies and with our allies and partners to help the Afghan government execute a comprehensive counterinsurgency approach that combines military operations with other critical elements such as development, capacity-building, good governance, and communications.

TRANSFORMATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. Much attention has been focused on the transformation of our conventional Armed Forces to make them more capable of conducting counterinsurgency and combating terrorism missions.

Do you believe that our SOFs need to be transformed?

Answer. Yes. We are in a long irregular war that requires U.S. Armed Forces to increasingly adopt indirect, unconventional, and clandestine approaches. To that end, I strongly support the 2006 QDR recommendation to increase SOF capabilities and capacities to perform more demanding and specialized tasks to defeat terrorists and other irregular challenges, while providing substantially increased global presence. Increasing SOF capabilities and capacities also broadens and deepens available U.S. strategic options for dealing with hostile states. I believe that the 2006 QDR provides an appropriate vision and strategy for the transformation of SOF.

Question. If so, what is your vision for such a transformation, and how would the transformation of conventional forces complement a SOF transformation, and vice versa?

Answer. Expanding the capability and capacity of SOF to take on the more demanding and specialized tasks will require the ability to:

- Conduct long-duration, indirect, and clandestine operations in politically sensitive environments and denied areas;
- Locate, tag, and track dangerous individuals and other high-value targets globally; and
- Detect, locate, and render safe WMD.

As the 2006 QDR recommended, we need to increase both SOF and conventional force capability and capacity to conduct and sustain long-duration irregular operations.

- For surge scenarios, the conventional force should become as proficient in counterinsurgency and stabilization operations as it is in high-intensity combat.
- For steady-state operations, the conventional force should possess the ability to train, mentor, and advise foreign security forces.

Additionally, expanding the capability and capacity of conventional forces through exploitation of the Revolution in Military Affairs, will, as demonstrated in Operation Enduring Freedom, substantially increase the effectiveness of unconventional warfare and special operations.

My vision for transforming SOFs, conventional forces and strategic forces is resident in the priorities (outlined in the answer to 24, above) I would likely have, if
confirmed, as ASD(SO/LIC&IC). My vision is very closely aligned with the transformation vision outlined in the 2006 QDR. My vision is described more fully in my recent testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on SOF and the global war on terror, in several publications and reports I have authored or co-authored while with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and in numerous public speeches I have given on the topic. I have provided the committee with several samples of each, and would be pleased to discuss my vision in greater depth at the committee’s request.

Question. Specifically, what do you believe transformation should mean for the special operations community in terms of missions, training, equipment, or in any other aspect?

Answer. SOF transformation should be focused on the capabilities, capacities and posture required to win the global war on terrorism, and on the capabilities and capacities required to conduct unconventional warfighting and SOF-intensive operations against hostile states, including those who possess advanced anti-access capabilities. With respect to the global war on terror, SOF transformation should result in capabilities and capacities to plan and synchronize the global war on terror and conduct persistent, low visibility indirect and clandestine operations in scores of countries (with which the United States is not at war) simultaneously. SOF transformation for the global war on terror should substantially improve SOF’s ability to operate in denied areas, to locate, tag and track terrorists and other high-value targets and threats, and to render safe multiple nuclear weapons simultaneously. SOF transformation for operations against hostile states should focus on the capabilities required to penetrate and operate in denied areas, and to exploit the full potential of the Revolution in Military Affairs. The development of SOF and global war on terror strategists and senior leaders should also be a top transformation priority. Additional details on SOF transformation are contained in my testimony on SOF and the global war on terror before the House Armed Services Committee.

Over the past 3 decades, as strategic circumstances have changed, SOF has been required to take on new missions, such as counterterrorism, information operations, and counterproliferation of WMD. The only changes in missions currently envisioned that would result from SOF and general purpose force transformation would be to divest certain areas to the GPF, freeing up SOF to do more of the unique missions for which they are specially trained, organized and equipped (e.g., UW, CT). The ongoing transformation of both the strategic environment and SOF capabilities, however, will undoubtedly require SOF to take on new, as of yet unforeseen, missions in the future. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing this discussion with the committee.

Question. Are the SOCOM and DOD investing in the technologies to transform SOF according to the vision you describe?

Answer. Yes. U.S. SOCOM and the Department are investing in key technologies to transform SOF. U.S. SOCOM has a strong technology development program designed to deliver key capabilities to the SOF warrior in the shortest time possible. In addition, the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) is responsible for managing and providing technical oversight of the Combating Terrorism Technology Support program. This program supports many organizations, including U.S. SOCOM, to conduct rapid prototyping for combating terrorism technologies. For the longer term, a new Capabilities Based Assessment for Irregular Warfare is underway in the Department which will help identify key capability gaps in irregular warfare. Identifying these gaps will help the Department focus technology development in new areas to the greatest benefit. Over time, however, substantial additional resources will almost certainly be needed if U.S. SOCOM is to fully realize my vision for transforming SOF.

Question. What, if any, special role can SOCOM’s development and acquisition capability play in Service and DOD efforts?

Answer. U.S. SOCOM has its own development and acquisition program for SOF-unique capabilities. The command also participates in Service-common development and acquisition. For these Service-common development and acquisition programs, U.S. SOCOM has a special role including its unique capability needs in larger service programs. U.S. SOCOM frequently takes a service common item and modifies it for SOF-specific needs, which results in significant savings. This acquisition operating practice, however, may become more problematic in the future if, as anticipated, the platform needs of SOF and the general purpose forces diverge significantly. For example, maintaining a long-range clandestine air mobility capability for SOF after the Combat Talon and other non-stealthy aircraft are no longer capable of penetrating into denied airspace is a looming challenge that may require additional resources to U.S. SOCOM. Ensuring that U.S. SOCOM requirements are met by Service and Department acquisition programs or by the provision of sufficient resources and program management capabilities to develop SOF-unique platforms is
a core responsibility of ASD(SO/LIC&IC). Conversely, as general purpose forces become more involved in irregular warfare, capabilities that were once SOF-unique could become increasingly available to general purpose forces.

CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

**Question.** The 1986 Special Operations legislation assigned extraordinary authority to the Commander, U.S. SOCOM, to conduct some of the functions of both a military service and a unified combat command.

Which civilian officials in the DOD exercise civilian oversight of the “service-like” authorities of the Commander, U.S. SOCOM?

**Answer.** Per title 10, U.S.C. and DOD Directive 5111.10 (in accordance with USD (P) priorities and guidance), the ASD SO/LIC&IC is the principal civilian oversight for all SOF matters. Other DOD civilian officials also exercise oversight in some capacity.

- USD (AT&L) coordinates on acquisition issues
- USD (P&R) coordinates on personnel policies such as SOF unique incentive packages
- USD (Comptroller) coordinates on SOF budget and year of execution program issues
- Service Secretaries coordinate on SOF manpower issues
- Director, PA&E, coordinates on SOF Program development and issues.

**Question.** In your view, what organizational relationship should exist between the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander, U.S. SOCOM? ASD(SO/LIC) provides civilian oversight of all special operations matters as required by title 10, U.S.C. As such, ASD(SO/LIC) provides civilian oversight of all special operations matters as required by title 10, U.S.C. As such, ASD(SO/LIC) provides policy and resource guidance and advice to implement Secretary of Defense and USD(P) priorities. ASD(SO/LIC) is a voting member of U.S. SOCOM’s Board of Directors for Program guidance and decisions. The relationship with Commander, U.S. SOCOM should be collaborative and cooperative to ensure that we develop the best possible forces and employ them effectively.

**Question.** What should be the role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in preparation and review of Major Force Program 11 and the Command’s Program Objective Memorandum?

**Answer.** The ASD(SO/LIC) provides policy oversight of the preparation and justification of the SOFs’ program and budget. The ASD co-chairs the U.S. SOCOM Board of Directors—the U.S. SOCOM resource decision forum. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Commander, U.S. SOCOM, to ensure that U.S. SOCOM funding sustains a ready, capable force, to meet this new era's challenges.

**Question.** What is the appropriate role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in the research and development and procurement functions of the SOCOM? The appropriate role of ASD(SO/LIC) is to provide policy oversight in resolving special operations acquisition issues. As the lead OSD official for SOF acquisition matters, ASD(SO/LIC) represents SOF acquisition interests within DOD and before Congress. The responsibilities and relationships between ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander, U.S. SOCOM are defined and described in a Memorandum of Agreement between the ASD and Commander, U.S. SOCOM. The ASD directs and provides policy oversight to technology development programs that address priority mission areas to meet other departmental, interagency, and international capability needs (e.g. the Technical Support Working Group).

**Question.** What is the appropriate role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in the operational planning of missions that involve SOFs, whether the supported command is SOCOM or a geographic command?

**Answer.** ASD(SO/LIC) serves as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all aspects of employment, deployment, and oversight of Special Operations and counterterrorism capabilities. SO/LIC provides policy oversight of the mission planning for U.S. SOCOM and geographic Combatant Commanders in the employment of SOF to ensure compliance with public law and DOD priorities. ASD(SO/LIC) coordinates deployment authorities and plans involving SOF within DOD and with interagency partners as required.

EXPANDED ROLES OF UNITED STATES SOCOM

**Question.** U.S. SOCOM has additional, expanded responsibilities in the global war on terrorism, as a supported COCOM, in addition to its more traditional role as a supporting COCOM.

What role should ASD(SO/LIC) play in the oversight and planning of such missions?

**Answer.** U.S. SOCOM should continue to exercise responsibility as the lead planner and synchronizer for the global war on terrorism. As U.S. SOCOM develops campaign plans in coordination with geographic COCOMs and Combat Support...
Agencies, the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) should maintain oversight of such planning and should develop concepts and initiatives for the employment of SOF and coordinate or obtain the authorities required within DOD, in the interagency and by Congress. ASD(SO/LIC&IC) is responsible for ensuring that the requisite policies, authorities, capabilities and resources are sufficient for execution of the plans and operations for which U.S. SOCOM is responsible. ASD(SO/LIC&IC) should also ensure that an appropriate balance in achieved between indirect and direct approaches and capabilities in U.S. SOCOM plans, operations, command structure and resource allocation decisions.

Question. In your view, what types of missions should SOCOM conduct as a supported combatant command?

Answer. U.S. SOCOM’s role should be, in accordance with the Unified Command Plan, the supported commander for planning and synchronization of the global war on terror. Actual mission execution in most instances would still be accomplished by Geographic Combatant Commanders, or, more precisely, in accordance with title 10, U.S.C., section 167: a special operations activity or mission shall be conducted under the command of the commander of the unified combatant command in whose geographic area the activity or mission is to be conducted.

Only in rare instances, involving highly sensitive targets or significant political considerations, would Commander U.S. SOCOM execute a mission; specifically, he shall exercise command of a selected special operations mission if directed to do so by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

Question. In your view, how are intelligence activities different from other SOCOM activities? U.S. SOCOM’s primary activities are directed at the operational and tactical level, using intelligence to directly facilitate the conduct of everyday mission sets covering the nine Special Operations Core Tasks. Since they are not directed by the Director of National Intelligence for the purpose of collecting or producing strategic intelligence, these activities fall outside of the consolidated national intelligence program. Some compartmented intelligence activities conducted by U.S. SOCOM elements are funded under intelligence programs and operate under different authorities.

SIZE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The QDR called for increases in the size of SOFs. Do you believe that we should increase the number of special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much? If confirmed, would you consider greater increases than those envisioned in the QDR?

Answer. Yes, I strongly believe it is imperative to increase the number of special operations personnel as prescribed in the 2006 QDR. SOF growth is a core aspect of SOF transformation. Only with this growth, will U.S. SOCOM be able to realize the steady-state posture that will likely be necessary to win the global war on terror. I believe that the SOF growth prescribed in the 2006 QDR is sufficient, but, if I am confirmed, and I determine at some point that additional SOF growth is required, I will consult with Congress. The most likely area for further growth in SOF capacity is in air capabilities.

Question. In your view, how can the size of SOFs be increased, while also maintaining the rigorous recruiting and training standards for special operators?

Answer. The 2006 QDR and the Downing Report focused significant attention on strategies for growing SOF, while assuring that high quality is maintained. This included ensuring that sufficient resources are devoted to the institutional training base to accommodate substantially increased throughput; exploiting the potential of direct entry enlistment into Special Forces via the 18X program; ensuring that Ranger units, who, in addition to providing critical capabilities, also serve as a core recruiting base for Special Forces and Special Mission Unit (SMU) personnel, are grown in proportion to the desired increase in those units; and redesigning training programs to achieve greater yield while maintaining quality. The Department’s classified SMUs, which are among the most difficult parts of the force to grow, given their very low selection yield and the extensive training and experience that is required to produce a successful operator, have grown substantially since their inception, despite doubts that it could be done, and are prescribed to grow substantially more as we continue to shift from a reactive to a proactive CT force. SMU growth has been accomplished without substantial dilution of quality.

To achieve the SOF growth prescribed by the QDR and develop and maintain the intelligence capabilities and ability to operate in politically sensitive and denied areas that we require for the global war on terror, we must find innovative ways to retain experienced SOF. The decline in the experience level of the force must be...
reversed. This is a challenge that SOF has in common with the National Clandestine Service, which is also expanding its ranks substantially, and, as a consequence, is seeing its experience levels decline. If confirmed, I will work with Congress, U.S. SOCOM, the Services, and others in DOD to achieve the SOF growth objectives of the 2006 QDR while maintaining the high standards expected of SOF.

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION OPERATIONS

**Question.** What is your definition of strategic communications and information operations, and what is the relationship between them?

**Answer.** Strategic communications are focused U.S. Government communication processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences. The goal is to create, strengthen, or preserve favorable conditions to advance national interests. Strategic communications is an overt instrument.

Information operations are the integrated employment of various techniques, including computer network operations, to influence or disrupt adversarial decision making, capabilities and operations while protecting our own. Information operations can be overt or covert. If confirmed I will assess these issues and be happy to discuss them in more detail in a closed session.

Information operations and strategic communications must be complementary and coordinated.

**Question.** What role do you envision for SOCOM in overall U.S. strategic communications and in U.S. information operations?

**Answer.** I see U.S. SOCOM playing a vital role in implementing strategic communication plans and supporting the Geographic Combatant Commanders' efforts to counter violent extremists around the world. U.S. SOCOM also provides information operations capabilities, which if confirmed, I will be happy to discuss in more detail in a closed session.

**Question.** Under what circumstances would the Commander, SOCOM, conduct information operations as a supported COCOM?

**Answer.** As the supported COCOM for planning and synchronizing the global war on terror, U.S. SOCOM guides collaborative planning, coordination, and execution of information operations. I can envision U.S. SOCOM leading the execution of information operations to support surgical, limited duration, counterterrorism, and other IW missions.

MARINE CORPS SPECIAL OPERATORS

**Question.** What do you believe should be the appropriate relationship between the Marine Corps and SOCOM?

**Answer.** I believe that U.S. SOCOM should develop a relationship with the Marine Corps similar to the relationship that it has with the Army, Air Force, and Navy.

U.S. SOCOM, in collaboration with ASD(SO/LIC&IC), should work closely with the Department of the Navy and the Marine Corps to coordinate the title 10, U.S.C. “Service like” responsibilities of U.S. SOCOM for the Marine Corps component.

**Question.** Do you believe that marines should be “SOF for life,” just as Army SOFs?

**Answer.** I do not believe we have had enough experience yet with the Marine Corps component of SOF to fully answer this question, but the Department’s experience with SOF from the other Services certainly suggests that there should be a strong bias towards “SOF for life.” The Marine Corps are organized differently than Special Forces but they share some of the same missions. Unlike Special Forces, however, there is not a SOF unique military specialty for the Marine component, at least not at this time. Current assignment policies for the Marine Corps component envisions that individuals will rotate between SOF and regular Marine Corps assignments. If confirmed, this is an issue that I will examine closely in collaboration with the Marine Corps and U.S. SOCOM.

**Question.** What can be done to improve the training of marines in the Marine Corps Special Operations units to ensure that they possess the language capabilities and cultural awareness that are needed for counterterrorism and training missions?

The Marine Corps already is leading the other Services in providing regional and cultural expertise to their Active Force. In addition, the marines make available web-based training, distance learning and other tools, putting them in a strong starting position to meet the language capability and cultural awareness demands of special operations missions. If confirmed, I will take a close look at what the Marine Corps has done and see how their efforts can be expanded and how the other Services, and U.S. SOCOM, can employ their learning tools.
Question. What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be divested by SOCOM, and why?

Answer. I am aware that, as a follow-up to the 2006 QDR, the Department is assessing the capability and capacity of the general-purpose forces to conduct counterinsurgency operations and train, equip, and advise large numbers of foreign security forces. This is one candidate area for limited SOF divestment. A GPF capability to train, equip, and advise large numbers of foreign security forces could allow SOF to focus on more SOF-unique and critical missions. SOF must maintain a very robust train, equip, and advise foreign security forces capability, however, to conduct operations in politically-sensitive environments, to ensure SOF access for other SOF activities, and to train, equip and advise irregular forces. The proper balance between SOF and GPF in counterinsurgency operations is very much situation-dependent.

Question. Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding them?

Answer. I do not currently foresee any additional missions that U.S. SOCOM should assume. I believe however, that SOF-led approaches to counterinsurgency are worth exploring. Counterinsurgency operations conducted by the United States will, more often than not, be conducted indirectly. SOF, and in particular its SF units, specialize in the indirect approach. I believe that employing unconventional warfare against non-state actors holds considerable promise as an expanded U.S. SOCOM mission area. This approach could allow SOF to access areas which would otherwise be denied. I believe that clandestine intelligence operations are an area of possible mission growth for SOF. The global war on terrorism has placed a premium on developing “ruggedized” case officers, which SOF and U.S. SOCOM are well equipped to provide. I strongly believe, however, covert action should remain the sole responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency. If confirmed, I look forward to discussing this issue in greater depth in a closed session with the committee.

Question. What can be done to ensure that SOF missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much emphasis and appropriate funding as direct action?

Answer. Counterterrorist capabilities, both proactive and reactive, counter-proliferation of WMD capabilities, and clandestine operations capabilities represent a critical national asset, and must be resourced accordingly. U.S. SOCOM's indirect capabilities, however, are increasingly central to the global war on terrorism. While the resources devoted to U.S. SOCOM's indirect capabilities have increased substantially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, this part of the portfolio remains significantly under-resourced. Indirect capabilities are underresourced, in my judgment, at both the Service and U.S. SOCOM levels. Resourcing U.S. SOCOM's direct and indirect capabilities should not, however, be a zero-sum game. While resources devoted to U.S. SOCOM's indirect capabilities should be significantly increased, resources should not simply be shifted from direct to the indirect. U.S. SOCOM's direct capabilities benefit immensely in the allocation of resources from their designation as special mission units, and their inclusion in a national mission force, sub-unified command. Owing to their critical importance and command advantage, U.S. SOCOM's direct capabilities also produce the preponderance of SOF officers selected for high command. This could lead to an imbalance in strategy. I do not believe, however, that there is such an imbalance currently. The dominant approach in the global war on terrorism is indirect, and this is recognized by U.S. SOCOM. The Commander, U.S. SOCOM, moreover, has also recently selected an officer who specializes in the indirect approach to become U.S. SOCOM's new Director of the Center for Special Operations.

Assuring a proper balance between direct and indirect capabilities will require additional resources devoted to indirect side, and some believe the creation of new organizational and command arrangements as well. An increase in resources could be facilitated by having the Services designate at least some of U.S. SOCOM's indirect capabilities as top priority special mission units on par with special mission units that specialize in direct capabilities. Some believe the command imbalance could be addressed by creating an equivalent three-star indirect operational command—a Joint Unconventional Warfare Command (JUWC). Under this proposal, indirect capabilities across U.S. SOCOM's Service components could be operationally assigned to this new command. This would give U.S. SOCOM and the GCCs two operational component commands instead of just one, with the Center for Special Operations and the Theater SOCOM functioning as integrated planners and synchronizers and force employers. This could increase the likelihood that SOF officers who...
specialize in the indirect approach would have as equal a shot at high command as their direct action counterparts.

SOF manpower, however, is a scarce resource. Creating new headquarters should be done only if absolutely necessary, and then in the most efficient manner possible. One approach that would meet at least the latter criterion would be to convert an existing service force provider headquarters into a provisional JUWC. Those who favor this approach suggest that the Army's Special Forces Command could be a candidate for this role.

I believe the ideas described above merit further study. If confirmed, I will work with the Commander, U.S. SOCOM and the senior defense civilian leadership to achieve an appropriate balance between indirect and direct capabilities.

FUTURE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

Question. Many believe that the principal threats of the 21st century will be asymmetric, unconventional ones, often emanating from non-state actors.

Since asymmetric, unconventional threats must now be confronted by our conventional forces, what is the future role of Special Operations? What special threats must SOCOM be focused on for the future?

Answer. Irregular warfare (IW) will likely be the dominant form of conflict for the foreseeable future. Both SOF and conventional forces must place increased emphasis on it. Conventional forces—rebalanced toward greater IW capabilities—and SOF are complementary capabilities, not competitive.

Expanding the capability and capacity of conventional forces for certain IW missions (e.g., COIN, Stability Operations, and FID) will free up SOF to take on the more demanding and specialized tasks, including:

- Long-duration, indirect and clandestine operations in politically sensitive environments and denied areas;
- Locate, tag, and track dangerous individuals and other high-value targets globally; and
- Detect, locate, and render safe WMD.

These are core missions in the global war on terror. Additionally, SOF must remain prepared to conduct unconventional warfare against hostile states, and increase its capabilities to conduct SOF-intensive operations in anti-access environments.

LESSONS LEARNED

Question. In your view, what have been the most significant lessons learned by SOFs in recent military operations, and what are the future operational, research and development, and procurement implications of these lessons?

Answer. Operation Enduring Freedom revealed the power of unconventional warfare when supported by precision airpower. A clear implication of OEF is that national leadership now has an increasingly viable indirect, small ground footprint option to decisively defeat a hostile regime. Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF–P) has shown the power of an indirect approach to counterinsurgency and counterterrorism as well. One implication of OEF–P is that SOF-led counterinsurgency concepts merit further study.

Proactive CT operations have shown that rapidly exploiting intelligence to identify and strike new targets significantly increases the odds of operational success. These operations also have shown that persistent ISR is vital to success.

DEVELOPMENT OF NEW SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that Special Operations capabilities are integrated into overall DOD research and technology development programs?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) toward this end. DDR&E publishes a strategic plan that guides investment and management priorities for collective research and development programs. This plan helps focus Department-wide science and technology priorities, and I would work to include SOF capabilities and needs into those priorities. I would also focus on leveraging Department-wide technology developments.

LANGUAGE AND CULTURAL AWARENESS CAPABILITIES

Question. In your opinion, what is the role of technology in the development of on-demand language and cultural awareness capabilities for deployed special operators?

Answer. Technology has a valuable role in providing these capabilities to our special operators. For example, we have developed technological solutions that allow us
to provide on-demand and reach-back translation capabilities to our deployed forces. However, there is no substitute for the expertise derived from personal interaction with those who speak the language. Language and cultural immersion programs are an important aspect of developing and maintaining language and cultural capabilities.

**Question.** How should SOCOM address the erosion of language and cultural deficiencies caused by the disproportionate deployment of specialized operators to Iraq and Afghanistan?

**Answer.** Iraq and Afghanistan, undoubtedly, have created a challenge for us to retain our language and cultural expertise in other areas.

We can mitigate at least partially the impact of deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan by leveraging the web-based training, distance learning, and Mobile Training Teams from the Defense Language Institute as well as our internal special operation language and cultural training capabilities.

### COUNTERDRUG/COUNTERTERRORISM MISSIONS

**Question.** SOFs have been deeply involved in training forces in Colombia to conduct counterdrug-counterterrorism missions.

In your view, what has been the success of training missions in Colombia?

**Answer.** From my understanding, Colombia is safer today than in the late 1990s; kidnappings, homicides, and massacres are at the lowest levels in almost 20 years. By most indicators of military readiness, Colombia’s military is also better today than at any other time in recent memory. Our training has helped produce a more professional and capable corps; they are better motivated and more conscious of their obligations to respect human rights.

**Question.** Are these appropriate missions for U.S. SOFs?

**Answer.** Yes. It is my understanding that SOF is making a major contribution to the success of Plan Colombia.

**Question.** What, if any, benefit do unified counterdrug-counterterrorist training missions in Colombia and counterdrug training missions worldwide provide to SOFs?

**Answer.** In addition to the positive impact upon U.S. Government counter-narcotics and counterterrorism efforts, SOF counterdrug and counterterrorism training missions in Colombia and throughout the world provide excellent opportunities for SOF to work with security and military forces of partner nations. These missions strengthen SOF skills such as instructor skills, language proficiency, and cultural immersion in real-world settings. They also facilitate the development of important professional and personal relationships that strengthen U.S. access. At the operational level, integrated counternarcotics and counterterrorism operations are complex contingencies that foster the development of SOF strategists.

### STABILITY OPERATIONS

**Question.** The office of ASD(SO/LIC) is responsible for policy and activities concerning stability operations, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance.

To your knowledge, what is the current involvement of the office of the ASD(SO/LIC) in the planning and conduct of stability operations in Afghanistan and Iraq?

**Answer.** The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs have the lead within Policy for planning and conducting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively. If confirmed, I will be the principal advisor on special operations and low-intensity conflict, and therefore, will work closely with my regional counterparts to ensure appropriate oversight of any operations in which SOF are employed.

It is my aim, if confirmed, to significantly increase the contribution of OSD’s capability experts in policy, strategy and operations. I believe that regional-functional operational collaboration can produce vastly improved policy oversight. I also will work to ensure that U.S. forces have the capabilities and capacity to conduct stability operations in general; to assess feedback from operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere to identify “lessons learned;” and to use that feedback to improve our future ability to conduct stability operations.

I understand that SO/LIC is currently working to improve coordination with inter-agency partners to help ensure greater effectiveness of the U.S. Government in planning and conducting stability operations. If confirmed, I plan to continue our efforts in this area.

**Question.** Who has the principal responsibility within the Department for the planning and conduct of stability operations in these nations?

**Answer.** The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy supervises the planning and conduct of stability operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, providing
policy-level oversight and coordination. The Joint Staff, in particular the Directorate for Strategic Plans and Policies (J–5), also plays a critical role in developing plans and operational guidance for the relevant combatant commands. Within SO/LIC, the Stability Operations Capabilities office supports relevant offices in Policy, including the regional desks and the Offices of Coalition Affairs and Partnership Strategy, as subject-matter experts on stability operations and by facilitating interagency coordination with respect to stability operations-related issues.

*Question.* If confirmed, what role would you play in the planning and conduct of ongoing and future stability operations? What are the major challenges in this area and how would you address them?

*Answer.* Under the policy reorganization, the ASD(SO/LIC&IC) is responsible for planning for stability operations, and developing capabilities to conduct them. Among the major challenges that need to be addressed are how to transition from the direct to the indirect approach, and how to improve our ability to produce capable and reliable foreign police forces. If confirmed, I would develop plans to address these and other challenges in coordination with the regional ASDs.

**Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs**

*Question.* Psychological operations (PSYOPs) and Civil Affairs (CA) have played prominent roles in recent military operations, from the Balkans to Afghanistan to Iraq. Most U.S. PSYOPs and CA units and capabilities are in our Reserve components. What role does the ASD(SO/LIC) have in providing oversight for PSYOPs and CA missions?

*Answer.* As the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense for DOD PSYOPs and CA, ASD(SO/LIC&IC) provides oversight of PSYOPs and CA policy and planning. ASD(SO/LIC&IC) reviews all request for forces for PSYOPs/CA assets and makes recommendations through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Combatant command authority for U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. SOCOM PSYOPs and CA assets are split between U.S. SOCOM and U.S. JFCOM. If confirmed, I will have policy oversight of both U.S. SOCOM and U.S. JFCOM, which will allow me to identify policy and programming actions to better support ongoing operations in these areas.

*Question.* In your view, do the Armed Forces have sufficient personnel and other assets to conduct the range of PSYOPs and CA missions being asked of them?

*Answer.* DOD is in the process of expanding CA and PSYOP structure in both the Active and Reserve components of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps. I also understand that the Joint Staff will conduct an analysis of CA/PSYOP shortfalls within a study of irregular warfare in time for the next POM. If confirmed, I will also review the CA and PSYOP structure and work with the Joint Staff, the Services, and the combatant commands to determine the shortfalls and how best to address them.

*Question.* In your view, is the planned mix of Active and Reserve components adequate in these areas?

*Answer.* No. I believe that we need a larger Active-Duty Civil Affairs force. This will allow the Reserve force to focus more directly on providing functional specialists (Government, Economics, and Public Facilities) that leverage the civilian skills within our Reserve components.

*Question.* What is the current and future impact on the training, equipping, and promotion and individual assignments of CA reservists?

*Answer.* Our Reserve Civil Affairs force is under considerable stress. The Army’s Active CA component will focus on support for Special Operations, while the Army’s Reserve component will focus on support to conventional operations. I understand that the Army is reviewing the impact of the growth of CA on the training pipeline and that USN and USMC are collaborating on their respective CA training requirements. I do not know what the impact will be regarding the assignments of CA reservists, but if confirmed, I will give attention to this issue as we review how to develop adequate CA capabilities to meet future challenges.

**Training Capability**

*Question.* The ability of special forces personnel to train realistically is of vital importance. What capabilities do you consider most important for effective training of special forces personnel?

*Answer.* Extended and advanced training is central to special operations proficiency. Some SOF personnel, for example, require constant advanced training, made possible only by real world exercises and very sophisticated facilities, and access to the most advanced training programs.
The most challenging task for SF personnel to perform is unconventional warfare. Cultural and societal knowledge and language and interpersonal skills are essential. Personalized learning integrated into other SF training, immersion programs, and distance learning tools are important, but language proficiency remains a very challenging area for SF. Nothing replaces the fluency gained from extended operational experience in a foreign language environment. Some UW operations require advanced special operations training. Being able to conduct UW at the operational level of war is increasingly imperative, and improving our capabilities in this area will require advanced SOF education. Maintaining SF combat skills requires significant resources. Since UW is one of the hardest tasks to simulate, significant operational experience is usually required to gain mastery. Valuable UW experience might be gained by increasing the number of SOF personnel who are detailed to other government agencies.

**Question.** What improvements are necessary, in your view, to enhance training for special operations personnel?

**Answer.** Language proficiency is an area of particular concern. Improving SOF proficiency will require substantial classroom instruction but, more importantly, also regional immersion training. Immersion training could be acquired by embedding officers and NCOs in foreign military organizations.

A more robust program to train and educate SOF strategists should also be studied.

**Question.** What, if any, training benefits accrue to U.S. SOFs from training foreign military personnel?

**Answer.** SOF personnel gain long-term benefits from working with and building relations with the foreign military personnel that they train. Such activities augment SOF’s language capabilities and cultural awareness. By training foreign forces, U.S. SOF personnel also learn their doctrine, tactics, and operating procedures.

**TRAINING AND EQUIPPING INDIGENOUS FORCES FIGHTING WITH SOF**

**Question.** In section 1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Congress gave SOCOM a 2-year authority to train and equip indigenous forces fighting alongside U.S. special operators. This year the Department is seeking a reauthorization.

How has SOCOM used this authority, and to what effect? If confirmed, how and where would you use this authority?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that U.S. SOCOM has obligated funds to train and equip foreign or irregular forces, groups and individuals engaged in supporting ongoing operations by U.S. SOFs. The agility to apply resources provided by this authority has had a meaningful effect on recent operations by allowing the command to fund activities in all five Geographic Commanders’ areas of responsibility—activities that otherwise would likely have remained unfunded. If confirmed, in addition to continuing current efforts, I would encourage the COCOMs to use this tool to expand their UW activities against hostile non-state actor targets.

**ADVANCED SEAL DELIVERY SYSTEM**

**Question.** To date, about $885 million has been spent on developing the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS). The fiscal year 2008 request for ASDS is $10.6 million for procurement and $20.3 million for research and development.

In your view, can SOCOM afford to have more than one ASDS? How long will it take to ensure that there is an operational ASDS?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that ASDS is available for limited operations and select taskings now. The ASDS will provide an important denied-area maritime clandestine infiltration and exfiltration capability. If confirmed, I will work closely with U.S. SOCOM to determine the number of ASDS hulls required.

**TREATMENT OF DETAINES**

**Question.** Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

**Answer.** Yes, I believe that as a matter of policy, the Department was already in compliance with the requirements of Common Article 3, and that the Deputy Secretary’s memo was sent to ensure that as a matter of law, all DOD components understood that Common Article 3 was the standard following the Supreme Court’s decision in *Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.*
Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Answer. Yes. I support the standards and believe that they incorporate the lessons learned in prior conflicts as well as have adapted to the enemies we face in the war on terrorism. I understand Congress was fully briefed as to the new interrogation procedures. The military intelligence community has stated that they believe that the procedures outlined in FM 2–22.3, including Common Article 3 treatment, provide the military with the best method for extracting timely operational intelligence.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?

Answer. If confirmed as the ASD(SO/LIC&IC), I will not have direct responsibility for the implementation of detainee operations policy. The office of Detainee Affairs, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Detainee Affairs, fall under the ASD(GSA), a position that is currently vacant. The Acting, Mr. Benkert, has responsibility within policy for the Office of Detainee Affairs. The Office of Detainee Affairs is important in this question as it is the office primarily charged with development of policy and conducting policy oversight on detainee matters, per the DOD Directive, and Secretary Rumsfeld’s July 2006 memorandum.

To the extent that my responsibilities for special operations involve detention operations, I will ensure that our policies and procedures are closely coordinated with broader detainee policy. I also will ensure that guidance that we develop on detainee issues is consistent with broader detention policies.

Question. The DOD Inspector General recently released a report on detainee abuse noting reports of detainee abuse by a SMU Task Force in Iraq that took place before the publicized behaviors at Abu Ghraib came to light. Additionally, the report noted that personnel in this SMU Task Force introduced battlefield interrogation techniques that included abusive tactics such as sleep deprivation, stress positions, the use of dogs, and the use of Survival Escape Resistance and Evasion techniques—techniques designed specifically to imitate tactics by a country that does not comply with Geneva.

Do you believe that such techniques contribute and are appropriate in the struggle against terrorism?

Answer. I am not directly familiar with this report, however, I believe that all U.S. Armed Forces have to comply with applicable law and policy regarding the treatment of detainees.

Question. What is your understanding about how battlefield interrogation techniques by such units were authorized and monitored?

Answer. I am not directly familiar with what policies or procedures were in force at the time that these SMUs operated. I believe, however, that DOD policy would have required that all interrogation tactics conform with those described in Army Field Manual 34–52 and any applicable specific rules of engagement issued by the Secretary of Defense.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that our SOF’s understand the necessity of complying with the Geneva Conventions when detaining and interrogating those individuals under U.S. control?

Answer. I would ensure that all policies and guidance that we develop for SOF are consistent with broader detainee policy, and would coordinate with the Office of Detainee Affairs on policy guidance that I believed would affect detainee treatment.

Question. What steps would you take to ensure that those foreign forces trained by our SOF’s understand the same necessity?

Answer. As part of such training, our SOF’s always indicate that further military assistance and training is predicated on such foreign forces adherence to the law of war.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes, I will appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress when called upon to do so.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to necessary and appropriate security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the ASD(SO/LIC)?

Answer. Yes, I will provide this committee or members of this committee accurate and appropriate information to the best of my ability when called upon to do so.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes, I will provide the necessary information to this committee and other appropriate committees and their staff when asked to do so.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes, I will provide the committee the necessary documents when appropriate and will consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing documents.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

1. Senator Akaka. Mr. Vickers, it has been reported in the media recently that we are arming Sunni insurgents so that they can fight al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Do you believe this is a good policy? If so, how are we ensuring that these weapons are not turned against us either during the battle with AQI or after the battle is over?

Mr. Vickers. Enlisting Sunni tribes in the fight against AQI represents a major strategic success. Defeating AQI is a principal U.S. war aim, and the Sunni population and its tribal militias are the principal instruments through which the conflict must and will be fought. Enlisting former Sunni insurgents in the fight against AQI reduces, though by no means does it eliminate, risk to U.S. forces in the near-term, and it better positions the U.S. to secure its interests in Iraq over the longer-term. I support a limited policy of providing support to former Sunni insurgents in the fight against AQI. It would be preferable, in an ideal world, to not have armed militias, but not having them could result in much less effective operations against AQI in present-day Iraq. To be sure, providing support to former Sunni insurgents is not without risk. There is always the risk that they could use their weapons to attack U.S. forces, or they could provide weapons to AQI. I believe these risks are manageable, and that various measures—the provision of advisors and tracking of weapons—can be adopted to ensure compliance. I do not believe, moreover, that the policy of providing limited small arms support to Sunni militias who join the fight against AQI will have a material adverse impact on the future stability of Iraq, or on strategic balances among sectarian groups in the event of a full-blown civil war in Iraq. Providing limited support to Sunni tribesmen and former Sunni insurgents can, however, tip the strategic balance against AQI, and secure the necessary cooperation of the Sunni population. Over time, it is imperative that Sunni militias be incorporated into legally constituted security forces.

2. Senator Akaka. Mr. Vickers, how will we make sure that the weapons are returned or destroyed when they are not needed anymore?

Mr. Vickers. The Department of Defense controls and accounts for defense articles and services provided to foreign nationals (both permanent and temporary transfers) by issuing guidance consistent with national security objectives and U.S. foreign policy. The goal of this guidance is to ensure all forces understand and comply with U.S. statutory requirements and DOD policies that govern U.S. international transfers of defense articles and services. Furthermore, the guidance issued outlines operational limitations and provisions, which are designed to make certain all defense articles and services transferred to foreign nationals, are accounted for and monitored throughout all phases of operations. Weapons are issued as required
for specific duties and those not permanently transferred are returned when units are demobilized.

3. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Vickers, how is our support to the insurgents perceived by the Kurds and the Shia?

Mr. VICKERS. Senior Kurdish leaders have expressed limited concern over additional armed elements threatening the security of Iraq. Kurdish leaders acknowledge the often hostile forces operating in the region, but understand that they must balance Kurdish goals of independence with U.S. aims to stabilize Iraq and defeat AQI. I think that arming insurgents operating in central and western Iraq poses a minimal threat to Kurdish control in northern Iraq. Senior Shia Iraqi government leaders have expressed skepticism about coalition forces arming insurgent groups as a way of fighting AQI, and they are concerned that arming the insurgents would create new militias that would eventually add to Iraqi security challenges. Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki protested, and insisted that those bearing arms without permission would be considered militias and would be dealt with as such. Shia leaders have predicted that arming insurgents could destroy all that has been achieved and that arming may promote added sectarian violence. Providing limited small arms support to Sunni militias, I believe, poses a minimal threat to Shia-populated regions, but it is also important that we continue to work with the Shia leaders to assuage their concerns.

CHANGE IN MILITARY STRATEGY

4. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Vickers, what would be the impact, in your opinion, if we were to change our military strategy in Iraq so that our troops would only be used to conduct offensive operations against terrorist organizations (i.e., AQI, etc.), and all other Iraqi security was immediately turned over to Iraqi security forces? The advantage in doing this is that our troops would still be in the theater (although probably at reduced levels) and engaging those organizations that were deliberately inflaming sectarian strife, but would not be trying to maintain security throughout Iraq. Of course, they would be able to defend themselves, if attacked, and they could re-engage if the security situation showed signs of catastrophic failure. Please provide your opinion on how a strategy change like this might impact the conflict in Iraq.

Mr. VICKERS. The purpose of the temporary U.S. surge in operations in Iraq is to reduce threats to the government and people of Iraq while continuing to strengthen Iraqi capability and capacity to provide for Iraq's security, and to create the conditions that would facilitate political reconciliation of sectarian elements. While it is too soon to tell if the surge in operations will achieve these objectives, it is manifestly clear that Iraqis must ultimately be responsible for their own security, and that U.S. forces must shift to a more limited and indirect role. A premature shift to such a role, however, would carry significant risk that the security situation in Iraq will deteriorate substantially, with the break up of Iraq into sectarian successor states a real possibility. The political and security situation could deteriorate to such an extent that continued offensive operations against terrorist organizations were placed in jeopardy. That said, this transition must occur, and it is imperative, however events in Iraq evolve, that the U.S. remain engaged, albeit in a more limited and indirect way, if U.S. interests are to be secured. As a hedge against Iraq's uncertain future, it appears increasingly evident that the U.S. needs to pursue a two-track policy, which, while maintaining strong support for the central Iraqi government, builds and maintains ties with each major sectarian community. It is essential that U.S. forces remain engaged in the training and development of Iraqi Security Forces. At the tactical level, many of the Iraqi units have proven marginally capable. However, at higher echelons it is apparent that the support structure is not yet in place to enable self-sufficiency. Therefore, without the support of U.S. forces, the ISF would potentially fail in their security mission.

PAKISTAN AND AL QAEDA

5. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Vickers, it is clear that the Pakistani government has not brought its full resources to bear in eliminating al Qaeda's safe haven in Pakistan, and that they are not likely to in the future. What are your views on the current situation in Pakistan?

Mr. VICKERS. Pakistan, along with Saudi Arabia, is a vital ally in the global war on terrorism. If either country were to fail to radical Islamists, the implications for U.S. security would be dire. The situation in Pakistan is increasingly worrisome.
The Islamist threat to the government is growing, and al Qaeda has established numerous safe havens, not just in western Pakistan, but throughout the country. It is clear that the September agreement, which suspended Pakistani Army operations in the tribal areas, has failed to achieve its objectives. It is imperative, in my view, that the U.S. increase its support for the Government of Pakistan, including, but not limited to, in the tribal areas of western Pakistan. Given the increasingly volatile political situation, U.S. support must remain indirect and clandestine. I believe the Government of Pakistan will strongly support such an approach.

6. Senator Akaka. Mr. Vickers, what strategies and policies do you believe we should be using to capture Osama bin Laden?

Mr. Vickers. I believe the appropriate strategies are indirect and clandestine ones. Our aim must be to assist the Government of Pakistan in winning over the allegiance of the local population without further inflaming a volatile political situation. Manhunting is an extraordinarily difficult task, but if we increase the intensity of our indirect and clandestine approach, we will eventually eliminate al Qaeda’s safe havens in western Pakistan and increase the likelihood that we will succeed in killing or capturing al Qaeda’s senior leadership.

7. Senator Akaka. Mr. Vickers, I believe that there are many potential underlying causes that can make a person susceptible to being recruited to be a terrorist. Our overall national strategy (according to U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)’s 2007 Posture Statement) includes attacking the roots of terrorism. It’s not clear how comprehensive our strategy is for doing this. What strategies and policies are currently being utilized in the global war on terror to attack the roots of terrorism?

Mr. Vickers. There is no one reason why people turn to terrorism. Therefore, we as a government must develop a strategy that addresses the manifold underlying causes of why people turn to terrorism and this can only be done through the development of a whole of government approach. For example, the Department of Defense continues to work with other government agencies to counter extreme ideologies and provide foreign assistance more effectively. Such efforts intend to develop viable ideological, political, and economic alternatives to the extremist ideology that breeds terrorism.

The recent operations in the Philippines could provide a model for future operations that seek to reduce terrorist safe havens and recruiting grounds. Our approach in the Philippines has addressed the terrorist problem from multiple angles. We have worked indirectly as advisors to the Philippine government forces as they continue to conduct operations against terrorist organizations. At the same time, we have worked with local governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to develop the economic and social infrastructure to strengthen stability and thereby reduce the attractiveness of terrorism. From the beginning, locals have been involved in the construction and rebuilding efforts and, as a result, they have “buy in” to the success of the country’s future well-being, which helps drain the pool of potential terrorists. We might look to apply the OIF-Philippines approach to other terrorist safe havens.

We must move more quickly to integrate the tools of various U.S. Government (USG) agencies so that we can apply a more comprehensive approach to attacking the multiple roots of terrorism. There are ongoing efforts to develop a USG-wide approach to helping our allies and partners and, if confirmed, I look forward to engaging other agencies in this endeavor.

8. Senator Akaka. Mr. Vickers, do you have recommendations for additional strategies or policies that could be used?

Mr. Vickers. See response to question 7.

9. Senator Akaka. Mr. Vickers, it seems that poverty, or a poor economy, could also be a factor in creating breeding grounds for terrorists. What can we do to minimize this factor, especially in poorer regions such as in Africa?

Mr. Vickers. A poor economy weakens governance capacity and causes social instability, creating conditions ripe for terrorist recruitment and sustenance. Our efforts in Africa must include a combination of economic, military, and political aid to help African states better govern their areas and reduce the threat posed by terrorist and other illicit organizations.
The Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSCTI), for example, focuses the capabilities of DOD, State, and USAID on defeating terrorism and creating an environment inhospitable to it in North Africa. While DOD focuses on developing the capabilities of North African partner nation militaries, State, USAID, and other U.S. Government agencies employ programs to promote good governance, provide humanitarian assistance, improve economic infrastructure, and enable the countries to assert tighter control over their territories. Although relatively nascent, this effort has been successful and we should look to continue to build on it to address other areas on the continent.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EVAN BAYH

UAV REQUIREMENTS

10. Senator BAYH. Mr. Vickers, according to testimony by Vice Admiral Olson in April, SOCOM is unable to fulfill its standard medium altitude unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) orbit requirement. It is my understanding that SOCOM’s long-term budget does not contain enough funding to manage this gap in the short-term. If so, how will SOCOM address this unacceptable budgetary and requirement shortfall?

Mr. VICKERS. SOCOM relies on Service-provided and SOF-unique UAVs to meet its airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance needs. As Vice Admiral Olson has testified, SOCOM’s ability to generate UAV orbits is well short of actual requirements. If confirmed, I would recommend a thorough review of UAV requirements to identify the scope and volume of UAV needs to meet key operational and strategic goals. Such a review would help prioritize the availability of assets to meet our most pressing needs in the near to mid-term while ensuring that near-term needs are properly balanced against longer-term ones. Some operations, for example, will require the ability to clandestinely penetrate denied air space, while others will need the ability to maintain persistent surveillance over multiple wide areas simultaneously. A portfolio of UAV capabilities will likely be required, along with additional capacity. A thorough review of UAV requirements will help ensure that DOD allocates sufficient resources to this critical capability area.

11. Senator BAYH. Mr. Vickers, what strategy would you employ to ensure that not only enough UAVs are in the air, but also have the communication infrastructure, logistical chain, and pilot/operator availability needed to meet this SOCOM requirement?

Mr. VICKERS. UAVs are indeed only one part of a system that includes communications infrastructure, logistical support, and trained operators. Each of these components is critical to system performance. Bandwidth constraints, for example, affect operational control of flight systems, while the availability of trained operators and command and control systems affect mission-capable rates. If confirmed, I would work closely with the USD(I) and others to explore options within each component of the UAV system to ensure that the Department and SOCOM achieve maximum performance from our UAV assets.
Michael G. (Mike) Vickers is Senior Vice President, Strategic Studies, at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), a non-partisan, independent public policy research institute located in Washington, DC. He directs a broad-based strategic studies program, funded by the U.S. Government, the U.S. defense industry, and private foundations. He provides regular commentary on national security, defense, and intelligence issues in the national broadcast and print media. His most recent CSBA monograph is “The Revolution in War” (2004).

In mid-2006, Mr. Vickers was asked to provide advice on Iraq strategy to President Bush and his war cabinet. On May 30, Mr. Vickers met with President Bush in the Oval Office to provide confidential advice on the way forward in Iraq. On June 12, Mr. Vickers met again with President Bush and his war cabinet at Camp David, Maryland. Mr. Vickers’ Memoranda to the President have been circulated at the highest levels of the U.S. national security establishment.

Mr. Vickers served as a senior adviser to the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the 2005–2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Defense Department’s major, 4-year review of strategy, capabilities, and force structure. He was involved extensively in the QDR, from defining its four focus areas and drafting the Secretary’s Terms of Reference, to writing the final report. In addition to his work advising the main QDR effort, he also served as Executive Director for a QDR “Red Team,” headed by Andy Marshall, Director for Net Assessment, which was tasked by the Deputy Secretary to provide the Department’s senior leadership with an alternative assessment of the QDR. The Red Team, which included six retired four-star officers, recommended major changes to the Department’s capability mix, the majority of which were adopted. With General Wayne Downing, USA (Ret.), and Major General Bill Garrison, USA (Ret.), Mr. Vickers also conducted an independent assessment of U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) (The Downing Report) for Secretary Rumsfeld. Almost all of the recommendations from the Independent SOF’s Assessment were subsequently implemented by the Department.

From 1973 to 1986, Mr. Vickers served as an Army Special Forces Noncommissioned Officer, Special Forces Officer, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Operations Officer, with operational and combat experience in Central America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Central Asia. His irregular warfare experience spans unconventional warfare, covert action, counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense.

During the mid-1980s, he was the principal strategist for the largest covert action program in the CIA’s history; the paramilitary operation that drove the Soviet army out of Afghanistan and played a major role in ending the Cold War. His Afghanistan experience is described in the New York Times bestseller and soon-to-be-released major motion picture, “Charlie Wilson’s War”. Mr. Vickers provided strategic and operational direction to an insurgent force of more than 300 unit commanders, 150,000 full-time fighters, and 500,000 part-time fighters. He developed paramilitary force structure and training requirements and streamlined program logistics. He controlled an annual budget approaching $1 billion, and oversaw a 400 percent growth in program funding. He prepared policy recommendations for President Reagan and the National Security Council, and regularly briefed cognizant congressional committees on program results.

He coordinated the efforts of more than 10 foreign governments, and traveled frequently to Europe and the Near and Far East to gain and maintain broad international support for the program. He negotiated several major covert materiel procurement contracts with foreign suppliers. For his work on the Afghanistan Covert Action Program, Mr. Vickers received a special promotion for exceptional performance.

In an earlier assignment with the CIA, Mr. Vickers planned the clandestine intelligence and covert operations portions of a fast-breaking rescue operation in the Caribbean. He deployed to the crisis site during the critical time frame, and performed operational tasks in a life threatening situation. Mr. Vickers received an award for heroism from the Director of Central Intelligence for major contributions to the success of the rescue mission, in another assignment, Mr. Vickers served as operations officer for a joint CIA-DOD counterterrorist operation in the Middle East. He received a commendation from the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency for outstanding performance. Mr. Vickers also completed the Career Training Program, a 15-month program for future Agency leaders, and the advanced paramilitary operations course.

As a Special Forces Officer, Mr. Vickers commanded a one-of-a-kind, 24-man, classified special operations unit. He played a major role in resolving on-scene two major incidents of international terrorism in Central America. He also directed con-
tingency intelligence collection activities throughout Latin America, and increased coverage in U.S. Southern Command’s area of responsibility by more than 200 percent. He regularly advised U.S. ambassadors, senior military commanders and other policy-level officials on military counterterrorist capabilities and crisis response options. He served on a unified command task force to plan contingency blockade and strike operations in Central America, led emergency evacuation operations in El Salvador and Suriname, and served as a national intelligence counterinsurgency advisor in El Salvador. As a second lieutenant, he graduated first in his class from the Special Forces Officer Course. Mr. Vickers was twice awarded the Meritorious Service Medal for outstanding operational performance.

Mr. Vickers holds a Bachelor of Arts, Cum Laude, in International Relations from the University of Alabama, and a Master of Business Administration from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. Mr. Vickers will soon complete a doctoral dissertation on the Structure of Military Revolutions, fulfilling the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree from Johns Hopkins University. During the 1996–1997 academic year, Mr. Vickers served as Acting Co-Director of the Strategic Studies Program at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and taught graduate courses in Strategy and Policy and Transformations of War.

Mr. Vickers holds Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information clearances.

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Mr. Vickers holds Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information clearances. He is married to Melana Zyla Vickers, and has five daughters.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Michael G. Vickers in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. **Name:** (Include any former names used.)
   Michael G. Vickers.

2. **Position to which nominated:**
   Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities).

3. **Date of nomination:**
   April 10, 2007.

4. **Address:** (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. **Date and place of birth:**
April 27, 1953; Burbank, CA.

6. **Marital Status:** (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Melana Zyla Vickers (Maiden Name: Melana Kalyna Zyla).

7. **Names and ages of children:**

8. **Education:** List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.

9. **Employment record:** List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
   - January 2007–Present, Senior Vice President, Strategic Studies, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1667 K Street, NW, Suite 900, Washington, DC.
   - September 1996–December 2006, Director of Strategic Studies, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW, Suite 912, Washington, DC.
   - July 1996–June 1997, Professorial Lecturer and Acting Co-Director of the Strategic Studies Program, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1740 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC.

10. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.

   Advisory/Consultative:
   - Member, Independent Special Operations Forces Assessment, 2005

   Full-Time Positions:

11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   - Senior Vice President, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 1667 K Street, NW, Suite 900, Washington, DC.

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
   - Member, National Presbyterian Church, Washington, DC.

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**
   (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
      None.
   (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
      Member, Republican National Committee, 2004–Present.
   (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

14. **Honors and awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
Bachelor of Arts, Cum Laude, University of Alabama, 1983.

Military Awards:
- Meritorious Service Medal (2).
- Good Conduct Medal.
- National Defense Service Medal.
- Ranger Tab.
- Parachutist Badge.
- Expert Infantry Badge.

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

16. **Speeches:** Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

17. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate? Yes.

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.  

MICHAEL G. VICKERS.
This 12th day of April, 2007.

[The nomination of Michael G. Vickers was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 23, 2007.]

**QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES**

**DEFENSE REFORMS**

*Question.* The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? Answer. No, not at this time.

*Question.* If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications? Answer. I see no need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act at this time.
Question. Do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?
Answer. Yes.

Question. From the perspective you have gained in your previous assignments, do you believe that the authority and responsibility of the combatant commanders, in general, and the Commander, United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM), in particular, are appropriate?
Answer. Yes. In general, the Commander, SOCOM’s authorities and responsibilities are appropriate. If confirmed, I will explore whether modification to personnel management authorities are required.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, SOCOM, to the following offices:
The Under Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. If confirmed, I would anticipate frequent interaction with the Under Secretaries, particularly in the development of military policy and the acquisition process. SOCOM maintains an especially close relationship with the Office of Under Secretary for Policy, who has primary responsibility for oversight of Special Operations Forces (SOF) operations and resources. Importantly, the law requires that we coordinate our involvement with the Office of the Secretary of Defense through the CJCS.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.
Answer. While SOCOM has the principal responsibility for the readiness and preparation of SOF in support of the Geographic Combatant Commanders, SOCOM’s ability to execute those missions would be greatly hindered without the sound policies and oversight, interagency coordination, and advocacy provided by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. Most of the Under Secretary for Policy oversight responsibilities regarding SOCOM are exercised through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
Answer. I anticipate continued close coordination and cooperation in the determination of SOCOM’s role in homeland defense and to determine the military support necessary to protect the United States and its citizens during times of national emergency.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. Commander, SOCOM, coordinates activities through the CJCS. This ensures the Chairman stays informed in order to execute his other responsibilities and also provides our command with the beneficial contributions of the Joint Staff. I see it as a commander’s duty to work with and through the Chairman in the execution of Presidential and Secretary of Defense directed taskings.
The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and when the Chairman is absent, or disabled, the Vice Chairman acts in his stead. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council responsibilities are delegated to the Vice Chairman. The VCJCS also regularly represents the Chairman on the Interagency Deputy's Committee, the Defense Acquisition Board, and other boards and councils as necessary. Thus, the VCJCS plays an essential role for the CJCS in fulfilling his principal military advisor obligations. Because of these important roles, communication between a combatant commander and the VCJCS is as essential as it is with the CJCS.
The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. The combatant commander’s authority over Service components, including those forces assigned to him, is clear but requires close coordination with the Secretaries to ensure no infringement on those lawful responsibilities the Service Secretary alone may discharge.
The Service Chiefs.
Answer. Without the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no combatant commander can hope to ensure the preparedness of his assigned forces for Presidential directed missions. Individually and collectively, the Joint Chiefs are a
source of experience and judgment that every combatant commander can call upon. If confirmed as Commander, SOCOM, I intend to continue a full and frank dialogue with the Chiefs of all the Services.

Question. The other combatant commanders.

Answer. The combatant commanders define requirements for their respective areas of operational responsibility, an effort that assists SOCOM in defining its support requirements. If confirmed, I intend to foster an atmosphere of teamwork and trust in my relationship with the combatant commanders. I will work closely with the other combatant commanders in order to best synchronize Department of Defense (DOD) activities in the global war on terrorism.

Question. The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center.

Answer. Our primary responsibility is to write the DOD’s global war on terrorism plan in support of the National Implementation Plan, which was developed by National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). In this role, SOCOM is actively engaged to support them. We have continuously assisted NCTC planning efforts and workgroups since its inception. SOCOM has actively supported their development through exercise funding and participation and the provision of embedded planners to coordinate SOCOM support, facilitate synchronization, and assist NCTC’s Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning with planning, implementation, and assessment efforts as required.

Question. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Answer. We are a consumer of CIA analysis. The Director of the CIA has been to SOCOM on numerous occasions over the last year. The CIA has liaison personnel at SOCOM and in the field, as well as SOCOM having a liaison at the CIA.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. If confirmed, you will be entering this important position at a critical time for the SOCOM. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

Answer. My 33 years in special operations have afforded me opportunities to serve and lead at every level. As a fully qualified SEAL operator with an advanced degree in National Security Affairs, I have both the training and education to lead this extraordinary force. I am a Middle Eastern specialist, a basic Arabic linguist, and an experienced joint planner. I have been decorated for personal valor as a SOF operator in two conflicts. My service in top leadership positions at both Service and joint headquarters has prepared me to operate at the senior levels of government. I have been involved in nearly every major decision regarding special operations for the last 4 years, and have represented SOCOM to the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense in several committees and working groups, including the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

MAJOR CHALLENGES/LESSONS LEARNED

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next Commander, SOCOM?

Answer. The major challenges are:

- Prioritizing the employment of SOF in order to gain maximum value from this limited asset.
- Sustaining the materiel readiness of our high-end mobility platforms in a resource constrained environment.
- Transforming our fixed-wing aviation fleet.
- Shifting to a more expeditionary deployment posture.
- Establishing the mechanisms and agreements with other agencies of government that will facilitate the best utilization of SOF globally.
- Maintaining appropriately streamlined acquisition processes and systems.
- Growing the force at the programmed rate while ensuring the quality and maturity that the Nation expects of SOF.

Question. What are the most important lessons you have learned during your tenure in senior leadership positions in the Special Operations community?

Answer. Our people remain our most valuable asset. SOF must be applied appropriately in order to conserve capability and capacity. SOF must remain flexible and responsive, with a strong set of unique skills and abilities that can be rapidly applied.

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to take a long-term approach to special operations. We have been extremely successful in responding to immediate requirements for several years at the expense of a fully executable long-term plan. I intend to form
teams to develop or improve long range vision for global posture, interagency relationships, joint training, SOF roles and missions, recruiting and retention, and technology development.

MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of Commander, SOCOM?

Answer. The Commander, SOCOM, lacks authority to manage the assignments, promotions, and pay of SOF. This inhibits his ability to meet his responsibility to ensure the combat readiness of the force.

The Commander, SOCOM, is designated the lead combatant commander for planning and synchronizing DOD activities against terrorists and terrorist networks. That said, SOCOM’s ability to drive behavior within DOD is limited due to unclear definition of authorities. That makes enforcement of those authorities difficult.

Question. What management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with the senior DOD leadership to clarify SOCOM’s authorities with respect to influencing or conducting operations inside and across other global combatant commanders’ areas of responsibility. This can be accomplished within DOD policy and planning documents during their next review cycles.

Personnel management authorities must be carefully considered with a goal of initiating solutions in fiscal year 2010.

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM

Question. From your perspective as Deputy Commander, SOCOM, what are the main “lessons learned” from Operation Iraqi Freedom, including the ongoing stability operations?

Answer. There remains a need to enhance the Joint Force Commander’s ability to integrate capabilities and capacities of both SOF and the general purpose forces (GPF) during execution of the global war on terrorism in order to create a joint force that is equally competent in irregular warfare as well as conventional warfare.

Three focus areas to achieving this goal are as follows:

• There is an overlap of SOF and GPF capabilities. SOF forces are routinely performing tasks that could be performed by existing GPF capabilities or GPF with additional training. Rebalancing GPF structure to mitigate shortfalls in low density/high demand SOF assets is essential to the global war on terrorism/Irregular Warfare (IW) effort.

• Our forces will continue to face an irregular enemy. There exists a necessity to move the IW concept to a full scale capability.

• Both SOF and GPF forces require enhanced language and cultural training

Addressing these focus areas would lead to a joint force with enhanced capabilities for IW and a balanced approach to warfighting that allows it to be as compelling in IW as it is in conventional warfare.

Question. What are the operational, research and development, and procurement implications of those lessons?

Answer. SOF must be organized, trained, equipped, and employed in a manner that enables full spectrum operations.

Question. How would you assess the adequacy of SOFs provided to Central Command, both in terms of quantity and mix, to conduct Operation Iraqi Freedom?

Answer. SOF in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of operations have proven to be extraordinarily capable and responsive to the needs of operational commanders. They provide operational flexibility to adequately meet mission requirements.

Question. What is the short- and long-term impact of continued operations in Iraq for SOFs, including in terms of readiness, retention, and modernization?

Answer. Short-term gains in combat experience at the cost of reduced capability in specific skill areas not utilized in OIF/OEF. Long-term impact is uncertain. I anticipate manpower and equipment recapitalization challenges.

AFGHANISTAN

Question. About 5 years after securing a military victory against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, U.S. and international forces are still fighting Taliban forces and other opponents of the Afghan government.

What is your assessment of the current situation in Afghanistan?
Answer. CENTOM has the lead for DOD’s efforts in Afghanistan, and we support CENTCOM in their strategy. I share the same view as Secretary Gates on Afghanistan. We are optimistic that efforts to rid Afghanistan of terrorists and build its new government are working. Things are headed in the right direction and we continue our work to eliminate enemy safe havens.

Answer. SOF are appropriately employed in both the direct action and irregular warfare role in order to suppress Taliban and al Qaeda activity while contributing to the long-term stability and security of Afghanistan.

That dual role of direct and indirect operations should continue to help resolve the conflict within Afghanistan. Where necessary, SOF must conduct direct action operations to help eliminate the armed threat. However, the indirect approach is vital to ensure success so the people of Afghanistan have the ability to maintain their own security and prosper.

POLICY OFFICE REORGANIZATION

Question. In your view, what is the impact on SOCOM of the ongoing reorganization of the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy?

Answer. SOCOM has not felt any significant impact to date from the reorganization.

Question. At what level do you believe most oversight of the command will occur—at the level of the Assistant Secretary or Deputy Assistant Secretary?

Answer. Most oversight will occur at the level of the Assistant Secretary.

TRANSFORMATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. Much attention has been focused on the transformation of our conventional Armed Forces to make them more capable of conducting counterinsurgency and combating terrorism missions.

Do our SOFs need to be transformed?

Answer. SOF can never remain stagnant and are in continuous transformation.

Question. If so, what is your vision for such a transformation, and how would the transformation of conventional forces complement a SOF transformation, and vice versa?

Answer. The foundation pillars of SOF transformation revolve around three Strategic Objectives: global war on terrorism Lead, Global Presence, and Global Expeditionary Force. SOCOM, while retaining an unequaled ability to conduct rapid and precise direct action operations, will also conduct operations in protracted regional and global campaigns designed to subvert, attrit, and exhaust an adversary rather than defeat him through direct conventional military confrontation.

Question. Are the SOCOM and DOD—particularly the military Services—investing in the technologies to transform SOF according to the vision you describe?

Answer. Yes, we are investing in those types of technologies. There are two integral parts to SOCOM’s technology program—leveraging the Services, Defense Agencies, and government laboratory efforts, while harvesting those technology efforts that can be rapidly transitioned into capabilities for the operator. We will continue to pursue technological advances that address SOF-unique requirements but which can also be integrated with the conventional forces.

RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. If confirmed, what metrics will you use to determine the effectiveness of SOCOM technology development investments and whether SOCOM is investing enough resources in these efforts?

Answer. We have created a series of technology road maps that assist us in identifying promising solutions to our problems. These road maps are schedule oriented; containing both the technology development time lines and the formal acquisition program schedules. As such, they have quantifiable metrics (cost, schedule, performance, and technology readiness) embedded in them.

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that SOCOM has the highest quality acquisition workforce to develop and manage acquisition and research and development programs?

Answer. The quality of our acquisition workforce is directly related to the combination of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) stand-
ards, the Services’ ability to continue to provide properly trained military acquisition personnel to fill our military billets, and our ability to hire qualified civilian personnel. The quality in our acquisition workforce comes from ensuring that SOCOM acquisition personnel (whether military or civilian) are trained and certified to DAWIA standards. This ensures they have the acquisition education, experience and training needed to effectively manage SOCOM acquisition, research and development programs. By virtue of a series of Memoranda of Agreement with the three Military Departments, SOCOM also has access to and can obtain experienced advice, program management support, and technical assistance from the Military Departments for our SOCOM acquisition programs.

BASING FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy released by the President in August 2004 called for SOFs from various overseas locations in Europe and the Pacific theater to be relocated to military installations in the United States in order to better manage the demand for forces and high operations tempo. Do you support this realignment of SOFs back to the United States?

Answer. Yes. The overall objective of the SOCOM Global SOF Posture (GSP) is to establish a worldwide persistent joint SOF presence to shape operational environments in support of the global war on terrorism and theater security cooperation initiatives. The realignment will permit a more tailor able force to accomplish this.

Question. In your opinion, does the realignment in any way diminish the ability of SOFs to support the requirements of combatant commanders? If so, how would you propose to address this problem?

Answer. No. Implementation of the GSP, when combined with SOF growth, provides SOCOM the ability to manage SOF from a global perspective and provides better flexibility to meet the increasing demands of the combatant commanders.

Question. In your opinion, are SOFs based at locations in the United States appropriately positioned to facilitate joint training, operations, and rapid deployment?

Answer. Yes. Currently we have SOF spread throughout the United States with the majority on or near both coasts. Although there are no true joint bases, our units are generally based in close enough proximity to enable joint training. If confirmed, I would seek additional opportunities to enhance joint training.

Question. In your view, with the growth of SOFs end strength should any military installations in the United States be designated solely as Special Operations bases?

Answer. No. SOCOM is not structured or resourced to manage military bases. The support provided by the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps in their roles as executive agents enables our forces to maintain their Service culture, enhances SOF recruiting, and provides SOF with access to Service-common facilities and transportation hubs resident on or near major military installations. This close proximity to our Services helps facilitate mobility and jointness without degrading our SOF-unique requirements and capabilities.

Question. In your opinion, does SOCOM have access to sufficient ranges in the United States to be able to adequately train for the full range of joint, combined arms special operations missions?

Answer. Yes. We have access to a spectrum of ranges but face ongoing coordination, utilization, and access challenges. Some of the ranges we have historically used require intensive coordination and often changes to training schedules to ensure sufficient range time. SOCOM and its components, together with the Services, are diligently working the issues. The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) is assisting us in certifying USMC ranges for nonstandard weapons. The U.S. Army SOCOM has been very successful working with Army to ensure Army SOF requirements are planned and built into Army ranges. The Air Force SOCOM worked with the Joint National Training Center to establish a Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) range for AC–130 gunship use. We are assessing the feasibility of investing in SOF ranges or in establishing right-of-first-use agreements at installations with ranges that support our requirements to improve access and reduce schedule changes. Further, we are looking at options for moving some training closer to our home bases.

COMBATING TERRORISM

Question. If confirmed, you would play an integral role in the Department’s combating terrorism mission. Which DOD official provides the primary civilian oversight with regard to SOCOM’s combating terrorism mission?
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., section 138, establishes the duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict. He is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense on special operations and low-intensity conflict, as well as the senior management official within the Department for special operations and low intensity conflict. These responsibilities include the overall supervision of special operations directed toward combating terrorism.

Question. What other DOD officials would be involved in oversight of SOCOM’s combating terrorism mission?

Answer. The Under Secretaries of Defense for Intelligence and Policy both provide oversight, direction, and guidance to SOCOM’s efforts to execute its mission. I would anticipate continued, frequent interaction with these two principal Under Secretaries.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Question. Information operations and information warfare will likely play an increasing role in 21st century warfare. What is your definition of information operations, and what role do you envision for SOCOM in overall U.S. information operations?

Answer. Information operations are the integrated employment of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own information systems.

SOF play a significant role utilizing Information Operations to achieve DOD objectives in the global war on terrorism. Through the Geographic Combatant Commanders, SOCOM plans and integrates the full range of information operations capabilities to deter, deny and degrade extremist operations and networks, while building partner nation capabilities and eliminating the conditions that foment terrorism.

SOCOM is the DOD proponent for psychological operations (PSYOP) forces, training, and capabilities.

Question. Under what circumstances would the Commander, SOCOM, conduct information operations as a supported combatant commander?

Answer. As the DOD lead for planning and synchronizing the war on terrorism, SOCOM guides collaborative planning, coordination, and when directed, execution of information operations. As the supported command, SOCOM envisions execution of information operations to support surgical, limited duration, counterterrorism missions, as well as support to long range planning to develop coordinated, trans-regional strategies against terrorists and their supporters.

Along with the DOD, SOCOM is also working with the Department of State and other government agencies to develop integrated national Strategic Communication processes and responsibilities, in which information operations plays a significant role.

SUPPORTED COMBATANT COMMAND

Question. As Deputy Commander, SOCOM, you have been involved in the exercise of SOCOM’s responsibilities as a supported combatant command, and as a supporting combatant command.

In your view, under what circumstances should SOCOM conduct operations as a supported combatant command?

Answer. When near simultaneous operations must be conducted within two or more Global Combatant Commands, SOCOM would provide the oversight to ensure synchronization and de-confliction of these operations.

Also, a scenario that requires a very small and precise operation that is SOF-perticular in nature could lead to designation of SOCOM as the supported commander.

Question. In your view, what resource, organization, and force structure changes, if any, are required in order for SOCOM to more effectively conduct both supporting and supported combatant command responsibilities?

Answer. To meet our responsibilities as a supported combatant command we must to continue to: properly man our components and headquarters; ensure they have the latest equipment and technology; and develop a better cross global combatant command, Service, coalition and interagency compatible collaborative planning and execution environment. We must also expand upon our liaison officer and Special Operations Support Team programs with our coalition partners and agencies.

Aircraft modernization, ISR platforms, and global sensor network are three key areas that require additional resources.
RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. How successful has SOCOM been in recruiting and retaining the personnel it needs?
Answer. The personnel readiness of SOF is excellent. Our primary focus in fiscal year 2007 has been to maintain readiness while executing current operational requirements and personnel growth. Execution of retention incentives, coupled with the expansion of our training base and ongoing efforts to improve recruiting, are the way forward as we maintain and grow the force.

Recently implemented retention and bonus programs are having a positive impact across all SOF personnel from all Services. Retention numbers to date meet or exceed each Service's retention goals.

We are cautiously optimistic that recently implemented recruiting and retention incentive programs will continue to positively shape the force.

Question. What are the biggest challenges to retention you see in the SOCOM community?
Answer. The greatest challenge will be the continued funding of retention incentives in a climate of constrained resources.

Question. Specifically, what is the status of the efforts to increase retention within SOCOM's components, and especially among the Navy SEAL officers, all senior NCOs, and pilots?
Answer. SEAL officers will be eligible for the Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) in 2007, which targets officers in pay grades O–4 through O–6, with the goal of retaining selected officers up to the 25-year career milestone. It complements the existing Officer Career Pay that was implemented in 1999 for officers with 6–14 years of service. Since inception of the Officer Career Pay, retention increased from a low of 34 percent to an average of 64 percent. Although the results are still undetermined, the CSRB is expected to influence retention behavior among Navy SEAL officers.

To retain the experience of senior noncommissioned officers, the combination of CSRB and Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) is producing positive results. For Army SOF in particular, the inception of the CSRB and AIP in fiscal year 2005 is retaining a more mature force. The average retirement time in service stood at 21.7 years for Special Forces (SF) personnel. We were losing experienced leaders at a critical career juncture. Fiscal year 2007 data shows that SF personnel now retire at an average of 25 plus years time in service. This is a significant jump in the right direction since inception of the CSRB and targeted AIPs. This combination is also working well for the other SOF components.

The Air Force Fixed Wing pilot population is being monitored closely due to an increased number of young aviators being assigned. This lack of experience concerns us because of the special skills required to fly SOF mission profiles. This is why we are looking at ways to increase the experience levels of fixed wing pilots. We have identified the critical attributes believed to be keys to success of SOF aviators and they will be stressed in our recruitment efforts. From an assessment perspective, we currently measure progress at every level of training and will continually look for ways to strengthen our evaluation rigor throughout the process. The Air Force SOCOM, partnered with the Air Force, Air National Guard, and Air Force Reserves, will continue to explore various venues in order to increase aircrew experience levels.

Question. What steps need to be taken, in your view, to meet the recruiting and retention goals of each of the Services' SOFs?
Answer. Recruiting will continue to be challenging. To mitigate these challenges, we need your help in increasing the recruiting budgets of the Services. The Services need greater flexibility to reward those qualified candidates who accept the challenges of Special Operations training. Recruiting commands need the flexibility of additional resources to apply to areas that are most underresourced. By continuing to work with the Services, I believe we will continue to improve the SOF accession numbers.

Question. What monetary or nonmonetary incentives do you believe would be most effective in this regard?
Answer. Monetary incentives including the Selective Re-enlistment Bonus (SRB), Officer Continuation Pay (OCP), Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB), Special Duty Assignment Pay (SDAP), and Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) are proving to be critical force shaping tools. To date, these have been the most effective retention tools we have. Additionally, providing targeted enlistment bonuses for new SOF accession candidates will help shape the future force.

We are currently exploring other quality of life benefits that are difficult to quantify or measure in order to optimize their impact on retention and readiness. I be-
lieve that intangible incentives, such as camaraderie, job satisfaction, and family support are just as important, if not more, so than monetary ones. However, the monetary incentives are the only metrics we can quantifiably measure at this time. We will study the potential impact of adjustment to retirement packages.

MARINE CORPS SPECIAL OPERATORS

Question. What do you believe should be the appropriate relationship between the Marine Corps and SOCOM?

Answer. SOCOM should work with the Marine Corps as it does with the other Services. A close relationship is especially important now as the Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) continues to gain initial capabilities.

Question. Do you believe that Marines should be “SOF for life,” just as Army SOFs are?

Answer. Yes, the career path of Marine SOF should be modeled after the other SOF components.

Question. What can be done to improve the training of marines in the Marine Corps Special Operations units to ensure that they possess the language capabilities and cultural awareness that are needed for counterterrorism and training missions?

Answer. The MARSOC is still not fully manned but is maturing at a faster than expected rate, benefiting from our other Service components’ lessons learned. It has implemented a qualification pipeline that includes language and cultural training. Additionally, their principal training unit has regionally oriented its teams to facilitate regionally focused training. Their program requires continued emphasis and we must provide for sufficient training capability afloat to account for sustainment and mission changes. They are on the right track.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS

Question. What current missions, if any, do you believe can and should be divested by SOCOM, and why?

Answer. SOF should not divest any mission areas. There are some tasks that should be handed off to GPPs at the right time.

Question. Are there any additional missions that you believe SOCOM should assume, and, if so, what are they and why do you advocate adding them?

Answer. No, our current mission set is appropriate to meet requirements to conduct both direct and in-direct operations.

Question. What can be done to ensure that SOF missions with medium- and long-term impact, such as unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense, receive as much emphasis as direct action, and that they receive appropriate funding?

Answer. Continue to fully implement the QDR decisions related to SOF growth in both capability and capacity. This will enable enhanced training and more robust presence outside of CENTCOM’s AOR.

Continue to support section 1208/1202 authorities as we work with the Theater SOCOMs to support their regional efforts.

SIZE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

Question. The QDR called for increases in the size of SOFs. Do you believe that we should increase the number of special operations personnel? If so, why, and by how much? If confirmed, would you consider greater increases than those envisioned in the QDR?

Answer. The QDR directed growth in both the size and capabilities of SOF, allowing SOCOM to accomplish its increased missions and responsibilities of synchronizing the global war on terrorism as both a supported and supporting command. Overall, the QDR increases SOF by 13,119 personnel, which will: grow U.S. Army Special Forces, Rangers, SOF aviation, Active-Duty U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations; increase SEAL Team force levels; establish MARSOC as the Marine Corps component of SOCOM; and create a SOF unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) squadron. This QDR directed growth will address most of the current manpower shortages faced by SOCOM. However, we are constantly evaluating and analyzing current and emerging missions, and any additional force structure or manpower required to support these requirements. At this time, our most pressing capability gap is in the area of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. SOCOM is working to address this shortfall, but in the future may require additional funding and equipment to close the gap.

Question. In your view, how can the size of SOFs be increased, while also maintaining the rigorous recruiting and training standards for special operators?

Answer. This must be a two-pronged strategy. The first must be retention efforts aimed at mid- and senior-level SOF warriors. This will mitigate gaps until the grow-
ing force matures. Second, it is imperative that the training standards for SOF not be diluted. While we look at ways to increase the proficiency within the training pipelines, we will maintain the standards necessary for our forces.

CIVIL AFFAIRS UNITS

*Question.* The increased role of the United States military in numerous missions throughout the world has stressed SOCOM, in particular the civil affairs units, most of which are in the Army Reserve.

If the current high operational tempo continues, would it be advisable to increase the number of civil affairs units?

*Answer.* This is something I would like to analyze over time.

*Question.* If so, should the increase be in the Active Army or the Army Reserve and why?

*Answer.* Given the recent transition of Reserve Component Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units to the Army, that is where most increases should be concentrated should they be needed. SOF retained the Active-Duty Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units, which were increased as part of the QDR.

*Question.* What impact has the high operational tempo had on recruiting and retention in Reserve Civil Affairs units?

*Answer.* To date, Army Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations branches are relatively strong. Recruiting remains a focus for junior officers while senior officers and enlisted inventories are manned at greater than 100 percent strength.

*Question.* Reserve Civil Affairs personnel are now under the administrative command of the Army. What impact do you believe this is having, and will have on the training, equipping and promotion and individual assignments of Civil Affairs reservists?

*Answer.* The transfer of U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) Civil Affairs personnel to the command of the Army occurred in October 2006 in an effort to ensure better integration of USAR Civil Affairs units with conventional forces. This action has been worked extensively by special working groups from SOCOM, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and the U.S Army to ensure that the full Civil Affairs capability is maintained and that the warfighting requirements of the combatant commanders are met. SOCOM, through the U.S. Army SOCOM, continues to retain joint proponentcy for both Active and Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations forces, as well as the Training Center of Excellence. I have full confidence in the U.S. Army’s ability to fully execute its title 10 responsibilities in order to ensure the proper training, equipping, and promotion of Civil Affairs soldiers within the U.S. Army Reserve.

The overall impact of this transfer to date is minimal.

READINESS AND OPTEMPO

*Question.* To what extent has the pace of operations in recent years had an impact on U.S. SOCOM’s readiness, retention, and resources?

*Answer.* Since September 11, 2001, the increased role of SOF in fighting the global war on terrorism has been accompanied by increased requests for base year and supplemental funding. In fiscal year 2001, SOCOM received a total of $2.3 billion; the current fiscal year 2008, the President’s budget request seeks $6.2 billion; in addition, the fiscal year 2008 global war on terrorism request seeks another $2 billion in supplemental funding to support global war on terrorism requirements.

With regard to retention, overall OPTEMPO has not had an adverse effect on morale, recruitment, and retention. Morale and retention are closely linked. Retention rates remain high for our enlisted SOF operators.

*Question.* What actions can be taken to reduce any negative impacts?

*Answer.* Full and timely funding of the fiscal year 2008 President’s budget request and the fiscal year 2008 global war on terrorism will provide SOCOM with the resources needed to meet the challenges of its increased missions and responsibilities of synchronizing the global war on terrorism.

*Question.* Do you expect the QDR-related personnel increases to alleviate the strain?

*Answer.* The QDR directed growth in both the size and capabilities of SOF, allowing SOCOM to accomplish its increased missions and responsibilities of synchronizing the global war on terrorism as both a supported and supporting command. Overall, the QDR increases SOF by 13,119 personnel, and will: grow U.S. Army Special Forces, Rangers, and SOF aviation; grow Active Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations; increase SEAL Team force levels; establish MARSOC as the Marine Corps component of SOCOM; and create a SOF unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
squadron. This growth will enable some OPTEMPO relief. More importantly, it will permit SOF presence in selected areas where we have been underrepresented for several years.

**Question.** What is the current state of special operations readiness, for all missions, for all Service components?

**Answer.** Operational readiness is at an all time high. Never in the history of our organization has the SOF community received the level of resource support, attention, and cooperation that we have realized and programmed from the President, Congress, and the Service Chiefs. At the same time, it is important to mention that deploying operational tempos for the average servicemember assigned to a SOF unit, and equipment utilization rates are also at their highest point in the history of our organization. Managing the second and third order effects of compressed rotational timelines, increased wear and tear on equipment, and impacts within the families of our dedicated servicemembers is a challenge that requires constant intrusive management and planning.

It is important to note that some manning shortfalls exist in a number of select skill sets across all Service components. We are managing this issue through increased accessions into the various pipelines, targeted pay incentives, and increased recruiting efforts.

**Question.** Is it your understanding that these readiness assessments include an assessment of current language skills for your geographically-specialized operators? Should they?

**Answer.** SOCOM has paid inadequate attention to the true language readiness of our force as a measure of total operational readiness. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that readiness assessment includes language metrics.

**Question.** What actions need to be taken, in your view, to address reduced language and cultural awareness proficiency that results from the fact that SOCOM has not been able to deploy many personnel to their regional areas of expertise?

**Answer.** In the current environment, training time is short and precious. We are still deploying SOF around the world but in smaller numbers outside of CENTCOM and the rotations of units not regionally oriented for CENTCOM has had an impact on language and regional capability.

Most SOF language requirements and abilities are in the Army component (Special Forces) and most of the initial language and culture training is conducted in our basic training pipelines.

We need to make it easier for personnel to train by providing greater access to proven, high quality training that can be delivered more flexibly than the traditional classroom but that has proven, measurable, results that are at least comparable to traditional training. Options that have worked well for us include tailored, low student to teacher ratio classes and delivering live training over the web.

Immersion and iso-immersion are training formats that produce significant results in short periods for students who have already attained basic proficiency (level 1). Since CENTCOM rotations make training time even more scarce, immersion and iso-immersion training are effective, if costly, means of maximizing the capability gained in the short periods available.

Our current language proficiency (i.e. testing) measurement process has a direct, negative impact on our training programs and, ultimately, capability. Conversing is the key foreign language skill for special operators; however, current test policy, infrastructure, and capacity focus on the read/listen portion of Defense Language Proficiency Tests that are increasingly constructed to serve users whose military tasks center on listening at proficiency Level 2 and higher.

The result is that our instructors focus on read/listen skills to demonstrate their effectiveness and our students focus on read/listen skills to obtain foreign language incentive pay while our key requirement is for speaking. SOF's language tasks are most often performed in face-to-face conversations. The listening component of these newer read/listen tests is less relevant to our requirements.

Those willing to dedicate the time should be provided a funded incentive. Funding foreign language incentive pay for personnel whose language proficiency is Level 1 or 1+ is important to increasing our capability. Special Operations personnel generally attend courses that target Level 1 proficiency and will train with a regional focus so that subsequent training and assignments will enhance the individual's capability over a career in SOF. Incentive pay at 1 and 1+ helps bridge the gap from initial SOF capability to higher levels.

Increased provision of role players, in language, across a wider range of exercises will also help to identify deficiencies while cementing the importance of the cultural and language expertise. In the long-term we need to increase the level of our capability and, as previously alluded to, eventually reaching a "closed-loop" for all SOF
operators. Regional orientation for specific units will capitalize on training and experience investments while yielding more expert capability.

Question. If confirmed, what language programs, if any, would you put in place to maintain and improve language skills?

Answer. There are some common elements in most of our programs. We normally target language proficiency level 1 for initial courses. All of our courses include relevant cultural content. SOCOM has a mature language training program in place within Army SOF and we need to continue this program and ensure it is fully funded.

The Marine SOF are rapidly establishing language and culture training as integral parts of their qualifying training. They have well thought-out plans in implementation now for sustainment and enhancement. Currently, this is focused primarily on their trainers but it is envisioned to eventually include the whole force. In the interim, tailored training is provided to the counterterrorism units. Exportable training support packages are also being provided to enable training enroute for units afloat as missions may change. The long-term effectiveness of the Marine SOF program hinges on retaining Marine SOF within SOCOM and targeted regional orientation.

Regionalization is of less importance to SOF Air Force units, with the exception of one squadron that specializes in training foreign forces. This squadron recently implemented a training pipeline and their initial and subsequent training are tied to regional orientation but, without repetitive assignments in SOF will have limited success.

We are conducting several joint SOF language training programs now and are assessing the results. We expect ready access to training time and gyms to remain fit but we are often unable to meet that same standard for language training.

These programs must be supported and facilitated with appropriate funding, incentives, personnel assignment and management policies, and relevant testing.

TRAINING AND EQUIPPING INDIGENOUS FORCES FIGHTING WITH SOF

Question. In section 1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Congress gave SOCOM a 2-year authority to train and equip indigenous forces fighting alongside U.S. special operators. This year the Department is seeking a reauthorization.

Answer. During the last 3 years (fiscal years 2005–2007), SOCOM has coordinated with the Geographic Combatant Commanders to use section 1208 funding authority in every theater. In some cases, it has been used to better enable partner nation forces to support us in fixing and finishing terrorists (e.g., the Philippines). In others, it has been used to employ indigenous elements to gain access to hostile areas where U.S. forces cannot openly operate and obtain information about potential terrorist targets which could not be obtained through conventional intelligence collection methods (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and Horn of Africa). In all cases, section 1208 authority has provided invaluable access and information that has saved American lives and contributed to the successful apprehension of high-value terrorist targets.

Question. If confirmed, how and where would you use this authority?

Answer. First, let me make the point that section 1208 funding authority is used by the Geographic Combatant Commanders who are conducting military operations using SOF. SOCOM does not conduct its own section 1208 operations. Nevertheless, I would continue to support the Global Combatant Commanders in using section 1208 in support of counterterrorist operations to gain access to terrorist safe havens and seek information that only indigenous tribes and native inhabitants can provide. Our supported commanders have confirmed repeatedly that section 1208 funding authority is an absolutely essential tool in the war on terrorism.

ADVANCED SEAL DELIVERY SYSTEM (ASDS)

Question. To date, about $885 million has been spent on developing the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS). The fiscal year 2008 request for ASDS is $10.6 million for procurement and $20.3 million for research and development.

In your view, can SOCOM afford to have more than one ASDS?

Answer. The original requirement for a small fleet of manned dry submersibles is unchanged, but it is clear that more than one of the current ASDS platform is unaffordable unless costs can be reduced. The Department cancelled the original ASDS program. As a result only one ASDS hull exists, and only the correction of reliability problems on that hull (designated ASDS–1) remain to be completed. The fiscal year 2008 funding is being used to correct these deficiencies through the in-
stallation of a series of design and reliability improvements. The Navy will be conducting an Alternate Material Solutions Analysis to determine how to best meet current and future SOF undersea warfare requirements. The analysis will examine a broad range of potential material solutions and will recommend a solution or combination of solutions to satisfy the capability gaps identified in a recent capability gap analysis performed by the Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command. The Alternate Material Solutions Analysis will also include the respective cost estimates for the various solutions. This will be completed by February 2008 and will inform any future program decisions.

Question. How long will it take for you to ensure that we have an operational ASDS?
Answer. We expect ASDS–1 to become fully operational and ready for deployment to meet assigned missions in fiscal year 2008. The ASDS Reliability Improvement Program was initiated in fiscal year 2006 to improve the operational reliability of the existing ASDS vehicle (ASDS–1), in order to make it fully operational and ready for deployment to meet assigned missions. The ASDS Reliability Improvement Program is on schedule. This ongoing reliability effort represents the major portions of the funding shown in the fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2008 budget exhibits. As a result of this effort, ASDS–1 has demonstrated significantly improved reliability within the past year during both independent and mated underway operations.

TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the Department of Defense Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?
Answer. Yes.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that the command strictly complies with the DOD Law of War program. The program is enforced through prompt investigation of allegations of abuse and where appropriate, disciplinary actions, to include prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Question. The DOD Inspector General recently released a report on detainee abuse noting reports of detainee abuse by a Special Mission Unit (SMU) Task Force in Iraq that took place before the behaviors at Abu Ghraib came to light. Additionally, the report noted that personnel in this SMU Task Force introduced battlefield interrogation techniques that included abusive tactics such as sleep deprivation, stress positions, the use of dogs, and the use of Survival Escape Resistance and Evasion techniques—techniques designed specifically to imitate tactics by a country that does not comply with Geneva.

Do you believe that such techniques contribute to and are appropriate in a struggle against terrorism?
Answer. No.

Question. What is your understanding of how battlefield interrogation techniques by such units were monitored and authorized?
Answer. I have no personal knowledge of the battlefield interrogation techniques noted above and who may or may not have authorized those techniques for use. I do know that some of these techniques (such as sleep deprivation) were outlined in the old Army Field Manual and were, within certain limits, permissible.

Question. Have the responsible SMU personnel been held accountable for their actions? If not, why not?
Answer. The personnel (whose conduct is described in the DOD IG report of investigation) were assigned to another combatant command during the time of the conduct that formed the basis of that investigation. I am not thoroughly familiar with the corrective actions taken by that command in response to the investigative find-
ings and recommendations. I am, however, aware of several instances of administrative and punitive actions against SOF personnel who were found to be in violation of the combatant commander’s policies.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that our SOFs understand the necessity of complying with the Geneva Conventions when detaining and interrogating individuals under U.S. control?

Answer. The DOD Law of War Program and SOCOM require that all DOD personnel and contractors must conduct operations in a manner consistent with the Law of War and U.S. domestic law and policy. Additionally, the DOD Detainee Program and Army Field manuals for detainee operations and interrogations have similar requirements. SOCOM enforces these regulations through unit and individual training before and during all missions and on an annual basis. I would continue this practice as one of my top priorities.

Question. What steps would you take to ensure that those foreign forces trained by our SOFs understand the same necessity?

Answer. As part of such training, our SOFs always indicate that further military assistance and training is predicated on such foreign forces adherence to the law of war.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

ARMING INSURGENTS

1. Senator Akaka. Vice Admiral Olson, it has been reported in the media recently that we are arming Sunni insurgents so that they can fight al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Do you believe this is a good policy? If so, how are we ensuring that these weapons are not turned against us either during the battle with AQI or after the battle is over?

Admiral Olson. I would defer the bulk of this question to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). That said, from a Special Operations Forces (SOF) perspective, some tribal sheikhs, both Sunni and Shia, have approached our special operations A-detachments and asked for support to provide security for their tribal areas and to rid them of foreign extremists. This is an opportunity to enhance efforts to fight al Qaeda by capitalizing on local opposition to al Qaeda in areas where such opposition did not previously exist. The plan is relatively modest in scope by providing security training to carefully vetted tribal members, who would be formed into “community watch” elements to report on suspicious intruders and protect the tribes from brutalism. This Department of Defense (DOD) approved plan does not include arming these watch groups, however, many of them do have their own arms.
2. Senator AKAKA. Vice Admiral Olson, how will we make sure that the weapons are returned or destroyed when they are not needed anymore?

Admiral OLSON. Exports of Defense-related goods and technology can have significant impact on our Nation’s security. We need to ensure that export of weapons support our security interests by protecting important military advantages and by supporting the military capabilities of our allies and friends that serve our mutual defense interests. The U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) controls and accounts for defense articles and services provided to foreign nationals (both permanent and temporary transfers) by issuing guidance consistent with national security objectives and U.S. foreign policy. The goal of this guidance is to ensure all SOCOM’s forces understand and comply with U.S. statutory requirements and DOD policies that govern U.S. international transfers of defense articles and services. Furthermore, the guidance issued outlines operational limitations and provisos which are designed to make certain all defense articles and services transferred to foreign nationals are accounted for and monitored throughout all phases of operations. Weapons are issued as required for specific duties and those not permanently transferred are returned when units are demobilized.

3. Senator AKAKA. Vice Admiral Olson, how is our support to the insurgents perceived by the Kurds and the Shia?

Admiral OLSON. Senior Kurdish leaders have expressed limited concern over additional armed elements facing the security of Iraq. Kurdish leaders acknowledge the often hostile forces operating in the region, and understand they must balance Kurdish goals of independence with U.S. aims to stabilize Iraq and defeat al Qaeda. Arming insurgents operating in central and southern Iraq poses minimal imposition to Kurdish interests and authorities in northern Iraq.

Senior Shia Iraqi government leaders have expressed skepticism about coalition forces arming insurgent groups as a way of fighting al Qaeda, and they are concerned that arming the insurgents would create new militias that would eventually add to Iraqi security challenges and promote sectarian violence. Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki expressed his protest and insisted those bearing arms without permission would be considered militias and would be dealt with as such. We are sensitive to the concerns of the Iraqi government, and are working to ensure these groups are properly vetted and coordinated with the ISF, to create a mutually-beneficial relationship between the central government and these local security units.

CHANGE IN MILITARY STRATEGY

4. Senator AKAKA. Vice Admiral Olson, what would be the impact, in your opinion, if we were to change our military strategy in Iraq so that our troops would only be used to conduct offensive operations against terrorist organizations (i.e., AQI, etc.), and all other Iraqi security was immediately turned over to Iraqi security forces? The advantage in doing this is that our troops would still be in the theater (although probably at reduced levels) and engaging those organizations that were deliberately inflaming sectarian strife, but would not be trying to maintain security throughout Iraq. Of course, they would be able to defend themselves, if attacked, and they could re-engage if the security situation showed signs of catastrophic failure. Please provide your opinion on how a strategy change like this might impact the conflict in Iraq.

Admiral OLSON. In my opinion, the impact would likely be a deteriorating security situation that would make our continuation of “offensive operations” very difficult. Our current counterinsurgency operations are amplifying our ability to conduct offensive operations against terrorist organizations, including AQI. Without earning the trust and support of local populations through our new strategy, gathering the intelligence to go after key terrorist leaders and networks would become increasingly difficult.

It is essential that U.S. forces remain engaged in the training and development of the Iraqi Army. At the tactical level, many of the Iraqi units have proven marginally capable. However, at higher echelons it is apparent that the support structure is not yet in place to enable self-sufficiency. Therefore, without the support of U.S. forces, the Iraqi Army would potentially fail in their security mission.

As an aside, it is important to note that “terrorist organizations” would be too narrow a definition of organizations posing a threat to stability in Iraq. Using the latter definition of “organizations that were deliberately inflaming sectarian strife” would be more appropriate as there are a number of groups responsible for the cycle of sectarian violence that are not labeled as terrorist organizations (e.g.: the Jaysh
al Mahdi). Additionally, the definition would have to include both Sunni and Shi'a threats, as fringe elements of both contribute to the current situation.

**CONTRACTOR ROLES IN IRAQ**

5. Senator Akaka. Vice Admiral Olson, during your confirmation hearing, Senator Webb asked you if our SOF in Iraq were working with contractors who were performing an operational role. You stated that all of SOCOM's contractors were support only, but that you did not know if they worked in conjunction with contractors hired by other commands that are performing an operational role. You said that you would study the issue, if confirmed. When do you expect to have the results of your study? Please inform me of the results of your study when they are available.

Admiral Olson. In my response to Senator Webb, I intended to indicate that I would look into DOD policy concerning contractors in the battlefield. SOCOM does not have cognizance over contractors that are hired by other combatant commanders or the authority to initiate a manpower study over them. Concerning DOD policy, in 2005 the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics promulgated a DOD-wide policy on this subject in DOD Instruction, 3020.41, entitled "Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces." My views on this subject are consistent with that policy. If confirmed, I would enforce that policy at SOCOM.

In general, contractor personnel may support contingency operations through their indirect participation in military operations, by providing communications support, transporting munitions and other supplies, performing maintenance functions for military equipment, and providing security services. However, there are numerous issues that need to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. DOD Instruction 3020.41 provides a process for considering and making informed judgments on those issues.

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**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EVAN BAYH**

**UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE (UAV) REQUIREMENTS**

6. Senator Bayh. Vice Admiral Olson, according to your testimony in April, SOCOM is unable to fulfill its standard UAV orbit requirement. It is my understanding that SOCOM's long-term budget does not contain enough funding to manage this gap in the short-term. If so, how would you address this unacceptable budgetary and requirement shortfall?

Admiral Olson. SOCOM continues to rely on a combination of service-provided and SOF-unique airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to help meet our needs, and our current unmanned aerial system roadmap already incorporates service programs such as the MQ-1 Predator, RQ-7 Shadow, and MQ-9 Reaper. Currently we are working with CENTCOM and the Joint Staff to meet the immediate surge requirement of SOF in that theater. At the same time, we are formalizing our fiscal years 10 to 15 enduring ISR requirements for submission to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. Our plan is to maximize the use of Service programs as a means to satisfy our requirements.

7. Senator Bayh. Vice Admiral Olson, what strategy would you employ to ensure that not only enough UAVs are in the air, but also have the communication infrastructure, logistical chain, and pilot/operator availability needed to meet this SOCOM requirement?

Admiral Olson. We view the air vehicle as one part of a complete system. Our current Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) requirements include the communication infrastructure, logistics support, and pilot and sensor operator availability. Our strategy is to resource, acquire, and field complete systems.

8. Senator Bayh. Vice Admiral Olson, please describe SOCOM's current and 5-year medium altitude UAV requirements. Are you able to meet current requirements now and do you expect SOCOM to be able to meet its medium altitude UAV requirements 5 years from now? Please include in your answer personnel, new or current vehicles, communication infrastructure, and logistical chains necessary to meet this SOCOM requirement?

Admiral Olson. The U.S. CENTCOM, which SOCOM endorsed, and the Joint Staff and Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell validated earlier this year. We expect this requirement to be met by a combination of resources from across the DOD, and we
are working with CENTCOM, the U.S. Strategic Command, and the Joint Staff to meet this need.

We are using lessons learned from SOF combat operations in multiple theaters to define our future requirements for manned and unmanned Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Once codified, we will submit our fiscal year 2010–2015 ISR enduring requirements for submission to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.

**JOINT RANGES**

9. Senator Bayh. Vice Admiral Olson, would the use of SOF dedicated joint ranges, especially with respect to airspace, permit better training than you currently have?

Admiral Olson. Yes. However, access to current ranges is the key element for SOF training. Current operational tempo for SOF and conventional forces has increased the range requirements for all Services. As SOF have few dedicated ranges, SOCOM Service Component Commands are required to share available times with conventional forces. SOCOM currently has standing memoranda of understanding with tenant command range managers which ensure our components access to ranges. Range management is best facilitated through service tenant organizations. The prioritization of SOCOM components in intra-service range scheduling would greatly assist in future range requirements.

**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK L. PRYOR**

**SPECIAL FORCES REQUIREMENTS**

10. Senator Pryor. Vice Admiral Olson, what is the timeline required to grow the force and increase the number of operators in the field?

Admiral Olson. SOCOM plans to add 5 Special Forces battalions, which will consist of 444 personnel per year beginning fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2012.

11. Senator Pryor. Vice Admiral Olson, what aviation requirements will be needed to compliment an increase in the numbers of future Special Forces units?

Admiral Olson. We will need a mix of SOF fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and tilt-rotor aircraft (both manned and unmanned) to provide SOF mobility, strike, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capability. Currently programmed increases in SOF aviation capacity adequately address our current growth in the Future Years’ Defense Program. In fiscal year 2008, we are beginning a recapitalization program for our SOF-tanker force. Recapitalizing our fleet of 37- to 40-year-old aircraft will increase our mobility capacity through improved aircraft capabilities and readiness of the fleet. In conjunction with this recapitalization effort is a study on the overarching long-term SOF mobility requirements. This study will be completed in the fall 2007. We are also working with Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Services to acquire a fleet of small and medium commercial variant military aircraft to fill a critical capability gap. This small fleet of commercial variant aircraft will have the ability to move small SOF teams in friendly but politically sensitive areas in support of the global war on terrorism.

**JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT**

12. Senator Pryor. Vice Admiral Olson, what role will the Joint Cargo Aircraft play in SOCOM?

Admiral Olson. The JCA will have a role in providing intra-theater airlift, where US military presence is acceptable, for SOFs just as C-17s, C-5s, C-130s and Operational Support Aircraft currently support.

That being said, JCA can only support a small part of the overall SOF airlift requirement. There is no “one-size-fits-all” solution when it comes to moving SOFs. SOF requires flexibility in platforms so that small teams can be moved and supported in austere locations with maximum efficiency and most importantly—with limited visibility.

**BODY ARMOR**

13. Senator Pryor. Vice Admiral Olson, what type of body armor does SOCOM use?
Admiral Olson. The SOF's approved standard body armor system consists of the Releasable Body Armor Vest (RBAV), hard armor plates, soft armor inserts, and Modular Supplemental Armor Protection (MSAP). This body armor system falls under the Special Operations Personal Equipment Advanced Requirements (SPEAR) program line.

14. Senator Pryor. Vice Admiral Olson, what is the directive toward body armor systems such as Dragon Skin?

Admiral Olson. SOCOM's Special Operations Personal Equipment Advanced Requirements (SPEAR) body armor system is the only approved SOCOM product authorized for use.

MARINE CORPS FORCES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

15. Senator Pryor. Vice Admiral Olson, what has been the impact of Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) to SOCOM?

Admiral Olson. Each of the Services bring unique mission capabilities to SOCOM, MARSOC included. MARSOC brings with it the culture and heritage of the United States Marine Corps. MARSOC's unique contributions to SOCOM are rooted in this history as a sea-based, expeditionary force with a long history of mission success. In addition to forces that are trained from the start to operate in an integrated sea-air-ground, MARSOC also brings capabilities that are in the highest demand globally: MARSOC command and control, intelligence, counterintelligence, canine operations, interrogators, and other specialized capabilities that can be employed in support of MARSOC or other SOF units. MARSOC units also provide a force multiplier on the battlefield, as integral elements of Marine Expeditionary Units with a direct relationship and connection to Theater Special Operations Commands and other theater SOF.

From its inception 24 February 2006, MARSOC has had and continues to have significant global war on terrorism effects in both developing our partner nations' CT capabilities in four of the five Global Combatant Commands (no opportunity in Northern Command yet), and in providing combat forces for CENTCOM operations. All 15 Marine Special Operations Advisory Group (formerly Foreign Military Training Unit) deployments to date have been to global war on terrorism Priority and High Priority countries, and both deployed Marine Special Operations Companies have been employed in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. MARSOC has a little over half of its programmed strength, and as it continues to grow it will increase critical SOCOM capacity for both the indirect and direct lines of operation for the war on terrorism. From four Foreign Military Training Unit deployments in fiscal year 2006, Marine Special Operations Advisory Groups will deploy to 14 or more events in fiscal year 2007 and are currently slated for 28 deployments in fiscal year 2008. The Marine Special Operations Companies provide an integrated SOF connection to deployed Marine Expeditionary Units, and provide Global Combatant Commanders a force multiplier as a result. The companies are employable as independent SOF units or as a supporting element to the Marine Expeditionary Unit or other theater or coalition forces.

The bottom line is that in a very short time, MARSOC has been a very beneficial SOF force multiplier for SOCOM.

16. Senator Pryor. Vice Admiral Olson, what is the unique contribution of MARSOC toward SF operations?

Admiral Olson. Each of the Services bring unique mission capabilities to SOCOM, MARSOC included. MARSOC brings with it the culture and heritage of the United States Marine Corps. MARSOC's unique contributions to SOCOM are rooted in this history as a sea-based, expeditionary force with a long history of mission success. In addition to forces that are trained from the start to operate in an integrated sea-air-ground, MARSOC also brings capabilities that are in the highest demand globally: MARSOC command and control, intelligence, counterintelligence, canine operations, interrogators, and other specialized capabilities that can be employed in support of MARSOC or other SOF units. MARSOC units also provide a force multiplier on the battlefield, as integral elements of Marine Expeditionary Units with a direct relationship and connection to Theater Special Operations Commands and other theater SOF.
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for appointment in the United States Navy to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be Admiral

VADM Eric T. Olson, USN, 0000.

[The biographical sketch of VADM Eric T. Olson, USN, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

TRANSCRIPT OF NAVAL SERVICE FOR VADM ERIC THOR OLSON, USN

24 Jan. 1952 Born in Tacoma, Washington
30 June 1969 Midshipman, U. S. Naval Academy
06 June 1973 Ensign
06 June 1975 Lieutenant (junior grade)
01 July 1977 Lieutenant
01 Aug. 1982 Lieutenant Commander
01 Sep. 1988 Commander
01 July 1994 Captain
29 July 1999 Designated Rear Admiral (lower half) while serving in billets commensurate with that grade
01 July 2000 Rear Admiral (lower half)
19 Sep. 2002 Designated Rear Admiral while serving in billets commensurate with that grade
01 Oct. 2003 Rear Admiral
02 Sep. 2003 Vice Admiral, Service continuous to date.

Assignments and duties:

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<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
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<tr>
<td>SEAL Team One (Platoon Commander)</td>
<td>Dec. 1976 June 1978</td>
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<tr>
<td>Naval Amphibious School, Coronado, CA (Swimmer Delivery Vehicle Training Division Officer)</td>
<td>Jan. 1980 Sep. 1981</td>
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<td>XO, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team One</td>
<td>Apr. 1983 Dec. 1984</td>
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<td>U.S. Military Liaison Office Tunisia (Joint Service Programs and Training Officer)</td>
<td>Apr. 1986 June 1988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Special Warfare Center, Coronado, CA (Director of Strategy and Tactics Group Department)</td>
<td>June 1988 July 1989</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO, SEAL Delivery Vehicle Team One</td>
<td>July 1989 July 1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander, Special Boat Squadron Two (Squadron Commander)</td>
<td>July 1991 Aug. 1993</td>
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<tr>
<td>Commander, Naval Special Warfare Development Group (Commander)</td>
<td>July 1994 June 1997</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC (Chief of Staff)</td>
<td>June 1997 Aug. 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command</td>
<td>Aug. 1999 Aug. 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (Deputy)</td>
<td>Aug. 2003 To date</td>
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</table>

Medals and awards:

Silver Star
Defense Superior Service Medal with Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster
Legion of Merit
Bronze Star with "V" Device
Defense Meritorious Service Medal with Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster
Meritorious Service Medal with two Gold Stars
Joint Service Commendation Medal with Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal
Combat Action Ribbon with one Gold Star
Joint Meritorious Unit Award with one Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster
Navy Unit Commendation
Meritorious Unit Commendation with two Bronze Stars
National Defense Service Medal with two Bronze Stars
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with one Bronze Star
Vietnam Service Medal with one Bronze Star
Southwest Asia Service Medal with two Bronze Stars
Armed Forces Service Medal
Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with two Bronze Stars
Navy and Marine Corps Overseas Service Ribbon with two Bronze Stars
Coast Guard Special Operations Service Ribbon
United Nations Service Medal
Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia)
Kuwait Liberation (Kuwait)
Rifle Marksmanship Medal with Silver "E"
Pistol Marksmanship Medal with Silver "E"

Special qualifications:
BS (Business Administration) U.S. Naval Academy, 1973
MA (Foreign Affairs) Naval Postgraduate School, 1985
Designated Joint Specialty Officer, 1988

Personal data:
Wife: Marilyn Olson of Yonkers, NY
Children: Daniel S. Olson (Son), Born: 24 November 1986; Alyssa D. Olson (Daughter), Born: 9 August 1989.

Summary of joint duty assignments:

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<tr>
<th>Assignment</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Rank</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>U.S. Military Liaison Office Tunisia (Joint Service Programs and Training Officer)</td>
<td>Apr. 1986–June 1988</td>
<td>LCDR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Special Operations Command, Fort Bragg, NC (Chief of Staff)</td>
<td>June 1997–Aug. 1999</td>
<td>CAPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (Deputy)</td>
<td>Aug. 2003–To Date</td>
<td>VADM</td>
</tr>
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</table>

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by VADM Eric T. Olson, USN, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.
PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Eric T. Olson.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command.

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   January 24, 1952; Tacoma, Washington.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Marilyn Olson (Maiden Name: Marilyn Cannata).

7. Names and ages of children:
   Daniel S. Olson, 20; Alyssa D. Olson, 17.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    UDT–SEAL Association.
    U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association
    Military Officers Association of America
    U.S. Naval Institute
    Special Forces Club (U.K.)

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    None.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
    Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
    Yes.

   [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]
SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

ERIC T. OLSON, VICE ADMIRAL, USN.

This 1st day of May, 2007.

[The nomination of VADM Eric T. Olson, USN, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on June 28, 2007.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Thomas P. D'Agostino by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

Question. Will the duties of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security change or remain the same if you are confirmed for the position, and if there are any changes proposed, what are those changes?

Answer. If confirmed as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, I expect the duties of the position to remain the same as they have been, at least for the near-term. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary to clarify those duties and modify them, if appropriate. I am not aware of any currently proposed changes to the duties of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these duties?

Answer. The duties of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security are clear—to lead the men and women of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) in their efforts to ensure America’s nuclear security. My background and experience is well suited for these duties. As an officer in the U.S. Navy, I was selected by Admiral Rickover and trained as a nuclear submarine officer. In this capacity, I managed technically complex, high-hazard operations on nuclear submarines. This training instilled a commitment to quality, discipline, and integrity that are so important when dealing with nuclear operations. After over 8 years on Active-Duty in the submarine force I continued to serve in the national security arena as a Naval Reserve Officer, as a propulsion systems program manager for the Seawolf (SSN21) submarine, and in a variety of positions in the Department of Energy (DOE). My background within DOE includes a wide variety of both technical and management positions; in the areas of tritium reactor restart, as Deputy Director in the Office of Stockpile Computation, as the Deputy Director for Nuclear Weapons Research, Development and Simulation, as the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Program Integration in the Office of Defense Programs, and most recently, as the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Program Integration in the Office of Defense Programs, and most recently, as the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, leading the $5 billion Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP). I was recently asked to serve as the Acting Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, coincidental with the submission of fiscal year 2008 budget request to Congress and accompanying testimony. This quickly educated me about the details of other programs in NNSA such as Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. If confirmed, I would continue to learn more about the scope of the NNSA’s nonproliferation expertise and responsibilities, but I believe my background and experience are well suited for the role of Under Secretary for Nuclear Security.

I earned a Masters in Business-Finance from John Hopkins University and a Masters in National Security Studies from the Naval War College. I have almost 31 years of service in both the U.S. Navy and as a civil servant, I have attained the rank of Captain in the Naval Reserve. All of my professional experience has been focused on service (military and civilian) in support of our national security. I am privileged to have been able to serve my country and am confident that this combination of service and education qualifies me to perform the duties of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security.

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security?

Answer. The importance of the position of Under Secretary of Nuclear Security demands that anyone who holds that position must always be abreast of current de-
velopments in not only nuclear security but also national security as a whole. I believe I am aware of the scope of the duties of the position, but expect to focus my near-term efforts on broadening my knowledge base of initiatives outside of NNSA’s Defense Programs.

As I have stressed as Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, good communication within NNSA and with our colleagues in DOE, with Congress, with the Department of Defense (DOD) and with other stakeholders is essential. Clear and effective communication is a primary key to success in any organization, and even more important with an organization that is large, geographically dispersed and that manages complex technical operations. I would look to increase the amount of time I spend talking to all levels of management, technical and support staff, in headquarters and the field.

**Question.** Assuming you are confirmed, what additional or new duties and functions, if any, do you expect that the Secretary of Energy would prescribe for you other than those described above?

**Answer.** I am not aware of any additional duties and functions that the Secretary of Energy would prescribe for me, other than to efficiently and effectively manage the operations of NNSA. If confirmed, I would work with the Secretary to clarify his expectations.

**RELATIONSHIPS**

**Question.** If confirmed, how will you work with the following officials in carrying out your duties:

- The Secretary of Energy.
- The Deputy Secretary of Energy.
- The Deputy Administrators of the NNSA.
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

**Answer.** I will work with the Secretary as I have as the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs and as I did during the period I served as the Acting Administrator earlier this year. I have become familiar with the Secretary’s leadership style while serving in these positions. His door has always been open to me and I look forward to working with him on cross-cutting issues for NNSA and the Department.

**Question.** The Deputy Secretary of Energy.

**Answer.** I will work with the Deputy Secretary as I have as the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs and as I did during the period I served as the Acting Administrator earlier this year. I have become familiar with the Deputy Secretary’s leadership style while serving in these positions. The Deputy Secretary serves as the Department’s Chief Operating Officer and we have regular interaction on crosscutting NNSA and departmental issues.

**Question.** The Deputy Administrators of the NNSA.

**Answer.** The Deputy Administrators are the direct reports to the Administrator of NNSA. These individuals bring a great wealth of knowledge and policy expertise in their assigned areas. I know all of the current Deputies and Associate Administrators very well and look forward to leading them if confirmed. It’s critical to the organization’s success that I have complete trust in these individuals in order to carry out the NNSA mission.

**Question.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

**Answer.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Kenneth J. Krieg, is also the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), which is the focal point for the relationship between DOE and DOD. The NNSA Administrator is DOE’s NWC member and deals directly with the Under Secretary of Defense on nuclear security issues.

**Question.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

**Answer.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Ambassador Eric S. Edelman, is a member of the NWC, which is the focal point for the relationship between DOE and DOD. The NNSA Administrator is DOE’s NWC member and deals directly with the Under Secretary of Defense on nuclear security issues.

**Question.** The Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force.

**Answer.** Relationships with the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force are important to issues related to nuclear security. NNSA generally deals with the uniformed Services more than the Service Secretaries through the NWC system. As a former Navy officer and current political appointee, I am well aware of the importance of civilian control of the military. If confirmed as an Under Secretary, I would seek to nurture relations with the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force.

**Question.** The Commanders of U.S. Strategic Command and U.S. Northern Command.

**Answer.** The Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, General James E. Cartwright, is a member of the NWC. The NNSA Administrator works with the Com-
mander of U.S. Strategic Command on a wide variety of significant nuclear weapons issues such as the annual assessment of the safety, reliability and performance of the nuclear weapons stockpile. I have established a good working relationship with General Cartwright in my current job and look forward to continuing that relationship if confirmed.

NNSA will continue its current close cooperation with Northern Command, primarily in the area of Emergency Operations. We have worked closely with NORTHCOM on exercise planning and have been full participants in both the Ardent Sentry and Vigilant Shield series of exercises. In fact, during last December’s Vigilant Shield exercise the NNSA assigned a liaison officer to the NORTHCOM Headquarters in Colorado Springs for the duration of the exercise. We will continue this effort to ensure full and integrated operations in the case of a real emergency.

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.

Answer. The Office of Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict is included in our overall support to and coordination with DOD in a number of areas. As part of our support, we have provided a full-time resident liaison to Special Operations Command to facilitate access to the unique capabilities of DOE’s national laboratories and to enhance the already close working relationship with DOE and NNSA.

If confirmed by the Senate, I will make sure that DOE’S unique nuclear capabilities, skills and assets are available to DOD or any other Federal entity.

Question. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.

Answer. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense is the Chairman of the NWC Standing and Safety Committee, the flag officer or Senior Executive Service “working level” group in the NWC system. In my experience, the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs and his Principal Assistant Deputy Administrator have more regular contact with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense than the NNSA Administrator, but I would encourage close coordination with DOD at all levels within the NNSA and DOE. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense plays a key role in the NWC system, so I view the NNSA’s relationship with that office as vitally important. The Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency also reports to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, so if confirmed, I expect to work with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense on matters generally outside the NWC system, such as nonproliferation.

Question. The Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

Answer. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) works with the NNSA’s Offices of Defense Programs, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and Emergency Operations on a number of issues, ranging from individual weapon system Project Officer Groups to hosting DTRA-sponsored work at NNSA sites and collaboration on nonproliferation issues. If confirmed, I would expect the Deputy Administrators for Defense Programs and Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to work most directly with the Director of DTRA, but I would maintain contact with the Director, as well.

Question. The Director of National Intelligence and other senior leaders of the Intelligence Community.

Answer. DOE is a member of the Intelligence Community. Within DOE, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence has primary responsibility for the Department’s interactions with the Director of National Intelligence and other Intelligence Community components. Each of the NNSA national laboratories maintains a Field Intelligence Element (FIE) that carries out analysis and technical work to fulfill DOE’s intelligence responsibilities.

If confirmed, I will continue to give my strong support to this cooperation and ensure that the Intelligence Community continues to have excellent access to the NNSA labs through the existing Intelligence Work-for-Others process.


Answer. NNSA has a close working relationship with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) at all levels. I will continue to draw upon these working relationships and try to improve upon them through closer coordination on matters affecting the Nation’s security.

I assure you that my staff and I, particularly my Associate Administrator for Emergency Operations, will continue the cooperative relationships we have built since the Department of Homeland Security was created. For example, we will continue to work closely in updating the National Response Plan (NRP) to define and refine the Federal Government’s responsibilities in the event of radiological or nuclear emergencies and incidents. Our two organizations will continue our good work on the National Incident Management System (NIMS), the National Preparedness System, and the comprehensive Homeland Security Exercise Program where we test
our abilities to respond to many types of incidents in addition to radiological and nuclear emergencies. We will continue to work closely with DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) as partners to assess the Nation’s radiological or nuclear vulnerabilities and risks, to mitigate radiological or nuclear threats, and to develop a robust technical nuclear forensics capability in cooperation with DNDO’s National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC).

Finally, we stand ready to execute our responsibilities under the National Response Plan to deploy our Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT) and fulfill our responsibilities under the Homeland Security Act for domestic radiological or nuclear events. For example, should an improvised nuclear device be discovered in the United States, we would give our full support to the Department of Homeland Security as the overall incident manager and to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as the lead law enforcement agency. We have worked hard to forge these cooperative relationships and I can assure you that we will continue this collaborative approach.

Question. Officials in the Department of State with responsibility for nuclear nonproliferation matters

Answer. NNSA works closely with the Department of State in the area of nuclear nonproliferation and, if confirmed as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, I would continue to do so. For instance, NNSA works in close concert with State to forward the goals of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. NNSA also supports State as it interfaces with the IAEA through the technical expertise within our national laboratories to work on the toughest nuclear nonproliferation issues we face, including Iran and North Korea.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security?

Answer. There are a number of challenges that will need to be addressed in the upcoming years, and NNSA is working to intensify efforts on the most difficult issues by creating a small number of Special Focus Areas.

- The future of our nuclear weapons stockpile and how that shapes our plans for Complex 2030.
- The role of Federal oversight, especially in the areas of nuclear safety and cyber security.
- Moving forward smartly and effectively in the consolidation and disposition of special nuclear materials (SNM).
- The vision of the future for our national security laboratories.
- Enhancing project management within NNSA.
- Enhancing NNSA’s future as an Employer of Choice.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. If I am confirmed, I will lead the effort recently initiated by the Acting Administrator by setting clear expected outcomes, identifying expected deliverables, and establishing timeframes for execution. Integrated Action Teams, led by senior executives, have been formed for each Special Focus Area to deliver on what needs to be done and to ensure completion. I will empower the team leaders to have the appropriate resources and decisionmaking authority in their areas, and I will personally engage each of the teams on a regular basis to stay informed of progress and eliminate any obstacles I can.

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

Answer. If confirmed, I will commit my personal involvement and that of the management team at the NNSA to set aggressive but realistic time lines for all of these areas. Some of these areas have firm time lines already, such as a Record of Decision (fall 2008) for our Complex 2030 effort and plans to remove all Category I and II SNM from Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) in the next year and from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) by 2014. Firm timelines will be established for those areas that do not yet have them, and NNSA management and staff will be held accountable for completing actions in a timely manner.

Question. Please explain the importance you place on continuing to ensure a unique organizational identity for the NNSA and what steps you would take to ensure such an identity if confirmed?

Answer. It is very important to ensure an organizational identity for the NNSA. In my experience in leadership and management over the past 30 years, organizations are most effective when there is a clear mission, clearly defined responsibilities, and when members of that organization understand where they fit in to ac-
complish that mission. When I was named acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, I was concerned with the organization’s reputation and the efficiency of the program. Soon after formally taking over the Defense Programs organization I established the organizational theme of “Getting the Job Done!” and identified a specific list of deliverables that would be accomplished within the following 2 years. These deliverables are challenging, important, and help focus the Defense Programs organization (both Federal employees and contractors across the nuclear weapons complex). To date, the theme of “Getting the Job Done!” has permeated the organization and has led to a focus of priorities and resources to ensure that all those in Defense Programs know what is expected and where our priorities lie. The “Getting the Job Done!” accomplishments by the NNSA included: delivering the B61–ALT37 first production unit; extracting tritium for the first time in over a decade; completing plutonium aging studies in pits; and just recently announcing that we have increased the rate of nuclear weapons dismantlements by 50 percent over last year’s level 4 months ahead of schedule.

This established identity is working in Defense Programs and will work in the NNSA. The key is to focus on mission priorities, ensure that all members of the organization understand the goals and where they fit in to accomplish the results.

PRIORITIES

**Question.** If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish to address the issues that would confront the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security?

**Answer.** If confirmed, the broad priorities that I would establish to address the issues that would confront the NNSA and me personally are in the areas of safety, security, Federal oversight, and mission success. I plan to set clear program expectations and then focus on these broad areas by ensuring that everyone, both those within the NNSA and those that partner with us and benefit from our success, understands what is expected and has the resources to complete their objectives.

OVERALL MANAGEMENT

**Question.** Do you believe that there are any organizational structure issues in the NNSA that should be addressed to improve management and operations of the NNSA, or that you would address if confirmed?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I plan to closely evaluate and implement changes that reinforce line management oversight. The current NNSA structure was a radical departure from the Department’s previous regional model, which was in place for 60 years. The NNSA approach of strong site offices places authority and accountability directly at the sites where work is actually performed. Now, 5 years later with our policies and governance models having matured, it is time to look at refocusing policy expertise to strengthen our direct line management functions. To that end, I hope to review and right-size all headquarters advisory and oversight functions based on mission need and rigorous workforce analysis.

**Question.** On December 20, 2002, NNSA announced a plan to restructure its management, including a 20-percent reduction in Federal personnel in 5 years. That 5-year period will be up in December 2007. Have these goals been achieved? If not, why not?

**Answer.** Yes, NNSA achieved its personnel reduction goals ahead of schedule at the end of fiscal year 2004. The reengineering effort for Federal personnel was working in two directions simultaneously: reducing and streamlining most sites and field locations, while at the same time increasing line-program areas experiencing major mission growth. For organizations involved in this reengineering (IWSA Service Center, headquarters, and the 8 site offices), there was a reduction of 383 FTEs, which represents a reduction of 20.5 percent. At the same time, the programs exempt from reengineering—Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Emergency Response—were increased by 43 FTEs, about 15 percent. The net change in NNSA’s Federal staffing from 2002 to 2004 was a reduction of 17 percent.

NNSA has continued its aggressive efforts in workforce restructuring and is now ready to embark on the next phase of reengineering that will further adjust program staffing in line with future missions, and assure the transition of critical skills in the next several years when a “bow wave” of retirements is expected.

**Question.** Do you believe that the expertise of DOE personnel serving outside the NNSA can be helpful to you if confirmed?

**Answer.** I believe that the success of the NNSA is very dependent on the experience and support of all Departmental employees. NNSA’s record of accomplishments and our ability to quickly address operational shortfalls in human capital, financial management, information technology, physical and cyber security, acquisition man-
agement as well as environmental health and the complexities of our management issues would not have been possible without the ability to leverage departmental assets as we do. If confirmed, I will continue to seek access to departmental talent in order to best serve our mission and avoid costly duplication of effort.

Question. Specifically, what expertise do you believe would be helpful and how will you utilize this expertise if you are confirmed?

Answer. I believe that the most critical expertise is the independent oversight provided for safety, environment, and security—both physical and cyber security—as well as independent cost estimating and construction management. All of these disciplines are critical to NNSA and the Department’s success. If confirmed, I intend to strengthen their involvement in our 5-year program planning and execution process.

Question. Are you aware of any limitations on your authority, if confirmed, to draw on that expertise?

Answer. There are no limitations on the authority of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security to draw upon the expertise of DOE personnel serving outside of the NNSA for assistance in achieving NNSA’s mission and fulfilling its responsibilities. Of course, the Under Secretary’s authority to draw on such assistance is, as it is in other matters, subject to the ultimate authority of the Secretary to direct all officials within the DOE and to establish priorities for NNSA and all other organizations within the Department.

Question. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, the DOE intelligence function was combined with the counterintelligence functions of NNSA and DOE into one single departmental office. How is this change working in your view?

Answer. NNSA continues to receive excellent support from the combined counterintelligence organizations. In fact, the organizational change has brought about greater synergy and the NNSA is receiving the benefits of the consolidation.

Question. Are there any issues that are not being addressed or addressed in an insufficient manner?

Answer. No.

Question. Would you recommend any changes to the combined organization?

Answer. At this point in time, I would not recommend any changes to this combined organization if confirmed.

Question. What is your view of the extent to which the NNSA is bound by the existing rules, regulations, and directives of DOE and what flexibility, if any, do you believe you would have in implementing such rules, regulations, and directives?

Answer. NNSA must comply with rules, regulations and directives issued by the Secretary of Energy. The Under Secretary for Nuclear Security is responsible for ensuring that NNSA and its contractors comply with these requirements. Some rules and regulations provide specific exemption procedures that NNSA can invoke if the Under Secretary concludes an exemption is warranted. In addition, the DOE Departmental Directives Program Manual provides a general exemption procedure that allows NNSA to deviate from DOE directives requirements. NNSA also permits Departmental elements, including NNSA, to issue “supplemental directives” that may be used to implement requirements in directives, assign responsibilities and establish procedures within a particular Departmental element. Finally, under the NNSA Act, the Under Secretary has the authority to issue NNSA-specific policies, “unless disapproved by the Secretary.”

Question. NNSA, in large measure, was created in response to security lapses at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). However, security lapses, particularly at Los Alamos, have continued to occur. Section 3212(b)(10) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 provides that “the Administrator has authority over, and is responsible for all programs and activities of the administration, including administration of contracts, including the management and operations of the nuclear weapons production facilities and the national security laboratories.” If confirmed, what would be your plan to make sure that security lapses do not continue at the NNSA facilities?

Answer. While there have been some high-visibility security lapses within the NNSA since its establishment, I believe we have made significant progress in improving the physical and cyber security of our nuclear weapons complex. The Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security and the NNSA Chief Information Officer have both brought increased formality to the headquarters management of their security programs and we are seeing improvements. If confirmed, I intend to strengthen our Federal line oversight of security to establish common expectations by which we exercise our legal and contractual authorities to ensure the security of our critical national security assets. I also intend to continue the strong partnership we have with the Department’s Office of Health, Safety, and Security and the
Department’s Chief Information Officer to develop the policies and rules necessary for effective security systems.

Question. If confirmed, what policies would you institute to improve the manner in which managers of NNSA facilities deal with security matters?

Answer. There needs to be a formal process for establishing clear security performance expectations down to the lowest level of the organization, then holding people and organizations accountable for meeting those expectations. My approach to addressing these issues would be to continue the work we have already started, which is to put greater emphasis on our capabilities to actively manage the security program. This approach has four major thrusts:

- Reducing the number of security areas and operations will allow us to focus our attention and resources on revitalizing the protection system components that provide the foundation for good security.
- Ensuring that we have a highly qualified Federal staff, in the right numbers, to actively manage and oversee the NNSA security program.
- Promoting stronger functional accountability within the security program by creating stronger lines of authority and accountability between the HQ and the field.
- Providing comprehensive oversight of field security to assess contractor performance against the expectations—rewarding good performance and providing penalties for ineffective performance.

I am very pleased to report that we have made significant progress in our security management and oversight capabilities, and we have developed some very promising approaches. For example, we have established peer reviews and Performance Assurance Assessments for improving the interactions and collaborations between the sites and HQ. I am confident that these initiatives will result in better performance expectations and a much stronger security program. If confirmed, I would actively work with the Principal Deputy to ensure these focus areas are fully developed and implemented.

DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

Question. What do you see are the highest priorities of the nonproliferation programs at NNSA?

Answer. The highest priorities in the nonproliferation programs are to fulfill the President’s commitments made under the Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative to complete nuclear security upgrades at Russian facilities by the 2008 deadline. Another priority is the repatriation of high enriched uranium from around the world to more secure locations in the U.S. or Russia, and the conversion of HEU-fueled reactors to use LEU fuel. In addition to these specific challenges, the nation faces emerging threats of the sort presented by a nuclear-capable North Korea and an Iranian regime apparently bent on acquiring or developing nuclear weapons. We must continue our efforts to combat nuclear terrorism by helping, other countries better secure their nuclear materials, eliminating excess materials, preventing the export of sensitive technologies, engaging foreign scientists with meaningful work in peaceful commerce, and by detecting illicit trafficking in nuclear and radiological materials.

Question. While the bulk of the nonproliferation programs at NNSA continue to be focused on the states of the former Soviet Union, a growing number of programs are focused on states outside of the former Soviet Union. Do you believe that there are additional opportunities for cooperation with states outside of the former Soviet Union? If confirmed what would be your priorities in these areas?

Answer. NNSA does work in nearly a hundred countries around the globe. Many of our efforts—Megaports, Sister Labs, Safeguards, Export Control, and certainly our Global Threat Reduction Initiative—are all aimed at working with other nations to increase their capacity, and thus our own, to detect, prevent, detect proliferation of WMD materials, technology, and expertise. If confirmed, I would expand these bilateral and multilateral programs where necessary to achieve the purpose for which they are intended—to protect this Nation as far from U.S. shores as possible.

Question. What do you believe is the greatest challenge in the nonproliferation programs with Russia?

Answer. NNSA’s programs with Russia have been, on the whole, very successful in the past several years. We have created an environment of mutual trust and understanding with our Russian counterparts, and high level attention, such as the Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative, have helped us accelerate our efforts in selected, critical areas. The nature of our relationship with Russia has transitioned from a donor-recipient relationship to one of partnership. They are planning on playing an ever larger role in financing portions of some of these nonproliferation programs.
efforts, and we are eager to work with them in areas associated with expanded use of nuclear power. We see them as strong partners in this arena. Our biggest remaining challenge is to completely transition some of the bilateral assistance programs (such as MPC&A) to full Russian funding and to ensure that those programs receive the Russian commitment, funding and budget attention required.

Question. In your view what are the three greatest unmet nonproliferation problems? Would you propose to address these needs if confirmed? What resources or cooperation would you need to meet such needs?

Answer. North Korea remains one of the largest nonproliferation problems we face. We have expertise in our complex that stands poised to work with the State Department and the IAEA should agreement be reached to dismantle North Korea’s nuclear facilities. Until that time, we must be vigilant in preventing North Korea from exporting its nuclear material, technologies and know-how to others, including terrorists. We can do this by helping those in the region improve their detection capabilities, helping to train border guards and other officials to recognize dual-use technologies, and by strengthening the export control regime worldwide. A second challenge remains the sheer amount of nuclear and radiological material that exists all over the world. There is an urgent need to reduce the amount of excess material, to convert research reactors that use HEU to LEU, and to ensure that a renaissance in nuclear power does not also result in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Better export controls, strengthened safeguards technologies, a Reliable Fuel Supply, GTRI and GNEP all play an important role. Finally, we need better detection capability. So we need to focus more of our R&D effort on novel approaches to standoff nuclear and radiological detection that will not impede trade flows or impose unnecessary burdens on the world’s commerce.

MEGAPORTS

Question. NNSA has worked to expand the Megaports program as quickly as funding and agreements with host countries are available. What are the current limiting factors in further acceleration of the Megaports program and, if confirmed, how would you address these factors?

Answer. As you are aware, the Megaports Initiative has expanded quickly over the past 2 years. There are 21 agreements in place for cooperation on this important nonproliferation program. We have been well supported with funding, especially with the recent fiscal year 2007 supplemental of $72 million. We are continuing our outreach efforts with host governments and expect to complete additional agreements soon with Malaysia, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Turkey, and Yemen. The greatest limiting factor in the Megaports program is the fact that we cannot simply drop into another country and set up radiation detectors wherever we think they are required. We need the assent and cooperation of foreign partners, including both foreign governments and private port operators. Issues of national sovereignty, data-sharing arrangements, and concerns about potential operational impacts at foreign ports all play a role in our ability to move this program forward. The Megaports program has been very successful thus far and appears to be poised for further successes.

Question. The Megaports program is coordinated with other work that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is carrying out at foreign ports. In your view are there opportunities to improve cooperation with DHS?

Answer. NNSA has developed a close working relationship with DHS and its various components, including Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). The link with CBP is crucial to coordinating our Megaports Initiative with DHS’s Container Security Initiative. We are also working closely with DNDO in the development of a global nuclear detection architecture, and in evaluation and procurement of next generation radiation detection technologies. NNSA is a critical partner in this relationship with our experience and expertise in international nuclear nonproliferation programs, nuclear materials and weapons science, and implementation of international security projects. If confirmed as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, I will continue this close partnership with DHS.

Question. One of the continuing challenges to the Megaports program, as well as other programs designed to detect nuclear and radiological materials, is that the materials that could pose the greatest risk, plutonium and highly-enriched uranium (HEU), are the most difficult to detect. NNSA has the responsibility for basic detection research and development programs. While other agencies, such as DHS, have responsibility for near term development efforts, the DOD has responsibilities as well.
Are the various detection efforts fully coordinated, or do you believe that additional efforts at coordination are needed?

Answer. I understand that NNSA’s nonproliferation research and development work has broad applicability to a number of Federal agencies. If I am confirmed as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, I will make an effort to focus on NNSA’s research and development, as well as the coordination process with other Federal agencies, and see if additional efforts of coordination might be needed.

NONPROLIFERATION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

Question. In addition to the detection technologies mentioned above, NNSA has responsibility for a broad range of research and development efforts. If confirmed what would be your nonproliferation research and development priorities?

Answer. I firmly believe that one of this Nation’s great treasures is its scientific and technical capability, a significant portion of which resides in our national laboratory system. Should I be confirmed, I would direct our nonproliferation R&D program to continue its coordinating efforts with other appropriate elements of the Federal Government in developing novel approaches to the problem of standoff detection of nuclear weapons-related materials. I would also seek improved capabilities for rapid post-event attribution and analysis.

Question. Do you believe that there are research and development areas that need more attention or funding?

Answer. As to funding, the President’s request for nonproliferation research and development funding represents an appropriate balance between needs and resources. However, to the extent that our policies and requirements change with world events, I would certainly reassess the need for additional resources as required. As to specific areas of attention, should I be confirmed, I would direct our nonproliferation R&D program to continue its coordinating efforts with other appropriate elements of the Federal Government in developing new and novel approaches to the problem of standoff detection of nuclear weapons-related materials. I would also seek improved capabilities for rapid post-event attribution and analysis.

FISSILE MATERIALS DISPOSITION

Question. The United States and Russia have each committed to the disposition of 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium so that it will not be used for weapons purposes. This is a very expensive program and has had many difficulties associated with it.

What is the current status of the U.S. and Russian efforts to agree upon a mutual date to complete disposition of the respective 34 tons of weapons grade plutonium?

Answer. Russia has proposed to dispose of its 34 metric tons of weapon grade plutonium as mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel primarily in the BN–600 and BN–800 fast reactors. Because this proposed disposition scenario is consistent with its national energy strategy, for the first time, Rosatom has proposed funding a significant portion of the program itself. Our view is that this commitment should be perceived as a major success.

NNSA is currently working with Russia to define the details of the Russian plan in order to ensure that appropriate proliferation concerns regarding fast reactors are addressed and we expect to reach agreement later this summer. Our current estimate is that both sides will complete disposition of 34 metric tons each of weapons grade plutonium in the 2035–2040 timeframe.

Question. What plans are there to dispose of additional amounts of weapons grade plutonium?

Answer. The Department is currently evaluating the cost and technical feasibility of using the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility in South Carolina for the following potential missions: 1) to dispose of up to 9 metric tons of impure plutonium currently proposed for disposition in DOE’s planned small-scale Plutonium Vitification process; 2) to dispose of additional weapons grade plutonium (beyond the 34 metric tons) expected to be declared surplus as plutonium requirements are reevaluated and dismantlements accelerated in connection with transformation of the nuclear weapons stockpile; and 3) to fabricate start-up fuel for fast reactors in support of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, once a decision on the fuel form for fast reactors has been made.

WEAPONS PROGRAMS PERSONNEL

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to retain critical nuclear weapons expertise in both the NNSA and the contractor workforce?
Answer. Retaining and developing critical nuclear weapons expertise is essential to the long-term vitality of the nuclear weapons program. As Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, I am personally involved in a number of specific steps designed to retain critical nuclear weapons expertise in both the NNSA and the contractor workforce. If confirmed as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, I would look to the NNSA management team to continue this work, with my continued personal involvement. Some specific steps we are currently taking include: 1) participation of early career designers in the Reliable Replacement Warhead designs at the national laboratories; 2) re-establishing an interagency effort to identify critical skills as a step towards gaining a clearer picture of the relative supply and demand for our highly trained personnel; 3) refining the methodology to use in identifying those skills likely to be at risk in the future due to shortages of appropriately educated and trained U.S. citizens; 4) utilizing the NNSA Future Leaders Program, where new college graduates with engineering and business administration degrees are recruited to work at the NNSA in management-track positions; 5) fully supporting work such as the Defense Science Board's Task Force on Nuclear Deterrence Skills, led by Admiral (retired) Henry Chiles.

I am very aware of the potential shortage of critically skilled workers at NNSA and our contractors due to impending retirements and the declining number of American citizens seeking graduate degrees in relevant fields, and realize there is no immediate fix for the situation. We need to continue to make working with the nuclear weapons program attractive to critically skilled workers, by offering competitive wages and benefits, but also by stressing the opportunities to contribute to national security by working with the best scientific tools in the world.

Question. Do you support retaining the capability to remanufacture every component expected to be found in the stockpile in the near term? What are the most pressing remanufacturing needs?

Answer. A key objective of stockpile and nuclear weapons complex transformation is to eliminate the need to retain the capability to remanufacture every component expected to be found in the present stockpile. Some existing components are problematic to make or involve hazardous materials that we want to eliminate. I support changes to transform the current weapons complex. The most pressing remanufacturing needs are for nuclear components in weapons. Specifically in the near-term, we need more efficient ways to manufacture parts in secondaries produced at our Y–12 National Security Complex. For the long-term, we need to resolve inadequacies in our capability to manufacture plutonium pits consistent with meeting national security requirements.

STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM

Question. The SSP has successfully supported the annual nuclear weapons certification effort for the last 15 years. Other than the National Ignition Facility what other capabilities, if any, would be needed to ensure that the stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without nuclear weapons testing?

Answer. The SSP is a highly integrated program that encompasses everything related to supporting the nuclear weapons stockpile so that it is safe, secure, and reliable without nuclear weapons testing. The large variety of capabilities in the SSP are complementary and work together to add confidence in assessing the state of the stockpile as it ages and as we pursue stockpile transformation. The National Ignition Facility has never been seen as the only capability needed for stockpile assessment. Its benefits in the areas of inertial confinement fusion and ignition will aid greatly in our knowledge of nuclear weapons, but only in concert with other capabilities such as those offered by the Advanced Simulation and Computing program, the stockpile evaluation program, and other parts of the SSP. The Secure Transportation Asset and safety basis work are two areas of the SSP that could be overlooked at the expense of high-profile facilities, but they are essential for the entire program to function as designed.

Question. In your view is the SSP fully coordinated with DOD?

Answer. In my view, the SSP is well coordinated with DOD. Through the NWC system, the DOE and the DOD communicate priorities and requirements on a continual basis. While DOD is not asked to “approve” every element of the SSP, DOD is fully aware of SSP plans through regular briefings and information exchanges at levels up to and including the Secretaries of Energy and Defense. The SSP only exists to fulfill the nuclear weapons stockpile requirements set by DOD and endorsed by the President, so it is to DOE’s benefit to have as full coordination as possible with DOD, especially in light of limited resources and tough choices that need to be made about how best to transform the nuclear weapons stockpile and supporting infrastructure.
**Question.** The NNSA is in the early stages of an effort to develop a new nuclear warhead to be a replacement for an existing warhead, without nuclear weapons testing. This effort is the reliable replacement warhead (RRW) program.

Do you believe that the SSP is capable of meeting this new challenge in the coming years?

**Answer.** I fully believe that the SSP, as detailed in the fiscal year 2008 budget request and supporting material, is capable of meeting the challenge of transforming the nuclear weapons stockpile through a RRW strategy in the coming years.

**Question.** If you are confirmed, and if during your tenure a problem arises in the RRW program that would require nuclear weapons testing, would you cancel the RRW program?

**Answer.** A fundamental premise of the RRW program is that any replacement warhead would be certified and fielded without the need to conduct an underground nuclear test. The RRW program is intended to ensure, for the foreseeable future, the Nation’s ability to sustain the nuclear weapons stockpile while minimizing the likelihood of having to return to underground nuclear testing. By relaxing Cold War design constraints (e.g., maximum yield in a minimum size/weight package), the RRW program will allow us to design replacement warheads that will provide the same military capabilities as the legacy warheads they replace, while incorporating improved performance margins, reduced uncertainties, and integration of advanced safety and security features.

In recent years, our stockpile surveillance program has discovered anomalies that could only have been resolved by a test during the era of nuclear testing. Today, we are able to resolve those anomalies through the use of our Stockpile Stewardship tools.

The increased margins in RRW systems would further decrease the likelihood of a technical issue requiring a test to resolve. Replacement warhead designs will be designed to provide more favorable reliability and performance margins than those currently in the stockpile, and will be less sensitive to incremental aging effects or manufacturing variances. It is anticipated that the RRW, designed with large margins, would be less susceptible to an anomaly or defect requiring testing than legacy stockpile warheads.

**Question.** When do you anticipate the 2006 annual stockpile memorandum will be completed?

**Answer.** DOE and DOD are currently coordinating final formulation of the fiscal year 2007–2012 Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Memorandum. Staff within each Department have been working very hard to get the memorandum finalized, signed, and sent to the President. I anticipate it will be submitted to the President soon.

**NUCLEAR MATERIALS CONSOLIDATION**

**Question.** Maintaining nuclear weapons materials at sites dramatically increases security costs and requirements. DOE and the NNSA have been working for many years to develop a materials consolidation plan to consolidate these materials at a smaller number of sites to reduce security costs. One of the sites that has been waiting for many years to move its nuclear materials is LLNL.

In your view, is it possible to move the material in the next 12 months? Is there capacity at the Device Assembly Facility (DAF) or at LANL or at the Savannah River Site (SRS) to accept this material?

**Answer.** LLNL has both excess materials and materials needed to support current mission requirements. There will be no significant security cost savings until both programmatic and excess materials are removed from the site. Some, but not all, of the excess material is packaged and ready for shipment. We can begin to ship excess materials offsite in fiscal year 2008, assuming the availability of transportation assets and a receiver site. For most excess materials, the plan is to move the materials directly to the site where they will be processed for final disposition. The proposed disposition path for most of the excess material at LLNL is through the SRS. SRS has capacity to accept materials packaged in long-term storage containers, but very limited space to accept other packages.

LANL has insufficient space to accept the LLNL excess material, and has its own excess materials that must be removed to make room for programmatic materials from LLNL. Excess materials could potentially be moved to the DAF at the Nevada
Test Site, but because of concerns about mission compatibility and extremely limited material handling/processing capabilities, DAF is not an ideal solution.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the overall plan to consolidate NNSA material?

**Answer.** Most HEU materials have been consolidated to the Y–12 National Security Complex. NNSA plans to continue to dispose of excess HEU materials and consolidate remaining materials within a much smaller security perimeter at Y–12. NNSA is currently removing all Category I and II SNM from SNL, with completion expected later this calendar year. In the longer term, NNSA plans to remove all Category I and II SNM from LLNL by 2014, and from LANL by 2022. Excess materials will be removed from LLNL and LANL as storage and disposition capabilities are made available at receiving sites. Programmatic materials from LLNL will be moved to LANL, the DAF at the Nevada Test Site, or other sites as appropriate. Long-term planning will not be finalized until after issuance of the Supplement to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement-Complex 2030.

**Question.** In your view, are efforts to achieve consolidation of materials storage adequately coordinated between DOE and NNSA?

**Answer.** Coordination between DOE and NNSA on consolidation of nuclear materials has been very good. The NNSA has been working with the DOE Office of Environmental Management to schedule the removal of excess materials from Y–12, SNL, LLNL, and LANL. NNSA is coordinating with the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy to transfer sodium-bonded HEU, currently stored at SNL, for consolidation with similar materials at Idaho National Laboratory. Similar plans are under development for consolidation of uranium-233 and plutonium-238 materials.

The major impediment to material consolidation is the availability of storage space and disposition processing capabilities. Coordination between all programs is essential to take advantage of remaining storage and processing capacity and capability. Development of new or replacement processing capability is also needed. NNSA is coordinating with other DOE program offices to assure that new processing capabilities have the appropriate capabilities and capacity for efficient disposition of materials, regardless of current program owner.

Secure transportation assets are managed within the NNSA for the entire DOE, but must be made available to support DOE materials consolidation actions. The highest materials consolidation priority within the Department is removal of SNM from the Hanford Site. We will continue to work with all program offices to ensure mission-critical transportation support is available as required, and materials consolidation activities are supported as effectively and efficiently as possible.

**FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE**

**Question.** The Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP) was established to address long-deferred maintenance backlogs in the nuclear weapons complex, particularly at the manufacturing facilities. Is it your understanding that FIRP is on track to address the maintenance backlog on schedule by the end of 2013, as stipulated in law?

**Answer.** The FIRP is a well run program which continues to significantly improve the physical condition of the nuclear weapons complex. However, there remains a large backlog of deferred maintenance across the complex. Under the current financially constrained Future-Years Nuclear Security Program, the FIRP will be unable to fully meet its commitment to address the deferred maintenance backlog by the end of 2013.

**Question.** In your view, has the Readiness in the Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF) program adequately addressed current maintenance issues or is a new backlog being created?

**Answer.** The RTBF program is addressing current maintenance issues at our most important program facilities. However, our program infrastructure is aging and increased maintenance investment is required to maintain facility availability. To ensure the highest priority maintenance issues are addressed, RTBF program managers have worked with field elements over the last 18 months to screen and prioritize over 5,000 program facilities into two defined mission dependency categories, consistent with Federal Real Property Council and Departmental guidance. The first category, Mission Critical, consists of those program facilities that are necessary to conduct mission work and complete program milestones. The second category, Mission Dependent (Not Critical), represents a larger number of support facilities needed to enable the completion of important program work. As a result of targeted investments from the RTBF program and the FIRP, facility conditions for our Mission Critical facilities are in the good to excellent range as compared to in-
dustry standards, and our Mission Dependent facilities are in satisfactory condition. While challenges remain to minimize the maintenance backlog as we consider program changes that may present opportunities to shrink weapons complex footprint, the RTBF program is adequately structured and managed to ensure priority maintenance issues at our most important facilities are addressed in a timely manner.

Question. In your view, what specific standards should be applied to ensure that the RTBF program meets current and future maintenance needs across the nuclear weapons complex so that additional scope is not added to FIRP?

Answer. Currently, NNSA is working with the DOE’s Office of Engineering and Construction Management to consider additional standards and facility sustainment models that could be applied to ensure maintenance is adequately addressed for all DOE facilities. Given the age of many program facilities and known budget constraints, we may decide to increase maintenance backlogs at select NNSA facilities that do not have an enduring program need, but this will not result in additional scope for FIRP. During the next 5 years of the Future Years Nuclear Security Plan, pending program decisions related to long-term program requirements may also result in additional opportunities for consolidation of capabilities. As program capabilities are consolidated, near-term maintenance backlog increases may occur until excess facilities and infrastructure assets are dispositioned.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that surplus buildings are torn down or transferred so that they will not need long-term maintenance?

Answer. Surplus buildings are a concern for the NNSA. Total NNSA parametric cost estimates for decontamination and demolition (D&D) for the period of fiscal year 2006 to 2010 have been reported as approximately $530 million, with LANL, LLNL, and the Y–12 National Security Complex as the largest contributors. D&D is a key to our continuing modernization of the complex, and our commitment to worker safety and health.

NNSA has several efforts underway to address our inventory of surplus buildings. First, for our legacy contaminated buildings we work closely with the Office of Environmental Management, the departmental organization responsible for addressing unfunded environmental liabilities and for executing the work. Second, NNSA has had a very successful demolition program underway for most of this decade—the Facilities Infrastructure and Recapitalization Program. This well-run and cost-efficient program has to date achieved a footprint reduction of 2.7 million gross square feet. If confirmed I will provide appropriate emphasis on ensuring that surplus buildings are torn down or transferred so that they will not need long-term maintenance.

Question. Would you support including the cost of tearing down those buildings that are being replaced within the total project cost of any new construction?

Answer. Yes. Report language in the Fiscal Year 2005 Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill specifically states:

"The costs of D&D for the facilities that are being replaced be included in the costs of all construction projects and identify such D&D costs clearly in the construction project data sheet."

I support this approach, and if confirmed, will continue to do so. Demolition is a key tool to reducing the size of the Nuclear Weapons Complex, streamlining operations, and assuring worker safety and health.

Question. What is your understanding of the schedule for tearing down the old administration building at LANL?

Answer. The Nuclear Security and Science Building (NSSB) project was completed on schedule and approximately $5 million under budget in 2006. The majority of the occupants of SM–43, the old administration building, have been relocated to the new facility. The majority of the SM–43 facility is now being transitioned toward disposition by wing closure, facility characterization, and disconnection of utilities. Because of the existing infrastructure at SM–43, including secure networks, and in anticipation of other new space becoming available in the near future, a portion of the facility will be maintained for occupancy into fiscal year 2008. Once the remaining personnel have been relocated, the entire facility will be closed and prepared for completion of D&D.

LANL is currently in the process of placing much of the SM–43 facility in cold-standby as part of a phased approach to facilitate ultimate D&D. LANL will continue to use a small portion (~100,000 square feet out of a total of over 300,000 square feet) into fiscal year 2008. Much of the staff (~700) has been moved to other facilities including the new NSSB. The current strategy is to empty the facility by the close of fiscal year 2008 and complete D&D by fiscal year 2011.

Question. DOE and NNSA often build one of a kind or first of a kind buildings. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that NNSA construction projects are managed to be completed within budget and on time?
Answer. If confirmed, my broad priorities would be to focus on ensuring that the Federal workforce is effectively performing its oversight mission throughout the complex. Effective oversight of the contractor is critical to ensuring that the complex is properly executing its mission. I, along with the acting Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, have identified six Special Focus Areas that we will use to drive the NNSA to improve its performance during the next 18 months. One of these six is to Integrate Project Management Best Practices throughout the NNSA. As part of this effort, I would anticipate reviewing the management of constructions projects in accordance with DOE O 413.3, to include identifying best practices and integrating lessons learned in our performance. This review would also require a careful evaluation of whether the resources within the Federal workforce are currently adequate. NNSA has also recently strengthened its Independent Project Reviews to ensure that technical, safety, and security requirements are fully identified and integrated into construction projects and that lessons learned from other organizations, sites, and projects are implemented into our NNSA projects. These actions, along with others underway in the Department, will help ensure that we demonstrate improved performance in managing our construction projects.

Question. What additional costing, project management and design skills do you believe are needed in the NNSA?

Answer. In the area of project management, I believe we have one of the best project management certification programs in the Federal Government. We have certified over 60 individuals through this program. We do need to improve our ability to develop accurate cost estimates for our very complex projects. We rely heavily on our M&O contractors and our Architect Engineering firms to develop the designs for our facilities. The Federal job is to establish the facility requirements and to communicate those requirements clearly to the contractors who then design the facilities to meet those requirements. However, as part of the Deputy Secretary's direction to integrate safety into design, we need to have our Federal employees participate more heavily in the design reviews that are conducted at various points in the design stage of our projects. I support efforts and policies that ensure contractors are designing the facilities to meet our requirements in a safe manner.

Question. At what point in the Critical Decision timeline do you believe an independent cost estimate should be performed for a construction project, and why?

Answer. Critical Decision 2, Approve Performance Baseline, is the point at which we establish the baseline for our projects, and that is the point in the Critical Decision timeline that I believe an Independent Cost Estimate should be performed. However, these types of detailed bottoms-up cost estimates are very expensive to perform and should not be performed on every project but rather reserved for those that are sufficiently complex or technically challenging such that there is significant value in conducting the cost estimate.

OPERATIONAL SAFETY

Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that nuclear and other operational safety issues are fully addressed in the design of new NNSA buildings?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to have NNSA follow the Department's standard, Integration of Safety into Nuclear Facility Design. NNSA has been complying with the early draft of the new standard and will operate in full compliance with the final version when implemented. This new standard requires early identification of Safety Class systems and other safety related requirements early in the project life cycle, just after approval of Mission Need. These measures ensure that all safety requirements are articulated, validated and understood early in the project life cycle.

Subsequent to Conceptual Design, configuration control in accordance with nuclear safety rule requirements will ensure that safety requirements are updated as new information becomes available. Compliance with the nuclear safety rule and nuclear quality assurance standard helps to ensure requirements are accurately translated into effective design features, that these design features are constructed correctly, that operational procedures correctly implement that both the design features and operator requirements essential to safety, and that all maintenance and operating personnel are adequately trained.

Question. If confirmed, what steps will you take to ensure that nuclear operational safety issues are identified by the Defense Nuclear Safety Board early in any construction design process and promptly resolved?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that NNSA Federal employees and contractors continue to work closely with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) members and staff to ensure that all safety concerns are understood and promptly
resolved. Where such resolution is not possible; I will ensure that the issue is raised to the attention of NNSA senior management for action. I will not allow construction to begin on any phase of a nuclear project until I am satisfied that all pertinent nuclear safety issues are satisfactorily resolved.

NOTIFICATION OF CONGRESS

Question. If confirmed, would you commit to promptly notifying Congress of any significant issues in the safety, security or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?

Answer. If confirmed as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, I will continue my practice of being open with Congress about issues and concerns affecting the nuclear weapons stockpile and nuclear weapons complex. Management and staff from the Office of Defense Programs routinely brief Members of Congress and congressional staff on the state of the stockpile and complex, as requested on specific subjects and on their own initiative. It is important to note that the most useful and comprehensive notifications come jointly from DOE and DOD, so Congress can get a complete picture of any concerns and how they affect not just nuclear warheads, but the overall nuclear security posture.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM IN EUROPE

1. Senator Akaka. Mr. D’Agostino, in your opinion, how might your role as the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration be complicated by the current problems with Russia over the deployment of the U.S. missile defense system in Europe?

Mr. D’AGOSTINO. The National Nuclear Security Administration has cooperated with Russia for over a decade on a number of programs to strengthen nuclear security and safety throughout Russia, the former Soviet Union, and now across the globe. This cooperation is based upon our mutually-shared nonproliferation objectives, and has evolved based upon changes in the global environment, including the post-September 11 threat of nuclear terrorism. Our nuclear nonproliferation relationship with Russia has been excellent, and I believe that our shared common goals will allow continued cooperation on these important issues.

IRAN

2. Senator Akaka. Mr. D’Agostino, in your opinion, has the international community exhausted all of its options in trying to convince Iran to back off on its nuclear program?
Mr. D'AGOSTINO. The United States is working closely with its international partners to achieve a diplomatic solution to the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear activities. I share the President’s confidence that this diplomatic approach is the right strategy for our country at this time and fully support it.

3. Senator Akaka. Mr. D’Agostino, some people have recently spoken out in the media advocating launching an attack on Iran to punish them for training and equipping foreign lighters who then attack and kill American soldiers in Iraq. What do you think would be the impact of an attack on Iran on international efforts to stop their nuclear program?

Mr. D'AGOSTINO. The United States is committed to achieving a diplomatic solution to the challenges posed by Iran and I support fully the President’s policy towards Iran. As the President, Secretary Gates, and Secretary Rice have reiterated, military action is neither desirable nor inevitable. Further questions regarding Iranian lethal activities in Iraq are best addressed by the Departments of State and Defense.

[The nomination reference of Hon. Thomas P. D'Agostino follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
May 21, 2007.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
Thomas P. D'Agostino, of Maryland, to be Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, Department of Energy, vice Linton F. Brooks, resigned.

[The biographical sketch of Hon. Thomas P. D'Agostino, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH BY THOMAS PAUL D'AGOSTINO

Thomas Paul D'Agostino is the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs at the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Mr. D'Agostino directs the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), which is responsible for maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. The NNSA's nuclear weapons complex includes three national research laboratories, the Nevada Test Site, and four production plants. Mr. D'Agostino's nomination to be the NNSA's Administrator was sent to the Senate on May 21, 2007.

Defense Programs oversees the SSP, which employs over 30,000 people around the country. This program encompasses operations associated with manufacturing, maintaining, refurbishing, and dismantling the nuclear weapons stockpile. Defense Programs also provides oversight and direction of the research, development, and engineering support to maintain the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile in the absence of underground testing, and assures the capability for maintaining the readiness to test and develop new warheads, if required.

In his previous assignments, Mr. D'Agostino served as the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Program Integration where he supported the Deputy Administrator and directed the formulation of the programs, plans, and budget for the SSP. He was also previously the Deputy Director for the Nuclear Weapons Research, Development, and Simulation Program where he directed the formulation of the programs and budget for the research and development program that supports the SSP. From 1989 to 1996, Mr. D'Agostino worked in numerous assignments within the Federal Government in the startup of the Department's tritium production reactors and at the Naval Sea Systems Command as a program manager for the Seawolf submarine propulsion system.

Mr. D'Agostino recently retired as a captain in the U.S. Naval Reserves where he has served with the Navy Inspector General and with the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare in developing concepts for new attack submarine propulsion systems. He also served with the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations (N3/5) in the Navy Command Center in the Pentagon.
In this capacity, he was the French Desk Officer for the Chief of Naval Operations responsible for all Politico-Military interactions with the French Navy and served as the duty captain at the Navy Command Center.

He spent over 8 years on Active-Duty in the Navy as a submarine officer to include assignments on board the U.S.S. *Skipjack* (SSN 585) and with the Board of Inspection and Survey where he was the Main Propulsion and Nuclear Reactor Inspector. In this position, he performed nuclear reactor and propulsion engineering inspections for over 65 submarines and nuclear-powered ships in the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.

Mr. D’Agostino’s awards include the Navy Commendation Medal with Gold Stars, Navy Achievement Medal, Navy Expeditionary Medal, Meritorious Unit Commendation, National Defense Service Medal, Presidential Rank Meritorious Executive Award, and numerous other awards. Mr. D’Agostino is married to the former Beth Ann Alemany of Manchester, CT, and has two children.

Mr. D’Agostino was nominated by the President for his current office on January 27, 2006, and was confirmed by the Senate on February 17, 2006. He was sworn in on February 22, 2006. Mr. D’Agostino served as NNSA’s Acting Administrator from January 22, 2007 to April 27, 2007.

Education:
Naval War College, Newport, RI, MS National Security Studies, 1997 (Distinguished Graduate); Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, MS Business Finance, 1992, United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, BS Physical Science, 1980.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. Thomas P. D’Agostino in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Thomas Paul D’Agostino.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, Department of Energy.

3. Date of nomination:
   May 21, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
5. **Date and place of birth:**
   January 17, 1959; Washington, DC.

6. **Marital Status:** (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
   Married to Beth Anne Alemany.

7. **Names and ages of children:**
   Anne Elizabeth D'Agostino, 20; Thomas Scott D'Agostino, 17.

8. **Education:** List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.

9. **Employment record:** List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
     - Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs (February 2006–present)
     - Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs (May 2005–February 2006)
     - Assistant Deputy Administrator for Program Integration (November 2002–February 2006)
     - Deputy Assistant Deputy Administrator for Research, Development, and Simulation (October 2000–November 2002)
     - Engineer, Office of the Assistant Deputy Administrator for Research, Development, and Simulation (March 2000–October 2000)
     - Deputy Director, Office of Stockpile Computation (June 1997–March 2000)
     - Engineer, Office of Economic Competitiveness (June 1992–June 1997)
     - Engineer, Office of Savannah River Restart (July 1990–June 1992)
     - Served with:
       - Navy Inspector General
       - Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Submarine Warfare
       - Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and Operations
   - May 1998–October 2005, Uniformed Services Benefit Association (life insurance company), Kansas City, KS
     - Member, Board of Directors and Board of Advisors

10. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.
    None.

11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
    None.

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    - U.S. Naval War College Foundation.
    - U.S. Naval War Alumni Association.

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**
    (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
    None.
    (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
    None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
None.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
- Navy Commendation Medal with Gold Stars
- Navy Achievement Medal
- Navy Expeditionary Medal
- Meritorious Unit Commendation (Navy)
- National Defense Service Medal
- Presidential Rank Meritorious Executive Award

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.
None.

16. Speeches: Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.
- Testimony before the Senate Armed Service Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces (as NNSA’s Acting Administrator), March 28, 2007.

17. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

Signature and Date

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO.

This 6th day of June, 2007.

[The nomination of Hon. Thomas P. D’Agostino was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 1, 2007.]
NOMINATION OF HON. PRESTON M. GEREN
TO BE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

TUESDAY, JUNE 19, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:39 a.m. in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Other Senator present: Senator Hutchison.

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Gabriella Eisen, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; and William G.P. Monahan, counsel.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: David G. Collins and Fletcher L. Cork.

Committee members' assistants present: Jay Maroney, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Darcie Tokioka, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazaraki, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Andrew King, assistant to Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Stuart C. Mallory and Jason Van Beek, assistants to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. We’re here today to consider the nomination of Pete Geren to a position which he’s
been serving in an acting capacity for several months, namely Secretary of the Army.

What we’re going to do is change the usual order of business here today. I know Senator Hutchison has other things that she must do, and so we’re going to call upon her first to make the introductions so that she can then be free to leave if she wishes and miss the brilliance of my opening statement and other opening statements. Senator Hutchison, if you’re ready we would call upon you to introduce our nominee.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, our other colleague is the co-author of this program, so maybe he could have a few minutes.

Chairman LEVIN. We’d be delighted to call on Senator Cornyn as well.

Senator Hutchison.

STATEMENT OF HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Senator Hutchison. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you so much for accommodating my schedule. It’s very thoughtful of you.

I’m so proud to be here to introduce Pete Geren to be Secretary of the Army. I started really working with Pete, although I knew him even before, when I was elected to the Senate, he was a Member of Congress, and has done a wonderful job. He was on the House Armed Services Committee and he has really had a lifetime of public service. In fact, his brother Charlie is also a member of the Texas House of Representatives and is also a good friend.

When Pete served in Congress, he was the primary architect behind the transformation of the Fort Worth Joint Reserve Training Base from the former Carswell Air Force Base. When that base closed, Pete was the one who saw the possible use to locate Reserve assets from all the Services and consolidate their training in one location. Today that joint training base has proven to be the model for others around the country. He saw this benefit years ago and really was the architect.

Pete brought his wonderful family here, who I have also known for years: his wife Becky and their three daughters: Tracy, Annie, and Mary. Clearly, they have made a sacrifice along with this lifetime public servant. They are strong supporters and sources of strength for Pete as he has had a continuing call to duty in Washington, despite multiple moves, and I think they are to be commended as well.

With the many challenges over the past 6 years, Pete Geren has become the go-to person at the Department of Defense (DOD). When the Air Force was having difficulty after a procurement crisis, Pete took over as Acting Secretary of the Air Force and helped navigate the Service through tough times and worked closely with Congress on many of the DOD initiatives. Because of his grace, his devotion to fact, his ability to master detail, and the esteem in which he is held on and off the Hill, he is respected in both the military and civilian ranks.

Since assuming the role of Acting Secretary of the Army, Pete has focused on restoring confidence in the Army Medical Corps, supporting the Army family, and growing the Army while working...
on the best path toward modernization. He is devoted to the soldiers. His first official act as Acting Secretary was to meet with the medical staff and patients at Walter Reed Army Medical Hospital. At that time he said: “We’ve let the soldiers down and we’re going to do better.”

He knows what’s best for the Army and he will make sure that our troops get what they need, and we all know, Mr. Chairman, the Army is bearing the brunt right now of our war on terror and they deserve to have a Secretary, hopefully confirmed very quickly, who is devoted to the Army, to helping it grow in the best possible way, but always tuned in to that Army family and making sure they have what they need to support their people who are fighting for our freedom.

Thank you very much for letting me speak and introduce a good friend and also one of the best public servants I have ever worked with. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hutchison, for your very valuable introduction.

Senator Cornyn.

Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your usual courtesy. Thank you for letting me say a few words on behalf of Pete Geren, a great Texan and a great American.

Senator Hutchison, the senior Senator from Texas, did an excellent job, as she did when Pete was nominated to be Under Secretary of the Army over 2 years ago, and I just want to add a few words on my own. I can’t help but remember the statement of Bob Bullock, whose name Pete will recognize, former lieutenant governor, long-time political figure in Texas, who I heard one time say: “There are two types of people in public life, those who want to be somebody and those who want to do something.” Pete is of the latter variety. He’s somebody who has continued to lead the United States Army and serve so ably in DOD and has done a superb job serving our Nation since he arrived at DOD in 2001.

As Senator Hutchison noted, he is uniquely qualified as a former Member of Congress with four terms in the House and time on the House Armed Services Committee. If confirmed, this could be Pete’s fourth major position within DOD. I don’t know too many civilian leaders that have led two different Services, as Pete has done as Acting Secretary of the Air Force and of the Army.

It’s good to see his family here with him. One of the things that’s impressed me about Pete’s service with DOD is his commitment to supporting our service men and women, and particularly as a former Air Force brat myself, military families. Pete, as we all know, played a critical role in working to improve the quality of support to our wounded servicemembers and their families after the recent events at Walter Reed. His strong leadership at a difficult time for the Army and the Nation was critical to ensuring that our military and their families receive only the best care and support for their service and sacrifice for the country.

Mr. Chairman, this committee has seen over the past 6 years a strong, committed, yet caring and compassionate, leader in Pete Geren in his various roles within DOD. In particular with the recent events at Walter Reed highlighting the challenges and providing the best health care and transitional services to our wounded
warriors, we’ve seen that Pete Geren is a uniquely qualified leader to solve the most complex challenges within the Army, and I strongly recommend to the committee that they support this nomination by the President of Pete Geren to serve as Secretary of the Army.

He’s a proven leader and the Army needs his depth, his experience, and his commitment. I’m proud to support this nomination on behalf of someone who exemplifies the spirit of selfless service to the Nation. Thank you very much.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Cornyn. Thank you again, Senator Hutchison.

Let me first call upon you, Secretary Geren, before I give my statement, to introduce your family if you will.

Mr. Geren. I’m proud to do that, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner, I’m proud that my wife and my three daughters are able to join me today: my wife Becky; my oldest daughter Tracy, who’s a rising senior; my middle daughter Annie, who’s going into the ninth grade; and Mary, who’s going into the fifth grade.

Mr. Chairman, they are all Texans through and through, as is their mother, and they miss home. I want to thank them very much for hanging in there with me over the years we’ve been in Washington.

Chairman Levin. We thank you. We thank them for their support for their husband and their father.

I look at your three daughters, I’m reminded of my three daughters who were about the same ages as your three daughters when I arrived in Washington. How important they were to me, to my wife Barbara, that they were there supporting us, because they’re part of this job and you can’t function well without the support of your family. We all know that. We’ve seen that over and over again. So we’re grateful to them, as well as we are to you for your public service.

Mr. Geren. Thank you.

Senator Warner. I’d like to join you, Mr. Chairman, in those comments. I would only add that they have done more than hang in. They are really there behind you 100 percent, and get him home in the evenings. Most decisions made in the Department after 8 o’clock at night are reversed the next morning. So get him home. Save him. He’s a pivotal figure in the future of the United States Army and our defense posture.

I’m hopeful that the Senate will confirm you.

Mr. Geren. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. If he doesn’t get home for dinner, you can blame us. We’re probably the ones who kept him busy answering our questions.

Under Secretary Geren was suddenly called upon to step up to his greater responsibilities as Acting Secretary of the Army shortly after the serious problems at Walter Reed Army Medical Hospital surfaced in February 2007. The Secretary of Defense determined that new leadership was needed to address those problems. Secretary Geren took prompt action to further identify the causes of those problems and to put in motion the process to begin corrective action.
We were all dismayed to learn that the Army failed to meet its obligation to provide for the proper care of injured and wounded soldiers recuperating at Walter Reed Hospital. We were dismayed to learn about the physical conditions of the buildings and the bureaucratic roadblocks and delays, about a disability evaluation process in disarray.

Just last Friday, the report of the DOD Task Force on Mental Health found that the stigma surrounding post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other mental health issues continues to serve as a barrier to many servicemembers seeking help. Additionally, the task force found that there are major issues with accessibility and numbers of mental health services and providers, stating that the “military system does not have enough fiscal or personnel resources to adequately support the psychological health of servicemembers and their families.”

Reports in the Washington Post on Sunday and Monday suggest that the Army does not have adequate programs or sufficient mental health staff to properly treat the 20 to 40 soldiers evacuated each month because of mental problems resulting from day-to-day intensity of combat that they face.

I’m proud to say that this committee, working with the Veterans Affairs Committee, acted last Thursday to address those and the larger myriad of problems by approving and reporting to the full Senate the Dignified Treatment of Wounded Warriors Act. We created a center of excellence for the diagnosis and treatment of PTSD. We authorized a number of measures to improve the prevention, diagnosis, mitigation, and treatment of PTSD and traumatic brain injury (TBI) and we require an educational initiative to reduce the stigma associated with seeking help for those conditions. We directed in our bill improvements to the military’s disability evaluation system. We require the Secretaries of Defense and Veterans Affairs (VA) to develop a comprehensive policy for the care, management, and transition from DOD to the VA of severely injured servicemembers.

This bill also enhances the health care benefits for medically retired servicemembers and authorizes medical care for their family members who leave their homes and jobs to help care for them.

All Americans expect that the Secretary will address these problems and continue to give corrective efforts to these and previously discovered problems, that his utmost attention is required to ensure that our wounded soldiers are treated in the manner that they so manifestly deserve and that the American public insists upon.

Secretary Geren’s responsibilities are sobering and his challenges are immense. He will lead an Army which has borne a huge burden since September 11, 2001, and has suffered the greatest number of casualties. The Army has been engaged in Afghanistan for over 5 years and is in its fifth year of war in Iraq. With the President’s surge, the number of soldiers engaged in Iraq will approach previous high level marks. Some Army units are on or entering their third year of Afghanistan or Iraq service and some individual soldiers are in their fourth year. Tours of duty have been extended. National Guardsmen and reservists are called up for periods beyond anybody’s expectation.
While Americans differ in their opinions about the wisdom of policies behind these operations in Iraq particularly, Americans recognize and honor the bravery, self-sacrifice, and devotion to duty of our military personnel and their families.

As for those of us in Congress, no matter how we voted on authorizing the war and whether we've been critics or supporters of the President's handling of the war, we are determined to see that our troops and their families are supported in every possible way. With the heaviest burden in this war falling on the Army, Secretary Geren's challenge, indeed the challenge for the Army, the Nation, and Congress, is sustaining an Army fully engaged in current operations while also modernizing and transforming that Army to meet future threats. The realities of warfare in the 21st century demands, in Army parlance, boots on the ground. It requires an Army that is optimally organized, trained, and equipped for anything we might ask it to do, all of which are the primary responsibilities of the Secretary of the Army. He must ensure an Army that is ready for all its potential missions, both today and in the future.

Secretary Geren must deal with an Army which in order to sustain the readiness levels in its deployed forces has seen the readiness of its nondeployed forces steadily decline. Most of those nondeployed units are not ready. Consequently, getting those units fully equipped and trained for their rotations is difficult and risky for the Nation should these forces be deployed before they are ready.

In testimony to this committee earlier this year, General Peter Schoomaker, then Army Chief of Staff, was direct in his concern for the strategic depth of our Army and its readiness. He was clear in his apprehensions about the short- and long-term risks resulting from the lower readiness levels of our nondeployed forces. We will be looking to Secretary Geren to take the actions necessary to reduce that risk and to restore the readiness of the Army for both current and future contingencies.

In a marked change of position, the administration now supports an increase in the Army's Active-Duty end strength by 65,000 soldiers to 547,000 over the next 5 years. As we are now in year 5 of the Iraq war, the proposed increases come late. We all understand the stress on our forces in Iraq, but few of these proposed additional soldiers would be trained and ready to help relieve that stress in the next year or 2.

During his own nomination hearing, General George Casey, Army Chief of Staff, said that he intended to see whether it was possible to speed up that process.

We must guard against merely creating a larger version of a less ready force. Secretary Geren will have to ensure that Army plans for expansion are comprehensive and detailed and do all that he can to ensure that they are fully resourced. He must ensure that Congress understands what is needed to bring our ground forces to the levels of strength and readiness necessary to avoid the unacceptable risks and the readiness shortfalls that exist today and to modernize our Army to meet our national security requirements in the future.
Secretary Geren, we look forward to hearing what you believe are the greatest challenges that the Army is facing and how you would address them as Secretary of the Army if the Senate confirms you to that position. Again, we thank you for your service. We thank your family for their support, and I call on Senator Warner.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That was a very comprehensive opening statement and what I'll do is ask to put my statement in the record.

I join you, of course, in welcoming the family, and I point out the rather extraordinary career which you've outlined in detail of this nominee. Since 2001, in many ways he's been preparing for this very moment and, subject to confirmation by the Senate, carrying out the duties of the Secretary of the Army.

It's a great challenge. It's a wonderful job. As you go through life and continue your distinguished career, I doubt there will be one more challenging and more fulfilling than this.

Service to the men and women of the Armed Forces is a rare opportunity. It is a deep and abiding privilege for those who enter that realm of what we call civilian control of the military. Subject to your strength, your conviction, and your dedication, you will earn their respect and that they deserve, and you have the capabilities in my judgment to give them.

I point out Admiral Michael Mullen when it broke that he will be the next nominee to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was asked what concerned him the most. He says: I lay awake at night worrying about the United States Army. That was a carefully phrased statement, but I think it's shared by all of those serving in the Pentagon today. That is that the United States Army needs the strongest of leadership at this point in history. I'm of the opinion that you can give that leadership and will give that leadership.

I only add one word of advice and that is that I presume the Secretary of the Army has a regular conference with the Secretary of Defense. That was the way we worked it when I was privileged to be Secretary of the Navy many years ago. I just hope that you give our Secretary of Defense Robert Gates the best, the toughest advice that you possibly can. He's a fine man and he can't be expected to do the 360 degrees day-in and day-out. He needs the Secretaries of the Services to come forth and to give him the unvarnished facts, so that together the two of you can make the correct decisions for the future of the Army. I hope that you will make that commitment.

Yesterday, we had a very good conversation in my office, as we've had many times together. But I was particularly impressed with your candor on the factual situation that faces you today, and particularly that vehicle that's come to the attention of so many people in DOD, and most specifically the Army and Marine Corps, the Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicle, and how you're concerned that previous decisions in the Department of the Army—you made that clear to me—just did not take into consideration the urgency and the quantity of those vehicles that are needed.
I hope either in your opening comments or in the course of the colloquy we’ll have with our witness today that you will point out what you intend to do to remedy that situation.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Thank you, Senator Levin. I join you in welcoming Secretary Geren and his family. I see some familiar faces out there who were with us last year on February 15, 2006, for Mr. Geren’s previous nomination hearing in the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Thank you for being with us again today.

At your previous nomination hearing, I noted the importance of family support to senior military and civilian leaders when the demands of the position manifest themselves. I’m sure there have been many long days and sacrifices by all of you. We are very appreciative of your support for your husband and father, and I hope you will always remember the importance of his service and contributions to the Army and the Department of Defense.

I recall having noted at the last hearing, however, that any time spent at the Pentagon office after 7:30 was to be questioned since any decisions made are likely to be reversed by 7:30 the next morning. Can you comment on the validity of that theory?

Secretary Geren, there are very few individuals who are more highly qualified than you to serve as Secretary of the Army. From the time you returned to duty, so to speak, in September 2001, you have been preparing for this assignment. The responsibilities of the Service Secretaries for the “training, equipping, and organizing” of the Armed Forces are absolutely crucial to their vitality and success. From my own experience as Secretary of the Navy, I can say that, while today’s problems may dominate your attention, many of the decisions that you would make as Secretary of the Army will have effects for years to come. You may already have experienced this having previously served as Acting Secretary of the Air Force and now the Army.

I won’t attempt to recount all the issues which you have worked on and will confront if you are confirmed. You surely will be questioned today about the Army’s strategic readiness and the effects of current operations on the Army’s ability to respond to worldwide threats. You will be asked about trends in recruiting and retention in the Guard, Reserve, and Active Forces and the ability of the Army to meet its planned increase of 47,000 soldiers in 5 years. Of course, the morale of the force—and family members—under very difficult conditions of service for many soldiers—is of great concern for all of us. You testified on various occasions following the revelations at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in February of this year, and we will want to hear more about the Army’s response and what more needs to be done especially in the areas of outpatient care, including mental health services.

I urge you to evaluate critically and clearly the capabilities of the Army in meeting its mission and listen carefully to the Army’s uniformed leaders and their views in this regard. I have publicly expressed my admiration and support for our magnificent All Volunteer Force, which has been 34 years in the making. I believe this force has met the challenges it faces and will continue to do so, but I am concerned that the force not be stretched beyond the breaking point.

You are key to the future of the Army in this regard, and Secretary Gates needs your absolute best advice and counsel. I urged Secretary Gates in his confirmation hearing last December not to restrict his advice, or personal opinions, regarding current and future strategy evaluations, and to be fearless—fearless—in discharging his statutory obligations. I offer the same advice to you.

Chairman Levin. Senator Warner, thank you so much.

Let me now ask Secretary Geren the standard questions that we ask of all nominees who appear before this committee. Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Mr. Geren. Yes, I will.

Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

Mr. Geren. No.
Chairman Levin. Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?

Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

Mr. Geren. Yes, I will.

Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

Mr. Geren. Absolutely.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?

Mr. Geren. Yes, I will.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Mr. Geren. Yes.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary?

STATEMENT OF HON. PRESTON M. GEREN, TO BE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

Mr. Geren. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and members of the committee: It truly is an honor to be before you today as the President’s nominee to be Secretary of the Army. I want to thank the President for his confidence in me and Dr. Gates for his confidence as well. It’s truly an privilege to have this opportunity.

Let me thank Senator Hutchison and Senator Cornyn for their very kind remarks, two great leaders for our State, two great leaders in the Senate. I deeply appreciate, and I know my family does as well, their kind and generous remarks.

Mr. Chairman, I’d also like to note Senator Hutchison’s predecessor, who was the person who brought me into public life, Senator Lloyd Bentsen. Had it not been for the opportunity to work for Senator Bentsen, I’m confident I would not have the opportunities to serve in our government today. Senator Bentsen passed away over the past year, a great American, a great Senator, and I want to acknowledge my debt to him.

Chairman Levin. Thank you for that, for all of us.

Mr. Geren. Senator, I introduced my family earlier. I have, as you do, three wonderful girls, three great kids. Again, I want to thank them for standing with me and standing with Becky and me in our time here in Washington and all the time.

My family and I came to Washington planning a 3-year hitch and 6 years later we’re still here. I joined DOD in August 2001 expecting a peacetime assignment in business transformation of DOD. Then came September 11 and the war. There’s a sense of mission working among our military during time of war that’s hard to walk away from.

For the past 6 years, I’ve watched soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines go off to war, and I’ve watched their families stand steadfast and unwavering in their support of their departed loved ones.
and live with the uncertainty of whether he or she would return home. They live with the certainty that there would be birthdays, holidays, anniversaries, graduations, and the ups and downs of everyday life that their loved one would miss, for 12 months originally and now 15 months, and too often watched those families live with a loss when their loved one did not return.

I've been inspired by the selfless service of our soldiers and humbled by the sacrifice of their families. I've held staff and leadership jobs in the Pentagon over these past 6 years and consider it the privilege of a lifetime to have the opportunity to work on behalf of our men and women in our Nation's military and their families during the time of war.

Our grateful Nation cannot do enough and I'm honored to play a part, a supporting role, in their service to our Nation on the front lines.

When I came before you seeking confirmation as Under Secretary of the Army, I told you my top priority would be taking care of soldiers and their families. I reaffirm that commitment today with a greater understanding of that responsibility. My year as Under Secretary of the Army taught me much. My 4 months as Acting Secretary of the Army has taught me much more.

We have over 140,000 soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. We can never take our eye off of that ball. They are counting on their Army, the big Army, to continue to provide them the training, equipment, and leadership to take the fight to the enemy and defend themselves. They count on their Army leadership back home to move the bureaucracy on the homefront. They count on their Secretary and their Chief to stand up for them, get them what they need when they need it.

We must act with urgency every day, every day, to meet their needs. Today the issue is MRAP. Tomorrow it will be different. The enemy is forever changing and forever adapting.

Mr. Chairman, further, as an Army we pledge never to leave a fallen comrade. That is not an abstract notion. That means on the battlefield, in the hospital, in the outpatient clinic, or over a life of dependency if that is what's required to fulfill this pledge.

I have witnessed the cost in human terms and to the institution of the Army when we break faith with that pledge, as a handful did at Walter Reed. A few let down the many and broke that bond of trust. But I have seen soldiers, enlisted noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and officers respond when they learn that someone has let down a soldier. They step up and they make it right, they make it better, and they do not rest until the job is done, and they expect and demand accountability.

I've seen the strain of multiple deployments on soldiers' families. A wife and a mother said recently: "I can hold the family together for one deployment. Two is harder and three is harder still." Over half of our soldiers today are married with families. Over 700,000 children are in the families of our soldiers. The health of the All-Volunteer Force depends on the health of those families.

We must expect that our future offers an era of persistent conflict. We will continue to ask much of the Army family. We must meet the needs of our families, provide them with a quality of life comparable to the quality of their service and sacrifice. It's the
right thing to do and the future of our All-Volunteer Force depends on it.

As President Lincoln pledged to us as a Nation: “Our duty does not stop when our soldier or our Nation leaves the field of battle. We must care for those who have borne the battle, his widow and his orphan.” That commitment extends over the horizon and we have learned we have much to do to fulfill that commitment.

Lately we have come face to face with some of our shortcomings—a complex disability system that can frustrate and fail to meet the needs of soldiers, a system that often fails to acknowledge, understand, and treat some of the most debilitating, yet invisible, wounds of war, leaving soldiers to return from war only to battle bureaucracy at home, and leaving families at a loss on how to cope.

DOD, working with the VA and this committee and this Congress, has an opportunity that does not come along often, to move our Nation a quantum leap forward in fulfillment of that commitment. We cannot squander this opportunity and, Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner, I commend this committee for the step forward you took last week in your bill to start the process of meeting the needs of those wounded warriors, and we look forward to working with you to push that initiative.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for all you do for our soldiers and their families. The Army has no greater friend than this committee. Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution makes the Army and Congress full partners in the defense of our Nation and in the service of our soldiers and their families. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to work with you in discharging our duty to those soldiers.

I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Secretary Geren, thank you for a heartfelt and a powerful statement. I can’t remember that I’ve ever heard a better one, frankly, coming from a nominee. It was very personal and I just wish every American, every soldier, and every one of their families could have heard your opening statement.

In your response to the committee’s advance policy questions, Mr. Secretary, you stated that if confirmed that you’ll conduct a comprehensive review of the Army’s medical support requirements and how the Army can better recruit and retain medical, dental, nursing, and behavioral health personnel.

This is obviously an urgent and a critical issue. The weekend’s articles in the Washington Post showed that the ranks of licensed psychologists, for instance, have thinned in recent years, dropping from 450 to 350. Many psychologists who have left reported difficulty in handling the stress of facing such pained soldiers as a reason that they left. Many of the psychologists who remained are inexperienced to treat patients with PTSD like they would patients with alcohol or marital problems.

The articles suggest that the Army does not have the infrastructure or the mental health personnel to deal with the large number of soldiers suffering from PTSD. They report that the Army has no PTSD center at Walter Reed, the place to which most soldiers who experience combat-related mental health problems are evacuated,
and note that the Army’s psychiatric treatment is weak compared with the best PTSD programs that the Government offers.

The article also reports that, even though Walter Reed maintains the largest psychiatric department in the Army, it lacks enough psychiatrists and clinicians to properly treat the growing number of soldiers returning with combat stress.

What is the Department doing to increase the number of trained, qualified, and experienced mental health professionals that are needed to handle this deluge of soldiers that are returning from this war with PTSD?

Mr. GEREN. Sir, you sum up the Army’s challenges very well in your comments. We recognize that we have a great deal of work to do in this area. We have begun the process. Last week we executed a contract to hire 200 more mental health professionals in the Army, which would increase our mental health professionals by over 20 percent.

It’s an area of shortage. It’s an area of shortage not only in the Army, but it’s an area of shortage in the communities that surround our military installations. So for many specialties the families and soldiers can turn to the TRICARE system and get service in the local economy. That same shortage of mental health professionals exists in the communities as well. We recognize that.

Acting Surgeon General Gale Pollock, that’s a top priority of hers and I worked with her over the last few months to identify resources for us to expand in that area.

Let me say some other things that we’re trying to do to leverage resources. In a couple of weeks we’re going to launch a train-teach program to teach everybody in the Army how to identify the symptoms of PTSD. We have a four-star conference later this week. General Casey is going to introduce it to those four-star generals next week. But we are still working it through the peer review process. We’ll be working with the Hill as well.

We recognize we have a challenge there, and the mental health professionals are one of the areas that we send downrange at higher percentage than any other mental health field because of the need in theater. But we are trying to do a better job of teaching our leaders in the Army to spot those problems before they become serious problems. We’re trying to staff up. We’re trying to work with the TRICARE system to help them provide more mental health care professionals outside of the Army system.

Sir, I acknowledge that’s a major challenge for us, and let me just expand it a little further: PTSD as well as TBI, are two of the signature wounds of this conflict, and we’re working them, but we have a lot of work to do.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

By the way, we’re going to have an 8-minute round on our first round.

On May 4, 2007, the Department released the findings of the Mental Health Advisory Team’s fourth assessment of the mental health and well-being of soldiers and marines in Iraq. That team found that, among numerous other things, multiple deployments directly correlate with higher levels of acute stress and that lengthy deployments lead to higher rates of mental health and marital problems.
The team found that the deployment length was more of a concern for soldiers than marines, who tended to have fewer deployment concerns than soldiers. The report is dated November 17, 2006. That's about 5 months before it was released, for reasons I'm not sure I understand why there was such a delay.

But nonetheless, that report predates Secretary Gates's announcement on April 11, 2007, that tours of duty for soldiers serving in Iraq would be extended from 12 to 15 months.

You, in your opening statement, made very eloquent reference to the strain of multiple deployments on families. My question is, did the Army consider the findings of the Mental Health Advisory Team when developing the plan to extend Army tours to 15 months?

Mr. Geren. Yes, sir, that's one of the many inputs that we considered when we made that recommendation to Dr. Gates. With the demand signal from theater, we were faced with two choices, neither of which was very good. The choice which was how we had been moving up until the point of that decision was waiting until the last minute and then extending troops in theater, with little warning, in some cases after they had already begun their redeployment home.

The better of those two tough choices was to go ahead and make a decision on the 15-month deployments with the commitment that there would be 12 months of dwell time in between those deployments, recognizing that it is a very difficult strain on the families. We've asked much of them; with that we're asking more. We are going to do what we can to support those soldiers and their families in these deployments. It's one of the reasons that we have identified additional resources to put in family programs immediately. We've moved them in over the last couple weeks to support families, to help them during this extended deployment.

Chairman Levin. On the question of the MRAP vehicles, the Army's validated requirement for MRAP vehicles is only 2,500, and by contrast the Marines' validated requirement is 3,700. The Marines' validated requirement is going to permit them to replace all of their up-armored Humvees with MRAP vehicles. The Army has said that the requirement of the Army could go as high as 17,000 MRAP vehicles, but there seems to be some reluctance on the part of the Army to validate that higher requirement.

What is the Army's reluctance to validate the higher requirement for the MRAPs?

Mr. Geren. My commitment and the commitment of the Army is to provide every MRAP to theater as quick as we possibly can that they need in theater. General Ray Odierno requested over 17,000, a one-to-one replacement for the Humvee. The Chief and I asked our G–3 and G–8 to go to theater—they left several days ago; they got back last night—to look at that requirement and determine, to prioritize it and look at what the immediate needs are, recognizing that there are some Humvees that perhaps because of their mission would not need to be replaced, certainly not immediately, maybe not in the long-term, but looking at what the need is.

They got back last night. They're going to make a recommendation. I can't tell you the number, but whatever that requirement is
we’re going to meet it and we’re going to move it to theater as fast as we can. The money that you gave us a month ago, we committed it last week. We are using that money to buy a version of the MRAP vehicle. We’re working with the Navy and the Marines to ramp up the production capacity so that we can get these to the theater as fast as possible. Every validated requirement we’re going to do our best to fill.

Chairman Levin. Mr. Secretary, in a news interview last weekend General David Petraeus indicated that the surge would not be completed and that its mission would not be completed by September. He said that historically counterinsurgencies have gone on for 9 or 10 years.

The question is this: should the higher troop level of the surge continue into the spring of 2008? Several Army officials have said privately that units will have to be extended even longer than the current 15-month deployment or the dwell time between rotations would have to be reduced below the 12 months that you just mentioned. What are the implications for Army units if the current troop levels in Iraq and Afghanistan are maintained into the spring of 2008?

Mr. Geren. We’re in the process of exploring those options. It’s too early to judge the surge. It’s too early to look into the next year. But for the Army we have to begin to plan. We have to look at our options. We’re exploring numerous options and have to look at all the components of the Army, the total Army. We have to look at every way that we can to support that demand.

At this point in time we’re not in a position to answer that fully. We are looking over the horizon, trying to anticipate what it might be and looking at the options on how we will fill that demand. But we’re committed to filling the requirements that the combatant commander asks and we have been able to do so up until now and we will continue to do so.

Chairman Levin. You’re saying that if the surge’s higher troop levels are continued into 2008 that there are options to fill those levels other than extending the deployments and other than reducing the dwell times? Is that what you’re saying?

Mr. Geren. Yes, sir. We have also the option of looking at the different utilization of the Guard and Reserve, different force mix. Also, the other Services have supported us in some of our ground missions up until now. Both the Air Force and the Navy have put troops into areas where they’re not their conventional area of service. So we will explore all those options. Really, at the present time I am not able to look that far into the future and give you any certainty on how we would fill it if in fact it becomes necessary.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, how well you know that the past 18 months particularly there have been many opinions rendered about the Army: severely overstressed, overextended. Even the word “broken” has been used. But to the best I can judge, the record clearly indicates that the Army each time has stepped up and met the challenge and has never, never tried to pull back or failed to respond to the orders of the Commander in Chief, whether it be the President, Com-
mander of Central Command, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and others, indeed the Secretary of Defense.

You and I know there are limits, limits from the standpoint of human endurance, family stress and strain, limits in the availability of equipment and so forth. We haven't reached them yet, fortunately, in my judgment. But what series of benchmarks, what series of alarms, have you put in place to alert you as the Secretary of the Army, if confirmed, that we have to make some corrective courses and indeed might require you to go to the Secretary of Defense and point it out and those deficiencies that you've discovered could well impact on our policy, whether it's how long we stay, to whether we can keep our troops there for longer periods, as the chairman said?

What is the framework of alarm systems you have in place?

Mr. GEREN. Yes, sir. As you've noted, Senator, repeatedly, the All-Volunteer Force is a national treasure. This is the first time we have fought an extended conflict with an All-Volunteer Force since the Revolutionary War. We were reminded of that over and over this past week as we celebrated the Army's 232nd birthday. Parallels between the Army of 1775 and the Army of 2007, an All-Volunteer Force in the field.

We have to keep a close watch on all indicators of the health of that Army. But as you correctly point out, sir, in this conflict when the Nation called, our soldiers have stepped up time and time and time again. Perhaps the greatest indicator of the commitment of those soldiers and the morale of those soldiers is the retention rates. Our retention rates continue to exceed our goals. Our retention rates among those who have deployed exceed the retention rates of those who have not deployed.

So we have an Army that continues to step up and meet the challenge. But we have to watch for those warning signs, as you alert us. The front line in identifying those warning signs is the NCOs and the junior officers in the field. They have to know what's going on mentally, emotionally, and physically with their soldiers, and they have to be in a position to step up and meet the needs of those soldiers and not let a problem fester there.

We're working to try to make that front-line soldier a better judge of the needs of the people that he or she leads. This train-teach program that I talked about earlier, we're going to teach every leader in the Army how to spot some of the emotional stresses, PTSD and other mental disorders, while they're still in their infant stages. They're our front lines and all the other indicators lag those indicators that they see. We have to stay in touch with them.

You look at other indicators, though, that tell us about the health of the force—absent without leave rates, desertion rates, drug use, criminal activity, accidents. We have seen most of those indicators hold steady. Three have not held steady and are troubling. Accidents have increased, as have suicides and divorces. One thing I've done since I've been at the Army is the Army senior staff gets together every Wednesday. We call it our balcony brief. I've added two slides to that brief, one is suicides and one is class A accidents that result in fatalities, so that our Army leadership every week,
in addition to everything they're doing all week long, is alerted to those two indicators as well as the other indicators.

The Army has stepped up. I have no doubt it will continue to do so, but we must take steps necessary to protect this treasure.

Senator WARNER. There are limits to human endurance.

Mr. GEREN. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. We have to recognize that.

Now, there has been some indication of shortage in the junior grade officers, the captains and the majors, in terms of your retention.

Mr. GEREN. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. For the first time you failed to meet your recruiting levels. It was just by several hundred, but nevertheless, failed to meet the goal. I'm pleased that you in the Army formally announced we missed our goal on recruiting. That indicates a certain softness that's in the system now. Do you acknowledge there being softness and what steps are you taking to remedy it?

Mr. GEREN. Let me mention one other important area of emphasis for us in making sure that we meet the needs of the soldiers, and that's meeting the needs of the families. You can destroy an Army by burning the soldier out or burning the family out. Staying in touch with those families and supporting them is a key ingredient to making sure that we retain the health.

We did experience this in the month of May for the first time in 23 months a recruiting shortfall. Our goal was 5,500. We made 5,100. The Guard also fell a little short of its recruiting goal. Over the course of this year, though, both the Active-Duty and the Guard are higher than our recruiting target. The Reserves remain a little below, in the low 90 percent range.

It's something we have to watch very closely. We have to. We are expanding our number of recruiters. We are also monitoring the environment in which we recruit. Many of the influencers are now expressing reluctance when they ought encourage their people.

Senator WARNER. It's the traditional family influence. We discussed that yesterday.

Mr. GEREN. Yes, sir, parents and other influencers.

Senator WARNER. Less enthusiastic about encouraging their family members to join the military. Let's face facts.

Mr. GEREN. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. That's a serious turn of events.

Mr. GEREN. It is.

Recruiting remains a challenge. I believe we'll make our 80,000 goal this year. We are on track to do that. But when you consider such a small percentage of the Nation steps up and supports our Army during this time, we have to do a better job of broadening the base and getting more Americans to consider this opportunity for service.

Senator WARNER. What about the junior officer situation?

Mr. GEREN. Yes, sir. With the junior officers, particularly captains and majors, we do have a shortage. Most of that shortage is attributable to changes in force structure with modularity. In 2005, we needed approximately 23,000 captains and majors. In 2013, we're going to need 30,000 captains and majors.
We also, in addition to the brigade combat teams we have in theater, we have many captains and majors supporting training over there of the Iraqi security forces and the Iraqi military. So we have a 7,000 shortfall. We have seen the retention rate for captains and majors slide a little bit from historical norms, but really just a little bit. That's not a significant contributor to this shortfall. But the two big contributors are the change in force structure and then the reduction in accessions late in the 1990s. We're paying the price for that today.

We have a program in place, a fairly robust program to try to address this shortage and try to grow it.

Senator WARNER. Let's turn to the important role played by the National Guard and the Army Reserve. More and more we've relied on them in this conflict. I think percentage-wise the only precedent is perhaps World War II, when they were all integrated into one fighting force. But you have to keep a strong Guard and Reserve. What steps are you taking in that area?

Mr. GEREN. Yes, sir. As you well know, with the changes that we made as a country in the 1990s we've grown the Reserve component to 55 percent of our total Army end strength. We cannot go to war without the Guard and Reserve, and we fight as one, we have to train as one, and we have to equip as one.

One of the most important initiatives we have under way is an unprecedented equipment investment in the Guard and Reserves. From 2005 to 2013 we're going to invest about $37 billion in the Guard and in the Reserves about $10 billion. In the next 18 months the Guard will get $10 billion worth of new equipment; the Reserves get $2.6 billion. This is just a piece of the effort to make sure that the Guard is properly equipped and is going to be ready to meet the call when we do turn to them, as we have repeatedly in this conflict, and they've performed with extraordinary distinction.

Senator WARNER. In this, as you say, conflict, two principally, Afghanistan and Iraq, and understandably the principal focus is on the needs for these conflicts. But at the same time, as Secretary you have to project ahead a minimum of a decade, indeed beyond, to put in place those programs and initiatives which will build America's future Army.

Now, how are you going to do that and at the same time meet the extraordinary requirements of these conflicts?

Mr. GEREN. Over the history of our country, we have often beggared the future in the understandable interest of meeting the needs of the present. We cannot allow that to happen with this Army. The platforms that we have in theater today are platforms in many cases that are older than the soldiers that are operating them.

The Future Combat System is our number one modernization priority for the Army. It's the only Army program in the top 10 modernization programs for DOD. I want to thank this committee for your strong support of that system. But that system not only is going to replace our manned ground vehicles with systems that are more survivable, more capable——
Senator WARNER. My time has run out. But you have in mind the future Army at the same time you’re building towards those goals?

Mr. GEREN. Yes, sir. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. The Senator from Connecticut.

Senator LIEBERMAN [presiding]. Thank you. Chairman Levin had to leave for a few moments, so he asked me to chair for a while. So it becomes my great pleasure as my first act to recognize myself to ask you the next round of questions. [Laughter.]

Secretary Geren, I can’t thank you enough for your service to our country in so many capacities. It shouldn’t even have to be noted, but I’m proud to say you were a Democratic Member of Congress. You served as Commander in Chief in this Army in the highest tradition of nonpartisan, perhaps bipartisan, service. I thank you for it. It makes us all proud of you personally as a friend, but also it sets a model, I think, for the rest of the country.

I thank you for your opening statement. I agree with Chairman Levin. I may have heard a better one, but I can’t remember it this morning. It was very moving.

I want to pick up the line of questions that both the chairman and the ranking member began with about the size of the Army as it faces the challenges that it is facing for us now. Just to mention, and you touched on it briefly, I think we will look back or historians will look back at the 1990s and say that we once again made a mistake that nations repeatedly make postwar, which is post-Cold War we reduced the size of the Army too drastically, generally speaking from about 780,000 to about 480,000. The Army therefore has felt the stress of its involvement in the global war on terror.

But I will tell you what you know and every time I’m out to see our troops in the field, that they are meeting the call. They are meeting it with not only a high sense of purpose and honor, but with tremendous skill and effectiveness. I see some stress emotionally that we’ve talked about. But I don’t see any diminution in the quality of service that the men and women of the Army are giving, and I thank you for that.

Now, obviously we all worry, as Senator Warner said, that there comes a breaking point. I appreciated your answer to Senator Levin’s question about what options we have if we determine, if the Commander in Chief determines, that the level of troop support that we have in Iraq now at the so-called surge level needs to be maintained, because we never want to be in a position where our resources determine our strategy instead of our resources being there to meet what our generals on the ground tell us they need to succeed.

I just want to pursue a bit of that. The first is to emphasize and maybe ask you to give a little more content, where do we find the troops necessary? Talk a little bit in more detail about the reenlistment rate, if you would, of those who have been actively deployed or not?

Mr. GEREN. The reenlistment rate has exceeded our goals. In fact, when you look at our plan to grow the Army, our recruiting numbers hardly change over the next 5 years. We’re going to grow it by 7,000 a year. Our recruiting number stays roughly at 80,000 every year from here on. We grow the Army through retention and
we shape the Army with retentions in areas where we need to grow the Army.

The retention has been strong. It's about 102 percent of our goal.

Senator Lieberman. How do you set the goal? That's impressive.

First, how do you set the goal?

Mr. Geren. The goals are based on what our needs are in those ranks, in those grades, and how many soldiers we need in that area. Of course, in captains and majors we need them all.

Senator Lieberman. So you're at 102 percent of your goal as of now?

Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.

Senator Lieberman. Obviously, the next way to go is recruitment, and I know that, as you've indicated, we're falling a little bit below. Why don't you give us more detail on that and break it down again in terms of Active-Duty, Guard, and Reserve?

Mr. Geren. Our Active-Duty goal through the end of the year is 80,000. We are above target. But in May, for the first time in 23 months, we dropped below the monthly target. Our goal was 5,500. We got 5,100.

The Guard came off of a string of consecutive months of exceeding their goal and also fell a little short.

Senator Lieberman. The Guard, can you give us a percentage?

Mr. Geren. The Guard I believe is around 92 percent. I'd like to provide the details for the record if I could. They are also on track.

I want to mention one thing the Guard has done. The Guard has come up with a very innovative recruiting model which the Reserves are now following and the Army Active-Duty is following as well, turning every Guardsman into a recruiter and giving a bonus. The program has been extraordinarily successful and we've learned that from the Guard. We appreciate their leadership in the area and we are incorporating the practices that they've developed to help us meet our recruiting goals. It's been remarkably successful.

[The information referred to follows:]

The Army National Guard recruiting goal through May 2007 was 3,012, with an actual 3,456 National Guard soldiers recruited, a percentage of 114 percent.
The June 2007 Army National Guard recruiting goal was 3,324, with an actual 3,258 Army National Guard soldiers recruited, a percentage of 98 percent.
The Army National Guard's recruiting goal through June 2007 was 26,405 with an actual recruited: 28,173 (106.7 percent).

Senator Lieberman. Senator Warner and you talked about some of the problems related to recruiting. Let me just step back for a moment and put it in this larger context. Under the President's budget, the plan was to move the Army to 547,000 personnel and to do so in 5 years, which would bring us to 2012, even 2013.

When General Casey came before us for his first testimony after his confirmation hearing, I and others expressed some impatience with the idea that we had to wait 5 years to get the Army up to 547,000. He said that he was going to take a look at doing it more quickly and that was a priority for him, which we appreciated.

I wonder if you could report to us on how that process is going, whether you share General Casey's goal of seeing if we can reach the 547,000 a lot sooner, since we're obviously in battle right now?

Mr. Geren. I do share that goal and we are examining it right now. We're working on it daily. One of the task forces that we put
together focuses on that. It’s an issue that goes beyond recruiting. We have to make sure that we have the training bases. We have to make sure we have the barracks. We have to make sure we have all the support systems.

Obviously, it would require moving the budget numbers around and sustaining these soldiers over the course of the time and that cost would begin earlier in the budget process. But we have told Secretary Gates that this is a matter that we are pursuing and considering, but I cannot tell you today that we’ve figured out how to get it done or that there is a way with certainty that we’re going to get it done. But that’s our commitment and we’re exploring how to do that.

Senator Lieberman. I appreciate that. You had a sentence or two that touched on this. Incidentally, Senator Ben Nelson is here and his subcommittee of this committee led the full committee in authorizing in the bill that we reported out of committee both making the 7,000 increase in personnel that the President recommended permanent, not temporary, and adding 13,000 additional. So that both creates an opportunity but also gives you a challenge.

I urge you to look as you suggested you might, at an array of different methods you might follow to increase the recruiting, because the fact is that we are still engaging a very small percentage of our overall population of eligible age groups in service in the military, and I hope that you’ll feel encouraged to come back and ask for a supplemental appropriation to make that possible if it’s necessary, because it seems to me that there’s nothing more important to the Army and to the safety and success of those in it now that would give you the adequate personnel that you need to carry out the missions the country is giving you.

Mr. Geren. Thank you. I just note very quickly, as part of this effort to grow the force, we’re also looking at the blue to green program, recruiting officers from other Services, particularly the Air Force; also looking at opportunities to bring soldiers from the Reserve component onto Active Duty. We have only an informal survey, but there are many who are interested in doing that.

The initial enlistee, the first termers, is a part of that initiative. But we also have to fill out the Army, shape the Army. So we are looking at other ways to bring in experienced soldiers that can fill the other grades.

Senator Lieberman. Good. My time is winding up, but I want to make one final point and if you have a quick response. I was struck when I was in Iraq the last time, which was about 2 weeks ago, about how many of our personnel in uniform are doing non-military work. I don’t mean just logistics. I don’t mean that at all. I mean nation-building. It is in one sense quite impressive and I wish every American could see what the U.S. Army and others are doing to rebuild the government, the health care system, the education system, and to secure the neighborhoods.

But some of that in the best of all worlds should, frankly, be done by people from other departments of our Government. I just wonder whether it’s time, notwithstanding the excellence with which the Army particularly is doing this, to see if you can’t get a little more help, as Ambassador Ryan Crocker seemed to be ap-
pealing for more help from the State Department in the letter to Secretary Rice that we read about this morning.

Mr. GEREN. Yes, sir, that would certainly be valuable.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator Dole.

Senator DOLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I thank you for your outstanding service to our country, for your presentation this morning, and I certainly look forward to supporting your nomination.

A number of senior officers estimates that the Army's long-term budget outlook for about the next 10 years is about $200 billion below what will be needed to fully fund the expanded Army, reset the force, and field the Future Combat System. In your professional opinion, are anticipated funding levels both over and beyond the Future Years Defense Plan adequate to accomplish these goals?

Mr. GEREN. Senator, in last year's budget—and I was Under Secretary at the time; Secretary Francis Harvey was Secretary of the Army and we had General Peter Schoomaker as Chief of Staff—we worked with the Secretary of Defense and with the Office of Management and Budget and were able to raise some issues with them and secured additional funding over the next 5-years program.

Dr. Gates has come to Chief Casey and me and asked us to present to him a plan to deal with readiness issues and we are in the process of doing that. We have a good working relationship with the Secretary and he's working with us to address long-term needs. I can't tell you where we will end up at the end of that process. But he shares our concern, your concern, this committee's concern, about readiness issues of the Army and he's working with us to try to identify ways to meet those needs.

Thank you for that question. I appreciate it.

Senator DOLE. What do you believe is the single most important responsibility of the Secretary of the Army?

Mr. GEREN. The statutory responsibility, the Secretary of the Army is the senior official in the Army in fulfilling our statutory obligation to organize, train, man, and equip our Army. It's hard to say what the most important role is. By statute, the job of the Secretary is to present the policies, the requirements of the Army, to the Secretary of Defense, to the executive branch, and to develop the budget and advocate for the budget to Congress, to the Secretary, and to the executive branch.

But as I think about my short time in the job as Acting Secretary of the Army, I think I have to put at the top of the list being an advocate for the soldiers and their families, being an advocate for the soldiers, and making sure that their voice is heard. The Secretary is in a unique position to act on those needs and it's critical that the Secretary takes that responsibility seriously. It doesn't show up, I guess, in the statute, but I would put it at the top of the list as well.

Senator DOLE. Thank you.

If you believe that the Army is not being funded adequately now or in the future, will you tell this committee in plain terms what
you believe and will you spell out for us the practical implications of the underfunding?

Mr. Geren. Yes, Senator. I support the President’s budget, but I’m going to work with the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense has shown us an open door to work with on the funding issues. I have every confidence that we, working with the Secretary of Defense, are going to be able to meet the funding needs of the Army.

Senator Dole. Do you believe that the time has come that we should begin a discussion in this country of the need to fund our regular military budget at no less than 4 percent of gross domestic product? Is it time to begin that discussion?

Mr. Geren. I don’t know that I could speak to that. At the present time, as far as a share of our gross national product, the share going into our military is by historical standards low. But the perspective I bring on the budget is looking at it from the Army’s needs and then going forward from there, rather than looking at the resources of the country and attaching a percentage. But certainly the percentage that’s devoted to national security at the present time is low by historical standards.

Senator Dole. Let me follow up on an earlier question. What do you believe should be done to substantially improve inter-agency cooperation?

Mr. Geren. I don’t know that I have a good answer right now for that. Dr. Gates has been very effective in working with the other departments of Government and I see progress on many fronts as a result of that. As far as the Army and the leadership of the Army, most of our work with the other agencies flows through Dr. Gates. Now, there is an area where we are working very effectively, I believe, with another Government agency and that’s the VA when it comes to wounded warriors and this disability system. We have a task force that has all the Service Secretaries on it, chaired by Secretary England and the Deputy for VA. I see a great constructive working relationship there developing and I believe it’ll work hand in glove with the legislation that you have recently passed helping wounded warriors.

Senator Dole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Dole.

Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Aloha, Mr. Geren.

Mr. Geren. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Akaka. I’m so happy to be here with you this morning as you’re the nominee for Secretary of the Army, and we have had a good prior chance to speak about other things. I would just like to start out by saying that I’m grateful to you and your family for your years of dedicated service to our country and for continuing to serve our country in these challenging times.

To give your family a chance to stretch, I would like to introduce your family who’s present here and welcome them as well: your wife Becky that’s here seated in the front seat. Becky, welcome, and three lovely daughters: Tracy, Annie, and Mary. We welcome you here to this hearing for your dad.

Mr. Geren. Thank you, Senator.
Senator AKAKA. If confirmed, you will have some extremely difficult challenges facing you as Secretary of the Army. With your background, though, I believe you are well-qualified to handle these challenges and to continue to lead the Army’s modernization so that it will be ready to face any of the Nation’s security challenges in the 21st century. I want to wish you well in doing that.

Mr. GEREN. Thank you.

Senator AKAKA. Secretary Geren, the Army Times last week reported on the massive backlog of mail delivery at Walter Reed. According to the article, the backlog was the fault of a contract employee who held onto the mail for individuals that he was unable to find. Have you verified that this problem is unique to Walter Reed and is not occurring at other medical centers?

Mr. GEREN. Sir, I can’t tell you that it’s unique to Walter Reed. When I learned about it last week, I called General Eric Schoomaker and said, we have to fix this right now, and asked him and asked General Pullock to assess the mail system at every one of our major medical centers around the country, and we’re doing that right now.

It’s absolutely unacceptable. We had over 4,500 pieces of undelivered mail. In my opening remarks I talked about how it makes you proud to see how soldiers respond when they learn that somebody has let down another soldier. When General Schoomaker and General Michael Tucker, his deputy commanding general, were alerted to this problem, they immediately assigned 30 personnel, jumped right in the middle of those 4,500 pieces of mail, and by midnight that night got those letters in the mail back to soldiers. That’s the kind of leadership that we have at Walter Reed now and I’m very proud to see it, and that kind of responsiveness of soldiers taking care of soldiers.

But I can’t tell you that we don’t have that problem elsewhere, and we are looking across the system to make sure that we do not. As you well know, there are few things more important than mail.

I’ve been told if you get the food right, you get the mail right, you’re a long way to getting your job done. We are working to get the mail right, sir.

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Secretary, before your time, in 2004 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that the Secretary of Defense develop and implement an action plan based on lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom to resolve issues with mail delivery at that time to the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD in its formal review of this report concurred with GAO’s recommendations and was at that time taking steps to implement them.

Do you know if this has been done? If so, have any surveys of the troops been conducted to see if their satisfaction with the mail service has improved?

Mr. GEREN. Sir, I don’t know. I’m not familiar with that GAO report, but I’ll follow up on it and I’ll get back to you.

[The information referred to follows:]

The Army accepted both GAO recommendations on improving mail delivery in theater. The first recommendation was to improve the quality of transit time data for postal operations by implementing a system that will accurately track, calculate, and report postal transit times. The Army initiated the use of U.S. Postal Service’s “Product Tracking System” and now tracks mail delivery to troop level for any
barcoded mail, such as Express, Insured, Certified, Registered, and Delivery Confirmation. The Military Postal Service Agency contracted with the Army Information Systems Engineering Command to complete the DOD Information Assurance Certification Accreditation Process (DIACAP) for Automated Military Postal System and the barcode scanners. DIACAP will satisfy the requirements for the Federal Information Security Management Act and accreditation for all Services. The current estimated completion date for DIACAP is September 2007.

The second GAO recommendation was to determine what longstanding postal issues need to be resolved, and develop a specific course of action and timetable for their resolution. This includes: strengthening the joint postal planning function and specifying a body to ensure the implementation of postal operations in theater; deploying properly trained and equipped postal troops into theater prior to the mail build-up; and dedicating adequate postal facilities, heavy equipment, and transportation assets for postal operations.

In October 2003, the Joint Service Postal Conference produced a Joint Services After Action Report (AAR) that was developed from the input of all the Services. The AAR also includes recommendations from postal experts that were in attendance at the Conference. The Defense Business Board recommended using contractors and government civilians to perform postal functions and on January 23, 2007, DOD Contracting Policy signed a memorandum, subject: Personnel Authorized to Fill/Perform MPS Positions/Functions which provides guidance on contracting postal positions/functions. Postal units are trained and certified by the U.S. Forces Command Army Postal Program Manager and the Adjutant General’s School before being deployed. Additionally, facilities and equipment have been identified and dedicated to the postal mission.

Senator Akaka. Thank you.

Yesterday the Washington Post reported that there continues to be problems at Walter Reed. The main thrust of the article is that at Walter Reed care for soldiers struggling with war’s mental trauma is undermined by, one, doctor shortages; and two, unfocused treatment methods. Secretary Geren, since you are currently the Acting Secretary, can you tell us if you were already aware of the problems described in the article and, if so, what has been done about that? If you were not previously aware of the problems, can you tell us why we are finding out about the problems at Walter Reed through the Washington Post?

Mr. Geren. Yes, sir. From the time I became Acting Secretary and began working in the health area, I became very much aware of the challenges in the mental health area. The mental health professionals, it’s a part of our medical team that we send in disproportionate numbers into theater, to Afghanistan, Iraq, and into Kuwait. We have stressed the workforce of the medical professionals in the mental health area that was already short and we’ve stressed it more with deployments.

The TRICARE system that supports our soldiers and families in many installations around the country also does not have an adequate supply of mental health professionals. General Pollock, the Acting Surgeon General, has brought the concerns about that to my attention and we’ve been working on them over the last few months. Last week we announced the hiring of 200 new mental health professionals, to commence immediately. They’re going into the workforce right now. Walter Reed is in the market trying to hire other mental health professionals. That began even before this 200, so that would be in addition to that.

But we do have a shortage in that area. The workforce is stretched. They do extraordinary work. They do an outstanding job. But they need greater resources, both for the families and the soldiers.
The PTSD issue, which was talked about a good bit in that article, is one that I'm very well aware of. General Pollock has developed a train-teach program for PTSD as a force multiplier. It's not only a problem that our mental health professionals can help us address, but every soldier in the Army we are going to teach how to spot the symptoms of PTSD so that we can engage early. Early engagement with somebody that's suffering the emotional challenges of PTSD improves their recovery dramatically.

We're also looking at ways to work force multipliers in other areas, use our mental health professionals to train other people in the Army, train suicide prevention techniques to other soldiers. We are going to work and continue to work to expand our resources in the mental health area, but it's a tough area to fill. The private marketplace is also short of mental health professionals, particularly in rural areas, and many of our bases and installations are in rural areas or in areas surrounded by smaller cities. Where you may have a large number of mental health professionals in a major metropolitan area, in other cities, in small cities, you don't. So it is a challenge. We're working it hard.

Senator Akaka. One of the parts of yesterday's Washington Post articles on Walter Reed that alarmed me and I'm sure many others was that the patient, Private First Class Joshua Calloway, was still not tested for TBI 7 months after arriving in Walter Reed, despite showing potential symptoms. In addition, one would have thought that he would have been tested upon arrival or shortly thereafter since he survived several bomb blasts while deployed in Iraq.

According to the article, Mr. Secretary, there are 43 times as many troops with psychological injuries from this war as from physical injuries. Why then are we still failing to test soldiers for TBI, if you know that answer?

Mr. Geren. We are expanding our testing for TBI. We have seen some of the hospitals in the system, particularly Madigan Army Medical Center, that have developed some good protocols. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, General Richard Cody, and I have worked together over the last several months. He developed a medical action plan and we sent tiger teams out to every major medical installation, tried to learn what best practices were, and we're working to move those best practices across the system.

In the area of PTSD and TBI, we are applying more resources. We are applying both financial and personnel resources in that area. We continue to do better, and our mental health professionals are dedicated to that task, and I can assure you, Senator, that it's going to receive the highest attention of your Army leadership and we work it every day.

Senator Akaka. Thank you for your responsiveness, Mr. Secretary. I want to wish you well and I want you to know that you do have my support.

Mr. Geren. Thank you very much. I appreciate that.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Akaka.

Senator Chambliss.

Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, thank you for your willingness to continue to serve. Mr. Chairman, I have known Secretary Geren since the first day I arrived in the U.S. House of Representatives in 1995 and we
served on the House Armed Services Committee together for the remaining 4 years that Pete was in the House. During that time, I had the opportunity to work with him on any number of issues in a very bipartisan way.

I have never known anyone who has had more commitment and a higher interest in the men and women in our military. He has made sure that their quality of life and their ability to serve were looked after. He's one of those individuals who is certainly unique because of his high degree of honor and his high degree of integrity. He's exactly the type of individual that we need in leadership positions at the Pentagon in this very critical time in our history.

Pete, I thank you for your willingness to continue to serve, as well as to Becky and the girls. It's a family commitment to public service. Pete, you have certainly exhibited everything that's good about public service in all of your years, and for that we thank you.

Mr. GEREN. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate that very much.

Senator CHAMBLISS. I just have one comment. In our visit the other day in my office, I mentioned to you about the experience I shared recently with spouses of deployed individuals down at Fort Stewart. I was very pleased to hear you talk about your commitment to the families of these individuals and recognize that there are some 700,000 young people who are children of members of the Army. In these difficult times and when it is such a family commitment to service, I'm pleased to hear you say you're going to put a lot of emphasis on making sure that quality of life gets better for these folks.

We shared with you the letter I mentioned to you about some specific issues that these ladies shared with me. I would just simply ask you to take a look at that at your earliest convenience and see how we can respond to them to make sure that life is better for these brave men and women who are serving us overseas right now, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Mr. GEREN. I certainly will.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you again for your service and I look forward to supporting you both here as well as on the floor as we proceed with this appointment.

Mr. GEREN. Thank you very much.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.

Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Geren, I wish you well. You actually bring to mind one of my mentors when I first came into the Pentagon, an Assistant Secretary of Defense, Jack Marsh, who was a former Democratic Congressman serving in a Republican administration and did a tremendous job for our country and for the people of the Army, and certainly helped me when I was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs to really get my arms around Army force structure issues and those sorts of things.

Again, I wish you well. I have three questions for you. The first is a procedural matter, but I hope you will agree that timely responses to questions from people appearing before this committee are an essential function of what we do up here. I would have two comments about that.
First, I gave a specific list of questions to Assistant Secretary Claude Bolton in April that are not that difficult to answer and we've not heard from him, and I hope you can tweak the system a little bit because they're important to us in terms of evaluating what's going on in Iraq.

Mr. Geren. I was made aware of that yesterday and followed up on that last night and received an e-mail late last night, a commitment that they are working on it and going to move out as quickly as possible.

Senator Webb. When I had the privilege of serving as a marine on then-Secretary Warner's staff, we had a 48-hour turnaround on anything that hit our desk, and the computerization wasn't anywhere near where it is today. But we rarely missed our 48-hour turnarounds. I think it would improve relations if those sorts of responses could come from DOD.

Mr. Geren. I appreciate that and I commit that we'll do our best to respond quickly. If circumstances prevent our responding quickly for whatever reason, we owe you an explanation. We must stay in touch with you and provide you the information as quickly as we can.

Senator Webb. Second, I watched your full testimony from my office before I came over here. I appreciate very much where your motivations are, and I've heard you say again how important it is for you to be, in your words, an advocate for the soldiers and their families. As you may know, I am deeply troubled by the 15-month deployment requirements that have been put on the Army, even separate from the less than one-to-one ratio with the 12-month dwell time back here.

In fact, I was at a party about 10 days ago when my son got back from Iraq. A long-time family friend, a woman who served in Vietnam, her husband served in Vietnam, her son is a young Army officer—and by the way, she supports your President, she voted for your President—she came up to me and she said: "You have to try to help; you have to put some sense into these people; these 15-month deployments are going to wreck the Army."

I'm just wondering, who was talking for the wellbeing and the health of the soldiers when this requirement was put down? I personally cannot see any element of a strategy of a commitment that's been going on for more than 4 years that can justify doing this to the soldiers and the Army and the families back here.

You made a comment, and I think you're right on. I grew up in the military. My dad was deployed at one time for 3 years intermittently. I've been deployed. My son's been deployed and extended. When you talk about burning out an Army by burning out a soldier and by burning out the family, when you look at a lot of the difficulties that we're seeing with these people coming back, it seems to me that somebody needs to be a voice in terms of dwell time and the length of these deployments.

Mr. Geren. Let me speak to that. Senator, I have to tell you that when we were forced to face the decision of how we were going to meet the demand from the combatant commanders and we considered the two options that were in front of us, one was to continue as we were going and make decisions on extensions on an ad hoc basis, and we found ourselves making them over and over on an
ad hoc basis—in fact, we had a couple of instances where we had brigades, already had some of the folks back home when we decided to extend.

Considering where we stand right now, in order to meet the demand from the combatant commander, extensions were inevitable, and we had to choose between having these ad hoc extensions and treating every unit differently with no predictability, no commitment on what the dwell time would be, or as the best in my opinion of the two bad choices, coming up with a 15-month extension with a commitment on 12 months.

Now, we hope to work ourselves out of that. But considering where we found ourselves when that decision was made, I felt it was the best of the two very tough choices to make. Our goal is to get back to one-to-one, in fact to get better than one-to-one. Our model makes it considerably better. But that was the decision that I believe was the right one.

I appreciate the burden that it puts on soldiers and their families. We were asking a lot before. With this we’re asking more. But when I consider the two options that were in front of us, I felt it was the better of the two.

Senator WEBB. I would submit that somebody needs to go in to the big boss and close the door and talk about what this is doing to the United States military. By the way, there is precedent for Congress to step in on these sorts of issues, the precedent being the other end of deployments during Korea, when troops were being sent over before they were fully trained and Congress stepped in and said: You’re not sending anybody over until they have been in the military for 120 days.

Somewhere along the lines here, I believe we need to get a strategy that takes into account the troops that are available or we’re going to really see some problems, and perhaps the indicators that we’ve been seeing from these West Point classes may be the canary in the coal mine.

The third question goes to force structure. I’m a real believer in the innovation that has taken place in the Army and I would commend the leadership of the Army for that. I strongly support the modernization programs, as you know when you came to see me on that. But having done a lot of work on Army force structure, here’s a question that I would have just for my own reference.

It seems to me that the Army moving into its brigade system still has its general officer assignments based on a divisional system. Am I understanding that correctly?

Mr. Geren. I don’t know the answer to that. I’d have to check.

Senator Webb. That came up when I was meeting with General Cody. I’m just curious as to—and this could be provided for the record—as someone who spent a good bit of time trying to sort these things out, how many general officers—may I ask this question for the record so we can understand: How many general officers at what rank were in the United States Army in 1968, when there were 18⅝ divisions and about 1.6 million people on Active-Duty? How many general officers were in the Army in 1986, when there were 761,000 on Active-Duty and 18 divisions? How many general officers are in the United States Army today? I would like to see that relatively soon, if I may.
Mr. Geren. I'll get back with you before the sun sets today on that one.

[The information referred to follows:]

The following information was provided to your office on June 19, 2007.

General officers under the modular design continue to be assigned at the division level. When the Army went to the modular force, it converted brigades to brigade combat teams (BCTs) and the appropriate rank for the commander is colonel. However, a BCT is a more complex organization than a brigade; therefore, each BCT was given another colonel to serve as the deputy commander. This did not have a significant impact on the Active component, but the National Guard has been transitioning from brigadier general level brigade commanders to colonel level BCT commanders. The division is still a necessary level of command, flexible to serve as a Joint Task Force, commanded by a two-star general, with one or two assistant division commanders.

The table below provides the Active component numbers for general officers.

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</table>

Senator Webb. Thank you very much and good luck in your new assignment.

Mr. Geren. Thank you very much.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Webb.

Senator Martinez.

Senator Martinez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, welcome and thank you for your willingness to serve at this important time in our Nation's history.

Today in the Orlando Sentinel it was reported a story which essentially focused on the concern in Florida that in the event of a serious hurricane hitting our coast this year that the National Guard might not be prepared to respond to such an event. The story did say that in fact there was equipment that was at 63 percent of authorized levels in helicopters and I believe it was 62 or 63 percent both for Humvees as well as for helicopters.

General Douglas Burnett, who I believe is a terrific leader for our Guard and does a great job, was professing his confidence that they could in fact respond, as they have so ably in the past, we hope it would be averted, but if such an event should occur, I just want to know your take on this. I wanted to understand what you felt was the current state of readiness for the Florida National Guard specifically and the Guard in general in terms of equipment.

Mr. Geren. Let me talk about the equipping plans for the Army to begin with and then talk about the hurricane preparedness. We have in our budget from 2005 to 2013 a really unprecedented level of investment in the Guard. We're starting from years of, to use General Schoomaker's term, holes in the yard. We made the Guard and Reserve 55 percent of our military back in the 1990s and we did not equip it properly. Our budget will put nearly $40 billion from 2005 to 2013 in the Guard and help meet many of those shortfalls. Over the next 18 months, $10 billion worth of equipment will go to the Guard, with a heavy emphasis on trucks, helicopters, and light aircraft. So many of the shortfalls that have been noted
in much of the discussion of the Guard lately will be met over the next 18 months.

But we recognize there's more to do in the near-term to meet these hurricane needs. Our Active-Duty Army worked with The Adjutants General (TAGs) of all the States—and your State has great leaders on this—to build compacts to make sure that any equipment shortfalls that are identified that would relate to the hurricane season and hurricane preparedness are met. Last hurricane season the consortium of all the TAGs—and they use the term—this is an odd one, but—horizontal and vertical States, the Gulf Coast States and the East Coast States—that consortium of States, including Guam, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico, came up with 11,000 pieces of equipment that they were short, and the Army provided those 11,000 pieces of equipment.

This year, because of the improvements in the readiness and the Guard equipping, I presented the same question to them and the number was 2,500 pieces of equipment. We are almost, at least for the continental United States, at 100 percent of filling that 2,500. We are a little short in a couple of the island territories.

General Cody, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, looks at that issue regularly. He has conference calls with the TAGs and asks them, do you have what you need, is there equipment that we can provide you? That 2,500–2,700 pieces of equipment was the demand that we got from the States and we have stepped up to fill it.

That as well as the partnerships between the States, so you have regional compacts so the different States can partner in the event one experiences a major crisis. So in the short-term that's how we are working with the States to meet their needs. But in the long-term, we're making an investment in the Reserve component equipment and we'll continue to do that.

Senator MARTINEZ. You feel comfortable and confident that the Florida National Guard is capable and able to respond to a natural disaster in Florida with the component of the compact and assistance that may come to be brought to bear?

Mr. GEREN. They've certainly been able to respond in the past and done an extraordinary job, even in the year, as you know better than I, when you had four hurricanes come up the peninsula.

Senator MARTINEZ. General Burnett is very comfortable and confident that they can respond. I just wanted to hear your perspective on it, in addition to the long-term plan for equipment and meeting those equipment needs.

Mr. GEREN. I'm confident that we have met the needs as identified to us by the TAGs, and they have done a great job of preparing an action plan and were very specific in the kinds of equipment that they needed and we've gotten that equipment to them. I think we're about 89–90 percent overall, close to 100 percent when you look at the continental United States. The average is down a little bit when you consider the islands and Hawaii, but we are working to deliver that right now. The equipment is on its way.

Senator MARTINEZ. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Martinez.

Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I’ve had the privilege of serving with Secretary Geren in the House of Representatives and I can personally attest to his competence, his integrity, and his decency. Mr. Secretary, I think you’re going to be a superb Secretary of the Army and I certainly support you.

Let me focus on some issues, but first let me associate myself with Senator Webb’s comments with respect to the 15-month tours of duty. These are magnificent young men and women that are doing the job of soldiering in the United States Army, but they can only take so much. I think there’s a serious, serious danger here going forward indefinitely that those types of tours and the effects will accumulate. We’re seeing some of the events you’ve already pointed out very candidly—suicide rates, marital discord. That’s probably the bow wave of something worse coming behind if we can’t change the policy.

But I’ll stop there and ask a specific question. Stop-loss. Do you anticipate that the stop-loss policy will remain in effect for the foreseeable future? I understand about 5,500 soldiers were denied their voluntary request to leave the Service this year, 6,200 this year and 5,500 next year. Is that about right?

Mr. Geren. Right now we have about 8,000 that are under stop-loss. Last year it was about 11,000. We anticipate by the end of the year it will be around 5,500–6,000. We look at the stop-loss as a necessary process right now to meet our deployment schedules. Secretary Gates thinks, and I agree with him, stop-loss is something that we need to work our way out of. I have tasked the Army to come up with a plan to work us out of stop-loss, to come up with alternatives, to come up with incentives. I have met with the Army staff multiple times over the 4 months that I’ve been in this job as Acting Secretary on that issue and continue to work with him. We have to look at creative ways to avoid using stop-loss as much as we have.

I’d like to tell you that we would be able to have a plan that we would do away with it entirely in the next year or so. I don’t think we’ll get there. But we need to be on a steady decline in the use of stop-loss. We need to come up with alternatives and we’re working to do that.

Senator Reed. To what extent does the stop-loss skew your retention statistics? Are they totally separate?

Mr. Geren. We look at it as separate. When we give you end strength numbers, it includes the stop-loss number, but it’s not part of our grow the force strategy. It’s not part of our calculation for growing the force. We use it to maintain unit cohesiveness in advance of deployment primarily and make sure that we have the skill levels and we have the unit cohesion necessary.

Senator Reed. Mr. Secretary, when you’re talking about 102 percent retention rate, does that include those people who are staying because they can’t leave?

Mr. Geren. I don’t believe so, but let me get back with you for the record on that. I don’t think that we include it, but I am not certain. Let me be certain and get back with you.

[The information referred to follows:]

Army retention rates are determined by the number of soldiers who reenlisted divided against the available population in a given fiscal year. Soldiers retained in
the Army under the provisions of stop-loss are a part of the available population as long as their adjusted expiration term of service date is in the fiscal year in question.

Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

In terms of junior officer retention, which is a critical point, but also probably more critical to the success of any small unit is the NCOs. The retention rate at E–5 and E–6 and in particular military occupational specialties (MOSs), combat MOSs, are they holding up?

Mr. Geren. Let me get back with you for the record on that. They're holding up well, but that's also an area in our new force structure that creates a much greater demand for those grades and it's an area where we do have a shortage long-term.

[The information referred to follows:]

The Army's retention rates for sergeant and staff sergeant in combat and combat support military occupational specialties, which are high-density specialties in brigade combat teams, are reflected in the below chart.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Reenlistment Rate</th>
<th>All Races</th>
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<tr>
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<td>SGT TOTAL</td>
<td>54.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SSG TOTAL</td>
<td>85.3%</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SSG TOTAL</td>
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<td>SSG TOTAL</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SSG TOTAL</td>
<td>85.2%</td>
<td>83.5%</td>
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Senator Reed. As you check, Mr. Secretary, one of my concerns is that there are military occupation specialties which are less stressful in some cases than being an infantry squad leader or an armored platoon leader, cavalry squad leader, et cetera. I think you have to drill down to the specifics of those individual young men
and women who are going out into leadership roles into our forward units and let us know how that’s holding up.

Mr. GEREN. Right, I certainly will.

Senator REED. One of the issues I think that’s been unintentionally prompted by the surge is I am told that the requirements for reset have had to be deferred, the funding just simply to get equipment into the theater for these additional forces. Is that true? Has the reset money been diverted into the surge?

Mr. GEREN. No, it has not. We’ve applied about 80 percent of the $17 billion that you have provided us. That will provide the equipment sets for reset for 24 brigade combat teams. We are working all the depots, except there’s only one depot that’s not operating at the maximum capacity necessary, in order to process that equipment through the depots.

Because of the surge, some of that equipment is staying in theater longer and will be coming home next year, and it will put more demand on the depots than we currently have right now. It will exceed the demand. Because it is staying in theater longer, we have less to reset in the depots than we would have otherwise.

Senator REED. Can you give me an idea of the ongoing tempo for reset funding going forward? As you indicated, we applied about $17 billion this year. How long and how much will we have to spend to reset the force?

Mr. GEREN. I need to get back with you on our estimates. We have it in our planning documents, but I need to get back with those specific numbers.

[The information referred to follows:]

Reset funding is not programmed across the Future Years Defense Plan but is based upon equipment that was actually destroyed, damaged, stressed, or worn out during operations and requested as part of the global war on terrorism appropriations. At pre-surge levels our estimated overall future reset requirements were $13–$14 billion a year (plus 2 to 3 years each year beyond the cessation of the current conflict). The increasing requirements for Army units in Iraq and Afghanistan will increase reset requirements, which we currently estimate to be an additional $2.5 billion to $3.5 billion a year.

Senator REED. There has been some concern about obviously the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), which is the greatest casualty-producer in Iraq particularly and to some degree occurring in Afghanistan. There’s been a commitment to the MRAP vehicle. That’s something that I presume you fully support?

Mr. GEREN. I strongly support it, yes, I do.

Senator REED. In terms of the Army after Iraq, I don’t think we can be too presumptuous, but certainly we have to think that vehicle would not be particularly useful for operations beyond Iraq, or would it?

Mr. GEREN. I believe that it would be. I think any conflict we find ourselves in going forward, the success that this insurgency has had using IEDs as a weapon against the United States, I would think any enemy contemplating a conflict with the United States would consider that as a weapon to use against us. So I would think it would.

Just real quickly on the MRAP, the vehicle that we’ve chosen as our top priority for the Army has the capacity to add additional armor. We are working on a FRAG Kit 6 that would help counter the threat of the explosively formed penetrators and we’re looking
at MRAP candidates that have enough additional capacity on the system to be able to hang that armor and be able to support it. But I think that we have to look at them as a vehicle that will be part of the Army going forward.

Senator REED. Mr. Secretary, again it's been a privilege to work with you and I look forward to working with you in your new capacity.

Mr. Geren. Thank you very much, Senator. I appreciate it very much.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.

Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your service. I remember first meeting you out in Broken Bow, Nebraska, where you brought a congressional team out to whip the Nebraska team on the one-box pheasant hunt. You've been shooting straight ever since.

Mr. Geren. Thank you.

Senator Ben Nelson. I appreciate your concern about the use of the stop-loss program because I too think that, while it's a legal way of returning soldiers, it's unpopular and over time and other multiple deployments, lengthy deployments, extensions, will erode support for the military internally from where it's most important, for a number of the individuals in the NCO ranks, as well as it will cause others not to accept commissions and will cause us ultimately problems that will beg us to solve.

What I'd like to do is ask you about holding contractors on the battlefield accountable. In responding to the committee's advance policy question on control and accountability of contractor personnel for their actions on the battlefield, you mentioned the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) and the requirement for contractors to comply with the terms and conditions of their contracts. But you do not mention the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). A provision in the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 amended the UCMJ to clarify that it applied to persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field at a time of declared war or contingency operation. This would of course include many, if not most, contractors on the battlefield.

Do you believe that contractors on the battlefield should be subject to the UCMJ?

Mr. Geren. Just real quickly, Senator, I'd like to speak on the stop-loss point. I agree with you it's something we need to work our way out of. At the present time, the Army does not have a good plan out of that and we are continuing to work it.

As far as holding contractors accountable on the battlefield, we have approximately 128,000 people working in contract capacity in Iraq today. I have just lately started to examine the issue of the contracting and the issue of whether or not we can hold contractors—in many cases they're third party nationals. Out of that 128,000, only about 30,000 are American citizens. Of the rest, many of them are Iraqis. Many others are third party nationals.

The lawyers have briefed me that with a full reading of the MEJA that we would be able to bring almost everybody that works for a contractor to justice under that act. They raise questions
about the challenges of using the UCMJ as an alternative, and I'm not far along in my understanding of their concerns there. I know we all share a commitment for accountability for those contractors.

The number of contractors, the role that contractors play now in support of our military, raises many questions that we're having to work through, and that accountability issue is one of them. So I really am not prepared to speak to the UCMJ application at this point, but I'm working on that issue and I'd like to provide you an answer for the record if I could.

Senator BEN NELSON. If you would, because I think this question is an important one, particularly as you go back and look at Abu Ghraib. There were questions asked whether the contractors there were going to be held responsible. You get into all sorts of very difficult issues. But I think that the 2007 act was designed to solve the question of whether or not they could be held accountable. Now, if there are legal questions as to why they can't be, obviously we'd be very interested to see what those arguments are.

But I think the goal was clear and that was to hold them accountable so that we don't go through the issue of people who are side by side that are not held accountable under the typical UCMJ.

Mr. Geren. I certainly share your commitment to holding them accountable and making them responsible. In the work that I've done with the lawyers to try to understand the issue, they talk about the fabric of the legal systems that overlap and address issues of contractor accountability, some depending upon whether it was an American citizen or a foreign national. You have the Iraqi criminal justice system. Obviously you have the MEJA, our Justice Department, and then this new tool of the UCMJ. So I need to get back with you as I understand it better.

[The information referred to follows:]

The Joint Service Committee (JSC) on Military Justice was established by the Department of Defense (DOD) to assist the President of the United States in fulfilling his responsibility to prescribe rules and regulations applicable to trials by court-martial and to facilitate the DOD's annual review of the Manual for Courts-Martial (MCM), as required by Executive Order 12473. The JSC comprises senior uniformed lawyers from each of the military departments and the Coast Guard, together with advisory members from the Office of the General Counsel, DOD; the Office of the Legal Counsel to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. Among its other functions, the JSC proposes modifications to the MCM to reflect changes to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

The JSC has worked to draft policy and procedures to implement the recent amendment to title 10 U.S.C. 802a, which took effect on the date of enactment and extends UCMJ jurisdiction over persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field “in time of declared war or a contingency operation.” In this regard, the JSC has examined several key policy issues, to include potential limits on the worldwide application of this expanded jurisdiction; the appropriate level at which the court-martial of a person “serving with or accompanying an armed force” may be convened; and the proper procedures to resolve issues of concurrent jurisdiction in the Federal civilian and military courts, which issues may be generated by some overlap between MEJA and title 10 U.S.C. 802a. The JSC provided its recommendations to the Secretary of Defense through the General Counsel of DOD and the recommendations are pending final staffing within DOD.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you.

As a former governor, I am a big supporter of our National Guard Forces. We've used them in Nebraska in the past when I was Governor and I think they've been used on other occasions since I've left. But the goal was to in every case have sufficient members of the Guard left on duty or available for duty in emer-
gencies in the States. Until we get that shortage of equipment taken care of, there is always going to be the question of whether or not they're going to have the right equipment or enough of it in the case of an emergency. So I hope that you'll make your staff aware of how important it is. I'm sure they think about it, about how important it is to get a reset going as quickly as we possibly can, to make certain that the Guard is fully capable of responding to an emergency, even in the case of mutual aid that's going from one to protect the other, but it leaves the other unprotected.

As you know from your Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska experience, tornado activity is common and it is not uncommon that the storm can go through and affect several States to one degree or another similarly and at the same time. So I hope that you'll push staff to work as fast as possible with funding to reset the Guard as quickly as possible.

Mr. GEREN. I certainly will. Thank you.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you for your service.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.

You made reference to 128,000 people working in contract capacity. What percentage of those are working for contractors? In other words, sometimes you read a statistic that we have 128,000 contractors in Iraq and that gives the impression that we have 128,000 people that have signed contracts with us.

Mr. GEREN. That's 128,000 contract employees.

Chairman LEVIN. How many of those would have contracts signed with the American Government, rather than people working for those people?

Mr. GEREN. I don't know the answer to that. I'll have to get back with you on that.

Chairman LEVIN. I think it would be useful.

Mr. GEREN. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Quite a distinction.

Mr. GEREN. Let me get back to you with certainty, but I believe all those are working on contracts or in support of American operations.

[The information referred to follows:]

As of April 5, 2007, Multi-National Force-Iraq census of contractor employees reports 128,880 contractor employees operating in Iraq. These 128,880 employees (20,819-U.S. citizens, 108,061-non-U.S. citizens) perform on 1,525 prime contracts and associated subcontracts. These employees represent 660 different companies operating in Iraq who have been awarded prime contracts from the Department of Defense. The Department of the Army does not have a list of prime and subcontractors. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics has been working with U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) to identify all contractors working in Iraq and may have that information.

Chairman LEVIN. They may be working on contracts, but these can be people who are working serving food.

Mr. GEREN. Many of them are. In fact, the logistics support, housekeeping, food, laundry, that's the largest percentage.

Chairman LEVIN. Those folks haven't signed contracts with the Government. They're employed by people who have signed contracts with the Government; is that correct?

Mr. GEREN. That's right, yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Can you get us the number of people who actually have contracts with the Government, as distinguished from people who are working for those, to give us those two numbers?

Mr. Geren. The actual number of people who have entered into contracts with the Government and then the number of employees that fall under those?

Chairman Levin. Under those contractors, right.

The reference has been made here to Abu Ghraib and I'd like to just understand what you know about the Abu Ghraib incident from your role as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense from September 2001 to July 2005. There's a group that's a working group that was called the Geren-Maples Working Group or something like that. What was your role as apparently the congressional interface on issues regarding detainee treatment and abuse?

Mr. Geren. The working group that you've referred to was set up I believe in May after the revelations at Abu Ghraib came out. It started as a small, rather informal group that was largely working to respond to queries from the Hill and provide information to the Hill, as well as provide information to the press.

A good bit of our early work was just working, frankly, with your committee and providing you the documents that you needed in order to conduct your oversight. As the months moved on and we had more and more reports, the reports made many recommendations on how we could do detention operations better. Secretary Rumsfeld charged our group, our task force that I chaired with General Michael Maples, and the task force grew. We had a couple dozen people that worked for it in some capacity at one time or another.

One of our primary responsibilities was taking those—I think we ended up with 500 different recommendations on how we could do detention operations better—and parcel them out in the Department: Army, you do this; Joint Staff, you do this; Navy, you do this; this is a joint effort. So that became a very large part of our work, taking those recommendations from all the different independent commissions and turning them into action items.

We also came up with some ideas of our own on how the Department could be better organized to respond to detention operations, recognizing that going forward in counterinsurgency warfare, detention operations would become an increasingly important part of the work of the United States of America in our role abroad.

For example, we recommended to the Secretary and he accepted the recommendation to create a Deputy Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs, so we could bring all the different organizations in the Department that worked detainee affairs up through one single person. We also worked with the International Committee of the Red Cross to come up with a way to better handle their reports so they could inform the people in the field as well as inform Department leadership and inform Congress, and we worked with your committee to come up with a protocol in order to handle those.

So our role was to take the lessons that we learned from the tragedy of Abu Ghraib and other incidents where we fell down and take those into the lessons learned and help build an organization in the Department that was better able to handle detention operations.
Chairman Levin. The recent article in the New Yorker quotes Major General Antonio Taguba, who was the officer who investigated the Abu Ghraib abuses, and also is saying that he didn't believe that Secretary Rumsfeld was truthful with Congress when he said that nobody in the Pentagon was aware of the nature of the photographs of abuse at Abu Ghraib until after those pictures were made public.

Then the article goes on to quote e-mails that were sent to senior Pentagon leaders, including Secretary Rumsfeld's military adviser, General Bantz Craddock, as early as January 2004, and those e-mails describe the abuses which were depicted in the photographs in a very vivid way, that detainees were performing indecent acts or were forced to perform indecent acts with each other, guards physically assaulting detainees by beating and dragging them with choker chains. Those e-mails again began in January 2004.

But Secretary Rumsfeld testified to this committee in May 2004 that he was not aware of the abuses. I'm wondering whether or not, for instance, you were aware of the January 2004 e-mails describing in graphic terms the abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib?

Mr. Geren. I was not. I didn't begin working on detainee operations at all in any capacity until May. I believe the 60 Minutes segment was in late April and then I started working again initially in support of the legislative effort to respond to your requests. But I was not involved early on at all and, other than the Taguba report, which I did read, I'm not aware of the basis for General Taguba's additional accusations.

Chairman Levin. You have not talked to Craddock or Taguba or Rumsfeld about those e-mails?

Mr. Geren. No, sir, I have not.

Chairman Levin. Were you occupying that position as a member of the working group when Secretary Rumsfeld testified to this committee in May 2004?

Mr. Geren. I don't believe we had our formal working group set up at that point. I was already being asked to support Powell Moore in the legislative effort and it evolved into the working group. But early on it was much more informal.

Chairman Levin. "Early on" being May, when you started?

Mr. Geren. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Or was it earlier than that?

Mr. Geren. No. It was late April when the information became public on 60 Minutes and I worked just in a supporting role in May. I'm not sure when we actually set up the task force, but I was certainly in a supporting role. In fact, some of the missteps we had in trying to get the Taguba report here to the committee, I worked on that, and we had a lot of little technical glitches on it. So one of my earliest recollections was trying to get the Taguba report to your committee.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Senator Thune.

Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if you'd yield to me to do two quick questions? I had intended to ask the questions along the line about these allegations, and I have no way of verifying the allegations of General Taguba. I went into some detail with the nominee yesterday on this issue. I think we had one fundamen-
tal agreement and that is that General Taguba's report was well-
respected here in Congress, I felt. Did you, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman LEVIN. I thought so.
Senator WARNER. He very ably testified. You mentioned yester-
day you felt that was the attitude certainly within the Department
of the Army. Why don't you use your own words as you described
it yesterday?
Mr. Geren. I remember the Taguba report being well-received
and I don't remember any criticism at all of the Taguba report. It
was a very large report. It covered a wide range of issues. We took
the Taguba report, immediately started working to try to address
the issues that he raised in that report. I don't remember any criti-
cism whatsoever of either General Taguba personally or his work
product. Not to say I was in every meeting or every conversation,
but I don't remember him being received as anything other than
someone who had done an excellent job with a very tough assign-
ment.
Senator WARNER. But in summary to the chairman's question,
you can represent to the committee in no way were you ever con-
sulted or made decisions with respect to his career once he finished
the work on that report and then began to proceed to other assign-
ments?
Mr. Geren. I was not. In fact—and I learned yesterday after I
made an inquiry about the Army's decision for General Taguba to
retire, General Cody discussed that with General Taguba in Janu-
ary 2006. I joined the Army as Under Secretary in February 2006.
So the decision on his retirement was made before I got there. It
was formally approved by Secretary Harvey in the summer of 2006,
but I had no involvement.
In fact, until this latest publicity about General Taguba came
out, a couple of the articles over the last several days, I didn’t real-
ize that General Taguba had retired.
Senator WARNER. Yesterday, Mr. Chairman, I talked with Gen-
eral Cody about it and drew on my own experience in the context
that the elevation of a two-star officer to a three-star rank is statisti-
cally only about 10 or 12 percent of two-stars reach three-star
rank. I’m not here pronouncing any judgment on General Taguba
because he certainly, as I said, performed well here before Con-
gress. So we’re not in possession of the facts that gave rise to the
Chief of Staff of the Army's decision as implemented by General
Cody—usually traditionally the Vice Chief is the one who notifies
the general officers with respect to their selection or nonselection
for advancement in rank.
In talking with General Cody, he assured me that the Army's
about 10 or 12 percent, as was the Navy when I was Secretary of
the Navy, and that it’s a very difficult call for the Chief of Staff
and the Vice Chief to make when the twos are up for consideration
for the three rank.
This article was well-written by a seasoned journalist with con-
siderable experience in investigative reporting. But at this point in
time is no implication from that article with respect to this nomi-
neree and I think you’ve assured us of that.
My last question is that you raised the statement that I have
made that I think the greatest asset we have today is the All-Vol-
unteer Force, and that's spread through all of the Services. But the Army has wisely adopted, and indeed the other Services and the Secretaries of Defense, the total force concept. In other words, we look upon the Army as being one. I remember that emblem that the Army wore for many years.

Is that still the case, total force concept, and the Guard is equally respected and treated equally with respect to the regulars?

Mr. Geren. It is. We are committed to a total force, one Army: Active, Guard, and Reserve.

Senator Warner. So that concept continues to this day.

Mr. Geren. Let me just mention real quickly one thing that we've done in the health care area. As you might remember, when we learned more about what was going on at Walter Reed in our outpatient clinics; there we had two separate populations. We had medical holds, which was Active-Duty; medical holdovers, which was the Reserve component. We've done away with that now. We have one outpatient population now and they're organized in a brigade, and we've taken that distinction away. Just one more step to ensure that they are treated as one.

Senator Warner. That's clear, but it had persisted out of Walter Reed for some lengthy period of time, though, until this most serious problem arose and came to public attention. I commend the Army for quickly removing that distinction. That's throughout our medical system now in the Army?

Mr. Geren. Yes, sir. On June 15 it went medical system-wide.

Senator Warner. I thank the chair. I thank my colleagues.

Chairman Levin. Senator Warner, thank you.

Senator Thune.

Senator Thune. Thank you. I am always happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from Virginia.

Mr. Secretary, I thank you for being here. I thank you for your willingness to answer the call to public service, for your past service to our country, and also to your family. I know we have had this discussion in the past about the sacrifices that not only the people who are involved in public life make, but also the people closest to them, their families. So we appreciate your willingness and their willingness to be here and to be willing to step up to what is indeed a very difficult challenge. We appreciate your service.

I understand most everything that can be said has been said today probably, or that can be asked has been asked. So I won't belabor the point. I was with a contingent of National Guard members from my State of South Dakota yesterday, too, and I understand many of those questions have been beat into the ground already.

But I do want to ask a question about modernization, which I suspect has been touched on as well. One of the challenges that we're going to face is modernizing our Army to meet our extraordinary security challenges in this century. Over the years, the Future Combat System has faced many criticisms and continues to do so. Since it is critical that we transform and modernize our Army, I'd like to know how are some of the past and possible proposed reductions in the Future Combat System—and I understand the House has proposed making some significant cutbacks in that pro-
gram—how are those proposed reductions driving changes to some of the program milestones?

Mr. Geren. Thank you, Senator, and I want to thank this committee for its strong support of Future Combat System.

It takes decades for us to change the major weapons systems in the Army. The platforms that we have today are platforms that began in the late 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s—the Bradleys, the tanks, most of the helicopter fleet. For us to modernize and be able to bring these new systems in years from now, we have to begin now. We have to live with the decisions we make today long into the future.

The cuts that we have seen over the last couple years have caused us to string out the investment in the Future Combat System, and that does make it more expensive. The Future Combat System not only is the modernization program for the future of the Army; it’s also a very important component of our effort to equip our troops in the near-term as well.

The ultimate goal, though, is for the Future Combat System to connect the soldier to the network, give that soldier situational awareness, let him be able to track blue forces, let him or her know where his comrades are, to use the network in order to increase his situational awareness of the battle space which he’s operating in. It will radically transform the ability of our soldier to perform, whether it's in urban settings like we find ourselves today; and it will connect the soldier in a way that will enhance his ability and it will also reduce his vulnerabilities.

It’s an important part of the future of our Army and any time we experience cutbacks—and if we were to experience cutbacks as proposed by the House, their $800 million cut which takes away much of the network and the manned ground vehicles, it would be a major setback, it would delay the program, and it would also add significant additional costs if we had to string it out.

The other concern, too, is you lose the technology base. The program depends on being able to keep—it’s a technologically very challenging undertaking—the scientists, the computer scientists, all the people that are part of that team. When a cutback happens, it causes the team to break up and they go on. They’re the tops in their field and they have other things they can do and other places that they go.

So it not only challenges us in our effort to keep the program on track, it also threatens the intellectual capital that’s assembled to move the program along.

Senator Thune. I was going to ask you about the technology spinout because I think you alluded to that, that the cuts have to be affecting that as well. There’s a recent GAO report that said that the Future Combat System has made tangible progress during the past year in requirements and technology; however, concerns continue to linger because of the need to meet demonstrated knowledge points. If confirmed, how are you going to manage the risks and the expectations of this program and meet the required milestones, given what we just talked about with some of the budgetary constraints that we’re facing?

Mr. Geren. The Future Combat System, and I wish we had changed the name, frankly, because the future truly is now, not to
sound like I'm using cliches. But it's the top modernization priority for the Department of the Army. It will remain the top modernization priority for whomever sits in this chair for years to come.

As Acting Secretary and, if confirmed as Secretary, and the same for my successor, it will be a top priority. The leadership of the Army will continue to work the program to make sure that we stay on budget and we meet the milestones. Key to that, though, is predictable funding. If we are not able to rely on predictable funding, it's going to require a lot of work-arounds; it's going to be a real challenge. But I can assure you, whoever sits in the seat of the Secretary of the Army is going to be working on a regular basis overseeing that program.

Senator Thune. I thank you again for your leadership and for your willingness to serve and look forward to your confirmation.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.

I just have an additional question or two about the article in the New Yorker that was about the Taguba report. In the article, General Taguba is quoted as saying the following: "The fact is that we violated the laws of land warfare at Abu Ghraib. We violated the tenets of the Geneva Convention. We violated our own principles, and we violated the core of our military values. I believe even today that those civilian and military leaders responsible should be held accountable."

Do you agree with that?

Mr. Geren. Sir, when we look back at what came of the Taguba report, it resulted in multiple prosecutions, a number of people who are serving time today. I have every belief that the evidence that was raised in General Taguba's report was followed where the facts lead. I know in all of my work on the detainee task force in support of every one of those investigations and those reports our instructions were follow the facts where they lead, leave no stone unturned, and work with this committee and work with Congress to get to the truth.

I'm not aware of any allegations of misconduct that weren't aggressively investigated and prosecuted. I'm not.

Chairman Levin. But in terms of his quote here, do you believe that we violated the laws of land warfare at Abu Ghraib? Do you believe we violated the tenets of the Geneva Convention?

They were violated, put it that way. Do you believe that the laws of land warfare were violated at Abu Ghraib? Do you believe that the tenets of the Geneva Convention were violated? Do you believe our principles were violated, that the core of our military values were violated at Abu Ghraib? That's my question.

Mr. Geren. Yes, sir, I do.

Chairman Levin. Do you believe that civilian and military leaders who are responsible should be held accountable? Whether that's happened or not isn't the question. Should they be held accountable?

Mr. Geren. Should people responsible be held accountable?

Chairman Levin. Yes.

Mr. Geren. Sir, absolutely, and I can assure you if I'm confirmed that I'm going to insist on a high standard of accountability.
Chairman Levin. Now, one of the things that General Taguba is quoted as saying in this article is that he was to investigate only the military police at Abu Ghraib and not those above them in the chain of command. Is that your understanding of what his instructions were?

Mr. Geren. I don’t know what his charge was. I didn’t get involved in this issue at all until the Taguba report was complete, and that was my first encounter with Taguba, was when it was created. One thing that I felt, and I don’t think it was intentional, that ended up posing a challenge for the whole understanding of Abu Ghraib was how we investigated different pieces of it. We did the military police with one investigation, we did the intelligence officers with another investigation. Instead of having them proceed together on parallel, you ended up having them seriatim, and that posed a challenge for all of us in trying to understand what we needed to do to make detention operations better, and it delayed it. It rolled it out over months, close to a year. In fact, I think we probably rolled into the next year with the final report.

But I’m not aware of the charge that General Ricardo Sanchez gave to General Taguba. If I saw that instruction, I don’t remember seeing it. I’m sure it was in our library.

Chairman Levin. So you’re just not in a position to say whether he was legally prevented from further investigation into higher authority? You’re just not familiar enough with either the instruction to him or his guidance to know whether that was accurate or not?

Mr. Geren. What his instrument of investigation was, was a 15–6, and I’ve never seen it. It’s possible that we had a copy of his 15–6 and my guess is if we did it was in our library. But I don’t remember seeing it and I don’t know what was General Sanchez’s charge. It wouldn’t surprise me, though, based on the way many of these other investigations, that he was told: You look at the military police, because perhaps at the beginning they thought that’s what the problem was, and the soldiers that ended up going to jail fell under that review. As we learned from him, he started having additional investigations added to the mix, and 12 investigations later we finally had it covered.

Chairman Levin. So you’re just not in a position to say whether he was legally prevented from further investigation into higher authority? You’re just not familiar enough with either the instruction to him or his guidance to know whether that was accurate or not?

Mr. Geren. No, but I expect that he has a written charge from General Ricardo Sanchez authorizing his 15–6, and that General Sanchez, I assume he was the approving authority for it as well. So I’d be glad to go back and look for those documents. I’m not aware of them, though.

Chairman Levin. Perhaps you could do that for the record, indicate or find out, give us your assessment of that statement. It’s a quote of his in the New Yorker. Just check out the record to the extent you can, instructions to him and the 15–6 as to whether he was “prevented from further investigation into higher authority.” Could you check that out for the record?

Mr. Geren. What I believe I could do without actually interviewing General Taguba would be to find the charge for his 15–6 and
try to find that document and provide it to the committee. If there were any private conversations that he had with General Sanchez, I don’t know how I would determine that. But if this would meet your request, sir, we’ll work to get the charging document and also the approving document when General Sanchez accepted his 15–6. [The information referred to follows:]

APPOINTMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL TAGUBA AS INVESTIGATING OFFICER IN THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE’S DETENTION AND INTERNMENT OPERATIONS

Senator Levin, I have enclosed a copy of the January 31, 2004, Coalition Forces Land Component Command Memorandum appointing MG Antonio Taguba as investigating officer. This packet also includes MG Taguba’s orders from U.S. CENTCOM, dated January 24, 2004, directing him to conduct an investigation into the 800th MP Brigade’s detention and internment operations; and Lieutenant General McKiernan’s approval of the report of proceedings by the investigating officer.
MEMORANDUM FOR MG Antonio M. Taguba, Deputy Commanding General Support, Coalition Forces Land Component Command, Camp Doha, Kuwait, APO AE 09304

SUBJECT: Investigating Officer Appointment

1. Pursuant to CENTCOM directive dated 24 January 2004, you are hereby appointed an investigating officer pursuant to Army Regulation 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers, to conduct an informal investigation into the 800th MP Brigade’s detention and intermittent operations from 1 November 2003 to the present.

   a. The investigation should inquire into all of the facts and circumstances surrounding recent allegations of detainee abuse, specifically, allegations of maltreatment at the Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility).

   b. The investigation should further inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically, allegations concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib Prison (Baghdad Central Confinement Facility).

   c. You should also investigate the training, standards, employment, command policies, internal procedures, and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade as appropriate.

   d. You should make specific findings of fact concerning all aspects of this investigation, and make any recommendations for corrective action as appropriate.

2. Before you begin your investigation, you should contact LTC Mark Johnson or LTC Gary Kluka, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Coalition Forces Land Component Command, DSN 438-8044/8006, who will serve as your legal advisors. You will consult with your legal advisor or his designee regarding all aspects of this investigation, including developing an investigation plan and determining whether witnesses need to be advised of their rights under Article 31, UCMJ. You will be assisted by an investigative team, coordinated by COL Kinard J. La Fate, CFLCC Provost Marshal.

3. You are to conduct this investigation using the informal procedures outlined in Chapter 4, AR 15-6. No individual has been named as a respondent at this time. All witnesses will be sworn prior to their interview. You are to thoroughly document all witness interviews in writing, preferably on a DA Form 2823 (Sworn Statement). You will interview all key witnesses in person, if practical. Due to the scope of this investigation, you may employ an investigative team to assist in the interview and analysis process. If in the course of your investigation you come to suspect that certain people may have committed criminal conduct, you must advise them of their rights under Article 31, UCMJ, or the Fifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution, as
AFRD-JA
SUBJECT: Investigating Officer Appointment

Appropriate. Witness waivers of their Article 31 or Fifth Amendment rights will be documented on a DA Form 3881 (Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate). In addition, you may need to provide a witness with a Privacy Act statement before you solicit any information.

4. You are to maintain a written chronology of your actions on this investigation and report your findings and recommendations on DA Form 1574, specifically citing the statements that support your findings. If there is conflicting evidence on a specific issue, evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and indicate whom you believe in your explanation.

5. You should complete your investigation and submit your final report to me by 1 March 2004. I must personally approve any request for an extension of time to complete the investigation.

DAVID D. McKIERNAN
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding
MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, COALITION FORCES LAND COMPONENT
COMMAND/U.S. ARMY FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND, APO
AE 59314

JAN 24 2004

SUBJECT: Investigation of the 800TH Military Police (MP) Brigade Detainee Operations

1. You are hereby directed to conduct an investigation into the
800th MP Brigade's detention and interment operations from
1 November 2003 to the present. Because your investigation will
inquire into the conduct of Brigade leaders at all levels of
command, appoint an investigating officer who is senior to the
current 800th MP Brigade Commander. Your investigating officer
may use Army regulations and processes as guidelines.

2. The investigation should inquire into all of the facts and
circumstances surrounding recent reports of suspected detainee
abuse. I have forwarded relevant material under separate cover.
The investigation should further inquire into detainee escapes
and accountability lapses as reported by CJTFO-7. These
incidents reflect poorly upon the Brigade and suggest possible
systemic problems, to include a lack of proficiency in detention
operations, the absence of clear standards, and supervisor
omissions. Several related investigations are currently
ongoing, including a USACDC investigation into specific
incidents concerning the Brigade's operations. The purpose of
this investigation should be to gain a more comprehensive and
all-encompassing inquiry into the fitness and performance of the
800th MP Brigade.

3. The report of investigation must include findings of fact
and indicate whether any misconduct or negligence occurred.
Further, the report must make recommendations concerning
corrective measures and disciplinary actions, as appropriate.
Finally, the 800th MP Brigade is a reserve unit and is scheduled
for demobilization. Accordingly, ensure that jurisdiction is
maintained over any members of the Brigade that are suspected of
misconduct.

1. This investigation must become the primary duty of the
investigating officer. The final report of investigation should
JOA

SUBJECT: Investigation of the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade Detainee Operations

be completed and returned to me by 1 March 2004. Submit any requests for an extension in a timely manner and outline the reason for the requested delay. The seriousness of these allegations warrants a thorough and prompt investigation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

R. STEVEN WHITCOMB
Major General, USA
**SECTION I: APPOINTMENT**

**Appointed by:**
LTG David D. McKiernan, Commander, Coalition Land Force Command (Appointing authority)

**on:** 31 January 2004

(Such includes: Letter of Appointment or Summary of Oral Appointment Data) (See para 3-31, AR 15-6-1)

**SECTION II: MARSHAL**

The (Investigating) Board convened at Camp Doha, Kuwait at 1800 Hours

**on:** 1 February 2004

If a formal record is for more than one session, check box ☐ Indicates the time each session began and ended, the place where present and absent, and explanation of absence, if any). The following persons: Inspectors, respondents, counsel were present: (List each name, indication capacity, e.g., President, Recorder, Member, Legal Advisor)

The following persons: Inspectors, respondents, counsel were absent: (Include brief explanation of each absence) (See para 3-5 and 3-6, AR 15-6-1)

The (Investigating) Board finished gathering/evidence at 2300 Hours on 19 February 2004

and concluded findings and recommendations at 2300 Hours on 26 February 2004

**SECTION III: CHECKLIST FOR PROCEEDINGS**

**A. COMPLETE IN ALL CASES**

1. **Includes:**
   - para 3-15, AR 15-6-1

2. a. The letter of appointment or summary of oral appointment data
   - b. Copy of letter to respondent, if any
   - c. Other correspondence with respondent, if any
   - d. Other written communications to or from the investigating officer
   - e. Privacy Act Statement (Confidential, if applicable, provided separately)
   - f. Explanation by the investigating officer of any unusual delays, difficulties, inexplicable, or other problems
   - g. Information as to location ofkernel board and included on page 1 of this report

**B.** Any other documents required under the law or regulations relating to substantive aspects of the investigation, if any

**FOOTNOTES:**

1. Copies of all required forms are on an annexed data.
   - If the file contains a written report and the statements described in the question did not occur in this investigation

DA FORM 15-74 MAR B3  EDITION OF MAY 2000 OBSOLETE. Page 1/2
Chairman Levin. That would be fine. We think we have the document, but why don't you check out the approving document because I'm not sure we have that one.

We end with a bang. We end with two bangs. Thank you so much. Thank you and your family again for your service, your family for their patience and support. Your daughters look absolutely fascinated in each one of your answers throughout this 3-hour hearing. We thank them for looking fascinated. Your wife I know, as well, is very much into how well you did. We look forward to bringing your nomination to the floor promptly and having you confirmed.

Mr. Geren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.

Chairman Levin. Thank you. We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Hon. Preston M. “Pete” Geren by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders. Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has made a profound and positive change in the operation of the Department of Defense (DOD). While I believe that the framework established by Goldwater-Nichols has significantly improved interservice and joint relationships and clarified responsibilities, the Department, working with Congress, should continually assess the law in light of improving capabilities, evolving threats, and changing organizational dynamics.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. This milestone legislation has served our Nation well for more than two decades. If confirmed, I would certainly work with Congress to determine whether the act should be revised to better address the requirements of combatant commanders and the needs and challenges confronting the military departments in today’s security environment. I also assess whether the law might be modified to more effectively allocate roles and responsibilities among the Joint Staff, the combatant commanders, the military departments, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). One particular issue that merits review is accountability for conduct of deployed forces.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

Answer. I have a varied background in public service and a wide range of experiences that is well-suited to this position. I served four terms in the U.S. House of Representatives, representing the 12th Congressional District of Texas, and for much of that time I was a member of the House Armed Services Committee. In that position, I worked directly with other Members of Congress and DOD on issues of significant interest to the military departments and the American people. I came to DOD in 2001, where I have held several staff and leadership positions. Serving as Acting Secretary of the Air Force gave me an appreciation of the challenges, capabilities, and achievements of another department. That perspective has been very useful in discharging my duties with the Army. As the Under Secretary and Acting Secretary of the Army, I developed an appreciation for, and a deeper understanding of, the unique demands and challenges facing the premier land force on the globe. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to continuing to serve the Army and this Nation. If confirmed, I pledge my best effort every day to be worthy of the trust placed in me by the President and the Senate, and to uphold the proud tradition of selfless service that characterizes the United States Army.

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Secretary of the Army?

Answer. The Secretary of the Army is the head of the Department of the Army and is responsible for, and has authority to conduct, all functions of the Department prescribed by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense.

Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions of the Secretary of the Army, as set forth respectively in section 3013 of title 10, U.S.C., or in regulations of DOD pertaining to functions of the Secretary of the Army?
Answer. At this time I have no specific recommendations for change. However, I intend to engage in an ongoing process of consultation with Army leaders, others in DOD, and Congress to pursue opportunities for improvement. I will not hesitate to recommend changes that I believe are in the best interests of the Army.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what additional duties, if any, do you expect that Secretary Gates will prescribe for you?

Answer. As he has done with other Service Secretaries, Secretary Gates may prescribe additional duties that support him in carrying out his duties and responsibilities to ensure that DOD successfully accomplishes the many demanding and varied missions with which it has been entrusted. At this time, I am not aware of any additional duties Secretary Gates may be considering. However, if confirmed, I will carry out any additional duties to the best of my ability.

Question. What duties and responsibilities would you plan to assign to the Under Secretary of the Army?

Answer. The Under Secretary of the Army performs such duties and exercises such powers as the Secretary of the Army prescribes. The Under Secretary is the Secretary's principal civilian assistant and advisor on issues of critical importance to the Army. If I am confirmed, and a new Under Secretary of the Army is nominated and confirmed, I will review the current assignment of functions, responsibilities, and duties within the Army Secretariat and determine the capacities in which the Under Secretary can most appropriately support my efforts to ensure that the Department of the Army is efficiently administered in accordance with law and the policies promulgated by OSD.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that you would confront if confirmed as Secretary of the Army?

Answer. The Army is faced with many major challenges, including providing proper support to soldiers and families in time of war, enhancing readiness, providing quality housing, modernizing our Cold War-era equipment, and meeting recruiting and retention goals just to name a few. A major challenge will be to modernize our Army to meet the extraordinary security challenges of the 21st century, no matter when and from where such challenge arises. Equally important is establishing strategic depth, the ability to respond to all challenges the Nation faces. Additionally, the Army must transform its support infrastructure and integrate Base Realignment and Closure decisions. Finally, our increased operational tempo and multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed a heavy burden on soldiers and their families. We must provide a quality of life commensurate with the quality of their service. We must not shrink from our responsibility as a Nation to care for those who have become ill, injured, or wounded in the service of our Nation—and we must do better for those suffering from Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and Traumatic Brain Injuries (TBI). Much has been accomplished to ensure that we meet this solemn obligation, yet much remains to be done. We owe our wounded nothing short of the very best medical care that our Nation can provide.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. A major part of addressing these challenges will be to work collaboratively with members of this committee, the entire Congress, the President, and Secretary Gates. I am committed to maintaining the Army as the dominant land force in the world, and with your help, I am confident of success. On many of these issues we have already made great strides, particularly on the medical front. Where I can make administrative decisions, I will act. If legislation is required, I won’t be shy about coming to you.

I will also join with Chief of Staff Casey in pursuing several critical initiatives, including growing the Army and making necessary readiness improvements; building momentum and continuity of our modernization efforts; completing the transition of the Reserve component to an operational force; and adapting our institutional processes to support an expeditionary Army that is currently suffering from the cumulative effects of 5 years at war.

Of special interest to me will be addressing the challenges facing the very essence of the Army, the center of our formation—soldiers and their families. The strain of multiple deployments demands that we step up our support to families. So I will work to further develop and implement the Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP) to provide better health care for our soldiers and their families, and continue working to develop better ways to deal with PTSD and TBI.
IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN DEPLOYMENTS

Question. Many soldiers are on their third and some their fourth major deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan. Recently, unit deployments have been extended to 15 months and dwell time in some cases is less than 12 months. What are the indicators of stress on the force, and what do these indicators tell you about that level of stress currently?

Answer. In this period of high operational tempo, we must closely monitor the condition of our soldiers and their families. Army leaders, officers, and NCOs must pay close attention to the mental and physical condition of their soldiers and address issues as soon as they arise. These leaders are the front line in ensuring we understand the condition of our soldiers and respond accordingly. Other indicators lag the awareness of those leaders. But, there are other indicators we watch closely. The high reenlistment rates we have experienced and continue to experience over the course of this conflict indicate that the morale of our soldiers remains strong. Additionally, Army discipline and misconduct rates, including desertion rates, absence without leave, drug use, and courts-martial, have remained steady over the last few years. However, other indicators are deeply troubling and offer cause for concern, such as the increase in divorce and suicide rates.

Question. For how long do you believe these levels of commitments can continue before there will be significant adverse consequences for the Army?

Answer. The Army will not be able to maintain its current level of commitments indefinitely without significant adjustments. The stress on the force is a major concern to all leaders in the Army and we are constantly monitoring and adjusting recruiting and retention incentives to keep pace with operational demand and Army transformation. The Army has taken action to mitigate these concerns by growing the size of the force, better utilizing the Reserve component, rebalancing military to civilian conversions, and monitoring the time individual soldiers spend at home between deployments. We also must do more to support the families of soldiers who are shouldering the burden of multiple deployments. Family support programs must be improved.

ARMY BUDGET SHARE

Question. The Army Posture Statement points out that the defense budget allocation by Service has changed little over time with the Air Force and Navy around 30 percent and the Army around 25 percent. Moreover, since the Army is manpower intensive, and personnel costs eat up a large part of its budget, only 25 percent of the Army’s budget goes toward research, development, and acquisition, as compared to 38 percent in the Navy and 43 percent in the Air Force. Further, the Army’s overall share of the DOD investment dollars is only 17 percent, as compared to 33 percent for the Navy and 35 percent for the Air Force. The result is that “the Army has been unable to invest in the capabilities needed to sustain a rising operational tempo and to prepare for emerging threats.” What is your understanding of the effects of this funding discrepancy on the Army?

Answer. In spite of rising budgets for the Army, the Army continues to work to address shortfalls in equipment and infrastructure that have accumulated over many years. In order to properly prepare for the future threats the Army must work to build in our nondeployed forces full spectrum readiness and strategic depth. The Army must achieve improved levels of readiness in our nondeployed forces or accept a force with suboptimal capability. We also are working to make overdue investment in housing and facilities. We have made great strides over the past 3 years in fixing our equipment readiness challenges and need your continued support.

Question. What specifically have you done as Under Secretary of the Army and what do you intend to do if confirmed as the Secretary to address this funding discrepancy?

Answer. I have made matching Army resources to strategic requirements a central theme during my tenure as the Acting Secretary of the Army. Working with OSD and the Office of Management and Budget during the development of the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget, the Army received increased funding levels for fiscal years 2008–2013. If I am confirmed as Secretary of the Army, I will continue to ensure we are good stewards of our Nation’s resources, and continue to work closely with members of this committee, Congress, and the administration to remedy Army readiness issues that result from previous funding shortfalls in the investment accounts.

Question. Have you discussed this problem with the Secretary of Defense or the Deputy Secretary of Defense? What is your understanding of what, if anything, they intend to do to address this discrepancy?
Answer. While building the President’s fiscal year 2008 budget, we shared the impact of these funding shortfalls with the Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary of Defense. We effectively communicated and quantified the challenges the Army faces in preparing for current conflicts and other emerging requirements. As a result of this collaborative effort, the Army’s resources were increased by more than $7 billion per year. Secretary of Defense Gates is working with the Army to meet readiness requirements and to ensure the Army has the resources necessary to support the National Military Strategy. Secretary Gates also is supporting the Army’s modernization efforts.

POSTURE FOR THE FUTURE

Question. Do you believe that current Army initiatives such as Grow the Force, Modularity, and Transformation to the Future Combat Systems adequately posture the Army to meet the most likely threats of the next two or three decades?

Answer. If I am confirmed, I will work to ensure the Army is ready to meet the most likely future threats. Grow the Force, Modularity, and Transformation to the Future Combat Systems will help posture the Army to meet those threats. We cannot predict threats with any certainty so we must build full spectrum readiness and strategic depth to ensure we are prepared for whatever may lie ahead. Our goal must be to build an Army versatile and agile enough to be employed in the range of military operations, across the major operational environments, in support of our national security strategy. The Army initiatives are designed to give the Army maximum flexibility to respond to continual and asymmetrical threats over the next 30 years.

Question. What other initiatives would you pursue in this regard if confirmed as Secretary of the Army?

Answer. If I am confirmed, I will pursue initiatives that ensure the Army is postured to fight and win across the full range of military operations against a variety of opponents with differing capabilities and provide better support to our Army families. The new Chief of Staff of the Army, General Casey, is working with Army leadership to advance a list of initiatives that seek to achieve these goals. Among the top priorities is support for soldiers and families, including improved health care for soldiers and dependents. Additionally, our disability system, built over generations, has become a bureaucratic maze and needlessly complex. It is a system that frustrates, and often stymies, the best intentions of dedicated public servants and compromises the Army values we pledge to uphold. In simplest terms, a soldier who fights battles abroad should not have to fight bureaucracy at home. The Army is working with OSD to revamp this antiquated disability system.

LESSONS LEARNED

Question. What are the major lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) which you would seek to address if confirmed as Secretary of the Army?

Answer. Lessons learned from OIF/OEF have led the Army to improve its training for counterinsurgency warfare. On the homefront, the pace of operations has placed great stress on Army families and we are building programs to better support our families. We must expand language skills and enhance cultural awareness to be successful in the operations and missions our Armed Forces are engaged in today. The Army must continue to modernize and sustain its combat training centers, home station training, and institutional training, instilling and sustaining a warrior ethos in soldiers and leaders who are trained to be agile and adaptable. Detention operations have improved over the course of the conflict, but we must continue to look for ways to enhance our capabilities in this area. With growth in the Army’s force structure and the challenges this places on training, the Army needs to continue to assess ways to train efficiently, using training resources from all Army components, as appropriate. As the Army develops its operational rhythm, Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) will continue to play a critical role in synchronizing cyclic training, while placing focus on theater-specific training requirements, such as training to defeat improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Because of the large load that the Reserve component (Army National Guard and the Reserves) is pulling, the Army needs to assess continually its mobilization policies, balancing training requirements to meet the appropriate level of Reserve component operational readiness with the domestic mission and requirements of the Guard and Reserves.

Question. More specifically, what are the lessons learned concerning manning, training, and equipping the Army which you intend to address if confirmed?

Answer. The Army must build on its distance learning program to enable soldiers in the field the ability to train individually on skills otherwise not available when
deployed. Further, the Army must take appropriate measures to provide adequate Training Support Systems (TSS) at Army installations to support full-spectrum training. Units must have greater capabilities at home stations to train across the spectrum of conflict in a training environment replicating the contemporary operating environment. One equipping lesson learned is that consistent, timely, and adequate funding is required to increase the equipment available for operations and training. We are taking steps to transition the LOGCAP contract from one to eventually three contractors to increase capabilities and generate competition. We must find ways to immediately respond to the stress and demands placed on our military families. We need to work to be able to change quickly to succeed in this type of conflict, facing a nimble and adaptive enemy.

**POST-IRAQ OFFICER RETENTION PLANNING**

**Question.** After the Vietnam War there was a large reduction in force which some believed masked a voluntary departure of some of the best and brightest junior officers from Active-Duty who, after serving in very responsible positions at a relatively young age in combat, had difficulty adjusting to a peacetime Army. The nature of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—small unit actions where junior leaders are not only military leaders, but also diplomats and city managers, and where they have even greater authority to act on their own initiatives—may produce similar behavior and consequent difficulty in retaining highly-trained and experienced junior officers. Do you agree that this is a potential problem, and if so, how would you address it if confirmed as Secretary of the Army?

**Answer.** After the Iraq War, we may face the risk of losing the “best and brightest,” combat-experienced officers and NCOs from our Army. We cannot allow the Army to drift in a post-conflict setting. This will require refocusing the Army, retaining the best and brightest soldiers, and leveraging combat-experienced soldiers in key and critical assignments, such as the Training and Doctrine Command. If I am confirmed, one of my most important tasks will be to develop retention measures to keep combat-experienced soldiers in the Army. We also must develop programs to better support families in an expeditionary Army during a period of persistent conflict.

**END STRENGTH AND RECRUITING GOALS**

**Question.** The Army’s recruiting goal for fiscal year 2008 is 80,000 recruits, the same as in fiscal year 2007. The Army has told the committee that it expects to end fiscal year 2007 with over 518,000 soldiers after starting the calendar year with around 502,000. The Army then plans to grow the force in fiscal year 2008 by another 7,000 soldiers to end the fiscal year at over 525,000 soldiers. How is the Army progressing in meeting its recruiting goals for this fiscal year? Is the Army on pace to meet its year-end goals?

**Answer.** The fiscal year 2006 end strength was 505,400. I expect that the Army will meet and exceed its fiscal year 2007 recruiting goal of 80,000 soldiers. Although the Army missed the monthly recruiting goal in May, for the year it remains ahead of requirements to achieve the fiscal year 2007 recruiting goal. We have added additional recruiters to help us meet our targets and are maintaining vigilance to quickly react to downward trends and indicators.

**Question.** How can the Army increase its end strength to over 518,000 this year and over 525,000 next year without increasing its recruiting goal?

**Answer.** Based on current analysis, an increase in recruiting goals is not necessary to meet our planned growth in Army end strength. In addition to recruiting, the Army uses retention and loss management tools as levers to manage end strength. Throughout fiscal year 2006 and the first half of fiscal year 2007, the Army has focused on retaining more initial term soldiers and has seen attrition drop to record lows. The combination of these tools has enabled the Army to grow strength faster.

**Question.** Has the Army changed its standards to achieve its recruiting mission and to meet its end strength goals?

**Answer.** The Army closely monitors indicators of quality in our recruits. Every soldier who enlists in the Army has been screened to ensure they have the appropriate qualifications to perform his or her designated Military Occupational Specialty. The Army continues to use the DOD quality marks as one measurement, while taking other actions to achieve results, such as the reduction of training base attrition. The Army has experienced a decline in high school diploma graduates and an increase in Category IV recruits. These trends must be monitored closely, but performance in those areas remain well above historical standards.

**Question.** What is the current end strength of the Army today?
Answer. The end-of-month May end strength for the Active Army was 507,459.

Question. What do you project the Army's end strength to be at the end of this fiscal year?

Answer. The Active Army end strength is projected to be 519,800 at the end of this fiscal year.

Question. In the past, the Army has asserted that, given recruiting challenges and training infrastructure, it can only grow its end strength by 5,000 to 7,000 soldiers per year. Is this still an accurate projection, or can the Army grow the force by more than 7,000 soldiers per year?

Answer. Growth of the Army beyond 7,000 per year is a factor of recruiting and retention. Each area has its specific challenges and requirements. For example, if we wanted to accelerate recruiting above 80,000 per year there would have to be an increase in recruiting resources and incentives, but also, basing, training, and equipment issues to address. Facilities such as barracks and developing training areas and ranges to accommodate the increased forces will take time to plan and construct.

STOP LOSS AUTHORITY

Question. How many soldiers do you expect the Army to retain under stop loss authority at the end of fiscal year 2007, in order to increase end strength to 518,000?

Answer. The Army uses stop loss to grow end strength, to maintain unit cohesion, and to prepare and maintain units for deployment. We expect stop loss to account for 6,300 toward the fiscal year 2007 end strength of 519,800.

Question. How many soldiers does the Army estimate it will retain under stop loss authority in fiscal year 2008 to achieve end strength of 525,000?

Answer. The Army expects stop loss authorities to account for 5,500 toward the fiscal year 2008 end strength of over 525,000.

Question. What is the Army’s plan for reducing stop loss as it increases its end strength through the out-years?

Answer. The Army, under the direction of OSD, is working to meet the Secretary of Defense’s intent to reduce the use of stop loss as reflected in the January 19, 2007 announcement concerning “Utilization of the Total Force.” The Army is currently developing a plan for minimizing the use of stop loss. The Army has commenced a complete review of the Army’s stop loss policy and is in the process of identifying ways to reduce the need for stop loss.

ARMY PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT

Question. The Army has long followed the dictates of the concept of “train as you fight.” In some cases, however, units have had to fight on prepositioned equipment that was less modern than that on which they had trained in the continental United States (CONUS).

What is your understanding of the effect on mission capability of operationally having to use equipment from prepositioned stocks that is not as modern as that with which the unit regularly trains?

Answer. The equipment that has been drawn from the Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) met operational requirements. The prepositioned equipment drawn combined with the Theater Provided Equipment met the combat capability required for the BCTs to which it was issued.

Question. What changes to policies regarding use of prepositioned equipment stocks would you recommend, if confirmed?

Answer. The last 4 years demonstrated that the APS program was flexible, responsive, and critical to the Army’s ability to deploy forces in support of combatant command requirements and adapt to changing strategic requirements. We must replenish the stocks with equipment that meets the needs of the modular force. I will review the underlying policy, but I am not aware of any changes needed at this time.

Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the current plan for reconstituting Army prepositioned equipment upon the withdrawal of units from Iraq?

Answer. APS capabilities will be reconstituted to provide the maximum level of strategic flexibility and operational agility. The Army has an APS Strategy 2013 which articulates the afloat and ashore equipment required to meet the future responsiveness needs of the combatant commanders. Once the current operational and equipping tempo stabilizes, the Army will develop an executable timeline within available resources to reset its APS sets according to the APS Strategy 2013.
EQUIPMENT AVAILABILITY

Question. In your view, is deploying additional brigades to Iraq likely to increase the strain on maintenance systems and further reduce equipment availability for training?

Answer. The 5-BCT surge and 15-month troop extension in Iraq will delay some units’ redeployment and postpone some equipment reset from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2008 or fiscal year 2009. The Army has plans in place to ensure these delays do not impact training or equipping of next to deploy units. This delay in retrograde and reset of approximately six BCT sets of equipment will result in some increased stress in fiscal years 2008 and 2009. Despite the projected increase in reset activities in these years, adequate, continued, and timely funding for reset will prevent a degradation of Army maintenance systems.

Question. Do you believe that the Army has enough equipment to fully support the predeployment training and operations for the next rotation to OIF/OEF?

Answer. The Army has enough equipment to ensure forces are adequately prepared and fully conduct operations in OIF/OEF. No soldier will go into combat without the proper training and equipment. There are, however, some equipment shortages in CONUS that require sharing equipment among predeployed units to ensure they are fully trained before deploying. Equipment sharing is generally managed at the brigade or division-level by transferring equipment among units to support specific training events. The Army works diligently to schedule forces for deployment as early as possible and to project the mission they must perform when deployed. As part of each synchronization cycle, a Department-level Force Validation Committee works to ensure that deploying forces are provided all the personnel and equipment required for their mission. Additionally, a Training Support and Resources Conference meets to ensure deploying forces have all the training support tools they need to train for their mission and are scheduled for a mission rehearsal exercise.

Question. What do you see as the critical equipment shortfalls for training and operations?

Answer. All soldiers receive the required training and equipment before going into combat. Active, Guard, and Reserve must be certified as ready before they are put in harms way. Achieving the necessary unit readiness involves consolidating training sets at our installations to compensate for equipment shortfalls among non-deployed units. The most common Active and Reserve component high-demand predeployment training equipment shortfalls occur with force protection-related equipment, where equipping solutions are developed to meet specific theater requirements. Most of the production of these items goes straight into theater to meet the force protection demand. These items include up-armored light, medium, and heavy tactical trucks, special route clearance vehicles (to include the RG–31, Buffalo, Husky, and Cougar), and counter remote-controlled IED warfare devices. We retain a limited number of these systems for home station training and at our combat training centers so soldiers will gain experience with these systems before they deploy. Additionally, a large number of our soldiers already have one or more rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan and have direct experience with these systems.

Other items of equipment with limited availability for home station training include kits designed to increase the survivability of standard Army equipment, including the Bradley and Tank Urban Survivability Kits, and up-armored HMMWV fragmentation kits. These kits are provided in theater. Finally, there are some additional training equipment gaps in specific areas which are driven by the Army’s desire to get the most modern and capable systems immediately into the hands of our soldiers in combat operations. These items include the most recent version of the Army Battle Command System, the Command Post of the Future, some advanced intelligence systems, and biometric systems. The Army is working to get appropriate levels of systems to support training the force into the training base and at unit home stations, as well as in our Combat Training Centers.

Significant quantities of Army equipment remain in Iraq and Afghanistan to minimize the time lost, and associated costs, in transporting equipment to and from these missions. The result is that units at home station have less than full sets of authorized equipment. Although rotating equipment between training units allows us to achieve the training requirements before deployment, these units are limited in their ability to support other contingencies around the world should the need arise.

Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address these shortfalls and ensure that units have what they need to train and operate?
Answer. The Army has taken measures to overcome the impact on training of equipment shortfalls by creating training sets of equipment and rotating units through training. Congress has allocated $17.1 billion in fiscal year 2007 supplemental dollars for the Army to reset the force. Over 70 percent of these supplemental funds have been obligated as of mid-April 2007 and will allow the Army to double the workload at its depots. The number of tanks, Bradleys, and other tracked vehicles being overhauled is being quadrupled. While the use of training sets is not the optimal solution, units have and will continue to meet all required training and readiness standards prior to commitment into combat. If I am confirmed, I would continue these efforts. I would also work with the administration and Congress to ensure that the Army develops budget requirements to better equip the forces at home station, between deployments, and to build strategic depth to support other contingencies that may be directed by the national leadership.

EQUIPMENT REPAIR/RESET

Congress provided the Army with $17.1 billion in fiscal year 2007 to help with the reset of nondeployed forces and accelerate the repair and replacement of equipment. What impact do you expect the increased funding to have on the readiness of our ground forces, and how soon do you expect to see this impact?

Answer. The funding has helped prevent erosion of unit readiness and restores equipment to a desired level of combat capability necessary for a unit’s future mission. The $17.1 billion provides the resources to replace, repair, and recapitalize equipment for 24 brigade combat teams and support units. Contracts to replace battle losses are being put in place during fiscal year 2007, but most of the equipment will not be delivered to the Army until fiscal year 2008. The reset funding will meet the requirements to properly equip our deploying forces, but will not address all equipment shortfalls or equipment still committed overseas in support of OIF and OEF.

Question. Is it your understanding that our repair depots are operating at full capacity to meet rebuild and repair requirements for reset?

Answer. Our depots currently are not operating at full capacity. They are operating at the capacity necessary to meet current requirements and available funding. Each depot’s production capacity is being optimized by each equipment type/commodity. In fiscal year 2007 we have scheduled 130,000 items to be reset. Because of timely, predictable funding, we were able to expand output. We have scheduled an additional 25,000 items this year.

The $17.1 billion received in fiscal year 2007 works off all fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007 depot backlog and we do not need them to do more in fiscal year 2007. The depots are repairing enough equipment to meet the requirements for next-to-deploy forces. The fiscal year 2007 supplemental funding also allows reset of 24 BCTs within 18–24 months.

Should Army requirements change, depots could do more and increase their capacity with predictable funding, available spare parts, increased work force, and more retrograded equipment.

Question. What additional steps, if any, do you believe could be taken to increase the Army’s capacity to fix its equipment and make it available for operations and training?

Answer. Consistent, timely, and adequate funding is required to increase the equipment available for operations and training. Congressional support has given the Army the necessary funding to eliminate the current depot backlog. For instance, the HMMWV backlog is projected to be eliminated by March 2008. The capacity to fix equipment depends on funding, past procurement, depot production, and retrograde from theater. Due to the large amount of equipment in theater, funding for reset must continue 2–3 years beyond the end of this conflict.

Question. What impact do you believe the President’s decision to send an additional five brigades to Iraq is likely to have on the pool of equipment available for nondeployed units to train with at home?

Answer. All units will be fully trained and equipped before going into combat. The Army will continue to be able to provide sufficient equipment for nondeployed soldiers to properly train before deployment. However, we will continue to rotate training sets among units as we did before the surge. For example, the Army is moving Up-armored High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (UAHs) between units to ensure predeployment training requirements are met at home station, while units in theater are provided the quantities of UAHs required to perform their combat mission. The Army is also addressing this equipping challenge by using reset to re-
pair, replace, and recapitalize equipment, filling training requirements from new production, and requesting additional funding to purchase needed equipment.

**Question.** What impact is it likely to have on the ability of Army National Guard units to respond to homeland security and disaster relief missions?

**Answer.** The plus-up has had no effect on Army National Guard units' ability to respond to and perform homeland security and disaster relief missions. Plus-up units are all Active component and their equipment came from new production and other Active component units, not from existing Army National Guard pools of equipment.

**MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES**

**Question.** In your role as the Acting Secretary, you have been involved in the Army's evolving requirement for the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. A recent memo from you to Secretary Gates indicated that the current Army requirement for MRAP vehicles is 2,500, but that the requirement could be increased to 17,700. The U.S. Marine Corps has decided to replace all of its Up-armed HMMWVs (UAHs) with MRAP vehicles.

Is the current Army requirement for MRAP vehicles still 2,500 and, if so, is that number adequate to meet the Army's needs?

**Answer.** Buying the MRAPs we need to better protect soldiers and getting them to theatre as soon as possible is our top near-term acquisition priority. The Army requirement for MRAP vehicles is much greater than 2,500 and Army leadership is working to determine the proper number. The Army has sent a high level team to theater to better understand the theater request. The Army has committed the supplemental funding provided by Congress to acquire 900 MRAP vehicles and will field the first vehicles this fall. We are working with the Navy and Marine Corps to achieve the highest production rates possible, as soon as possible, for MRAPs.

**U.S. ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE IN EUROPE**

**Question.** A major drawdown of U.S. military personnel in Europe is underway. The heart of this proposal is a reduction of approximately 47,000 Army personnel and the relocation of 3 combat brigades from Europe to the United States. After that decision had already been made, the fiscal year 2008 budget proposes to add 65,000 soldiers to Army Active-Duty end strength over the next 5 years. As part of this increase, the Army proposes to create six new light infantry combat brigades.

If confirmed as the Secretary of the Army, what would be your role and responsibility in the final determination of the permanent station location for each of the six additional brigades?

**Answer.** If confirmed as the Secretary of the Army, I would ensure the Army considers operational, fiscal, and environmental implications of force growth and ongoing realignments prior to determining stationing locations.

**Question.** In your current role as the Acting Secretary, what criteria has the Army developed to assess locations for the placement of the six brigades?

**Answer.** The Army will use the best military value criteria, training capacity, power projection, logistics infrastructure and capacity, soldier well-being, cost and growth capacity, and environmental considerations. The criteria are derived from the 2005 base realignment and closure analysis. We will ensure that our planning, analysis, and criteria meet all of the requirements included in the National Environmental Policy Act.

**Question.** Do you believe the consideration of locations for the final determination of the permanent station location for each of the six additional Active brigades should include Army Reserve and Guard installations in the United States?

**Answer.** The Army is in the initial stages of analyzing installation capacity and capability for supporting six brigade combat teams. Army Reserve and Guard installations in the United States are being considered.

**Question.** Given the role our forces in Europe have played in operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, do you believe it would be in our strategic interest to base one or more of these six additional brigades in Europe?

**Answer.** Our current strategy which is the Global Defense Posture Realignment strategy calls for a shift to a more CONUS-based, joint and expeditionary Army and the Army plans to base the six new brigades in CONUS.

**Question.** What is your current role as Acting Secretary of the Army in the decision to locate some or all of these additional 65,000 Army personnel should be based in Europe, when do you expect this basing decision to be made, and what would your role be in making this decision, if confirmed?

**Answer.** In my current role, I provide recommendations on global basing strategy and ensure the Army's recommended stationing decisions are consistent with strate-
gic guidance and meet the requirements of the combatant commander. If confirmed, I would expect to continue providing my recommendations to OSD in these critical areas.

**Question.** In your opinion, should DOD determine the location of the six brigades before making any irrevocable decisions to return property in Europe?

**Answer.** The Army is proceeding with analysis of the CONUS basing options for the six brigades consistent with the strategic guidance from the Secretary of Defense. Currently, there are no plans to utilize European options.

**Question.** The training ranges at the National Training Center in California and the Joint Readiness Training Center in Louisiana are already fully utilized. If the ongoing drawdown from four heavy brigades to one Stryker brigade in Europe is fully implemented, it seems likely that the Joint Multinational Readiness Center in Germany will not be fully utilized. Do you believe we should take the availability of this training range, and the cost avoidance of not building new ranges if we have an underutilized range available, into consideration in deciding whether or how soon to draw down our ground forces in Europe, and where to base the proposed six new brigade combat teams?

**Answer.** One of the Secretary of the Army's responsibilities is to ensure the responsible stewardship of all Army resources whether the resource is funding, equipment, or facilities. If confirmed as Secretary of the Army, any basing decision would include a complete analysis of resource requirements and availability.

**ARMY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY**

**Question.** The Army invests in science and technology (S&T) programs to develop advanced capabilities to support current operations and future Army systems. The Army's budget request has included a declining level of investment in S&T programs over each of the last 4 fiscal years. What do you see as the role that Army S&T programs will play in continuing to develop capabilities for current and future Army systems?

**Answer.** The Army's S&T program is the investment the Army makes in our future soldiers. This program has to be as adaptable and responsive as our soldiers in the field. The Army's S&T strategy should be to pursue technologies that will enable the future force while simultaneously seizing opportunities to enhance the current force.

**Question.** Do you believe that the Army should increase its level of investment in S&T programs?

**Answer.** The Army's planned S&T investments seek to mature and demonstrate the key technologies needed to give our soldiers the best possible equipment now and in the future. Given the current environment and priorities, I believe our level of investment is appropriate.

**Question.** What metrics would you use, if confirmed, to judge the value of Army S&T programs?

**Answer.** The real value of S&T programs is measured by the increased capability of the force achieved when new technologies are inserted into systems and equipment and that equipment is provided to fully-trained soldiers. While technology is still in S&T, we use the standard DOD established Technology Readiness Levels to report when technologies are judged to be mature enough for successful transition to an acquisition program of record.

**Question.** What role should Army laboratories play in supporting current operations and in developing new capabilities to support Army missions?

**Answer.** The S&T community can support current operations in three ways. First, soldiers are benefiting today from technologies that emerged from past investments. Using our Rapid Equipping initiative, we are seeking to field technologies as soon as possible to help in the warfight. Second, the Army should exploit transition opportunities by accelerating mature technologies from ongoing S&T efforts. Third, we should also seek to leverage the expertise of our scientists and engineers to develop solutions to unforeseen problems encountered during current operations. To enhance the current force, Army S&T should be providing limited quantities of advanced technology prototypes to our soldiers deployed to the fight.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you ensure that weapon systems and other technologies that are fielded by the Army are adequately operationally tested?

**Answer.** Operational testing is of critical importance and one of the cornerstones of the Army’s acquisition program. It ensures that the systems and technologies work not only from a technical aspect, but also from the perspective of how our soldiers will use these systems around the world in actual operations. The Army has a systematic approach to test new systems under the conditions that replicate actual combat as much as possible. The Army partners the Army Test and Evaluation
Command with the Program Executive Offices, the Training and Doctrine Command, and the soldiers from various Army Commands to plan and execute very thorough operational tests. I fully understand the importance to the Army of operational testing and the impact it has on ensuring the right systems get to our soldiers. As Secretary, I will insist we conduct thorough operational tests so we understand how the system performs in the hands of our soldiers prior to fielding.

Question. Are you satisfied with the acquisition community’s ability to address the operational needs of deployed forces?

Answer. The Army constantly seeks more agility in addressing the anticipated and unanticipated operational needs of deployed forces. OEF and OIF have transformed the way we approach this topic. The acquisition community must always balance the need to fill requirements with the need to comply with laws and regulations. The biggest challenges for the acquisition community are retaining trained people, managing the interaction with requirements and testing communities, and managing complex programs that require high levels of oversight.

Question. If confirmed, what recommendations would you have to speed the ability for the Army to provide operational forces with the specific systems and other capabilities that they request?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to continue funding the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) to rapidly increase mission capability while reducing risk to soldiers and others. The REF equips operational commanders with off-the-shelf solutions or near-term developmental items that can be researched, developed, and acquired quickly. The Army must also continue to develop, test, and evaluate key technologies and systems under operational conditions and rapidly field those capabilities that will enable our forces to rapidly confront an adaptive enemy. Additionally, a reexamination of the Federal Acquisition Regulation and Defense Acquisition Regulation and our acquisition processes should be undertaken to reflect the asymmetric, catastrophic, and irregular situations we are facing in the current environment.

ARMY LABORATORIES AND RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND ENGINEERING CENTERS

Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army laboratories and research and development centers have the highest quality workforce, laboratory infrastructure, resources, and management, so that they can continue to support deployed warfighters and develop next generation capabilities?

Answer. If confirmed, I would encourage the recruitment and retention of the highest quality laboratory workforce. The Army has already taken significant advantage of the authorities provided by Congress for recruiting bonuses, laboratory pay banding, pay-for-performance, incentive awards, and employee advanced education and development programs. Our vital laboratory infrastructure is fundamental to exploit the knowledge of our people and to attract and retain the most talented scientists and engineers to work for the Army. Despite tremendous pressures on resources to fund current operations and Army modernization we have struggled to sustain S&T funding at roughly $1.7 billion for the past several budgets. The Army promotes efficient use of these resources and effective laboratory management through multiple processes: peer groups, laboratory internal management reviews, Army headquarters and cross-Service technology reviews, as well as input from subject-matter experts from industry, academia, and other government agencies.

ARMY TEST AND EVALUATION EFFORTS

Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army’s test and evaluation infrastructure is robust enough to ensure that new systems and technologies are tested to verify their combat effectiveness and suitability?

Answer. The infrastructure today is fully meeting the current requirements of the global war on terror. Fiscal year 2011 will be a challenge to ensure long-term test and evaluation infrastructure. My intent is to address the test and evaluation infrastructure in the next Program Objective Memorandum (POM) cycle.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRANSFORMATION ROADMAP

Question. A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by the Department on March 30, 2005, directed a series of actions aimed at transforming the Department’s foreign language capabilities, to include revision of policy and doctrine, building a capabilities based requirements process, and enhancing foreign language capability for both military and civilian personnel. What is your understanding of the steps being taken within the Army to achieve the goals of the Defense Language Transformation roadmap?

Answer. The Army has made great progress in the area of Language Transformation, and we are committed to the four goals of the roadmap:
1. Creating foundational language and cultural expertise in the officer, civilian, and enlisted ranks for both Active and Reserve components.
2. Creating the capacity to surge language and cultural resources beyond these foundational and in-house capabilities.
3. Establishing a cadre of language specialists possessing a level 3/3/3 ability (listening/reading/speaking).
4. Establishing a process to track the accession, separation, and promotion rates of language professionals and Foreign Area Officers (FAOs).

The Army is addressing language training across a broad spectrum of skill levels. Today, language training involves more than just making soldiers into linguists; it involves giving soldiers of all specialties basic communication skills that are needed in the contemporary operating environment. The Army is not making every soldier a language expert, but giving them tools to succeed in the environment in which they will operate. For our language experts, the Army has set a high language proficiency goal of 3-listening, 3-reading, and 3-speaking. The Army increased Foreign Language Proficiency Pay Policy to encourage soldiers to improve their existing proficiency and acquire new language capabilities in critical languages. We are also using online tools such as Rosetta Stone as well as native-speaking role players in training scenarios to replicate the contemporary operating environment. Additionally, we have embedded the tasks of the Language Transformation Roadmap in a new chapter of Army Regulation 350–1, Army Training and Leader Development, and language training is a part of our predeployment ARFORGEN model. One of our key initiatives was the creation of Military Operations Specialty 09L which recruits native foreign language speakers to be interpreters/translator. The Army is the only Service with a program such as 09L. We have trained and sent forward 377 trained interpreters in support of the global war on terrorism, as well as expanding the program to all components of the Army. These language experts as well as others such as our FAOs are tracked by Army career field managers.

**Question.** What is your assessment of an appropriate timeframe within which results can be realized in this critical area?

**Answer.** This is a capability that we are building, and the fruits of our work through the Language Transformation Roadmap and other initiatives will take time to produce results. In the mean time, contract linguists and 09L interpreters and translators are vital to our capacity to surge language resources.

**ARcMY MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING PROCESS**

**Question.** Over the past several years, the Army’s planning, programming, and budgeting process has not kept pace with rapidly changing requirements. While this is more understandable for events like the Presidential decision to surge additional forces into Iraq, it is less understandable with respect to long-term program decisions such as the modular conversion of Army brigades or the more recent proposal to increase the size of the Army. It has become routine for the Army to submit “placeholders” instead of actual program plans in budget requests, and to purchase temporary facilities followed almost immediately by additional funding requests to buy permanent facilities to replace the temporary ones. What is your assessment of the Army’s management and planning process?

**Answer.** The Army planning, programming, and budgeting process ties together strategic guidance with the capabilities required to carry out the National Military Strategy while working within the constraints of fiscal guidance. The Army manages mission requirements for resources and manpower over a 5–to-6-year period. The Army seeks to balance the need for both the current force and future force to ensure our soldiers and their families have the necessary capabilities, facilities, and programs to meet their needs. However, no matter how well the staff plans for the future, there will always be unforeseen changes to requirements (especially in today’s environment) and decisions made beyond the control of the Army. New plans require time to establish, and sometimes temporary solutions must be implemented. These temporary solutions and other lessons learned often lead to unexpected capability gains to Army formations engaged in combat. As the Army attempts to provide these new capabilities and lessons learned to our soldier engaged in combat, timelines for decisions on emerging capabilities do not always match timelines associated with the planning, programming, and budget process. Placeholders should be used sparingly, but they allow the Army to make the best decision on prudent use of available resources in this fluid environment.

**Question.** In your view, does the Army have enough people with the right skills to manage the changes being attempted, or is the Army undertaking more organizational change than it is capable of accomplishing during a time of war?
Answer. The Army is transforming its processes designed to identify and eliminate wasteful practices while gaining greater efficiencies. The Army is attempting to garner savings to self-finance many of its initiatives, while sustaining our capabilities to meet the increasing demands of our wartime missions. I believe the Army has the right group of people with the right skill sets to see the Army through these challenging times. The Army must, however, continue to provide the necessary training as new technologies and processes are made available to improve productivity and remain a relevant and ready force.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you plan to take to improve the Army's management and planning processes, in particular for major force structure and program changes?

Answer. If confirmed, I will examine how we can make the process more adaptive to the changing environment, building upon the positive working relationships the Army has built with DOD leaders. I believe improvements can be instituted to make the process more efficient. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy for Business Transformation to engage the Army staff in a concerted effort to identify and implement meaningful change and process improvements. In this effort, however, I would maintain a central focus on the readiness of the Army to fight the global war on terror.

ARMY INSTALLATIONS

Question. The Department of the Army recently was criticized for substandard facility conditions at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center, which in part led to leadership changes in the chain of command for the center.

In your current role as the Acting Secretary, have you seen a change in how the leaders in the Department of the Army address the conditions and quality of facilities and installations throughout the Army?

Answer. First, I'd like to address the steps we have taken with the Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP) to improve medical facilities. The Installation Management Command (IMCOM) has conducted a 100 percent review of Warrior in Transition barracks and identified corrective measures required to bring them up to standard. Additionally, the IMCOM has identified requirements for other buildings on installations that Warriors in Transition would use. Army-wide, quality of life remains a top Army priority to ensure soldiers and families have safe and adequate facilities to live, work, and train. The Army has made substantial progress in the last 4 years increasing Base Operations Support 41 percent and Facility Sustainment/Restoration and Modernization 15 percent. We have doubled our effort in Restoration and Modernization funding to $200 million per year. Care for our families is foremost in the Army's stationing and mobilization of soldiers. The environment in which our soldiers and families live, work, and train plays a key role in recruiting and retaining the All-Volunteer Force. For example, 19,000 family homes have been built or modernized under the Residential Communities Initiative. This is quality housing that our families proudly call home. Although, we are still not doing as much as we would like in this time of war and constrained resources, we continue to make consistent and steady progress toward improving the installation services necessary to sustain the All-Volunteer Force.

Question. In your opinion, does the Department of the Army have additional problems with facility conditions across the Army aside from the ones identified at Walter Reed? If so, how serious are they?

Answer. We have identified shortcoming in other facilities across the Army and are working to address them. The Army is continuously challenged to balance facility sustainment, restoration, and modernization projects to meet mission and life, health, and safety requirements. Facilities projects compete for funding and must be prioritized for execution over a number of years. If confirmed, I will make it a top priority to ensure that our efforts to improve facilities for our wounded warriors, soldiers, and families are continued.

Question. If confirmed, would you implement any additional programs or guidance to ensure our soldiers work and live in adequate facilities?

Answer. If confirmed, I would implement initiatives from three working groups which address issues in this area. One initiative, enhancing the quality of support to soldiers, civilians, and families, will develop a plan for improvements to installation services. Another initiative, complete Reserve component transition, will complete the conversion to modular units and adjust and resource post-deployment policies and family support programs to ensure care of soldiers and their families that are dispersed throughout the United States. A third initiative, Adapt Army Institutions to Support an Expeditionary Army at War, will provide initiatives to support soldiers, civilians, families, and wounded warriors with reliable and standard levels
of quality of life. Also, it will offer improved installation management systems to better align with ARFORGEN phases and mitigate the effects of repeated deployments. This would include improving services, facilities, and the military construction process.

**CONTRACT SUPPORT FUNCTIONS**

**Question.** DOD has engaged in the privatization of many of its support functions. As a result, the Department now relies heavily on contractors to perform acquisition, budget, and financial management functions that are critical to the execution of the Department’s mission. Senior DOD officials have informed the committee both formally and informally that, because of reductions in the acquisition work force, the Department now lacks the capability to effectively oversee the work performed by its support contractors.

Are you concerned about the extent to which the Army has become reliant upon contractors to perform critical functions?

**Answer.** The Army is committing additional personnel and resources to provide the required level of contract administration on large contracts, particularly for the Army’s contracting officers who support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Another area of concern is a shortage of Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs) within units to provide surveillance on service contracts in support of contingency operations.

**Question.** What steps, if any, do you believe the Army should take to ensure that it has the resources it needs to provide effective oversight for its support contractors?

**Answer.** Working within existing manpower constraints, the Army needs to ensure that its limited contract oversight resources are organized and employed in the most efficient manner. In addition, it needs to continue to place appropriate management emphasis on COR training.

**Question.** The privatization of functions previously performed by DOD employees now extends to many functions performed on the battlefield. As a result, many functions that were performed by DOD personnel as recently as the Gulf War have been performed by contractor personnel in the current conflict in Iraq.

Do you believe that the DOD has reached, or exceeded, an appropriate balance in providing for the performance of functions by contractors on the battlefield?

**Answer.** The downsizing of the Army in the 1990s has increased the need for contractors to provide non-inherently governmental functions. The use of contractors is a force multiplier enabling the U.S. Army to keep soldiers engaged in core U.S. Army missions. Currently, there are an estimated 129,000 contractors in Iraq. They continue to perform a vital role performing services such as mail delivery, laundry and food services, water and ground transportation of goods, road and rail maintenance, construction, base operations, petroleum supply, and maintenance and technical support for high-technology systems. The Army balances the need to use contractors to provide critically needed services while using soldiers and DOD civilians to perform inherently governmental functions.

**Question.** Where do you believe that the DOD should draw the line between functions on the battlefield that can and should be performed by contractors and functions that should only be performed by DOD personnel?

**Answer.** DOD must maintain vigilance to ensure that only non-inherently governmental functions are contracted out.

**Question.** Do you believe that contractors on the battlefield are subject to appropriate levels of control and accountability for their actions, or would additional regulation be appropriate?

**Answer.** With changing conditions on the ground, we must be vigilant to ensure that we maintain proper oversight over our contract workforce. I believe that existing controls are appropriate but must be re-evaluated regularly. In October 2005, the DOD issued DOD Instruction 3020.41 titled “Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces,” to address contingency contractor personnel. Section 6.1.3 states that “contingency contractor personnel fulfilling contracts with the U.S. Armed Forces may be subject to prosecution under Federal law, including but not limited to, the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), 18 U.S.C. 3261, which extends U.S. Federal criminal jurisdiction to certain DOD contingency contractor personnel, for certain offenses committed outside U.S. territory.” The Department of Justice has responsibility for prosecuting violations of Federal law. Besides being subject to Federal law, contractors must abide by the terms and conditions in their contracts. All DOD contracts being performed in a combatant commander’s area of operations require that contractor employees adhere to the policies and directives of the combatant commander.
MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. The Army has fielded the Patriot system and is upgrading all Patriot units to the most modern and capable PAC-3 configuration. The Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system is being developed as a near-term system for defending against short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. What do you believe is the Army’s proper role in fielding, operating, sustaining, and funding missile defenses, and how does that role relate to the role of the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)?

Answer. As a member of the joint team, the Army is responsible to field and operate land-based missile defenses as capabilities are made available by the MDA. Upon transition and transfer of land-based missile defense elements to the Army, the Army will assume responsibility for the operations and sustainment of these capabilities. MDA is responsible for research and development of missile defense capabilities and the Army is responsible for their operations and support of the land-based systems. The Army’s close partnership with MDA throughout the developmental process has enabled us to succeed in putting capabilities in the field and enabled us to achieve the interoperability of these capabilities with the other Services and our allies.

STRATEGIC RISK

Question. Do you believe that the extended pace and scope of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan create higher levels of strategic risk for the United States based on the availability of trained and ready forces for other contingencies?

Answer. Strategic risk for the Nation must be considered from a joint perspective. As for the Army’s role in support of the National Military Strategy, the Army’s increased operational tempo and multiple combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan limit Army resources available for other contingencies.

Question. How would you characterize the increase in strategic risk in terms of the Army’s ability to mobilize, deploy, and employ a force for a new contingency? In your view, is this level of risk acceptable?

Answer. Strategic risk must be considered from a joint perspective. The Army can still meet strategic requirements to mobilize, deploy, and employ its forces in support of national military strategic objectives; however, if the OEF and OIF demand does not decrease, the Army may require a longer timeline to provide resources to support a new contingency. The level of risk that the force faces today is increased, but the force remains capable of responding to an unforeseen surge requirement. We will continue to work with Congress and OSD to reduce risk.

Question. What impact, if any, do you expect the decision to increase Army forces committed to Iraq to have on our ability to meet our security obligations in other parts of the world?

Answer. Our Nation’s strategies to respond to threats around the world involve all components of our Nation’s defense, including all four Services. High utilization of the resources of one Service may require an adjustment in the role of the other Services. Army forces committed to Iraq do limit the Army’s ability to meet other security obligations around the world. The decision to lengthen combat tours would be lengthened to 15 months reflects that increased demand; however, our Nation’s military is capable of meeting and defeating threats to the Nation in support of current national and defense strategies.

Question. How and over what period of time, in your view, will increases to Army end strength reduce or mitigate this risk?

Answer. The Army’s approved growth in end-strength will increase the Army’s ability to respond to contingencies. We must grow the Army, and we are working to do that, adding 65,000 to the Active-Duty Force, 8,000 to the Guard, and 1,000 to the Reserve over the next 5 years. But we must remain flexible as circumstances change to meet future demands. The “Grow the Army Plan” is based on lessons learned from the past 5 years and increases the strategic depth for the Army to meet global requirements of the long war. The growth will also enhance other combat capabilities (Patriot Air Defense), combat support (Military Intelligence, Engineer, and Military Police) and combat service support (Transportation, Quartermaster, Medical, Ordnance and Maintenance). The plan recognizes increased demands on the Institutional Army to recruit, train, and sustain the operational force. Adjustments must reflect growth in the operational force while we continue to seek efficiencies in the Institutional Army to reduce its percentage of the Army’s end strength.

Question. What additional actions, in your view, are necessary to reduce or mitigate this strategic risk?
Answer. Adequate and predictable funding of modernization and transformation efforts are crucial to mitigating this strategic risk. Policy and budgets must match the current strategy and demand. We also must build the capacity of our international partners and allies as we cannot face these challenges alone. We must invest in partner nations who know the culture, language, and geography of our enemies. The President’s budget includes vital funds for that effort. Additionally, rebalancing the forces in the Reserve component and fully transitioning the Reserve component from a Strategic Reserve to an operational force will further mitigate risk.

WALTER REED ARMY MEDICAL CENTER

Question. You testified before the committee at the Army posture hearing on March 15, 2007, and again at a joint hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee on April 15, 2007, regarding revelations of poor conditions for outpatient soldiers at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center. At those hearings, you discussed the many ways the Army planned to address the issues at Walter Reed, including personnel changes, the creation of new offices to address the specific needs of wounded soldiers, and changes in the resources and facilities for outpatient care.

What is your assessment of the overall changes that have been made thus far at Walter Reed, and what more needs to be done?

Answer. I am encouraged by the accomplishments made by MG Gale Pollock, Acting Surgeon General, MG Eric Schoomaker, Commander, Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC), and his Deputy, BG Michael Tucker, over the past 90 days. They have shown a commitment to correcting deficiencies in the management of outpatient care, to include providing for the needs of the families of our brave soldiers. As a result of these efforts, along with others planned for the coming months, I am confident that our warriors in transition and their families will receive the best medical and restorative care and support services possible.

Question. What specific changes have been made to address the issues of care and treatment for outpatients and their families?

Answer. The most important steps taken to date are the establishment at WRAMC of the Warrior Transition Brigade (WTB), along with the introduction of the concept of a “triad” of a primary care manager (usually a physician), a nurse case manager, and a squad leader. The WTB provides the leadership structure necessary to allow our warriors to focus on healing. Soldiers previously living in Building 18 now reside in high quality housing; Abrams Hall and the Mologne House, located on the WRAMC Campus, both provide telephone, cable television, and internet service in each warrior in transition room. As a result of the findings of the 2006 Army’s Physical Disability Evaluation Transformation Initiative, WRAMC is beta testing a streamlined approach to Medical Evaluation Board processing, reducing the number of required documents from 38 to 18. Another accomplishment is the establishment of the Soldier Family Assistance Center (SFAC). At WRAMC, the SFAC is centrally located within the hospital and is designed to support the needs of warrior family members. The SFAC is a concept that has worked with great success at Brooke Army Medical Center in San Antonio, TX, and I believe will be of great benefit at WRAMC and to all Army treatment facilities. These and numerous other improvements that Major General Schoomaker and his staff have implemented at WRAMC are part of a comprehensive AMAP that was first implemented in April 2007. I am confident that the Army is not only correcting the deficiencies at WRAMC, but is developing a comprehensive program to ensure that warriors in transition and their families receive the best quality care and support possible at all Army treatment facilities.

Question. If confirmed, what measures would you propose to minimize or mitigate the detrimental effects, if any, from the closure of Walter Reed as required by the 2005 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Round?

Answer. The Army, working with DOD and Congress, is seeking to accelerate the construction of the new center at Bethesda. The Army is committed that WRAMC will remain fully operational until the new center is fully operational. The ability to manage patient care functions between the medical centers appropriately and seamlessly, is facilitated by the ongoing functional integration of clinical services at WRAMC and National Naval Medical Center (NNMC). The Army expects that all the major clinical services at WRAMC and NNMC will be functionally integrated before the end of the current calendar year. Integrated clinical service provides active patient management spanning inpatient and outpatient at both institutions. When the transition from WRAMC to the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center is completed, all of the lessons learned and the functional integration
process will be fully implemented. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that we maintain WRAMC at full operational capacity until the NNMC is prepared to provide medical care to our soldiers.

**MEDICAL PERSONNEL RECRUITING AND RETENTION**

*Question.* The Army is facing significant shortages in critically needed medical personnel in both Active and Reserve components. The committee is concerned that growing medical support requirements, caused by the stand-up of Brigade Combat Teams, potential growth of the Army, surge requirements in theater, and other factors will compound the already serious challenges faced in recruitment and retention of medical, dental, nurse, and behavioral health personnel. Moreover, the committee understands that the Army continues to direct conversion of military medical billets to civilian or contractor billets.

*Answer.* If confirmed, would you undertake a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army, incorporating all new requirements for 2008 and beyond?

*Answer.* If I am confirmed, I will undertake a comprehensive review of the medical support requirements for the Army, to include a review of authorities necessary to increase recruitment and retention of medical, dental, nurse, and behavioral health personnel.

*Question.* What policy and/or legislative initiatives do you think are necessary in order to ensure that the Army can continue to fulfill medical support requirements as its mission and end strength grow?

*Answer.* To continue to fulfill medical support requirements as its mission and end strength grow, the Army needs to explore the use of special pays and retention bonuses for health care professionals and authority to appoint officers in the Army Medical Department with a reduced military service obligation. We also need to explore ways to improve TRICARE services for soldiers and families.

**NATIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL SYSTEM**

*Question.* Congress enacted broad changes in the DOD civilian personnel system in 2004 to provide the Department with more flexible tools for the management of its civilian workforce in support of our national security. However, DOD employee unions have strongly resisted the implementation of the proposed new system. What is your view of the success of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) implementation within the Army so far, and if confirmed, what would be your expectation for continued implementation of NSPS within the Army?

*Answer.* The implementation of NSPS thus far is successful. More than 41,000 Army civilians have now been converted to NSPS. Implementation efforts have been well planned and managed and have incorporated a robust program of communication and training for Army managers and employees. The Army’s first pay-for-performance rating cycle was also successful with employees receiving performance-based pay in January 2007. The NSPS performance management process resulted in greater communication between supervisors and employees to develop meaningful job objectives aligned with organizational goals and resulting performance ratings reflected the workforce’s contribution toward achieving such goals. NSPS has allowed for increased flexibility in rewarding exceptional performance. Lessons learned from our implementation experiences are being used to adjust policy and training. An additional 29,000 employees are scheduled for conversion to NSPS during the November 2007 to February 2008 timeframe.

*Question.* What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure broader employee acceptance of NSPS?

*Answer.* Management support and accountability are essential to employee acceptance. If confirmed, I will assure that managers are held accountable for communicating performance expectations, and that they provide fair and equitable ratings. Building consensus through communication and transparency is paramount to successful implementation. Therefore, the Army will maximize our unprecedented training effort to ensure that all participants understand the new system and their roles in making it successful.

*Question.* Based on your experience, what are the critical factors for successful implementation of a total transformation of work force policies and rules, including performance-based pay?

*Answer.* Among the factors I consider critical are leadership commitment and support, and an educated and knowledgeable workforce. NSPS is a key pillar in Army’s transformation plan and is integral to developing the right mix of people and skills across the Total Force. I will ensure all leaders are committed to NSPS and remain engaged in the successful implementation. Further, I will endorse a pay-for-perform-
ance system that is consistent, fair, equitable, and recognizes our employees based on their contribution to mission accomplishment.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you monitor the acceptance of the NSPS and what role would you expect to play in managing the NSPS implementation in the Army?

**Answer.** I strongly support the need for transformation in civilian management. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate actively the effectiveness and impact of the implementation of NSPS and will set that tone for the leadership in the Army as we continue to implement NSPS. The Army has established an NSPS Program Management Office that recommends Army NSPS policy, provides guidance, monitors implementation, and will keep me informed of progress and any issues that require my attention. These policy decisions are made with the guidance of an NSPS General Officer Steering Committee. In addition to the inclusion of NSPS-specific questions in the Army's annual workforce survey, onsite evaluations to assess program effectiveness are being performed which will provide additional implementation feedback and lessons learned. Finally, Army, along with the other Services, works closely with the Program Executive Office, NSPS, on evaluation methods and tools that will be useful for monitoring NSPS and its acceptance. The Army will be able to consider DOD-wide survey and implementation results, and compare them to what we find through Army.

**MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE**

**Question.** The transformation of the Armed Forces has brought with it an increasing realization of the importance of efficient and forward thinking management of senior executives.

What is your vision for the management and development of the Army senior executive workforce, especially in the critically important areas of acquisition, financial management, and the scientific and technical fields?

**Answer.** The Department of the Army has taken a very deliberate and direct approach to Senior Executive Service (SES) management within the Army. If confirmed, I intend to continue this initiative. The Army looks to its SES Corps as a replacement for military leaders in critically important areas, such as acquisition, financial management, science, engineering, and human resource management fields. As the Army has sent its flag officers into joint billets to support the war, it has replaced them with SES members. Army is reallocating positions to ensure senior executives are aligned with evolving business strategy. My vision for the management and development of senior executives is a senior civilian workforce that possesses a broad background of experiences to prepare them to move between positions in order to meet the continually changing mission needs of the Army. Those experiences will have been gained in the Army and in other military departments and agencies. There will be a systematic and progressive assignment pattern for executives that will lead them to positions of greater responsibility. I am committed to providing for the professional development and management of our civilian executives in ways consistent with what the Army has done for its General Office Corps for many years. As the Army moves forward with its transformation, if confirmed, I will be committed to reinforcing and institutionalizing the value that each senior executive brings to the leadership team and to promoting and sustaining high morale and esprit de corps.

**RESERVE DEPLOYMENT AND MOBILIZATION**

**Question.** In recent years, Reserve Force management policies and systems have been characterized as “inefficient and rigid” and readiness levels have been adversely affected by equipment stay-behind, cross-leveling, and reset policies.

What are your views about the optimal role for the Reserve component forces in meeting combat missions?

**Answer.** I support the Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) transitioning from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational Reserve that will provide the rotational depth needed to meet our global commitments and homeland defense and homeland security requirements. Our “Grow the Army Plan” is based on lessons learned and a thorough analysis of combatant commander requirements. As we transform and rebalance our Reserve components they will enhance the Army’s strategic depth. The Army proposes to grow the Reserve component by 9,000 by fiscal year 2012. As we grow the force, the ARNG will continue to transform to Brigade Combat Teams and rebalance its force structure to provide additional Combat Support and Combat Service Support capabilities. The USAR will continue to rebalance its institutional force and to increase Combat Support and Combat Service Support operational force capacity.
Question. What is your opinion about the sufficiency of current Reserve Force management policies?
Answer. The Army's goal for mobilization of Reserve component units will remain a 1-year mobilized to 5-years demobilized ratio. However, due to operational demand, some units may be remobilized sooner. In order to meet joint force requirements, the Army is adapting and implementing the ARFORGEN process. The goal of the ARFORGEN process is to provide us a flow of ready forces to meet operational requirements and will provide predictability for our soldiers, families, and employers. ARFORGEN, when fully implemented together with our Reserve component utilization policy and our rebalancing initiatives should provide us with the flexibility and capabilities we need for our Operational Reserve.

Question. Do you support assigning any support missions exclusively to the Reserve?
Answer. I support Army efforts to balance our capabilities within and across the Active component, National Guard, and Army Reserve to develop a total force that provides strategic depth and full-spectrum capabilities. The combined effects of growing the force, rebalancing, and transforming to a modular force will posture the Army to meet the needs of the Nation by increasing Combat, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support capabilities.

ARMS FAMILY ACTION PLAN

Question. The Army Family Action Plan has been successful in identifying and promoting quality-of-life issues for Army families. What do you consider to be the most important family readiness issues in the Army, and, if confirmed, what role would you play to ensure that family readiness needs are addressed and adequately resourced?
Answer. If confirmed, meeting the needs of our soldiers and their families will be my highest priority. The Army Family Action Plan (AFAP) will play an important role in meeting this priority. The AFAP is a dynamic program which enables the military community to share and raise issues which are most pressing to Army soldiers, civilians, and family members. This process further allows senior leadership to address and/or resolve issues brought forward or identified by these members of the Army community. AP is recognized and supported by commanders and is the force behind legislative, regulatory, and policy changes as well as improvements to programs and services across the Services. Current funding and staffing shortfalls challenge the ability to provide sufficient support to command, soldiers, and family members. Army Community Service (ACS) programs and services are instrumental in alleviating family member stress by building strong resilient families and increasing soldier and family readiness. Compassion fatigue and burnout are beginning to impact staff, Family Readiness Group (FRG) leaders, and leader spouses as they provide needed programs and services to family members. To address this concern, the Family and Morale, Welfare, and Recreation Command is developing and training Mobile Assistance Teams to relocate to installations to augment and provide respite. Additionally, to meet surge capabilities and address reunification and reunion issues, additional Military Family Life Consultants are needed. These professionals provide consistent support and education to soldiers and families on dealing with the effects of deployments by developing positive coping mechanisms.

Question. How would you address these family readiness needs in light of global rebasing, BRAC, extended deployment lengths, and the planned growth of the Army?
Answer. Army Community Service has worked extensively with garrisons to develop individual plans to meet staffing, funding, and programming needs. The Army updates these plans quarterly to ensure centers are continually addressing staffing and resource requirements and are changing missions and strategies to meet mission and deployment surge capabilities. If confirmed, I would monitor these plans to ensure that family needs are addressed as the Army grows and undertakes global restationing, BRAC, and extended deployments.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure support of Reserve component families related to mobilization, deployment, and family readiness?
Answer. Supporting families of our geographically dispersed soldiers and family members poses special challenges but will be a high priority for me if I am confirmed. The Army has developed an Integrated Multi-component Family Support Network (IMFSN) to assist us in meeting this challenge. If confirmed, I would support the efforts of IMFSN and other programs to ensure that family support systems and services are accessible, consistent, and predictable for Guard and Reserve soldiers, and family members during all phases of deployment. We do not have all the answers but we must engage with Reserve component soldiers and families to de-
velop programs that meet their needs. The welfare of the Army family, Active and Reserve components, is critical to the health of the U.S. Army.

MENTAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT TEAM IV

**Question.** The Army's mental health assessment studies in the Iraqi theater have been valuable in identifying the extent of mental health conditions and resource and training challenges being experienced in OIF.

Based on the findings of MHAT IV that soldiers experience increased stress due to multiple and lengthened deployments, what actions would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that appropriate numbers of mental health resources are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon their return?

**Answer.** The Army is committed to providing our soldiers the best mental health care possible. Indeed, we are now initiating an effort to recruit an additional 200 mental health professionals, to be based in CONUS and in theater. The Army plans other major changes as part of our comprehensive AMAP. Next month, the Army will roll out an extensive educational program on PTSD and TBI for all its soldiers and leaders. This program consists of a standardized presentation commanders will use to inform and educate both soldiers and leaders. The teaching materials and visual support products are in the final stages of development and are undergoing review by military and civilian health professionals. The Army also is developing proposals for establishing TBI and PTSD Centers of Excellence to provide nationwide education and training to Army leaders, clinicians, soldiers, and their families. Additionally, under current practices mental health assessments are conducted on all soldiers prior to deploying, immediately upon redeployment, and 3 to 6 months following redeployment.

**Question.** What do you think have been the most valuable findings of the Army's mental health assessment teams, and what are the lessons which can be applied to future deployments?

**Answer.** The MHATs have many valuable findings, including: 1) the impact of deployment lengths and multiple deployments on soldiers' mental health; 2) the level of combat continues to be the main determinant of a soldier's mental-health status; 3) good NCO leadership is the key to sustaining a soldier's mental health and well-being; 4) the suicide prevention program needs to be modified for the combat environment; and 5) there continues to be a perceived stigma for those that seek mental health care. The importance of leadership in the mitigation of mental health difficulties is one of many lessons that can be applied to future deployments. If I am confirmed, I will also reinforce the need to provide comprehensive and easily accessible behavioral health care, both in theater and at home.

INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE RECALL POLICY

**Question.** A July 2006 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies recommended that the Army revitalize its Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) program by culling existing IRR databases and ensuring that the Army has valid contact information on IRR members who may be recalled to serve.

What has the Army done to clarify the mobilization policy that applies to both officer and enlisted members of the IRR?

**Answer.** DOD IRR policy mandates the separation within 2 years of IRR officers who have fulfilled their Military Service Obligation unless they elect to remain in the IRR. To date, over 10,000 IRR officers have been notified that they have to make this election. Approximately 75 percent have been transferred to the inactive status list or separated. The Army is developing a policy applicable to the enlisted IRR population that will also transfer nonparticipants to the inactive status list until separation. The Army has clarified current mobilization policy in the Personnel Policy Guidance which is made available on the Web and made specifically available to the IRR soldiers via the IRR soldier portal, a Web site maintained exclusively for IRR soldiers and their families.

**Question.** What has the Army done to update its IRR mobilization database?

**Answer.** The Army has several initiatives to improve the IRR database. Two of the initiatives seek to improve IRR data reconciliation and control of the IRR population. These initiatives address methods to reset the force by conducting a systematic screening of all data records for nonmobilization assets, to include soldiers passed over for promotion, those with security violations, physical disqualifications, documented hardship, and adverse characterizations of service. Following such a screening, the Army would determine the appropriate disposition of individuals and process for final resolution those soldiers who no longer have further potential for useful military service. When appropriate, these soldiers are being separated. Additionally, the Human Resources Command has processed over 20,000 existing bad
addresses through a new contract with a credit bureau agency reducing the number of incorrect addresses from 35 percent to 10 percent on the database. Through these combined efforts, the IRR population has been reduced by approximately 25 percent to approximately 78,000.

Question. What is your assessment of the value of the IRR to the All-Volunteer Total Force, and what is your opinion about the role the IRR should play in the future?

Answer. The IRR has served honorably and has been a critical element to fill shortfalls in the both the Active and Reserve components. As of June 2007, the Army has mobilized 10,339 IRR soldiers to augment the global war on terror. The IRR will continue to serve a critical role in the future. In accordance with the IRR Transformation Plan, the Army is taking measures to change the "cultural" attitude about the IRR from a strategic to an operational force. Those IRR soldiers meeting operational readiness will be referred to as Individual Warriors with the ability to earn a Reserve retirement through various opportunities targeted specifically at them for their active role in participating in the program.

OFFICER SHORTAGES

Question. A report issued by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in July 2006 found that the Army projects an officer shortage of nearly 3,000 in fiscal year 2007, with the most acute shortfalls in the grades of captain and major with 11 to 17 years of service. Unless corrective action is taken, CRS found that officer shortages will persist through 2013 unless accessions are increased and retention improves.

What is your understanding of the reasons for the current shortfall, and what steps is the Army taking to meet this mid-career officer shortfall?

Answer. The current Army need to grow the officer corps is primarily due to increased requirements for Regular Army Competitive Category captains and majors. These will increase from 23,500 in 2005 to nearly 30,000 by 2010. Retention rates are slightly below historical averages but account for a small percentage of the shortfall. Steps to address this shortfall are answered in the next answer.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure adequate numbers of highly-qualified captains and majors are serving on Active-Duty over the next 10 years?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the Army’s strategy to meet these added requirements by increasing lieutenant accessions and raising the selection rates for captains and majors. The Army has also called to Active-Duty Reserve component officers and accepted increased numbers of interservice transfers of officers with the Blue to Green program, generating 1,000 additional officers. The second part of the Army’s strategy is a proposal to retain officers who otherwise would leave Active Duty. The retention tools include a captain’s retention menu of incentives including graduate school education, preferences for basing, and a $20,000 Captain’s Critical Skills Retention Bonus at a greater rate. The growth of Army requirements necessitates retaining mid-grade officers in critical skills. While unprecedented for the Army, bonuses to retain mid-grade officers are being employed very successfully by the Navy. If confirmed, it will be one of my most important tasks to fill our increasing demand for captains and majors by keeping our current force of combat-experienced junior officers in the Army.

NATIONAL GUARD ORGANIZATION, EQUIPMENT, AND READINESS

Question. Legislative proposals introduced in 2006 and 2007, recommendations by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves submitted on March, 1, 2007, and responses by the Department in response to these calls for change are all currently under consideration.

How do you assess the changes in the roles and mission of the National Guard and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau?

Answer. The past 4½ years of war and emergencies at home have demonstrated the degree to which the Nation relies on the National Guard. As we have increasingly utilized the National Guard at home and overseas, it has become clear that the National Guard must be organized, trained, and equipped to serve as an integral part of our operational force, not a "Strategic Reserve." The Army, the Secretary of Defense, and the Reserve component leaders are working together to provide greater predictability and support for our Reserve component soldiers, their families, and employers. In support of these missions and the Defense Secretary’s new policy, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau is working with the Governors, Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force, as well as other Federal agencies when National Guard Forces are supporting those agencies. We rely on the Chief of the National Guard
Bureau to act as our key link to and advisor on matters pertaining to the National Guard. It is a testament to the inherent flexibility of the current organization of the National Guard Bureau that not one mission has been unexecuted in this environment of high-demand, dual-purpose requirements, and I would expect that extraordinary performance to continue.

Question. Do you think that the current Army processes for planning, programming, and budgeting sufficiently address the requirements of the National Guard? What is the appropriate role for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in this regard?

It has been my experience as the Under Secretary that the current Army planning, programming, and budgeting process has been effective in examining, assessing, prioritizing, and allocating resources to the Total Army—the Active component and the Reserve component. The Army is currently executing and programming unprecedented resource levels to the Reserve component. The Director of the Army National Guard and Chief, National Guard Bureau are fully represented in Army planning and programming deliberations. Their respective staffs have been integrated directly into the Department of the Army headquarters staff so that we fully understand Reserve component requirements and so that there is full transparency and accountability in an improved total force. As a result, the Chief, National Guard Bureau and Director of the Army National Guard have maintained a “One Army” perspective and spirit. If I am confirmed, I will ensure that the Active and Reserve component will continue to work in concert to provide the land component capabilities our Nation needs.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the resourcing needs of the National Guard are fully considered and resourced through the Army budget?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that leaders from the National Guard are included fully in budget planning, negotiations, and execution. As the Acting Secretary of the Army, I work closely with National Guard leaders and will continue to do so. Further, as the Acting Secretary of the Army, I have been engaged with the leaders of the Guard and Reserve, the Secretary of Defense, and the other military departments in an effort to implement or incorporate several of the goals and improvements that are contained in proposed legislation or have been recommended by the Commission. One of those improvements is to amend the Charter to specify that the Chief, National Guard Bureau will also serve as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters involving planning, operation, and integration of non-Federalized National Guard Forces, and other matters as the Secretary of Defense determines appropriate. If confirmed, I will work in full partnership within DOD to assess the way ahead for the National Guard.

Question. What is your view of the appropriate role of the National Guard Bureau vis-a-vis the Army, Air Force, and Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. As the Acting Secretary of the Army, I have been engaged with the Secretary of Defense, National Guard leaders, and the other military departments in an effort to implement several of the goals and improvements that are contained in proposed legislation or have been recommended by the Commission. As directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Department of Defense and the Army are in the process of implementing the proposals attached as Exhibit A to these questions.

SPACE

Question. The Army has recently restructured its program executive office for air and missile defense to include Army space efforts, and issued a new Army space policy.

Are you satisfied that current DOD management structures adequately support Army equities in space?

Answer. I believe that there are opportunities for improvement. The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System helps to ensure all Service equities are addressed but is too slow and cumbersome when applied to unique space systems. The establishment of an Executive Agent for Space is a positive development to bring together component inherently joint and interagency capabilities but the current processes are immature. These processes will continue to evolve and will further enhance the Army’s equities in space.

Question. Are you satisfied with the current level of effort in the Army related to space programs? Do you believe these efforts have the right focus?

Answer. As the importance of space programs increases across DOD, we need to continually keep pace within the Army to ensure that we fully leverage these capabilities. Some of our capabilities are one of a kind, and we are working to ensure we can maintain the capabilities needed to support our forces. The Army’s Senior
Space Council, comprised of two- and three-star generals with vested interests in space, monitor Army efforts related to space programs and are chartered to ensure Army space needs are addressed. In addition, the Army is developing a cadre of space professionals by leveraging joint education resources.

Question. The Army currently defines its space career field as a subset of the information technology career field. Do you believe the information technology career field structure is adequate to support Army space interests?

Answer. Although space officers are managed in the Information Operations technology career field, they are individually managed by a dedicated space assignment officer. This structure ensures the space officers receive the necessary guidance and developmental assignments.

Question. Do you believe that the space career fields of the Army, Navy, and Air Force should be integrated?

Answer. While we continue to strive to achieve greater jointness and integration in space operations, I do not believe that the Services space career fields should be integrated. Addressing the Army only, I believe that we need a core of space professionals that deeply understand Army needs, doctrine, and operations.

Question. Does the Army plan to assign personnel to the new Operational Responsive Space Office (ORSO)?

Answer. Yes, the extent and at what rank will be decided as the office design is finalized. The Army considers the ORSO a key emerging space office and is actively participating in the development and expects to play an integral part in the long-term operation.

DETAINEE TREATMENT STANDARDS

Question. Do you agree with the policy set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense England stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?


Question. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on Interrogations, FM 2–22.3, issued in September 2006, and in DOD Directive 2310.01E, the DOD Detainee Program, dated September 5, 2006?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you believe it is consistent with effective military operations for U.S. forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Answer. Compliance with the humane treatment standards specified in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is fully consistent with effective U.S. military operations, and with Army values.

Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan comply with the standards in the Army Field Manual, the DOD Directive, and applicable requirements of U.S. and international law regarding detention and interrogation operations?

Answer. The Army, as the primary force provider to CENTCOM, has developed a robust training program to ensure that all U.S. forces involved in detainee and interrogation operations are aware of their obligations under U.S. and international law, as well as the implementing DOD policies. All personnel receive the statutorily mandated annual law of war training from legal professionals. This training includes instruction on the humane treatment standards specified in Common Article 3. The Army has also developed detailed training programs for all personnel, military and civilian, deploying to perform detainee and interrogation operations. In addition, regular semiannual assessments of detainee operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are conducted to ensure that operations are compliant with policy and doctrine. Additionally, the Army is developing an enhanced predeployment training program for officers slated for detention center operations.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Secretary of the Army?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Answer. Yes.
Implementation of Recommendations from the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves

1. The Secretaries of the Military Departments, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer:

   a. Utilized the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process to ensure that needed National Guard civil support capabilities identified by the Department of Homeland Security and validated by the Department of Defense are consistent with priorities established in the Defense Planning Guidance.

2. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of the Army, the Secretary of the Air Force, and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Commander, U.S. Northern Command, as required, the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command and the Commander, U.S. Southern Command, and with the support of the Director for Administration and Management and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau:

   a. Revise the Charter of the National Guard Bureau. These changes to the charter will ensure that the National Guard Bureau becomes the focal point for the National Guard matters at the strategic level, but will in no way diminish the title 10 statutory responsibilities of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force. The charter shall be amended to specify the following responsibilities and functions:

      (1) The Chief of the National Guard Bureau serves as an advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters involving planning, operation and integration for the non-federalized National Guard forces, and other matters as the Secretary determines appropriate.

      (2) Establish an advisory relationship between the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the combatant commanders for the United States, commensurate with the mission requirements of the combatant commanders.

      (3) Provide for the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to communicate directly with the heads of DoD components and the Office of the Secretary of Defense Principal Staff Assistants on National Guard matters, the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force informed on communications as they pertain to their respective service.
(4) Support the development and integration of operational concepts, capabilities and plans for National Guard domestic operations for the combatant commanders for the United States as prescribed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the secretaries of the Army and Air Force and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

(5) In accordance with applicable law, coordinate, support and monitor the employment of non-federalized National Guard forces with appropriate combatant commander, other federal agencies when the National Guard forces are supporting those agencies, and the National Guard State Join Force Headquarters.

b. Initially, the revised charter will be prepared as a directive-type memorandum, pending publication of the charter in the DoD Directives System.

3. The Secretaries of the Military Departments:

a. Ensure that National Guard and Reserve general and flag officer have the opportunity to serve in joint assignments, obtain joint experience, and acquire joint assignments, obtain joint experience, and acquire joint qualifications to compete for positions for which the grade of Lieutenant general/vice admiral (09) or general/admiral (0-10) is authorized.

b. Ensure that the nomination process contains the requirements to consider National Guard and Reserve officers for assignment to commands and other senior joint and service positions at all combatant command and other senior joint and service positions throughout the command and staff structure.

4. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the commander, U.S. Northern Command, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, and the Chief, national Guard Bureau:

a. Draft an executive order establishing a Council of Governors to advise the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security on homeland security issues, matters involving the National Guard of the various states, and other matters of mutual interest.

b. Submit an annual report to Congress describing those civil support requirements generated by the Secretary of Homeland Security and those validated as well as executed by the respective Secretaries of the Military Departments.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

PROMOTIONAL VIDEO

1. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, in 2004, you participated in a promotional video for the Christian Embassy (CE) that featured senior military and civilian defense officials and was filmed inside the Pentagon. What was your understanding as to the audience for whom this video was intended?

Mr. Geren. The CE is one of the many religious groups of various faiths that provide programs and services to the civilian and military personnel in the Pentagon. During my tenure in Congress and my first 2 years in the Pentagon, I participated in the CE programs. The programs are provided free of charge to participants. I was asked by a member of the CE staff to record a statement to the supporters who sponsor the CE programs speaking to the value of the program and thanking them for their support. I understood the audience to be the people who made the various programs possible. I was surprised to learn it was put on the internet and had distribution broader than the people who supported the CE programs. It was intended as a message of thanks to the people who made the work of the CE possible. When I learned it had been posted on a Web site (2 years after it was recorded) I requested that it be removed and it was.

2. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, do you believe that it was appropriate for Department of Defense (DOD) officials to permit the filming of this video inside the Pentagon? If not, do you believe that it was appropriate for you to participate in the video?

Mr. Geren. I understood my participation to serve to thank the people who made the CE programs in the Pentagon possible. As the programs are publicly advertised and held in the Pentagon, the same as programs for other faiths, it did not occur to me that an expression of gratitude to the sponsors and supporters was inappropriate. I recognize that I should not use my position in the Department to advance fund-raising efforts by nonprofits. Filming should not be done in the Pentagon in a manner where the surroundings are identifiable and could be perceived as official endorsement by the Department. At the time, it did not seem inappropriate, however, knowing what I know now and considering my position today I would decline to be interviewed.

3. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, do you believe that it would be appropriate for you to participate in such a video as Secretary of the Army or Acting Secretary of the Army?

Mr. Geren. No. It would not be appropriate to use my position in DOD to endorse any other organization other than the Combined Federal Campaign (CFC), Army Emergency Relief, and those organizations listed in the Joint Ethics Regulation.
tion 3–210, for which official support is authorized. Further, I recognize that even though I may endorse the CPC, it is inappropriate to use my position to endorse any individual participant.

4. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, what impact, if any, do you believe your participation in this video is likely to have on your credibility on issues regarding the role of religion in the military, should you be confirmed as Secretary?

Mr. Geren. I hope it will have no impact, but I cannot predict with certainty how the matter may be viewed or construed by others. I believe you will find that my record, both public and private, would demonstrate that I respect the rights, liberties, and beliefs of others. I assure you that, if confirmed, I will conduct the responsibilities of this office fully respectful of the religious beliefs of all faiths, and of those who have no faith.

5. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, in your written responses to the advance policy questions regarding basing options to support the proposed growth of the Army, you state that there are no plans to use European basing options. This contradicts the Army’s notice of intent published in the Federal Register on May 16, 2007. This notice describes the Army’s proposed programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) for basing options to support the proposed growth of the Army, and specifically refers to bases outside the United States. Please clarify your written response to this question. Is the Army considering options to put any newly created units in Europe?

Mr. Geren. The PEIS is one of several tools used to assist decisionmakers. As required by the National Environmental Policy Act, the PEIS will analyze alternatives that are reasonable and realistic as we develop solutions to station the larger Army force. One of the alternatives will look at using existing infrastructure in order to properly analyze environmental impacts. However, our current strategy is based on the Global Defense Posture Review that calls for a more continental United States (CONUS)-based, joint and expeditionary Army.

6. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, is the Army considering options that would leave units in Europe that might otherwise have been relocated to the United States prior to the proposal to increase the size of the Army?

Mr. Geren. The Army is currently executing the Global Defense Posture Review which restations a number of Germany-based units to CONUS locations and is programmed to be completed by fiscal year 2011. The Army must, however, continue to assess the continually changing strategic environment so that it can support our National Security and Military Strategy and meet the combatant commanders’ requirements while fighting the global war on terror. For analytical assessments, this leaves all options open for consideration. At this time, there have been no recommendations or plans submitted by the Army to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) for stationing additional forces in Europe or to reverse previous decisions regarding the 2004 Global Defense Posture Review.

7. Senator Levin. Secretary Geren, your answer may not be the same to both questions, yet in either case, such actions, which your Federal Register notice states the Army is considering, would require the Army as a manner of prudent management to make these basing decisions before making any irrevocable decisions to return property to the German government. Is the Army going to make these basing decisions before turning over any property in Germany that might be needed to support the basing options described in the Army’s Federal Register notice?

Mr. Geren. DOD should not take irrevocable action to return property or move units from overseas before it has determined the CONUS locations for the new Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). Installations in Germany should be considered strategic assets and any action to return property to host nations must be carefully weighed against future strategic requirements and previous decisions.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED

SEAMLESS ADMINISTRATION TRANSITION

8. Senator Reed. Secretary Geren, administration changes are often times of discontinuity in Service programs, policies, and even personnel. These discontinuities could lead to a loss of critical capabilities while the Army is still heavily engaged
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. If confirmed, what do you plan to do to make the transition between administrations more seamless and having the least negative impact on Army capabilities, soldiers, and civilians?

Mr. GEREN. My goal is to do everything possible to make the transition to a new administration seamless and as least disruptive as possible for the Army. I will work with civilian and military leaders in the Army to plan and execute the transition in full cooperation with the representatives of the new administration. During a change in administration each Service has a presidential appointee from the previous administration in place during the transition of administrations for continuity. The Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army manages the political transition for the Army. She will work with the Director of the Army staff and the transition team of the incoming official to ensure a seamless transition for both the Army and the incoming official. The Director of the Army staff is enlisted to assist in collecting information papers from the Army staff to provide the incoming official, after confirmation, information they will require in their first 90 days in office. A travel schedule is also developed to get the incoming official to see and meet with Army installations. To aid in this transition, I will also make available all necessary records and files as well as make myself personally available to the transition team.

MANUFACTURING RESEARCH

9. Senator REED. Secretary Geren, if confirmed, how will you ensure that the Army's Manufacturing Technology program is effective in developing manufacturing technologies and processes that can increase the capability and reduce the costs of Army systems?

Mr. GEREN. The ability to efficiently manufacture technologically advanced material is essential to achieve our science and technology (S&T) strategy. I would sustain our efforts to synchronize manufacturing processes and new technology development. This increases the opportunities to accelerate technology transition into production and to provide enhanced capabilities to our soldiers. For mature technologies that are already fielded in systems, the manufacturing technology program seeks to develop improved components and or techniques to manufacture components to reduce production costs or sustainment costs.

10. Senator REED. Secretary Geren, how will you work to ensure that these innovative manufacturing processes are widely distributed and adopted throughout the defense industrial base?

Mr. GEREN. I will support continued industry collaboration and information sharing about innovative manufacturing technology processes to promote industry-wide understanding and implementation of advanced techniques to reduce acquisition and sustainment costs of Army systems.

ARMY UNIVERSITY RESEARCH PROGRAMS

11. Senator REED. Secretary Geren, if confirmed, how will you determine what is the appropriate level of investment for the Army in university research programs that develop next generation combat capabilities while training the next generation of engineers, scientists, and technology leaders?

Mr. GEREN. The Army's S&T investment portfolio seeks balance across the three budget activities of basic research (18 percent), applied research (40 percent), and technology development (42 percent) to transform new understanding into enabling technology for warfighting capability. We believe this to be an appropriate balance to execute our S&T strategy that seeks to provide near-term solutions to warfighter needs today while simultaneously pursuing research that will enable brand new or perhaps unforeseen technology applications in the mid- and far-term. We invest roughly 18 percent of the requested S&T budget or over $300 million a year into basic research. Of that nearly 70 percent is provided to universities. Despite many competing demands for resources to engage in the global war on terrorism we have been able to sustain roughly this level of research funding since the beginning of the decade. Army research funding has been sufficient to capitalize on new opportunities in nanoscience and biosciences as well as advanced simulations to enable technology in new types of materials for soldier protection, situational awareness, and sustainment. It is always challenging to determine an optimum amount in any area of investment; however, based upon our experience we think that the research investment levels are appropriate to the total investment in research and development at $10.6 billion in the President's budget request for fiscal year 2008.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

TROOP MAIL DELIVERY

12. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, as we discussed during your hearing, the Army Times last week reported on the massive backlog of mail delivery at Walter Reed. According to the article, the backlog was the fault of a contract employee who held onto mail for individuals who he was unable to locate. You indicated that you have not yet verified whether this problem is unique to Walter Reed, and is not occurring at our other medical centers. Would you please check to see if this is an isolated instance, and notify us of your findings when you are done?

Mr. Geren. The incident at Walter Reed was an isolated event. I directed an assessment of the 10 most populated medical hold mail facilities for Wounded Warrior Transition Units and all 10 facilities received a satisfactory rating.

13. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, in 2004, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that the Secretary of Defense develop and implement an action plan based on lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to resolve issues with mail delivery to the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. The GAO report was report number GAO–04–084, titled, “Operation Iraqi Freedom Longstanding Problems Hampering Mail Delivery Need to Be Resolved,” dated April 2004. DOD, in its formal review of this report, concurred with GAO’s recommendations and was, at the time, taking steps to implement them. During your confirmation hearing, I asked you if you knew whether DOD had completed the actions recommended in the GAO report, and if any surveys of the troops have been conducted to see if their satisfaction with the mail service has improved. You indicated that you did not know, but would check into it and find out. Would you please inform us of your findings?

Mr. Geren. DOD has implemented the recommendations for executive action as specified in the GAO report. Currently, the primary method of measuring our quality assurance of mail service provided is through the DOD Interactive Customer Evaluation system (ICE). This is a Web-based customer survey available to all DOD employees to submit complaints or comments on a variety of issues, including the postal service. Currently, neither ICE nor installation commanders have generated any negative reports back to the Military Postal Service Agency. The U.S. Army Military Postal Service Agency is committed to providing the highest quality of service in support of all servicemembers deployed around the world.

Stryker Training

14. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, as you may know, the Army has agreed to limit training necessary to prepare the 25th Infantry Division’s 2nd BCT to fight in Iraq as a Stryker Combat unit. Based on the Army’s own assessment of its needs, it is my understanding that five training programs, four at Schofield Barracks and one at the Big Island’s Pohakuloa Training area, were allowed to continue. Do you believe that the more limited training program outlined by the Army will afford Hawaii’s Stryker Brigade the training necessary to fulfill their mission requirements? If your answer is no, do you anticipate that the Army will need to transfer the Stryker Brigade training activities currently conducted in Hawaii to an alternate location?

Mr. Geren. The limitations on training of the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) were due to litigation over the environmental impact statement and the Army’s decision to transform the 2–25 to a SBCT in Hawaii. The litigation resulted in the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. District Court in Hawaii placing temporary injunctions on this transformation and training until the Army completes a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement. The Army then outlined an extensive training program, consisting of live fire and non-live fire training tasks, necessary to transform 2–25 SBCT and prepare it for deployment to Iraq later this year. In its Interim Injunction Order, the U.S. District Court allowed the Army to proceed with a limited training program, as well as the completion of the Stryker equipment fielding process.

What you refer to as the five training programs the Court allowed the Army to proceed with are actually five Stryker-related construction projects, not training programs. Three of these construction projects are training ranges, one is the Stryker motor pool and one is the multiple deployment facility. These are the projects the Army identified as being critical to preparing 2–25 SBCT for its deployment.

The training of 2–25 SBCT in Hawaii has been conducted within the limits of the injunction. It will be supplemented with training at the Southern California Logis-
tics Area in August which is necessitated by the scope of the injunction. This training, in conjunction with training in September to be conducted at the National Training Center in California, will ensure the unit is combat-ready when it arrives in Iraq.

The Army must retain the ability to train Pacific-based units on Hawaii, including the Hawaii-based Stryker brigade. Our units in Hawaii provide critical support to the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. The unit must be prepared to respond to quick reaction contingencies within the Pacific. To do this, units stationed in Hawaii require the capability to train in Hawaii to ensure they are ready for deployment, without the lengthy notification and off-island training periods afforded to us in our support of OIF. This training capability is particularly essential for our company level units and leaders.

15. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Geren, has the Army’s Environmental Command established a timeline for the completion of the court ordered supplemental environmental impact statement?

Mr. GEREN. Yes. The supplemental environmental impact statement is scheduled for completion by November 5, 2007, with a record of decision by December 5, 2007, which then completes the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process.

NATIONAL GUARD EQUIPMENT

16. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Geren, one of the concerns that is being expressed by many States today is the shortage of equipment for National Guard, and the potential that equipment shortages may make it difficult for the Army National Guard (ARNG) to respond effectively to any disasters that may occur. Most National Guard units were not fully equipped before the Iraq War, and the equipment shortages have been made more severe by the Guard deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. The problem is exacerbated for Hawaii (and probably Alaska, too) because of the physical separation from the rest of the States making it difficult for neighboring States to provide assistance in the event of a disaster. Has the National Guard developed plans by which they can rapidly share equipment between neighboring States during a disaster until such time as equipment resets can be completed? In particular, are there plans in place that would provide rapid assistance to more remote locations, such as Hawaii, in the event of a disaster that overwhelms the remaining capabilities of the Hawaii National Guard? If not, will you, if confirmed, ensure that plans are made for such a contingency?

Mr. GEREN. There are several plans in place to augment the military equipment of the Hawaii and Alaska National Guard as needed in response to a homeland security event. National Guard Regulation 500–3, Response Management Plan, for Civil Support Team (CST) responses, outlines the plan to share CSTs among States. All States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands are participants in Emergency Management Assistance Compact system (Guam is not). Every State also makes more specific agreements with surrounding States in various forms for support in the event of a natural or man made disaster, as part of their emergency response planning process. Hawaii and Guam have agreements in place with U.S. Army Pacific for Active-Duty support during hurricanes. The Active Army and Army Reserve have identified military equipment that could go to each State as requested. We expect that these plans will be most effective in a predictable scenario. Sharing equipment, particularly over the long distances to Alaska and Hawaii, costs time. A scenario that arrives without warning or multiple homeland security events will strain this plan. This is why the Army plans to invest $21 billion in restocking National Guard equipment before the end of the Future Years Defense Plan, which will restore the percentage of National Guard domestic equipment at the nearly pre-September 11 level.

DEPLETED URANIUM

17. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Geren, on June 13, 2007, the Honolulu Weekly published an article discussing depleted uranium (DU) issues in Hawaii. As you may already know, a number of spotting rounds that contained DU were found at Schofield Barracks while construction was being performed for the Stryker Brigade. What is troubling about the article is that it discusses how the Army has been unresponsive to the concerns of local residents on this issue. This is of great concern for me as it affects the safety of the community. Has the Army ever stored DU munitions or any other form of DU anywhere in Hawaii or the surrounding waters? If so, what is the current status of these facilities?
Mr. Geren. Let me first assure you that public safety is our first and foremost concern. Our dedication to responsiveness and the protection of public health have shaped our actions since we discovered DU fragments from the M101 spotting round.

We first learned that DU was used at Schofield Barracks in the summer of 2005, when fragments from M101 spotting rounds for the Davy Crockett weapon system were discovered during range modernization efforts. Until this discovery, we were not aware that this formerly classified weapon system had been used in training on Hawaii. As soon as we became aware of the DU, we provided information about the potential effects of DU to the command for distribution and began archival research to determine the source and extent of the M101's use in Hawaii. We have learned that 714 M101 spotting rounds, containing 6.7 oz each of DU, were shipped to Hawaii in April 1962.

Although there is no record that these munitions were used at Schofield Barracks, the presence of the DU fragments from the M101 spotting round indicates that training with this round was conducted on this range during the mid-1960s. From our archival research, we also learned that the range footprints of the Makua Military Reservation and the Pohakuloa Training Area would accommodate training with this munition. As you may be aware from recent articles in Hawaii's press, we have now conducted a scoping survey to determine if the M101 spotting rounds were also used at these ranges. Our survey confirmed the presence of DU fragments at the Pohakuloa Training Area, but was inconclusive at the Makua Military Reservation because of heavy vegetation in the likely impact area, if the M101 had in fact been used at Makua. We have also initiated a more detailed survey of Schofield Barracks' range and determined that further investigation is required for this range and the Pohakuloa Training Area, where DU was determined present.

We have been working, and continue to work, with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Hawaii State Department of Health to conduct the required investigations. We will continue this collaborative effort as we evaluate the survey's results and determine the response required to ensure the protection of human health and the environment from the potential effects of DU. Additionally, we are coordinating our efforts with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, to obtain their input on the medical aspects of our efforts. We have initiated dialog with senior members of the State Legislature and the Governor's Office to inform them of our plans. Further, we have initiated a public outreach effort to provide updates to the public through the media and develop other venues to ensure the widest dissemination of information on the subject and our ongoing efforts to address DU.

Although the DU present at the impact areas on Schofield Barracks' ranges and the Pohakuloa Training Area ranges does not present a hazard to the public, we understand that it is a topic of significant interest to the public and will ensure that our actions in response to the DU are carried out in a transparent way.

18. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, if they still have DU stored in them, have the facilities been licensed by the NRC for DU storage?

Mr. Geren. We are not storing DU munitions in Hawaii and have no plans to do so. To our knowledge, the only DU present in Hawaii from munitions-related activities consists of fragments from training conducted between 1962 and 1968 using the M101 spotting round for the Davy Crockett weapon system. We are currently working with the NRC and the Hawaii State Department of Health to: (a) complete a detailed survey of Schofield Barracks' range; (b) determine the actions required, now that our scoping survey has verified the presence of DU fragments on the Pohakuloa Training Area; and (c) decide what approach will be taken to address the Makua Military Reservation where overgrowth and explosive hazards precluded the conduct of a scoping study. We will continue this collaborative effort as we evaluate the results of our completed surveys, and determine the response required to ensure the protection of human health and the environment from the potential effects of DU.

If required to support our response action, we will obtain an appropriate license from the NRC.

19. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, has the Army ever used DU for any purpose (i.e., for munitions or any other purpose) anywhere in Hawaii or the surrounding waters? If so, where?

Mr. Geren. We have found records indicating 714 M101 spotting rounds containing DU, for the Davy Crockett weapons system, were shipped to Hawaii in 1962. We have identified DU fragments from these munitions on both Schofield Barracks' range complex and the Pohakuloa Training Area. While we have evidence to indicate that certain areas within the Makua Military Reservation were also able to ac-
commodate training with the M101 spotting round, overgrowth and explosive haz-
ards precluded our ability to verify safely whether DU fragments are also present
in these areas.

To the best of our knowledge, no other Army weapon systems that use DU muni-
tions have been fired at PTA. Although the Army has several current systems capa-
bile of firing DU munitions, these munitions are not used in Hawaii. A Nuclear Reg-
ulatory License is required to fire such munitions. The Army does not have such
a license and has no plans for activities in Hawaii that would require such an au-
thorization.

20. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, if so, what has been done to ensure the safe-
ty of citizens from potential exposure to DU?

Mr. Geren. Once we became aware that DU was present on Schofield Barracks' range, we initiated monitoring for DU in surface water runoff. Although trace ura-

nium is present, it is well within Environment Protection Agency (EPA) safe drink-
ing water standards. Until further review, we are unable to determine whether the trace uranium found is naturally occurring uranium or manmade (DU). When our archival research indicated that certain areas within both the Makua Military Res-

ervation and Pohakuloa Training Area could have supported firing of the M101 spotting round, we initiated action to conduct a scoping study of these areas to de-
termine whether it was also used in those areas.

We are currently working with the NRC and the Hawaii State Department of Health to: (a) complete a detail survey of Schofield Barracks' range; (b) determine the actions required, now that our scoping survey has verified the presence of DU fragments on the Pohakuloa Training Area; and (c) decide what approach will be taken to address the Makua Military Reservation where overgrowth and explosive hazards precluded the conduct of a scoping study. We will continue this collabo-
rative effort as we evaluate the results and determine the response required to en-
sure the protection of human health and the environment from the potential effects
of DU.

Additionally, we are coordinating our efforts with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to obtain their input on the medical aspects of our efforts. We have initiated dialog with senior members of the State Legislature and the Governor's Office to inform them of our plans. Further, we have initiated a public outreach effort to provide updates to the public through the media and develop other venues to en-
sure the widest dissemination of information on the subject and our ongoing efforts to address DU.

21. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, has the Army taken any steps to address
the concerns of the local residents cited in the article? If not, why not?

Mr. Geren. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Environment, Safety,
and Occupational Health, Mr. Tad Davis, is currently engaged in an outreach plan
with local media through print, radio, and internet. Secretary Davis has briefed
staff from the offices of Senators Inouye and Akaka, Representatives Abercrombie
and Hirono, State legislators, and other stakeholders to outline the Army's four-
point plan regarding DU in Hawaii.

The Army's four-point plan to address DU is as follows:

(1) We have and will continue to provide all information obtained to the
Hawaii State Department of Health in a timely manner.

(2) The State has been, and will remain, a partner in the planning and
execution of our extensive survey and monitoring effort this summer to ad-
dress Schofield Barracks' range, Makua Military Reservation, and
Pohakuloa Training Area.

(3) The State will be a partner in the planning and execution of a mutu-
ally agreed upon response.

(4) The Army will provide any necessary training to State participants.

On August 29, 2007, we assembled a panel of experts, from every functional area
involved in the survey process, including representatives from a variety of Army
agencies, the State of Hawaii Department of Health, the NRC, the Agency for Toxic
Substances and Disease Registry, and Cabrera Services, the contractor performing
the survey, and conducted a press conference at Schofield Barracks' range area with
all major media outlets to explain our survey process, demonstrate the technology
used to detect DU, and respond to questions.

Our plan is to provide all information we obtained about DU's use in Hawaii to
the Hawaii State Department of Health and the NRC, to work with these agencies
to conduct the necessary investigations, and to include these agencies in execution
of any response necessary to ensure the protection of human health and the environment. In addition, we will provide any necessary training to our State partners.

22. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Geren, is the Army planning to conduct an outreach to the local citizens to address their concerns and to explain what the Army is doing about them? If not, why not?

Mr. Geren. We are committed to ensuring an open and collaborative approach with the people of Hawaii as we seek to address their concerns regarding the presence of DU. We will continue to reach out to Hawaii’s legislators, press, and public health organizations as we work with the NRC and the Hawaii State Department of Health to determine the response necessary to ensure the protection of human health and the environment from the potential effects of DU. Our August 29, 2007, press conference demonstrated our commitment.

LAND ACQUISITION

23. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Geren, on June 21, 2007, USA Today published an article about the Army’s need to acquire significant amounts of land to be able to support combat training with advanced combat technology. The article states that the Army currently uses about 7 million acres on 102 training sites and ranges across the country, and needs to expand those training sites by 70 percent over the next 4 years. This means that the Army will be looking to purchase another 4.9 million acres by 2011. The article also states that “Proposals already underway in California, Colorado, and Hawaii would add 540,000 acres.” How much total property is the Army looking to acquire in Hawaii?

Mr. Geren. The USA Today article contained factual errors. The Army has a 5 million acre doctrinal training land shortfall worldwide; however, we are not pursuing that amount of land for acquisition. Land acquisition is a relatively small (albeit important) part of the Army’s overall effort to meet its training land requirements. The Army plans to meet its training land shortfall mainly through focused management to maximize existing land holdings, buffering through partnerships, utilization of other Federal lands where possible, and greater reliance on simulators.

The Army already expanded the Pohakuloa Training Area, on the island of Hawaii, and Schofield Barracks, on the island of Oahu, for a total of 26,000 additional acres. This land acquisition, referenced in the USA Today article, is complete and at this time, there are no plans for additional land acquisition in Hawaii.

24. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Geren, what locations is the Army considering for making these acquisitions?

Mr. Geren. In 2003, Headquarters, Department of the Army G–3, approved the Range and Training Land Strategy (RTLS). The purpose of the RTLS is to address the increasing land deficit facing the Army. The RTLS serves as the mechanism to prioritize Army training land investment, and helps to optimize the use of all Army range and training land assets. The RTLS provides a long-range plan for the Army to provide the best range infrastructure and training land to units.

The RTLS has five phases. The first phase was to inventory current Army training assets. The inventory was completed in 2002 and covered nearly 500 Active and Reserve component installations and training locations. The second phase examined land values, parcel ownership, environmental constraints, environmental requirements, and population trends from public records to identify opportunities for training land acquisition and buffering. The third phase analyzed available land data to recommend short-term and long-term opportunities based on Army training priorities. The RTLS process ensures that Army planners continually reevaluate against the Army Campaign Plan (ACP), so that any investment decisions will match stationing changes. The fourth phase was the establishment of planning objectives and the identification of installations where land acquisition supports the ACP. The key to this phase was to ensure that any land acquisition effort was feasible, affordable, and manageable in terms of environmental restrictions. Due to the timing of this fourth phase, the Army was able to inform base realignment and closure stationing recommendations with respect to training land, indicating where there is potential to mitigate land deficits through long-term investment and management. The fifth and final phase was to evaluate public attitudes and provide outreach support to specific land acquisitions.

The deliberate phases of the RTLS provide the framework for the Army to select the most appropriate course of action to address training land shortfalls at specific Army installations. The options that the Army can pursue include focused manage-
ment to maximize existing land holdings, buffering through partnerships, utilization of other Federal lands where possible, and land acquisition.

In response to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, section 2827(c), the Army has submitted a Report to Congress on Potential Expansion of Army Operational Ranges. In this document, the Army provides details concerning training requirements for Army units and the underlying reasons for changes to unit training requirements for land and alternatives to meet training land shortfalls.

As stated previously, the Army is not looking at acquiring additional land in Hawaii. In California, the Army is currently acquiring additional training and mitigation land around the National Training Center. Additionally, the Army has received approval from the Secretary of Defense to pursue up to 418,000 acres of additional training land to expand PCMS in Colorado, and the Army is working closely with Congress to improve that land acquisition strategy. If additional acquisition elsewhere is deemed necessary, the Army would submit a waiver to DOD land acquisition moratorium, and if approved by OSD, work with Congress and the public to explain the rationale and proceed as required by law and regulation.

25. Senator A KAKA. Secretary Geren, has the Army begun any outreach to the local population to engage and inform them about the Army’s plans? If not, will the Army be doing so in the near future? If not, why not?

Mr. Geren. The Army works hard to effectively communicate with its neighbors about our plans. When we have significant new actions, the NEPA process becomes the structured format for involving the community and allowing a process for questions and comments.

In addition to the formal public involvement process driven by NEPA, the Army has developed a Sustainable Range Program (SRP) Outreach and Communication Campaign to improve public support and the Army’s understanding of public concerns related to live training. The Campaign provides installations with a strategy to easily and effectively communicate with the public regarding live fire training and encroachment challenges. A training support package has been designed as a part of the SRP Outreach and Communication Campaign to provide installation staff with tools to help communicate with stakeholders (government and non-government) and the local community on sustainable range issues.

The Army is also working with OSD to establish positions which support our local commanders with community outreach capabilities. These positions will build on the expertise of the Public Affairs Community, but go beyond our focus on media outlets to create a more enduring relationship with people and organizations.

MEASURING SUCCESS

26. Senator A KAKA. Secretary Geren, DOD has been providing quarterly briefings to Congress on measuring our success in Iraq. One of the parts of the report discusses which provinces have been turned over to the Iraqi Government for full Iraqi control, including provincial security. One of the seven provinces which have been turned over to Iraqi control is the Maysan Province, which the Iraqis took over on April 18, 2007. According to DOD, several other provinces are close to meeting the criteria necessary for “security independence.” During the last week, British and Iraqi forces conducted raids in Amara in the Maysan province. The British forces did much more than provide logistical support. They were, in fact, part of the operational force. Twenty people, characterized as militants, insurgents, Shiite militiamen, and terrorists in different media reports, were killed. It does not seem like the Iraqis have truly obtained security independence in Maysan province if every time they deal with internal security issues, they need coalition forces to assist. For measures of success to be useful, they must be meaningful. Do you believe that the measure of turning over provincial security to the Iraqis is a meaningful measure of success? If so, why?

Mr. Geren. Sir, I appreciate your question; however, it would be more appropriately addressed by the combatant commander in Iraq.

DEPLOYMENT HEALTH CLINICAL CENTER AT WALTER REED

27. Senator A KAKA. Secretary Geren, according to the June 18, 2007, article on Walter Reed in the Washington Post, the Deployment Health Clinical Center (DHCC) at Walter Reed is one of the best treatment centers for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) in the country. Unfortunately, it is small and can only handle about 65 patients a year. The article rightly points out that this facility should
be expanded given the patient workload coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, the article says that the DHCC was forced to give up newly renovated quarters in March and was placed in temporary space one-third the size to make room for a Soldier and Family Assistance Center. Given that psychological injuries currently outnumber physical injuries to our troops by a factor of 40-to-3, what message does reducing the space for the DHCC, and failing to expand the program of treatment offered by the DHCC, give the troops who have psychological injuries?

Mr. GEREN. While the care DHCC is offering for PTSD is a critical component of the spectrum of care for soldiers with war-related PTSD, only 5 percent of affected soldiers require this level of care, are clinically appropriate for it, and consent to participate. This translates to about 1 percent of all Walter Reed psychiatric patients. This suggests that while there may be a role for expansion of DHCC’s program to other sites, it is not the solution for the majority of soldiers requiring psychiatric treatment.

It is true that the DHCC was moved to make room for the newly expanded Soldier and Family Assistance Center. Their current location is temporary in order to accommodate expanded services and much needed renovation on a campus where space is at a premium. The command at Walter Reed is comprehensively addressing space requirements to best serve the needs of patients, families, and staff. This is part of the Army’s commitment to ensuring all soldiers receive a level of medical care and support services commensurate with the quality of their service. Toward that end, we are working closely with DOD to establish a National Center of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury. The mission of the Center will be to coordinate Service programs for TBI and psychological health by establishing best practices, research, and education.

In addition, this summer the Army launched an unprecedented “leader-teach” program designed to raise awareness, promote treatment, and reduce the stigma associated with seeking behavioral health care. The leader-teach training program involves leaders teaching their soldiers in a small-unit environment about the signs and symptoms of PTSD and mild TBI. General Casey kicked off the training at the 4-star conference on 22 June 2007. All soldiers in the Army—both Active and Reserve component—are required to receive this important face-to-face training over the next 90 days.

28. Senator AKAIA. Secretary Geren, how do doctors at Walter Reed justify placing some PTSD patients in the DHCC while others receive less effective treatment (i.e., group therapy)?

Mr. GEREN. WRAMC is totally committed to the proper treatment of soldiers with combat-related illnesses such as PTSD. All casualties are screened for the presence of trauma-related illness. Those patients for whom illnesses like PTSD are identified receive a thorough, comprehensive diagnostic evaluation and treatment plan. The entire spectrum of treatments is considered, including all those recommended by the National Center for PTSD Studies, the American Psychiatric Association, and the VA/DOD Clinical Practice Guideline for the management of Post-Traumatic Stress outlined below:

- Medication therapies (SRI, anxiolytics, sleep aids, etc.)
- Individual therapies (cognitive therapy, exposure therapy, eye movement desensitization and reprocessing, stress inoculation training)
- Group therapies (supportive, psychodynamic, and cognitive with a trauma focus)
- Adjunctive therapies (OT, art therapy, rec therapy, relaxation training, etc.)
- Clinical outcomes studies have proven the effectiveness of our care.

The therapies offered often include group therapies as an effective component of an overall treatment program. No patients are treated with group therapy to the exclusion of other effective therapies. Effective treatment is patient-centric and WRAMC strives to place all soldiers in the treatment regimen most appropriate to each soldier’s needs.

The Specialized Care Program offered by DHCC is an additional level of care that is part of a spectrum of care that is required for a small percentage of the more highly symptomatic patients. Not all patients require this level of intensity for a full recovery, just as all patients with any illness do not require hospitalization or an intensive care unit to recover from their illness.

In an effort to better address and coordinate care for PTSD, the Army is working closely with DOD to establish a National Center of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury. The mission of the center will be to coordinate Services programs for TBI and Psychological Health by establishing best practices,
from the battlefield to the hospital; from the establishment of the Joint Patient Tracking Application to track wounded warriors to the development of a sustainable system where injured and ill soldiers are medically treated most up-to-date. Experts are collaborating with the National Center for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and with behavioral health staff and initiating more screening for TBI. We also regularly collaborate with the National Center for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and with other experts in the civilian world to ensure that our treatment methods are the best.

Privacy of medical information and related legal considerations preclude a detailed account of the specifics of PFC Calloway’s health care at DHCC. We do have some extraordinarily complex patients. All are evaluated and offered the full spectrum of treatment recommendations for their presenting symptoms. In some cases, patients refuse treatment or fail to comply with treatment recommendations, which makes it difficult to keep them in a structured treatment program. DHCC never uses availability, access, or administration of clinical treatment for disciplinary or punitive reasons. To use clinical treatment in this way under any circumstances is unethical, particularly for individuals with mental or cognitive disabilities. We always try to be flexible and adaptive to meet the individual patient’s needs. We consistently provide the best treatment possible to our troops suffering from PTSD or Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). We are constantly striving to improve. We are hiring more behavioral health staff and initiating more screening for TBI. We also regularly collaborate with the National Center for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and with other experts in the civilian world to ensure that our treatment methods are the most up-to-date.

30. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, you stated in your advance policy question responses that “We must not shrink from our responsibility as a Nation to care for those who have become ill, injured, or wounded in the service of our Nation—and we must do better for those suffering from PTSD and TBI.” I know that all of the members of this committee agree with you on that point. We know that the Army has been taking corrective actions over the past couple of months to eliminate the deficiencies that were identified by the Washington Post back in February. My concern is that some of the corrective actions may create new problems. For instance, the DHCC was forced to move out of newly renovated facilities in March and into a temporary space one-third the size to make room for the new Soldier and Family Assistance Center. The DHCC is one of the best PTSD treatment centers in the country. I am concerned that its effectiveness could be reduced by this move. What metrics are being used by the Army to measure the success of the corrective actions taken at Walter Reed and other Army medical treatment facilities? Mr. Geren. The Army Medical Action Plan (AMAP) is a phased effort designed to develop a sustainable system where injured and ill soldiers are medically treated and vocationally rehabilitated to prepare them for successful return to duty or transition to active citizenship. Phase 1 of the AMAP was completed on June 15, 2007, with the completion of 10 immediate fixes ranging from the establishment of Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) at Army Treatment Facilities in order to provide effective leadership and care management of warriors in transition to implementation Army-wide of the Joint Patient Tracking Application to track wounded warriors from the battlefield to the hospital; from the establishment of the Patient Care
Triad of physician, nurse, and squad leader to coordinate the care of every warrior in transition to the activation of Reserve component lawyers and paralegals to provide legal advocacy for warriors undergoing the Physical Evaluation Board process.

We have now entered Phase 2 of the AMAP with new policies and standards of excellence in place. The focus has shifted to supporting our newly-formed WTUs. The performance measures are being finalized to ensure that a clear and common understanding exists Army-wide of these new policies and standards, and the resources needed for continued success. Beginning July 23, 2007, these performance measures will begin to be evaluated at all locations throughout the Army with WTUs. The capability to measure and track compliance with all the requirements of the AMAP has been developed and will be important as the Army medical department and Army leadership continues to institutionalize the AMAP. To this end, measurable outcomes have been developed for each action and will be used to identify successes, as well as to identify areas needing specific attention.

31. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, what have the metrics shown so far?

Mr. Geren. The metrics of greatest concern at this time are those that track timeliness of completion of AMAP tasks, as specified in Department of the Army Execution Order (EXORD) 118–07, Healing Warriors. The first order of business is to staff the Warrior Transition Units (WTUs) with nurses, physicians, and squad leaders to work as a team (referred to as a Triad in the AMAP) that works directly with warriors in transition and their families. Command and control personnel have already been assigned to all 35 WTUs and efforts to staff these units to attain a minimum of 50 percent strength by September 3, 2007, to Initial Operational Capability (IOC) are proceeding. Currently, eight WTUs are staffed at essentially the 90 percent level necessary to attain full operational capability (set in the EXORD to be completed for all WTUs by January 1, 2008). Additionally, 11 WTUs are staffed at greater than 50 percent strength for a combined total of 19 of 35 units (54 percent) already at the level required by September 3, 2007. Efforts continue to staff the remaining 16 WTUs to accomplish IOC. Currently being finalized are the performance standards, checklists, and tracking capability to be utilized when teams begin their staff assistance visits as part of Phase 3 of the EXORD, beginning July 23, 2007. The initial intent of these visits and the results obtained is to provide both Army Treatment Facility and WTU unit commanders an initial "yardstick" by which to measure success to date in implementing the AMAP. Additionally, these tracking reports will provide senior leadership a complete yet concise means of identifying both successes and shortcomings. This tracking capability will also be valuable in the long-term to monitor ongoing operations in support of the AMAP.

STRATEGIC RESERVE

32. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, you stated in your advance policy question responses that "As we have increasingly utilized the National Guard at home and overseas, it has become clear that the National Guard must be organized, trained, and equipped to serve as an integral part of our operational force, not a 'Strategic Reserve.' " Do you believe that a "Strategic Reserve" of troops is no longer needed by the United States? If so, why? If not, who will serve as our Strategic Reserve now that the National Guard and Reserves are part of our operational force?

Mr. Geren. The geostrategic environment of persistent conflict requires that our Army be responsive and flexible, and able to meet the demands of an expeditionary force. We no longer have the luxury of extended time periods for training after mobilization. Additionally, QDR 2006 directed the Army to operationalize the Reserve components. As such, we have implemented the "train-alert-deploy" model, to ensure that Reserve units are ready prior to mobilization. Using this model, Reserve units now provide a greater ability to support Homeland and contingency requirements.

The Army now uses the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, a cyclic training and readiness process, which synchronizes strategic planning, prioritization, and resourcing. ARFORGEN fields available forces, Active or Reserve, to meet global demands and will prepare forces in the ready pool to deploy to meet any contingency requirements. With the Reserve component operating in the ARFORGEN model—1:4, we would in effect have a Strategic Reserve in the Reserve component units who are not in the ready pool, but would be available if full mobilization were necessary. With ARFORGEN and sufficient and timely funding, the Army will continue to field the best led, equipped, manned, and trained cohesive units for deployment at home and abroad.
EXPANDING THE WAR ON TERRORISM

33. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, according to a recent State Department report, terrorists are changing their tactics. Specifically, the report states that early terrorist attacks were largely expeditionary, with terrorists selected and trained in one country, then secretly inserted into the target country to conduct their attack. The report further states that the new trend is toward guerrilla terrorism, where the terrorist team is grown close to its target, using target country nationals. Finally, the report states that this trend is a shift in the nature of terrorism, from traditional international terrorism into a new form of transnational, non-state warfare that resembles a form of global insurgency. This represents a new era of warfare. This report suggests to me that the battlefield for the war on terror is no longer limited to Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, while our military is tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the terrorists are expanding the battlefield throughout the world. How do you think the change in terrorist strategy should affect how we shape our military to deal with the security issues of the 21st century?

Mr. Geren. The future strategic environment is one of persistent conflict, and requires an Army with the capabilities and capacities to meet these emerging challenges. For the foreseeable future, we will likely face threats from state and non-state actors/proxies who will seek to acquire and employ WMD, and challenge our advantages in space and cyberspace. The Army is restoring depth and building full spectrum capable forces while also improving our capabilities and capacities to conduct irregular warfare and to execute the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) strategy, including its force planning construct. Our forces are now conducting long-term counterinsurgency/irregular warfare (COIN/IW) operations, building partner capacity (BPC), and providing capabilities to protect the Homeland. We are improving our mobility, including high-speed sealift. We are pursuing increased intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and C4I interoperability (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence). We have also provided for increased Army Special Operations Forces (SOF) and improving the General Purpose Forces (GPF) expeditionary capabilities, development of language and cultural awareness, and leader development. Even when the Army is task organized for non-lethal operations such as building partner capacity, we are able to achieve escalation dominance when required. We will continue our efforts to ensure that Army forces are trained and ready through the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model and modular force conversions.

34. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, since September 11, the United States has relied heavily on our military for prosecuting the war on terror. Our invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq have placed a heavy toll on the readiness of our military, and on the ability of the National Guard to provide disaster relief at home. In your opinion, has the war in Iraq been an effective and efficient use of taxpayer resources in fighting the global war on terror?

Mr. Geren. In my view, the Army has responded to events of September 11 in an outstanding manner. The soldiers and families of our Army should be proud of their service and their accomplishments. We have the best led, trained, and equipped Army this Nation as ever produced. In this long war, our soldiers will continue to face many challenges and will continue to be prepared to answer the call to duty.

35. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, what do you see as the function of law enforcement in protecting our Nation against terrorism versus the function of the military?

Mr. Geren. The Posse Comitatus Act (title 18, U.S.C. section 1385) and DOD policy place limitations on direct involvement in law enforcement activities by military forces. Any deployment of DOD resources and domestic incident management actions during an actual or potential terrorist incident are conducted in coordination with the Department of Justice.

END STRENGTH INCREASE

36. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, in your responses to the advance policy questions, you stated that the Army will be able to meet its fiscal year 2007 increased end strength without increasing its recruiting targets for the fiscal year. You said this is because the Army uses retention and loss management tools to manage end strength. You further indicated that attrition is at record lows. What has changed between last fiscal year and the current fiscal year that will allow the Army to substantially grow in end strength with no increase in recruiting?
Mr. Geren. The Army has three levers at its disposal to manage strength: accessions, retention, and loss management. At the end of fiscal year 2006, we projected end strength of 513,000 for fiscal year 2007. This forecast included 80,000 accessions, 62,000 in retention, and 74,000 total losses, with a 6-month attrition holding at 12 percent. Additionally, total losses to date were approximately 2 percent lower than fiscal year 2005.

The current projection (as of end of month May 2007) is for a fiscal year 2007 end strength of 518,400 including stop loss. This increase is due to continued low attrition and a 5 percent increase in retention rate primarily due to the special expiration term of service bonuses currently offered. Additionally, more officers are being accessed into the Army Competitive Category.

As a result of these management actions, the Army will be able to increase its end strength without increasing recruiting.

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

37. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, in your responses to the advance policy questions, you stated that “no soldier will go into combat without the proper training and equipment.” In order to meet the heavier deployment schedule, has the Army reduced or modified in any way the training requirements necessary to qualify as being fully trained for deployment? If so, when and why was this done, and how was the training modified?

Mr. Geren. The Army remains committed to ensuring our soldiers are fully trained and ready to meet the challenges of the current operating environment. We continue to explore alternative training methods and strategies to provide the right training and education to our soldiers and meet commanders’ needs. Training has been modified at all levels based on lessons learned from Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

The Army significantly modified enlisted Initial Entry Training (IET) to include more night, urban, and convoy operations in a field environment; and weapons and combat survival training. Warrior Tasks and Battle Drills (WTBD) was introduced in 2004 and allows soldiers to execute what they have learned through simulated warfighting environments. Other training modifications for IET soldiers include the implementation of Combat Lifesaver and weapons immersion training.

All soldiers now conduct advanced rifle marksmanship training which provides the skills necessary to conduct short-range marksmanship in order to prepare them for the contemporary operating environment.

Another training initiative is convoy live fire exercises. These exercises are conducted in order to train soldiers on weapons safety while on vehicles, weapons orientation, identifying IEDs, react to IEDs, control fires, fire distribution, ammunition control, and build overall soldier confidence.

To accommodate units and their deployment schedules, the Army is making extensive use of mobile training teams (MTT) for the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course and several functional training courses. MTTs travel home station units instead of having soldiers relocate to separate training bases. This provides soldiers pre-deployment training without having to leave their families before or after deployment.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command is piloting a learning model focused on mid-grade professional military education with initial focus on the captains’ career course. The model leverages use of technology, Saturday training, fast tracking, and Guided Experiential Learning (GEL). GEL is the instructional design and delivery strategy which ensures training will be at least as effective as existing instruction despite a reduction in training time. The Sergeants Major Academy is also piloting the effectiveness of GEL.

38. Senator Akaka. Secretary Geren, has the Army made use of accelerated programs to speed troops, particularly new recruits, through training in time to meet unit deployment schedules? If so, how are these training programs used, how many troops have been trained through the accelerated program, and has the Army studied how soldiers who have undergone the accelerated training have performed in combat?

Mr. Geren. The Army has adjusted courses at all levels to accelerate training in response to operational unit demands for personnel. For enlisted initial entry soldiers, two programs have been piloted within the past year. The first, ability group batching, is a process that accelerates select soldiers through Advanced Individual Training (AIT). Soldiers chosen for accelerated training may display strengths or more experience and education and it allows them to move to designated units as
soon as they meet course standards. Ability group batching is being piloted at Forts Bliss, Jackson, and Lee. Fort Bliss accelerated one military occupational specialty (MOS) class by 2 weeks and graduated 35 soldiers through this program. Fort Jackson’s pilot accelerates 30 soldiers per class and reduces the course time from 12 weeks to 6 weeks. Fort Lee accelerated classes for 8 MOSs and to date has graduated 1,803 soldiers through this program. Ability group batching will not work with every MOS; MOSs with small numbers and infrequent starts will not benefit from this initiative. End of AIT course tests indicate these ability group batching graduates are as well trained as their due course counterparts.

The second acceleration program for enlisted initial entry soldiers is Assignment Oriented Training (AOT). AOT is a training approach used primarily in AIT for those MOSs that can be assigned to different echelons/types of units. Soldiers are trained using courses tailored to the equipment and skill sets required for the first unit of assignment. Each course trains only those critical tasks required to be performed by the soldier for the specific echelon unit and its operational unique equipment/systems. Four MOSs are currently conducting AOT training and the Army is currently assessing additional MOSs for this program.

Professional development training for noncommissioned officers and officers has been reduced through initiatives such as Saturday training and incorporating more technology-based instruction. Courses have been reduced in most cases by one-third of their original timeline. The Army continues to provide technically competent, fully trained and confident soldiers to the operational Army. Feedback during the most recent Warrior Task and Battle Drills review indicates operational units and veterans of OEF/OIF are satisfied with the quality of soldiers and leaders completing training.

39. Senator A KAKA. Secretary Geren, if the Army has studied the results of accelerated training, what were the results of the study?
Mr. G EREN. The Army is committed to providing operational units with trained and ready soldiers who can deploy, fight, and survive in today’s contemporary operating environment. The Army has not conducted an all-inclusive effort to evaluate the effects of accelerated training initiatives; however, there are several pilot programs on accelerated training. One of these was conducted on AOT. AOT is a training method in which soldiers are trained only on those critical tasks required to be performed by the soldier at his/her first assignment. In 2005, the TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC) completed Phase I of a study on AOT at the U.S. Army Signal Center and School. Results showed that, when assigned to correct units, AOT-trained soldiers arrived at units with the basics and were ready for unit training. TRAC begins the next phase of the study in October 2007.

Another pilot the Army is conducting is ability-group batching in AIT. End of course testing in AIT shows that these soldiers are as well-trained as other soldiers who did not go through the pilots. However, it is clear ability-group batching is not suitable for all military occupational specialties, especially low-density courses.

The Army Learning Model was analyzed at the July 2006 meeting of the Secretary of the Army’s Distributed Learning/Training Technology Subcommittee and at the August 2006 Science of Learning Workshop sponsored by the Army Research Institute. The model is being evaluated for two Captains Career Courses in fiscal years 2007–2008; one at the Field Artillery School and one at the Signal School. The TRADOC Analysis Center is conducting the evaluations and will brief interim results in January 2008.

TRADOC continually receives feedback from the operational Army to ensure institutional training meets their needs. This feedback from the field is continually derived through surveys, visits, lessons learned, and periodic assessments of training. Additionally, every school proponent ensures those soldiers graduating from accelerated training programs meet and complete all course requirements.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EVAN BAYH

ARMY UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

40. Senator B AYH. Secretary Geren, please describe the Army’s asset acquisition and operator training strategies for the Warrior unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program. Why did the Army end up selecting a model based on the MQ-1 Predator as opposed to developing a new platform?
Mr. G EREN.
Acquisition

The U.S. Army is adhering to the Integrated Acquisition Framework and DOD 5000 series for development of the Sky Warrior—Extended Range/Multi-Purpose (ER/MP) Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) capability. Asset Acquisition (Materiel Development) is based on the Operational Requirement Document (ORD) which was published and approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The ORD specifies the threshold and objective requirements of the ER/MP system technical parameters needed for the field Army as per the Mission Needs Summary and Operations and Support Concept. The Army Project Manager-Unmanned Aircraft Systems (PM–UAS) is charged with program management of the system and will continue to meet acquisition milestones, as per DOD 5000.2, throughout the program life cycle.

Operator Training

The U.S. Army will have one single enlisted MOS for Tactical UAS. The training course program of instruction will include a Common Core, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, Imagery, Air Vehicle and Payload operations, Simulator and Flight training, and culminates with Warrior drills and Capstone collective field training exercises. Students will be administered Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) examinations at the conclusion of the common core tasks to earn FAA certificates. Students will be provided 40 hours of flight simulation prior to their first flight of any UAS to ensure proper operations and techniques are soundly trained.

Selection Process

PM–UAS submitted a request for proposal (RFP) to industry in October 2004 via Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps). Offerors from industry provided proposals within the timeline to the Government in accordance with the RFP addressing technical, program management, past performance, and cost estimates. The Government conducted a Source Selection Evaluation Board with a multi-disciplined team in two phases: Evaluation of "paper" proposals to screen to ensure "Go/No-Go" criteria was met and areas were rated as specified in the Source Selection Plan; and, offerors conducted a Systems Capabilities Demonstration to show the Government current system capabilities and performance. At conclusion of the Source Selection proceedings, the Army's Source Selection Authority made decision in favor of General Atomics-ASI to be the Army's future ER/MP.

41. Senator BAYH. Secretary Geren, what advantages, if any, do you find inherent in using contractors and noncertified pilots as Warrior operators as opposed to the Air Force policy of using rated pilots?

Mr. GEREN. At present, the Army utilizes a combination of enlisted UAS MOS soldiers and contractors to operate our Warrior-A systems in Iraq. Our enlisted soldiers perform all Warrior-A cruise pilot functions and mission payload/sensor operations. Contractors purely land and take-off the air vehicle. However, the Army is in the process of training soldiers as take-off and landing pilots for the Warrior-A air vehicles. Upon deployment this fall, our Warrior-A platoon for CJTF–82, Afghanistan, will consist of pure military operations. Additionally, our Sky Warrior Program of Record UAS will include an automatic take-off and landing system, negating the requirement for take-off and landing trained military operators. The use of highly trained and qualified enlisted soldiers for Warrior-A and Sky Warrior UAS operations affords the Army a more efficient use of our force structure as 83 percent of the Army Aviation force structure are enlisted soldiers. Second, from a fiscal perspective, it is more cost effective to train existing enlisted soldiers to operate our UAS vice converting them to commissioned officers with the requisite officer training.

42. Senator BAYH. Secretary Geren, what disadvantages were taken into consideration before moving ahead with this proposal?

Mr. GEREN. To date, the Army has trained over 6,000 enlisted soldiers to operate our UAS. Most of these soldiers have completed one if not multiple combat tours, making them experts in the safe employment of UAS in support of tactical combat operations. Our UAS enlisted MOS retention and recruitment is on track. UAS MOS initial term reenlistment is 70 percent while the Army average is 50 percent. Midterm reenlistment for UAS MOSs is 74.5 percent, while the Army average is 75.9 percent. Career reenlistment is 85.7 percent while the Army average is 52 percent. To date, UAS recruitment for fiscal year 2007 is at 79 percent, with 2 plus months remaining in the fiscal year to recruit 16 more UAS MOS soldiers. Our UAS training fully qualifies our enlisted soldiers to safely and effectively operate UAS within both the tactical and National Airspace Systems.
43. Senator BAYH. Secretary Geren, where, in terms of an overarching DOD medium to high altitude UAV plan, does the Army see itself?

Mr. Geren. Perhaps the best way to define where the Army sees itself is with an explanation of the definitions for UAVs as defined in the Joint Field Manual 3-04.15, “UAS Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of UASs”, dated 3 Aug 06. This document describes three classes of UAS: Manportable, Tactical, and Theater.

- Manportable UAS are small, self-contained, and portable. Their use supports the small ground combat teams/elements in the field. The Army’s Raven UAS falls into this category. It is hand-launched, soldier transported, and fielded to battalions and smaller organizations. The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) BCT will have its own manportable UAS, the Micro Air Vehicle (MAV). The MAV will feature both “hover and stare” and “perch and stare” capabilities made possible by its lift-augmented ducted fan propulsion system. This capability will allow operation virtually anywhere, even in confined spaces.

- Tactical UAS are larger systems that support maneuver commanders at various tactical levels of command and can support the small combat teams when so employed and are locally controlled and operated by a specialized UAS unit. The Army’s Shadow, IGNAT, Hunter, Warrior A, and ER/MP Warrior all fall into this category. The FCS BCT will have its own tactical rotary-wing UAS, the Firescout.

- Theater. The Army does not have any UAS that fall into this category.

In addition to these definitions, the Joint UAS Center of Excellence (JUAS COE) Concept of Operations (CONOPs), as endorsed by the Army during fiscal year 2007, defines the Tactical class of UAS. The Raven is considered a “Tactical 1” system by the JUAS COE CONOPs since it is hand-launched, soldier transported, and fielded to battalions and smaller organizations. The Shadow is defined as a “Tactical 2” system per the JUAS COE CONOPs since it is mobile-launched, vehicle transported, locally controlled and operated by a specialized UAS platoon within the BCT. The IGNAT, Hunter, Warrior A and ER/MP Warrior are classed “Tactical 3” systems within the JUAS COE CONOPs since they are organic to the division, conventionally launched (rolling take-off) and primarily operated out of airfields. The FCS MAV is a Tactical 1 and the Firescout is a Tactical 2, in accordance with the JUAS COE CONOPs.

In summation, in accordance with the above two Joint publications, the Army sees its medium altitude class of UASs being employed at the tactical level of operations.

44. Senator BAYH. Secretary Geren, how will the lessons learned from the Air Force programs be evaluated for the Army’s benefit?

Mr. Geren. To benefit from Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy UAS lessons learned, The Army works through the Joint UAS Center of Excellence (JUAS COE) for emerging CONOPs and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), the Joint UAS Materiel Review Board for materiel related solutions and TTPs as well as the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System for procurement. Additionally, the Center for Army Lessons Learned and Training and Doctrine Command validate, integrate, and transform Army and Joint operational lessons learned into requirements, doctrine, CONOPs, and TTPs. The UAS lessons learned from the Joint Force allows the Army to benefit and leverage their experience to provide soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen the best possible UAS support on the battlefield.

45. Senator BAYH. Secretary Geren, how will the Army’s lessons learned impact future Navy and Air Force programs?

Mr. Geren. The JUAS Materiel Review Board (MRB) remains the DOD’s UAS forum to address materiel issues. Some of the objectives of the JUAS MRB include “Facilitate Service-level coordination of UAS capabilities and potential future systems” and “Identify, resolve, and/or mitigate materiel issues at the earliest opportunity in the JCIDS process.” Lessons learned through the acquisition of the Army’s programs are briefed to the JUAS MRB to ensure all DOD and Service representatives have the most current information regarding materiel issues and lessons learned. There have been multiple Acquisition Project and Product Managers that have attended in the past providing information briefings of UAS developments and procurements. Lessons learned are shared with the Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and other DOD agencies and will be reviewed and considered in relation to their Service programs.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK PRYOR

JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT

46. Senator Pryor. Secretary Geren, what is the Army requirement for the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA)?

Mr. Geren. Each of the Services has title 10 responsibilities for providing direct support to their forces as outlined in Joint Publication 3–17 and defined in Technical Publication 525–4–0. For sustainment operations, Army fixed wing aviation perform those missions which are between the intra-theater missions performed by the Air Force and the tactical maneuver and movement performed by Army rotary wing, or ground assets. Army commanders deploy organic fixed wing assets to support routine sustainment and transport time-sensitive/mission-critical parts, cargo, and/or personnel over strategic (inter-theater) and operational/tactical (intra-theater) distances to forward-deployed future forces in remote and austere locations. For the Army, the JCA fills the gap of time sensitive mission critical re-supply versus scheduled, bulk delivery by the Air Force. The JCA is procured to meet this requirement while transforming Army aviation, specifically the ARNG and the Army Reserve fixed-wing fleets to a more modern, capable force. Without transformation of the Army's legacy fixed-wing fleet, the Army will continue to pour funding into antiquated aircraft that provide limited value on the battlefield and fly the CH–47 helicopters on costly re-supply missions thus limiting the flexibility of the Joint Force Ground Component Commander.

47. Senator Pryor. Secretary Geren, how will this aircraft's unique capability increase the mobility of soldiers in the battlefield?

Mr. Geren. The Army's maneuver unit is the BCT which is a small modular, flexible force that is used independently on an asymmetrical battlefield, often in obscure locations. The JCA provides the ability for the BCT to meet the needs of the ever changing battle space. The JCA allows for a more effective movement of supplies with its transloadability to CH–47 Chinook cargo helicopters while also providing for more efficient resupply of mission critical/time-sensitive items. With its ability to land on unimproved runways of 2,000 feet or less in length and operate in high/hot conditions, such as Afghanistan, the JCA can deliver high priority supplies directly to the user. The JCA reduces the risk and burden to soldiers by minimizing the number of required ground convoys to resupply combat consumables, such as fuel, ammunition, and spare parts, throughout a high threat area of operations. The ability to resupply units is critical to maintaining combat readiness.

48. Senator Pryor. Secretary Geren, do you believe the Army should operate the JCA independent of the Air Force? If so, why?

Mr. Geren. Yes, the Army's primary mission is to operate the JCA in an independent, direct support role under the control of the Joint Force Commander (JFC). Its secondary role is to support the Air Force/U.S. Transportation Command Common User Pool requirements. With both the Army and Air Force deploying the JCA, the JFC has more flexibility in meeting time sensitive as well as longer haul missions that don't require a larger aircraft such as the C–130. The JFC needs the ability to call on either the Army or Air Force to meet these key types of missions. The JCA is not a unique program to just the Army and Air Force. All Services have similar capabilities that exist in their Services from UH–60s, UAVs, C–130s, to watercraft. Additionally, each Service also relies on each other's joint training programs and maintenance for these assets, JCA will be no different. The bottom line is each Service has these capabilities to respond to their specific title 10 responsibilities to support their forces. The JCA program was vetted through the Joint Staff and DOD for its programmatics as well as for its roles and missions and Concept of Operations and will co-exist as complementary to the Air Force; which it will be used as a component of the overall intra-theater lift requirement.

STOP LOSS POLICY

49. Senator Pryor. Secretary Geren, what is the Army's current stop loss policy?

Mr. Geren. The Army's goal is to reduce the use of stop loss and eventually eliminate its use. However, current demands on the force require its use to provide trained and ready units to theater. Stop loss allows the Army to sustain a force that has trained together as a cohesive element, and maintain cohesion throughout its deployment. Losses caused by separation and retirement adversely impact unit training, cohesion, and stability in OIF and OEF deploying units. Stop loss allows the Army to maintain unit cohesion and effectiveness in combat. It is used spar-
ingly, affecting only about 1 percent of the total force, for limited periods of time. This balances the need for unit effectiveness against the impact on individual soldiers. The desired result of implementing stop loss is to retain trained, experienced, and skilled manpower to ensure our formations, placed in harm’s way, remain cohesive, ready, and combat-effective elements, throughout their deployment.

There are two stop loss models currently being used in support of the Army’s effort in the global war on terrorism.

a. Active Army unit stop loss. Applicable to all regular Army soldiers assigned to organized Active Army units alerted or participating in OIF and OEF.

b. Reserve component unit stop loss. Applicable to all Ready Reserve soldiers who are members of ARNG or United States Army Reserve assigned to Reserve component units alerted or mobilized in accordance with section 12302 or 12304, title 10, U.S.C. for participation in Operation Noble Eagle, OEF, and OIF.

Current stop loss applicability: The current stop loss policy is minimalist by design and precisely implemented. The program only affects soldiers in units selected to participate in OIF/OEF, from the time of the unit’s Mobilization/Latest Deployment Date minus 90 days and continues through the demobilization/redeployment date, plus a maximum of 90 days. The 90 days after return to the unit’s permanent duty/demobilization station is used to provide our soldiers time for transition activities (separation and retirement), for medical screening, and where applicable for processing for a permanent change of station.

As of end of month May 2007, stop loss affects a total of 8,540 soldiers from all components (Active Army, 4,946; ARNG, 2,125; and Army Reserve, 1,469). The current DOD guidance is to eliminate the Army’s use of stop loss as soon as operationally feasible. The Army still requires stop loss to meet mission requirements; however, the Army shares the Secretary of Defense goal and is using significant means to minimize the use of stop loss while ensuring units are fully manned and trained. The combination of various initiatives such as retention bonuses, stop movement, accelerated unit leveling, assignment incentive pay for deployment extensions, continued implementation of lifecycle managed units, and sufficient forces supports a 1:2 deployment cycle. The Army has reduced the total number of soldiers (all components) who are affected by stop loss from an average of 13,800 in 2005 to an average of 8,900 in 2007.

DEPLOYMENT EXTENSIONS

50. Senator Pryor. Secretary Geren, what factors influenced your decision to extend deployments from 12 months to 15 months?

Mr. Geren. As an Army, to meet the demands from Central Command (CENTCOM), we were forced with two “bad” choices: (1) continue with the then current policy of extending deployments on an ad hoc basis, with little or no notice, with the result that most soldiers were being extended; or (2) establish the 15-month policy that guaranteed a 12-month dwell time.

The better “bad” choice was the second. I recognize the heavy burden this adds to our soldiers and families and it is our goal to move back to 12-month deployments as soon as possible.

51. Senator Pryor. Secretary Geren, what effect do you believe this new regulation will have on morale, not just for the soldiers but also for their families?

Mr. Geren. I recognize that tour extensions have an adverse impact on soldiers and families and we are committed to providing appropriate levels of support that address the issues that arise. Additionally, our goal is to return to 12-month deployments as soon as circumstances in theater allow it. Based on the Army’s response to the extensions of the 172d Stryker Brigade, Fort Wainwright, Alaska, and the 1/34 BCT, Minnesota ARNG, the Army has applied a template of issues and solutions, for execution in support of soldiers and families impacted by the most recent unit extensions. Additionally, we continue to review, adapt, and fund programs and services specifically targeted at sustaining soldiers and families before, during, and after deployment. One of the Army’s current seven key initiatives is focused exclusively on support for soldiers, civilians, and families as a key readiness factor.

52. Senator Pryor. Secretary Geren, would you recommend an additional leave period be granted during this extension?

Mr. Geren. The Under Secretary of Defense approved on July 13, 2007, an increase in the rest and recuperation leave period from 15 days to 18 days for service members deployed to OEF or OIF for 15 months.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER
TOUR OF DUTY ROTATION OF MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS

53. Senator WARNER. Secretary Geren, it has been reported that certain Army medical officer specialties, such as internal medicine and pediatrics, have been assigned 12- or even 15-month rotations in the CENTCOM area of responsibility, while other specialties, such as pulmonologists, are being assigned 6-month or shorter rotations. What is the Army policy on rotational deployment of Medical Corps officers?

Mr. GEREN. The Medical Corps officers deploying with BCTs serve for the length of the unit’s deployment. Commanders and deputy commanders of deploying medical units serve for the length of the unit’s deployment. Medical Corps officers, other than the commanders and deputy commanders, deploying to staff the area medical support units, Forward Support Surgical Teams, and Combat Support Hospitals, depending on their primary specialty, serve either 180 days or the length of the unit deployment.

The U.S. Army Medical Command has identified 28 medical specialties that will serve on 180-day rotations. In general terms, those 28 specialties require significant skills retraining when deployments exceed 180 days. That is because the specialists do not perform the full range of their specialty skills while deployed. Retraining that exceeds 1 month in duration is considered excessive. The impact of deployments beyond 180 days for those specialists represents an additional loss of those specialty providers for the period of their retraining. Examples of these specialties are cardiothoracic surgeons, gastroenterologists, and pediatric cardiologists. We expect the other 11 medical specialties that deploy for longer periods of time to be performing more of the range of their skills while in theater. Examples of these specialties are psychiatrists, family practitioners, and emergency medicine physicians. Regardless of medical specialty, Graduate Medical Program directors will not be deployed for more than 90 days. This is related to the importance of the director’s presence to run the Graduate Medical Education Program and to satisfy the requirements of the Residency Review Committee. The details of Medical Corps deployment length are published in the Army’s Personnel Policy Guidance.

54. Senator WARNER. Secretary Geren, does that policy vary depending on medical specialty?

Mr. GEREN. Yes, the rotation policy varies based on duty position in theater and medical specialty. The policy identifies 28 Medical Corps Specialties that can deploy for no greater than 180 days and 11 specialties that can deploy for 15 months.

55. Senator WARNER. Secretary Geren, can you provide an explanation and justification for any disparity and what policy decisions were taken into consideration?

Mr. GEREN. Army Medical Corps officers are initially trained as general/field medicine officers. Upon the completion of that training, they are further trained in one of 37 specialties. While the Military Healthcare System uses all these specialties to maintain a healthy deployable Army, general/field medicine officers are the physicians in greatest demand for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. After the specialty demands for the theater are met, the other medical specialties are used to meet the theater demand for general/field medicine officers. We shortened the length of deployment for those medical specialties that would have the greatest skill degradation while deployed and those that would require significant retraining of skills upon redeployment. Those specialties for which a deployment greater than 6 months could be expected to require more than 30 days of retraining were limited to deployments not to exceed 180 days.

56. Senator WARNER. Secretary Geren, what actions are being taken to ensure fair and equitable rotations for all medical officers?

Mr. GEREN. There is an ongoing effort to ensure Medical Corps officers will have similar deployment experiences during the duration of the conflict. Initially, our efforts focused on ensuring that physicians were not sent back a second time to theater while there were other physicians in that specialty who had yet to deploy to theater. As we now are deploying the same physicians back to theater, commands are considering the number of months the physicians served in the combat zone and the number of months since their return from theater (dwell time). We make exceptions on repetitive deployments or on shortened dwell time for volunteers. We collect data on each physician, showing his/her individual deployment history. This data is readily available to all levels of command within the U.S. Army Medical Command and is used as a decisionmaking tool when scheduling physicians to deploy to theater.
57. Senator WARNER. Secretary Geren, what are the current attrition and retention rates, broken down by specialty, in the medical officer ranks?

Mr. GEREEN. The overall retention rate for Medical Corps officers in fiscal year 2006 was 60.69 percent. In fiscal year 2005 it was 54.42 percent. Retention rates are computed based on physicians who remain on Active-Duty beyond their initial obligation date. A detailed breakdown by medical specialty is provided in the below chart. Our total losses for fiscal year 2006 were 402. 31.3 percent of those losses were to retirements, the remainder was either discharges or release from Active-Duty.

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58. Senator WARNER. Secretary Geren, have medical officers recently retired or resigned from service indicated a pattern of morale or deployment operation tempo as reasons for their leaving the Service?

Mr. GEREEN. Yes, morale and deployment operation tempo have impacted on retention and retirement. Specific concerns raised by physicians in exit surveys have been categorized in four main areas:
a. Prolonged deployments in excess of 6 months. Provider consensus is that 6-month deployments (or shorter) would significantly improve morale and retention.

b. Obstacles to patient care. These obstacles include problems with Armed Forces Health Longitudinal Technology Application, the Department’s computerized recordkeeping system that increases physician administration time, takes time away from patients, is not user friendly, and adds no significant provider benefits; continued increases in administrative requirements/training; and a shortage of physicians and support staff, both military and civilian.

c. Insufficient pay. Bonuses are not included in retirement pay and entitlement bonuses have not changed since early 1990.

d. Family stabilization.

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE GROUP

59. Senator WARNER. Secretary Geren, I commend the Army on its initiative to stand up an Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) to develop tactics, training, and procedures for future conflicts. I believe that this organization will benefit our military’s endeavors as well in Afghanistan and Iraq. The AWG currently maintains a temporary headquarters and operations element in make-shift facilities at Fort Meade, MD, and a training unit at Fort A.P. Hill, VA, while the Army is in the process of determining a final location for the unit. While I realize the current situation is temporary, I am concerned that the potential scattering of elements among different installations will have a detrimental impact on the AWG’s effectiveness, while at the same time being contrary to the Army’s recent goals to consolidate missions and activities of a particular unit under one flag at one installation. If confirmed, what criteria will you use to determine a permanent location for this unit that will serve the best interests of the Army?

Mr. Geren. At this time we are validating requirements and assessing potential locations. The Army will base the final recommendation upon three criteria groupings: operational, stationing, and cost analyses. The permanent location recommendation will represent the best of three criteria across the board. We will carefully consider all relevant factors.

60. Senator WARNER. Secretary Geren, in your opinion, what impact would the separation of command, operational, and training elements of this type of organization have on the efficiency and effectiveness of the unit?

Mr. Geren. The AWG was designed as a decentralized organization capable of operating and sustaining itself in a decentralized mode. Nevertheless, the impact of separately located elements is one of the relevant factors to be considered in our decision.

61. Senator WARNER. Secretary Geren, I note with interest the Army’s recent interaction with representatives of the local communities around the Pinon Canyon Maneuver Site in Colorado and the community’s desire to enhance the economic benefit of supporting the Army’s plans for the expansion of ranges and the control of encroachment around ranges. In your current role, is the Army taking into consideration the concerns of local communities in force structure basing and range expansion decisions involving training ranges?

Mr. Geren. Yes. The Army views itself as a partner and good neighbor with the communities in which we live and depend upon, and should always be willing to listen to the concerns of nearby communities. The Army is presently preparing an Environmental Impact Statement for continued transformation and potential expansion of the Army. This process, conducted under the NEPA, requires consideration of a range of alternative installations for siting major Army units. The public plays an important role in identifying sites that should be considered before a final decision is made. The Army takes into account environmental and socio-economic factors, along with a whole host of other relevant factors, such as the types of units, ranges, and support facilities, prior to selecting an installation for home-basing and training a specific unit. Public comments and concerns raised during the NEPA review process allow the public to influence the final decision regarding site selection for major Army units, as well as for range expansion decisions involving training ranges.

62. Senator WARNER. Secretary Geren, if confirmed, what would you propose to address the concerns of local communities which take steps to control encroachment
inconsistent with Army training requirements and which support increased range operations even at the expense of the community’s economic development?

Mr. GEREN. Communities that take action to plan and limit economic development in order to protect the essential training of American soldiers are great friends of the Army. It demonstrates that communities and installations are working together and have recognized that poorly planned growth will neither support the long-term economic viability of the community, nor the continued economic viability of the installation.

Some of the vital tools that are available to produce a correct economic analysis for the 'growth versus encroachment' issue depend upon Congress’ continued support of the OSD Office of Economic Adjustment’s Joint Land Use Studies for communities around Army installations. Similarly, continued congressional support of the DOD Readiness and Environmental Protection Initiative is equally important. The Army calls our own program under this authority the Army Compatible Use Buffer Program. These programs are vital to community planning, and congressional funding of conservation or compatible use buffers around vital training, testing, and operating areas is essential to sustain military readiness, ecological integrity, and economic prosperity.

In many cases, land use restrictions surrounding installations contribute to the long-term economic viability of local communities. Developing compatible land uses around Army installations does not preclude continued economic activity on conserved lands. For example, many Army installations are surrounded by agricultural farm and ranchlands. Farmers and ranchers are good neighbors and their operations do not adversely impact Army mission. Many farmers and ranchers want to stay on their lands, but there is much pressure to sell the land for commercial or residential development. Selling development rights while retaining all other rights on their property allows farmers and ranchers to receive payment for the development value of their property while providing for continued agricultural and other economic uses of their property. It represents a “win-win” outcome for both the Army and the local community.

63. Senator W ARNER. Secretary Geren, in your opinion, who will make the final determination on the location of the AWG, and when is this decision expected to be made?

Mr. GEREN. The decision will be made in accordance with the applicable stationing policies and regulations. There is not a scheduled timeline for a decision. The Army will inform the community of interest prior to public notification. The Secretary of Defense retains the authority to station organizations within the National Capital Region.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEM

64. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Geren, Iraq and Afghanistan have shown us that our ground forces still play a vital role in our national defense. We have seen the effectiveness as well as some of the limitations of our heavy armored vehicles. While we have added armor on our trucks and Humvees to give our troops more protection, the Services are looking to replace those vehicles with the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle. There is skepticism that the vehicles being fielded as part of FCS will not adequately protect our soldiers in the future. Can you tell us about the overall survivability capabilities of the FCS manned ground vehicles (MGVs) compared to the vehicles they will replace?

Mr. GEREN. The FCS MGVs are being designed to be able to counter current and future threats with the ability to upgrade protection as it is developed. The FCS MGVs will have far better protection over a number of older platforms including cannons, medical, reconnaissance, maintenance, and command vehicles they will replace. The MGV team is taking lessons learned from the Abrams Tank Urban Survival Kit program and Bradley Urban Operations Kit program and incorporating them into the MGV platforms. These survivability enhancements account for the MGV’s additional weight growth; such as the use of kits for mine blast protection and the inclusion of active protective systems for rocket-propelled grenade threats. Additionally, the MRAP vehicle program is currently exploring solutions to counter the Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) threat. When a suitable solution is available, the FCS BCT will incorporate EFP protection to FCS platform as a kitted solution.
65. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Geren, what level of ballistic protection will they provide?
Mr. Geren. The FCS MGV will provide 14.5 millimeter, 360-degree hemispheric protection, 30 millimeter protection over the frontal 60-degree arc, as well as protection from rocket-propelled grenades, anti-tank guided missiles, and high explosive/high-explosive anti-tank effects. As further armor protection solutions are developed, the platforms can be upgraded to meet future threats.

66. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Geren, how do the other aspects of FCS help with making them more survivable?
Mr. Geren. In addition to the FCS MGV’s armor and other vehicle protection, the unmanned air and ground platforms, sensors and intelligence systems that support an FCS BCT will enable soldiers to avoid detection and avoid being hit—the soldiers will be able to see what is around the next block or hill. The passing and sharing of data from sensors, UAVs, UGVs, unattended ground sensors, and other platforms is not relayed by a radio call but appears on the common operating picture screen inside the MGVs. This translates to passing and sharing real-time data, not data or information that is passed through layers of relays. The FCS BCT deploys unmanned platforms forward first—to sense the battlefield—while gathering data and information that is instantly passed to all in the sector. Should an MGV receive fire, its active protection system reacts and removes the threat without damage to the system.

67. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Geren, you stated that FCS is your number one modernization program but significant cuts have impacted the program. The Senate fully funds FCS in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 report language and states in the Senate Report, “it would be a critical mistake to abandon the Army’s core modernization effort.” What is the current status of FCS and its system of systems?
Mr. Geren. Currently, the FCS BCT is on schedule and on budget. All planned engineering milestones to date have been met and successfully completed. The evaluation, production, and fielding of Spin Out 1 capabilities are in process and will continue through 2008. Spin Out 1 has all of the required program acquisition controls in place, and all systems within it are progressing through key engineering milestones.

Significant accomplishments include:
- The Non-Line-of-Sight Mortar (NLOS-M) firing platform completed its first iteration of testing at Camp Ripley, MN, in April 2007, firing over 600 rounds in a little over 5 weeks with no major faults. The results of the test demonstrated NLOS-M is on the path to a superior fighting vehicle delivery in 2011.
- The build-up of the integration test bed chassis is in progress at the Power & Energy (P&E) Systems Integration Lab (SIL) at BAE, Santa Clara, CA. The chassis is used for integrating the complete propulsion system. The power pack (engine/generator) set is already assembled in the sponson of the test bed (similar to vehicle assembly). Evaluation of the fully integrated propulsion system in the P&E SIL will begin on August 15, 2007, and continue through November 2007, for immediate work supporting NLOS-C early prototypes.
- The NLOS-C System Demonstration fired more than 2,000 rounds during 2005–2007 and the NLOS-C Firing Platform has fired more than 270 of the scheduled 5,000 rounds since its delivery in October 2006, to Yuma Proving Ground (YPG), Arizona. The information and test data acquired through testing have been incorporated into the threshold design of the NLOS-C pre-production prototype vehicles scheduled to begin arriving at YPG for testing in the summer of 2008.
- In February 2007, the Army conducted the FCS Experiment 1.1, where integration of sensors, soldiers, munitions, firing platforms, and manned and unmanned aerial platforms in a tactical scenario was successfully demonstrated at Fort Bliss, TX. The experiment was a success, with over 160 Experiment 1.1 lessons learned captured. The participating soldiers praised the FCS technologies, stating that they wished they could bring them back to their units.

68. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Geren, what impact would another budget cut have on FCS?
Mr. Geren. The proposed House Armed Services Committee budget cuts would critically weaken the FCS BCT by causing a severe reduction in technologies and
fielded platforms. This cut would terminate 90 percent of MGVs, 75 percent of Unmanned Ground Vehicles, 50 percent of Unmanned Aerial Systems, and 20 percent of the System of Systems Engineering effort required to integrate these systems in a network. A reduction in these systems will result in a loss of capability and the inability to meet requirements urgently needed by the soldier.

FCS BCT fills a strategic role in Army modernization that no other unit in the military can fill. The goal of the FCS BCT is to be highly transportable, lethal, survivable, and maneuverable. Current heavy brigades lack the ability to deploy quickly, and light units lack the lethality and survivability inherent in the FCS BCT. The loss of FCS BCT or degradation of its technologies and capabilities will result in a significant reduction-in-force effectiveness for the United States in the future, especially as current forces continue to be used in ongoing operations and are worn out, damaged, and retired.

Further, current forces are becoming aged, with outdated technologies and communications equipment. Retrofitting these vehicles may be prohibitively costly, or even not possible, given the weight, space, and power requirements. FCS has these capabilities designed in from the ground up. Another budget cut to FCS would remove most of these capabilities and force us to maintain the Cold War technologies for over 60-plus years, well beyond 2040.

NON-LINE-OF-SIGHT CANNON

69. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Geren, when people ask about our Army cannon capability, I tell them the best thing we have is the World War II-era Paladin. The M109 Paladin, a 155mm howitzer, was introduced in the 1960s. It will remain the principle self-propelled howitzer until the arrival of the FCS NLOS–C. What is the status of the initial prototypes of the FCS NLOS–C?

Mr. GEREN. The NLOS–C initial prototypes completed a design review in December 2006, and the first two systems are currently being assembled at FCS integration labs around the country with an expected delivery in May 2008. The NLOS–C initial prototype mission module is currently undergoing qualification and safety testing at Yuma Proving Ground from October 2006 through October 2008. As the first FCS MGV platform to mature, the Army intends to field the NLOS–C by fiscal year 2010. This timeline allows the Army to meet congressional direction from section 8086 of the DOD Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 109–289).

70. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Geren, are you on schedule to deliver all prototypes in 2008?

Mr. GEREN. Program Manager FCS will deliver five NLOS–C early prototypes by the end of calendar year 2008, based on the early 2006 24-ton configuration. The remaining three systems to be delivered in calendar year 2009 will be based on the enhanced 27-ton configuration with improved armor, suspension, propulsion, and electronics.

TRAIN AND EQUIP

71. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Geren, in your answers to the advance policy questions, you discuss the importance of building the capacity of our international partners and allies. You also discuss the importance of investing in partner nations who know the culture, language, and geography of our enemies. Section 1206 authorizes United States general purpose forces to train and equip foreign state military forces. What is your opinion of the current Section 1206 authority and its ability to, in your words, “build the capacity of our international partners and allies?”

Mr. GEREN. The current provisions of Section 1206 of the 2007 Defense Authorization Act, which expire annually, authorize the Secretary of Defense to spend up to $300 million to conduct such train and equip missions. DOD has requested that this authority be made permanent and that the spending authority be increased to $750 million per year.

I support the concept and the request made by the Department. If we are to build partner capacity, it only logically follows that training and equipping will play a major role in achieving that end. It could be more effectively done under a 2-year authority to proceed since this would allow continuity of training and give us the ability to procure long lead time items. Clearly, the heart of the matter is the wisdom and effectiveness of the train and equip projects we actually undertake. The train and equip authority is, de facto, a tool that geographic combatant commanders can use to shape the strategic environment to America’s benefit in their respective areas of responsibility. They nominate specific projects to be undertaken under the
authority granted by Section 1206. The proposed projects are then reviewed by Joint Staff, Defense Department, and State Department staffs and approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense. The Army plays no direct role in this process; nevertheless, I have every confidence in my colleagues and rest assured that their work will lead to wise decisions. Army soldiers and civilians will be involved in carrying out a portion of the tasks arising from the approved train and equip projects. Here, too, I have every confidence that our soldiers and civilians will do a fine job.

As is the case with any project we undertake, we must be mindful of the opportunity cost. The Army’s soldiers currently carry a very heavy burden and we must be responsible to avoid adding to that burden—after all, carrying out these missions will involve family separations while soldiers perform such training missions in foreign countries. Similarly, the authorization to allocate funds to such train and equip projects carried no appropriation with it; therefore, the Secretary must carefully weigh the costs and benefits involved when he decides to proceed with a 1206 project.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

BRAIN INJURIES

72. Senator COLLINS. Secretary Geren, one out of every 10 returning service members are affected by TBI, which has been identified as the signature wound of the global war on terror. Bomb blasts are the most common cause of injury and death in Iraq. While improvements in body armor and protective gear have enabled our troops to survive attacks that once would have been deadly, they still do not fully protect against damage from blasts from roadside explosives or suicide bombers. As many as 28 percent of the 1.4 million troops who have served in Iraq and Afghanistan have been exposed to bomb blasts and may have suffered at least mild TBI. Sixty percent of the blast victims treated at Walter Reed have been diagnosed with mild, moderate, or severe TBI. These statistics, however, do not tell the whole story. While the evidence of brain injury may be dramatically clear in some cases, in others there may be no outward or visible evidence of trauma. It also can take days, weeks, and even months before the symptoms of TBI are readily apparent. As a consequence, mild or moderate TBI may go misdiagnosed or undetected, particularly if the servicemember has sustained more obvious injuries. Sadly, failure to accurately diagnose or treat TBI can result in frustration and an endless series of hardships for our returning veterans and their families. What specific measures do you support to help ensure that troops with TBI receive accurate diagnoses and care?

Mr. GEREN. We have published and exported the Military Acute Concussion Evaluation tool for use in theater; published clinical practice guidelines for acute management of mild TBI in military operational settings; and provided education for theater medics on acute evaluation of concussions. We are adding TBI specific questions to the Post Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA) that all soldiers complete upon returning from deployment. The TBI screen will be fully functional in July. If a soldier answers yes to a potential traumatic brain injury event like a fall, a motor vehicle accident, or being near an explosion, then an additional detailed questionnaire will open and be reviewed by a clinician. Also, TBI specific questions have been added to the new Periodic Health Assessment (PHA). This tool will be used to catch up the entire Army by screening for TBI at the time of an annual health assessment. Concurrently, we are performing TBI screening for soldiers in theater following blast exposure even when no other wounds or injuries have occurred. To emphasize the importance and awareness of timely TBI care in those who are not obviously wounded or injured, an All Army activity message delineating the appropriate TBI evaluation and documentation was released on June 15, 2007. Additionally, all servicemembers medically evacuated through Landstuhl Regional Medical Center (LRMC) are screened for TBI if their condition permits. Since medically evacuated soldiers may not receive a PDHA prior to departing the combat theater or they may not be in a condition to be screened for TBI at LRMC, the acting Surgeon General has directed Medical Treatment Facility (MTF) commanders ensure that all OIF/OEF medically-evacuated soldiers receive or have received the following three evaluations: (1) the PDHA, (2) TBI screening and follow-up with a clinician if necessary; and (3) the Post Deployment Health Reassessment (PDHRA). In addition, we are deploying the Automated Neuropsychological Assessment Metrics, an Army-owned computer based neurocognitive assessment tool that has been used extensively in research and with the military. This instrument provides an objective assessment of cognitive performance that can be compared to military norms or the
individual soldier's baseline test results. Pre- and post-deployment neurocognitive testing process was pilot tested at Fort Campbell on two groups of 80 deploying soldiers on June 11 and 20, 2007. Soldiers will be re-tested as part of the post-deployment medical processing. The Surgeon General recently stood up a proponency office to address health integration and rehabilitation. Our warriors with more severe TBI will continue to receive the same cutting edge medical care delivered every day at our military medical centers and at VA Polytrauma Centers. Furthermore, our MTFs are working with the Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center to create a seamless TBI care network that provides the right level of care at the best location for every soldier.

73. Senator COLLINS. Secretary Geren, another concern of mine is the personality disorder process and how it relates to PTSD and TBI. There are indications that personality disorder discharges are being used as a tool to quickly discharge servicemembers who have service-connected mental health conditions, including PTSD and TBI. According to an article by Joseph Kors titled “How Specialist Town Lost his Benefits” (The Nation), Specialist Jon Town was injured and sustained major loss of hearing in a rocket attack in Ramadi, Iraq, in October 2004. His injuries resulted in memory loss and depression, ending his military career. But instead of sending Specialist Town through the medical board process, the Army elected to give him a personality disorder discharge, depriving him of disability benefits and guaranteed VA care for his injuries. DOD records indicate that over 22,500 personality disorder discharges have been processed within the past 6 years. This is not a small number of individuals that supposedly had a pre-existing personality disorder. While this number is small in comparison to the overall discharge rate, misdiagnosis of potentially debilitating brain injuries and their impact on personnel once discharged is cause for concern. Consequently, I am concerned about the use, and potential misuse, of the personality disorder discharge. What is the process used by the Army to diagnose, if a servicemember has a personality disorder?

Mr. GEREEN. If a soldier is referred by a commander to mental health for consideration for a personality disorder separation, a clinical evaluation of the soldier is performed. His or her psychiatric history is reviewed. The soldier's current symptoms and functioning are assessed. Information is also obtained from the unit, as to how the soldier is performing. In the vast majority of cases there have been significant performance difficulties that have led to the referral. Psychological testing may be done if there are diagnostic questions. Other collateral information may be obtained if needed. The soldier must meet the diagnostic criteria in Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-IV) for a personality disorder. In addition, other significant medical conditions should be excluded.

We separate soldiers under Chapter 5–13 (Personality Disorder) only if the doctoral-level provider concludes the disorder is so severe that the soldier's ability to function effectively in the military environment is significantly impaired. This condition must be a deeply ingrained maladaptive pattern of behavior of long duration that interferes with the soldier's ability to perform duty (combat exhaustion and other acute situational maladjustments do not meet these criteria). The diagnosis of personality disorder must be established by a psychiatrist or doctoral-level clinical psychologist with necessary and appropriate professional credentials privileged to conduct DOD evaluations.

In 2006, the Active Army discharged approximately 70,000 soldiers, yet only 1,086 received a Chapter 5–13 separation. The Army has averaged about 1,000 personality disorders per year since 1993.

The recent focus on personality disorders has allowed us the opportunity to re-examine our procedures. We will review all cases where a previously deployed soldier has received a personality disorder discharge. We are also re-examining our internal review process. We encourage any soldier who believes that they were incorrectly discharged to appeal to the Army Discharge Review Board (ADRB). The Army Medical Command stands ready to provide the ADRB with behavioral health expertise as needed.

74. Senator COLLINS. Secretary Geren, if such diagnosis is given, what criteria are used to determine whether or not the servicemember should be discharged?

Mr. GEREEN. Army policy for administrative separation on grounds of personality disorder is not unilateral, but rather derives from governing DOD policy. The basis is a deeply ingrained maladaptive pattern of behavior of long duration, not amounting to physical disability, that interferes with the soldier's ability to perform duty. A key provision is that the diagnosis of personality disorder must be established by a psychiatrist or psychologist. Separation is authorized only if the diagnosis concludes that the personality disorder is so severe that the soldier's ability to function
effectively in the military environment is significantly impaired (the criterion for separation). Based on the psychiatrist or psychologist diagnosis and conclusion, the soldier’s unit commander initiates the separation proceedings and refers them to the separation authority, the special court-martial convening authority (Colonel). The Army Surgeon General has directed a review of all personality disorder discharges of OIF/OEF veterans be reviewed by behavioral health experts.

75. Senator Collins. Secretary Geren, if a servicemember is discharged with a personality disorder, what effect does this have to the benefits they may receive as compared to someone who is diagnosed with either PTSD or TBI?

Mr. Geren. Servicemembers determined unfit as a result of PTSD or TBI are either retired or separated for disability. If separated, the member gets 180 days of transitional health care. If retired, the member is eligible for TRICARE. There is no recoupment of any unearned portions of bonuses for separation or retirement for disability.

Generally, a servicemember with 6 or more years of Active service who is administratively separated for a personality disorder would receive half separation pay and 180 days of transitional health care. In extraordinary instances, the Secretary may authorize full separation pay when the specific reasons for separation and the overall quality of the member’s service have been such that denial would be clearly unjust. Separation pay is significantly less than disability severance pay. Unearned portion of any bonuses are recouped when a member is separated for personality disorder.

MENTAL HEALTH EDUCATION

76. Senator Collins. Secretary Geren, in your response to the advance policy questions to this committee, you discussed the Mental Health Assessment Team IV (MHAT IV) studies and actions the Army is taking to ensure that appropriate numbers of mental health resources are available to soldiers in theater, as well as upon their return. You mentioned that next month the Army will roll out an extensive education program on PTSD and TBI. What will this education program consist of?

Mr. Geren. The Army launched a Chain Teaching program on July 18, 2007, as part of an aggressive campaign to educate more than 1 million Active, Reserve, and National Guard soldiers about PTSD and mild TBI. It is important to implement the Chain Teaching program to help us identify those needing care, and make available the best medical care we can provide. The Chain Teaching program is a Leaders Teaching Soldiers program and will be presented initially to leaders in the chain of command, who will then be responsible for presenting the training to the soldiers in their command. The goal is to launch the program Army-wide on July 18, 2007, and complete the training within 90 days. All soldiers in the Active Army, ARNG, and Army Reserve are required to receive this training.

Both mild TBI and PTSD (post combat stress) can have negative effects on a soldier’s personal life, professional abilities, and health. Soldiers may be affected by one or both conditions at the same time and every soldier is entitled to help. These conditions are treatable and can improve significantly with the right care. All soldiers should watch themselves and their buddies for signs and symptoms of concussion or post combat stress.

Leaders must be aware of their soldiers’ conditions and needs, must support their soldiers in getting help, and must eliminate bureaucratic or organizational obstacles that interfere with soldiers’ recovery. It is important for soldiers and family members to have an awareness of PTSD and mild TBI and to seek treatment for these conditions as soon as possible. For soldiers who may need temporary or long-term medical assistance, the Army and VA are prepared to provide them the best health care possible.

77. Senator Collins. Secretary Geren, what are the goals you hope to accomplish with this program?

Mr. Geren. I hope to increase awareness and improve care for TBI, PTSD, and other psychological effects of war. I also hope to diminish the stigma attached to mental health treatment and counseling. The Chain Teaching program will augment behavioral health assessment tools and measures already in place, and emphasize the Army’s commitment to providing the best health care possible.

78. Senator Collins. Secretary Geren, will the Army Guard and Reserve be included in this extensive education program?
Mr. Geren. Yes, absolutely—the Army Guard and Reserve will receive the exact same education and training as the Active Force.

GUARD AND RESERVE FORCES

79. Senator Collins. Secretary Geren, on several occasions, including your testimony to this committee, you emphasized that the National Guard and Reserves are no longer Strategic Reserves but are instead now Operational Reserves. You stated that the role of the National Guard and Reserves has changed from being a Strategic Reserve to part of the operational force and that the Army is a total force now. You train as one, fight as one, and, as a result, one third of the combat veterans from OIF and OEF come from the Guard and Reserve. I am concerned, however, that by making the National Guard and Reserves an operational force, we will not have the necessary Strategic Reserves available should the need arise in the future. Why do you think this change is beneficial to the Army?

Mr. Geren. The operational force will meet any future challenges. The Army now uses Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), a cyclic training and readiness process, which synchronizes strategic planning, prioritization, and resourcing. ARFORGEN fields available forces—Active and Reserve component—to meet global demands and will prepare forces in the ready pool to deploy to meet any contingency requirements. With the Reserve component operating in the ARFORGEN model—1:4, we would in effect have a Strategic Reserve in the Reserve component units who are not in the ready pool, but would be available if full mobilization were necessary. With ARFORGEN and sufficient and timely funding, the Army will continue to field the best led, equipped, manned, and trained cohesive units for deployment at home and abroad.

80. Senator Collins. Secretary Geren, what are the potential impacts this could have on our Nation’s ability to surge during future conflicts?

Mr. Geren. The Nation’s ability to respond to future conflicts and disasters has improved with the reorientation of the ARNG and U.S. Army Reserve as Operational Reserve Forces. They will be more ready in terms of capacities, capabilities, and readiness as this change balances resources, programs, and policies to support both current operations and future force transformation. This methodology will ensure a continuity of the effort and a correct application of limited resources, while communicating current Army priorities to support the global war on terrorism and Army Campaign Plan objectives.

[NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT]

As In Executive Session,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Preston M. Geren of Texas, to be Secretary of the Army, vice Francis J. Harvey, resigned.

[BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF HON. PETE Geren]

Pete Geren assumed his duties as Acting Secretary of the Army March 9, 2007, and will continue serving concurrently as the Under Secretary of the Army.

As Acting Secretary of the Army, Mr. Geren has statutory responsibility for all matters relating to the United States Army: manpower, personnel, Reserve affairs, installations, environmental issues, weapons systems and equipment acquisition, communications, and financial management.

Mr. Geren is responsible for the Department of the Army’s annual budget and supplemental of over $200 billion. He leads a workforce of over 1 million Active-
Duty, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve soldiers, 230,000 Department of the Army civilian employees, and 280,000 contracted service personnel. He has stewardship over 15 million acres of land.

Mr. Geren has been serving as the 28th Under Secretary of the Army since February 21, 2006, following his nomination by President George W. Bush and confirmation by the United States Senate.

Mr. Geren joined the Department of Defense in September 2001 to serve as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense with responsibilities in the areas of interagency initiatives, legislative affairs, and special projects. Mr. Geren served as Acting Secretary of the Air Force from July to November 2005.

Prior to joining the Department of Defense, Mr. Geren was an attorney and businessman in Fort Worth, Texas.

From 1989 until his retirement in 1997, Mr. Geren was a Member of the U.S. Congress, representing the 12th Congressional District of Texas for four terms. He served on the Armed Services, Science and Technology, and Public Works and Transportation Committees during his tenure in Congress.

Mr. Geren attended Georgia Tech from 1970–73 and received his BA from the University of Texas in 1974 and his JD from the University of Texas Law School in 1978.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Hon. Preston M. “Pete” Geren in connection with his nomination follows:]
7. **Names and ages of children:**
   Tracy Elizabeth Geren, 17; Sarah Anne Geren, 14; and Mary Caroline Geren, 10.

8. **Education:** List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
   - University of Texas, B.A., 1974.
   - University of Texas, J.D., 1978.

9. **Employment record:** List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
   - March 9, 2007–Present - Acting Secretary of the Army.
   - November 2005–February 20, 2007 - Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.
   - April 1999–August 2001 - Attorney, self-employed - 210 W. 6th Street, Fort Worth, Texas.
   - September 1989–January 1997 - Member of Congress, 12th Congressional District of Texas.

10. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.

11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
    - See SF–278 and Ethics Agreement.

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    - Honorary Member, Rotary Club of Fort Worth.
    - Member, Exchange Club of Fort Worth.
    - Member, State Bar of Texas.
    - Member, Fort Worth Club.
    - Member, City Club of Fort Worth.
    - Member, Rivercrest Country Club.

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**
    (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
    (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
    - None.
    (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
    - January 5, 2001, Presidential Inaugural Committee, $475.
    - February 19, 2001, Jim Lane for City Council, $100.
    - February 26, 2001, Wendy Davis for City Council, $100.
    - March 21, 2001, Frank Moss for City Council, $100.
    - April 25, 2001, Dianne Bagsby for County Commissioner, $150.
    - October 8, 2003, Charlie Geren for State Representative, $1,000.
    - December 16, 2003, Friends of the University of Texas PAC, $500.
    - April 15, 2004, Koehler for School Board, $250.
    - April 25, 2005, Carter Burdette for City Council, $100.

14. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
    - Honorary PhD University of North Texas.
    - Outstanding Young University of Texas Alumnus.
Distinguished Alumnus, University of Texas Law School.

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.

None, other than newsletter-type material when I was in Congress. I do not have copies.

16. **Speeches:** Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

- Eulogy for Sonny Montgomery Funeral.
- WRAMC Staff Address.
- AUSA ILW Breakfast.
- AUSA Army Civilian Luncheon.

17. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

Peter Geren.

This 1st day of June, 2007.

[The nomination of Hon. Preston “Pete” M. Geren was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on June 26, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on July 13, 2007.]
NOMINATIONS OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF; AND GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

TUESDAY, JULY 31, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:32 a.m. in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J. Noblet, research assistant; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member; Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork and Kevin A. Cronin.

Committee members’ assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Christopher Caple, assistant
to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey and Dahlia Reed, assistants to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Todd Stiefler, assistants to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Andrew King, assistant to Senator Graham; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune; John L. Goetchius and Brian W. Walsh, assistants to Senator Martinez; and Bradford T. Sellers, assistant to Senator Corker.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN**

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.

Today we welcome Admiral Michael Mullen, the President’s nominee to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and General James Cartwright, the nominee to be Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We congratulate both of you on your exceptional careers, we thank you for your willingness to continue to serve.

We also appreciate the support of your families. We all know that the positions to which you have been nominated require, not only hard work and a devotion to public service, but also the support of your family.

If confirmed by the Senate, our two nominees will face extraordinary challenges in the coming years. First and foremost, the next Chairman and Vice Chairman will be called upon to work with the senior civilian leadership within the Department of Defense (DOD), the National Security Council, and the President to address the ongoing crisis in Iraq.

Despite the loss of more than 3,600 of America’s best and bravest, despite 7 times that many wounded, and an expenditure of $600 billion to date, and $10 billion more each month, Iraq remains torn by sectarian strife, an unreliable police force, and the Intelligence Community has recently reported to have concluded that the years of our occupation of Iraq have seen a surge of al Qaeda in Iraq.

Secretary Gates has stated that our troops are buying the Iraqis time, to pursue reconciliation. Unfortunately, while our troops have done everything that is asked of them, and more, the Iraqi political leaders remain frozen by their own history, unwilling to take political risks to reach the compromises so essential to a constructive settlement of their national problems.

The State Department reported to Congress last Thursday that, “Iraq’s parliament in recent months has been at a standstill, with nearly every session since November adjourned, because as few as 65 of the 275 members made it to work.” They wrote that, “Part of the problem is security, but Iraqi officials also said they feared that members were losing confidence in the institution, and in the country’s fragile democracy.”
The President continues to call for patience. But the American people long ago lost patience with the failure of the Iraqi leaders to do what everybody agrees needs to be done, if success can come to Iraq. They must compromise their political differences.

The American people want a change in course in Iraq, not the continuation of a status quo, without a plan to force the Iraqi leaders to take responsibility for their own country. Giving the Iraqi political leaders more time to work out agreements over resource sharing, power sharing, and constitutional amendments isn’t the plan, particularly in the absence of consequences for their failure to do so.

Iraq is not the only challenge that the next Chairman and Vice Chairman will face. Our senior military leadership also faces a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan, an al Qaeda operating from safe havens in the Pakistan federally-administered tribal areas; an unpredictable nuclear power in North Korea; an Iran that seems to be aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons, and causing problems throughout the region; an Army and Marine Corps in need of tens of billions of dollars to replace and repair equipment that has been damaged and destroyed in the course of ongoing operations; the military’s nondeployed ground forces, that have a low level of readiness to meet any wartime mission; weapons programs that despite the expenditure of more than $100 billion a year, are increasingly unaffordable; a military that faces constant challenge in recruiting the troops that it needs; and men and women in uniform and their families suffering from the increased strains of repeated deployments, and a sustained high operational tempo.

Indeed, our ground forces are being stretched near the breaking point, our Army and Marine Corps have attempted in vain to stabilize rotational schemes for an unstable and open-ended Iraq strategy. Deployments have become longer and longer, while goals for breaks between deployments have gone unmet.

The leaders who will address these problems will need more than the total commitment and hard work that they bring to the job, and that we’ve come to expect from our military leaders. We rely on our military leaders to provide independent military advice to the President, the National Security Council, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress. Too often, the voices of our military leaders have been muted, by senior administration officials, and some have told those civilian leaders what they wanted to hear, instead of providing them with the unvarnished facts that they really needed.

If our military is going to overcome the challenges that it faces today, the new Chairman and Vice Chairman will have to be willing to speak up forcefully and directly to their civilian leaders, to speak the truth as they see it, to power.

Today’s nominees are outstanding individuals, with exceptional military backgrounds. If confirmed, they will be assuming their positions as the most senior military leaders of our Nation, responsible for the welfare and safety of all America’s military forces who are not only brave, but are also true professionals; all that this or any other nation could hope for. That is an awesome responsibility, but I believe that our nominees are more than up to the task.

Senator Warner.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we might recognize Senator Inhofe for a minute. He has to go to the Environment and Public Works (EPW) Committee where he's a ranking member.

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Inhofe.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, I'll make this very brief.

First of all, I'm in total support of the two outstanding nominees here, and I look forward to working with you.

I will say this, Mr. Chairman, that I do agree with the position that we really are stressed right now, in terms of resources, assets, and force strength. All during the drawdown of the 1990s, I was on the Senate floor saying that this day would come, and this day is here.

But I want to say to both of you that after my 14th trip over there, to the Iraqi area of responsibility, I came back seeing incredible progress in terms of the Imams, the Clerics, and the positive attitude of those individuals who are the citizens, and the things that the Iraqis are doing, I just thought that was great. I've read things that you folks have said, similar to this.

The best news was, on the other side, two of the most severe critics in the New York Times came back from a lengthy period of time over there, and agree with virtually everything that you two have said about the progress that's taking place right now.

So, I congratulate you.

I thank you, Senator Warner. We do have the markup in the EPW, and I have to attend that.

Senator WARNER. You have my proxy?

Senator INHOFE. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if we might, as a committee, also recognize the newest member of the committee, Senator Corker. We're delighted to have you, and that you selected to come on this committee, where I hope that you will move from that chair slowly down to this chair. It took 29 years for us, didn't it?

[Laughter.]

Chairman LEVIN. I'm not sure if the emphasis is on "move" or on "slowly" though. [Laughter.]

We do welcome you, very much. Senator Warner speaks for everybody on this committee, and we join him in a very warm welcome.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Admiral Mullen and General Cartwright, and I wonder if you might introduce your families to those in attendance here?

Admiral MULLEN. Certainly, Senator.

My wife Debra is here, sitting behind me.

Chairman LEVIN. Yes.

Admiral MULLEN. My two sons who are both Active-Duty Navy lieutenants, are not here today.

Senator WARNER. But they're on Active-Duty, and accountable this morning, somewhere.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. General Cartwright?

General CARTWRIGHT. Senator, my wife Sandy is sitting behind me. Our oldest daughter, Billie Ann, is next to her. Her husband is a member of the West Virginia National Guard, 2nd Battalion,
9th Special Forces Group, and just recently returned from his third combat tour.

Chairman LEVIN. Third combat tour.

General CARTWRIGHT. Our youngest daughter, who's not here, and her husband are assigned in Europe, under the Defense Intelligence Agency, one to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and one to the Army.

Senator WARNER. Total contribution to our Nation's security by your families. You exemplify so many military families all across America.

I want to take a moment, Mr. Chairman, and I'm sure you share with this me, to recognize that you two gentlemen replace extraordinary officers who have served their country long and well.

Admiral Edmund Giambastiani, former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, retired last week after 37 years of naval service, and a remarkable career, including service as Commander of Submarine Force, Atlantic Fleet, and other submarine capabilities, but most importantly, surviving Admiral Hyman Rickover, who I knew, and who was a magnificent trainer of young men in our submarine forces.

I shall always remember Admiral Giambastiani, his total availability, certainly to this Senator and other Senators, at any time—day or night—to respond to inquiries, and other problems that I had with the Department.

Admiral Mullen, you'll be relieving General Peter Pace, the first United States Marine to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Pace had no less distinguished career, including service as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as Commander of U.S. Southern Command. He recently marked 40 years of commissioned service that began with combat in Vietnam.

You, likewise, Admiral Mullen, were aboard ship during the days of Vietnam, my recollection.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. I suspect in fulfilling this career, you'll be almost the last person on Active-Duty to have served in the Vietnam conflict.

I congratulate you and your family.

Admiral MULLEN. Thank you, sir.

Senator WARNER. I've heard General Pace speak very movingly about the debt he felt, always, to the young marines under his command, wherever they might have been, though, especially in Vietnam. Most deeply to those whose families made the ultimate sacrifice.

I would say, without any equivocation, that General Pace fulfilled that promise, and he has honored all of those who have served with him.

We thank General Pace, Admiral Giambastiani, and their families, for their service.

Admiral, you and I have had a very interesting and wonderful professional relationship for many years.

General Cartwright, likewise. I've had the opportunity to get to know you and your family. Knowing you both as I do, however, I believe it's your individual dedication to duty, integrity, and accountability, as well as your experience that have brought you to
this day, and this hearing. I intend to support both of you. I encourage my colleagues to do likewise.

There will be many questions about operations in Iraq during the course of this hearing, and that’s the way it should be. I’d like, however, to focus on the question, as we move forward, on the readiness of the Armed Forces, and ensuring the continued success of the All-Volunteer Force.

I’ve had—literally—a lifetime association with the concept of the All-Volunteer Force. As you’ll recall, Admiral Mullen, during the days of Vietnam, we had the draft. While those that were drafted served honorably, today is an All-Volunteer Force. It’s probably the most bold experiment that any military had ever tried, particularly in the wake of the Vietnam War, but it has worked. It has succeeded beyond our expectations. Now you two gentlemen become the trustees of what I hope will be the continuation of the All-Volunteer Force concept, as we meet the requirements of the military today, and the years in the future.

Our Active-Duty and Reserve military personnel have performed heroically since the attacks of September 11, 2001. They have the respect and the gratitude of every member of this committee, but more importantly, they have the respect and the gratitude of Americans from coast to coast.

But our All-Volunteer Forces, particularly our ground forces, have been on a wartime footing for 4 years. I know you have your concerns, as I do, about the ability of these forces to continue to recruit, to continue to replenish, reinforce, and continue this tempo of operations, certainly over the next 6 to 12 months.

The men and women in the Armed Forces, and their families, have humbled this Nation with their dedication to duty, and the sacrifices that they have made. Despite the admiration to which men and women in uniform are held today, however, there is this concern about the ability of our recruiters, for example, to replenish the force for the families of our military personnel to continue to bear the burdens of the ongoing military tempo.

Many of the legislative initiatives taken by this committee, under my leadership as chairman, and now our distinguished colleague, my friend from Michigan—we’ve done that, to bring forward those programs that we feel can help you to do that job of keeping this All-Volunteer Force strong.

You both started your careers prior to 1973, and spent a substantial part of those careers ensuring the success of our professional forces. We have every confidence that the two of you can do the same in the course of your respective jobs coming up.

Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. I’d like to put in a statement on behalf of Senator McCain, who was not able to be with us this morning.

Chairman LEVIN. Of course. That statement will be made part of the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

I extend my congratulations to Admiral Mullen and General Cartwright on their nominations for the two most senior positions in the Armed Forces, that of Chair-
man and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I thank them for their continued service to our Nation.

Each of these officers has an impressive record of achievement—Admiral Mullen as a Surface Warfare Officer, and General Cartwright as a Marine Aviator. Their joint duty assignments and senior leadership experience combined with their deep knowledge and understanding of the Armed Forces make them uniquely qualified to serve as the principal advisers to the President, National Security Council, and Secretary of Defense.

If confirmed, they will be installed during one of the most challenging times in our Nation’s national security history. We have been involved in a violent struggle against the forces of militant extremists since al Qaeda terrorists killed Americans on September 11. Now we are fighting extremists in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other spots across the world. While the struggle is currently centered in Iraq and Afghanistan, we must be prepared and postured to successfully defend our Nation and its interests around the globe for years to come.

Let me turn briefly to Iraq. We have made a great many mistakes in this war, and both Baghdad and Washington remain divided about how to correct them. There are no easy choices in Iraq, and the temptation is to wash our hands of this messy situation. To follow this impulse, however, would portend catastrophe. Withdrawing before there is a stable and legitimate Iraqi authority would turn Iraq into a failed state and a terrorist sanctuary, in the heart of the Middle East. We have seen a failed state emerge after U.S. disengagement once before, and it cost us terribly. In pre-September 11 Afghanistan, terrorists found sanctuary to train and plan attacks with impunity. We cannot make this fatal mistake again.

It is clear that the overall strategy that General Petraeus has put into place, based on a traditional counterinsurgency strategy that emphasizes protecting the population—and which gets our troops off of the bases and into the areas they are trying to protect—is the correct strategy. Some of my colleagues argue that we should return troops to the forward operating bases and confine their activities to training and targeted counterterrorism operations. That is precisely what we did for three and a half years and the situation in Iraq only got worse. No one can be certain whether this new strategy, which remains in the early stages, can bring about ever greater stability. We can be sure, however, that terminating this strategy as it is just commencing will result in certain failure.

In an op-ed piece in the New York Times yesterday, Kenneth Pollack and Michael O’Hanlon addressed security progress that they witnessed during a recent visit to Iraq. They call upon Congress to sustain this effort and not force a precipitous withdrawal. I have attached their op-ed to my statement for inclusion in the record.

I would like to thank our nominees and their families for their service and look forward to their speedy confirmation by the Senate. I also wish to state my appreciation to General Pace and Admiral Giambastiani for their years of service. They have my best wishes for the future.

Above all, I want to recognize the men and women of our Armed Forces and their selfless efforts throughout the world. Their task is anything but easy. They have served multiple tours in combat zones and in difficult assignments around the globe. They do so with courage, determination, and skill that leaves us in awe. The success of our Armed Forces begins with the individual servicemember and we are eternally grateful for their willingness to serve our Nation, and the support provided by members of their families.

Chairman LEVIN. Admiral Mullen?

STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral MULLEN, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and distinguished members of the committee, good morning, and thank you for the opportunity to be here with General Cartwright, as you consider our nominations for Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I appreciate your time and all of the support this committee provides our brave men and women, and their families. I’m also grateful to the President, and to the Secretary of Defense, for their confidence in me. I appreciate the love and support of my wife, Debra,
here with me, and that of our two sons, Jack and Michael, both of whom serve on Active-Duty in the Navy.

Finally, I'm thankful for the opportunity and privilege to continue to serve.

Should you confirm me, please know that for the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, and their families, who have—and are—performing so nobly, and sacrificing so much, I will represent them with the full measure of my effort. To listen, to learn, and to lead.

Mr. Chairman, I realize the war in Iraq weighs heavily on your mind, as it does on the minds of the people of this great country. It weighs heavily on mine. In a moment I will share some thoughts about that conflict, but before I do, let me outline what I believe will be my three overarching challenges as we look into the future.

The first challenge is the defense of our national interests in the Middle East. Iraq and Afghanistan, for sure, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, Sunni/Shia rivalries, the rise of Islamic militants, the resurgence of al Qaeda, Lebanon—all threaten to tear at fragile seams, and all bear directly on the safety of the United States.

I'm especially concerned about the increasingly hostile role played by Iran. I support diplomatic efforts to counter Iran's destabilizing behavior, and hope their leaders will choose to act responsibly. But, I find their support for terrorism, and their nuclear ambitions deeply troubling.

My second challenge will be resetting, reconstituting, and revitalizing our Armed Forces, particularly the ground forces. There is strain. We are stretched. Though recruiting and retention figures, in general, remain good, and morale is still high, I do not take for granted the service of our people or their families, and I worry about the toll this pace of operations is taking on them, our equipment, and on our ability to respond to other crises and contingencies.

I'm committed to achieving a two-to-one troop rotation as soon as possible. I'm committed to making sure our wounded warriors come home to the very best medical treatment possible, in the very best medical facilities we can provide. I'm committed to providing the equipment they need, specifically, and urgently right now, more Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles quickly to the fight. To make sure broken equipment gets fixed, and worn-out equipment gets replaced faster.

The U.S. military remains the strongest in all the world, but it is not unbreakable. Force reset, in all its forms, cannot wait until the war in Iraq is over.

My third challenge is the proper balancing of strategic risks for the future. Current operational commitments are creating significant demands on the force. I worry, that with all of the focus on Iraq, which is certainly appropriate, the Nation might lapse into complacency about our still-mounting global responsibilities. The longer, larger war on terror—and I believe it is a long war—will likely take our troops to places we do not now foresee, and will demand of them skills they may not yet possess.

At the same time, we must stay ready to deter, if possible, and defeat, if necessary, threats from regional powers who possess conventional and, in some cases—in some cases—nuclear capabilities.
How we stay engaged around the world—which we must do—how we build and maintain partnerships—which we must do—will largely determine our ability over the long-term to do so for the Nation all that it expects of us. We must rebalance our strategic risks carefully, and as soon as possible.

Let me now turn to Iraq, for you have a right to know where I stand. I believe the surge is giving our operational commanders the forces they needed to execute more effective tactics, and improve security. That is happening. Security is better. Not great, but better.

I believe security is critical to providing the Government of Iraq the breathing space it needs to work toward political national reconciliation and economic growth, which are themselves, critical to a stable Iraq. Barring that, no amount of troops, in no amount of time, will make much of a difference.

I look forward, as I know you do, to hearing from Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus in September. I believe prudence dictates that we plan for an eventual drawdown, and the transition of responsibilities to Iraqi security forces, and we need to do that wisely.

I understand the frustration over the war, I share it. But I am convinced that, because security in Iraq is tied to security in the region, and because security in the region bears directly on our own national security, we must consider our next moves very carefully.

The Joint Chiefs are completing our own assessment. I plan to, again, visit the theater myself in the near future to better understand conditions on the ground. We are a military at war, Mr. Chairman, and war is ugly, messy, and painful. Our troops are fighting with honor. They are sacrificing bravely and greatly, sometimes with their own lives.

Two short weeks ago, I pinned a silver star on a young man, a Navy SEAL, who risked his life to save that of a comrade. I’m inspired by the opportunity, the privilege, to continue to lead men and women of our Armed Forces through what will surely be, beyond Iraq, a protracted campaign that will define the quality of American life for generations to come.

Whatever our tasking may be in the future, we are obliged to the American people to defend them and their interests. To make sure we are ready in every way, across every military mission, to do their bidding. We must be able to win both wars, and the peace that follows.

Should you confirm me as the next Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you’ll have my unmitigated and unwavering dedication to that task. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Admiral, thank you so much.

General Cartwright?

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General CARTWRIGHT. It’s an honor to come before you today for this confirmation hearing. I want to express my sincere thanks to you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner, for your prompt consider-
ation of this nomination, especially given the other pressing demands before this committee.

Also, to the members of the committee with whom I've met over the past several days, for taking the time to discuss the position, and my nomination.

Mr. Chairman, I am truly honored to be nominated by the President for the position of Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I am a marine. I took an oath to serve my country when I joined the Service, and it's been a privilege to serve soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines for nearly 4 decades. It is an honor to be considered for this position, it represents a major personal challenge, and I'm humbled by the responsibility it entails.

If confirmed, I will provide my straightforward, candid, professional advice. I look forward to answering any questions you have of me today, and, if confirmed, a continuing dialogue with this committee.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General Cartwright.

Let me begin by asking you both the standard questions that we ask of our nominees, and you can both answer at the same time, if you would.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.

General Cartwright. I have.

Chairman Levin. Have you assumed any duties, or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

Admiral Mullen. No, sir.

General Cartwright. No, sir.

Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.

General Cartwright. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.

General Cartwright. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request, before this committee?

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.

General Cartwright. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree to give your personal views, when asked before this committee to do so, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.

General Cartwright. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents—including copies of electronic forms of communication—in a timely manner.
when requested by a duly-constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.

General Cartwright. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

We'll have an 8-minute first round for questions.

Admiral, do you agree—given the purpose of the surge, which is to give the Iraqi Government what you and the President call “breathing space” to make the political compromises needed for reconciliation and a political settlement—that there's been very little, or no, progress in terms of political settlements?

Admiral Mullen. Yes sir, I agree there does not appear to be much political progress.

Chairman Levin. Do you agree—I think your statement made this clear—but let me ask you directly, that without a political settlement or a coming together and reconciling differences, that there is little, or no, hope of ending the violence in Iraq?

Admiral Mullen. Mr. Chairman, in my statement, I try to be very focused on this, that security is absolutely necessary to provide the opportunity for the political center of gravity, in Iraq, which is the political movement on the part of that government. That needs to happen. Clearly, the space is being created, and the political environment in Iraq, and that government needs to move forward.

Chairman Levin. As you put it, no amount of troops can solve their political problems for them?

Admiral Mullen. Over time, no sir, I don't believe they can.

Chairman Levin. Now, assuming that there is a continuing failure of the Iraqi political leaders to reach a political settlement, there's going to be a range of options that we're going to need to look at. Because you've said that the failure to achieve tangible progress towards reconciliation will require a strategic reassessment. Give us the range of options that you think need to be considered, if September comes along, and there's still no political progress. Start from, at one end, an announcement that we're going to begin to reduce troops, starting at a particular time, transitioning to a more limited mission on the one hand, and on the other hand, continuing the surge as it currently is. What options lie between those that you believe need to be considered if this failure of the Iraqi leaders continues?

Admiral Mullen. I think it's very important, Mr. Chairman, as I indicated to get to September, and I'm very anxious to hear, in particular, what Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus have to say. I have not spent time on the ground lately, and I think it's vital that we hear what they have to say, particularly with respect to the progress in the areas of politics and economics, which are lagging in security.

Chairman Levin. If the report is that there's continued failure in that area, what do you view as the options that should be considered?

Admiral Mullen. I think over time the options are—on the one hand, to continue the mission as it's described, which is basically a security mission, mostly with the United States in the lead, turn-
ing it over to the Iraqis in time. We are doing some of that now—but mostly the operation that’s occurring right now is with the U.S. in the lead—at a level, from a security standpoint, not to exceed the 15–12 rotation numbers that Secretary Gates has laid out there. Because I’m very concerned about exceeding that would start to break on the Armed Forces. It gets to Senator Warner’s point, which is, longer-term preservation of the All-Volunteer Force, which I think is vital.

A second option would be to start to turn over the security mission to the Iraqi security forces more rapidly—basically, put them in the lead as quickly as possible, and as they were able to provide for that security, start to transition our forces out to a lower level.

A third option, on the other end, would be to just move out as soon as possible—and, in that second option, and actually in the first two options—I think it’s important that we sustain a capability to fight al Qaeda. That we not let Iraq implode, from an overall security standpoint, and that in this transition, we give the Iraqis an opportunity to both lead—from a security standpoint—as well as politically.

The third option would be to do it expeditiously. By expeditiously, I mean, at the other end of the pole—move out rapidly, and just bring troops home as rapidly as possible. With what I understand right now, I would caution against that, at this point. Because I am concerned about that kind of rapid withdrawal, and what it might mean—not just for Iraq, but what it would mean in the whole region.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Admiral, Secretary Gates has often expressed support for open debate in Congress on Iraq, and he said that, for instance, the debate here on the Hill, in terms of reduction of forces in Iraq, changing course in Iraq, was useful in terms of letting the Iraqis fully understand the impatience here at home, and the importance of their getting on with their domestic reconciliation, and the importance of political reconciliation to the success of the enterprise in Iraq. Do you agree with Secretary Gates’ statements about the importance and value of the debate here on the Hill, in terms of putting pressure on the Iraqi leaders?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir, I agree that the debate is important, it is valuable, and that it certainly could put pressure on the Iraqis, to see exactly what we’re doing.

Chairman LEVIN. Is that pressure on them useful?

Admiral MULLEN. If I were to measure that by the amount of political progress, thus far, I think it’s useful from our perspective, I’m not sure it’s had the impact some of us would expect it to have, in terms of them moving forward politically, and some of the other areas, but particularly politically.

Chairman LEVIN. Is it desirable that they feel pressure to reach political settlement?

Admiral MULLEN. I think we need to bring as much pressure on them as we possibly can.

Chairman LEVIN. Admiral, you’ve indicated in your pre-hearing questions that we should continue our strong support for local police units in al Anbar Province, and other areas. Have you seen press reports that indicate that our support for those units—par-
particularly those Sunni units in al Anbar Province—that the Iraqi Government has not agreed to that concept? Disagrees with the arming of the—particularly Sunni—police in al Anbar? Have you seen those press reports?

Admiral MULLEN. I have seen, I think, one report to that effect, within the last week.

Chairman LEVIN. Does that create a caution in your mind, that if trying to provide security in one area creates a problem in terms of the Iraqi political leaders, particularly the Prime Minister of Iraq, disagreeing with it, that we could be—in a sense—making a political reconciliation more difficult?

Admiral MULLEN. What I've learned—particularly the Middle East—is that we need to be mindful that when we make a move, there can be unintended consequences—good and bad—associated with that. We just need to be mindful of that as much as we can, ahead of time, before a move is made.

In this particular area, I have a tremendous amount of respect for David Petraeus and for Ryan Crocker. At this point, it's really over to them. They clearly are in favor of this. In addition to the political reconciliation in Baghdad, at the head of government level, there is an important level of political reconciliation which needs to take place in the villages, in the tribes, on the ground. So I certainly think that's going to be a very important connection to make, as well.

Clearly, that is starting in al Anbar. The leadership in al Anbar in recent months has gotten fed up with al Qaeda, and it's been that combination of both the security we've provided, and the leadership that is provided in the tribal areas that has started to turn that around. I would, at this point, certainly not push back on that. That doesn't mean the alarm bell that may be going off in Baghdad, with the Government, isn't a valid alarm.

Chairman LEVIN. My time is up. [Recess.]

We appreciate your patience during that interruption, and we will now call on Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'd like to follow up on the chairman's dialogue on the importance of your leadership, as it relates to this most complex situation facing us in Iraq.

I'm always one to go back and study history. I just want to step back to November 2006. The chairman and I had come back from Iraq at that time, and we both gave our respective views, and I indicated that Iraq was, in my judgment, aimlessly sliding sideways. We are coupled up to go back again, here, very shortly on another trip.

But on that November 30, 2006, President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki made a joint statement, following their meeting in Amman, Jordan. I want to quote that statement: “The Prime Minister confirms the commitment of his government to advance efforts towards national reconciliation and the need for all Iraqis, and political forces in Iraq, to work against armed elements responsible for violence and intimidation.”

Now, moving to January 10, 2007, when President Bush addressed the Nation with his new strategy, following a series of studies performed in the administration, the Joint Staff made a
contribution—you remember that period very well Admiral Mullen, you were part of that.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. There were consultations with Congress. The President made that rather dramatic statement on January 10 about the military surge that was required, in his judgment, augmentation of forces, to bring about what he and Prime Minister Maliki agreed upon, in November, in Amman, Jordan.

In his January 10 statement, again, he said, “If the Iraqi Government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American people, and it will lose the support of the Iraqi people. Now is the time to act. The Prime Minister understands this.”

Yesterday, the Iraq parliament adjourned without passing any laws. You have answered in the advance questions, your own candid assessments, and you’ve discussed them this morning.

So, we’re faced with what I view now, is a surge of our military forces, working with the Iraqi forces, and I think credit should be given to the Iraqi forces, as having performed in a credible manner, in their partnership of the two military organizations, to perform the surge. If we see evidence, coming forward now—as you indicated in your opening statement—of success data points in the surge—not total, but indications.

The surge is moving forward, successfully. But the Maliki Government is sliding backwards, and is failing in the partnership that was established as the predicate, the foundation, for the surge concept of January 10.

Now, you are faced with that. You have to sort this out. My first question to you—what would be the consequences if America failed to achieve that degree of stability for the Iraqi people, who have voted for, and achieved, sovereignty. I don’t look upon this as achieving victory—just achieving a security so that the Iraqi people can fully exercise a range of sovereignty, and hopefully that nation will join other nations in that region.

Now, given that, what are the consequences if this program fails? Right now, it is a measure of failure. The military going forward, the central government going backwards. What are the consequences, or is it perceived that we, the United States, have failed to bring about that level of security, and maintained it so the government can take its place in the world?

Admiral MULLEN. I think the principal consequence that would concern me most is the stability in the region. Which is why, when I asked about possible alternatives, and I know everybody understands this, but I think we need to reemphasize it, we must move in a measured fashion.

One of the reasons I supported the surge, was because I felt that it was very important to change the calculus. There were questions out there that were unanswered, about will more troops make a difference? Can we provide this security? Can we take that issue off the table to focus more specifically on the other legs of the stool—the economy, and the political aspect of this.

Clearly, it has given us an opportunity to do that. In our moves in the future, I think, we need to be mindful of that, as well. To
be sure, as we move, that if the calculus changes, that we can see, clearly, what we should do, and do so in a measured way.

I worry a lot about moves that would turn Iraq into a cauldron, and I think that would be—not just bad for the people of Iraq, not just bad for the people of America—but for our vital interests in that part of the world.

Senator WARNER. What about the consequences to the economies of the world, about an unpredictable energy source in that region?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Sixty percent of the known oil reserves—I’m not talking just about Iraq—are in that region. If there’s instability there, that would have direct consequences on the world economy.

Admiral MULLEN. Vital interests certainly include sustaining stability in that part of the world. Specifically, resources and oil. Both near-term and long-term is the al Qaeda threat, which we must continue to address that we don’t put Iraq in a position where their neighbors are emboldened, and could move in. That’s why I would argue strongly for measured moves, that we clearly understand the risks.

Senator WARNER. We have to address the consequences in Iran.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Iran developing a nuclear capability, and weaponry. The Palestinian conflict, the security of Israel—it all is tied together.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes sir, it is.

Senator WARNER. We can’t look at Iraq in isolation, do you agree with that?

Admiral MULLEN. I agree with that, yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. General Cartwright, let’s look in the situation of this surge forward and the government backwards. The troops today are smart, and they follow these things. They recognize that they were called into this battle in this surge, on the predicate there would be this partnership, between the Maliki Government, and our President, and the coalition forces, to succeed.

How do you think that the troops accept their challenge to lose life and limb, to carry out their orders, when they see the other half of the partnership is absolutely failing?

They communicate with their home base, they read newspapers. They’re as current on affairs as we are.

General CARTWRIGHT. Senator, they are smart. They are aware of their surroundings, and they are aware of the objectives that have been set in front of them—both the military objectives, and the objectives to bring the government and the economy into a more favorable vector.

They believe in their mission, they’re going to do their best to provide the head room—if we use that term—to allow that government the opportunity. But, there comes a point at which they’re going to look at that, and say, “How much longer? For what price?” if progress isn’t seen.

Senator WARNER. Right.

Finally, I say to both of you—Congress in its appropriations bill, had language, the language started in this committee, to create an independent analysis of the Iraqi security forces under your former colleague, General James Jones, Commandant of the Marine Corps
and our most recent NATO Commander. That is up and running quite successfully, I've worked with them. General Jones put together a team of a dozen or so retired admirals, two police chiefs, and they're looking at the viability of the Iraqi security forces today, and what they'll look like tomorrow, and in the immediate future.

To his credit, Secretary Gates, I went to talk with him, has given them tremendous support, to go into Iraq, where they've just completed a week's study, they intend to return. I hope that we can receive the commitment from both of you that you will support that entity—the independent study—as established by Congress in the appropriations bill, to go forward and make that analysis.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. I spoke with General Jones before he went, and basically just reviewed with him what he expected to do. I have not spoken with him since his trip, and certainly there's no one I have more personal respect for than Jim Jones. I've served for him, and with him, so I'm sure that he will put together a very valuable insight into what's going on with the Iraqi security forces.

Senator WARNER. That will be available in that timeframe that you focused on so carefully in your testimony—early September.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. I spoke with General Jones before he went, and basically just reviewed with him what he expected to do. I have not spoken with him since his trip, and certainly there's no one I have more personal respect for than Jim Jones. I've served for him, and with him, so I'm sure that he will put together a very valuable insight into what's going on with the Iraqi security forces.

Senator WARNER. That will be available in that timeframe that you focused on so carefully in your testimony—early September.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. You, likewise? He'll need support from time to time, logistically, and so forth. That will be forthcoming, then, from the JCS?

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, sir. I will support him. I have met with him since he has returned, to ensure that I understand the scope of his mission, and we will work to ensure that he gets the tools he needs to conduct that independent analysis.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Admiral, we also, in terms of giving us assurance, the assessment that you referred to that the Joint Chiefs are performing, I assume, would also be made available to this committee?

Admiral MULLEN. That assessment, Mr. Chairman, is part of the internal deliberations in the tank to support advice to the President. Certainly, if brought forward to discuss that, I'd be happy to talk very frankly about my participation in that.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator Kennedy.

Senator KENNEDY. I join in welcoming you, Admiral Mullen and General Cartwright. Admiral Mullen has extraordinary experience—seven command tours, and his experience has been broad, deep, and really, extremely impressive. You've been dedicated to the Navy, the Nation's security, and we thank you for your professionalism, and quite frankly, thank you for your honesty and candor, and thoughtfulness in response to the questions that have come here today.

On that Joint Chiefs' assessment—I have my own assessment, along with the chairman—as I understand, that will be available to the President, but not to Congress? Is that going to be in early September, as well?

Admiral MULLEN. That assessment is really their internal deliberations, tied to advice both to the Secretary of Defense and the President of the United States.
Senator KENNEDY. But your understanding, that’s going to be in a timely way to be there at the time when the General——

Admiral MULLEN. We expect to do that in continence with all other activities in September.

Senator KENNEDY. I thank you, Admiral, and I listened carefully to your response about the cauldron in Iraq. I believe, quite frankly, we’re in a cauldron at the present time, I’m not sure that the continued presence of American troops is useful and helpful in dampening down the kinds of intensity of the violence that we’re seeing over there at this period of time. I think you’ve stated very clearly the range of considerations, but we read that National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report, it is—as described—a situation where Americans are constantly getting caught in the crossfires.

General Cartwright, I think you remind us with your own background and experience of the extraordinary bravery and courage of the service men and women, and they’ve been over there 4 years. I’m always reminded, having brothers who served in World War II, that war lasted a considerably shorter period of time than this has lasted in a country of 28 million people, and a country that we, basically, scorched 10 years ago. They had a third-rate military kind of an operation, and we have our men and women that are suffering and dying there, longer than we fought in World War II, and they deserve the best policy. For the very reasons that you’ve outlined—because of their courage and their bravery. That’s what many of us are interested—as both of you are—in attempting to do.

Admiral Mullen, I’m concerned about when the President announced the surge—he talked about security, he talked about the opportunity for political reconciliation and reconstruction. I think that most of us understand that on those issues, the political reconciliation, we haven’t seen much evidence of, the conflict has continued, and the reconstruction program has been hardly much to mention at all.

The issue that is very much before the American people is the timeliness of, when is this judgment, and when your decision is going to be made? You’ve outlined different alternatives now. We had in January, when this surge was started, Secretary Gates said, it was viewed as a temporary surge. In February, Secretary Gates told the Senate Appropriations Committee, “I think General Petraeus believes he’ll have a pretty good idea of whether this surge is working, probably by early summer.” In April, Secretary Gates told us more time would be needed. I think its been General Petraeus view all along, sometime, at some point, during the summer, mid- to late-summer, perhaps, he has thought that he would be in a position to evaluate whether the plan was working.

In May, the President said even more time would be necessary, he told us General Petraeus said, “It would be at least the end of the summer, before we can assess the impact of this operation.” Congress ought to give the Petraeus plan a chance to work. A week later, Secretary Gates said the administration would make their evaluation of the situation of the surge in September.

On May 9, Lieutenant General Ray T. Odierno, the Commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq, said the surge needs to go through the beginning of next year, for sure. Then on July 20, General
Odierno again admitted that it would be at least November before the military could provide a real assessment.

What the American people want is a real assessment. They want it in a timely way. They've had assurance, by the President and the Secretary of Defense, that we would have that in September. You've indicated that, from your responses to the questions from the chair and Senator Warner, that you thought you'd be prepared to make that judgment as well.

Can you give us the assurance now, that that is your timetable?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. That we are going to have that judgment from you as to what these alternatives are by September?

Admiral MULLEN. It is, to the best of my understanding right now, the intent of Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, to come in and deliver that assessment in September. I talked about the timeliness of the Joint Chiefs assessment as well.

Senator KENNEDY. Let me ask you, comments that you made in your earlier statements, if you could clarify about some of the things you wrote in your questions to the committee. You suggested that we, “Work with the Government of Iraq to achieve a long-term security agreement, that supports our mutual interests.” Yet, you wrote that you agree with the U.S. policy not to seek permanent military bases. Can you clarify what you mean by “long-term security agreement” and what you mean by a “commitment measured in years, not months”?

Admiral MULLEN. I think that, Senator—and I'll just reiterate what I said in my answer—that I understand the United States' position with respect to permanent military bases, I don't expect any. I think it is very important in the long-term strategy, which has been laid out in the end state, that Iraq is an ally in the war on terror, and that we have a relationship which is supportive of each other in that part of the world.

Senator KENNEDY. So the long-term security agreement does not include the permanent bases?

Admiral MULLEN. That's correct, yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. I'm sure you believe, know, or understand that the Iraqis believe those bases that are being built over there, are going to be permanent American bases. At least, that's the view of many.

Just shifting, because the time is moving on—I'm very impressed by what you have talked about, and your vision of the 21st Century Navy, the fifth part, where you talk about the training, the new challenges for training the professional military officers. You need to have the firm grasp, and you've reviewed those fundamentals—my time is short, you're familiar with this—in tactics, technology, and leadership. You've indicated that this was your intention, as the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), that you were going to have increased diversity rewards for continuing education training, the institutionalization of executive development. I don't know whether you've referenced it as, Winston Churchill said, “Battles are won by slaughter and maneuver. The greater the General, the more he contributes to maneuver, the less he demands from slaughter.”

Do you want to just comment?
Admiral Mullen. I'll go to Senator Warner's comment about the All-Volunteer Force. I think that we, as leaders, need to pour ourself into the development of our people in the future. It's across that full spectrum in what I see as a very challenging world and global responsibilities and leadership from the United States, which is very important.

Senator Kennedy. My time is up. Thank you very much.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.

Senator Collins.

Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Mullen, this morning you described our troops as being strained and stretched, and this is a concern that I share, and that I think every member of this panel shares. We've seen longer deployments, more waivers granted to recruits with criminal records, we've actually seen an extension of the age limit for recruits. We've also experienced considerable difficulty in filling specialty positions, such as for linguists—which are obviously very important in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Press reports have said that more than 50 Arabic linguists have been discharged from our Armed Forces since the, “Don't Ask, Don't Tell” policy was instituted. In addition to this loss of translators, the estimates are that there were more than 11,000 other servicemembers that have been separated since “Don't Ask, Don't Tell” was instituted by Congress, back in the early 1990s.

I've recently met with a retired admiral in Maine, who urged me to urge you to reexamine the “Don't Ask, Don't Tell” policy. In your view, should we reevaluate this policy?

Admiral Mullen. Senator, the current policy and law is, as you've described. It's a policy that came in a time and was greatly debated at the time that it was actually put in place.

I'm supportive of that policy, I really think it is for the American people, to come forward, through this body, to both debate that policy, and make changes, if that's appropriate.

That's how I see it. The current policy is one I support, have supported, and until it changes, or really changes both in policy and law, that's where I am.

Senator Collins. Would you encourage Congress to reevaluate the policy?

Admiral Mullen. I'd love to have Congress make its own decisions with respect to that. [Laughter.]

Senator Collins. Let me switch to a different issue, involving Iraq. You've discussed this morning the possible consequences of a rapid withdrawal, in response to Senator Warner's question. Some of the proposals that members of Congress have been putting forth, particularly in the House, mandate a rapid withdrawal with a starting date, and an end date.

Now, aside from the dire consequences, in your view, of a rapid precipitous withdrawal on the Iraqis, on our country's security, and on the region—are there logistical concerns? Some of the proposals would give our troops very little time to withdraw—just a matter of a few months. Is it practical, from a logistics and safety concern, for a rapid withdrawal in a matter of months, to be undertaken?

Admiral Mullen. Should we be put in that position, make the decision to do that, we need to be, I think, mindful that it will,
logistically, it’s a physics problem, it’s just physically going to take us some time to move. We have an extraordinary amount of equipment there. We would have to decide, what we would leave, what we would bring back, and what we would repair.

In addition to that, I am extremely concerned in any transition scenario, ensuring that we do it in a way that protects our troops. That we don’t expose them to the kind of challenges that could be brought on. There’s risk in being there now, there will be risk in any kind of transition. But that we plan for, and make sure that, any exposure is both understood, risks are understood, and we absolutely minimize it, to support their safety.

Senator COLLINS. Finally, I cannot leave this round of questioning without bringing up a concern that you and I have discussed many times. That is the adequacy of our shipbuilding budget.

As CNO, you’ve done an extraordinary job in providing funding toward the goal of a 313-ship fleet. That is, at a minimum, what I believe is necessary to ensure that we have the sea power necessary to project force. We have a real challenge from China, for example, which is rebuilding its fleet at an alarming rate.

If you are confirmed, will you continue to advocate for a 313-ship fleet?

Admiral MULLEN. As of today, Senator, I am still the CNO, and I’m still working hard to develop, support, and fund the plan to which you refer, for 313 ships, which I think is vital for our country.

Certainly, while I will have vast responsibilities, across the entire Joint Force, and mindful of that, and we’ve spoken to many of those—I’ll never lose sight of what that number is, and how we’re doing.

I would also thank you for your continued support for shipbuilding, and in particular, the shipyard, which is so special to us, in building our new ships, and all of the citizens of Maine who do that, and do that exceptionally well. They are national treasures.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Collins.

Senator Lieberman.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Admiral Mullen and General Cartwright, for your extraordinary service, and your willingness to take on these critical assignments at this critical time.

General Cartwright, I think you’re finding out this morning that one good thing about being Vice Chairman, is that you get asked less questions than the Chairman. [Laughter.]

But, that will only be on occasions like this.

Admiral Mullen, most of the time has been spent on Iraq, I don’t really want to go over that much more, except to thank you for your answers. I think they’ve been straightforward, and important for us to hear.

You were asked in the question period whether you thought there was any purely military solution to the problem in Iraq, and you said, no—I want to say that, as one whose strongly supportive of what we’re doing in Iraq, I totally agree with you. In the end,
it has to be a political solution. The military presence there is a necessary, but not sufficient, basis for an ultimate solution.

It’s necessary, one, because you have this real sectarian violence, it’s going on after these people have been liberated from a brutal dictator.

Two, you have some outside forces that are stirring up the sectarian violence, and don’t want a political solution to occur.

Now, I’m speaking particularly about al Qaeda in Iraq. Why are we there? I thought in one sentence, or two sentences you gave a very logical way—not only why we’re there, but why when we talk about a drawdown, to do it in a sensible, planned way. That is because security in Iraq is tied to security in the entire region. Security in that region of the world is—and has always been—tied directly to American security.

That’s why we’re trying to get the Iraqi military to be able to provide the security that is necessary for an ultimate political solution.

I want to go in my questions to Iran. You mentioned it in your opening statement, you said you were concerned with Iran’s aggressive posture, and destabilizing activities. Could you just say a little bit more—in more detail—about what concerns you most about Iran’s activities today, in the Middle East and beyond?

Admiral MULLEN. I alerted strongly a year ago, when the Israelis went into Lebanon, and the support that was clearly there from Iran to support Hezbollah. Not that it was new, but it was clearly highlighted in a way that the world could see.

Iran is now supporting the Taliban, in the Middle Eastern view of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

Senator LIEBERMAN. Because they’ve not previously been allied, correct?

Admiral MULLEN. They have been pretty strong enemies.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Enemies. So why would you think it was——

Admiral MULLEN. So, that strategic shift, for them to me, is a big deal.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Admiral MULLEN. The resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan is of concern.

Senator LIEBERMAN. So do you think that’s, when you say “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” it’s us?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir, absolutely. That’s my view.

Senator LIEBERMAN. I agree. If the Taliban’s against us, then Iran—no matter what the previous hostilities with the Taliban, are going to support the Taliban now.

Admiral MULLEN. Clearly we have strong indications to evidence that they have provided technology that is, has made its way into Iraq, is now making its way into Afghanistan, and which are killing our soldiers and coalition soldiers.

Those are what I consider to be facts, in addition to the rhetoric, which is very strong, in addition to the clear support of many things in Southern Iraq, and then I would just back off to just my CNO hat, as I have watched them operate over the last couple of years in the Persian Gulf, to Senator Warner’s point about the re-
sources that flow through that Gulf, and the immediate global impact of strangling that out.

It is that combination of things—in addition to the pursuit, certainly, of the capability of developing nuclear weapons. This isn't just a view I've developed myself, because I've talked to our friends in that part of the world, I've interacted with many of the Gulf States. The leadership of those States are very concerned about it, and it's very important we assure our friends there, now and in the future, that we will be there for them, and that all ties into this whole regional stability piece. So, it is that combination of things that makes me very concerned about Iran, and where they're headed.

Senator LIEBERMAN. That's part of the explanation of what you meant about the impact of how we conclude, or go forward with our presence in Iraq?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Senator LIEBERMAN. If we do it too rapidly, if we do it before they're ready, we create the cauldron, it will send a signal to our allies in the region, and it will, of course, encourage Iran.

Admiral MULLEN. I think we need to do it thoughtfully, measured, understand the risks, and be prepared for that.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. Based on that "enemy of my enemy is my friend," would you agree that one of Iran's goals now—both in Afghanistan and Iraq, and generally in the region, is to try to push the United States out, or to push us, at least, into a less prominent position?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. I would agree with that.

Senator LIEBERMAN. That's a real concern. I would say not only to us, but all of our allies in the region, including particularly, the moderate Arab allies, and of course, Israel.

I want to thank you for being specific about the importance of the Gulf, and the passage of oil through that Gulf. We sometimes hesitate to do that. We have put ourselves—not to go on about it here—into a dependent position when it comes to how we power our society, we use too much oil from abroad. But, the fact is, that's real now, and as Senator Warner suggested—and you've answered—we ought not to be hesitant to say that one of the reasons we need to maintain stability there—and have the military presence, for instance, that the Navy represents under your leadership in the Gulf, is that a crisis there could raise the price of oil so high that it would have a devastating impact on the world economy, but let's be appropriately chauvinistic—on America's economy, and on the quality of life of tens of millions of Americans.

We now have two carrier battle groups in the Gulf, is the second one still there, or do I understand it may be deploying out?

Admiral MULLEN. We try not to discuss where they are and what they're doing publicly, Senator.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay.

Admiral MULLEN. But, clearly we've had a Navy presence there since the late 1940s.

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right.

Admiral MULLEN. I would expect we would continue to have that—and we will continue to have aircraft carriers and other naval assets in that part of the world, and we do.
Senator Lieberman. Right. Always the ability, in a moment of crisis to move naval assets there rapidly.

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.

Senator Lieberman. Final question—totally different part of the world, but as we're engaged in the battle against Islamist extremism, Iran, al Qaeda, et cetera, there's a world out there that we're trying very hard to manage, of rising superpowers, particularly China—manage diplomatically, to avoid conflict. But, you said in your prepared response, that you believe long-term trends suggest that China is building a military force scoped for operations beyond Taiwan. Could you just talk about what you meant, and how you feel about our relations with China?

Admiral Mullen. Clearly, their investment, their high-end capability submarines, surface ships, they're talking now about bringing an aircraft carrier within 2 to 3 years—and the technologies, and the weapons, the aviations side—all of which give them more capability than to just defend Taiwan.

I said in answering the question, a peaceful rise of China, given many things including the economic engine that she is, is a very good thing for the world. What I've spoken about consistently, is the transparency of their development, on the military side—and it has not been transparent, I actually hosted my counterpart here—a few months ago—he had that message loud and clear, and I actually hope, later on or in mid-August to return that visit, to China, in a continued desire to make and sustain contacts and engagements, so we do understand each other better.

It's very important, thank you very much.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.

Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, I have had the opportunity to spend some personal time with the Admiral, and certainly believe that he and the General are outstanding nominees. This is my first hearing, and I want to thank you for the protocol that you have in place, number one, the questions and answers that they both have extensively answered, and having those in advance, and second, the first come, first talk protocol that you have here.

Because this is my first meeting, and I certainly do not expect to ever do this again, I'm going to defer to some of the more senior members, I know they're anxious to ask questions, and I appreciate the opportunity to do that.

Chairman Levin. You're very wise to indicate you're not going to repeat that mistake in the future. [Laughter.]

Senator Corker. Okay, thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

In that case, Senator Cornyn is next.

Senator Cornyn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank Senator Corker, and welcome him to the committee as well. It's nice to know some of us are gaining a little bit of seniority, thanks to the addition of new members on the committee.

Admiral, General, welcome. Thank you, again, for your service to our Nation, and your willingness to take on this huge challenge.

I haven't been here the whole time, but I want to allude to an op-ed piece that appeared in the New York Times yesterday by Mi-
chael E. O’Hanlon and Kenneth M. Pollack, which is titled, “A War We Might Just Win.” Interesting title.

They say that here’s the most important thing that Americans need to understand. We’re finally getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms, and they talk about what victory might look like. They call it “sustainable stability,” what they see as the victory there. They point out to the high morale of our troops, a huge contrast with the mood here in Washington, DC.

During the debates we’ve had on the way forward in Iraq, and whether, and on what conditions we might withdraw our troops, I’ve always believed that we all want our troops to come home, as soon as possible, but the difference between us are those who want to do so on a timetable—without regard to conditions and consequences, and those who believe that it ought to be based on conditions on the ground. We ought not leave Iraq without the ability to sustain and defend itself, not just because of what it would mean to our allies, but what it would mean to us, in terms of a failed State in Iraq, and the encouragement and emboldening that it would provide to al Qaeda, and our other enemies.

Would you summarize, perhaps, Admiral, what you view as the consequences of a withdrawal from Iraq that’s based on a timetable, without regard to conditions on the ground?

Admiral MULLEN. If I may just briefly speak to the op-ed piece, Senator, which you brought up. One of the things that struck me about that, certainly, that it would come from individuals who were very pessimistic, as they said, I think, as recently as a year ago. That said, they focused on the military side, and I feel very strongly that that, clearly, is starting to go well, and providing the kind of space and time we talked about earlier, in order for the Government of Iraq to move forward.

The other thing that struck me was in my most recent trip, which was over the holidays, was the contrast between what I found on the ground, in theater, and what I thought was going on based on being here. They spoke to this, as well. I really do think that’s an important piece for all of us, and it goes back to listening to General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker when they come in, and really understanding, and having their birds’ eye view for what’s going on, so that when we make decisions, we have that view in mind.

I worry about a mandated timetable. I worry about mandating to any commander on the ground. Because it severely constrains an operational, or a tactical, commander. I’m a warfighter at heart, if I’m on the other side, and I know the timetable’s out there, it’s going to create an opportunity for me to do some things to possibly take advantage of that. It doesn’t mean I win, but certainly I can put that in my calculus.

That said, and General Petraeus said it yesterday in an interview, the surge is scheduled to start to be relieved in the spring, just with rotational units—and that it is temporary—that’s what the Secretary of Defense has said, and we need to be mindful of that, as well.

So, there is a time element here, there is a condition on the ground element here, and I think it is the mixing of those two that
we need to be mindful of, in terms of decisions that we make in a measured way.

Senator Kennedy and I talked about a cauldron. Certainly there are parts of Iraq that are not going well right now. I'm concerned that it will turn into a failed State, one that emboldens Iran, and other neighbors, those kinds of things, when I talk about a cauldron. That would impact, not just Iraq and the Middle East, but us.

Senator CORNYN. While there do appear to be objective reasons to be more optimistic, although as far as our military is concerned—

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir, I would agree.

Senator CORNYN.—there seems to be an attitude that if we just put enough pressure on the Iraqis, on the governance side, that we can somehow force them to do, or persuade them to do things that they might not otherwise do, or on a timetable that might be more suitable to our preferences.

What I've always wondered is, if we put so much pressure on the Iraqis that they collapse and are unable to govern themselves without a lot more bloodshed, perhaps, a lot more confusion and chaos in the meantime, that would seem to me to be a bad thing, to put that much pressure on them.

I don't really know how to gauge that. I'd be interested in your thoughts. How do we know that we're putting, let's say, optimal pressure on them, to encourage them to govern themselves, to take that responsibility, but not so much that they just collapse, and create that failed State that we all are concerned about.

Admiral MULLEN. I struggle with that as well, Senator. I don't have a specific answer with respect to that. I do, again, go back to Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus, and their views of that, because they are there, to me, seemingly, they would be able to—particularly the Ambassador—answer that question better than anybody else. How far along that curve are we? That they may collapse any minute, I just don't know.

Senator CORNYN. Mr. Chairman, in the spirit of Senator Corker, I will yield back my remaining time.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much.

Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Admiral and General, not only for being here today, but for your extraordinary service to the Nation and the naval service. Thank you very much.

You said, Admiral Mullen, in response, I believe, to a question of Senator Levin, that you were going to do your utmost to maintain rotations of no more than 12 to 15 months. Effectively, that means—as you also suggest—by next April, regardless of the conditions on the ground, the surge will end, because we simply will not be able to put manpower on the ground, unless we extend rotations. Is that a fair assessment?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir, that's fair.

Senator Reed. So, all this discussion of conditions on the ground, let the thing play out—I think are trumped, essentially, by an overwhelming reality of our force structure. It has to end next April, the surge. I think we have to begin to think about the end of the
surge. There is a timetable directed by the force structure that we have, and I think both of you gentlemen recognize that. I think, again, we seriously have to consider what happens after the surge. That is a lot of what you will be thinking about, and General Cartwright will be thinking about.

But, this notion that we’re going to have an unlimited opportunity to keep forces there at this level, that we’re only going to take forces down based upon General Petraeus’ suggestion that things are okay now, I think, is fully rebutted by the force structure. Is that fair?

Admiral Mullen, I think that’s fair, Senator. The other—and this gets to responding to Senator Levin’s question about options, and how is the transition to the Iraqi security forces going, when does that take place—back to Senator Cornyn’s point—I think all of us want to bring our forces home as soon as we can. Those are other aspects of this that certainly will be informed by understanding where we are with respect to how Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus see it.

Senator Reed. I appreciate the fact, and I just spent an evening with both General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker about 2 weeks ago. They’re terribly talented individuals who are doing their best, but it seems that what is really driving the situation—first, our force structure, second, again, I think you’ve suggested this, there’s been no real political progress on the ground. That was one of the premises of the surge, that there would be some significant political progress. Those two factors, I don’t think, will be significantly altered in the next 60 days, or maybe even 6 months. Do you have any comments on that?

Admiral Mullen. I’m actually very committed to waiting until September to see where those two individuals are, sir.

Senator Reed. Let me change subjects, slightly. What is Admiral Fallon’s role as the Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), given that every suggestion by the White House is that General Petraeus will be the deciding voice, in fact, even, I think, General Pace’s role seems to be somewhat diminished. Are you concerned about that, in terms of, Chairman of the JCS, your role as incumbent will be, as the Chief Advisor to the President, will not be the chief advisor to the President on this issue?

Admiral Mullen. My view, if confirmed to this position—and it is actually my view as a member of the Joint Chiefs—is General Petraeus, while a very important individual, and clearly one for whom I have the greatest respect—is one voice. He has a couple of bosses, one of whom is Bill Fallon, and Bill Fallon is working this very hard, as well. I know that. I’ve spent time with him. He has a voice in this, and will have a voice in this, as we move forward. The same is true with the Joint Chiefs, and General Pace has led that effort very well.

Senator Reed. One of the persistent problems is the inability of non-DOD elements to complement the increased forces, military forces, with civilian actors.

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.

Senator Reed. Do you see any progress on that front? If there is not progress on that front, how do we address the needs of reconstruction, how do we address the report by the International Crisis
Group, which I believe was issued yesterday, which basically declares Iraq as a failed State? Huge numbers of people who are without even access to water, and frankly, that is a contrast to 2003. How do we deal with that? If you’re talking about stability, one of the most destabilizing elements is people who are starving, and thirsty, and desperate.

Admiral Mullen. Senator, one of the reasons I supported the surge, was because of our Government’s commitment, not just the military lines, but the economic and political lines. Not just to have Ambassador Crocker work the problem, but expand that base.

We’ve expanded the number of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), they are, in fact, being stood up, over the fall. I am concerned about the pace of that—the other arms of government are much more engaged with this surge than prior to that surge, I’ve been concerned for a long time about the depth and capacity for that kind of capability. I think we have to have it as a government, not just for this run, but for the future.

I remain concerned about that. It’s better than it was, but it’s not where it needs to be.

Senator Reed. Just a final point. I have seen reports, news reports, that were broadcast by al Zawahiri, that basically suggested that, they see us as being trapped in Iraq. If we disengage, that will be something that would not be consistent with what they see as a strategy they feel is working very well for them. Is there any credence in terms of that?

Admiral Mullen. When I laid out the three challenges in my opening statement about the Middle East, and certainly Iraq and Afghanistan as a part of that, and security in that area. That is what I believe my leading challenge will be. We need to take steps which assure that we are stable for the short- and the long-term there. That we move, in Iraq, with that in mind. I don’t consider that a trap, I consider that we clearly have very complex, very tough challenges, that we have to work our way through.

Senator Reed. Thank you very much. Again, Admiral and General, your great service to the Navy and Marine Corps, and your perspective service as the Chairman and the Vice Chairman is something I think will give confidence to all of us.

Admiral Mullen. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.

Senator Graham.

Senator Graham. Thank you. My compliments to both of you for your service to our Nation to pick up where Senator Reed left off. About 2 years ago, we had this debate about, do we need more people in the Army or the Marine Corps, and there was a pretty strong push-back that we didn’t. Looking back, was it a mistake not to build up the Army and Marine Corps sooner?

Admiral Mullen. I’m very supportive of building them up, yes, sir.

Senator Graham. How many troops can we muster to stay in Iraq on a sustained basis, come April?

Admiral Mullen. If you drop the guidelines, the specific 15–12 rotation—

Senator Graham. Let’s assume we kept them.
Admiral Mullen. If we keep them—we can continue coming down, we can rotate troops in behind the ones that would rotate out, coming down from 20 right now, to 15, which we do without relief. Based on what the mission is—15 brigades—based on what the mission is—

Senator Graham. I'm an Air Force guy, just give me numbers. I don't do brigades. How many people will we have?

Admiral Mullen. We have 160,000 there now, certainly as we come down, we could back fill them. But, as I indicated earlier, Senator, I'm very concerned about the stress that is placed on our people. I think we have to put that into the equation.

Senator Graham. So let's put that in the equation. Would it be your advice, what you know now, what troop level could we maintain without breaking force, given the 12–15 month dynamic, come April?

Admiral Mullen. If we start to come down, it would take us a couple of years to get us into a one-to-one rotation, that means 1 year over, 1 year back. We have to come down to about 10 brigades, or let's say half the force that we have right now, to move us towards a two-to-one rotation. Roughly, in that ballpark. Which means, over for a year, back for 2 years. Which is our goal right now.

Senator Graham. So, we would be reducing our force presence by half?

Admiral Mullen. To achieve that, yes, sir. But it would take us awhile to get there.

Senator Graham. How long?

Admiral Mullen. Probably 3 to 4 years.

Senator Graham. Now, we're trying to grow the size of the Army and Marine Corps, and I assume, General Cartwright, you support that?

General Cartwright. I do. Yes, sir.

Senator Graham. The number we're picking for the Marine Corps, is that the proper number, in your opinion?

General Cartwright. The 202,000 would allow us to get to this 2 and 1 ratio, sooner. That sooner would not be measured in multiple years, it may cut off a few months, because we have to, not only train them, but we have to buy the equipment to equip them. When you put the two of those together, getting those forces into the field, and making them operationally viable is going to take you 2 to 3 years.

Senator Graham. Admiral, when it comes to the Army, have we picked the right number, in terms of growing the Army?

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. As far as I understand right now, in fact, I've spoken with General Casey about this as recently as yesterday—and we discussed this, and where General Casey wants to go is to get to the 547,000, which is the currently approved number, and then evaluate where we need to go.

Senator Graham. Is it pretty clear that elements of the Iranian Government are actively involved in killing American soldiers?

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.

Senator Graham. What do we do about that?

Admiral Mullen. I think we need to continue to, certainly, make a point of that in every forum that we have, work hard on shutting
off the paths that the technology is coming through, and consistent with my concern with their very strong statements about where they're headed, and the support of the terrorist regimes, I think we need to address that very strongly.

Senator GRAHAM. Why do you think they're trying to kill American soldiers?

Admiral MULLEN. Basically, in support of continuing to try to make it difficult for us in Iraq. Actually, in Afghanistan, as well.

Senator GRAHAM. So, it's your belief that Iran is trying to, basically, drive us out of Iraq so they would, I guess, be a winner, if we left?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. Why do you think they're trying to kill American soldiers?

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Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. So, it's your belief that Iran is trying to, basically, drive us out of Iraq so they would, I guess, be a winner, if we left?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Senator GRAHAM. How would they win?

Admiral MULLEN. I think that the Shia connection between Tehran and Baghdad is one of great concern. The influence that they have with the Badr, the Mahdi Armies, is of great concern. It's very difficult to predict how that would play, specifically, in terms of what Iran would do, but I think they'd be much more comfortable with a Shia-run government right next to them.

Senator GRAHAM. If it was perceived throughout the world that the United States lost in Iraq, who would be the winners?

Admiral MULLEN. Clearly, Iran would be. The challenge we have with respect to al Qaeda, which I think we have to continue to address, under all circumstances, there would be the Islamic theocracies, the radicals, would certainly be seen to be on the winning side.

Senator GRAHAM. General, are we—through the surge—diminishing al Qaeda's presence and viability in Iraq, or not?

General CARTWRIGHT. We are challenging it. In that challenge, in areas, we are diminishing it, for sure. They are resilient. They seem to have an unlimited pool from which to draw from, if you're on the battlefield. In other words, as we defeat, others come in behind.

But, the environment in which they're finding in Iraq, with the surge, currently, is an unfriendly environment, and that's challenging their ability to be resilient in that area.

Senator GRAHAM. How would you define winning in Iraq, Admiral?

Admiral MULLEN. I worry a little bit about the terms “success,” “failure,” “winning,” and “losing.”

Senator GRAHAM. Wars are about winning and losing.

Admiral MULLEN. I understand that. Yes, sir, I understand that. A stable Iraq, which can govern itself, has control of its borders, and gets to a level of national and local reconciliation, as well as it not becoming a safe haven for al Qaeda.

Senator GRAHAM. How would you define winning, General Cartwright?

General CARTWRIGHT. My sense is that we find a government that observes the rule of law, number one. Number two, that we have an economy in that country that's improving. Number three, we have security. Number four, it sits in a strategic location, geographically, it sits between extremists and moderates, and that in that position it helps us, in a regional construct, as we've spoken
to, to help the area and the region develop in a more logical and measured way.

Senator GRAHAM. How would you assess our likelihood of winning, given what you know now, Admiral Mullen?

Admiral MULLEN. I think it’s very important, back to the regional stability, Senator, that we take steps to ensure that it is secure.

Senator GRAHAM. The question is not whether it’s desirable to win, but the likelihood of winning. We all know it’s desirable to win, but the likelihood?

Admiral MULLEN. Based on the lack of political reconciliation at the government level, although I spoke earlier about some of it going on, at the local level, which I think is important, I would be concerned about whether we’d be winning in Iraq.

Senator GRAHAM. General?

General CARTWRIGHT. I think we can win, Senator. It’s going to be a challenge. In September, we’re going to get the opportunity to assess that the path we’re on is the right path, or whether we want to make adjustments, but we do have the ability, and we do have the staying power to do that. From a regional perspective to create the environment that we want to create out there.

Senator GRAHAM. Finally, do you see Iraq as part of a global struggle? Or an isolated regional event?

Admiral MULLEN. At this point I see it actually, not isolated but rather regional and global. I have come to believe that there are very few struggles around the world that don’t, these days, have global impact.

Senator GRAHAM. Would you agree this is a war, really, we can’t afford to lose, when it’s all said and done?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham.

Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I’d like to welcome both the Admiral and the General. It’s kind of scary to say this, but I’ve known Admiral Mullen for more than 40 years now. I think that he is the right individual for this job. He’s someone who’s always been known for his clarity of thought, and for having the courage of his convictions. I think we’re seeing that at this hearing here today.

General Cartwright, with your background, not only tactically, but also having had enormous strategic responsibilities in our country, I wish both of you well.

I’d like to just say something for the record, with response to what my colleague from Texas mentioned on this op-ed piece. Just to clarify, my thoughts from the individuals who wrote the op-ed piece in the New York Times yesterday, at least one of them, was one of the big supporters for the invasion of Iraq in the first place. Mr. Pollack wrote a whole book about why we should go in. Whatever the findings on the ground, I don’t think we should be characterizing this as people who have been turned around by recent events.

Also, Admiral, I think you know this, and I was really gratified to see the scope of your testimony, with respect to our strategic obligations around the world, and also the fact that you mentioned
that we need to get back to the goal of a 2-to-1 rotational cycle for our troops.

But the question, really, has never been, from this side, whether we should pick one specific date, in terms of withdrawing from Iraq. The question has been, how we recuperate, as a Nation, for what many of us believe was an enormous strategic blunder. Going into one specific country, that was not directly threatening us, at a time when we needed to be focusing on international terrorism at large, and the other strategic considerations that you mentioned in your report—and that really goes to how we balance all of our national assets, not simply the military assets—and what does it mean? What does it mean to fail? What does it mean to succeed? You’ve been asked a number of leading questions here with specific terms in them. But, in reality, what we have to be doing here, is to figure out the right configuration of national assets, that will allow us to diminish our presence, physically, in Iraq, at the same time increasing the stability of the region.

I don’t think we focus on this enough, when we start talking about the problems in Iraq. That, the issue of regional instability, what you’ve alluded to a number of times in your testimony, is the key. Not simply regional instability if we were to make a precipitous withdrawal, but regional instability now. Largely as a result of the fact that we went into Iraq in the first place. We’re now seeing oil at a higher level than ever. We’re pushing $80 a barrel on oil. That’s always an indicator from the international community about its unease with what’s happening in that region.

We’re seeing turmoil with refugees, inside and out. The number that I’ve seen is about 4.5 million refugees, about 2 million of those, right now in Jordan, straining that government. We’ve seen sponsorship of ethnic factions from the outside, we’ve spent a good bit of time talking about Iran. We should also be talking about the Saudis, the numbers that I’ve seen is the Saudis actually have a plurality of suicide bombers in Iraq.

We see instability on the Turkish border, with respect to Turkey now being threatened by the strength of the Kurdish communities up there, and how it would affect Kurdistan at large.

So, really, the question becomes, to what extent our military presence in Iraq affects this instability, and to what extent these issues should be dealt with through robust diplomacy? I’d like your thoughts on that.

Admiral Mullen. I think that, back to my constant refrain on regional stability, and then, specifically, getting to what to do about Iraq, I think they’re inextricably linked. We, as we make decisions about moving forward, need to keep that in mind.

You’ve described a few of the complexities that are clearly here. It’s where we are, and we need to be mindful of that as we move forward. I don’t think you can tear them apart, I don’t think you can de-link them. Many of these questions don’t have an answer that is very exact, this is, “I know what we should do, therefore let’s do this,” which is why I would argue for us to move through this in a very measured way.

We do have regional and global responsibilities, that are very much tied to how we move forward here.
Senator Webb. Right, and I think that the thing that we often miss in this debate, because it’s become like the Battle of the Psalm, politically, in terms of the way people have dug in up here on trying to resolve this issue, but there are instabilities that have been created, simply because we’re there, and there are instabilities that could result if we leave in the wrong way. But we do need, in my view, to be moving toward that.

May I ask you, with respect to this notion of permanent bases—we all agree that there shouldn’t be permanent bases, but how do we define a permanent base? I read an article yesterday that said, “Well, we’re using sand bags instead of concrete,” but my view is that there ought to be a different way to measure that. How do we define a permanent base, when we say we’re not going to have one?

Admiral Mullen. The way I think about it, is we have permanent bases in places overseas right now, be it Germany for the Army, for instance, or Okinawa for the Marine Corps, or Cuzka for the Navy—those are permanent bases, where we have permanent change of station (PCS) people, we have PCS families, in many cases. In Bahrain we don’t, we certainly have strong support there. That’s where I would draw the line. I recognize the significance of the issue.

Senator Webb. I would say the term is—where I’m trying to get here is—the term really has more diplomatic overtones than it does structural.

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.

Senator Webb. A lot of people who wanted to move us into Iraq were openly saying that we should be on the ground in Iraq for the next 50 years. I would assume you don’t agree with that?

Admiral Mullen. I certainly haven’t put any kind of timetable like that. I do think we will be there for years, not months, but I don’t see it as, on a permanent basis.

Senator Webb. When you mentioned, if you move to the 2-to-1 rotational cycle, it would take 3 to 4 years to get there, this was in response to Senator Graham’s question. Would you say it would take 3 to 4 years to get to 2-to-1, or 3 to 4 years to get to 80,000 troops in Iraq?

Admiral Mullen. If we get down to about half of where we are right now, somewhere around 8 to 10 brigades, it is my understanding is it’s about 3 to 4 years, in terms of being able to sustain that with a rotation that isn’t to——

Senator Webb. Just simply in terms of drawing out the rotational cycles——

Admiral Mullen. That’s right.

Senator Webb. Given the current mission.

Admiral Mullen. Also, the new troops, the increased end strength in the ground forces, and we have a tendency to focus on personnel only and for not just the Army, but also the Marine Corps, and to General Cartwright’s point earlier, we have to provide the equipment—both repair it, as well as buy it, and train them.

Senator Webb. If I may, Mr. Chairman, just one short question, I don’t want General Cartwright to think that he was being totally ignored.
I have a much more parochial issue, but having worked in the Pentagon and knowing that the sorts of things that the Vice Chair works on, it seems to me, with such a high percentage of officers in the military right now having enlisted service, that we have a cap, generally, with Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA), of 30 years aggregate service before you're forced to retire. It seems to me that we're losing a lot of really highly-qualified officers, who particularly, if they go through a program like the Marine Corps Enlisted Commissioning Education Program (MECEP), or something where they have college time that counts against their Active-Duty time—we're losing a huge number of people with a lot of talent, right about the 20-year level, when they become lieutenant colonels, or commanders—wouldn't it be logical to start the clock again for a lot of these people when they're commissioned, in terms of their 30-year career?

General CARTWRIGHT. My sense is that, when we look at it, at what's going on today, that the shortfalls that we have, where we would like to have a little more capability than we do, are in the mid-grade officers and mid-grade enlisted. They really are—in Marine terms—the strategic corporals out there. Their decisions carry strategic consequence on the battlefield.

Having a seasoned force in that area—and that talks to grade-shaping, and those types of activities, is to our benefit. We're looking at that, we're considering the options, we have made some adjustments in how long people can serve, and how we compensate them for serving longer, but I think you bring up a good point, and if confirmed, we'll take a look at that.

Senator WEBB. I would like the opportunity to pursue that at the subcommittee level.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Chairman, can I just take 60 seconds to respond to that question?

Chairman LEVIN. Try 30 seconds.

Admiral MULLEN. It's been my experience, Senator Webb, with the 20-year goal out there, from when you come in to when you're going to retire, is one that you really have to work hard to penetrate. I've seen many great line-of-duty officers who leave as lieutenants at the 20-year mark. So, I don't disagree with the possibilities here, but we, I think, would have to really come to grips with, how do we make the incentive beyond 20? I mean, significantly.

Senator WEBB. Let me clarify what I'm saying. You have someone who's 10 years enlisted, 10 years an officer, who maybe, when they get to the 30-year point is making lieutenant colonel, who conceivably could be flag officer. But they're topped out.

Admiral MULLEN. Right.

Senator WEBB. They're gone, and you're losing a great resource.

Admiral MULLEN. I would support that.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator Chambliss.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, let me add my thanks for your service to our country. You're doing a terrific job, and I look forward to both of you being elevated to a different position, where you can provide even stronger leadership.
Yesterday there was an announcement regarding foreign sale of arms. First of all, what comments can you make relative to the countries to whom a decision has been made, at least by the administration that's come into Congress, relative to those sale of arms? How much of an input did you gentlemen have in that decision, and how big a role did that decision play in this issue of regional stability that you allude to, Admiral Mullen?

Admiral Mullen. Let me try to work it from the last question first, Senator Chambliss. It played a significant role in terms of regional stability, because I think we need to ensure that our friends in that area can be reassured and supported as we do in many places throughout the world.

I can't give you a list of who's there, because I haven't seen it, but my specific involvement was tied to the ship piece of what I believe is in the package—I haven't seen the final package—but what I believe is in the package, specifically with respect to Saudi Arabia. I've worked that in the building, in terms of support. I've seen a list in the newspaper, but I can't respond—I just don't know in terms of the level of detail of all of the other countries that are actually in the package.

Senator Chambliss. General Cartwright, any additional comments?

General Cartwright. Senator, I have not been involved in those discussions. Obviously, if I'm confirmed, then I would have the opportunity to participate. But I would focus on the regional issues, and the stability and the balance that it either does, or does not, bring to the region.

Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, based on your comments to Senator Graham in response to his questions, would you consider Iraq to be the focal point of the global war on terrorism today?

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. I think that al Qaeda in Iraq is, specifically, and not giving them a safe haven there. I'm also concerned about the reemerging safe haven they have in Pakistan, and that is clearly the focal point right now. But, I don't limit it to that, because al Qaeda is out and about in lots of places in the world.

Senator Chambliss. That being the case, and also with your comments relative to the fact that we know that Iranians today are participating in the attacks against our soldiers on the ground in Iraq, is a military option against Iran, or is there a military option against Iran that is lurking out there?

Admiral Mullen. I would hope that we could address this issue, and these issues about Iran, diplomatically. I think, as is always the case, for me, military force should be used as a step of last resort, and that's where I'd put it right now.

Senator Chambliss. Let me switch gears a minute to Afghanistan, we talk a lot about Iraq, obviously, but after our initial success in Afghanistan, it's been necessary that we increase the size of the force structure there, a lot of activity on the ground and otherwise, in Afghanistan. Give us your quick summation of where we are, relative to the conflict in Afghanistan?

Admiral Mullen. In reviewing, starting last September as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we started to look heavily at Iraq and Afghanistan, and we'd actually, in that review, and the Afghanistan piece, have looked for resurgence of the Taliban, com-
ing out of the winter thaw, and a significant challenge with respect to that resurgence. That resurgence, based on what I thought was going to happen, to the level that we had predicted it would happen, and what has actually occurred, has not been as significant as I thought it would be.

That said, I am concerned about its resurgence. Clearly, the forces there—and there are American forces, as well as the forces from NATO—are very important in moving ahead, and so it's not as bad as we had, or as I had seen it to be at this particular point. That said, it isn't going away, and it's something I think we're going to continue to need to address.

Senator Chambliss. Are you comfortable with the speed with which the Pakistani military is moving against our enemies in Pakistan?

Admiral Mullen. I'm extremely concerned about the safe haven which is being built in the Fa Ta region. I am moved in a positive direction that, in fact, President Musharraf has directed the Army to move in that direction. I know, having been there recently, that is a huge challenge for him. I honestly don't know, Senator, how fast they could react. I am concerned with the speed with which the safe haven is building up.

Senator Chambliss. With regard to these force structure changes that we have inside of Iraq today, and the new strategy we're pursuing, if we're looking at taking down that force structure in April, based upon what you know today, are we accomplishing the mission that additional force structure was dedicated to?

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. We are.

Senator Chambliss. At this point in time, without knowing what's going to be said in this report next month, are we seeing the kind of positive results that would justify—irrespective of whether or not we have the soldiers to go back in and replace those folks—are we justified in thinking that we can reduce the size of the force structure next spring?

Admiral Mullen. Part of that is how much security do we have next spring? It's very difficult for me to answer that right now. The heart of the challenge right now, clearly is in Baghdad. General Petraeus has said, and I take him at his word in this regard, that he has no expectation that it will be sustained beyond the spring. I saw him say that as recently as yesterday.

Senator Chambliss. What about the improvement of the Iraqi Army to step in behind us and maintain the security in those areas—particularly of Baghdad, that we have at this point in time, cleaned out, and are now holding?

Admiral Mullen. The report is that it's moved well in some areas, and that in other areas it's uneven. In addition to the Iraqi security forces, General Cartwright talked about this earlier—key as well, is the development of the police force in Iraq. They've clearly made progress. In fact, the Iraqi security forces on the military, in some cases, are performing independent military operations, which is terrific. We're moving in the right direction here. In some areas, not as rapidly as we would like to be.

Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.

Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Mullen, I congratulate you on your nomination.
Admiral MULLEN. Thank you, sir.
Senator BEN NELSON. I believe you have the depth of knowledge and experience to lead us through these very difficult times to some conclusion on our mission and our transition to a new mission in Iraq.

General Cartwright, you and Sandy have been a very vital part of our community in Omaha, and we’re going to miss you. I want to thank you for putting together the Global Innovation and Technology Center in Omaha, which has invited community, private sector management, and others, to develop new strategies and innovations in our thinking in support of STRATCOM, and we appreciate that very much. It will be a legacy to, not only the community, but I think to our military.

As we look at the September 15 date, then recognizing the realities of April, and given the fact that the President spoke last week about Iraq and said al Qaeda and Iraq 95 times in a very short period of time, shouldn’t the mission be transitioning to fighting al Qaeda as soon as we possibly can? I know Senators Collins, Warner, and I and others felt that the surge should be focused in al Anbar and other areas where al Qaeda existed, rather than trying to intervene to create some sort of temporary situation in Baghdad to give the government a chance to catch it’s breath, or as I think, General, you said some head room, to be able to do this.

If the President said 95 times our threat in Iraq is al Qaeda, why wouldn’t we be repositioning and transitioning as soon as possible if we know what’s going to happen in April? Why wouldn’t we be getting ready for that today, and transition the mission to fighting al Qaeda and supporting the government in helping develop their peacekeeping, their military, and police positions for security, and taking security of the border, and protecting our assets in Iraq? Why wouldn’t we look to do that more immediately, rather than wait? Or will we, if the report on September 15th would justify it, would we then begin to transition our troops into that mission?

Admiral MULLEN. In the counterinsurgency that we’re involved in, and I won’t speak for General Petraeus, but my understanding of it is, principally we have to protect the people. Security for the Iraqi people is where that surge is focused and it is providing that. It is moving in that direction. We have a ways to go.

Senator BEN NELSON. Will it be temporary or will it be permanent?
Admiral MULLEN. I don’t know sir.

But even in this counterinsurgency surge operation, the focus is also very much on al Qaeda. That is, and in fact, it is a combination of the tremendous men and women in the Army and the Marine Corps, in particular, out west in Anbar, combined with the strategic shift of the tribal leadership, which has created a much more secure environment in Anbar than existed as recently as 6 or 7 months ago. Whatever our mission might be, whether it’s what we have right now or when it changes, an enduring piece of this is going to be focused on al Qaeda. I think that is now and it will be no matter what. We are making progress there.
Senator Ben Nelson. We're making progress, but they keep growing in terms of their numbers and capabilities. So, under that theory, wouldn't we want to put more emphasis on that part of the surge? We supported going into al Anbar, we supported the counterinsurgency efforts, overall. What we didn't support was trying to intervene in somebody else's civil war. All the talk about who wins strikes me as being odd because I don't think you can ever win somebody else's civil war.

They have to win this war. We have to help them win a peace. I think that's where our goal has to be. If al Qaeda is the biggest threat to—it's been described as the biggest threat to—the future of the Government in Iraq, I would think that we would be putting more emphasis, sooner—without having to wait until September 15 to decide to do that—because of the urgency of the moment.

Admiral Mullen. My understanding Senator, is there's a tremendous amount of emphasis on this now. In fact, it's the Sunnis, in particular, in Anbar who are turning out al Qaeda.

Senator Ben Nelson. With our help?

Admiral Mullen. Yes sir, absolutely. It's a combination of things. Having made that strategic shift our way, it's made it much more difficult for them.

Senator Ben Nelson. But isn't it also occurring somewhat in the north, in the Sunni regions as well?

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ben Nelson. Do we have sufficient troops in the north to help the tribal leaders fight against al Qaeda?

Admiral Mullen. Everything I understand is, yes we do sir. We do. It's actually reasonably stable up there, with the exception of a couple spots.

Senator Ben Nelson. Well then, why would there be a suggestion that al Qaeda is growing in its strength in Iraq?

Admiral Mullen. My understanding is, clearly al Qaeda is growing in its strength in terms of the safe haven, in Pakistan, specifically. My assessment at this particular point—and I'd have to go back and do some research—but my assessment is that they are actually not growing in Iraq, that in fact, the intensity with which we're engaging them is severe and will continue to be severe.

Senator Ben Nelson. I guess I'm still of the opinion that if we have them on the run, we ought to take them out and put whatever forces it takes to do that, because that's going to have a more enduring impact than trying to keep the temporary peace in Iraq for an Iraqi Government that is taking the next month off, while we continue to fight.

Now, I've been a supporter of the benchmarks because I've always felt that we talk in terms of winning, losing, and gaining ground. What would you say, in terms of evaluating the success on the ground in Iraq, in terms of some metric? Are we 20 percent toward our goal there, are we 30 percent, or 10 percent, or 50 percent or more?

Admiral Mullen. I couldn't give you a number, Senator. I just don't know. I know we're significantly better than we were. We're headed in the right direction. That's what the discussion is about—and I think Dave Petraeus had this right. It took us several months to get the 5th Brigade there, which got there in June.
There’s been significant positive steps taken in security since the 5th Brigade was there. We’re on a campaign right now to continue that and that’s why I think he deserves the time to see how far he can move this before we make judgments about where to go again, where to go next.

Senator BEN NELSON. I agree with you in not setting an end date to how long our troops will be there, not to send the message to our enemies and adversaries as to what date we plan to withdraw or what our plans are. But I don’t agree that we shouldn’t begin the process of transitioning troops into a larger effort against al Qaeda at the present time. That’s something we could begin doing now. We wouldn’t have to wait until September 15. If the September 15 report says we ought to do it, we ought to do it with warp speed, recognizing the realities of how difficult it is to begin to move people into that effort.

Admiral MULLEN. Certainly.

Senator BEN NELSON. I’ll finish with this last question—if we did move to that kind of a mission rather than continuing to try to intercede in a civil war, would that result in a drawdown of troops?

Admiral MULLEN. Clearly, if we only did that, if we turned the security issue and the security challenge over to the Iraqi security forces.

Senator BEN NELSON. But we would go ahead and continue to support the borders and our assets and the Iraqi Government and the military?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes sir, but it would amount, essentially to turning the security mission over to them and we would, clearly, focus on al Qaeda, and it would result in, I think, fewer troops.

Senator BEN NELSON. A significant number or do we have any idea?

Admiral MULLEN. It would depend on the threat. It really would depend on the threat.

If I can, just for 1 second, on the border issue. There are discussions about borders and keeping them secure—that is something I’m not enough of an expert, although I’m concerned about it, and I need to go study it—is historically, that’s a real challenge, keeping borders closed, or securing borders. That discussion needs to be, I think, mindful of a significant amount of capability from wherever, whether it’s the host nation or some other country that it would take to do something like that.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, and congratulations to both of you. I look forward to working with you.

Admiral MULLEN. Thank you, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

Senator Martinez.

Senator MARTINEZ. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Admiral Mullen, General Cartwright, welcome to both of you and congratulations on the new undertakings that you’ll be assigned to and asked to serve. I appreciate and thank both of you for serving at this difficult time for our Nation.

In asking something fairly local, Senator Nelson and I both are Florida Senators, and are very concerned about the situation at Naval Station Mayport in Jacksonville, FL. Admiral, I know you and I have talked about this from time to time in your position as
The question really has to do with the situation at Mayport and the viability of it into the future, relating to a disbursal of our nuclear carrier fleet on the east coast. I wanted to ask your position on the strategic disbursal of our Atlantic fleet carriers on the east coast, and if you agree that it is in our national interest to ensure that we maintain two nuclear carrier ports on the east coast of the United States?

Admiral Mullen. I am, Senator, and I'm on the record more than once for this, very supportive of strategic disbursal of our carriers. I also consider the King's Bay, Mayport, Jacksonville hub a vital part of our, both strategic interests and key for, not just capability, but for our people for the future. As I look at what I think the challenges will be in recruiting and retaining, sailors—in particular—and their families for the long run, it's a great hub that I think we need to continue to invest in.

Senator Martinez. Thank you. I appreciate that.

Shifting to the broader issues that have been discussed so much here this morning, having to do with our situation in Iraq. I wanted to ask, perhaps both of you, to comment on this, if you would.

One of the things that continues to concern many of us is the interference by Iran in the violence that takes place in Iraq. I know that last week there was an important diplomatic interaction, which I'm not sure in the past has yielded any benefits and perhaps it won't in the future as well, from a military standpoint. What can we do to better protect the borders of Iraq from intrusion by Iran and Syria? Having those two States continue to increase the violence, increase the weaponry, and the training for those who seek to continue to create violence in Iraq?

Admiral Mullen. I think from the Iranian border perspective that it is vital for us to continue to try to make sure our forces, our security forces, coalition security forces, are engaged in, at every level—and our entire Government, actually—engaged at every level to stop the kinds of weapons which are coming across that border from coming in.

I said earlier, I don't believe a military response is appropriate at this time. I would never take that off the table, with respect to Iran for the exact reason that you lay out. I think the diplomatic path needs to be visited, we need to continue to address it diplomatically, and in my view, it shouldn't necessarily just be through us or direct engagement. Iran has friends, needs, and supporters in large and significant countries that they're engaged with that also may offer avenues to bring pressure on Iran to cease providing this kind of capabilities.

Senator Martinez. In other words, those countries that are involved with Iran, in trade and commerce and other ways that are important to Iran.

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.

Senator Martinez. That they should also manifest their opposition to their involvement.

Admiral Mullen. Absolutely.

Senator Martinez. General, is there anything you'd like to add on that?

General Cartwright. The only thing that I would add, Senator, is at the tactical level, we should never cede our responsibility and
ability to defend ourselves. If we find these adversaries in Iraq, and they’re challenging our forces, we don’t give up the right to go after them, number one. Number two, if we know with attribution who they are, then we ought to hold them accountable. First, through the discussion you just had. But, like the Admiral, I would not take military action off the table force, if all other means don’t work.

Senator MARTINEZ. Again, being a Florida Senator, we are very interested in U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and all that it does with our partners and neighbors in the Western Hemisphere. I just wanted to ask whether you felt that they have the sufficient forces and all the necessary equipment that they would need in order to fully exercise their mission? I think one of the great concerns is the potential for a mass migration situation emerging from Cuba, if that country should become destabilized.

Admiral MULLEN. Senator, you have a very active engaged commander down there, by the name of Admiral Jim Stavridis.

Senator MARTINEZ. Wonderful guy.

Admiral MULLEN. I hear from him constantly about what additional things I need to be doing to support them. We really are working hard to support that. We have the U.S.N.S. Comfort, the hospital ship down there.

Senator MARTINEZ. Right.

Admiral MULLEN. This summer, for several months, and she has seen thousands—50, 60, 70,000 patients on this trip in various countries. We have the global fleet station manifested by the high-speed vessel the U.S.S. Swift, which is engaging countries down there. We have our combatants, some of our combatants that are down there. In recent times, we have as much, if not more, capability deployed down there across all the Services, as we have in recent times. That’s in recognition of what I think is a real need to be engaged and to stay engaged for the future.

Senator MARTINEZ. There’s not been enough said about the Comfort and the wonderful job that they’ve been doing in the region. I’ve read some recent reports of their work in the Nicaraguan region and I think it’s terrific they are there. The kind of good will that they are bringing and the kind of healing and hope that they’re bringing to children and others in the region, I think, is commendable, sir.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. Thank you.

Senator MARTINEZ. It’s a great thing.

In addition to the obvious for SOUTHCOM, I’m also concerned about Colombia on Plan Colombia and the implementation of Plan Colombia, and the commitment that I feel is so important that we continue to have the improvement of the security conditions in Colombia, as a great regional partner and ally, and I wonder if you might comment on that. Again, I’d open it to both of you to comment.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

I think what Colombia has done in recent years has been extraordinary in terms of addressing the challenges that government had, in terms of the crime associated with the drug trade. That strategic support for that needs to continue.

I’ve met with my counterparts—actually I’ve met with the last two Chiefs of Naval Operations—and, certainly pledged to continue
that. It is still a huge challenge and I think we need to be very
strong on that.

General CARTWRIGHT. I would agree, but on this question and
the previous question, the shortfall that probably worries me the
most about SOUTHCOM is our ability to support their intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance needs. We have to improve that in
order to help some of these nations help themselves.

Senator MARTINEZ. My time is up.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Martinez.

Senator Bill Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you.

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service to our country.

Admiral Mullen, I don't know you as well as I know General
Cartwright, because I've had the privilege of working directly with
him on all of the strategic stuff. But, your reputation is impeccable.

Putting on my parochial and my national hat, as Senator Mar-
tinez has, let me just state for the record that one of your prede-
cessors as CNO, Admiral Vernon Clark, said, “Overcentralization
of the carrier port structure is not a good strategic move. The Navy
should have two carrier-capable homeports on each coast.” He went
on to say, “It is my belief that it would be a serious strategic mis-
take to have all of those key assets of our Navy tied up in one
port.” That was in response, for the record, specifically talking
about the disbursal of the nuclear carriers in the Atlantic Fleet.

Likewise, Secretary of the Navy, Gordon England, now Deputy
Secretary of Defense has said on the record, “My judgment is that
dispersion is still the situation. A nuclear carrier should be in Flor-
da to replace the U.S.S. John F. Kennedy to get some dispersion.”

Senator Martinez and I have just had a meeting with the Sec-
etary of the Navy, and he stated to us, in effect, the same thing.
He has stated to us this morning that he has stated that for
the record. I just don't have it in front of me. So, in light of that and
your statement, and I'm going to paraphrase right here, “I am very
supportive of the strategic disbursal of our carriers.” You then went
on to say, Admiral, King's Bay and Mayport Complex is key for our
strategic posture, as well as key for our Navy personnel.

Admiral MULLEN. And Jacksonville.

Senator BILL NELSON. Jacksonville, of course, Jacksonville Naval
Air Station. I wish we were still talking about Cecil, but we can't
be talking about that any more.

Admiral MULEN. Yes, sir. I, actually, was working for Admiral
Clark when he said that. I agreed with what he said then, I agree
with it now.

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. Let me move on.

One of the sore points on this committee, Admiral, was in a re-
sponse to a question from Senator Levin directly to General Eric
Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff—and this was, I believe prior to
the war, when Senator Levin asked this question—Senator Levin
asked, for the occupation, how long and how many? General
Shinseki said, “Several hundred thousand for several years.” We
know that the Bush administration disagreed with that assessment
and, indeed, the Secretary of Defense did not even show up at Gen-
eral Shinseki's retirement. So, that sticks in our craw here. What
we want to know, and we believe—because we believe in you—Admiral, as the principle uniform military advisor to the President, how would you manage and present the full range of advice presented to you by members of the JCS as General Shinseki had done? Let’s throw in the combatant commanders, as well.

Admiral Mullen. I have spent an awful lot of my time in the last 2 years, particularly over the last year, in the tank with my counterpart Joint Chiefs. In particular, we have spent a great deal of effort focusing—since last fall—on how we should move ahead. General Pace has led that effort very well. We have all had voices, we’ve all been very much heard, not just with him, but also with the Secretary of Defense, who meets with us in that tank regularly, as well as a meeting we had with the President. That model, that directness, and the frankness, is one to which I subscribe.

What I would tell you about what I would tell him is the full range of options as frank as I can be and when, certainly, asked here by you or other members, I would do the same.

Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.

Admiral, it’s my understanding that it’s your intention to delegate responsibility over the strategic forces to General Cartwright. What is your intention there?

Admiral Mullen. I haven’t reached an intention on that, yet. There’s nobody that’s better prepared to do that and as we look at dividing up the workload, that makes a lot of sense to me. But, he and I have not spent a great deal of time talking about who’s going to do what.

So my answer is, I don’t know how that comes out. Certainly, it makes sense to me.

Senator Bill Nelson. I have been told that was in the works. It made a lot of sense because that fellow knows an awful lot about strategic forces.

Let me ask you, what about, for example, this relationship with Russia, and Russia now having thrown up a blockade with regard to the opportunities for joint cooperation on such a thing as national missile defense. How would you approach that?

Admiral Mullen. Clearly, that’s something that I would lean on General Cartwright for a great deal because of his background and experience. The only reason I’m a little hesitant, there will certainly be issues and levels that I’ll have to engage on in that portfolio. I am a supporter of having a missile defense capability. Ballistic missiles are proliferating. Clearly, there are challenges and existent policy discussions about how that’s going to actually be implemented. I suspect at some point in time, I certainly would be engaged, if I get confirmed for this job.

Just briefly, back to your first question. If it isn’t going to be that way, I’ll let you know, in terms of General Cartwright’s responsibilities.

Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.

Let me ask either of you, General Cartwright has, I know, specific knowledge on these questions—the Stockpile Stewardship Program of our nuclear stockpile and the question is, that we are in this phase-down of reducing considerably the number of nuclear weapons we have—both us and Russia. Does the success of that
program continue to support the moratorium on nuclear weapons testing?

Admiral Mullen. From my perspective, yes sir, it does. I'll let General Cartwright answer further.

Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Let me throw in an additional question for you, then. If the Stockpile Stewardship Program can support a new replacement warhead, is there any doubt about its ability to support the Life Extension Program as well?

General Cartwright. This issue kind of goes to the heart of whether or not we do engineering to do what are called Life Extension, which are updates to current weapons. The challenge there is the weapons that we have were not designed to be updated, so you're trying to take apart something that really wasn't designed to be taken apart—versus what is called now the reliable replacement option, which takes new technology, same form-fit function to the weapon, same delivery systems, etcetera, but brings in modern manufacturing capabilities, engineers in safety, security, and reliability at the front end, and gives us the opportunity, probably, to reduce, particularly those weapons that are not in the operational stockpile, but those that are in there for spares, backup, etcetera, reduce that stockpile significantly.

The replacement options strength is its focus on safety and security and its ability to reduce the stockpile that we have today. That, to me, makes me lean more towards the reliable replacement over the life extension. The value that we have out of Stewardship was really characterized in understanding the character of our current stockpile, its life and other attributes, and what we could do about them, without having to go back to aboveground or underground testing.

Senator Bill Nelson. Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.

Senator Thune.

Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral and General, thank you for your service and your willingness to answer the call. You both have extraordinary records, and we're pleased that you're willing to take on, what are very difficult and challenging jobs, as is evidenced by the way in which your predecessor was treated in the job.

As the ranking member of the Seapower Subcommittee, I have to express my displeasure at the way in which General Pace was treated. His departure had nothing to do with his performance or competence and everything to do with the politics of an unpopular war. I think it's also unfortunate, since he was the first marine to serve as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, for that great institution, too.

But nonetheless, I wish him well on his future endeavors and I hope that you are treated better than he was, as you enter this very difficult and challenging job. We look forward to working with you and know that we have a lot of heavy lifting ahead of us.

Admiral Mullen, you will be our country's highest ranking military officer. The July 2007 NIE serves as a constant reminder that al Qaeda and other radical Islamist groups continue to pose a threat to our security. So as a Nation at war, your nomination
comes at a very critical time. Given the environment that we live in today, what do you consider to be the biggest challenges facing our national security?

Admiral MULLEN. The stability in the Middle East and, we talked a lot about Iraq, Afghanistan, and al Qaeda. That’s part of that as well. We must get al Qaeda on the run and keep them on the run.

The stress that our ground forces are going through, specifically because of the number of deployments, number of rotations, and the prospect for more. That they are, in fact, away a lot more than they are home. The stress that not just puts on individuals who are performing magnificently in uniform, but also families. The balancing of the global responsibilities we have, given we have ground forces that are essentially very ready and exceptionally capable in the counterinsurgency world, but we’ve let other mission capabilities, certainly training and equipping and other areas has degraded. There will continue to be global challenges that we need to balance our strategic risk with respect to that.

Specifically, with respect to al Qaeda, Senator, since you brought it up. They are still the essence of the most significant threat we have. They have a safe haven now. They have leadership, which is reinvigorated. They have lieutenants back in place. They clearly have a stated challenge to hit us. I applaud the efforts of many in this country and throughout the world that have put us in a position where we have not been struck again, but it’s not because they don’t have the intent to do so.

Senator THUNE. Would you say, Admiral, that it is the same al Qaeda in Iraq and Afghanistan that we are fighting?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Senator THUNE. In other words, they are part of the same global terrorist network, same group of killers with the same intention and objective, and that is to figure out ways to create regional instability and to kill Americans?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Senator THUNE. There was a question that was asked earlier, I think by the Senator from Nebraska, regarding al Qaeda in Iraq and I want to come back to that for just a minute, because frankly, I wanted to make an earlier point about there’s been a lot said, that we need to go fight al Qaeda in Afghanistan and somehow that’s where we ought to be directing our efforts. What’s the level and the extent of the presence that al Qaeda has today in the Baghdad area?

Admiral MULLEN. They are principally west. I’d have come back to you about the specific level that’s there, but the major concern for where al Qaeda in Iraq is has been west. In the Sunni, both villages and certainly provinces.

[The information referred to follows:]
Senator THUNE. Another question I wanted to ask has to do with, you had stated in your advance policy questions, that one of the most important actions that has to be taken to mitigate and correct our lack of strategic depth is modernization across all the Services. “Much of our equipment”—this is your quote—“is approaching or is at the limits of its service life. Replacing aging equipment with modern systems and integrating new capabilities will ensure our armed services remain preeminent.”

The Services, obviously, are faced with tough choices because we have near-term requirements balanced against long-term investments, and ongoing operations with the military modernization.

When faced with the budgetary constraints that we’re forced to spend on today’s forces, rather than invest in tomorrow’s, I guess I’d be interested in getting your perspective about how we strike that balance. Abraham Lincoln once said, “You cannot escape the responsibility of tomorrow by evading it today.” So, how do we balance our immediate needs against our long-term modernization so that we’re prepared to meet the threats, not only of today, but also in the future?

Admiral MULLEN. We are, in fact, strategically at a very significant time—because we are, all the Services are, replacing equipment that was bought in the 1980s with the buildup at that time.

So, each Service is moving to modernize through investment in equipment for the future. By in large up to now, most of the cost of war has been handled in the supplementals. Which also includes some investment in modernization, as it should, because we are wearing this gear out, in some cases, 10 to 20 times faster than we expected to wear it out.

The concern I have is over the long-term, as we take what has been the supplemental, embed that in the base budget, is will the resources be there in order to modernize? It’s back to the rebalancing piece and the challenges that exist globally. I would have great concern about a precipitous drop in the baseline defense budget, given the strategic environment in which we’re living.

I know, clearly the ground forces are going through tremendous challenges because they’re engaged in a war, they’re trying to transform, their equipment is wearing out, and they’re trying to modernize. In the Army’s case, they’re trying to modularize as well. The Air Force and the Navy are experiencing challenges with respect to equipment, airplanes, in particular, that are wearing out, and some ships, in the case of the Navy’s point. Recapitalizing there is a real challenge, as well.

We’ve also, the Air Force and the Navy, in particular, have felt enormous pressure in the budget, in terms of supporting what’s going on with respect to the war. So that’s kind of a quick assessment of where I think we are and what the challenges are, and they’re significant.

Senator THUNE. Would it be helped by a higher increased top-line in the defense budget?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes sir, it would. I’m not someone that says, “Just give me more money, everything will be okay.” It has to do with good stewardship of the money that we have, in addition to recognizing the strains that we’re under, at a really critical time, and doing that well.
Senator THUNE. One other question I had, has to do with, DOD has been pushing for a variety of authorities and increases in programs to engage other militaries. Is there a well thought out strategy behind this effort? Could you discuss these alleged problems between you and the State Department on Section 1206, train and equip programs? Because that does seem to be a way in which we can stretch our resources further, by working and engaging with other militaries.

Admiral MULLEN. I agree that it is a way to do that, to work with State. We've done that, in great part, and that we need to continue to do that for the future.

I talked earlier about surging the other arms of our Government. I think the future is going to be much more about the other arms of our Government, DOD and State specifically, or State and Agriculture working together in ways that we haven't necessarily in the past, because of the global challenges that we have. So I applaud the move towards section 1206. It's a much more robust program than it's been and I think we will need to continue to make it so in the future.

Senator THUNE. Thank you very much, and my time has expired. General, I didn't give you a chance to talk much, but thank you again for your service, your willingness to serve, and we look forward to working with you.

Mr. Chairman?

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune.

Senator McCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Congratulations to both of you on your nominations and God bless you and your families for your service to our country.

To kind of segue way off of Senator Thune's comments, I'd like to spend a little bit of time talking about contracting. We obviously have an explosion of contracting that has occurred. In 2006, we had $151 billion of service contracts that the military embraced. That's up from $80 billion in 1996. That's an exponential increase.

The legal status of these contractors is murky and I will tell you, after 6 months of looking at this with some discipline, I am confident that the accountability is absent without leave. I, after going to Iraq and spending some time there with the contracting part of this operation, it's clear to me that contracting has encountered a head-on collision with the culture of command in a combat environment.

I would certainly appreciate your take on how we begin to engrain in our military training for commanders, the responsibility of contractor oversight. The model that the military has worked with for years, in terms of a contracting representative that is present, is not working. Because there is turnover there, there is not any kind of long-term specialized training, and ultimately at the end of the day—and I will not identify which commander said this to me, but I can assure you that there were a number of comments made that caused great consternation, like, "It may have cost $10 billion, but I wouldn't have cared if it cost $15 billion. I needed the stuff when I needed it."

There's this sense that, the commanders have their military mission, which I'm very respectful of. They want to accomplish that
mission. They are really not as concerned about who’s watching the contractors, who has responsibility for the contractors, what kind of accountability are we putting in place. Until we hold those commanders responsible, I have a feeling we’re going to be, it’s going to be all foam and no beer in terms of what we’re really accomplishing, in terms of contractor accountability and oversight of these tax dollars.

I would appreciate your take on how we can get to, what I think, is the nub of the matter and that is someone losing their command or not getting promoted because of failure to oversee contracts in a responsible way.

Admiral Mullen. Senator, in trying to respond to Senator Thune—I’m very mindful of the challenges with resources. Responsible stewardship of the taxpayers dollars is a high priority for me, has been for a long time. It is a significant amount of money. If you’ve been looking at this for 6 months, you know a great deal more about it than I do, specifically. I would have to do some research to come back with a more thorough answer.

That said, I will say from a warfighting standpoint, from an operational standpoint, my expectations for those in uniform who are on their mission is not to spend a great deal of time on that. I, actually, resonate with whoever said that. I’m not happy to, I’m not arguing we should act that way, but those individuals are so focused on carrying out the mission, that they need it when they need it. We need to do this responsibly, and have mechanisms in place—and it’s an extraordinary number of contractors as you have pointed out.

That said, the military commanders I have engaged with since 2004 in Iraq and Afghanistan, but particularly in Iraq, have been very supportive of the support that they’ve received from the contractors. There’s probably a great deal of work that needs to be done here, but that a warfighter would respond that way is not a surprise to me. I’m not sure that that’s not the right answer.

Senator McCaskill. I guess then that really is kind of part of the problem. I’m a little concerned that I would know more about it than you would, honestly, since we have more contractors on the ground than we have military. It worries me that this is not further up, and I have a man from Missouri who was kidnapped as part of a convoy attack last November. We’ve not heard from him since a video in January. If you look at that contractor and what was going on, the way they were hiring Iraqis, the way they were firing Iraqis, what they were paying Iraqis, the weapons that they were caught with, the weapons that were stolen, that were then sold back to them. What can happen on the ground with these security contractors, in terms of undermining our relationship with the Iraqi people.

I mean, we’re spending a lot of time worrying about PRTs, we’re spending a lot of time about establishing a level of trust with the Iraqi people that can be undermined, in an instant, by a security guard that shoots a body guard of the Vice President of the country. Or that the Iraqis that go back and then are part of a convoy attack. I just, until someone at the highest levels of the military embraces the idea that we are now fighting this war with private contractors, in terms of logistic support.
My dad peeled potatoes in World War II. We’re not going to have military guys peeling potatoes in the future. We’re going to have contractors peeling potatoes. I understand that there’s cost savings that can be realized there, but we haven’t realized them in this war. This war has cost more than it should have because of our inability to get a handle on contractors.

I get it that you relate to that commander wanting to fight the military mission, but somewhere in the chain of command, someone higher than a major, somebody that has the kind of authority you all have, is going to have to take responsibility for promoting, demoting, and disciplining the military for their failure to oversee these contracts or they’ll never get fixed.

Admiral MULLEN. Please don’t take what I said, in terms of not being supportive, that this, what you just described needs to be done. We have moved tens of thousands of contractors into theater very rapidly. So I certainly understand your concern. It’s an area that I owe you a better answer to, and I’ll come back and get it to you.

[The information referred to follows:]

Admiral MULLEN. You raise valid points regarding contracting and contractor management in Iraq. The Department takes seriously its responsibility for management and oversight of its contracts, regardless of where they are written and where they are executed. The growth in contractor support of our forces in Iraq is a reflection of broader trends in the Department towards increased contractor support of our military due to post-Cold War force reductions. This growth has presented challenges to the Department in terms of visibility, management, and oversight of contracts and contractor personnel supporting our forces in forward areas such as Iraq.

The Department has undertaken numerous initiatives and actions to improve its ability to manage and oversee contracts and contractor personnel in these forward areas.

One key action has been the formation of the Office of the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program Support within the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness. This office’s mission is to establish and oversee the program for managing contractor personnel in forward areas, per DOD Instruction 3020.41, and to provide direction in other areas to support more effective and efficient geographic combatant commander logistics and material readiness needs. Key elements of its program include: 1) Establish and maintain a policy framework to govern management of contractor personnel in forward areas; 2) Develop and implement the Synchronized Pre-Deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) Program for contractor personnel tracking and accountability in forward areas; 3) Establish deployable joint contracting planners to be co-located with and report to the combatant commanders; 4) Establish a specialized group of acquisition planning and execution staff to augment our current deployable contingency contracting capability; 5) Develop training and education programs for planning and managing contracting services and contractor personnel and incorporation of these programs into DOD leadership programs; and 6) Establish a “Lessons Learned” program. The Program Support Office program will respond to requirements in Section 854 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 that require the Department to develop joint policy on requirements definition, contingency program management and contingency contracting, including designating General Officer/Flag Officer/Senior Executive Service (GO/FO/SES) level personnel with responsibility for these areas during contingency operations. Presently, a senior commissioned officer has been designated as the Head of the Contracting Activity for the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A). This individual reports directly to the Multi-National Forces-Iraq and Afghanistan Commander, who reports directly to the U.S. Central Command Combatant Commander. Further, a clear line of authority and chain of command has been established for the JCC-I/A, focused on joint capabilities and policy execution. This contracting oversight structure is working well. Complete details of DOD’s comprehensive plan for improving management and oversight of contracted support will be forthcoming in the upcoming interim report to Congress on the implementation status of section 854 requirements.
To enable the Department to effectively deliver equipment and services to meet warfighter needs, acquisition policies and procedures have been established under the procurement umbrella of the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR). The FAR is supplemented by the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation (DFAR), and further defined by DOD Directives, Instructions, Regulations, and Publications to satisfy specific and unique contracting warfighter requirements. For example, the Department issued a rule creating a new FAR/Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Part 18, “Emergency Acquisitions,” which centralizes existing flexibilities available under current law and facilitates expedited acquisition of supplies and services in an emergency. The Department has also made significant progress on a proposed FAR section entitled, “Contractor Personnel in a Theater of Operations or at a Diplomatic or Consular Mission.” This section addresses the issues of contractor personnel who provide support to the mission of the U.S. Government in a theater of operations outside the United States but are not covered by the DOD clause for contractor personnel authorized to accompany the deployed troops. The Department is awaiting final approval of the proposed FAR clause from the Office of Federal Procurement Policy.

To help our Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) better understand the myriad of new initiatives, a Joint Contingency Contracting Community of Practice was created to promote knowledge sharing across organizational boundaries. This collaborative tool serves as a central repository for DOD contingency contracting learning and job support assets, including policy and guidance information, after-action reports, predeployment information, and related knowledge to promote increased job performance. A Joint Contingency Contracting Summit is held quarterly to foster innovative ideas and solutions to increase support to our warfighters, identify strategic partnership development opportunities, and promote a strategic outreach and communication plan to increase awareness of these valuable tools and resources.

The recent creation of the Emergency Procurement DFARS Committee is helping to develop and implement initiatives that will allow our CCOs to effectively and efficiently respond to contingency requirements. As part of this committee, a Joint Contingency Contracting Working Group has developed a DOD Contingency Contracting Guide that will be incorporated into DFARS Part 18, Procedures, Guidance, and Instructions (PGI). This guide is intended to provide practical advice as well as reminders of policies that affect contracting in contingency operations. In conjunction, we have also developed a pocket-sized CCO handbook and compact disk that provide the essential information and tools necessary to operate and train effectively in the joint environment. Both the guide and handbook are useful tools that help us standardize joint contingency contracting operations.

One of the most significant accomplishments to date to ensure jointness and cross-service coordination in the area of contingency contracting is the formulation of doctrine. A Joint Contracting Writing Team is working to develop joint doctrine to ensure our contingency contracting troops have clear and unambiguous guidance in the field. This joint publication, titled, “Contracting and Contractor Management in Joint Operations,” provides the combatant commanders, subordinate Joint Force Commanders, and Service component commanders with standardized guidance and information related to integrating contracting and contactor management into joint operations. A draft of the doctrine is currently being staffed.

The Department continues to aggressively look for ways to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of contracted support to the warfighter in forward areas.

General Cartwright. You raised a myriad of issues regarding contracting and contractor management in Iraq. The Department takes seriously its responsibility for management and oversight of its contracts, regardless of where they are written and where they are executed. The growth in contractor support of our forces in Iraq is a reflection of broader trends in the Department towards increased contractor support of our military due to post-Cold War force reductions. This growth has presented challenges to the Department in terms of visibility, management, and oversight of contracts and contractor personnel supporting our forces in forward areas such as Iraq.

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The Department continues to aggressively look for ways to improve the efficiency
and effectiveness of contracted support to the warfighter in forward areas.

Senator McCaskill. That would be great. I appreciate that very
much.

I would also appreciate a specific answer about the man from
Jackson County, Missouri that was with the Crescent Company,
five of them were kidnapped back last November in a convoy attack
that—what I've read about it, it's clear that some of the Iraqis that
had worked for this company were part of the attacking group. The
implications there, obviously I'm very concerned about this Missou-
r, who has not been heard from, but if you look at what hap-
pened, it is anecdotal, but it is symptomatic of the kind of problems
that we have with some of these security companies that are doing
so much. They're carrying weapons in the battlefield.

Admiral Mullen. Yes, ma'am.

[The information referred to follows:]

Admiral Mullen. [The information was provided to the committee in classified
form.]

General Cartwright. [The information was provided to the committee in classi-
fied form.]

Senator McCaskill. They are shooting people in the battlefield.
They are killing Iraqi citizens sometimes. I think we have to really
do a much better job of getting a handle on all that.

Thank you all, very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.

Senator Sessions.

Senator Sessions. Thank you, Chairman Levin.

Thank you gentlemen, we appreciate your service to your coun-
try. I've gotten to know both of you over the years and have re-
spected your work and believe you're ready to assume these big re-
sponsibilities.

General Cartwright, we have really worked together a lot on the
Strategic Forces Subcommittee, of which I am now ranking mem-
er, and formerly chaired, and you were, as Strategic Commander,
we did a lot of work together.

I won't ask some of the questions I could ask about that because
those are matters that I think we've discussed and we have some
idea about.

Admiral Mullen, you mentioned something in one of the answers
to the advance policy questions, that you thought perhaps the most
significant mistake we've made in this Iraq effort, was that we did
not fully integrate all elements of U.S. national power in Iraq. I
think that is a big problem for us. For example, it's not the mili-
tary's primary responsibility, is it, to work with the Iraqi Govern-
ment to deal with the political problems they are facing. That's not
your primary responsibility, that's the State Department's primary
responsibility.

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, it is.
Senator Sessions. Likewise, it’s not the military’s responsibility to get the water and electricity operating or the economy moving.

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.

Senator Sessions. Or the agricultural products being produced better.

So, we’ve created this situation in which the military, in my way of thinking, is the one entity that works in Iraq. You had to take over responsibilities that should not really be yours. Will you press that issue?

Admiral Mullen. Yes sir, I will.

Senator Sessions. I would encourage you to do so and I also think, perhaps, that General Lute’s appointment maybe could assist you. He’s a National Security Advisor for Iraq. One of the things that I understand the President wants him to do is make sure that other agencies are all working together effectively.

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir. I understand that is one of his principle responsibilities and I very much look forward to working with him in that regard. I have sat at the table for the last couple years, and been very concerned about the entire interagency process and I haven’t been at the interagency table. Certainly if confirmed, I’ll have an opportunity to do that. I can’t just offer complaints, I’m going to have to offer some solutions, as well. But we all believe that we need to move forward in that regard.

Senator Sessions. I believe the military has done a really fine job in Iraq. We’ve made some errors.

Admiral Mullen. Sure.

Senator Sessions. We can improve as we go forward, but a lot of the problems are, that we talk about, such as Senator Levin emphasizes the political solution is not primarily the military’s responsibility. It’s really the State Department’s responsibility.

Admiral Mullen. You mentioned in some of your statements, about the time you received this nomination that you were concerned about the Army. You are a Navy person, so let me ask you, will you be alert to the stresses on the Army? Will you be quick to respond to the legitimate concerns that are out there? They’re doing better in many ways than I would have imagined.

Admiral Mullen. They are.

Senator Sessions. They are, reenlistment is still good.

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.

Senator Sessions. The morale is still good, but we’re asking an awful lot out of them. What are your concerns there?

Admiral Mullen. The Army and Marine Corps—they have been absolutely extraordinary, and their morale is good. I’ve seen that when I visit them in theater. Everyone that comes back, as recently as last week, reports that same that their morale is exceptionally good and they are executing at a level that makes us all proud, in this All-Volunteer Force.

I am concerned about the number of deployments, the time away, in fact, even when they are home there’s training associated with that. So they spend weeks, if not months, out of their own house, again, away from their families. I believe we have to relieve that.

As CNO, I have spent a great deal of my time focused on this for my sailors and their families, and I assure you if I’m confirmed
as Chairman, I will do the same for all our forces, particularly the ground forces, who are bearing the brunt of this war.

Senator Sessions. I couldn’t agree more. I say to General Cartwright, I think we do need to think about those soldiers out there. Have you had the opportunity, Admiral Mullen and General Cartwright, to read the counterinsurgency manual that General Petraeus has produced? You may not have had a thorough opportunity to, but have you read that?

Admiral Mullen. I have read, in detail, the key aspects of counterinsurgency, yes, sir.

Senator Sessions. Most of us sit here and we respond to the daily headlines in the media. Would you agree that it is an important thing for American people and this Congress to understand that there are principles of defeating an insurgency, and that sometimes it takes time?

Admiral Mullen. It does take time.

Senator Sessions. All right. Divide the enemy, to deny them bases of support, to co-opt certain groups, to deny them supplies, divide them whenever possible, all of those things so we can have some belief that General Petraeus, who wrote this manual, is executing, not just an attack policy, but a sophisticated multi-faceted policy designed, using historical precedent to defeat this insurgency?

Admiral Mullen. As I read the manual, and my understanding, Senator Sessions, of what is involved in counterinsurgency, Dave Petraeus is doing exactly what he wrote and he is having that kind of impact, specifically it is about security of the people. Eventually about the politics of the country and that the people will feel that this is a legitimate government. That’s not a short road. That doesn’t happen in a few weeks or months, but he’s clearly on that path.

Senator Sessions. In Afghanistan there were decisions that had to be made about, do you attack the warlords, or do you co-opt them?

Admiral Mullen. Right.

Senator Sessions. Sometimes they were defeated militarily, sometimes they were brought into the government. These are tough, subtle decisions that need to be made, but always there needs to be a vision for a victory, stability, and peace in the government.

Admiral Mullen. Right. Yes, sir.

Senator Sessions. Would you say to the American people that sometimes progress may be made, that they don’t see on occasion?

Admiral Mullen. I think we would all be well served to understand, both the insurgency and the counterinsurgency principles that are embedded in this kind of situation. Again, I think General Petraeus has moved very strongly in the right direction.

Senator Sessions. It’s a sophisticated and complex thing.

Admiral Mullen. It is.

Senator Sessions. It requires determination and persistence and we can’t be flopping around based on the latest polling guides. We have to be focused on this issue in the long run and I hope that, you’ll be asked—both of you, to testify here—and you’ll be asked about this, the progress or lack of it in Iraq. It’s important.
I also want to say, Admiral Mullen, I appreciated your enthusiastic, I would say, responses to the whole management of DOD because that's one of your big responsibilities. General Petraeus, he has that combat area, but you have to manage this whole Department, consider our Ground Forces, our Naval Forces, our Air Forces, our budget, what we can put our priorities on and need to for the next 20–30 years. I believe you have the ability to do that and we look forward to working with you.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

I wonder if Senator Clinton would yield to Senator Warner. You are next to be called, but he just has a few additional minutes and he needs to leave.

Senator CLINTON. Absolutely.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. Senator Clinton, may I thank you for that courtesy. The many years that you've been on this committee, that's the hallmark of your service. Courtesy, respect, and you've been a good strong working partner through the years. We don't want to lose you. [Laughter.]

Chairman LEVIN. Your time is up, Senator Warner. [Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. Gentlemen, my two good friends from Florida, in exercising, understandably the interest of their State—and we all feel that strongly—reviewed some of the past deliberations within the Department of Navy regarding the strategic disbursal doctrine.

But how well you and I know that doctrine started back in the Cold War days when we were looking at the intercontinental exchange of weaponry. So much has evolved since that period of time and most particularly, what we learned from September 11, that there isn't a single city or township in this country that does not have a measure of vulnerability, if that type of individual desires to bring harm to our citizens.

In the discussions that you've had with me and I had with Admiral Vern Clark. I've always said you have to put the securities interest first, and then do what is necessary.

So as you proceed to continue to look at these factors and determine the various east coast facility ports that can best serve our national security system, most particularly the Navy, you will take into consideration, I'm sure, the changing world of threats. How that really makes almost all the facilities equally vulnerable, due to the diversity of threats we face now, vice the old doctrine of intercontinental vulnerability.

Let's proceed in an open and clear way on that. There are enormous costs involved to equip a port with facilities to handle a nuclear carrier. You know that.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. I know that. They're far above the cost associated with the conventional carriers. It is true that they're being phased out, but the realities are, there are other ways to balance the disbursal of naval assets, as opposed to moving large carriers. Yes, Norfolk has proudly served that purpose for generations of the nuclear carriers that are there. At any one time, usually there's just one, maybe two at the most in port, and the rest are dispersed.
My last question goes to Afghanistan. We want to make certain today we cover fully that serious situation over there. We have the continuing problem over there of the drug elimination, which is at the core of funding. It looks like it’s well over half of the gross national product. We have the national caveats, which are the rules by which the participating countries in NATO allow or disallow the use of their forces.

For example, there are no caveats on the U.S. force, the British force, and I think, one or two of the others. Yet, for reasons that elude me, other forces come in with restrictions on the utilization of their forces, most particularly when it relates to missions in harms’ way. How will you deal with those issues regarding Afghanistan?

Admiral Mullen, I think on the drug issue with Afghanistan, it’s a priority and I would continue to both make it a priority, understand it in both its breadth and depth, and move to bring every part of our national power to try to assist in getting that right. Because it is clearly feeding the problem that we’re challenged with.

With respect to the caveats, in particular, in Afghanistan, having come to this job that I’m in right now from Naples, and been the Operational Commander in the Balkans where we still have, today, upwards of 16,000 to 17,000 NATO troops in Kosovo. At the time I took command, it was upwards of 24,000. We since transitioned 7,000 troops in Bosnia to the European Union. The issue of caveats is a significant one. My take on it, it comes from governments’ struggle with what they’re going to provide. They work their way through their own dynamic challenging process of agreement and disagreement. It is in that commitment and in that, oftentimes, arrived-at position that it’s done so with certain caveats.

I experienced in Kosovo, very specifically, governments or forces from countries who were very limited, particularly if it got to the use of force.

In this war, we need to continue to address this. We need all arms of our Government, elements of national power to continue to work this with the leadership of those countries in addition to, in particular, the leadership in NATO. It’s a constant challenge and I don’t believe in the long-run, we can succeed without continuing to force that. If we don’t, those capabilities and those requirements, oftentimes, fall back on us in what we’ve already described this morning as a very stressed force. Near-term improvement in there, I think, is very important.

Senator Warner. I thank you.
I wish you both the best and that with your families.
Admiral Mullen. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Senator Clinton.
Chairman Levin. Senator Clinton.
Senator Clinton. Thank you very much.

Admiral Mullen, General Cartwright, I appreciate greatly your committed service to our Nation, and I also want to thank your families, because I know they’ve served as well. Both of you have long and distinguished careers that have taken you around the
world, and your families have been there with you and supporting our country. I appreciate that.

As both of you are, I’m sure, aware, I have recently corresponded with Secretary Gates, requesting briefings for the appropriate oversight committees, including this one, and what the current contingency plans are for any future withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq. In my exchanges with Secretary Gates, I pointed out that the seeds of many of the problems that continue to plague us in Iraq, both in terms of troops and mission, were planted in the failure to adequately plan for the conflict and then properly equip our men and women in uniform.

After an exchange of letters with Secretary Gates and Under Secretary of Defense Eric Edelman, this Thursday DOD will brief this committee in a closed session, on the status of planning for the redeployment of U.S. forces.

In his letter last week to me, Secretary Gates stated, “You may rest assured that such planning is indeed taking place with my active involvement, as well as that of senior military and civilian officials and our commanders in the field. I consider this contingency planning to be priority for this Department.” Let me ask you both, are you aware of the contingency planning that Secretary Gates referred to in his letter, Admiral Mullen?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes ma’am, I am.

Senator CLINTON. You also, General Cartwright?

General CARTWRIGHT. I’m aware. In my current job I don’t participate in it right now.

Senator CLINTON. If confirmed, will each of you be involved in so far as you know, in this contingency planning? Admiral Mullen?

Admiral MULLEN. Senator Clinton, in part of my advance policy questions I was asked where I think we made mistakes. One of the issues was I didn’t think we have the planning that we should have had in place. If confirmed, I’m very committed to properly planning to the best of my ability, every possible operation that we might be involved in. That certainly includes the kind of contingency planning that you’ve asked about in your letters and to which the Secretary has responded and of which I am aware and, to a certain degree thus far, have participated.

Senator CLINTON. Thank you.

General Cartwright?

General CARTWRIGHT. I concur.

Senator CLINTON. I would ask each of you if you will commit to keeping this committee and Congress informed, in classified sessions, if necessary, about the process of contingency planning for any future redeployment. Admiral?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, ma’am.

Senator CLINTON. General?

General CARTWRIGHT. Yes, ma’am.

Senator CLINTON. It is clear that, as you pointed out in your answers to advance questions provided to this committee, that many of us have serious concerns about the quality of planning, the interaction between the military and civilian leadership with respect to planning, the decision making process, certainly leading up to the invasion and then continuing in the years since. I think that many
of us will be looking to you as our chief military officers for our country, to really focus in on this planning issue.

I've been impressed with Secretary Gates' openness and willingness to interact with Congress, to listen to the professional military leadership around him, but I'm looking for ideas about how to institutionalize that. I think that the lessons learned from the last years may be very difficult ones for any of us to learn and apply, but we have to be committed to doing so.

It does seem that Congress is moving toward an effort to put down conditions for a phased redeployment and obviously, whether that happens this year or next year, it's going to happen at some point. None of us want to see the consequences of poor planning.

The other issue here, that is not, perhaps, strictly within the military's purview, is the question of the thousands of Iraqi civilians who have been assisting us over the last years—the translators and interpreters, the cooks, the embassy employees—and recently Ambassador Crocker has raised very serious questions about what exactly our planning is for them. So I would suggest, perhaps, that it at least be considered in the contingency planning, because that is a continuing responsibility that we bear. I would appreciate each of you taking that and moving forward.

I think that in your answers Admiral Mullen, in the advance policy questions, you say something that I think all of us agree with, and that is there is no purely military solution in Iraq. Does that lead you to the conclusion that even if our troops were to have tactical successes in parts of Iraq, as now is being reported in al Anbar Province, that we cannot consider our mission successful without political action? Even some resolution of the differences among the various factions within Iraq?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, ma'am. I think the lead issue is political reconciliation for that government and progress on the political leg of the security, economic, and political three-legged stool that we've talked about. It absolutely has to happen.

Senator CLINTON. It appears that the political progress is not occurring, and this is something that our chairman has been particularly focused on, really from before the invasion, and certainly consistently since. The failure to establish, and then to achieve, benchmarks when we had the occupying authority and in the years since we have seen an Iraqi Government established.

Admiral, I have to ask, in your advance policy question responses and what you have talked about today, given the lack of political progress since the escalation began, despite what may be, admittedly, short-term advances with the surge strategy, how do we expect to obtain any evidence of political movement, in the absence of a very different attitude and capacity of the Iraqi Government, that were we to be there, as you suggested, for years instead of months? Do you have any suggestions as to what more could be done to force, or require, the political resolution that is so necessary?

Admiral MULLEN. I think it's been clearly stated within the last year that they need to make progress in terms of amnesty, de-Baathification, an oil-revenue sharing log, constitutional reform, and relationships with the provinces. The progress there has not been good, at least that's the current assessment.
What I've asked to do is really wait until Ambassador Crocker, who has the lead on this aspect of it, comes back with General Petraeus and reports in September. I still maintain that if we aren't making progress in that realm, the prospects for movement in a positive direction are not very good. But, waiting until then, I think, is important.

Senator CLINTON. I agree with your assessment. I've obviously reached that conclusion some time ago in terms of the assessment as to what the Iraqis themselves are actually willing to do. I think you could make a very strong case that the Iraqis are not ready to put violence aside as a tool for the various agendas they're pursuing—sectarian, political, personal, and commercial. There's a lot of activity going on here.

It does seem to me that either sooner—in my view, which is the appropriate outcome, you both most likely will be confirmed, which I think is a great tribute to you both, for your service to this country—or later we will be faced with implementing a new approach, a sort of post-surge approach. I think that the political problems that the Iraqis are failing to address will, unfortunately, require that we take a different strategic attitude toward Iraq. The results will have to be carefully monitored because obviously there are consequences no matter what we do.

Two final points if I could, Mr. Chairman.

The concerns that many have—and regardless of where one stands on how much time we should provide or not—the concerns that we all share are the consequences for our troops and for the Iraqi people, that will flow from a decision to redeploy. If we redeploy out of Baghdad and concentrate on al Anbar. If we redeploy into the north and concentrate on shoring up the Kurds so that they're not subjected to, most likely, Sunni and external problems, whatever the combination of actions might be. It is incredibly important that it be managed and implemented as carefully as possible because of the difficulty of withdrawing troops and equipment. Everybody who has briefed me on this, basically comes to the same conclusion—that this is as dangerous as going in. We know that if our only way out is through the south into Kuwait, it is especially dangerous because the increasing chaotic situation in the south, with various Shiite factions vying for control, will make us, unfortunately, have to navigate an even more dangerous exit. I would just underscore this, that this has to continue, and has to be focused.

Finally, I think that the work that you will have to supervise, not only is operational, of course, but may very well be doctrinal. I mean, it took quite some time to rewrite, revise, and update the counterinsurgency manual. The doctrines that the former Secretary of Defense would quite often refer to or throw out seem not to be based on very much work or, frankly, institutional support and infrastructure.

So, I think that there is not only a very difficult strategic and operational side of this, but also a doctrinal side. I would strongly recommend that when you assume your new positions, since you'll be consumed by the day-to-day operations, because no matter what happens, it's going to be incredibly intense, I would predict, both politically here in Washington, but on the ground militarily and po-
litically in Iraq, that you think about—and perhaps in conjunction with this committee and others—coming up with some process to look at a lot of these doctrines and assumptions that clouded judgment and undermined the careful thought that should go into any difficult and dangerous set of decisions, such as we were making as a country.

I don't think it's something that either of you will have the time to focus on, but under your supervision and monitoring, I think it is extremely important that we really understand where we're headed, with a new kind of enemy, with a different kind of warfare, with a global threat, because we will withdraw from Iraq. We will certainly do it, I believe, almost regardless of what happens in next year with this President, as soon as we change Presidents, and how we do it, how we're prepared for it. But then we're going to have a lot of other problems that we face globally that will need some clear thinking on.

I wish you both well and I thank you for your service.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Clinton.

Thank you also, for your initiative, which is just the latest of many you've taken, to urge this committee to get that briefing, that you referred to, on preparations and planning for a phase reduction and redeployment of our forces. It will take place at some point. In the view of many of us, sooner rather than later, but in any event, it will take place and we very much appreciate your suggestion that there be a briefing that will take place, as you indicated, this week.

As indicated, there will be a second round of questions should any colleagues within earshot or listening to this, want to come back and ask a few additional questions.

Admiral, let me go back to Pakistan with you for a moment. We've spoken somewhat about the fact that al Qaeda has a sanctuary there. On the other hand, after the administration said that it would pursue actionable targets anywhere in the world, putting aside whether it was in Pakistan or any place else, the Pakistan Foreign Ministry issued a statement calling such talk irresponsible and dangerous.

Now, al Qaeda has grown in strength in the last few years. They've grown in strength in Pakistan, they've grown in strength in Iraq. What is your reaction to the Pakistani reaction, that our suggestion that we would go after or could go after al Qaeda in Pakistan or anywhere else in the world, that kind of talk, according to their Foreign Ministry, is irresponsible and dangerous?

Admiral MULLEN. I think that, where we have a threat such as this, we need to rest comfortably at some point, that it is being addressed. We know it is a threat to us, it is a threat to our country. That we must figure out a way to do that. So, to discuss possibilities which would be the Government of Pakistan addressing it directly. They are an important ally of ours in this war on terror. They've expressed that, and that might be one path, certainly. I consider, to be potentially a very responsible path. That it is the only path, I don't think that is open, is also a possibility. We should gather all the strength of our Government and our allies to address that threat.
Chairman Levin. You made reference in your response to Senator Clinton to one of the mistakes, which you referred to in your very open, forthright answer, on the question of the mistakes which the United States has made in Iraq. I want to compliment you on your willingness to set forth these mistakes. They included, no early and significant dialogue with neighboring countries, the disbanding of the Iraqi Army, a divisive deBaathification process, and insufficient forces for stability operations. You said that they’re still having a negative impact, including on your prescription, or including on the ability that you hope we would have to mitigate the impact by pursuing a balanced strategy in Iraq. Is that the three-legged stool that you were referring to?

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Okay. Would you agree that al Qaeda has seen a resurgence in Pakistan and that it’s stronger in Iraq now than it was a few years ago?

Admiral Mullen. It is, it has certainly seen resurgence, yes sir, and it is stronger. I worry about it, actually, not just there, in other parts of the world.

Chairman Levin. Would you agree that it’s stronger in Iraq now than it was before the war?

Admiral Mullen. I really——

Chairman Levin. In Iraq?

Admiral Mullen. Yes sir, I understand that. We’ve actually had some pretty significant successes against al Qaeda in Iraq.

Chairman Levin. Recently, but would you say it’s stronger before those successes, those recent successes, was it stronger than al Qaeda was in Iraq before the war? In other words, haven’t they obviously——

Admiral Mullen. I think al Qaeda is stronger than when the war started, yes sir. Certainly.

Chairman Levin. All right. That’s fair enough.

The issue of detention policy has come up, and I was wondering whether or not you agree with the policy that was set forth in the July 7, 2006, memorandum of Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England, stating that all relevant DOD directives, regulations, policies, practices, and procedures must fully comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention?

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Do you support the standards for detainee treatment specified in the revised Army Field Manual on interrogations that was issued in September 2006 and the DOD directive that DOD issued on September 5, 2006?

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. You believe it is consistent with effective counterinsurgency operations for the United States forces to comply fully with the requirements of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions?

Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. Let me address this to you General, give Admiral a moment or two to think about lunch. This is a question of the Moscow Treaty, which set a goal for the U.S. and Russia to have no more than 1,700 to 2,200 operational deployed warheads by
2012—the Treaty does not address total stockpile numbers or delivery systems, just operationally-deployed warheads.

In your judgment, could we reduce the total stockpile size and to dismantle some nuclear warheads before 2012, in other words, the number of operationally deployed warheads—but is it possible, in your judgment, to reduce the total stockpile size before that year?

General CARTWRIGHT. 2012?

Chairman LEVIN. Yes.

General CARTWRIGHT. My sense is first, yes, we can. The biggest leverage, I think, to do that and to do it significantly is to move towards this earlier discussed reliable replacement warhead.

But even absent that, we should be able to reduce that stockpile. We have taken measures within the Department in concert with the Department of Energy to begin doing that. We actually have shown significant increases in the numbers of weapons—military jargon, that we are de-miling, or removing—from the stockpile. We need to stay on that path.

I agree that as long as there are other countries in the world that have nuclear weapons, we’re going to have to have a deterrent in the nuclear side of the house. But that should be, as has been stated several times—not today, but in our policy documents—the smallest number necessary to be consistent with national security needs. That’s, as you say sir, the broader stockpile, not just the operationally deployed weapons.

Chairman LEVIN. Admiral, you’ve had enough breathing space. Let me come back to you.

Admiral MULLEN. I’m ready.

Chairman LEVIN. You are, indeed. There’s been a lot of discussion this morning, perhaps more than on any other subject, on the question of the failure of the Iraqi political leaders to make progress. That is the strategic purpose of the surge as stated by the President. Would you agree with that?

Admiral MULLEN. Yes sir, it is.

Chairman LEVIN. That strategic purpose, even though there’s some evidence that there may be some positive progress on the military side of the surge, in terms of the strategic purpose of the surge, we have not seen any progress.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Now, it’s the judgment of many of us that in order for there to be political progress, that the political leaders have to reach an accommodation. As a matter of fact, I think that’s almost a consensus point. Maliki himself has said that it’s the failure, and these are his words, “The failure of the Iraqi politicians to reach a political settlement that is the cause of the continuing blood shed.”

It may be true that the State Department handles or assesses, but it is also true that the only leverage that exists is military leverage. I don’t know of any other leverage that we can apply. You’d think that the blood-letting inside of Iraq would be adequate leverage on the Iraqi politicians. You’d think that the prospect of an all out civil war—even worse than there is now—would be enough leverage on the Iraqi politicians. But the leverage that we have is embodied in the forces that you will command and that the President, as Commander in Chief, commands.
So, we’re going to need you to do what you have promised you would do and I know will do thoroughly, which is to give thought to the issue that you said is the key issue, as to how much leverage we can put on the Iraqi leaders by telling them that their future is in their hands and we can’t save them from themselves. This open-ended commitment of our military is going to end and when it’s going to end. That is not exclusively in your hands, obviously, that’s going to ultimately be a decision of the civilian leaders.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. But your recommendation on that point, as well as General Petraeus’ recommendation and CENTCOM Commander’s recommendation.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. These are critically important recommendations. I would really press upon you, the power that lies in your hands to force those Iraqi politicians. If you make a mistake, maybe it would work out badly, but if you don’t use that leverage, it also could be a terrible waste of an opportunity.

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Your words and your answer to the question that we asked prior to the hearing, you believe that quelling the current level of violence in Baghdad is a necessary condition for a political solution and as part of your answer you said the following—and I couldn’t agree with you more—“Failure to achieve tangible progress towards reconciliation requires a strategic reassessment.”

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. I know you mean it. I’m glad you mean it. I’m glad those words are there. I wish you all the best.

General, we’ve not paid adequate attention or given you enough tough questions this morning. We’ll try to, all of us, make up for that at a later time. But we wish you both well.

We thank you, we thank your families for their support because we all feel deeply, without it you could not do what you need to do. You would not be where you’re sitting today without the support of your families.

That’s true of us, by the way, in politics, may I say. Although I don’t want to end on that note, because it properly should be ended on a note of thanks to you, the men and women under your commands now, that you will be commanding, and the families that give you such great support.

Admiral MULLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. We will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

**QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES**

**DEFENSE REFORMS**

*Question.* You previously have answered the committee’s policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in connection with your nomination to be the Chief of Naval Operations.
Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of these reforms changed since you testified before the committee at your most recent confirmation hearing for Chief of Naval Operations?

Answer. No. Overall, the Goldwater-Nichols reforms have strengthened the warfighting and operational capabilities of our combatant commands and our Nation. The importance of these reforms has not diminished with time.

DUTIES

Question. Based on your experience as the Chief of Naval Operations, what recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions of sections 152 through 155 of title 10, U.S.C., relating to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the organization and operation of the Joint Staff?

Answer. At this time, I do not recommend any changes to the law. If confirmed, and after I have been in office for a sufficient time to determine if changes are advisable, I will recommend changes as appropriate or necessary.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

Answer. I believe I am qualified to serve as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and have significant experience in the duties required. I had the privilege of seven command tours from which I gained a solid operational foundation. I have served in three joint flag positions: Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic; Commander, Allied Joint Force Command Naples, Italy; and currently as Chief of Naval Operations. While in command in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), I was directly responsible for NATO operations in the Balkans, which included 17,000–24,000 troops on the ground, as well as standing up the military school for the Iraqi security forces. As a Service Chief for the last 2 years, as a member of JCS, I have been an advisor to the Chairman, Secretary of Defense, National Security Advisor, Homeland Security Advisor, and the President, shaping military advice. Further, I served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), completed five tours at Navy headquarters, a tour with the Bureau of Naval Personnel and one in naval training. Finally, I believe my background and experience will be beneficial in leading the Armed Forces through the challenges that lie ahead.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 151(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Chairman of the JCS is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Secretary of Defense. Other sections of law and traditional practice establish important relationships between the Chairman and other officials. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Chairman of the JCS to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Department of Defense (DOD) is composed of OSD, the military departments, the Chairman of JCS, the combatant commands, the Inspector General of DOD, the Defense Agencies, DOD field activities, and such other offices, agencies, activities, and commands established or designated by law, or by the President or by the Secretary of Defense. The functions of the heads of these offices are assigned by the Secretary of Defense according to existing law. The Chairman and the JCS are responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the functions assigned to them. Under title 10, the Chairman, JCS is the principal military adviser to the President, the NSC, Homeland Security Council (HSC), and the Secretary of Defense.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Question. The Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Answer. Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act. As such, the relationship of the Chairman with the Deputy Secretary is similar to that with the Secretary.

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.

Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., and current DOD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions. They may issue instructions and directive type memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. These instructions and directives are applicable to all DOD components. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense,
communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of JCS.

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
Answer. With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, and for Networks & Information Integration, all Assistant Secretaries of Defense are subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of JCS. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant Secretaries in a manner similar to that described above for the Under Secretaries.

Question. The General Counsel of DOD.
Answer. Under title 10, U.S.C., section 140, the DOD General Counsel serves as the principal legal advisor to the Secretary of Defense. In general, the DOD General Counsel is responsible for overseeing legal services, establishing policy and overseeing the DOD Standards of Conduct Program, establishing policy and positions on specific legal issues and advising on significant international law issues raised in major military operations, the DOD Law of War Program, and legality of weapons reviews. The office of the DOD General Counsel works closely with the Office of Legal Counsel to the Chairman of JCS; and communications with the combatant commanders by the DOD General Counsel are normally transmitted through the Chairman of JCS.

Question. The Vice Chairman of JCS.
Answer. The Vice Chairman of JCS performs such duties as may be prescribed by the Chairman with the approval of the Secretary of Defense. When there is a vacancy in the Office of the Chairman or in the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases.

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., section 165, provides that, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the secretaries of military departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands.

The Chairman advises the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments conform with priorities in strategic plans and with the priorities established for requirements of the combatant commands.

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.
Answer. As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service Chiefs are no longer involved in the operational chain of command. However, this does not diminish their importance with respect to title 10 responsibilities, and among other things, they serve two significant roles. First and foremost, they are responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of their respective Services. Without the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no combatant commander can be ensured of the preparedness of his assigned forces for missions directed by the Secretary of Defense and the President.

Second, as members of JCS, the Chiefs are advisers to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense as the senior uniformed leaders of their respective Services. In this function, they play a critically important role in shaping military advice and transforming our joint capabilities. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Service Chiefs to fulfill warfighting and operational requirements.

THE COMBATANT COMMANDERS.

Question. The combatant commanders fight our wars and conduct military operations around the world. By law, and to the extent directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman serves as spokesman for the combatant commanders and is charged with overseeing their activities. He provides a vital link between the combatant commanders and other elements of DOD; and as directed by the President, may serve as the means of communication between the combatant commanders and the President or Secretary of Defense.

Question. The Assistant to the President/Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan.
Answer. The Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan is a direct advisor to the President. As the role of the Chairman is to serve as the principal military advisor to the President, NSC, HSC, and Secretary of Defense, if confirmed, I will work closely with him to ensure our efforts are synchronized across the interagency and combatant commanders.
Question. The Commander, Multinational Forces-Iraq.

Answer. As a subordinate command of the United States Central Command, the Chairman, JCS communicates to the Commander, Multinational Forces-Iraq through the Commander, United States Central Command.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that you would face if confirmed as Chairman of JCS? My immediate concern is Iraq. Progress in Iraq requires a committed security, stabilization, reconstruction, and transition campaign. In the broader Middle East, I believe stability is critical.

Resetting, reconstituting, and revitalizing our force demands my focus. The war has spread our forces thin. I am concerned about the effects of the stress on our ground forces. We need to achieve a 2-to-1 force rotation construct. We also need a force correctly shaped and sized, trained, and equipped, to deter and prevent, and if necessary, fight and win our Nation’s wars.

I believe we must carefully rebalance the global strategic risk. This is a critical time in our Nation’s history, the challenges of the Middle East and the current stress on our ground forces are representative of the dynamic nature of the security challenges we face in the 21st century.

Question. What do you consider to be the biggest problems that you would confront, if confirmed?

Answer. My immediate concern is Iraq. Progress in Iraq requires a committed security, stabilization, reconstruction, and transition campaign. In the broader Middle East, I believe stability is critical.

Resetting, reconstituting, and revitalizing our force demands my focus. The war has spread our forces thin. I am concerned about the effects of the stress on our ground forces. We need to achieve a 2-to-1 force rotation construct. We also need a force correctly shaped and sized, trained, and equipped, to deter and prevent, and if necessary, fight and win our Nation’s wars.

I believe we must carefully rebalance the global strategic risk. This is a critical time in our Nation’s history, the challenges of the Middle East and the current stress on our ground forces are representative of the dynamic nature of the security challenges we face in the 21st century.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges and problems?

Answer. If confirmed, I would pursue a strategy focusing on vital national interests, which employs all elements of national power, and balances global strategic risk. Our military is central to supporting vital national interests:

- Homeland secure from catastrophic attack;
- Sustained global influence, leadership and freedom of action;
- Sustained strategic endurance and military superiority;
- Flourishing global and national economies;
- Assured access to strategic resources; and
- Regional stability in Middle East.

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what would be your priorities as Chairman?

Answer. My immediate concern is Iraq. Progress in Iraq requires a committed security, stabilization, reconstruction, and transition campaign. In the broader Middle East, I believe stability is critical.

Resetting, reconstituting, and revitalizing our force demands my focus. The war has spread our forces thin. I am concerned about the effects of the stress on our ground forces. We need to achieve a 2-to-1 force rotation construct. We also need a force correctly shaped and sized, trained and equipped, to deter and prevent, and if necessary, fight and win our Nation’s wars.

I believe we must carefully rebalance the global strategic risk. This is a critical time in our Nation’s history, the challenges of the Middle East and the current stress on our ground forces are representative of the dynamic nature of the security challenges we face in the 21st century.

NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

Question. There has been much discussion about the threats the United States will face in the coming decades, including radical Islam, the so-called “long war” against terrorism, and the growing potential for confrontations with a range of violent non-state actors. We also recognize now the importance of and requirement to be able to competently conduct stability and support operations. There are also pres-
sures to take a broader view of the threat to United States national security from potential political, economic, and social instability caused by environmental catastrophes brought on by global warming or natural disasters.

Are you satisfied that the 2004 National Military Strategy is appropriate for the threats the Nation faces today and could face in the coming decades? What changes, if any, should be considered?

Answer. The military objectives of the 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS)—Protect the United States, Prevent Conflict and Surprise Attacks, and Prevail Against Adversaries—were developed broadly to remain relevant to the complexities of the emerging security environment.

If confirmed as Chairman, I will continue to examine the NMS to ensure it appropriately accounts for emerging trends, to include, where appropriate, effects brought on by environmental catastrophes. I will submit an updated assessment in February 2008 as required by title 10, section 153(d).

ROLES AND MISSIONS

Question. Since the end of the Cold War, the Department has considered and re-considered its capabilities requirements, technology acquisition strategies, organizational structure, and forces mix. The geo-strategic environment appears to be changing faster than our military can change to meet new threats, challenges, and opportunities. Fundamental to change within the Armed Forces is agreement on the appropriate distribution of roles and missions among the military departments and several independent agencies. The last two Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs) have acknowledged major shifts in the strategic environment facing the Nation, but recommended no changes to roles and missions and only minor adjustments to the form and size of the defense establishment.

Are you satisfied that our defense establishment is optimally structured, that roles and missions of the military departments are appropriately distributed, and that United States forces are properly armed, trained, and equipped to meet the security challenges the Nation faces today and into the next decade?

Answer. I believe we must continue to shift from a force that focused on major combat operations to one that is more able to counter the current unconventional threats our Nation faces. The United States military must maximize the effectiveness of our asymmetric advantages wherever they exist. We have learned several lessons from operational experience, and as the last QDR points out we have prepared the armed forces to defeat terrorist networks, defend the homeland in-depth, prevent the acquisition or use of weapons of mass destruction, and shape the choices of countries at strategic crossroads.

At the same time the last QDR considered how we think about the enterprise, how we manage it, and how we field capabilities. We must institutionalize that approach to enable the continued transformation of the Department. I recognize the importance of continuing this transformation in operations, strategy, and within the enterprise and will do so, if confirmed.

STRATEGIC DEPTH

Question. At this moment, the U.S. ground forces are fully committed to or exclusively preparing for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. In order to ensure that deployed forces are fully prepared, personnel and equipment are cross-leveled from nondeployed units. Therefore, the few remaining brigades lack the personnel, equipment, and training necessary for unrestricted availability to meet any new contingency should one arise. This situation puts the Nation in a perilous position. We lack what former Chief of Staff of the Army, General Peter Schoomaker, called “strategic depth.” This lack of military depth could embolden a potential adversary, slow our ability to respond to a new emergency, and increases the probability of higher casualties in any future conflict. In the absence of sufficient strategic depth, the Nation must more carefully manage strategic risk.

What is your assessment of the current readiness of our Armed Forces, and particularly our ground forces, for worldwide commitment to any contingency and any level of operations?

Answer. Current operational commitments are creating significant demands on the force, particularly our ground force. Readiness of deployed forces and forces that are preparing to deploy remain our highest priorities. Sustaining operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, while maintaining readiness to respond to new contingencies around the globe, is a heavy burden on our current force structure. Current operations are degrading our ability to perform full-spectrum operations. That said, we have significant strategic depth resident in our Air Force and Navy, which mitigates somewhat the current strategic risk because of the stress on our ground forces.
While it is critical that we maintain our focus on current operations, where possible, we are taking steps to enhance our ability to respond to emerging or unplanned events. We are building strategic depth by increasing the size of our forces.

**Question.** What in your view is the level of strategic risk the Nation faces given the lack of depth in our ground forces?

**Answer.** The Chairman’s Risk Assessment Report provided to Congress in February 2007 was developed in consultation with the Joint Chiefs. I endorse its classified assessment of the level of risk facing our Nation. That level of risk is due to a number of factors, including stress on the United States military, especially our ground forces. From a military perspective, continued deployments, accelerated equipment usage rates across the Services and high operational tempo all contribute to risk and are unlikely to subside in the near term. I am confident that our Armed Forces remain capable of defeating all who threaten our Nation’s security.

**Question.** What in your view are the three most important actions we should take immediately to mitigate and correct our lack of strategic depth?

**Answer.** Mitigating risk requires a number of actions, many already ongoing. Priorities include efforts to:

1. Get to a 2-to-1 force rotation metric; this will require an increase in the size of the Army and Marine Corps. Growth will improve our warfighting capacity and reduce the stress experienced by our forces.
2. Resetting, repairing, and replacing equipment worn out or damaged in battle and restoring prepositioned stocks drawn to equip new units or those committed to operations in Iraq or Afghanistan will ensure our forces are ready to respond rapidly to contingencies at home and abroad.
3. We must also stress modernization across all the Services. Much of our equipment is approaching or is at the limits of its service life. Replacing aging equipment with modern systems and integrating new capabilities will ensure our Armed Forces remain preeminent.

**TRANSFORMATION**

**Question.** Please describe the progress that the Department, including the JCS and the Joint Staff, has made in transforming the Armed Forces.

**Answer.** I recognize the need to shift the balance of our capabilities to better meet the irregular, disruptive, and potentially catastrophic security challenges of the 21st century while maintaining our ability to overmatch any traditional challenge that may arise to confront us.

DOD has shifted its focus in the following ways:

- From a peacetime tempo to a wartime sense of urgency in an era of surprise and uncertainty;
- From single-focused threats to multiple, distributed, and complex challenges;
- From a “one-size-fits-all deterrence” to tailored deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist networks and near-peer competitors;
- From responding after crisis starts (reactive) to preventive actions so problems do not become crises (proactive); and from crisis response to shaping the future;
- From peacetime planning to rapid Adaptive Planning;
- From a focus on kinetics to a focus on effects;
- From 20th century processes to 21st century approaches—particularly how information used innovatively generates power; and
- From a DOD solutions to interagency, multi-lateral and multi-national comprehensive approaches.

The JCS have championed the shift from dependence on large, permanent overseas garrisons toward expeditionary operations utilizing increasingly more austere bases abroad; from focusing on primarily traditional combat operations toward greater capability to deal with asymmetric challenges; from deconflicting joint operations to integrated and even interdependent operations—all while massing the cumulative power of joint forces to achieve synergistic effects. Specific examples include:

- Ground forces taking on more of the tasks heretofore performed by Special Operations Forces;
- Improving warfighter proficiency in irregular warfare; counterinsurgency; and stabilization, transition, and reconstruction operations;
- Developing proficiency in foreign languages and cultures;
Implementing ground-force modularity at all levels; ensuring they are largely self-sustaining, and capable of disaggregating into smaller, autonomous units (Army brigade combat teams);

- U.S. Marine Corps has established a Marine Corps Special Operations Command and within it established Foreign Military Training Units; and improved the capability to conduct distributed operations as well as "low-end" SOF missions;
- Special Operating Forces (SOF) are increasing their capability to detect, locate, and render safe weapons of mass destruction. SOF is also significantly increasing capacity;
- U.S. Special Operations Command has been designated the lead combatant command for planning, synchronizing, and executing global operations against terrorist networks;
- Joint air capabilities are shifting to systems with far greater range and persistence; larger and more flexible payloads for surveillance or strike; and the ability to penetrate and sustain operations in denied areas;
- Future joint air capabilities will exploit stealth and advanced electronic warfare; they will include a mix of manned and unmanned aircraft for both surveillance and strike;
- Joint maritime forces including the Coast Guard are increasingly conducting highly distributed operations with a networked fleet that is more capable of projecting power in littoral waters; and
- The Navy is expanding its riverine capability for river patrol, interdiction, and tactical troop movement on inland waterways.

The Joint Staff supports and facilitates transformation efforts by acting as the primary agent for developing and monitoring concept development and joint experimentation.

- The Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC) family consists of the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations, Joint Operating Concepts, Joint Functional Concepts, and Joint Integrating Concepts. These concepts look 8–20 years into the future and serve to translate strategic guidance, such as the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and Strategic Planning Guidance, into joint force capabilities through joint experimentation.
- The concept development and experimentation process actively solicits and fosters participation by combatant commanders, Services, and agencies to bring together and leverage off the differing perspectives to address future warfighting needs and challenges.
- Joint Concept Development and Experimentation involves the unprecedented integration of strategists, operational planners, and participation of the requirements, experimentation, and acquisition communities.

As an integral part of the capabilities based planning process, the Joint Staff developed a Joint Capability Area framework and lexicon representing the beginnings of a common language to discuss and describe capabilities and increase transparency across related DOD activities and processes.

**Question.** If confirmed, what would be your goals regarding transformation in the future?

- We must recruit and retain the high quality of our joint force we must rapidly reset and transform the force to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.
- Our future military concepts all reflect the need for addressing future security challenges as a unified team with other interagency partners. One of my primary goals would therefore be to push for DOD to partner with other interagency members to address how we will achieve national security objectives now and in the future through inter-governmental concepts.
- We must continue to build relationships with multi-national partners and potential partners, laying the foundation for future joint operations and shaping the environment for those operations.

**Question.** Do you believe the Joint Staff should play a larger role in transformation? If so, in what ways?

**Answer.** I believe the Joint Staff should continue current transformational initiatives and work harder to fuse the development of JOpsC that will enable forces in the field to be more effective, aggressively address and solve issues that fall in or across the seams between the combatant commands, and work with the Services to ensure our best ideas, efficiencies and technologies are made available to our future warfighters.
JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT


Is the 2005 Chairman of JCS Vision for JOD consistent with your views? If confirmed, will you revise this vision?

Answer. Yes, the 2005 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision for JOD is consistent with my views. The premise of JOD vision is to have a competency-based, lifelong continuum of learning . . . in a joint context. The goal of JOD is to ensure we have the largest possible body of fully qualified and inherently joint officers for joint command and stag responsibilities. If confirmed, I will continue to enforce the foundations addressed in the JOD vision to ensure our officers are strategically minded, critical thinkers, and skilled joint warfighters. I am committed to increasing levels of joint competency and joint capabilities for all officers, both Active and Reserve.

If confirmed, I will remain fully supportive of JOD as it is written today. I also understand that developing our officers is a continuous process that will go through several iterations and reviews. I am committed to ensuring they are prepared to support the vision and strategy as laid out by the President and the Secretary of Defense.

Question. What do you consider to be the principal issues addressed by the strategic plan, and, if confirmed, what objectives would you hope to achieve?

Answer. The Strategic Plan modernizes JOD and management in the 21st century. The joint force management infrastructure must be as dynamic as the environment in which the joint force operates to ensure we have the right mix of joint educated, trained, and experienced officers—the Plan recognizes this and meets the demands of today's robust environment.

If confirmed, I will continue implementation of the new Joint Officer Management process, per the changes authorized in National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2007, to develop the flexible joint manpower structure we need to meet the ever-changing military environment. The Strategic Plan led to legislative changes enabling the new Joint Qualification System will be responsive to the warfighters in multi-Service, multi-national, and interagency operations and produce the number of fully qualified and inherently joint officers we need. It builds on Goldwater-Nichols' traditional path to joint qualification and opens up the aperture by better recognizing the accrual of joint experience.

Question. What do you consider to be the principal issues addressed by the strategic plan, and, if confirmed, what objectives would you hope to achieve?

Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols Act correctly established Joint Professional Military Education, along with a joint duty assignment, as the standard for today's joint professional. For the past 20 years officers have aspired to earn the Joint Specialty Officer designation. While the premise of that designation (that an officer be proficient in joint matters) remains the same, the title has changed under NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007 to “Joint Qualified Officer.”

Joint education remains central to the development of Joint Qualified Officers—the strength of joint education is that it is at the heart of JOD and is a major pillar of the Joint Learning Continuum that also includes individual training, experience, and self-development.

If confirmed as the Chairman, I understand my responsibility under title 10, to ensure the necessary joint training and education of the Armed Forces to accomplish strategic and contingency planning and preparedness to conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense is critical to the defense of our Nation.

The weakness is that we still have a challenge with capacity in delivery of JPME Phase II—with the size of our current military officer force today, the number of officers requiring JPME II far exceeds our capacity to educate all officers at the JPME II level. We do have the ability to provide every officer, both Active and Reserve component, the opportunity to receive JPME Phase I credit, and have been granted, thanks to the Congress' approval, expansion of Phase II Joint education to the Senior Level Colleges' in-resident programs.

Question. What is your assessment of the appropriate balance between education and experience in achieving qualification as a joint specialty officer?

Answer. Both education and experience are critical to JOD. I believe that our system must be flexible enough to provide selected officers a tailored mix of the joint education, training and assignment opportunities they need to gain the experience
and achieve the competency-level an organization requires to effectively fill critical joint positions.

**REBALANCING FORCES**

*Question.* In a memorandum of July 9, 2003, the Secretary of Defense directed action by the Services, the Joint Staff, and OSD aimed at achieving better balance in the capabilities of the Active and Reserve components. The Secretary noted that the Department "needs to promote judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components with force rebalancing initiatives that reduce strain through the efficient application of manpower and technological solution based on a disciplined force requirements process."

*Answer.* What progress has been made in achieving the Secretary's vision?

The Secretary’s vision encompassed three principal objectives: rebalance the Active and Reserve Forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilization of the Guard and Reserve; establish a more rigorous process for reviewing joint requirements, which ensures that force structure is designed appropriately and requests for forces are validated promptly to provide timely notice of mobilization; and make the mobilization and demobilization process more efficient.

We have instituted a new process for assignment, allocation, and apportionment of United States military forces to the combatant commands. The Global Force Management Process provides comprehensive insight into the total number of United States Forces available in our inventory forces and helps us match requirements with available forces. Sourcing solutions are developed and then approved at a quarterly Global Force Management Board designed to ensure the best options are selected to achieve desired effects.

Additionally, the lessons learned during Operation Iraqi Freedom concerning Reserve mobilization and demobilization have been put into action. Specific recommendations were made, each with follow-on actions, to enhance the capability of the Department to mobilize and deploy Reserve Forces in the most effective manner possible. The Department has rewritten policies that have been included in the Global Force Management process. As part of this process, every Reserve deployment is reviewed for an effective alternative source of manpower—civilian, contractor, or volunteer.

In May of this year, the Secretary of Defense signed a memorandum implementing changes recommended by the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. These changes, have met with considerable support as they are designed to enhance the National Guard Bureau to meet the national security requirements of the United States.

Rebalancing the force will continue to be an ongoing process. The Reserve components, and the Total Force, must always preserve the capability to operate across the full spectrum of conflict.

*Question.* What do you consider to be the biggest continuing obstacles to achieving the goals that the Secretary of Defense has set forth in his memorandum?

*Answer.* The biggest challenge is determining what capabilities we’ll need in the future and therefore, determining the appropriate balance between the active and Reserve components while maintaining sufficient warfighting capability. To that end, rebalancing of the force is an ongoing activity within the Department. The Department continually assesses its force structure and rebalancing within, and between, the active and Reserve components with the expressed purpose of improving readiness and deployability. Reserve component sources must be adequately resourced and prepared for anticipated requirements. Maintaining interoperability and providing the resources to train and equip the Reserve Forces to a single operational standard remains a Total Force imperative.

Not since World War II have the Reserve components been called upon to perform in such a high operational tempo, and they have performed in an exemplary manner. It is true that when you call out the Reserve component you call out the Nation, and they have answered that call.

**HEALTH CARE BENEFITS**

*Question.* In May 2007, the Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care issued an interim report concluding that “to sustain and improve military health care benefits for the long run, actions must be taken now to adjust the system in the most cost-effective ways.” Among other recommendations, the Task Force recommends increasing the portion of the costs borne by retirees under age 65, and suggesting an increase in military retired pay to offset part or all of the increase if Congress believes that the increases are too large relative to retired pay.
What recommendations, if any, would you offer to address the increasing cost of health care and other personnel benefits?

Answer. Our men and women in uniform make great sacrifices for their Nation, and their personnel benefits, to include compensation and health care programs, have always been a priority for me. The continued support of Congress, and the Nation, is greatly appreciated by our military servicemembers.

The rising cost of health care is clearly an issue we need to work and will seek the support of Congress. Maintaining the life long continuum of care is especially critical with the ongoing operations in the Middle East. We need to strike a balance between our people, health care, acquisition and operations and maintenance.

If confirmed, I will continue to support the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs as they lead the Department’s ongoing effort to promote efficiency in both our direct health care and purchased care programs.

The Task Force on Military Health Care’s final report will be released in December. I look forward to review those recommendations and will use the report findings to help shape an equitable plan to sustain the benefit, while attempting to control the significant rise in costs.

Question. If confirmed, what role would you anticipate playing in any shaping or rethinking of health care benefits for military personnel, including retirees and their families?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support a health care benefit system that is flexible, effective, and cost-efficient to serve the needs of our military members, retirees, and their families.

I look forward to continuing our efforts with Congress and DOD to ensure military personnel can serve their nation with the knowledge that their health care benefits are secure. In this time of war, we are committed to providing the best care possible for our forces that are returning with combat injuries. I will also continue to support close cooperation between the DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs to improve care for our troops and for those who have left the Service.

Question. How would you assess the impact of health care benefits on recruitment and retention of military personnel?

Answer. The recruiting and retention environment is very dynamic and competitive, and a quality health care system is an important cornerstone in our overall benefits package. Maintaining our high-quality, All-Volunteer Force is dependent on our ability to continue to recruit and retain men and women with a desire to serve their Nation. Our health care benefits program clearly helps us in these efforts.

Question. What role should the Chairman of JCS, as opposed to the service chiefs, play with respect to health care benefits?

Answer. If confirmed, my title 10 role is to provide military advice to the President, NSC, HSC, and the Secretary of Defense. In that capacity I will support the Services and the Department as they evaluate benefit programs. The Service Chiefs have a direct function within their respective departments in the delivery of health care services in addition to offering appropriate advice as members of JCS.

SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY

Question. In response to a congressional requirement for formulation of a comprehensive policy related to sexual assaults in the Armed Forces, the Secretary of Defense promulgated guidance aimed at more effectively preventing sexual assaults, investigating incidents of sexual assault, and responding to the needs of victims of sexual assault.

What role, if any, has the Joint Staff played in monitoring progress within the military services and the combatant commands’ areas of responsibility in order to ensure enforcement of a “zero tolerance” policy relating to sexual assaults?

Answer. As a member of the DOD Sexual Assault Advisory Council, the Joint Staff works closely with the Joint Task Force Sexual Assault Prevention and Response team, the Services, and OSD. This ensures that the policy is executable in the joint and multinational operational environment.

The Joint Staff provides a monthly report to the task force on Service progress in completing investigations of sexual assaults that occur in the United States Central Command area of operations. The Joint Staff also provides assistance to combatant commanders during the development of their internal procedures; serve as a liaison staff to address Service policy issues that might impact a commander’s ability to conduct investigations; and provides support to victims in the joint environment.
Question. What reporting requirements or other forms of oversight by service leaders do you think are necessary to ensure that the goals of sexual assault prevention and response policies are achieved?

Answer. I do not believe we need any additional reporting requirements on oversight by Service leaders. The prevention of sexual assault is the responsibility of all leaders and every soldier, sailor, airman, and marine. Leaders in particular must be apprised of command climate and aware of sexual assault or harassment incidents, and remain in the forefront to ensure that our policies are understood and enforced. They should also be held accountable in this area.

Question. If confirmed, will you direct any changes to the Joint Staff's responsibilities for addressing the issue of sexual assault in the Armed Forces?

Answer. If confirmed, I will stress to the entire Armed Forces my expectations. Every leader plays a vital role in the prevention of sexual assault. The Joint Staff will monitor the training and incident reporting of sexual assault very closely. Any changes to the Joint Staff responsibilities would be initiated.

INDEPENDENT LEGAL ADVICE

Question. During your assignment on the Joint Staff, you may have had the opportunity to observe the working relationship between the Chairman's legal advisor, the DOD General Counsel, the Judge Advocates General of the Services and judge advocates advising commanders in the field.

What is your view about the responsibility of the Chairman's legal advisor to provide independent legal advice to you, other members of JCS, and to the Joint Staff?

Answer. I view the Chairman of JCS Legal Counsel as having responsibility for providing independent legal advice to the Chairman in his role as principal military adviser to the President, the NSC, HSC, and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, he must advise the Chairman, Vice Chairman, and Joint Staff on the full spectrum of legal issues. Given the Chairman’s role as spokesman for the combatant commanders, the Legal Counsel frequently advises and assists combatant commander's legal staffs. In all of these roles, I expect the Chairman’s legal counsel to provide his best independent counsel.

Question. What is your view of the need for the Judge Advocates General of the Services to provide independent legal advice to the Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. I similarly believe that the Judge Advocates General should provide their best independent counsel with regards to all of their roles and responsibilities; to include advising the Chiefs of Staff.

Question. What is your view of the responsibility of judge advocates within the services and joint commands to provide independent legal advice to military commanders?

Answer. Uniformed staff judge advocates are essential to the proper functioning of the Armed Forces. In the critical area of military justice, commanders and commanding officers are required by statute (title 10, section 806) to communicate with their staff judge advocates with the purpose of receiving instruction and guidance in this field. In addition, officers rely on their staff judge advocates for advice on all types of legal matters, extending beyond their statutory responsibilities. A staff judge advocate has a major responsibility to promote the interests of a command by providing relevant, timely, and independent advice to its military commander, whether at shore or in the fleet. Title 10, section 5148(2)(2) reinforces the critical need for independent advice from a staff judge advocate, by prohibiting all interference with a judge advocate's ability to give independent legal advice to commanders, as applied to any employee of DOD. Commanders depend extensively on their staff judge advocates to provide independent advice, which combines legal acumen and understanding of military requirements and operations.

WOMEN IN COMBAT

Question. The issue of the appropriate role of women in the Armed Forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and the American public.

What is your assessment of the performance of women in the Armed Forces, particularly given the combat experiences of our military, since the last major review of the assignment policy for women in 1994?

Answer. Today, more than 333,000 women serve in the United States Armed Forces around the world and they are performing with distinction. From commanders, pilots, crewmembers, technicians, to military police, women will continue to play a critical role in the defense of our Nation in a wide variety of assignments and skills.
Question. What is your understanding of the status of the report on implementation of DOD policies with regard to the assignment of women required by section 541 of Public Law 109–163?
Answer. It is my understanding the draft report is still being worked within the Department and has not been released.

Question. Does the DOD have sufficient flexibility under current law to make changes to the assignment policy for women?
Answer. Current law provides adequate flexibility to make changes to DOD assignment policy for women.

Question. Do you believe any changes in the current policy are needed?
Answer. The current DOD policy recognizes that women are an integral part of our Armed Forces and provides the flexibility needed to address changes to the operational environment. If confirmed, and there are appropriate changes to be brought forward, I will do so.

COMMISSION ON NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Question. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves issued a second interim report to Congress on March 1, 2007, recommending among other things that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) should not be a member of JCS, but that the National Guard Bureau should be a joint activity and the Commander or Deputy Commander of U.S. Northern Command should be a Reserve or National Guard officer at all times.

What is your opinion on the recommendations of the Commission?
Answer. I agree with the Secretary of Defense’s memo dated 10 May 2007. The Secretary agreed in whole or part with 20 of the Commission’s recommendations and proposed alternatives for the 3 remaining recommendations.

Question. What is your view of the appropriate role of senior Reserve component officers on the Joint Staff and on the staffs of the combatant commanders?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with senior officers from the National Guard and the Reserves to assist me as advisors on National Guard and Reserve matters.

Question. What is your view about making the CNGB a member of JCS? What is your rationale for this opinion?
Answer. I do not recommend that the CNGB be a member of JCS. Due to the impact that the National Guard has on national security, I believe the CNGB should be invited to participate in JCS discussions when Guard equities are addressed in a similar fashion as the Commandant of the Coast Guard. In addition, if I am confirmed, the CNGB will have full access to me and the upper echelons of the Joint Staff.

RELIANCE ON RESERVE COMPONENT

Question. The men and women of the Reserve component have performed superbly in meeting the diverse challenges of the global war on terrorism. Such a heavy use of the Reserve components however could have potential adverse effects on recruiting, retention, and morale of Guard and Reserve personnel.

What is your assessment of the impact of continuing Guard and Reserve deployments on the readiness and attractiveness of service in the Guard and Reserve?
Answer. The men and women of our active and Reserve Force are performing superbly. The prolonged demand on certain capabilities resident in the Guard and Reserve is a serious concern. Of note, the highest retention percentages in the Reserve components come from units that have deployed for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom—clearly, these servicemembers understand the importance of their service and are volunteering again to continue to serve their country. We must continue to ensure our personnel receive strong support from their civilian employers, provide support for their families, and we must also continue to closely monitor recruiting and retention. I would like to thank the employers of the Reserve Force for their understanding during this time of national need. The Armed Forces will continue to need their support during this long war.

To decrease demand on the Reserve component, the Department has several initiatives underway which help alleviate additional burden on the Guard and Reserve including: (1) rebalancing of forces, (2) modularization for a better deployment rotation base, (3) new training and certification procedures for our Army Guard and Reserves prior to mobilization to maximize their utility while minimizing their total time away from home, and (4) increases in the Active component.

I understand that the Department is working hard to deal with the prolonged demand on certain capabilities resident in the Guard and Reserve. Secretary Gates redefined the mobilization policy when he issued the “Utilization of the Total Force:
memorandum on 19 January 2007. In this memorandum, Secretary Gates identified the following:

1. Setting the length of involuntary mobilization at a maximum of 12 months for Reserve component units;
2. Mobilizing ground forces on a unit versus individual basis;
3. Establishing a planning objective with a ratio of 1 year of mobilization followed by 5 years of ‘dwell time’;
4. Establishing a new program to compensate, or provide for incentives to members required to mobilize or deploy early or often, or be extended beyond established rotation policy goals;
5. Reviewing hardship waiver programs to ensure they are properly taking into account exceptional circumstance; and
6. Minimizing the use of stop loss as a force management tool.

Implementing these six areas will provide increased predictability for our citizen soldiers, their civilian employers, and their families.

Readiness within the Reserve components continues to be strong within the community-based forces. If confirmed, I will continue to monitor recruiting and retention in both our Active component and Reserve component forces.

Question. What missions, if any, do you consider appropriate for permanent assignment to the Reserve component?

Answer. The Reserve components must be able to operate across the full spectrum of conflict, and reflect their parent services total force capabilities. The Nation has made a tremendous investment in its military members. These highly trained individuals who, if they choose to leave the Active components of their Services upon completion of their obligated commitment, can re-serve America in their specialties in the Guard and Reserve if these components mirror the full capabilities of their services.

END STRENGTH OF ACTIVE-DUTY FORCES

Question. In light of the manpower demands of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, what level of active-duty personnel (by Service) do you believe is required for current and anticipated missions?

Answer. The Services, Joint Staff, and OSD have looked at this impact and have brought forward their force structure recommendations. The Army and Marine Corps have planned growth that is consistent with the future demands expected to be placed on our ground forces. This planned growth is partially offset by limited manpower reductions in the Navy and Air Force. If confirmed, I will continue to work with the Services to determine the right size force as current and anticipated missions change.

Question. How do you assess the progress made to date by the Services in finding ways to reduce the numbers of military personnel performing support functions that can better be performed by civilian employees or contractors?

Answer. The conversion from military to civilian manpower has been ongoing for some time. Military-to-civilian personnel targets are the result of collaborative reviews and analyses between OSD and the Services. This process has been effective and, as it is collaborative with the Services, I believe it is working toward an effective balance of personnel helping to accomplish the Department’s mission.

Question. What manpower savings can be achieved through reductions in overseas presence, application of technology, and changes in roles and missions?

Answer. As we continue to shape our force in response to the changing roles and missions around the world, there will continue to be adjustments to where we posture our forces. If confirmed, I will work with the Service Chiefs and the Department to evaluate the global environment and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense regarding the appropriate placement of our forces to assist in carrying out our Nation’s global engagement strategies.

Question. What is your assessment about the feasibility and advisability from a cost standpoint of increasing the end strength of the Army to 547,000 and the Marine Corps to 202,000?

Answer. I support the planned growth in both the Army and Marine Corps as we move toward a 2-to-1 force rotation metric. The two Services have planned for and are prepared for the mission of increasing their end strength. The President’s budget submission has included the costs associated with this needed growth of our ground forces.

I fully realize the pressure that manpower accounts place on the Department’s budget. Salaries, health care, and other supporting infrastructure all come at a cost, but it is my belief that our soldiers and marines, and their families, are deserving of the relief afforded by a greater end strength.
RECRUITING AND RETENTION

Question. The ability of the Armed Forces to recruit highly qualified young men and women and to retain experienced, highly motivated commissioned and non-commissioned officers is influenced by many factors, and is critical to the success of the All-Volunteer Force. While retention in all the services has remained strong, recruiting data in 2007 have shown increasing difficulty for the Army, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Navy Reserve, and Air National Guard in meeting monthly recruiting goals. The Active-Duty Army in particular is facing difficulties, failing to meet its target for May and June.

What do you consider to be the most important elements of successful recruiting?

Answer. I believe the most important elements of successful recruiting are: tapping the reservoir of patriotism by providing the opportunity to serve the Nation; offering America’s best and brightest the chance to serve in a proud and respected profession; possessing a properly resourced cadre of highly motivated and trained recruiters; having complete access to the recruiting pool; offering a competitive compensation and benefits package; and providing the opportunity for young men and women to achieve skills, education, and experience. In addition to these efforts, it is important that we get our message of service to those with the greatest influence on our candidate pool: the parents, teachers, coaches, and spiritual leaders.

Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have to improve recruiting for the ground forces?

Answer. I appreciate the tools that Congress has provided (such as increased recruiting bonuses and raising the maximum enlistment age) because they are proving valuable to recruiting efforts. I believe we will have to increase the incentives. The dynamic recruiting environment will remain very competitive, and the Services continue to explore methods to improve recruiting. We look forward to the continued support from Congress to give the Department the flexibility needed to adjust as needed to meet this critical mission.

Question. How can the Department better target and reach the “influencers”—the parents, teachers, and coaches who influence our young men and women, and their career choices?

Answer. The entire Department and our Nation’s senior leaders must reach out to, and engage, the American people—especially parents, teachers, coaches, and clergy—to help them understand and appreciate the critical function our All-Volunteer Force provides to our Nation. We need a national campaign to succeed here. We all need to be recruiters.

Question. What do you consider to be the most important components in the success of all the Services in retaining experienced junior officers, petty officers, and noncommissioned officers?

Answer. I believe the most important components in retaining experienced junior officers, petty officers, and noncommissioned officers are:

(1) challenge them with great responsibilities;
(2) properly compensate them;
(3) provide for a balance that permits them to achieve balance in their lives;
(4) provide an environment of support for their families: good schools, good housing, and good medical care;
(5) achieve 2:1 dwell time for our ground forces; and
(6) the continued support of American people and the value that our Nation places on the service and sacrifice of all servicemembers and their families.

As with recruiting, we are very grateful for the tools provided by Congress as they are critical to continued success in the retention of our force.

Question. In your opinion, what impact is the current recruiting environment likely to have on our ability to sustain an All-Volunteer Force?

Answer. The All-Volunteer Force has served this Nation well for 34 years. It will continue to do so. It provides a force that is intelligent, motivated, and dedicated, and meets our Nation’s needs.

MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES

Question. The final report of the DOD Task Force on Mental Health issued in June 2007 found evidence that the stigma associated with mental illness represents a “critical failure” in the military, preventing individuals from seeking needed care. The report states, “Every military leader bears responsibility for addressing stigma: leaders who fail to do so reduce the effectiveness of the servicemembers they lead.”
If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure addressing the stigma associated with mental illness in the military?

Answer. Mental illness as a result of combat operations' needs to be addressed and treated just like any other medical condition. Every leader in DOD needs to conform to this line of thought. If confirmed as Chairman, I intend to provide strong leadership to ensure that we address this issue.

Question. What is your view of the need for revision to military policies on command notification and self-disclosure for purposes of security clearances?

Answer. Personal mental health issues cannot be ignored and as an institution, DOD must directly address this issue. While mental health questions need to asked and investigated for security clearances, a balance needs to be established between mental health issues that have a high possibility to be detrimental to national security and mental health issues that the member recognizes and is actively seeking help. If confirmed, I will review current policies to ensure the policies do not institutionalize a mental health stigma.

IRAQ

Question. What is your assessment of the current situation facing the United States in Iraq?

Answer. In recent months, there has been a steady improvement in the security lines of operation evidenced by both empirical data (metrics) and the sense of the commanders. However, there is very limited progress in reconciliation, which remains the precondition to an Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself and be an ally in the war on terror. Execution of the governance and economic lines of operation has been largely unsatisfactory, albeit nascent governmental institutions and a lack of experience with the democratic process hamper them. Current indications are that the Iraqi leadership is still struggling in its ability to move forward with reconciliation and that this political process will take time. The Iraqi political process is the key enabler that must be a focus of our effort.

Question. From your perspective, what are the top lessons learned from our experience in Iraq?

Answer. We face determined, agile enemies in Iraq. Achieving the desired end-state will require a sustained and integrated interagency effort as well as unity of effort with the Iraqi Government. Effective strategic and operational planning by the interagency and with both our coalition partners and the Iraqi Government is critical to our success.

The evolving regional strategic landscape requires the reconstitution of our strategic depth and flexibility. We must ensure we have the capacity to act in the future. Achieving progress in Iraq and furthering broader U.S. regional interests are intricably linked. Slow progress in Iraq is undermining U.S. credibility and weakening efforts to achieve regional objectives.

Question. What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes the United States has made to date in Iraq? Which of these do you believe are still having an impact? What do you believe could be done now to mitigate such impact?

Answer. I believe the most significant mistakes to date are:

(1) Did not fully integrate all elements of U.S. national power in Iraq;
(2) Focused most attention on the Iraqi national power structures with limited, engagement of the tribal and local power structures;
(3) Did not establish an early and significant dialogue with neighboring countries, adding to the complex security environment a problematic border situation;
(4) Disbanded the entire Iraqi Amy, a potentially valuable asset for security, reconstruction, and provision of services to the Iraqi people, providing a recruiting pool for extremist groups;
(5) Pursued a de-Baathification process that proved more divisive than helpful, created a lingering vacuum in governmental capability that still lingers, and exacerbated sectarian tensions;
(6) Attempted to transition to stability operations with an insufficient force; and
(7) Unsuccessful in communicating and convincing Iraqis and regional audience of our intended goals.

I believe many of these are still having an impact. The void left by a disbanded Iraqi Army and has not yet been filled by the Iraqi security forces, allowing sectarian violence to continue in too many areas.

I believe that pursuing a balanced strategy in Iraq, with full interagency support, and an aggressive strategic communications plan can mitigate this impact.
Question. What do you believe are the most important steps that the United States needs to take in Iraq?

Answer. Our approach must be consistent with enduring United States vital and regional interests. We must commit to a long-term security relationship with Iraq that facilitates political reconciliation, supports development of a stable Iraq, and is directly tied to our enduring long-term interests in the region.

We must work through the interagency and regional partners to expand Iraqi governance and economic capacity. This effort must be centered on developing effective incentives and disincentives (and associated measures of effectiveness) to influence Government of Iraq (GOI), Iraqi factions/leaders, regional states, as well as Syria and Iran.

We must continue our long-term fight against al Qaeda, contain the sectarian conflict within the borders of Iraq, and prevent large scale civil war and the resultant humanitarian crisis.

Question. Do you believe that there is a purely military solution in Iraq, or must the solution be primarily a political one?

Answer. No, there is no purely military solution in Iraq. The enormous complexity, historic differences, competing views of the future Iraq, and lack of trust in new institutions will require long-term political and social solutions. In the near term, political progress requires demonstrated commitment to national reconciliation in order to address:

1. de-Baathification and lack of proportional Sunni representation in the Government, Army, and Police;
2. Equitable distribution of oil revenue; and
3. Amnesty.

Question. Do you believe that political compromise among Iraqi political leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution?

Answer. Yes. Compromise is a key to advancing solutions to the political issues facing Iraq. For Iraq to progress politically, their politicians need to view politics and democracy as more than just majority rule, winner-take-all, or a zero-sum game.

Question. Do you believe that quelling the current level of violence in Baghdad is a necessary condition for a political solution?

Answer. I believe that Baghdad is the center of gravity and that reducing violence there is an essential enabler. However, as violence is contained, there are two follow-on conditions required to stabilizing the situation and facilitating an Iraqi political solution:

- The GOI, with Coalition support, must make progress toward reconciliation, eliminating the insurgency, decrease the levels of sectarian, and intra-Shia violence, and set conditions for the transfer of responsibility to GOI and Iraqi security forces (ISF).
- We must achieve unity of effort within the U.S. Government (interagency), among coalition partners, and between the coalition and the Iraqi Government.

Progress toward reconciliation and associated reductions in sectarian and intra-Shia violence is vital; failure to achieve tangible progress toward reconciliation requires a strategic reassessment.

Question. What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders to make the political compromises necessary for a political solution? What leverage does the United States have in this regard? We cannot impose political change upon the Iraqi political leadership.

Answer. We can, however, create the conditions of security that help facilitate Iraqi political reconciliation. We are seeing the beginning of this in the neighborhoods of Baghdad that have been stabilized. A moderate degree of normalcy is returning and within those areas, we are seeing increased cooperation between the local Iraqis and the ISF and coalition forces.

We can also leverage our demonstrated commitment to a secure Iraq to host a regional conference on Iraq. Together with regional leadership, we could develop effective incentives and disincentives (and associated measures of effectiveness) to influence the GOI, Iraqi factions/leaders, and regional states.

The U.S. can forge regional political and economic support to the GOI to further encourage GOI reconciliation. This regional approach could seek to revive reconstruction funding, encourage business and financial partnerships, and encourage additional support from neighbors (e.g., establish embassies, direct investment, development assistance, debt forgiveness, Iraqi ministry development, etc).

Some Iraq leaders are becoming increasingly intransigent as they posture themselves for what they perceive to be our near-term withdrawal. A U.S. lever to
counter this intransigence and facilitate political reconciliation would be a demonstrated commitment to our enduring interests in Iraq and the region (e.g. work with the GOI to achieve a long-term security agreement that supports our mutual interests).

Inducing the fractured Iraqi leadership to move forward on reconciliation will be difficult and it will take time. We do have some powerful levers available to us including security guarantees, financial incentives, favorable trade status, etc. However, these levers may not be strong enough to outweigh the deep-seated mistrust among the main political factions.

Question. What do you believe are the prospects for Iraqi political leaders to make those compromises and, if made, what effect do you believe this would have toward ending the sectarian violence and defeating the insurgency?

Answer. I believe that the Iraqi political leadership, left to their own internal processes, will have great difficulty achieving the trust required to compromise and move forward on reconciliation. Political and economic progress in Iraq will require patience, persistence and a commitment measured in years not months. Our strategies and force structure must be aligned to facilitate a lengthy Iraqi political reconciliation process while addressing our own vital interests in Iraq relative to the region: degradation of al Qaeda (Iraq) and containment of the conflict.

Political reconciliation will be achieved when a sufficient level of trust and compromise has been reached among the leadership of the main political factions in Iraq. The ability to compromise is a key enabler that will facilitate governance and decisionmaking. When the GOI reaches this milestone, the leadership of political factions will turn away from violence as a method for advancing their agenda, and sectarian violence should decline precipitously. Without considerable U.S., international and regional support and pressure, successful reconciliation is unlikely in the near-term.

Question. What role, if any, did you play in the development of the new Iraq strategy announced by the President earlier this year?

Answer. We had rigorous and thorough discussions and debates. I met personally with the President and the Secretary of Defense in a thorough discussion along with the other Joint Chiefs. The President then made his decision, and I am in support of that decision and working to make it succeed.

Question. With regard to the recent “surge strategy,” what role will you have, if confirmed, in proposing or recommending changes to the strategy? What role will you have in deciding or recommending when U.S. troops can begin to reduce and transition to new missions?

Answer. If confirmed as Chairman, my role is to advise the President and the Secretary of Defense this includes proposing or recommending changes to strategy, troop reductions, or mission transitions. I intend to be engaged from day one. I intend immediately to go to the theater in order to more clearly understand conditions on the ground.

Question. What is the state of planning for such an “exit strategy”? If none has begun, will you require that such planning begin?

Answer. If confirmed, I will take a very active role in all existing and contingency planning efforts.
Question. What role will you play, if any, in an ongoing assessment of the capability of Iraqi security forces to take on more of the security responsibilities?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the combatant commander in the assessment of Iraqi security forces.

Question. What is your understanding of U.S. policy with respect to the arming and support of Sunni militia forces against al Qaeda in al Anbar province and elsewhere in Iraq? What would you recommend in this regard?

Answer. It is my understanding that coalition forces are not arming Sunni militias. I believe we should continue our strong support for local Police Support Units (PSU) in al Anbar province and other areas where the Ambassador and Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF–I) support this concept. Indigenous forces are the key to success in the Iraqi counterinsurgency as demonstrated in al Anbar, which has witnessed an 80-percent decrease in enemy attacks since this time last year. We must continue to focus our efforts in supporting homegrown police and security forces in Iraq.

Question. What considerations will be factored into a decision regarding whether (and if so, what kind and how much) U.S. military equipment currently in Iraq should be left behind for use by the Iraqi Army?

Answer. Equipment/material will be screened for redistribution in theater. Items of military value will be retrograded in accordance with applicable Military Regulations. Equipment will also be screened for sufficient service life/residual value to ensure retrograde is a fiscally sound course of action. If not sufficient, we will then consider transfer to the Iraqi Army.

Additionally, equipment that has undergone significant upgrade since being deployed to theater (e.g. Uparmored HMMWVs, medium and heavy trucks, etc.) may also be screened for transfer.

There are some other types of nonmilitary equipment managed by contractors (e.g. generators, living trailers, tents, etc.). These will also be screened for transfer/donation to the ISF per Annex D of MNF–I Framework Operation Order (OPORD).

Finally, certain non-military equipment/material that is deemed to have significant value to help stimulate the Iraqi economy, will also be screened for transfer/donation in accordance with Annex D of MNF–I Framework OPORD.

Question. In the National Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress prohibited the use of funds to seek permanent bases in Iraq or to control the oil resources of Iraq. Do you agree that it is not and should not be U.S. policy to seek permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to control oil resources of Iraq?

Answer. I agree with U.S. policy not to seek permanent military bases in Iraq or to control Iraq’s oil resources.

Question. If you agree, what are your views on the construction of any additional facilities inside Iraq for use by our military forces?

Answer. I view any construction the U.S. undertakes in Iraq as temporary basing of our forces. If confirmed, I will engage the GOI on a long-term security relationship.

Question. Is the United States military capable of sustaining present force levels in Iraq and Afghanistan without breaking the force?

Answer. If confirmed, I will provide the Secretary of Defense and the President my best military advice as our campaign progresses regarding our missions and the appropriate force levels necessary to achieve them. Of particular concern is the stress on the force. The Army currently has a 15:12 month dwell ratio. The Marine Corps has a 7:7 month dwell ratio. My goal, if confirmed, is resetting the dwell ratio to 2:1.

Question. Are you concerned about the negative impact of the perceived occupation of a Muslim nation by the United States and its western allies?

Answer. Yes. I am concerned about negative perceptions. In order to change the negative impact, it is necessary to see the issues through the eyes of the Muslim community and recognize their particular concerns. If confirmed, I will work to bolster our strategic communications.

AFGHANISTAN

Question. What is your assessment of the long-term prospects for Afghan military forces to effectively provide a secure environment for a democratically elected government to function?

Answer. Recent International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and United States military efforts disrupted the Taliban’s spring surge and eliminated key leadership. Efforts like these are helping create the stability necessary for eventual transition
of security control from NATO to the Afghanistan security forces (ASF). Challenges remain however, including Taliban sanctuaries inside Afghanistan and Pakistan, along with al Qaeda and Iranian support to the Taliban. We must do everything necessary to ensure the success of NATO and facilitate their continued long-term commitment.

**Question.** What, if any, types of military assistance would you recommend in addition to current efforts?

**Answer.** We must work with our NATO allies to both fill the requirements stated in the NATO Combined Joint Statement of Responsibilities and reduce operational caveats. In addition to military forces, it is critical that the United States, NATO and the international community provide the supporting enablers that build Government of Afghanistan capacity and integrate security operations with governmental and economic development.

**Question.** What steps do you believe coalition forces and the international community need to take in the near-term to improve the lives of the Afghan people?

**Answer.** Reinforcing the Government of Afghanistan’s ability to protect and provide for the Afghan people is critical to marginalizing the insurgency and creating a secure environment. The international community has agreed to assist in the development and strengthening of many vital institutions.

We have a critical need for trainers to support the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), ministerial level mentors to develop Afghan Government capacity, and the ability to execute critical infrastructure projects which include roads, power, and rural development.

**Question.** News reports indicate that there is growing Afghan resentment over civilian deaths resulting from U.S. counterterrorism operations and U.S. or NATO air strikes. Are you concerned that these reports of civilian deaths are undermining efforts to win the support of the Afghan people for the mission in Afghanistan? What steps, if any, do you believe ought to be undertaken to address the issue of civilian deaths in Afghanistan?

**Answer.** Yes. I am concerned about civilian deaths. Our military commanders in Afghanistan exert considerable efforts to avoid civilian casualties. These efforts include:

- Continuously reevaluating our operational and tactical approaches to ensure that the operational benefits outweigh the potential damage to overall strategic goals that could result from civilian casualties;
- Investigating every incident to determine if procedures were followed or if they need to be revised; and
- Coordinated, credible post-incident reports are conducted, followed by rapid reporting of conclusions, lessons, and investigations.

**Question.** In November 2006, the U.N. and World Bank released a report on the drug industry in Afghanistan. In February, the Center for Strategic and International Studies released a report on Afghanistan, which included recommendations regarding the counterdrug policy. What is your opinion of the conclusions and recommendations of these reports as they relate to the effectiveness of international military efforts to help Afghanistan combat illegal drug production and trafficking?

**Answer.** I agree with the broad conclusions that a comprehensive “smart” CN strategy is essential in order to combat illegal drug production and trafficking.

**Question.** Should international military forces have an explicit counterdrug mission? If so, should its focus be on interdiction, capturing drug lords, and destroying drug facilities? If not, what is the appropriate role for the military?

**Answer.** The current NATO/ISAF Operation Plan specifically prescribes the military support to counternarcotics (CN) mission, that includes the following sharing CN information; supporting the CN information campaign; provision of enabling support to air & ground lift for CN personnel and equipment; and supporting Afghan Government CN operations.

**Question.** If the U.S. military were to take on the mission of capturing drug lords and dismantling drug labs in Afghanistan, what would be the impact on the drug trade in Afghanistan?

**Answer.** I believe our forces currently deployed to Afghanistan should remain focused on stabilization and ANSF development missions.

**Question.** What can DOD and the military do—via the Provincial Reconstruction Teams or other means—to support the counterdrug efforts of other agencies in those areas?

**Answer.** It is my assessment that DOD should continue its support to CN operations in Afghanistan and work closely with the interagency to support CN programs through continued funding of National Interdiction Unit (NIU) training.
PAKISTAN

Question. In your view, should the Pakistan Government be doing more to eliminate safe havens for the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other extremists in its tribal areas and elsewhere in Pakistan and to prevent them from conducting cross-border incursions into Afghanistan?

Answer. Yes. Although the GOP has recently addressed AQ sanctuaries and Taliban leadership in their border areas, expansion of the GOP’s partnership with ISAF and the Government of Afghanistan is needed to support Afghanistan stability. We must continue to support the growth to their Frontier Corps and recognize that the GOP political situation is very complex with competing demands hindering its ability to fully support United States goals. If confirmed, I will provide any requested assistance to the GOP in its fight in the global war on terror and extremism.

IRAN

Question. What options do you believe are available to the United States to counter Iran’s growing influence in the Middle East region?

Answer. The United States can leverage common interests and objectives with our regional partners. These include:

- Regional security
- Freedom of navigation
- Access to markets
- Assured access to oil and other resources
- Stable, unified Iraq
- Resolution of the Middle East Peace Process

We also share common regional concerns:

- Islamic extremism and the destabilizing influence from Iranian sponsorship of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Taliban;
- Iranian exploitation of Shia populations and the growing Sunni-Shia rift;
- Iranian hegemony and nuclear aspirations.

Iran is central to these concerns and remains the principal destabilizing factor in the region. These commonalities of interests and concerns should be leveraged to develop a regional cooperative security capability while at the same time establishing a dialogue with Iran to explore peaceful options.

Question. Do you believe that a protracted deployment of U.S. troops in Iraq, if the situation on the ground in Iraq does not improve, could strengthen Iran’s influence in the region?

Answer. A protracted deployment of U.S. troops to Iraq, with no change in the security situation, risks further emboldening Iranian hegemonic ambitions and encourages their continued support to Shia insurgents in Iraq and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Growing Coalition successes on the ground in Iraq should mitigate this risk and improve the credibility of our message to create a regional security construct to counter Iranian destabilizing activity.

Question. In your view, does Iran pose a near-term threat to the United States by way of either its missile program or its suspected nuclear weapons programs?

Answer. I am concerned with Iran’s aggressive posture and destabilizing activities. I support current international and regional diplomatic and financial measures to counter Iranian behavior now to preclude confrontation in the future.

Question. Other than nuclear or missile programs what are your concerns, if any, about Iran?

Answer. As articulated above, Iran remains the principal destabilizing factor in the region. In the last year Iran has supported actions by Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and insurgent factions in Iraq. Iran is likely to leverage geographic proximity and our regional partners’ fear of reprisals and threats of economic disruption to counter regional objections to their hegemonic and nuclear ambitions. We must bolster our regional friends and allies to counter these concerns and thwart Iran’s destabilizing activities.
Question. What do you believe are the objectives of the Chinese military modernization program?

Answer. China is a rising power in the world. We should have no doubts about that. As China grows economically, we can expect that they will want a military capable of protecting their national interests. Those interests include, first and foremost, Taiwan, but also disputed areas in the South China Sea. They also recognize the growing economic interdependence with the rest of the world. Their economic development depends on an assured supply of energy and other natural resources.

Question. What do you believe are China’s global political-military objectives and specifically its objectives regarding Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific region?

Answer. Rising Chinese military power is not just a U.S.-China issue; it is an issue for the entire Asia-Pacific region. China increasingly understands the importance of stability in the Asia-Pacific region. In that respect, we welcome China’s positive contributions in the Six-Party Talks on Korea, and its participation in some international peacekeeping operations.

The United States has refused to renounce the use of force against Taiwan and its sustained military build-up across the Strait risks disrupting the status quo. While China’s near-term focus appears to be on Taiwan, long-term trends suggest China is building a force scoped for operations beyond Taiwan. Many of China’s neighbors have called for military modernization and adjusting their plans and expenditures. Conflict between China and its neighbors could potentially erupt over disputed territories, resource rights, or energy. In response, our one-China policy insists on a peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences. How do you believe the United States should respond to the Chinese military modernization program?

Answer. As the QDR stated, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could, over time, offset traditional U.S. military advantages. We do not want to overreact but at the same time, we must not under react. Our strategy seeks to encourage China to make the right strategic choices for its people, while we hedge against other possibilities.

Another response must be greater engagement between our militaries. We need to avoid a situation where neither side understands the plans and intentions of the other, and where we are prey to misunderstandings of the other’s goals. I hosted my Chinese Navy counterpart in Washington in April and plan to travel to China myself next month. I told Admiral Wu that I hoped our navies could cooperate in areas where we have common concerns, starting with areas such as disaster relief. Interaction at the Service Chief level needs to be complemented with increasing contacts throughout our militaries. Let us bear in mind that the American military continues to be pre-eminent in the world; we should not exaggerate the challenge we face from a modernizing China and a modernizing military. We need China to be much more transparent than has occurred thus far.

Question. What changes, if any, do you believe that DOD should make in the quality or quantity of military-to-military relations with China, and why?

Answer. President Bush has said that we welcome a China that is “peaceful and prosperous.” We have called upon China to be a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system. To that end, we are increasing cooperation in some areas and need to address with the Chinese candidly those areas where we do have differences. That means engaging with the Chinese military as broadly as possible, reaching out to establish relationships with the next generation of People’s Liberation Army (PLA) officers.

This is not a one-way exchange, however. The lack of transparency is a real problem. China’s defense budget is increasing by double-digit percentages per year. At issue is not the amount of increase, but the discrepancy between the official budget and what China actually does—the lack of transparency—which drives uncertainty and questions of Chinese intent. I hope the next generation of our military will have considerably greater exposure to China; we need a cadre of Chinese-language officers in all our services who are expert in this region.

Question. In your view, what can the United States do to increase transparency on the part of the Chinese military?

Answer. We need to increase engagement between the PLA and the U.S. military. We need to have higher-level dialogues with China on economics, for instance, where we have candid and even frank discussions of issues where we have differences. We should be as open with the Chinese as they are willing to be with us. I would like to regularize military discussions with the Chinese, to allow us to build trust over time. That is the best way to encourage transparency in their activities.
COLOMBIA

Question. U.S. military personnel have been involved in the training and equipping of Colombian military forces involved in counter-narcoterrorism operations. U.S. military personnel, however, do not participate in or accompany Colombian counter-drug or counter-insurgency forces on field operations in Colombia. What changes, if any, would you recommend for the role of the U.S. military in Colombia?

Answer. If confirmed, I would make no immediate changes to the role of the United States military in Colombia. I believe the most appropriate role for the United States military is to continue to address systemic deficiencies in the training and employment of the Colombian armed forces.

Question. What is your assessment of the progress achieved by the Colombian armed forces in confronting the threat of narcoterrorism?

Answer. I believe the Colombian armed forces have progressed well over the last few years. United States training and equipment as well as intelligence support and planning advice have contributed significantly to this progress. The Colombian Military's (COLMIL) Plan Patriota offensive now called Plan Consolidation the largest in the Nation's history, continues to pressure FARC in its base areas. The COLMIL has captured key nodes and dominates mobility corridors, denying FARC access to support and population. A number of FARC, National Liberation Army (ELN), and United Self-Defense Groups of Columbia (AUC) high value targets have been killed or captured. Colombian police are now present in all 1,098 municipalities.

Colombia's 2007 defense budget is 5.8 percent of GDP as compared to 2006 when it was 5.4 percent of GDP. This represents a 12-percent increase in defense expenditures, from $7.11 billion to $7.96 billion. Since President Uribe took office, the Colombian Armed Forces have recruited over 100,000 new members. Finally, over 30,000 members of the illegal armed groups have demobilized. The COLMIL has made significant progress fighting narco-terrorists, and their rapid expansion has enabled the Government of Colombia to reestablish control of its territory and restore government presence and services.

While the COLMIL is more “forward-leaning” than ever, their mettle will continue to be tested as the illegal armed groups, primarily FARC, resort to new tactics in order to undermine the government’s democratic consolidation plan.

U.S. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

Question. U.S. relations with Russia are strained over a variety of issues. If confirmed do you believe that there are any opportunities to improve relations through military to military programs, or are there any other actions that you would recommend be taken?

Answer. Yes. I believe the United States and Russian militaries have made progress in the area of military cooperation since 2003 when Presidents Bush and Putin directed their respective military chiefs to focus on creating the capability to conduct combined military operations for future missions. This progress has been steady and tangible and certainly sets a positive tone for other constructive security cooperation with Russia. This cooperation has been personally directed by the United States and Russian Presidents through the Presidential Action Checklist and has yielded results.

I have witnessed the effects of establishing a relationship with my counterpart in the Russian Navy in my capacity as the Chief of Naval Operations. As a result of personal engagement, relations between Admiral Masorin, the Commander in Chief of the Russian Federation Navy, and me have fostered an increasing level of trust and openness. Admiral Masorin is scheduled to conduct a counterpart visit here in the U.S. in August, which will be the first one since 1996. This type of engagement has enabled open discussions on topics varying from new concepts like the 1,000 Ship Navy to more sensitive topics including Black Sea engagement. If confirmed, I will continue to develop this kind of relationship with my counterpart in Russia as well as in other countries.

Question. In your view, are there any specific programmatic areas, such as missile defense, further nuclear reductions, or space programs, where cooperation with Russia could be beneficial?

Answer. I believe it is essential that we continue to encourage the Russian Government to cooperate in addressing the emerging threat to both our Nations from the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. This includes missile defense and enhancing counterterrorism cooperation with Russia.
If nuclear reductions will continue in a predictable and transparent fashion, the potential exists to build trust and confidence in the management of our respective strategic nuclear infrastructures.

I believe space programs offer an opportunity of mutual benefit. If confirmed, I will recommend that we continue to seek out joint programs on which we can cooperate, given the advanced technological capacities of both our Nations.

REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Question. The United States has made a commitment to reduce the number of operationally deployed nuclear warheads.

Do you believe reductions in the total number of warheads in the stockpile are also feasible? If your answer is yes, how should capabilities and requirements be evaluated to identify which warheads and delivery systems could be retired and dismantled?

Answer. Yes. I am confident that the total number of weapons in our stockpile can be reduced by developing a new triad composed of offensive strike system, active and passive defenses, and a responsive. These actions will allow us to preserve a credible deterrent with which to meet our national security requirements and our obligations to our allies, and reduce the overall size of our stockpile.

If confirmed, I will work closely with OSD, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Services, and combatant commands to evaluate our nuclear force structure options with a broad view toward the integration of non-nuclear and nuclear strike forces, missile defenses, and a responsive infrastructure to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons while mitigating the risks associated with drawing down United States nuclear forces.

STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Question. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the importance of planning and training for post-conflict stability and support operations. Increased emphasis has been placed on stability and support operations in DOD planning and guidance in order to achieve the goal of full integration across all DOD activities.

What is your assessment of the Department’s current emphasis on planning for post-conflict scenarios?

Answer. The Department is explicitly addressing planning for post-conflict scenarios as part of an aggressive implementation of Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations.

Question. What role should the Joint Staff play in implementing the new directive regarding post-conflict planning and the conduct of stability and support operations?

Answer. I believe the Joint Staff should assist OSD in supervising the implementation of the new directive by the Services and combatant commands.

During the conduct of stability operations, the Joint Staff should assist in coordinating such things as logistics, coalition building and sustainment, and the provision of forces.

If confirmed, I will direct the Joint Staff to provide me with analyses and insights pertaining to the policy, strategy, and progress of stability operations.

Question. In your view, what is the appropriate relationship between DOD and other Federal agencies in the planning and conduct of stability and support operations in a post-conflict environment?

Answer. In my view, and as stated in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44, it is critical that the Secretaries of State and Defense integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans when relevant and appropriate.

I believe that honoring this general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels is necessary and appropriate.

Question. What lessons do you believe the Department has learned from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. I believe the central lesson is the importance of post-conflict planning and post-conflict training. In order to effectively plan and execute post-conflict operations we must understand their role in post-conflict operations.

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

Question. In May of this year, President Bush issued a statement urging the Senate to act favorably on U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.

Answer. Yes, I support United States’ accession to the Law of the Sea Convention, and I believe that joining the Convention will strengthen our military’s ability to conduct operations.

Question. How would you answer the critics of the Convention who assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the United States?

Answer. I believe that accession to the Law of the Sea Convention is in national security interest of our Nation. The basic tenets of the Law of the Sea Convention are clear and the United States Armed Forces reap many benefits from its provisions. From the right of unimpeded transit passage through straits used for international navigation, to reaffirming the sovereign immunity of our warships, providing a framework for countering excessive claims of other States, and preserving the right to conduct military activities in exclusive economic zones, the Convention provides the stable and predictable legal regime we need to conduct our operations today and in the future.

The ability of United States military forces to operate freely on, over and above the vast military maneuver space of the oceans is critical to our national security interests, the military in general, and the Navy in particular. Your Navy’s—and your military’s—ability to operate freely across the vast domain of the world’s oceans in peace and in war make possible the unfettered projection of American influence and power. The military basis for support for the Law of the Sea Convention is broad because it codifies fundamental benefits important to our operating forces as they train and fight:

- It codifies essential navigational freedoms through key international straits and archipelagoes, in the exclusive economic zone, and on the high seas;
- It supports the operational maneuver space for combat and other operations of our warships and aircraft; and
- It enhances our own maritime interests in our territorial sea, contiguous zone, and exclusive economic zone.

These provisions and others are important, and it is preferable for the United States to be a party to the Convention that codifies the freedoms of navigation and over flight needed to support United States military operations. Likewise, it is beneficial to have a seat at the table to shape future developments of the Law of the Sea Convention. Amendments made to the Convention in the 1990s satisfied many of the concerns that opponents have expressed.

Since 1983, the United States Navy has conducted its activities in accordance with President Reagan’s Statement on United States Oceans Policy, operating consistent with the Convention’s provisions on navigational freedoms. If the United States becomes a party to the Law of the Sea Convention, we would continue to operate as we have since 1983, and would be recognized for our leadership role in law of the sea matters. Joining the Law of the Sea Convention will have no adverse effect on the President’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) or on United States intelligence gathering activities. Rather, joining the Convention is another important step in prosecuting and ultimately prevailing in the global war on terrorism.

TREATMENT OF DETAINEES

Question. The Constitution, laws, and treaty obligations of the United States prohibit the torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of persons held in U.S. custody.

What steps, if any, do you believe the Joint Staff should take to ensure the humane treatment of detainees in DOD custody and to ensure that such detainees are not subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment?

Answer. DOD has policies in place to require compliance with U.S. law concerning humane treatment of detainees in DOD custody. In a July 7, 2006, memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense required all components of the DOD to treat detainees in accordance with President Reagan’s Statement on United States Oceans Policy, operating consistent with the Convention’s provisions on navigational freedoms. If the United States becomes a party to the Law of the Sea Convention, we would continue to operate as we have since 1983, and would be recognized for our leadership role in law of the sea matters. Joining the Law of the Sea Convention will have no adverse effect on the President’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) or on United States intelligence gathering activities. Rather, joining the Convention is another important step in prosecuting and ultimately prevailing in the global war on terrorism.

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I believe the Joint Staff should work to ensure all United States military personnel engaged in detention operations comply with United States domestic law, the Law of War, and our international treaty obligations including the Prohibition on
Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

FUTURE OF NATO

Question. Over the past several years, NATO has experienced great changes. NATO has enlarged with the addition of seven new members from Eastern Europe and the Baltics, and has taken on an ambitious stabilization mission in Afghanistan, as well as a training mission in Iraq.

In your view, what are the greatest opportunities and challenges that you foresee for NATO over the next 5 years?

Answer. In my view, NATO has proven its relevance by its ability to transform from its Cold War posture to meet the out-of-area challenges of the 21st century. NATO’s greatest opportunities—and challenges—lay in its ability to continue to transform in the coming years.

Most critically, NATO must demonstrate that it can deliver the results needed in Afghanistan. NATO’s military forces cannot alone provide the long-term solution, but must play a role together with other actors in the international community.

In the area of military capabilities, NATO and Allied nations must continue to focus on expeditionary capacity. Enlargement of NATO and expanding Alliance relationships with partner nations of all types will present NATO with challenges and opportunities. Shaping how NATO engages with partners, from the Mediterranean Dialogue to global partnership initiatives, will in turn set the stage for future Alliance initiatives critical to Allied security.

These opportunities will not come cheaply—which is perhaps one of the greatest challenges facing the Alliance. Most Allies spend little on defense. Transforming national militaries while also contributing them to ongoing Alliance operations far from home is an expensive prospect, but one that is absolutely critical to the future success of NATO.

Question. Do you envision further enlargement of NATO within the next 5 years?

Answer. Accession to NATO is a political question for the 26 NATO Allies.

Question. What progress are the NATO member nations, particularly the new member nations, making with respect to transforming their militaries, acquiring advanced capabilities, and enhancing their interoperability with the U.S. and other NATO member nations?

Answer. Most Allies (due to limited resources made available to defense ministries) are forced to make critical choices between spending money on transforming their militaries or on contributing to Alliance operations within existing capabilities.

Many Allies, however, have been able to strike a delicate balance between these two choices, but with reduced effectiveness. The cost is that national transformational processes are delayed, or have key elements canceled, while contributions to operations are smaller, or less capable, than needed.

The bottom line is that all but a few Allies meet the agreed-upon 2 percent of GDP allocated for defense spending—if this target was met, across the board, almost all transformational and operation requirements could be met.

Question. What steps could NATO take, in your view, to reduce tensions with Russia?

Answer. I believe the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) can play a vital role in mitigating tensions with Russia by addressing key strategic issues, to include:

- NATO and Russian perceptions of the ballistic missile threat from the Middle East;
- Cooperation in regional stabilization and reconstruction efforts (e.g., in Iraq and Afghanistan);
- Managing Russia’s reaction to possible NATO enlargement, as well as Russian suspicions about United States and NATO activities in Europe and Central Asia; and
- Determining how to best facilitate Russia’s fulfillment of its “Istanbul Commitments” in withdrawing military forces from Moldova and Georgia.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE


Do you believe that in order to perform its intended function successfully, the BMDS, including each of its elements, needs to be operationally effective?

Answer. Yes. I believe the United States has a viable initial operational capability and we are maturing the system toward a full operational capability. Thorough test-
ing is critical to operational effectiveness, and, if confirmed, I will continue my commitment to testing as the BMDS evolves.

**Question.** Do you believe that the United States should deploy missile defense systems without regard to whether they are operationally effective?

Answer. In view of the threats we face, today and will face in the future, I believe the United States should deploy components of the BMDS as soon as they become available even as we improve their operational effectiveness. Due to our continuing successes with BMDS, I remain confident in our initial operational capability and its continued maturation.

**Question.** Do you believe that operationally realistic testing is necessary to demonstrate and determine the operational capabilities and limits of the BMDS, and to improve its operational capability?

Answer. Yes. I believe that operationally realistic testing is necessary to demonstrate and determine the operational capabilities and limits of the BMDS, and to improve its operational capability.

**Question.** If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to ensure that the BMDS, and each of its elements, undergoes operationally realistic testing?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the OSD, the Missile Defense Agency, the combatant commands to ensure operationally realistic testing is accomplished.

**Question.** The military is supposed to play an important role in helping to determine requirements for our military capabilities, and to help determine the capabilities that will meet the needs of the combatant commanders for their operational plans. What do you believe should be the role of the military (as the warfighter) in helping to determine the requirements and force structure needs for our ballistic missile defense forces, including such elements as JCS, the combatant commands, the Joint Force Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, and the military departments?

Answer. I believe the military has a central role in helping to determine the requirements and force structure needs of our ballistic missile defense forces. The JCS provide military advice and oversight of requirements and force structure. The combatant commands integrate ballistic missile defense capabilities into operational plans and help formulate requirements.

The Joint Force Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense plans, integrates, coordinates, and conducts ballistic missile defense operations for United States Strategic Command. The military Services and the Missile Defense Agency provide resources, support, and leadership to all elements of the BMDS.

**Question.** If confirmed, what steps would you take to help ensure that U.S. missile defense forces and capabilities meet the needs and operational plans of the combatant commanders?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with OSD, the Missile Defense Agency, and United States Strategic Command as they continue to fully collaborate with the military Services and all combatant commands to ensure the needs of the warfighter are met, to include training, testing, wargaming, and conducting realistic exercises and simulations, to improve the capability and reliability of the missile defense system.

**Question.** Section 223 of the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007 establishes that “it is the policy of the United States that the DOD accord a priority within the missile defense program to the development, testing, fielding, and improvement of effective near-term missile defense capabilities, including the ground-based mid-course defense system, the Aegis BMDS, the Patriot PAC–3 system, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, and the sensors necessary to support such systems.”

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the Department complies with this policy requirement in its development and acquisition of missile defense capabilities?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with OSD, the Missile Defense Agency, the military Services, and the combatant commands to ensure the development, testing, acquisition, fielding, and improvement of effective near-term missile defense capabilities to meet the threats that we face today and will continue to face in the future.

**ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT**

**Question.** Do you see a need for any change in the role of the Chairman or the Vice Chairman of JCS in the requirements determination, resource allocation, or acquisition management processes?
Answer. No. I believe the role of the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of JCS in the requirements determination, resource allocation and acquisition management process is very effective. The processes are improving and are meeting future joint warfighting needs. If confirmed, I will focus on responsiveness to immediate and near-term joint warfighting needs by working closely with the Services in executing the joint urgent operational needs processes.

I also view the Joint Requirements Oversight Council initiatives that provide enhanced assessments of proposed capabilities and weapon systems by considering not only the Key Performance Parameters, but also technology, cost, and schedule risks, increased emphasis on affordability, and the “watch list” to monitor program cost baselines as very likely to achieve improvement in acquisition management and fielding capability quicker.

While I believe the Chairman and Vice Chairman roles are adequate, the Service Chiefs need to have more authority and control in acquisitions, by being placed in the acquisition chain-of-command.

DEFENSE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS

Question. Our investment in defense science and technology (S&T) programs is designed to support defense transformation goals and objectives and to ensure that warfighters of today and tomorrow have superior and affordable technology to support their missions and to give them revolutionary war-winning capabilities.

Do you believe there is adequate investment in innovative defense science to develop the capabilities warfighters will need in 2020?

Answer. Yes. The fiscal year 2008 S&T budget ($10.7 billion) represents approximately 2.3 percent of the Department’s top line for fiscal year 2008 and is planned to increase by 8.8 percent during fiscal years 2008–2013.

Question. Do you believe current Defense S&T investment is appropriately balanced between near-term and long-term needs?

Answer. Yes. The fiscal year 2008 S&T budget is well balanced, with 14 percent obligated for Basic Research, 40 percent for applied research, and 46 percent for applied technology development. This balance supports the Department’s strategy to fulfill both near- and long-term S&T needs. The various S&T enterprises within the Department continue to deliver near-term solutions to the warfighter while maintaining a long-term perspective to research and develop capabilities for the future.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

Question. The DOD efforts to quickly transition technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the last few years. Challenges remain to institutionalizing the transition of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons systems and platforms.

What are your views on the success of the Department’s technology transition programs in spiraling emerging technologies into use to confront evolving threats and to meet warfighter needs?

Answer. I would contend that the pace of globalization has accelerated the speed of war to the point that by fixating on today’s threat, we run the risk of growing myopic and ineffective. To outpace the diverse and uncertain challenges we face now and in the future, we need an acquisition system capable of transitioning new technologies into existing programs to answer warfighter needs. While steps have been taken to meet these challenges, clearly more must be done. Our warfighters deserve this capability to confront evolving threats. If confirmed, I will ensure Service and agency leadership continue to embrace early transition planning and demonstrate methods for transitioning technology.

Question. What more can be done to transition critical technologies quickly to warfighters?

Answer. The Technology Transition Council has been re-engineered to execute a federated approach to coordinating transition efforts across the enterprise. If confirmed, I will continue to foster an environment of creative thinking needed to keep pace with the speed of war, delivering critical technologies to the warfighter.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Chairman of JCS?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Answer. Yes.

Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK PRYOR

MILITARY IN IRAQ

1. Senator PRYOR. Admiral Mullen, the debate over the global war on terror has led a few current military leaders to agree that there is no military solution for the war in Iraq. Do you agree with this statement?
Admiral MULLEN. Yes, there is no purely military solution in Iraq. The enormous complexity, historic differences, competing views of the future Iraq, and lack of trust in new institutions will require long-term political and social solutions. In the near-term, political progress requires demonstrated commitment to national reconciliation in order to address:
(1) de-Baathification and lack of proportional Sunni representation in the Government, Army, and police;
(2) Equitable distribution of oil revenue; and
(3) Amnesty.

2. Senator PRYOR. Admiral Mullen, what recommendation would you make to the President and Secretary of Defense if General Patraeus’ September report indicates no change in the status of combat operations in Iraq?
Admiral MULLEN. Our approach must be consistent with enduring United States vital and regional interests. We must commit to a long-term security relationship with Iraq that facilitates political reconciliation, supports development of a stable Iraq, and is directly tied to our enduring long-term interests in the region.
We must work through the interagency and regional partners to expand Iraqi governance and economic capacity. This effort must be centered on developing effective incentives and disincentives (and associated measures of effectiveness) to influence the Government of Iraq (GOI), Iraqi factions/leaders, regional states, as well as Syria and Iran.
We must continue our long-term fight against al Qaeda, contain the sectarian conflict within the borders of Iraq, and prevent large scale civil war and the resultant humanitarian crisis.

REFUGEES IN IRAQ

3. Senator PRYOR. Admiral Mullen, since 2003 approximately 2 million Iraqis have fled the country and 900,000 have been internally displaced. With another 90,000 Iraqis fleeing every month, what responsibility does the U.S. military have to ensure a secure reintegration of refugees returning to Iraq following a troop withdrawal?
Admiral MULLEN. I believe the United States should develop a long-term relationship with Iraq, beyond our current operations. While the reintegration of Iraqi refugees into their society is the responsibility of the GOI, the continued support and involvement of the U.S., working in conjunction with the international community, is important to the reintegration of Iraqi refugees.
The U.S. and coalition can best support the GOI and their reintegration efforts by working together to achieve a level of security prior to withdrawal that would
facilitate refugee reintegration and avoid a larger humanitarian crisis. To this end, U.S. and coalition forces should conduct contingency planning to address a humanitarian crisis should one occur.

Given the sectarian divide within the Iraqi society, the GOI’s ability to provide security and essential services to the people of Iraq is the key precursor to a successful reintegration effort.

4. Senator Pryor. Admiral Mullen, how can we ever have a stable Iraq with this much flux across the border?

Admiral Mullen. Iraq’s borders are a tough issue, and we need to address securing the Iraq borders very deliberately, in a measured manner, while fully understanding the complex challenges in doing so. That said, I believe Baghdad is the center of gravity and that reducing the violence there is an essential enabler. As violence is contained, there are two follow-on conditions required to stabilize the situation and facilitate an Iraqi political solution:

- The GOI, with coalition support, must make progress toward reconciliation, eliminating the insurgency, decrease the levels of sectarian, and intra-Shia violence, and set conditions for the transfer of responsibility to the GOI and ISF.
- We must achieve unity of effort within the U.S. Government (interagency), among coalition partners, and between the coalition and Iraqi Government.

Progress toward reconciliation and associated reductions in sectarian and intra-Shia violence is vital; failure to achieve tangible progress toward reconciliation requires a strategic reassessment.

5. Senator Pryor. Admiral Mullen, this committee recently approved the nomination of LTG Douglas Lute, USA, to the position of Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan. While the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff also act as advisors to the President, what relationship do you foresee having with General Lute and how does he fit into the military chain of command?

Admiral Mullen. I foresee a collaborative, supportive working relationship with General Lute. In response to your second question, General Lute is not in the military chain of command. By title 10 (10 U.S.C. 151) the Chairman is the “principle military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.”

NAVY OPERATIONS

6. Senator Pryor. Admiral Mullen, do you believe the Navy’s current Helicopter Master Plan, dated 1998, should be updated to address the realities of the global war on terror?

Admiral Mullen. The Navy’s 2002 helicopter concept of operations (CONOPS) combines the acquisition efficiencies of the 1998 Helicopter Master Plan, which reduces the number of helicopter types operated by the Navy from seven to two, with operational efficiencies achieved through the reorganization of squadrons to align them with the broadened warfighting requirements of Navy Carrier Strike Groups and Expeditionary Forces. The 2002 helicopter CONOPS was updated this year with a 2007 Navy Helicopter Force Analysis Study, which re-examined helicopter support for Sea Power 21 concepts including the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and global war on terrorism missions. This analysis study is currently under the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) review and will be incorporated in the next Helicopter Master Plan.

7. Senator Pryor. Admiral Mullen, how can the Navy operate with pre-September 11 master plan in a post-September 11 operational environment?

Admiral Mullen. The Navy and Marine Corps have changed their operating philosophy to provide better defense in a post-September 11 operational environment. The Navy published two versions of the Naval Operations Concept (NOC), both of which describe how the Navy/Marine Corps team will contribute to the defense of our Nation. The first edition of this document was signed in 2002 and entitled “Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations.” The current version is the NOC 2006, and it refines and expands upon the 2002 version to deal with the dynamic post-September 11 security environment.

The NOC is principally guided by national strategy as articulated in the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National Strategy for Maritime
Security. Specifically, this concept calls for more widely distributed forces to provide increased forward presence, security cooperation with an expanding set of international partners, preemption of nontraditional threats, and global response to crises in regions around the world where access might be difficult.

The NOC espouses an approach for organizing and employing Navy and Marine Corps capabilities to meet the strategic challenges of the global war on terrorism. It seeks to make best use of the resources we have today to counter the existing threats in our current strategic environment. In short, the NOC is about how we are going to use what we have today differently to best fight and win the war on terror, positively participate in the global maritime community, yet remain prepared to counter or defeat future threats against the United States, be they traditional, irregular, disruptive, or catastrophic.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

NARROWBAND SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

8. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, in his April 19, 2007, written testimony before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Vice Admiral James McArthur, USN, Commander of the Naval Network Warfare Command, noted the shortage of narrowband tactical satellite communications. To satisfy the increasing demand for tactical satellite communications, the Navy is developing a fleet of Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellites. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has noted, however, that “MUOS development has become time-critical due to the failures of two ultra high frequency (UHF) follow-on satellites. In June 2008, communications capabilities are expected to drop below those required, and remain so until the first MUOS satellite is available for operations in 2010.” Is the Department of Defense (DOD) examining options for addressing this communications capability gap?

Admiral Mullen. DOD has explored options to mitigate the UHF availability gap until full fielding of MUOS. Options under consideration include Integrated Waveform (IW), Leased Commercial Satellite Communications, and possible early fielding of MUOS capable terminals. The Department is currently fielding IW in two phases, with Phase I to be completed in 2008 and Phase II projected for completion in 2009. IW will provide higher channel throughput, better voice quality, capability to support more networks per channel (up to 14 versus today’s 1), enhanced flexibility to best configure a channel to support the mission, and greater ease of use and operation.

9. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, does the Department believe MUOS will address the full tactical satellite communications needs of the Services after the constellation is fully operational? Or will bandwidth need continue to outpace capacity?

Admiral Mullen. MUOS will provide a 10-fold increase in capacity over UHF follow-on, providing UHF mobile communications for our tactical users. MUOS will support almost 2,000 simultaneous worldwide accesses to meet our bandwidth requirements. Understanding that bandwidth need will always outpace available capacity, DOD is moving forward with fielding MUOS, implementing IW, and pursuing the lease of commercial satellite communications to minimize the disparity between bandwidth needs and available capacity.

10. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, what are Department plans for mitigating the narrowband satellite communications gap in the near- and long-term?

Admiral Mullen. To meet near-term requirements, the Department is implementing IW, pursuing Leased Commercial Satellite Communications; and early fielding of the MUOS capable terminals to mitigate the narrowband satellite communications gap until MUOS is fully operational. For the long-term, the Department is in the preliminary stages of determining the appropriate follow-on system for MUOS. The MUOS constellation consists of four satellites and one spare. Satellite design life is 10 years and projected satellite life span is up to 14 years.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

INTERAGENCY COOPERATION

11. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, you mention in several places in response to your advance policy questions that one of your transformation goals is for DOD to address security challenges in cooperation with other interagency members.
Several people have commented that this interagency cooperation is currently lacking, particularly in U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. What are some specific areas in which you would like to see interagency cooperation improve, and what will you do as Chairman to help facilitate this cooperation?

Admiral MULLEN. I believe more attention is required in the following areas:

- Reform efforts that focus on developing the capability to prepare for, plan, and execute interagency approaches to national and homeland security challenges.
- Ongoing efforts within the U.S. Government to develop strategic planning and exercise capabilities, as well as establishing protocols to achieve unity of effort between DOD, the National Guard, and interagency partners in responding to contingencies in the homeland.
- Development of domestic and global contingency plans to address the environment for synchronizing United States military response both within DOD and with our interagency partners.

As Chairman, I will facilitate this cooperation by providing the appropriate level of military support and leadership to the interagency effort.

12. Senator C HAMBLISS. Admiral Mullen, regarding Iraq, what are some specific ways that you believe interagency cooperation could expand the economic and governance capacity of the Iraqis?

Admiral MULLEN. We are already seeing successes at a local level in our Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, where interagency personnel from the State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development, and U.S. Department of Agriculture are being integrated into these teams embedded with Brigade Combat Teams. They are helping improve provincial budget execution, working with provincial councils, and engaging with former enemy combatants to broker bottom-up reconciliation. We need to continue this effort.

At a national level, we have had less success. Staff at Embassy Baghdad and Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF–I) are working hard with the GOI to improve the rule of law, execute their capital budget, and protect their critical infrastructure. Unfortunately, provisions of essential services have only improved slightly in many areas. To help improve these efforts, embedded advisors are now being placed inside key ministries: 26 advisors are in place, with another 20 embedded advisors on their way. The Iraq Transition Assistance Office has 94 advisors dedicated to Iraqi ministries. In addition to these dedicated personnel, other officials, such as the Treasury Attache’s Office, Embassy’s Economic Section, and the joint MNF–I/Embassy Energy Fusion Cell have been tasked to develop the capacity of Iraqi ministries. This is a work in progress, but remains a very high priority.

RE-BASING INITIATIVES

13. Senator C HAMBLISS. Admiral Mullen, there has been a good deal of skepticism regarding the Pentagon’s planning for the “perfect storm” caused by the culmination of rebasing initiatives. The implementation of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, which includes the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy initiative to restation 70,000 troops and their families from Europe and Korea to the U.S., Joint Basing initiatives, the Army’s and Marines’ efforts to grow the force, and the redeployment of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan will all require military construction efforts that haven’t been seen since World War II. Is DOD on track in its planning for rebasing?

Admiral MULLEN. The Department is on track in its planning for rebasing, even considering restationing 70,000 troops and their families from Europe and Korea to the United States, Joint Basing initiatives, the Army’s and Marine’s efforts to grow the force, and the redeployment of troops from Iraq. All BRAC 2005 recommendations are currently fully funded and on track to be implemented by the statutory deadline of 15 September 2011. Guidance has been published to update business plans based on execution realities, and these updates will continue through implementation. The Department continues planning for basing implications of the force growth in the continental United States and any potential timing implications for implementation of Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy decisions.

14. Senator C HAMBLISS. Admiral Mullen, what is the status of these efforts, and what do you see as the final outcome from the completion of these initiatives in terms of military quality-of-life?

Admiral MULLEN. The rebasing initiatives are on track. The scope of restationing 70,000 troops and their families from Europe and Korea, Joint Basing, growing the
force, and the redeployment of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan is momentous. However, unit deployments and soldier, sailor, airman, marine, and family relocations are carefully choreographed. Throughout these rebasing initiatives, we have done our best to reduce the impact on the force.

The Department has included, as an integral component, a number of important quality-of-life facilities in our construction projects over the next 3 fiscal years. As these projects are accomplished, we see significant improvement in the numbers and types of quality facilities, which provide places for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians and their families to work, live, and train. Our people continue to make great sacrifices in fighting the global war on terrorism and our Nation owes them a debt of gratitude. We therefore see it as absolutely necessary to ensure we make every effort to match their quality of life with the quality of service they provide our Nation.

15. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, is the plan to draw down troops in Europe outdated, given the ongoing war in Iraq and other world developments?

Admiral Mullen. The current plan to draw down troops in Europe is under review, based on Commander, U.S. European Command’s (EUCOM) concerns about meeting commitments within his area of responsibility. The Joint Staff, OSD, EUCOM, and headquarters, U.S. Army are currently reviewing U.S. troop strength in Europe. This review is based on concerns about changes that have taken place worldwide since the 2004 Report to Congress on “Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture.” The recommendations from this review are expected by late September 2007.

HELICOPTERS

16. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, given the serious shortfall across the Services in vertical lift assets, what is your plan as Chairman to make certain we have the number and type of helicopters we need to fight the war on terror and ensure the safety of our warfighter? Do you consider this one of your top priorities?

Admiral Mullen. The Services have identified their vertical lift requirements and our requirements, acquisition, and programming processes are hard at work acquiring and replacing vertical lift capability; searching for new, innovative means to provide the vital logistical and attack capabilities afforded by vertical lift assets. All vertical lift requirements in the Services are funded with the exception of the Air Force’s CSAR–X which is involved in a GAO protest. The Air Force is currently meeting this requirement with the H–60H. Once the GAO protest is resolved, the Air Force will continue with procuring CSAR–X.

I believe a comprehensive plan to identify, procure, and field future vertical lift assets is critical to fight the war on terror and ensure the safety of our warfighters.

17. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, last year, the Navy completed an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) that identified the need for a new medium lift helicopter to supplement the capability of the H–60. I do not believe there has been any follow through on meeting this requirement. Where do we stand on this procurement, and what steps have been taken to fulfill the need identified by the AOA?

Admiral Mullen. The Airborne Resupply/Logistics for the Sea Base AOA is currently being staffed for final Navy approval. The AOA addresses the heavy lift, medium range vertical lift requirement for the Sea Base, in anticipation of retiring the MH–53E, which provides heavy and medium lift support. Like the MH–53E, the material solution for a future heavy lift requirement could suffice for the medium lift requirement. The Navy is conducting additional vertical heavy lift requirements analysis and developing a vertical heavy lift CONOPS. Making a procurement decision with regard to vertical medium lift would be premature in advance of these competing initiatives.

18. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, I am aware that the Navy’s H–60 Sierra is having tremendous difficulty meeting the basic performance parameters for Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) mission—it’s primary mission in conjunction with the LCS platform. Has the Navy done an assessment of other available medium lift helicopters to determine if there is an alternative to the H–60S that can meet the AMCM mission requirements at an equal or similar cost per flight hour? If not, when will such an analysis occur?

Admiral Mullen. The H–60 Sierra is in the developmental test phase and is meeting performance characteristics for assigned missions. Significant effort is ongoing to integrate a suite of AMCM systems onto the MH–60S helicopter. The Navy
continues to make progress in this effort, with each of the five AMCM systems in various stages of development. Contractor and developmental test evaluations for the MH–60S/AQS–20A Organic AMCM mine hunting sonar have been successful; the system is scheduled to commence operational test in October. The process of integrating the MH–60S Airborne Mine Neutralization System is ahead of schedule. Appropriate progress is being made on the remaining three systems—Airborne Laser Mine Detection System, Organic Airborne and Surface Influence Sweep, and Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System. The Navy does not have any plans to conduct analysis of other available medium-lift helicopters as an alternative to the current MH–60S/AMCM solution.

19. Senator Chambliss. Admiral Mullen, based on these shortfalls, do you believe the Navy's current Helicopter Master Plan, dated 1998, should be updated to address the realities of the global war on terror?

Admiral Mullen. Yes. The Navy's 2002 Helicopter CONOPs combines the acquisition efficiencies of the 1998 Helicopter Master Plan, which reduces the number of helicopter types operated by the Navy from seven to two, with operational efficiencies achieved through the reorganization of squadrons to align them with the broadened warfighting requirements of Navy Carrier Strike Groups and Expeditionary Forces. The 2002 Helicopter CONOPs was updated this year with a 2007 Navy Helicopter Force Analysis Study, which re-examined helicopter support for Sea Power 21 concepts including the LCS and global war on terrorism missions. This analysis study is currently under OPNAV review and will be incorporated in the next Helicopter Master Plan.
Medals and awards:
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal with one Gold Star
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit with one Silver Star
Meritorious Service Medal
Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal
Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal
Navy Unit Commendation
Meritorious Unit Commendation
Navy “E” Ribbon with Wreath
Navy Expeditionary Medal
National Defense Service Medal with two Bronze Stars
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
Vietnam Service Medal with one Bronze Star
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Humanitarian Service Medal with one Bronze Star
Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with three Bronze Stars
Navy and Marine Corps Overseas Service Ribbon with one Bronze Star
Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross Unit Citation with Bronze Palm
Republic of Vietnam Civil Actions Unit Citation with Bronze Palm
NATO Medal
Foreign awards:
Italian Defense General Staff Joint Forces Medal of Honor

Special qualifications:
BS (Naval Science) U.S. Naval Academy, 1968
MS (Operations Research) Naval Postgraduate School, 1985
Language Qualifications: Italian (Knowledge)

Personal data:
Wife: Deborah Morgan of Sherman Oaks, CA
Children: John Stewart Mullen (Son), Born: 30 April 1979; and Michael Edward Mullen (Son), Born: 29 December 1980.

Summary of joint duty assignments:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Assignment</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Rank</th>
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[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Michael Glenn Mullen.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Date of nomination:
   28 June 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   October 4, 1946; Hollywood, CA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Deborah Morgan Mullen.
7. Names and ages of children:
LT John Stewart Mullen, USN, 28; LT Michael Edward Mullen, USN, 26.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
   Navy Marine Corps Relief Society, Board Member.

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   National Order of the Legion of Honor (France) awarded on May 12, 2007.
   Grand Officer of the Order of the Italian Republic (Italy) awarded on April 14, 2007.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

M.G. MULLEN, ADMIRAL, USN.

This 29th day of June, 2007.

[The nomination of ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on August 2, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 3, 2007.]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. You previously have answered the committee’s policy questions on the reforms brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in connection with your nomination to be Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM).

Has your view of the importance, implementation, and practice of these reforms changed since you testified to the committee at your most recent confirmation hearing for the position of Commander, U.S. STRATCOM?
Answer. No. Overall, the Goldwater-Nichols reforms have clearly strengthened the warfighting and operational capabilities of our combatant commands (COCOMs) and our Nation. The importance of these reforms has not diminished with time.

Question. Do you foresee the need for modifications of Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. I do not believe that changes to Goldwater-Nichols are necessary at this time. However, I am aware of ongoing reviews. If confirmed, I will study these efforts and provide my best military advice.

DUTIES

Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in the duties and functions of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as set forth in section 154 of title 10, U.S.C., and in regulations of the Department of Defense (DOD) pertaining to functions of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. None at this time.

Question. Based on your experience as Commander, U.S. STRATCOM, what recommendations, if any, do you have for changes in chapter 6 of title 10, U.S.C., as it pertains to the powers and duties of combatant commanders?

Answer. None at this time.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

Answer. Thirty-six years of military service, to include diverse operational and staff assignments, have given me the background and experience to serve as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the Joint Staff Director Force Structure, Resources and Assessment, I evaluated major acquisition programs and budgets and gained invaluable insight into the capability requirements development process. As Commander, U.S. STRATCOM, I have been responsible for the global command and control of United States strategic forces and worked to deliver a broad range of strategic capabilities and options to the President, Secretary of Defense, and geographic combatant commanders. My years of operational and strategic experience have given me the skills required to look to the future and assess the mix of capabilities to prevail as we move into the future as a Nation.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act. As such, the relationship of the Vice Chairman with the Deputy Secretary is similar to that with the Secretary. In addition, the Vice Chairman co-chairs the Deputies Advisory Working Group with the Deputy Secretary of Defense to work key resource and management issues for DOD.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. Under existing directives, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has been delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense on any matters upon which the Secretary is authorized to act. As such, the relationship of the Vice Chairman with the Deputy Secretary is similar to that with the Secretary. In addition, the Vice Chairman co-chairs the Deputies Advisory Working Group with the Deputy Secretary of Defense to work key resource and management issues for DOD.
by the Chairman, or during the absence or disability of the Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or disability ceases. If confirmed, I look forward to building a close and effective working relationship with the Chairman.

**Question.** The Under Secretaries of Defense.

**Answer.** Title 10, U.S.C., and current DOD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions. They may issue instructions and directive type memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. These instructions and directives are applicable to all DOD components. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Question.** The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

**Answer.** With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, and for Networks and Information Integration, all Assistant Secretaries of Defense are subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant Secretaries in a manner similar to that described above for the Under Secretaries.

**Question.** The Secretaries of the military departments.

**Answer.** Title 10, U.S.C., section 165, provides that, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries of military departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands. The Chairman, or Vice Chairman when directed or when acting as the Chairman, advises the Secretary of Defense on the extent to which program recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments conform with priorities in strategic plans and with the priorities established for requirements of the COCOMs.

Of particular interest, the Under Secretary of the Air Force acts as the Executive Agent for Space Program procurement, which is especially important to the Vice Chairman in the role as Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). If confirmed, I recognize the importance of working closely with this senior official on vitally important space programs.

**Question.** The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.

**Answer.** As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service Chiefs are no longer involved in the operational chain of command. With respect to title 10 responsibilities, they serve two significant roles. First and foremost, they are responsible for the organization, training, and equipping of their respective Services. Without the full support and cooperation of the Service Chiefs, no combatant commander can be ensured of the preparedness of his assigned forces for missions directed by the Secretary of Defense and the President.

Second, as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chiefs are advisers to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense as the senior uniformed leaders of their respective Services. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Service Chiefs and their Vice Chiefs to fulfill warfighting and operational requirements.

**Question.** The combatant commanders.

**Answer.** The combatant commanders fight our wars and conduct military operations around the world. The Chairman provides a vital link between the combatant commanders and other elements of DOD, and as directed by the President, may serve as the means of communication between the combatant commanders and the President or Secretary of Defense. When the Vice Chairman is performing the Chairman’s duties in the latter’s absence, he relates to the combatant commanders as if he were the Chairman.

**Question.** The Special Assistant to the President/Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan.

**Answer.** As an officer serving in an agency outside DOD, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff communicates to the Special Assistant to the President/Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan through the Secretary of Defense.

**Question.** The Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security.

**Answer.** The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council along with the Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security. In this capacity, we will work together to oversee and coordinate the Nation's
nuclear weapons policies to include the safety, security, and control issues for existing weapons and proposed new weapons programs.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that you would face if confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. Winning the global war on terrorism is the Nation's highest priority and our most pressing challenge. In this struggle, our Armed Forces play a leading role in protecting the Homeland; attacking and destroying terrorist networks; and countering ideological support for terrorism—which is the decisive element of the U.S. Government war on terrorism strategy.

Major challenges include building partnership capacity with partner countries which reduce and defeat the threat of violent extremism, and also attempting to resolve "whole of government" issues in this campaign, to integrate all instruments of national power, influence, and capability.

It is more efficient and effective to engage partner nations and make investments to shape the security environment and deter violent extremism than to commit U.S. forces in contingency operations. Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere demonstrate the importance of building the capacity and capability of partners and allies to better secure and govern their own countries.

A major challenge we face in Iraq is to be able to rapidly recognize and exploit new opportunities to make the reduction in sectarian violence and security self-sustaining.

With regard to whole-of-government issues, we should continue to move forward in a collaborative effort to develop the right interagency mechanisms and authorities to better integrate all instruments of national power, influence, and capability and to meet critical national security needs.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that we deny terrorists the resources they need to operate and survive, enable partner nations to counterterrorism, deny WMD proliferation and increase our capacity for consequence management.

In addition, we will continue to defeat terrorists and their organizations, counter State and non-State support for terrorism in coordination with other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations and contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism.

As a Nation, we should defeat violent extremist groups through the disruption of transnational violent extremist networks, increases in partner nation capacity and advances in government legitimacy until terror groups pose only a local threat and are incapable of attacks on the U.S. homeland, U.S. vital interests, or regional stability. Once these conditions are established, we can conclude combat operations and transition to an advisory role.

We should further aim, through this advisory role to support foreign internal defense, deny the migration or expansion of violent extremist groups through continued increases in partner nation counterterrorism capacity and information sharing; by countering ideological support to terrorism; and by producing a long term development plan to reverse the underlying conditions that foment discontent. Once our partner nations achieve overmatch against terror groups, we can reduce our advisory presence to normal bilateral and regional status.

We should support our partners through information sharing, cooperative counterterrorism operations and countering ideological support for terrorism. While DOD is not the lead Federal agency for this effort, the military can contribute significantly through security operations, humanitarian assistance, military-to-military contacts, and the conduct of operations and military information operations.

We owe it to our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines to leverage all instruments of our defense arsenal to defeat our adversaries. In this regard, there have been some recent innovative steps to building partnership capacity, such as the section 1206 authority that allows the Defense and State Departments to more rapidly train and equip partner military forces.

We must continue to build on the success of section 1206 by enacting the Building Global Partnerships act, which will help us meet critical national security needs.

JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL

Question. If confirmed as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you would be the Chairman of the JROC. The JROC has the responsibility to validate Service requirements. As the Services transformation initiatives have matured, some have been approved for System Development and Demonstration (SDD) even
though it appears that some programs lacked the technical maturity the programs require to transition into SDD.

What background and expertise do you possess that you believe qualifies you to serve as the Chairman of the JROC?

Answer. In my previous assignment to the Joint Staff as Director, Force Structure, Resources and Assessment Directorate (J–8), whose missions include serving as JROC Secretary and Chairman of the Joint Capabilities Board, I gained insight into the internal roles, missions, responsibilities, and processes of the JROC. As Commander, U.S. STRATCOM, I gained a new and invaluable perspective into how the JROC interacts with COCOMs. These most recent assignments provide me with unique experience and expertise to fulfill the role of Chairman of the JROC.

Question. How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in the DOD acquisition process?

Answer. The JROC is engaging the acquisition and programming communities earlier in the requirements process to improve JROC decisions and enhance oversight of acquisition programs. The JROC is performing an enhanced assessment of proposed capabilities and weapon systems by considering not only the Key Performance Parameters (KPPs), but also technology, cost, and schedule risks. These assessments ensure that warfighter requirements are realistic and that cost and schedule risks are reasonable. The JROC also considers overall affordability of a weapons system before approving performance requirements.

Question. What is your vision for the role and priorities of the JROC?

Answer. The direction for the JROC that Admiral Giambastiani charted is sound and I intend on building on the work already accomplished. Specifically, I am referring to the “JROC Initiatives.” These initiatives collectively assist the JROC in making better informed fiscal decisions, conducting more comprehensive assessments of the combatant commanders’ warfighting issues and bringing stakeholders from the Department and interagency to the JROC to solve appropriate issues. My vision for the JROC is one that gets the JROC ahead of strategic issues. One initiative in particular is the list of Most Pressing Military Issues (MPMI), which serves as a focusing construct for issues that come before the JROC. The MPMI, which includes items such as “improve interagency coordination and planning to develop shaping strategies to assist nations at strategic crossroads” and “improve information sharing to support operational forces and mission partners by improving bandwidth and information sharing tools” to name two, enable the JROC to provide priority guidance in solving COCOM and Department issues.

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend in the membership of the JROC?

Answer. The JROC provides independent military advice to our senior leaders by deciding which issues become validated military requirements and which do not. I think the membership of the JROC is correct in order to provide an independent military voice. However, I would strongly support the JROC effort to bring together senior leaders, as advisors, from across the Department and the interagency, to inform the JROC in making more sound and affordable decisions. The incorporation of senior civilian leaders as advisors to the JROC is important, and will continue if I am confirmed as the Vice Chairman.

Question. Do you believe the current JROC process has been able to adjust satisfactorily to a capabilities-based, vice threat-based, approach in determining requirements?

Answer. Yes. When the JROC approves the Capabilities Development Document (CDD), the JROC approves the quantity of items needed to achieve the Initial Operation Capability and Full Operation Capability. The JROC’s approval of a CDD is carried forward to the Defense Acquisition Board where the Defense Acquisition Executive makes the final decision on units to be procured.

Question. As you likely know, the outgoing Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instituted policies and programs directed at helping manage undesirable cost growth in certain major weapons systems. One example is an initiative that imposes
cost growth flags for “JROC Interest” programs different from those triggered by Nunn-McCurdy. Another example is an initiative that provides for expanded participation of other stakeholders in the resource allocation process, in the JROC. Still another example is an initiative that sought to achieve greater involvement by the combatant commanders throughout the requirements process.

To what extent would you support and continue implementation of these, and any other such, initiatives?

Answer. I would support the continued implementation of the full package of JROC initiatives previously instituted as they enable sound, strategy driven decisions. Additionally, these initiatives:

- Establish priorities for the Department;
- Ensure resource informed and constrained decisions;
- Establish a process that is accountable and repeatable;
- Align and synchronize processes throughout the Department;
- Facilitate timely delivery of capabilities to the joint warfighter;
- Provide guidance on the MPMIs;
- Better capture the COCOM’s requirements and voice for future warfighting capabilities; and
- Bring stakeholders from across the Department and interagency to the JROC to solve issues.

Question. What principles would guide your approach to inviting, and helping ensure the sufficient participation of, other such stakeholders in the JROC?

Answer. The guiding principles associated with JROC participation include:

- Provide independent military advice to our civilian leaders. To preserve the independent nature of this advice, the voting membership of the JROC has been limited to the Nation’s senior warfighters responsible for training, manning, and equipping our force;
- Promote participation in the JROC process from across the enterprise by informed stakeholders to ensure appropriate context and comprehensive recommendations are provided to the JROC; and
- Promote utilization of Senior Warfighting Forums, composed of the COCOM Vice Commanders to identify current and future warfighting operational requirements.

Question. Are there other such initiatives instituted by the outgoing Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that you view as particularly likely, or unlikely, to be productive in achieving acquisition reform?

Answer. Though still a pilot program, the Tri-Chaired Concept Decision initiative may provide tangible benefits in the acquisition reform arena by decreasing acquisition risk through the implementation of a corporate investment decision process.

Question. The Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (otherwise referred to as “the Kadish Report”) recommended reviewing and modifying applicable regulations to require JROC approval to conduct Initial Operational Testing and Evaluation (IOT&E) in an environment other than that which was defined and documented in the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) at the Milestone B decision. The Test and Evaluation community agrees that IOT&E requirements are defined by the TEMP, but takes the position that the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation and the service test agencies—not the JROC—are the appropriate arbiters of what the TEMP requires. What is your view of this issue?

Answer. I would agree with DOT&E and the Service test agencies that they are the experts on how a system should be tested based on the KPPs in the CDDs that the JROC validates.

ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT

Question. Do you see a need for any change in the role of the Chairman or the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the requirements determination, resource allocation or acquisition management processes?

Answer. I believe the role of the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the requirements determination, resource allocation, and acquisition management process is effective. The processes themselves are continuously improving in meeting future joint warfighting needs. We are working on improving the responsiveness to the immediate and near term joint warfighting needs through the Services and joint urgent needs processes.

Question. The committee has proposed various changes to DOD acquisition procedures that are included in title VIII of S. 1547, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008. Sections 801 through 805 would address major defense acquisition programs. If confirmed as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, you would head the requirements community in helping the Department analyze and approve major defense acquisition programs.

What is your opinion about whether these provisions, if enacted, would help the Department reform how it buys major weapons systems?

Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review these provisions in detail, but if confirmed, I will work with the committee to enact the best legislation possible to improve acquisition procedures.

Question. Which of these provisions, if any, do you have concerns about and why?

Answer. I have not had an opportunity to review these provisions in detail, but I am concerned that section 801(a) would define “substantial savings” for multi-year contracts and unnecessarily limit the contracting options available for large programs where significant taxpayer dollars could potentially be saved.


If confirmed, to what extent would you support and continue implementation of the defense acquisition reform initiatives set forth in that report that directly involve the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the JROC, in particular, the Tri-Chair Concept Decision initiative?

Answer. If confirmed, I will fully support the defense acquisition reform initiatives set forth in the February 2007 “Defense Acquisition Transformation Report to Congress” that directly involve the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the JROC, in particular, the Tri-Chair Concept Decision initiative pilot program. I believe this initiative shows promise in improving strategic investment decisions for potential major acquisition programs.

Question. Are there other initiatives or tools discussed in the Defense Acquisition Transformation Report that you view as particularly likely, or unlikely, to be productive in achieving acquisition reform?

Answer. There are a few other initiatives discussed in the Defense Acquisition Transformation Report that should be productive in achieving acquisition reform. One is the Requirements Management Certification Training Program being developed for military and civilian requirements managers with responsibility for generating requirements for major defense acquisition programs. This training will produce a consistent understanding between the warfighters, the acquisition community, and the resourcing community to improve delivery of capability to the warfighter.

I also view the JROC initiatives that provide enhanced assessments of proposed capabilities and weapon systems by considering not only the KPPs, but also technology, cost, and schedule risks, increased emphasis on affordability, and the “watch list” to monitor program cost baselines as very likely to achieve improvement in acquisition management and fielding capability quicker.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNCIL

Question. If confirmed as Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, you will serve as a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council.

What would your priorities be for the Nuclear Weapons Council?

Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to continuing my membership on the Nuclear Weapons Council in my new role as Vice Chairman.

My priorities will be ensuring the national security interests of the United States continue to be met with a stockpile that is safe, secure, and reliable; improving the responsiveness of our national security infrastructure; and working with Congress to implement the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program.

Together these initiatives will allow us to achieve effective deterrence at the lowest level of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security requirements, and fulfill our obligations to allies with a safe, secure, and modern arsenal.

JOINT OFFICER MANAGEMENT


Is the 2005 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Vision for JOD consistent with your views? If confirmed, will you revise this vision?

Answer. It is consistent—the premise of JOD vision is to have a competency-based, lifelong continuum of learning . . . in a joint context. The goal of JOD is to ensure we have the largest possible body of fully qualified and inherently joint officers for joint command and staff responsibilities. If confirmed, I will continue to en-
force the foundations addressed in the JOD vision to ensure our officers are strategically minded, critical thinkers, and skilled joint warfighters, and will remain committed to increase levels of joint competency and joint capabilities for all officers, both Active and Reserve.

If confirmed, I will remain fully supportive of the JOD as it is written today. I also understand that developing our officers is a continuous process that will go through several iterations and reviews. I am committed to ensuring they are prepared to support the vision and strategy as laid out by the President and the Secretary of Defense.

Question. What do you consider to be the principal issues addressed by the strategic plan, and, if confirmed, what objectives would you hope to achieve?

Answer. The Strategic Plan modernizes joint officer development and management in the 21st century. Today's military is actively and decisively engaged in joint operations to an extent we never imagined. The joint force management infrastructure must be as dynamic as the environment in which the joint force operates to ensure we have the right mix of joint educated, trained, and experienced officers—the Strategic Plan recognizes this and meets the demands of today's robust environment.

If confirmed, I will continue implementation of the new Joint Officer Management process, per the changes authorized in the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, to develop the flexible joint manpower structure we need to meet the ever-changing military environment. The Strategic Plan led to legislative changes enabling the new Joint Qualification System (JQS)—the JQS will be responsive to the warfighters in multi-service, multi-national and interagency operations and produce the number of fully qualified and inherently joint officers we need. It builds on Goldwater-Nichols' traditional path to joint qualification and opens up the aperture by better recognizing the accrual of joint experience. Leaders developed through this new process will become our future joint leaders and strategic thinkers.

Question. What do you consider to be the primary strengths and weaknesses of the requirements for joint professional military education with respect to qualification as a joint specialty officer?

Answer. The Goldwater-Nichols Act correctly established Joint Professional Military Education, along with a joint duty assignment, as the standard for today's joint professional. For the past 20 years, officers have aspired to earn the Joint Specialty Officer designation. While the premise of that designation (that an officer be proficient in joint matters) remains the same, the title has changed under NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007 to "Joint Qualified Officer."

Joint education remains central to the development of Joint Qualified Officers—the strength of joint education is that it is at the heart of joint officer development and is a major pillar of the Joint Learning Continuum that also includes individual training, experience, and self-development.

I understand the Chairman's responsibility under title 10, to ensure the necessary joint training and education of the Armed Forces to accomplish strategic and contingency planning and preparedness to conform to policy guidance from the President and the Secretary of Defense is critical to the defense of our Nation.

The weakness is that we still have a challenge with capacity in delivery of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) Phase II—with the size of our current military officer force today, the number of officers requiring JPME II far exceeds our capability to educate all officers at the JPME II level. We do have the ability to provide every officer, both Active and Reserve component, the opportunity to receive JPME Phase I credit, and have been granted, thanks to the Congress' approval, expansion of Phase II Joint education to the Senior Level Colleges' in-resident programs.

Question. What is your assessment of the appropriate balance between education and experience in achieving qualification as a joint specialty officer?

Answer. Both education and experience are critical to joint officer development. I believe that our system must be flexible enough to provide selected officers a tailored mix of the joint education, training and assignment opportunities they need to gain the experience and achieve the competency-level an organization requires to effectively fill critical joint positions.

REBALANCING FORCES

Question. In a memorandum of July 9, 2003, the Secretary of Defense directed action by the Services, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) aimed at achieving better balance in the capabilities of the Active and Reserve components. The Secretary noted that the Department “needs to promote judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components with force rebalancing initiatives
that reduce strain through the efficient application of manpower and technological solution based on a disciplined force requirements process.”

What progress has been made in achieving the Secretary’s vision?

Answer. The Secretary’s vision encompassed three principal objectives: rebalance the active and Reserve Forces to reduce the need for involuntary mobilization of the Guard and Reserve; establish a more rigorous process for reviewing joint requirements, which ensures that force structure is designed appropriately and requests for forces are validated promptly to provide timely notice of mobilization; and make the mobilization and demobilization processes more efficient.

We have instituted a new process for assignment, allocation and apportionment of U.S. military forces to the COCOMs. The Global Force Management Process provides comprehensive insight into the total number of U.S. Forces available in our inventory forces and helps us match requirements with available forces. Sourcing solutions are developed and then approved at a quarterly Global Force Management Board designed to ensure the best options are selected to achieve desired effects.

Additionally, the lessons learned during Operation Iraqi Freedom concerning Reserve mobilization and demobilization have been put into action. Specific recommendations were made, each with follow-on actions, to enhance the capability of the Department to mobilize and deploy Reserve Forces in the most effective manner possible. The Department has rewritten policies that have been included in the Global Force Management process. As part of this process, every Reserve deployment is reviewed for an effective alternative source of manpower—civilian, contractor, or volunteer.

Rebalancing the force will continue to be an ongoing process. The Reserve components, and the Total Force, must always preserve the capability to operate across the full spectrum of conflict.

Question. What do you consider to be the biggest continuing obstacles to achieving the goals that the Secretary of Defense has set forth in his memorandum?

Answer. The biggest challenge is determining what capabilities we will need in the future and therefore, determining the appropriate balance between the active and Reserve components, while maintaining sufficient warfighting capability. To that end, rebalancing the force is an ongoing activity within the Department. The Department continually assesses its force structure and rebalancing within, and between, the active and Reserve components with the expressed purpose of improving readiness and deployability. Reserve component sources must be adequately resourced and prepared for anticipated requirements.

Not since World War II has DOD called on the Reserve components to perform in such a high operational tempo, and they have performed in an exemplary manner. It is true that when you call out the Reserve component you call out the Nation, and they have answered that call. However, maintaining interoperability and providing the resources to train and equip the Reserve Forces to a single operational standard remains a Total Force imperative.

HEALTH CARE BENEFITS

Question. In May 2007, The Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care issued an interim report concluding that “To sustain and improve military health care benefits for the long run, actions must be taken now to adjust the system in the most cost-effective ways.” Among other recommendations, the Task Force recommends increasing the portion of the costs borne by retirees under age 65, and suggesting an increase in military retired pay to offset part or all of the increase if Congress believes that the increases are too large relative to retired pay.

What recommendations, if any, would you offer to address the increasing cost of health care and other personnel benefits?

Answer. Our men and women in uniform make great sacrifices for their Nation, and their personnel benefits, to include compensation and health care programs, have always been a priority for me. The continued support of Congress, and the Nation, is greatly appreciated by our military servicemembers.

The rising cost of health care is clearly an issue we need to work. DOD health care costs will grow from a projected $38 billion in 2008 to more than $65 billion by 2015. Because the Sustain the Benefit proposal was not approved, we are faced with a $17.4 billion budget deficit across the fiscal year 2009–2013 Program Objective Memorandum. If confirmed, I will continue to support the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs as they lead the Department’s ongoing effort to promote efficiency in both our direct health care and purchased care programs.
The Task Force on Military Health Care's final report will be released in December. I look forward to reviewing those recommendations and will use the report findings to help shape an equitable plan to sustain the benefit.

**Question.** If confirmed, what role would you anticipate playing in any shaping or rethinking of health care benefits for military personnel, including retirees and their families?

**Answer.** We need to maintain a system that is flexible, effective, and cost-efficient to serve the needs of our military members, retirees, and their families.

If confirmed, I look forward to continuing our efforts with Congress and the DOD to ensure military personnel can serve their nation with the knowledge that their health care benefits are secure. In this time of war, we are committed to providing the best care possible for our forces that are returning with combat injuries. I will also continue to support close cooperation between DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs to improve care for our troops and for those who have left the Service.

**Question.** How would you assess the impact of health care benefits on recruitment and retention of military personnel?

**Answer.** The recruiting and retention environment is very dynamic and competitive, and a quality health care system is an important cornerstone in our overall benefits package. Maintaining our high-quality, All-Volunteer Force is dependent on our ability to continue to attract and retain men and women with a desire to serve their Nation. Our health care benefits program clearly helps us in these efforts.

**Question.** What role should the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as opposed to the service chiefs, play with respect to health care benefits?

**Answer.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's title 10 responsibility is to provide military advice to the President and the Secretary of Defense. In that capacity, he will support the Services and the Department as they evaluate benefit programs. The Service Chiefs have a direct function within their respective Departments in the delivery of health care services in addition to offering appropriate advice as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES**

**Question.** The final report of the DOD Task Force on Mental Health issued in June 2007 found evidence that the stigma associated with mental illness represents a "critical failure" in the military, preventing individuals from seeking needed care. The report states, "Every military leader bears responsibility for addressing stigma; leaders who fail to do so reduce the effectiveness of the servicemembers they lead."

If confirmed, what actions would you take to ensure addressing the stigma associated with mental illness in the military?

**Answer.** The stigma associated with mental health illness is an issue in both the civilian community and the military. If confirmed, I intend to provide strong leadership to ensure that we overcome this impediment and expect leaders at every level to follow suit.

We have already started to address this issue within DOD. The Services have implemented multiple initiatives to try to build resilience, prevent adverse effects of combat stress and provide increased access to mental health services, including initiatives such as embedding mental health personnel in our deploying units and performing post-deployment health assessments and reassessments.

DOD currently has formed a "Red Cell" to look at over 365 recommendations from the Mental Health Task Force report as well as several other reports. We are developing a plan of action to address each of these recommendations. This action plan will be reported to Congress within the next 60 to 90 days and I would work closely with Congress, our military leaders, Veteran's Affairs and other Federal and civilian organizations to see that our servicemembers and their families psychological health and mental health issues are addressed.

**Question.** What is your view of the need for revision to military policies on command notification and self-disclosure for purposes of security clearances?

**Answer.** Secretary Gates recent announcement that the military security clearance process will no longer include questions about mental health care history is a significant step in, attempting to remove the stigma of receiving mental health care among military members, particularly in a time of war when combat stress is impacting many of our servicemembers.

**SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY**

**Question.** In response to a congressional requirement for formulation of a comprehensive policy related to sexual assaults in the Armed Forces, the Secretary of Defense promulgated guidance aimed at more effectively preventing sexual assaults,
investigating incidents of sexual assault, and responding to the needs of victims of sexual assault.

What role, if any, has the Joint Staff played in monitoring progress within the military services and the COCOMs' areas of responsibility in order to ensure enforcement of a “zero tolerance” policy relating to sexual assaults?

Answer. As a member of the DOD Sexual Assault Advisory Council, the Joint Staff works closely with the Joint Task Force Sexual Assault Prevention and Response team, the Services, and OSD. This ensures that the policy is executable in the joint and multinational operational environment.

The Joint Staff provides a monthly report to the task force on Service progress in completing investigations of sexual assaults that occur in the U.S. Central Command area of operations. The Joint Staff also provides assistance to combatant commanders during the development of their internal procedures; serves as a liaison staff to address Service policy issues that might impact a commander’s ability to conduct investigations; and provides support to victims in the joint environment.

Question. What reporting requirements or other forms of oversight by service leaders do you think are necessary to ensure that the goals of sexual assault prevention and response policies are achieved?

Answer. Prevention of sexual assault is the responsibility of all leaders and every soldier, sailor, airman, and marine. Leaders in particular must be apprised of command climate and aware of sexual assault or harassment incidents, and remain in the forefront to ensure that our policies are understood and enforced.

INDEPENDENT LEGAL ADVICE

Question. During your assignment on the Joint Staff, you may have had the opportunity to observe the working relationship between the Chairman’s legal advisor, the DOD General Counsel, the Judge Advocates General of the Services and judge advocates advising commanders in the field.

What is your view about the responsibility of the Chairman’s legal advisor to provide independent legal advice to you, other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to the Joint Staff?

Answer. I view the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Legal Counsel as having responsibility for providing independent legal advice to the Chairman in his role as principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. In addition, he must advise the Chairman, Vice Chairman, and Joint Staff on the full spectrum of legal issues. Given the Chairman’s role as spokesman for the combatant commanders, the Legal Counsel frequently advises and assists combatant commander’s legal staffs. In all of these roles, I expect the Chairman’s legal counsel to provide his best independent counsel.

Question. What is your view of the need for the Judge Advocates General of the services to provide independent legal advice to the Chiefs of Staff?

Answer. I similarly believe that the Judge Advocates General should provide their best independent counsel with regards to all of their roles and responsibilities; to include advising the Chiefs of Staff.

Question. What is your view of the responsibility of judge advocates within the Services and joint commands to provide independent legal advice to military commanders?

Answer. As with the Service Judge Advocate Generals, staff judge advocates should also provide their best independent legal advice to their commanders. With regard to military justice in particular, convening authorities must at all times communicate directly with their staff judge advocates.

WOMEN IN COMBAT

Question. The issue of the appropriate role of women in the Armed Forces is a matter of continuing interest to Congress and the American public.

What is your assessment of the performance of women in the Armed Forces, particularly given the combat experiences of our military, since the last major review of the assignment policy for women in 1994?

Answer. Today, more than 333,000 women serve in the U.S. Armed Forces around the world and they are performing magnificently and with distinction. From crewmembers, technicians and commanders, to pilots and military police, women will continue to play a critical role in the defense of our Nation as officer and enlisted functional experts in a variety of specialties.

Question. Given the nature of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Army’s ongoing effort to reorganize to become a more modular, flexible, combat force, is the
time right to conduct a comprehensive review of the policy, regulations, and law pertaining to the assignment of women in the Armed Forces?

Answer. The flexibility exists within current law and policy to allow the Services to review their programs based on their circumstances. I do not see the need for a comprehensive review at this point.

Question. Does DOD have sufficient flexibility under current law to make changes to the assignment policy for women when needed?

Answer. Current law provides adequate flexibility to make changes to DOD assignment policy for women. The law recognizes that DOD and the Services will need to constantly assess the role of women and the dynamics of the constantly changing battlefield. The law and DOD policy also allows the Services to impose additional restrictions based on Service unique mission requirements.

Question. Do you believe any changes in the current policy are needed?

Answer. The current DOD policy recognizes that women are an integral part of our Armed Forces and provides the flexibility needed to address changes to the operational environment; no policy changes are needed at this time.

COMMISSION ON NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

Question. The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves issued a second interim report to Congress on March 1, 2007, recommending among other things that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau should not be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but that the National Guard Bureau should be a joint activity and the Commander or Deputy Commander of U.S. Northern Command should be a Reserve of National Guard officer at all times.

What is your opinion on the recommendations of the Commission?

Answer. I'm in complete agreement with the Secretary of Defense's memo dated 10 May 2007. The Secretary agreed in whole or part with 20 of the Commission's recommendations and the proposed alternatives for the others.

Question. What is your view of the appropriate role of senior Reserve component officers on the Joint Staff and on the staffs of the combatant commanders?

Answer. Reserve component officers should be embedded not only in the upper echelons of the Joint Staff but throughout all of the COCOMs to ensure best utilization of the total force.

If confirmed, I intend to actively consider all possible candidates, including Reserve component general/flag officers for billets at all COCOMs, as recommended by the Commission.

Question. What is your view about making the Chief of the National Guard Bureau a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff? What is your rationale for this opinion?

Answer. I fully support pending legislation to elevate the Chief of the National Guard Bureau to a four-star position. I agree with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau that the Chief of the National Guard Bureau does not need to be a member of JCS. The Chief of the Guard Bureau should be invited to participate when Guard equities are addressed in a similar fashion as the Commandant of the Coast Guard. In addition, the Chief, National Guard Bureau, will have full access to me and the upper echelons of the Joint Staff.

RELIANCE ON RESERVE COMPONENT

Question. The men and women of the Reserve component have performed superbly in meeting the diverse challenges of the global war on terrorism. Such a heavy use of the Reserve components, however, could have potential adverse effects on recruiting, retention, and morale of Guard and Reserve personnel.

What is your assessment of the impact of continuing Guard and Reserve deployments on the readiness and attractiveness of service in the Guard and Reserve?

Answer. The men and women of our Active and Reserve Force are performing superbly in the global war on terrorism. However, the prolonged demand on certain capabilities resident in the Guard and Reserve is a serious concern, and we are working hard to deal with this issue. Of note, the highest retention percentages in the Reserve components come from units that have deployed for Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom—clearly, these service members understand the importance of their service and are volunteering again to continue to serve their country. We must continue to ensure our personnel receive strong support from their civilian employers, provide support for their families, and we must also continue to closely monitor recruiting and retention.

To decrease demand on the Reserve component, the Department has several initiatives underway which help alleviate additional burden on the Guard and Reserve including: (1) rebalancing of forces, (2) modularization for a better deployment rotation base, (3) new training and certification procedures for our Army Guard and Re-
serves prior to mobilization to maximize their utility while minimizing their total
time away from home, and (4) increases in the Active component.
The men and women of our Active and Reserve Force are performing superbly in
the global war on terrorism. However, the prolonged demand on certain capabilities
resident in the Guard and Reserve is a serious concern, and I understand that the
Department is working hard to deal with this issue. Secretary Gates redefined the
mobilization policy when he issued the “Utilization of the Total Force: memorandum
on 19 January 2007. In this memorandum, Secretary Gates identified the following:
1. setting the length of involuntary mobilization at a maximum of 12
   months for Reserve component units;
2. mobilizing ground forces on a unit versus individual basis;
3. establishing a planning objective with a ratio of 1 year of “dwell time”;
4. establishing a new program to compensate, or provide for incentives to
   members required to mobilize or deploy early or often, or be extended be-
   yond established rotation policy goals;
5. reviewing hardship waiver programs to ensure they are properly tak-
   ing into account exceptional circumstance; and
6. minimizing the use of stop loss as a force management tool.
Implementing these six areas will provide increased predictability for our citizen
soldiers, their civilian employers, and their families.
Readiness within the Reserve components continues to be strong within the com-
community-based forces. We will continue to monitor recruiting and retention in both
our Active component and Reserve component forces.
Question. What missions, if any, do you consider appropriate for permanent as-
signment to the Reserve component?
Answer. The Reserve components must be able to operate across the full spectrum
of conflict, and reflect their parent services total force capabilities. The Nation has
made a tremendous investment in its military members. These highly trained indi-
viduals who, if they choose to leave the Active components of their Services upon
completion of their obligated commitment, can re-serve America in their specialties
in the Guard and Reserve, if these components mirror the full capabilities of their
services.
However, the members of the Reserve components have developed considerable
expertise in the defense of the homeland, to include maritime security, air sov-
ereignty, and civil support, and are uniquely prepared to lead and assist in the com-
mand, control, and direction of these missions. As such, serious consideration should
be given to placing Reserve component leaders in command at Northern Command,
Army North, and all other domestic security missions as is currently being done
with the command of 1st Air Force.

END STRENGTH OF ACTIVE-DUTY FORCES

Question. In light of the manpower demands of Operations Enduring Freedom and
Iraqi Freedom, what level of Active-Duty personnel (by Service) do you believe is
required for current and anticipated missions?
Answer. The overall force level is not completely representative of the impact of
Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom on the forces. However,
the key point is the matching of capabilities to mission requirements. Capability de-
mands change based upon different phases of the operation. Within this context,
ground forces are the largest aggregate of forces in high demand. The Services,
Joint Staff, and OSD have looked at this impact and have brought forward their
force structure recommendations. As such, the Army and Marine Corps have
planned growth that is consistent with the future demands expected to be placed
on our ground forces.
Question. How do you assess the progress made to date by the services in finding
ways to reduce the numbers of military personnel performing support functions that
can better be performed by civilian employees or contractors?
Answer. The conversion from military-to-civilian manpower has been ongoing for
some time. Military-to-civilian personnel targets are the result of collaborative re-
views and analyses between OSD and the Services. From these come Program
Budget Decisions that implement the conversions. This process has been effective
and, as it is collaborative with the Services, I believe it is working toward an effec-
tive balance of personnel helping to accomplish the Department’s mission.
Question. What manpower savings can be achieved through reductions in overseas
presence, application of technology, and changes in roles and missions?
Answer. As we continue to shape our force in response to the changing roles and
missions around the world, there will continue to be adjustments to where we pos-
ture our forces. If confirmed, I look forward to being a key advisor as the Department continuously evaluates the global environment and determines the appropriate placement of our forces to assist in carrying out our Nation’s global engagement strategies. Additionally, I look forward to playing a role in helping determine the Service and DOD’s priorities for development and acquisition of new technologies. Improving capabilities through technology is important and can result in manpower savings.

RECRUITING AND RETENTION

**Question.** The ability of the Armed Forces to recruit highly qualified young men and women and to retain experienced, highly motivated commissioned and non-commissioned officers is influenced by many factors, and is critical to the success of the All-Volunteer Force. While retention in all the Services has remained strong, recruiting data in 2007 have shown increasing difficulty for the Army, Army Reserve, Army National Guard, Navy Reserve, and Air National Guard in meeting monthly recruiting goals. The Active-Duty Army in particular is facing difficulties, failing to meet its target for May and June.

What do you consider to be the most important elements of successful recruiting?

**Answer.** The basic elements of successful recruiting continue to be: tapping the reservoir of patriotism by providing the opportunity to serve the Nation; offering America’s best and brightest the chance to serve in a proud and respected profession; possessing a properly resourced cadre of highly motivated and trained recruiters; having complete access to the recruiting pool; offering a competitive compensation and benefits package; and providing the opportunity for young men and women to achieve skills, education, and experience.

**Question.** What recommendations, if any, do you have to improve recruiting for the ground forces?

**Answer.** We are very grateful for the tools that Congress has provided (such as increased recruiting bonuses and raising the maximum enlistment age) because they are proving valuable to our recruiting efforts. The dynamic recruiting environment will remain very competitive, and the Services continue to explore methods to improve recruiting production. We look forward to the continued support from Congress to give the Department the flexibility needed to adjust as needed to meet this critical mission.

**Question.** How can the Department better target and reach the “influencers”—the parents, teachers, and coaches who influence our young men and women, and their career choices?

**Answer.** In order to compete with an improving economy, in an era when the main influencers of our youth—parents, teachers, coaches, etc.—are less inclined to recommend military Service, it will take the entire Department and our Nation’s senior leaders working together collectively to ensure that the American people understand and appreciate the critical importance that our All-Volunteer Force provides to our Nation.

**Question.** What do you consider to be the most important components in the success of all the Services in retaining experienced junior officers, petty officers, and noncommissioned officers?

**Answer.** Superbly trained, well-equipped, and highly-dedicated Americans have always been our Nation’s ultimate asymmetric advantage. Our ability to recruit these individuals is certainly critical to our success, but of equal importance is our ability to retain these experienced professionals. Our military has been successful at retention because of its tradition of service, strong leadership at all levels, and support by the Nation. Therefore, the most important components of retaining our professional force are: (1) Believing that the Nation values the service and family sacrifice of all servicemembers; (2) Strong leadership and mentorship; (3) Personal and professional development opportunities; (4) Opportunities to lead and grow at every level throughout their careers; and (5) Competitive compensation, benefits and incentive packages that reward their Service and provide a good quality of life for their families. As with recruiting, we are very grateful for the tools provided by Congress as they are critical to continued success in the retention of our force.

**Question.** In your opinion, what impact is the current recruiting environment likely to have on our ability to sustain an All-Volunteer Force?

**Answer.** The All-Volunteer Force has served this Nation well for 34 years. It provides a force that is intelligent, motivated, and more dedicated and more inclined to stay than the force I saw as a young officer. Most importantly, it represents the society that it protects. While there have been some isolated challenges in recruiting in the recent past, thanks to the dynamic cadre of trained recruiting professionals
and the tremendous support of Congress, the All-Volunteer Force should continue to provide the servicemembers needed to support our Nation.

IRAQ

Question. What is your assessment of the current situation facing the United States in Iraq?

Answer. Approximately 6 months into the execution of Operation Fardh al-Qanoon (FAQ), all surge forces have been in theater for 1 month and are conducting combat operations. Coordinated offensive operations in Diyala Province and the Baghdad belts have begun to disrupt al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and erode terrorist freedom of operations.

Tribal, anti-AQI measures in al Anbar have sustained popular rejection of AQI and reduced violence in the province sufficiently to begin programs improving essential services and providing jobs. The coalition and the Iraqi Government are expanding engagement to exploit similar tribal movements in other provinces to reject terrorism and promote stability.

Sufficient time has not yet elapsed to establish the kinds of trends the surge seeks to create. General Petraeus will report on his assessment of progress in September, and we should allow him that time to develop the situation and provide his assessment and recommendations.

However, we do have initial indicators. Encouraging trends thus far include overall reductions in civilian casualties, murders, and sectarian violence in Baghdad compared to pre-FAQ levels as well as significant decreases in suicide and Vehicle Born Improvised Explosive Device high profile attacks over the past 3 months.

Substantial security threats remain. Iraq-wide, the consistent reductions in violence in Anbar province are matched by increased attacks in Iraq and Diyala. High-profile attacks have decreased since the beginning of FAQ, but remain too high. AQI uses high profile attacks to damage key infrastructure such as bridges and mosque and to cause high numbers of casualties to stoke sustained sectarian violence.

Despite a small spike in attacks in the wake of the 13 June Samarra Golden Mosque bombing, Iraq appears to have avoided the spiraling violence it witnessed after the February 2006 Samarra Mosque bombing.

Iraqi security forces (ISF) are growing in size and capability while continuing to conduct operations alongside coalition forces. The ISF still face many challenges including their sustainment capabilities and Manning levels—but they are facing these with our assistance while continuing to fight the extremists and terrorist who threaten the future of their nation.

A nascent governmental structure and immature political institutions have slowed economic growth and hampered ministerial capacity.

Question. From your perspective, what are the top lessons learned from our experience in Iraq?

Answer. We entered this conflict without a centralized, coherent counter-insurgency doctrine. We’ve fixed that problem, and General Petraeus is using that doctrine now. Using the model of “clear, hold, build”, we’ve learned that the ground commander must have the appropriate force levels to be able to hold the ground once it’s cleared.

Further, we’ve learned that, in order to build, commanders must engage local leaders and make them part of the solution. In the more rural areas, that means the tribal sheikhs. Indigenous forces are perceived as more legitimate, which makes them more effective. We’re seeing evidence of this in the al Anbar province now.

We’ve learned that our enemy is incredibly adaptive; therefore, we must be as well. From tactics to equipment, we must be able to quickly alter our methods to meet a rapidly-changing environment. This not only applies to ground units, but to service institutions and our industrial base as well.

We must better understand the environment in which we will operate. Iraq is a complex country, ethnically, religiously, and culturally. That complexity must be taken into account at all levels. At the tactical level, we’ve learned that the actions, or lack thereof, on the part of junior leaders can have a strategic impact.

Accordingly, we have adjusted our junior and mid-grade officer, noncommissioned officer, and individual training programs to ensure that the leaders and troops conducting these operations are prepared for the environment in which they operate.

We have also created more realistic training environments for deploying units.

Finally, I also believe we’ve learned that this type of conflict requires a whole-of-government approach. This fight is not just a DOD fight. It takes all the elements of national power—the Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, and Treasury—to succeed in this complex environment.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant mistakes the United States has made to date in Iraq? Which of these do you believe are still having an impact? What do you believe could be done now to mitigate such impact?

Answer. We have not integrated all elements of U.S. national power in Iraq. Often, particularly in the early going, our military, political, economic, and information powers were not well synchronized. This resulted in missed opportunities and created difficulties that we are still dealing with today.

Disbanding the entire Iraqi Army robbed the Government of Iraq (GOI) of what might have been a valuable asset for reconstruction and provision of services to the Iraqi people. Furthermore, this action provided a recruiting pool for extremist groups.

The manner in which de-Baathification has been pursued has been more divisive than helpful and the process demands reform.

We attempted to transition to stability operations with a force that did not have the requisite manpower to do so. Thus, we gave way to a rapidly-building insurgency and yielded the initiative to terrorist organizations.

Our plus-up of forces is intended to isolate Baghdad and the belts around it, reestablish a dominant security posture with ISF and coalition forces, and provide the space for political and economic growth to take place.

We did not tell our story to the Iraqis, regional audiences, or the American people. Modifying public affairs and public diplomacy institutions to better deliver messages to the Iraqi people should have been conducted.

Question. What do you believe are the most important steps that the United States needs to take in Iraq?

Answer. Redouble our efforts to support the GOI in establishing the security, stability, and long-term good governance required to forge political agreements that build momentum for larger political settlements and eventual reconciliation. Our political strategy to achieve a political solution is key and our military efforts must provide the supporting effort to achieve the needed political solution.

Develop effective and self-sufficient ISFs and transitioning responsibilities to Iraq's Government as conditions allow. This should give its people additional confidence to build and sustain institutions.

Provide security to the people of Iraq which will allow the space necessary for the GOI to make necessary political and economic progress.

Convince Syria and Iran to work toward stability in Iraq—and change their behaviors that promote instability in Iraq.

Support, via the International Compact and other economic initiatives, near-term job creation programs, a significant expansion of micro-credits, along with rehabilitation of viable state owned enterprises that can open for business quickly is necessary.

Help the GOI build upon the impacts of moderates devoted to a stable Iraq through engagements with elements of Iraqi society that reject extremism and terrorism. Engagement and inclusion of moderate elements will build the foundations necessary for eventual nation-wide reconciliation.

We must have the needed authorities to continue coalition operations in Iraq beyond 2007. Another United Nations Security Council Resolution, with authorities similar to those of 2007, will be necessary.

Question. Do you believe that there is a purely military solution in Iraq, or must the solution be primarily a political one?

Answer. The majority of problems in Iraq require a political solution. The most contentious issues are part of an overall settlement and not individual issues in isolation. However, military force is necessary to create the stability needed to foster dialogue and genuine political progress.

We must be ready to seize upon improving security environments with our political and economic teams to take advantage of fleeting windows of opportunity. However, there are elements in Iraq, specifically AQI and some Shia extremists that can, and will, be dealt with by only military force.

Diplomatic efforts, similar to those made in the political spectrum, must be reinvigorated with Iraq's neighbors. Support to terrorist efforts in Iraq must be eliminated if success is to be achieved in the near-term.

The bottom line is that the military dimension supports the political dimension, which must take the lead in our strategy to succeed in Iraq.

Question. Do you believe that political compromise among Iraqi political leaders is a necessary condition for a political solution?

Answer. Yes. Compromise is key to advancing solutions to the political issues facing Iraq. It is important for Iraqi politicians to acknowledge and embrace that politics is not zero-sum game and may appear only marginally helpful in the short-term, but produce more prosperous long-term benefits.
Political party leaders must be willing to compromise on individual aspirations for the benefit of all Iraqis. We must limit the negative impact associated with such decisions; ensure that all parties are aware of the compromises made by opponents, and enable political leaders to reach compromises in ways that maintains dignity.

Thus, the Government of Iraq must advance toward inclusion by passing key legislation on reconciliation, sharing of oil and gas revenues, and provincial powers. Further, holding timely provincial elections and passing constitutional amendments on the matters agreed upon last year would reduce incentives for violence.

Addressing all of these issues as parts of a larger question, rather than trying to tackle each in isolation, will have the best chance of success and is likely to yield the most favorable outcomes for all concerned.

Question. Do you believe that quelling the current level of violence in Baghdad is a necessary condition for a political solution?

Answer. Baghdad is the centerpiece of the political solution we seek—its percentage of the populace, sectarian mix, and symbolism are inescapable for the entire nation and region.

Baghdad, and the area, or belts, immediately surrounding the capital city, is key terrain on the strategic landscape and must be controlled to achieve enduring political gains. That said, security is achieved in part due to political compromises and accommodations competing factions make.

Proactive work by the U.S. Government to achieve diplomatic and political solutions, while efforts to achieve military security objectives are ongoing, will likely combine to produce the overall effects we desire.

However, Iraq is a complex country with complex challenges. Some problems manifest themselves at the national level while others have local underpinnings. We cannot afford to limit our approach to simply Baghdad.

Current coordinated coalition and ISF offensive operations in Diyala province aim to quell violence outside of the capital in another important area with a diverse population.

Question. What do you believe will induce Iraqi political leaders to make the political compromises necessary for a political solution? What leverage does the United States have in this regard?

Iraqi leaders must embrace non-violent measures to achieve their goals. Further, they must be willing to politically compromise for the good of all Iraqi citizens.

The U.S. still has significant leverage to bring key players to compromise, including diplomatic initiatives, economic and assistance incentives, selective use of military force, and publicity and information gathering and sharing.

Our allies, both in the region and around the world, can also provide some needed leverage. The United Nations must also be fully engaged in these measures.

Question. What do you believe are the prospects for Iraqi political leaders to make those compromises and, if made, what effect do you believe this would have toward ending the sectarian violence and defeating the insurgency?

Answer. Prospects for compromise are marginally better, but linked to security conditions. A stable environment is necessary for dialogue, negotiations, and compromise.

The recent return of the Sadrist and Tawafuq blocs to the Iraqi parliament reflect a significant compromise of powerful political factions and is a positive step toward the Government of Iraq’s reconciliation efforts through key Parliamentary legislation on sharing of oil and gas revenues and provincial powers.

Passing this legislation will go a long way to reducing and defeating sectarian violence and the insurgency.

Question. What role, if any, did you play in the development of the new Iraq strategy announced by the President earlier this year?

Answer. I was not involved in the development of the new Iraq strategy.

Question. With regard to the recent “surge strategy,” what role will you have, if confirmed, in proposing or recommending changes to the strategy? What role will you have in deciding or recommending when U.S. troops can begin to reduce and transition to new missions?

Answer. As Vice Chairman, my role is to advise the President and the Secretary of Defense on the progress of the operation based on my interaction with the combatant commander, Admiral Fallon, General Petraeus, other members of JCS and our intelligence agencies.

Question. What do you see as a reasonable estimate of the time it will take to demonstrate success in securing Baghdad?

Answer. We are demonstrating success in Baghdad today. We have made significant progress toward breaking the cycle of sectarian violence that had been growing last year. Sectarian violence is down below pre-surge levels. Attacks on civilians and
The numbers of high-profile attacks are down as well. And we are rooting out terrorist cells that have entrenched themselves in the city.

There are still challenges with security in a city as large as Baghdad and one that has gone through so much. But we are seeing success. Is Baghdad completely secure at this time? No, not entirely. It has only been 1 month since the last of our additional brigades arrived in Iraq.

We have provided the commanders on the ground additional resources and we should provide them the time they need to apply those resources to create the stability and security needed for political progress.

We will have a better idea of how well our new strategy is working in September, but it will still take more than a couple of months to see the political and economic results our current security efforts are designed to support. 8–12 months is probably a much more reasonable timeframe.

Question. If confirmed, how would you craft an “exit strategy” for U.S. forces in Iraq? What are the necessary pre-conditions; how would you phase the redeployment; and what residual forces would be needed for what period of time, and for what purposes over the long-term?

Answer. I would characterize our strategic approach going forward in different terms. “Exit strategy” implies withdrawal from Iraq entirely. It is more likely that we will forge an enduring strategic relationship with Iraq that will see a U.S. presence for some time to come, although that presence may well be in lower force levels.

In my judgment our strategic interests in Iraq and the region will require a national commitment for some time to come, although the nature of that commitment will certainly evolve.

We should develop our strategy in conjunction with the other key members of the national security team, to include the State Department, Treasury Department, the Justice Department, among others, to insure that all elements of our national power, diplomatic, economic, and informational, are all operating along with the military instrument, with a shared understanding of the plan.

Going forward, we must achieve the right balance between force levels, their mission, and the situation on the ground from start to finish.

Question. What is the state of planning for such an “exit strategy”? If none has begun, will you require that such planning begin?

Answer. If confirmed, I believe that detailed planning for all likely contingencies should be undertaken and would recommend the effort begin, if it is not already in progress. It is the duty of the military to provide the best possible military advice for any contingency to the President.

Question. What role will you play, if any, in an ongoing assessment of the capability of ISFs to take on more of the security responsibilities?

Answer. If confirmed, I would continually assess the progress of the ISFs, especially regarding the funding and equipping status. We must continually work with the combatant commander, Admiral Fallon, to ensure he is properly resourced to enable the ISFs to assume more responsibility of the security of their country.

Question. What is your understanding of U.S. policy with respect to the arming and support of Sunni militia forces against al Qaeda in al Anbar province and elsewhere in Iraq? What would you recommend in this regard?

Answer. While not directly involved in my current assignment, I understand coalition forces are not arming Sunni militias; however, we are supporting and augmenting local Police Support Units in various provinces. Indigenous forces are the key to success in the Iraqi counterinsurgency as demonstrated in Anbar, which has witnessed an 80-percent decrease in enemy attacks since this time last year. We should continue to focus our efforts in supporting homegrown police and security forces in Iraq.

Question. What considerations will be factored into a decision regarding whether (and if so, what kind and how much) U.S. military equipment currently in Iraq should be left behind for use by the Iraqi Army?

Answer. Equipment/material will be screened for redistribution in theater. Items of military value will be retrograded IAW applicable Military Regulations.

Equipment will also be screened for sufficient service life/residual value to ensure retrograde is a fiscally sound course of action. If not sufficient, we’ll then consider transfer to the Iraqi Army.

Additionally, equipment that has undergone significant upgrade since being deployed to theater (e.g. uparmored HMMWs, medium and heavy trucks, etc.) may also be screened for transfer.
There are some other types of non-military equipment managed by contractors (e.g., generators, living trailers, tents, etc). These will also be screened for transfer/donation to the ISF per Annex D of MNF-I Framework Operation Order.

Finally, certain non-military equipment/material that is deemed to have significant value to help stimulate the Iraqi economy, will also be screened for transfer/donation IAW Annex D of MNF–I Framework Operation Order.

**Question.** In the National Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress prohibited the use of funds to seek permanent bases in Iraq or to control the oil resources of Iraq.

Do you agree that it is not and should not be U.S. policy to seek permanent basing of U.S. forces in Iraq or to exercise control over Iraq’s oil resources?

**Answer.** It is not U.S. policy to seek permanent military bases in Iraq or to control Iraq’s oil resources, which belong to the Iraqi people. The United States may, however, discuss a long-term strategic relationship with the Iraqi Government, as it does with many governments in the region and around the world.

**Question.** If you agree, what are your views on the construction of any additional facilities inside Iraq for use by our military forces?

**Answer.** Any construction we undertake should be for the temporary basing of our forces. We should, however, continue to engage the GOI on a long-term security relationship. Any basing decisions will be made at the request of the GOI.

**Question.** Is the United States military capable of sustaining present force levels in Iraq and Afghanistan without breaking the force?

**Answer.** Our current force levels, or “surge”, were intended to be a sustained increase in forces, but not one without an end. As we achieve the conditions necessary to adjust force levels, we will work with the Commanders of MNF–I and Central Command to redefine missions appropriately. We see no extension beyond 15 months for any forces on the ground—as General Petraeus announced in Iraq recently.

I will provide the Secretary of Defense and the President my best military advice as our campaign progresses regarding our missions and the appropriate force levels necessary to achieve them. The strain on the Services, particularly the Army and Marine Corps—our service men and women, and their families—has been and will remain one of many operational considerations that influence our strategy.

**Question.** Are you concerned about the negative impact of the perceived occupation of a Muslim nation by the United States and its western allies?

**Answer.** I am concerned about negative perceptions, especially when they are not based on the facts.

**AFGHANISTAN**

**Question.** What is your assessment of the long-term prospects for Afghan military forces to effectively provide a secure environment for a democratically elected government to function?

**Answer.** Based on the progress we have made to date with the army, and are beginning to make with the police, the Afghan national security forces should be able to provide a secure environment that will allow the government to succeed.

The Afghan National Army is the first successful national institution in Afghanistan in decades and enjoys considerable support and respect from the Afghan people.

With continued effort and support from the U.S. Government and the international community, both institutions will be a positive contributor to the fledgling Afghan democracy.

**Question.** What, if any, types of military assistance would you recommend in addition to current efforts?

**Answer.** We have not yet met the minimum requirements stated in the NATO Combined Joint Statement of Requirements. Continued diplomacy at the highest levels will be required to address shortfalls and caveats, which would make the troops we have much more effective. The most critical shortfall is training Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams for the Afghan National Army (ANA).

**Question.** What steps do you believe coalition forces and the international community need to take in the near-term to improve the lives of the Afghan people?

**Answer.** Reinforcing the Government of Afghanistan’s ability to protect and provide for the Afghan people is critical to marginalizing the insurgency and creating a secure environment. The international community has agreed to assist in the development and strengthening of many vital institutions.

We have a need for trainers to support the ANA and ANP, ministerial level mentors to develop Afghan Government capacity, and the ability to execute critical infrastructure projects which include roads, power, and rural development.
Question. News reports indicate that there is growing Afghan resentment over civilian deaths resulting from U.S. counterterrorism operations and U.S. or NATO airstrikes. Are you concerned that these reports of civilian deaths are undermining efforts to win the support of the Afghan people for the mission in Afghanistan? What steps, if any, do you believe ought to be undertaken to address the issue of civilian deaths in Afghanistan?

Question. Should international military forces have an explicit counterdrug mission? If so, should its focus be on interdiction, capturing drug lords and destroying drug facilities? If not, what is the appropriate role for the military?

Answer. I am deeply concerned that reporting that is not balanced may undermine our efforts. As far as the steps to be undertaken, I will echo what is already being expressed by the operational commanders involved:

There are three key elements to this issue, which include:
1. Ensuring clear measures exist to mitigate the risk to civilians;
2. Coordinated, credible post-incident reports are completed in a timely manner, followed by rapid reporting of conclusions, lessons and investigations when warranted; and
3. The need for consistent, cohesive public messaging in Kabul, Brussels, and nation capitals of what happened and why.

PAKISTAN

Question. In your view, what military means can and should the United States employ to fight terrorists based in Pakistan?

Answer. At this time, I think Pakistan is doing as much as we can reasonably expect in the border regions and elsewhere. On 11 July, Pakistan forces stormed Islamabad’s Red Mosque to end an 8-day siege in which Islamic extremists had barricaded themselves in the Mosque.

The Taliban reacted to the assault by calling for the renunciation of the North Waziristan Peace Agreement. Pakistan is now dealing with the fallout of that battle, and has sent additional troops into the Tribal Areas as the Taliban have launched a series of bombings which have killed nearly 300 people in the days following the assault on the Red Mosque.

Cooperation among the U.S., NATO–ISAF forces, and the Government of Pakistan on both sides of the border is critical. For example, the Tripartite Commission and the Border Security Subcommittee meetings are important to enhancing this cooperation. The U.S. needs to stay engaged in these meetings and continue to help bring all sides together in a spirit of coalition cooperation and trust.

We continue to look at ways that U.S. and coalition forces can improve interoperability and coordination along the border to reduce cross-border incursions by extremist elements.

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We continue to look at ways that U.S. and coalition forces can improve interoperability and coordination along the border to reduce cross-border incursions by extremist elements.

Question. What options do you believe are available to the United States to counter Iran’s growing influence in the Middle East region?

Answer. Iran is one of the most important regional actors with regard to Iraq, Afghanistan and the broader Middle East region, and therefore must be taken into account as we execute and develop future policy.

I fully support the current diplomatic initiatives with regard to Iran, to include U.N. actions (both sanctions and financial measures), regional initiatives, and international pressure.

I fully support DOS Gulf Security Dialogue initiative to reassure our regional partners. This includes military aspects such as building partnership capacity building, border security, missile defense, and proliferation security initiatives.

Question. Do you believe that a protracted deployment of US. troops in Iraq, if the situation on the ground in Iraq does not improve, could strengthen Iran’s influence in the region?

Answer. Regardless of the security situation in Iraq, if U.S. and coalition are prematurely withdrawn, Iran would have unimpeded access, and influence in Iraq. It is difficult to predict what effect this will have in the region. Perhaps most troubling is the potential for continued displacement of ethnic and religious groups.

Question. In your view, does Iran pose a near-term threat to the United States by way of either its missile program or its suspected nuclear weapons programs?

Answer. While these programs will not threaten the homeland in the near term, they are on a path to threaten the United States and we should not wait until the threat has matured to address it. Iran’s posturing can also threaten U.S. interests in the region.
Question. If you believe either of these programs pose a near-term threat, what in your view are the best ways to address such a threat?
Answer. We should continue to support the current diplomatic initiatives with regard to Iran, to include U.N. actions, regional initiatives, financial measures, and international pressure.

We should encourage Iran to fulfill its responsibility with regard to international agreements to the Nonproliferation Treaty and the additional protocol.

We should initiate the fielding of defensive measures for the homeland, our forward-deployed forces, friends, and allies.

Question. Other than nuclear or missile programs what are your concerns, if any, about Iran?
Answer. Iranian malicious activities throughout the region through the use of proxies to extend Iranian influence into sovereign nations by providing weapons, technology, training, and finance to these proxies.

I am concerned Iran’s continued destabilizing activities will impact stability and potentially impact the regional economy.

It is important to maintain and strengthen our relationships with our regional partners and allies, by continuing to build partner capacity, and land and maritime security to counter Iranian influence in the region.

If confirmed, I will continue to work closely and coordinate with all applicable U.S. Government departments to ensure our policies toward Iran take a regional approach.

COLOMBIA

Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend for the role of the U.S. military in Colombia?
Answer. The most appropriate role for the U.S. military is to continue to address systemic deficiencies in the training and employment of the Colombian armed forces. Under the leadership of President Uribe, Colombia has made important strides towards defeating the narcoterrorists.

The Government of Colombia and the Colombian armed forces have primary responsibility for bringing security and the rule-of law to their sovereign nation.

The Colombian security forces and state intelligence services are best suited to sift through the complex maze of local allegiances. They are also best equipped to leverage the cooperation of local communities.

Question. What is your assessment of the progress achieved by the Colombian armed forces in confronting the threat of narcoterrorism?
Answer. The Colombian armed forces have progressed well over the last few years. U.S. training and equipment as well as intelligence support and planning advice have contributed significantly to this progress.

The Colombian military’s (COLMIL) Plan Patriota offensive now called Plan Consolidatorz the largest in the Nation’s history, continues to pressure Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in its base areas. The COLMIL has captured key nodes and dominates mobility corridors, denying FARC access to support and population. A number of FARC, National Liberation Army (ELN), and United Self-Defense Groups of Columbia (AUC) high value targets have been killed or captured.

Colombian police are now present in all 1,098 municipalities.

Colombia’s 2007 defense budget is 5.8 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) as compared to 2006 when it was 5.4 percent of GDP. This represents a 12-percent increase in defense expenditures, from $7.11 billion to $7.96 billion. Since President Uribe took office, the Colombian armed forces have recruited over 100,000 new members. Finally, over 30,000 members of the illegal armed groups have demobilized.

This is all good cause for validated optimism. The COLMIL has made significant progress fighting narcoterrorists, and their rapid expansion has enabled the Government of Colombia to reestablish control of its territory and restore government presence and services.

While the COLMIL is more “forward-leaning” than ever, their mettle will continue to be tested as the illegal armed groups primarily FARC resort to new tactics in order to undermine the government’s democratic consolidation plan.

Despite COLMIL successes, the permanent presence of security forces in areas previously held by the FARC is the only way to guarantee their eventual defeat. Only sustained efforts against all illegal armed groups will eventually win the peace.
Question. U.S. relations with Russia are strained over a variety of issues. If confirmed do you believe that there are any opportunities to improve relations through military to military programs, or are there any other actions that you would recommend be taken?

Answer. The U.S. and Russian militaries have made progress in the area of military cooperation since 2003 when Presidents Bush and Putin directed their respective military chiefs to focus on creating the capacity to conduct combined military operations for future missions.

This progress has been steady and tangible and sets a positive tone for other constructive security cooperation with Russia.

This cooperation has been personally directed by the U.S. and Russian Presidents through the Presidential Action Checklist and has yielded results.

I believe that military-to-military programs would continue to benefit from this level of oversight as the checklist process has overcome bureaucratic obstacles that had previously been insurmountable.

While military cooperation positively influences the broader bilateral relationship, political and economic considerations will continue to play a key role in the emergence of constructive strategic relations. As Russia seeks a greater world leadership role, we should encourage their constructive participation in both governmental initiatives, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, and non-governmental initiatives, such as the Clinton Global Initiative. In the end, we stand a better chance of addressing some of the core issues that breed conflict as partners with Russia.

Question. In your view, are there any specific programmatic areas, such as missile defense, further nuclear reductions, or space programs, where cooperation with Russia could be beneficial?

Answer. It is essential that we continue to encourage the Russian Government to cooperate in addressing the emerging threat to both our Nations from the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. This includes in the arena of missile defense.

I would also highlight the importance of enhancing our counterterrorism cooperation with Russia given the extremist threats facing both our societies.

Nuclear reductions, as agreed to with the Russian Federation in the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty), should continue in a predictable and transparent fashion with our Russian partners, in such a way that builds trust and confidence in how we manage our respective strategic nuclear infrastructures.

I would also maintain that space programs offer a potentially fruitful and mutually beneficial area for combined work; we will continue to seek out joint programs on which we can cooperate, given the advanced technological capacities of both our Nations.

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which seeks to build collective and individual capacity to combat the global threat of nuclear terrorism, is another example of how we can cooperate. In a joint statement issued last month by U.S. Assistant Secretary John C. Rood and Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak, the participants indicated they were pleased by the large increase in participation in the Global Initiative at this meeting. Expanded participation by the international community will help combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen our capacity to prevent the acquisition of nuclear materials and know-how by terrorists.

STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Question. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the importance of planning and training for post-conflict stability and support operations. Increased emphasis has been placed on stability and support operations in DOD planning and guidance in order to achieve the goal of full integration across all DOD activities. What is your assessment of the Department’s current emphasis on planning for post-conflict scenarios?

Answer. Planning for post-conflict scenarios is a very high priority for the Department.

Stability operations are now a core U.S. military mission, with priority across the Department comparable to combat operations.

The Department is explicitly addressing planning for post-conflict scenarios as part of an aggressive implementation of DOD Directive 3000.05, Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations.

Full implementation will take years, especially as DOD partners with civilian departments and agencies to develop new whole-of-government planning and execution capabilities.
Question. How can the Joint Staff better implement the new directives on post-conflict planning and the conduct of stability and support operations?

Answer. The Joint Staff assists OSD in supervising the implementation of the new directive by the Services and COCOMs.

During the conduct of stability operations, the Joint Staff should assist in coordinating such things as logistics, coalition building & sustainment, and the provision of forces. The Joint Staff should also provide analyses and insights pertaining to the policy, strategy, and progress of stability operations.

The Department can better implement DOD Directive 3000.05 and National Security Planning Document (NSPD)–44 by strongly supporting the budget requests of our civilian partners, especially the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, as they develop and provide a civilian expeditionary capability that will be able to effectively prepare for, plan, and conduct post-conflict and stability and support operations.

Question. What lessons do you believe the Department has learned from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Answer. Post-conflict planning and post-conflict training are essential.

The U.S. Government requires a whole-of-government approach in order to effectively plan and execute post-conflict operations.

The U.S. Government has shortfalls in civilian expeditionary capability, which is required to assist a post-conflict state in the reconstitution of its governance, essential services, economy, rule of law, and so on.

The State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is making progress in this area and its work in developing a civilian response capability is fully supported by DOD.

COUNTER-DRUG OPERATIONS

Question. In your view, what technologies and tactics need to be developed to improve the United States military’s counterdrug operations and assistance to other countries?

Answer. Success in counterdrug operations depends on the synchronized application of all elements of U.S. national power: diplomatic, informational, military and economic.

The U.S. military must act in conjunction with the Department of State, the Coast Guard, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and our international partners.

The goal is to assist willing nations in the source and transit zones to build their own internal capacity for combating the production and trafficking of illegal drugs.

The U.S. military should continue to provide support across a broad spectrum of counterdrug operations. Specific military assistance includes unit training for host nation counterdrug forces, providing aviation support, intelligence analysis and providing military equipment.

While there can be some gains by developing new technologies and tactics, the U.S. should focus on broadening and expanding its international partnerships in combating drug trafficking.

REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Question. The United States has made a commitment to reduce the number of operationally-deployed nuclear warheads.

Do you believe reductions in the total number of warheads in the stockpile are also feasible? If your answer is yes, how should capabilities and requirements be evaluated to identify which warheads and delivery systems could be retired and dismantled?

Answer. Yes. I am confident that working with Congress we can reduce both the operationally deployed weapons and the total number of weapons in our stockpile. In 2001, the President directed that the United States reduce its operationally-deployed strategic nuclear weapons from about 6,000 to 1,700 to 2,200 weapons by 2012—a two-thirds reduction.

We can best achieve the goal of reducing the total number of weapons in our stockpile by developing a responsive infrastructure and the RRW. Together they will allow us to preserve a credible deterrent with the lowest number of weapons necessary for national security.

If confirmed, I will work closely with OSD, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), the Services, and COCOMs to evaluate our nuclear force structure options with a broad view toward the integration of non-nuclear and nuclear strike forces, missile defenses, and a responsive infrastructure to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons while mitigating the risks associated with drawing down U.S. nuclear forces.
INTEGRATION OF SPACE PROGRAMS

Question. Previously, the Under Secretary of the Air Force was designated as the Executive Agent for Space, which included being Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. This integration of white and black space was one of the recommendations of the Space Commission.

What is your view on the need to institute a more integrated approach to both sides of the space community?

Answer. I agree strongly with the need to integrate black and white space. We have been working this issue very hard for some years now. Members of both communities participate in a number of joint bodies; we are developing joint programs, and at senior levels have very tight relationships. We have completed a virtual integration of our operation centers and now have a common Deputy Commander in place to ensure coordinated and synchronized operations. No process is perfect; there is always room for improvement. But I believe we have been very successful and anticipate that our success and close working relationship will continue.

SPACE PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

Question. In many instances the military and intelligence space programs have experienced technical, budget, and schedule difficulties. In some instances these difficulties can be traced to problems with establishing realistic, clear, requirements and then maintaining control over the integrity of the requirements once established.

How in your view can or should the space systems requirements process be improved?

Answer. While I am encouraged by the improvements that have been made to the space systems requirements and acquisition processes over the last several years, the space systems requirement process could be further improved with additional collaboration and coordination between the DOD’s JROC and the DNI’s Intelligence Community Mission Requirements Board. This would result in increased vigilance and scrutiny of the space requirements process. Additionally, where appropriate, adoption of commercial practices could help to reduce the requirements approval time.

Question. In many circumstances space programs take many years from conception to launch. The result is that the technology in the satellites is significantly out dated by the time the satellites are launched and operational, which in turn, can lead to a decision to terminate a program early, and look to a newer technology. This vicious cycle results in significantly increased costs for space systems as sunk costs are never fully amortized.

How in your view can this cycle be addressed?

Answer. This cycle can be addressed by reducing the complexity of spacecraft and lift vehicles, designing smaller, lighter single-purpose satellites rather than complex multi-purpose satellites which must be sub-optimized to perform a variety of missions, by adopting commercial practices to streamline the design and manufacturing process and by pursuing a “block build” strategy that allows for infusion of new technology as programs progress.

OPERATIONALLY RESPONSIVE SPACE

Question. Do you support the concept of operationally responsive small satellites and what do you see as the most promising opportunities for small satellites?

Answer. I support the concept of Operationally Responsive Space (ORS). The concept is intended to rapidly deliver space capabilities to the Joint Force Commanders. This will enable the warfighter to integrate space capabilities when and where needed to produce the desired effect. ORS strategy includes rapid exploitation of new or innovative space technical and operational capabilities, augmenting space capabilities in time of crisis, and reconstituting capabilities when required. ORS is presently in the experimentation and demonstration phase. During this time we are using small satellites called tactical satellites to help inform the ORS concept of operations.

PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE

Question. As the Commander of the U.S. STRATCOM, developing a conventional, non-nuclear, prompt global strike capability has been a priority for you. If confirmed you would continue to have a role in the requirements development process for such a capability.
What is your vision of the capability that should be developed for prompt global strike and the types of targets that would underpin the need to develop the capability?

Answer. I envision an evolutionary strategy designed to yield a range of prompt, non-nuclear kinetic alternatives for dealing with time-sensitive or fleeting, high-value targets that are beyond the reach of other conventional forces due to time and/or distance, where the cost of inaction would be high.

Question. Would you envision multiple different types of systems being developed?

Answer. Potentially, yes. We are currently reviewing a number of concepts proposed by the Services to fill this capability gap. Our evolutionary strategy will focus on delivering increasing capabilities over time.

Question. How would you ensure that the capability developed is not mistaken for a nuclear system?

Answer. We take the risks of misinterpretation seriously and are actively engaged with others to develop transparency and confidence building measures, drawing on our years of experience with other multi-role systems such as the air launched cruise missile or tactical land attack missile. As we pursue prompt global strike capabilities, we will fully explore delivery system attributes such as basing and other unambiguous signatures to further reduce these risks.

Question. Does the administration’s decision not to extend the START have any impact on development of a prompt global strike capability?

Answer. It will provide greater flexibility to pursue prompt global strike solutions, while simultaneously seeking to preserve appropriate confidence building measures. In the end, we seek new systems that contribute to national security and reduce our reliance upon nuclear weapons.

RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD

Question. The proposal for a RRW included in the fiscal year 2008 budget is for authority for an early phase in the nuclear weapons development. Three of the relevant congressional committees have recommended that the RRW proceed with phase 2A development only, and the fourth committee recommended no funding for the RRW. Work in phase 2A would, if eventually approved and funded, begin to provide some understanding as to whether RRW could meet the programmatic goals established for it.

One of the goals is that it would be deployed without nuclear weapons testing. Do you support this goal?

Answer. Yes. The RRW is specifically designed to provide greater reliability and design margins than those currently in our stockpile. RRW will allow the United States to manage the risks of the 21st century while reducing the likelihood of returning to nuclear testing to certify reliability. If this goal cannot be met we should reassess proceeding with RRW.

Question. One of the goals is that it would enable additional reductions to the overall stockpile. Do you support this goal?

Answer. Yes. The introduction of RRW will allow us to retire weapons that are currently being retained in our stockpile to provide Reserve capability in the event of a technical failure in the operationally-deployed force. A challenge we face today is that our Cold War legacy weapons move farther away from their original design specifications with each successive service life extension.

RRW will reduce the need for continued updates to these legacy systems and will allow us to retire increasing numbers of them from our stockpile.

RRW is critical to sustaining long-term confidence in our nuclear deterrent capability while sizing our stockpile to meet the challenges of the 21st century security environment. If these goals cannot be met we should reassess proceeding with RRW.

Question. One of the goals is that it would increase security and safety of nuclear warheads. Do you support this goal?

Answer. Yes. RRW will make U.S. nuclear weapons safer and more secure against unauthorized use given the security threats we face today and will face in the future. RRW will incorporate state-of-the-art security features that cannot be retrofitted to older weapons. Additionally, RRW designs will provide more reliable performance margins than those currently in the stockpile, will help retire hazardous materials found in legacy weapons, and will be less sensitive to incremental aging effects and manufacturing variances. If this goal cannot be met we should reassess proceeding with RRW.

CURRENT NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE

Question. As Commander of U.S. STRATCOM you were involved with the annual surveillance process for the nuclear weapons stockpile.
In your view is the current stockpile safe, secure, and reliable?
Answer. Yes. Our stockpile stewardship program ensures the current stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable. However, as the Cold War-era stockpile ages, our ability to certify the stockpile in a non-testing environment will be increasingly challenged.
The RRW program will allow us to meet the threats of the 21st century with a stockpile that is increasingly safe, secure, and reliable while reducing the likelihood of a return to nuclear testing.

Question. As Commander of U.S. STRATCOM, you worked closely with the NNSA and its stockpile stewardship program.
In your view is the stockpile stewardship program providing the tools to ensure the safety, reliability, and security of the nuclear weapons stockpile now and over the long-term?
Answer. Yes. The stockpile stewardship program has been instrumental to our ability to ensure a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile while observing our moratorium on nuclear testing.
In the longer-term, it is critical that our infrastructure, including the national laboratories, maintain the critical nuclear skills needed to meet the Nation’s strategic requirements.
RRW will allow us to preserve our strategic nuclear capability with a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile while furthering the goals of the stockpile stewardship program.

Question. In your view is the stockpile stewardship program capable of supporting design, engineering, development, manufacture, and deployment of an RRW?
Answer. Yes. The NNSA oversees the stockpile stewardship program and ensures the safety, security, and reliability of our existing stockpile.
All aspects of the nuclear enterprise—the design teams at our national laboratories, the manufacturing production facilities, and other key parts of the Departments of Energy and Defense—will work together to support the design, engineering, development, manufacture, and deployment of RRW.

UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

Question. In May of this year, President Bush issued a statement urging the Senate to act favorably on U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.
Answer. Yes. I support accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. The Convention protects and advances the national security, economic, and environmental interests of the United States.

Question. How would you answer the critics of the Convention who assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the United States?
Answer. As the world’s preeminent maritime power, leader in the war on terrorism, and the Nation with the largest exclusive economic zone, the United States should accede to the Law of the Sea Convention.
The Convention codifies navigation and overflight rights and high seas freedoms that are essential for the global mobility of our Armed Forces. It supports our maritime maneuverability and mobility on, over, and under the world’s oceans.
The Convention furthers our National Security Strategy and enhances our position as a global leader in maritime affairs.

TREATMENT OF DETAINEEs

Question. The Constitution, laws, and treaty obligations of the United States prohibit the torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of persons held in U.S. custody.
What steps, if any, do you believe the Joint Staff should take to ensure the humane treatment of detainees in DOD custody and to ensure that such detainees are not subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment?
Answer. DOD has policies in place to require compliance with U.S. law concerning humane treatment of detainees in DOD custody. In a July 7, 2006 memorandum, the Deputy Secretary of Defense required all components of the DOD to treat detainees in accordance with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. The 2006 DOD Directive (2310.01E) governing the Department’s Detainee Program requires that all persons subject to the Directive to apply, at a minimum, the standards of Common Article 3 to detainees in the custody of DOD. The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 also prohibits the use of any interrogation technique not listed in the Army Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation with any person in the custody of DOD. That manual has been revised, it is public, and it binds the operations of DOD.
With regards to detainee treatment, we acknowledge mistakes have occurred in the past and we have learned valuable lessons in the U.S. military. We have worked hard to ensure commanders demand the humane treatment of all detainees at all locations.

United States military personnel engaged in detention operations are required to comply with U.S. domestic law, the Law of War, and our international treaty obligations including the Prohibition on Torture and Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.

**BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**

*Question.* Section 234 of the Ronald W. Reagan NDAA for Fiscal Year 2005 requires operationally realistic testing of each block of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS).

Do you believe that in order to perform its intended function successfully the BMDS, including each of its elements, needs to be operationally effective?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you believe that the United States should deploy missile defense systems without regard to whether they are operationally effective?

Answer. I believe there are two attributes that should be considered in the operational deployment of BMDS; will it be operationally effective, and/or will it affect the adversary’s behavior? I believe the decision to deploy BMDS is operationally sound.

*Question.* Do you believe that operationally realistic testing is necessary to demonstrate and determine the operational capabilities and limits of the BMDS, and to improve its operational capability?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to ensure that the BMDS, and each of its elements, undergoes operationally realistic testing?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with OSD, the Missile Defense Agency, the military Services, and the COCOMs to ensure operationally realistic testing is accomplished.

We will conduct each test so that it continues to build on the knowledge gained from previous efforts and adds challenging objectives, with the goal of testing the system under increasingly realistic circumstances to meet the needs of the warfighter.

*Question.* The military is supposed to play an important role in helping to determine requirements for our military capabilities, and to help determine the capabilities that will meet the needs of the combatant commanders for their operational plans.

What do you believe should be the role of the military (as the warfighter) in helping to determine the requirements and force structure needs for our ballistic missile defense forces, including such elements as the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the COCOMs, the Joint Force Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, and the military departments?

Answer. The military should have, and has, a central role in helping to determine the requirements and force structure needs of our ballistic missile defense forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff provide military advice and oversight of requirements and force structure. The COCOMs integrate ballistic missile defense capabilities into operational plans and help formulate requirements.

The Joint Force Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, as a component for U.S. STRATCOM, conducts planning, integration, coordination, and global synchronization in support of the geographic COCOMs. The military Services and the Missile Defense Agency provide resources, support, and leadership to all elements of the ballistic missile defense system.

*Question.* If confirmed, what steps would you take to help ensure that U.S. missile defense forces and capabilities meet the needs and operational plans of the combatant commanders?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with OSD, the Missile Defense Agency, and United States STRATCOM as they continue to collaborate with the military Services and COCOMs to ensure the needs of the warfighter are met, to include training, testing, wargaming, and conducting realistic exercises and simulations, to improve the capability and reliability of the missile defense system.

*Question.* Section 223 of the John Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007 establishes that “it is the policy of the United States that the DOD accord a priority within the missile defense program to the development, testing, fielding and improvement of effective near-term missile defense capabilities, including the ground-based midcourse defense system, the Aegis ballistic missile defense system, the Patriot PAC-
system, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, and the sensors necessary to support such systems.”

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the Department complies with this policy requirement in its development and acquisition of missile defense capabilities?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the OSD, the Missile Defense Agency, the military Services, and the COCOMs to ensure the development, testing, acquisition, fielding, and improvement of effective near-term missile defense capabilities to meet the threats that we face today and will continue to face in the future.

FUTURE OF NATO

Question. Over the past several years, NATO has experienced great changes. NATO has enlarged with the addition of seven new members from Eastern Europe and the Baltics, and has taken on an ambitious stabilization mission in Afghanistan, as well as a training mission in Iraq.

In your view, what are the greatest opportunities and challenges that you foresee for NATO over the next 5 years?

Answer. NATO has proven its relevance by its ability to transform from its Cold War posture to meet the out-of-area challenges of the 21st century. But transformation is not an end-state—rather, it is a steady state. NATO’s greatest opportunities—and challenges—lie in its ability to continue to transform in the coming years.

Most critically, NATO must develop its role in the Comprehensive Approach, the whole-of-international community approach that will ultimately deliver the results needed in Afghanistan.

NATO’s military forces cannot alone provide the long-term solution, but must play a role together with other actors in the international community, such as the European Union, the United Nations, and other appropriate Intergovernmental Organizations (IGO) and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs).

In the area of military capabilities, NATO and Allied nations must continue to focus on expeditionary capacity. Gaps in critical modern capabilities, such as strategic airlift, air-to-air refueling, helicopter support, and theater ballistic missile defense will need to be addressed as well.

Enlargement of NATO and expanding Alliance relationships with partner nations of all types will also present NATO with challenges and opportunities. Shaping how NATO engages with partners, from the Mediterranean Dialogue to global partnership initiatives, will in turn set the stage for future Alliance initiatives critical to allied security.

These opportunities will not come cheaply—which is perhaps one of the greatest challenges facing the Alliance. Most allies spend incredibly little on defense, especially considering the large political commitments they have made. Transforming national militaries while also contributing them to ongoing Alliance operations far from home is an expensive prospect, but one that is absolutely critical to the future success of NATO.

Question. Do you envision further enlargement of NATO within the next 5 years?

Answer. That is a political question that will have to be answered by each of the 26 NATO Allies.

For the United States, that question will be decided by the President and the Congress.

At the 2006 NATO Summit in Riga, Allies stated that at the 2008 NATO Summit they will be prepared to extend invitations to those aspirants who meet NATO’s performance-based standards and are able to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security and stability.

Question. What progress are the NATO member nations, particularly the new member nations, making with respect to transforming their militaries, acquiring advanced capabilities, and enhancing their interoperability with the U.S. and other NATO member nations?

Answer. Most allies (due to limited resources made available to defense ministries) are forced to make critical choices between spending money on transforming their militaries or on contributing to Alliance operations within existing capabilities.

Many allies, however, have been able to strike a delicate balance between these two choices, but with reduced effectiveness. The cost is that national transformational processes are delayed, or have key elements canceled, while contributions to operations are smaller, or less capable, than needed.

The bottom line is that all but a very few allies meet the agreed-upon 2 percent of GDP allocated for defense spending—if this target was met, across the board, almost all transformational and operation requirements could be met.
Question. What steps could NATO take, in your view, to reduce tensions with Russia?

Answer. Progress has been made within the context of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC); however, I believe that this body can play a dominant role in mitigating the threat of a renewed confrontation between NATO and Russia. Its full potential has yet to be realized.

The NRC could play an integral role in addressing key strategic issues to include:

- NATO and Russian perceptions of the ballistic missile threat from the Middle East;
- Better orchestrated cooperation in regional stabilization and reconstruction efforts (e.g., in Iraq and Afghanistan);
- Managing Russia’s reaction to possible NATO enlargement, as well as Russian suspicions about U.S. and NATO activities in Europe and Central Asia; and
- Determining how to best facilitate Russia’s fullment of its “Istanbul Commitments” in withdrawing military forces from Moldova and Georgia.

Long-term goals would be to:

1. Improve NATO-Russia politico-military cooperation, both in Europe and globally, including cooperation in missile defense;
2. Military-to-military engagement between Russia and NATO, while still progressing with interest at the military level, is considerably hindered by Russian political constraints. The Partnership for Peace Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that Russia signed in April 2005 was recently ratified by the Duma. This SOFA could open up several new areas of practical cooperation.
3. To help manage allies’ concerns about a resurgent and assertive Russian Federation and remind them of the importance of united push back against Russian behavior when needed; and
4. To influence positively Russian public attitudes toward NATO, promote democratic and defense reforms within Russia, and encourage “normal” relations between Russia and its neighbors in Europe and the Former Soviet Union.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Question. The Special Operations Command (SOCOM) relies on support from the Services for their “service common” equipment, which they modify using their Major Force Program-11 budget. Often, however, SOCOM’s acquisition needs are not always adequately prioritized by acquisition boards and by the Services.

What is your view on the appropriate relationship between SOCOM and the Services, and SOCOM and the acquisition boards?

Answer. The current relationship and alignment of SOCOM is appropriate, and I believe fosters their ability to ensure their most pressing needs are met. The Services work hard to ensure they understand SOCOM needs and to provide the “service-common” equipment. SOCOM has their own acquisition boards and processes for SOCOM-unique equipment and that works well. In addition, they have a seat at the appropriate AT&L acquisition forums when they have specific issues or equities and that appears to be working well. At this time, I am not aware of any specific SOCOM requirements which have been hindered by the current relationships and processes.

Question. What, if anything, can and should be done to ensure that SOCOM’s acquisition needs are better met than they are to date?

Answer. I believe SOCOM is well postured to advocate and procure systems to fill their needs. They are actively engaged with the JROC, and, when needed, the JROC facilitates SOCOM issues and needs through various processes such as the combatant commander Integrated Priority Lists and Capability Gap Assessments. In addition, the Vice Chairman co-chairs Defense Acquisition Boards and can help facilitate and advocate on their behalf.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK Pryor

MILITARY IN IRAQ

1. Senator Pryor. General Cartwright, the debate over the global war on terror has led a few current military leaders to agree that there is no military solution for the war in Iraq. Do you agree with this statement?
   General CARTWRIGHT. The solution to the war in Iraq is part military, part political.

2. Senator Pryor. General Cartwright, what recommendation would you make to the President and Secretary of Defense if General Patraeus' September report indicates no change in the status of combat operations in Iraq?
   General CARTWRIGHT. The Joint Staff is planning for all potential contingencies. This planning is ongoing and will be completed after the report comes out. Until then, it would be inappropriate to provide conjecture as to how I might advise.

REFUGEES IN IRAQ

3. Senator Pryor. General Cartwright, since 2003 approximately 2 million Iraqis have fled the country and 900,000 have been internally displaced. With another 90,000 Iraqis fleeing every month, what responsibility does the U.S. military have to ensure a secure reintegration of refugees returning to Iraq following a troop withdrawal?
   General CARTWRIGHT. The United States has a strategic interest in mitigating the humanitarian suffering and potentially region-wide destabilizing impact of large numbers of Iraqi refugees and internally displaced persons. Unfortunately, it is beyond our means to resettle all who have moved away from their homes. Nor would it be easy to discover the motivation for many of these relocations. I think it is fair to say that some people move for reasons unrelated to security, even in Iraq. To make matters more difficult, we do not really have a good estimate of the number of émigrés or Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). There are estimates that vary widely. So, the magnitude of the problem is an unknown. Although we have anecdotal evidence that many have returned to their homes, particularly in places like al Anbar, we do not have firm numbers. Based on this experience, I would say the best thing we can do for the displaced population is to defeat the terrorists and rogue militias that drove them away in the first place.

4. Senator Pryor. General Cartwright, how can we ever have a stable Iraq with this much flux across the border?
   General CARTWRIGHT. Iraq's borders are a problem. But, that is not unusual in this part of the world. Arab peoples do not look at borders the same as Americans. There is the Bedouin tradition of free movement across boundaries. In fact, some tribes straddle borders, so we have families routinely crossing back and forth. Beyond this, some Iraqis fled in search of better security or opportunities. The President's New Way Forward is designed to address these reasons for emigration, by improving security conditions in Iraq and rebuilding the economy as best we can
so that Iraqis no longer need to leave to have a safe and prosperous life. Naturally, we focus most of our efforts on those trying to enter Iraq for bad reasons: foreign fighters, weapons smugglers, and other insurgent facilitators. To that end, we are making progress in the development of the Iraqi Government’s Department of Border Enforcement, and we are working with neighboring countries to increase the security of Iraq’s borders. Syria and Iraq co-hosted a border security conference in Syria on 8–9 August 2007, attended by Iraq’s neighboring states along with observers from the United Nations “Permanent Five” (U.S., U.K., Russia, China, and France), the United Nations, the European Union, and the Arab League. Participants agreed to continue cooperation on border security issues, to increased intelligence sharing, and to convene a meeting of technical experts from participating parties. We continue to encourage Iraq’s neighbors to play a constructive role in securing Iraq’s borders.

5. Senator Pryor. General Cartwright, this committee recently approved the nomination of LTG Douglas Lute, USA, to the position of Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan. While the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also act as advisors to the President, what relationship do you foresee having with General Lute and how does he fit into the military chain of command?

General Cartwright. I foresee a collaborative, supportive working relationship with General Lute. Based on his tenure as the former Joint Staff Director for Operations—and as you well know from his confirmation hearing—he is clearly a very capable, qualified officer; we look forward to working closely with him. In response to your second question, General Lute is an advisor to the President and is not in the military chain of command.

6. Senator Pryor. General Cartwright, do you believe the Navy’s current Helicopter Master Plan, dated 1998, should be updated to address the realities of the global war on terror?

General Cartwright. The Navy’s 2002 Helicopter concept of operations (CONOPs) combines the acquisition efficiencies of the 1998 Helicopter Master Plan, which reduces the number of helicopter types operated by the Navy from seven to two, with operational efficiencies achieved through the reorganization of squadrons to align them with the broadened warfighting requirements of Navy Carrier Strike Groups and Expeditionary Forces. The 2002 Helicopter CONOPs was updated this year with a 2007 Navy Helicopter Force Analysis Study, which re-examined helicopter support for Sea Power 21 concepts including the Littoral Combat Ship and global war on terrorism missions. This analysis study is currently under the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations review and will be incorporated in the next Helicopter Master Plan.

7. Senator Pryor. General Cartwright, how can the Navy operate with pre-September 11 master plan in a post-September 11 operational environment?

General Cartwright. The Navy and Marine Corps have changed their operating philosophy to provide better defense in a post-September 11 operational environment. The Navy published two versions of the Naval Operations Concept (NOC), both of which describe how the Navy/Marine Corps team will contribute to the defense of our Nation. The first edition of this document was signed in 2002 and titled “Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations.” The current version is the NOC 2006, and it refines and expands upon the 2002 version to deal with the dynamic post-September 11 security environment.

The NOC is principally guided by national strategy as articulated in the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the National Strategy for Maritime Security. Specifically, this concept calls for more widely distributed forces to provide increased forward presence, security cooperation with an expanding set of international partners, preemption of nontraditional threats, and global response to crises in regions around the world where access might be difficult.

The NOC espouses an approach for organizing and employing Navy and Marine Corps capabilities to meet the strategic challenges of the global war on terrorism/long war. It seeks to make best use of the resources we have today to counter the existing threats in our current strategic environment. In short, the NOC is about how we are going to use what we have today differently to best fight and win the War on Terror, positively participate in the global maritime community, yet remain
prepared to counter or defeat future threats against the United States, be they traditional, irregular, disruptive or catastrophic.

Therefore, contrary to what some may believe, the Navy and Marine Corps are not operating with a "pre-September 11 master plan," but are using current doctrine like the NOC 2006 to focus on the major strategic missions like homeland defense, war on terror/irregular warfare, conventional campaigns, deterrence, and shaping and stability operations.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

REBASING INITIATIVES

8. Senator Mccain. General Cartwright, there has been a good deal of skepticism regarding the Pentagon’s planning for the “perfect storm” caused by the culmination of rebasing initiatives. The implementation of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) round, which includes the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy initiative to restation 70,000 troops and their families from Europe and Korea to the U.S., Joint Basing initiatives, the Army and Marines’ efforts to grow the force, and the redeployment of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan will all require military construction efforts that haven’t been seen since World War II. Is the Department of Defense (DOD) on track in its planning for rebasing?

General Cartwright. The Department is on track in its planning for rebasing, even considering restationing 70,000 troops and their families from Europe and Korea to the United States, Joint Basing initiatives, the Army’s and Marine’s efforts to grow the force, and the redeployment of troops from Iraq. All BRAC 2005 recommendations are currently fully funded and on track to be implemented by the statutory deadline of 15 September 2011. Guidance has been published to update business plans based on execution realities, and these updates will continue through implementation. The Department continues planning for basing implications of the force growth in CONUS and any potential timing implications for implementation of Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy decisions.

9. Senator Mccain. General Cartwright, what is the status of these efforts, and what do you see as the final outcome from the completion of these initiatives in terms of military quality-of-life?

General Cartwright. The rebasing initiatives are on track. The scope of restationing 70,000 troops and their families from Europe and Korea, Joint Basing, growing the force, and the redeployment of troops from Iraq and Afghanistan is momentous. However, unit deployments and soldier, sailor, airman, marine, and family relocations are carefully choreographed. Throughout these rebasing initiatives, we have done our best to reduce the impact on the force.

Quality-of-Life is one of the Department’s top four priorities, which also include win the war on terrorism, accelerate transformation, and strengthen joint warfighting. Our priorities are mutually supportive in that success in one will support success in others. Conversely, delay in one will impede success in others. Bringing people home alive and intact is Quality-of-Life Job #1. The best leadership, the most innovative tactics, the best equipment, and the best force protection are indispensible to this goal. We must show respect for the men and women who serve this country in the way we man, train, equip, mobilize, deploy, employ, sustain, redeploy, refurbish, and demobilize the force. This applies to the Total Force—Active, Guard, Reserve; military, civilian, and contractor. We must be mindful of the effects making changes to the quality of life on one segment of the force has on other segments of the force, as well as the second and third order effects of initiatives in this area.

The Department has included, as an integral component, a number of important quality-of-life facilities in our construction projects over the next 3 fiscal years. As these projects are accomplished, we see significant improvement in the numbers and types of quality facilities, which provide places for our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians and their families to work, live, and train. Our people continue to make great sacrifices in fighting the global war on terrorism and our Nation owes them a debt of gratitude. We therefore see it as absolutely necessary to ensure we make every effort to match their quality of life with the quality of service they provide our Nation.

10. Senator Mccain. General Cartwright, is the plan to draw down troops in Europe outdated, given the ongoing war in Iraq and other world developments?

General Cartwright. The Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. European Command (EUCOM), and Headquarters, U.S. Army, are currently reviewing
U.S. troop strength in Europe, based on the EUCOM Commander’s concerns about meeting commitments within his area of responsibility. This review is based on concerns about changes that have taken place worldwide since the 2004 Report to Congress on “Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture.”

JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT

11. Senator MCCAIN. General Cartwright, the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA) has been a controversial topic over the last few years. Although there is support for the program, and the Army and Air Force have signed a Memorandum of Agreement establishing a joint requirement, there is still no clear path ahead as to who should be the executive agent for the program. Similar to last year, this year’s House version of the Defense Authorization Bill authorizes money for JCA to the Army, although less than DOD requested, while the Senate version authorizes money for the Air Force, while the appropriations committees moved the money to the Army. As the National Defense Authorization and Appropriations Bills for Fiscal Year 2008 are pending, where the money’s final resting place will be is still in question. Currently, the JCA is operating out of a Joint Program Office, and is on cost and schedule. If the program is transferred fully to the Air Force or fully to the Army, will they be able to seamlessly assume full programmatic control and continue to maintain cost and schedule?

General CARTWRIGHT. The Joint Cargo Aircraft program fulfills a critical capability gap for the Army and the Air Force. The JCA will replace aging C-23 and C-26 aircraft and will complement the existing joint capabilities in order to fulfill the intra-theater airlift mission, focused on transporting time-sensitive mission-critical cargo and passengers. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council has validated this requirement for both Services and believes that the joint CONOPS developed by the Army and Air Force will optimize the efficiencies and operational effectiveness for the Joint Force Commander.

The Joint Program Office is working closely with both Services to field this capability as soon as possible to meet critical needs of the joint warfighter and has developed a comprehensive joint acquisition strategy in order to do so. According to the JCA program office, any efforts to consolidate funding into one Service would likely increase the overall program cost and delay the schedule of the program.

UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE EXECUTIVE AGENCY

12. Senator MCCAIN. General Cartwright, in response to an Air Force request, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) recently endorsed the Air Force as the Executive Agent for Medium and High Altitude Unmanned Aircraft Systems. The Joint Staff further recommended the Air Force address equipment standardization and acquisition streamlining. In 2005, the JROC determined that an executive agent wasn’t necessary, and instead created two Centers of Excellence and the Joint Unmanned Aerial Systems Materiel Review Board to share operational tips and work out best practices. The Army opposes designating the Air Force as executive agent, as does the Navy. In your view, does establishing an executive agent impact the legal responsibilities and authorities of the various Services, specifically in relation to acquisition management?

General CARTWRIGHT. I do not believe establishing an executive agent would impact the Services’ legal responsibilities or authorities. That said, the DOD has a formal process, including legal review, to assess and determine the applicability of executive agency to any given issue. In the specific case of unmanned aerial vehicles, the Secretary of Defense is currently reviewing the JROC’s recommendations.

13. Senator MCCAIN. General Cartwright, if confirmed, how will you assure the Services manage their acquisition dollars in a way that avoids duplication and maximizes current efficiencies, while operating within the current acquisition regulations?

General CARTWRIGHT. As Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would serve as the co-chair for the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB). The DAB is the DOD’s senior oversight body for acquisition. The DAB process is designed to ensure the Services avoid duplication, maximize efficiencies, and comply with acquisition regulations.

14. Senator MCCAIN. General Cartwright, how will you ensure that the needs of the commanders on the ground and in the field are not compromised in this area?
General CARTWRIGHT. As Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I intend to be in close contact with all combatant commanders. Issues impacting commanders on the ground and in the field will receive my highest priority for resolution.

[The nomination reference of Gen. James E. Cartwright, USMC, follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment as the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and appointment to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., sections 601 and 154:

To be General

Gen. James E. Cartwright, 0000.

[The biographical sketch of Gen. James E. Cartwright, USMC, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GEN. JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT, USMC

General Cartwright assumed his duties as the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command on 9 July 2004.

General Cartwright’s previous assignment was as the Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (J–8), the Joint Staff. As director, he supported the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in force structure requirements; studies, analyses, and assessments; and in the evaluation of military forces, plans, programs, and strategies. As Secretary of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, he coordinated Joint Staff actions in support of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and represented the interests of the commanders of the combatant commands in requirements generation, acquisition and planning, and programming and budgeting.

General Cartwright was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps in November 1971. He attended Naval Flight Officer training and graduated in April 1973. He attended Naval Aviator training and graduated in January 1977. He has operational assignments as an NFO in the F–4, and as a pilot in the F–4, OA–4, and F/A–18.


General Cartwright was named the Outstanding Carrier Aviator by the Association of Naval Aviation in 1983. He graduated with distinction from the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB 1986, and received his Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island 1991. He was selected for and completed a fellowship with Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1994.
The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Gen. James E. Cartwright, USMC, in connection with his nomination follows:

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   James E. Cartwright.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   September 22, 1949; Rockford, IL.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Sandra K. Cartwright (maiden name: Waltz).

7. Names and ages of children:
   Billee Ann Bennett, 33; and Jayme Roland, 27.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution.
   None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    None.

11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    None.
12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
   Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
   Yes.

   [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee's executive files.]

   SIGNATURE AND DATE

   I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

   JAMES E. CARTWRIGHT.

   This 6th day of July, 2007.

   [The nomination of Gen. James E. Cartwright, USMC, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on August 2, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 3, 2007.]
TO CONSIDER CERTAIN PENDING MILITARY NOMINATIONS

TUESDAY, JULY 31, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:08 a.m. in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J. Noblet, research assistant; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member; Kristine G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork and Kevin A. Cronin.

Committee members' assistants present: Sharon L. Waxman and Jay Maroney, assistants to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Christopher Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Jon Davey and Dahlia Reed, assistants to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Todd Stiefler, assistants to Senator Sessions; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
Chairman Levin. Before I call on Senator Warner, there is now a quorum present. I would ask the committee to consider a list of 1,875 pending military nominations, they've all been before the committee the required length of time, and I would ask for a motion to favorably report those nominations.

Senator Warner. So moved.

Chairman Levin. Is there a second? Seconded.

All in favor, say aye? [Chorus of ayes.]

Opposed, nay? [No response.]

The motion carries.

We appreciate that action and we'll call on Senator Warner. Thank you for allowing me to do that before your turn.

The list of nominations considered and approved by the committee follows:

1. COL Bradley S. MacNealy, ARNG, to be brigadier general (Reference No. 109).
2. In the Air Force, there are 27 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with Maria M. Alcina) (Reference No. 368).
4. In the Navy there is one appointment to the grade of rear admiral (list begins with Victor G. Guillory) (Reference No. 501–2).
5. CAPT David J. Mercer, USN, to be rear admiral (lower half) (Reference No. 566).
6. In the Navy Reserve, there are 206 appointments to the grade of captain (list begins with Nicholas J. Alaga, Jr.) (Reference No. 567).
7. In the Army, there are 32 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel (list begins with James E. Caraway, Jr.) (Reference No. 628).
8. Col. Lyn D. Sherlock, USAF, to be brigadier general (Reference No. 646).
13. Lt. Gen. Frank G. Klotz, USAF, to be lieutenant general and Assistant Vice Chief of Staff and Director, Air Staff (Reference No. 701).
14. In the Navy, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant commander (Peter J. Oldmixon) (Reference No. 702).
15. In the Navy, there are 43 appointments to the grade of captain and below (list begins with Dan L. Ammons) (Reference No. 703).
16. In the Navy, there are 19 appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with Gilbert Ayan) (Reference No. 704).
17. In the Navy, there are 16 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Simonia R. Blasingame) (Reference No. 705).
18. In the Navy, there are 20 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Jeffrey A. Bayless) (Reference No. 706).
19. In the Navy, there are 26 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Chris D. Agar) (Reference No. 707).
20. In the Navy, there are 27 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Paul B. Anderson) (Reference No. 708).
21. In the Navy, there are five appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Christina S. Hagen) (Reference No. 709).
22. In the Navy, there are 14 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Christopher J. Arends) (Reference No. 710).
23. In the Navy, there are 10 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Sarah A. Dachos) (Reference No. 711).
24. In the Navy, there are 26 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Benito E. Baylosis) (Reference No. 712).
25. In the Navy, there are 18 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Douglas S. Belvin) (Reference No. 713).
26. In the Navy, there are nine appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Fitzgerald Britton) (Reference No. 714).
27. In the Navy, there are 56 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with William L. Abbott) (Reference No. 715).
28. In the Navy, there are 538 appointments to the grade of commander (list begins with Kevin T. Aanestad) (Reference No. 716).
29. COL Michael J. Trombetta, USAR, to be brigadier general (Reference No. 734).
30. In the Army, there are 23 appointments to the grade of major general (list begins with Charles A. Anderson) (Reference No. 735).
31. RADM David Architzel, USN, to be vice admiral and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (Reference No. 736).
32. VADM John D. Stufflebeem, USN, to be vice admiral and Director, Navy Staff, N9B, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Reference No. 737).
33. RADM (Selectee) Adam M. Robinson, Jr., USN, to be vice admiral and Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery and Surgeon General (Reference No. 738).
34. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to be lieutenant colonel (Jonathan L. Huggins) (Reference No. 741).
35. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to be lieutenant colonel (Nelson L. Reynolds) (Reference No. 742).
36. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to be lieutenant colonel (Bryan M. Boyles) (Reference No. 743).
37. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to be major (Michael S. Agabegi) (Reference No. 744).
38. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to be major (Freddie M. Goldwire) (Reference No. 745).
39. In the Air Force, there are four appointments to be lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Val C. Hagan) (Reference No. 746).
40. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to be lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Kent S. Thompson) (Reference No. 747).
41. In the Air Force, there are four appointments to be major (list begins with Thomas S. Butler) (Reference No. 748).
42. In the Army, there is one appointment to be colonel (Stephen T. Sauter) (Reference No. 749).
43. In the Army, there is one appointment to be colonel (Terry D. Bonner) (Reference No. 750).
44. In the Army, there is one appointment to be lieutenant colonel (Mark Trawinski) (Reference No. 751).
45. In the Army, there is one appointment to be major (Francisco C. Dominici) (Reference No. 752).
46. In the Army, there is one appointment to be major (Joseph E. Jones) (Reference No. 753).
47. In the Army, there is one appointment to be major (Colin S. McKenzie) (Reference No. 754).
48. In the Army, there are two appointments to be major (list begins with Lozay Foots) (Reference No. 755).
49. In the Army, there are two appointments to be major (list begins with Louis R. Kubala) (Reference No. 756).
50. In the Army, there are two appointments to be major (list begins with William A. McNaughton) (Reference No. 757).
51. In the Army, there are three appointments to be lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with James E. Cole) (Reference No. 758).
52. In the Army, there are two appointments to be lieutenant colonel (list begins with Daniel L. Duecker) (Reference No. 759).
53. In the Army, there are 44 appointments to be major (list begins with Joseph A. Bernierrodriguez) (Reference No. 760).
54. In the Navy Reserve, there is one appointment to be captain (Bruce S. Lavin) (Reference No. 761).
55. In the Navy Reserve, there are two appointments to be captain (list begins with Christopher R. Davis) (Reference No. 762).
56. In the Navy Reserve, there are three appointments to be commander (list begins with Robert D. Clery) (Reference No. 763).
57. In the Air Force, there are 24 appointments to be major general (list begins with Robert R. Allardice) (Reference No. 769).
58. In the Army, there are 342 appointments to be major (list begins with Mazen Abbas) (Reference No. 770).
59. In the Navy, there are 56 appointments to be commander (list begins with Michael J. Allanson) (Reference No. 771).
60. In the Navy, there are 36 appointments to be commander (list begins with Maria L. Aguayo) (Reference No. 772).
61. In the Navy, there are 27 appointments to be commander (list begins with Antony Berchmanz) (Reference No. 773).
62. In the Navy, there are 58 appointments to be commander (list begins with Eric J. Bach) (Reference No. 774).
63. In the Navy, there are 116 appointments to be commander (list begins with Elizabeth M. Adriano) (Reference No. 775).
Total: 1,875.

[Whereupon, at 10:09 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
NOMINATIONS OF ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS; GEN WILLIAM E. WARD, USA, FOR APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND; GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND; AND LT. GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, TO BE GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER FOR TRANSFORMATION

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building; Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.
Other Senators present: Senator Inouye.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: William M. Caniano, professional staff member; David G. Collins, research assistant; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Robert M. Soofer, professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional
staff member; Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston, Benjamin L. Rubin, and Brian F. Sebold.

Committee members’ assistants present: Jay Maroney, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Andrew R. Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski and Nathan Reese, assistants to Senator Inhofe; Todd Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions; Stuart C. Mallory and Jason Van Beek, assistants to Senator Thune; and Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. The Senate Armed Services Committee will come to order.

Today, the committee considers the nominations of four distinguished senior military officers: Admiral Gary Roughead, the nominee to be Chief of Naval Operations (CNO); General William Ward, the nominee for Commander, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM); General Kevin Chilton, the nominee for Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM); and General James Mattis, the nominee for Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation.

We all know that the long hours and hard work that are put in by our senior military officials at the Department of Defense (DOD) require commitment and sacrifice, not only from our nominees, but also from their families. We greatly appreciate the willingness of our nominees to carry their new responsibilities that they will be carrying, but we also appreciate the support of the families. Without that support, these men could not possibly do what they have been asked to do throughout their careers and what they are going to be asked to do when they’re confirmed. At the appropriate time, we will ask our nominees to introduce their families.

Our nominees are an impressive group of officers, one from each military service, as it happens, with a combined total of more than 140 years in military service. Admiral Roughead has served as Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Commander of the Pacific Fleet, and Commandant of the U.S. Naval Academy. General Ward has served as Deputy Commander, U.S. Europe Command (EUCOM) and as Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Europe, and 7th Army Germany. General Chilton has served as Commander, Air Force Space Command, and has flown three Space Shuttle missions. General Mattis has served as Commanding General of the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and Commanding General of the 1st Marine Division.

If confirmed, each of our nominees will be responsible for helping the DOD face critical challenges.

Admiral Roughead would be the 29th CNO. He will face difficult tasks of recruiting and retaining a quality force and maintaining current readiness to conduct the ongoing war on terrorism, while, at the same time, transforming the Navy force structure to deal
with the threats of the future in the face of difficult cost and scheduling problems with the Navy's major acquisition programs.

General Ward would be the first commander of a brand new command, U.S. AFRICOM. He will be confronted by challenges of transnational terrorism, instability, and the concern of many Africans about the U.S. military's intention in Africa. This committee will be looking to the new command to greatly improve efforts to train members of African militaries for peacekeeping missions in Africa.

General Chilton will be the Commander, U.S. STRATCOM, and will face challenges of ensuring the safety and security of our nuclear weapons, looking at the further reductions in the nuclear stockpile, ensuring that the missile defense system is fully tested, reliable, and focused on near-term threats, working to improve our abilities to protect vital computer networks, support the other combatant commanders, and coordinate the various elements of the intelligence community to ensure that the military has the most up-to-date and timely intelligence.

General Mattis will be the new Commander of U.S. JFCOM. JFCOM supports the development and integration of present and future joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities. This committee has a longstanding interest in this command's mission, responsibilities, authorities, and activities with respect to joint doctrine development, training, experimentation, and acquisition.

General Mattis has also been nominated as Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, one of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) two strategic commanders. General Mattis would be only the third to hold this position since Allied Command Transformation was established in 2002. In this capacity, he'll face the task of carrying out Allied Command Transformation's mission of promoting the continuing transformation of NATO's forces, capabilities, and doctrine, and to enhance the Alliance's effectiveness and interoperability.

I'm going to turn the gavel, now, over to Senator Ben Nelson, who has agreed to take over as chair this morning, because the fact that the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 is on the floor, and I should be down on the floor of the Senate. I'm very grateful to Senator Nelson for accepting the responsibility. I'm sorry that I'm going to miss most, if not all, of the testimony of you four gentlemen, and the answers to the questions, but my staff is here and will be following the hearing very closely.

Now, I'll ask my old friend and colleague—or my young old friend and colleague—[Laughter.]

Senator Warner.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

We should acquaint our witnesses and families with the fact that the Senate is scheduled to start a series of as many as five votes around 11 o'clock. consequently, Mr. Chairman, I'm going to ask unanimous consent to place in the record a statement by Senator McCain, followed by a statement that I have prepared. I join you in welcoming the families, and I'll forego going into the details of those statements, because I think you adequately covered it every-
thing, and because it will enable our members to have the maximum amount of time for questions before they must depart for the important votes that will take place at 11 o’clock.

Chairman Levin. Those statements will be made part of the record.

Senator Warner. Fine.

[The prepared statements of Senator McCain and Senator Warner follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

I want to welcome and congratulate Admiral Roughead, General Ward, General Chilton, Lieutenant General Mattis, and their families on your nominations. Your nominations come at a critical time in our country’s history. The United States faces a myriad of strategic, diplomatic, and military challenges. If confirmed, your commands will play an integral role in ensuring the future security of our Nation, friends and allies. Mr. Chairman, I have confidence in these nominees, their leadership and experience and am grateful to them for their service.

Admiral Roughead, congratulations on your nomination as the 29th Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). I am a strong proponent of defense acquisition reform. In this year’s Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act, we have established a three-star military deputy to the Service Acquisition Executive which would strengthen the performance of the service acquisition executive; improve the oversight provided military officers serving in acquisition commands; and, strengthen the acquisition career field in the military. I look forward to hearing your thoughts about appointing a Principal Military Deputy with significant experience in the areas of acquisition and program management. I also welcome your thoughts on what role the CNO and any member of the Joint Chiefs should play in acquisition program management.

While a great deal of emphasis has been placed on our ground forces, the Navy faces significant challenges, including China’s rapid development of a blue-water navy and developing a comprehensive Indian Ocean strategy which includes deterring threats to vital sea lanes of communication and maintaining a capacity to facilitate humanitarian assistance as the Navy did during the 2004 tsunami disaster. Our efforts gain us a great deal of goodwill in the region and should continue to build on those relationships. I look forward to hearing your thoughts on the future of the Navy and how it will support the National Military Strategy and your plans to implement the “313-ship Navy.”

General Ward, welcome and thank you for accepting this challenging and important new assignment. The new Africa Command (AFRICOM) offers a variety of opportunity not only for the military but for the interagency. This new command will have unprecedented interagency participation and cooperation. The establishment of AFRICOM is testament to the growing importance of Africa to U.S. national security and strategic interests. I hope AFRICOM will be a model example of how the military working with other U.S. agencies can foster long-term stability on the continent. While the U.S. has provided both military training and humanitarian assistance to several African nations, AFRICOM has an opportunity to manage all of these efforts and achieve maximum results. I believe the most important role we can play in Africa is in enhancing nations’ governance, law enforcement and peacekeeping capacity. AFRICOM’s success will rely heavily on close interagency cooperation. Your long and exemplary service and varied experiences make you well-suited to lead this new command. I look forward to hearing your vision for its development and mission.

General Chilton, as the current Commander of Air Force Space Command, you are more than qualified to lead U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). The mission of “strategic forces” has changed significantly over the last 30 years and the threat to our strategic forces. Now, we face a formidable threat to our information operations. I look forward to hearing from you about what areas you are prepared to improve within STRATCOM’s diverse portfolio including, global strike, space operations; information operations; missile defense; command and control; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; and countering weapons of mass destruction. I am also very interested in the ongoing investigation of the transport of nuclear warheads on a B–52 bomber in September. I look forward to hearing the results of that investigation, but I would also welcome your ideas about how to prevent such an incident from happening again.
General James Mattis, thank you for your service. You have performed admirably as the Commander of the U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command. The Marines are a small service, but the work the Marines have done in al-Anbar, Fallujah, and Kabul is remarkable. You have done a formidable job in your current command and I congratulate you on your nomination to serve as the Commander of the United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation. We will be well-served by your vast experience and I appreciate all the work and sacrifice of the men and women under your command. You have been on the frontlines of the wars we are waging on multiple fronts. Never before have we asked so much of our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and theaters around the world, our troops are participating in an unprecedented number of joint operations and their efforts appear nearly seamless. Our troops face daunting challenges, but they are succeeding and excelling at every task they are given. Despite the sacrifices of our brave men and women, Americans will continue to face profound and pervasive threats to the liberty and freedom that we so richly enjoy. If confirmed as JFCOM Commander, you will play a pivotal role in developing our interoperability requirements to counter these threats. Now more than ever, JFCOM must be agile and responsive to an ever-evolving threat situation. I look forward to hearing your priorities for improving our troops’ readiness and joint warfighting capabilities.

I thank all of the nominees and their families for being here today and for all of their honorable and long service to this Nation. I look forward to your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Thank you, Senator Levin. I join you in welcoming Admiral Roughead, General Ward, General Chilton, and Lieutenant General Mattis, and their family members, and congratulating them on their nominations.

Admiral Roughead, we are delighted to have you appear before us as the President’s nominee to be the 29th Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). You’ve earned this nomination and your current assignment as Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command through a most impressive career of proven leadership, including multiple command at-sea tours, and as Commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The challenges before the CNO demand such experience and more.

I will be interested in your views on how the new Maritime Strategy, which the Navy is preparing to unveil, will influence the size and shape and operations of our Navy in support of the National Military Strategy. As well, I look for your plans to recapitalize the fleet, to what Admiral Mullen has referred to as the “313-ship Navy,” and similarly, your plans to address the looming critical shortfall in strike-fighter aircraft. It will be important to understand how you propose to control requirements and control cost in order to achieve these most fundamental objectives for the Navy. Again, I commend and thank you for your dedicated service to our Nation and look forward to your testimony today.

General Ward, you have been nominated to take on a very exciting and challenging assignment. If confirmed, you will be the first commander of the newly established Africa Command (AFRICOM). The decision to have an independent command for Africa reflects a growing recognition that the African continent is as important to U.S. national security interests as are Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and South America.

However, AFRICOM will have some unique attributes, as so many of the challenges there require an intensive dedication of the non-military tools of national power. The military also has a role to play in helping to strengthen the capabilities of African nations to govern their own spaces and to participate in peacekeeping operations. To be successful, this command must be characterized by a very high degree of cooperation with the Department of State and the country teams in U.S. embassies on the continent. I can think of no officer better prepared or more qualified to get this command off on a positive footing.

General Chilton, as the current Commander of Air Force Space Command, with extensive space and nuclear force experience, you are well qualified to lead U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). During the Cold War, U.S. “strategic forces” were synonymous with nuclear capabilities. Today, however, STRATCOM’s mission goes well beyond nuclear deterrence, and must take into account new threats to national security posed by terrorism, rogue states, and non-state actors.

STRATCOM is now charged with integrating space operations: information operations: missile defense: global command and control: intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance; global strike; combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD); as well as the traditional mission of strategic deterrence.

General Chilton, I will be interested to learn where you intend to place your emphasis and how you view STRATCOM’s role in fighting today’s threats. I’m sure the committee would also benefit from your views on the September 5, 2007 incident regarding the inadvertent transport of several nuclear warheads aboard a B–52 bomber, as well as the broader question concerning the handling of nuclear weapons across our forces. This is a matter of grave concern to this committee and the chairman and ranking member have requested a full investigation.

The committee will also hear from Lieutenant General James Mattis who has been nominated to serve as the Commander, United States Joint Forces Command and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation.

General Mattis, your current service as Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command, provides you a unique understanding of the importance of the missions carried out by JFCOM. In its role as force provider, JFCOM assigns nearly all conventional forces based in the continental United States, while JFCOM is also charged with the development of interoperability requirements which ensure our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines can combine their capabilities into a single successful effort. To fulfill this role, JFCOM must maintain close coordination with Active, National Guard, and Reserve elements and deep awareness of current unit availability and readiness.

The committee looks forward to hearing about your plans and priorities for strengthening both our readiness and our joint warfighting capabilities. The committee is also very interested to hear your plans for advancing NATO transformation and interoperability, which is so critical to NATO’s ability to carry out joint operations in-theater and beyond, as in Afghanistan.

I thank each of our nominees, and their families, for their continued service and look forward to their testimony.

Senator WARNER. I think—at the appropriate time, it would be nice to have each nominee introduce their families—extraordinarily turned out—and it’s so important, because we all recognize that you’re here today—recognized by our President and about to be confirmed by the Senate; I’m confident that each of you will be—only because of the strong support that each of you receive through family structure in these many years to reach the very, very top of your military professions. So, I not only congratulate you, but your families, who helped you achieve that goal.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Before Senator Nelson calls on each of you for your own opening statements and to introduce your families, let me just ask the standard questions.

These are questions that are asked by this committee of each of our nominees. You can answer together.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

[Witnesses replied in the affirmative.]

Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

[Witnesses replied in the negative.]

Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record at hearings?

[Witnesses replied in the affirmative.]

Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?

[Witnesses replied in the affirmative.]

Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
[Witnesses replied in the affirmative.]
Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify, upon request, before this committee?
[Witnesses replied in the affirmative.]
Do you agree to give your personal views, when asked before this committee to do so, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
[Witnesses replied in the affirmative.]
Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
[Witnesses agreed.]
We thank you all.

Senator Nelson, thank you, again.

Senator BEN NELSON [presiding]. Are there any opening statements from any of our members?

Senator WARNER. I forego it, on behalf of Senator McCain and myself. I believe we’re anxious to proceed to questions.

Senator BEN NELSON. There being none——

Senator INHOFE. I would do the same.

Senator BEN NELSON. Okay.

Admiral Roughhead, we’ll begin with you.

STATEMENT OF ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, USN, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF ADMIRAL AND TO BE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and distinguished members of the committee, it’s a great honor to appear before this committee as the nominee to be our Navy’s CNO.

I’m grateful for the confidence placed in me by President Bush, Secretary Gates, Secretary Winter, and Admiral Mike Mullen.

I am most grateful for the support, the understanding, and inspiration of my wife, Ellen, who has been with me all these years, and our daughter, Elizabeth——

Senator BEN NELSON. How many years? [Laughter.]

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I’ll let her answer that, sir. [Laughter.]

1973 is when we first met. We had a very long courtship—9 years. She would never say yes. So, that’s—for those years. But then, we’re also joined by our daughter, Elizabeth, who is a junior at Middlebury College in Vermont, where she’s majoring in conservation biology. They truly are the loves of my life.

The opportunity to serve our Nation and to lead our Navy is the highest honor for any naval officer. For the past 4 years, I’ve had the privilege of leading our operational forces in the Atlantic and the Pacific, Navy and Joint. I’ve watched our sailors perform magnificently from the high end of combat to the most extensive humanitarian and relief operation ever undertaken by our military.

Every day and in every environment, I’m inspired by what they do and who they are. They are bright, they are focused, they are tough, and they are competent, yet they are compassionate when
reaching out to others. They truly are the face of our Nation in far-off lands.

Today, 51 percent of our force is underway, 41 percent are deployed. We have 14,650 sailors on the ground in the Middle East; 6,500—or just above 6,500—are there on individual assignments. We are a ready, agile, and global Navy.

My priorities have been, and will be, maintaining our current readiness, building the Navy of tomorrow, and that which underpins all we do—our people—our sailors, our civilians, and our very special families whose hallmarks are sacrifice and self-reliance.

Maintaining our current readiness gives us the ability to be an effective force anywhere in the world. With building the Navy of tomorrow comes the responsibility, the accountability, and the obligation to clearly and thoughtfully define how we will fight and what we need, not want, to be able to do that. We must accurately articulate our requirements, and be disciplined in our process, to get us to that new future.

But all we acquire is of little worth without the people who give it value. Our policies must enable us to recruit, to retain, and to fulfill the young men and women of America, and our Navy must reflect the demographic of our diverse Nation.

Those are my priorities. You know them so well, because, without your leadership and your support and your interest, we would not be the Navy that we are today or the Navy we must be tomorrow.

Thank you for all you do to maintain our Navy. To lead our Navy at this time is humbling, but, if confirmed, I am eager and ready to do so. I look forward to your questions.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Admiral.

Senator Inouye is here to make a more appropriate introduction, I believe.

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF HAWAII

Senator INOUYE. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much.

Thirty-four years ago, Admiral Gary Roughead was commissioned as an Ensign in the United States Navy. After graduating from the Naval Academy at Annapolis, the Admiral has had a long and distinguished career in the Navy. He has served several tours of duty at sea, and is remembered as the first naval officer to command both an Aegis destroyer and an Aegis cruiser. He also commanded the George Washington carrier battle group and served as both the Deputy Commander at the Pacific Command and the Commander of the Pacific Fleet.

Today, Admiral Roughead is the Commander of the U.S. Fleet Forces Command, where he is responsible for providing manned, trained, and equipped Navy operating forces worldwide. In this capacity, he's also the supporting commander to U.S. JFCOM for Naval Global Force Management and the Navy Supporting Component to the U.S. Northern Command and U.S. STRATCOM.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, this is a very, very impressive resume. Admiral Roughead’s various responsibilities make him well-qualified to serve as the Navy’s next CNO.
But that is not the reason that I volunteered to recommend him to the committee. My reasons are much more personal. Mr. Chairman, for several years I’ve had the great pleasure to work with the Admiral in his leadership positions, particularly in the Pacific. I’ve come to know the Admiral as a man of keen vision, tireless energy, great wisdom, and compassion. Admiral Roughead possesses those elements of leadership which allow him to be effective without instilling fear among his subordinates. He has been successful without evoking jealousy among his peers, and he has demonstrated great competence without conceit.

He is a very rare man and superior naval officer who is very deserving of the post to which he is nominated. The country can do no better than to have him at the helm.

Mr. Chairman, I don’t want to embarrass him, but there’s one story I wish to pass on regarding this nomination. Several months ago, when it became known that Admiral Roughead was to be considered for nomination as the next CNO, I began receiving phone calls and messages from other senior naval leaders. In every case, they suggested that the Admiral was the right man for the job. But what was most surprising was when other candidates for the position also suggested that they believed that Admiral Roughead was the best choice. In all my years in the Senate, I do not recall another time when this has happened. I think that speaks volumes about the nominee.

So, Mr. Chairman, I’m here this morning to strongly endorse the candidate, Admiral Gary Roughead, for the position of CNO. I believe he is a superb choice, and I wholeheartedly recommend him to the committee.

I thank you very much, sir.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Senator.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Senator.

General Ward?

STATEMENT OF GEN WILLIAM E. WARD, USA, FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND

General WARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Senator Warner, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for this opportunity to appear before you today.

I am deeply honored to have been nominated by the President and the Secretary of the Defense to serve as the Commander of the U.S. Africa Command. This has been a journey for me that I am truly honored to be considered for, and I take this nomination with a great degree of humility, as well as serenity.

With me today is my wife—and, Senator, I think that she would be okay with me saying—for 36 years. I hope so, anyway. [Laughter.]

Joyce has been, as you’ve indicated, a very constant support, and, truly, she is the rock upon which I stand. Also with us today is our daughter, Kahni, and our son-in-law, Kenyatta, who are both residents of the State of Virginia, living here, and I am so proud of both of them and all that they do. While not here, our son, KJ, is watching these proceedings, if they’ve been televised, as he is overseas, working in Germany.
Also accompanying me today is Ambassador Mary Carlin Yates, from the State Department (DOS). Mary has been tapped to be the Deputy to the Commander of this Command for Civil Military Affairs.

The African continent is linked to the United States by history, culture, economics, and geostrategic significance. The continent’s economic, social, political, and military importance in global affairs has grown tremendously. In my current capacity as Deputy Commander of EUCOM, I have traveled extensively on this vast continent to meet military and civilian leaders and witness our ongoing military engagement to help bring stability. From my observations, I believe our assistance to existing and emerging African security institutions is most effective when it fosters African solutions to African challenges.

Many African leaders and their collective organizations, such as the African Union, have committed to work towards a safe and secure environment on the continent to promote effective development and governance. The United States EUCOM, Central Command (CENTCOM), and Pacific Command (PACOM) have made great strides working with African militaries to enhance the security on the continent through military exercises, humanitarian programs, training events, and support to peacekeeping operations. Much of their success stems from listening to the Africans and getting their perspective, and applying the solutions in accordance with their stated needs and within our means. The creation of AFRICOM will allow the DOD to view all of Africa through a single lens of a single unified command, allowing us to maximize our participation as a partner in pursuit of our mutual interests for peace, prosperity, and stability.

I believe success and credibility on the continent will only be gained by a continuous and sustained engagement with African organizations and nations to enhance their capabilities and capacity in achieving the goal of a stable and prosperous Africa, where growth and expanded horizons exist for future generations.

AFRICOM has the opportunity to redefine the concept of a unified command with a vision and a willingness to look beyond the current paradigm. Our interagency colleagues from DOS, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and many more who have also been working on the continent for decades will be a part of this endeavor. A vision of this new command will draw upon the expertise of its interagency members. Together, the work will best offer the chance that military efforts are harmonized with the work of the interagency, nongovernmental humanitarian organizations, private enterprise, and our international partners.

Mr. Chairman, if I am confirmed by the Senate, I pledge to work hard to establish a command that is value-added for both the United States and the peoples of Africa. I have been privileged and honored to serve our great Nation as a soldier for over 36 years. I will be honored to continue to serve alongside the outstanding soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, and statesmen of AFRICOM as their commander.

I thank you for this opportunity, and I thank you for your support to our Nation’s servicemembers.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, General.
General Chilton?

STATEMENT OF GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF, FOR RE-APPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

General CHILTON. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, good morning.

Let me begin by first thanking all of you for allowing us to testify before you today. I know how busy you have been, and how busy you are going to be over the coming days, and I greatly appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today.

I'm both humbled by the confidence that the Secretary of Defense and the President placed in me with this nomination, and humbled by your consideration of my nomination for this very important position.

But I assure you I wouldn't be here today, or anywhere in my career, if it wasn't for the wonderful family I have behind me. I'd like to take the opportunity to begin by introducing my wife, Cathy, of 19 years of marriage. Cathy, besides maintaining the overhead of taking care of me over these many years, somehow has managed to be the mother to four wonderful daughters, and continue in her service to this country as a reservist in our United States Air Force. Cathy is a Colonel in our United States Air Force Reserve. So, she's figured out a way to balance things far beyond anything I could ever do. Next to Cathy is my eldest daughter, Madison, who will be celebrating her 18th birthday tomorrow and is a senior in high school and working hard toward going to college, and has a love—she thinks—for veterinary medicine in her future. Next to her is my daughter, Mary Catherine, who is a sophomore in high school and is just the most wonderful person you'd ever want to meet. Sitting next to Mary is my daughter, Megan, who has begun her freshman year in high school this year. So, we have quite a team at St. Mary's there in Colorado Springs. Last, but certainly not least is my daughter, Morgan, who's 12 years old, and is in sixth grade. I am a kept man. [Laughter.]

Senator INHOFE. Now, you're not implying that you outrank Cathy.

General CHILTON. Sir, I mentioned that she was a Colonel in the Air Force Reserves. In the Chilton house, she is a 5-star General. [Laughter.]

As I said, I truly would not be here today without their love and support.

I am, again, humbled by the nomination to this very important position as the Commander of U.S. STRATCOM. If confirmed, I will be following in some big footsteps, those of my friend General “Hoss” Cartwright. I take this nomination very seriously, and I commit to you that I will give it my very best, if confirmed.

Lastly, I'd like to thank you for the opportunity I've had to meet with various members of the committee, for the working relationships I've had with the Strategic Subcommittee in my previous role as the Joint Functional Component Commander for Space and Global Strike, and in my current position in Air Force Space Command. These are relationships I know I will look forward to continuing.
I look forward to your questions, and again, thank you very much for this opportunity.

Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, General.

General Mattis?

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, TO BE GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES JOINT FORCES COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER FOR TRANSFORMATION

General Mattis, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee and taking your valuable time for this hearing.

I am honored by the confidence the President and the Secretary of Defense have placed in me to lead Supreme Allied Command Transformation and U.S. Joint Forces Command. If confirmed, I will do my best to carry out my duties and work openly with Congress. Should you confirm me, my first priority will be to support NATO and our combatant commanders in active operations against the enemy. My second priority will be preparing our NATO forces and the U.S. Joint Team to defeat future enemies. I will blend these duties, guided always by my respect for the troops, who put themselves on the line, for their families, and for the defense of our way of life.

Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, and I'm ready for your questions.

Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, General.

I think we'll begin with a round of questions at 6 minutes each. General Chilton, should you be confirmed, we look forward to you joining an already great community in the Omaha/Bellevue area of Nebraska. The addition of your family will raise the population figures immensely in that area. [Laughter.] I know the folks at STRATCOM are eager for your experience and your leadership that you will bring to that position.

As you think about the STRATCOM future, are there any major longer-term issues that need to be dealt with, other than the ones that you'll begin with on a day-to-day basis? What are your longer-term expectations?

General Chilton. Senator, STRATCOM has a lot on its plate, and they have done, I think, a marvelous job in organizing all the various mission responsibilities that the command has been given.

I think that a couple of areas will take increased focus and, I predict, will be growth areas in the future. One will be the responsibilities in the space domain. Clearly, space is no longer a sanctuary. That has been made clear to us this past year. I think we need to be extra focused in this area to make sure that we have the right command-and-control structures in place, the right information in place, the right command relationships in place to provide the space capabilities that all our forces around the world have become dependent upon.

I think another area that we're going to want to raise our focus on is in cyberspace, the global network, and the threats to that particular domain. This is, again, another domain on which the entire joint force has become dependent on, it's integrated into the way
we do operations, and it is a global capability for which STRATCOM has specific authorities and responsibilities.

At the same time, we have to keep our eye on the ball with our strategic nuclear deterrent missions and our continuing mission effort to combat WMD, integrate missile defenses, coordinate information operations, and integrating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance asset requirements for the combatant commands around the world.

Senator 

The integration of offensive and defensive systems is a major challenge. Do you think that there are some specific things that might be helpful to make sure that integration is as seamless as it can be?

General . Senator, I don’t have any specific changes that I have thought of at this time. What I will focus on, if confirmed, is how we’re moving forward in integrating missile defense and the active and passive defense part of the new triad with our offensive capabilities, both kinetic and nonkinetic.

Senator . Thank you.

General , when we met, earlier this week, you made a very important point, in my opinion, that equipment and weapons augment our operations, but the real way to win in Iraq and Afghanistan, and perhaps in other parts of the world, is through human bonds and relationships that can be developed with our troops on the ground. You outlined the need to readdress training in language and in culture, as well. Could you give the committee some of your thoughts on how we might do that and why you think that’s important?

General . I can, Mr. Chairman. I believe we face an enemy today lacking—the current enemy lacks a fleet, lacks an air force. The way we need to dominate this enemy is to create the kinds of bonds with people across the globe that checkmates this enemy. We’re going to have to be able to speak languages and understand cultures that perhaps in the past have not been so critical to our Nation’s security. I think the way to do this is with an emphasis on training and education, and perhaps beyond things that we—historically, we looked at as the military priorities—tactics, use of equipment, that sort of thing. But we’re in a type of war where we are not going to win with a new radio or a new ship or a new airplane. We need those in order to checkmate other enemies, so that they don’t get brave in certain areas that we don’t want to confront them in. But, at the same time, the enemy that we’re up against today, we are going to have to think differently if we want to deny them an impact on our way of life.

Senator . General , as you undertake perhaps one of the most challenging assignments that you might anticipate, how would you approach, as the new commander, dealing with cultures that perhaps have not had any real connection with the United States—insular governments, insular and isolated cultures? Do you have any thoughts about how you might approach that?

General . Mr. Chairman, thank you.

If confirmed, I think one of the underring endeavors to causing those with whom we would want to work to understand who we are, is to build effective relationships. The business of building relationships is a resource-intensive business, it requires investment
in time, it requires investment in those things that are important to those with whom you want to be a partner. If confirmed, I would continue to reinforce the sorts of activities that would cause trust and confidence to be built, because we, as a Nation, understand, and those with whom we would want to partner understand us. That comes through relationships. That comes through doing the sorts of things that build mutual trust and confidence. That comes through doing the sorts of things because we understand, are supportive of mutual interests and mutual needs. We would invest time towards that end, sir.

Senator BEN NELSON. As we look at other cultures, so very often we want those cultures to look like us almost immediately. Do you think that you can create a command there that will have, not only the interest in the other cultures, but the patience to deal with cultures that are different than ours, as opposed to wanting to absolutely proselyte those into our culture?

General WARD. Senator, these things take time. I am aware of the time, and that’s why the investment over time is so important, so that the trust and confidence that we would hope would be established is seen, not because of words, but because of deeds, and the things that we do in interacting over time. I believe that that is critically important.

The other point there was, I’m an infantryman, and, for many years, I’ve valued the importance of being in a foxhole, symbolically, but also sometimes quite literally for protection. But another important aspect of that foxhole is, you have to get outside of it, go downrange and look back at it from the perspective of others. I think that is also critical to this endeavor, looking at this entire endeavor from the perspective of others, so that we have our best opportunity of getting in a way that causes the effects to be achieved that we want to achieve. We must see it through the eyes of others, as well.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you.

Senator WARNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have a question for each of you and ask that you abbreviate your responses.

First, to the Admiral, the current CNO, an extraordinary man who is soon to become Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, put forth a new maritime strategy for national security. I presume that you have examined it and that you have made a decision as to whether you hope to continue along that same strategy.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, Senator. I’ve been a participant in the development of that strategy this past year, participating in the conversations with the country.

Senator WARNER. Would you briefly describe what the tenets are of that strategy?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The tenets are—quite frankly, they address much of what my colleagues have just addressed, to look to the future, to not be captured by the status quo, to see where the strategic trends are going to take us, to provide a vision for our Navy and, actually, all of our maritime forces, because we’re doing this in cooperation with the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard. But I intend to continue that process, and it will serve us well.
Second, he set a goal of 313 ships. We're at 278 now. Do you hope to close that gap in the tenure of your 4 years, if confirmed, and is so, how?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. If confirmed, Senator, I'm going to work to close that gap and get to 313 as a floor.

Senator WARNER. Do you feel that the current budget, as received by the Department of the Navy, will enable you to allocate to or are you going to require some funds over and above the normal allocation in the Department?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Senator, clearly the current budget, we're challenged to do that. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the committee to close that number.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

General Chilton, I think it's important that the committee bring up a matter at this time. It's slightly out of the usual questions that we ask of our nominees with regard to their future plans. On August 29, the Air Force discovered that a B–52 bomber inadvertently transported six advanced cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads from Minot, ND, to Barksdale, LA. Can you tell us what role you'll have in the investigation, and what steps you would take, if confirmed, to ensure that this type of professional error never occurs again?

General CHILTON. Senator, let me begin with my current role. As the Commander of Air Force Space Command, I am in charge of the safety and security of all of the nuclear weapons that support our land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. It is a responsibility I take very seriously, as does the Commander of Air Combat Command with regard to the weapons for the B–52 and the B–2 bombers.

Senator WARNER. Understood.

General CHILTON. If confirmed as the Commander of STRATCOM, I would make sure that the service components who support STRATCOM, who are chartered to maintain the security and safety of our weapons, are doing their job. I would recommend that STRATCOM staff participate in the inspections of those facilities, and that we maintain the appropriate oversight, so that we can do our job at STRATCOM, be prepared to employ those weapons if called on. We cannot do that job if they are not safe and secure.

Senator WARNER. Clearly human error entered this equation, but that error may have occurred as a consequence of the appropriate check-offs or other security benchmarks that are in place. You're going to have to go back and review that system to determine where that human error entered and how it could have been prevented if we'd taken steps in accordance with a fixed series of benchmark checks. Is that correct?

General CHILTON. Absolutely. In my current role, the plan is to do that. Right now, Major General Raaberg is conducting the investigation. We expect that to report out, the end of this month. We have already taken actions, both in Air Force Space Command and in Air Combat Command, to review our procedures, to meet with those individuals responsible for executing those procedures to make sure they clearly understand the gravity of what they do, and
make sure they are properly trained. As the STRATCOM Commander, I would want to see those results.

Senator WARNER. I do feel very firmly that appropriate accountability, if it is justified by the facts, should be invoked by the Department.

General Mattis, you're going to have one of the toughest jobs of anyone; namely, that you have to determine what is in the inventory of the United States by virtue of available forces to match up with potential contingencies, and, if need be, an actual operating contingency, where forces have to move. I think you're going to have to tell those field commanders and others, from time to time, "We don't have them." I hope that you're prepared, as I've come to know you through the years—prepared to say, "No, they're not there;" that you need the resources to get them ready and have them available to meet those contingencies.

General Mattis. Yes, Senator. I share your concern. I noted General Casey's testimony yesterday.

Senator WARNER. I draw your attention to that.

General Mattis. Yes, sir. I think that it's something that we have to be prepared to say, and it's in the face of a U.S. military that has never been willing to say no when it came to a test of our resolve to defend this country. But we need to have a balancing act here, where we can candidly and openly share with you what we need to do our job, and recognize sometimes we simply don't have the forces to do something. We will provide that. I will get in consultation, if you confirm me, with the component commanders there at JFCOM, and make certain that's stated.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

Lastly, General Ward, your challenges are quite great. You are focused on, not only title 10, but title 22 activities. Why don't you describe the difference between the two and how you're going to balance that mission?

General Ward. Senator, thank you.

Briefly, the title 10 activities are those activities that we, within the DOD, have proponency for. The title 22 activities are those within the DOS. The business of building relationships—building partners' capacity is, in fact, the job of each of those departments, as well as others within our government. We would look to create an interagency approach. We work in a very collaborative and harmonious way so that the efforts that we each bring to that particular endeavor are best realized in producing an effect that produces the stability, the security, and the capacity within these organizations that we'd like to see.

I think the interagency construct of the command, as envisioned, as we work to bring that to full operational capability, will go a long way in ensuring that we are harmonized in working with the various elements of our Government; most notably, the DOS, USAID, and DOD.

Senator WARNER. I know your deputy will be from the DOS. Having had some modest experience, those two Departments don't always act like gear wheels together.

General Ward. Yes, sir

Senator WARNER. You're going to have to solve some of that friction.
My time is up.

Senator BEN NELSON. Senator Webb.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It's always interesting to follow my senior Senator and my senior colleague from Virginia, because we've had so many similar experiences, both in the military and in the Pentagon, that I find that some of the questions I was going to ask have just been asked. I think that's very healthy, in terms of looking at where the focus is from this committee.

I'd, first of all, like to say, Mr. Chairman, that I've been able to meet personally and at length with all of the nominees. I'm very impressed with the quality and with the matching of talent to the jobs. I intend to support, strongly, everyone here. I've had the opportunity to ask a number of questions, as I said.

I would say, to the Chilton family, having grown up in the Air Force, I spent my last 3 years in high school in Omaha, and I played a lot of baseball right across from the house where you're going to live. I never quite made it into the big house, but—— [Laughter.]

—that's a—it's a wonderful place to live. I have great confidence you're going to really enjoy it there.

I would also like to say I've had the pleasure of knowing, for some time, General Mattis, and also Admiral Roughead, and both are just absolutely superb officers. General Mattis, I think it deserves to be pointed out, has commanded at every level in the Marine Corps, starting at a rifle platoon. When marines look at marines, that's the first thing you look at, in terms of respect. I'm very confident that you're going to get your hands on the issue that Senator Warner mentioned. It's a really serious issue, in terms of what we are trying to do, on both ends of this difficult problem, matching our people to the mission; at the same time, not—in some cases, not defining the mission properly when it comes to taking care of our people. So, we need the kind of integrity that you're going to bring here, and the kind of eyes you're going to put on this problem in order to get some balance.

I have a couple of questions for Admiral Roughead, because of the nature of the job you're going to be doing, that I'm concerned about getting on the record. One is, what would you say—we know we have a 313 floor for the Navy. We also know that, in this type of environment, which cyclically occurs when we get involved in these extensive ground operations, where we have to sustain ground forces and we're burning up gear and all the rest of that. Sometimes we tend to forget the strategic issues that face us. That's something that General Chilton will face on one level, but it's definitely something that affects the Navy, because we start drawing down force structure, and it takes so long to gear it back up again. What would you say would be an optimal build right now? Not off the charts, but an optimal build for the United States Navy, to meet its strategic requirements around the world?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Senator, I believe that the shipbuilding plan that we have in place right now is giving us the balanced fleet that we need. We are introducing some new classes of ships that are challenging us in the shipbuilding account. But that balanced fleet will give us the capability we need from the high end to the more
nontraditional missions that we’re going to face. So, as we have looked at our maritime strategy, I believe the build plan that we are on will give us what we need——

Senator Webb. Did you mention 313 is a floor?
Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir.
Senator Webb. What would be an optimal build?
Admiral Roughead. I would say that, as we look to the future, the need to increase our ability to operate more in the green water, closer to shore, is an area that we must look—and I intend, if confirmed, to pursue that and explore any growth in that area.

Senator Webb. So, you’re not going to put a number on it.
Admiral Roughead. No, sir.

Senator Webb. Okay.
Admiral Roughead. It’s very worthy of deeper consideration.

Senator Webb. I have two questions that I would like to get written responses to. I don’t want to take the time of the committee on them. They’re rather detailed. One of them relates to the facilities in Norfolk Naval Shipyard that I think we need to be paying some attention to. The other relates to issues of home porting—carrier home porting and your views on strategic dispersal in the modern era, where we’re facing a different kind of—in my view, a different kind of threat—the terrorism threat, as opposed to the traditional conventional threat that people like to use. I want to get those to you, and I would appreciate a pretty quick turnaround on them, if you could do it.

Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir, I will.

Senator Webb. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, if I might intervene, I would hope that, General Chilton, you will issue a early invitation to my colleague from Virginia to, at long last, come to the big house.

[Laughter.]

General Chilton. If confirmed, that’ll be top on the list. [Laughter.]

Senator Webb. I could take you to some pretty interesting places.

[Laughter.]


Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have one question I want to ask each of the witnesses, except for General Chilton, because he won’t be dealing directly with it, and that has to do with training and equipping. We started the program, as you all know—I’ve talked to you—although I apologize to you, Admiral, because we had to cancel our meeting——

Admiral Roughead. Yes, sir.

Senator Inhofe.—because of votes—but it’s something that we’ve tried. It’s been very successful. I’ve made some 15 trips to the area of responsibility over there, and the commanders in the field all tell me that 1206, 1207, and 1208, and the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) are very, very critical, and very, very significant. So, I’m going to ask that question of three of you. Let’s start with you, General Mattis.

General Mattis. Sir, this is the kind of war where ammunition, at times, is better spent—the money for that is better spent trying to make common cause with the people. This is not a war that can
be won purely by military means. We’ve all heard that a number of times. We’ve seen the proof on the ground. Those funds allow us to make immediate impacts and to bring people around who may have been brought up on a diet of hatred and bias, and bridge over to them, and create a sense of common purpose. You’ve seen this work in al Anbar province, I think for when the enemy made mistakes, we could then exploit those mistakes.

Senator INHOFE. Yes, sir. So, you strongly support that.

General MATTIS. Very strongly.

Senator INHOFE. Also, we had a conversation in my office about your transformation and your commitment to the Future Combat System (FCS). If you’d just make one quick comment on that, we’ll go on——

General MATTIS. Yes, sir.

Senator INHOFE.—to the next one.

General MATTIS. The Army has to modernize, sir. FCS is the roadmap they’ve laid out. We don’t need other countries with artillery that can outrange ours, and this sort of thing. FCS addresses those deficiencies.

Senator INHOFE. All right, fine.

General Chilton—and let me thank all four of you for your service. I’m looking forward to supporting all four of you in this confirmation process. I’ve often thought—I look back wistfully at the days of the Cold War, when things were predictable. When you look at our missile defense system right now—which is deficient, in my opinion, in the boost phase, but we’re making progress in midcourse and terminal phase—do you agree with me that perhaps that threat is greater now than it was even back in the cold war, in terms of Iran and other countries—North Korea and China—having capabilities they didn’t have before?

General CHILTON. Yes, sir, I’d agree that the threat is greater, and it’s more dispersed around the globe, as well.

Senator INHOFE. Yes, and do you think we’re going to be equipped to deal with that?

General CHILTON. Senator, I think that is a goal of——

Senator INHOFE. That’s your job.

General CHILTON. Well, my job——

Senator INHOFE. Partially.

General CHILTON.—if confirmed, is to make sure we have an integrated approach to missile defense that——

Senator INHOFE. Right.

General CHILTON.—both serves the local theater commander, as well as the global needs in defense of——

Senator INHOFE. Yes.

General CHILTON.—the United States of America.

Senator INHOFE. Good. Very good.

Admiral Roughead, I won’t ask you if you agree with me or with the President, because you obviously are the President’s nominee, and not mine. I don’t agree with the Law of the Sea Treaty, and I think there are a lot of deficiencies. When you look at this, the level of a superbureaucracy that we would be answering to, I have some serious sovereignty questions.

The only thing I would ask you is—the Law of the Sea Treaty does identify four specific areas in which ships may be stopped at
Admiral ROUGHEAD. Senator, when I look at the Law of the Sea Treaty, I believe our operations at sea will be enhanced by the Law of the Sea Treaty. The codification——

Senator INHOFE. That wasn't my question. My question was, If we only have four ways of stopping them, and one of them is not our suspicion they might have WMD or terrorism, is that a concern to you?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Senator, I believe that the authorities that we have, and what would be afforded in the treaty, give us the authorities we need to act on the high seas.

Senator INHOFE. All right. Military actions are exempt under this treaty, but it doesn't define what "military actions" are. Do you have a definition for that?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Senator, I believe that the treaty will allow us to conduct the operations that support our access to our operations. So——

Senator INHOFE. Yes. Well, I'm looking forward to supporting you. I disagree with you on this issue.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Sure.

Senator INHOFE. Now, General Ward—first of all, we've had a chance to really get to know each other. I'm delighted when I look behind you and I see Mary Yates, because I've known Mary in Burundi, Ghana, and other places, and I think you're going to be really served well by her. Also, you and she have something in common, that you agree and understand that—how important, in the African continent, how—relationships are. As you and I have talked before, I've had occasion to be over there, probably more than 30 times, and develop these relationships.

So, I'd first like to ask you if you would—when you take this on—and I'm delighted we have AFRICOM. I have not liked the way it's been divided between EUCOM and CENTCOM before, and we've talked about this. One area of concern of mine is western Sahara. Right now, I would only ask that you listen to some of the experiences of former Secretary James Baker and the efforts that he has had in trying to do something about this group that's been wandering in the wilderness now for some 30 years. I won't ask for a response, except that you will have that on your radar screen.

Second, we do have, let's get back to train and equip. Do you agree with the others on train and equip——

General WARD. I do, Senator. Those authorities and flexibilities that are outlined in 1206, 1207, 1208, as well as the expanded CERP, are precisely the sorts of tools that——

Senator INHOFE. Good.

General WARD.—are helpful in the field for doing things that make a difference in the near term for long-term, positive consequences.

Senator INHOFE. That's good. As far as the five African brigades, it's not as well defined as I'd like it, but it's my understanding—and not too many people on this committee are really familiar with
that—that we are really helping the Africans to help themselves, to help them develop these—as we see the squeeze in the Middle East, and we see the terrorism activity going through Djibouti and down through the Horn of Africa, and proliferating—I would only ask if you have any opinions right now that you’d like to share with us about the African brigades that we’re pursuing right now.

General WARD. Those five African brigades, Senator, are in differing levels of readiness, as well as capability. It’s important, I think, to be a partner with them to cause them to be as capable as they can be, so that they can, indeed, pursue the course that they’ve set out for themselves—i.e., taking care of their problems, their challenges, either within their borders, regionally, or on the continent. To the degree that we can be of an assist to them in helping them achieve that capacity, then that capability, over time, I believe, is something that we ought to be pursuing.

Senator INHOFE. Exactly the response I wanted. Thank you very much, and you’re the man for the job.

I know my time’s up. Admiral Roughhead, I forgot to ask you the train and equip question.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Absolutely, Senator. As the Commander in the Pacific, I made great use, and it makes——

Senator INHOFE. Good.

Admiral ROUGHEAD.—a huge difference.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BEN NELSON. Senator Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Chilton, it’s good to see all of your family here. You don’t have any boys? [Laughter.]

General CHILTON. I don’t, Senator. We have a boy dog at the house. [Laughter.]

Senator WARNER. Oh, boy dog. Oh. [Laughter.]

General CHILTON. “A.”

Senator BILL NELSON. I’m going to ask you to respond in writing to the question. Our Strategic Forces Subcommittee is going to be looking into the question of that nuclear weapon that was flown from the north part of the country down to the southern part of the country, and what we’re going to do about that, and then we’ll confer with you as we get ready for that hearing.

General CHILTON. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

Individuals at the highest level of Department of Defense (DOD) remain engaged in the examination of this event, and investigations into the incident will continue at all echelons over the next 4–6 months. Air Force leadership has requested review of the incident and resulting Air Force actions by external organizations with varying roles, to include the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Nuclear Support Staff, the Joint Staff, the DOD Inspector General, and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). Major General Raaberg, ACC/A3, completed an investigation of the chain of events that resulted in this occurrence, at the direction of Commander, Air Combat Command. Commander. U.S. STRATCOM has requested joint assessment and review of nuclear expertise imbedded on staff to support ongoing investigations and review the role of U.S. STRATCOM in providing oversight of services nuclear surety processes.

Senator BILL NELSON. I want to ask you about—as we’re trying to give the warfighter and the commander greater flexibility of getting up smaller satellites in operationally responsive space, you
have said that you think that the STRATCOM should explore the feasibility of rapidly deploying capabilities that can help these combatant commanders. Can you describe for the committee what kind of investments you think that are necessary at Cape Canaveral and Vandenberg in order to sustain and modernize these launch facilities so you could have operationally responsive space?

General CHILTON. Senator, I would say the investments we need at Vandenberg and at Cape Canaveral go beyond just any support we would provide for a responsive space launch capability. Those two sites are fundamental to our access to space, as a Nation, not only for military and intelligence purposes, but also for commercial and for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, obviously. Over the years—and I've seen this since I returned to the Air Force back in 1998—we have had ongoing efforts to apply bandages, is what I would call it, to sustain these launch sites. In my current position as Commander of Air Force Space Command, looking forward to the future, we have spent a good part of this year taking a step back and asking, “what can we do to stop bandaging the problems and actually move our launch sites and the infrastructure forward to the 21st century and make the critical improvements that we will need, to support not only a responsive launch capability, but our continued operations?” We're preparing to bring those concerns forward into the 2010 Program Objective Memorandum period, the investments we think we need to be making across the Future Years Defense Program to bring us up to where we need to be for the future.

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. General Helms, the commander down there, is concerned that we have that modernization, so that we can respond. I'm sure the commander at Vandenberg feels the same.

General CHILTON. Absolutely.

Senator BILL NELSON. So, we're going to need to work with you on that, and I assume that you and the new Space Command Commander will be able to work together.

General CHILTON. Absolutely, Senator. We'll focus our efforts on that.

Senator BILL NELSON. Admiral Roughhead, following up Senator Webb's question that he said he was going to ask you in writing, and on behalf of my colleague from Florida, Senator Martinez, I want to recall, for the record of the committee, what Admiral Clark, the CNO, said to this committee in February 2005, “The Atlantic fleet should continue to be dispersed”—talking about the carriers—“in two home ports.” He went on to say, “The Navy should have two carrier-capable home ports on each coast.” Continuing the quote, “It is my belief that it would be a serious strategic mistake to have all of those key assets of our Navy tied up in one port.”

Then, Deputy Secretary Gordon England, as the former Secretary of the Navy, testified to our committee, “My judgment is that dispersion is still the situation. A nuclear carrier should be in Florida to replace the John F. Kennedy to get some dispersion.”

Now, we've talked about this privately. On behalf of my colleague, Senator Martinez, and I, what we'd like is to have you have the opportunity, for the record, to state, what do you consider to
be in the strategic assets of our country with regard to the disper-
sal of the carrier assets?

[The information referred to follows:]

In the post-September 11 world, we must be aware of our vulnerabilities with re-
gard to our fleet, people, and infrastructure. The Navy regularly assesses the force
posture, strategic dispersal and force protection needs of our afloat forces and our
shore infrastructure. In our assessments we examine the strategic environment and
potential threats. We assess where we need assets positioned to generate the re-
sponse and the presence to respond to likely contingencies and tasking.

Before making decisions about positioning of forces, we must consider a variety
of factors including national security requirements, environmental impacts, total
cost and other programmatic implications, impact on sailors and their families, and
the current and future strategic environment.

Admiral Roughead. Senator, similar to what we’ve just com-
pleted in the Pacific, where we looked at what the force posture
and the positioning of those forces should be, I believe the same
process needs to take place on the East Coast to look at the strat-
egic environment that, not only we’re in today, but where we’ll be
going tomorrow, to look at what we need positioned to generate the
response and the presence that will be important to our Nation and
our Navy. That must be done in the context of what we anticipate.

We have underway an environmental impact statement in
Mayport that is looking at a range of options in Mayport—13 op-
tions. I believe all that must come together to determine what is
best for the country and best for the Navy, in being able to gen-
erate effective naval forces. If confirmed, I look forward to being
engaged in that, and to continuing to have that discussion.

Senator Bill Nelson. Do you have in your mind that you’re
going, as CNO, to implement a plan for carrying out this principle
of strategic dispersal?

Admiral Roughead. As CNO, I will be making a recommenda-
tion to the Secretary as to where I believe our forces should be,
what those forces should be—not just the afloat forces, but also our
infrastructure, which is so important in being able to generate that
power. I intend to participate in that very actively.

Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.


Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, let me thank all of you for your public service, your ex-
traordinary service. I look forward to supporting each of you in
your new role.

Admiral Roughhead, it’s a particular pleasure to welcome you
back to Washington. We worked together when you were head of
the Navy’s Liaison Office, and I really enjoyed working with you,
particularly on shipbuilding issues back then. I could not be more
delighted with the President’s nomination of you to be the new
CNO.

Admiral Roughead. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Collins. I was very pleased that my two colleagues from
Virginia mentioned Admiral Mullen’s farsighted plan for a 313-ship
Navy. You and I had the opportunity to discuss that in the office.
I was very pleased to hear you repeat, publicly today, that you view
it as a floor, because I think we have been underfunding shipbuild-
ing for many years, and it takes a great deal of time to turn that
around to ensure that we do have the capability necessary to meet
our national security requirements. I look forward to ensuring that you have the resources, not only to implement, but go beyond Admiral Mullen's plan.

Now, part of the plan includes 55 Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), which will give the Navy a new capability that it has not previously had. That program has run into some problems, both with schedule and with cost overruns. But it seems to me that it's still vitally important. I would like to hear your comments on the importance of the LCS program, in terms of giving the Navy a needed capability that it currently lacks, but also in helping us achieve the goal of a 313-ship fleet.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Thank you, Senator.

The LCS is very important for the Navy. I've said, on several occasions, that, had I had some LCS in the Pacific when I was commanding the fleet there, I could have done much more. The LCS represents a new way of taking on the threats that we anticipate in the future. It is incorporating new technology that is relevant to the manning concepts that we will have to have in place as we move into the future, and LCS brings that together. It is very important. It is not simply a ship that will be used in what I refer to as the green water, but it's one that, because of its flexibility in antisubmarine warfare and mine warfare and antisurface warfare. It will be integral into our more conventional force packages, our carrier strike groups and our expeditionary strike groups.

So, even though LCS has gone through some challenges, I believe that the steps that the Secretary and others have taken are appropriate to get that ship to the fleet, where we need it, and we need it quickly, and we need it in those numbers that you spoke of, 55. LCS is very important to our Navy.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you.

Another part of the plan that it's very important to achieve the size fleet that we need is the guided missile destroy (DDG) modernization program. Could you comment on that, as well?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, Senator. In addition to the DDG, also our amphibious transport dock and our cruiser modernization, it is important that, when we have a fleet of 313 ships, that those ships be relevant to the type of threats that we will face in the future. The modernization plan allows us to do that. We have made significant investments in our ships, particularly our DDGs and cruisers. We must make that modernization plan a reality, so that those ships will be able to serve for the life that we envisioned. That is equally as important to shipbuilding, but keeping our current fleet relevant and capable into the future.

Senator COLLINS. Indeed, we're able to apply some of the lessons that we're learning on the DDG–1000 project in order to reduce the crew size, for example, on the DDG–51 class of destroyers, which I think also has benefits, in terms of the life-cycle costs.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, ma'am.

Senator COLLINS. Admiral, I want to switch to another important installation in my home State of Maine, and that is the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, which is one of the four public yards that the Navy has. Recently, the employees and the commander of the shipyard brought to my attention that they have been forced to turn away submarine availabilities, including specialized repair activi-
ties for the U.S.S. *Alexandria* and the U.S.S. *San Juan*, due to the workforce constraints that have been imposed by the Navy. Portsmouth is now limited to a civilian workforce of just over 3,900 civilians, yet the Navy has submarines in need of maintenance and repair work, and it seems that this work is being delayed due to what appear to be arbitrary manpower and overtime limitations. In addition, there is always unforeseen emergency maintenance or repair work that needs to be done.

If you are confirmed, will you evaluate the imposed workforce levels at the public shipyards, including Portsmouth, to ensure that they're sufficient to handle emergency and other unforeseen work on Navy ships and submarines?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I will, Senator, because our four Navy shipyards and the work that they do, particularly on our nuclear fleet, is very, very important. It's not just the workforce, but the scheduling and the improvements that we make there. All are factors in providing a ready fleet, and I will be involved in that very closely.

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. I very much look forward to working with you, as well as the other members of the panel.

The other members of the panel, I do have questions, for the record, for you. But Maine's a big Navy State, so I had to focus on Admiral Roughead.

Thank you.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Thank you.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Senator.

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, want to add my support of the gentlemen who have been nominated for these positions. This is a panel and a group of nominees with great experience, great skill, and we're grateful for your service to our country, each and every one of you, and to your families—we appreciate the sacrifice and the service of the families also undertake whenever you serve in your capacity. So, we appreciate your willingness to take on these important responsibilities.

General Chilton, I remember visiting with you about your daughters in my office, and I have two daughters that are—well, one's in college and one's in high school. You have adventurous days ahead of you, and I only had half the adventure, I guess I would say. But it's great fun, in all of their activities, and I know you're going to enjoy those days ahead of you.

I would like to ask you a question regarding a statement that you made in response to the advance policy questions regarding ballistic missile defense. You stated, and I quote, that the “unified command plan directs STRATCOM to plan, integrate, coordinate global missile defense operations and support for missile defense, as well as to develop and advocate missile defense characteristics and capabilities for all combatant commands. If confirmed, this is an area that I will focus on to be sure I clearly understand the command's authorities and responsibilities, as well as those of the regional combatant commanders and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).”

Currently, MDA is tasked with many funding responsibilities of missile defense, which include research and development, procurement, and testing. This responsibility places a major burden on the
agency's primary research and development mission. Assuming that you are confirmed as STRATCOM Commander, I'd like to know what your thoughts are on seeing more operational control of missile defense given to the active forces in the manner that you described.

General CHILTON. Senator, that is the goal, I believe, of MDA to acquire these systems and then turn them over to the Active Forces to operate as they mature and become ready. That is my understanding of where we're headed. For the Airborne Laser program, in particular, as the former Air Force programmer, I know we were looking forward to the time period when that system became certified for use. The Air Force was going to take over operation of that system in support of the combatant commanders around the world.

So, that is the way I see it moving forward.

Senator THUNE. One of the questions I want to ask with regard to the future of some of these programs is, do you believe that direct energy technology is important to the future of missile defense?

General CHILTON. I absolutely believe that's an area we need to continue to explore, because the potential return for developing that type of capability, I think, could be revolutionary.

Senator THUNE. One of the, obviously, strategic capabilities—our newest strategic capabilities—is missile defense. By the end of the year, we should have 24 groundbased interceptors fielded for the protection of the Homeland against long-range ballistic missile threats; approximately 21 SM–3 missiles on Navy ships—10 Navy ships—to provide protection against medium-range missiles; and hundreds of Patriot PACOM–3 missiles to protect against short-range ballistic missile threats. Missile defense capabilities have been used, now, in the two Gulf wars to protect U.S. forces; and during July 2006, the groundbased midcourse defense system was ready to intercept a long-range North Korean test missile, should it have been necessary. How do you view the role of missile defense, as a strategic capability?

General CHILTON. It's absolutely a critical part, Senator, of our triad today, which morphed from a classic, just offensive, nuclear triad of the Cold War to one that provides nuclear, conventional, and nonkinetic offensive capabilities balanced with a defensive posture and defensive capabilities through the missile defense system, and then our responsive infrastructure being the third leg of that new triad. So, missile defense is an absolutely critical element of the strategic deterrent posture for this country.

Senator THUNE. What impact do you think our initial deployments have on our ability to address potential threats that are posed by North Korea and Iran?

General CHILTON. My understanding of our deployments today is that they are focused to the west to deter against a North Korean attack, and that we currently do not have the capabilities in place for an Iranian attack, but this is a threat that we foresee developing in the future.

Senator THUNE. Do you have confidence in our currently-deployed missile defense systems?
General CHILTON. I do, sir, from the level of knowledge that I have of them today. But, if confirmed, this will be an area I will study. My current duties do not have me focusing a lot on the end-to-end portion of that. As Air Force Space Command Commander, we participate in the early-warning portion and the midcourse tracking with some of our radar sites, and I'm very confident in their ability to do their mission. The end-to-end portion of that, I'll delve deeper into, if confirmed.

Senator THUNE. With regard to the missile defense capabilities through 2013, do you think that these deployments are going to keep pace with your understanding of the threats?

General CHILTON. Senator, I do not know the schedule, today, of the deployment plan for those weapons. I couldn’t give you an answer today as to whether or not that schedule matches up with existing threat predictions.

Senator THUNE. Well, again, my time is expired, so I didn’t get a chance to ask the other members of the panel questions. But thank you, again, for your service to our country, and we look forward to your confirmation.

Thank you very much.

General CHILTON. Thank you, Senator.

Senator THUNE. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Senator.

We have five votes, starting around 11 o'clock, so I think Senator Warner and I will wrap up the questions, and then we'll gavel the hearing over.

Senator Warner, you indicated that you have additional questions.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I do.

I'd like to start off with General Chilton. I listened very carefully to your testimony, and read through all of the documents and your responses to questions. I want to get down to this concept of deterrence in strategic military activities today, worldwide.

I've had some modest experience, some 5 years in the Pentagon in the Navy Secretariat, and then coming here for quite a few years. I've seen the evolution of this doctrine through those years. It's predicated on the concept of mutual-assured destruction: those nations that possess a nuclear weapon, you deal with them, recognizing their capabilities, and the doctrine of deterrence plays a critical role. Each nation carefully reviews any consideration of even putting on readiness their strategic nuclear capability, and certainly before considering utilizing it, evaluates—what are the consequences were the other country to initiate such a strike?

Those years I was in the Pentagon, we were at the pitch intensity in what we've known as the Cold War with the Soviet Union. But, throughout that period, we were always able to engage the Soviet military in positive steps. For example, we established the hotline, whereby each leader of their nation—Soviet Union and the United States—could pick up a phone and instantaneously reach their counterpart. We went through the Incidents at Sea Agreement, which was negotiated with the Soviet navy at the time their navy was challenging us on the high seas of the world, challenging in certain respects. They had capabilities that matched ours. I
could enumerate a number of other steps that we took between the United States and the Soviet Union.

General Abizaid, a man whom I greatly respect, said publicly the other day—and I want to try and paraphrase it accurately—we could learn to live with a nation such as Iran, should they possess a nuclear weapon, but I quickly draw to your attention my response to that statement, that I do not see in Iran today any of the capabilities, in terms of a military chain of command, a review process, a rational, quiet analysis of the consequences, should they ever obtain such a weapon, of the utilization of that weapon. Therefore, I somewhat disagree with my very valued friend, General Abizaid.

Now, North Korea, they do have a very significant military chain of command. Again, the decision rests with the supreme leader, so to speak. But, again, we’re working our way through that equation, I think, rather well, in terms of their capability. Let’s hope that that is removed from the world scene. It is a world issue, it isn’t simply a U.S. issue.

But I don’t see it with Iran and such other nations that may be trying to acquire the very fundamentals of constructing a weapon. I want to get your reaction of how we can rely on that concept of deterrence with a nation that does not have, in our judgment, that very careful review and decisionmaking policy by a government. How do we employ it today against these emerging nations who desire to acquire these weapons?

General Chilton. Senator, I think the two key things I’m hearing from you that worked so well in the Cold War time period, were both transparency and confidence-building measures that were taken between the countries to make sure we understood each other’s capability and decisionmaking processes. I’m a proponent of transparency and confidence-building measures, and military-to-military relationships with all countries.

I also believe that, just because you don’t completely understand a competitor’s process at a particular moment, it does not mean they cannot be deterred, because of the consequences that they could perceive from an untoward action toward another country; in particular, us. It is also important to understand our capability and our willingness to defend our country. I think we always need to be clear about that, that we are capable, willing, and ready, and then, even when there is not transparency, I believe there still is a level of deterrence. But there, as you point out, would remain a level of uncertainty that is something that we would want to focus on to remove that uncertainty.

Senator Warner. I don’t wish to engage in any saber-rattling here at this time—but to just draw to your attention that we have to go back and revisit how the doctrine of mutual assured destruction and other things worked in the past, and examine them in the framework of—I’m not singling out Iran—but those emerging nations. Just look at the performance of the President of Iran here recently, publicly, against a background of many similar actions and statements that just are so illogical. It does begin to show that the doctrine of deterrence needs to be reexamined with respect to these emerging nations, given the apparent absence of that structure that was present during the Cold War years.
Admiral Roughead, I'm glad that you, I thought, in a very diplomatic and straightforward way, handled questions from our colleague from Florida. As you readily are aware, there's a little engagement between the States of Virginia and Florida on the question of port security. But I've always felt that it's imperative that we, in the Congress, support our military when the military makes a decision which is in the best interest of our Nation.

Now, the doctrine of strategic dispersal—again, my first introduction was back in the years of the Cold War, when I was privileged to serve in the Navy Secretariat, and that doctrine was entirely different than it is today. While, during that period, I think there was some validity to dispersal, today it's quite different. At any one time in Virginia—I know you know from your own experience—many times there are no carriers in port, and then perhaps one coming in for upkeep and so forth, and very quickly that ship is rotated out. It's not as if suddenly everything is focused in one port. Those days fortunately are pretty well gone because of the need to keep in an operational status.

As you work through this, I would hope that you take into consideration that there is a dramatic change in what I call the fundamentals of strategic dispersal today from what it was many years ago.

Lastly, I'd like to give you the opportunity to present your views about the Law of the Sea. That issue could be before the Senate very shortly. I again draw on some modest work in that area, when I was in the Navy Secretariat. I went to the Law of the Sea Conferences, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, to represent our country, and particularly to make certain that the future operations of the United States Navy were not in any way abrogated or impaired by a treaty. Now, that work in the early 1970s on that treaty at that time has pretty well been displaced by the treaty today which, in my examination, as you said, enhances—in no way deters or restricts—but, in fact, enhances the utility and the value of our ships, deployed wherever they are in the world on the high seas. Am I correct?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, Senator, it enhances, it codifies what we need, to be able to operate. More importantly, by being party to the treaty, it will give us a seat at the table as that treaty is discussed, as provisions are considered; because I believe, if you're not at the table, you don't have a voice. I believe our efforts in the maritime domain need to be influenced by what we think, what we believe, and what's in the best interest of our country.

I also saw, in the Pacific, where, by not being party to the treaty, as we were working on some of the proliferation security initiatives, that some countries would avoid participating with us because of that.

Senator WARNER. The United States was not a signatory to that treaty; and, therefore, the Navy did suffer, as a consequence.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. That's correct. We did. Countries that were very important to our relationships out there were very apprehensive, and, in some cases, didn't participate. I would never recommend being party to anything that limited our strategic mobility, the ability to defend the country, or that would put our sailors in harm's way.
Senator WARNER. Fine.
Admiral ROUGHEAD. I don't see anything in the treaty that would do that, and I believe we should accede to that treaty.
Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the testimony of Admiral Roughead be conveyed to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. They're going to have primary jurisdiction and probably hold such hearings as they deem necessary as they are reviewing this treaty.
I presume that is already well known and documented and submitted as a part of the support for the Senate's consideration of this treaty. Do you know that?
Admiral ROUGHEAD. I do not know specifically what was——
Senator WARNER. Could you verify that?
Admiral ROUGHEAD. But I will verify that.
Senator W ARNER. We will forward your testimony, but I would hope that the DOD has made known the views of the Navy with regard to that treaty.
Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir.
Senator WARNER. Thank you very much.
General Mattis, I read through your response to the questions about your “NATO hat,” and this thing is drawn up very cleverly by those writers in the Pentagon, about all your responsibility with NATO, and you responded to a series of questions. But, in reading through your responses to the questions, I do not see any reference to—and there may be a good reason for it—a situation that faces our forces operating in Iraq today which is of great concern to this Senator. Excuse me, in Afghanistan. Oftentimes, we're focused so much on Iraq, we forget about a very essential military operation that we're undertaking both directly with our military forces in Afghanistan, and as a part of the NATO force, of which you have these responsibilities. It's set out in our record in response to your questions, so I won't ask for further amplification.

But here's the problem. In Afghanistan today, the growth of narcotics is growing exponentially. The increase of the current narcotic crop this past year was somewhere between 15 and 20 percent over what it was the year before. The funds from the sale of those narcotics, grown in Afghanistan, processed, to some degree, in Afghanistan, and then shipped throughout Europe, has resulted in enormous amounts of dollars and other forms of compensation flowing back to the Taliban and other insurgents in Afghanistan. Those funds are enabling our adversaries in Afghanistan to acquire sophisticated weapons, to do many other things.

What do you understand is the current role of the NATO forces? Do your responsibilities—in any way allow you to inject your thinking into this problem? Because we have Americans at increasing risk from this ever-increasing flow of dollars back from the sale of those narcotics. I mean, we're talking about multimillions of dollars of cash.

General Mattis. Yes, sir. Senator, I don’t disagree with a single word that you just said. I think you’ve summed up the problem. I believe that the efforts of NATO and the U.S. forces to create a stronger central government that creates control over the country are on target. This is one of the manifestations of a lack of governmental control. This is why we need President Karzai’s government
be strengthened, not just with military purposes—not just for military purposes. We need a dramatic leap in our interagency and our international partners’ efforts to reduce drug demand, to come up with substitute crops and the kind of supporting infrastructure that allows those crops to become viable, not simply a good program that makes us feel good, but actually has an alternative for those farmers, in light of how much money they’re being paid right now.

But I think that the preparation of the NATO forces, which JFCOM and Allied Command-Transformation work together on, can help address this. But it’s a larger problem than just the military preparation of the troops. I’ll work as much as I can, if I am confirmed, to broaden the aperture on this.

Senator Warner. Within the scope of your authority here—and it seems to me a fairly broad authority—I would hope you would inject your thinking because you’ve had a lot of experience, in your career, with insurgency.

General Mattis. Yes, sir.

Senator Warner. How many tours do you have to Iraq?

General Mattis. Depending on how you’re counting, sir, too many. [Laughter.]

Senator Warner. Well, quite a few.

General Mattis. Yes, sir.

Senator Warner. You’re familiar with this problem.

General Mattis. I’ve been in Afghanistan, sir.

Senator Warner. You have been in Afghanistan.

General Mattis. Yes, sir.


Lastly, Mr. Chairman, in Afghanistan, is the question of the national caveats. To those who may be following this hearing, I would like to explain them—that when a NATO country allocates some of its troops to a force deployed out of the NATO area—the Balkans was one campaign, but this is the first real, significant deployment of NATO forces in a combat role, beyond the original parameters of the NATO forces in their countries. They say, “Our troops can be used only for A, B, C, and D, and not E, F, G.” As a consequence, the U.S. forces, the British forces, the Canadian forces really don’t have any limitations. The commanders of the forces can utilize them for any role in combat they deem appropriate. But the other forces cannot be used. Frankly, it comes down to—some of them are not exposed to the degree of risks that the U.S., British, and Canadian troops are exposed to. What are we going to do about that national caveat situation?

General Mattis. Sir, if confirmed, I would first of all encourage that we all recognize the difficulty this makes for unity of effort. It’s one thing if we aren’t going to have unity of command—and you’re aware of the command relationships there. But unity of effort on a battlefield is critical if we’re to really make progress.

My intent would be to work collaboratively with General Craddick and the Chiefs of Defense of NATO, and see how we can move this forward, while recognizing that nations have interests, and I know our own has interests, and we make certain caveats, ourselves—not ones that impact on battlefield efficiency in Afghanistan right now. But I think a certain amount of understanding of
where they’re coming from, but an aggressive search for common ground that will allow us to gain this unity of effort that we need there, so that we have the responsibilities and the demands placed, I think, equally across the alliance forces.

Senator WARNER. Thank you.

General MATTIS. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Good luck, General.

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you all for being here today, and congratulations to your families for a job well done this morning, and to all of you.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, you mentioned a key word, “families.” We’ve stressed that. I’d like to have each of you put into the record—I will not delay this hearing further—some of the initiatives you’re going to take with respect to the families of those under your command.

[The information referred to follows:]

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The Navy has multiple initiatives to further support the families of our sailors, these include:

Fleet and Family Support Programs

With increased programmed funds in fiscal year 2008 and the outyears, the Navy has put greater emphasis on providing additional prevention, education, and counseling services to Navy families. Greater outreach to families is being accomplished through information and referral, educational, individual consultation and clinical counseling services at community centers, schools and in public-private venture housing areas. Revitalization of family employment readiness programs and services is also a focus for fiscal year 2008. In addition, services are tailored and staffed to better meet the needs of Navy families who have been disproportionately impacted by the global war on terror. For example, school liaison positions have been created to work with school districts and Navy families to ensure successful transition of Navy children from one school to another, and to ensure that the pressures facing military children are well understood by teachers and school officials. The Navy is providing brief, solution-focused clinical counseling services to a greater number of family members, including children, in fiscal year 2008, and is providing home visitation services to new parents who need assistance.

Individual Augmentee (IA) and Family Support

IA assignments are new for most sailors and their families. The Navy continues to work hard to ensure that deployment services and support are tailored and responsive to the unique needs of IA sailors and their families. To improve understanding of, and responsiveness to, the needs of sailors, families and Navy leadership, Navy has developed IA Sailor, Family, and Command Handbooks that are posted on the World Wide Web and are continually updated to provide basic information on IA deployment preparation, readiness, and reunion issues. An IA Family Connection Newsletter is distributed each month to IA families via Navy Fleet and Family Support Centers and Command Ombudsmen. Additionally, IA deployment readiness briefs are provided in various formats on a regular basis, as are IA Information Fairs and “Family and Friends” homecoming programs. To better reach IA families who do not live near a military installation but who have access to a computer, the Navy has initiated “virtual” IA Family Discussion Groups. In fiscal year 2008, Navy Fleet and Family Support Centers are committed to making telephone outreach contacts to all IA families. Information, referral and ongoing support to the family throughout the sailor’s IA assignment are offered during these outreach contacts. To date, about half of family members contacted have asked for ongoing contact and support. Command Ombudsmen are also receiving training on the uniqueness of IA deployment, resources available to IA families, and indicators of possible combat or operational stress.

Child and Youth Programs

Increased capability to support Navy family readiness in child and youth programs includes an expansion plan of 4,000 additional child care spaces utilizing various delivery systems (child development centers, child development homes, 24/7 center/home care). To assist parents and children with the challenges of frequent deployments, an additional 100,000 hours of respite child care will be provided for
families of deployed servicemembers. In efforts to combat youth obesity, the Navy will implement a nationwide youth fitness initiative called “FitFactor,” as a means to increase youth interest and awareness in the importance of healthy choices in life.

Family Financial Readiness

Financial fitness of sailors and their families is critical to mission readiness. The Navy’s Personal Financial Management Program received national level recognition and was honored as the 2006 Outstanding Education Program of the Year by the Association of Financial Counseling, Planning and Education. To ensure individual and family financial fitness, the Navy has increased the number of Accredited Financial Counselors available to work one-on-one with sailors and family members to develop realistic and achievable financial plans. Navy is also providing educational programs specifically tailored to family members and teens, and is partnering with on-base financial institutions, consumer awareness experts and industry leaders to assist with financial fitness initiatives.

Navy Family Ombudsman Program

A strong Command Ombudsman program helps ensure that families have information necessary to meet the challenges of the military lifestyle and that commanders have a better understanding of their families’ welfare and readiness. Navy ombudsmen serve as a liaison between the command and families. In fiscal year 2007, the Navy undertook a number of initiatives to strengthen, revitalize, and improve its Ombudsman Program. These efforts, which are ongoing in fiscal year 2008, include establishing an Ombudsman Registry to identify Command Ombudsmen and distribute timely information. In the event of a natural or manmade disaster, the Registry may also be used by higher authority to facilitate tracking and providing support to Navy families.

Personal and Family Preparedness

In fiscal year 2008, the Navy has placed a major emphasis on personal and family preparedness. “Operation Prepare” is a comprehensive marketing initiative disseminated Navy-wide. With the theme, “Be Informed, Have a Plan, Make a Kit,” the initiative has yielded enhanced personal and family readiness. The Navy-wide emphasis on “Operation Prepare” has increased sailor and family awareness of what to do to prepare for and respond to a manmade or natural disaster.

General WARD. High-quality, motivated people are the bedrock of our Nation’s defense readiness, and they remain so due to our steadfast commitment to their quality of life. For the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), providing quality of life support and services to the command’s servicemembers, civilians, and family members is a top priority. Whether forward deployed temporarily or permanently assigned on the continent, quality of life programs will be critical to the success of the command in two fundamental ways. First, they will help us attract and retain the best people—well-trained, motivated, and highly-skilled. Second, quality of life programs ensure our people and their families will be taken care of regardless of duty location. U.S. AFRICOM’s approach to quality of life will be in line with overall DOD policy: holistic, but with special considerations given to the possibility that some of our persons may operate in very austere environments.

Quality of life initiatives will require that we provide servicemembers, as well as those civilians who volunteer to come to AFRICOM and support the work we do, with a fair and adequate compensation system that recognizes the hardships associated with working in very remote and isolated locations. There is a high probability that some personnel will be located in areas without many of the typical support services found at major military installations in the United States.

We will continue to advocate for adequate family support, since some of the command’s personnel may need to be separated from their families for extended periods of time while deployed to the African continent. These areas include, but are not limited to: access to health care, similar to that available in the States or that meets or exceeds acceptable standards set by our medical experts; access to adequate housing; access to excellent education for families; and the availability of appropriate morale and welfare services. This support, at home station, deployed and at remote locations, is essential to provision of excellent quality of care for all of our personnel.

In the interim, any personnel assigned to duties in African nations will likely be supported by agreements with individual embassies. We often negotiate these agreements with embassy staffs to support limited numbers of military personnel who work in foreign nations. There is a fee for this service arrangement. It is through
this comprehensive vision and sufficient resourcing that we plan to provide an ade-
quise quality of life for our most precious resource, our people.

In conclusion, the AFRICOM is committed to providing a comprehensive package
of services that support the challenges of not only the traditional military way of
life, but also the unique challenges associated with standing up a portion of the
command in an area of the world where issues associated with a lack of basic infra-
structure, disease, tropical illnesses, and overall health are generally more prevalent
than in most modern western societies. Ultimately, our goal is to make AFRICOM
an assignment of choice, built on a top-quality, well-trained, highly-motivated, and
appropriately supported work force of dedicated servicemembers, civilian employees,
and their family members.

General MATTIS. Increased deployments associated with the global war on terror-
ism coupled with routine deployments for training and other global commitments
have significantly increased the operating tempo of our Armed Forces. The fre-
quency of deployments is difficult enough for our servicemembers, but is also ex-
tremely taxing and stressful on military families. Therefore, taking care of our fami-
lies must be a top priority for commanders at every level. As the Joint Force trainer
and Joint Force provider, one of my main goals will be to establish predictable and
stable training and rotation cycles for deploying forces.

To accomplish this task requires advance planning and early identification of force
requirements. I will work with the Joint Staff, supported combatant commanders,
and my Service component commanders to ensure early identification of future force
requirements to support operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Knowing
projected deployment dates well in advance will provide a measure of stability for
servicemembers which will in turn reduce the emotional and mental stress on fami-
lies. Additionally, the implementation of the Force Management Improvement
Project coupled with the Defense Readiness Reporting System will help streamline
the Request for Forces (RFF) process thus improving the predictability of force de-
ployments.

Another way of creating constancy for families is maximizing the efficiency of
predeployment training. How much time a unit spends overseas is normally the
focus when discussing the impact of deployments on families but a great deal of
time is also spent away from home conducting predeployment training. Finding
ways to reduce the amount of time spent away from home training is an excellent
way of improving the quality of life for servicemembers and their families. As the
Joint Force Trainer, I will constantly be looking for ways to improve and maximize
the efficiency of predeployment training in order to minimize the impact on families.

One of my first tasks as Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, will be to review
the Unified Endeavor Mission Rehearsal Exercise Program to see where we might
be able to streamline the program while still providing high quality training to de-
ploying units. Leveraging existing Joint training capabilities such as the Joint Na-
tional Training Capability and Distant Learning programs are excellent ways of re-
ducing the amount of time spent away from home conducting predeployment train-
ing. Synchronizing and integrating predeployment training events with deployment
schedules is an extremely important aspect of improving the quality of life for our
military families.

Lastly, the Individual Augmentation process is another area that needs to be re-
viewed. Currently, there are 7,000 Individual Augmentees filling billets in over sixty
Joint Task Force Headquarters worldwide. Often, Individual Augmentee require-
ments are not well-defined or known in advance. Even if the requirement is clearly
identified or known in advance, it is often difficult to match a person with the capa-
bilities and qualifications being requested. Consequently, personnel are often noti-
fied on short notice that they must fill Individual Augmentee billet which puts them
and their families under unnecessary stress. In my view, we must do a better job
of integrating the Individual Augmentation process with the RFF process to maxi-
mize the amount of time an Individual Augmentee has to prepare for deployment.
One of my main objectives as Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, will be to
institutionalize an Individual Augmentation process that serves both the needs of
the supported combatant commanders and reduces the turbulence inflicted on our
servicemembers and their families.

Finally, creating a predictable and stable environment for our military families
is absolutely essential in maintaining the viability of our All-Volunteer Force. With-
out a measure of predictability and stability in their lives young Americans are less
likely to join the military and existing servicemembers are less likely to reenlist.
Our servicemembers and their families sacrifice a great deal to serve their country
and it is incumbent on us to do everything in our power to provide them with a
measure of steadiness when it comes to deployments. This can only be done through sound leadership and proper advance planning.

General CHILTON. Initiatives that center on the family will be a topic I carry forward in meetings and discussions with my functional, Service, and component commanders, as well as my headquarters staff. The focus will be on programs designed to recognize the contribution of family members which enable our active duty servicemembers to serve the Nation. The sacrifices made by spouses, and children in particular, will be reviewed as we continue to increase our emphasis in this area.

Senator WARNER. I think we have to always be in a forward-looking mode, because the families of those in uniform are serving an ever-increasing and important role. How often have the witnesses come before this committee and told us that the determination of a serviceperson to continue his or her obligations and re-up, as we say, for the enlisted person, and for an officer to extend into the next 4 or 5 years, his willingness or her willingness to serve. That decision is made around the family table.

Senator BEN NELSON. We stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:13 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to ADM Gary Roughead, USN, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. Almost 2 decades have passed since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms. You have had an opportunity to observe the implementation and impact of those reforms, particularly in your joint assignments. Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?

Answer. Yes. I strongly support full implementation of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. Since enactment, the act has increased cooperation among the Services resulting in a more capable, effective, and agile Joint force.

Question. What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented?

Answer. These defense reforms have enhanced our Nation’s warfighting capabilities; however, there is always room for process improvement. Specifically, improvements in the acquisition process are needed to ensure new systems are in full compliance with Joint interoperability requirements, and to enhance the coordination and interaction between those who define our requirements and those who acquire our systems.

Question. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?

Answer. I consider the most important aspect of these defense reforms to be the emphasis and commitment to joint warfighting and the resulting benefit we derive from our experiences in joint warfare. Operations directed by combatant commanders with forces from all the Services have produced greater net effect than independent service actions.

Question. The goals of Congress in enacting these defense reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; and enhancing the effectiveness of military operations and improving the management and administration of the Department of Defense (DOD). Do you agree with these goals?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Recently, there have been expressions of interest and testimony from senior military officers recommending modifications to Goldwater-Nichols.
Do you believe that legislative proposals to amend Goldwater-Nichols may be appropriate? If so, what areas do you believe it might be appropriate to address in these proposals?

Answer. Goldwater-Nichols has served us well, but in the past 20 years the security environment has changed significantly and a review is worthy of consideration. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) and Secretary of the Navy if I see need for specific improvement.

Question. What do you understand the role of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to be under the Goldwater-Nichols Act relative to the SECDEF, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the other members of the Joint Chiefs, and the combatant commanders?

Answer. The CNO has significant interaction with these leaders. If confirmed, I will work for the SECDEF and the Secretary of the Navy, who will be my direct civilian supervisor. I will be responsible under the Secretary of the Navy for organizing, training, and equipping forces in support of the combatant commanders. I will also be responsible for the identification, validation, prioritization and justification of resource requirements for Navy acquisition programs. Along with the other Service Chiefs, I will be a member of the JCS tasked with the responsibility for actively reviewing and evaluating military matters and offering professional military advice to the President, National Security Council, and SECDEF.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 5033 of title 10, U.S.C., discusses the responsibilities and authority of the CNO. Section 151 of title 10, U.S.C., discusses the composition and functions of the JCS, including the authority of the CNO, as a member of the JCS, to submit advice and opinions to the President, the National Security Council, or the SECDEF. Other sections of law and traditional practice, also establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the CNO to the following offices:

Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The SECDEF is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the DOD. As a Service Chief and member of the JCS, the CNO is a military adviser to the SECDEF, particularly regarding matters of naval warfare, policy, and strategy.

Question. Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Answer. The Deputy SECDEF, on occasion, serves as acting Secretary in the absence of the Secretary. During these periods, the CNO’s relationship with the Deputy Secretary will essentially be the same as with the Secretary. The Deputy Secretary is also responsible for the day-to-day operation of the DOD. If confirmed, I will endeavor to interact regularly with him and provide him with my best possible professional military advice and the same level of support as I would the Secretary.

Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense.

Answer. Under current DOD Directives, Under Secretaries of Defense coordinate and exchange information with DOD components, to include the Services, in the functional areas under their cognizance. If confirmed as CNO, I will respond and reciprocate. If confirmed, I will use this exchange of information as I communicate with the Chairman of the JCS and provide military advice to the SECDEF.

Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. The CNO is a member of the JCS and, as such, works with and through the Chairman in the execution of duties. Along with the other Service Chiefs, I will be a member of the JCS tasked with the responsibility for actively reviewing and evaluating military matters and offering professional military advice to the President, National Security Council, and SECDEF.

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. When functioning as the acting Chairman, the Vice Chairman’s relationship with combatant commanders is that of the Chairman. Also, the Vice Chairman has the same rights and obligations as other members of the JCS. If confirmed, I would exchange views with the Vice Chairman on any defense matter considered by the JCS. The Vice Chairman also heads or has a key role on many boards that affect readiness and programs and, therefore, the preparedness of naval forces. If confirmed, I will establish a close relationship with the Vice Chairman on these critical issues.

Question. The Secretary of the Navy.

Answer. The CNO is responsible, under the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), for providing properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to support combatant commanders in the accomplishment of their missions. In addition, the CNO assists the Secretary of the Navy in the development of plans and recommendations for the
operation of the Department of the Navy. The Navy enjoys a productive, collaborative environment within the Department, and if confirmed, I will work closely with the Secretary of the Navy.

Question. The Under Secretary of the Navy.
Answer. The Under Secretary of the Navy is the principal assistant to the Secretary of the Navy and is first in line of succession. The Under Secretary performs such duties, and exercises such powers, as the Secretary shall direct. If confirmed, I look forward to establishing a close relationship with the Under Secretary and to working with him to achieve the Secretary's goals.

Question. The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy.
Answer. The Assistant Secretaries of the Navy work with the Under Secretary to achieve the Secretary's goals. Like the Under Secretary, the Assistant Secretaries perform such duties, and exercises such powers, as the Secretary shall direct. If confirmed, I will work with the Assistant Secretaries to achieve the Secretary's goals.

Question. The General Counsel of the Navy.
Answer. The General Counsel of the Navy serves as legal advisor to the Department of the Navy and performs such functions as the Secretary of the Navy shall direct and necessary to provide for the proper application of the law and effective delivery of legal services within the Department. If confirmed, I will work closely with the General Counsel to achieve the Secretary's goals.

Question. The Judge Advocate General of the Navy.
Answer. Under 10 U.S.C. §5148(d), the Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the Navy performs duties relating to any and all Department of Navy legal matters assigned to him by SECNAV. The JAG provides and supervises the provision of all legal advice and related services throughout the Department of the Navy, except for the advice and services provided by the General Counsel. It is important that the CNO receive independent legal advice from his senior uniformed judge advocates. If confirmed, I will work closely with the JAG and seek the JAG's legal advice.

Question. The Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Answer. A unique historical and operational relationship exists between the Navy and the Marine Corps. Many of our capabilities, programs, and personnel issues are inextricably linked. Our forces deploy together, and both must be ready on arrival. If confirmed as CNO, my relationship with the Commandant of the Marine Corps must be exceptionally close and I will be committed to making every facet of the Navy-Marine Corps team stronger.

Question. The Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force.
Answer. Our Armed Forces must work together to recognize each other's strengths and to complement each other's capabilities. We must achieve and maintain synergy in warfare, training, and procurement to ensure each Service contributes optimally to Joint and combined operations. If confirmed, I am committed to working with my counterparts to enhance Joint interoperability and other aspects of the joint relationship in order to improve the warfighting capabilities of the United States.

Question. The combatant commanders.
Answer. The CNO's responsibility as a Service Chief is to provide properly organized, trained, and equipped forces to the combatant commanders to accomplish their military missions. If confirmed, I will work to foster close working relationships with the unified and specified combatant commanders.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the next CNO?
Answer. The major focus of the next CNO must be to maintain current readiness and provide ready, capable forces; to define and deliver a relevant naval force for the future; and to ensure we recruit and retain those military and civilian personnel who seek to serve our country in the U.S. Navy. The preeminent challenge is balancing these three priorities in a fiscally constrained environment. Each focus area has its own challenges and opportunities.

Maintaining Current Readiness. We are continually generating forces for the current fight and employing our Navy much differently than in years past. We are simultaneously providing ready naval forces and personnel for Joint Force Commanders, sustaining forward presence and fulfilling commitments to allies in other vital regions, and responding to increasing demands in regions where we have not routinely operated, specifically South America and Africa. Being ready and responsive to carrying out a range of missions demands new approaches to delivering operational availability at best cost.

Future Force. The means and methods of conflict and the security environment undergo constant change. Technology and asymmetric approaches are advancing
rapidly. Our view of the future must address strategic trends and not be captured by the status quo. Our ships, submarines, aircraft, weapons, and networks must outpace potential adversaries. The cost of future systems and the ability of our overall acquisition processes to pace the speed of technological innovation is increasingly challenging our ability to deliver a balanced force.

People. Our people are the foundation for all we do. The demographics, attitudes, and expectations of our population are changing and we must understand that dynamic. We are seeing that influencers (parents, counselors, friends) are having more of an impact on individual choices. Competition for talent in today’s professional marketplace is intense. Attracting and retaining a diverse, high-quality Total Force of military and civilians must remain our highest priority.

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I will remain committed to warfighting readiness to ensure we remain agile, capable, and ready forward. I will continue to employ our Fleet Response Plan to increase operational availability of our traditional forces, and I will pay particular attention to individual readiness as we continue to support the current fight.

There is no question that our acquisition programs will be under great pressure; therefore, to build the right forces for tomorrow we must be exacting in developing requirements, mindful of the factors that increase cost and committed to working with the acquisition community and our Joint partners in doing all we can to be effective, efficient, and timely in delivering future capability. Also, I will continue to strengthen initiatives of the Navy Enterprise to identify efficiencies and produce maximum cost savings Navy-wide, while continuing to ensure our Navy remains strong, effective, and relevant.

We must size our force and implement policies so the young men and women of our country see opportunity and achieve personal and professional fulfillment by serving in our Navy. The competition for people necessitates that we put in place policies that advantage us and address the many rewards of service. We must be unwavering in our obligation to take care of sailors and their families who suffer the effects of combat.

MOST SERIOUS PROBLEMS

Question. What do you consider to be the most serious problems in the execution of the functions of the CNO?

Answer. In my view, the most serious problems the next CNO will face in executing his duties are: (1) properly balancing current resources allocated to sustain, train, and equip the Navy; (2) obtaining the necessary resources to build and man the future Navy; and (3) ensuring continuity among requirements, resourcing, and acquisition in the existing planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process.

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with my Navy senior leadership team, my fellow Service Chiefs, the Chairman of the JCS, the Secretary of the Navy, and through him, the SECDEF and Congress to develop balanced, fiscally-responsible approaches to addressing and solving these problems.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. Section 5033 of title 10, U.S.C., requires the CNO to have had significant experience in joint duty assignments, including at least one full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment as a flag officer.

What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

Answer. I believe that the breadth and depth of my experience as a naval officer and joint warfighter qualifies me for this position. I have had the privilege of six commands in the Pacific and Atlantic, which form a solid operational foundation. I have served in several Joint flag positions: Commander, Second Fleet and Commander, NATO Striking Fleet; Deputy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command; Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet and Commander, Joint Task Force 519. I am serving currently as Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command responsible for the Navy’s Global Force Management and support to three combatant commanders. Further, I have completed four assignments at Navy headquarters, including a tour as the Navy’s Chief of Legislative Affairs. My tour as Commandant of Midshipmen, U.S. Naval Academy provided insight into naval education and training and the development of officers as leaders in our Navy and Marine Corps.
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

**Question.** In May of this year, President Bush issued a statement urging the Senate to act favorably on U.S. accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. Officials of the DOD, including the previous CNO, have advocated for accession to the Convention.

Do you support United States accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** How would you respond to critics of the Convention who assert that accession is not in the national security interests of the United States?

**Answer.** I believe that accession to the Law of the Sea Convention is in our national security interests. The basic tenets of the Convention are clear and beneficial to the Navy. From the right of unimpeded transit passage through straits used for international navigation and reaffirming the sovereign immunity of our warships, to providing a framework for countering excessive claims of other states and preserving the right to conduct military activities in exclusive economic zones, the Convention provides the stable, predictable, and recognized legal regime we need to conduct our operations today and in the future.

U.S. military forces must be able to operate freely on, under, and above the world’s oceans. That freedom is critical to our national security interests, the military in general, and the Navy in particular. The Law of the Sea Convention codifies fundamental benefits important to our operating forces as they train, transit, and fight. Amendments made to the convention in the 1990s addressed many of the concerns that opponents have expressed. Also, joining the convention will not subject the U.S. Navy to the jurisdiction of international courts, nor will it adversely affect the President’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) or United States intelligence activities.

The convention is the bedrock legal instrument underpinning public order for the world’s oceans. By joining the convention, we can best assert our leadership in oceans law and policy, and in conjunction with our Freedom of Navigation program, we can best protect the navigational rights and freedoms that are of such critical importance to our Nation’s security and economic prosperity.

**TRANSFORMATION**

**Question.** If confirmed, you would play an important role in the process of transforming the Navy to meet new and emerging threats. What are your goals regarding Navy transformation?

**Answer.** Transformation is never complete; it is a constant process and attitude. Our new Maritime Strategy and our ongoing transformation efforts, within the framework of Seapower 21, guide the Navy’s future direction. I believe we are already making great strides in developing the capabilities we will need in coming years. Areas of particular interest include cyberspace, unmanned systems, and Maritime Domain Awareness. As we transform our warfighting models and concepts, we must correspondingly evolve our recruiting, training, and retention efforts. All require the highest degree of coordination with the other Services.

**FLEET RESPONSE PLAN**

**Question.** The Fleet Response Plan has been implemented to provide a surge capability for “presence with a purpose.” In a report issued in November 2005, the Government Accountability Office found that the Navy had not fully tested and evaluated the Fleet Response Plan. In addition, there have been some reports indicating sailors’ dissatisfaction with unpredictability in the new deployment schedules. What strengths and weaknesses have you perceived to date with the implementation of the Fleet Response Plan?

**Answer.** The Fleet Response Plan (FRP) has many strengths. The FRP enables the Navy to increase operational availability and generate more forward presence on short notice than was possible in the past. It allows the Navy to respond to global events more robustly with a disciplined, deliberate process to ensure continuous availability of trained, ready Navy forces. The FRP allows the Navy to identify clearly the surge forces ready to respond to Maritime Security, Theater Security Cooperation, Homeland Defense, Major Combat Operations, or Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations.

That said, the FRP rollout strategy did not initially provide a timely, detailed explanation and evaluation of key management metrics to our sailors. Accordingly, in August 2006, the CNO issued more definitive FRP guidance. In my current capacity, I expanded that guidance and I remain focused on effectively communicating the
key elements of the FRP throughout the Navy. I am confident that the FRP is both viable and appropriate to meet the challenges today and tomorrow.

Question. After a FRP surge, do you feel there is sufficient ship maintenance and repair capability in the public and private sectors to quickly reconstitute the force?

Answer. Yes, there is sufficient maintenance and repair capability to fulfill the Navy's maintenance and repair requirements for reconstituting the force after a surge. After the initial surge for Operation Iraqi Freedom, and enabled by funding from Congress, the public and private sector demonstrated ample capacity for ship repair.

Question. Would that assessment change if the Navy were confronted with several back-to-back surge demands?

Answer. No, the assessment would not change as long as the overall FRP cycle lengths did not change dramatically and severe damage was not incurred by a significant number of ships.

ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT

Question. Do you see a need for any change in the role of the Office of the CNO in the requirements determination, resource allocation, or acquisition management processes of the Department of the Navy?

Answer. From my perspective, the role of the CNO in the requirements determination and resource allocation process is clear and appropriate. While the current cooperation among the CNO and acquisition officials is good, it should not be personality dependent. Service Chiefs should have a more formal role in acquisition management to ensure continuity among the requirements, resourcing and acquisition processes.

Question. Do you see a need for any change in the structure or functions of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) or the role played by the CNO and the Vice CNO in the JROC?

Answer. I do not. I have not yet been involved in the JROC process but I look forward to participating. If confirmed, and after I have participated in the process, I will recommend changes as appropriate.

RECAPITALIZING THE FLEET

Question. Despite the fact that Navy leadership has determined that it needs to have a 313-ship fleet to meet the maritime requirements of the National Military Strategy, it is currently operating with 277 battle force ships. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has concluded that the Navy has underestimated the costs for building the 313-ship fleet by approximately 30 percent. Additionally, the Navy has acknowledged an approaching strike-fighter gap which may range from 50 to 220 aircraft (the range depending on the procurement rate for Joint Strike Fighter aircraft and the service’s ability to extend the service life for F/A–18 C/D and E/F aircraft).

Do you agree with the CBO’s assessment that there is significant cost risk associated with the Navy’s shipbuilding plan?

Answer. Estimating and controlling costs associated with far-term warfighting requirements are always challenging. As cost estimates are refined, the Navy may need to make adjustments to these important programs.

Question. What actions do you believe are necessary to execute the Navy's shipbuilding plan within the Navy's budget estimates?

Answer. The Navy's shipbuilding plan recognizes the need for exacting requirements and cost control methods, which can only be achieved in partnership with industry. The Navy continues to evaluate each ship class and identify cost reduction opportunities while balancing warfighting requirements, costs, and industrial base realities.

The Navy is committed to stable out-year procurement that industry can use to anticipate workload. This allows industry to commit resources, create efficiencies, and decrease the end-cost of Navy ships. The Navy plans greater use of contract incentives to contribute to real cost containment in future shipbuilding plans. In addition, the Navy plans to pursue other areas for improvement in the acquisition workforce and organization to strengthen the foundations of the Navy's shipbuilding efforts. As we build the future Fleet, discipline will be required of all stakeholders to ensure success of the plan.

Question. How would you characterize the risks to mission performance posed by the current shortfall in battle force ships and the growing shortfall in tactical aircraft?

Answer. While the current risk is manageable in the near term, the Navy's 313-ship force is needed to meet warfighting demands in 2020. These demands include
Conventional Campaigns Major Combat Operations (MCOs), war on terror/irregular warfare, and homeland defense.

The Navy’s strike-fighter shortfall will not manifest itself until the 2016 timeframe and is not impacting the Navy’s ability to meet current combatant commander requirements.

**Question.** What adjustments to the respective programs are necessary and appropriate to reduce that operational risk?

**Answer.** To achieve Navy’s desired capability and capacity and to minimize operational risk, we are reducing types and models of ships, maximizing reuse of ship designs and components, and employing a business model that encourages the use of open architecture and mission systems modularity.

Similarly, our aviation plan balances aviation capabilities through cost-wise investments in recapitalization, sustainment, and modernization programs. Future Navy strike-fighter shortfalls will be mitigated through inventory optimization and possible additional procurement in POM–10.

In all areas, we will continue to work closely with our partners in industry to control requirements and costs, and provide the industrial base the stability it needs to become more productive.

**Question.** What further adjustments would you consider if the Navy’s program comes under further pressure due to cost growth?

**Answer.** In the face of the rising cost of naval ships and aviation procurements, the Navy has increased its efforts to reduce costs, improve its requirements estimation capability, and seek alternative, lower cost solutions. Absent that, top-line relief may be required.

**ALTERNATIVE FINANCING METHODS FOR SHIPBUILDING**

**Question.** Navy leaders have testified that alternative financing methods must be found for shipbuilding.

What are your views and recommendations on the benefits and feasibility of alternative financing methods, such as incremental funding and advance appropriations?

**Answer.** It is the Navy’s policy to fully fund the cost of shipbuilding programs in the year of contract award. However, there are instances when alternative financing methods for ships should be used, such as advance procurement and incremental funding for large capital ships. It is advantageous to begin detail design in advance procurement rather than in the year of full funding to allow maturation of the design before construction begins. Advance procurement can lead to construction efficiencies and less rework due to fewer design changes. These financing methods must be used judiciously to preserve budget discipline.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the long-term impact of such alternative financing methods on the availability of funds for shipbuilding?

**Answer.** Alternative financing methods allow the Navy to maintain the shipbuilding industrial base through more efficient management of shipbuilding and conservation, Navy total obligational authority, provide greater flexibility in executing scarce resources, and help avoid individual-year funding spikes. Whenever possible, the Navy remains committed to following the full-funding policy.

**ATTACK SUBMARINE FORCE LEVELS**

**Question.** The Navy’s most recent statement of requirements for attack submarine force levels was 48 attack submarines. However, the Navy projects that the number of attack submarines will fall as low as 40 boats and remain below the 48-boat requirement for more than a decade. The Navy is now claiming that it will be able to mitigate this shortage using three techniques: (1) building the new Virginia class submarines faster by reducing the time between the start of construction to delivery from the current level of 86 months for the last boat to deliver to a level of 60 months; (2) extending the life of some boats currently in the fleet from 3 to 24 months; and (3) increasing the length of deployments. By using a combination of these measures, the Navy claims that it will be able to maintain no less than 42 boats in the force and will be able to maintain the current level of commitments to the combatant commanders (roughly 10 boats continuously on deployment).

What is your assessment of whether the three techniques listed above will yield a number of deployed attack submarines sufficient to meet the requirements of the combatant commanders and other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance needs?

**Answer.** The Navy has formulated options that can mitigate some of the risk caused by having less than 48 attack submarines (SSNs) from 2020 through 2033. These options include reducing submarine build-time, extending the hull life of selected submarines, and increasing the length of some submarine deployments. These
measures would enable the Navy to maintain no less than 44 SSNs, which would provide about 10 forward deployed “SSN years” annually. Despite the fact that attack submarine force levels will be less than the required 48 SSNs from 2020 to 2033, the Navy should be able to meet the combatant commanders’ critical forward presence requests and maintain a warfighting surge capability with acceptable risk.

**NAVY/MARINE CORPS INTRANET AND NEXT GENERATION ENTERPRISE NETWORK PROGRAM**

**Question.** What is your assessment of the status of the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) program and the ability of that program to meet the Department of Navy’s information technology needs? I have recently served in three major headquarters that used NMCI. I believe NMCI has decidedly improved the Navy’s cyber-security posture. Are you satisfied with the efforts to date to establish the Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN) program?

**Answer.** The actions taken to date are appropriate for a program of such importance to the Navy and Marine Corps. A requirements Task Force has been established under the direction of the Department of the Navy Chief Information Officer (DON CIO), OPMN N6 and Headquarters Marine Corps Command, Control, Communications and Computers (HQMC C4). The Task Force has drafted an initial requirements document that will be reviewed by Fleet Commanders and stakeholders. The acquisition for the follow-on to NMCI will commence after requirements are approved.

**Question.** What significant lessons learned do you think that the Navy should draw from NMCI as it scopes and structures the NGEN program?

**Answer.** We have learned many lessons from the implementation and operation of NMCI. First and foremost, IT is critical to both our warfighting and business processes. In addition, networks require alignment of enterprise resources and requirements, not just IT resources. Systems must have rapidly adaptable architectures, improved interoperability, options for increased collaboration, and increased remote accessibility. Our networks must be secure, yet our information assurance processes should not be onerous to users. The ability to incorporate new technology through the life of the contract with appropriate technical refresh must be assured.

**SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM**

**Question.** The budget request for defense Science and Technology (S&T) still falls short of the Defense Science Board’s recommended goal of dedicating 3 percent of the total defense budget to S&T. In particular, the Navy S&T program, especially the investment in long-term, innovative work which has been so successful in confronting emerging threats, has declined significantly since the fiscal year 2006 request.

If confirmed, what metrics would you use to assess whether the Navy is investing adequately in S&T programs?

**Answer.** There are three key components to an effective S&T program: a strong investment in basic and early applied research to build the scientific foundation for future technologies; an emphasis on key “game changing” initiatives that provide technological advantage to the Navy and Marine Corps warfighter; and a critical focus on transitioning S&T programs to the acquisition community and the fleet. The metrics, therefore, are the balance of investment across these three components, the rate of transition of deployable S&T products, and the success of S&T products in precluding technological surprise by potential adversaries.

**Question.** How would you assess the value and appropriate investment level for basic research programs?

**Answer.** I believe that a strong investment in basic research programs is necessary to ensure we can maintain our advantages into the future. In my recent assignments, I have not dealt with investment decisions for basic research programs. If confirmed, I will assess our investment levels to ensure we derive the needed benefit from our S&T programs.

**TECHNICAL WORKFORCE**

**Question.** A significant challenge facing the Navy today is an impending shortage of high quality scientific and engineering talent to work at Navy laboratories and technical centers.

In your view, what are the pros and cons of having Active-Duty Navy personnel trained and working as scientists and engineers within the Navy research and acquisition system?
Answer. There is significant advantage in having current warfighting experience within the research and acquisition process for future naval systems. The demands on Navy officers to meet the required expertise in their Navy warfare areas, and our growing need to develop officers with the requisite joint skills, may make this arrangement very challenging. If confirmed, I will continue efforts to identify specific needs and provide opportunities for select personnel to work in Navy labs and technical centers.

TEST AND EVALUATION ISSUES

Question. What do you see as the role of the developmental and operational test and evaluation communities with respect to rapid acquisition, spiral acquisition, and other evolutionary acquisition processes?

Answer. Developmental and operational test and evaluation communities are critical to reducing development risk and to providing Navy leadership the performance information needed to make good acquisition, fielding, and deployment decisions.

Question. Are you satisfied with the Navy’s test and evaluation capabilities? In which areas, if any, do you feel the Navy should be developing new test and evaluation capabilities?

Answer. I am satisfied with the Navy’s test and evaluation capabilities. However, our test and evaluation organization and processes must not be outpaced by the speed of technological advance.

MILITARY-TO-CIVILIAN CONVERSIONS

Question. The Services have been engaged in a multiyear effort to eliminate thousands of military billets and replace them with civilian employees or contractor personnel. The Navy has been the most aggressive service in targeting health profession billets for military-to-civilian conversions. If confirmed, how would you anticipate using military-to-civilian conversions to shape the future force of the Navy.

Answer. The Navy continually reviews military billets to determine which billets require the unique skills of a sailor and which billets can best be filled as effectively, and at lower cost, by a civilian or by private industry.

The results of these analyses will be used to ensure that sailors continue to have viable and rewarding career paths, and that we continue to support the Fleet with an appropriate mix of civilian and uniformed professionals. If confirmed, I will continue these efforts.

Question. If confirmed, what metrics would you establish to measure the effectiveness of this management tool, and how would you determine if and when DOD civilian employees and private contractors could perform work in a more efficient or cost-effective manner?

Answer. The effectiveness of the Navy’s military-to-civilian conversion efforts must ultimately be measured by the degree to which they meet the following criteria: maintaining or improving Fleet readiness; the collective capability and competence of our Total Force; and overall cost savings.

Question. How would you measure the impact of such conversions on readiness?

Answer. Warfighting capability and readiness will be assessed using existing metrics and methods of assessment applied across the Fleet by the operational commander.

Question. If confirmed, how would you assess the quality and supply of civilian physicians, dentists, and nurses to replace military personnel, and their willingness to serve in the Federal civilian workforce?

Answer. If confirmed, my measures would be the quality of care provided to our sailors and families; whether those health professionals are meeting standards for training, certification, and licensure; and our recruiting and retention statistics on the civilian personnel that work in our medical system.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. The Navy will play an important role in defending the Nation against the threat of long range ballistic missile attack and in defending allies, friends, and deployed forces against theater ballistic missile threats. Do you view ballistic missile defense as a core Navy mission?

Answer. Yes, I believe the Navy’s ability to provide ballistic missile defense will be increasingly important to Joint warfighting now and in the future.

Question. What plans does the Navy have for testing the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System?

Answer. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is currently charged with testing of the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System (ABMD) for the Defense Department.
Under this construct, the Navy will continue testing the Aegis SM-3 missile defense capability under the current agreement with MDA, providing full-time commitment of an Aegis cruiser to the Testing and Evaluation (T&E) role. Additionally, the Navy plans to modify other Aegis ships to conduct MDA missions when required.

**Question.** Are you satisfied with the current rate of production for the SM-3?

**Answer.** Yes; however, I believe the current rate of production is the minimum prudent rate.

**Question.** When will the Navy, vice the Missile Defense Agency, begin acquisition of SM-3 missiles?

**Answer.** There is no approved plan for the Navy to begin acquisition of SM-3 missiles.

### NAVY END STRENGTH

**Question.** The department’s proposed budget for fiscal year 2008 includes an Active-Duty end strength of 328,400, which include a reduction of 12,300 sailors. The end strength requested for the Navy Reserve is 67,800, which includes a reduction of 3,500 sailors.

Based on the manpower demands needed to fight the global war on terrorism, including significant Active-Duty increases for the Army and Marine Corps, do you think that these reductions in personnel in the Navy continue to be warranted?

**Answer.** The Navy has been able to capitalize on efficiencies to accomplish the manpower reductions to date while meeting operational demands. We are quickly approaching the limits of those efficiencies and the number of manpower reductions should begin to level out.

I am confident that the Navy has thoroughly analyzed current and future manpower requirements in developing its manpower force structure. The reductions we have taken to date have been made possible by integrating a Total Force manpower solution, leveraging technology on new platforms, reducing manpower intensive platforms, and finding efficiencies in training and infrastructure including identifying work that is no longer required and applying civilian substitutions to non-military essential work.

**Question.** How do the proposed cuts in end strength take into account the support requirements associated with the planned increases in Marine Corps end strength?

**Answer.** Navy end strength includes increases to the Fleet Marine Force that provides direct support for the new USMC operational unit growth. In addition, resources were added to the Navy portion of the Defense Health Program to provide medical benefits to the increased number of Marines and their families.

**Question.** Do you view the additional 698 Active-Duty personnel added by the House in H.R. 1585 as necessary to ensure Navy medical personnel are available in adequate numbers to support Active and Reserve component personnel, retirees, and their family members?

**Answer.** The health care mission to support military personnel, retirees, and their family members can be fully met without the additional 698 Active-Duty medical personnel proposed by H.R. 1585. The additional 698 end strength would restore 209 military end strength previously identified as military-to-civilian conversions. The restoration of the 209 military end strength is not required to support either the operational or health benefit mission of Navy Medicine. This end strength has previously been identified as “non-military” essential and funding has been provided to hire the necessary civilian personnel to ensure the health benefit mission is met.

The remaining 489 positions that H.R. 1585 addresses were divestitures due to an overall Active-Duty reduction to Navy personnel. Consequently, the health benefit mission to Active-Duty Forces has decreased and can be met with current personnel levels. The reduction of 489 positions did not impact any operational mission requirements.

### NAVY RESERVE

**Question.** What is your vision for the roles and missions of the Navy Reserve, and, if confirmed, what objectives would you seek to achieve with respect to the Navy Reserve’s organization, end strength, and force structure?

**Answer.** As demonstrated through force generation, deployment and redeployment, Reserve component forces meet two significant needs of our Navy: (1) they provide capability and capacity in support of Major Combat Operations; and (2) they provide operational augmentation to meet routine military mission requirements. As such, we must maintain the role of the Reserve component as our Strategic Baseline, and we should capitalize on the ability of the Reserve component to provide Operational Support in a predictable and periodic manner.
To best employ our Reserve component, we must align organizationally and fiscally to realize the full value of the Reserve component that can meet Operational Support missions.

The optimal size of the Navy Reserve is a function of capacity and capabilities in the Active Force. We must ensure that the right capabilities reside in the appropriate components and that components are fully complementary. We must periodically review and validate Reserve component capabilities in alignment with our working Active/Reserve Integration (ARI) model. We must then recruit and retain individuals with the required skills, in appropriate numbers, to support Navy strategies and Operational Support requirements.

DEFENSE OFFICER PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT ACT

Question. The Navy has requested authorization for additional Active-Duty officers in excess of Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) limits in the grades of lieutenant commander, commander, and captain even as significant reductions in end strength are being implemented.

What is the rationale for increasing the number of Navy control grade officers, and do you anticipate that additional increases will be required in the future?

Answer. Navy needs a flexible tool that allows rapid adjustments as requirements change. While aggregate Navy end strength and total officer end strength continue to decline, the need for more senior and experienced officers, as a percent of the officer corps, continues to escalate. The current DOPMA tables worked well for a fleet with large ships and large crews and predominantly multi-seat aircraft. But ships with smaller crews and more single seat aircraft result in a need for fewer junior officers, as a percentage, in our operational units. At the same time, Joint education and billet requirements (Joint and non-Joint) are increasing the demand for DOPMA-controlled officers.

The Navy has been operating at or near DOPMA limits for several years but at the cost of suppressing the grade requirement of over 500 billets. Detailing to the true requirement of some billets and meeting individual augmentee demands has created an effective shortage of DOPMA-controlled officers. A solution to this shortage is the requested DOPMA relief that would allow promotion to the true demand. Additionally, the Chief of Naval Personnel is evaluating community management practices, officer force shaping policies, and special and incentive pays. These practices will better align Navy control grade officer strength with today’s operational trends while increasing retention of officers reaching critical career decision points. The DOPMA relief requested is adequate to cover current needs and provides headroom to accommodate anticipated future growth.

Question. What changes to DOPMA or other statutory provisions affecting Navy officer personnel management (including flag officers) are needed or, at a minimum, should be considered?

Answer. I am grateful that both the Senate and House have included, in their respective versions of the National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2008, our request for a 5 percent across-the-board increase in DOPMA control grades. Enactment of this provision will allow Navy to gradually ease suppression of over 500 control grade billets, thereby enhancing readiness as we begin filling those billets with the officers possessing the right skills and experience required by those billets. It also provides modest additional headspace to permit us to address emerging control grade growth in support of joint, combatant commander, and other Service support requirements. Navy is continuing to explore options to retain more senior and experienced officers on Active-Duty.

Question. What changes in law or policy with respect to numbers of senior enlisted personnel and their training, education, and utilization are needed in your judgment?

Answer. I am pleased the Senate version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 includes a provision to increase the upper limit on the authorized daily average of Active-Duty enlisted members in pay grades E–9 from 1 to 1.25 percent of the enlisted force. This change would increase the maximum limit for personnel in the combined pay grades E–8 and E–9 to 3.75 percent and would allow the Navy to best meet our needs.

This change addresses challenges that require a Total Force composed of senior, well-educated, motivated, and competent people who can adapt to the many demands of future missions. If enacted, it will allow us to meet our needs for managing our senior enlisted personnel.
**Q** What is your assessment of the impact on Active-Duty and Reserve officers of the newly implemented Joint Qualification System (JQS)? Do you think additional changes in law or regulation are needed?

**A** When the JQS is implemented on 1 October 2007, it will recognize the skills that support U.S. military response to national security threats, interagency coordination, combat operations, and humanitarian crises. It will also account for the intensity, environment, and duration or frequency of a joint experience. A key change will be the ability to award credit to Reserve component officers, previously not allowed.

The JQS provides the opportunity to create and sustain the largest possible pool of fully-qualified and inherently joint leaders suitable for joint command and staff responsibilities in both the Active-Duty and Reserve components.

The new JQS is being implemented in spirals over the next 3 fiscal years. Additional changes in law or regulation should only be considered after full implementation of JQS.

**Q** In your view, are the requirements associated with becoming a Joint Qualified Officer, including links to promotion to general and flag officer rank, consistent with the operational and professional demands of Navy line officers?

**A** We have made solid progress in policy initiatives linking career progression and joint management policies within Navy line officer career paths. Navy will plan for, prepare, and assign high quality line officers to joint billets. We are creating a pool of well qualified line officers who are fully qualified and inherently Joint leaders suitable for joint command and staff responsibilities. We are meeting our joint promotion objectives and we are filling our joint assignments and JPME seats with our best and our brightest. Navy acknowledges its responsibility to produce skilled joint leaders, tested in their Service’s roles, missions and capabilities, and we are aggressively executing this responsibility.

**SELECTIVE EARLY RETIREMENT AUTHORITY**

**Q** The Navy has requested that Congress reinstate enhanced authority for selective early retirement. What changes in existing law, if any, regarding selective early retirement, are needed in your view?

**A** Although the Navy does not routinely use Selective Early Retirement (SER) as one of its primary force shaping tools, its employment may become necessary as the Navy transforms to meet future warfighting requirements. The extension of 10 U.S.C. 638a, Expanded SER, would allow the Navy to effectively and efficiently manage potential force structure changes without requiring the excessive accession reductions used in the 1990s to meet end strength controls. The Expanded SER would allow the Service Secretary to identify groups of officers to be considered for early retirement by year group or specialty within a competitive category, or any combination of those identifiers. Current SER authority does not provide for the identification of groups narrower than an entire competitive category to be considered. The expanded authority is an important force management tool for shaping the force to meet current and future requirements.

**REBALANCING FORCES**

**Q** In a memorandum dated July 9, 2003, the SECDEF directed action by the Services, the Joint Staff, and the Office of the SECDEF aimed at achieving better balance in the capabilities of the Active and Reserve components. The Secretary noted that the Department “needs to promote judicious and prudent use of the Reserve components with force rebalancing initiatives that reduce strain through the efficient application of manpower and technological solutions based on a disciplined force requirements process.”

What progress has the Navy made in achieving the Secretary’s vision?

**A** We have effectively completed the initial rebalancing efforts called for in the SECDEF’s memorandum. Between fiscal year 2003 and fiscal year 2006 the Navy rebalanced over 33,000 spaces both within and between the Active and Reserve components. Within that time, the Navy created the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), which is evolving into a relevant force for pre-conflict and reconstruction operations and is an important dimension in the war on terrorism. The ratio of the Active-Duty to Reserve personnel within NECC is nearly 1:1 (Active component 48 percent; Reserve component 52 percent).

Navy’s robust planning, programming, and budgeting processes and the focused efforts of our Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education (MPTE) Enterprise
allow us to continuously review the force, ensuring that we have the right mix of Active-Duty, Reserve, government civilian employees, and contractors to achieve mission success.

*Question.* What do you consider to be the biggest continuing obstacles to achieving the goals that the SECDEF has set forth in his memorandum?

*Answer.* The biggest obstacles to achieving the goals that the SECDEF has set forth are the changing security environment and the changing demographic from which we recruit. If confirmed, I am committed to taking those steps needed to ensure we have access to the full range of our Nation’s talent.

**INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES AND “IN LIEU OF” MISSIONS**

*Question.* Secretary Winter, in his written testimony for the Navy Posture Hearing earlier this year, stated that there were, at that time, more than 8,000 sailors deployed in the Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Operations as Individual Augmentees (IAs) and 4,500 sailors performing “in lieu of” missions. Will the Navy continue to be able to support these nontraditional assignments as it draws down its end strength?

*Answer.* Navy will be able to support augmentation assignments under its current personnel inventory reduction plan. The majority of Navy billets that are in the most demand for augmentation assignments are not being eliminated. A careful review of specific active duty skill areas, such as Seabees and Intelligence personnel, resulted in measures to retain those specific billets and highly trained personnel. U.S. Fleet Forces is using a Fleet IA Capacity Model to help calculate a community’s ability to source IA requirements. The Navy’s intent is to deploy task-organized units rather than individual or small group IAs in the future.

*Question.* What are the criteria being applied to determine which Active-Duty and Reserve officers and enlisted personnel are assigned duty as individual augmentees?

*Answer.* We take into account several factors when selecting members to source augmentation requirements and Reserve mobilizations; specifically, skills identified during coordination of the Joint sourcing plan for “in lieu of” and “ad-hoc” missions. The combatant commander identifies the required skills (MOS, experience, etc) in the Unit Request Form (URF) and/or the Request for Forces (RFF) documents that are submitted to the Joint Staff. Through the Naval Personnel Development Command, we can determine which specific Navy designator/rating or Navy Enlisted Classification System code (NEC) best meets the required skills. We then work with appropriate commands to identify and plan additional training required to meet the specific joint mission and the unique skill identified by the supported component commander. Most positions tasked to Navy require basic skills in supply, administration, engineering, medical or intelligence. After establishing the required skills, volunteers are given priority. Members must have the proper rating/designator and possess the required skills, experience, clearance, and subspecialty (if required). Additionally, all requirements are filled taking into consideration the member’s professional and personal circumstances and any potential readiness impact on the sourcing commands.

Active-Duty Personnel Specifics: Individuals are selected by their parent commands. U.S. Fleet Forces Command is responsible for assigning appropriate tasking across all Navy commands. Navy major commands are assigned requirements to fill augmentation requests, which are then passed to subordinate commands to identify augmentees. Commands first seek volunteers and then make assignments based on skill requirements.

Reserve Personnel Specifics: Volunteer drilling reservists who have not been previously mobilized are considered first, followed by previously identified sailors who were deferred/delayed but are now available. After volunteers have been considered, nonvolunteers assigned to supporting Reserve units (if applicable) and who have not been previously mobilized are considered, then finally the applicable community managers are asked to nominate qualified sailors. In addition to skill requirements, other factors considered when selecting a sailor include experience, Expiration of Active Obligated Service, and Mobilization Availability Status (MAB) codes. Our Navy Reserve alongside our Active component sailors are providing integrated operational expertise to support a full range of operations.

*Question.* How do these assignments impact Navy readiness?

*Answer.* Navy’s current readiness remains excellent. Congressional support has been critical in this regard and, as a result, Navy units and individual augmentees deploy properly trained and properly equipped. I believe that the current level of effort is sustainable. Currently, augmentation numbers represent approximately 3 percent of the Total Force, 2 percent of the Active-Duty component force, and 4 percent of the Reserve component force. Fleet manning projections and readiness indi-
cators are continuously assessed. Navy Personnel Command has undertaken a series of regular surveys and assessments to monitor indications that the increased deployment/workload demands may be adversely impacting retention or the health of the Force.

**TRICARE FEE INCREASES**

*Question.* In May 2007, the Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care issued an interim report concluding that “to sustain and improve military health care benefits for the long run, actions must be taken now to adjust the system in the most cost-effective ways.” The Task Force recommended increasing the portion of the costs borne by retirees under age 65, and suggested an increase in military retired pay to offset part or all of the increase if Congress believes that the increases are too large relative to retired pay.

*Do you agree with the view that TRICARE fees for military retirees should be increased?*

*Answer.* We must be very careful not to erode the confidence of the men and women who serve in the United States Armed Forces and our military retirees. We must continue to provide them with the healthcare to which they are entitled while seeking ways to deliver healthcare benefits in a flexible, effective, and cost-efficient manner. The fees associated with the TRICARE plans should be balanced and fairly adjusted with no one group carrying an undue burden, including the taxpayer.

*Question.* What constraints, if any, should be imposed, in your view, on a retiree’s ability to use his or her TRICARE benefit?

*Answer.* Constraints should not be placed on a retiree’s ability to use his or her authorized TRICARE benefit. They should be afforded every opportunity to exercise their healthcare benefits within the established plan.

*Question.* What recommendations, if any, would you offer to address the increasing cost of health care and other personnel benefits?

*Answer.* Preventable chronic disease linked to lifestyle accounts for 75 percent of our health care costs. A strong emphasis on integration of health and wellness must be the foundation of an efficient healthcare system. Prevention programs such as tobacco cessation, weight management and mental and physical well being provide significant short and long term cost savings, as well as a more responsive force. Other opportunities to reduce costs include containing the growth of pharmacy costs by marketing the TRICARE Mail-Order Pharmacy (TMOP) and encouraging the use of generic medications when appropriate. The Navy should also continue improvement of our electronic health data system, AHLTA, to increase the productivity of our providers. Additionally, expanding and investing in telemedicine and telehealth capabilities would enable the use of healthcare resources in more remote locations.

*Question.* If confirmed, what role would you anticipate playing in any shaping or rethinking of health care benefits for military personnel, including retirees and their families?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will remain mindful of the challenges we face in healthcare, I will know the quality of care that our servicemembers and their families receive, and I will remain keenly focused on this issue so vital to readiness and the welfare of our sailors, retirees, and families.

*Question.* How would you assess the impact of such benefits and changes on recruitment and retention of military personnel?

*Answer.* Military personnel and their families, to include retirees, are strong advocates within our recruitment and retention efforts. The healthcare benefit is a strong recruiting and retention factor and we must ensure our benefits remain attractive within the overall U.S. labor market.

**SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY**

*Question.* In response to a congressional requirement for formulation of a comprehensive policy related to sexual assaults in the Armed Forces, the SECDEF has promulgated guidance aimed at more effectively preventing sexual assaults, investigating incidents of sexual assault, and responding to the needs of victims of sexual assault.

What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the Navy’s program for preventing sexual assaults and addressing the needs of victims of sexual assault?

*Answer.* Sexual assault is not tolerated in the Navy. When incidents occur, the Navy is committed to effective victim response and accountability for offenders. Prevention is our first priority, however when incidents occur, the Navy has a comprehensive reliable process in place to quickly respond to victims, offer reporting options, conduct a full and fair investigation, and hold offenders accountable. We must adhere to, assess and continually improve this process.
The senior leadership of the Navy communicated to each commanding officer the expectations regarding Sexual Assault Victim Intervention (SAVI) responsibilities and reporting compliance, and Navy policy provides clear succinct guidance. Training on sexual assault awareness and prevention is required and provided annually. Annual and periodic training is required for all key stakeholders of the SAVI program to include legal, medical, NCIS, and Chaplains. Training for sailors is included throughout our curricula, including RTC Great Lakes, the Naval Academy, and prospective commanding officer and executive officer courses.

Navy continually monitors resources for the SAVI program, has funded Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARC) positions to cover all installations (40 percent increase in positions since 2005), and trains Victim Advocates for all commands, both afloat and ashore. There is ongoing collaboration throughout the Navy to assess and improve the SAVI program and response to victims. Trained Victim Advocates respond quickly when incidents are reported to offer advocacy, medical, counseling, and military and civilian resources to victims. Each installation conducts monthly Sexual Assault Case Management Group meetings to review all unrestricted cases of sexual assault with key responders to address any systemic gaps or barriers.

Navy is fully engaged in collaboration and support of DOD Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) and Service Sexual Assault Prevention and Response programs. Commands transmit required incident reports promptly. Data collected on both restricted and unrestricted reports of sexual assault are forwarded to OSD SAPRO quarterly meeting data collection requirements and trend analysis with continual improvement in performance metrics.

Leaders are charged with remaining vigilant to the conditions that precipitate sexual assault and with being responsive to the needs of victims.

DEFENSE INCIDENT-BASED REPORTING SYSTEM

Question. Defense Incident-Based Reporting System (DIBRS) is an information technology system funded and managed by the Defense Manpower Data Center and required under DOD Directive 7730.47. It is intended to provide more comprehensive data on the incidence and types of crimes committed within the Armed Forces. The Department of the Navy is developing a Department of the Navy Criminal Justice Information System (DONCJIS) to satisfy DIBRS reporting requirements but has been unable to predict when the system will be fully operational.

What is the status of the Navy's implementation of DIBRS and DONCJIS?

Answer. Through DONCJIS, the Department will achieve full compliance with all aspects of the DIBRS reporting requirement. The Department has recently convened a Flag Officer-level Executive Steering Committee (ESC) to provide additional focus and oversight to the effort, with the goal of bringing the system to fruition in the near term. An upcoming ESC meeting will establish the final, target implementation date which is currently projected to be mid-fiscal year 2008.

Question. What utility do you see for Navy's senior leaders in having the information available through DIBRS?

Answer. The Department does not anticipate using the DIBRS reporting data directly. However, the data contained in DONCJIS will provide tremendous value to Naval leaders in better understanding critical trends affecting morale, safety, and readiness. In particular, the Department's Uniform Crime Report, and associated analytical products derived from DONCJIS, will provide more insight into the quantity and types of criminal activity throughout the Navy and Marine Corps. The richness of data available from DONCJIS, when fully deployed, will provide the Department's leadership with much better management oversight and actionable information than any other current DOD system.

INDEPENDENT LEGAL ADVICE

Question. In your past assignments, you have had the opportunity to observe the working relationship between the Navy General Counsel, the JAG of the Navy and judge advocates advising commanders in the field.

What is your view of the need for the JAG to provide independent legal advice to the CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps?

Answer. The CNO must receive independent advice from legal counsel. The law appropriately prohibits any officer or employee of the DOD from interfering with the JAG's independent legal advice to the Secretary of the Navy and the CNO. An independent, candid and trusted relationship among the JAG and CNO and the Commandant of the Marine Corps is essential to the proper functioning of their positions.
Question. What is your view of the responsibility of judge advocates within the Services and joint commands to provide independent legal advice to military commanders?

Answer. Judge advocates in all the Services are obligated to provide independent legal advice based on sound judgment and experience. Their loyalty is to the government of the United States, while simultaneously promoting the interests of their commander.

Commanders and commanding officers are obligated to discuss military justice concerns with their staff judge advocates. Independent legal advice to military commanders is the cornerstone of our military justice system and the foundation for maintenance of good order and discipline and accountability.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS

Question. The Navy is involved in civil litigation over its use of mid-frequency active sonar during training exercises and its impact on the environment. A U.S. District Court in California recently enjoined Navy’s use of mid-frequency active sonar in the Southern California at-sea training ranges through 2009 that impacted Navy training exercises needed to ensure readiness for deployment of Navy ships, submarines, and aircraft based on the west coast. On August 31, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted an emergency stay of the District Court’s injunction pending an appeal by the Navy.

What is the Navy doing to comply with environmental laws so it can continue to effectively train with mid-frequency active sonar?

Answer. In 2002, the Navy began implementation of a comprehensive, fully funded strategy to ensure compliance with applicable Federal laws. In close coordination with the National Marine Fisheries Service, we have developed an execution plan that will result in completion of full environmental documentation of all major Navy training and exercise areas. The process of completing this documentation, including the required analysis and public comment periods, is a multi-year effort. The end result will be compliance for our ranges and operating areas.

We have issued public Notices of Intent in the Federal Register to develop Environmental Impact Statements for twelve ranges and Operating areas. We expect to finalize these documents by the end of 2009. Once finalized, we will have fulfilled all legal requirements, including obtaining all necessary authorizations and completing all required consultations, for all training, including mid-frequency active sonar, for our at-sea ranges and operating areas.

Concurrent with implementing our long term strategy, in the interim, we have prepared environmental planning under the National Environmental Policy Act and have obtained Biological Opinions under the Endangered Species Act when necessary for all major exercises. These exercises and other major exercises through January 2009 will be conducted in compliance with the National Defense Exemption under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA). The process of obtaining Letters of Authorization under the MMPA is a several year effort; therefore the exemption was necessary in order to allow our major exercises to be conducted while the long term range and operating area documentation is prepared. The National Defense Exemption was part of the strategy developed with the National Marine Fisheries Service that allows both agencies to apply resources to the long-term plan.

During the exemption period, we will continue to employ stringent, scientifically based, mitigation measures, developed with National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s concurrence, to protect marine mammals during all sonar activities.

Despite our compliance plan, lawsuits have been filed concerning our Joint Task Force Exercises and Composite Training Unit Exercises occurring in the Southern California Operating Area and our Undersea Warfare Exercises occurring in the Hawaiian Islands Range Complex. We are working with the Department of Justice in addressing these lawsuits.

Continued training with active sonar is absolutely essential in protecting the lives of our sailors and marines and our Nation’s defense. Increasingly quiet diesel-electric submarines continue to proliferate throughout the world. Our Navy must train to counter diesel-electric submarines and to ensure our forces can locate, track, and defeat them. Active sonar is the primary system to accomplish this task.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the CNO?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

1. Senator KENNEDY. Admiral Roughead, the Navy testified before this committee that the concept for procurement of the next three surface combatant ships would be to bundle the research and development and then reuse systems across all three ships. The three ships, Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), DDG–1000, and CG(X) were described as the “family of ships.” This committee has been very supportive of that concept as we watch pressure on budgets and receive testimony on the open architecture nature of the DDG–1000 research and development program. However, it does not appear that the Navy is holding to its plan as we see two separate combat systems in the LCS, no firm path forward on CG(X) that will reuse DDG–1000 open architecture, hull, and main engineering and combat systems. Reusing systems and subsystems across a number of new development ships should save taxpayer dollars while meeting Navy requirements. How do you intend to influence the development requirements for these three ships to maximize the application of key DDG–1000 technologies across all three ship classes?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The Navy is benefiting from the “family of ships” approach through the reuse of systems and technologies across DDG–1000, CG(X) and LCS. The CG(X) is part of the family of ships with its program of record based on DDG–1000 features and technologies. The Analysis of Alternatives results are currently under review, but design ship decisions have not yet been finalized. The program is assessing the potential reuse of 9 of the 10 DDG–1000 critical technologies, including:

- Integrated Composite Deckhouse & Apertures
- Infrared Mockups
- Multi-Function Radar (MFR), a component of the Dual Band Radar (DBR)
- Peripheral Vertical Launch System (PVLS)/Advanced VLS
- Integrated Undersea Warfare (IUSW) System
- Hull Form
- Integrated Power System (IPS)
- Autonomic Fire Suppression System (AFSS)
- Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE)

The 10th DDG–1000 critical technology, the Advanced Gun System (AGS), is not currently in the CG(X) alternatives due to different mission requirements of the ships.

The Ship Self-Defense System (SSDS) is a combat system that integrates and coordinates the existing sensors and weapons systems aboard most classes of non-AEGIS ships. SSDS is maximizing reuse of the DDG–1000 Total Ship Computing Environment (TSCE) Infrastructure software. The SSDS Mk 2 Combat System has integrated software components of the DDG–1000 TSCE Infrastructure, planned for installation on LPD 17 and CVN 68 Class ships. The Navy will continue to promote the principles of Open Architecture as it moves forward with completion of DDG–1000 software development. All applicable software components related to the DDG–1000 critical technologies will be re-usable by CG(X), if implemented. Other key
DDG–1000 Combat System capabilities (i.e. MH–60R integration, 57 mm gun, Electronic Warfare (EW) System) will be evaluated as reuse candidates.

Regarding applicability to LCS, although the ship is complementary to DDG–1000 and CG(X) from an operational need standpoint, the LCS ship size, mission module concept, and procurement timelines have precluded, to date, application of key DDG–1000 technologies, beyond common use of the 57 mm gun system. Some DDG–1000 technologies are candidates for potential insertion into future LCS flights, including human systems integration, condition-based maintenance, and distance support. Additionally, the Navy intends to procure LCS Flight 1 seaframes starting in fiscal year 2011, with a Common Combat System and command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) suite. The Common Combat System requirements provide an open architecture solution that is compatible with other ship classes in terms of sensors and mission software, providing a more affordable and effective solution in which the Government owns the data rights.

In addition, the Navy plans to leverage the DDG–1000 Dual Band Radar investment on the CVN 78.

As delineated in the approach and examples above, the Navy remains committed to bundling the research and development investments in DDG–1000 and using them across the “family of ships” where applicable.

2. Senator KENNEDY. Admiral Roughhead, Congress has heard a lot about the LCS program over the last several years, and much of it is negative. I believe the difficulties this program is experiencing today are the result, in part of the rush that occurred at the beginning of the program. The capability to reach close to shore quickly is undoubtedly a continuing requirement as global threat scenarios continue to evolve. However, I’m concerned that the problems in the LCS program jeopardize our ability to act effectively in this battle space in the near term. Our committee stated in the mark-up of the fiscal year 2008 defense budget that “if the Navy really believed that the threat were that urgent, it might have taken more near-term steps to address it. For example, the Navy might not have cancelled the remote mine hunting system capability on a number of the DDG–51 class destroyers, ships that will be available to the combatant commanders much sooner than LCS. The Navy might also have taken this modular capability slated for the LCS and packaged those modules to deploy sooner on ships of opportunity.” Additionally, the Mission Module Program Office, Program Executive Office (PEO) Littoral and Mine Warfare, stated “We do not necessarily need an LCS to deploy these systems. Wherever a helicopter could land, whether it is a large-deck, a carrier or a pier or shore facility, we could deploy this mine warfare capability.” Has the Navy taken a hard look at putting these mission modules on other ships or forward-based them on-shore while we figure out whether we’re on the right track with LCS hulls, or could we completely eliminate the LCS hulls, and deploy the capability on other ships?

Admiral ROUGHHEAD. Yes, the Navy conducted thorough analysis to determine the best ship class to deploy the three focused mission packages. This analysis shows the LCS, with its speed, draft, payload, and endurance is the optimal ship from which all three mission packages can best be employed in order to close the littoral warfighting gaps.

The Navy’s analysis examined multiple potential solutions to the capability gaps identified in the Joint Requirements Oversight Council’s (JROC) Assured Maritime Access in the Littorals Initial Capabilities Document (ICD). The JROC approved LCS ICD included a Function Solutions Analysis (FSA) which examined seven solution options, including procuring more of the current programmed force, installing upgraded systems on the current force, and modifying the DDG 51 class hull to carry the three mission packages. The FSA recommended the solution that contains the option for a new class of ships specifically tailored to the focused missions of Mine Warfare, Submarine Warfare, and Anti-submarine Warfare. The study also concluded that the new focused-mission class produced the most affordable and best overall performance against the littoral capability gaps.

LCS best addresses the capability gaps identified in the JROC’s Assured Maritime Access in the Littorals Initial Capabilities Document. It was designed from the keel up to specifically deploy the current focused mission systems with a future capability to expand into other roles. No other ship could deploy the full capability of a mission package without overcoming significant challenges including computing environment interfaces and space limitations. While there are elements of a mission package that could possibly be deployed from other ship types (e.g. an MH–53 can use the AQS–20 side-scan sonar for mine hunting much as it uses the AQS–14 today, resulting in partial mine countermeasures (MCM) capability when compared to the LCS mine warfare mission modules), it is the whole LCS mission package that satisfies the capability gap. Because of the uniqueness of the Mission Packages,
LCS is the preferred and optimal ship to use the mission packages and mission modules.

3. Senator KENNEDY. Admiral Roughhead, the Navy has requested and I support a 55 percent increase to the statutory cost cap for LCS, up to $460 million. This figure represents only the sea frame, which as I understand it, is basically the bare ship, without specific mission capability like mine or anti-submarine warfare. Given that this is the first time that I am aware of that we have procured the essential mission capability of a ship separately from the hull, I believe we should be considering when we consider the future of this program. To compare the procurement cost of an LCS to another ship, apples to apples, we would need to add the cost of the ship and the mission modules. What is the cost of LCS with its mission modules, and how does it compare to other, similarly outfitted ships that are multi-mission capable?
Admiral ROUGHHEAD. The projected end cost of an LCS sea frame procured in fiscal year 2008 is $460 million. This includes the following cost categories: basic construction, electronics (government furnished equipment), change orders and other program costs.

During operations, an LCS will be outfitted with a single mission package configured for either mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare (ASW) or anti-surface warfare (SUW). The underlying strength of the LCS lies in this innovative design approach, applying modularity for operational flexibility. MP development and procurement separate from the sea frames allows LCS warfighting capability to keep pace with evolving threats, improve technology, and adapt more quickly than traditional ship programs.

An MP consists of multiple mission modules, including mission systems transported and housed in support containers with necessary spares, special tools and other support equipment. An MP relies on supporting aircraft, MP operating crew, and training and pipeline units which are separately funded. In fiscal year 2008, the Navy request includes $47.8 million to procure one mine warfare package, $12.5 million for one SUW package and $25.3 million for associated program costs in OPN and RDT&E. The average baseline cost of each type of MP across the entire program is $68 million per mine warfare package (baseline package starting in fiscal year 2009), $42.3 million per ASW package (baseline starting in fiscal year 2009) and $16.7 million per SUW package (baseline starting in fiscal year 2010). Cost estimates reflect planned integration of additional mission systems as these become ready for operational use.

Due to differences in requirements, mission equipment and operational concepts, there are no similarly outfitted, multi-mission capable ships with which to compare costs.

4. Senator KENNEDY. Admiral Roughhead, given that we currently have parallel development and production paths for these two designs, and that the Navy has testified that they may actually keep both designs, how does this impact life cycle costs?
Admiral ROUGHHEAD. The Navy’s restructured LCS program proposes procurement of additional Flight 0 LCS ships in fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 to meet operational requirements.

Procurement of additional Flight 0 ships may result in higher life cycle costs, but is necessary to reduce risk in existing warfighting capability gaps.

The two existing designs will undergo operational performance testing in fiscal year 2009, and the results will be considered as part of the evaluation for a single design selection for the fiscal year 2010 and later Flight 1 ships.

Selecting a single Flight 1 seaframe achieves commonality in hull, mechanical, and electrical (HM&E) and C4I systems in the LCS class. Continued procurement of two seaframe designs into fiscal year 2010 and beyond is an alternative, should the Navy determine that each design presents a unique operational advantage. The implementation of a common combat system and C4I suite as part of Flight 1 would reduce lifecycle cost of the common warfare system, but would not achieve the savings in seaframe HM&E, crew training, and logistics costs anticipated from selecting a single seaframe design.

5. Senator KENNEDY. Admiral Roughhead, isn’t it more expensive to have two different designs of the same ship from a training and maintenance perspective?
Admiral ROUGHHEAD. Yes, training and maintenance costs are more expensive for two different designs. By design, however, the LCS combat systems (mission modules) will have the same capabilities and equipment, therefore significantly reducing associated training and maintenance costs.
The Navy's proposed restructured LCS program continues to procure ships from the existing Flight 0 designs, and supports selection of a single Flight 1 design in fiscal year 2011 and out.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACk REED
LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP PROGRAM

6. Senator Reed. Admiral Roughead, as you are aware, the LCS program has had difficulties regarding cost overruns and changing capability requirements. What is your plan and timeline for determining requirements and total cost?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The LCS program meets an urgent warfighting requirement and is a critical component to achieving the Navy's force structure objective of at least 313 ships. Significantly important, the Navy monitors this program closely. LCS capabilities requirements are delineated in the program's Capabilities Development Document (CDD). The CDD reflects the specific requirements of the ship and is eventually sent to industry team(s) responsible for building to these requirements. The CDD goes through a rigorous and formal development, review and approval process, and ultimately requires JROC. There have been no changes to LCS capability requirements as delineated in the CDD since JROC approval in May 2004.

Likewise, cost has been examined in great detail. The Navy identified significant cost growth with the lead Lockheed Martin (LM) ship and issued a 90-day stop work order in January 2007 for the second LM ship, LCS 3, to provide time to assess factors contributing to the cost growth and to develop an executable program plan for the way ahead. Similarly, cost growth was identified with the lead General Dynamics (GD) ship and the Navy suspended construction of the second GD ship, LCS 4, to develop an executable program plan. In both cases, the Navy evaluated the overall performance of the programs, working closely with the contractors to address cost overruns and root causes.

The Navy has revised its estimates for LCS 1 and 2 end costs plus post-delivery and outfitting, and has provided these estimates to Congress. The Navy is committed to continue working with Congress on this important program which is needed to fill existing warfighting capability gaps. We will provide our revised acquisition plan with the fiscal year 2009 budget submission.

7. Senator Reed. Admiral Roughead, what are your views on an independent review board to assess both capabilities and costs?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Independent review boards may be appropriate in certain cases. With respect to the LCS, the Navy has conducted extensive program assessments and has conducted various reviews. These include reviews both by an independent Program Management Assist Group and by the Naval Inspector General. As a result, the Navy has developed an executable program plan that adjusts the acquisition profile, ship cost estimates, budgets and schedules and provides resources for effective management of cost, production and technical risk to deliver ships to the Fleet to support the urgent warfighting requirement.

Of note, the Secretary of the Navy has recently announced his intention to establish an advisory panel that will provide him with independent advice and recommendations on matters of importance to the Navy, including acquisition.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK Pryor
NAVY HELICOPTERS

8. Senator Pryor. Admiral Roughhead, I am aware that the Navy's H–60S is having difficulty meeting the basic performance parameters for its Airborne Mine Countermeasures (AMCM) mission. Has the Navy completed an assessment of an alternative medium lift helicopter to the H–60S that can meet AMCM requirements at an equal or similar cost per flight hour? If not, when will such an analysis occur?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The Navy has designated the MH–60S as its future airborne mine warfare helicopter; the MH–53E is the Fleet's current AMCM platform. The Navy has no current plans to address alternatives beyond the MH–60S to meet this established mission, now evolving with the advent of new AMCM technological advances.

A significant effort is ongoing to integrate a suite of AMCM systems on the MH–60S helicopter. The AQS–20A sonar mine hunting system will be the first of these systems fielded. To date, it has demonstrated successful performance and is sched-
uled to commence its Operational Test in November 2007. Furthermore, the MH–60S has successfully completed numerous aircraft developmental milestones, demonstrating that it is capable of meeting basic AMCM performance parameters.

The Navy is in the process of transforming its mine warfare capability from the current, dedicated platform-centered capability to an organic, LCS based capability. The MH–60S plays a critical role in this LCS–mine warfare transition. The MH–60S will be able to perform all mine countermeasures missions (mine hunting, mine sweeping, mine identification and mine neutralization) through employment of a suite of developing MIW systems. Future mine warfare concept of operations will significantly further reduce timelines and risk from mines by employing the MH–60S in addition to unmanned airborne, surface, and subsurface vehicles. These systems will provide persistent operations, allowing MH–60S utilization for rapid reacquisition and subsequent neutralization of mines.

In June 2007, the Navy's helicopter concept of operations was updated with the Navy Helicopter Force Analysis Study, which reconfirmed the MH–60S's role in meeting AMCM requirements. With the MH–60S and associated AMCM systems in early developmental stages of meeting these requirements, the Navy does not currently plan to conduct an additional assessment of an alternative medium lift helicopter for mine warfare. The Navy will continue to closely monitor the helicopter's development and performance to ensure that the warfighter ultimately receives the most effective AMCM systems and delivery helicopter.

9. Senator Pryor. Admiral Roughead, do you believe the Navy's current Helicopter Master Plan, dated 1998, should be updated to address new operational capabilities indicative of the global war on terrorism?

Admiral Roughead. The Navy continually reevaluates Fleet warfighter capabilities to ensure that they pace the current and future threats. Developed in 1996, the Navy's Helicopter Master Plan was a requirements-based acquisition strategy to recapitalize the Navy's aging helicopter force while reducing future operating costs and expanding warfighting capabilities and missions. That plan did pre-date the Global War on Terror.

The Navy's follow-on 2002 Helicopter Concept of Operations (CONOPS) leveraged the acquisition efficiencies of the Helicopter Master Plan and brought operational efficiencies through the reorganization of squadrons to align with the warfighting requirements of Carrier Strike Groups and Expeditionary Forces.

In 2007, the Helicopter CONOPs was updated with the Navy Helicopter Force Analysis Study. The Navy Helicopter Force Analysis Study determined the all encompassing helicopter force structure, mix of helicopters, and required capabilities for Carrier Strike Group, Expeditionary Strike Group, Maritime Pre-positioned Force—Future, independent deployers, the global war on terror, continental U.S. missions, and Vertical Takeoff Unmanned Aerial Vehicles for LCSs to support multi-mission force requirements and the Navy's 313-ship plan.

The Navy's requirements analysis process remains dynamic and is designed to keep pace with current and future threats.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JIM WEBB

STRATEGIC DISPERSION OF THE FLEET

10. Senator Webb. Admiral Roughhead, strategic dispersion of the fleet may have made sense during the Cold War, but there is no sound national-security reason for doing so today—especially for aircraft carriers homeported in Norfolk, VA. Good stewardship of taxpayer dollars also weighs against carrier homeport changes. Converting Naval Station Mayport, FL, to accept a nuclear-powered carrier would require expensive investments in nuclear-support infrastructure estimated at $235 million to $500 million. Additionally, the Navy spent $155 million in recent years to demolish and rebuid Pier 11 to support aircraft carriers in Norfolk more effectively. The Navy should obtain a full return on this investment in the future. Norfolk also offers a home-porting advantage for carrier crews in terms of its immediate proximity to public and private shipyards certified for maintenance, modernization, and refueling of nuclear-powered ships. Given this framework, what factors in the current and projected national-security environment suggest the desirability of relocating an aircraft carrier to Mayport? What argues against it?

Admiral Roughhead. We are in the process of evaluating this issue. Several factors will inform our decision, and could argue either for or against a decision to relocate forces to Mayport. These factors include:
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• Ability of fleet assets to meet combatant commander requirements under the Fleet Response Plan (FRP);
• Results of the ongoing Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) process;
• Cost implications of any force structure shifts to Mayport;
• Ability to meet nuclear carrier refueling and ship maintenance requirements; and
• Impact on our sailors and their families.

11. Senator WEBB. Admiral Roughead, you said that the same process used by the Navy to position aircraft carriers in the Pacific region should be used on the east coast. There are substantial differences between the Pacific and Atlantic regions, however, in terms of geography, Navy forward presence, and operations. How would a change in an aircraft carrier’s homeport a few hundred miles from Norfolk to Mayport improve the Navy’s response and presence as you suggested?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. In reaching our decision on east coast carrier homeporting, we must consider our ability to respond to combatant commander mission requirements. Ships operating from Mayport, FL, would offer an improved response time to the U.S. Southern Command Area of Responsibility. Also, in the event naval forces were unable to operate from Norfolk, Mayport would provide an alternate location from which the Navy could support combatant commander requirements. These operational considerations must be evaluated in the context of the ongoing EIS process, the total cost implications, the ability to meet nuclear carrier refueling and ship maintenance requirements, and the impact on our sailors and their families.

12. Senator WEBB. Admiral Roughead, Navy and Marine Corps carrier-based aircraft squadrons are based close to Norfolk to afford the carrier and its air wing more efficient and less costly at-sea training, fleet and joint exercises, and operational deployments. In what ways would the relocation of a carrier from Norfolk to Mayport affect this logical and time-proven model?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. There would be a minimal affect. Fixed-wing carrier based aircraft can fly, unfueled to the Fleet Training Areas. Fixed-wing aircraft at Naval Air Station (NAS) Oceana and NAS Norfolk can transit and join a carrier in the Virginia Capes or Jacksonville Operating Areas. Rotary-wing aircraft also would experience a seamless transition if required. Since the loss of the Fleet Training Areas in Puerto Rico, the Jacksonville Operating Area has been used more extensively for fleet and joint exercises and certification for deployments.

Because east coast carrier air wings are currently composed of squadrons from Virginia, South Carolina, Washington, and Florida; the Navy’s experience with carriers homeported in Mayport indicates this would not significantly change our onload logistic requirements.

13. Senator WEBB. Admiral Roughhead, what is the current status and future milestones for the current Navy Environmental Impact Study (EIS) of relocating ships to Mayport?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The Draft EIS will be released to the public in March 2008. Public hearings are tentatively scheduled for April 2008. The final EIS will likely be released to the public in December 2008. A record of decision is anticipated in January 2009.

14. Senator WEBB. Admiral Roughhead, will the Navy's EIS study address the full costs associated with relocating an aircraft carrier from Norfolk to Mayport—to include needed investments in nuclear-support infrastructure, the cost resulting from a crew's permanent change of station, and other expenses generated when carriers would be required to relocate to Norfolk for extended overhauls?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The purpose of the EIS is to evaluate the potential environmental impacts of homeporting additional U.S. Fleet Forces surface ships at Naval Station Mayport, FL. Although the EIS does include estimated costs associated with infrastructure requirements for the various alternatives, an EIS is not required to, and normally does not, analyze every cost associated with a proposed action such as cost of permanent change of station moves.

In addition, I will provide to the Secretary an assessment of the national security requirements and a recommended force laydown for his consideration. In his final decision, the Secretary will consider the national security requirements, strategic positioning of our ships, existing capabilities, total cost, and other programmatic factors, and the impact on our sailors and their families.
NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD

15. Senator W. Ebb. Admiral Roughead, you state in your response to one of the committee's advance policy questions that ship-repair facilities are currently adequate to incorporate surges in deployment. Virginia's Norfolk Naval Shipyard has made noteworthy performance improvements in lowering costs and completing work on or ahead of schedule, but serious and, in some cases, unsafe deficiencies exist. They include aging, deteriorating buildings, piers, and dry docks; a degraded electrical-distribution system; and an inefficient plant layout for the maintenance, modernization, and repair of nuclear-powered submarines and aircraft carriers. As Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), what is your plan to remedy these and other deficiencies to allow Norfolk Naval Shipyard to remain a world-class facility?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. We recognize that the Navy has historically taken risk in shore infrastructure investment to increase investment in afloat readiness and future platforms and weapons systems. As a result, the condition, capability and current and future readiness of our shore infrastructure has degraded. We are embarking on a Shore Investment Strategy that will direct a systematic and consistent approach to assessing the material condition of our shore infrastructure and provide a comprehensive, balanced investment program that will improve our shore facilities worldwide, to include Norfolk Naval Shipyard.

Using Military Construction (MILCON) and Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization programs, we have already begun to address deficiencies as follows:

| Project | Description | Cost (M) | Date
|---------|-------------|---------|------
| P391   | Pier 3 Replacement (Iner 1 of 2) | $47.3M | November 2006
| P391A  | Pier 3 Replacement (Iner 2 of 2) | $30.9M | December 2006
| P382   | Dry Dock #8 Modernization | $55.0M | December 2007

In addition to the MILCON Projects above, Navy awarded a fiscal year 2007 special project, repair berths 3 & 4, for $22.7 million in September 2007.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

PORTSMOUTH NAVAL SHIPYARD

16. Senator Collins. Admiral Roughhead, I would like to address a topic of concern to me and many of my constituents in Maine, and that is the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. Portsmouth has a demonstrated proficiency in work on attack submarines and continues to lead the Nation in timely and cost-effective submarine overhaul, modernization, and repair work. The shipyard was also identified as the “gold standard” of public shipyards during the 2005 base realignment and closure (BRAC) considerations and earlier this year, was designated as the Ship Availability Planning and Engineering Center for the Virginia-class of submarines. I have no doubt that the capable and dedicated workforce at Portsmouth will rise to this challenge and that of maintaining a new submarine class, as they have so many times before.

I visited the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard most recently in August, however, and I am concerned that the Navy is not providing Portsmouth with the infrastructure and facilities it needs to perform its important mission in the most cost-effective manner possible. I will give you one example to illustrate my point. Portsmouth is scheduled to perform its first Virginia-class submarine availability in fiscal year 2010. The Navy's Program Objective Memorandum (POM) for fiscal year 2011 includes plans to build a new waterfront support facility for Portsmouth's #3 drydock. That drydock will be used to berth Virginia-class submarines. But, those submarines are scheduled to start arriving at Portsmouth before this waterfront support facility is built, and I am concerned that the challenges posed by a new submarine class, coupled with those of an already aging and dated facility, could cause unnecessary inefficiencies and delays. The Navy's latest business plan for our Nation's four public shipyards outlines the challenges we face in modernizing our public shipyards' infrastructure, including funding limitations and competing priorities. Yet, since 1992, approximately $762 million have been spent on MILCON projects at the four public shipyards, and only $63 million—just over 8 percent—of those funds have been expended at Portsmouth. That figure is deeply disconcerting to me and has understandably resulted in extensive needs at Portsmouth. I believe that the men and women of Portsmouth Naval Shipyard warrant greater support from the Navy in modernizing the shipyard's dated facilities. If confirmed, would you...
pledge to thoroughly review and modify as necessary the Navy's MILCON plans for Portsmouth and the other public shipyards to ensure that their workforces are provided with the facilities they need to complete their important missions?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I do. The Navy recognized it has taken some risk in shore infrastructure investment in the past to increase investment in afloat readiness and future platform and weapons systems. As a result, the condition, capability and current and future readiness of our shore facilities have degraded. We will develop a Shore Investment Strategy that will direct a systematic and consistent approach to assessing the material condition of our shore infrastructure and provide a comprehensive, balanced investment program that will improve our shore facilities worldwide, including Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. I am committed to this approach.

DDG–51 MODERNIZATION

17. Senator COLLINS. Admiral Roughead, DDG–51 modernization upgrades will increase automation, enhance situational awareness, and reduce the crew size per ship. At my urging, this committee has included a provision in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 directing the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to Congress outlining the alternative acquisition strategies under consideration for the DDG–51 modernization program, including the potential use of the DDG–51 construction shipyards. Will you commit to seriously reviewing the potential benefits of utilizing the uniquely qualified and experienced DDG–51 construction shipyards for in-service DDG–51 modernization?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I am committed to the continued review and refinement of the DDG modernization acquisition strategy, including potential utilization of DDG–51 class construction shipyards. Additionally, DDG–51 Class construction shipyards remain eligible to compete/team for the multi-ship, multi-option cost contract vehicles in ships' homeports.

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

18. Senator COLLINS. Admiral Roughead, one concern that I have with the proposed plan for the LCS program is that after the Navy down-selects to one sea frame design, the Navy intends to have an open competition to award the contract for construction of future LCSs. It would seem to me that all of the pains that have been endured during the design and construction of the first two ships would be lost if you subsequently awarded a third party, that is neither LM nor the GD-Bath Iron Works-Austal team, the final contract award. How does the Navy plan to recoup the learning costs that have been associated with the design and development by LM and GD if the contract is awarded to a different shipyard?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The Navy's intended approach will provide a mature design package that incorporates the lessons learned from lead ship design and construction. This complete design package, coupled with the full and open competition acquisition plan for procurement, will maximize competition to get the best price for the Navy.

While this strategy may result in additional nonrecurring start up costs in the near-term, the approach expands potential sources, thereby increasing competition to drive costs lower. Expanding potential sources also enables higher production rates in the outyears needed to procure a 55-ship LCS class and achieve the Navy's force structure objective of at least 313 ships.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MEL MARTINEZ

DISPERSAL OF ATLANTIC FLEET

19. Senator MARTINEZ. Admiral Roughead, after the BRAC round of 2005, we are now left with two surface homeports on the Atlantic and the Gulf of Mexico. With the retirement of U.S.S. John F. Kennedy we now have all our carriers in the Atlantic located in Norfolk. What is your position on the strategic dispersal of our Atlantic Fleet carriers?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. We must carefully consider various factors before deciding on potential strategic dispersal of our Atlantic Fleet assets, including our carriers. The factors include:

- Ability to meet combatant commander requirements under the FRP,
- results of the ongoing EIS process,
- cost implications of any force structure shifts,
the ability to meet nuclear carrier refueling and ship maintenance requirements, and
• impact on sailors and their families.

We are in the process of evaluating this important strategic matter.

20. Senator Martinez. Admiral Roughead, do you agree that it is in the best national security interest of the U.S. to maintain two nuclear carrier home ports on the east coast?

Admiral Roughead. There are many factors to consider regarding strategic dispersal options for the Fleet, including carriers. Two carrier homeports on the east coast is a potential option that we are studying. Several factors will inform the decision on carrier home ports, including: the ability of fleet assets to meet combatant commander requirements under the FRP, results of the ongoing EIS process, cost implications of any force structure shifts, the ability to meet nuclear carrier refueling and ship maintenance requirements, and impact on sailors and their families.

21. Senator Martinez. Admiral Roughead, there is an ongoing EIS at Naval Station Mayport to determine what steps will be needed to make it nuclear ready. What steps are the Navy taking now, while the fiscal year 2009 budget is still being worked on, that will help hasten the transition at Mayport into a nuclear ready port as quickly as possible?

Admiral Roughead. As you note, the EIS to review and assess a broad range of alternatives for homeporting additional surface ships, including a nuclear aircraft carrier, at Naval Station Mayport is ongoing. The EIS is planned for completion in January 2009. Any near term actions to “hasten the transition at Mayport into a nuclear ready port” would be premature at this time. During the EIS process, the Navy will continue to resource and maintain the existing infrastructure at Naval Station Mayport to meet the mission of the installation.

10 CARRIER FLEET

22. Senator Martinez. Admiral Roughead, the administration wants to reduce the carrier fleet to 10 ships until the commissioning of the U.S.S. Gerald Ford (10 carriers between the first quarter of fiscal year 2013 and the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2015). I understand that current threat assessments are based on peace-time models and that the risk during the 33 months where we would have 10 carriers has been deemed an “acceptable, although moderate, risk”. However, recent movements by our enemies have shown that peace-time models may not fit for our near- and longer-term future. Are 10 carriers adequate to meet the national security threats around the globe?

Admiral Roughead. I am committed fully to an 11-carrier force, as analysis indicates that fewer than 11 carriers is not acceptable for an extended period. The Navy conducts risk analysis which is continually updated based on changes in the threat environment. The analysis of the temporary reduction in carrier numbers determined that our most feasible option from a technical, fiscal, and risk perspective, is to leverage the flexibility available in our operations and maintenance schedules to manage the risk during the period of concern.

The Navy will be able to mitigate the majority of the carrier force structure gap through selective rescheduling of carrier availabilities (either advancing or delaying the planned start of selected availabilities). The inherent flexibility provided by the FRP will enable the Navy to further mitigate additional risk or shortfalls in carrier force structure.

23. Senator Martinez. Admiral Roughead, what can we do to help alleviate some of the risk involved with maintaining a 10 carrier fleet for the projected 33 month timespan?

Admiral Roughead. The Navy has conducted risk analysis that balances projected demands with projected operations and maintenance schedules, and has determined the risk to be moderate and acceptable.

The Navy looked at several options to mitigate the projected shortfalls in carrier presence and surge capacity during that period and determined the best mitigation strategy is to adjust maintenance schedules to either delay or advance scheduled availabilities to align with modified operating schedules. The inherent flexibilities of Navy’s FRP and the planned 50-year service life of Nimitz- and Gerald R. Ford-class carriers permit several options to better optimize carrier strike group availability. Examples include:
• Delay Refueling Complex Overhauls and add Selected Restricted Availabilities (SRAs).
• Accelerate, delay, or shorten Docking Planned Incremental Availabilities (DPIA).
• Reschedule smaller maintenance availabilities including Planned Incremental Availability, SRAs, and Continuous Maintenance Availability.

While the above actions will help to mitigate risk during the limited period of a 10 carrier fleet, they can not be sustained indefinitely. I am committed fully to an 11-carrier force for the long term.

24. Senator MARTINEZ. Admiral Roughead, in your opinion, what are the greatest potential challenges and threats that face our currently undersized naval fleet?
Admiral ROUGHEAD. The greatest potential threats that currently face our Navy are:
• The emergence of sensors, platforms, and weapons systems that challenge the U.S. Navy's access to strategic maritime environments.
• The continued proliferation of asymmetric capabilities (such as swarming small boats and mines) to lower-tier nations and non-state actors that challenge unimpeded Navy operations.
• The targeting and disruption of U.S. computer networks.
• The evolution of terrorist means and methods, including maritime threats to the homeland.

The Navy is meeting current near-term combatant commander demands to counter these threats, but faces potential challenges in sustaining current readiness levels while continuing to build the future fleet as outlined in the Quadrennial Defense Review. The Navy's investment strategy adequately balances today's capability and capacity requirements with the longer-term realities of a changing future security environment. Meeting these challenges requires a strong commitment to sustained combat readiness, stable shipbuilding and aircraft procurement programs, and pursuing, with our industry partners, the efficiencies required to afford the future force.

25. Senator MARTINEZ. Admiral Roughead, should a contingency arise where the President deems it necessary to deploy six or seven of our aircraft carriers, what would be your plan to support this potential mission?
Admiral ROUGHEAD. The Navy's FRP delivers enhanced surge capability, while continuing to provide rotationally deployed forces to fulfill Global Force Management commitments. The FRP goals are to provide six carriers for surge response within 30 days of notification and one carrier within 90 days. This readiness is referred to as "6+1."

Typically, the first carriers to respond to the contingency described would include the carrier already deployed for rotational presence and the carrier assigned to the Forward Deployed Naval Forces. With forces based in the continental United States maintaining unit readiness to support surge operations, aircraft carriers having completed the Advanced Integrated Phase of training and certified as Major Combat Operations (MCO) Ready would deploy next. Other carriers in the Integrated or Basic Phases of training would receive accelerated training to attain MCO surge certification and would deploy as required, based on the contingency. Navy monitors FRP readiness very closely and leverages the flexibility available in our operations and maintenance schedules to meet all requirements.

SHIPBUILDING BUDGET

26. Senator MARTINEZ. Admiral Roughead, what will you do to ensure that the cost overruns and late deliveries that some of our recent shipbuilding projects have seen do not occur during your tenure as CNO?
Admiral ROUGHEAD. There have been a variety of reasons for cost overruns and late deliveries in major shipbuilding programs, including inadequate acquisition workforce staffing, overly optimistic cost estimates, requirements growth (increased scope), inaccurate assessments of technology maturity, poor performance in the shipyards, and starting construction prior to design maturity. The acquisition and requirements communities' goal remains to provide the Navy with the Fleet required to meet national requirements.

The Navy has taken positive action to reduce requirements creep through the Navy's Resources and Requirements Review Board, a senior three-four star level board which reviews the capability and resource requirements for all major acquisi-
tion programs. This process allows the Navy to make better cost and capability requirements tradeoffs.

The only area in which the Navy requests assistance from the committee is stability in program funding, the lack of which can result in major cost increases. A commitment to the Navy’s Annual Long Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels will create predictable programs in terms of funding and procurement requirements. The result enables the industrial base to forecast future workload to plan investments in capital and labor efficiency improvements to drive down end-costs and improve delivery schedules.

27. Senator Martinez. Admiral Roughead, in terms of the Navy’s overall budget, what steps will you take to ensure that the proposed requirements and costs of our entire range of shipbuilding projects are kept in line with the Navy’s budget estimates?

Admiral Roughead. The Navy’s shipbuilding plan recognizes the need for careful management of requirements and aggressive cost control measures. This can only be achieved in partnership with industry by utilizing realistic assumptions, instilling discipline in shipbuilding requirements, and driving more industry and government investments to reduce cost. With more definition of future ship programs, the Navy may need to adjust the average annual investment objective while always validating the warfighting requirements as appropriate. Given the importance of requirements-containment and cost-reduction to the viability of the shipbuilding plan, the Navy continues to evaluate each ship class and identify cost reduction opportunities while balancing warfighting requirements, costs, and industrial base realities.

The Navy is committed to stable out-year procurements that industry can use to anticipate workload. This, in turn, allows industry to commit resources and create efficiencies to decrease the end-cost of Navy ships. The Navy plans greater use of contract incentives, such as steep share lines combined with performance incentives to contribute to real cost containment in future shipbuilding plans. Also, the Navy will pursue other areas for improvement in our acquisition workforce and organization. As we build the future fleet, discipline will be required of all stakeholders to ensure all shipbuilding projects are in line with the Navy’s budget estimates.

SUBMARINES

28. Senator Martinez. Admiral Roughead, according to news reports, between 2002 and last year, China built 14 new submarines, including new Song-class vessels and several other types, both diesel- and nuclear-powered. With the Chinese defense budget continuing to grow at startling rates should the U.S. increase our own production of submarines?

Admiral Roughead. A force of at least 313 ships, including 48 attack submarines, is necessary to meet future projected warfighting requirements. These warfighting requirements are indexed to the Department of Defense fiscal year 2020 threat assessments, which include anticipated potential threat force levels and are compliant with the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and Strategic Planning Guidance. The shipbuilding plan detailed in Navy’s Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for fiscal year 2007 is the best balance of anticipated resources to force structure requirements.

29. Senator Martinez. Admiral Roughhead, for reasons of cost, what are your thoughts on the U.S. developing and producing quiet diesel submarines, which would potentially be a fraction of the cost of their nuclear powered counterparts?

Admiral Roughhead. Navy has no plans to build diesel submarines for its own use. Diesel submarines do not meet our operational requirements. Nuclear powered submarines are more effective in potential wartime scenarios and are more cost effective when all aspects of fielding a force of conventionally powered submarines are considered.

[The nomination reference of ADM Gary Roughead, USN, follows:]
Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for appointment as Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy and appointment to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be Admiral

ADM Gary Roughead, 0000.

[The biographical sketch of ADM Gary Roughead, USN, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

TRANSCRIPT OF NAVAL SERVICE FOR ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, USN

15 July 1951 __________ Born in Buffalo, NY.
06 June 1973 __________ Ensign, U.S. Navy.
06 June 1975 __________ Lieutenant (junior grade).
01 July 1977 __________ Lieutenant.
01 Oct. 1987 __________ Commander.
01 Aug. 1993 __________ Captain.
31 Oct. 1997 __________ Designated Rear Admiral (lower half) while in billets commensurate with that grade.
01 Oct. 1998 __________ Rear Admiral (lower half).
18 May 2000 __________ Designated Rear Admiral while serving in billets commensurate with that grade.
08 Aug. 2001 __________ Rear Admiral.
08 Aug. 2003 __________ Designated Vice Admiral while serving in billets commensurate with that grade.
15 Aug. 2003 __________ Vice Admiral.
30 June 2005 __________ Designated Admiral while serving in billets commensurate with that grade.
01 Sep. 2005 __________ Admiral, service continuous to date.

Assignments and duties:

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<th>Assignments and Duties</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
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<td>Naval Nuclear Power School, Naval Training Center, Bainbridge, MD</td>
<td>June 1973</td>
<td>Oct. 1973</td>
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<tr>
<td>Surface Warfare Officers School Command Newport, RI (DUINS)</td>
<td>July 1978</td>
<td>Apr. 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service School Command, NTC, Great Lakes (DUINS)</td>
<td>Apr. 1979</td>
<td>July 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet Training Center, Norfolk, VA (DUINS)</td>
<td>July 1979</td>
<td>Jul 1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Officer Ship Material Readiness Course, Newport, RI (DUINS)</td>
<td>Mar. 1990</td>
<td>June 1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief of Legislative Affairs</td>
<td>Jan. 2001</td>
<td>Aug. 2003</td>
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Assignments and Duties

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<tr>
<th>Position</th>
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<th>To</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Commander, U.S. Pacific Command</td>
<td>Oct. 2004</td>
<td>June 2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces Command</td>
<td>May 2007</td>
<td>To date</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Medals and awards:
- Defense Distinguished Service Medal
- Distinguished Service Medal
- Defense Superior Service Medal
- Legion of Merit with three Gold Stars
- Meritorious Service Medal with one Gold Star
- Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal
- Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal Star with one Gold Star
- Joint Meritorious Unit Award
- Meritorious Unit Commendation with two Bronze Stars
- Navy “E” Ribbon with two Silver “Es”
- National Defense Service Medal with two Bronze Stars
- Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with one Bronze Star
- Vietnam Service Medal with one Bronze Star
- Sea Service Deployment Ribbon with one Silver Star

Special qualifications:
- BS (Foreign Affairs) U.S. Naval Academy, 1973.
- Language qualification: Spanish (knowledge).

Personal data:
- Wife: Ellen Weflen of Mulberry, IN.
- Children: Elizabeth Anna Roughead (Daughter), Born: 19 April 1987.

Summary of joint duty assignments:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Rank</th>
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[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by ADM Gary Roughead, USN, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior
to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. **Name:** (Include any former names used.)
   Gary Roughead.

2. **Position to which nominated:**
   Chief of Naval Operations.

3. **Date of nomination:**

4. **Address:** (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee's executive files.]

5. **Date and place of birth:**
   July 15, 1951; Buffalo, NY.

6. **Marital Status:** (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
   Married to Ellen Weflen Roughead.

7. **Names and ages of children:**
   Daughter - Elizabeth (20).

8. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   None.

9. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   None.

10. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    U.S. Naval Institute - Member.
    Surface Navy Association - Member.
    U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association - Member.

11. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    None.

12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
    Yes.

13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
    Yes.

   [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee's executive files.]

   ______

   **SIGNATURE AND DATE**

   I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.
   ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, USN.

   This 27th day of July, 2007.

   [The nomination of ADM Gary Roughead, USN, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on September 27, 2007, with the
recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on September 28, 2007.

[Prepared questions submitted to GEN William E. Ward, USA, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

**QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES**

**DEFENSE REFORMS**

*Question.* The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

*Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?*

*Answer.* As the Deputy Commander of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), I have witnessed firsthand the importance of a broad, global perspective complemented by an integrated, joint approach that synchronizes military activities and complements them with other instruments of national power, nongovernmental agencies and our allies. At EUCOM headquarters the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) presents a model for combined, interagency cooperation. Every military service that makes up the Command works closely with a representative from the Departments of State (DOS), Justice, Treasury, Drug Enforcement Agency, as well as with representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and intelligence agencies to provide for the effective coordination of the interagency effort.

*Question.* If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will be carefully examining what modifications might be appropriate for this new unified command structure as Africa Command (AFRICOM) evolves.

*Question.* Do you believe that the role of the combatant commanders under the Goldwater-Nichols legislation is appropriate and the policies and processes in existence allow that role to be fulfilled?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you see a need for any change in those roles, with regard to the resource allocation process or otherwise?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I will carefully examine what modifications might be appropriate for this new unified command structure and will inform the Department and Congress, as appropriate.

**RELATIONSHIPS**

*Question.* Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, U.S. AFRICOM to the following offices:

- The Under Secretaries of Defense.
- The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.
- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Answer. The Chairman functions under the authority, direction and control of the National Command Authority. The Chairman will transmit communications between the National Command Authority and the AFRICOM Commander as well as oversee the activities of the Commander as directed by the Secretary of Defense. As the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is a key conduit between a unified commander, Interagency and the Service Chiefs. The AFRICOM Commander will keep the Chairman informed on significant issues regarding the AFRICOM area of responsibility (AOR). The Commander will directly communicate with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a regular basis.

Question. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; however, the AFRICOM Commander will keep the Vice Chairman informed on all significant issues regarding the AFRICOM AOR. The AFRICOM Commander also advises the Vice Chairman in his role as the Chairman of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the Vice Chairman of the Defense Acquisition Board, co-chair of the Defense Advisory Working Group, and a member of the Senior Readiness Oversight Council specifically on all joint issues that address present and/or future joint warfighting capabilities.

Question. The Director of the Joint Staff.

Answer. There will be no direct command relationship between the Director of the Joint Staff and the AFRICOM Commander. The AFRICOM Commander will work with the Director of the Joint Staff on issues related to Africa.

Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments.

Answer. The Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are employed by AFRICOM. The Secretaries fulfill their responsibilities by exercising administrative control through the Service Component Commands assigned to AFRICOM.

Question. The Service Chiefs.

Answer. The Service Chiefs are responsible for ensuring the organization and readiness of each respective service branch and for advising the President. However, the Service Chiefs do not have operational command authority. The AFRICOM Commander will rely upon each of the Service Chiefs to provide properly equipped and capable forces to accomplish missions in the AFRICOM AOR.

Question. The other combatant commanders.

Answer. Once AFRICOM reaches Full Operational Capability, there will be a series of agreements between AFRICOM and EUCOM with regards to the Mediterranean Dialogue countries (Israel, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, and Morocco). There will also be unique commander to commander agreements and memoranda concerning Egypt, Yemen, and Gulf of Aden (between Central Command (CENTCOM) and AFRICOM). Formal relationships between the AFRICOM Commander and the geographic and functional Unified Commanders, like the other Unified Commanders, will derive from command authority established by title 10, U.S.C., section 164. Combatant commanders closely coordinate as necessary to accomplish all assigned missions.

Question. The Secretary of State.

Answer. While there will be no direct command relationship between the Secretary of State and the AFRICOM Commander, there will be an expectation of a close working relationship between the Secretary of State and the AFRICOM Commander. Because AFRICOM is focused on title 22 activities, there is an expectation that AFRICOM will have a much closer, more integrated working relationship with the DOS.

Question. The respective U.S. chiefs of mission.

Answer. There will be no formal command relationship between the AFRICOM Commander and the U.S. Chiefs of Mission for the Nations of the AFRICOM AOR. In a foreign country, the U.S. Ambassador is responsible to the President for directing, coordinating and supervising all U.S. Government elements in the host nation. The AFRICOM Commander will coordinate and exchange information with U.S. Chiefs of Mission regularly on matters of mutual interest, to include engagement activities with partner militaries. In addition to the regular exchange of information with the U.S. Chiefs of Mission, it is likely that just as the Commander and Deputy Commander for EUCOM hosted regional conferences, so too might the AFRICOM Commander. If confirmed, I intend to continue this practice.

Question. The respective U.S. defense attaches.

Answer. There is not a direct command relationship between the respective U.S. defense attaches and the AFRICOM Commander. Military protocol will be exercised between the U.S. defense attaches and AFRICOM, as appropriate.
Question. If confirmed, you will be the first Commander of the newly established United States AFRICOM. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

Answer. I have been fortunate to serve in a number of positions that have helped prepare me for these duties—foremost among them is my service over the past 16 months as the Deputy Commander, U.S. EUCOM. In this position I had the opportunity to work with our partners in Africa and understand some of the challenges these nations face in providing security for their people, modernizing their militaries, eliminating corruption, and ensuring overall transparency in their governments. My assignment as United States Security Coordinator, Israel-Palestinian Authority allowed me to glean a unique perspective into the inner workings of the DOS, which will be very useful given the interagency construct of this new command. Working as Chief of the Office of Military Cooperation in Egypt, I served as a member of the Country Team under Chief of Mission authority. This experience provided me tremendous experience in the areas of security cooperation and assistance, which I will apply across the continent of Africa.

Between service as a Brigade Commander of the 10th Mountain Division during Operation Restore Hope on the Horn of Africa, followed by a tour as Commander, Stabilization Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I gained hands-on experience in the conduct and management of post-conflict stability and humanitarian relief operations which are complex and dynamic. While the Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the United States Army in Europe, I learned a great deal about the importance of the U.S. Army’s presence in Europe and its engagement activities with NATO and partner nations in Europe. Each of these positions brought to light the need for close coordination, not only between AFRICOM and its neighboring unified commands, but also among AFRICOM, EUCOM, the African Union, and NATO.

I believe all these experiences are relevant towards understanding the nature of the security situation in Africa and effectively partnering with the Africans as they develop and implement solutions. A fundamental focus of the AFRICOM Commander’s engagement should include careful consideration of what our partners need from the U.S. to help them develop to meet their stated needs. Just as EUCOM focused on security cooperation activities with African nations, so too will AFRICOM continue developing capabilities of African nations to help solidify our relations, achieve our mutual goals, and provide a bright future full of promise and opportunity.

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges and opportunities that would confront you as the first Commander of AFRICOM?

Answer. A fundamental focus of the AFRICOM Commander’s engagement should include careful consideration of what our partners need from the U.S. to help them develop to meet their stated needs. Just as EUCOM focused on security cooperation activities with African nations, so too will AFRICOM continue developing capabilities of African nations to help solidify our relations, achieve our mutual goals, and provide a bright future full of promise and opportunity for Africans everywhere. I see the establishment of AFRICOM as a wonderful opportunity to efficiently and effectively apply the elements of U.S. national power in ways that help the Africans develop and implement their solutions to African concerns. Establishing a new command and transferring responsibilities to it is complex. Three unified commands and U.S. AFRICOM’s Transition Team have been working as a team to ensure no disruption or confusion in the execution of on-going Department of Defense (DOD) efforts in Africa.

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges and opportunities?

Answer. My goal is to make the transition of operations and activities to AFRICOM’s responsibility as seamless as possible. I will reinforce the excellent work currently being done on the continent and the strong relationships already established. All three combatant commands have had extensive and positive experiences working with DOS, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and various nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). AFRICOM’s exercises, training, and humanitarian assistance efforts across the continent must occur in ways that demonstrate value-added through its existence.
Question. What do you anticipate to be the most serious problems in the performance of the functions of Commander, AFRICOM?

Answer. U.S. AFRICOM’s contributions will be seen in terms of how it directly contributes to the stability, security, health, and welfare of the regional institutions, nations, and people of Africa. It will be measured in terms of the strength, viability, and sustainment of the programs it will be expected to carry out on behalf of the U.S. government. Securing adequate resources to conduct those programs will be one of my top priorities as commander of AFRICOM.

Question. What management actions and timelines would you establish to address these problems?

Answer. Any actions taken should be premised on better facilitating the activities of the U.S. Interagency. Additionally, U.S. AFRICOM’s value added will come by listening to the needs of our African Partners and helping to find solutions by working with the African Union and its African Regional Economic Communities, our European allies and other partners and friends with a strong interest on the continent.

Question. Please discuss the role that you have played in the intra-DOD discussions which led to the creation of AFRICOM.

Answer. I participated in initial briefings to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff concerning the potential impact on missions and activities of EUCOM’s portion of the proposed AFRICOM AOR.

Question. Please discuss the role that you have played in the ongoing discussions with the AFRICOM implementation team and transition team.

Answer. On behalf of the EUCOM Commander, I served as a member of the executive committee monitoring the development of the AFRICOM Implementation Guidance that formalized the parameters, requirements, and timelines for the Transition Team’s activities. I monitored the progress of the Transition Team and ensured that the Transition Team had adequate facilities prepared in Stuttgart so they could perform their mission.

Question. What is your understanding of the mission of AFRICOM?

Answer. AFRICOM promotes U.S. National Security objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the AOR. AFRICOM leads the in-theater DOD response to support other U.S. Government agencies in implementing U.S. Government security policies and strategies. In concert with other U.S. Government and international partners, AFRICOM conducts theater security cooperation activities to assist in building security capacity and improve accountable governance. As directed, U.S. AFRICOM conducts military operations to deter aggression and respond to crises.

Question. What do you believe to be the pros and cons of establishing this new combatant command?

Answer. I believe the establishment of AFRICOM will add a more unified focus to the continent. Furthermore, the elimination of Unified Command Plan boundaries within Africa will position AFRICOM well to establish strong and lasting habitual relationships with our African partners (especially with the African Union), allies, and international organizations operating on the continent.

There are two aspects of one primary “con” associated with the creation of AFRICOM—the first is related to managing expectations of the benefits realized with a U.S. Headquarters locating to the Continent. The other aspect is managing the perception that a U.S. military headquarters signals a heavy handedness to the continent.

Question. According to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, no final decisions have been made on the organizational structure and chain of command of AFRICOM. Please discuss how you envision the two Deputy Commanders—one DOD-appointed and one State Department-appointed—functioning?

Answer. The Commander of AFRICOM will have two deputies: the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (filled by a senior DOS Foreign Service officer) and the Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (filled by a military flag officer). Both positions are three-star equivalents and peer equals. Each will have primary spheres of responsibility to work in conjunction with the other. Since a State Department official cannot exercise military command under title 10, U.S.C., the Departments of Defense and State agreed to the title of “Deputy to the Com-
mander” instead of “Deputy Commander” to ensure parallelism between both positions without implying that both positions have military command authority.

The Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities (DCMA) will be responsible for directing the command’s civil-military planning and programs, with emphasis on aligning U.S. AFRICOM activity with that of other U.S. Government departments and agencies carrying out U.S. foreign policy. The Deputy to the Commander for Military Operations (DCMO) will be responsible to implement and execute the command’s activities, including those planned and programmed by the DCMA.

**Question.** What responsibilities do you expect each deputy commander to have under his or her jurisdiction?

**Answer.** The DCMA will be responsible for AFRICOM policy development, resourcing, and program assessment. The DCMA will direct the command’s plans and programs associated with health, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian mine action, disaster response, and security sector reform.

The DCMO will be responsible for U.S. AFRICOM operational implementation and execution. Additionally, the DCMO will exercise combatant command authority under title 10, U.S.C., in the Commander’s absence.

Because we wish to integrate activities and eliminate “stovepipes,” both Deputies necessarily will collaborate and coordinate with each other on activities within their respective portfolios. To that end, they share responsibility to develop U.S. AFRICOM partnerships and capacity through the planning and execution of contingency and other operations (such as noncombatant evacuation, humanitarian assistance, disaster response and peace support); joint and combined training and exercises; foreign military training and professional development; security assistance, and security sector reform.

**Question.** What authority, if any, will the State Department/Civilian Deputy have over military personnel?

**Answer.** Both the civilian DCMA and the uniformed DCMO have the authority to direct activities within their appropriate areas of responsibility. Both Deputies will have supervisory authority for civilian and military personnel in those subordinate offices and directorates for which the Deputies are responsible. The civilian DCMA cannot hold military command authority under title 10, U.S.C., the military DCMO will exercise combatant command in my absence. The Departments of Defense and State are comfortable with this arrangement.

Because U.S. AFRICOM will have non-DOD personnel “seconded” or “detailed” to the command as well as others serving in a traditional liaison role, the command, DOD and the appropriate corresponding department of agency will need to establish agreements regarding the relationship between the command and the integrated non-DOD staff member. We envision a similar arrangement to that already in place between the Departments of Defense and other departments and agencies for the Foreign Political Advisor (POLAD) and the representatives to the JIACG. I do not believe that any statutory changes are necessary to support either position.

**Question.** What authority, if any, will the DOD/Military Deputy have over civilian personnel?

**Answer.** Interagency civilian personnel assigned to AFRICOM will have authorities established in agreements between the DOD and the respective agency.

**Question.** Do you believe any statutory changes are required to facilitate the proper functioning of these deputy commanders?

**Answer.** The Departments of Defense and State have carefully reviewed the roles, functions, and responsibilities of both deputies and are confident that current authorities under title 10, U.S.C., are adequate to support the respective duties and responsibilities for AFRICOM. AFRICOM will be in a better position to evaluate statutory sufficiency and, if appropriate, recommend any revisions or changes in the coming months.

**Question.** If confirmed, will you maintain on your staff the position of a State Department POLAD? If so, why? If not, why not?

**Answer.** Yes. I view the roles and responsibilities of a senior POLAD as vital to the successful completion of the commander’s mission. These include providing advice on political ramifications of plans, operations, and crisis response; assisting in representation with U.S. Ambassadors and foreign officials within the AOR; and keeping the commander informed on relevant authoritative foreign policy guidance. The addition of the DCMA position in AFRICOM will not duplicate these responsibilities.

**Question.** Other U.S. combatant commands are staffed by permanently assigned active-duty and civilian personnel. It is the committee’s understanding that the Department plans to follow the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of Africa (CJTF-
In your view, do you think this staffing model is the most effective one, and if so, why?

Answer. Permanently assigned active duty and civilian personnel will be assigned to AFRICOM.

Question. In briefings provided to the committee, the Department has indicated that civilians from a number of U.S. Government departments and agencies will be detailed to AFRICOM. What role do you envision these individuals playing in the daily operations of AFRICOM?

Answer. AFRICOM’s guiding principle will be to ensure coordination of its activity with other U.S. Government departments and agencies, and, as appropriate, with foreign governmental, international, non-governmental, private and profit organizations, at early stages of the planning and execution cycle. In order to enable this coordination, AFRICOM headquarters’ intent is to have an integrated staff of permanently assigned DOD (military and civilian) and non-DOD U.S. Government department and agency personnel, as well as liaison officers and staff from foreign military and civilian organizations and AFRICOM liaison personnel with duty at selected external organizations.

Non-DOD U.S. Government department and agency staff positions within AFRICOM headquarters will be at three levels: senior leadership and management positions (such as the Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Activities and the directors or deputy directors of headquarters offices or directorates); senior experts in advisory or liaison capacities (such as the Foreign Policy Advisor, the Development and Humanitarian Assistance Advisor, and the senior Treasury Department representative), and subject-matter experts integrated into staff positions throughout headquarters offices and directorates.

Senior expert advisors and liaison officers will represent their parent organizations to AFRICOM, advise the Commander and staff regarding parent organization and functional issues, communicate AFRICOM and parent organization issues across functional activities, and fully participate in AFRICOM headquarters planning and execution support. They derive their authority from their parent organizations.

Subject-matter experts from non-DOD U.S. Government departments and agencies will be detailed or “seconded” to AFRICOM. These subject-matter experts are embedded within the headquarters staff at the directorate level and below in both supervisory and action officer positions after coordination with the providing organization. They derive their authority from the AFRICOM Commander as exercised within the organizational structure. Embedded officers will be fully qualified to assume the duties and responsibilities of the position prior to joining the AFRICOM staff. These officers contribute unique perspectives at the inception of AFRICOM planning and ensure that AFRICOM activities are compatible and integrated with those of other U.S. Government departments and agencies.

Question. Will U.S. Ambassadors to African countries maintain chief of mission authority over all U.S. Government activities in the countries to which they are posted, including military relations, once AFRICOM is in place?

Answer. Yes. U.S. Ambassadors to African countries maintain chief of mission authority over all U.S. Government activities in their countries. As AFRICOM Commander, I will ensure that my senior subordinate leaders, and my representatives in Embassies (Office of Security Cooperation Chiefs) and I will ensure all military relations, activities, etc. are closely coordinated with country teams. We will closely coordinate all our activities with embassy chiefs of mission.

Question. In your opinion, how will AFRICOM differ from other regional combatant commands?

Answer. The President directed DOD to establish AFRICOM, whose focus will be to build a stable security environment that will enable Africans to pursue broader goals, such as economic security. We believe that the security aspect—part of the “three-pronged” approach—should be accomplished under U.S. DOD leadership. AFRICOM will support the other two prongs, with the State Department conducting diplomacy, and the Agency for International Development carrying out development work. AFRICOM will also have elements and personnel from a variety of government organizations, which will enhance its ability to provide support in these areas.

Question. If confirmed, would you recommend that AFRICOM include Service component commands in a manner similar to other regional combatant commands?

Answer. I believe the eventual structure of the Service components should be a reflection of the scope of missions assigned. We are still developing the concept of Service component commands for AFRICOM.
U.S. POLICY TOWARDS AFRICA

Question. What role, if any, do you expect to play, if confirmed, in promoting U.S. public diplomacy in Africa?

Answer. AFRICOM will play a supporting role in advancing U.S. public diplomacy on the continent.

Question. What role, if any, do you expect AFRICOM to play in helping to coordinate U.S. diplomatic, foreign assistance, economic, and military goals and activities?

Answer. AFRICOM will play a supporting role in the advancement of U.S. diplomatic, foreign assistance, and economic goals. It will play the leading role in the advancement of U.S. military goals and activities.

Question. Some have asserted AFRICOM is simply an American effort to protect U.S. access to gas and oil; to fight terrorists and Islamic radicals; and to counter China’s interest and activism. How do you respond to these assertions?

Answer. AFRICOM will be primarily focused on conducting security cooperation to build partnership capacities in areas such as peacekeeping, maritime security, border security, counterterrorism skills, and as appropriate supporting U.S. Government agencies and implementing other programs that promote regional stability.

AFRICA-SPECIFIC SECURITY CHALLENGES

Question. Do you believe AFRICOM should address Africa-specific security challenges, such as preventing the use of child soldiers and countering the role of civil militias and other armed, nonterrorist elements in conflict-prone countries? If so, how?

Answer. We can help our African partners address these kinds of African-specific security challenges. Fostering a fundamental respect for the rule of law should not stop within the civilian realm. By capitalizing on our military relationships throughout the continent, AFRICOM will be able to work with partner nation militaries as a supporting role to the efforts of the DOS in addressing these problems. By talking to African leaders and gaining an understanding of the depth and the nature of these problems, and using an interagency approach we can help build African capacities to deal with these challenges.

HIV/AIDS

Question. How much success has DOD had in efforts to counter AIDS in African militaries?

Answer. DOD is a major player in the HIV/AIDS Interagency Country Core Team with focus on the foreign militaries. DOD prevention efforts are reducing the stigma associated with HIV/AIDS and effecting behavioral changes needed to reduce HIV prevalence. In the past year, DOD reached 378,000 with prevention messages; counseled and tested 87,906; trained 2,500 on HIV policy, 9,000 peer educators, 2,400 medical staff; supported 280 counseling and testing centers, 50 laboratories, 26,000 on anti-retroviral treatment.

Question. If confirmed, how, if at all, would you like to see such efforts increased or programmatically altered? If so, how?

Answer. AFRICOM will continue to build on current DOD efforts in Africa. We will continue our focus on prevention, capacity building, and support our foreign military in HIV policy development to ensure infrastructure is in place for HIV testing and counseling.

President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) funding directed towards the foreign militaries has increased from $9 million in 10 countries in 2004, to $43 million in 20 countries in 2007. However, the DOD Executive Agent for DOD HIV/AIDS Prevention Program (DHAPP) efforts with the foreign militaries, the U.S. Naval Health Research Center, supports over 20 countries that are not receiving PEPFAR funding. DHAPP funding through congressional plus-ups to the Defense Health Program averaged $3 million annually. In 2007, DHAPP was unfunded resulting in uncertainties with DOD-initiated programs in these non-PEPFAR countries. Continued congressional support will ensure DHAPP’s continuity and program success.

Question. In your view, should this effort be lead by DOD or by other elements of the U.S. Government?

Answer. DOD is a critical member of the Interagency team led by the DOS, Office of the Global AIDS Coordinator that synchronizes the U.S. Government response to HIV/AIDS pandemic. DOD should continue to be the lead on the U.S. Government HIV/AIDS prevention effort with the foreign militaries. The success of our partner-
ships with the African foreign military in the fight against HIV/AIDS will enhance national security and regional stability.

DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

**Question.** What role would you expect AFRICOM to play in the area of humanitarian assistance?

**Answer.** AFRICOM will play a supporting role. The U.S. military is not an instrument of first resort in providing to humanitarian assistance but supports civilian relief agencies. We recognize the significant role and capabilities of USAID as the principal U.S. agency extending assistance to countries responding to and recovering from natural or manmade disaster. The U.S. military may be involved when it provides a unique service; when the civilian response is overwhelmed; and civilian authorities request assistance. The USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance validates all such requests for U.S. military assistance. Our role in this context will not change. We will play the supporting role when necessary and appropriate. The difference is that this command will be better prepared to respond to such eventualities and to do so better. We will have USAID staff within the command in order to help make sure that such responses when appropriate and necessary are well-planned and executed.

**Question.** What steps, if any, do you expect AFRICOM to take to enhance ongoing U.S. Government humanitarian assistance programs?

**Answer.** There will be a robust Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief branch within the command focused on Africa, which will include the participation of USAID staff. This will enable better planning and coordination of military support to humanitarian assistance efforts.

**Question.** In your view, what role, if any, should AFRICOM have in addressing ongoing political conflicts or humanitarian crises such as those in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic?

**Answer.** AFRICOM will take an appropriate role as directed by U.S. policy. A significant number of these existing crises will require active participation on the part of African organizations, countries, and leaders. AFRICOM will leverage traditional Theater Security Cooperation programs to develop African capacity and capability to respond to existing crises and hopefully prevent new ones from emerging.

**Question.** In what program or policy areas not strictly related to military matters, if any, do you believe AFRICOM should play a role?

**Answer.** AFRICOM is contemplated as playing a larger role in development activities than a traditional combatant command, in close coordination with agencies more directly involved in developmental activities.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the role AFRICOM will play in the area of development activities, which are overseen by USAID?

**Answer.** The command will play a supporting role, as required. We recognize that USAID is the principal agency extending assistance to countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms; DOD plays a supporting role for USAID development and humanitarian objectives.

**Question.** How do you expect AFRICOM would function in countries without USAID missions?

**Answer.** In countries where there is no USAID presence, we would further strengthen our ties with the regional programs, work with the country team, as well as rely on USAID staff within the command to assist in the appropriate design, coordination, and execution of programs. USAID has three regional programs that cover many of the other countries where there are no missions. CJTF-HOA, for example, has been able to forge strong relationships throughout their area of operation with these regional programs in support of efforts in countries where USAID does not have a physical presence.

**Question.** How will AFRICOM coordinate its activities with those of USAID?

**Answer.** AFRICOM will provide one African focused organization to communicate and coordinate with USAID. USAID will have several staff based in the command in order to further facilitate communications and coordination, as well as bring the necessary expertise. The establishment of the command will greatly facilitate USAID communication and coordination with the DOD concerning Africa.

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

**Question.** Since the Secretary of Defense announced in February 2007 the intention of the DOD to create a U.S. military combatant command for Africa, there has been a great deal of debate of the location regarding this new combatant command.
What kind of headquarters structure do you believe is most appropriate for AFRICOM? A strong central location? A hub-and-spoke approach?

Answer. We are looking at all options and will determine appropriate options after additional analysis and dialogue with governments on the continent.

Question. What are the potential overseas basing implications related to the establishment of AFRICOM?

Answer. We need to measure the acceptance of headquarters locations in terms of the African Union (AU), subregional organizations, and individual nations—we need to be welcomed. Furthermore, our presence on the continent implies a long-term commitment. We will better understand this once additional analysis is concluded.

Question. Are permanent bases envisioned as part of the new command?

Answer. Permanent bases are not envisioned as part of the command.

Question. What criteria will be used to determine the size, location, and management of these locations, including the site of a permanent headquarters somewhere on the continent?

Answer. A site selection criteria was developed in coordination with the DOS. Some of the criteria includes: political stability; security factors; access to regional and intercontinental transportation; availability of acceptable infrastructure; quality of life; proximity to the AU and regional organizations; proximity to U.S. Government hubs; adequate Status of Forces Agreement. The transition team has used these criteria to narrow down potential sites. Those potential sites have been briefed to the DOS informally and we have begun dialogue on the advantages and disadvantages of those sites.

Question. What, if any, additional cooperative security locations does DOD hope to establish in Africa? What is the estimated cost of establishing and operating these locations?

Answer. Once established, AFRICOM will conduct in-depth analysis to determine if and where cooperative security locations are required to meet logistics and Theater Security Cooperation engagement requirements across the African continent.

Question. What, if any, plans does DOD have to expand the size of its military presence and/or facilities (temporary or permanent) at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti?

Answer. AFRICOM plans to utilize Camp Lemonier as an enduring Forward Operating Site. There are no current plans to expand the U.S. presence at Camp Lemonier. Once established, AFRICOM will conduct analysis to determine the appropriate level and capability of assigned personnel and facilities in order to meet strategic mission requirements.

SECTION 1206 FUNDING

Question. Section 1206 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, as amended, established a new program that gives the DOD the authority to spend, in coordination with the DOS, up to $300 million of its operations and maintenance funds to train and equip foreign militaries to undertake counterterrorism or stability operations.

What is your assessment of the section 1206 program’s impact in the AFRICOM AOR?

Answer. In fiscal year 2006, $111 million of section 1206 money was provided to build intelligence-sharing capacity for Pan-Sahel countries, along with maritime domain awareness systems for countries in the Gulf of Guinea. In Sao Tome and Principe, a basic Regional Maritime Awareness Capability has been established. The full-up capability is on schedule for completion prior to December 31, 2007. The installation in Nigeria was delayed several months due to the recent change in government, but the program has resumed and is making progress. In the end, these nations will own, operate, sustain, and be able to propagate this capability without external support. This distributed partnership in maritime awareness will foster localized ownership of regionally and internationally shared maritime security.

The fiscal year 2006 section 1206 program also included the Multi-National Information Sharing Initiative (MISI), an information sharing capacity building program in Trans-Sahara Africa—specifically Chad and Nigeria. This program greatly enhances the partner nation’s ability to respond to humanitarian crises and other threats. Additionally, the technology will allow greater interoperability among the U.N., U.S., and African agencies positioned to address these crises.

For fiscal year 2008, section 1206 programs will play an even larger role because AFRICOM’s Foreign Military Financing budget has been reduced to $16 million.

Question. Recent projects funded under section 1206 authorities have provided assistance, as part of the larger East Africa Regional Security Initiative, to Ethiopia
and Chad, countries with poor human rights records and a history of suppressing political opposition.

Answer. Security Cooperation programs remain the cornerstone of our strategy to promote common security, which ultimately supports national security objectives. Section 1206 authority is one of the many security cooperation programs used to build relationships with countries like Chad and Ethiopia that support U.S. strategic interests, enhance partner security capabilities, and improve information exchange and intelligence sharing.

Question. If confirmed, what metrics would you use to assess the relative costs and benefits of proposals for 1206 funding?

Answer. Successful section 1206 proposals are conceptualized in collaboration with other U.S. agencies, meet urgent and emergent regional security needs, and compliment existing interagency security cooperation activities.

SECTION 1207 FUNDING

Question. Section 1207 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 authorized the Secretary of Defense to use or transfer defense articles, services, training, or other support to the Secretary of State to provide immediate reconstruction, security, or stabilization assistance to a foreign country for the purpose of restoring or maintaining peace and security in that country.

What is your assessment of the section 1207 program’s impact in the AFRICOM AOR?

Answer. While there are currently no 1207 being executed in Africa, funds are being pursued for fiscal year 2008 to support programs in Somalia, Mali, and Niger.

SECTION 1208 FUNDING


What is your assessment of this program?

Answer. The section 1208 authority gives us very important latitude in our pursuit of Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans-Sahara (OEF–TS) objectives in where more traditional security assistance and military-to-military engagement authorities don’t readily apply. We are currently using the program to develop an indigenous intelligence capacity in Niger. This capacity will be focused in the northwest region of the country and will fill a critical capabilities gap of the Nigerian military.

Question. If confirmed, how would you like to see the program used in Africa?

Answer. We would continue to use the program in a fashion similar to the concept we are implementing in Niger. We are developing similar concepts for specific regions of Mali and Mauritania, and are considering others in Chad and Nigeria. I believe the flexibility this authority provides will remain useful for OEF–TS in particular for a number of years.

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Question. Since July 2005, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has helped to provide air transport for peacekeepers and civilian police from African troops contributing countries into and out of Darfur. NATO has also provided training to AU officers, mainly on how to run a multinational military headquarters and manage information effectively.

How would you envision AFRICOM interacting with NATO on operations within the African AOR?

Answer. AFRICOM could assist NATO efforts on the African continent by ensuring close coordination of U.S. contributions and capabilities to NATO operations and training. NATO is uniquely suited to allow AFRICOM access to European interests and capabilities and experience on the African continent. Where authorized and appropriate, AFRICOM can provide logistical support to NATO, professional military training and engagement in conjunction with and other security cooperation and outreach efforts. If confirmed, I will strongly support continued participation of NATO’s ongoing Mediterranean Dialogue with North African nations.

UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS IN AFRICA

Question. The United Nations currently has six U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa. The U.N. also maintains over 50,000 peacekeeping troops and police in Africa, and this does not include the expanded U.N. Mission in Sudan.
What role do you see AFRICOM playing vis-à-vis these U.N. peacekeeping missions?

Answer. U.N. peacekeeping missions need professionally trained peacekeepers. The African Union’s stated policy is to man as many African peace support operations with African peacekeepers. To support both of these objectives, AFRICOM will continue the work begun by EUCOM and CENTCOM in assisting in the training of African peacekeepers. AFRICOM will work closely with the State Department to train African peacekeepers through the State Department’s African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program.

Would you advocate expanding the U.S. military’s role in support of U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa?

Answer. The decision as to the U.S. Government’s level of participation in any U.N. peacekeeping mission will be made at the highest levels of our government. If confirmed, my objective will be to build a unified command that will respond to the level of participation required to support U.N. peacekeeping missions in Africa.

GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS INITIATIVE

Question. In 2004, the President announced the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). The goal of the initiative was to train 75,000 peacekeepers. What role do you believe AFRICOM should have in support of this initiative?

Answer. With State Department as the executive agent, GPOI expects to train approximately 40,000 troops in AFRICOM’s AOR. AFRICOM will continue involvement in GPOI and ACOTA programs through existing coordination mechanisms with State Department-hosted GPOI steering conferences. Given title 10 and 22 funding guidelines and current operations tempo, AFRICOM will also continue to provide small military teams for special mentoring assistance to State Department-contracted ACOTA training events.

Question. What is the prospective role of AFRICOM in ensuring that GPOI is successful in Africa?

Answer. The State Department’s ACOTA program, as the GPOI peacekeeping training arm for Africa, is highly successful and is increasing its program strength and effectiveness on the continent. AFRICOM will aggressively work with State Department to resource military mentors for ACOTA training events, and will continue to reach out to European nations interested in partnering with peacekeeping training.

Question. In your opinion, how quickly should GPOI be able to provide basic deployment equipment packages to countries that are willing to deploy troops immediately to current peacekeeping operations, as in Darfur, but lack the resources to do so?

Answer. Through the ACOTA program, State Department maintains standing contracts to provide training equipment for long-term self-sustained training. These contracts also provide basic trainee equipment packages for individual soldiers. These packages can be used during peace support operations deployments. Operational deployment-specific equipment falls under non-ACOTA GPOI funding. However, the equipment needs of Troop Contributing Countries for peace support operations in Darfur and other anticipated operations dwarf GPOI’s ability to provide the magnitude of equipment required to satisfy United Nations Contingent Owned Equipment requirements.

Question. In your opinion, are GPOI training efforts providing well-trained peacekeepers for U.N. and other operations?

Answer. I have personally witnessed the effectiveness of ACOTA training in Rwanda as they prepared for their deployment in support of the AU mission in Darfur. The troops I observed were well-trained and well-equipped. U.S.-sponsored peacekeeping training is responsible for the majority of the approximately 17,000 African peacekeepers serving in on-going peace support operations. Most partners have incorporated ACOTA trainers into their long-term training programs to monitor and observe indigenous training provided by GPOI-trained instructors. The ACOTA program provides training and certifies instructors, which will be critical for future United Nations Chapter VI and VII peace support operations.

TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT FOR AFRICOM MISSIONS

Question. The defense research and technology community has developed a number of capabilities that are potentially supportive of AFRICOM’s missions—including vaccines to combat infectious diseases, language translation systems, and cultural modeling, simulation tools, and wargames.
What specific technology-based capabilities do you feel need to be developed or im- 
proved in order to best support AFRICOM’s missions?

Answer. There are several capabilities that need to be developed to best support 
AFRICOM missions. As stated earlier, promoting stability among African nations 
will be a priority for AFRICOM. The size of Africa, the length of its coast line, and 
the limited interior infrastructure challenges the African nations in their ability to 
maintain adequate air, land, and maritime awareness. To help address this short-
fall, I would like to see development of technologies that provide adequate national 
and regional awareness of borders, coast lines and air corridors. To support regional 
cooperation, I believe we need to develop technology that allows for the national in-
formation collected to be shared regionally. For these technologies to be adopted by 
African nations, they need to be affordable, robust, and easy to use.

Another major technology challenge for AFRICOM will be the requirement, while 
responding to disasters or contingencies, to deliver large amounts of humanitarian 
supplies and/or peace keepers quickly. The current U.S. strategic lift system is lim-
lited in its capability to deliver forces and support to areas that lack mature 
logistical infrastructure. Technologies that would deliver units and supplies any-
where in Africa within 3 to 5 days, independent of air and sea ports or a road net-
work, would allow AFRICOM to be responsive to shaping opportunities by providing 
pre-hostility support, or reaching victims of a natural disaster without having to 
wait for seaports, airports, or roadways to be cleared or repaired.

Question. If confirmed, how would you work with the defense research and acqui-
sition community to ensure that they are aware of those needs and supportive of 
AFRICOM's missions?

Answer. EUCOM has already actively engaged the research and acquisition com-
munity to develop solutions for Africa-related capability shortfalls. The community 
is aware of the requirement sets required to support AFRICOM missions. These 
Concept Development and Experimentation efforts and initiatives will ultimately 
transfer to AFRICOM according to individual transition strategies.

TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION WITH AFRICA

Question. The DOD makes use of international research and technology coopera-
tion both to increase military capabilities, especially for coalition and multinational 
operations, and to expand and improve ties to friendly nations. Examples include 
work on advanced technologies with South Africa and cooperative research activities 
in Egypt and Kenya.

What opportunities do you see for the Department to expand its research and 
technology cooperation activities in Africa?

Answer. The U.S. has developed research and development (R&D) relationships 
with several African nations and AFRICOM will seek to lead continued U.S. efforts 
in this arena. In our quest to develop “African systems for Africans”, it behooves 
us to partner with national industries to jointly develop technologies/systems to 
meet their requirements. Our African partners have a strong desire to operate and 
maintain their own systems, without any outside influences. Early R&D and acqui-
sition partnering will help facilitate initial African acceptance and set the founda-
tion for long-term transition to African owned and operated systems.

Question. What benefits to AFRICOM's ability to accomplish its missions might 
be accrued if the Department enhances its technology cooperation activities in Afri-
can?

Answer. Building Partnership Capacity within the African regions is central to 
AFRICOM’s strategic vision. By providing innovative technology, new concepts, and 
mentoring to aid information sharing, we directly influence security and stability of 
partner nations and surrounding regions.

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

Question. National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD 44) assigns the DOS 
the responsibility to coordinate and lead integrated U.S. Government efforts, involv-
ing all U.S. departments and agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan 
for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities. NSPD 44 also states 
that, when relevant and appropriate, reconstruction and stabilization contingency 
plans and missions will be coordinated with U.S. military contingency plans to en-
sure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations.

Are the new organizational constructs envisioned for AFRICOM, in whatever form 
is eventually decided upon, going to be able to adequately address capacity short-
falls in non-DOD organizations?

Answer. It will not be the specific task of AFRICOM to identify the capacity short-
falls in non-DOD organizations. The envisioned organizational construct for
AFRICOM should provide insight into the coordinated capacity of various organizations in meeting our shared objectives.

**Question.** If not, what other steps are needed, in your view, to address this issue, and how should they be accomplished?

**Answer.** The purpose of U.S. AFRICOM is to more appropriately organize the DOD to serve the continent of Africa due to its growing strategic importance. AFRICOM will provide a single point of response for DOD when it comes to African challenges.

**Question.** What do you foresee as the main bureaucratic or logistical obstacles to the success of the interdisciplinary-interagency approach planned for AFRICOM?

**Answer.** Once full and complete mission analysis is accomplished with an approved mission statement for AFRICOM, the work to enter agreements and assign resources to implement the multi-disciplinary approach will take greater shape.

**Question.** How do you plan to address these obstacles?

**Answer.** We have been working to develop agreements to share with various agencies and departments that may want to join the AFRICOM team. We continue to reach out to our interagency partners to conclude agreements.

**Question.** U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) formed Interagency Directorate (J9) to spearhead coordination between its interagency partners and to address quickly emerging challenges facing Central and South America and the Caribbean. Some of the command's interagency goals include: improving synchronization of operations and activities between SOUTHCOM and other U.S. Government organizations operating in this part of the world to create a collaborative, effective, and efficient command, engage interagency partner decisionmakers, and integrate personnel from these agencies on a full time basis into the SOUTHCOM staff. This model and its purpose seems consistent with the intentions of AFRICOM.

What is your assessment of the J9 model? Do you believe it would be appropriate for AFRICOM?

**Answer.** We have looked at SOUTHCOM's J9 model and have already begun to incorporate some of the good ideas of the J9 into the Partnership Division of our Outreach Office. For example, we are designing our Partnership Division as the "portal" to AFRICOM for the interagency and outside partners, similar to what SOUTHCOM has done with its J9. We have also met with members of U.S. Northern Command's (NORTHCOM) JIACG to hear the lessons they learned while standing up their JIACG.

**TRANS-SAHARA COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNERSHIP**

**Question.** The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a State Department-led initiative that seeks to eliminate and prevent terrorist sanctuaries in the Trans-Sahel region of Africa.

Would you include this program as a part of AFRICOM's stability operations?

**Answer.** Yes. Military power alone can not address the myriad of issues facing the African continent today. The U.S. Government will need to mobilize all facets of national power to counter the spread of instability by assisting our partners overcome the economic, political, and environmental conditions that have historically weakened the institutions, thereby allowing African nations to concentrate on the needs, aspirations and desires of the people. Only through the building of sustainable relationships fostered by programs like the TSCTP which fuses the capabilities of multiple U.S. Government agencies together can we build the cooperation that will assist the African states in the development of a stable and prosperous Africa.

To contain and ultimately eliminate violent extremism in the Trans-Sahara the conflict will not be waged on the battlefield, but on the airwaves and in the hearts and minds of the Trans-Saharan populace. TSCTP has broadened its focus to take the battle to the enemy on the social, economic and political fronts. Spurring economic development, expanding educational opportunities, building health clinics, providing food assistance and promoting good governance are all combined to be part of a long-term public diplomacy and development campaign against radicalism.

**Question.** How do you expect the TSCTP program will be coordinated among DOD, State and USAID participants within AFRICOM?

**Answer.** As an established program, TSCTP continues to demonstrate the value of forging new processes in furthering cooperation among the entire U.S. Government interagency community, not just that between DOD/DOS and USAID and I anticipate that it will continue to utilize the methods that presently exist. It is my desire that this program will continue its great work at AFRICOM as it is presently doing for EUCOM and will be a template for other interagency cooperation programs within AFRICOM.
Question. What role do you foresee for the African Union or other African organizations in stability operations in Africa, and how can the new command best facilitate that role?

Answer. The nations of Africa and the organizations they have formed to promote security and cooperation on the continent will carry the lion’s share of the burden when it comes to stability operations and indeed all missions in Africa. AFRICOM is in a prime position to assist building the military capabilities of those nations that strive to take on greater regional responsibility through military to military training and exercises. Additionally, when directed, the command will be prepared to support African led operations, such as the airlift provided for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). In general, by being a committed and focused partner, the new command will work with African nations and their organizations as they shoulder the demands of maintaining security and prosperity on the continent.

Question. What role, if any, would you expect AFRICOM to play in helping determine how agency resources will be allocated?

Answer. It is the intent of AFRICOM to work with our inter-agency partners in ensuring full transparency of each of our programs, thus leading to increased harmonization and effectiveness of our collective efforts.

INTELLIGENCE ISSUES

Question. In December 2004, Congress passed the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act, which created the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and charged it with conducting “strategic operational planning” to combat terrorist threats to U.S. interests at home and abroad. NCTC has taken the lead on developing the National Implementation Plan, a detailed, interagency plan for combating terrorism, which assigns roles and responsibilities to departments and agencies across the government.

What is your understanding of the role of the NCTC with respect to AFRICOM?

Answer. With regard to AFRICOM, the NCTC develops strategic guidance and the national, interagency objectives and tasks on counter terrorism matters which AFRICOM, along with our interagency partners on the continent, are responsible for implementing.

Question. How will AFRICOM’s responsibilities for integrating military and civilian planning interface with NCTC’s responsibility for integrating military and civilian planning?

Answer. AFRICOM, along with these other Departments and agencies, has an obligation under NSPD–46 to work together very closely to ensure that all of our plans and activities are coordinated, synchronized and mutually reinforcing. It will be my priority to ensure that AFRICOM planning is fully coordinated and integrated with our interagency partners. The AFRICOM staff structure and integration of inter-agency personnel in the Command is designed specifically toward this end.

Question. How are the specific agency roles and responsibilities outlined in the National Implementation Plan integrated with AFRICOM’s efforts to bring stability to Africa?

Answer. A key underpinning for a more stable Africa is to encourage all segments of the population to reject terrorism as a political instrument. This requires that we build the trust and confidence of African governments and populations that only comes through the development of habitual relationships and implementation of programs and initiatives which promote secure environments and political and economic stability. It necessarily requires U.S. involvement across the diplomatic, information, military and economic spectrum by the various U.S. Departments engaged in Africa. Such engagement is already occurring. However, for AFRICOM’s efforts to be most effective, and for our collective interagency efforts to be mutually reinforcing in promoting stability, we must plan and implement our programs with a high degree of routine coordination and full knowledge of programs and capabilities all Departments bring to the African continent. How we integrate AFRICOM’s efforts with our interagency partners will be through the development and implementation of specific counterterrorism and security cooperation plans which are fully coordinated with the other agencies and their planning efforts.

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Question. Africa has one of the most largest and most mature NGO communities in the world. In many cases, the NGOs are the first responders in Africa.

If confirmed, how would you expect to coordinate AFRICOM’s operations with these organizations?

Answer. AFRICOM will establish a robust relationship with the U.S. Agency for International Development. AFRICOM will reach out to the NGO community in Africa through our Partnership Division in our Outreach Office. As we establish and
maintain these key relationships we will continue to coordinate our efforts with USAID representatives within the command. We have learned from our recent efforts in the Horn of Africa and elsewhere in Africa that there is a broad range of NGO and community-based activities taking place. These activities bear significant short-term and long-term results.

**STABILITY OPERATIONS**

**Question.** DOD has established policy designating stability operations as a core U.S. military mission and directing that they [stability operations] be prioritized comparable to combat operations. The directive implementing this policy assigns the Commanders of the Geographic Combatant Commands the responsibility to engage relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs, and members of the private sector in stability operations planning, training, and exercising, as appropriate.

What type of guidance and specific steps do you believe are necessary for combatant commanders to effectively coordinate and integrate planning with State, USAID, other U.S. agencies and organizations, and multinational partners?

**Answer.** I think we agree with the premise that there needs to be better interagency cooperation that facilitates the use of all aspects of national power. This involves more than just establishing headquarters, it involves a campaign based, comprehensive approach in which all interagency players are involved in complex planning and execution. A campaign, by definition, is a number of disparate actions and activities that are coordinated to realize a singular end state. Campaigns require authorities and funding—which come from the executive branch and Congress.

Stability operations planning must be accomplished from inception by a full interagency team. This prevents planning in a vacuum and avoids the situation where a finalized and signed plan is passed on to a partnering U.S. Government agency which cannot fulfill the roles and responsibilities assigned in the plan. Finally, field outreach to the embassies, USAID staff, and staff of other U.S. Government agencies will aid significantly in coordination.

**Question.** What steps, staff, and resources are needed to establish an interagency team within AFRICOM that can routinely and actively contribute to DOD’s operational planning?

**Answer.** We need people across the interagency assigned to AFRICOM willing to be consistently engaged in the planning process—not instead of a military staff with interagency representatives only for perfunctory planning. AFRICOM needs experienced interagency planners.

Another way of approaching this issue is to establish an interagency planning school or curriculum which looks at campaign planning from the interagency perspective. From there, we need to codify a process for interagency campaign design. This process needs to be a cooperative effort that goes beyond DOD. My hope is that this concept will engender a productive dialogue that produces effectual change that the military and our interagency partners can make in order to improve interagency cooperation and teamwork. The Joint Staff J7 is now looking at the idea of “Mission-Centric Planning,” a promising recognition of the role that individual Country Teams can—and ought to—play in operational planning.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you address the challenges associated with sharing information between DOD and non-DOD partners in policy, organizational structures, training, or other measure within the control of the combatant commander?

**Answer.** The key to solving the information sharing challenges is to get the right representatives from other U.S. Government agencies at the AFRICOM table; developing the mission focused teams with wide spectrum expertise from across the interagency and when needed facilitate reach back to home and field offices. For those key U.S. Government agencies not represented at AFRICOM, I would aggressively seek to bring in the appropriate out of area representation.

This is an area where non-DOD partners have to be taken on their own terms. The DOD has much to gain and to offer in the information sharing arena. As other non-DOD agencies often operate in a more decentralized manner, DOD can utilize its expertise in information gathering and synthesis to provide our interagency partners a regional and multi-agency picture. This may directly benefit the country teams and other organizations as they can see the actions outside of their traditional areas of focus. The DOD will benefit from the vast regional expertise and subject matter experts that the other government agencies bring to the table. We also must recognize our partners’ requirement for information, which may well be in different formats and categories, and work on developing common data bases which meet both DOD and non-DOD needs.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you expect to take to facilitate greater understanding of the planning process and capabilities between DOD and non-DOD communities involved in stability operations?

Answer. Planning and planning expertise are key to successful operations in the DOD. As a result, attending planning courses is a vital requirement for DOD planners. We need to significantly expand available seats in planning courses, so that personnel for U.S. Government agencies partnering with the DOD can attend these courses and obtain the necessary level of planning expertise. Again, the development of an interagency planning course might help in this area.

In addition, I would include DOS, USAID, and others in TSC planning exercises and encourage AFRICOM staff to participate in the planning exercises of DOS, USAID, and others.

Question. How do you believe the significant differences in the capacity of non-DOD organizations to engage in stability operations could best be addressed?

Answer. First, we must assess the planning and execution capabilities of other U.S. Government agencies, since planning capacity of USAID and other agencies is sometimes underestimated. Second, develop common training modules, including interactive joint exercises, which will help build capacities in areas lacking by agencies including emphasis on lessons learned from previous stability operations.

A second issue is that non-DOD organizations, both government and private, are structured so as to optimally meet the requirements of their particular tasks, usually very different than DOD organizations. At the operational level, for example, the major overseas planning entities for DOD are the geographic commands, whereas for the DOS and most other U.S. Government agencies these entities are the country teams in each host country.

We in DOD should not expect that the solution to interagency cooperation in Stability Operations lies in making the rest of the U.S. Government look like ourselves. In many aspects of stability operations DOD would be the supporting agency, and we thus need to understand the strengths and weaknesses of non-DOD agencies and concentrate how we can gain greater synergy by working together. The real strength of the COCOMs, the ability to plan and execute across international boundaries on a regional basis, is a natural complement to the strengths of other U.S. Government agencies represented in the Country Teams to cooperate in furthering common U.S. goals within international boundaries.

One of the ways, that COCOMs can overcome the problems, and build real synergy in Stability Operations, is to organize itself so as to be able to work most effectively with non-DOD agencies. AFRICOM intends to be a leader in developing this concept. This is a work in progress, but I am convinced that we are on the right path for the future.

Article 98

Question. The State Department and DOD have been limited in their ability to engage with some African nations because bilateral "Article 98" agreements, which protect American citizens from the International Criminal Court, have not been secured.

What is your assessment of the impact of the inability of the U.S. to provide foreign military assistance to countries with whom we have not been able to negotiate Article 98 agreements?

Answer. AFRICOM's anticipated AOR will consist of over 50 countries. While only a handful of those countries are currently adversely affected by the lack of an Article 98 agreement, two of the most important regional powers, South Africa and Kenya, are included. The other affected countries are Mali, Namibia, Niger, and Tanzania.

De-linking international military education and training (IMET) with American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA) sanctions was a positive and critical step in rebuilding these relationships. However, with ASPA sanctions blocking foreign military financing (FMF) for these countries, bilateral sanctions are causing both direct and indirect adverse effects, and these effects spread to other areas of U.S. interest.

In South Africa the bulk of the FMF credits of $6 million (2002) were applied to cases to support the South African National Defense Forces (SANDF) C–130 fleet for parts and training. The suspension of FMF support to South Africa played a part in their decision to modernize their lift fleet with the Airbus M400 over the C130. The effect will continue to be felt for decades to come as defense contracts are lost to other countries, affecting both our defense industry and our overall interoperability with the most powerful nation on the continent. In Kenya, the prohibition on Foreign Military Sales (FMS) is causing our support for their F5 aircraft to close. CENTCOM's intent to support Kenya's desire to modernize their Airborne, special
operation forces, and counter terrorism elements will also not be executable due to a lack of Foreign Military Financing.

**DISASTER RESPONSE**

**Question.** For each of the past several years, the continent of Africa has experienced a number of major natural disasters. Most recently, we have seen flooding in Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda. DOD has responded in a limited way. Should DOD’s role in responding to such disasters change with the standing up of AFRICOM?

**Answer.** DOD has an excellent working relationship with USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). We plan to have a liaison officer from OFDA in our Command structure. Although I do not see our role in support of OFDA, as the lead Federal agency for disaster response, changing, I do see our ability to plan with and improve our capability to provide support to OFDA greatly improving with the stand up of AFRICOM, and given necessary resources to respond are provided when requested.

**Question.** In some countries, a natural disaster compounds a political conflict, thereby exacerbating existing security and humanitarian conditions. To what extent do you believe AFRICOM should step in to facilitate humanitarian aid?

**Answer.** AFRICOM can call upon the unique capabilities of the U.S. military to address a wide variety of issues resulting from natural disasters or complex humanitarian emergencies. As a part of AFRICOM’s interagency approach to issues in Africa, I will follow the lead of the U.S. Chief of Mission for the affected country, coordinating with and supporting his/her efforts. At the same time any assets that are made available to the issue will also be coordinated and vetted with OFDA.

**HUMAN RIGHTS**

**Question.** In your view, does the U.S. do enough to train African militaries on matters such as respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the proper role of the civilian-controlled military in a democracy?

**Answer.** In my current position as Deputy Commander of EUCOM, I have observed the serious effort that the Departments of Defense and State devote to these issues as we work together in training African militaries. For example, the State Department funds International Military Education and Training programs that are implemented within U.S. embassies by military officers assigned to our Offices of Defense Cooperation and Defense Attaché Offices. Foreign military members and units proposed to receive U.S. Government funded training undergo a “vetting procedure” to review the backgrounds for human rights violations. This vetting occurs for all security assistance programs and military training programs. The State Department’s African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) program, which often includes U.S. military trainers, and Defense’s Africa Center for Strategic Studies programs both “vet” proposed trainees. During ACOTA training events, human rights, rule of law, and the role of a civilian controlled military in a democracy are all topics that are emphasized as the U.S. Government trains African peacekeepers.

**Question.** If confirmed, would you expect to create an office within AFRICOM to monitor and coordinate human rights issues?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I expect to very closely analyze the command structure of AFRICOM taking into consideration the new expertise provided by incorporating interagency staff, before making a formal decision on establishing a specific office to monitor human rights issues.

**COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE—HORN OF AFRICA**

**Question.** What is your view of the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa to the United States?

**Answer.** There are a number of key reasons behind the “strategic importance” of the HOA to the U.S. African countries are plagued with internal and external tensions which have prevented economic growth and political stability. The U.S. interagency efforts combined with the CJTF–HOA presence helps to prevent regional conflict leading to a more stable environment.

HOA, like the other regions in Africa, represents the next frontier of global economic development and competition. Development of new markets and new resources not only supports the U.S. economy, but creates prosperity in a historically poor region, ameliorating the underlying causes of instability and conflict.
Much of the world’s oil flow and other critical mineral resources pass through international waters near the HOA coast. It is vital for the U.S. to prevent disruption of these global superhighways.

Historically, extremists have sought refuge in the HOA sub-region. Not only do they present a threat to the U.S.-African partnership aimed at pursuing political stability and economic prosperity, but from the HOA it can be exported to other parts of the world. It is again of key strategic importance that we do all that we can to prevail against such a threat.

**Question.** With the standing up of AFRICOM, do you believe the U.S. can play a more significant role in this subregion, particularly in a country like Somalia? If so, how?

**Answer.** The standing up of AFRICOM will further contribute to the current CJTF–HOA efforts aimed at promoting regional stability by bringing a more focused and coherent interagency effort in the region. With regard to Somalia, CJTF–HOA’s military assistance to the Ugandan Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF) deployed in support of the AU Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia provides a good example of the significant role AFRICOM can bring to support a resolution for the Somalia conflict.

CJTF–HOA supported the AU’s logistic planning efforts to deploy the UPDF to Mogadishu, facilitated medical training for the UPDF and worked with a NGO to provide medical supplies to the UPDF for direct assistance of the citizens in Mogadishu. CJTF–HOA also facilitated training for UPDF marine forces in Kenya prior to their deployment to protect the Mogadishu Seaport.

AFRICOM’s focused attention on the HOA region and interagency staff composition will facilitate a wide range of opportunities for assistance to the AU’s efforts in the region using African solutions to African problems.

**MARITIME SECURITY**

**Question.** Maritime security has proven to be a significant issue on the coasts of west and east Africa. In the west, northern migration to Europe and the Gulf of Guinea are the challenges and, in the east, pirating in the major shipping lanes and transporting of terrorists to and from the Middle East are the challenges. What is your assessment of EUCOM’s efforts to combat maritime threats in the west?

**Answer.** Africa presents some unique challenges in the maritime security environment. The West Indian Ocean and Gulf of Guinea regions of Africa are areas which clearly demonstrate the complexity of maritime challenges present around the continent. In each of these regions, problems such as illicit or criminal activity, piracy, environmental and fisheries violations, resource theft, and trafficking, occur on a routine and regular basis. The common challenges in both of these regions highlight the extent of the problem, and identify some of the various attributes that must necessarily be addressed if a comprehensive maritime security solution for Africa is to be provided. In the end, African solutions for African challenges will yield the best results.

EUCOM is actively working with the Gulf of Guinea countries, through Navy Europe (NAVEUR), to help them address their maritime threats. The African Partnership Station (APS) program, about to launch, will be another effort to help the Gulf of Guinea nations combat their maritime threats.

**Question.** What is your assessment of U.S. CENTCOM’s efforts to combat maritime threats in the Horn of Africa?

**Answer.** The Horn of Africa region has unique maritime security challenges that include problems such as illicit/criminal activity, piracy, environmental and fisheries violations, resource theft, and trafficking, which occur on a routine and regular basis. The challenges extend beyond the Horn of Africa and include the entire West Indian Ocean region of Africa. With over 4,750 miles of coastline and only 25 boats to provide maritime security, the region possesses virtually no capability to interdict fishery theft, piracy, narco-trafficking, or any other illicit activity in the maritime domain when it occurs.

CENTCOM’s efforts to combat maritime threats in the Horn of Africa, Naval Forces, Central (NAVCENT), and the Coalition Task Force, CTF–150, working with the CJTF–HOA, have been focused on assisting the Africans to combat terrorism, piracy, narcotic trafficking, and other illicit activity. Through maritime interdiction operations, developing maritime domain awareness, and providing military-to-military training, both Task Forces have been working towards building regional capacity through bi-lateral and multi-lateral engagements in the Horn of Africa region.

Presently, both the Horn of Africa and the West Indian Ocean region lack significant naval forces, coastal security forces or security structures to provide any meaningful or realistic deterrent. CENTCOM, through the efforts of CTF–150 and CJTF–HOA...
AEF, has made great strides to assist the region in combating the threat while helping the region strengthen its ability to fully maintain its maritime security. AFRICOM will continue to build on these efforts and look to add value where needed to lead toward African solutions for African challenges. What role do you expect AFRICOM to play in efforts to combat maritime threats in and around Africa?

Answer. AFRICOM will build upon the existing efforts to assist African nations to build capacity in the areas of maritime security and safety, specifically, in the Gulf of Guinea region, the Horn of Africa, and the West Indian Ocean region. AFRICOM will add value to these efforts, maximizing the resources that the Inter-agency, non-government organizations, our international partners and our African partners already bring to the continent.

**EGYPT**

*Question.* It is the committee’s understanding that Egypt has been given dual status in the CENTCOM and AFRICOM AORs.

What is your understanding of how this dual status in two geographic AORs will be implemented?

*Answer.* Operationally and administratively Egypt will be part of the CENTCOM AOR. However, AFRICOM will have the ability to work with Egypt on Africa-related issues.

*Question.* For instance, how would issues related to U.S. Foreign Military Financing assistance with Egypt be coordinated by the two commands?

*Answer.* CENTCOM will have responsibility for the coordination of foreign assistance programs for Egypt. There will be little change in how security assistance and combatant command programs in general would be managed with Egypt once AFRICOM reaches final operating capability.

**AFRICAN UNION**

*Question.* In December 2006, the State Department established a U.S. Mission to the AU. The purpose of this mission is to forge a strategic partnership with the AU that will further peace, stability and prosperity throughout Africa. In March 2007, you visited with AU officials about a number of issues, including AFRICOM. In your assessment, is the AU receptive to the AFRICOM?

*Answer.* Yes. The AU’s strong support of communications exercise Africa Endeavor is an example of the positive development between the AU and the USEUCOM. In addition, over the last few years EUCOM has provided the AU advice, mentoring and tactical expertise as the AU developed the concepts, doctrine, policies and procedures for Command, Control, and Communications and Information Services (C³IS) which will support the African Standby Forces. These programs will continue under AFRICOM, fully endorsed by the AU.

*Question.* Do you believe the AU will be receptive to U.S. assistance in the form of training and advisory and technical support to the development of an African Standby Force?

*Answer.* Yes. The AU’s stated policy is to man as many African peace support operations as possible, sourced in large part through Africa Standby Forces, which the AU intends to certify for initial operating capability by 2010. To assist the AU in reaching its goal, AFRICOM will assume sponsorship of ongoing command and control infrastructure development and liaison officer support, continue to resource military mentors for peacekeeping training, and develop new approaches to supporting the AU and African Standby Forces.

**LIBYA**

*Question.* Over the past few years, the United States’ relationship with Libya has improved dramatically.

In your assessment, what should be the nature of our military-to-military cooperation with Libya?

*Answer.* Libya’s continuing transformation to responsible governance and normalization in its relationship with the international community shows a level of commitment by its leadership that necessitates a deliberate, measured pace of engagement between our two militaries. Initial activities align with U.S. Country Team initiatives to highlight American goodwill, and to assess with Libyan military leaders where we can best assist and collaborate to enhance their current capabilities.

We have made steady progress with Libya since restrictions under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) were modified in February of this year. However, removal or waiver of legislative restrictions imposed under Section 507 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Appropriations Act of 2006 (Public Law 109–112) would provide additional opportunity to positively influence
our relationship with the Libyan military through English language training and other International Military Education and Training (IMET) program opportunities.

Question. In your opinion, is Libya's nonparticipation in the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Program (TSCTP) a liability for the program?

Answer. Libya's eventual inclusion in the TSCTP will add value to the program. But, I do not view their current absence as a liability. TSCTP focus is much more on the Sahel countries that have less capability than Libya or the rest of the Maghreb.

Liberia

Question. The United States and Liberia have long enjoyed a special relationship, dating back to the 1820s when the first group of settlers arrived in Liberia from the United States. Liberia now counts the United States as its strongest supporter in its democratization and reconstruction efforts. It has been reported that Liberia has expressed a strong desire to be considered as one of the hubs of the new AFRICOM.

What role do you envision for Liberia in AFRICOM's planning?

Answer. The democratization and reconstruction programs in Liberia are critical to restoring stability in that country and the West Africa region as a whole. The United States Government, in conjunction with other nations, multi-national organizations, and NGOs, is committed to contributing to Liberia's continued transition from a post-conflict society to a stable democracy. AFRICOM, along with DOS, USAID and other key agencies will play a role in supporting the U.S. Government's commitment to Liberia's reconstruction. The cornerstone of Liberia's effort to rebuild its national defense is the U.S.-led Security Sector Reform (SSR) program. To secure Liberia's peaceful security environment, the United States is funding the creation of a new Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) by training and equipping a 2,000-soldier force. The goal of the U.S. is to complete the rebuilding of the new AFL forces in time for the U.N.'s peacekeeping mission to begin its drawdown of forces in 2009. AFRICOM, in close coordination with the efforts underway through the DOS, will continue to promote peace and security within its programs and authorities.

Maghreb/North Africa

Question. Partially isolated from the rest of the continent by the Atlas Mountains and the Sahara, the Maghreb has proven to be a significant counter terrorism challenge for the United States. The TSCTP has attempted to build the capacity of these northwest African nations to conduct counterterrorism operations.

In your opinion, are U.S. efforts in this region adequate? Should DOD be doing more?

Answer. The continued growth of al Qaeda's influence in North Africa indicates that U.S. efforts in the region should be sustained. In the Sahel, DOD is providing as much capacity building assistance as those countries either desire or can effectively absorb. However, we continue to seek ways that we can assist and enhance capabilities of nations in the region. One specific area of success has been the growing synergy between EUCOM's Trans-Sahara Partnership (TSP) and DOS's TSCTP where we are discussing planned programs and activities within the Interagency in an effort to build upon each other's success and avoid duplication of effort or efforts at cross purposes. AFRICOM can achieve more by working in a more coordinated and coherent way with the U.S. Government Interagency, NGOs, and other partners seeking to advance peace, stability, and security in Africa.

Question. How would you assess Libya's efforts to prevent terrorist and criminal groups from exploiting remote territories in light of the country's persistent inability to prevent large numbers of economic migrants from crossing its borders?

Answer. As I understand, Libya faces some challenges in this regard, as do most of the Maghreb and Sahelian countries. This highlights the importance of positive engagement and influence with Libya.

Darfur, Sudan

Question. More than 3 years of fighting in Darfur have destroyed hundreds of villages, displaced 2.2 million people and led to hundreds of thousands of deaths. If confirmed, you would be one of the U.S. Government's most senior military advisors on matters relating to the crisis in Darfur.

What is your assessment of the situation in Darfur and what recommendations would you provide to your leadership as commander of AFRICOM given the circumstances as they stand today?
From a military perspective, what is the proper role for the United States and NATO to play in assisting the deployment of the UN-AU hybrid mission and in supporting the pursuit of its mission?

Answer. The United States remains actively engaged in helping to resolve the crisis in Darfur through humanitarian assistance, support of the political process, and logistical assistance to the African Union and the United Nation's support to the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and its transition to a United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). As part of the U.S. Government Interagency effort, we actively plan for diplomatic and military contingencies to pressure the Sudanese government to allow a United Nations peacekeeping force in Darfur.

Through outreach to troop contributing countries (TCC) and with UN, AU, and our partners, we are working to ensure that this hybrid force will be deployed quickly and effectively with sufficient political and military support to successfully bring peace to the war-torn Darfur. DOD must continue to play its supporting role to ensure the timely deployment of PK forces and provide logistic and planning.

SOUTH AFRICA

Question. South Africa has stated publicly its opposition to AFRICOM and has indicated that it will not host AFRICOM personnel. If confirmed, how would you intend to address South Africa's concerns regarding AFRICOM, particularly given that country's position of influence in Africa?

Answer. South Africa is a continental leader and has a key role in the development of Africa. If confirmed, I intend to find areas of common interest to develop a relationship built on trust and mutual support. The resumption of International Military Education and Training (IMET) last year, after a 4-year suspension due to the American Servicemembers' Protection Act (ASPA) sanctions, was a positive step forward. Ongoing Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) training and a scheduled medical exercise in 2009, will provide additional opportunities to strengthen our bi-lateral relationship. Lastly, I will continue direct dialogue with the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and South African leaders both civilian and military on the role and mission of AFRICOM.

CHINA

Question. In your opinion, what effect has China's engagement with African militaries had on those militaries and on U.S. security interests?

Answer. China's military involvement on the African continent includes military education and training in China, military sales to African countries to gain access to markets and resources, and roughly 1,300 peacekeepers that support all 7 U.N. Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) in Africa. To date, China's military involvement has not had any discernable impact on U.S. security interests in Africa. Addition of new Chinese military equipment may pose unforeseen future interoperability challenges.

Question. Do you foresee China's growing energy demands affecting security developments in Africa?

Answer. Africa is growing in military, strategic and economic importance in global affairs. We are seeking more effective ways to prevent and respond to humanitarian crises, improve cooperative efforts to stem trans-national terrorism and sustain enduring efforts that contribute to African unity and bolster security on the continent.

NIGERIA

Question. Nigeria, the most populous nation in Africa, has faced intermittent political turmoil and economic crisis since gaining independence in October 1960. Nigeria is one of the United States' key strategic partners in Africa. The country is Africa's largest producer of oil, and is America's fifth largest oil provider. As the continent's second largest economy, Nigeria's stability and prosperity affect not only those in the market for Nigerian oil, but the entire region. On the military side, Nigeria has a 76,000 member strong military. Before the lifting of sanctions by many Western nations, Nigeria had turned to China, Russia, North Korea, and India for the purchase of military equipment and training.

What constructive role do you believe AFRICOM can play in this fragile country?

Answer. AFRICOM looks forward to opportunities with the new Yar'Adua administration to enhance the relationship between our two countries. Early indications are that the new leader is demonstrating a bold willingness to address corruption and economic development. We see Nigeria as a key regional partner. The United States and Nigeria are now moving forward on common initiatives such as peacekeeping training, Regional Maritime Domain Awareness, and consultations with other international partners on energy security in the Niger Delta.
In addition to the typical security cooperation activities like International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and the Defense HIV/AIDS Prevention Program, there are two major initiatives in which DOD plays a major role. Operation Enduring Freedom—Trans Sahara (OEF–TS) is the military component of the TSCTP. This program seeks to reduce ungoverned space that might be exploited by terrorist groups and mitigate the influence of extremist ideologies. In Nigeria, OEF–TS has concentrated primarily on development and humanitarian assistance in Northern Nigeria as part of the embassy’s Muslim Outreach Program, as well as strategic communications. Now that the elections are over we stand ready to broaden and deepen OEF–TS activities to include training and equipping counterterrorism forces and encouraging intelligence sharing with other TSCTP partners.

DOD also participates in the quarterly meetings with the Government of Nigeria on development and security in the Niger Delta. While there is no military solution to the Niger Delta’s problems, security can enable development and political dialogue. DOD’s contribution to this effort is primarily in coastal and maritime security, as well as initiatives aimed at reducing weapons trafficking. The cornerstone of DOD efforts is a multi-million dollar program known as the Regional Maritime Awareness Capability (RMAC) funded partially under 1206 Authority.

AFRICOM should also integrate its efforts with the West African regional organization, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) headquartered in Abuja, Nigeria. Over the past decade, Nigeria provided over 45 percent of ECOWAS’ military troop contributions for peacekeeping missions. Through fiscal year 2008, DOD will support the comprehensive training and equipping of additional Nigerian peacekeeping battalions with mentors and advisors.

**CLIMATE CHANGE**

**Question.** During a recent visit to EUCOM, committee staff was briefed on the security threats in Africa. One of the items discussed by personnel from EUCOM’s J2 Directorate was the impact of global climate change. What is your assessment of the threat posed to Africa by climate change?

**Answer.** Climate change could exacerbate current instability in Africa in a number of ways. Droughts, floods, and other effects of climate change could lead to future crop failures, massive refugee flows, and significant damage to African economies and societies. The chaos and desperation of these tragedies could help undermine governments, increase civil unrest, and promote extremism in a number of countries.

**Question.** What are the national security implications for the United States?

**Answer.** Climate change could pose a serious threat to U.S. national security interest in Africa. Some countries could be pushed into greater instability as a result of floods, droughts, or other catastrophes brought on by global climate change. Unstable areas provide the perfect recruiting ground for terrorist groups seeking new blood for their war against the west. Devastating storms in the Gulf of Guinea, for example, might damage the region’s oil infrastructure, leading to disruptions in oil production and higher oil prices for the global economy.

**CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT**

**Question.** In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

**Answer.** Yes. I fully recognize and understand the importance of congressional oversight as it is clearly outlined in the Constitution of the United States.

**Question.** Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

**Answer.** Yes. Although the President is my Commander in Chief, and he and the Secretary of Defense constitute my chain of command, I recognize that my oath is to the Constitution. That document clearly divides responsibilities with regard to defense between the executive and legislative branches. For both the administration and Congress to execute their respective responsibilities appropriately, it is incumbent upon me to be honest and forthright with both while offering my best military advice.

**Question.** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, AFRICOM?
Answer. Yes. That is an inherent part of my responsibilities as outlined above, and I will be happy to appear when called.

**Question.** Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

**Answer.** Yes.

**Question.** Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

**Answer.** Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

**QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS**

**MARITIME SECURITY OF AFRICA**

1. Senator Collins. General Ward, maritime security has proven to be a significant issue on the coast of West and East Africa. In your advance policy questions you state that Africa presents some unique challenges in the maritime security environment. You also mentioned that the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) is actively working with the Gulf of Guinea countries, through Naval Forces, Europe (NAVEUR), to help them address maritime threats. Can you tell us what you envision will be the new U.S. Africa Command’s (AFRICOM) role in maritime security on the west and east coast of Africa?

General Ward. AFRICOM, in concert with its naval component NAVEUR, will continue the EUCOM legacy by working on building maritime capability and capacity in Africa. NAVEUR will continue its role of helping to build and maintain the core competencies of leadership and combat readiness to counter any adversary, as well as develop new capacities for our partners, such as maritime security and safety where participating nations network maritime detection and identification information to appropriate law enforcement agencies.

In particular, the Automated Identification System is the first step to achieve this awareness and will provide a critical foundation to the Global Maritime Partnerships. Additionally, another program designed to enhance maritime security and safety is the Africa Partnership Station. This initiative is designed to provide direct assistance using at-sea training platforms that provide a persistent regional presence with a minimal footprint ashore.

Deployments of vessels off West Africa will continue, utilizing engagement teams from these vessels for familiarization events—from small engine repair to health education—the efforts to build long lasting partnerships will continue.

[The nomination reference of GEN William E. Ward, USA, follows:]

**Nomination Reference and Report**

**As in Executive Session,**

**Senate of the United States,**

**July 11, 2007.**

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for appointment in the United States Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be General

GEN William E. Ward, 0000.

[The biographical sketch of GEN William E. Ward, USA, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

TRANSCRIPT OF NAVAL SERVICE FOR GEN WILLIAM E. WARD, USA

Source of commissioned service: ROTC.

Military schools attended:
- Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
- United States Army Command and General Staff College
- United States Army War College

Educational degrees:
- Morgan State University - BA - Political Science
- Pennsylvania State University - MA - Political Science

Foreign language(s): None recorded.

Promotions:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Promotion</th>
<th>Dates of appointment</th>
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<tr>
<td>2LT</td>
<td>6 Jun 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1LT</td>
<td>9 Oct 72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>9 Jun 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>1 Jan 83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTC</td>
<td>1 Feb 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COL</td>
<td>1 Jun 92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BG</td>
<td>1 Mar 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MG</td>
<td>1 Feb 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>8 Oct 02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>9 May 06</td>
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Major duty assignments:

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<th>From</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Assignment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 71</td>
<td>May 74</td>
<td>Rifle Platoon Leader, later Executive Officer, A Company, later Anti-Tank Platoon Leader, later Motor Officer, 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 74</td>
<td>Oct. 74</td>
<td>Liaison Officer, 2d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 74</td>
<td>Apr. 76</td>
<td>Rifle Platoon Leader, B Company, later Commander, C Company, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 17th Infantry, 2d Infantry Division, Eighth United States Army, Korea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 76</td>
<td>Dec. 76</td>
<td>Student, Infantry Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, GA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 76</td>
<td>Nov. 78</td>
<td>Instructor of Social Sciences, later Assistant Professor, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 78</td>
<td>Apr. 82</td>
<td>Student, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr. 82</td>
<td>June 83</td>
<td>Instructor of Social Sciences, later Assistant Professor, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, West Point, NY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 83</td>
<td>May 85</td>
<td>Executive Officer, United States Army Military Community Activity—Aschaffenburg, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 85</td>
<td>June 86</td>
<td>Executive Officer, 1st Battalion (Mechanized), 7th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 86</td>
<td>June 87</td>
<td>Executive Officer, United States Army Military Community Activity—Aschaffenburg, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 87</td>
<td>Oct. 88</td>
<td>Staff Officer (Logistics), Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, United States Army, Washington, DC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 88</td>
<td>July 91</td>
<td>Executive Officer to the Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 91</td>
<td>June 92</td>
<td>Deputy Director for Operations, 1–3, National Military Command Center, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 92</td>
<td>June 94</td>
<td>Commander, 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, NY, and Operation Restore Hope, Mogadishu, Somalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 94</td>
<td>July 95</td>
<td>Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division (Light) and United States Army, Hawaii, Schofield Barracks, HI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 95</td>
<td>Nov. 00</td>
<td>Deputy Director for Operations, 1–3, National Military Command Center, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 00</td>
<td>Oct. 02</td>
<td>Assistant Division Commander (Support), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 01</td>
<td>July 99</td>
<td>Chief, Office of Military Cooperation, Egypt, American Embassy, Egypt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 99</td>
<td>Nov. 00</td>
<td>Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division (Light) and United States Army, Hawaii, Schofield Barracks, HI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 00</td>
<td>Oct. 02</td>
<td>Assistant Division Commander (Support), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, NC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 02</td>
<td>Oct. 03</td>
<td>Commander, Stabilization Force, Operation Joint Forge, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 03</td>
<td>Feb. 05</td>
<td>Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany.</td>
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Summary of joint assignments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assignments</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Director for Operations, J–3, National Military Command Center, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC</td>
<td>July 95–Sep. 96</td>
<td>Colonel/Brigadier General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief, Office of Military Cooperation, Egypt, American Embassy, Egypt</td>
<td>Feb. 98–July 99</td>
<td>Brigadier General/Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vice Director for Operations, J–3, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC</td>
<td>Nov. 00–Oct. 02</td>
<td>Major General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, Stabilization Force, Operation Joint Forge, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina (No Joint credit).</td>
<td>Oct. 02–Oct. 03</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Commanding General/Chief of Staff, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany with temporary duty as United States Security Coordinator, Israel-Palestinian Authority, Tel Aviv (No Joint credit).</td>
<td>Mar. 05–Dec. 05</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Commander, United States European Command, Germany</td>
<td>May 06–Present</td>
<td>General</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

U.S. Decorations and badges:
- Defense Distinguished Service Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Distinguished Service Medal
- Defense Superior Service Medal (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Legion of Merit (with two Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Defense Meritorious Service Medal
- Meritorious Service Medal (with six Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Joint Service Commendation Medal
- Army Commendation Medal (with three Oak Leaf Clusters)
- Army Achievement Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
- Combat Infantryman Badge
- Expert Infantryman Badge
- Master Parachutist Badge
- Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
- Army Staff Identification Badge

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by GEN William E. Ward, USA, in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.
PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   William E. Ward.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Commander, United States Africa Command.

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee's executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   March 6, 1949; Baltimore, MD.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
   Married to the former Joyce Lewis.

7. Names and ages of children:
   William E. Ward, Jr., age 34; and Kahni J. Ward, age 30.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution.
   None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    Association for the U.S. Army; Omega Psi Phi Fraternity, Inc.; Army War College Alumni Assoc.; Morgan State University Alumni Assoc.; National Society of Pershing Rifles; Watertown New York Sunrise Rotary; 555 Parachute Infantry Assoc.; Army/Air Force Mutual Aid Assoc.

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    None.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
    Yes.

13. Personal views: Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?
    Yes.

   [The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

William E. Ward.
This 10th day of July, 2007.

[The nomination of GEN William E. Ward, USA, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on September 27, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on September 28, 2007.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, USAF, by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms brought about fundamental change in the manner in which the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Services carry out the mission of national security.

Do you support full implementation of these defense reforms?
Answer. Yes.

Question. What do you consider to be the most important aspects of these defense reforms?
Answer. The most positive aspect is the overall improvement in our joint military operations. The Goldwater-Nichols Act resulted in much needed improvements in joint doctrine, joint professional military education, and joint strategic planning. Another important element is clarity in the chain of command from the national leadership to the combatant commanders and the unambiguous responsibility placed upon each combatant commander for execution of the mission and preparedness of assigned forces.

Question. What is your view of the extent to which these defense reforms have been implemented?
Answer. I believe that the DOD has vigorously and successfully pursued implementation of these reforms.

Question. The goals of Congress in enacting the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations defense reforms, as reflected in section 3 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, can be summarized as strengthening civilian control over the military; improving military advice; placing clear responsibility on the combatant commanders for the accomplishment of their missions; ensuring the authority of the combatant commanders is commensurate with their responsibility; increasing attention to the formulation of strategy and to contingency planning; providing for more efficient use of defense resources; enhancing the effectiveness of military operations; and improving the management and administration of the DOD.

Do you agree with these goals?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you foresee the need for additional modifications of Goldwater-Nichols in light of the changing environment and possible revisions to the national security strategy.
Answer. No. I do not believe changes to Goldwater-Nichols are necessary at this time. If confirmed, I will monitor any proposals and provide my best military advice.

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)?
Answer. The Commander, STRATCOM maintains primary responsibility among the combatant commanders for strategic nuclear forces to support the national objective of strategic deterrence. Additional responsibilities assigned by the President include providing integrated global strike planning and command and control to deliver precision kinetic and nonkinetic effects; developing characteristics and capabilities, advocating, planning, and conducting space operations; planning, integrating, and coordinating global missile defense support, operations, and desired characteristics and capability development; planning, integrating, and coordinating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in support of strategic and global operations; integrating and coordinating DOD information operations efforts across geographic areas of responsibilities; planning, leading and coordinating DOD global network op-
erations and defense; and serving as the lead combatant commander integrating DOD efforts combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Additionally, Commander, STRATCOM provides strategic military advice to the Secretary of Defense and exercises command over the organization and operation of all assigned forces and headquarters in accordance with public law and DOD regulations.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer. Over 31 years of commissioned service in the United States military have prepared me for this position. My career includes diverse and challenging operational and staff assignments, within both the Air Force and Joint Service environments and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). I believe these assignments have prepared me for the specific duties of the Commander, STRATCOM. My assignment as Task Force 204 Commander (responsible for the readiness and generation of our nuclear bomber fleet) combined with my command of STRATCOM’s Joint Functional Component Command for Space and Global Strike (responsible for integrated planning and command and control for space and global strike operations) have prepared me for the STRATCOM responsibilities for strategic nuclear forces, global strike and conducting space operations. Further, my experiences as the Commander of Air Force Space Command, coupled with those at NASA, to include work in launch, mission control, on orbit operations, program management and international negotiation, particularly with Russia, I believe will serve me well if confirmed. In the cyber and information operations areas, my command of the Air Force Network Operations Command and oversight of the Air Force’s information operations and intelligence wings as the 8th Air Force Commander will be helpful. In the mission area of ISR, I’ve had the opportunity to fly in the tactical and strategic mission areas in the RF-4 and command the 9th Reconnaissance Wing, our Air Force’s U-2 and now Global Hawk wing. Again, as the 8th Air Force Commander, I had the opportunity to oversee all of our Air Force’s manned reconnaissance platforms. In the missile defense area as the Commander of Air Force Space Command, I have had the opportunity to become very familiar with the contributions the Air Force makes to this capability in the form of space based and terrestrial early warning and tracking systems. Finally, my staff positions as the Air Force programmer and Joint Staff Deputy Director for Political Military Affairs for Asia, Pacific and the Middle East have given me a strategic perspective that I think will be of value if I am confirmed.

Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, STRATCOM?

Answer. My military career has provided me an ongoing opportunity to expand leadership experiences, interact with new organizations and people, and to continue the learning process. If confirmed, I look forward to working with several of the organizations upon which STRATCOM depends for continued success and which I did not have an opportunity to work with while commanding STRATCOM’s Joint Functional Component Command for Space and Global Strike. I will also need to increase my familiarity with these organizations (e.g. Department of Energy-National Nuclear Security Administration, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Nuclear Weapons Council, etc.) and the contributions they provide to mission success.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the commanders of the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, STRATCOM, to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense.

Answer. Pursuant to title 10, U.S.C., section 164, subject to the direction of the President, the Commander, STRATCOM, performs duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and is directly responsible to the Secretary for the preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the command.

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.

Answer. In accordance with title 10, U.S.C., section 132, the Deputy Secretary of Defense will perform such duties and exercise powers prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. The Deputy Secretary of Defense will act for and exercise the powers of the Secretary of Defense when the Secretary is disabled or the office is vacant.
If confirmed, I will work closely with the Deputy Secretary on matters of strategic importance.

**Question.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Answer. Title 10, U.S.C. and current DOD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary of Defense regarding matters related to their respective functional areas. Within these areas, the Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions, and in discharging their responsibilities the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. Communication between the Under Secretaries and combatant commanders is direct unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on all policy issues that affect STRATCOM operations.

**Question.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., and current DOD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary of Defense regarding matters related to their respective functional areas. Within these areas, the Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions, and in discharging their responsibilities the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. Communication between the Under Secretaries and combatant commanders is direct unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence on matters in the area of STRATCOM's assigned responsibilities pertaining to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR).

**Question.** The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., and current DOD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisors to the Secretary of Defense regarding matters related to their respective functional areas. Within these areas, the Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions, and in discharging their responsibilities the Under Secretaries may issue instructions and directive memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. Communication between the Under Secretaries and combatant commanders is direct unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics on Command issues pertaining to his departmental responsibilities.

**Question.** The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy.

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy serves under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Any relationship the Commander, STRATCOM requires with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy would exist with and through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

**Question.** The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense executes responsibilities including overall supervision of the homeland defense activities of the DOD while serving under the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Any relationship the Commander, U.S. Northern Command and Commander, U.S. Pacific Command require with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security would exist with and through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. If confirmed, I look forward to this relationship in concert with the Commander, U.S. Northern Command and Commander, U.S. Pacific Command on related national security issues.

**Question.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Answer. Title 10, U.S.C., clearly establishes the Chairman as the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. In this role he is the most senior ranking member of the armed forces but does not exercise command over any military forces or serve in the chain of command between the President and Secretary of Defense and combatant commanders, although the President may transmit communications through him. By law and as directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman consults with the combatant commanders, evaluates and assists in achieving their requirements and plans. He provides a vital linkage between the combatant commanders and other elements of the DOD. If confirmed, I will assist the chairman with my full and diligent efforts and advice. If confirmed, I will keep the Secretary of Defense informed on matters for which he may hold me personally accountable and work through the Chairman in the fulfillment of my duties, in keeping with all legal and departmental regulations.

**Question.** The Secretaries of the Military Departments.
Answer. Under title 10, U.S.C., section 165, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and subject to the authority of the combatant commanders, the Secretaries of the Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned to unified and specified commands. The authority exercised by a combatant commander over Service components is quite clear but requires close coordination with each Secretary to ensure there is no infringement upon those lawful responsibilities which a Secretary alone may discharge. If confirmed, I look forward to building a strong and productive relationship with each of the Secretaries of the military departments.

Question. The Chiefs of Staff - the Services.

Answer. As a result of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Service Chiefs no longer serve in the operational chain of command. They now serve to provide organized, trained, and equipped forces to be employed by combatant commanders in accomplishing their assigned missions. Additionally, these officers serve as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as such have a lawful obligation to provide military advice. Individually and collectively, the Service Chiefs are a tremendous source of experience and judgment. If confirmed, I will work closely and confer regularly with the Service Chiefs.

Question. The Director of the National Reconnaissance Office.

Answer. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) is a DOD organization engaged in the research and development, acquisition, launch and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems necessary to meet the needs of the Intelligence Community and of the DOD. According to the Unified Command Plan (UCP), STRATCOM is the responsible combatant commander for both space operations and for planning, integrating, and coordinating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance in support of strategic and global operations, as directed. In these capacities, the Commander, STRATCOM must maintain a close relationship with the Director of the NRO to coordinate and represent requirements in these mission areas. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of the NRO on matters of shared interest and importance.

Question. The combatant commanders, including Commander, U.S. Northern Command.

Answer. The Commander, STRATCOM, has both supported and supporting relationships with other combatant commanders, largely identified within the UCP, the Forces for Unified Commands Memorandum, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, specific command arrangement agreements, OPLANs, and CONPLANs. In general, the Commander, STRATCOM, is the supported combatant commander for the national strategic war plan, for planning and conducting DOD space operations, for planning, leading, and coordinating DOD global network operations and defense and, in general, is a supporting combatant commander for other UCP assigned missions. These additional functional missions and our current era of rapid global, technological, and threat changes create opportunities to further refine the supporting/supported command relationships between the combatant commands. If confirmed, I look forward to working with other combatant commanders to broaden and enhance the level and range of these relationships.

Question. The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration.

Answer. According to title 50, U.S.C., section 2402, the Department of Energy's Under Secretary for Nuclear Security serves as Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration. The Administrator is responsible for all Department of Energy programs and activities related to nuclear weapons, including the stockpile stewardship program. Although the Administrator serves outside the DOD's operational control, he does serve on the Nuclear Weapons Council and executes duties which closely concern STRATCOM. If confirmed, I will work closely and confer regularly with the Administrator.

Question. The Director of the Missile Defense Agency.

Answer. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) serves as the missile defense systems engineering and development organization for the DOD. It provides the research, development, testing, and evaluation of the missile defense and associated systems that would be employed by combatant commanders. The current UCP charges STRATCOM with responsibilities for planning, integrating, and coordinating global missile defense operations, including developing and advocating for missile defense characteristics and capabilities desired by combatant commanders. Given these closely aligned responsibilities, both the Commander, STRATCOM and its Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense must continue their close working relationship with MDA. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Director of MDA to ensure that combatant commanders' required ballistic missile defense and warning capabilities are appropriately and effectively represented to MDA.
The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.

Title 10, U.S.C., section 139, provides for a Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, who serves as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on operational test and evaluation in the DOD and the principal operational test and evaluation official within the senior management of the DOD. The Director, as allowed by law and departmental regulations, formulates policy, provides guidance, coordinates, reviews, monitors, and makes recommendations regarding test and evaluation matters under his purview. If confirmed, I will work closely with and seek the advice of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation in assessing the progress of command programs of interest.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Commander, STRATCOM?

The rapidly transforming world has empowered our potential adversaries to leverage information and space technologies to asymmetrically threaten U.S. interests. Our civil, military, and commercial systems are increasingly dependent on access to cyberspace and space-based capabilities. These dependencies make securing these domains crucial to our national security. The largest challenge facing STRATCOM is managing the complexities of securing these domains while meeting the demands of the command’s other mission areas.

In your view, what are your priorities for the STRATCOM?

Deliver space capabilities to support joint operations around the globe. Provide the Nation a global deterrent capability to prevent potential adversaries from acquiring and/or using WMD. Integrate and synchronize DOD effects to combat adversary use and proliferation of WMD. Enable decisive global kinetic and non-kinetic combat effects through the application and advocacy of integrated ISR space, cyberspace, and global strike operations, information operations, integrated missile defense, and robust command and control.

STRATEGIC THREATS

In your view, what are the most serious strategic threats facing the United States today?

I believe the most serious strategic threat to the U.S. today is the threat of non-state terrorist groups gaining control of and using WMD against the homeland. Attacks impacting our freedom to operate in space and cyberspace also pose serious strategic threats.

What future strategic threats should the United States prepare for?

We face four persistent and emerging global challenges: traditional adversaries (nation-states), unconventional non-state or state supported actors, catastrophic use of WMD, and disruptive capabilities to supplant our advantages in particular operational domains. Based on these challenges, and within STRATCOM’s realm of responsibility, several significant threats present themselves: those that affect our cyber and space systems, WMD, and ballistic and cruise missiles. Cyber-space and space are "global commons," and as such, are vitally important to our daily way of life and the economic well-being of our Nation and the world. We have all observed manifestations of threats to these domains in the recent past. WMD and ballistic missiles are threats with obviously devastating consequences.

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND MISSIONS

In an overarching sense, how do you define the STRATCOM mission?

I think the command’s current mission statement captures it well: Provide the Nation with global deterrence capabilities and synchronized DOD effects to combat adversary WMD worldwide. Enable decisive global kinetic and non-kinetic combat effects through the application and advocacy of integrated ISR, space and global strike operations, information operations, integrated missile defense and robust command and control.
Question. STRATCOM has absorbed multiple new missions since its creation, with the most recent additions being cooperative threat reduction, information operations, and computer network security. How successful has STRATCOM been at integrating these new missions and acquiring the expertise needed to perform them?

Answer. My current understanding is that Cooperative Threat Reduction is a Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) mission and that STRATCOM leverages DTRA through its Director, Dr. James Tegnelia, who is also dual-hatted as the Director, STRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. If confirmed, I will assess the scope of all mission areas, integration and expertise.

Question. What organizational challenges remain at STRATCOM related to these new missions? Specifically, what additional work, if any, remains to be done and what expertise, if any, needs to be acquired for these new missions?

Answer. Challenges within all mission areas are a function of mission maturity, integration with mission partners, operational capabilities, and the environment in which operations take place. If confirmed, I will evaluate all mission areas and determine the need for additional prioritization and expertise. I will also examine the roles and missions between the STRATCOM staff and the Joint Functional Component Commanders.

Question. If confirmed, would you recommend or support any changes in the missions currently assigned to STRATCOM? If so, what changes would you recommend?

Answer. Not at this time. As my understanding of the missions evolves and integration matures, I will assess command mission effectiveness and recommend changes as appropriate.

Question. Are you aware of any additional new missions that are being contemplated for STRATCOM?

Answer. No.

ORGANIZATION

Question. General Cartwright, the previous Commander of the STRATCOM reorganized the Command to establish a series of joint functional component commands that correspond to the mission areas of the STRATCOM. If confirmed, would you maintain or modify this structure?

Answer. I do not have any present plans to modify this structure. As my understanding of the missions evolves, and integration matures, I will assess command mission effectiveness and recommend changes as appropriate.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. How do you view the role of the Commander, STRATCOM, related to ballistic missile defense?

Answer. The UCP directs STRATCOM to plan, integrate, coordinate global missile defense operations and support for missile defense, as well as to develop and advocate missile defense characteristics and capabilities for all combatant commands. If confirmed, this is an area that I will focus on to be sure I clearly understand the command’s authorities and responsibilities as well as those of the regional combatant commanders and the MDA.

Question. If confirmed, would you recommend or support any changes in the authorities of Commander, STRATCOM, as they relate to ballistic missile defense?

Answer. As of today I would not recommend any changes. If confirmed, I will continue the close working relationships with fellow combatant commanders and the MDA that have been established, and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense ensuring the appropriate authorities are in place to support the defense of our Nation and our friends and allies.

Question. If confirmed, what role would you anticipate playing in the assessment of the military utility of ballistic missile defenses against short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles?

Answer. DOD regulations require STRATCOM to direct, coordinate, and report the Military Utility Assessment of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). The latest version of this report was delivered to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12 July 2007 and to the Secretary of Defense on 27 July 2007. I plan to continue submitting this report annually until such time as the BMDS architecture has matured and all elements have been transitioned to their respective Services.

Question. What are your views on the relationship between ballistic missile defenses and nuclear deterrence?

Answer. Ballistic missile defense represents an essential component of our active and passive defensive measures to support our National Military Strategy. Missile
defense systems raise our adversaries’ perceived costs associated with their continued development of ballistic missiles. In addition, our ballistic missile defenses enhance deterrence by helping to deny adversaries the benefits they might seek through ballistic missile attack. As a key component of the New Triad, ballistic missile defense enhances global deterrence by complementing strike assets and a responsive infrastructure.

**Question.** From the perspective of the warfighter, do you believe that the spiral acquisition of ballistic missile defenses through concurrent fielding, development, testing, and operations is appropriate?

**Answer.** Yes. The capability-based spiral acquisition process with the unique authorities given to the MDA provide critical ballistic missile defense capabilities to the Nation faster than the traditional processes.

**Question.** Do you believe that the exploitation of the operational capabilities of the ballistic missile test bed provides a militarily useful capability and contributes to deterrence?

**Answer.** Yes. I believe this approach can contribute to deterrence of a limited long-range attack from North Korea.

**Question.** In your view, at what stage in the deployment of missile defense capabilities should operationally realistic testing be conducted?

**Answer.** When conducting operational testing, whether before or after fielding, by definition the testing should be as operationally realistic as possible. How and when development testing shifts to operational testing and then follow on operational testing (classically done after fielding) varies from program to program. I am not informed enough at this point to have an opinion on at what stage in the deployment of particular missile defense capability that operationally realistic testing should be conducted. If confirmed, I will work closely with MDA to understand their plans and criteria for deployment of the various capabilities they are developing.

**Question.** In your view, what is the threat scenario driving a decision to place interceptors in Eastern Europe, including both timing and location?

**Answer.** The threat scenario involves an Iran that threatens Europe and the U.S. Homeland with ballistic missiles. Iran has demonstrated ballistic missile capabilities which make the ballistic missile threat against Europe real today and, in the future, possible against the United States. Add that to Iran’s President publicly threatening neighboring states, and Iran’s developing nuclear program and I would conclude that this is a threat and scenario we should address sooner rather than later. If we choose to address this threat to our allies and ourselves with a missile defense system then the selection of the location for the deployment of this system becomes one dependent on the geometry of missile trajectories and desired reaction timelines. If confirmed, I will consult with MDA to better understand their considerations for recommending specific deployment locations.

**Question.** In your view, what are the opportunities to work collaboratively with Russia to address emerging ballistic missile threats and the means to address such threats?

**Answer.** I think there are both technical and diplomatic opportunities to work with Russia for the benefit of mutual national security concerns over the ballistic missile threat. The recent Russian proposal to use one of their radar systems is worth exploring and encouraging.

**Question.** What is your view on the responsiveness of current space systems to meet warfighter needs and what are the opportunities for the Operationally Responsive Space program to meet military and other space requirements?

**Answer.** I think the current systems we have on orbit are very responsive to warfighter needs today. That said, we should continue to look for ways to make them even more responsive. We should also continue to explore the feasibility of rapidly deploying capabilities that can augment regional combatant commander emergent needs or replenish lost capabilities should our current systems come under attack. We should also look for ways to more rapidly deploy breakthrough technological developments into the space domain. Today, I believe these are the opportunities that the Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) program should explore.

**Question.** What is your view of the ability of the DOD to develop and deploy space systems in a cost-effective and timely manner?

**Answer.** I believe we have this ability. It takes capable government and industry leadership in our program offices, requirement discipline, targeted technological investment to reduce technical risk prior to program start, and stable funding after program start.
Question. What steps, if any, do you believe might be necessary to improve the responsiveness of current space systems?
Answer. We need to completely re-architect the way we do space surveillance and develop space situational awareness for our operational commanders. Today, we have a legacy Cold War architecture that is not responsive to today's needs let alone tomorrow.

Question. In your view, what are the most important unmet requirements for space systems?
Answer. The need for adequate surveillance and reconnaissance of the space domain, the regional combatant commander needs for surveillance and reconnaissance in their areas of responsibility and the need for increased global satellite communications bandwidth to support global military operations.

Question. What do you believe should be done to meet those requirements, and what space programs should be accorded highest priority?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue to be an advocate for the key enhancements required of our future space systems. I will also advocate through my Service components for investments in science and technology to maintain our pre-eminence well into the future. In the near term, programs supporting improved Space Situational Awareness capabilities, improved Surveillance and Reconnaissance, and increased bandwidth would be a high priority.

Question. How important, in your view, is persistent surveillance? What programs do you believe are best able to provide this capability?
Answer. Persistent surveillance is paramount to developing a better understanding of adversary intentions and a key contributor to a credible strategic deterrent. It is also important to the successful conduct of combat operations at the operational and tactical level of warfare. Shorter revisit times provided by enhanced persistence can increase opportunities to operate inside an adversary's decision cycle. I believe we need to continue to work on ways to better integrate our airborne and space-based Surveillance, and Reconnaissance system so they can be employed in a complementary manner to increase the persistence our combatant commanders require.

Question. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Congress approved a national policy to support two space launch vehicles, or families of launch vehicles, capable of launching national security payloads into space. Recently the two launch vehicles were combined into one company to provide launch services to the U.S. Government. What are your expectations with respect to efficiencies, and when would you expect these efficiencies to begin to be realized?
Answer. Last year, ULA projected annual savings on the order of $150 million per year starting in 2011. These numbers were developed as a snapshot in time based on expected launch rates. As we have seen in the past, these rates can both increase and decrease, however, in any case there should be efficiencies over the two company approach.

Question. What, in your view, should the United States do in the future, and what steps would you take if confirmed, to ensure continued reliable access to space?
Answer. I would advocate for continued attention to and appropriate investment in the mission assurance programs the U.S. Air Force has put in place today. I would also advocate for increased investment in the sustainment and modernization of our two key launch sites at Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral. I would support efforts to explore how we might better leverage other launch ranges such as Wallops, Kwajalein, White Sands, and Kodiak.

Question. Do you believe that the Nation should sustain redundant space launch capabilities?
Answer. For today, yes.

Question. How important, in your view, is the Air Force Operationally Responsive Launch program?
Answer. If you are referring to the ORS Office as required by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2007, it is a joint effort vice an Air Force program. I believe it is important to explore the potential of this program to improve the responsiveness of current capabilities, to augment current capabilities, to replenish lost capabilities or accelerate deployment of breakthrough technologies.

Question. In your view, what are the most significant challenges that the U.S. faces in military space programs and policy?
Answer. I believe the most significant challenge is getting a firm grasp on Space Situational Awareness, answering the “who, what, where, and why” of everything in orbit in a timely manner. We must also have adequate plans and capabilities in place to ensure the current space capabilities we provide to the joint fight can be either defended or delivered by alternate means to deter our adversaries from attempting to deny our freedom to operate in space.
Training of U.S. military personnel to understand and to incorporate space assets into all aspects of operations is critically important to future success. How would you address this challenge including ensuring that blue force training includes space operations?

Answer. This has been a major focus area for me in my current command. We are currently looking at the standards for how we assess, train and develop our airmen in the space career fields and also how we as an Air Force deliver the right level of education for all airmen at our basic, intermediate and advanced schools. If confirmed, I will advocate for increased support to the National Security Space Institute and ask for an examination of our course curriculum in our joint schools to see if we are conducting the right level of space education in those institutions. I will also advocate for the inclusion of space scenarios in our joint exercises to heighten awareness of the necessity to include consideration of this domain in future conflicts.

Question. What role does the National Security Space Institute play in the training process, and how could their training programs be improved?

Answer. The National Security Space Institute is the DOD’s premier focal point for space education and training. It compliments existing space education programs provided by the services by teaching joint policy and doctrine, acquisition and integration, and preparing warfighters for joint military operations. While not a joint organization, it is operating in a joint manner. Continued efforts should be made to attract space cadre from all services and coalition partners, to establish firm community educational requirements and to provide stable funding to support these requirements.

Question. What, in your view, are the priorities for improving space situational awareness?

Answer. We must be able to improve our ability to rapidly detect and track objects in orbit to evolve from cataloguing to understanding and anticipating the purpose of each object in orbit. While sustaining our current systems, we need to simultaneously improve our sensor coverage of the space domain with a mix of ground and space-based sensors while improving the data transmission architecture and equipment necessary to fuse the data we collect into useable information for the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) Commander. At the same time, we need to invest in the appropriate command and control equipment to allow the JSpOC Commander to fulfill his mission of supporting STRATCOM and the other regional and functional combatant commanders. Additionally, we must continue to foster collaborative data sharing with our allies and their systems to enhance global coverage.

Question. What programs and policies, in your view, should be changed or added to ensure adequate space situational awareness?

Answer. I think as a government, we should examine the potential utility of a code of conduct or "rules of the road" for the space domain, thus providing a common understanding of acceptable or unacceptable behavior within a medium shared by all nations.

Question. In 2002, the Executive Agent for Space was established and the responsibility for space programs was consolidated under the Executive Agent, the Under Secretary of the Air Force. This consolidation was later undone, and today the responsibility for space program management is spread among three positions. What are your views on how military and national security space should and could be integrated?

Answer. In the area of operational planning and execution, I believe it is an imperative that military and national security space be integrated. STRATCOM created the JSpOC to ensure a more focused global command and control of DOD space operations. Their and the NRO’s efforts to better integrate the JSpOC and NRO operations center and to share data are key to the successful conduct of space operations in any future conflict.

Question. In your view, what role should the National Security Space Office (NSSO) play in integrating military and national security space?

Answer. My view is that the NSSO should assess existing national security space acquisition strategies, plans, and programs in order to advise national security space decisionmakers on matters affecting the acquisition of national security space capabilities.

Question. In your view, should the role of the NSSO be modified or expanded in any way?

Answer. Given the changes in various authorities in the department over the past year, I believe NSSO roles and functions should be re-examined by the Executive Agent for Space.
CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE

Question. In your view, how serious is the vulnerability of our Nation and deployed military forces to the cruise missile threat?
Answer. Cruise missiles represent a credible threat to the Homeland, deployed forces and allies. The preponderance of the cruise missiles under development can carry nuclear, biological, or chemical warheads and sub-munitions. Thus, prudent defense planning, active defense design, and command and control are required to mitigate the threat.

Question. What role do you believe STRATCOM should play in the cruise missile defense of our Nation?
Answer. The STRATCOM role in the cruise missile defense of our Nation should align with our current mission to integrate global missile defense. By leveraging the Command’s unique ballistic missile defense advocacy and requirements role, similar cruise missile defense capability requirements could be smoothly integrated into existing processes.

NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Question. Do you believe that there is a minimum number of strategic nuclear weapons needed to sustain a viable deterrent posture?
Answer. In today’s world and for the foreseeable future, yes. The size and composition of our nuclear forces should be determined by taking into account a broad range of political-military considerations, of which deterrence is but one factor. I fully support the President’s commitment to reduce the nuclear stockpile to the lowest level possible consistent with our national security needs.

Question. In your view, is there a relationship between U.S. nuclear deterrence policy and nonproliferation policy? If so, please describe the relationship.
Answer. Yes, I believe there is a relationship. A credible U.S. nuclear deterrent, in concert with treaty and alliance structures, assures allies that the U.S. will deter, prevent, or limit damage to them from adversary attacks. This removes incentives for many of them to develop and deploy their own nuclear forces thereby encouraging nonproliferation.

Question. There has been much discussion in the press and elsewhere about the need for a new discussion on nuclear weapons policy. Former Senator Sam Nunn, and former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, and former Secretary of Defense William Perry, in a joint editorial in January, 2007, called for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. If confirmed as Commander of the STRATCOM, you would be involved in such discussions and in shaping the next U.S. Nuclear Posture Review.

In your view, what are the key questions on which future analyses of U.S. nuclear policy should focus?
Answer. U.S. nuclear weapons policy is the purview of the Secretary of Defense. If confirmed, I will provide a combatant commander’s insights regarding the nuclear capability requirements necessary to perform the missions assigned to U.S. nuclear forces under my command by the Secretary of Defense. Some of the key questions I would think should be examined for any future analyses include: Are nuclear weapons still key to the national security interests of the U.S. and STRATCOM’s specific strategic deterrence mission? If not, what alternative capabilities exist or should be fielded to meet those needs? If so, what levels of force do we need to sustain and how should we proceed to properly organize, train and equip them for the future?

RELIABLE REPLACEMENT WARHEAD

Question. The proposal for a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) included in the fiscal year 2008 budget request seeks authority for an early phase in the nuclear weapons development process. Three of the relevant congressional committees have recommended that the RRW proceed with phase 2A development only, the fourth committee recommended no funding for the RRW. Work in phase 2A would, if eventually approved and funded, begin to provide some understanding as to whether RRW could meet the goals established.

One of the goals is that it would be deployed without nuclear weapons testing. Do you support this goal?
Answer. Yes.

Question. One of the goals is that it would enable additional reductions to the overall stockpile. Do you support this goal?
Answer. Yes.
Question. One of the goals is that it would increase the safety and security of the weapons themselves. Do you support this goal?

Answer. Yes.

HARD AND DEEPLY BURIED TARGETS

Question. In your view, how adequate are current efforts to address hard and deeply buried targets?

Answer. In my current position, I am not well enough informed as to the adequacy of current efforts. If confirmed, I will examine our current efforts. That said, it is clear that potential adversaries protect their most highly valued assets in hardened and deeply buried facilities. Deterrence requires that we possess a full spectrum of capabilities to hold these highly valued assets at risk, whether kinetically or nonkinetically. I support ongoing efforts to deliver the robust suite of intelligence, planning and strike capabilities necessary to enable full dimensional defeat of these facilities and the high value assets they protect.

Question. If confirmed, would you support or recommend steps to improve the management or coordination of development efforts to hold at risk hard and deeply buried targets?

Answer. If confirmed, I would fully support an integrated examination of the suite of capabilities necessary to enable full dimensional defeat of these facilities and the high value assets they protect. I believe an integrated approach would better direct development efforts across the broad spectrum of potential military solutions—kinetic and nonkinetic.

Question. Do you support development of new or modified nuclear weapons to hold at risk hard or deeply buried targets?

Answer. The DOD must first define the capability required to hold such targets at risk and then evaluate all potential material and non-material solutions to engage them. I do not believe nuclear weapons should be eliminated from consideration as a possible solution.

ARMS CONTROL

Question. In the last several years, the United States ratified the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty with Russia and withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

What is your view of the significance of strategic arms control agreements in the current environment?

Answer. I believe agreements must be verifiable to the satisfaction of the signatories or they are of little value. Also, we need to keep in mind that as weapons technologies proliferate around the world, predicting which nations will come to possess advanced weaponry is becoming increasingly difficult. In light of this, I think we should ensure that future treaties are constructed to allow us to protect our national interests in an evolving international environment.

Question. If confirmed, what arms control initiatives, or other forms of cooperative initiatives related to armaments, if any, would you recommend?

Answer. Arms control initiatives are in the purview of the policy makers in the Department of State, DOD and National Security Council. In order to provide my best military advice to those bodies, I would first review our current arms control programs to better understand where we are today and what we might do better with new initiatives.

Question. In your view, should the U.S. continue to abide by a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing?

Answer. Given my current understanding of the health and readiness of our forces, I would say yes for now. If confirmed, this is an area that I will delve further into to better understand plans for sustaining the health and readiness of our systems and work closely with the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration, and our national laboratories.

Question. In your view, what elements of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty would be beneficial to retain if the treaty is allowed to expire in 2009?

Answer. It is my understanding that official U.S. negotiating representatives are now discussing with their Russian counterparts an agreement that would continue selected transparency and confidence building measures that would continue to benefit both nations, and that these elements would build on the openness both nations have demonstrated in our mutual willingness to convince each other of our sincerity to limit our strategic nuclear systems.
GLOBAL STRIKE

Question. Are you satisfied with service efforts to provide appropriate weapon systems and platforms to support the STRATCOM global strike mission, including conventional, prompt global strike?

Answer. Speaking from an Air Force perspective, I feel we are headed down a path to develop the technologies that would enable our participation in this mission. If confirmed, I will look across all Services efforts and work closely with them to fill this capability need.

Question. What strike weapon systems and platforms do you believe are most important in this regard?

Answer. The Air Force-led Prompt Global Strike Analysis of Alternatives will be complete in the spring of 2008. This analysis is exploring military concepts proposed by the Services and industry to identify the concepts best suited to close the prompt global strike capability gap. I look forward to seeing the results of this analysis.

STOCKPILE STEWARDSHIP PROGRAM

Question. What is your view of how well the Stockpile Stewardship Program is proceeding towards its goal of being able to continuously assess and annually certify the U.S. enduring nuclear weapons stockpile as safe, secure, and reliable, without the need for underground nuclear testing?

Answer. I do not have a view at this time. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the National Nuclear Security Administration to better understand details of their Stockpile Stewardship Program.

Question. In your opinion, what are the biggest challenges for the Stockpile Stewardship Program?

Answer. I have not formed an opinion on the challenges of the Stockpile Stewardship Program. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the National Nuclear Security Administration to understand their specific challenges.

MILITARY-TO-MILITARY COOPERATION PROGRAMS

Question. The STRATCOM has a long history of conducting military-to-military exchanges and discussions with its counterparts in Russia.

If confirmed, would you continue or expand this dialogue?

Answer. I would work to expand this dialogue.

Question. Would you expand your military-to-military programs to include other countries, such as China?

Answer. Yes. That would be my advice to the Secretary of Defense.

STRATEGIC FORCES AND MISSIONS

Question. During the Cold War, the primary mission for strategic forces was to deter the Soviet Union from using its nuclear weapons and, more broadly, to contribute to U.S. efforts to contain the Soviet Union. Strategic forces were therefore synonymous with nuclear forces. This isn't the case today, as the wide-ranging missions assigned to STRATCOM make clear.

What, in your view, is the primary mission for U.S. Strategic Forces today and in the future?

Answer. As your question implies, our strategic forces are no longer synonymous with our nuclear forces alone. Consistent with the missions assigned to STRATCOM, I see our strategic forces as including our Global Strike forces (nuclear and conventional), space forces, cyber and information operations forces, global ISR forces, and ballistic defense forces.

These forces serve to deter, dissuade and if necessary defeat adversary attacks on the U.S. or its allies.

Question. Should we think differently about the use of strategic forces today?

Answer. Yes, because the scope of those forces and their contributions to our security have expanded significantly since the Cold War.

Question. Given the mission for strategic forces, as you define it, what capabilities are still needed to carry out that mission?

Answer. We require survivable, responsive Global Strike forces that are second to none, space forces that ensure we have assured access to space and the space capabilities that enable all U.S. military forces to fight and win when and where necessary, cyber and information operations forces that can protect our Nation’s access to cyberspace and can deny potential adversaries the ability to asymptomatically undermine our military capabilities; global ISR forces that can provide our military forces information about any adversary necessary to deter or defeat them at acceptable cost; and integrated ballistic missile defense forces that help dissuade potential
adversaries from acquiring ballistic missiles, deter adversaries from launching bal-
listic missile attacks on the U.S. or its allies, and limit the damage adversary ballis-
tic missile attacks can inflict.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS SECURITY AND HANDLING

Question. If confirmed, will you commit to working with the Nuclear Weapons
Council to undertake a review of nuclear security and handling practices and proce-
dures?
Answer. Yes.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is im-
portant that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able
to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee
and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those
views differ from the administration in power?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or des-
ignated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate
and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as Com-
mander, STRATCOM?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communica-
tions of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appro-
priate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms
of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted com-
mittee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay
or denial in providing such documents?
Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED

TREATMENT OF CYBER ATTACK AS A LAW ENFORCEMENT ISSUE

1. Senator Reed. General Chilton, prior to September 11, 2001, the United States
Government, to a significant degree, treated the threat of terrorism inside the
United States more as a law enforcement problem than as a national security threat
that had to be stopped before it occurred. Do you believe that we are doing the same
thing with the cyberspace threat? Is that a problem?

General CHILTON. Current laws treat attacks from within the continental United
States (CONUS) against the government or its citizens as a law enforcement prob-
lem, while prevention of attack upon the homeland from external threats has his-
torically been the responsibility of the Department of Defense (DOD). However, the
cyberspace threat we face today is unconstrained by geopolitical boundaries and
norms. The speed of a cyber attack requires a proactive approach to limit its effec-
tiveness.

A cyber attack could appear to originate inside CONUS but actually begin from
overseas. Getting attack attribution right in minimum time is instrumental in de-
veloping an appropriate response. Whether considered a law enforcement or na-
tional security issue, the lead department or agency designated to respond must be
the best equipped and have the authorities to combat the immediate threat.

2. Senator Reed. General Chilton, the lead agencies in defending non-DOD inform-
ation systems against attack are civil and the posture is one of reacting to devel-
op_ing threats with what could be called passive defensive measures. Do you believe
that there should be a different approach, and if so, how would you characterize it?

General CHILTON. Response to the cyber attack threat directed at our Nation re-
quires a balanced set of capabilities to ensure DOD, government and the civilian
sectors are adequately protected. Private and governmental organizations charged
with defending the .org, .com, .gov, and .mil domains continue to become increas-
ingly vulnerable to exploitation and attack by our adversaries. The characteristics required to deter and defend these cyberspace domains are a balanced set of capabilities that are agile, tailorable, persistent, and scalable with the necessary tools to react within the timelines and proper authorities that deny the adversary his intended objective.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK PRYOR
AIR FORCE CYBER COMMAND PROVISIONAL

3. Senator PRYOR. General Chilton, on September 12, 2007, the Secretary of the Air Force announced the activation of the Air Force Cyber Command Provisional (AFCYBER(P)) at Barksdale Air Force Base, LA. The cyber domain is characterized by use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum, including all energy such as radio waves, microwaves, and directed energy. Considered to be an operational domain, what are the planned roles and missions of AFCYBER(P)?

General CHILTON. Title 10, U.S.C., section 8013, makes the Secretary of the Air Force responsible for organizing, supplying, training, equipping, et cetera, forces within the U.S. Air Force (USAF). As a combatant commander, it would be inappropriate for me to answer questions within the Secretary's purview. I look forward to partnering with the Air Force as it continues to develop Air Force Cyber Command and the integration of its roles and missions with both United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and DOD information operations activities.

4. Senator PRYOR. General Chilton, in an effort to establish a permanent Major Command (MAJCOM), what criteria will the Air Force be considering for the location of its headquarters?

General CHILTON. Title 10, U.S.C., section 8013, makes the Secretary of the Air Force responsible for organizing, supplying, training, equipping, et cetera, forces within the USAF. As a combatant commander, it would be inappropriate for me to answer questions within the Secretary's purview.

5. Senator PRYOR. General Chilton, what is the timetable for this decision?

General CHILTON. Title 10, U.S.C., section 8013, makes the Secretary of the Air Force responsible for organizing, supplying, training, equipping, et cetera, forces within the USAF. As a combatant commander, it would be inappropriate for me to answer questions within the Secretary's purview.

6. Senator PRYOR. General Chilton, how many tenant units will there be? What equipment is needed?

General CHILTON. Title 10, U.S.C., section 8013, makes the Secretary of the Air Force responsible for organizing, supplying, training, equipping, et cetera, forces within the USAF. As a combatant commander, it would be inappropriate for me to answer questions within the Secretary's purview.

7. Senator PRYOR. General Chilton, what kind of funding will be required? How big will the command be?

General CHILTON. Title 10, U.S.C., section 8013, makes the Secretary of the Air Force responsible for organizing, supplying, training, equipping, et cetera, forces within the USAF. As a combatant commander, it would be inappropriate for me to answer questions within the Secretary's purview.

8. Senator PRYOR. General Chilton, does the Air Force have an adequate pool of personnel specially trained to qualify as operators in this command?

General CHILTON. Title 10, U.S.C., section 8013, makes the Secretary of the Air Force responsible for organizing, supplying, training, equipping, et cetera, forces within the USAF. As a combatant commander, it would be inappropriate for me to answer questions within the Secretary's purview.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER
AIR FORCE CYBER COMMAND

9. Senator WARNER. General Chilton, the Air Force is currently in the process of standing up the Air Force Cyber Command that will be tasked with helping defend America’s interests in cyberspace. How do you anticipate STRATCOM working with a new Air Force Cyber Command and the other Services with respect to cyber war-
fare? What relationships do you intend to foster given the mission STRATCOM shares with Air Force Cyber Command?

General Chilton. As the combatant command charged with integrating and coordinating DOD Information Operations, including computer network defense, I anticipate working closely with the Secretary of the Air Force as he develops this new Command, and with United States Joint Forces command as the provider of forces. STRATCOM is organized with joint functional components for its various mission areas. Cyberspace spans Joint Functional Component Command-Network Warfare, Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations, and Joint Information Operations Warfare Command. I intend to foster mutually supportive relationships as we explore how Air Force Cyber Command best fits as a provider of warfighting assets into our overall Department mission.

10. Senator Warner. General Chilton, as the Air Force looks for a permanent location for Cyber Command, in your view what characteristics will the host region need to provide in order to successfully support Cyber Command?

General Chilton. Title 10, U.S.C., section 8013, makes the Secretary of the Air Force responsible for organizing, supplying, training, equipping, et cetera, forces within the USAF. As a combatant commander, it would be inappropriate for me to answer questions within the Secretary's purview.

11. Senator Warner. General Chilton, would you believe that collocation near existing DOD facilities, a well educated workforce familiar with DOD, and a variety of advanced research institutions would be beneficial for a Cyber Command location?

General Chilton. Title 10, U.S.C., section 8013, makes the Secretary of the Air Force responsible for organizing, supplying, training, equipping, et cetera, forces within the USAF. As a combatant commander, it would be inappropriate for me to answer questions within the Secretary's purview.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

ISR CAPABILITIES

12. Senator Collins. General Chilton, you mention that the largest challenge facing STRATCOM is managing the complexities of securing cyberspace and space-based capabilities, while meeting the demands of the other combatant commands. A July Government Accountability Office (GAO) report states that combatant commanders carrying out ongoing operations rank the need for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities as high on their priority lists. DOD is investing in many ISR systems, to meet the growing demand for ISR assets in theater. Are we making the right ISR investments to meet the warfighter needs?

General Chilton. Yes, we are making the right ISR investments. STRATCOM is a member of all the relevant forums and as the combatant commander's advocate for ISR, we ensure that the combatant commander's ISR requirements are captured, articulated and considered when shaping the budget. Second, through our component, JFCC–ISR, we receive the day-to-day combatant command's ISR requirements. We recommend the allocation of DOD ISR capabilities and ensure that they are seamlessly integrated and synchronized with those of the Intelligence Community to support the joint warfighter's priority missions and needs.

[The nomination reference of Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, USAF, follows:]
To be General.
Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, USAF, 0000.

[The biographical sketch of Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, USAF, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF

Gen. Kevin P. Chilton is Commander, Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO. He is responsible for the development, acquisition and operation of the Air Force’s space and missile systems. The general oversees a global network of satellite command and control, communications, missile warning and launch facilities, and ensures the combat readiness of America’s intercontinental ballistic missile force. He leads more than 39,700 space professionals who provide combat forces and capabilities to North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Strategic Command.

General Chilton is a distinguished graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy Class of 1976. A Guggenheim Fellow, he completed a Master of Science degree in mechanical engineering at Columbia University. He flew operational assignments in the RF–4C and F–15 and is a graduate of the U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School. General Chilton conducted weapons testing in various models of the F–4 and F–15 prior to joining the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in 1987. At NASA he flew on three space shuttle missions and served as the Deputy Program Manager for Operations for the International Space Station Program. The general has served on the Air Force Space Command Staff, the Joint Staff, the Air Staff, and commanded the 9th Reconnaissance Wing. Prior to assuming his current position, he was Commander, 8th Air Force, and Joint Functional Component Commander for Space and Global Strike, U.S. Strategic Command.

Education:
1976 - Distinguished graduate, Bachelor of Science degree in engineering science, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO.
1977 - Master of Science degree in mechanical engineering, Columbia University, New York, NY.
1982 - Distinguished graduate, Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.
1985 - Air Command and Staff College, by correspondence 2001 Air War College, by correspondence.

Assignments:
May 1977–May 1978, student, undergraduate pilot training, Williams Air Force Base, AZ.
May 1978–August 1978, student, RF–4C Replacement Training Unit, Shaw Air Force Base, SC.
August 1978–November 1980, RF–4C pilot and instructor pilot, 15th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron, Kadena Air Base, Japan.
January 1985–August 1987, test pilot and operations officer, 3247th Test Squadron, Eglin Air Force Base, FL.
August 1987–August 1988, astronaut candidate, NASA, Johnson Space Center, Houston, TX.
August 1988–May 1996, astronaut, National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Johnson Space Center, Houston, TX.
May 1999–September 2000, Commander, 9th Reconnaissance Wing, Beale Air Force Base, CA.

October 2000–April 2002, Director of Politico-Military Affairs, Asia-Pacific and Middle East, the Joint Staff, Washington, DC.

April 2002–August 2004, Director of Programs, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC.


June 2006–present, Commander, Air Force Space Command, Peterson Air Force Base, CO.

Flight information:

Rating: Command astronaut pilot.
Flight hours: More than 5,000.

Major awards and decorations:

- Distinguished Service Medal
- Defense Superior Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters
- Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
- Distinguished Flying Cross
- Defense Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
- Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
- Air Force Commendation Medal
- NASA Space Flight Medal with two oak leaf clusters
- NASA Exceptional Service Medal
- NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal

Other achievements:

- Guggenheim Fellow
- Commander’s Trophy, Undergraduate Pilot Training
- 1982 Secretary of the Air Force Leadership Award
- 1984 Liethen-Tittle Award for top graduate, U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School

Effective dates of promotion:

- Second Lieutenant - June 2, 1976
- First Lieutenant - June 2, 1978
- Captain - June 2, 1980
- Major - May 2, 1985
- Lieutenant Colonel - June 2, 1989
- Colonel - Jan. 1, 1993
- Brigadier General - May 1, 1999
- Major General - April 1, 2002
- Lieutenant General - Aug. 9, 2005
- General - June 26, 2006

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, USAF, in connection with his nomination follows:]
PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Kevin P. Chilton.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Commander, United States Strategic Command.

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   Nov. 3, 1954; Los Angeles, CA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Catherine A. Chilton (maiden name: Dreyer).

7. Names and ages of children:
   Madison, 17; Mary, 15; Megan, 13; and Morgan, 11.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    Air Force Academy Association of Graduates.
    Order of Daedalians.
    American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.

11. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    Guggenheim Fellow, 1976.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
    Yes.
13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**SIGNATURE AND DATE**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

KEVIN P. CHILTON, GENERAL, USAF.

This 16th day of July, 2007.

[The nomination of Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, USAF, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on September 27, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on September 28, 2007.]

**QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES**

**DEFENSE REFORMS**

*Question.* The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

*Answer.* The Department has made great progress in the joint arena since the enactment of Goldwater-Nichols. The changes to the Joint Officer Management process enacted by the National Defense Authorization Act of 2007 have corrected longstanding shortfalls. I don’t believe there is a need for any major modifications to the act, however, given the current world environment and the challenges we face we need to build on the successes of Goldwater-Nichols. There is room, in my opinion, for additional refinement.

*Question.* If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

*Answer.* Congress should consider means to increase integration of all U.S. Government agencies in appropriate training and force readiness environments in order to build the foundation for more effective “whole of government” approaches to crisis prevention or crisis resolution.

Continue Departmental efforts, such as Capability Portfolio Management, to integrate acquisition and resource allocation processes in meeting joint capability requirements. In other words, Services develop “Service-Specific” systems and capabilities after joint review and authorization to ensure joint/interoperability issues are addressed.

**DUTIES**

*Question.* What is your understanding of the duties and functions of Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM)?

*Answer.* The Unified Command Plan focuses the command on two main missions: 1) providing conventional forces trained to operate in a joint, interagency, and multi-
national environment, and 2) transforming the U.S. military’s forces to meet the security challenges of the 21st century. The Commander, JFCOM, serves as the chief advocate for jointness and interoperability, championing the joint warfighting requirements of the other combatant commanders. As such, he is responsible for five major areas:

- Serves as the Primary Joint Force Provider. In this role, JFCOM has combatant command over a large portion of the conventional forces of the U.S. Armed Forces and provides them as trained and ready joint-capable forces to the other combatant commanders when directed by the Secretary of Defense.
- Functionally responsible for leading joint concept development and experimentation (CDE) and coordinating the CDE efforts of the Services, combatant commands, and defense agencies to support joint interoperability and future joint warfighting capabilities. The Commander of JFCOM is also tasked with leading the development, exploration, and integration of new joint warfighting concepts and serving as the DOD Executive Agent for joint warfighting experimentation.
- Serves as the lead Joint Force Integrator, responsible for recommending changes in doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities to integrate Service, defense agency, interagency and multinational capabilities. A recently assigned responsibility in this area is that of Joint Command and Control Capability Portfolio Manager—a DOD effort to improve interoperability, minimize capability redundancies and gaps, and maximize capability effectiveness.
- Serves as the lead agent for Joint Force Training. This effort is focused at the operational level with an emphasis on Joint Task Force Commanders and their staffs and the ability of U.S. forces to operate as part of a joint and multinational force. Additionally, JFCOM is responsible for leading the development of a distributed joint training architecture and developing joint training standards.
- Leads the collaborative development of joint readiness standards for Joint Task Force Headquarters staffs, functional component headquarters staffs, and headquarters designated as potential joint headquarters or portion thereof, for recommendation to the Chairman.

In addition to these Unified Command Plans (UCPs) assigned missions, JFCOM has been assigned as the executive agent within the Department of Defense (DOD) for the following mission areas:

- Joint Urban Operations
- Personnel Recovery
- Joint Deployment Process Owner
- Training and Education to Support the Code of Conduct
- Joint Experimentation

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT)?

Answer. The SACT is responsible to the military committee for overall recommendations on transformation. He leads transformation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military structures, capabilities and doctrines, including those for the defense against terrorism in order to improve the military effectiveness and interoperability of the Alliance. He cooperates with the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) on integrating and synchronizing transformation efforts with operational activities and elements. He also promotes improvements to the capabilities of NATO forces made available by nations, especially for Combined Joint Task Forces and NATO Response Force Operations. Specifically, SACT:

- Leads, at the Strategic Commander level, the NATO Defense Planning Process, including the development of the Defense requirements review.
- Develops Strategic Commander Force proposals within the Force Planning Process and conducts Strategic Commander assessment of national contributions to the NATO force structure in coordination with national military authorities.
- Leads, at the Strategic Commander level, the development of NATO Joint and Combined concepts, policy and doctrine, as well as Partnership for Peace military concepts in cooperation with SACEUR.
- Leads, at the Strategic Commander level, the development of future Communications Information Systems strategy, concepts, capabilities and architecture.
- Leads, for military matters in NATO, partnership for Peace and other non-NATO joint individual education and training, and associated policy.
Assists SACEUR in the education and training of functional commands and staff elements that plan for and conduct operations with multinational and joint forces over the full range of Alliance military missions.

**Question.** What are the advantages and disadvantages of serving in both of these roles simultaneously?

**Answer.** Both Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and JFCOM strive for interoperable and interdependent forces. These efforts revolve around the mutually supporting themes of operational lessons learned, combined/joint training, interoperability, and CDE. It makes great sense for one person to wear these two hats since these are parallel missions—both are trying to achieve essentially the same goal. If confirmed, I will continue to leverage the joint capabilities resident in JFCOM with the transformation goals of NATO, as well as integrating NATO processes and personnel into JFCOM experimentation and training efforts—this is a win/win situation.

The significant challenge will be one of time management. NATO conducts its business in formal high-level forums which require the presence of both Strategic Commanders—both of whom are dual hated with U.S. and NATO responsibilities. The vast majority of these meetings are conducted in Europe. Maintaining the proper balance between JFCOM and ACT duties will require my close attention, but it is a challenge that, if confirmed, I am ready to meet.

**BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE**

**Question.** What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

**Answer.** I’m very fortunate to have had the opportunity to not only serve over 35 years in uniform, but also to have commanded troops from the platoon level up to my present assignment as Commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, which is also the Marine component for U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Perhaps one of my most important opportunities was leading the Marine Corps’ Combat Development Command, where I was able to help shape much of the current doctrine and training that the Marine Corps has since incorporated. It was also there that I was able to co-author, with General Petraeus, the new Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual. Over the years, I’ve had what I believe is considerable experience in joint operations and working with coalition forces. In every assignment I was fortunate to serve for, and lead, brave, innovative, and hardworking people, both in uniform as well as senior civilian leadership. Above all, I have tried to learn, mentor, and lead at every chance. All of this has prepared me for this opportunity.

**RELATIONSHIPS**

**Question.** Section 162(b) of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, JFCOM, and SACT, to the following:

The Secretary of Defense.

**Answer.** The Commander, JFCOM performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, and is directly responsible to him to carry out its assigned missions.

**Question.** The Under Secretaries of Defense.

**Answer.** Title 10, U.S.C., and current DOD directives establish the Under Secretaries of Defense as the principal staff assistants and advisers to the Secretary regarding matters related to their functional areas. Within their areas, Under Secretaries exercise policy and oversight functions. They may issue instructions and directive type memoranda that implement policy approved by the Secretary. These instructions and directives are applicable to all DOD components. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries to the commanders and the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Question.** The Assistant Secretaries of Defense.

**Answer.** With the exception of the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Public Affairs, Legislative Affairs, Intelligence Oversight, and for Networks and Information Integration, all Assistant Secretaries of Defense are subordinate to one of the Under Secretaries of Defense. In carrying out their responsibilities, and when directed by the President and Secretary of Defense, communications from the Under Secretaries
to commanders of the unified and specified commands are transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant Secretaries in a manner similar to that described above for the Under Secretaries.

**Question.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Answer.** The Chairman is established by title 10 as the principal military advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense. The Chairman serves as an advisor and is not, according to law, in the operational chain of command, which runs from the President through the Secretary to each combatant commander. The President directs communications between himself and the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This keeps the Chairman fully involved and allows the Chairman to execute his other legal responsibilities. A key responsibility of the Chairman is to speak for the combatant commanders especially on operational requirements. If confirmed as Commander, JFCOM, I will keep the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense promptly informed on matters for which I am personally accountable.

**Question.** Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

**Answer.** SACEUR is one of two co-equal Strategic Commanders within NATO’s command structure. As NATO’s other Strategic Commander, the SACT supports SACEUR in the education and training of functional commands and staff elements that plan for and conduct operations, with multinational and joint forces, over the full range of Alliance military missions authorized by the North Atlantic Council/Defense Planning Committee. ACT also conducts and evaluates training and exercises of forces and headquarters, in coordination with and on behalf of SACEUR. Lastly, ACT supports SACEUR in joint analysis, evaluations and assessments of NATO-led operations and forces, including NATO Response Force certification.

**Question.** The North Atlantic Council/Defense Planning Committee, the NATO Chiefs of Defense and Defense Ministers, and the military committee of NATO.

**Answer.** As one of two co-equal Strategic Commanders within NATO’s command structure, the SACT provides military advice to the military committee, North Atlantic Council and Defense Planning Committee on matters pertaining to transformation, as required. The Commander may make recommendations directly to the military committee, the International Military Staff, national Chiefs of Defense, Defense Ministers and Heads of State and Government on transformational matters affecting the capability improvement, interoperability, efficiency, and sustainability of forces designated for NATO.

**Question.** The Secretaries of the Military Departments.

**Answer.** The secretaries of the military departments are responsible for the administration and support of the forces assigned to the combatant commands. The Commander, JFCOM, coordinates closely with the secretaries to ensure the requirements to organize, train, and equip forces assigned to JFCOM are met. Close coordination with each Service Secretary is required to ensure that there is no infringement upon the lawful responsibilities held by a Service Secretary.

**Question.** The Chiefs of Staff of the Services.

**Answer.** The Chiefs of Staff of the Services organize, train, and equip their respective forces. No combatant commander can ensure preparedness of his assigned forces without the full cooperation and support of the Service Chiefs. As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs have a lawful obligation to provide military advice. The experience and judgment of the Service Chiefs provide an invaluable resource for every combatant commander. If confirmed as Commander, JFCOM, I will continue the close bond between the command, the Service Chiefs and the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard in order to fully utilize their service capabilities, and to effectively employ those capabilities as required to execute the missions of JFCOM.

**Question.** The combatant commanders.

**Answer.** In general, JFCOM is a supporting command—it’s job is to make the other combatant commands more successful. If confirmed, I will continue the close relationships with other combatant commanders to increase the effectiveness we've created, and continue to build mutual support. The joint capabilities required by combatant commanders to perform their missions—today and in the future—forms a large basis of JFCOM's mission. Today's security environment dictates that JFCOM work very closely with the other combatant commanders to execute our national military strategy.

**Question.** The commanders of each of the Service’s training and doctrine commands.

**Answer.** Tasked by the UCP as the executive agent for joint warfighting experimentation, a strong relationship exists between JFCOM and the Services’ training and doctrine commands. General Smith has maintained a close working relationship...
with these organizations and their commanders via a monthly component commanders meeting, and if confirmed, I will continue these relationships.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

**Question.** In your view, what are the major challenges and problems confronting the Commander, JFCOM?

**Answer.** From my present view outside the wire I would postulate that the most significant challenge is meeting the combatant commander’s force sourcing requirements. The task of providing trained and ready joint forces, on a predictable and stable schedule that minimizes stress on families while providing adequate time for training, will continue to be a challenge for anyone with the Global Force Provider mission.

Second is the continuing challenge of developing capabilities that are truly born joint. First and foremost is institutionalizing Joint Command and Control. The assignment of JFCOM as the Joint Command and Control Capability Portfolio manager appears to be a step in the right direction.

Finally, continuing the overarching transformation of our joint force while prosecuting current campaigns will be an ongoing challenge as the strategic environment continues to evolve.

**Question.** In your view, what are the major challenges and problems confronting the SACT?

**Answer.** My sense is training forces for deployment to Afghanistan and other NATO operations is the most immediate challenge. Incorporating and institutionalizing lessons learned in training, capability development, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures has historically been a problem for any organization. I expect some challenges in this area. Transforming NATO military capabilities, especially those of the newest NATO members, will be a complex, expensive, and time-consuming process. Preparing and cultivating partner countries for possible accession into NATO I believe will be a very delicate and complicated endeavor. Ensuring that the NATO Response Force (NRF) is well resourced and remains a vehicle for experimentation and transformation is an extremely important aspect of NATO’s global warfighting capability that I believe will require my attention. Finally, working to build bridges and capabilities with Partnership for Peace (PfP), Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) countries will be an important aspect of my responsibilities.

**Question.** Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing them?

**Answer.** Since I am not confirmed yet, I have not had great insight into the internal workings of either commands, so I cannot give as complete an answer as I would like. Certainly, if confirmed, I will continue to work with the other combatant commanders, as well as the Services through JFCOM’s component commands, to shape JFCOM’s ability to provide the most logical and effective sourcing solutions for the joint warfighter. With respect to developing joint solutions while programs are still on the drawing board, I would like to further expand on the Capabilities’ Portfolio Management efforts that are ongoing, and look beyond just Joint Command and Control to evaluate other areas that would be ripe for this style of management. Finally, I will continue to leverage the training and experimentation efforts that the combatant commanders and joint warfighters want and need, in order to take a holistic approach to shaping combat development capabilities that our forces involved in the current fight need in future years.

JOINT FORCE PROVIDER

**Question.** What is your understanding of the role of JFCOM as the joint force provider to meet combatant commander requirements?

**Answer.** As the conventional Joint Force Provider (JFP), it is JFCOM’s goal to source all validated rotational and emergent force requirements in support of the combatant commanders. To accomplish this, JFCOM provides DOD leadership with the recommended force allocation solutions to make proactive, risk-informed force management and allocation decisions. JFCOM works to source these force requirements through collaborating with JFCOM Service components, each of the Services (both Active-Duty and Reserve) and combatant commands’ to meet combatant commands’ force requirements.

**Question.** From your experience as Marine Forces Commander, CENTCOM, what are your observations and evaluation of the performance of Joint Forces Command in meeting your combatant command’s force requirements?

**Answer.** Overall, JFCOM along with the other stakeholders in the Global Force Management process are doing an outstanding job in supporting the combatant com-
mands' force requirements. But demand is currently outpacing force supply in specific capability areas and the current systems are not perfect. Problems remain: force stress, persistent shortfalls use of in-lieu-of forces, et cetera. The cunning enemy that we face is forcing us to adapt our force and staffing requirements. At times, the force providing processes have not proven agile enough to keep up with the pace of change and unplanned requirements. This is the source of some frustration. To their credit, however, JFCOM and other stakeholders in the Global Force Management Process are, reviewing their processes: determining how to streamline procedures and increase visibility in order to increase responsiveness to combatant command force requirements.

Question. In this regard, include your observations and evaluations of the use of in-lieu of forces to meet theater requirements.

Answer. In my judgment, in-lieu-of (ILO) forces provide effective support to meet theater requirements. ILO solutions are, by definition, substitutions of force when the standard force is unavailable. As such, ILO solutions provide capability to meet theater requirements that would otherwise go unfilled. Of critical importance as ILO forces are continued to be employed is ensuring that they have received the proper training and equipment in order to enable their effectiveness.

Question. Based on your evaluation, what in your view are the most urgent challenges requiring JFCOM attention and how would you propose to meet these challenges or improve the command's efficiency or effectiveness as the joint force provider to our combatant commands?

Answer. The most urgent challenge impacting JFCOM's effectiveness as Primary Joint Force Provider is access to high quality force readiness and force availability data. JFCOM is teaming with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, Service headquarters and technical organizations Defense Information Systems Agency in several initiatives that are aimed at improving data access and visibility. Ultimately, a global visibility capability tool is envisioned that will enable JFCOM staff and supported combatant commands to more rapidly access information and use it to develop recommended force allocations for Secretary of Defense's consideration.

JOINT FORCE READINESS

Question. Joint Forces Command's current mission statement acknowledges its responsibility to provide "trained and ready joint forces" to our combatant commanders. The readiness of our nondeployed forces, especially our ground forces, for worldwide commitment has been impacted by the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. What is your unclassified assessment of the readiness of our nondeployed land, air, and sea forces?

Answer. That portion of the armed services making up the ground force is essentially either deployed forward in the global war on terror or is in some stage of resetting for future deployment. Those units that are in reset are challenged in their readiness by equipment needs, rotation of manpower and time to train. The Services are doing great work preparing these ground forces for their next deployment—but every day in reset is crucial to preparing them and, in general, they achieve a deployment ready state just in time for their next deployment rotation. The air and maritime forces are more ready across the board, but specific skill sets within those forces are also stressed due to deployments (e.g., Military Intelligence, EOD).

Question. What policies, programs, or actions would you specifically propose to strengthen the readiness of our nondeployed air, land, and sea forces?

Answer. Continued support of Congress to provide resources necessary to facilitate rapid force reset and recapitalization is probably the most important single element to ensure a strengthening of force readiness.

READINESS REPORTING SYSTEMS

Question. Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) measures unit readiness for combat missions at the high end of the spectrum of war rather than counterinsurgency, stabilization or other contingency missions. The Department has developed and begun fielding the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) to replace GSORTS.

Based on your years of tactical unit command, both in garrison and while deployed, what are your views of the importance of a comprehensive, objective, accurate, reliable, adaptable, and timely readiness reporting system?

Answer. A readiness reporting system as you have described is obviously important. The readiness reporting system provides the basis for force analysis that yields readiness and availability information that underpins JFCOM's recommended sourcing solutions to meet the geographic combatant commander's force needs.
**Question.** What in your view should be the requirements of a readiness reporting system capable of meeting Joint Forces Command’s mission as joint force provider?

**Answer.** JFCOM has described the technical requirements for a readiness reporting system that supports and dovetails with the aforementioned Global Visibility Capability tool. In general terms, the readiness system should reflect objective readiness metrics and subjective assessments of a force's ability to carry out specific mission tasks or a spectrum of military missions.

**Question.** In this regard, is it more important for Joint Forces Command to have a clear picture of available Service capabilities or the readiness data on specific units and systems, or both?

**Answer.** I would expect that JFCOM would require both to perform its Joint Force Provider role. JFCOM currently works with its Service components and each Service to generate the shared understanding of what Service capabilities are available and why they are available—based on unit readiness data. In its effort to improve Joint Force Provider processes, JFCOM has defined needs for the Global Visibility Capability tool include:

- Force availability
- Force capabilities identifiers
- Force structure
- Force readiness
- Global Force Management (GFM) strategic guidance (priorities)
- Force location
- Force apportionment
- Common operating picture
- Works in progress (pending changes in the force)

**Question.** What weight would you assign to each of the requirements you identify?

**Answer.** As JFCOM and other GFM stakeholders focus on development of the Global Visibility Capability tool high priority items include: force availability, force capabilities identifier, force structure, force readiness. GFM strategic guidance, force location and force apportionment are medium priority. Common operating picture and works in progress are low priority.

**Question.** What is your understanding of or experience with the new Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)?

**Answer.** The DRRS provides enhanced capability, and if we achieve its goals, it can provide us solid foundation for force planning. I believe this system is an improvement over previous reporting systems although I need to discuss DRRS with the service components to determine their confidence in the system before declaring my own overall assessment.

**Question.** How would you evaluate this new system’s ability to assess the personnel, equipment, and training readiness of forces and its utility in support of Joint Forces Command’s joint force provider process?

**Answer.** DRRS is a subjective readiness reporting system that focuses on evaluation of a force’s ability to execute mission essential tasks rather than measure equipment, supply, manning and training levels as a means of assessing readiness. DRRS continues to evolve and its full potential to succeed as a readiness system remains to be seen.

**Question.** One of the concerns about the GSORTS and DRRS is the use or misuse of the commander’s “subjective upgrade.” Commanders are authorized to raise or lower their reported level of readiness in a more subjective fashion than is otherwise required in a strict application of objective standards as defined in the readiness reporting regulation.

Based on your years of tactical unit command, in general have you used this authority to subjectively upgrade or downgrade your readiness reports? If so, what philosophy has guided your use of subjective upgrade or downgrade?

**Answer.** I have used subjective reporting in the past within the parameters of the reporting system at the time. If the reporting system directs an assessment of a unit’s full spectrum combat mission, then the full suite of equipment, manning and training is necessary to ready that unit to the full spectrum level. If the unit is tasked with a less demanding mission, for example, disaster relief—then a subjective report of readiness against that lesser mission is helpful to reflect that the unit is capable of success with the current state of manning, equipment, and training.

It's important to keep in mind that readiness reports are intended for senior headquarters consumption and their information needs and intents are key variables in defining any readiness system. I have never hesitated to apply my military judgment in assessing the readiness of units I commanded. Quantitative assessments
alone cannot adequately articulate a unit’s readiness and I strongly endorse holistic appraisals by commanders.

Question. How have you mentored your subordinate commanders in their use of subjective upgrade in their readiness reporting to and through you?

Answer. The U.S. Marine Corps trains leaders to be honest, forthright, critical thinkers and they are selected to leadership positions based, in large part, on their demonstration of good judgment. I have relied on the good judgment of my subordinate commanders to reflect accurately their unit’s capabilities within the parameters of the readiness reporting system. The readiness of their units has been a subject of frequent discussion with my subordinate commanders. I expect them to apply their judgment and report their honest assessment.

Question. What in your view are the benefits and dangers of the use of subjective upgrades or downgrades?

Answer. The obvious danger is that an inaccurate report may be used as the basis for a decision to commit a unit to a mission that it is not prepared to undertake. A benefit may occur when a subjective readiness upgrade allows reflection of capabilities that are not measured in an objective based system (e.g., a unit with a great deal of leadership experience, but has not yet completed all training may be more capable than objective assessment reveals).

Question. If confirmed, how would you monitor the use of subjective upgrades or downgrades in the readiness reporting system to ensure that Joint Forces Command has the most accurate, reliable, and timely information necessary to meet its responsibilities as joint forces provider?

Answer. I will monitor reports of force readiness through my Service component commanders who are in the best position to continually assess the accuracy and reliability of readiness reports. I will also travel and observe unit training and share Joint training lessons learned.

JOINT FORCE TRAINER

Question. Joint Forces Command also serves as a major joint force trainer. In this role, the command certifies the training readiness of Joint Task Force headquarters to plan, organize and manage the execution of joint force operations at all levels of conflict. The command supports combatant commander joint exercises and mission rehearsal exercises prior to deployment of major headquarters. However, Joint Forces Command does not certify the training readiness of deploying forces at the unit or “tactical” level.

Based on your experience as Commander, Marine Forces, CENTCOM, what is your evaluation of the readiness of Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps units as they are arriving in Iraq or Afghanistan?

Answer. I can speak authoritatively only on the Marine, Navy, Air Force, and Army units I have personally observed or commanded over the last 6 years of conflict. Technically and tactically their performance has demonstrated a high state of readiness. Gaps in our counterinsurgency doctrine and training have been addressed as we adapted to the enemy situation.

The readiness of forces arriving in Iraq and Afghanistan for units is good, but there is always room for improvement. The readiness of individual Augmentees, those personnel who are called upon to fill niche capabilities or to augment or round out a unit is improving, but still requires more work. This assessment is based on a number of factors: improved training, better lessons learned, changes in doctrine and capabilities and the readiness to share this across the services and through Joint organizations. We have adapted to changes in the enemy but we must continue to adapt so agility is a key tenet in how we improve. The key to this process is transitioning the lessons we observe and experience on the battlefield into lessons learned in our training, doctrine, tactics techniques and procedures. It is also about recognizing and pushing forward the capabilities we need to the warfighter as soon as they are ready and have been evaluated.

As the Joint Force Provider I will be committed to working through our Components Commands Air Combat Command, Marine Forces Command, Fleet Forces Command, Services, and the combatant commanders to make sure we provide the most ready forces that meet combatant commander criteria across the globe. One of my first tasks will be to assess this readiness with the Components and take stock of combatant commander requirements and then ensure JFCOM provides and supports those units going into harm’s way.

As the Joint Force Trainer I will continually assess and make improvements in Joint training through Joint Headquarters Mission Rehearsal Exercises, Joint Task Force training certification, Joint Operational Analysis, and through direct interaction with the combatant commanders. We will also review individual Augmentee
training and improve it using capabilities such as the Joint Knowledge Online system that is designed to support the U.S. and coalition force individual augmentees from predeployment, through deployment and post deployment to provide courses and a place to ask the expert. I look forward to the challenge of improving our readiness and training.

Question. Based on your observations and evaluations, should JFCOM be assigned a greater role in setting standards and the certification of the training readiness of tactical units prior to their deployment?

Answer. I believe that the Commander of the unit together with their higher headquarters which is usually a JFCOM Component is in the best position to certify training readiness of the units. Setting standards for readiness is primarily accomplished by the combatant commander and the Service but as the Commander, JFCOM, I will continually assess and provide support to ensure that our troops are trained adequately. This will include realistic training for commanders and staffs of Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Multi-National Corps—Iraq, and Combined Joint Task Force 82 in Afghanistan. Significant expansion of joint distance learning tools such as the Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability. We will continue to improve enabling technology for all major Service training centers and combatant commanders to train together in a distributed environment through the Joint National Training Capability (JNTC). We will continue to provide dedicated assessment teams to Iraq and Afghanistan to identify areas for improved command and control of U.S. and multi-national forces and as Commander of ACT I will ensure that these improvements are shared throughout NATO.

LESSONS LEARNED

Question. One of JFCOM's missions is to conduct lessons learned studies that can result in changes to joint tactics and doctrine. These efforts are informed by the command's wargaming experimentation program, as well as a number of advisors, including retired general officers, who have been sent to Iraq to review the operational situation.

Based on your experience as Commander, Marine Forces, CENTCOM, what are your observations and evaluation of the Joint Forces Command's lessons learned efforts?

Answer. JFCOM's Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) embedded collection teams with the Joint Force Commander's Headquarters during the course of operations. Those forward teams were in daily communication with each other and reached back to analysts in the U.S. This daily information sharing uncovered both immediately applicable lessons for the commanders in the field, and provided more comprehensive information on causality for subsequent analysis. This approach is a great leap forward over sending interview teams forward to collect information after the fact as we've historically done. It provides a level of timeliness, fidelity and impact that has not been achieved in previous lessons learned programs. Service teams have also moved to this approach. This method has permitted rapid adaptation and sharing of “best practices” between our various services and units. It is a proven force multiplier in making us learning organizations.

Question. What are your observations and evaluation of how these lessons learned impacted the conduct of operations in Iraq or Afghanistan?

Answer. I observed two types of impacts: the first is the immediate impact provided by forward collectors' observations to the operational commanders, and the second is the result of subsequent analysis and recommendations being shared with senior DOD and U.S. Government leadership. JCOA analysis identified lessons and derived recommendations that were fed into multiple efforts. As a result of the sharing of joint and service lessons learned, training has been reoriented in real time, organizations have been modified, and doctrine rewritten to strengthen our intellectual approach to this form of war.

Question. If confirmed, how would you propose to improve the command's lessons learned systems?

Answer. Key to the collection of needed data is trust in the purpose and concept of JCOA's embedded missions. I intend to work and advocate with my fellow combatant commanders to set the conditions at the highest level for the continued success of JCOA's employment as primary tool for operational level analytical support to the fielded Joint Task Force headquarters. We will continue to infuse a sense of urgency in disseminating best practices uncovered by sharing lessons learned. Additionally, the ability of U.S. forces to turn worldwide collected lesson observations into knowledge will reach a new level with the implementation this year of the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS). JLLIS allows for trans-
parency among all the service and combatant commands’ lessons learned databases. The key for JFCOM will be the development of business models to process this large amount of information into knowledge, which we can then use to guide improvements for the joint warfighter.

Finally, if confirmed, I intend to engage the Secretary of Defense and Chairman on methods for ensuring resource allocations to the recommendations that go forward based on our analysis and are approved through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) process.

Question. As the Consolidated Disposition Authority, you reviewed the investigations into the conduct of marines that resulted in civilian deaths in Haditha, Iraq. What insights did you gain as a result of this duty?

Answer. The incident illuminated a number of issues, among them how the violent extremists use civilians as cover for their activities as well as the enemy’s disregard of any historic norms for the protection of innocents. In such wars “among the people,” our units must demonstrate high performance coupled with strong self-discipline and cultural understanding coupled with precision fires. We also require engaged leaders who act as emotional “shock absorbers” for their younger troops. Accountability, real and omnipresent, is as critical to victory today as is training and equipping our forces.

Question. If confirmed, how would you incorporate these insights into your responsibilities as Commander, JFCOM?

Answer. I will incorporate the lessons learned from this event into joint training evolutions, especially in pre-deployment training for units rotating into Iraq and Afghanistan. Live, simulated, and computer based training, that replicates the ethical dilemmas found in combat will be effective in minimizing these types of events. It is important to teach our service men and women when and when not to use their weapons. I will work with the services through the JFCOM Components to ensure these training capabilities are highlighted. Additional language and cultural training for our forces is also helpful in mitigating the challenging situations that are often found in a counterinsurgency environment. The Haditha incident also demonstrated the need to develop better Counterimprovised Explosive Device (CIED) capabilities. I will work with the Services and combatant commanders to develop these capabilities.

NATIONAL GUARD READINESS FOR CIVIL SUPPORT MISSIONS

Question. An issue of concern to Congress is the apparent low levels of readiness of the National Guard for its domestic or civil support missions. The reality is that we do not know with great confidence the true “readiness” of the National Guard for its domestic support missions because there is no national readiness reporting system that objectively captures the National Guard’s personnel, equipment, or training requirements or their status relative to those requirements.

What is your assessment of the National Guard’s current readiness to respond to the range of domestic contingencies that our states may face?

Answer. I believe the National Guard maintains a good level of readiness to respond to the range of domestic contingencies normally faced by a State in a given year. This year National Guard forces have responded, under state control, to floods, fires, hurricanes, tornadoes, and the tragic bridge collapse in Minnesota. Governors and their TAGs generally will not offer National Guard forces for deployment if they believe that offering will negatively impact the state’s ability to respond to its citizens needs. The National Guard forces that have returned from deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan generally are at lower readiness levels and the Army is working diligently to reset these forces.

Question. What in your view is the role or responsibility of JFCOM, as the joint force provider, in developing a readiness reporting system that monitors the Guard’s readiness for civil support missions?

Answer. Once the DRRS is fully evolved and National Guard units are reporting readiness via DRRS, the mission essential task based readiness system could reflect National Guard readiness for civil support missions.

JOINT REQUIREMENTS OVERSIGHT COUNCIL

Question. The JROC has the responsibility to assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in identifying and assessing the priority of joint military requirements to meet the national military strategy and alternatives to any acquisition programs that have been identified. How would you assess the effectiveness of the JROC in the Department’s acquisition process?
Answer. Yes, in my experience as Commander, Marine Forces, CENTCOM, where I have been the ultimate customer for decisions that the JROC makes, my belief is that the JROC has been effective at engaging the acquisition and programming communities earlier in the requirements process to improve JROC decisions and enhance oversight of acquisition programs. For example, JFCOM collected and analyzed lessons learned from Afghanistan and Iraq. These lessons were compared to the Integrated Priority Lists and Joint Quarterly Readiness Reports submitted by the combatant commanders. This comparison was then used to develop recommended approaches for resolution which were submitted to the Joint Staff and JROC. All of these recommendations were endorsed by the JROC.

Question. Do you see the need for any change in the organization or structure of the JROC?

Answer. The JROC provides independent military advice to our senior leaders by deciding which issues become validated military requirements and which do not. I think the organization and structure of the JROC is about right in order to provide that independent military voice. However, I would strongly support the Vice Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff and the JROC effort to bring together senior leaders, as advisors, from across the Department and the Interagency, to inform the JROC in making more sound and affordable decisions. I believe the combatant commanders also need to have an effective voice in the resource decisions of joint requirements and should be include as advisors to this important body. It will be the one way that combatant commanders can continue to influence the need to keep acquisition programs interoperable. If confirmed, I look forward to investigating options that include combatant commander representation in the JROC.

Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to interact with the JROC in pursuing the development of improved joint force capabilities?

Answer. I would offer that the direction that Admiral Giambastiani charted is sound and I am confident that General Cartwright will continue to lead us in the right direction. All I can offer is that if confirmed I will continue to bring the most significant warfighting challenges pertaining to JFCOM and the combatant commanders to the visibility of the JROC so that the JROC can make the best possible decision about future capabilities and programs.

Question. Do you feel that the Commander, JFCOM, should have a larger role in the activities of the JROC, given the unique JFCOM mission to support joint warfighting?

Answer. In my view, we must continue to "operationalize" the JROC and acquisition processes to respond with agility when Warfighter Challenges are presented and validated. The Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS) is designed to impact mid- to far-term capabilities and funding (3 years and beyond). The process has less flexibility to quickly respond to emerging requirements within the PPBE process in the near-term budget years (1-2 years). A variety of ad hoc measures have been used to address this challenge.

Congress has assisted by providing authorities such as Limited Acquisition Authority (LAA) to JFCOM. This authority has proven to be of great value. One near-term solution is to extend this authority and dedicate appropriate resources in order to have funds available to quickly acquire joint warfighting capabilities for the combatant commanders. In the long-term, the JCIDS process needs to adapt to more effectively meet the demands and pace of today’s operations. If confirmed, I look forward to helping to develop a systemic way to address these concerns.

J O I N T R E Q U I R E M E N T S

Question. Commander, JFCOM, is responsible for advocating for the interests of combatant commanders in the overall defense requirements and acquisition process. From your perspective has the JFCOM effectively represented the requirements and needs of combatant commanders to the JROC and the military Services?

Answer. Yes, JFCOM has well represented the requirements and needs of the combatant commanders to the JROC.

Question. In your view, are combatant commanders capable of identifying critical joint warfighting requirements and quickly acquiring needed capabilities?

Answer. Yes, as one of the component commanders for CENTCOM it is my belief that the combatant commander in working with their component commanders is perfectly suited to identify those joint urgent needs for adjudication by the JROC. What suggestions, if any, do you have for improving the requirements and acquisition process to ensure that combatant commanders are able to quickly acquire needed joint warfighting capabilities?

Answer. This is a difficult question and one that I will be interested in getting my hands around should I be confirmed. I will tell you that combatant commanders...
currenly have the ability to provide their requirements to the Service acquisition community through the Joint Staff. This system works for long-term needs. Combatant commanders also have the ability to forward a Joint Urgent Operational Need Statement to address their short-term, urgent needs. It is my responsibility as a combatant commander in a supporting relationship to help them find solutions to their problems.

JOINT CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

Question. In your view, how successful has JFCOM been in developing and delivering new joint capabilities to the warfighter?

Answer. I think very successful. JFCOM continues to work with the combatant commanders to determine warfighter gaps and challenges and look for solutions. JFCOM develops new capabilities, often partnering with the Services, and leverages our experimentation expertise, our Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations, and our interim joint capability development efforts to find solutions that can be operationally tested and fielded. For example, JFCOM has partnered with Services to develop and field test Machine Foreign Language Translation Systems (MFLTS) that enable troops to better communicate with Host nation populations. Several thousand of one-way translation devices are currently in use and a two-way translation device is undergoing developmental testing in Iraq.

Question. What steps would you take to improve JFCOM’s efforts in this area?

Answer. The ability to expeditiously develop new capability hinges not only on identifying the right technology, but also on having access to the resources (manpower and funding) to effectively pursue solutions that meet the warfighter’s needs. In addition to R&D funding, interim solutions also require temporary operations and maintenance to ensure sustainability. If confirmed, I will work with my staff to ensure that JFCOM in partnership with Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and others as appropriate, are adequately funded and provided the authorities necessary to enable the development and fielding of interim solutions, until a Service program of record is available to meet combatant commander urgent needs.

TRANSFORMATION

Question. By serving as the Department’s “transformation laboratory,” JFCOM enhances the combatant commands’ capabilities as outlined in the Department’s UCP. Do you believe JFCOM should play a larger role in transformation and setting transformation policy? If so, how?

Answer. JFCOM’s role and influence in transformation continues to grow through constantly expanding interaction with the Services, Joint Staff, and OSD in the joint experimentation, joint training, joint integration, and joint force providing responsibilities as assigned by the UCP. The JFCOM transformation role includes both interactions within the existing DOD developmental processes and the ability to act as a coordinator of Service, combatant commander, and agency efforts. Transformation policy clearly rests with the Department. However, JFCOM is afforded substantial and sufficient opportunity to inform policymakers and to shape the mechanisms that execute transformation policy.

Question. In your view, what capabilities that have been fielded are truly transformational?

Answer. JFCOM and its partners have fielded several capabilities that are truly transformational, not least of which is the Training Transformation initiative that combines real forces with individuals and crews in simulators and computer-generated forces that integrate into a common operational picture for training. This JNTC rides on a permanent network that continues to expand around the globe. Units and forces can train at instrumented ranges or from home station, depending upon their training objectives.

Enabling capabilities developed by JFCOM and partners, and transforming the way operators perform in the field, include:

- The Knowledge and Information Fusion Exchange (KnIFE) is a state-of-the-art data fusion capability and operations center that has proved highly successful in meshing hundreds of data sources to provide focused knowledge products on Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). KnIFE serves thousands of customers including warfighters in the field and in training, the research and development community, and interagency. KnIFE is a division of the Joint Center for Operational Analysis and is being expanded to address a variety of other asymmetric threats.
The Joint Training Experimentation Network (JTEN), developed as part of the JNTC, created a 24x7x365 persistent network for joint training & experimentation, where none existed before. The persistent network has enabled permanent interconnectivity at the U.S. Secret-level between numerous Service component and combatant commander national training facilities, live instrumented ranges, model and simulation centers of excellence (COEs), and other standing training networks such as the USAF’s Distributed Mission Operations Network (DMON) and the Navy’s Navy Continuous Training Environment (NCTE).

The Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability (JKDDC) is the DOD Training Transformation (T2) program responsible for transforming individual joint training capability. In the spring of 2007, JKDDC delivered the newly enhanced Joint Knowledge Online (JKO), an enterprise portal system providing access to a learning management system of joint courseware and web-based learning tools and services via Internet, military unclassified and classified networks. JKO provides a more effective and convenient online training opportunity for individuals to prepare in advance for collective training exercises and integrated operations.

JFCOM assisted the geographic combatant commanders as they established core elements for their Standing Joint Force Headquarters. It transformed the concept of readiness for operational-level joint command and control by establishing a permanent, trained and ready organization for the combatant commanders to employ when needed, providing joint C2 capability to a Service-proved headquarters.

Joint Enabling Capabilities are a transformational approach to meet the requirements of the combatant commanders that are not currently met by the Services. They include Standing Joint Force Headquarters Core Elements, the Joint Communications Support Element, the Joint Public Affairs Support Element and Quick Reaction Teams of targeteers and collection managers from the Joint Transformation Command—Intelligence. Several other Joint Enabling Capabilities are under development and in testing with operational forces.

Advanced terrain analysis prototype software (Geospatial Analysis and Planning Support (GAPS)) to meet the warfighter requirements for rapid route analysis and identification, sensor planning and placement and counter fire systems planning and placement.

Machine Foreign Language Translation System—facilitates working with and establishing rapport with the indigenous population.

Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulation (SEAS)—this tool models and simulates reactions of institutions, organizations, and individuals that make up a society and their effects on joint operations, and has been employed in support of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Angel Fire—a Near Real Time Persistent Forensic Capability, currently being tested on the battlefield by the Marine Corps. The optical sensor device covers a 16 square kilometer area and can provide the joint warfighter with a dedicated sensor to rapidly respond to enemy actions and near real-time reaction to an improvised explosive device (IED).

**Question.** What capabilities currently under development do you consider to be truly transformational and deserving of support within the Department and Congress?

**Answer.** The most critical lesson we have learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Katrina is the need for a whole of government approach to achieve national objectives. JFCOM experimentation in knitting together the interagency and multinational communities has already resulted in significant cross-domain collaborative advancements and more realistic training for all who participate. This whole of government approach also has considerable applicability to the structure and functions of the new AFRICOM and for the emerging regional objectives of Commander, SOUTHCOM. Applying organizational and functional principles developed in experimentation venues and refined in training venues can have a transformational effect in our regional security cooperation and conflict prevention.

Operational modeling and simulation capability has a potentially transformational effect on the operational planning, mission rehearsal, operations execution, and effect assessment requirements of operational commanders. New modeling capabilities that focus on the human element have great potential for planning and assessing the effects of irregular warfare.
Ensuring the integration and interoperability of U.S. and coalition command and control capability is one transformational area that JFCOM is making a major effort. Recently, JFCOM led a large joint and coalition combat identification exercise at the Army's National Training Center in California and Nellis AFB, NV. All 4 U.S. Services, Special Operations Command, and partners from 8 NATO/ISAF nations participated, bringing a total of 1,800 personnel, 40 vehicles, and 40 aircraft to the desert for 2 weeks to examine 16 different combat identification technologies as well as procedures for executing digital joint and combined close air support. I look forward to seeing the after action report and technology analysis.

The management of DOD requirements, resources, and acquisition strategy across specific capability portfolios to improve efficiency and interoperability and reduce redundancy is another key transformational area where JFCOM has a major effort ongoing. As directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, JFCOM is the Joint Command and Control Capability Portfolio Manager, one of four such portfolio efforts across DOD. We have just finished a 5 month effort geared toward recommending changes to Service programs for the fiscal year 2009 program objective memorandum (POM) that provide DOD with a more balanced and responsive Joint Command and Control portfolio. We will do the same for fiscal year 2010 and beyond.

Question. What metrics should the Department use to determine whether it is investing enough resources and placing a high enough priority in the transformation of its capabilities?

Answer. The ultimate metric is how well the capability meets the current and future needs of the customer—the combatant commanders and Services. Assessing these metrics requires constant engagement with regional and other functional commands, the Service Chiefs, and other agency staffs. Overall metrics need to be at the national strategic level across the whole of government. Any metric that is solely focused on DOD tells only part of the story.

Question. In your view, what role should JFCOM play in supporting the Department, including the Services and defense agencies, in achieving successful systematic migration of mission capabilities to these new military technologies?

Answer. This is one of those questions in which I must immerse myself if I am confirmed, because being outside JFCOM until now hasn’t given me the familiarity I need to answer. The answer probably lies somewhere between providing the joint context as JFCOM currently does for all Service and defense agency acquisition decisions, and some measure of greater influence over acquisition decisions. What I do know is that no capability we provide will survive unless it meets a warfighter's need and is ultimately sustained in a Service or joint program of record.

Budget and Resources

Question. Since 2001, the JFCOM budget authority has risen considerably because of additional functional mission responsibilities assigned to the command. Have the increases kept pace with the JFCOM taskings and do you foresee the need for future growth?

Answer. For the most part, resources have kept up with the growing mission responsibilities. I understand, the resources to support the JFCOM portfolio of solutions and capabilities has been a departmental effort over the past few years, and the informed allocation of those resources is intended to provide for that mission in support of delivering the appropriate joint tools to the warfighter. As in any organization available resources drive the prioritization of work.

As for future growth, I can not discount that possibility. As joint warfighting capability gaps are identified, it will be critical for the department to assess the risk, prioritize their effect on the overall ability of the force to complete the mission, and then determine the appropriate allocation/reallocation of resources as required to mitigate or accept that risk.

Question. In what specific areas do you see the need for future growth?

Answer. This is difficult to answer without having had a chance to evaluate the command performance, but I believe there may be two areas once evaluated to be ready for expansion, but that will need to be a departmental and Presidential decision.

First is in the area of joint force management. Our current global force management operations: emergent force sourcing, rotational force sourcing, individual augmentation, exercise force sourcing, and adaptive planning contingency sourcing, continue at an unprecedented pace. This elevated operating tempo has placed significant stress on the global force pool and highlighted the need for continued improvements in visibility and sourcing of global force requirements, adaptive and contingency planning, global assessment of risk, and rapid evaluation of force readiness and availability.
Second, as we expand the scope of the department’s capability portfolio managers, there will be some near term requirement to selectively expand the skill set and capacity of those personnel executing the Joint Command and Control (JC2) capability portfolio management functions for the Department at JFCOM. The critical effect desired will be to foster the integration and interoperability of strategic, operational and tactical C2 within a net-enabled environment; scalable C2 capabilities responsive to evolving command structure size, and seamlessly integrated with components and mission partners; and the phase-out of non-interoperable, excess and/or duplicative capabilities.

Lastly, as the joint enabling capability concept expands to fill more and more of the combatant commanders' force requirements not met by Service forces, there may be a need for increased manpower and funding to maintain the readiness of these operational-level capabilities commensurate with combatant commander requirements and the readiness level of the tactical forces they command.

**Question.** Do you believe that JFCOM has adequate staff to efficiently manage this increase in budget authority?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that efforts are underway to examine that question. The rapid growth in the command’s resources since 2001, combined with a complex resourcing environment is driving JFCOM toward an internal review that looks at business management and execution processes to ensure that the command is adequately staffed. A quick analysis, of the last 6 years of resourcing, appears to show that management infrastructure has remained relatively flat, while mission resourcing has grown; if confirmed, it is something that I will urge the staff to continue to look at as we move forward.

**Question.** Do you believe that JFCOM has adequate government technical staff to deal with its increasing role in acquisition programs?

**Answer.** I believe the short answer is no, but if confirmed, I will need to investigate this issue more closely. It is my understanding that JFCOM is working with the department to determine required capacity and capability, and identify the resources (fiscal and manpower) needed to effectively execute the Joint Command and Control (JC2) portfolio management mission. As JFCOM continues to expand its influence and management across the JC2 portfolio, it will be critical to develop and build upon the existing acquisition program oversight capacity and capability. The likely solution will be a combination of organic (JFCOM assigned) and non-organic (matrix’d as required) technical staffing to provide the appropriate assessment and review.

**Question.** Approximately two-thirds of JFCOM headquarters staff is government civilians or contractors.

In your view, is this large civilian and contractor workforce a function of JFCOM’s multiple functional responsibilities or is it a reflection of a shortage of military personnel?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that JFCOM is working to meet the needs of combatant commanders today while ensuring we are ready for the requirements of tomorrow. In my experience this requires the right mix of military, government civilians and contractors who together make up an experienced work force. The contractor portion of the workforce provides the flexibility to surge to taskings and to work on different subject areas that may or may not have traditionally been part of JFCOM's expertise. Contractors provide expertise and afford organizational agility as missions change or new ones are added. Government civilians provide program management, corporate knowledge and continuity of effort. As military personnel become less available for program management tasks to fill existing billets, they may be replaced by government civilians. But government civilians cannot replace the fresh operational expertise that military personnel bring to solving JFCOM’s problem sets.

**Question.** Do you believe that JFCOM has an appropriate mix of military and civilian personnel?

**Answer.** If confirmed, one of my initial tasks will be to review JFCOM’s work force and ensure it meets mission requirements and most optimally utilizes military, civilian and contractor personnel.

**JOINT EXPERIMENTATION**

**Question.** How would you rate the success of the joint experimentation activities of JFCOM, and the Department as a whole, in supporting the development of new concepts of operations?

**Answer.** Experimentation plays a useful and proven role in transformation for identifying needed near and far term capabilities. The art and science of experimentation have evolved considerably since the days of Millennium Challenge 02, which
cost far too much for the learning achieved. Today’s experimentation achieves far more at much lower cost by employing a distributed network and involving far fewer players, who can work from their home stations, all driven and assessed by sophisticated, tailored modeling and simulation.

This increasingly sophisticated experimentation network allows conceptual solutions to warfighter challenges to be tested through hundreds if not thousands of iterations over short periods of time. Testing elements of the supporting operating concepts to the Joint Operations Concept process thus becomes much easier and far more comprehensive.

By providing access to all sorts of military and other interagency partners, this network has increased DOD-wide productivity and enabled the Department to increase value derived from its experimentation dollars, whether those dollars are joint or Service-specific.

Question. What changes would you recommend to increase the effectiveness of joint experimentation activities?

Answer. Recent Department initiatives linking joint experimentation to other acquisition and strategic guidance processes will go a long way to aligning what have been to date very stovepiped processes. How well remains to be seen, since the first information call is only now being answered. But I believe this initiative has great potential for increasing effectiveness across more than just experimentation.

The entire body of experimentation work has recently moved from being defined as activity-driven to being defined as productivity-driven, so that venues are now developed directly in response to experimentation objectives, rather than objectives being tailored to fit existing venues. This should have a considerable impact on effectiveness.

One area requiring considerable improvement is the transition into Service programs of record of those solutions validated through joint experimentation in order to field and sustain those capabilities for the joint operators.

Multinational and interagency participation and partnership in DOD joint experimentation needs to be resourced and expanded.

Question. Based on your experience, do you believe that the overall Department commitment and investment in joint experimentation is adequate to ensure the effective integration and interoperability of our future forces?

Answer. The Department is obviously committed to joint experimentation. We will move to a higher level of integration when defense agencies are fully incorporated in joint experimentation. Efforts must continue to better align Service title 10 and joint experimentation. Current investments in joint experimentation have shown improvement in the integration and interoperability of joint forces. Security challenges we face now and in the future mandate a comprehensive approach to include interagency and multinational partners. Current funding and policy for joint experimentation do not facilitate this broadened body of work.

Question. What do you believe to be the appropriate role for JFCOM in determining how the respective Services should invest their experimentation dollars?

Answer. The UCP assigns JFCOM responsibility to lead joint CDE and coordinate the CDE efforts of the Services, combatant commanders, and defense agencies to support joint interoperability and future joint warfighting capabilities. The Commander, JFCOM, is also tasked with leading the development, exploration, and integration of new joint warfighting concepts and serving as the DOD Executive Agent for joint warfighting experimentation. This does not require strict JFCOM control of how Services invest their experimentation dollar, but does require a clear communication of the planned activities of Service experimentation and the ability to develop a common vision of the course of experimentation with the Chairman, Joint Chief of Staff, and Joint Chiefs. Services can then exercise their appropriate fiscal authorities under Title 10, guided by that common vision of the course of experimentation.

URBAN OPERATIONS

Question. JFCOM’s experimentation and lessons learned efforts have had significant recent activity dedicated to understanding and development of urban operations concepts.

What is your assessment of current DOD capabilities to conduct urban operations?

Answer. The capability is improving but there is much work to be done in this area. I believe my combat experience during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) will be helpful in this area.

Question. What major issues need to be addressed to improve those capabilities?
Answer. The center of gravity for success in the urban environment is winning the support of the population. They will decide which side will succeed. If we win them over, we have millions of allies on our side. If we lose their support, we have at best case, millions of non-supporters; worst case, millions of enemies.

We gain the support of the population by securing and improving the systems that make up the city. This includes basic services such as power, water, and sewage, but also the political system, the information system, even the social and cultural systems. When we successfully provide the population a more compelling view of their future than that provided them by our opponents, the population will take over and make it impossible for the threat to exist there.

The tasks associated with securing the broad spectrum of urban services are outside our traditional tactical thinking. We also understand that this mission cannot be successfully accomplished with military capability alone and that we need greater participation from the interagency community, where much of this type of expertise resides. The requirement for the use of military force to defeat the threat has not gone away, but we now understand that military force must be precisely applied in a much broader operational context.

Critical needs include:

- Increased capacity for human intelligence.
- Greater urban operations reconnaissance and surveillance to assist in the counter-IED fight
- Joint command and control systems that enable the integration not only of military capability, but also of interagency capability in a coalition environment.
- Precise weapons effects that minimize collateral damage
- Strategic communications capabilities that improve our ability to help the population understand the truth about what we are doing and gain their support.
- The ability to better visualize the urban operating environment, including the ability to sense through the massive structures of the city
- Force tracking in the urban environment to ensure we know exactly where all of our forces are located

Question. Based on results from the JFCOM Urban Resolve 2015 experiment last year, efforts are being made to promote the concept and fielding of airborne persistent surveillance assets such as Angel Fire.

What is your assessment of the value of the development of improved sensors, aircraft, and downlink technology and the field testing and integration of these assets with feeds from other battlefield sensors?

Answer. It is incredibly valuable. Combatant commanders consistently identify “persistent surveillance” as a capability gap in their integrated priority lists, despite the fact that U.S. and Coalition warfighters operate and maintain numerous aerial surveillance platforms of varying capabilities. These individual platforms are inherently limited in their ability to conduct persistent surveillance primarily due to platform design and sensor characteristics, particularly against an adaptive, elusive adversary; ISR data derived from the platforms/sensors largely remains “stovepiped” within the platform/sensor architecture until its value is diminished. A critical component in implementing this approach is the development/implementation of common standards, application, interfaces, and data registries. If confirmed, I intend to continue to emphasize the development of improved sensors and to ensure processes are jointly synchronized and focused to enhance ISR integration with warfighting capabilities.

JOINT FORCES COMMAND LIMITED ACQUISITION AUTHORITY

Question. Congress has provided the Commander, JFCOM, with the authority to develop and acquire equipment for battle management command, control, communications, and intelligence and other equipment determined to be necessary for facilitating the use of joint forces in military operations and enhancing the interoperability of equipment used by the various components of joint forces.

What is your assessment of the benefits of this authority?

Answer. LAA, granted to the Secretary of Defense, has proven to be an exceptionally useful and flexible tool for JFCOM in support of other combatant commands, however, no funds were allocated to JFCOM to support LAA. The benefits of authorities to rapidly acquire solutions for the joint warfighter are obvious. But without proper resourcing we will continue to lag the problem.

Based on warfighting shortfalls validated by combatant commanders, LAA has allowed JFCOM to field mature technologies or improved capability to the warfighters
in the regional combatant commands more rapidly than the normal DOD acquisition process.

Since 2004, JFCOM's implementation of LAA in support of the combatant commands has been used to fund and accelerate seven critical capabilities to the warfighter, in some cases years earlier than the standard acquisition process would have provided them.

Question. Do you concur with the findings and recommendations of the Government Accountability Office in its April 2007 report which were somewhat critical of JFCOM's past and continued use of LAA?

Answer. I think that what JFCOM has been asked to do with LAA is a challenging assignment particularly in light of the resource constraints that JFCOM must follow.

That being stated, I do not agree with all the findings of the GAO report, but concur with the Department's response to the GAO. My interpretation of the GAO report is that GAO believes there is duplication of effort between JRAC and LAA. While there may be cases where the two processes may overlap, the intent is different and should an overlap exist, coordination between JFCOM and JS/JRAC eliminates any duplicative effort.

I will, if confirmed, fully participate in a review of the LAA statute and JRAC processes to determine the role LAA should play in support to operational needs of the joint warfighter and inform Congress of the results of that review.

Question. What internal changes, if any, would you recommend to improve the execution of the authority?

Answer. If confirmed I would commit to studying this more thoroughly, but would offer that the statute could be modified to include use of operations and maintenance funding to sustain capabilities provided under the statute until either the recipient can POM for sustainment funding or the capability transitions to a DOD program of record. Another possibility could be to provide an acquisition contingency program element made up of RDT&E, operation and maintenance and OP dollars to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (USD(AT&L)) to fund JRAC and LAA approved projects.

Question. Do you believe that an increase in acquisition staff size is necessary?

Answer. I am not in a position to speak for USD(AT&L) on makeup and organization of the Defense Acquisition Work Force in DOD. JFCOM, however, has no acquisition staff and none is required at this time since all acquisition transactions under LAA are executed through Service/Agency Acquisition staffs using Service Acquisition authorities. If the LAA statute was made permanent, and JFCOM was empowered by USD(AT&L) to execute all aspects of acquisition authority, I would then revisit the need, size and organization of an acquisition staff to execute LAA responsibilities.

Question. Do you believe this authority should be made permanent?

Answer. It is my understanding that JFCOM has submitted a fiscal year 2008 legislative proposal to that effect, which is currently under consideration by the congressional defense committees. In light of the GAO report, I think a thorough evaluation of the authority should be reviewed and only after that review should LAA be made permanent. In the meantime, I don't think Congress should let the current LAA statute expire. I assure you that I will most certainly advocate the best and most expedient way to get joint capabilities in the hands of the warfighter.

Question. What additional acquisition authorities, if any, does JFCOM require to rapidly address such joint warfighting challenges?

Answer. None at this time.

Question. Do you believe similar acquisition authority should be extended to other combatant commands, and, if so, which commands and why?

Answer. Special Operations Command already has acquisition authority to meet specific needs of their special operations mission. It is my belief that LAA was given to JFCOM to meet the unique interoperability and C2 missions assigned to the command under the UCP and reinforced recently by the Joint C2 CPM mandate of the Deputy Secretary of Defense. For those missions, JFCOM should be the single entity determining the joint solutions to interoperability and C2 problems faced by all the combatant commanders.

Question. Will you recommend that the Department directly fund JFCOM to support the authority—which has not occurred to date?

Answer. I would like to reserve judgment on whether to directly fund JFCOM to support the authority pending my own internal review of JFCOM's LAA. Although an acquisition contingency fund (program element) made up of research, development, technology, and evaluation (RDT&E) operations and maintenance and OP subheads available to USD(AT&L) to fund LAA approved projects might be an attractive interim course of action.
Question. What role should oversight officials from the Office of the USD(AT&L) play in the utilization of JFCOM’s acquisition authority?

Answer. While approval of LAA projects should remain the decision of Commander, JFCOM, USD(AT&L) should have a responsibility to arrange funding for the LAA projects and continue to perform an oversight role in ensuring JFCOM doesn’t violate acquisition regulations in the execution of the LAA mission.

DEFENSE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS

Question. The Department’s Science and Technology (S&T) programs are designed to support defense transformation goals and objectives. These programs are intended to ensure that warfighters—now and in the future—have superior and affordable technology to support their missions and to give them revolutionary war-winning capabilities.

Do you believe there is an adequate investment in innovative defense science to develop the capabilities the Department will need in the future?

Answer. It is my understanding that JFCOM has developed an excellent working relationship with DARPA over time; if confirmed, I intend to examine these issues more closely.

Question. Do you believe the Department’s investment strategy for S&T programs is correctly balanced between near-term and long-term needs?

Answer. This is an area where I plan to review and analyze more closely should I be confirmed.

Question. What is the role of JFCOM’s modeling and simulation program in development on new warfighting capabilities for DOD?

Answer. While JFCOM modeling and simulation (M&S) has focused on developing new warfighting capabilities, more importantly it has facilitated a more comprehensive understanding of the national and global security environment of the 21st century. It replicates the complexity and terrain of the security environment without placing soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in harms way. In addition, JFCOM M&S enables complete integration of the other key players in national security, such as multinational and interagency partners, with little attendant risk (politically and operationally). Distributed operations allow participants greater access to joint venues through the network, and from their home stations, thus driving down costs and encouraging participation.

The two major elements of JFCOM’s M&S enterprise are experimentation and training. M&S enables both in ways not even considered possible less than 10 years ago.

For experimentation, the case of urban resolve is instructive. The experiment modeled many of the situations we are facing in the urban environment today, and modeled situations we fear may materialize in the not too distant future. In this simulation-supported experiment, JFCOM was able to take dozens of looks at proposed solutions, and when something failed, reset and look again and again. Analysis took only weeks, and successfully capabilities transitioned to fielding programs within a few months.

For training, JFCOM manages the JNTC that integrates live forces (the principal training audience) with a virtual input from individual/team trainees operating simulators with constructive inputs from computerized models. Live-virtual-constructive inputs are all combined into a single operating picture that all the participants share.

Finally, M&S not only enables development of new warfighting capabilities, but constitutes a new, emerging warfighting capability in itself. Some of the M&S transformational capabilities that have already been fielded are operational applications of models developed for other reasons that are now being applied in planning, mission rehearsal, mission execution, and assessment in direct support of operators.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

Question. The Department’s efforts to quickly transition technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the last few years. Challenges remain to institutionalizing the transition of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons systems and platforms.

What are your views on the success of JFCOM programs in spiraling emerging technologies into use to confront evolving threats and to meet warfighter needs?

Answer. Service and defense agency efforts to provide new and emerging technologies to the warfighters have continued to improve during execution of the Global War on Terror. JFCOM has played a role in that effort with LAA. While the efforts to date are praiseworthy, challenges remain in the execution of all rapid acquisition efforts and transition of the provided capabilities to the units who will render life
cycle support to those capabilities. In all the efforts to get new technology into the hands of the warfighter, those providing the capability must not forget, in their earnestness, that training, logistics and life cycle support planning/execution are the true determination of how well any new technology will improve, over the long haul, the warfighter’s ability to effectively employ and sustain the capabilities these new technologies bring to our forces.

Question. Do you believe there are improvements that could be made to transition critical technologies more quickly to warfighters?

Answer. This is another one of those questions in which I must immerse myself if I am confirmed, because being outside Joint Forces Command until now hasn’t given me the familiarity I need to answer. Both the JROC and JFCOM LAA ensure that provided capabilities have a plan to sustain the provided capabilities brought by new technology to the battle space.

JOINT COMMAND AND CONTROL CAPABILITY PORTFOLIO MANAGER

Question. DOD recently assigned JFCOM the acquisition oversight role of Joint Command and Control (JC2) Capability Portfolio Manager. As you understand it, what does this responsibility entail and do you believe it is consistent with the overall JFCOM mission and funding levels?

Answer. As I understand it, the Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked JFCOM to manage a group of like capabilities—in this case, Joint Command and Control—across the DoD, to improve interoperability, minimize capability redundancies and gaps, and maximize capability effectiveness. He also asked that JFCOM integrate requirements/capabilities, acquisition and programmatic considerations across materiel and non-materiel (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF)) considerations. As such, it fits exactly within the overall JFCOM mission space. However, there may be a need to selectively expand this capability in the future.

Question. What do you see as the major challenges towards the development and deployment of joint, interoperable command, control, and communications systems?

Answer. Portfolio management is a truly transformational effort by the Department to apply common business rules to our warfighting enterprise. In essence, we say we fight in a joint, combined, and interagency environment that requires interoperable, scalable, net-enabled command and control and associated systems, but we design and procure these systems at the Service level, often independently from similar efforts in the other Services. That is the niche JFCOM fills. The command provides the joint, multinational, and interagency context and understanding that is by definition missing from the Services and it uses that knowledge to fill the critical joint gaps that exist in the individual Service C2 and associated DOTMLPF efforts.

END STRENGTH OF ACTIVE-DUTY FORCES

Question. What level of active-duty personnel (by Service) do you believe is required for current and anticipated missions?

Answer. This is not strictly a numbers game—the key is to find the right amount of capability and have an instituted process for effectively and efficiently employing it. Increasing the end strength of the Army and Marine Corps can add capability, but it is just one tool we can use to meet the demands of missions now and in the future.

Question. How would you assess the progress made to date by the Services in reducing the numbers of military personnel performing support functions through hiring of contractors or substitution of civilian employees?

Answer. The Services have made significant inroads into shifting duties from military personnel to contractors in the areas of combat operations and moving support work to government civilians in non-hostile areas around the globe. There are over 100,000 contractor personnel working in Iraq right now which have enabled the military to stay focused on the mission. Outside the conflict area, the government civilian community provides a wealth of manpower to fill support positions. The conversion of military to civilian billets is making good progress, however it is imperative that we not lose sight of the funds required to sustain this effort. We must also fund the continued development of our civilian workforce. There is a challenge with government civilians working in a combat zone and their pay incentives. These individuals do not receive the tax and pay benefits currently afforded uniformed military personnel. Given that we ask government civilians to volunteer for work in a combat zone, I would encourage Congress to examine government civilian compensation in a combat zone and enact legislation in support of deployed government civilians.
RELIANCE ON RESERVE COMPONENT

Question. The men and women of the Reserve component have performed superbly in meeting the diverse challenges of the global war on terrorism and have been greatly relied upon in Operations Noble Eagle, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom. The roles and missions that should be assigned to the Reserve Forces is a matter of ongoing study.

What missions do you consider appropriate for permanent assignment to the Reserve component?

Answer. Our Reserve Forces have demonstrated that with proper training and equipping they are capable of performing alongside their active counterparts in support of virtually any mission. I would not categorically constrain any mission to either the active or the Reserve components. I believe the National Guard should remain a dual-missioned force available for both State and Federal Support missions.

Question. What should the focus of JFCOM be in ensuring that Reserve Forces are trained and ready to participate effectively in joint operations?

Answer. My experience is our Reserve Forces operate equally with our Active-Duty Forces as an integral part of joint operations. The focus for Reserve Forces should be to prepare them to seamlessly participate effectively in joint operations alongside their Active duty counterparts, and coalition partners regardless of the mission. Joint Forces Command, along with the Services, should provide training for Reserve Forces in the same manner that they train Active-Duty Forces.

Question. The Department’s Training Transformation Implementation Plan of June 10, 2003, provides that the Department’s training program will benefit both the Active Duty and Reserve components.

If confirmed, how would you ensure that the Reserve and the National Guard benefit from the JNTC, a key component of the Training Transformation Implementation Plan?

Answer. I will stay actively engaged with the leaders of the Reserve components and JFCOM’s Component Commander to ensure all joint forces have an opportunity to benefit from the JNTC, appropriate to their mission. Together, we will continue to develop collaborative understanding of the joint enhancements required at key Reserve and National Guard training programs.

STABILITY AND SUPPORT OPERATIONS

Question. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have underscored the importance of planning and training for post-conflict stability and support operations. Increased emphasis has been placed on stability and support operations in DOD planning and guidance in order to achieve the goal of full integration across all DOD activities.

What is your assessment of the Department’s current emphasis on planning for post-conflict scenarios?

Answer. The Department has made great progress in the area of Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO) and has put emphasis on military planning for post-conflict scenarios. The Department’s efforts have helped to codify the best practices and procedures that the recent experiences have taught us. The Department has given a priority to military support to post-conflict planning and the conduct of stability and support operations comparable to that we have historically placed on preparations for major combat operations.

However, post-conflict operations require a whole of government effort. Typically during a crisis, those in military and civil service have come together with the best intentions and eventually respond in a unified manner. The lack of planning can make the initial efforts awkward, uncoordinated, and inefficient. The Department is an active participant in the executive branch’s efforts to improve the integration of U.S. Government efforts.

Question. How can the new directives on post-conflict planning and the conduct of stability and support operations be better implemented?

Answer. One of the most important ways to better implement the directives is to institutionalize and expand the Department’s efforts towards integrated whole of government planning. If confirmed as Commander, JFCOM, I will keep the emphasis on matters for which I am personally accountable such as:

- Capturing the joint lessons learned and improving our ability to share them with our interagency partners
- Developing joint concepts in collaboration with interagency partners
- Expanding joint exercises to include interagency partners in the event development and execution
Expanding joint training efforts to include interagency partners access and participation in exercises, courseware development and online distributed training

Integrating Interagency partners into Joint Command and Control solutions.

**Question.** What lessons do you believe the Department has learned from the experience of planning and training for post-conflict operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?

**Answer.** Most lessons learned from our experiences of planning and training for post-conflict operations is related to the importance of integrating our interagency and multinational partners. The integration issues emphasize the need to invest in:

- Defining the lead and supporting roles and responsibilities in the planning process
- Developing collaborative decisionmaking processes
- Developing compatible information systems to include interface controls, data sharing, and disclosure processes
- Expanding joint exercises to include interagency and multinational partners in the exercise scenario and objective development and execution.

**JOINT PERSONNEL RECOVERY AGENCY**

**Question.** In September 2004, the JFCOM Chief of Staff (MG James Soligan) issued a memorandum entitled, “Joint Personnel Recovery Agency Mission Guidance,” stating, in part, that “the use of resistance to interrogation knowledge for offensive purposes lies outside the roles and responsibilities of Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA),” and that “JPRA personnel will not conduct any activities or make any recommendations on offensive interrogation techniques or activities without specific approval from the JFCOM Commander, Deputy Commander, or the Chief of Staff.” The memorandum further noted that, “Deviations from the JPRA chartered mission of this nature are policy decisions that will be forwarded to OSD for action.”

If confirmed as Commander, JFCOM, would it be your intent that JPRA continue to operate within these policy guidelines?

**Answer.** Yes, I will ensure that JPRA continues to operate in these guidelines.

**NATO TRANSFORMATION**

**Question.** In their Summit Declaration issued at Riga, Latvia, in November 2006, the NATO Heads of State emphasized “the importance of continuing transformation of NATO’s capabilities and relationships.” They also endorsed the Comprehensive Political Guidance, which provides a framework and political direction for NATO’s transformation over the next 10 to 15 years.

What do you believe is the role of the SACT in bringing about the transformational change to NATO forces?

**Answer.** SACT is the commander responsible to the military committee for overall recommendations on transformation. In this capacity, he leads the transformation of NATO military structures, and capabilities and doctrines in order to improve the military effectiveness and interoperability of the Alliance. Of the two Strategic Commanders, SACT leads the defense planning process and in coordination with SACEUR, delivers a comprehensive and capabilities based Defense Requirements Review that identifies the Minimum Military Requirements in order to fulfill the Level of Ambition that NATO’s political leaders have set.

With respect to the transformational change to NATO forces, SACT’s role is to:

- Transform NATO’s military capabilities through a rigorous process supported by concept development, experimentation and a comprehensive training program.
- Work with SACEUR to continue to describe how NATO should conduct operations in the future and identify the associated required military capabilities.
- Respond to emerging operational requirements stemming from current operations thereby assisting SACEUR.
- Assist nations through the review of their individual national defense plans and reform efforts.

**Question.** If confirmed, what would be your priorities for meeting alliance capability requirements?

**Answer.** The Comprehensive Political Guidance provides a framework and political direction for NATO’s continuing transformation, and helps ACT focus its work in support of improving NATO’s ability to conduct operations and missions, and developing usable capabilities. If confirmed, my priorities for meeting Alliance capabilit-
ity requirements would focus on aiding the efforts to develop agile, expeditionary, interoperable and sustainable forces that can deploy quickly and operate in an unpredictable, asymmetric environment; support the improvement of deployability and sustainability of NATO forces, and information superiority. Furthermore, I will focus on specific capabilities in the field of training and education, which are also essential as ACT moves forward with NATO's transformation endeavor.

**Question.** What do you foresee as the major challenges to NATO transformation?

**Answer.** In current and future NATO missions, NATO headquarters and tactical operations are increasingly joint and will be a common denominator which will require need for interoperability and common standards at the lowest tactical levels. Increasingly, these NATO operations are alongside, and often include non-NATO nations and non-military actors. One of the main challenges will be to ensure that NATO possesses clear standards to ensure equipment interoperability and the right processes, capabilities and the validation and qualification tools to deliver the requisite training and education to ensure interoperability of tactics, techniques and procedures.

Other major challenges that I foresee to NATO transformation are:

- The delivery of timely transformational products to Allied Command Operations and the Nations that improve and transform the military forces.
- Advancing a clear and common understanding throughout the Alliance of military transformation and ACT's role in the process, and provide the appropriate resources to meet the associated requirements.
- Capturing the right lessons learned from NATO operations today, and implementing appropriate corrective actions so that we can provide increasingly effective capabilities for tomorrow's operations.

**Question.** It has been reported that NATO is reassessing the size and scope of the NRF, a central element of NATO's transformation efforts.

What is your assessment of the current capabilities of the NRF?

**Answer.** The NRF is based on a sound concept to deliver capable expeditionary forces and to assist in transforming our military capabilities to meet the security needs of the 21st century. The NRF achieved Full Operational Capability in November 2006. However, it has been reported lately that Nations are, at this stage, not in a position to meet the full demands of the force and hence cannot provide all required capabilities. The primary reason seems to be the current high operational tempo, including operations in Afghanistan and the Balkans that directly competes for forces and capabilities that might otherwise be available for the NRF. This situation however impairs the ability of the NRF to conduct the full range of its missions. The NRF as a vehicle for NATO transformation remains a solid premise and one that I shall support.

**Question.** What role do you believe the SACT can play in improving the capabilities of the NRF?

**Answer.** The NRF has been identified as a primary vehicle for transformation; besides being a credible force for expeditionary operations across the full spectrum of military operations. As such, it becomes the primary platform for improving and broadly incorporating enhanced capabilities such as Counter IED, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, and Fratricide Prevention equipment and procedures into Alliance forces so they are available to the warfighter. The rotation of NRF forces facilitates modernization and transformation of military forces across the alliance, and then NRF exercises incorporate, refine, and ensure joint and multinational interoperability to include doctrinal and structural changes.

Therefore, I believe that the vital role SACT plays, in cooperation and coordination with SACEUR, in improving the capabilities for the NRF follows:

- Ensuring that the NRF remains a key driver for enhancing interoperability within the Alliance, particularly through joint and combined education and training.
- Promoting the NRF as the fundamental vehicle for the incremental implementation and dissemination of new concepts and capabilities and the one that possess the ability to rapidly incorporate capability enhancements and implement them into national forces that are committed to expeditionary joint and combined operations.

**Question.** ACT is supported in its transformational efforts by a number of multinational COEs. Currently there are seven NATO-accredited COEs.

What do you believe is the proper role for COEs in supporting ACT's transformation mission?

**Answer.** While not part of NATO's command/manning structure, ACT can leverage some of the COE's expertise and products in support of the transformation mission. By looking to ACT for recommendations on annual work plans, the COEs can
be assured of a focus of effort complimentary to ACT and of benefit to the Alliance transformation efforts. Specifically, there should be a good synergy of effort with the Netherlands Command and Control, U.S. Combined Joint Operations from the Sea, German-Netherlands Civil Military Cooperation, and Czech Joint Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosive (CBRNE) COEs.

**JFCOM-ALLIED COMMAND TRANSFORMATION RELATIONSHIP**

**Question.** What do you believe is the proper relationship between JFCOM and ACT?

**Answer.** There is a great opportunity for synergy, collaboration and support between the two commands—and it is very much a two-way street that benefits both NATO and the U.S. The work being accomplished in the areas of Joint Experimentation and Joint Training directly complement similar efforts being undertaken by ACT. The expansion of the NATO/ISAF mission in Afghanistan has increased the frequency of cooperation between the two commands. Lesson learned in Afghanistan by NATO can be applicable for U.S forces in Iraq, the Horn of Africa, and as we stand up AFRICOM. The global war on terror and our enemy mandates that we continue to build and support the symbiotic relationship between the two commands. As NATO’s North American Strategic Command I believe the vision to place it in Norfolk alongside JFCOM was exactly correct. The co-location of NATO’s Transformation Command with JFCOM has already proven to be an invaluable resource to the militaries of all NATO countries, including the United States. I will push hard to ensure we are working to maximize this relationship especially in key areas of training, doctrine development, C2, intelligence fusion and dissemination, new capabilities and experimentation, and lessons learned and best practices. We will improve this effort as this relationship matures in the crucible of support to the warfighter.

**RESPONSES TO WMD THREATS AND NATURAL DISASTERS IN THE UNITED STATES**

**Question.** Deficiencies in the responses of Federal, State, and local agencies to Hurricane Katrina have generated debate about the appropriate role for military forces in responding to national crises.

**What do you see as the appropriate role for Commander, JFCOM; Commander, NORTHCOM; and the Governors and Adjutant Generals of each State and territory in responding to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) incidents within the United States?**

**Answer.** As Commander, JFCOM, has no AOR, JFCOM’s role is that of Joint Force Provider to Commander, NORTHCOM, or any other designated Supported Commander, following a WMD incident. JFCOM is tasked to provide forces requested by the Supported Commander and validated by the Joint Staff (SECDEF) in a timely manner. The Commander, JFCOM, does not generally provide forces to Governors or TAGs who have purview over their own State National Guard forces, however if those forces are Federalized by the President, they could be provided to the Supported Commander by the Commander, JFCOM. It is generally assumed that in case of a WMD incident the President would choose to use forces under title 10, but there is no guarantee of that eventuality. Should the response be limited to title 32 forces, JFCOM would have a limited role in the response.

**Question.** What is the appropriate role and response for Active-Duty Military Forces in supporting civil authorities in responding to natural and manmade disasters not involving WMD threats within the United States?

**Answer.** Active-Duty Military Forces are always ready and willing to give their help in recovering from disasters at home and have demonstrated that repeatedly in the past. Most recent examples are the Hurricane Katrina aftermath and the bridge collapse in Minnesota. DOD has always demonstrated an appropriately aggressive posture toward assistance, in support of a Lead Federal Agency (LFA) following a disaster, often deploying forces within hours of stated need.

**Question.** Hurricane Katrina has demonstrated the importance of joint and interagency training in preparation for support disaster operations.

**In your view, how could JFCOM influence joint and interagency training to enable better coordination and response for natural disaster operations?**

**Answer.** There are probably two high-impact approaches JFCOM can use to enable coordination and response during natural disaster operations: experimentation and best practices. The first discovers best practices, the second trains the entire interagency and non-governmental partners in those best practices.

The Noble Resolve series of experiments that JFCOM initiated this year brought together Federal, State, and local governments, commercial organizations, Department of Homeland Security and its subordinate agencies, all the Services,
NORTHCOM, U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), and subordinate operating forces, the National Guard Bureau, and the National Guards of Virginia, Oregon, Washington State, and Texas. These partnerships, and the progress they made in Noble Resolve on best practices and organizational structures for both natural and man-made disaster response, were very impressive and bode well for the future. This series needs to continue.

Multinational Experiment 5 does the same for international partners, and is informing EUCOM and AFRICOM on ways to integrate a whole of government and multinational approach to humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and preventing conflict in Africa.

Joint exercises spread the best practices identified in lessons learned and experimentation, and practically integrate Joint Forces and Interagency partners. Of the 13 priority exercises conducted in fiscal year 2007, 3 focused primarily on Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR) and Consequence Management or Foreign Consequence Management.

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION RESPONSE UNITS

Question. What role do you believe JFCOM should play in the training, assessment of readiness, and employment of units with WMD response missions, such as the WMD-Civil Support Teams and the CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF)?

Answer. JFCOM will assume expanded responsibilities in training and assessment for the National Guard centric CCMRF construct scheduled to initial operational capability in fiscal year 2009. JFCOM is tasked to ensure that Service training plans are in accordance with NORTHCOM joint mission-essential tasks (JMETs) for CCMRF units, which is a relatively new mission for JFCOM. JFCOM will also assess readiness against those JMETs and report that assessment to the SECDEF monthly and the Senior Readiness Oversight Council quarterly. JFCOM will not employ those units, but will provide them in a timely manner to a supported commander following SECDEF validation of a requirement.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, JFCOM, and SACT?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED

INDUSTRY ROLE IN NATO TRANSFORMATION

1. Senator Reed. General Mattis, the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed a number of methods by which industry helps shape and partner in efforts to transform military technology. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) participates in these types of outreach and partnership efforts in a number of venues. What role...
do you feel U.S. and European industry can play in shaping and accelerating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) transformation?

General Mattis. The U.S. Armed Forces have benefited greatly by close collaboration between the DOD and the defense industry in development and production of systems that have greater joint utility, but we still have much that needs to be done. Cooperative Research and Development Agreements have benefited both DOD and industry when it comes to developing new capabilities. This construct might also be used by NATO to advance transformational concepts and ideas. We’re hampered by too much proprietary development and production, and a lack of common and interoperable standards across the board. In this regard, properly constituted and safeguarded “reading rooms,” open to properly cleared persons, may permit government and industry to share advances and facilitate making open architectures for our new systems.

Certainly partnerships with industry, academia, and business are vital to modernizing NATO’s armed forces. JFCOM currently partners with Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in a number of areas. As Commander, JFCOM, and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, it is my intent to strengthen and institutionalize the bonds wherever possible. Additionally, ACT already has a close working relationship with NATO’s Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD), the NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG), and the NATO Research and Technology Board. ACT also has a close working relationship with NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency (NC3A) and the NATO Standardization Agency which facilitates transformation. Recently, NATO established the Defense Leaders Forum (DLF) which brings together the very best industry, academic, and business leaders to discuss and identify solutions for a variety of challenging issues. ACT is actively involved in the DLF and I’m eager to find ways to expand this participation in the future to accelerate transformation. Cooperation and collaboration among these organizations is absolutely essential in equipping NATO forces with the very best equipment available. Lastly, I look forward to learning more about these organizations and how they contribute to NATO transformation efforts.

2. Senator Reed. General Mattis, how would you seek to establish and improve ties between NATO’s transformation efforts and defense industry?

General Mattis. In an Alliance of 26 nations, all with their own vital national interests at stake and voting citizens who depend on jobs in their national defense industries, improving the flow of information across the Alliance and between nations and industries is a challenge. Clearly, there needs to be transparency in NATO’s dealings with industry and a refined focus on developing processes to share information with industries which are acceptable to all nations. This will provide an overarching framework for the Nations of NATO to cooperate with industry to accelerate transformation of our systems and processes.

This means that cooperation with industry should embrace the full spectrum of capability development to include:

- The early, exploratory stage of research and development where research is facilitated by a free exchange of ideas.
- At the informal level by promoting and leading informal networking to benefit from each other’s best practices, trends, and helping industry understand at different levels the Alliance’s perspective of the future.
- Down the road by recognizing that despite national interests, pooling of efforts can be beneficial in specific areas.
- Promote closer ties with the European Defense Agency.

BATTLEFIELD CASUALTIES

3. Senator Reed. General Mattis, in your future role at NATO, you must address the social, intellectual, and training dimensions of transformation. Many believe that a major driver in European defense policy discussions centers on casualty expectations and ways to reduce casualties, including technology-based and doctrinal approaches. What roles would you expect the concerns for casualties, both civil and military, to drive the willingness of NATO to commit forces and how will transformation affect such political processes and the resulting decisions?

General Mattis. Reducing casualties may be a major concern for any country, but especially those with a democratic form of government. Since NATO is an Alliance of 26 nations, one must contend with 26 separate political systems. Public support throughout the Alliance nations is undermined by fragile political consensus over intervention or by the impact of protracted involvement. This is complicated if pro-
tection measures appear to be insufficient for the forces, if military casualties are the result of fratricide incidents resulting from a clear lack of interoperability, or if opposing forces are allowed to win the strategic communication battle. There is no doubt casualties have impacted national politics and policies for some of NATO Allies, and of course national caveats restricting the forces of some nations from fully participating in combat operations have hindered NATO efforts in fighting the enemy.

Reducing the number of casualties on the battlefield is a top priority. My goal as Commander, ACT, will be to leverage existing and future technologies to reduce casualties on the battlefield wherever possible regardless of whether or not it impacts a nation’s decision to send military forces into combat. Transformation will affect the process by enhancing and adapting force protection to today’s environment, by reducing fratricide risks through interoperability improvements, by teaching NATO forces to adjust the use of force to the environment they are operating in, and by supporting information operations efforts.

But the primary method of reducing casualties, whether from enemy fires or fratricide, will seldom be technology based. Sound training of leadership, smooth information-sharing processes in headquarters staffed by officers who have mastered their warfighting skills, cohesive formations that have trained together and integrated their activities prior to entering the combat zone, and a shared appreciation of the enemy situation (from the strategic to the tactical/small unit level) will often be most fundamental to casualty reduction. We can embolden our allies if we develop a shared appreciation for the threat and ensure that we are doing everything possible, with technology and sound military training, to reduce casualties to absolute minimums.

4. Senator Reed. General Mattis, what institutions are in place within NATO to accelerate technological transformation?

General Mattis. I think clearly the establishment of ACT as one of the only two strategic commands in NATO was a monumental step. Other institutions are:
- NIAG is a subordinate organization of the CNAD and is a key link between the military, nations, and industry.
- CNAD and its five subordinate organizations
- NATO Research and Technology Organization
- NATO Standardization Organization and Standardization Committee or Standardization Agency

I look forward to working with the military committee and the Conference of National Armament Directors in official venues such as the DLF and ACT Industry Day conferences.

5. Senator Reed. General Mattis, what are their authorities and what are their responsibilities?

General Mattis. I cannot adequately answer this question at the present time since I have not had an opportunity to fully review the roles and missions of the aforementioned organizations. A full assessment of authorities and responsibilities that are present or that may be needed is on my agenda after I have taken command of ACT, and I welcome the opportunity to discuss this with Senator Reed once I'm more conversant on these complex issues.

6. Senator Reed. General Mattis, there is a great difficulty in doing away with NATO programs that no longer fit within the “transformed” strategic NATO capabilities. What ideas would you suggest in promoting ways to enable NATO to end investments in capabilities that no longer fit within the structure of a transformed organization?

General Mattis. I cannot adequately answer this question at the present time since I have not had an opportunity to review NATO’s List of Required Capabilities, the Long-Term Capability Requirements list or the Prioritized List of Capabilities Shortfalls. Nor have I been briefed on the results of the Defense Readiness Review process. However, one of my first steps as Commander, ACT, will be to conduct a review of these documents in coordination and consultation with Allied Command Operations and the Defense Review Committee. Programs that do not satisfy NATO capability requirements outlined by the Defense Review Committee or that are obsolete should be considered for termination. Since money is a finite resource it is important that NATO use its available resources as efficiently and wisely as possible. It is my responsibility to be a conscientious steward of NATO Euros and to ensure
NATO is getting the best return on its investment by producing the most effective capabilities possible.

As a preface to how I will approach this process of adapting/modernizing our forces, I will ensure that we rigorously define the military problem that needs to be solved—what desired accomplishment is not currently being achieved. By working with our NATO allies to sufficiently define the problem, we will better work together to divest irrelevant capabilities and create capabilities necessary for today and tomorrow’s security. Without first adequately defining the problems we face, no relevant modernization of our capabilities can be achieved.

Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins

National Guard Readiness

7. Senator Collins. General Mattis, I am concerned about the level of readiness of the National Guard for domestic and civil support missions. This year, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, General H. Steven Blum testified before the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves that “88 percent of the forces that are back here in the United States after having been deployed are very poorly equipped today in the Army National Guard.” A Government Accountability Office report that was also released this past year found that most State National Guard leaders have expressed concerns about having sufficient equipment to respond effectively to a large-scale disaster, whether natural or manmade. In addition, a March 2007 report by the congressionally chartered independent Commission on the National Guard and Reserves has found that many Army and Air National Guard units stationed in the United States are rated “not ready.” As the Joint Force Provider, what is your assessment today of the Guard’s current level of readiness to provide adequate support to civil authorities in the event of another catastrophic event like Hurricane Katrina?

General Mattis. I appreciate Lieutenant General Blum’s testimony and candor regarding the readiness of the National Guard. The high tempo of operations and demands of global war on terrorism have strained the Guard just as it has strained the Active component forces. Material readiness remains a considerable challenge for all of our forces; Active, Guard, and Reserve. In my role, as Joint Force Provider and Joint Force Trainer, I look forward to working with Lieutenant General Blum, the National Guard Bureau, and the Joint Staff in identifying and finding ways to improve joint training and readiness for National Guard units so they are capable of performing a wide range of missions.

Providing adequate resources to the National Guard is one way of ensuring they are properly equipped to perform their core missions. Requested supplemental appropriations are specifically intended to address material shortcomings, especially in Active Army and Army National Guard units. During the next fiscal year, particular attention is being paid to those National Guard units assigned to the Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High Yield Explosive Consequence Management Forces (CCMRF). Those units assigned to CCMRF missions will have priority with regard to equipment fielding. The increased equipping priority recognizes the importance of providing timely support to civil authorities following any disaster, whether natural or manmade. This increased readiness will assist Governors in their domestic efforts when they employ their National Guard as well.

As noted in the question, the challenges with equipping National Guard Forces are considerable; although, even when constrained by equipment shortfalls is still capable of responding to domestic disasters in support of State and Federal directives. Our job as senior leaders, both military and civilian, is to ensure that we provide the resources that enable our National Guardsmen to perform their duty effectively today and tomorrow when the call comes.

[The nomination reference of Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC, follows:]

Nomination Reference and Report

As in Executive Session,
Senate of the United States,
September 12, 2007.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
The following named officer for appointment to the grade of general in the United States Marine Corps while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To be General


[The biographical sketch of Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

RESUMÉ OF LT. GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC

Projected Rotation: 8 Nov. 2007.

Education/Oualifications:
Central Washington State University, BS, 1971
National War College, MS, 1994
The Basic School, 1972
Amphibious Warfare School, 1978
Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 1985
National War College, 1994
Capstone, 2001
JFLCC, 2004
Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 2006
Pinnacle, 2006
Infantry Officer
Joint Specialty Officer

Date of rank: 1 Jan. 2005.
Date of birth: 8 Sep. 1950.
MRD: 1 July 10.

Languages: None.

Commands:
Deputy Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force; and Commanding General, 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade (BGen: July 2001–July 2002).
Commanding Officer, 7th Marines, 1st Marine Division (Col.: June 1994–June 1996).
Commanding Officer, Recruiting Station Portland, OR (Maj: June 1985–Aug. 1988)

Joint assignments:
Executive Secretary, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Col: June 1996–June 1998).

Service staff assignments:

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee.
The form executed by Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC, in connection with his nomination follows:

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   James N. Mattis.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Commander, United States Joint Forces Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation.

3. Date of nomination:
   September 1, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   September 8, 1950; Pullman, WA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Single.

7. Names and ages of children:
   None.

8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
   None.

9. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   None.

10. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    Member of U.S. Naval Institute.
    Member of Marine Corps Association.

11. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the committee by the executive branch.
    None.

12. Commitment to testify before Senate committees: Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the administration in power?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–E are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

JAMES N. MATTIS, LT. GEN., USMC.

This 11th day of September, 2007.

[The nomination of Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, USMC, was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on September 27, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on September 28, 2007.]
NOMINATIONS OF HON. JOHN J. YOUNG, JR.,
TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS; HON. DOUGLAS A. BROOK TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER; AND MAJ. GEN. ROBERT L. SMOLEN, USAF, (RET.) TO BE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 4, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Levin, McCaskill, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Chambliss, and Thune.

Other Senators present: Senators Stevens and Inouye.

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff member; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; and Arun A. Seraphin, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member; Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Jessica L. Kingston, Ali Z. Pasha, and Brian F. Sebold.

Committee members’ assistants present: James Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon
I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Warner; Anthony J. Lazarski, Mark Powers, and Nathan Reese, assistants to Senator Inhofe; Todd Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions; Lindsey Neas, assistant to Senator Dole; and Stuart C. Mallory and Jason Van Beek, assistants to Senator Thune.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody.

The committee meets today to consider the nominations of John Young to be Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Doug Brook to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller; and Robert Smolen to be the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

Before I proceed with a brief introduction, I just want to give everybody the good, reassuring news that Senator Warner is doing just great. Many of us have checked in with his office, and everybody on this committee, everybody in the Senate, was worried about him, but I think our worries are over. The doctors have advised us, and this is as recently as the last few minutes when I checked with his office, that his heart is behaving; it’s probably behaving a lot better than he is, as a matter of fact. The expectation remains that he will be home over the weekend, and back at work next week. After talking to his office, I would not be surprised to see him leaving the hospital ahead of expectations. His wife, Jeanne, of course, is doing great, and she has been with him consistently, morning and night; and her being there is, I am sure, a big boost to him. So, we’ll start off with that good news this morning.

We welcome our nominees and their families to today’s hearing. We know the long hours that senior Department of Defense (DOD) officials put in every day. We appreciate the sacrifices that our nominees are willing to make to serve our country. They will not be alone in making these sacrifices, so we will thank, in advance, the families of our nominees for the support and assistance that we know that they will provide to our nominees, and that the nominees need.

I’d like to extend a particular welcome to Mr. Young, who is well known to this committee because of his service here in the Senate from 1993 to 2001 as a professional staff member for the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee. Mr. Young has come before us for confirmation twice before, once as the President’s nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, and once as the nominee to be the DOD’s Director of Defense Research and Engineering. He has served admirably in both capacities.

Later on, we will ask you, Mr. Young and the other nominees, to introduce members of your family, but we think we will hold off on doing that until each of you make your opening statements, so that I can call on Senator Inhofe and then Senator Stevens, who I know has a hectic schedule.

Mr. Young, if confirmed, will assume leadership of the DOD’s acquisition organization at a particularly difficult time. Far too many
of our major weapons acquisitions have been plagued by cost increases, late deliveries to the warfighters, and performance shortfalls. Earlier this year, the Department reported that 25 of its major defense acquisition programs had overruns of at least 50 percent. Since that time, the Department has added six more major weapons systems to that list. Over the last few years, we’ve seen an alarming lack of acquisition planning across the Department, the excessive use of time and materials contracts, undefinitized and other open-ended commitments of DOD funds, and a pervasive failure to perform contract oversight and management functions necessary to protect the taxpayers’ interest. The root cause of these and other problems in the defense acquisition system is our failure to maintain an acquisition workforce with the resources and skills needed to manage the Department’s acquisition system.

Earlier this year, the Acquisition Advisory Panel, chartered pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2004, reported that “The Federal Government does not have the capacity in its current acquisition workforce necessary to meet the demands that have been placed on it. The failure of the DOD, other Federal agencies, to adequately fund the acquisition workforce,” the panel concluded, “is penny wise and pound foolish, as it seriously undermines the pursuit of good value for the expenditure of public resources.”

Mr. Brook served as Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management in the first Bush administration, but he has another high qualification; he grew up in east Detroit. That’s just a few miles from where I live. He attended the University of Michigan, graduating with a bachelor of arts degree in 1965, and a master of public administration degree in 1967. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management, and Controller, Mr. Brook will face the challenge of balancing the demands of ongoing operations and current readiness against the acquisition programs important to the future of the Navy. He will also play a key role in modernizing the Navy’s business systems so that they can provide timely, accurate, and reliable financial information needed to manage the Department.

Finally, Mr. Smolen has served in the U.S. Air Force for more than 30 years, rising to command positions at Air Force Space Command, Pacific Air Forces, and Air Force Materiel Command. Mr. Smolen, if confirmed as Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, will be responsible for maintaining the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile without conducting nuclear testing. Many of those who have assisted in performing this function in the past are at or past retirement age. Attracting new scientists and engineers with the right skills to meet the challenges of maintaining the stockpile, retaining those with necessary expertise and experience, and making sure that the knowledge is passed down, will be an increasingly difficult challenge in the next few years.

Let me call, first, on Senator Inhofe. Then, Senator Stevens, we will call upon you. I understand Senator Inouye may also be coming. But let me first call on our acting ranking member, Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You’ve already adequately explained why Senator Warner isn’t here, and I do have his statement; I’d like to read just two sentences; and then put the entire statement in the record.

Chairman LEVIN. Please.

Senator INHOFE. In talking about the three nominees today, Senator Warner states, “I believe these nominees are excellent choices. I would like to further voice my unqualified support for their swift confirmation. I would also like to offer my thanks and gratitude to their families for their service and support.”

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

Mr Chairman, regrettably, I am unable to attend this hearing today to receive the nominations of John J. Young, Jr. to be Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; Douglas A. Brook to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller; and Robert L. Smolen, to be Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration. I believe these nominees are excellent choices, and I would like to further voice my unqualified support for their swift confirmation. I would also like to offer my thanks and gratitude to their families for their service and support.

Over his career, Mr. Young has established an outstanding record of service, working in a variety of posts in the government as well as in the private sector. Currently, Mr. Young serves as the Director, Defense Research and Engineering, a job he has held since 2005. In this position, Mr. Young overseas the $70 billion defense research enterprise, including the research laboratories of the armed services and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Prior to this, Mr. Young successfully served as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. In addition, as a former professional staff member of the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, he is well versed in the workings of Congress, particularly the committees which have jurisdiction over the armed services. I expect that this experience will be useful throughout his testimony today.

Mr. Young has had a distinguished public service career with over a decade of service to his country and I am pleased to offer my strong support for his nomination. He is eminently qualified to serve as Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

Likewise, Dr. Brook’s service as a professor of public policy and Director of the Center for Defense Management Reform at the Naval Post Graduate School make him uniquely qualified for the position of Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller.

Major General (Retired) Smolen will also bring a wealth of experience to his duties as the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration, including over three decades of service in the United States Air Force where he commanded at every level and served as the Director of the Air Force Office of Nuclear and Counterproliferation.

If confirmed by the Senate, I look forward to working together with these distinguished nominees to address the matters that currently confront our military during this challenging period in our history.

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, I have had a chance to get to know the nominees who are here today. I feel very good about them. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, each one has an excellent background and, I think they are qualified for the positions for which they are nominated.

Mr. Young, you joined the staff of the Senate Appropriations Committee from the private sector in 1993. You served from 2001 to 2005 as Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, and, in 2005, became the Director of Defense Engineering and Technology, DOD’s Chief Technology Officer. Earlier this year, you were assigned duties as Principal Deputy.
The diversity of your experience provides you with unique qualifications to build on your predecessor, promising initiatives and programs, as well as to meet the pressing demands that come with the position of the chief procurement officer for the DOD.

Mr. Brook served as Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management from 1990 to 1992. You have a wealth of experience in business, government, military service, as a Navy Reserve Supply Corps officer, and, most recently, in academia. We appreciate your willingness to leave your current position at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterrey, CA, and return to Washington to serve in a similar capacity with the Department of the Navy. I understand that Senator Warner introduced you at your last nomination hearing, in February 1990. I happened to be there at the time. I’m sure he would endorse you, as I said, in his opening statement.

Major General Smolen, your Air Force service since you were commissioned in 1974 is extraordinary. I would only say that, in all the accomplishments you’ve done, you conspicuously left off the most significant thing about your career, and that is your 2 years as wing commander at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma. So, without objection, I’d like his resume’ to include that, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]

The positions to which you have all been nominated are enormously important to our national security in the organizations in which you serve. The personnel you will lead are some of the most dedicated public servants in the Federal workforce, and I believe that you folks are qualified to do that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much.

We’re delighted to have Senator Stevens with us to introduce one of our nominees. I don’t know if there’s any higher praise that can be given to a nominee than what fellow staff members give to them, and our staffs are very, very high in their praise of you, Mr. Young. But, I think, if there is any higher praise, it would come from a Senator who knows you, perhaps, better than any other Member of the U.S. Senate, Senator Stevens.

STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ALASKA

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I’d ask that my statement be included in the record.

Chairman LEVIN. It will be.

[The prepared statement of Senator Stevens follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR TED STEVENS

It is an honor to introduce John Young to the committee today. I have known John for the past 16 years. From 1991 to 2001, he served as a staff member on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, which I co-chair with my good friend, Senator Dan Inouye. He is truly bipartisan in that he worked for both Senator Inouye and myself. John was a valuable member of our staff. He first came to our committee as a Congressional Fellow from Sandia National Labs. He became a professional staff member in 1993 and served as the staff analyst for a variety of Department of Defense (DOD) programs.

President Bush nominated John to serve as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition in 2001. He has proved in this role that
he is a skilled leader dedicated to ensuring our men and women in uniform have the resources they need to complete the mission.

John was instrumental in achieving significant improvements and efficiencies in Navy’s acquisition programs. He used innovative methods to achieve cost savings in a variety of programs which had a tremendous benefit to the Department of the Navy.

John’s success as Assistant Secretary led President Bush to nominate him to serve as Director of Defense Research and Engineering. He has served in that position for the past 2 years and achieved a series of major accomplishments related to his responsibilities. For example, John formed and guided a Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle Task Force at Secretary of Defense direction to ensure the successful and coordinated delivery of the maximum number of MRAP vehicles to deployed forces during calendar year 2007.

He led a DOD Energy Task Force which coordinated DOD efforts and developed new initiatives.

He coalesced and coordinated DOD efforts on Biometrics to ensure the program’s successful support of global war on terrorism operations, to gain greater collaboration across the components, and to engage the interagency process in DOD Biometric activities.

He published a DOD Science and Technology Strategic Plan.

I am confident that John will approach his new position with the same commitment and dedication he exhibited during his time as Assistant Secretary of the Navy and as Director of Defense Research and Engineering.

I join my co-chair and good friend, Senator Inouye, in supporting his nomination, and I urge the committee to act swiftly on this matter.

Thank you.

Senator STEVENS. You have each, members of the committee, mentioned his background. Let me add that he actually became a member of the Senate staff in 1991, when he came to us as a congressional fellow from the Sandia National Labs before we convinced him that he should join the staff of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee. I can tell you, without any question, that he’s a man of integrity, commitment, and, really, totally devoted to his position. He’s also a pretty good tennis player. With his help, I’ve been able to best Senator Warner. He won’t mind me mentioning that, because it’s not very often that that happens. [Laughter.]

Chairman LEVIN. We’ll notify Senator Warner of that.

Senator STEVENS. That’ll wake him up, that’s for sure. [Laughter.]

Senator INHOFE. That’ll get his heart going.

Senator STEVENS. He was Director of Defense Research and Engineering. He has been really outstanding in several ways. For instance, I’m not sure you know that he formed and guided the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle that we’re all so interested in, to ensure that it’s successful, and coordinated the delivery of the maximum number of MRAPs to be deployed in calendar year 2007. He led the DOD Energy Task Force, which has come up with several new initiatives. He coordinated the DOD efforts on biometrics, and above all, he has published a DOD Science and Technology (S&T) Strategic Plan.

He’s the right man for the right job. I tell you, I don’t know of any person that I have known in the time I have been with my good friend, Senator Inouye, as one of us has been chairman of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee since 1981, I think, of all the people that we’ve had who knew something about the DOD, and particularly in the area in which he is, really, very, very qualified, John Young has distinguished himself. So, we’re proud that he has been nominated for this position, and we hope that you’ll confirm him very rapidly.
It’s an honor to be here with him and his family. You’ll find he has two fine young baseball players to greet you today. Beyond that, he’s a good father.

So, I recommend him highly, and hope we’ll confirm him quickly. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator STEVENS. Senator Inouye will be along. The two of us have conducted our subcommittee in a manner that we are chairman and co-chairman. When I stepped out and Senator Inouye became chairman the first time, John Young remained in his position and worked for the whole committee. We have that type of subcommittee, and I do believe that you’ll find he is a man that’s committed to the DOD in a totally nonpartisan concept. He’s a man of his word.

Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Stevens. That is a very meaningful statement, indeed.

We’re going to ask our witnesses, now, the standard set of questions that we ask all of the nominees that come before us. You can answer together.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest? [All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process? [All three witnesses answered in the negative.]

Will you ensure that your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings? [All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests? [All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings? [All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify, upon request, before this committee? [All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly-constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good-faith delay or denial in providing such documents? [All three witnesses answered in the affirmative.]

We thank you all.

Why don’t we start with you, Mr. Young, with your opening statement. If you would, please introduce your family or friends that are with you, we’d love to meet them, as well.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN J. YOUNG, JR., TO BE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and distinguished members of the committee, actually, I thank you very much for that opportunity.

I would not be here today if it were not for the love and support of my wife, Barbara, my children, Nathan, William, and Kathryn. They have directly and indirectly contributed to my previous positions, and they will be a vital part of my ability to perform the duties of this position, if confirmed. My children were 10, 7, and 4 years old when they joined me for my first appearance before this committee. So, they do mark time for me, and, to some extent, for you.

First, I'm honored that President Bush, Secretary Gates, and Secretary England have extended me their confidence and support in nominating me to lead the defense acquisition team.

Chairman LEVIN. I wonder if we could interrupt you. I see that a dear friend of yours and ours has arrived, I know he wants to say a few words, and I know the kind of schedule he is keeping.

We indicated, Senator Inouye, that you would probably be able to get here, and I don't think Mr. Young would mind it one bit if we interrupt his opening comments so that you could add your introduction and support. Senator Stevens just also spoke.

So, let me interrupt you, Mr. Young, to welcome Senator Inouye.

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF HAWAII

Senator INOUYE. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin, Senator Inhofe, Senator Sessions, Senator Collins, I'm pleased to be here to introduce Mr. John Young, the President's nominee to be Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

As many of you will recall, on two occasions I've had the privilege of introducing Mr. Young to this committee as the President's nominee for positions within DOD. I'm pleased to again speak for him in this new position for which he has been nominated.

John Young left the committee to serve as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, and has been serving as the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. In both of these positions, he has earned high marks from senior leadership in DOD. These accomplishments are too numerous to list, but his tireless efforts to reform our business practices in shipbuilding, aircraft manufacturing, and weapons procurement are very well known to this committee and to the entire defense industry.

Mr. Young's long experience in acquisition matters for Congress, DOD, and the private sector make him uniquely equipped to become the next Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

Therefore, I am most pleased to reintroduce him to you formally, even though I know that many of you have gotten to know him over the past 16 years. I again recommend him to you without equivocation.
Mr. Chairman and members, he's a good person.
Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.
Senator INOUYE. He's my friend.
Chairman LEVIN. Nothing more needs to be said. Thank you so much, Senator Inouye for getting here.
Senator INOUYE. I thank you very much.
Congressional, John.
Mr. YOUNG. Senator, thank you so much.
Chairman LEVIN. Okay, Mr. Young, let us now return to you for your opening statement.
Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman.
I am honored that President Bush, Secretary Gates, and Secretary England have extended to me their confidence and support in nominating me to lead the defense acquisition team.
Second, I believe it is critical for the defense acquisition executive to serve with the affirmation of the United States Senate. Thus, I am very appreciative of the committee's efforts to schedule and conduct this confirmation hearing.
I'm also very grateful to Senator Inouye and Senator Stevens for their kind words of introduction. Their service to this Nation, their leadership, and their strong support for the men and women who serve our Nation provide a true example for me, and I have sought to constantly apply the principles I learned from these gentlemen.
I believe my experiences have well prepared me for this challenge. I have served almost 2 years as the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. I also had the privilege of serving for over 4 years as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. Prior to that, I worked for 10 years on the staff of the Senate, providing oversight and analysis of aircraft procurement accounts, as well as virtually all research, development, tests, and evaluation programs. Finally, I have worked in industry and at Sandia National Labs as an engineer and project manager. I believe that the breadth, depth, and relevance of these experiences will allow me to effectively serve as the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, if confirmed.
I believe strongly in the capability and dedication of the defense acquisition team. However, I also believe that we need to make a number of course corrections to improve our performance. Our past efforts have delivered tremendous weapons systems and remarkable capability; however, the cost growth the Department has experienced represents a detrimental lost opportunity to procure greater quantities or additional new systems and capabilities. We must seek to deliver systems within the budget in order to avoid cutting healthy programs or to allow the acquisition team to deliver greater capability in other areas.
We need to take a more active role in engaging the requirements process, as the acquisition team. We must mature technologies before moving into the costly final phases of development. We must seek jointness and interoperability, irrespective of service programs and budgets. We have to provide a robust set of tools for the men and women who have volunteered to protect and defend this Nation's freedom.
If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with this committee and Congress. I assure you that I will work with determination to make these course corrections.

I would offer my thanks to each of you for your support of every member of the DOD team, and I appreciate the chance to appear before the committee today.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Mr. Young.

General Smolen.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. ROBERT L. SMOLEN, USAF, (RET.),
TO BE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

General Smolen. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, distinguished members of the committee, I am both humbled and honored to be the President’s nominee for the position of Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs at the Department of Energy’s (DOE) NNSA.

First, I appreciate the confidence placed in me by Secretary Bodman, and also by the NNSA Administrator, Tom D’Agostino.

If confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure the safe and efficient operations of the nuclear weapons complex while preparing NNSA’s Defense Programs for the future to better meet the needs of the 21st century.

I’d like to take this time, sir, to introduce my wife, Andree. She has really been the Rock of Gibraltar through 33 years worth of military service and more moves than I can stand. I certainly appreciate her willingness to allow me to, again, hopefully, continue to serve this great Nation.

I have three adult children. They’re spread out all over, and, unfortunately, are unable to be here today, but I also want to thank them for the support they’ve given me throughout the years, and their understanding.

As I began to think about my retirement from the Air Force, which was just a couple of months ago, I originally thought that perhaps I would pursue employment outside of government, and I really hadn’t contemplated anything of the nature of the job that I am coming to talk to you about. I’ve always been a big believer in public service, obviously. When the phone rang, and I was asked if I would like to be considered for this position, I simply believed it to be an extension of my service to the Nation in uniform, and I knew instantly that I wanted to pursue this challenge. I believe, if confirmed, that I will continue to make a difference by building on this lifetime of service. Nothing has made me prouder than serving my Nation, with 33 years of military service, the last 10 of which I was closely involved in operational nuclear issues within the Air Force. Prior to my last assignment, which was the Commander of the Air Force District of Washington, I served first as the Deputy Director of Air Force Nuclear and Counterproliferation, and later as the director of that office, before going over to the White House, where I was the Director of Strategic Capabilities Policy that encompassed all of the nuclear programs, as well.

Prior to that, as Senator Inhofe mentioned, I had a number of opportunities to command, one of which was at Tinker Air Force Base. I have commanded at the squadron group wing and major command level.
I trust that the background that I have demonstrates that I can appropriately be qualified to be the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs; and to enhance my knowledge and expertise, if confirmed, I plan to immediately engage with those people who can help me better understand the complexities of the issues and prioritize the challenges before NNSA’s defense programs. This will include meeting with staff and managers in key parts of the program, both at headquarters and in the field, along with NNSA’s and DOE’s management, their key partners, such as the DOD and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, and Congress, as well.

As a result of dramatic improvements in procedures, tools, and policies, just this week, NNSA announced that they increased the rate of nuclear weapon dismantlements for fiscal year 2007 by 146 percent over last year’s level. They are ensuring that these weapons can no longer be used again, and thus, demonstrating that the United States is serious about nonproliferation leadership role in the global community. I’m also equally proud of the steps taken to fulfill the President’s direction to reduce the stockpile to nearly one-half by 2012, compared to the 2001 levels.

I’m encouraged by NNSA’s future plans to transform and reduce the nuclear weapons stockpile and develop a supporting infrastructure that is more modern, smaller, efficient, and more secure to meet the challenges of tomorrow. I support the ongoing studies to evaluate whether we should pursue a strategy of reliable replacement to our cold war nuclear warheads. These studies will allow NNSA to gather the data necessary for this and subsequent administrations, in consultation with Congress, to make decisions on our nuclear weapon stockpile.

In addition to the contribution of NNSA’s dismantlement efforts, the reliable replacement strategy also offers positive implications for our nonproliferation objectives. The reduced possibility of the need to conduct underground tests to diagnose or remedy a stockpile reliability problem will bolster efforts to dissuade other countries from testing.

If confirmed as the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, I will draw upon over 30 years of service in national security matters to provide continued sound leadership for the men and women of NNSA who work so hard on these critical missions. With your approval, it would be my great privilege to continue my career of service with NNSA.

I thank you very much for allowing me to be here today to be able to address, and for your consideration for this important position.

Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General.

Dr. Brook?

STATEMENT OF HON. DOUGLAS A. BROOK TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER

Dr. Brook. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appreciate very much your scheduling this hearing today to consider my nomination. I am, similarly, honored that the President, the Secretary of
Defense, and the Secretary of the Navy have put forth my nomination, and that I have the opportunity to appear before you today.

I'm accompanied today by my wife, Mariana, seated behind me. We've been married for 33 years. Mariana is a native of Charlotte, NC, and we currently live in Pacific Grove, CA. Seated next to Mariana is Professor Cynthia King. Dr. King is a colleague of mine at the Naval Postgraduate School, and I'm gratified at the support that I have from the President, the Provost, the Dean, and my faculty colleagues at the Naval Postgraduate School.

Mr. Chairman, it was 17 years ago that I last appeared before this committee in the capacity of a nominee. I believe you were a member of the committee, Mr. Chairman, as were some other of your colleagues. At that time, Senator Warner presented me, as Senator Inhofe mentioned, as a nominee for Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management. I now find myself before you today as the nominee to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management.

If I recall correctly, at that hearing 17 years ago, I pledged to the committee that, if confirmed, I would work, to the best of my ability, to meet my responsibilities under title 10, and to exercise responsible leadership over the financial operations of the Army.

Today, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I make that same pledge to you. If confirmed, I will work, to the best of my ability, to fulfill my duties under title 10 and exercise responsible leadership over the financial operations of the Department of the Navy.

Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for considering my nomination. I am pleased to respond to your questions or comments, and to hear your advice and concerns.

Chairman Levin. Okay. We're going to try an 8-minute first round of questioning.

Mr. Young, let me start with you. As you mentioned, and I mentioned in my opening statement, we have a large number of major defense acquisition programs that have exceeded their cost estimates by significant amounts. In January 2007, it was reported that of the 25 defense acquisition programs that did exceed their estimate by that amount, 8 were in the Army, 8 in the Navy, and 9 in the Air Force. Another six have exceeded their critical cost-growth threshold since then. Why is it, do you think, that so many of our programs are so far over budget?

Mr. Young. I believe, sir, there are, unfortunately, a number of factors in it. One, our budget process seeks to make, in some cases, optimistic estimates about what it will cost to develop a system and how much time it will take to deliver that system. Then, we frequently set the requirements bar optimistically high, in hopes that the technology will come in a timely way to meet that requirement. When all those forces collide, you end up with an optimistic schedule, excessive requirements, and not enough funding. Then, you get in a spiral where the programs take longer and cost significantly more. The decisions you make along the way are suboptimal. It would be my hope to do a much better job of structuring programs to realistic requirements, realistic schedules, and as realistic as possible an estimate of the budget it will take to do that, and then manage those carefully. Programs have to be managed as a contact
sport, and I think, as you said, Mr. Chairman, we probably need to look hard at making sure we have adequate talent in the DOD to manage those programs.

Chairman Levin. One of the shifts that has occurred over time, Mr. Young, is that the DOD now spends more for the acquisition of services than it does for products, including major weapons systems. Yet, the DOD Inspector General (IG) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) have reported that the Department consistently fails to conduct required acquisition planning and contract oversight functions for its service contracts. So, the GAO now is reporting that the DOD is “ill-positioned to determine whether it is getting what it pays for under these service contracts.” Can you tell us what steps you think you might be able to take, when confirmed, to ensure that the taxpayers are getting their money’s worth from the $100 billion-plus that the DOD spends every year on contracting for services?

Mr. Young. Yes, Mr. Chairman, there are efforts underway now to develop a consistent set of policies across the DOD for acquiring services and to coordinate the purchases of procurements between the services, and then, wherever possible, use competition as the driving force to help improve the value we get. Then we have to take steps to increase, as you’ve said, our oversight of those contracts. I will push in all of those areas to improve our acquisition of services.

Chairman Levin. Last week, the Congress Daily reported that the Army is currently unable to take delivery of more than 1,000 badly-needed family of medium tactical vehicles (FMTV) trucks, because the commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) parts in the truck’s engine and transmissions contain specialty metals that don’t comply with the Berry Amendment. Until this issue is addressed, the DOD will reportedly be unable to accept 2,200 trucks that are now under contract, or to order any additional trucks from that contractor. Now, there’s a rule, being currently considered by the DOD, which is called a COTS waiver, that would enable it to accept delivery of the FMTVs and other similar systems which contain these small amounts, presumably inadvertently, of COTS items. Do you know, offhand, the status of that rulemaking? How quickly would you hope that the DOD can address this problem?

Mr. Young. I tried to get the status of this in preparation for the hearing, sir, and we have been able to accept a portion of those vehicles under the COTS waiver you talked about, because the law was changed, and the change in the law has affected it. We were building trucks in stride, and the law changed. Some of those trucks we have now been able to accept with a COTS waiver. For another portion of the trucks, in new orders, we have to take additional steps. I believe there’s a determination of nonavailability that will help us continue procuring the trucks that the military must have.

Chairman Levin. Okay.

Dr. Brook, let me ask you a few questions now. The DOD has been working, over the last 6 years, to develop a business enterprise architecture to ensure that its business systems work in a coordinated manner to provide timely, accurate, and reliable information to the managers of the DOD. Unfortunately, the Comptroller
General has reported that the enterprise architectures of the military departments are not mature enough to responsibly guide and constrain investment in business systems. According to the GAO, the Navy has fully satisfied only 10 of the 31 core framework elements of an enterprise architecture. Are you familiar with this problem? If so, what would be your plans to address it?

Dr. Brook. I am not familiar with the details of the problem, but I sympathize with the statements of the Comptroller General. This has been a difficult undertaking for the DOD over many years, to conduct systems modernization and get to the desired goal. I'm not sure what the Comptroller General means, completely, when he talks about the maturity of systems modernization, but, if confirmed, I would consider that to be part of my responsibilities to look into, and I will look forward to working with you on that topic, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Would you, when you're confirmed, get back to us after you've had a chance to review that issue? Let us know what steps are being taken.

Dr. Brook. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

Developing a business Enterprise Architecture for an organization as large and diverse as the Department of the Navy is a complex task. Having been recently confirmed, I will provide my written response to your office in January 2008 giving me the opportunity to thoroughly review details associated with this issue.

Chairman Levin. Over the last several years, the DOD has taken a number of steps to realign its management structure to expedite and enhance its business transformation efforts. The DOD established a new Defense Business Systems Management Committee, the Business Transformation Agency, and Investment Review Boards. The military departments do not appear to have taken similar organizational steps, and decisionmaking remains stovepiped in separate chains of command for financial management, information technology management, acquisition management, and other functions. Do you believe, Dr. Brook, that the organizational structure of the Department of the Navy is properly aligned to bring about business systems modernization and financial management improvements? If not, what steps do you plan on taking, if you're familiar enough to share those with us?

Dr. Brook. Senator, I'm not entirely sure that the Department of the Navy's governance structure for business management reform is aligned with DOD, and I need more information in order to respond intelligently toward that.

I do see that the DOD has, as you've mentioned, been evolving different organizations and different alignments for governance and implementation of business systems reform, and it seems to me that if the Services, including the Navy, perceive stability at the DOD level, it should follow suit with their own organizational alignment.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Senator Inhofe.

Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Back, many years ago, at the first confirmation hearing of Secretary Rumsfeld, I was pointing out some problems, as I saw it, because the people of America have the expectation that we would
have the best of everything, and I am just contending that we did not. So, in pursuing this with Secretary Rumsfeld, I said, “all the generals get together, and they’re going to decide, what are we going to need 10 years from now?” and they’re going to be wrong. I’ve said, several times, Mr. Chairman, when I was in the House Armed Services Committee, we had someone, in 1994, testify that in 10 years we wouldn’t need ground troops. So, I said, “Well, how do you resolve the problem?” He said, “Well, for the entire 20th century, the defense spending was 5.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). After the drawdown of the 1990s, it went down to 2.7 percent.” Now, unfortunately, when something happens, and then you get into a war, you have to spend money on the things that are bleeding the most, and quite often, that’s not S&T.

According to a recent press report, you recently sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense in which you assess current spending of defense S&T as inadequate to keep pace with emerging threats. The report concluded that the Pentagon has been “coasting on basic science investments of the last century and noted that major corporations have disestablished science centers and research labs.” You concluded, “The reality is that the DOD is the predominant source of funds pursuing basic and applied research in the physical sciences.” I guess the question would be, are you concerned about the adequacy of the current investment in S&T? What would you do to improve it?

Mr. Young. I think, Senator, I offer a couple of answers. Behind some of the context of that report and that memo is the fact that S&T spending today in the DOD, on a historical basis, going back 25 years, is at roughly its highest level that it’s been. In constant-dollar terms, we have a very high level of S&T spending, presently.

To be fair, Secretary Gates asked me to offer him ideas about the health of the S&T programs in areas where we can make investments. I believe the S&T program could be more robust, because we now find ourselves with new challenges. The S&T program, that is healthy now, was largely defined, while it’s not totally true; we’ve made adjustments, but a lot of it was defined by adversaries we expected to face on more conventional battlefields. Today, as you know very well, the global war on terrorism is facing unconventional adversaries on unconventional battlefields, and that demands new investments in other areas. So, I do believe there are some demands to investigate new technologies that could help us in the warfare we’ll face in the future, and that that suggests we have to make adjustments in S&T.

Senator Inhofe. Yes, well, don’t get me wrong, I agree with you. I would have probably given the same report. It goes beyond just S&T. So, I guess what I’d ask of you and everyone here is, as we go through the budget process, we be totally upfront with each other and make sure that you do have what is going to be necessary to meet these needs.

In a similar line, I’d ask General Smolen and Secretary Young the same thing. As noted by the National Research Council in their report, “Rising Above the Gathering Storm,” U.S. advantages in S&T have begun to erode. The United States is producing fewer scientists and engineers than our economic competitors, such as India and China. We all know this is true, and that this is not
something that you can correct from your position that I hope you’ll be assuming. But we can look at our laws as they are right now, in terms of recruiting people. It bothers me when I see India and China and other countries cranking out more scientists than we do. Do you have any thoughts on how to correct this problem? I assume you agree it’s a problem. Either one of you.

Mr. Young. For my part, Senator, I absolutely do. I inherited, I did not create, a problem called the National Defense Education Program, where we reach out and recruit young graduate-school-level engineers. I’ve doubled, in 2006, or in 2007, and doubled again in 2008, the funding for that program, with the support of the Secretary and the Deputy. We’ve also taken on expansion of that program into the high school level to get kids interested in math and science early, so they do become engineers. Then, beyond that, I’m very interested in doing something that I think addresses the chairman’s questions, and that is, we mature technology by building prototypes. In years past, we built a lot of prototypes. We need to do that to mature technology, help us control costs. That very process, I believe, will inspire a lot of young people to come and work on DOD issues.

Senator Inhofe. What do you think, Dr. Brook? Because you deal with the postgraduate group out there. Do you have any ideas you want to share with us?

Dr. Brook. No, sir, I don’t. I’m in the business school there and on most campuses there’s a wide gulf between the business school and the engineering school.

Senator Inhofe. We seem to be getting enough lawyers. [Laughter.]

It seems like—well, anyway.

Chairman Levin. Your time is up. [Laughter.]

Senator Inhofe. No, it’s not. Almost. [Laughter.]

Let me ask you this question, then, if I could, Dr. Brook. The committee is encouraged by the DOD efforts to modernize its financial management systems and accountability. The creation of the Business Transformation Agency within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and annual detailed enterprise transition plans are positive signs toward the DOD getting its financial house in order. Now, I ask, if you are confirmed, what priority would you assign to the review of the Navy’s enterprise transition plan contributions and its financial management modernization?

Dr. Brook. Senator, that would be a very high priority of mine. That’s an area of specific interest for me, to see that the financial management systems of the Department of the Navy are improved. If confirmed, I will spend a great deal of attention on that.

I think that the creation of the Defense Business Transformation Agency, as you mentioned, is a significant step in trying to institutionalize the efforts inside the DOD to drive these reforms. If confirmed, I’d look forward to participating in that effort.

Senator Inhofe. All right. I think that the chairman kind of talked, but not directly, about the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) program; or I think it’s pronounced “dime-ers.” I’d like to have your comments as to your support of the full implementation of that program.
Dr. Brook. Senator, I am only vaguely aware that the DIMHRS initiative is underway. I understand it’s a way to merge personnel management and pay in a system, but I don’t know any of the details on that. I’m not able to comment.

Senator Inhofe. All right.

Well, my time is expired. I would ask Kathryn if she wants to say anything about her daddy. [Laughter.]

No. Okay, that’s fine. [Laughter.]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.

Senator McCaskill.

Senator McCaskill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Welcome to all of you, and thank you for your service.

One of the things I’ve struggled with since I began trying to track financial accountability within the DOD is figuring out who to blame. It’s really hard to figure out who to blame when something goes terribly wrong and taxpayer money is wasted at unprecedented levels, because of the way this whole thing is set up.

Mr. Young, what I would ask you is, who should be blamed? If you’re aware, I would love to hear, has there ever been, that you know, any military commander who has lost a promotion or who has been demoted, or anyone who has been fired, for failure to oversee a contract appropriately, or failure to definitize a contract appropriately, or failure to track the monitoring of a contract appropriately, since you’ve been at the DOD? Are you aware of anyone who has ever been demoted or denied a promotion or fired over their failure to hold the people in the DOD and in the military accountable for the way they spend money?

Mr. Young. Yes, Senator, I’m aware of a few instances where people were disciplined in those manners because of the failure of a program to achieve success.

Senator McCaskill. Let me ask you, specifically, at what point in time will it get to your desk? Like the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract, for example, at what point in time will it get to your desk? When we hit 10 billion of undefinitized contract? When we hit 15 billion? We came in at 20 billion, in 1 year, of an undefinitized contract that was cost-plus. At what point in time does it get to your level, and you say, “Wait a minute, something is not right here”? Mr. Young. As you’re probably aware, there are defined thresholds for acquisition-category programs, several hundred million dollars of research and development (R&D) or higher amounts for the procurement account, which guarantee I have a voice in the milestone decision process for those programs. It is my hope though to pursue those programs and get the team to pursue those programs with the kind of discipline I think you are seeking to demand.

Senator McCaskill. Did the LOGCAP program get to your predecessor’s desk? Did that contract get to that desk?

Mr. Young. I’m not sure I can answer that question. I wasn’t part of those discussions, but I believe, from memory, that he did participate in, certainly, defining the acquisition strategies for the new LOGCAP contract.
Senator McCaskill. If you wouldn’t mind getting back to me as to if it ever got to your predecessor’s desk, and if so, when it got to your predecessor’s desk? That’s part of my problem.

[The information referred to follows:]

In general, the Department’s approach to the management of contracts, including undefinitized contract actions (UCAs), is to apply a common policy and rely on decentralized execution of that policy. The Department’s policy on UCAs is derived from 10 U.S.C. 2326, and it is implemented in Department of Defense (DOD) Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Subpart 217.74, which applies to all DOD components.

Contracting officers must obtain the approval of the head of the contracting activity before entering into any UCA or changing the scope of an UCA after performance has already begun. The DFARS requires UCAs to be definitized within 180 days. Not more than 50 percent of the predefinitization not to exceed price may be obligated prior to definitization, unless the contractor submits a qualifying proposal before that 50 percent has been reached. In that case, no more than 75 percent may be obligated before definitization. A request to waive these limitations must go to the head of the agency (e.g., the Secretary of the Army or designee for an Army UCA), and no waiver may be authorized except to support a contingency operation, a humanitarian operation, or a peacekeeping operation.

Presently, nothing in law, policy, or regulation requires the head of a contracting activity to notify higher authority regarding the approval of a UCA or the head of an agency to notify the Office of the Secretary of Defense regarding a waiver needed to support a contingency operation, a humanitarian operation, or a peacekeeping operation. However, in fiscal year 2008, the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy will be working in consultation with me to develop updated policy guidance for the implementation and enforcement of requirements applicable to UCAs.

Given the estimated size of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program IV, it is my understanding that the planned program acquisition strategy was reviewed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff in July 2006 and subsequently discussed with Mr. Krieg, the then Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

Senator McCaskill. I mean, you have to understand that, when I was in Iraq, and they put up a PowerPoint slide of the LOGCAP contract and the slide went from 20 billion 1 year, to 15 billion down, and I kept waiting for them to say to me, “This is the great work we did,” and then the woman who was making the presentation in Baghdad said to me, “The difference between the 20 billion and the 15 billion was a fluke.” Well, when we have a $5-billion fluke, we have a real problem, in terms of oversight and accountability, in terms of the way these contracts are being managed.

Let me go to another subject, briefly, contractors overseeing contractors, lead system integrators (LSI). I think that, you know the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a good example of where an LSI obviously didn’t work. I know we have an LSI with Future Combat Systems. This idea that the contractors are watching contractors, and, particularly, we’ve seen examples where contractors are watching contractors within cost-plus contracts. So, let me see, we hire someone to do something, and then they get to make money off the fact that they’re going to hire somebody else to do it and watch them. I don’t think that’s what was envisioned, in terms of a cost-plus contract; a contractor hiring a contractor who may hire a contractor, and then the contractor at the top is making a cut off every single one, and we’ve exponentially increased the cost of the contract for the American taxpayer. I know you’ve been involved in the littoral “problem,” I will gently call it. I think I could call it
something much more colorful. But if you would comment about this phenomenon.

Mr. Young. Senator, I share your concerns about that, and I believe those strategies, to use LSIs, have to be considered very carefully. The best example I can tell you is that, with Secretary England’s support, in the Navy, we essentially reversed that structure in the DD(X) destroyer program, because there was a fee-on-fee, as we call it, issue, and we didn’t think we were getting the best value for the taxpayer’s dollar. So, I think those strategies have to be considered carefully, and their use will be more rare, in my view, unless it’s well justified.

Senator McCaskill. I’m aware of that, and I’m encouraged by it. We actually, as we say, changed the course of the ship, which is great.

Finally, let me ask you about IG and auditing resources. If you look at the growth, in terms of the acquisition budget over the last 10 years, if you make the assumption that DOD had the right number of auditors and investigators and acquisition personnel prior to this growth, then a pretty strong case can be made that you don’t have enough. Now, having said that, we’ve done a global calculation of around 20,000 people that work in DOD in some form of auditing or investigations, and I’m looking for that work product of 20,000 people, and I’m searching it out, and I’m going to continue to search it out, because it’s not immediately transparent to the public where that work product is. I think there’s a whole lot of circle-the-wagons that go on. I did not realize that the IGs within the active military are not truly what we think of as IGs. They don’t report outside, they just go up the chain of command, and try to help their commander. They’re not providing transparency to the public. Are you going to push for additional acquisition personnel or auditing personnel or IG personnel as part of your tenure?

Mr. Young. Senator, I actually had a chance to have a discussion with the chairman yesterday about the fact that we have legislative restrictions, which I believe this committee is dealing with, that I hope the committee will succeed to give us the flexibility to possibly add resources in acquisition personnel, contracting personnel, and audit personnel. The best example I can give you, or an anecdotal piece of data, is, since 2001, the Defense Contract Management Agency has actually been reduced from 12,100 to 9,700 people. In the early 1980s, there were twice as many as those numbers. So, in light of the instances you cited, the procurement budget’s gone up to $100 billion, and the R&D budget has gone up substantially. It seems we’re going to have to apply more resources here to get effective oversight.

Senator McCaskill. Mr. Chairman, I would certainly want to help with that, because I think what’s happened is, if it’s a new system, or if it’s something that people want to fight for, for their home district, we’re more than willing to write as big a check as we’re asked to write. But somehow we have artificially put constraints upon the level of personnel that are watching these dollars, and there is no way we can expect them to do the work that taxpayers expect if we’re throwing all the money at them that they ask for, in terms of operational funds, but we will not allow them
to have sufficient personnel to watch the way we're spending that money. We're cutting off our nose to spite our face.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Levin. Senator McCaskill, just, on that point, what Mr. Young was referring to is a couple of provisions in our bill, that will be going out at conference, which address the two issues. One is a cap, which was put on the number of personnel, which Congress placed. So, when you ask who's to blame, in terms of the reductions in the personnel in acquisition, we have the share of our responsibility.

Senator McCaskill. I wasn't here. No, just kidding. [Laughter.] That was a joke.

Chairman Levin. It's a fair comment. Those of us who were here, the administration at the time, carry a share of responsibility. There were some debates on that issue, by the way. I haven't gone back to reconstruct those debates, but that was not done without transparency. That was a debated item; should we reduce the number of personnel? That's one thing. We're going to take that cap off, or we're going to change that cap, in our bill.

Second, there was an artificial limit on the number of acquisition personnel. We have a lot more acquisition going on, but we have the same number of people, and we've made a change in that in our bill, as well.

Senator McCaskill. That's great.

Chairman Levin. We are very aware and active, in terms of our efforts, this year, to try to get more folks involved in acquisition oversight.

So, there are two things, specifically in the bill going to conference, which will address the issue which you very properly raise, and which you're so familiar with. Hopefully, in conference we'll be able to persuade the House that our course is the correct course. I'm not familiar with what they've done, they may have similar provisions, I don't know. If not, hopefully you can, and I know you will, weigh in on that subject at conference.

Senator McCaskill. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.

Senator Thune.

Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to also extend a welcome to each of you gentlemen, and thank you for your willingness to serve your country, and to your families, who also make great sacrifice in that regard. We appreciate their willingness to be a part and be involved in public service, as well.

Mr. Young, I want to get on a line of questioning here dealing with a recommendation in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). In the last QDR, the Air Force set a goal of increasing long-range strike capability by 50 percent by 2025. That is a goal which I welcome. Our current bomber fleet is performing exceedingly well in both Afghanistan and Iraq; however, I am concerned that we are heading toward a gap in our long-range strike capability. The United States hasn't built a new bomber since 1997. To compound the problem, we have advanced surface-to-air missiles that are being proliferated worldwide, which are creating formidable air defenses. As we saw in Turkey during the invasion of Iraq, we can't
always count on nations to allow us to launch attacks on our enemy from close range. While the F–22 and F–35 have excellent stealth capability, they will not, for example, be able to fly from Diego Garcia to a target thousands of miles away with limited fuel supply and limited payload to strike a target as effectively as a B–1 or a B–2 or a B–52.

Early this year, the Air Force released the long-range strike white paper. The white paper quotes that a procurement spike for the next-generation long-range strike platform is expected to begin in 2011. As the DOD builds the fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2015 program objectives memorandum, are you going to support the proposed 2011 funding spike for the next-generation platform?

Mr. YOUNG. Senator, I'd certainly support the goal outlined by the QDR. Within that, though, I expect to work hard with the Air Force and on behalf of the DOD to make sure we set the requirements bar commensurate with the time and the budget we intend to allot to that program. I think I would agree with you that there is definitely merit to developing a new bomber, but I'm anxious not to bring you another program where we optimistically reach for too much requirement, we under-budget it, and we set the schedule that may be optimistic. I want to work with the Air Force to define a program that we have a high confidence with coming back to you and telling you we'll deliver successful results. With that, we will try to meet those goals.

Senator THUNE. The Air Force expects to have that, sort of, revolutionary long-range strike capability by 2035. Do you believe that the DOD will need a new long-range strike platform between now and 2035, or do you think that the current bomber fleet can survive that long, based on scheduled upgrades?

Mr. YOUNG. Senator, I'd have to go and look at that set of data. I have not looked at it in that level of detail. The current initiative is pursuing a goal of a bomber possibly in a gap by 2018. That's the first issue at hand. Can we define a program and a set of requirements to meet that goal? There's no question, in that longer-term timeframe, we have to have more like a revolutionary bomber capability, and we'll have to work with the Air Force to also define that program. It'll start with technology investment to enable such a capability.

Senator THUNE. If we don't have that kind of a capability, what is the alternative? I mean, what else do we do to deal with the threats that we're going to be encountering? If we're not looking at a next-generation bomber, what are the alternatives?

Mr. YOUNG. I think we have no alternative but to look at a next-generation bomber. I mean, we do have tools in our inventory. There are significant weapons; we certainly have Tomahawks and others. But to achieve the range you're talking about, you have to have a next-generation bomber in your tool set.

Senator THUNE. Okay. One of the things that I wanted to come back to you, too, in dealing, again, with bombers, the B–1 has played a vital role in the global war on terrorism. It's provided close air support to troops on the ground, convoy support for road patrols, and acts as a significant show of force. The B–1 can also carry the largest payload of guided and unguided weapons in the Air Force inventory, and is the backbone of America's long-range
bomber force. It can rapidly deliver massive quantities of both precision and nonprecision weapons against any adversary literally anywhere in the world at any time. In addition, the B–1 and the F–15E are the only weapons with the capability to fly low-altitude missions, day or night, in any weather.

Given those contributions, I was surprised by a recent decision, in July of this year, by your predecessor, as the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Kenneth Krieg, to remove the B–1B from the list of those Air Force programs designated with a DX rating, to be of the highest national defense urgency. Under the Defense Priorities and Allocations System, the priority of the B–1 bomber was lowered to a DO rating, indicating critical to national defense; however DX takes precedence over DO programs. So the B–1B will no longer merit having the highest-priority access to parts, materials, and commodities.

Now, it is important, I think, to ensure that our most pressing military needs are met first. So, based on my concerns, in August of this year Senators Johnson, Hutchison, Cornyn, and I sent a letter to your office requesting that the DOD re-evaluate that decision to remove the B–1B as one of their highest-priority programs. It’s been over a month since we sent the letter, and we’ve not received a response. So, I would ask that, assuming you’re confirmed in the position, if you could get back to us on the status of that request, we would greatly appreciate it.

Mr. YOUNG. Absolutely, Senator. I’m sorry we have not replied.

[The information referred to follows:]

Senator, our response to your letter of August 28 regarding the B–1B program being assigned a DO rather than a DX industrial priority rating is in the final stages of review.

The Department applies DX industrial priority ratings to those programs approved by the Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of Defense based on two criteria. First the program must be of the highest national defense urgency based on military objectives and second, the program must have compressed milestone delivery schedules which can only be met with the industrial priority of a DX rating. During a comprehensive review of the DX list earlier this year, the Department made the decision to change the Defense Priorities and Allocations System priority for several programs, including the B–1B program, from DX to a DO rating.

Removal of the B–1B program from the DX list does not imply that the B–1B is no longer important. As you have described here, the B–1B is a versatile weapons system and the backbone of the heavy bomber force. Rather, the priority rating was changed to DO because the Department determined that a DO rating would be sufficient to meet the Department’s national defense objectives and the B–1B program’s schedule requirements.

If parts constraints surface for the B–1B, or for any other program, the Department can, with assistance as needed from the Department of Commerce, expedite subcontract or prime contract deliveries on a case-by-case basis, even if this requires diverting resources from a DX-rated program. Thus, there are processes in place that assure the B–1B program continues to have priority access to parts and materials.

Senator THUNE. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman?

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune.

Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to Senator Chambliss.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Senator Chambliss.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I appreciate the courtesy of my colleague from Alabama.
Mr. Young, I had intended to start off my line of questioning to you a little bit differently than what I’m going to, because I thought Senator Graham might be here. Knowing that he lives about 15 miles from Clemson University, I was going to start off by talking about the Clemson game last week. But since he’s not here, we’ll move on. [Laughter.]

Mr. Young. Probably better for both of us, Senator.

Senator Chambliss. Secretary Young, you have been in this position, acting, now, for several months. This town is famous for the rumors that surface around here from time to time, one of which recently has been that there’s discussion at the Pentagon about the derailing of the multiyear contract for the F–22 and the derailing of the proposed bridge money that may be available for consideration for the purchase of additional F–22s. My question to you is; is that rumor true? Is there any conversation at the Pentagon relative to derailing the F–22 multiyear contract or the bridge money?

Mr. Young. I have not participated or observed any of those discussions, certainly not derailing the existing F–22 multiyear procurement.

Senator Chambliss. Speaking of multiyears, we have several others that are out there. Is there any conversation relative to derailing any of the other multiyear contracts for any branch of the service?

Mr. Young. Senator, I’m not aware of that, and I guess that’s an answer, but I’d be very concerned about discussions like that. We enter into multiyear contracts to achieve the savings and provide stability.

Senator Chambliss. Talking about multiyears, I just want to confirm the conversation we had yesterday. Give us the benefit of your thinking with regard to multiyear contracts, their value to the services, as well as their value to the taxpayer.

Mr. Young. Senator, I am interested in entertaining a discussion of multiyear procurements on every program where we have good maturity in the program and the potential to save the taxpayer dollars. I think any dollar saved for the taxpayer is a dollar that we have a chance to either return to the Treasury or buy additional capabilities for the warfighter, so we ought to look at multiyears in every case. Only where the savings are insignificant should we reconsider using a multiyear tool. I think we also have to understand that, in some cases, when we’re buying at low procurement rates, multiyears help ensure we don’t bring more cost growth to the table, because vendors and suppliers at low procurement rates subject the DOD to annual adjustments in their prices. So, we can’t always anticipate what will happen to us if we don’t use a multiyear to try to give ourselves all the best chance to succeed and save the taxpayer money.

Senator Chambliss. As I told you yesterday, I appreciate that attitude, because I think, from a business perspective, the multiyear is one of the best tools that we’ve ever exercised, and whether it’s the Pentagon or any other Federal agency out there, we don’t always do a good job of being stewards of the taxpayer money. I think it’s proven that we do save money, and it is a great tool, and we need to use more of it down the road.
Let me move to something that has surfaced recently. I want to talk about an issue that was the subject of an article in the Washington Post on Monday of this week. It appears that the Air Force recommended that Commonwealth Research Institute (CRI) hire Charles Riechers so he could provide specific technical expertise in the area of acquisition, transformation, and fleet modernization. He was hired under an existing contract with CRI. The Air Force utilized his services as a contractor, rather than a direct consultant, because it was faster to get him under a current contract. The slant of the Post article is that CRI hired him, but he was performing work for the Air Force, rather than CRI. The Air Force says this is not inappropriate, and what would have been inappropriate was if Mr. Riechers had shared his research findings with CRI, as that could give them an unfair advantage in future contract competition.

My questions to you are; why didn't the Air Force simply hire Mr. Riechers as a direct consultant? Is it common for DOD to hire technical experts under scientific and engineering technical assistance contracts? In your view, was there anything inappropriate about the Air Force's actions?

Mr. YOUNG. It is common, I think, for DOD to seek expert technical advice under System Engineering Technical Assistance (SETA) contracts. In general, we have those contracts. In some cases, we have contracts through vehicles like a Navy Seaport, where we compete for those services and ask a number of people; can they provide this service? We get, hopefully, the best price and the best technical value from that service.

It is unusual, to me, in my understanding of the system, that we would go to an open contract and ask that a specific person be put on that contract, and whether that contract is broadly defined to let that person be brought to that contract and asked to do work that may or may not have been in the original scope of the contract. I think the Air Force would have to answer those questions, but there are some unusual dimensions to this, and then some that are a normal course of business, where the DOD, finding itself with long timelines to hire people, uses contracts to get the expertise we need to oversee programs.

Senator CHAMBLISS. Okay. Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.

Senator Sessions.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Young, to follow up a bit on the long-term contracts Senator Chambliss asked you about, I have an understanding that, many times, in building highways, politicians are asked to build 10 highways when they only have enough money for 5. But, to make everybody happy, they start 10, and they end up costing a lot more per highway than if they had just gone on and promptly completed 5. You have Services, you have interest groups, you have Members of Congress that want a whole bunch of programs started. Do you think it's a valid concern that we might do better if we delayed starting some of those projects and then moved the ones we decide to move more rapidly, with higher numbers of production each
year, and then we might actually get a better product at a lower cost?

Mr. YOUNG. Senator, I believe that's absolutely true, and the best example I can offer you is, I found myself, in the Navy, as Assistant Secretary, signing a paper that I needed to sign to proceed with procurement of a training aircraft. Because we were buying those aircraft at eight a year, they were costing $30 million apiece. The original plan was, I think, to buy 14 to 15 a year, at $20 million apiece. So, I had that studied, and we paid several hundred million dollars for the same airplanes. We really never changed the requirement. But, because we didn't demonstrate the very discipline you're talking about, we paid several hundred million dollars more for no more capability. I would like to have those discussions in the DOD.

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you.

Dr. Brook, with regard to actually maintaining control over the integrity and the smart spending of taxpayers' dollars, do you have that responsibility? Will you use the IG to report to you, or is it your basic responsibility just to manage the dollars so that they are properly allocated and properly accounted for?

Dr. BROOK. Senator, if confirmed, it would be my primary responsibility to oversee the development of the budgets and to oversee the internal controls that the Navy would have in place to manage dollars and be responsible. I, in the past, have developed very close relationships with the IG and the audit agencies, and have been able to work very closely with them to make sure that we're monitoring the financial activities and that we're following applicable laws and trying to be as responsible as we can.

Senator SESSIONS. Within the Services, and in the Navy, in particular, who is in charge of overall responsibility of ascertaining whether or not programs are being managed well, contractors are performing well, and they are held accountable, if they do not?

Dr. BROOK. Well, I think it's a shared responsibility among the senior leadership of the Navy, depending on the functional areas that we're working in.

Senator SESSIONS. So, you have the contracting officer, who would be the first line of oversight. Is that right?

Dr. BROOK. I'm not an expert in contracting, Senator. That sounds reasonable, but I'm not sure.

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I think, sometimes we need pretty robust independent review. The budget of DOD, I think, certainly is not too large, but it's grown substantially. We're talking about $450 billion of baseline defense budget, and even a percentage of savings can free up money to complete programs that we definitely need to complete. So, I'd hope that you will understand. I think Congress needs to do a better job of monitoring how we do it. I think you'll see that, in the future. I hope that each of you will be out there on the front line of doing it.

To follow up, Secretary Young, on Senator Inhofe's questions about S&T, in your August report of this year you expressed very real concern about S&T and our investment. Have you given any thought to what the appropriate number is that we need to increase those programs by, how much it would cost us to be at the level we ought to be?
Mr. **Young.** In the memo, I cited to Secretary Gates that we need to look at those metrics. The previous metric has been 3 percent. We've not achieved that metric. I'm not sure that's the right metric. We need to go and look at businesses and even investments by other countries, and set a better metric. But, lacking that, I offered in that memo a number of investments that would have us add approaching a couple of billion dollars a year to the S&T budget, which would be near a 20-percent increase in that budget. It was targeted to several things that I think could pay dividends for the warfighter and the Nation.

Senator **Sessions.** Yes, I notice you indicated that it could save money. I remember, early in the Bush administration, he talked about leaping-ahead technology. In other words, not investing in a system that's going to be out of date, but leaping to, and perhaps investing in S&T, and being able to develop a new paradigm of capability. Is that what you're referring to? Can that happen? Are we doing enough in that direction?

Mr. **Young.** I think both can happen. A number of those ideas I offered, at Secretary Gates's request, were tailored to areas that are nontraditional, related to the global war on terror and other things, and then some of the areas are places where we could have breakthrough technology that would develop a new material that can let us move away from, say, MRAPs that weigh 30,000 to 80,000 pounds, and potentially develop a lighter vehicle that's more mobile and tactically useful. We have to make those investments in a next generation of materials, and, as you've said, leap ahead of what we're buying today.

Senator **Sessions.** With regard to the LCS, I chaired the Seapower Subcommittee in 1997, and during that time we began to analyze how the new Navy would be configured. As I understand it, 55 of these ships are to be completed, which would represent about a sixth of the Navy's 300-plus fleet. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and others have made clear to us they consider this a critical program that will just be an absolutely necessary component of the Navy fleet. Some of the cost increases have gone because the Navy has asked for and obtained militarization of a ship that was originally thought to be a commercial-type ship. Anyway, my question to you is; do you believe this is a critical part of the Navy's fleet and that this program needs to be maintained, with costs kept at a minimum, and produced in a way that meets the Navy's needs, and respects the taxpayers' investment?

Mr. **Young.** Senator, I believe I can legitimately claim to be an original plank-owner on LCS, and I believe firmly and strongly in the need for that capability in the Navy. I'm disappointed about the costs, and we need to go attack that and see if we can do better. But we have to have that class of ship in the naval fleet.

Senator **Sessions.** It also saves money off personnel, as I understand. Can you explain what this fast, mobile, shallow-water vessel's capabilities are, and the number of personnel it takes to operate it, compared to other ships?

Mr. **Young.** I think, Senator, it may be best pointed out by an example that motivated me. Ahead of the Operation Iraqi Freedom, we conducted approaching 1,000 boardings in the Gulf waters of small dowels and other vessels. We were doing that with destroy-
ers, DDG–51s, that cost over $1 billion and have crews of 350. Then, in some cases, that ship still has a speed limit that won't let it run down adversaries who quickly move to faster ships. LCS will let you run down that adversary with a ship that doesn't cost $1 billion and with a crew that's more like 50 people. It provides the capability and the opportunity to save money, as you've said, and put fewer crew members at risk. There are multiple dimensions to the benefits of LCS.

Senator Sessions. Well, I think so. I'm sorry we've had some difficulties with that. I hope that you will keep it on track and meet the challenges and the legitimate questions that are raised.

Mr. Chairman, just briefly, a consistent concern we've heard from service chiefs is that Goldwater-Nichols does not sufficiently allow them to participate in the acquisition process. In other words, civilian personnel is involved in that. I note that Admiral Roughead recently stated his view that we need to “enhance the coordination and interaction between those who define our requirements and those who acquire the systems.”

First, I want to register that as a legitimate concern, and, second, ask you if you'd briefly comment on it.

Mr. Young. Senator, I believe strongly in the enormous wisdom that's embodied in Goldwater-Nichols and the importance of having an acquisition team that has a line, through people like me, to the President, and then a requirements team that has a line also to the President, but through a military advisory team, and then those teams working together. In my time in the Navy, I had Saturday sessions with then CNO Vern Clark, to set those requirements bars on LCS and say, “If you want to go this fast, it potentially will cost this much.” We need to work with them, and did, in my time in the Navy, on DD(X), when we took the firing rate from 12 rounds a minute, which was a very costly gun and loading system, to 10 rounds a minute. That small change made a big difference in cost. I need the acquisition team to make those pushes. I need the requirements team to stand their ground where it makes a military difference, and get to a middle ground that's effective for delivery.

Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.

I want to go back to this contract that CRI had with the Air Force that was used, apparently, to pay the civilian contracting official $13,000-plus a month for that 2-month period. I have trouble with your answer on that. It seems to me it's just totally out of place for a company to be paying someone for work that that person is not performing for that company, to begin with. Whether or not that person is performing work for the government or not is a different issue. I'm not sure of that. There's been some statements made that he was performing useful work. Here we had some Air Force official telling a contractor to pay somebody $13,400 a month for work not being performed for that company. It seems to me that is unsustainable, that's wrong. Would you agree with that?

Mr. Young. Yes, I'm troubled with those dimensions of it, sir.
Chairman Levin. There's also, I believe, that a company would be given a fee, an administrative fee for its operations, and that they would make money from that contract as well. Would that likely be the case?

Mr. Young. I think, in virtually every case that is correct. I think you're extremely familiar with the article. This article cites that this company is a not-for-profit, so I would have to ask the Air Force to understand whether there was a fee-bearing portion of those costs.

Chairman Levin. It may be not-for-profit, but it's making money on the contract.

Mr. Young. Yes, sir.

Chairman Levin. The administrative charges, overhead charges—

Mr. Young. In virtually every case, there are those charges, absolutely.

Chairman Levin. Whether or not this is really a nonprofit is another issue.

Mr. Young. Right.

Chairman Levin. That's an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) issue. They can figure that out, even though some of the amount of money which is going to the people who are working for that nonprofit are pretty stunning amounts, whether it qualifies or not is an IRS issue.

But I have trouble with the Air Force doing this. I think it makes you ask; what is going on in contracting world, where that is done? I'm wondering if you can get into this question for us. After you're confirmed, which hopefully you will be, very promptly, can you check into this contract and tell us what happened? Is anyone held accountable if something wrong was done here? Are there any rules against this kind of thing; paying people for work they didn't perform for the entity that is paying the person? Where is the accountability if that takes place, and how common or frequent is this occurrence? It reminds me a little bit of what we call offloading, where one agency is using another agency's contract, when there's just a lack of accountability in it. So, if you could get back to this committee on that matter, and tell us; is it unusual, is it common, and what action is being taken, if action is appropriate? To me, it tells me that there's something amiss in the world of contracting that this kind of a activity can take place. Okay?

Mr. Young. I'd be happy to look at it in detail, and I'd like to get your views of those facts when we get them to you, sir.

Chairman Levin. All right, I'd like your views. We're happy to give you our views, but I'd like your views about it, as well, when you submit them to us.

Mr. Young. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

Mr. Chairman, Air Force officials have provided the following summary of the facts, circumstances and legal aspects of this contract.

The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) had a requirement for scientific and engineering expertise. The Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force had an open task order under an existing contract under which Commonwealth Research Institute (CRI) was to provide the Air Force with technical expertise. Mr. Riechers was well qualified to provide these services, and CRI hired him to do so. Mr. Riechers provided scientific and engineering technical
assistance services to the Air Force and made recommendations that were instrumen-
tal in engineering our acquisition transformation and continuing the Air Force’s
modernization of our aging fleet. The work Mr. Riechers performed was in accord-
ance with the contract Statement of Work with CRI. CRI management was respon-
sible for the overall direction and control of Mr. Riechers’ performance.

For Economy Act transactions, it is not unusual for agencies to acquire supplies
or services through another Federal Agency. The basic contract was issued by the
Department of the Interior Southwest Acquisition Branch on behalf of the Air Force,
Directorate of Security Counterintelligence and Special Programs Oversight (SAF/
AAZ). The scope of work includes performance of independent technical studies and
analyses; conduct of site surveys and field data collection; and evaluation of initia-
tives, exercise support, and systems demonstrations. The Economy Act (31 U.S.C.
1535) is applicable to orders placed under this contract. The Economy Act permits
ordering of supplies and services through another Federal Agency when a more spe-
cific statutory authority does not exist, there is no current contracting vehicle for
the acquisition, and it is more economical to have another agency perform the con-
tracting. (Note: FAR 17.501 defines an “interagency acquisition” as “a procedure by
which an agency needing supplies or services (the requesting agency) obtains them
from another agency (the servicing agency).”)

Based on the facts known to us at this time, the Air Force believes that the au-
thorization of the action that occurred was not prohibited by law, regulation, or pol-
icy, nor was there a need for a deviation or waiver to support any of these efforts.
However, I cannot tell you that I am comfortable with all aspects of this contracting
action.

To further examine whether such events may have constituted an impropriety,
the Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force requested an inde-
pendent investigation by the Department of Defense Inspector General. I believe we
should get the results of this investigation to fully inform our review of this matter.

Chairman LEVIN. A question for you, General, if I have a mo-
ment left in my time. There’s been some criticism of the approach
that the NNSA has taken so far to efforts to modernize and reduce
the size of the nuclear weapons complex. Much of the criticisms re-
volved around the fact that the NNSA is not closing and consolidat-
ing any of the production sites. As the modernization process
moves forward, will you look carefully at opportunities to close and
consolidate production sites, if appropriate?

General SMOLEN. Absolutely.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. On the reliable replacement warhead,
you made reference to this, but the question now is, at NNSA, as
to whether they’re going to be able to manage the life extension
program for nuclear weapons so that it’s not cut short in anticipa-
tion of any decision with respect to the reliable replacement war-
head. On the other hand, life extension program should not be
rushed to avoid the reliable replacement warhead decision. What
will you do to make sure that there’s a balancing of the research
on the reliable replacement warhead with the carrying out of the
life extension program?

General SMOLEN. Sir, I believe the reliable replacement warhead
provides great promise for the future as an alternative for us. We
still need to do some study before we can make final determina-
tions on how effective that will be. In the absence of knowing that,
we certainly must proceed with the life extension programs to con-
tinue to maintain the stockpile as credibly as we possibly can.

With regard to the facilities, I will absolutely take a close look
at all of our facilities. There have been numerous studies, sir, and
I have been reviewing those studies, and I hope to confer with col-
leagues, if confirmed, to understand all of that much better. I think
there may in fact be good opportunity for consolidation, but at this
Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Senator McCaskill.

Senator McCaskill. At the risk of beating a dead horse, I want to go back, also, to the contracting question. Since this is, now, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Acquisitions in the Air Force, this is someone whose job is all about accountability. I'm concerned, first of all, I think, at first blush, it potentially is an Antideficiency Act (ADA) violation. The reason I say it could be an ADA violation is that section 1342 of the ADA says government employees can't accept voluntary services. Well, if the government was getting the benefit of his research for those 2 months, and the government wasn't paying for it, then wasn't that voluntary? Wasn't he providing a work product? He wasn't doing the work product for his employer. He had no contact with his employer during those 2 months. He was working for the government during those 2 months, not for his employer. I think there's a real question here as to whether or not the law was violated, whether or not there was a felony committed by the Deputy Secretary for Acquisition or by the DOD and by this person who provided work to the government on a voluntary basis, even though his employer was not asking for that work. All the employer was doing was paying him.

Now, that's one concern I have. The second concern I have is; what in the world are we giving CRI $26,000 for what they don't need? What are we contracting with them for? I mean, if they have $26,000 sitting around that they can pay to anybody that the Pentagon asks them to pay, do they have more money over there they're not using? Maybe we should ask them to continue paying his salary as the Deputy Acquisition Director for the Navy, if they have all this money sitting there. What in the world are we giving them money for? Then, there's a whole other level that is really troubling to me. Why are they even called a not-for-profit? What is the not-for-profit? If you read this article, and their excuses they use for being a not-for-profit, I mean, have we no shame? I mean, we are shoveling money at some of these people through the appropriations processes like it's Monopoly money.

I think that what happened here was, it was easier to get this guy's check covered for a couple of months from a friendly contractor than go through the process you have to go through to get him on the payroll at the Pentagon. So, we wanted to do it quickly, so call a friendly contractor and let them write the check for a couple of months. Isn't that exactly what the ADA is supposed to prevent: giving a contractor an advantage at the Pentagon by virtue of voluntary services?

Now, I know that's the legislative intent of that provision of ADA. Whether or not you can fit this factual scenario firmly within that prohibition under the law, but what worries me is that no one seems to be really concerned about this, which makes me think, as the chairman said, this may be very commonplace.

Which leads me to my question on ADA and for my comptroller friend. I have looked into ADA violations, and the record here is very, very sparse. We've tried to get the information, from DOD, how many ADAs have resulted in punishment. Now, if you look at
the kind of money that’s being spent, and where it’s being spent, in fiscal year 2006 we’ve been able to determine, with the number of potential cases only being 58, the number of ADAs that resulted in punishment was 9. In fiscal year 2005, there were seven. As of January 2007, there were only three. Frankly, there were only 12, in terms of potential cases. Well, I think this article outlines another potential case, and I think that there are probably many, many other potential cases. In your future position, I would like your commentary on what we can do to instill a more aggressive attitude about the ADA and what it is intended to accomplish. It’s hard for me to believe that there are few violations that are occurring. As I looked into the process, I found it’s incredibly byzantine. With how long it takes and the investigation and they basically say “no harm, no foul,” if the person has moved on. So, all you have to do to really avoid ultimate punishment under this is just go away. You can imagine, if we did that with all the laws in the country that were felonies, if everyone just agreed to change their job, no harm. I think we’re going to have to get a lot more serious about this if we want to change some of the attitude there. So, I would like your comments about the ADA and its enforcement.

Dr. Brook. Senator, I’ve never seen much data on the ADA, either, so I don’t know what the number of total cases are or what the percentages of punishment are or what the different levels of punishment might be. But I take your larger point very seriously. I think accountability is critical in the financial management area, and that’s why the ADA was enacted. I certainly take your comments to heart. I share your concern about accountability, and it’ll be a very important aspect of my leadership, if confirmed.

Senator McCaskill. Let me, finally, if I could, just one more question, Mr. Chairman. I don’t know, Mr. Young, what you can do, and maybe we could have a conversation about this later, but I would like your reflection upon how do we instill, in military training, some kind of sense of responsibility for oversight on contracting? What happened in Iraq was a function of us trying to do more with fewer people. So, we took contracting to an unprecedented level in every area. The military commanders are quick to admit they wanted to make sure the ice cream was in the mess hall, they wanted to make sure the latrines were cleaned, they wanted to make sure the supplies moved. They really didn’t care what it was costing, in a global sense. I don’t mean to say they’re not patriotic people that want to support their country; of course they are. But that was not their concern. Their concern was the mission. If you look at the individuals who are tasked with overseeing these contracts within each unit, these contracting officer representatives are not trained. It was almost like you get the short straw, that you’re overlooking the contract.

I would appreciate you and Secretary Gates, to the extent that you could have a conversation with him about this, talk about what we need to do, in terms of training, because we’re not going to go backwards, I can’t believe, because we don’t have the ground strength to do it. If we ever have another contingency like this, and if we are ever in another conflict like this, I think we’re going to continue to contract. Now, the problem is, we can’t ever contract
like this again. So, my sense is that no one is really excited about the idea that we start embedding training in the military about how you monitor a contract. Do you have any comment on that?

Mr. Young. Absolutely, Senator. One, I want to assure you that this is very high on Secretary Gates's list, near the top of Secretary England's list. I participated in a meeting with him on this issue yesterday. I participated earlier this week in a meeting with Secretary Geren, the Army Secretary, on this. I do think you'll see the Army seek to move some steps back. We're trying to understand the issue. But what's changed is what I think you've highlighted. As we move very hard to make sure the military people who are at the pointy end of the spear, there was a loss of focus on the fact that, when the spear is deployed, there has to be certain support and certain abilities to oversee that support; contingency contracting and contingency contracting oversight. The recent issues are going to refocus the DOD's attention at the most senior levels, including mine, on this issue. I believe it will include training, it will probably include people, and it'll include changes to our processes.

Senator McCaskill. Thank you.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Let me commend you, Senator McCaskill. The provision which you and Senator Carper authored, which is in the bill, which will require training for these nonacquisition people who are doing contracting work in a deployed environment, will hopefully survive conference. You, again, will be an active part of that conference, but we want to commend you for that effort, which is something which can then be implemented by the DOD, because it does raise an important issue.

Senator Sessions.

Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. I think these are three able persons. You've conducted a fair and complete hearing. I thank you, and I have no further questions.

Chairman Levin. Thank you.

Are you all set, Senator McCaskill?

Senator McCaskill. In writing, if you would, I would like your comments, Mr. Young, on the effectiveness of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). You do not have a seat on that council, and, of course, you know that the undercurrent is, there's a lot of backscratching by the various branches, "I won't mess with your program if you don't mess with mine." Should you have a seat on that Council? Should there be someone watching to make sure that the Army's saying, "Okay, I won't complain about that if you promise you won't complain about what I want to get through the JROC." If you believe you should have a seat on that Council in your position that I'm confident you'll be confirmed for, whether or not that might have a cleansing effect, at least on the perception that might be out there. I'm not sure it's a reality, as I say, but certainly it's a perception that there may be some backscratching going on.

Mr. Young. Senator, I'd welcome the chance to talk to you about my experienced reality.

Senator McCaskill. Okay, great. I like that kind of reality.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The information referred to follows:]
The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) was created as the governing body of military expertise on the Joint Staff and is chartered to provide independent, military advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the President in validating military requirements. With this as its primary function, the JROC seeks advice from representatives across the Department of Defense (DOD). The JROC charter was recently amended to include both the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller (USD(C)) as advisors.

Section 944 proposed by the House for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 would make the USD(AT&L) and the USD(C) permanent voting members of the JROC. While the JROC relies upon the advice of these important civilian leaders, codifying the role of these civilian leaders as permanent voting members may run counter to the JROC's principal purpose of providing independent military advice regarding the validation of warfighter requirements.

I believe it is most critical for the DOD and Service Acquisition Executives, as the President’s representatives and stewards of tax dollars, to constantly question requirements in light of technology maturity, cost, and alternate material or operational tactic solutions. Further, the entire acquisition team should constantly identify and push for joint solutions in every situation, including when unique service requirements exist.

Chairman LEVIN. Before closing, let me, again, thank you for your commitment to this Nation, to your families and friends and colleagues who have come here to support you, particularly, Mr. Young, to your children, who have not only shown support for you through your career, but who have made an amazing effort here to look interested throughout this hearing. [Laughter.]

That really takes talent. I never could do that.

We thank you all, and we will move these nominations as quickly as we possibly can.

We will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:13 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to John J. Young, Jr., by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DOD) Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions? Answer. I do not see a need for modifications of Goldwater-Nichols in the areas affecting acquisition. The civilian and military roles defined in the act produce a healthy tension that balances warfighting needs with taxpayer interests. I believe proposals to change this aspect of Goldwater-Nichols by shifting acquisition to the Service Chiefs would be a disservice to the President and our Nation’s taxpayers. The debate over requirements, technology, cost, and capability should begin at levels below the President and the Secretary of Defense. There is great risk in such a change of even further overstating of requirements, growing unfunded requirements lists, and further escalation in the cost of weapon systems.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. Based on my experience as the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) and Department of the Navy Acquisition Executive, I continue to oppose any modifications that would shift acquisition program management to the Service Chiefs. For the sake of the taxpayer, there needs to be a constant debate at all working levels between the acquisition team—led by Presidential appointees—and the requirements community—led by the Service Chiefs and the Joint Staff.
The debate should encompass available technology, cost, affordability, delivered capability, joint options, and alternative solutions.

**DUTIES**

*Question.* Twenty years ago, Congress established the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition in response to the recommendations of the Packard Commission. The Packard Commission report stated: ‘This new Under Secretary . . . should be the Defense Acquisition Executive. As such, he should supervise the performance of the entire acquisition system and set overall policy for R&D, procurement, logistics, and testing. He should have the responsibility to determine that new programs are thoroughly researched, that military requirements are verified, and that realistic cost estimates are made before the start of full-scale development. (In general, we believe, cost estimates should include the cost of operating and maintaining a system through its life.) He should assure that an appropriate type of procurement is employed, and that adequate operational testing is done before the start of high-rate production. He also should be responsible for determining the continuing adequacy of the defense industrial base.”

*Question.* Do you believe that the position of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) has the duties and authorities necessary to carry out the recommendations of the Packard Commission?

*Answer.* Yes.

*Question.* Do you see the need for modifications in the duties and authorities of the USD(AT&L)?

*Answer.* No.

*Question.* Do you believe that the DOD has effectively implemented a streamlined chain of command for acquisition programs, as envisioned by the Packard Commission?

*Answer.* I believe that the Department has implemented acquisition chains of command that provide the best management structure to meet current acquisition requirements. If confirmed, I will continue to examine these acquisition structures to improve outcomes and streamline oversight.

*Question.* Do you see the need for modifications in that chain of command, or in the duties and authorities of any of the officials in that chain of command?

*Answer.* At the present time, I do not see any need for modifications in the chain of command or in duties and authorities, but modifications could be needed in the future as acquisition mission requirements evolve. I believe the statutory reporting chain which provides USD(AT&L) directive authority for Service acquisition programs via the Service Secretaries is a critical authority which must be maintained. If confirmed, I will continue to evaluate the current chains of command and recommend adjustments, if needed.

*Question.* Section 133 of title 10, U.S.C., describes the duties of the USD(AT&L). Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect that Secretary Gates will prescribe for you?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I expect the Secretary to assign me duties and functions commensurate with the USD(AT&L) position, and any others he may deem appropriate.

*Question.* Do you recommend any changes to the provisions of section 133 of title 10, U.S.C., with respect to the duties of the USD(AT&L)?

*Answer.* No.

*Question.* If confirmed, what duties and responsibilities would you plan to assign to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD) for Acquisition and Technology and the DUSD for Logistics?

*Answer.* Based on my experience working with both positions, I do not, at this time, see an urgent need for any major changes in the roles and responsibilities of the DUSD for Acquisition and Technology or the DUSD for Logistics and Material Readiness. At this time, the duties assigned to each position serve an important role to meeting the goals and objectives of the Secretary of Defense. I do believe that the DDR&E should serve as the Department’s principal staff assistant for technology matters and the DUSD for Acquisition and Technology should be the principal staff assistant for acquisition program management.

*Question.* In your view, should the USD(AT&L) be a member of the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee (JROC)?

*Answer.* The JROC membership may be appropriate. The USD(AT&L) must at least participate in a full advisory role.
Question. If confirmed, you will be responsible for managing an acquisition system pursuant to which the DOD spends more than $200 billion each year. Section 133 of title 10, U.S.C., provides for the Under Secretary to be appointed from among persons who have an extensive management background in the private sector.

What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

Answer. I believe that my responsibilities and service as the DDR&E and the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition provide substantial and unique background and experience that qualifies me for this position. Further, my experience as a professional staff member on the Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee and my experience working in a variety of positions in industry provides me with a strong and extensive background for this position.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the USD(AT&L)?

Answer. As the DDR&E, I established a vision for the organization of developing the technology to defeat any adversary on any battlefield. I believe this vision, expanded to recognize including acquisition and sustainment, to a high degree also outlines the challenges I would face as USD(AT&L). We must ensure the Nation has the technology, systems, training and support necessary to defeat adversaries on every front—urban warfare to cyberspace. We must be efficient with the nation’s tax dollars in order to give the warfighter the largest possible set of robust warfighting tools. The acquisition team must ensure the tools are interoperable and joint and must execute programs with speed and creativity. We have already seen the pace of adjustment of our adversaries in the Global War on Terrorism. If confirmed as the USD(AT&L), my challenge will be to oversee and integrate the research, development, procurement, logistics, and facilities functions within the available resources in order to ensure the Nation maintains unmatched military capability. If confirmed, I believe some of the more specific challenges I would confront include:

- Improving the effectiveness, credibility, and performance of the Defense Acquisition Team in every acquisition business area.
- Making proactive, clear progress in controlling cost and requirements in order to deliver program results within budget and schedule.
- Ensuring the acquisition process is transparent, objective, timely, and accountable.
- Forging consensus among the acquisition, requirements, and budget communities to enable effective acquisition.
- Fostering a science and technology (S&T) program that meets the Nation’s future defense needs.
- Implementing logistical and supply chain management initiatives which are effective for the warfighter and the defense enterprise.
- Addressing industrial base challenges in an increasingly globalized commercial marketplace.
- Building and sustaining a high performing, agile, and ethical defense acquisition workforce.
- Ensuring business transformation efforts support sound program decisions and financial management.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. If I am confirmed, I expect to draw on my previous experiences as well as the advice and counsel of all members of the defense acquisition team in order to develop and implement a number of initiatives to address these challenges. If confirmed, I also will seek to work closely with the Services, agencies, and Congress to develop and execute plans and initiatives that will make tangible progress on these challenges.

MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEM ACQUISITION

Question. Please describe the approach taken by the Department to reduce cycle time for major acquisition programs. Do you believe the Department’s approach has been successful?

Answer. I believe that the fundamental step in the DOD’s efforts is the requirement for appropriate Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) at key milestones as mandated by Congress. Ensuring that we move appropriately mature technology into
successive stages of program development is fundamental to controlling and reducing cycle times for major acquisition programs.

The Department has also undertaken additional steps to control and reduce cycle times. Key additional steps include efforts to stabilize program funding and requirements in order to permit planned, deliberate program execution. Additional supporting initiatives or pilot projects include concept decision, Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) re-engineering and Performance Based Logistics. If confirmed, I will work to build on these foundations to seek continued improvement.

**Question.** What specific steps has the DOD taken to adopt incremental or phased acquisition approaches, such as spiral development?

**Answer.** Incremental and Spiral acquisition strategies are being utilized in the Department. These approaches are defined in DOD 5000.2, are embedded in the Defense Acquisition University training for Program Management, Systems Engineering and Contracting and are utilized by all Services.

**Question.** How will the requirements process, budget process, and testing regime change to accommodate spiral development?

**Answer.** Spiral development is an acquisition strategy and approach that is designed to identify the end-state requirements, which are not known at program initiation. Requirements, budget and test regime are refined through demonstration and risk management.

**Question.** How should the Department ensure that the incremental or phased acquisition programs have appropriate baselines against which to measure performance?

**Answer.** Each program being executed under an incremental or phased acquisition approach must still have clear requirements and metrics for each phase or increment. There are two key elements of success. First, the requirements of the initial increments must be commensurate with the budget, schedule and technology available to the program. Second, the Department must be able to adjust the requirements, shifting some requirements to later phases or increments, in order to ensure execution within budget and schedule.

**Question.** Over the last several years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has prepared a series of reports for this committee comparing the DOD approach to the acquisition of major systems with the approach taken by best performers in the private sector. GAO’s principal conclusion has been that private sector programs are more successful, in large part because they consistently require a high level of maturity for new technologies before such technologies are incorporated into product development programs. The Department has responded to these findings by adopting technological maturity goals in its acquisition policies.

**How important is it,** in your view, **for the Department to mature its technologies with research and development (R&D) funds before these technologies are incorporated into product development programs?**

**Answer.** I believe it is absolutely necessary for the Department to appropriately mature technologies before they are incorporated into product development programs. Experience demonstrates that programs built on mature technologies are much more likely to meet cost, schedule, and functional objectives. DOD R&D funds are an important, and often the primary, method for maturing technologies.

**Question.** What steps would you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the key components and technologies to be incorporated into major acquisition programs meet the Department’s technological maturity goals?

**Answer.** Ensuring incorporation of mature technologies (e.g., TRL 6 at MS B, TRL 7 at MS C) into Major Defense Acquisition programs requires a sustained approach that engages early with the program’s capabilities development and stays engaged through system design and development (SDD). During my tenure as DDR&E, I have strongly encouraged the Department’s S&T staff to work closely with major acquisition programs well before Milestone decision points to ensure that technology immaturity issues are identified, and that technology maturation plans are developed. If confirmed, I would continue this practice through technology readiness assessments and quick-look technology maturity evaluations to ensure that key components and technologies satisfy technological maturity goals. If confirmed, I expect to work to ensure that appropriate investments are made to mature technology to support each stage of development.

**Question.** What steps do you believe the Department should take to ensure that research programs are sufficiently funded to reduce technical risk in programs so that technological maturity can be demonstrated at the appropriate time?

**Answer.** The DOD must adequately fund technology maturation for the technologies necessary for our military systems. The Department has many opportunities to leverage the research investments of other Federal agencies and the commercial sector (including international developments) to advance technological maturity.
However, the final result must be proven, appropriate stages of technical maturity for advancement to the next stages of development.

Question. What role do you believe TRLs and Manufacturing Readiness Levels (MRLs) should play in the Department’s efforts to enhance effective technology transition and reduce cost and risk in acquisition programs?

Answer. TRLs have proven to be a very effective tool for focusing Department attention and effort on technology maturation, and if confirmed, I will continue to use them. MRLs are an emerging tool to support acquisition decision making that shows promise. The DDR&E team has worked with industry to develop MRLs that are reconciled with TRLs and to provide a common framework for assessing and managing manufacturing risk from technology development through each step of acquisition.

Question. The committee has proposed various changes to DOD acquisition procedures that are included in title VIII of § 1547, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008. Sections 801 through 805 would address major defense acquisition programs.

What is your opinion about whether these provisions, if enacted, would help the Department reform how it buys its largest and most expensive weapons systems?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review each of the sections addressing changes for multi-year procurement, Milestone B certification, DOD organization and structure, investment strategy and report on total ownership cost.

Question. Which of these provisions, if any, do you have concerns about and why?

Answer. Consistent with the Statement of Administration Policy regarding § 1547, I am concerned that section 801(a) would define "substantial savings" for multiyear contracts. This definition would unnecessarily limit the contracting options available for large programs where significant taxpayer dollars could be saved.

DEFENSE ACQUISITION REFORM INITIATIVES


If confirmed, to what extent would you support and continue implementation of the defense acquisition reform initiatives forth in that report?

Answer. In general, I support the majority of the acquisition reform initiatives identified in the Report. If confirmed, I will support the implementation activities which are already underway and evaluate additional ways and means to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the system.

Question. In particular, please discuss your views about the following:

Portfolio Management.

Answer. In general, I would support the Capability Portfolio Management Initiative which provides a common framework recognizing federated ownership. It facilitates strategic choices and improves the ability to make capability trade-offs. Successful experiments in portfolio management are impacting strategic portfolios, weapon systems, and weapon sustainment choices.

Question. Tri-Chair Concept Decision.

Answer. In general, I believe forums like the Tri-Chair and processes like Concept Decision are very useful for the alignment of the acquisition, requirements and resource teams in pursuit of a common capability goal. If confirmed, I will review this initiative for any additional support or direction needed.

Question. Time-Defined Acquisitions.

Answer. In general, I support the Time-Defined Acquisition (TDA) initiative which is designed to make schedule a key performance parameter. The TDA approach seeks to prescribe a fixed time for capability delivery and to use schedule to drive the program’s focus, plans and technology choices. If confirmed, I will review this initiative for any additional support or direction needed.

Question. Investment Balance Reviews.

Answer. In general, I support the Investment Balance Reviews (IBR) initiative that provides the Defense Acquisition Executive with the opportunity to make course corrections during the life cycle of the portfolio of capabilities, systems and programs. If confirmed, I will review this initiative for any additional support or direction needed.

Question. Risk-Based Source Selection.

Answer. In general, I support this initiative to provide an informed basis for assessing industry proposals, quantifying the risk in terms of cost and time, and providing the basis for more informed discussions with the offerers. If confirmed, I will review this initiative for any additional support or direction needed.

Question. Acquisition of Services Policy.
Answer. In general, I support the initiative on Acquisition of Services which is designed to reduce cycle time, increase competition and provide better value for the Department. If confirmed, I will review this initiative for any additional support or direction needed.

*Question.* Systems Engineering Excellence.

Answer. In general, I support this initiative which is designed to strengthen our Systems and Software Engineering acquisition policy and practices with a goal of world class performance for the Department. If confirmed, I will review this initiative for any additional support or direction needed.

*Question.* Award Fee and Incentive Policy.

Answer. During my tenure as the Navy Acquisition Executive, I issued three memorandums providing policy and guidance on the use of profit, incentives and award fees. These memoranda specifically pushed for greater use of objective criteria for awarding fees, aligning the payment of fees to measurable steps on the critical path through development, and tailoring the profile for the award of fees to stages of progress in development. I strongly believe the DOD must continue to use fees as a vital tool in managing acquisition programs and incentivizing performance. If confirmed, I expect to continue to push for progress in the careful and judicious use of profit and fees.

*Question.* Open, Transparent, and Common Shared Data Resources with Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR).

Answer. The Department needs better information tools for use in managing its portfolio of programs and in monitoring progress in program execution. The DAMIR system represents an effort to fill some of these gaps. If confirmed, I will review this initiative for any additional support or direction needed.

*Question.* Restructured DAES Reviews.

Answer. The DAES reviews provide a forum for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to work with the Services and Agencies to evaluate progress in program execution. Recent adjustments in the DAES review process have sought to improve the quality of information and to focus on the key metrics which provide insight into program execution. These steps are useful, and the Department should continue to make every effort to ensure program execution is carefully measured and monitored to provide early signals of the need to take action and make adjustments which can improve the probability of successful program execution. In general, I support this initiative which is designed to improve decision making, communication, trust and integrity between OSD, the Joint Staff and the Services. If confirmed, I will review this initiative for any additional support or direction.


Answer. If confirmed, I will review the interim policy issued April 26, 2007 as well as public comments in preparation for finalization of a responsive policy.

*Question.* Are there other initiatives or tools discussed in the Defense Acquisition Transformation Report that you view as particularly likely, or unlikely, to be productive in achieving acquisition reform?

Answer. I am aware that the second Defense Acquisition Transformation Report was recently submitted. The Report has identified additional initiatives that are considered productive. If confirmed, I will study all of the acquisition reform initiatives to determine additional ways and means to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the system.

### Weapons Systems Affordability

*Question.* The investment budget for weapon systems has grown substantially over the past few years to $150 billion per year. An increasing share of this investment is being allocated to a few very large systems such as the Joint Strike Fighter, Future Combat Systems, and Missile Defense.

Do you believe that the current investment budget for major systems is affordable given increasing historic cost growth in major systems, costs of current operations, projected increases in end strength, and asset recapitalization?

Answer. Current investment budget projections for major systems do suggest these programs are affordable under current topline estimates and assumptions as well as given continuing support from Congress for costs in other areas. However, the DOD must execute these programs within budget and avoid incurring cost growth. The Department has been emphasizing funding programs to more realistic estimates. This is a practice I intend to continue, if confirmed.

*Question.* What would be the impact of a decision by the Department to reduce purchases of major systems because of affordability issues?
Answer. If confirmed, I will carefully assess the impact of any proposal to reduce purchases of major systems because of affordability and utilize the assessment in making final recommendations.

Question. If confirmed, how do you plan to address this issue and guard against the potential impact of weapon systems cost growth?

Answer. The Department must ensure that only those technologies and capabilities that are technologically mature are included in new systems. If confirmed, I intend to emphasize realistic cost estimates and funding profiles. If confirmed, I will also work to ensure that program requirements are well understood at program initiation and are stabilized as much as possible over the long-term to guard against “requirement creep.”

LEAD SYSTEMS INTEGRATOR

Question. For the Future Combat Systems program and several other major defense acquisition programs, the Department has hired a lead system integrator (LSI) to set requirements, evaluate proposals, and determine which systems will be incorporated into future weapon systems. What are your views on the LSI approach to managing the acquisition of major weapon systems?

Answer. I believe the acquisition team should keep every single management tool available in our toolbox, and the acquisition team should make judicious choices about the use of these tools. In general, I think the Department should use care in choosing an LSI strategy and should have very specific reasons for selecting a lead systems integrator approach. Use of an LSI for a major system acquisition is in some ways similar to hiring a prime contractor to develop a materiel solution to satisfy the government’s need, which we strive to state in terms of performance requirements. An LSI generally performs comparable roles and responsibilities to a prime contractor. An LSI is subject to the same safeguards that apply to all Federal contractors, as defined by the standard clauses that are included in our contracts.

Question. What lines do you believe the Department should draw between those acquisition responsibilities that are inherently governmental and those that may be performed by contractors?

Answer. The rules regarding the performance of inherently governmental functions do not vary. The Government retains responsibility for the execution of the program; makes all requirements, budgeting and policy decisions; and performs source selections at the prime level.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that LSIs do not misuse their access to sensitive and proprietary information of the DOD and other defense contractors?

Answer. The Department has contract terms, backed up by law and regulation, that govern what a prime contractor can do with information gained in the performance of a contract. Likewise, the subcontract arrangement established between the prime and subcontractor contains provisions that protect the subcontractor’s information from misuse. If confirmed, I will review these issues as necessary and determine whether additional steps need to be taken.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that LSIs do not unnecessarily limit competition in a manner that would disadvantage the government or potential competitors in the private sector?

Answer. This is a concern that arises in many programs as the defense industrial base becomes more concentrated. It is not an issue particular to contracts using an LSI. If confirmed, I will review these issues as necessary and determine whether additional steps need to be taken.

MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENTS

Question. Providing a stable funding profile for defense programs is absolutely essential to effective program management and performance, for both DOD and the defense industry. One already tested means of increasing program funding stability is the use of multiyear procurements. At the same time, however, multiyear procurements tie up DOD funds over long periods of time, making it difficult for the Department to reallocate funds if they are needed to meet higher priority defense needs.

What are your views on multiyear procurements? Under what circumstances do you believe they should be used?

Answer. In general, I strongly favor multiyear procurement strategies. Frequently, multiyear procurements can offer substantial savings through improved economies in production processes, better use of industrial facilities, and a reduction in the administrative burden in the placement and administration of contracts. The
following criteria should be considered in deciding whether a program should be considered for multiyear application: savings when compared to the annual contracting methods; validity and stability of the mission need; stability of the funding; stability of the configuration; associated technical risks; degree of confidence in estimates of both contract costs and anticipated savings; and promotion of national security.

**Question.** What is your opinion on the level of cost savings that constitute “substantial savings” for purposes of the defense multiyear procurement statute, 10 U.S.C. § 2306b?

**Answer.** I favor placing no threshold on the level of cost savings that constitutes “substantial savings.” What is best for the taxpayer is to preserve flexibility for the Department to maximize savings through the use of multiyear contracts. Placing a threshold on “substantial savings” would unnecessarily limit the contracting options available for large programs where significant taxpayer dollars could be saved.

**Question.** Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe that a multiyear contract should be used for procuring weapons systems that have unsatisfactory program histories, e.g., displaying poor cost, scheduling, or performance outcomes but which otherwise comply with the requirements of the defense multiyear procurement statute, 10 U.S.C. § 2306b?

**Answer.** Additional analysis and careful review of all information should be completed when a multiyear contract is being considered for use in procuring weapon systems that have unsatisfactory program histories but which otherwise comply with the statutory requirements. The Department would need to examine all risk factors to determine if multiyear procurement would be appropriate.

**Question.** How would you analyze and evaluate proposals for multiyear procurement for such programs?

**Answer.** The Department would need to examine all risk factors in conjunction with the potential for cost savings to determine if multiyear procurement would be appropriate for a program with an unsatisfactory history. If confirmed, I will analyze and evaluate proposals for multiyear procurements in accordance with all statutory and regulatory requirements.

**Question.** If confirmed, what criteria would you apply in determining whether procuring such a system under a multiyear contract, is appropriate and should be proposed to Congress?

**Answer.** If confirmed, the primary criteria I would seek to apply in deciding the appropriateness of the use of a multiyear contract is the potential for achieving cost savings for the Department and the taxpayer and the potential for successful industry execution. The determination of savings is clearly dependent on supporting criteria such as the stability of the budget, the stability of the requirement, the accuracy and validity of cost estimates, and the ability of the contractor to perform.

**Question.** Under what circumstances, if any, should DOD ever break a multiyear contract?

**Answer.** Given careful screening of programs prior to awarding the multiyear contract, there should be very limited and unusual circumstances that would result in the breaking (i.e., cancellation) of a multiyear contract. If confirmed, the particular circumstances of any given break for a multiyear procurement would be addressed on a case by case basis.

**Question.** If confirmed, how will you treat proposals to renegotiate multiyear procurements?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would treat proposals to renegotiate multiyear procurements very cautiously.

**LEASING**

**Question.** Over the last several years, there has been much debate concerning the leasing of capital equipment to be used by the military services. Advocates of leasing capital equipment have argued that leases can enable the Department to obtain new equipment without significant upfront funding. Opponents of such leases have argued that this approach shifts today’s budget problems to future generations, limiting the flexibility of future leaders to address emerging national security issues.

What are your views on leasing of capital equipment, and when, if ever, do you consider such leasing to be a viable mechanism for providing capabilities to the Department?

**Answer.** In general, I believe the acquisition team should keep every single management tool available in our toolbox, and the acquisition team should make judicious choices about the use of these tools. I consider leasing of capital equipment to be a viable mechanism for providing capabilities to the Department in a limited number of circumstances. In general, I believe that a lease should be cost effective
for the DOD unless there are additional, compelling reasons for use of a lease. Leases are rarely suitable for the acquisition of major military systems and should not be used just to avoid upfront investment costs.

**Question.** The Air Force proposal in 2001 to lease 100 tanker aircraft was severely criticized by a series of independent reviewers—including the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research Service, the National Defense University, the GAO, and the DOD Inspector General (IG)—before it was finally cancelled.

What do you believe were the major problems with the tanker lease proposal?

**Answer.** The proposal has been critiqued by a series of independent reviewers—including the Congressional Budget Office, the Congressional Research Service, the National Defense University, the GAO, and the DOD IG. The reviews generally suggested there was a lack of transparency and accountability within the Department. If confirmed, I will continue to work to ensure that the lessons learned are incorporated into the training, education, and business processes of the Department.

As an observer of the tanker lease proposal, I was concerned about two significant issues. First, I believe the proposal needed a high quality, accurate cost analysis to inform the deliberations. A proposal of this scope may have also merited a concurrent, independent cost analysis. The cost and a number of other factors should have been weighed and debated in a more transparent process. Second, I believe the Air Force had not carefully assessed the Service’s ability to purchase the tankers at the end of the lease within their projected budgets beyond the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). A second lease would have been costly to the taxpayer. Alternatively, it would also have been very expensive to slow or break other acquisition programs in order to budget for the buyout of the lease just beyond the FYDP.

**Question.** What lessons do you believe the DOD should learn from the failed effort to lease tanker aircraft?

**Answer.** The undertaking of an acquisition program of such a magnitude needs to be fully transparent and consider the concerns of all the stakeholders. Also, as is the case in virtually every acquisition program, the DOD needed to fully understand the life cycle cost issues, including buyout of the lease, and realistically assess the affordability of the program within the reasonable projections of the long-term budget.

**TANKER RECAPITALIZATION**

**Question.** Before the final KC–X Request for Proposals (RFP) was disseminated, the Air Force briefed Congress on the benefits to the Department of continuous competition over the life of the KC–X program, particularly in view of the fact that modernizing the tanker fleet is projected to take several decades. The assertion was made that, consistent with experience, competition would provide the best product for the Department at the best price.

What are your views on whether the current acquisition strategy supporting the KC–X tanker program should have the benefit of competition beyond the first 80 aircraft?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will carefully review the KC–X tanker program acquisition strategy. While it is possible the program could benefit from competition beyond the initial procurement, I think there would have to be clear and compelling potential for cost savings for the taxpayers that would offset the potential cost increases of a new competition, an additional non-recurring investment for development, and a life cycle premium for different type model series aircraft. The additional costs may be offset by the potential benefits of competition as well as allowing the insertion of beneficial new technology to the fleet. Frankly, it would be very difficult to accurately assess all of these factors today, thus I believe that it is premature to make this decision at this point in time.

**Question.** Do you agree or disagree with the findings of the IG’s report?

**Answer.** I understand that the DOD IG report on the Air Force KC–X Aerial Refueling Tanker Aircraft Program of May 30, 2007, found that the Air Force did not include in the KC–X acquisition strategy a requirement to obtain accurate, complete, and current cost and pricing data to determine the reasonableness of the contractor's proposed price for the noncompetitive portion of the KC–X aircraft acquisition.

I also understand that the Air Force concurred with the finding and will update the acquisition strategy for the Milestone B decision, anticipated by the end of 2007. If confirmed, I will further review the IG report as appropriate.

**Question.** What actions would you take if confirmed, to ensure that the appropriate level of oversight will be possible and will occur on the KC–X program?

**Answer.** As an Acquisition Category (ACAT) 1D program, the milestone decision authority for KC–X is the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE), USD(AT&L). As
you are aware, the Defense Acquisition System includes a robust senior level review process to advise the DAE in his oversight of program planning and execution. If confirmed, I will exercise all appropriate and necessary oversight of this program, and the Department will manage the program with transparency and openness.

UNSOULICITED C–17 GLOBEMASTER PROCUREMENT PROPOSAL

Question. In March 2007, the contractor supplying the C–17 aircraft directed its long-lead suppliers for that aircraft to cease work on parts which were not already under contract. The contractor subsequently instructed its suppliers to resume work on providing parts for 10 new C–17s beyond the number already on order with the Air Force and its international customers. In a statement issued on June 19, 2007, the contractor explained its action citing "increased bipartisan congressional support" and "increasing signs that the U.S. Air Force has requirements for 30 additional C–17s." The contractor reportedly told these suppliers that it would "commit [its] resources to provide long-lead funding for the C–17s to be delivered after mid-2009" and that this "action will protect the option in the months ahead for the cost-effective acquisition of C–17s in fiscal year 2008."

What is your view of the responsibility (if any) that the Government bears when a contractor decides to build a product on speculation that the Government might decide to buy it in the future?

Answer. The government bears no responsibility and should not encourage such an action.

Question. Do you believe that the Government’s responsibility for such a decision changes if Government officials encourage the contractor to do so? In your view, would such communications by a Government official be appropriate?

Answer. The government should not encourage such an action, and it would be inappropriate to have any such communications other than via formal contracting actions.

Question. Are you aware of any such communications in this case?

Answer. No, I am not aware of any such communications.

Question. What are your views, if any, on whether the Air Force should purchase additional C–17s that are not reflected in the Future Years Defense Plan or the Air Force’s Unfunded Priority List?

Answer. Force structure decisions should be based on military judgment and sound planning and analysis regarding the future needs for joint warfighting.

Question. If the Air Force were to pursue such purchases, what are your views on how they should be funded? Do you believe that any such funding should come from within the Air Force budget?

Answer. Any such purchase should be programmed and budgeted via the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution system.

LEAD SHIP FUNDING

Question. In recent years, the DOD has shifted its policy for funding the construction of first ships of a class. While the Department previously funded such vessels in Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy, they are now funded in R&D accounts. This change was implemented to provide additional management flexibility, but it has also resulted in reduced visibility over cost, schedule, and performance. For example, the scope of problems with the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was identified by the Navy only months before available funds were exhausted.

Do you believe that funding the construction of first ships of a class in R&D accounts is in the best interest of the DOD? If so, why?

Answer. As the Navy acquisition executive, I believed strongly in funding the lead ship of a class with research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funds. It is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately predict the exact cost of a lead ship of a class. When cost growth develops, the mechanisms in place between Congress and the Pentagon for adjusting to unexpected cost increases can often result in further delays and therefore even more cost increases. Indeed, the Ship Cost Adjustment process, and the restriction to use funds in the year of appropriation for paying ship cost increases is extremely cumbersome and difficult. This process frankly encourages poor management choices and late recognition of the need for funds.

It was my expectation that the DOD would make budget adjustments for the lead ship, if necessary, in the annual RDT&E budget. Those budgets would be fully visible to Congress and subject to Congress’ authorization and appropriation oversight. Congress would actually have far greater visibility and oversight into our management of the lead ship. There is absolutely no reason for there to be less visibility into the cost of a lead ship funded in the RDT&E account. I am committed to ensuring the DOD and Congress have full visibility into the cost of our platforms. The
Department always maintains an estimate at completion for the cost of a ship regardless of the type of funds used. The alternative is to budget a best estimate for a challenging lead ship and wait several years to determine whether the large block of single year funds has been sufficient. Indeed, I worry that the early phase decisions in a construction program lasting several years are not adequately cost constrained because of the availability of a large block of single year funds provided to cover the entire cost of the lead ship. I believe the annual appropriation of R&D funds would actually put greater pressure on the acquisition team and industry to make careful decisions about managing funds at each step of the lead ship construction process.

**Question.** What steps, if any, do you believe the Department and Congress should take to address the lack of visibility that can result from funding first ships of a class in R&D accounts?

**Answer.** I do not agree that funding the lead ship of a class results in a lack of visibility into the cost of a ship. The visibility into the cost of the lead ship is no better if the lead ship is authorized and appropriated one single year block of funds for the entire cost of the lead ship to spend over several years in procurement. Indeed, Congress has been concerned in the past to learn years later of the need for funds to complete the construction of previously authorized and appropriated lead ships. Funding lead ships in RDT&E actually provides Congress far greater visibility into the cost and progress on a lead ship. The DOD will provide Congress an estimate of the total cost of the lead ship and indicate the annual increments in the RDT&E accounts. Congress will get an annual update on the projected cost to complete the lead ship and will have the opportunity to review and approve every cost increase and adjustment. Indeed, Congress will have insight into possible cost growth far earlier than a traditional lead ship procurement process where the total initial cost estimate for the ship is almost spent, at taxpayer expense, and the DOD and Congress are faced with new bills and a significant sunk cost.

**Question.** What is your opinion on the use of fixed-price contracts for lead ships?

**Answer.** The value and risk associated with using fixed-price contracts for lead ships must be assessed in conjunction with the technological challenges associated with each ship program. I support Congress’ approach as set forth in section 818 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, which directed the Milestone Decision Authority to select the appropriate type of contract, after reviewing the complexity and technological risk associated with the program.

**LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP**

**Question.** Secretary Winter recently cancelled the contract for one of the vessels in the LCS program as a result of the Navy’s inability to bring costs under control in that program. According to the Office of the IG of the Navy, one of the contributing factors in the poor cost performance on that program may have been the inexperience and lack of qualifications of the Navy Program Manager.

What lessons should be learned from the problems experienced to date with the LCS procurement?

**Answer.** I have not reviewed the LCS program in adequate detail to determine the lessons learned. However, based on some cursory reviews, I believe there are some initial lessons. First, every program requires a valid and effective earned value management system in order to provide industry and the government with an accurate, measurable sense of progress. This was a serious deficiency for the LCS program. Second, acquisition program management is a contact sport, and new ways of doing business require even greater diligence and management attention. The DOD has constantly learned that controlling requirements adjustments requires constant attention and discipline. LCS affirmed that there is another level of requirements, government technical authority, which requires determined management and discipline. To be certain, industry must perform, and it is not clear that the level of industry performance on LCS was adequate. However, the government has a responsibility to operate in a manner that can help enable success and in a manner that is consistent with industry planning expectations. The interpretation of technical authority and the translation of those changes into performance made LCS delivery to budget impossible for both government and industry.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you expect to apply those “lessons learned” in overseeing the management of both the LCS and other major defense acquisition programs?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will continue the DOD’s efforts to ensure that acquisition programs have management baselines which can be tracked with an earned value management system. If confirmed, I will also continue to evaluate appropriate addi-
tional steps that should be taken to provide effective oversight of major defense ac-
quision programs.

**Question.** As the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN(RDA)) at the time, what was your role in selecting the former LCS Program Manager and in approving his qualifications for that position?

**Answer.** My recollection is that I approved the assignment of the former LCS program manager for the position with reservations. During my tenure as ASN(RDA), I generally sought to avoid approving waivers and to reject officers for key acquisition positions unless those officers met the acquisition experience and training criteria for those positions. The military personnel detailing system generally put forward one or more candidates, for assignment to open positions. In this case, the military personnel system felt strongly that an experienced operational officer with strong leadership skills should manage the LCS program, despite his limited acquisition experience. The military personnel system also felt that strong program executive officer (PEO) oversight and supporting acquisition talent would fill any gaps. There are many instances where I rejected personnel because of the lack of acquisition experience and training. In this case, I regretfully did not reject this assignment, acknowledging strong views from the military personnel system.

**Question.** What steps need to be taken, in your view, to ensure that officers selected for program management positions have sufficient training and qualification to succeed?

**Answer.** We have a very capable work force from which to select our prospective program managers. I would emphasize career management including selection, training, tenure and mentoring of program managers. Succession planning and a rigorous selection process are key tools for obtaining capable military and civilian program managers. As part of their career development process, officers seeking to manage programs must pursue the training necessary to be certified and have significant experience in acquisition management. I think the Department should only in the rarest cases, if ever, assign an officer without requisite acquisition credentials and experience to a program management or PEO position.

**SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT**

**Question.** Problems with computer software have caused significant delays and cost overruns in a number of major defense programs. Section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 required DOD to establish a program to improve the software acquisition process. What is the status of DOD’s efforts to improve software development in major weapon systems?

**Answer.** I understand that the Department has established a Directorate for Systems and Software Engineering focused on improving software assurance. The Directorate supports acquisition success through software policy, guidance and best practices, reinforced through program reviews; improves the state of practices for software engineering; provides leadership and advocacy through outreach initiatives; and fosters software resources to meet DOD needs. If confirmed, I will evaluate as appropriate the DOD’s progress and plans in this area.

**Question.** What additional steps would you take, if confirmed, to address delays and cost overruns associated with problems in the development of software for major weapon systems?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would generally initiate an internal and/or independent executive review of the major systems which have experienced software delays and cost overruns.

**ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES**

**Question.** When a required capability is defined, one method to ensure that capability is provided in the most cost-effective manner is through the conduct of an analysis of alternatives (AOA). This analysis not only helps to present alternatives, but also assists in the determination of key performance parameters and the threshold and objective values of these parameters.

Under what circumstances, if any, do you believe it is appropriate for the Department to proceed with the acquisition of a major system without first conducting an AOA?

**Answer.** I do not believe it is appropriate for the Department to proceed with the acquisition of a major Acquisition Category I (ACAT I) level system without first conducting an AOA. I do believe there are opportunities to improve the process by making AOA’s tailored, more timely and appropriately scoped.

**Question.** If confirmed, what will be your position on conducting analyses of alternatives for the programs for which you will be the Milestone Decision Authority?
Answer. If confirmed, I will generally expect that an appropriate AOA will be conducted before any program for which I am the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) can proceed into development.

RAPID ACQUISITION

Question. Section 811 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 gave the Secretary of Defense new authority to waive certain statutes and regulations where necessary to acquire equipment that is urgently needed to avoid combat fatalities. What plans do you have, if confirmed, to use the rapid acquisition authority provided by section 811?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support the Secretary's use of the Rapid Acquisition Authority when it becomes necessary to waive certain statutes and regulations that inhibit our ability to rapidly acquire equipment that is urgently needed to avoid combat fatalities.

Question. Do you believe that the Department has the authority and flexibility it needs to acquire products needed to avoid combat fatalities? If not, what additional authority or flexibility do you believe is needed?

Answer. The Department has significant authority and flexibility to meet urgent operational needs, and the Rapid Acquisition Authority granted by Congress further complements that authority and flexibility. I believe the Department must continue its efforts to respond more quickly and effectively to resolve urgent operational needs for our forces in the field.

If confirmed, I will evaluate the need for additional changes as these needs are identified, and I will make appropriate recommendations.

Question. When the Department acquires equipment under section 811 or other authority without first undertaking full operational testing and evaluation, what steps do you believe the Department should take to ensure the long-term effectiveness and sustainability of the equipment?

Answer. I believe the Department takes appropriate steps when it acquires equipment under section 811 or other authority. There is prudent risk management to ensure that our forces receive equipment that is appropriately safe, interoperable, suitable and effective for its intended purpose. When the solutions to immediate warfighter needs transition to programs of record, steps are taken to continue to verify their long-term effectiveness and to ensure adequate sustainment and training plans for the equipment are developed.

SERVICES CONTRACTING

Question. Over the past decade, there has been a dramatic increase in the volume of services purchased by the DOD. At the request of the committee, the GAO has compared DOD's practices for the management of services contracts to the practices of best performers in the private sector. GAO concluded that leading companies have achieved significant savings by insisting upon greater visibility and management over their services contracts and by conducting so-called "spend" analyses to find more efficient ways to manage their service contractors. Section 801 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 required DOD to move in this direction. While DOD has initiated efforts to establish a management structure and leverage its purchasing power, we understand such efforts remain in various stages of implementation.

What is the status of these efforts, and do you believe the Department is providing appropriate stewardship over service contracts?

Answer. The DOD has a number of efforts underway in an effort to improve management of service contracts. If confirmed, I will review our progress and plans for these initiatives as necessary.

Question. Do you believe that the Department should conduct a comprehensive analysis of its spending on contract services, as recommended by GAO?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support near-term efforts to conduct spend analyses to develop a better understanding of how the DOD buys services.

Question. What steps would you take, if confirmed, to improve the Department's management of its contracts for services?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the Department's initiatives and plans to manage this set of issues to ensure that we are making the necessary progress in providing oversight and management of the Department's acquisitions of services.

Question. The Office of Federal Procurement Policy and the DOD have long agreed that Federal agencies could achieve significant savings and improved performance by moving to performance-based services contracting (PBSC). Most recently, the Army Environmental Program informed the committee that it has
achieved average savings of 27 percent over a period of several years as a result of moving to fixed-price, performance-based contracts for environmental remediation. Section 802 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, as amended, established performance goals for increasing the use of PBSC in DOD service contracts.

What is the status of the Department’s efforts to increase the use of PBSC in its service contracts?

Answer. I do not have direct experience in this area. However, I would be pleased to work with Congress on this issue, if confirmed.

Question. What additional steps do you believe the Department needs to take to increase the use of PBSC and meet the goals established in section 802?

Answer. If confirmed, this is an issue which I would have to review in detail in order to be able to make recommendations to the committee.

INTERAGENCY CONTRACTING

Question. GAO recently placed interagency contracting—the use by one agency of contracts awarded by other agencies—on its list of high-risk programs and operations. While interagency contracts provide a much-needed simplified method for procuring commonly used goods and services, GAO has found that the dramatic growth of interagency contracts, the failure to clearly allocate responsibility between agencies, and the incentives created by fee-for-services arrangements, have combined to expose the DOD and other Federal agencies to the risk of significant abuse and management. The DOD IG and the General Services Administration (GSA) IG have identified a long series of problems with interagency contracts, including lack of acquisition planning, inadequate competition, excessive use of time and materials contracts, improper use of expired funds, inappropriate expenditures, and failure to monitor contractor performance. DOD, in conjunction with the GSA and the Office of Management and Budget, is taking a number of actions to improve training and guidance on the use of this contract approach.

If confirmed, what steps will you take to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the actions currently underway or planned regarding DOD’s use of other agencies’ contracts?

Answer. If confirmed, I would continue the efforts outlined in the January 1, 2005 policy on the “Proper Use of Non-DOD Contracts.” Adequate data must be obtained so that DOD and the assisting agencies know which DOD activities are utilizing non-DOD contracts to meet their needs and to specifically identify what the assisting agencies are acquiring on our behalf. The Department should continue the coordination between OSD and the assisting agencies (i.e., GSA, Interior, Treasury, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)). The DOD should also seek to understand the driving forces behind these activities, including the possibility that the DOD is not adequately manned to independently execute and manage these efforts.

Question. Do you believe additional authority or measures are needed to hold DOD or other agency personnel accountable for their use of interagency contracts?

Answer. Given what I know today, I believe the authority and regulations are sufficient in terms of accountability. If confirmed, I will review and evaluate these issues as necessary.

Question. Do you believe contractors have any responsibility for assuring that the work requested by DOD personnel is within the scope of their contract?

Answer. The primary responsibility for ensuring work is within the scope of a contract rests with the contracting officer.

Question. Do you believe that DOD’s continued heavy reliance on outside agencies to do award and manage contracts on its behalf is a sign that the Department has failed to adequately staff its own acquisition system?

Answer. I believe the DOD should seek to understand the driving forces behind these activities, including the possibility that the DOD is not adequately manned to independently execute and manage these efforts. I believe the Department may determine that there are areas where staffing is inadequate.

“BUY AMERICA”

Question. “Buy America” issues have been the source of considerable controversy in recent years. As a result, there have been a number of legislative efforts to place restrictions on the purchase of defense products from foreign sources. What benefits do you believe the Department obtains from international participation in the defense industrial base?

Answer. International sales, purchases, and licensed production ensure U.S. warfighters have access to the best technology in the world. International participa-
ition also promotes international defense cooperation, contributes to operational interoperability, and promotes cost savings. These arrangements rationalize the defense equipment supplier base to achieve the greatest efficiency in equipping our collective forces.

**Question.** Under what conditions, if any, would you support the imposition of domestic source restrictions for a particular product?

**Answer.** In certain instances involving national security and the preservation of a key defense technology or production capability, domestic source restrictions may be necessary. The Department has (and has exercised) the authority to “self-impose” such domestic source restrictions using the authority of 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(3). These restrictions then are included in the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement.

**Question.** Section 831 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure that the United States firms and United States employment in the defense sector are not disadvantaged by unilateral procurement practices by foreign governments, such as the imposition of offset agreements in a manner that undermines the United States industrial base.

What steps, if any, do you believe the Department should take to implement this requirement?

**Answer.** I understand that the DOD has established an interagency team composed of the Departments of Defense, Labor, Commerce, and State and the U.S. Trade Representative whose charter is to consult with other nations about limiting the adverse effects of offsets. I think the team should continue its work. If confirmed, I would review many proposed actions to ensure they will not harm the economy, defense industrial base, defense production, or defense preparedness.

**SPECIALTY METALS**

**Question.** Section 842 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 recodified the specialty metals provision of the Berry Amendment in section 2533b of title 10, U.S.C. On January 17, 2007, the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy issued a memorandum implementing the non-availability exception in section 2533b. The January 17, 2007, memorandum states: “Several factors can and should be taken into consideration in making a determination that compliant specialty metal is not available. Are compliant parts, assemblies or components available in the required form as and when needed? What are the costs and time delays if requalification of certain parts of the system is required? What will be the impact on the program’s delivery schedule, program costs, and mission needs?”

Do you believe that section 2533b provides the Department the flexibility that it needs to ensure that it can purchase weapon systems and parts in a timely manner for the national defense?

**Answer.** It is my understanding that the provision permits the Department to utilize a non-availability exception when the Department is not able to access compliant suppliers. If confirmed, I will review this provision for a more complete understanding of flexibility for assurance of our weapon system purchases.

**Question.** Do you believe that the steps taken by the Department to implement section 2533b have been consistent with the requirements of that provision?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will complete any necessary reviews of the steps taken to ensure the consistent implementation of the provision.

**Question.** If confirmed, what additional steps, if any, would you plan to take to ensure that section 2533b is implemented in a manner that is consistent with the interests of the DOD?

**Answer.** The DOD has established a Strategic Materials Protection Board, in accordance with Section 843 of Public Law 109–364. If confirmed, I will become the Chairman of that Board. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that the Board examines national security and domestic availability issues associated with specialty metals and other strategic materials critical to national security.

**Question.** What changes, if any, would you recommend be made to section 2533b?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will complete appropriate reviews of the implementation of section 2533b and make any necessary change recommendations.

**Question.** On July 2, 2007, the DOD proposed to amend the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement to waive application of section 2533b to commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) items. The Federal Register Notice states: “Exercise of this statutory COTS waiver is critical to DOD’s access to the commercial marketplace.”

Do you support the Department’s decision to exercise this exemption authority?
Answer. In general, the acquisition of COTS products is one way to consider cost, schedule and performance alternatives. If confirmed, I will review the Department’s decision as appropriate.

Question. What is your understanding of the extent to which COTS items are embedded in major weapon systems purchased by the DOD?
Answer. To my knowledge, the Department has conducted no definitive studies on the extent to which COTS items are embedded in major weapons systems. If confirmed, it may be appropriate to ask major weapon system programs to review the extent of COTS item usage in military systems.

Question. Do you believe that the DOD has sufficient market power to persuade producers of COTS items to alter their commercial supply chains to comply with the requirements of section 2533b?
Answer. When the Department is not the predominant buyer, it has limited leverage in those markets. There is little incentive for commercial companies to modify their procedures to meet the peculiar requirements of the Department, particularly if the Department is a small player in the market and changes would affect the firm’s competitiveness.

Question. Do you believe that it would be in the Department’s interest to do so?
Answer. In general, it is in the Departments best interest to get the best value. If confirmed, I will review this area as appropriate.

THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

Question. What is your view of the current state of the U.S. defense industry?
Answer. I believe the U.S. defense industry is a market leader and innovator for products and services. Nevertheless, there are and will always be challenges the Department must address. If confirmed, I would work within the Department and with Congress to address them.

Question. Do you support further consolidation of the U.S. defense industry?
Answer. There should be no blanket policy of encouraging or discouraging further consolidation or divestiture. Each proposed transaction must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis in the context of the individual market, the changing dynamics of that market, and the need to preserve competition. Generally, I am concerned about consolidation trends which have had an adverse impact on competition opportunities for the DOD.

Question. What is your position on foreign investment in the U.S. defense sector?
Answer. In general, I am not opposed to foreign investment in the United States, provided there are checks and balances to protect our national security.

Question. What steps, if any, do you believe the DOD should take to ensure the continued health of the U.S. defense industry?
Answer. The Department should continue to take actions and make decisions that strengthen that portion of the industrial base that supports defense. The Department also should continue to focus its acquisition strategies, both for development and production, in a manner that encourages true competition and drives innovation—seeking to draw nontraditional suppliers into the defense enterprise.

ROLE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS

Question. Concerns have been expressed that over time the purview of the office of the USD(AT&L) has been diminished. The Department has established a separate set of regulations for the acquisition of space systems. The MDA has the primary role for missile defense systems and has established its own acquisition approach for these systems. Air Force acquisition scandals and the use of Other Transaction Authority on the Future Combat Systems program have raised questions as to the effectiveness of oversight provided by the USD(AT&L).

Do you believe that the USD(AT&L) has the authority necessary to provide effective oversight over major acquisition programs of the military departments and defense agencies?
Answer. At this point, I believe the USD(AT&L) has the authority needed to execute the responsibilities of the position. Those responsibilities include oversight of both Missile Defense and Space Systems acquired by the Department of Defense. I believe that it is important for the USD(AT&L) to fully exercise those authorities working in partnership with the Services and Agencies.

Question. Do you believe that the USD(AT&L) should have additional authority to reverse acquisition decisions of the military departments, where the USD(AT&L) believes it is necessary to do so in the public interest?
Answer. At this point, I do not believe additional authority is required. The USD(AT&L) reviews ACAT I programs and has the ability to assume cognizance...
over any other acquisition program in the department in which the USD(AT&L) has a "special interest." I do believe that the offices in USD(AT&L) need transparency and visibility into all Service and agency acquisition efforts. There may be cases where the management team in USD(AT&L) should use available authorities to ensure both public interest as well as greater jointness and interoperability.

Question. In your view, should the Service Acquisition Executives (SAEs) report directly to the USD(AT&L)?

Answer. The current arrangement properly recognizes the responsibility of the Secretary of each military department for all affairs of that department, including supplying and equipping, and it facilitates a strong tie between the SAEs and the other military department leadership, including those developing capability needs. The USD (AT&L) currently has adequate authority to provide guidance and direction to the SAEs through the military department secretaries. However, if confirmed, I would review what changes, if any, are appropriate to improve oversight and communication.

Question. Do you believe that the Service Chiefs should play a role in the acquisition chain of command?

Answer. The Service Chiefs have a key role to play in the development of capability needs and in the planning and allocation of resources consistent with those needs. I do not believe service chiefs should play a formal role in the acquisition chain of command.

Question. What role should USD(AT&L) perform in the oversight and acquisition of joint programs, the acquisition of space systems, and missile defense systems?

Answer. The USD(AT&L) has cognizance over the entire acquisition process including the oversight and acquisition of joint, space, and missile defense systems. I believe this broad, corporate oversight role is vital and should be maintained and fully exercised.

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

Question. Over the last decade, DOD has reduced the size of its acquisition workforce by almost half, without undertaking any systematic planning or analysis to ensure that it would have the specific skills and competencies needed to meet DOD’s current and future needs. Additionally, more than half of DOD’s current workforce will be eligible for early or regular retirement in the next 5 years. While DOD has started the process of planning its long-term workforce needs, GAO reports that the Department does not yet have a comprehensive strategic workforce plan needed to guide its efforts.

In your view, what are the critical skills, capabilities, and tools that DOD’s workforce needs for the future? What steps will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the workforce will, in fact, possess them?

Answer. In general, some of the most pressing critical skills needed for future success are program management, systems engineering, cost estimating, logistics, contracting, and test and evaluation. I believe that meeting warfighter needs demands continued leveraging of technology, and this means we need a strong S&T component of the acquisition workforce. If confirmed, I will support initiatives to increase funding for workforce recruiting, development and retention initiatives to ensure we have the right skills and capabilities. If confirmed, I would hope to take steps to improve the speed, agility and flexibility of DOD’s processes for recruiting and hiring these critical members of the workforce.

Question. Do you agree that the Department needs a comprehensive human capital plan, including a gap analysis and specific recruiting, retention and training goals, to guide the development of its acquisition workforce?

Answer. I believe that a comprehensive human capital strategic plan is a useful tool for guiding development of the acquisition, technology and logistics workforce. I understand that the Under Secretary for Defense, Personnel and Readiness, is leading department-wide efforts to ensure comprehensive human capital planning. I will work closely with his staff, the Services, and Congress to successfully implement responsive workforce initiatives. I believe successful execution of this plan will require process improvements which allow DOD to effectively compete for human capital.

Question. Do you believe that DOD’s workforce is large enough to perform the tasks assigned to it? Do you support congressionally-mandated cuts to the acquisition workforce, and do you think further cuts are necessary?

Answer. I am not aware of any legislation pending which would reduce the acquisition workforce. The appropriate size of the acquisition workforce is a very important issue that I will engage in partnership with the Services to ensure we have
the workforce size, capability and capacity to meet critically important acquisition needs. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the committee on this challenge.

Question. Has the Department had difficulty in attracting and retaining new staff to come into the acquisition workforce? If so, what steps do you think are necessary to attract talented new hires?

Answer. During the past 5 years, data suggests that the Department has experienced both success and challenges in attracting and retaining acquisition workforce members. If confirmed, I will review the steps being taken and provide guidance for continued improvement to address this important area.

Question. What are your views regarding assertions that the acquisition workforce is losing its technical and management expertise and is beginning to rely too much on support contractors, Federally-Funded Research and Development Centers, and, in some cases, prime contractors for this expertise?

Answer. I do have concerns about our human capital in the acquisition workforce and am keenly aware of challenges having to do with technical expertise from my role as the DDR&E and Chief Technology Officer of the Department. If confirmed, I will place a high priority on efforts to attract, develop, and retain expertise in the technical and managerial fields. Technical and managerial expertise provided by the private sector has been, and I believe will continue to be, an important contribution to national security. If confirmed, I intend to ensure there is an appropriate balance of skills suited to the circumstances and activities to be performed.

Question. What is the appropriate tenure for program managers and PEOs to ensure continuity in major programs?

Answer. The assignment period for program managers and PEOs must facilitate both continuity and individual accountability. On May 25, 2007, the USD(AT&L) issued a memorandum that expanded on existing policy. The memo emphasized the statutory requirement (10 U.S.C. 1734) for the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) to ensure a written tenure agreement is prepared when a program manager is assigned to an ACAT I or II program and highlighted that the tenure period for program managers of major defense programs shall correspond to the major milestone closest to 4 years or as tailored by the CAE based on unique program requirements, such as significant milestones, events or efforts. If confirmed, I would monitor implementation of these tenure requirements to ensure continuity in major acquisition programs. I believe that these tenure requirements are very important, and the tenure requirements should be honored with only extremely rare exceptions.

LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT

Question. The Department is increasingly relying on civilian contractors in combat areas for maintenance and support functions. How do you view this trend? Do you believe that the Department has drawn a clear and appropriate line between functions that should be performed by DOD personnel and functions that may be performed by contractors in a combat area?

Answer. The U.S. Armed Forces have always been supported by civilian contractors, whether at peace or war. The post-Cold War force reduction of military forces, the "peace dividend," is the driving force for where we are today. In order to maintain desired combat capability, clearly an "inherently governmental mission," in the smaller force, the Department reduced the military logistical support force structure. Contract capabilities fill the void and provide support which can be drawn upon only as needed to perform functions that must be accomplished to support the military forces. DOD has, consistent with available resources, their allocation, and mission requirements, defined those roles which remain inherently governmental in nature. For example, only military forces may operateensively under rules of engagement. Security contractors are only permitted to operate defensively and must conform to a separate set of instructions, the Rules on the Use of Force. I believe this is an important topic in the context of modern warfare, and if confirmed, I will examine these issues carefully.

Question. Transforming supply chain management will require not only process improvements but major investments in technology and equipment ranging from the use of passive Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags to improve asset visibility to procuring more trucks to improve theater distribution. What steps do you believe are necessary to improve the management of DOD's supply chain?

Answer. DOD Logistics is a complex business supporting all aspects of the Department's supply chain. I understand that there are a number of focused efforts underway to strengthen the effectiveness of joint logistics and sustainment performance:
Integrating life cycle management principles into acquisition and sustainment programs to provide better life cycle reliability and materiel readiness for our weapons systems and equipment.

Implementing programs to strengthen Supply Chain Operations to include initiatives under the leadership of our designated Distribution Process Owner, the United States Transportation Command; as well as Continuous Process Improvements such as the joint regional inventory management initiative; and technology improvements, such use of RFID technology.

If confirmed, I intend to continue these efforts and seek to continue the trend of improved performance.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Question. What, in your view, is the role and value of S&T programs in meeting the Department's transformation goals and in confronting irregular, catastrophic, traditional and disruptive threats?

Answer. Over the past 2 years, I have had the honor of being the DDR&E, the Department's Chief Technology Officer. In that role, I have been the spokesman for the value of the Department's S&T program. I believe S&T is a vital element for modernizing and transforming the capabilities of the military forces. Through new capabilities brought about by the S&T program, we should enhance the Nation's ability to confront irregular, catastrophic, traditional, and disruptive threats. This past year, the DDR&E team brought forward a number of new programs specifically focused on enhancing our capabilities in these new threat areas. For instance, we are establishing a biometrics program to identify people; we are establishing a program to tag, track, and locate objects of interest; we established a program in human, social, cultural and behavioral modeling, among others. Each should deliver a capability to confront new world threats.

Question. If confirmed, what direction will you provide regarding funding targets and priorities for the Department's long-term research efforts?

Answer. Long-term research has been, and will continue to be, very important to maintaining a supply of new capabilities to our warfighters. Any funding targets or goals should be balanced against other department goals, so I can't give an absolute funding target for long-term research. As DDR&E, I strive to maintain and grow the basic research investment of the Department to provide new opportunities. If confirmed, maintaining and strengthening long-term research would be a goal.

Question. What specific metrics would you use, if confirmed, to assess whether the Department is making adequate investments in its basic research programs?

Answer. Under my direction, DOD has begun the assembly of a science and engineering investment database. A comprehensive database is the initial, key step to providing transparency across all organizations in the S&T enterprise and will form the baseline for future discussions. The database should give us a better picture of our enterprise investment in basic research and the ability to review and evaluate the degree of investment concentration in specific fields or technologies. By its very nature, the output of basic research is difficult to track. In general, basic research output can be measured in at least three areas: (1) New knowledge—publications in reference journals, (2) Intellectual capital—students supported, degrees awarded, (3) Tech transitions—new knowledge (scientific findings) picked up in technology and development programs by the Services and industry. One overarching goal is to ensure organizations funded by DOD and the broader research community possess an understanding of our missions and their technological areas of need. However, I believe we must move beyond these traditional measures and identify relevant metrics to ensure adequate investment in basic research.

Question. Do you feel that there is sufficient coordination between and among the S&T programs of the military Services and defense agencies?

Answer. During my tenure as the DDR&E, we instituted a new process, which we call Reliance 21, to improve the coordination between the military Services and departments. This new process was developed with the S&T executives of all the components. The DOD's S&T stakeholders instituted this change to improve the coordination and collaboration among the components. The Reliance 21 process will improve coordination, but we need to let the process mature before we determine if it is sufficient. The DDR&E team has also instituted a detailed database to catalogue and make available details on the S&T program across the department—again, this is a work in progress, but highlights that I believe the enterprise has an opportunity to more efficiently and effectively coordinate S&T projects and investments.
In your view, what is the appropriate role of the Chief Technology Officer of the DOD?

Answer. I believe the Chief Technology Officer should provide the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary and Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics advice on the “state of the art” in militarily relevant technologies and oversee the planning execution of a balanced, coordinated and proactive DOD S&T program.

DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

In your view, does the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) report to the DDR&E?

Answer. Organizationally, the Director of DARPA reports to the DDR&E. I believe it is essential for the Director of DARPA to report to the DDR&E in order to permit the DDR&E to meet his or her responsibilities as the Chief Technology Officer.

In your view, has the authority provided by section 1101 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 been used appropriately and effectively by DARPA to attract and retain a highly qualified technical workforce?

Answer. DARPA's implementation of the section 1101 authority has been an unqualified success. In fact, the Department modeled the Highly Qualified Expert program based on DARPA's authority and its success with it. DARPA has been able to attract and retain highly qualified technical experts for limited term appointments. The ability to hire these technical experts on limited terms, expeditiously and more comparably and competitively with industry standards, that continues to make this program successful. For example, under this authority, DARPA has been able to make an employment offer and have the program manager report for duty in as few as 6 working days. It would be helpful to be able to exercise these authorities more broadly throughout the DOD.

Do you see the need for any changes in section 1101?

Answer. I understand that DARPA’s management of 1101 program has gone very well over the years. I am not aware of any need for changes at this time.

In your view, does DARPA’s current program strike an appropriate balance between investments in near-term technology programs that are directly tied to current battlefield needs and investments in longer-term research efforts that seek to develop future capabilities? Should DARPA be focused principally on longer-term threats and capabilities?

Answer. DARPA remains a vital element of the overall DOD research and engineering program, and the Department’s overall modernization and transformation efforts. I do not believe that DARPA should be exclusively focused on longer-term threats and capabilities. Technology development and maturation follows different models, some of which are integrated from far-term to near-term to fielding prototypes. It is reasonable for DARPA to be engaged in technologies at different levels of maturity. I believe the hallmark of DARPA should continue to be a focus on higher risk activity.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSITION

The Department’s efforts to quickly transition technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the last few years. Challenges remain to institutionalizing the transition of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons systems and platforms.

What impediments to technology transition do you see within the Department?

Answer. The primary challenge that impedes technology transition is the lack of early and frequent interaction between the S&T and acquisition communities in an effort to create windows of opportunity for insertion of mature technology and to support proper and timely budgeting. Our current budget processes limit our flexibility to reallocate funds, posing another impediment to the Department’s opportunity to exploit and transition new technology. Finally, the growing aversion to risk in programs generates another impediment to technology transition. The military deeply fund agencies have made improvements in early planning and investing for technology transition, accelerating the movement of capabilities to the warfighter, and initiating mechanisms for bridge funding. The Department, needs to develop effective, strategic approaches to technology transition, particularly for uniquely joint and transformational capabilities.

Additionally, taking advantage of the plethora of worldwide innovation to achieve superiority and affordability is at odds with the linear, deliberate nature of traditional military acquisitions. Our programmatic, budgeting and contracting practices often deter involvement of nontraditional businesses. I believe the Department
should develop and implement a number of initiatives to improve outreach to, and participation by, these innovative, nontraditional suppliers.

*Question.* What steps will you take, if confirmed, to enhance the effectiveness of technology transition efforts?

*Answer.* As DDR&E, I have personally worked to advocate the transition of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations (ACTDs) and other S&T programs. I have also initiated process changes to enhance transition efforts. Further, I assigned the Assistant DUSD for Innovation and Technology Transition to assume the role of an advocate in a leadership position who is "driving transition every day." If confirmed, I will continue to support the acquisition team and all viable initiatives to improve the DOD's access to, and adoption of, the best technology solutions from all sources.

*Question.* What can be done from a budget, policy, and organizational standpoint to facilitate the transition of technologies from S&T programs into acquisition programs?

*Answer.* From a budget perspective, I believe it is important for the DOD to have S&T funds which are generally available and can be flexibly used to transition successful technology developments. A breakthrough technology development can languish for 12–18 months waiting for the budget process to provide funds which support final development and utilization in a military system.

From a policy perspective, I believe the DOD should return to some of the practices which have been historically effective. Greater utilization of prototypes offers the opportunity to mature technology, demonstrate the technology's potential to acquisition and operational personnel, enhance the management and systems engineering skills of our work force, and allow a lower risk SDD phase. Most importantly, such prototyping efforts would provide a useful tool for attracting scientist and engineers into the defense acquisition workforce and for inspiring our Nation's young people to pursue careers in science and engineering.

I am not aware of significant organizational issues or impediments at this time.

*Question.* Do you believe that the Department's S&T organizations have the ability to carry technologies to higher levels of maturity before handing them off to acquisition programs?

*Answer.* DOD S&T organizations are very capable of maturing technologies. However, as has been noted for many years, there is sometimes a "valley of death" between technology development efforts and acquisition program receptors. Throughout DOD, there are many efforts to bridge this valley of death. I believe it is important to encourage such efforts.

*Question.* Section 2359a(c) of title 10, U.S.C., requires the USD(AT&L) to carry out an initiative to facilitate the rapid transition of new technologies from S&T programs into acquisition programs and to designate a senior official of the Department to manage this initiative. If confirmed, would you expect to appoint a single technology transition advocate who would be responsible for promoting technology transition throughout the Department?

*Answer.* As DDR&E, I have asked the Assistant DUSD for Innovation and Technology Transition to lead efforts to drive technology transition every day. If confirmed, I will carefully evaluate additional opportunities and initiatives that can support the transition of technology to the warfighter.

**TEST AND EVALUATION**

*Question.* The Department has, on occasion, been criticized for failing to adequately test its major weapon systems before these systems are put into production.

What are your views about the degree of independence needed by the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) in ensuring the success of the Department's acquisition programs?

*Answer.* In general, I believe an independent DOT&E is critical to ensuring the Department's acquisition programs are realistically and adequately tested in their intended operational environment. If confirmed, I will seek the advice of the DOT&E on testing and evaluation issues.

*Question.* Are you concerned with the level of test and evaluation conducted by the contractors who are developing the systems to be tested?

*Answer.* In general, I believe contractors are an important and integral part of the test and evaluation process during system development. If confirmed, I will evaluate this area and expect to place greater emphasis on coordinating and integrating Contractor Test, Developmental Test, and Operational Test and Evaluation.

*Question.* What is the impact of rapid fielding requirements on the standard testing process?
Answer. Rapid fielding requirements place greater stress on the entire acquisition team, including the test and evaluation community. Traditional test and evaluation processes and procedures may not be adequately responsive for rapid fielding efforts. My limited experience suggests that the test and evaluation teams have worked very hard and made necessary adjustments. I would cite the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle Program as a good example. If confirmed, I will work with all stakeholders to ensure testing processes appropriately support rapid fielding without delaying our response to these urgent requirements.

Question. If confirmed, how will you work to ensure that all equipment and technology that is deployed to warfighters is subject to appropriate operational testing?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with DOT&E on testing and evaluation issues.

Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 included several provisions to improve the management of DOD test and evaluation facilities. Are you satisfied with the manner in which these provisions have been implemented?

Answer. If confirmed, I will review the provisions and implementation status as necessary to determine any corrections needed.

Answer. If confirmed, I will review this area as necessary to consider any additional steps to improve the management of its test and evaluation facilities.

Question. Do you believe that the Department should take any additional steps to improve the management of its test and evaluation facilities?

Answer. I do believe there are concerns regarding the complexity, range requirements, test equipment, and cost associated with systems of systems testing. I understand that the DOD has developed a Joint Test Roadmap which outlines an approach to link geographically distributed test facilities, laboratories and ranges to create more realistic test environments. If confirmed, I will work with all members of the acquisition and testing teams to ensure the DOD addresses these issues and to act on any valid recommendations.

JOINT IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT OFFICE

Question. What recommendations, if any, do you have for improving the way in which Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Office (JIEDDO) is developing and transitioning improvised explosive device (IED) defeat technologies?

Answer. I believe the key challenge confronting JIEDDO is the institutional and budget issues which arise when an activity is predominately and robustly funded by supplemental funds. Transitioning JIEDDO programs to Service and agency programs of record without clarity about the point of transition from supplemental to Service or agency budget funds probably presents the greatest challenge. I understand that JIEDDO is developing a detailed approach to transition JIEDDO sponsored IED Defeat technologies to programs of record. The JIEDDO approach addresses budgetary, oversight and long-term sustainment issues.

As DDR&E, I have taken steps to include JIEDDO in the Defense Science and Technology Advisory Group (DSTAG) in an effort to create a common knowledge about technology efforts on IED defeat programs and to maintain a dialogue about responsibility and coordination on these efforts. I would advocate continuation of JIEDDO discussions in the DSTAG forum if confirmed.

Question. Based on your observations as DDR&E, do you feel that the USD(AT&L) has the appropriate level of oversight and authority over critical JIEDDO technology development and acquisition programs?

Answer. USD(AT&L) is closely linked to JIEDDO with representatives participating in weekly resource and technology meetings chaired by the JIEDDO. AT&L is also a member of the steering group that provides oversight of major counter IED initiatives.

Question. In your view, is JIEDDO sufficiently aware of the S&T efforts of the Department and the Services so that promising technologies are rapidly identified and applied to the threat of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)?

Answer. Through a series of meetings that occurred earlier this year, JIEDDO provided to DDR&E an extensive overview of their entire S&T program plus other focus areas including threats and current projects. These discussions included counter IED programs and focus areas to better defeat the medium- and long-term IED threat. Since these meetings, I have taken steps to include JIEDDO in the
DSTAG in an effort to create a common knowledge about technology efforts on IED defeat programs and to maintain a dialogue about responsibility and coordination on these efforts. JIEDDO has full access to the S&T programs and initiatives of the Department’s RDT&E organization including those of the Services, DARPA, and defense agencies.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE


Do you believe that in order to perform its intended function successfully the BMDS, including each of its elements, needs to be operationally effective?

Answer. Clearly, each element of the BMDS and the overall system must be operationally effective in order to successfully perform the intended function.

Question. Do you believe that the United States should deploy missile defense systems without regard to whether they are operationally effective?

Answer. I do not believe that the United States should deploy missile defense systems without regard to whether they are operationally effective.

Question. Do you believe that operationally realistic testing is necessary to demonstrate and determine the operational capabilities and limits of the BMDS and to improve its operational capability?

Answer. I do believe that operationally realistic testing is necessary to delivering and maturing an effective BMDS.

Question. If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to ensure that the BMDS, and each of its elements, undergoes operationally realistic testing?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support this plan, and I would need to review these plans and the proposed test activities to determine whether additional steps are necessary or appropriate.

Question. All Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) are required to complete initial operational test and evaluation before going beyond low-rate initial production (LRIP). BMDS has not yet undergone initial operational test and evaluation. Do you believe that independent operational test and evaluation of the BMDS, and each of its elements, is necessary to ensure that the system and its elements are operationally effective and suitable for combat?

Answer. I understand that the MDA presently is executing a plan to expand the use of a Development/Operational Testing Approach that allows the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) warfighter community (which represents all combatant commanders) and all the Service Operational Test Agencies to be an integral part of the test program. If confirmed, I would support this plan, and I would need to review these plans and the proposed test activities to determine whether additional steps are necessary or appropriate.

Question. At what point, if any, do you believe independent test and evaluation of the BMDS and each of its elements undergoes independent operational test and evaluation?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work with DOT&E to see what testing is planned and discuss any shortcomings identified by DOT&E. In some cases, such as theater assets, individual elements may add independent capabilities outside of the BMDS as a whole. In those cases, some degree of independent testing may be appropriate.

Question. Congress has previously authorized the Secretary of Defense to use funds authorized and appropriated for RDT&E for the MDA for the fielding of ballistic missile defense capabilities.

Are you aware of any other major defense acquisition programs on which the DOD is authorized to use RDT&E funds to field operational systems?
Answer. Satellites and their ground control systems such as Space-Based Infrared Radar System, National Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, and Advanced Extremely High Frequency provide recent examples of DOD using RDT&E in Major Defense Acquisition Programs to field initial operational capabilities. I am also aware of the funding of the first two LCS ships using RDT&E funds.

Question. What, in your view, would be the positive and negative implications of requiring the MDA to budget RDT&E funds for RDT&E purposes, procurement funds for procurement purposes, operation and maintenance funds for operation and maintenance purposes, and military construction funds for military construction purposes?

Answer. Some have argued that improved transparency, accountability, and oversight would result from this budgeting requirement. However, the MDA organization believes they have had a successful track record of delivering capabilities quickly because the agency was granted the flexibility to use RDT&E funds for procurement, O&M, and construction activities.

Question. Section 223 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 establishes that "it is the policy of the United States that the DOD accord a priority within the missile defense program to the development, testing, fielding and improvement of effective near-term missile defense capabilities, including the ground-based midcourse defense system, the Aegis BMDS, the Patriot PAC–3 system, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, and the sensors necessary to support such systems."

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that the Department complies with this policy requirement in its acquisition of missile defense capabilities?

Answer. The MDA organization believes that the Department is currently in compliance with this policy requirement. If confirmed, I am prepared to review in detail any committee concerns regarding compliance with this policy. If confirmed, I will also support continuation of this policy in large part through my chairmanship of the recently established Missile Defense Executive Board, which provides oversight of MDA's integrated requirements, acquisition, and budgeting processes.

Question. On January 2, 2002, the Secretary of Defense set forth guidance and priorities for the Missile Defense Program. The Secretary directed that Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) elements enter the formal DOD acquisition cycle at Milestone C, concurrent with transfer of service procurement responsibility, with the USD(AT&L) overseeing all service missile defense procurement activity.

In your view, what principles should be applied in determining what BMD elements enter the DOD acquisition cycle at Milestone C?

Answer. When a BMDS element is ready for transfer, the normal procedure would be for USD(AT&L) to establish product teams to support a Milestone C decision by the Defense Acquisition Board. Elements that have reached Milestone C will be subject to legal requirements under title 10 in accordance with the terms of the applicable statutes.

Question. After these elements have entered Milestone C, to what extent should they be subject to legal requirements under title 10, U.S.C., associated with programs entering the Defense Acquisition System, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2341, 2366, 2399, and 2433–2435?

LRIP rates for traditional acquisition programs are established at Milestone B, but because the BMDS and its elements have not followed DOD’s milestone process, no LRIP quantities have been established.

In your view, how will those quantities be determined for those BMD elements entering Milestone C, pursuant to the Secretary’s guidance?

Answer. A reasonable and likely course of action would be for LRIP rates for any BMDS components that may in the future be reviewed at a Milestone C to be established by test requirements and quantities necessary to ramp up to full rate production. If confirmed, I would have to review the specific details of each program in order to establish my views on these issues.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COUNCIL

Question. If confirmed as USD(AT&L), you will chair the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC).

In your view, what are, or should be, the highest priorities of the NWC?

Answer. The NWC’s highest priority should be to assure that the Nation’s current and future nuclear deterrent forces remain safe and effective.

Question. What improvements, if any, do you believe should be made to the operations of the NWC?
Answer. I would not suggest any immediate changes to the operations of the NWC at this time. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the members of the Council, Department of Energy, Joint Staff, OSD(Policy), and STRATCOM to identify any appropriate improvements.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION

Question. There are significant problems with the management and implementation of the DOD chemical weapons demilitarization program. Congress has become increasingly concerned that the Department does not appear to be on track to eliminate its chemical weapons in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention timelines.

What steps is the Department taking to ensure that the U.S. remains in compliance with its Treaty obligations for chemical weapons destruction?

Answer. I understand that current estimates indicate that the United States will not meet the Chemical Weapons Convention’s destruction deadline of April 29, 2012. The Department will continue to examine ways to accelerate chemical weapons destruction, while insuring the continued safety and security of the workers, communities and the environment.

Question. Do you agree that the United States should make every effort to meet its treaty commitments, including its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to move this effort forward?

Answer. If confirmed, I would seek to ensure that:

1. Appropriate resources are applied;
2. Contract incentives are implemented; and
3. Alternative approaches for the destruction of chemical weapons are implemented where safe and affordable.

CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER

Question. The Comptroller General has strongly recommended that the DOD establish a new position of Chief Management Officer to address the many “high-risk” problems with the Department’s systems and processes. Earlier this year, the Institute for Defense Analysis recommended that the Deputy Secretary of Defense be designated as the Department’s Chief Management Officer, and that he have a full-time deputy, at a high level within the Department, to assist in that effort.

What is your view of the recommendations of the Comptroller General and the Institute for Defense Analysis regarding a Chief Management Officer for the DOD?

Answer. I concur with the Deputy Secretary of Defense’s two previous statements to Congress about the creation of a Chief Management Officer. Those statements are a May 11, 2007 letter to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and June 26, 2007 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee.

- The business functions of the Department can not be managed separately from its operational matters. A single full-scope Deputy Secretary is the best way to ensure that the Department’s business mission is aligned and integrated to support the Department’s warfighting mission.
- I believe that new legislation regarding a Chief Management Officer would impede rather than enhance organizational effectiveness because an organization the size of the Department needs to have a high degree of management flexibility.
- The key management issue to be addressed in the Department is not the organizational structure as per se—rather, it is how to ensure integration among otherwise diverse operations. If confirmed, I will work toward that end.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the USD(AT&L)?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Answer. Yes, within the limits of my authority.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JACK REED

TEST AND EVALUATION

1. Senator REED. Mr. Young, in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Congress directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation to provide a report to Congress on “Policies and Practices for Test and Evaluation.” In July 2007, Congress received this report. Additionally, an implementation policy was promised to Congress by December 2007. Which of the test and evaluation (T&E) principles described and proposed for consideration in the July 2007 report do you support?

Mr. YOUNG. Requirements generation, program management, and systems engineering (to include T&E), are three pillars the Department rests on to ensure we acquire weapon systems that bring needed combat capability to the warfighter. Earlier tester involvement with an operational focus and better integration of developmental and operational testing will enhance the ability of the Department to quickly field weapon systems that will meet the warfighter’s needs. The specific policies to implement these principles are currently being staffed within the Department. If confirmed, I will work with all stakeholders to ensure these policies are reflected in the Department’s acquisition regulations and implemented.

2. Senator REED. Mr. Young, which of the T&E principles do you not support and why?

Mr. YOUNG. In general, I believe all the fundamental principles described in the report have merit. As I affirmed in my previous response, the specifics to implement these principles are currently being staffed within the Department. If confirmed, I will work with all stakeholders to ensure the implementation of these policies.

3. Senator REED. Mr. Young, what steps are you planning to take to construct the implementation policy for T&E that, according to the report, “will be reported to Congress no later than the end of 2007”?

Mr. YOUNG. Currently, AT&L’s Developmental Test and Evaluation organization within the Directorate for Systems and Software Engineering is leading a working group consisting of members from Service and DOT&E organizations. This group is defining the specific policies which will then be incorporated in the appropriate Department of Defense (DOD) issuances and guidance documents. Separately, work is underway to update the Department’s acquisition policy directive (DODD 5000.2) to incorporate any new policy changes to include T&E. If confirmed, I will ensure the work continues to implement these policy changes.

CLARITY OF BUDGET REQUESTS

4. Senator REED. Mr. Young, Congress and the public depend on the DOD to accurately and completely describe its budget request and the program activities being proposed for funding using taxpayer dollars. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently found that “DOD’s research and development budget requests to Congress do not provide consistent, complete, and clear information.” GAO made two specific recommendations on the submission of budget materials to Congress to address the issue, both revising the regulations that govern the process and more carefully overseeing the development of these budget materials. What is your assessment of the quality of the budget justification materials sent to Congress?

Mr. YOUNG. I believe the quality of budget justification materials sent to Congress is, in general, sufficient in detail and accuracy to allow informed decisionmaking.
Also, the current formats used to justify our budget requests provide enough flexibility to enable us to describe programs that vary greatly in resources required, complexity, and scope. However, I also believe improvements can be made. The Department partially concurred with the GAO recommendations, noting that we have a disciplined review process in place and will put additional emphasis on proper reporting of program progress and planned efforts.

5. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, what specific steps do you plan to take to improve the quality of the budget materials submitted to Congress?

Mr. Young. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to ensure budget justification documents are prepared and distributed in a timely manner, are a relevant and convenient source of information for Congress, and are consistent with the information used in the acquisition process. I will take steps to ensure I am engaged in potential resource and programmatic issues in time to allow me to be part of an informed decision making process during our budget development. I will also work to assure the Department provides Congress more complete and relevant descriptions and justifications for the resources we are requesting in our budget materials.

6. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, do you plan to follow the specific recommendations of the GAO in this area?

Mr. Young. GAO recommends the Secretary of Defense take several actions aimed at providing Congress with more clear and complete information on RDT&E funding requests. I support ensuring that Congress receives relevant, timely, and accurate information in support of the Department’s budget request. If confirmed, I will take those recommendations into account and work with the Comptroller on possible implementation.

LAB PERSONNEL DEMONSTRATION ISSUES

7. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, in response to concerns voiced by Jo Ann Davis, then Chair of the House Civil Service Subcommittee, that the defense laboratories were being denied the ability to improve their personnel demonstration programs, Deputy Secretary Gordon England, then head of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS) implementation group, assured the chairperson in an April 26, 2004, letter that these defense laboratories “should be able to continue individually to refine and evolve their successfully tailored systems over the next several years if they determine that such adjustments are beneficial.”

Likewise, in a July 2006 letter to then Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Warner, the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness (P&R), Dr. David Chu, and your immediate predecessor, the Under Secretary for AT&L, Kenneth Krieg, after lauding the performance of the demonstration laboratories further stated “demonstration projects will continue to refine and evolve as indicated in the enclosed plan” prior to any incorporation into the NSPS.

I am concerned that these commitments to Congress have been ignored. Though the laboratories have worked to develop numerous substantive personnel flexibilities that could be used by the demo labs, none have been approved. In fact, in a memorandum for the record dated June 7, 2007, which reported on the meeting of officials from P&R and from AT&L, including your deputy for laboratories, a minor proposed laboratory amendment was denied stating the argument that “the Department is not receptive to requests for amendments that propose no new interventions. The replication at an additional Software Technology Research Laboratory (STRL) (demo lab) location of an intervention previously implemented at another STRL location is not a new intervention. The Department is not likely to gain significant information from personnel innovations previously tested.”

This seems to indicate that the Department is not interested in fulfilling Secretary England’s commitment to Congress, and not interested in utilizing successful personnel authorities to address the Department’s critical and growing technical workforce shortage. Do you support this policy of not sharing successful flexibilities among the demonstration labs?

Mr. Young. If confirmed, I will work with the Under Secretary of Defense for P&R, who has the Department-wide lead in this matter, to create the optimum long-term situation for all the DOD laboratories.

8. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, given the statements of Secretaries England and Krieg, why have there been no laboratory amendments approved by the Department since 2002?
Mr. Young. To my knowledge, no requests for amendments have been submitted to test new personnel management interventions. This is consistent with the June 7, 2007 memorandum, which reported on the meeting of officials from Under Secretary for P&R and from former USD(AT&L), and our Report to Congress which states, “Science and Technology Reinvention Laboratories will continue with their respective demo systems and will be allowed to seek innovative enhancements and refinements.” that have not been previously tested.

9. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, as Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), and now as USD(AT&L), I understand that you are the DOD proponent for these laboratories. What have you done and what do you plan to do to implement the commitments made to Congress by Mr. Krieg and Mr. England?

Mr. Young. As the DDR&E, it was the office of one of my direct reports, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD) for Laboratories and Basic Sciences (LABS), which had the lead for AT&L on the July 2006 letter sent to the Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Warner from the Under Secretary for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)), Dr. David S.C. Chu, and the former USD(AT&L), Kenneth J. Krieg. I remain fully supportive of the views expressed in that letter and in my response to your earlier question regarding “why have there been no laboratory amendments approved by the Department since 2002?”

10. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, can you give the committee assurances that you will support the laboratories in their efforts to retain and enhance the laboratory demonstration programs?

Mr. Young. To the extent authorized by my position, if confirmed by the committee, I will implement policies which engender the most favorable long-term circumstances for all the DOD laboratories.

APPROVAL OF AMENDMENT ON SHARING EXISTING FLEXIBILITIES

11. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, in May 2005, the DOD Office of Civilian Personnel Policy, within the Office of the USD(P&R), approved a laboratory personnel demonstration program amendment, which would permit each laboratory to utilize the flexibilities available at other demo laboratories. This approved amendment was sent to the Under Secretary for his approval. To date, almost a year and a half later, no action has been taken on this proposal. Do you support this proposal to allow approved flexibilities to be shared among the demo labs?

Mr. Young. I support the conclusions of Dr. David S.C. Chu/Honorable Kenneth J. Krieg Report to Congress. Consistent with that report and the June 7, 2007 memorandum that I mentioned previously, it is my understanding that the approval was not granted because the “innovative enhancements and refinements” requested had been previously tested at one or more existing personnel demo lab locations.

12. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, as the proponent for laboratory interests within the Pentagon, with the obligation to promote policies and initiatives which benefit the long-term research capabilities of these organizations, what actions have you taken during your tenure and what actions would you take as Under Secretary to ensure that this proposal is approved and executed?

Mr. Young. If confirmed, I will remain a strong supporter of all policies which fashion the best possible long-term condition for all DOD laboratories.

STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL ACQUISITION PLANNING

13. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, experts believe that successful industrial companies managing complex operations have learned that strategic plans provide the basis for a process that quickly and cost-effectively serves their customer’s needs with high-quality products. They suggest that if DOD were to use an equivalent method, it would manage its acquisition and science and technology (S&T) investments using an overall strategic plan that is: (1) based on projected capability needs of the combatant commanders; (2) vetted and prioritized by authorities motivated primarily by joint, rather than Service-specific, objectives; (3) budgeted according to those priorities; and (4) backed up by detailed visions of the hardware, software, and new doctrine required to realize each capability.

This plan would then be extended to generate a tactical action plan that describes technical requirements and milestones, schedules, future spending, and integrated Service and Defense Agency responsibilities for executing each element. In this model, the Secretary and the Under Secretary for AT&L would manage operations
by periodically reviewing progress on the tactical action plans and making necessary adjustments.

Do you see merit in moving DOD towards an acquisition and S&T development process based on an industrial model that has a strategic plan that leads to tactical action plans?

Mr. Young. As evidenced by the DOD Research and Engineering Strategic Plan, published in the summer of 2007, I believe there is a need, in some cases, for strategic plans to be aligned with the National Security Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and the needs of the combatant commanders. From a broader perspective, members of the AT&L communities are deeply integrated in the development of the “Guide to the Development of the Force” (GDF) formerly known as the DOD Strategic Planning Guidance. The GDF will be the overarching framework that should align the Department’s requirements and capabilities with acquisition programs and services. At a next level of detail, I have been an advocate for the development of roadmaps in selected technology and portfolio areas as key tools for guiding DOD investment programs.

14. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, what steps do you plan to take to move towards that model?

Mr. Young. Within the AT&L components, we are refining a series of internal goals to link the acquisition enterprise to the strategic national security priorities. It is my intention, if confirmed, to move towards a more open, data-driven process for decisionmaking linked to national security and DOD objectives. The internal goals should help us do so.

15. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, do you believe that the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) should serve in the corporate management role in the acquisition and S&T development process by actively reviewing and if necessary, redirecting ongoing DOD programs?

Mr. Young. The USD(AT&L) serves as the Defense Acquisition Executive within the DOD. Part of this responsibility is to acquire the best possible weapons systems for the best possible price, and to do so absolutely should involve directing program changes as required to attain this “best value.”

16. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, do you believe that the Reliance 21 initiatives you established as DDR&E should evolve into a process with the industrial model’s level of follow-through, management control, and the necessary Service and agency commitment and cooperation? If so, what barriers exist which would prevent the process from developing into that type of activity, and what actions will you take to overcome them?

Mr. Young. We instituted the Reliance 21 model for Defense S&T planning to increase the corporate level visibility, inter-dependency, and cooperation among the DOD components. Since we began the Reliance 21 process only last spring, it is premature to speculate on barriers to the evolution of the model. To date, it seems to be working well, but I believe more time is needed to really determine barriers to complete implementation. However, it is clear to me that current DOD programming and budgeting processes do present at least a hurdle for the service official’s proper resourcing of A&T plans and these hurdles are even higher for the DDR&E team working at the corporate level.

ROLES AND AUTHORITIES OF DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING

17. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, do you believe there should be any changes made to the roles, authorities, or resources of the DDR&E?

Mr. Young. I believe the roles and authorities for the DDR&E are sufficient at this time. Resources such as funding for programs and people are balanced across Department-wide needs. I do have concerns that the assignment of additional missions and oversight responsibilities to DDR&E have not included additional experienced personnel to execute these functions.

18. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, in the industrial sector, the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) reports directly to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO). The DDR&E has been established as the CTO of the Department. Do you think the Department would be better served by having DDR&E report directly to the Secretary for Defense as opposed to the Under Secretary for AT&L?

Mr. Young. I believe the reporting chain for the DDR&E is appropriate. The DDR&E, as the CTO also does have direct access to the Secretary of Defense.
19. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, in your answers to advance policy questions you indicated that “it is essential for the Director of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to report to the DDR&E in order to meet responsibilities as CTO.” How should the fact that the Director of DARPA reports to DDR&E be operationalized?

Mr. Young. In fact, the Director of DARPA does report to the DDR&E. This reporting relationship is specified in DOD Directive 5134.3, Director of Defense Research and Engineering where it clearly states the DDR&E exercises authority, direction, and control over the Director of the DARPA. It is important to maintain this organizational structure and to ensure the DDR&E leadership team has full visibility and appropriate participation in DARPA activities. No other actions are needed.

20. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, based on your observations as DDR&E, do you believe that DDR&E is currently exercising adequate authority over DARPA?

Mr. Young. As DDR&E, I have made concrete progress in exercising DDR&E authorities and responsibilities with regard to DARPA.

DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE

21. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, what steps do you plan to take to limit the risks that the Department accepts through the acquisition of critical defense technologies, such as integrated circuits, from offshore vendors?

Mr. Young. The Department is committed to providing the best capability to the warfighter. We want to promote interoperability with our allies and coalition partners, and take full advantage of the benefits offered by access to the most innovative, efficient, and competitive suppliers—worldwide. The Department also wants to promote consistency and fairness in dealing with its trading partners, an important national security consideration in itself, while assuring that the U.S. defense industrial base is sufficient to meet critical defense needs. Consequently, the Department is willing to use reliable, non-U.S. suppliers—consistent with national security requirements and prudent risk management—when such use offers comparative advantages in performance, cost, schedule, or coalition warfighting.

The Department is not acquiring military materiel produced overseas to the detriment of national security or the U.S. defense industrial base. The Department employs a small number of non-U.S. suppliers, and the use of those suppliers does not introduce an unacceptable risk of foreign vulnerability or negatively impact the long-term economic viability of the national technological and industrial base. The record indicates there has been no difference in reliability between the Department’s U.S. and non-U.S. suppliers. For example, the Study on Impact of Foreign Sourcing of Systems conducted by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy, a focused analysis of 12 operationally important DOD programs completed in January 2004, indicated that foreign subcontracts collectively represented only about 4.3 percent of the total contract value for those programs. We are planning to conduct another focused subcontractor study in 2008 to reexamine the extent of non-U.S. suppliers in our supply chain.

With regard to integrated circuits, these and related electronic devices are increasingly dominated by global commercial markets. Current commercial product development strategies and supply-chain management practices may not, for DOD purposes, adequately prevent electronic device tampering, counterfeiting, and reverse engineering, nor do they always adequately meet unique DOD performance and maintainability requirements. In the early days of the semiconductor industry, the military market was a large fraction of overall sales and helped to drive technology. Today, the U.S. military portion of microcircuits sales is approximately 1 percent of the world market and less than 9 percent of the U.S. market ($3.6 billion out of $40.7 billion). With the increased growth of consumer markets, the DOD’s ability to control and influence the electronics sector has diminished. Nevertheless, DOD is in the process of developing a trusted integrated circuits strategy and policy that is comprehensive, viable, cost-effective, realistic, and in the long-term ensures the supply of trusted integrated circuits for sensitive defense applications. This policy will include multi-layered defense-in-depth as a practical strategy that involves people, technology, and operations; anonymity in commercial off-the-shelf integrated circuits procurement; trusted suppliers, brokers, and products; design information protection; anti-tamper technology; failure detection and forensics; damage mitigation; and chip signature authentication.
Mr. Young, what specific initiatives are you considering that will support the strengthening of the defense industrial base?

Mr. YOUNG. The Department’s preferred approach to establishing and sustaining essential industrial and technological capabilities supporting defense is to leverage its research, development, acquisition, and logistics processes and decisions to create a competitive environment that encourages industry to make sound technology development investments, and to make sound technology insertion and production facility/capacity decisions.

When these market forces are insufficient, the Department can use Defense Production Act (DPA) tools to focus industry attention on critical technology development, accelerate technology insertion into manufacturing processes, create or expand critical production facilities, and direct production capacity towards meeting the most urgent warfighter needs. Title III of the DPA is specifically designed to establish, expand, maintain, or modernize industrial capabilities required for national defense. The Title III Program strengthens the economic and technological competitiveness of the U.S. defense industrial base, accelerates the transition of technologies from research and development to affordable production and insertion into defense systems, and can reduce U.S. dependency on foreign sources of supply for critical materials and technologies.

For example, the Department is using the Title III Program to sustain a U.S. production capability for high purity beryllium. High purity beryllium possesses unique properties that make it indispensable in many of today’s critical U.S. defense systems, including sensors, missiles and satellites, avionics, and nuclear weapons. The DOD dominates the market for high purity beryllium and its active and full involvement is necessary to sustain and shape the strategic direction of the market. There are no reliable foreign suppliers that could provide high purity beryllium, and without DOD involvement and support, U.S. industry would not be able to provide sufficiently pure material in the required quantities for defense applications. The Department has therefore taken special action to maintain a domestic supply, and is using the authorities in Title III of the DPA to contract with a U.S. firm to build and operate a new high purity beryllium production plant capable of meeting national security specifications.

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INDIRECT COSTS FOR UNIVERSITY DEFENSE RESEARCH

23. Senator REED. Mr. Young, the House Defense Appropriations bill includes language that limits the rate that a university can charge the government for indirect, overhead costs related to the performance basic research activities. The university community is very strongly opposed to this provision. What is your position on the provision?

Mr. YOUNG. University indirect costs are analyzed and indirect cost rates negotiated to ensure these rates reflect the fair and reasonable total cost of conducting research at these institutions. Consistent with the Statement of Administration Policy on the House version of H.R. 3222 and the Department’s appeal to the appropriations conference, I am opposed to the language imposing artificial, arbitrary caps on indirect costs of basic research. A cap will likely lead some research organizations to forego DOD basic research awards and accept support only from other agencies and non-Federal sponsors, thus reducing DOD access to world-class research needed to maintain the future technological superiority of the U.S. military.

24. Senator REED. Mr. Young, how do you intend to monitor and control the indirect costs of research performed by contractors in industry and academia so that government research programs are as efficient and effective as possible?

Mr. YOUNG. Based upon what I know today, the process for negotiating a research organization’s indirect cost rate involves a substantial amount of monitoring and oversight of those costs. The process includes scrutiny of the organization’s rate proposal by Federal agency negotiators who are contracting and accounting professionals. Where DOD is the Federal entity designated by the Office of Management and Budget to negotiate the government-wide rate at an organization, the indirect cost proposal also is audited. In addition, each research organization is required to disclose to the Government its accounting practices that are used to ensure consistent and appropriate charging of costs to Federal awards. Any change in an organization’s disclosed practices must be approved by the responsible Federal agency. If confirmed, I will review and evaluate this area as appropriate.
25. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, do you believe these “ceilings” on the amount of work a Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC) can perform for DOD are in the best interests of the Department?
Mr. Young. The Department has always opposed the continuation of the externally imposed ceilings on the use of its FFRDCs. Each fiscal year the Department identifies a need for FFRDC assistance to meet its high quality contracted technical and analytical support for key programs, including intelligence, space systems, command and control, homeland defense, war on terrorism, and other areas where advanced technologies are being bought to bear in support of the modernizing and transforming United States Forces. The Department does not have enough of the technical expertise in-house and relies on its FFRDCs to provide high quality, bias-free analysis, systems engineering and other technical support for its weapons and technology programs. Military leadership also depends on the objective, independent research performed by their FFRDCs as cornerstones for important planning and investment decisions, yet not only does the Department have an overall external imposed ceiling on its use of FFRDCs there is also a sub-ceiling placed on its studies and analysis FFRDCs which provide this support. With the uncertainties and dynamics of the current world situation, there are more unknowns, therefore the Department needs reliable quick turnaround independent evaluations and recommendations for decisions. The return on investment by using the FFRDCs is high.

26. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, what advantages does the Department accrue from the “ceilings”?
Mr. Young. The Department sees no advantages by having external ceilings placed on its use of its FFRDCs. Each fiscal year the Department has experienced shortfalls in its need for assistance and support from its FFRDCs. The impact of the shortfalls is felt across the Department and over the years as national priorities changes different programs suffered.
Congress continues to provide additional funding for the global war on terror, homeland security, space systems, missile defense, but limits the Department’s ability to select some of the most qualified sources to obtain the needed high-quality technical and analytical support. The significant, externally imposed restrictions on the Department’s use of its FFRDC in the 1990s have seen some relief in the last few years but the FFRDCs are only at the fiscal year 1991 FFRDC support levels. The Department has previously urged Congress to support its request that it be allowed to manage its FFRDCs without externally imposed ceilings. If ceilings are to be continued, the Department would urge support of its annual request for FFRDC support as contained in the President’s budget.

27. Senator Reed. Mr. Young, what steps do you plan to take to ensure that the Department has the access it needs to the technical expertise resident in the FFRDCs?
Mr. Young. Access to very specialized, unique, and unbiased technical expertise is a primary reason for our FFRDCs and is, thus, the center of a great deal of attention in our management of our use of these institutions. The first step, and most important in the short term, we are pursuing is creating tasks that bring FFRDC technical talent to the very front lines of the global war on terrorism operations by employing their tools and expertise in direct support of real-time operational needs. The enthusiasm exhibited by FFRDC personnel in working to directly support our operations, and its utility to field commanders, is a testament to the effectiveness of this initiative. From a researcher’s point of view, there are other steps as well: we work hard to maintain an environment such that our FFRDC contractors can maintain continuity of employment so academics need not devote constant attention to “grantsmanship”; we provide discretionary Independent Research and Development (IR&D) resources at each FFRDC to pursue high-value, defense-relevant, intellectually challenging, projects; and we minimize the bureaucratic impediments associated with access to sensitive or proprietary data that researchers experience in the private or academic sectors. Overall, we try and foster an environment in which creative intellects—that may not be attracted to government service for a variety of reasons—can most effectively be employed in exploiting sophisticated, cutting-edge, technologies for our defense needs.
28. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Young, one of the responsibilities of the USD(AT&L) is to ensure that DOD employs the appropriate procurement type for its contracts. As the chairman of the Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, I have been particularly concerned about the appropriateness of DOD’s wide-spread use of the war as a justification to issue long-term, sole-source contracts. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) has recommended that the Federal Government should “generally avoid the use of sole-source and limited-competition contracting actions.” Under what circumstances would you consider it appropriate for a logistics support contract, such as Kellogg, Brown, and Root’s (KBR) Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract, to be awarded as a sole-source, cost-plus award fee, long-term contract?

Mr. YOUNG. KBR’s LOGCAP III contract was not a sole-source contract. This current LOGCAP III contract was competitively awarded in December 2001. KBR was selected as the best value contractor from among three competitive offerors.

Based on the LOGCAP II experience, where the volume of requirements (that is, $50 million) from 1996 to 2001 did not support the use of multiple contract awards, we did not pursue a multiple-award scenario for LOGCAP III. For LOGCAP IV, the Defense Department chose to use a multiple-award strategy based on the volume of requirements that we have experienced under Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

29. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Young, would you consider it appropriate to allow the duration of such a contract to extend beyond the amount of time necessary to replace it with a contract that was awarded through open competition?

Mr. YOUNG. To provide continuity in the delivery of required services, the Department endeavors to put a new contract in place by the time the predecessor contract is due to expire. When this is not possible, the contracting officer must determine the best way to provide for continued performance of necessary work pending the availability of a new contract.

For example, the LOGCAP III contract, competitively awarded in December 2001, was structured as a 1 year base contract, with nine 1 year options. It was structured intentionally to allow for rapid growth and flexibility to support unknown future contingencies. As the program grew and began to strain the resources of a single contractor, the Army took action to identify various methods of increasing contractor support and to assess the risks involved with various strategies to satisfy the breadth and depth of the program’s requirements. The result was an acquisition strategy for LOGCAP support with multiple contractors competitively responding to global requirements for urgent support. The final strategy, determined in 2006, consists of a separate LOGCAP IV support contract and multiple LOGCAP IV performance contracts.

30. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Young, cost-plus award fee (CPAF) contracts give little incentive to the contractor to keep costs low since there is no risk to the contractor, and the award fee is based on contract costs: the higher the costs, the greater the profit. In your opinion, is this type of LOGCAP contract structure the best value for the American taxpayer given the contractor’s operating environment in Iraq, or would you have structured the contract differently?

Mr. YOUNG. The LOGCAP III contract has a variety of payment provisions, including firm fixed price (FFP) that can be used when there are firm requirements that are not susceptible to changes in scope, quantity or schedule. It also includes CPAF provisions, which are most appropriate when uncertainties in performance and cost do not allow for fixed price contracting but incentivizing contractor performance is still desired.

The largest volume of effort under the LOGCAP III contract for performance in Southwest Asia has been CPAF. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army determined that the uncertainties of performance conditions and constant change have not supported the use of FFP contracts.

I would have to review the requirements and circumstances to determine whether this is the optimal contract structure in my opinion. I think we would need to apply strong management oversight to a contract with a significant CPAF value.
CONTRACTOR ABUSE

31. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, DOD’s budget, although large, is still finite. As such, DOD contracting officials need to be good stewards of the resources they are given. Every dollar wasted is a dollar that could have been better spent on resetting equipment, procuring new technologies, or caring for our wounded warriors. Yet DOD contracting in Iraq has many problems leading to numerous examples of waste, fraud, and abuse that have been identified by the SIGIR, GAO, and other audit/oversight agencies. The SIGIR’s findings characterize the LOGCAP contract in Iraq as lacking transparency, oversight, and financial accountability, and his findings included cases of waste, fraud, abuse, and financial mismanagement.

For instance, SIGIR auditors found that KBR had repeatedly overcharged the government for work that it did not perform, and paid suppliers more than amounts owed. Overhead expenses for such activities as transportation, security, and office support ranged from 11 percent to as high as 55 percent of the contract value, and were billed to reconstruction contracts by KBR. If confirmed, what actions will you recommend DOD take to prevent contractor abuses such as these?

Mr. Young. I recently directed that all DOD contracting officers must ensure that, prior to contract award, all statements of work and terms and conditions that relate to the delivery of supplies or services in or out of Iraq and Afghanistan must be approved by the Commander, Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC–I/A). I also directed that JCC–I/A must be assigned contract administration responsibility for the portion of the contract that relates to performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, in coordination with JCC–I/A and the Joint Staff, is issuing implementing guidance. I believe these are strong steps toward improving oversight.

Pursuant to section 813 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Technology) is chairing a panel on contracting integrity. The panel includes a subcommittee to address contracting integrity in a combat/contingency environment. Their initial report is due to Congress in December 2007.

32. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, GAO provided an analysis of 93 award-or-incentive-fee contracts awarded by DOD, and found that DOD frequently paid most of the available award fees, regardless of whether the contractor fell short of, met, or exceeded expectations. DOD allowed contractors second chances to earn “initially unearned” or deferred award fees, and paid a significant number and amount of fees for performance that was judged to be “acceptable, average, expected, good, or satisfactory.” GAO concluded that despite the fact that DOD paid billions in award fees, DOD has little evidence to support its contention that the payment of award fees improved contractor performance. It appears that DOD’S process for determining how much of an award-fee or incentive-fee a contractor has earned is not functioning properly in Iraq. If confirmed, how do you intend to address the problem of overpayment of fees?

Mr. Young. As the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, I issued three memoranda on profit policy. I believe strongly that the Defense Department must carefully use award and incentive fees as tools to motivate successful program execution. I further believe that program managers should award fees in proportion to performance. In general, I believe the Defense Department should tie award fees to specific events and deliverables to make this a more objective process. If confirmed, I intend to push for the application of these principles in all acquisition programs.

The Department has taken actions to address each of the seven recommendations made by the GAO report that you reference and all of the related requirements of section 814 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. These actions include:

1. Issuing several policy memoranda providing revised guidance to the military departments and defense agencies on the use of award and incentive fees;
2. Drafting revisions of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement to incorporate this revised policy into its regulations;
3. Employing a FFRDC to assess various mechanisms for evaluating contractor performance and making payment of award fees;
4. Assessing the results of that study, and the Department plans to take appropriate action;
5. Working to develop an automated process that will improve its collection and assessment of relevant data on award and incentive fees paid to contractors.
As a result of these actions, the Department is planning to publish a Department-wide Award Fee Contract Guide to replace various guides currently maintained by the military departments and defense agencies.

Senate Report 109–254 that accompanied the Senate’s National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2007 made reference to some of the Department’s actions that I just mentioned, and it opined: “The committee commends Department plans to provide senior-level strategic thinking to the manner in which the Department ‘governs, manages, and executes its activities.’ The committee believes that establishing some guidelines, standards and accountability in the use of award and incentive fee contracts, along with an evaluation of their strengths and weaknesses when effectively used will improve productive use of performance contracts.”

If confirmed, I intend to ensure that these efforts to improve our regulations, policies, procedures, and practices are carried out appropriately.

33. Senator A KAKA. Mr. Young, in 2000, the Federal Government awarded $67.5 billion in non-competitive contracts. By 2005, that figure increased 115 percent to $145 billion. The net result of this growth in contracts was that the value of contracts overseen by the average government procurement official rose by 83 percent. If confirmed, what steps do you intend to take to ensure the acquisition workforce is appropriately sized and structured to be able to carry out its responsibilities of contract oversight? How do you intend to improve contract oversight in the field, particularly in war zones, such as Iraq and Afghanistan?

Mr. Y OUNG. As the Acting USD(AT&L), I am taking steps, in partnership with the military departments, to ensure we have the right workforce capability for all acquisition-related functions, including contract oversight. I have established Enterprise Outcome #3: “Take Care of Our People,” which includes establishing a comprehensive workforce analysis and decisionmaking capability to support workforce size, and structure decisions. I have taken steps to focus on critical skill set gaps, both current and future, in important acquisition mission areas. In support of the major people initiatives of the Quadrennial Defense Review and DOD human capital strategies, we are moving to standard competency models and competency assessments to improve workforce career development, training, and management of capability. Currently, the update efforts are complete (through Phase II) for program management, life-cycle logistics, and contracting. Each is going through subsequent validation and refinement. We have deployed and accelerated a comprehensive competency assessment initiative for the DOD contracting community. The contracting competency assessment began in June 2007, and as of October 1, 2007, approximately 2,300 contracting personnel from the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) and the Air Force have participated in the pilot, and in fact, DLA has completed its assessment. A DOD-wide assessment of the contracting workforce will begin in January 2008. This competency assessment will assist senior contracting leaders in identifying critical skill gaps and defining appropriate workforce strategies. Their actions may include reallocation of resources, targeted recruitment, better retention strategies, and targeted expansion of education and training resources. We are strengthening management and support to contracting officer representatives (CORs) who provide an important oversight role. We are improving COR training by adding additional lessons on contingency contracting and the operational environment. We are providing in-theater training support to the U.S Army and Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC–I/A), and we have established a quarterly training initiative to address training needs that are identified by both the Army, through its Contracting Operations Reviews, and separately by the Commander, JCC–I/A. Defense Acquisition University (DAU) personnel are deploying again on October 30 to provide a 4-day training session in-theater. This training will be conducted on a quarterly basis.

To improve contract oversight in the field, particularly in areas such as Iraq and Afghanistan, I directed that all DOD contracting officers must ensure that, prior to contract award, all statements of work and terms and conditions that relate to the delivery of supplies or services in or out of Iraq and Afghanistan must be approved by the Commander, JCC–I/A. I also directed that JCC–I/A must be assigned contract administration responsibility for the portion of the contract that relates to performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, in coordination with JCC–I/A and the Joint Staff, is issuing implementing guidance.
Security Contractors

34. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, it seems to me that engaging enemy combatants in a foreign country on behalf of the United States is an “inherently governmental function.” You seem to agree with this statement in your response to advance policy question #101, but you make a distinction between defensive and offensive operations in Iraq. It is possible that the attempt to draw a distinction between the two when battling a counterinsurgency could be a contributing cause of our problems today? Trying to decide if an action taken by an Iraqi citizen is an offensive action aimed at the asset guarded by the security contractors may not always be clear cut.

For instance, it may not always be possible to determine the intentions of an approaching vehicle, and therefore, the contractor may choose to react aggressively. Based on media reports of Blackwater’s actions in Iraq, it seems possible that because the security contractors are operating in a war zone, they are quicker to interpret non-hostile actions by the local citizens as being hostile actions, leading to responses that may have been inappropriate and counterproductive to our counterinsurgency efforts.

We must remember that the local citizenry will perceive any action taken by an American contractor on behalf of the U.S. Government, or while escorting officials of the U.S. Government, as being an official act of the U.S. Government. In addition, since our fight against the Iraqi insurgency is one where we are trying to win the hearts and minds of the local citizenry, it is imperative that all U.S. personnel (military and civilian) respect the local population and provide a positive representation of our country.

The negative perceptions of security contractors is obviously compounded by their lack of accountability. It seems intuitive that anyone engaging the enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan should be following the military rules of engagement and should be subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). As such, it is questionable whether private security firms should have been used in Iraq and Afghanistan to begin with, especially without being subject to any criminal penalties.

Obviously, real world events have showed us the problems of our heavy reliance on these firms, as they are continuing to create headaches for our counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.

In your opinion, what is the basis for concluding that the security operations for U.S. Government/diplomatic officials in a war zone is not inherently governmental, and therefore, can be contracted out to contractors, such as Blackwater, Triple Canopy, and DynCorp?

Mr. Young. Security for U.S. Government/diplomatic officials entails a wide range of operations. While some of these operations are inherently governmental, others may be appropriate for contract services.

Security provided by private security contractors (PSC) should be limited or guided by orders or rules that identify specific ranges of acceptable decisions or conduct and subject the discretionary authority to final approval or regular oversight by government officials. Geographic Combatant Commanders issue “rules for the use of deadly force” that govern the use of weapons by civilians. These rules are different from the “rules of engagement” applicable to military forces.

Protection of innocent civilians is at the heart of all security operations, whether conducted by the military or PSCs. In response to “offensive” versus “defensive” acts, the terms are potentially misleading. Private security contractors are authorized to act in self defense against legitimate threats against individual(s) they are responsible for protecting, such as diplomatic personnel, and for their own personal protection. For example, in an ambush, PSCs operate differently from military forces. PSCs are trained to drive out of the ambush site as quickly as possible, while military forces are trained to assault towards the forces ambushing them. The PSC reaction is defensive; the military, offensive. Both are acting in self defense.

35. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, given current events surrounding security contractor operations in Iraq, will you conduct a reevaluation of the roles of security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Mr. Young. Yes. A few weeks ago Secretary Gates sent a senior-level team to Iraq to evaluate DOD’s policies and procedures for DOD PSCs. As a result of that trip, DOD has initiated several steps to improve management and oversight of DOD PSCs. We are also engaging in discussions on how we use contractors during contingency operations. These discussions will include a reevaluation of the roles and responsibilities of security contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan.

36. Senator Akaka. Mr. Young, given that many of these contractor personnel are former military, it can be argued that they do not particularly possess any special
skills that our military does not already have. In addition, they cost two to three times what our troops cost, and are not subject to any criminal penalties for their actions. This sends the wrong message to our troops. It seems to me that if the reason for needing contractors is just to free up troops for military missions, then the military should request an increase in end strength to compensate for the security contractor work, and replace the contractors as soon as troops are ready to handle the mission. Do you agree? If not, why not?

Mr. YOUNG. This is a difficult question to answer as there are a number of metrics to consider in arriving at a succinct response. Increasing end strengths has long-term consequences relative to remuneration over a full career and retirement benefits, whereas the contractor augmentation of uniformed personnel has increased short-term costs but without long-term impacts. It is important to note that DOD contractors accompanying our armed forces are subject to criminal penalties for their actions under both the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), and under the UCMJ. Nonetheless, the question of security contractor roles deserves further study, review, and consideration.

37. Senator A KAKA. Mr. Young, if confirmed, what steps do you intend to take to address the DOD’s reliance on security contractors in war zones?

Mr. YOUNG. Contractors have, since the beginning of this nation, always played a vital role in defending our great country. In Iraq and Afghanistan, PSCs are providing a variety of defensive security functions, including: static and perimeter security, convoy escort, personal security, and consular services. As a result, more combat troops are available to focus on operational objectives. At present, private security contractors represent less than 5 percent of the total contractor population. I will continue to evaluate the appropriateness of this mix based upon a thorough risk analysis.

NATIONAL DEFENSE STOCKPILE

38. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Young, thank you for your recent report on the July meeting of the Strategic Minerals Protection Board. I have reviewed the Board’s Terms of Reference and note that there is no mention of the National Defense Stockpile (NDS). The NDS, as you may know, has been the subject of study over the years and most recently in a report released October 5, 2007, by the National Research Council (NRC). The Council’s report addresses many of the issues raised in the Strategic Minerals Protection Board’s Terms of Reference concerning the supply of critical materials.

The NRC concludes that the DOD does not appear to have the information systems for data collection and analysis necessary to understand its actual materials requirements and their availability over time. Also, the NRC’s review of the history of the NDS clearly indicates that the system has not been a priority consideration for the DOD in the adjustment of policies and programs to most effectively and efficiently manage the system. The NRC report recommends establishing a new system within the DOD to collect and analyze data necessary to manage and assure the supply of strategic or critical materials to the military.

How would you propose to undertake a comprehensive assessment and establishment of an integrated supply chain management approach to assuring the supply of critical materials?

Mr. YOUNG. The Department is currently reviewing the NRC recommendations to determine the best course of action to ensure availability of material for military Service needs. We will focus on how to identify and capture material requirements on a timely basis. Once material needs are established, the Department can apply supply chain analysis processes to identify global commodity supply sources, evaluate the supply chain weaknesses, and make a determination of the most appropriate tool to assure continued supply of strategic or critical materials.

39. Senator A KAKA. Mr. Young, how would you propose to integrate the NDS into the Strategic Materials Protection Board’s Terms of Reference?

Mr. YOUNG. The Department’s Strategic Materials Protection Board met for the first time on July 17, 2007. The Terms of Reference approved at that meeting stated that the Board would: examine risks associated with materials designated as critical to national security; recommend a strategy to the President to ensure the domestic availability of materials designated as critical to national security, as appropriate; and recommend such other strategies to the President as the Board considered appropriate to strengthen the industrial base with respect to materials critical to na-
data from this study does not include Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force aircraft whose studies are still in progress.

CORROSION

40. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Young, are you aware of the corrosion issue? If so, do you agree that it is a serious issue that costs DOD an enormous amount of taxpayer dollars each year, and that there are large potential savings not being realized because program managers fail to build corrosion prevention and control into their acquisition programs?

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, I am very aware of the impact of corrosion on the Department’s equipment and infrastructure. The ongoing DOD cost of corrosion study has identified $10 billion in annual corrosion costs. In addition, I recognize that in the past, large corrosion related savings have not been achieved in an environment of competing performance requirements and that tradeoffs of corrosion protection were likely made in some cases. For instance, corrosion protection was traded for more environmentally friendly finish systems, etc. However, more recently the DOD corrosion emphasis has resulted in policy and the necessary tools, which I believe will result in corrosion being better addressed in the hierarchy of those competing demands.

41. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Young, what was your experience in the Navy with regard to getting program managers to build corrosion prevention and control into their systems?

Mr. YOUNG. Among other initiatives, the Navy uses a combination of training and corrosion program reviews to enhance the program manager’s consideration of corrosion during the acquisition process. For example, the Navy worked closely with the DOD Corrosion Office to insert corrosion-related content into program management courses at the DAU. In addition, a Corrosion prevention and Control Plan (CPCP) template was developed for ships and submarines (to complement a previously-developed CPCP template for aircraft) and it has been inserted into the DOD Corrosion Prevention and Control Planning Guidebook, Spiral #3. Finally, to insure consistency throughout the Department, a corrosion DOD Instruction (DODI) is being finalized which will mandate this. The DODI will require that each Service Secretary establish a process to review and evaluate corrosion for all development, acquisition, and sustainment contracts requiring an acquisition plan.

42. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Young, were you satisfied with the Navy’s efforts during your tenure there?

Mr. YOUNG. While there is always room for improvement, the Navy was aggressive in its corrosion prevention and mitigation activities during my tenure. In addition to intra-Navy actions, we fully supported the DOD Corrosion efforts by: providing over $12 million in matching funding to support 30 joint-Navy prevention/mitigation projects; staffing key Corrosion Prevention and Control Integrated Product Team positions with personnel; taking the lead in developing a web-based product introduction process that enables suppliers to meet DOD’s corrosion prevention/mitigation requirements more quickly; and acting aggressively on the results from the Navy ship/submarine cost of corrosion study. Also, I am pleased to note, that the April 2007 DOD corrosion prevention GAO audit showed that for implementing corrosion prevention and control plans and forming corrosion prevention advisory teams the Navy was leading the other Services. The new Corrosion Prevention DOD Instruction will require that all Acquisition Category 1s to have both a corrosion prevention and control plan and corrosion prevention advisory teams.

43. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Young, do you support giving corrosion prevention and control higher priority in future weapons systems and in the sustainment of current systems and if confirmed, will you give it your personal attention?

Mr. YOUNG. Yes, if confirmed, I will give corrosion prevention and control high priority in future weapons systems and in the sustainment of current systems. I will implement the direction in 10 U.S.C. 2228 and establish specific requirements for the DOD Corrosion Executive as well as the Service Secretaries.

44. Senator AKAKA. Mr. Young, if the Air Force did know where they were, then why were the missiles sent to Barksdale when the command on the receiving end was not expecting them?

Note that data from this study does not include Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force aircraft whose studies are still in progress.
Mr. Young. The transfer of Advanced Cruise Missile bodies from Minot Air Force Base (AFB) to Barksdale AFB was part of a scheduled logistical relocation of the missile bodies that had been going on for months. The team at Barksdale AFB was expecting to receive missile bodies with ferry training payloads, as they had five times in the past, and as required under the logistical relocation plan. The Barksdale Team was not expecting to receive the nuclear warheads. The DOD can provide the full details of the series of errors and oversights associated with this incident at your convenience.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON
MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAM

45. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Young, last July the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC)—which is headed by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is composed of the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the military departments—agreed that the requirements process for ballistic missile defense (BMD) should be transitioned back into normal DOD processes, and the JROC would establish oversight of missile defense requirements. This indicates that the current system of missile defense requirements is not satisfactory to the main requirements oversight body within the Department, and raises a number of questions about the need to improve oversight of missile defense acquisition within the Department, as well as in Congress. If confirmed, will you pledge to work closely with this committee to ensure rigorous oversight of the Department's missile defense program and the Missile Defense Agency?

Mr. Young. If confirmed, I would be committed to rigorous oversight of all defense acquisition programs, including the BMD System acquisition.

46. Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Young, if confirmed, would you consider commissioning an independent review and assessment of the BMD acquisition program?

Mr. Young. Yes, if confirmed. I would consider commissioning an independent review and assessment of the BMD acquisition program. I believe such a review is merited because it would provide a new perspective, and perhaps new solutions, to many of the challenges facing the BMD program today.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EVAN BAYH
PRINTED CIRCUIT BOARD TECHNOLOGY

47. Senator Bayh. Mr. Young, in a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on February 6, 2007, Secretary Gates was asked about the investments the DOD was making to ensure that it has a reliable and trusted supply of printed circuit boards for future and legacy systems and to ensure necessary innovation in the design and manufacture of this critical technology. He answered that one of the Department’s centerpiece efforts is the DLA sponsorship of logistics research and development technology demonstrations under an Emerging Critical Interconnection Technology (E/CIT) program. What investments in the E/CIT program and other programs are you making that continue to address the Department’s vital printed circuit board requirements?

Mr. Young. The Department received appropriated funds from Congress in fiscal year 2007 for logistics research and development of printed circuit board technologies and demonstrations. Included in this appropriation was funding for the preservation of access to reliable printed circuit board manufacturing in the United States. In fiscal years 2008–2010, we will look at the need and feasibility of adding support for Printed Wiring Assemblies managed by the DLA in order to best serve our military customers.

48. Senator Bayh. Mr. Young, in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, the Department was tasked with creating a report regarding the recommendations of the National Research Council Committee on Manufacturing Trends in Printed Circuit Board Technology. How will it address future actions the Department intends to take?

Mr. Young. The Department has completed the draft report and is in the final stage of coordination, which is expected to be submitted in November 2007. The Department concurs with each recommendation and identifies the implementation actions planned. Details will be forthcoming in the fully coordinated report.
49. Senator Clinton. Mr. Young, since 2002 in real terms the basic research budgets proposed by the DOD declined by over 6 percent or nearly $100 million. This is during a time period when the overall research and technology development budget has grown by 35 percent or $19 billion, along with huge increases in the DOD top-line budget. That indicates that the Department has shifted emphasis to near-term, lower-risk research and away from longer-term fundamental research that will develop next generation warfighting capabilities and train the next generation of scientists and engineers. Do you think that there has been underinvestment in basic research by DOD? If so, what will you do to address that underinvestment?

Mr. Young. The basic research budget in constant year dollars is up 8 percent from the President's Budget Request 2000 through 2008. Since 2002, the budget has declined 6 percent which illustrates a key fact: within some small variation, the basic research budget for DOD has been “flat” for almost 20 years.

Continued investment in basic research is necessary to confront, understand, predict, and counter not only the current threat but also those which will evolve later in this century. We cannot predict the next adversary, its weapons, its tactics, or its capabilities. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that all the Services and agencies do not neglect their perpetual requirement to prepare for the future by funding basic research today.

50. Senator Clinton. Mr. Young, what do you view as the value of university research within the overall DOD technology development strategy?

Mr. Young. DOD sponsored research at universities underpins the development of future military capabilities in two ways. First, universities are world-class research performers in science and engineering fields important to national defense. Second, investment in university research pays additional dividends through the associated training of scientists and engineers, thereby helping to ensure the future availability of talent needed for defense research and development. For the DOD Basic Research program, universities are prolific sources of discovery, new knowledge, and understanding that lead to more effective and less expensive weapons systems. With the benefit of hindsight, we can see patterns of prior basic research, much of it performed at universities, that spawned today’s revolutionary military capabilities, including the Global Positioning System, stealth, night vision, and precision strike. We expect equally important new capabilities to emerge over the long-term from today’s investments in DOD basic research.

51. Senator Clinton. Mr. Young, at your October 25, 2005, confirmation hearing to be the DDR&E, I raised the important role that DOD investments in fundamental computer science play in the development of new warfighting capabilities. I asked you to look into the issue of general disinvestment in fundamental computer science, particularly by DARPA, due to the potential detrimental long-term consequences. Have you reviewed the Department’s investment strategy for fundamental computer science?

Mr. Young. I agree that computer science research has an important role in the development of new capabilities. The review that you’ve asked for is underway. In advance of a final assessment, I can tell you the progress to date. To gain insight from the research community, we conducted a workshop with the academic chairs of the Nation’s 10 largest university computer science research departments. After the workshop we began reviewing reports and data from government institutions that track the Federal investment. Currently, we are looking at the DOD investment over the past several years in order to complete the review.

52. Senator Clinton. Mr. Young, do you feel that the investment situation has changed for the better since your confirmation as DDR&E?

Mr. Young. It is premature to answer the question prior to completing the requested review of computer science research. I will say, however, that several capability areas in which we have increased our attention have reinforced the importance of computer science such as biometrics, information assurance, large scale data set processing, and networking.

53. Senator Clinton. Mr. Young, what steps will you take in your new role to ensure that we have sufficient investment in this critical area?
Mr. YOUNG. As we continually explore opportunities and evaluate our investments in S&T, we are watchful for areas where our investment is out of balance with overall strategy and objectives. Our Reliance 21 process facilitates oversight by providing a mechanism to stand up Technology Focus Teams (TFTs). TFTs are chartered by senior OSD and Component S&T management to assess technologies or investment areas. For example, this year we are having teams look at software, networks, and large data sets. If the level of computer science research is negatively affecting these particular technologies then the teams will likely uncover that fact in their reviews. I expect Reliance 21 to be an important tool in balancing our investment.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN WARNER

AEGIS COMBAT SYSTEMS

54. Senator WARNER. Mr. Young, the contract for Aegis combat systems on Navy surface ships has not been competed since 1969. When you were the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition, you approved two sole-source justifications to spend a total of $2.5 billion with the incumbent Aegis combat system contractor on a cost-plus basis. You also took some innovative actions to try to change the Navy’s culture by embracing “open architectures” for these ships to allow many other companies (particularly small businesses) to provide cutting-edge computing systems and software at potentially much lower cost. Could you please tell me DOD’s current plan to evolve the Aegis combat system into a true open architecture, using an open business model that fosters competition between many companies?

Mr. YOUNG. The Department of the Navy is implementing an overarching strategy to acquire surface ship combat systems using an open architecture model approach which takes into account acquisition law, existing program delivery schedules, and supportability from both a financial and personnel resources perspective. Surface Warfare combat systems will transition from platform-based development to capability-based development, realign architectures to achieve commonality where appropriate, encourage competition to enhance innovation and reduce costs, and decouple combat system development from platform development while continuing to recognize the need for some platform specific needs.

Instead of a single, large company producing a separate and unique combat system for each ship class and continuing to upgrade that system over its life cycle, the Surface Navy is moving toward a competitive environment where many participants—including small businesses and other nontraditional DOD contractors—will contribute capabilities to collaboratively deliver the best product for the best value using commercial, open standards and open business models. This will allow an unlimited number of qualified vendors to compete for and contribute to the Surface Navy combat systems product line. The specific number of companies that will bid and participate is unknown at this time.

The open architecture model encompasses both technical and business aspects and is enabled by well designed system and component interfaces that use open and published commercial standards, encourage competition, facilitate software and hardware reuse over multiple ship classes, enable incremental improvements, reduce dependency on prime item integrators, and foster innovation from non-traditional DOD companies.

55. Senator WARNER. Mr. Young, on July 9, 2007, the Navy published an announcement in the Federal Register of its intent to again extend the Aegis Combat System Baseline Computer Program Development contract with the incumbent contractor on a sole-source, cost-plus basis. The same announcement says that “competition is being considered for fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2013 surface Navy combat systems upgrades” and that the Navy may conduct an “Industry Day” in July or August to discuss it. This seems backwards—sole-source, non-competitive contracting for hundreds of millions of dollars should be DOD’s last resort, not its first choice. If DOD were truly interested in open systems with many vendors, why wouldn’t you consult with industry first to determine what could be competitively performed, and then minimize the work that had to be performed sole-source?

Mr. YOUNG. The July 9, 2007, Federal Register announcement is a limited 1-year Navy extension of the Aegis Combat System Baseline Computer Program Development contract to the minimum efforts required for completion of development tasking in fiscal year 2008 in order to prevent disruption to the Guided Missile Destroyer (DDG) New Construction ship deliveries and Cruiser Modernization.
Over the past several years the Navy has been working closely with Industry and the other military departments to define an Objective Combat Systems Architecture as well as the developmental work and systems engineering required to evolve to this Navy-defined, standards-based architecture. This new architecture will enable enhanced innovation and allow qualified vendors to compete for and contribute to the overall Surface Navy combat systems product line. The Industry Day that was referenced in the July 2007 announcement, but was not conducted, will address the developmental work associated with the Objective Combat System Architecture. A new date for the Industry Day is not set.

56. Senator Warner. Mr. Young, for the next $2 billion Aegis combat system contract, how many new companies do you plan to allow to bid for work?
Mr. Young. Instead of a single, large company producing a separate and unique combat system for each ship class and continuing to upgrade that system over its life cycle, the Surface Navy is moving toward a competitive environment where many participants—including small businesses and other non-traditional DOD contractors—will contribute capabilities to collaboratively deliver the best product for the best value using commercial, open standards and open business models. This will allow an unlimited number of qualified vendors to compete for and contribute to the Surface Navy combat systems product line. The specific number of companies that will bid and participate is unknown at this time.

57. Senator Warner. Mr. Young, how many of these will be at the prime level, to foster head-to-head competition with the incumbent contractor which has had a 40-year lock on this market?
Mr. Young. In order to manage the risk at an appropriate level for our many programs of record, we will not implement this business model in one single step. Rather, taking a measured approach, we will capitalize on significant systems engineering and integration experience resident with the incumbent prime contractors and move toward greater competitive acquisition opportunities in design and warfighting capability development over time.

58. Senator Warner. Mr. Young, please provide any written analysis the Department has performed prior to the date of this hearing to support the specific tasks that DOD does not currently plan to be competed under the July 9 announcement, and the specific rationale for not competing them.
Mr. Young. The July 9, 2007, Federal Register announcement is a limited 1-year Navy extension of the Aegis Combat System Baseline Computer Program Development contract to the minimum efforts required for completion of development tasking in fiscal year 2008 in order to prevent disruption to DDG New Construction ship deliveries and Cruiser Modernization.

The Navy is currently defining an Objective Combat Systems Architecture as well as the developmental work and systems engineering required to evolve to this Navy-defined, standards-based architecture. This new architecture will enable enhanced innovation and allow qualified vendors to compete for and contribute to the overall Surface Navy combat systems product line. The Navy has not completed analysis of the specific tasks and definition of the work packages to be competed for these efforts.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

SHIPYARD ACQUISITION STRATEGY

59. Senator Collins. Mr. Young, in 2005 you served as the Under Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. In this capacity you were the architect of what I felt from the outset was a very ill-advised one-shipyard acquisition strategy for what is now the DDG–1000 program. As you were well aware, such a strategy would likely have resulted in the loss of one of our Nation’s two remaining surface combatant shipyards. Fortunately, Congress took action to block your proposal, and I hope that Hurricane Katrina has illustrated to you the risks that a one-shipyard acquisition strategy would have entailed.

I conveyed to you the potential consequences of a natural disaster or terrorist attack on one of our shipyards, and it is unfortunate that the former came to pass. Our Gulf Coast shipyards are still recovering from Hurricane Katrina after more than 2 years of rebuilding efforts. So, I hope you have rethought your initial position on this matter and recognize the long-term importance of maintaining competition
in the industrial base, which serves both to drive down costs over time and to provide a surge capability in the event of national security emergencies.

Do you have any thoughts or reflections you would like to share with this committee regarding this matter?

Mr. Young. I would hope the DOD could have robust competition in as many areas as possible. I believe industry consolidation through mergers or acquisitions can limit the number of competitors and thus the opportunity for competition. However, there may be cases where DOD plans provide inadequate quantities or budgets to maintain viable competitors over the long-term without paying cost premiums with taxpayer funds, thus denying our warfighters other quantities or capabilities that could be purchased. Unique cases of low quantity, high cost items require careful analysis to evaluate all aspects of the positive and negative benefits of an acquisition strategy for the warfighter, the taxpayer, and the industrial base.

60. Senator Collins. Mr. Young, in your answers to the advanced policy questions, you state that you are "concerned about consolidation trends which have had an adverse impact on competition opportunities for the DOD." Yet, you previously advocated for a one-shipyard acquisition strategy for the DDG–1000 program, citing short-term budget pressures. Such an approach would have effectively eliminated competition in the DDG–1000 program. How do you reconcile your previous endorsement of a one-shipyard acquisition strategy for the DDG–1000 program with this statement advocating competition?

Mr. Young. I believe there were many lessons as we evolved to the current DD(X) strategy. I do believe that the final evolution of the DD(X) acquisition strategy, the dual lead ship strategy that we developed in the Navy, has created tremendous incentives for program execution and cost control which will benefit the Navy and the Nation. I look forward to the chance to learn more about the progress of the DD(X) program.

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP PROGRAM

61. Senator Collins. Mr. Young, the Navy's proposed plan for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program is to eventually down-select to one sea frame design and then have an open competition to award the contract for the construction of all future LCSs. It would seem to me that all of the pains that you have endured during the design and construction of the first two ships would be lost if you subsequently awarded a third party, that is neither Lockheed Martin nor the General Dynamics–Bath Iron Works–Austal team, the final contract award. What incentive is there for industry to become involved in a program such as LCS if there is the possibility that after working through the lead ship design and construction, there would be a competition for the final contract award that would be open to competitors that did not contribute or invest in the initial program and which would profit from the work done by the original design shipyards?

Mr. Young. I am not familiar with the current plans for the LCS acquisition. I assure you that I will review the details of these plans, if confirmed. The Department of the Navy is fairly paying the industry teams for their work under the initial LCS program. However, I think any possibility of awarding an LCS construction contract to a third party would have to be considered carefully and in great detail. DOD must understand the new risks that the Department might incur under such an award.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

F–22 AIRCRAFT

62. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Young, if the Air Force comes forward with a request for funding for a Lot 10 of F–22 aircraft during the fiscal year 2009 or fiscal year 2010 budget process, will you support that request?

Mr. Young. Yes, I would consider it. The Department would weigh such a request in light of the other fiscal priorities within the Department, during budget deliberations.

NUNN-MCURDY

63. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Young, I believe the Nunn-McCurdy law is a critical tool which provides the Services the ability to assess whether a DOD program is experiencing cost overruns, as that program is defined by its production profile de-
scribed in the Services’ and Department’s Program of Record. Will you assure the committee that the current fixed firm price (FFP)/not-to-exceed (NTE) proposal that has been submitted for the C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engineering Program will receive a complete and independent assessment by DOD, in light of your responsibility for programs that are assessed by the Services to have a Nunn-McCurdy breach?

Mr. Young. Yes. I have already initiated the Nunn-McCurdy review process, as a result of Secretary Wynne’s September 27, 2007, notification of the breach to Congress. A review of the current proposal will be an important part of that review.

64. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Young, I understand that Nunn-McCurdy does not segregate service-directed profile changes and their resulting cost increases from other cost increases, such as those resulting from contractor and/or supplier factors. Should the current Nunn-McCurdy law be amended in order to more appropriately segregate cost growth and account for whom or what drove a program’s cost increases?

Mr. Young. I would not recommend the suggested segregation since circumstances differ from program to program, and could add additional complexity to the Nunn-McCurdy process. I do believe it is useful to understand the nature of cost increases and, if confirmed, would seek to account for and explain them to Congress when the Nunn-McCurdy statute applies.

65. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Young, do you believe that a Service Secretary should be allowed to assess a Nunn-McCurdy breach without a prior review by OSD/AT&L or would you like to see the law amended to provide this additional “check and balance”?

Mr. Young. I intend to work closely with the Service Secretaries on issues such as this, and see no reason for amending the Nunn-McCurdy statute. Nothing in the statute precludes a Service Secretary from reviewing programs and making recommendations at any time. I do believe in a transparent process which should ensure that USD(AT&L) understands the issue and nature of cost increases in a timely manner.

66. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Young, do you feel that a FFP contract or a NTE contract is an appropriate contractual vehicle to allow a defense contractor to perform a service or modification at a FFP, or NTE price limit, where the contractor assumes the risk to produce at or below that price?

Mr. Young. Yes, when the requirements are firm and the contract performance risks are well understood and manageable, it is perfectly appropriate to use a FFP. With regard to NTEs: We use NTE pricing with unpriced contractual actions (UCAs). When we complete negotiations of a UCA we convert the UCA to a definitized contract. When the requirements are firm and the contract performance risks are well understood and manageable, we will use a FFP contract as the appropriate contract vehicle.

67. Senator Chambliss. Mr. Young, do you believe that the use of Economic Price Adjustment (EPA) clauses are appropriate in long-term FFP and/or NTE contracts?

Mr. Young. In general, we prefer not to use EPA clauses. However, in those instances when we have abnormally long periods of performance (as is the case in many of our shipbuilding contracts) and there is a great degree of uncertainty in the pricing of labor and materials in those out-years, we will utilize EPA contract provisions in order to protect the Government and the contractor against major fluctuations in material and labor escalation, as the case may be.

[The nomination reference of John J. Young, Jr., follows:]
John J. Young, Jr., of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, vice Kenneth J. Krieg.

[The biographical sketch of John J. Young, Jr., which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF JOHN J. YOUNG, JR.

On November 2, 2005, John J. Young, Jr. was appointed as the Director, Defense Research and Engineering. As the Director, Mr. Young is the Principal Advisor to the Secretary of Defense on technical matters and acts as the Department's Chief Technology Officer. His portfolio includes oversight of a $70 billion research enterprise; which includes: Basic and Applied Research, development of certain prototypes, oversight of the Service laboratories and federally funded research and development centers, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Defense Technical Information Center.

Mr. Young is a graduate of Georgia Institute of Technology, where he participated in the cooperative engineering education program at Georgia Tech, working with what is now Lockheed Martin Tactical Aircraft Systems in Fort Worth, TX. Under this program, he worked in eight different engineering groups primarily supporting the F–16 program and advanced fighter technology efforts. Mr. Young next worked at the BDM Corporation in Huntsville, AL, providing engineering support of Army missile defense interceptor programs.

After receiving a Master's degree in Aeronautics and Astronautics from Stanford University, Mr. Young joined the technical staff at Rockwell Missile Systems Division in Duluth, GA. He became a member of the Technical Staff at Sandia National Laboratories in 1988 where he worked on hypersonic weapon designs and maneuvering reentry vehicle aerodynamics as well as standoff bomb concepts. While at Sandia, he was selected as an American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) congressional fellow. He served his AIAA fellowship with the Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and then joined the committee's professional staff. During his tenure with the committee, he served as the staff analyst for Department of Defense (DOD) procurement, research, development, test, and evaluation programs. Prior to leaving the committee, he was responsible for reviewing all DOD aircraft procurement programs as well as the activities of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. He also evaluated the science and technology program budgets for the Navy, Air Force, and Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Young is the former Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition. As the Navy's Senior Acquisition Executive, Mr. Young implemented a wide range of innovative organizational and business practices to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of Navy and Marine Corps procurement and research programs. He stabilized programs and controlled cost through emphasis on milestone-based incentive fees, control of change orders and requirements, multiyear procurement contracts, and creation of competitive and joint programs.

Under his leadership, the Navy acquisition team successfully changed Navy acquisition approaches through programs like Operation Respond and the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). In response to the urgent needs of the U.S. Marine Corps, he led the department's urgent acquisition efforts under Operation Respond—a team established to rapidly meet the technological and material requirements generated from deployed warfighters serving in Iraq. Operation Respond efforts ensured that the Marine Corps had needed items ranging from vehicle armor to helicopter survivability equipment to ballistic goggles. LCS was defined through collaborative work with the Chief of Naval Operations and naval fleet leadership, leading to a keel laying in roughly 3 years after program initiation. Mr. Young has also pursued greater jointness on many efforts, including his successful merger of the Air Force and Navy Joint Tactical Radio System clusters and the Distributed Common Ground Station.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee.]
The form executed by John J. Young, Jr., in connection with his nomination follows:

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   John Jacob Young, Jr.

2. Position to which nominated:
   Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   May 29, 1962; Newnan, Georgia.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Barbara Joan Schleihauf.

7. Names and ages of children:
   Nathan Jacob Young, 15; William Joseph Young, 13; and Kathryn Elizabeth Young, 10.

8. Education:
   List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
   - Stanford University; 10/85–6/87; Master’s in Aeronautics and Astronautics; Stanford, CA.
   - Georgia Institute of Technology; 6/80–6/85; Bachelor’s in Aerospace Engineering; Atlanta, GA.
   - Newnan High School; 9/78–6/80; High School Diploma; Newnan, GA.

9. Employment record:
   List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
   - Department of Defense; Washington, DC, Director, Defense Research and Engineering, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, DC; 11/05–Present.
   - Department of Navy; Washington, DC, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition), Department of the Navy, Washington, DC; 7/01–11/05.
   - United States Senate, Committee on Appropriations; Washington, DC, Professional Staff Member, Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Washington, DC; 12/93–7/01.
   - Sandia National Laboratory; Albuquerque, NM; Member of the Technical Staff serving the U.S. Senate as an American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) Congressional Fellow on the U.S. Senate Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, Washington, DC; 1/91–12/93.
10. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.
   No additional positions.

11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   None.

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
   Member—American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.
   Member—Jamestown Parent Teacher Association.
   Member—The Briarean Society, Phi Kappa Phi, Tau Beta Pi, Sigma Gamma Tau, and Phi Eta Sigma college honor societies.

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**
   (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
   None.
   (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
   None.
   (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
   None.

14. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
   2007—Selected as American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) Fellow.
   2006—Awarded the Defense Acquisition University David Acker Award for Skill in Communication.
   2005—Awarded Distinguished Public Service Award by the Secretary of the Navy for invaluable contributions to the Department of the Navy by leading the Operation Respond team and creating innovative approaches to multi-year contracts that provided efficient warfare systems to the taxpayer.
   2003—Awarded Distinguished Public Service Award by the Secretary of the Navy for implementing innovative business practices, stabilizing the Navy’s most important programs, and encouraging partnership with industry.
   Awarded certificate of service from the Secretary of the Navy for 10 years of service in the United States Government.
   Selected for the 1996 National Security Leadership Course at Syracuse University.
   Selected for the 1996 class of Georgia Institute of Technology Council of Outstanding Engineering Alumni.
   Please see attachment sheet for additional recognitions and achievements.

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.

16. **Speeches:** Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.
   I have attached for your review two copies of recent speeches that I have delivered in the past 5 years.

17. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?
   Yes.
The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

JOHN J. YOUNG, JR.

This 21st day of June, 2007.

[The nomination of John J. Young, Jr., was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on November 15, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on November 16, 2007.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Douglas A. Brook by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DUTIES OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER)

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller) (ASN(FM&C))?
Answer. If confirmed, I would be responsible for advising the Secretary of the Navy on financial management matters and for directing and managing all financial activities and operations of the Department of the Navy (DON).

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?
Answer. I hold degrees in political science, public administration and public policy and I have served as a Navy Supply Corps officer. From 1990–1992, I served as Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management) and in 1992–93 was Acting Director of the Office of Personnel Management. I am currently on the faculty at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) where I teach a required course in Defense Budget and Financial Management Policy. I am also director of the Center for Defense Management Reform at NPS where I conduct and oversee research in various areas of defense management.

Question. Do you believe that there are any actions that you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the ASN(FM&C)?
Answer. Yes, although I am generally knowledgeable about Navy financial management, I will need to make the transition from a relatively abstract academic environment to the specific operational environment. This means learning quickly the details of current Navy financial management and comptrollership matters.

RELATIONSHIPS (OLA)

Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between the ASN(FM&C) and each of the following:
The Secretary of the Navy.
Answer. The ASN(FM&C) is the principal assistant and advisor to the Secretary of the Navy on fiscal and budgetary matter. The ASN(FM&C) also performs other duties as the Secretary may prescribe.

Question. The Under Secretary of the Navy.
Answer. Similarly, the ASN(FM&C) is also the principal assistant and advisor to the Under Secretary of the Navy on fiscal and budgetary matter. The ASN(FM&C) also performs other duties as the Under Secretary may prescribe.

Question. The other Assistant Secretaries of the Navy.
Answer. The ASN(FM&C) provides advice on financial matters to the other Assistant Secretaries, and provides financial management policy leadership, guidance, implementation and coordination with the other Assistant Secretaries. If confirmed, I would ensure that their interests are represented in recommending financial alter-
natives to the Secretary of the Navy. I would work to ensure that financial management activities of the Department support their respective portfolios.

**Question.** The General Counsel of the Navy.

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would expect to have a close working relationship with the General Counsel, to understand and address the legal implications of DON financial matters and to assure compliance with fiscal law.

**Question.** The Chief of Naval Operations.

**Answer.** If confirmed, I am committed to providing the support that the Chief of Naval Operations requires in order to execute his duties and responsibilities and achieve the mission of the Navy.

**Question.** The Commandant of the Marine Corps.

**Answer.** If confirmed, I am committed to providing the support that the Commandant of the Marine Corps requires in order to execute his duties and responsibilities and achieve the mission of the Marine Corps.

**Question.** The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

**Answer.** In the role of ASN(FM&C), I would, if confirmed, work with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in the development and execution of the budgetary and fiscal policies and initiatives of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Secretary of the Navy.

**Question.** The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/Chief Information Officer.

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would work to ensure that DON information technology systems that support diverse activities are properly managed and resourced to accommodate the full spectrum of financial management functions and reporting.

**Question.** The Director, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation.

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the program priorities of the DoN are well understood; that thorough DON program reviews are conducted within the framework of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process; the results are communicated to leadership; and are in concert with overall Department of Defense (DOD) strategy.

**Question.** The Assistant Secretaries for Financial Management of the Army and Air Force.

**Answer.** If confirmed, I am committed to working closely with the Assistant Secretaries of the Army and Air Force in the area of financial management to support the efforts of the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in order to facilitate decision making at all levels and achieve the strongest cooperation between the Services possible. I am committed to working to foster a cordial and productive working relationship with these colleagues.

**CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ROLES IN THE NAVY BUDGET PROCESS**

**Question.** What is your understanding of the division of responsibility between the ASN(FM&C) and the senior military officers responsible for budget matters in Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and headquarters, Marine Corps, in making program and budget decisions, including the preparation of the Navy Program Objective Memorandum, the annual budget submission, and the Future Years Defense Program?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would have the responsibility and the authority for all budget matters within the DON. The Director of the Office of Budget would serve under my direct supervision and would be responsible to me for the formulation, justification, and execution of the Department’s budget. The Navy and Marine Corps officers responsible for programming would also serve as my principal military advisors in my capacity to oversee development of the DON program objectives memoranda.

**BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION AGENCY**

**Question.** What is your understanding of the division of responsibility between the BTA and the senior military officers responsible for budget matters in the Office of the Secretary of Defense?

**Answer.** The stated mission of the BTA is “to guide the transformation of business operations throughout the DOD and to deliver Enterprise-level capabilities that align to warfighter needs.” It is my understanding that the BTA provides the framework for DOD’s future business environment, using a “tiered” approach that allows components to execute plans that are within this framework but also allowing the flexibility to support unique mission requirements. This approach, if executed prop-
erly, would support the effort to achieve accurate and timely financial decision-making in DON.

Question. What is your understanding of the role of the ASN(FM&C) in providing the Navy’s views to the BTA, or participating in the decision-making process of the BTA, on issues of concern to the Navy?

Answer. BTA states that “the Department’s approach to business transformation relies on tiered accountability at the enterprise, component, and program levels [. . .]. The components are participants in the governance process as well as key implementers.” Thus, the Assistant Secretary should be involved in establishing and implementing DOD-wide financial management standards and improvement programs that affect DON.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the ASN(FM&C)?

Answer. The DON, like all of DOD, is challenged by internal and external pressures on its budgetary resources. Recognizing these pressures and constructing budget proposals that meet the needs of the Navy and the Nation will be an ongoing challenge. At the same time, good financial management requires the systems, processes, and educated and trained personnel to produce timely, accurate, and useful financial information to support sound decisionmaking.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have to address these challenges?

Answer. Recognizing that, if confirmed, my remaining term of office is likely to be relatively short, I see three critical challenges:

• First, the development of sound Navy and Marine Corps budget proposals for fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010.
• Second, to make discernible progress toward achieving auditability of the Department’s financial statements.
• Third, to identify needs, plan, and invest in appropriate training, education and career development for the Navy’s military and civilian financial management personnel.

If confirmed, I will work closely with the Navy’s military and civilian leaders to develop sound budget proposals that recognize the needs of the Navy and Marine Corps and the fiscal environment in which budgetary decisions will be made. With regard to financial statements, I will endeavor to provide the leadership commitment required to make progress toward achieving an auditable financial statement. In the career development area, I will review and act where necessary to develop a sound plan for education, training, career development and assignment of financial management personnel.

In addition, the ASN(FM&C) is in a position to be an agent of transformation, with capability to develop the strategies to make financial and budgetary business operations more effective and efficient. If confirmed, I would support the continued development of improved DON business operations.

PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the ASN(FM&C)?

Answer. Please refer to the answers to the above questions. If confirmed, I will quickly become engaged in the Navy’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System process to assure that every effort is made to produce sound and defensible budget proposals. I will provide strong leadership support for making progress on the Navy’s financial statements under the Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness plan. I will immediately begin a review of the education, training, career development, and assignment of financial management personnel.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Question. DOD’s financial management deficiencies have been the subject of many audit reports over the past 10 or more years. Despite numerous strategies and initiatives, problems with financial management and data continue.

What do you consider to be the top financial management issues that must be addressed by the DON over the next 5 years?

Answer. I believe the top challenge will be to support an expanded wartime mission to combat terrorism, and to execute that urgent mission within resources provided by Congress. To be successful, we need to fundamentally change the way we do business, documenting, and better controlling our business processes, making
them less costly and more effective. In my experience, the weaknesses that are attributed to financial management are symptomatic of weaknesses in our systems and processes. There seems to be consensus between the audit community and the department that the major challenge is the department’s ability to generate timely, relevant, and reliable financial information for decisionmaking. Resolving that problem requires a combination of new information systems, new business processes, training and education, and cultural change. Those factors must all be addressed in balance to ensure the department becomes more financially proficient and can sustain that proficiency.

Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to ensure that progress is made toward improved financial management in the Navy?

Answer. The Department has a Financial Improvement Program, which is aligned with the DOD Financial Improvement and Audit Readiness Plan. If confirmed, I will work to ensure progress is made in accordance with that plan and will also look at whether adjustments are required to the plan.

Question. If confirmed, what private business practices, if any, would you advocate for adoption by the DOD and the Department of the Navy?

Answer. Certainly some governmental activities are business-like and some management practices can be incorporated from the private sector. With respect to financial management, in those cases where there is an appropriate private sector practice the Navy would benefit by emulating, if confirmed, I would give them serious consideration. I would also look to other well-run Federal or State governmental agencies, or the non-profit sector, for management best practices.

Question. What are the most important performance measurements you would use, if confirmed, to evaluate changes in the Navy's financial operations to determine if its plans and initiatives are being implemented as intended and anticipated results are being achieved?

Answer. I understand the importance of effective performance measurement and support the use of metrics. I understand that both Navy and the DOD comptroller are developing measures of progress in financial management. If confirmed, I will work to understand and employ these and other metrics to measure financial management performance.

Question. Over the last several years, the DOD has taken a number of steps to realign its management structure to expedite and enhance its business transformation efforts. For example, the Department has established a new Defense Business Systems Management Committee, the BTA, and the Investment Review Boards. The military departments do not appear to have taken similar organizational steps. Do you believe that the organizational structure of the Department of the Navy is properly aligned to bring about business systems modernization and financial management improvements?

Answer. Over the past several years, the governance and management structures for systems modernization and financial management improvement have been evolving. To the extent those organizational structures and plans are now stable, I believe it would make sense for the components to follow suit. However, until such time as I can gain greater experience and understanding of how these structures are working, I cannot say whether they are currently properly aligned.

Question. If not, how do you believe the Department should be restructured to more effectively address this issue?

Answer. If confirmed, I would need to look into this matter in depth from within before drawing any conclusions.

BUSINESS MANAGEMENT MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

Question. For the past several years, the Department has pursued a Business Management Modernization Program (BMMP) aimed, in part, at correcting deficiencies in DOD’s financial management and achieving the ability to receive an unqualified “clean” audit.

Do you support continuing the BMMP?

Answer. In the evolution of the Department’s efforts to transform its business management practices, it is my understanding that the BTA has superseded the BMMP. I support the objectives of business management modernization and will work to make progress toward an unqualified audit opinion.

Question. If confirmed, what would your role be in this business modernization effort?

Answer. I would engage in BTA matters involving financial capabilities and standards and support the Secretary's role in deliberations of the Defense Business Systems Management Committee.
Question. The BMMP advocates top-down leadership in establishing an enterprise architecture for business systems modernization. The Services, however, appear to be pursuing independent pilot programs for modernizing business systems, despite the risk that a Service-led approach could produce numerous incompatible systems. Do you support an Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)-led approach to business modernization?

Answer. I support the defense business transformation goal of tiered accountability where enterprise-wide policy and standards are set by OSD and component-specific programs are managed by the components in conformance with those standards and policies. I support communication and coordination mechanisms to ensure both the centralized and decentralized aspects of the work are efficient and effective.

Question. If so, what would you do, if confirmed, to ensure that the Navy supports such an approach?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure the programs managed by the Navy conform to the standards and policies set by OSD and the various laws governing system development.

Question. A critical requirement of the BMMP is an “enterprise architecture” that would establish standards and requirements for modernization or new acquisition of business information technology systems.

Do you agree that an effective enterprise architecture is a critical step to ensure that new and modified business information technology systems serve their intended purposes?

Answer. Yes. A common architecture more readily supports the aggregation of financial data for reporting or to ensure that business performance data is useful for management decisionmaking.

Question. The Comptroller General has taken the position that the enterprise architectures of the military departments are not mature enough to responsibly guide and constrain investment in business systems. According to Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Navy has fully satisfied only 10 of 31 core framework elements of an enterprise architecture.

What is your view of this issue? If confirmed, what steps, if any, do you plan to take to address this problem?

Answer. I will review the Comptroller General’s report and take his conclusions seriously. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Department’s Chief Information Officer as I review the financial improvement plans for the department to ensure that our investment in business systems is aligned to DOD’s objectives and guidance.

Question. Section 2222 of title 10, U.S.C., requires the DOD to institute a process to ensure that money is not wasted on new or upgraded defense business systems that are not in compliance with the required enterprise architecture. The Comptroller General has testified that the enterprise architectures of the military departments “are not mature.” Nonetheless, they continue to invest billions of dollars every year in thousands of business system programs.

What is your view of this issue?

Answer. I am not sufficiently knowledgeable about the maturity of the Navy’s enterprise architecture to comment. If confirmed, I will review the Comptroller General’s report and take his observations seriously.

Question. Do you believe that we need additional controls on the expenditure of funds for business systems until such time as the required enterprise architecture is complete?

Answer. That is a specific remedy to an issue I do not yet fully understand. If confirmed, I will make it a priority to look into this matter, but at this time I am not able to comment.

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**GAO RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM**

**Question.** In testimony before the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee, the Comptroller General of the United States, David M. Walker, suggested that “to improve the likelihood of meaningful, broad-based financial management and related business reform”, DOD should give the leaders of its functional areas, or “domains,” control of systems investments.

What is your view of this suggestion?

Answer. Generally, I believe that control of investments should be delegated to the lowest level capable of handling that control. At the same time, we have an enterprise-wide concern that requires some degree of top-down control and oversight. I am not conversant in the specifics of the “domains” referred to in the question but will look into that matter, if confirmed.
Question. Mr. Walker testified that the DOD should fix its financial management systems before it tries to develop auditable financial statements. He stated that: “Given the size, complexity, and deeply ingrained nature of the financial management problems facing DOD, heroic end-of-the-year efforts relied on by some agencies to develop auditable financial statement balances are not feasible at DOD. Instead, a sustained focus on the underlying problems impeding the development of reliable financial data throughout the Department will be necessary and is the best course of action.”

Do you agree with this statement?

Answer. My research supports the Comptroller General’s view that size and complexity are barriers to achieving unqualified audit opinions. It has also shown that heroic effort can sometimes result in improved audit reports but that such progress is generally unsustainable. Instead, well-designed information systems and business processes, leadership commitment, positive resource allocation and well-trained people are required to go beyond short-term gains in this area.

Question. What steps need to be taken in the Navy and Marine Corps to achieve the goal stated by the Comptroller General?

Answer. I do not possess the level of detailed knowledge to adequately answer that question. If confirmed, that question will be a priority because, in my opinion, the Department will require leadership to continue strengthening, tightening, and improving business processes, systems, and the proficiency of its workforce.

LEASING MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS

Question. The controversy surrounding the Air Force 767 tanker lease proposal raised significant concerns over leasing versus purchasing major military equipment. The Navy and Marine Corps have also entered several lease agreements in recent years for certain logistical support ships.

What is your opinion of the pros and cons of leasing versus buying major capital equipment? Is leasing a viable and cost-effective option for procuring DON equipment, and if so, in what situations?

Answer. This is an area that I would intend to study carefully if confirmed. If confirmed, working with the Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and Acquisition, I would support policies requiring the completion of a business case analysis prior to a determination to buy or lease equipment. Each situation should be carefully reviewed and the results of the analysis should guide the decision process.

SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING AND ANNUAL BUDGETING

Question. Since September 11, 2001, the DOD has paid for much of the cost of ongoing military operations through supplemental appropriations. What are your views regarding the use of supplemental appropriations to fund the cost of ongoing military operations?

Answer. When funding requirements are dynamic, long-range forecasts are less reliable. Dynamic operational demands require a higher degree of timeliness and flexibility. Supplemental appropriations have the benefit of being more timely than the annual budget process and have greater flexibilities to support the changing demands of a wartime fiscal environment. Navy’s support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and the global war on terror continues to require a higher tempo of operations than expected for peacetime operations. Thus it may not be practical to attempt to program and budget for a dynamic war as far in advance as the normal budget process requires. Therefore, it has been appropriate to fund the global war on terror through the use of supplemental appropriations. I also recognize that the Department has identified projected global war on terror costs along with the fiscal year 2008 budget, and, if confirmed, I would support this practice.

AUTHORIZATION FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Question. Do you believe that an authorization pursuant to section 114 of title 10, U.S.C., is necessary before funds for operations and maintenance, procurement, research and development, and military construction may be made available for obligation by the DOD?

Answer. Yes. However I acknowledge that situations can occur where funds have been appropriated but not authorized. I understand that it has been the Department’s practice to work with all the oversight committees to resolve these matters. If confirmed, I will respect the views and prerogatives of the Department’s oversight committees and will work closely with the committees to achieve a resolution of the issues, as necessary.
INCREMENTAL FUNDING OF SHIPS

Question. Both the executive and legislative branches have traditionally followed a policy of full funding for major capital purchases such as ships. Recently, the Department of the Navy has begun relying on alternative funding methods for the purchase of ships, such as incremental funding or the purchase of an initial class of ships through RDT&E funds instead of normal procurement accounts. What is your opinion of these types of funding strategies and of the pros and cons of incrementally funding ship construction?

Answer. I am aware that alternative funding approaches for ship acquisition have been undertaken but I am not sufficiently knowledgeable about these funding models to respond. Generally, I believe that the present challenges of naval ship construction make it imperative that the Navy work with Congress on appropriate financing policies.

FUNDING FOR HEALTH CARE FACILITIES

Question. The conditions at Walter Reed Army Medical Center focused considerable attention on the care, management, and transition of wounded service members, as well as the condition of medical care facilities. What is your understanding of the Secretary of the Navy’s responsibility for the construction, maintenance, and modernization of Navy medical facilities, including battalion aid stations which support the U.S. Marine Corps?

Answer. This is an area I would have to study in detail, if confirmed.

Question. Do you believe the current system of oversight and funding for DOD medical facilities clearly defines responsibility and authority between the military departments and the OSD?

Answer. This is an area I would have to study in detail, if confirmed.

Question. What changes do you believe are necessary, if any, to improve quality and accountability for Navy and Marine Corps medical facilities?

Answer. This is an area I would have to study in detail, if confirmed.

DEFENSE INTEGRATED MILITARY HUMAN RESOURCES SYSTEM

Question. To address pay and personnel record keeping, and other personnel management requirements, DOD is developing the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS), an integrated, joint military personnel and pay system envisioned for use by all the Services. What is your understanding of the status of the development and implementation of DIMHRS in the Department?

Answer. I am aware that the Department is pursuing a DOD-wide solution for personnel management and pay through DIMHRS but I am not sufficiently knowledgeable on the details of this program to comment. If confirmed, I will make a point of understanding the financial impacts of this initiative.

Question. What is your understanding of the Navy and Marine Corps views of the pros and cons of implementing DIMHRS?

Answer. I understand that DON is committed to a transition to DIMHRS following the Army and Air Force, but I am not sufficiently knowledgeable on the details of this program to comment. If confirmed, I will make a point of understanding the financial impacts of this initiative.

Question. Do you support the full implementation of DIMHRS into the DON? If not, why not?

Answer. I am not sufficiently knowledgeable on the details of this program to comment. If confirmed, I will make a point of understanding the financial impacts of this initiative.

FAMILIES FIRST

Question. For over 10 years, U.S. Transportation Command and its subordinate command, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, have worked to improve the process of moving servicemembers’ household goods. Implementation of the new system—“Families First”—will use a “best value” approach to contracting with movers that will focus on quality of performance, web-based scheduling and tracking of shipments, encouragement of door-to-door moves, and full replacement value for damaged household goods. It has been estimated that implementation of Families First would increase the annual costs for permanent change of station moves by up to 13 percent. What is your understanding of the implementation of Families First and a full replacement value for damaged personal property in the Navy and Marine Corps?
Answer. This is an area I would have to study in detail, if confirmed. If confirmed, I will make a point of understanding the financial impacts of this initiative.

Question. What is your understanding of the projected costs of Families First to the Navy and Marine Corps over the next 5 years?

Answer. This is an area I would have to study in detail, if confirmed. If confirmed, I will make a point of understanding the financial impacts of this initiative.

Question. Do you support full implementation of the Families First program, including the development of the Defense Personal Property System, in the DON?

Answer. I strongly believe we should support our sailors and marines and their families. Any proposal to make their household goods shipments simpler, more timely, with greater assurances and lower expense to the service member is worth serious consideration. I am not familiar with the details of the Families First program, but, if confirmed, I will certainly devote sufficient time to understanding it and its impact on the overall DON budget.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the ASN(FM&C)?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[The nomination reference of Douglas A. Brook follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

As in executive session, Senate of the United States, June 5, 2007.

Ordered. That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Douglas A. Brook, of California, to be an Assistant Secretary of the Navy, vice Richard Greco, Jr., resigned.

[The biographical sketch of Douglas A. Brook, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

Biographical Sketch of Douglas A. Brook, Ph.D.

Dr. Douglas A. Brook is Professor of Public Policy and Director of the Center for Defense Management Reform at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Monterey, CA. From 2002 until 2005, Dr. Brook was Dean of the NPS Graduate School of Business and Public Policy. The School offers defense-focused MBA program and other graduated education programs for U.S. and international military officers.

Before joining NPS, Dr. Brook was Vice President, Government Affairs for the LTV Corporation.

Prior to joining LTV, Brook served in two presidentially-appointed positions. In 1992 he was Acting Director of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, the central personnel management agency of the Federal Government. From 1990 to 1992
Brook was Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management, the Army's senior financial official.

Dr. Brook began his career as Director of Public Finance of the National Association of Manufacturers in New York. Subsequently, he joined the Libbey-Owens-Ford Company and served as Vice President and head of the company’s Washington, DC, office. In 1982 he founded Brook Associates, Inc., a public affairs consulting business serving corporate and trade association clients, which he managed until assuming duties at the Pentagon. He also served two elected terms on the Town Council of Vienna, VA.

Dr. Brook grew up in East Detroit, MI. He attended the University of Michigan, graduating with a Bachelor of Arts degree in political science in 1965 and a Master of Public Administration degree in 1967. In 2001 he earned his Ph.D. in Public Policy at George Mason University. He also completed the 1977 Executive Program at the University of Virginia’s Colgate Darden Graduate School of Business Administration.

Brook served on active duty as a Navy Supply Corps officer and was a member of the Naval Reserve for 30 years. He retired with the rank of Captain.

Dr. Brook and his wife, Mariana, reside in Pacific Grove, CA.

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[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Douglas A. Brook in connection with his nomination follows:]
7. Names and ages of children:
None.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
- 2005–Present—Professor of Public Policy and Director of Center for Defense Management Reform, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.
- 2002–2005—Dean, Graduate School of Business & Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
- Member—Business Advisory Board, Sodexho USA.
- Of Counsel—Valente & Associates.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
- American Society of Military Comptrollers
- Association for Public Policy and Management
- American Society for Public Administration
- Military Officers Association of America
- Naval Reserve Association
- Saltaire Property Owners Association
- Duck (NC) United Methodist Church
- Church in the Forest (Pebble Beach)
- Congressional Country Club
- Army and Navy Club
- AARP
- Naval Postgraduate School Foundation
- Monterey Museum of Art
- University of Michigan Alumni Association
- Monterey Symphony Chorus

13. Political affiliations and activities:
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
- None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
- None.

14. Honors and Awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
- Joseph L. Fisher Doctoral Award, George Mason University School of Public Policy, 2001.
- Fellow, National Academy of Public Administration
- Army Distinguished Civilian Service Medal
- National Defense Service Medal
Armed Forces Reserve Medal
Meritocracy Service Medal

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.


Technical Reports and Working Papers


Invited Presentations


16. **Speeches:** Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

N/A.

17. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

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**SIGNATURE AND DATE**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

DOUGLAS A. BROOK.

This 22nd day of June, 2007.

[The nomination of Douglas A. Brook was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on November 15, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on November 16, 2007.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Robert L. Smolen by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

**QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES**

**DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS**

**Question.** What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs?

**Answer.** The Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs is primarily responsible for maintaining a safe, secure and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile. This is accomplished by ensuring the safe and efficient operations of the nuclear weapons complex, and preparing Defense Programs for the future, to include both a transformed nuclear weapons complex and nuclear weapons stockpile, to better meet the challenges of the 21st century.

**Question.** Is it your understanding that the duties of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs will change or remain the same as those of your predecessor?

**Answer.** If I am confirmed, my duties as Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs will remain generally the same as those of my predecessor. Relatively recent actions to place the Site Office Managers under the Deputy Administrator and to create one organization responsible for Readiness in Technical Base and Operations are settled.

**Question.** If you are aware of any proposed changes to the duties and functions of the Deputy Administrator, what are those changes?

**Answer.** I am unaware of any proposed changes to the duties and functions of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs.

**Question.** What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these duties?

**Answer.** I recently retired from the United States Air Force with over 33 years of service and in 7 of the 10 years I was directly involved in operational and policy issues relating directly to the duties of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs. I began my military career with operational experience in ground and airborne nuclear missile command and control. I have served on the staff of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have also worked in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force in Legislative Liaison; first in the House of Representatives and later as the Chief of the Senate office on Capitol Hill. Most recently, I served as Deputy Director and then Director of the Air Force Office of Nu-
clear and Counterproliferation in the Pentagon. At the conclusion of those assignments, I served as the Director of the Strategic Capabilities Policy in the Executive Office of the President, and was responsible for the development, coordination, and implementation of national security policies to support the President and the National Security Council. In that capacity, I was the senior ranking military officer in the White House complex. During the course of my career, I have commanded units at the squadron, group, wing, and major command levels while on assignment at Air Force Space Command, Pacific Air Forces Command, Air Force Materiel Command, and Headquarters in the Air Force District of Washington.

**Question.** Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs?

**Answer.** I trust that my background and experience show me to be appropriately qualified to be the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, and I hope the Senate will agree. To enhance my expertise and knowledge, if confirmed, I plan to immediately engage with those people who can help me better understand the complexities of the issues and prioritize the challenges before Defense Programs. This will include meeting with staff and managers in key parts of the program, both at Headquarters and in the field, along with National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and Department of Energy (DOE) management, key partners such as the Department of Defense (DOD), Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, and Congress. I realize that if I am confirmed, I will be leading an organization with a proven track record of success—my immediate challenge will be to learn how I can continue to lead this exceptional group and to help build upon processes that can make the organization even more productive.

**Question.** Assuming you are confirmed, what additional or new duties and functions, if any, do you expect that the Administrator of the NNSA would prescribe for you other than those described above?

**Answer.** I am unaware of any additional duties and functions that the NNSA Administrator would prescribe for me other than to continue his efficient and effective management of defense programs operations. If confirmed, I will work with the Administrator to clarify his expectations and strive to be a valued part of the team.

### RELATIONSHIPS

**Question.** If confirmed, how will you work with the following officials in carrying out your duties:

- The Secretary of Energy.
- The Deputy Secretary of Energy.
- The Other Deputy Administrators of the NNSA.
- The Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management (EM).

**Answer.** I have great respect for the Secretary and look forward to working with him through the NNSA Administrator on Defense Programs issues. The NNSA is very fortunate to have a Cabinet Secretary representing us in the administration who can work with the Secretaries of Defense, State, and Homeland Security on cross-cutting interagency issues and policies concerning the Nation’s security.

**Question.** The Deputy Secretary of Energy.

**Answer.** The Deputy Secretary serves as the Department’s Chief Operating Officer and I expect to have regular interaction on issues that affect both NNSA and other organizations within the Department. From major construction projects to cyber security to pension policies, there are many issues in which the Deputy Secretary plays a key role.

**Question.** The Other Deputy Administrators of the NNSA.

**Answer.** The Deputy Administrators for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and Naval Reactors would be my peers if confirmed. I have known both of these individuals for several years during my military career. In fact, I regularly worked with the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation while we were at the National Security Council. Both of these individuals bring a great wealth of knowledge and policy expertise in their assigned areas. I have been meeting with the Deputies and Associate Administrators to better familiarize myself with the individuals and their specific program responsibilities. I look forward to leading those in Defense Programs if confirmed.

**Question.** The Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management (EM).

**Answer.** The Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs needs to have a special working relationship with the Assistant Secretary for EM in ensuring that NNSA supports and facilitates the cleanup of legacy waste and contamination at NNSA sites. As we move towards a smaller stockpile, decrease the number of sites with special nuclear materials, and consolidate these materials across the complex we will need to work hand-in-hand as one Department to meet our goals.

**Question.** The other relevant Assistant Secretaries of DOE.
Answer. I look forward to working with the other Assistant Secretaries within the DOE, if confirmed. The DOE is a unique place with many talented leaders in both NNSA and other DOE organizations. Thus, in order to be most effective, there will need to be close collaboration. As we move towards further diversification at our national laboratories, I see myself working with the Office of Science in particular for the greater good of NNSA, the Office of Science, and the Nation.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).

Answer. I have personally known the prior two individuals confirmed to this position and worked closely with them. As Acting USD(AT&L), Dr. John J. Hammett, is Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC)—focal point for the relationship between the DOE and the DOD. My role would be to support the NWC collectively by dealing directly with the USD(AT&L), the NNSA Administrator (as DOE’s voting member to the NWC), and the distinguished members from U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on all NNSA-specific matters relevant to the NWC. Specifically, I would work with the USD(AT&L) by attending NWC meetings and being heavily involved in all NWC matters. As a former Director for Air Force nuclear programs, I am quite familiar with this process.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Ambassador Eric S. Edelman, is a member of the NWC—focal point for the relationship between the DOE and DOD. While the NNSA Administrator serves as the NWC voting member for DOE and would most likely deal directly with the Under Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Administrator manages all NNSA issues relating to Defense Programs. Specifically, I would deal directly with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on nuclear weapons policy matters, in coordination with the NNSA Administrator.

Question. The Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force.

Answer. Relationships with the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force are important when dealing with issues related to nuclear security and Defense Programs. Defense Programs generally deals with the uniformed Services more than the Service Secretaries through the NWC system. As a retired Air Force senior officer, I am well aware of the importance of civilian control of the military and can use my experience to help NNSA better understand relationships between the Services and their respective Departments. I have had regular personal contact with the Secretary of the Air Force who I have known for several years. If confirmed as the Deputy Administrator, I would seek to further cooperative relations with the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force.


Answer. The Commander of STRATCOM is a member of the NWC. The current nominee, General Chilton, is a personal friend. The NNSA Administrator and I would deal directly with the Commander of STRATCOM. The Deputy Administrator is fundamentally important to the STRATCOM relationship for all nuclear weapon program activities. One of the Commander’s most important duties related to NNSA is providing the Annual Assessment Report to the President—a candid report on the safety, reliability and expected performance of the nuclear weapons stockpile, based on information from Defense Program advisors and the national laboratories. As the Commander is responsible for deploying the nuclear weapons stockpile, Defense Programs and STRATCOM must have a close relationship at many levels. I expect that, if confirmed as the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, I would spend a significant amount of time working with the Commander and his staff, particularly during this period of stockpile transformation. The Commander of NORTHCOM is also a personal friend and colleague. All issues related to carrying out his responsibilities with regard to homeland defense would receive my focused and complete attention.

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities.

Answer. Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict are included in NNSA’s overall support to and coordination with the DOD in a number of areas. As part of our support, we have provided a full-time resident liaison to Special Operations Command to facilitate its access to the unique capabilities of DOE’s national laboratories and to enhance the already close working relationship with DOE and NNSA. If confirmed by the Senate, I will ensure DOE’s unique nuclear capabilities; skills and assets are properly available to the DOD and other Federal entities.

Question. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs.
Answer. The Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs deals with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Defense Programs on a regular basis. The Assistant to the Secretary is the Chairman of the NWC Standing and Safety Committee, the flag officer or Senior Executive Service “working level” group in the NWC system. In this capacity, even though the formal communications path to the Assistant to the Secretary position is through the Principal Deputy Administrator for Operations in Defense Programs, I would expect to spend a significant amount of time working with the Assistant to the Secretary, particularly during this period of stockpile transformation.

Question. The Director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

Answer. The DTRA works with the NNSA’s Offices of Defense Programs, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, and Emergency Operations on a number of issues, ranging from individual weapon system Project Officer Groups to hosting DTRA-sponsored work at NNSA sites and collaborating on nonproliferation issues. If confirmed, I would work directly with the Director of DTRA to further our common goals.

Question. Officials in the Intelligence Community.

Answer. The DOE is a member of the Intelligence Community. Within DOE, the Director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence has primary responsibility for Departmental interactions with the Director of National Intelligence and other Intelligence Community components. Each of the NNSA national laboratories maintains a Field Intelligence Element, responsible for conducting analysis and technical work to fulfill DOE’s intelligence responsibilities. If confirmed, I will give my strong support to this cooperation and ensure that the Intelligence Community continues to have excellent access to the national security laboratories and other assets of the Office of Defense Programs.

Question. Officials in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with responsibilities for nuclear related homeland security matters.

Answer. NNSA has a close working relationship with the DHS at many levels, most notably led by NNSA’s Deputy Under Secretary for Counterterrorism. If confirmed, I will draw upon these working relationships, continue them, and try to improve upon them through closer coordination on matters affecting national security. If I am confirmed, Defense Programs will continue the cooperative relationships prevalent since the creation of DHS. We will continue to work closely in updating the National Response Plan (NRP) to define and refine the Federal Government’s responsibilities in the event of radiological or nuclear emergencies and incidents. We will continue cooperative efforts on the Homeland Security Exercise Program, where we test our abilities to respond to many types of incidents in addition to radiological and nuclear emergencies. We will continue to work closely with DHS’s Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) as partners to assess the Nation’s radiological or nuclear vulnerabilities and risks, to mitigate radiological or nuclear threats, and to develop a robust technical nuclear forensics capability in cooperation with DNDO’s National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center. Finally, NNSA stands ready to support the overall Federal Incident Response Team and fulfill our responsibilities under the Homeland Security Act for domestic radiological or nuclear events. For example, should an improvised nuclear device be discovered in the United States, Defense Programs is the lead technical office that would support the overall Federal Incident Response Team and the Federal Bureau of Investigation in its role as lead law enforcement agency. Defense Programs has worked hard to forge these cooperative relationships and I can assure you that I would continue this collaborative approach.

Question. Officials in the Department of State with responsibility for nuclear nonproliferation matters.

Answer. NNSA works closely with the Department of State in the area of nuclear nonproliferation. If confirmed as Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs I would continue to do so, most notably through Defense Programs’ Nuclear Counterterrorism Design Support Program and NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. We will always be mindful of the potential or perceived impacts to arms control and nonproliferation of initiatives such as the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) and Complex Transformation. The Department of State can be a valuable resource to assist with other countries’ concerns.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs?

Answer. In my view, the major challenges confronting the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs are complex and stockpile transformation. NNSA needs to continually articulate and refine its plans to transform the stockpile and complex
through the RRW Program and Complex Transformation. Defense Programs, unlike many Federal organizations, is requirements driven. While Defense Programs has made significant improvements in meeting near-term commitments, relief on legacy stockpile requirements has not been provided. At the same time, modernization of many nuclear facilities is necessary due to aging and growing safety and security concerns.

Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I plan to meet the challenges of combining near-term success with long-term transformation by setting clear expectations and constant, clear communications. I was a tough “customer” while serving as the Air Force Director of Nuclear and Counterproliferation, but NNSA consistently met my expectations. I attribute that mostly to the good lines of communication established between the Air Force and NNSA, from the depot level, through the Project Officers Groups to the Commanders. I believe my Air Force experience can help greatly in keeping those lines of communication open. If confirmed, I would also continue to strengthen the notion of an integrated nuclear weapons complex where everyone has measurable metrics, is rewarded for success, and accountability is clear.

Question. If confirmed, what management actions and time lines would you establish to address these problems?

Answer. If confirmed, I would immediately work to identify and knock down barriers to success in the program. I do not yet have a specific timeline in mind with regard to management actions. I will develop one as soon as I am confident I understand the specific challenges we face collectively and in the individual programs. If desired, I believe that approximately 90 days after confirmation, I could be prepared to share with Congress any specific management actions anticipated for the near-term.

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish to address the issues that would confront the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs?

Answer. My highest priorities would be the same as my predecessors have had—to maintain the safety, security and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile while positioning the complex for future transformation. NNSA must continue to meet its near-term deliverables to the DOD while looking to the future. I believe NNSA can adequately do both—and must in order to fulfill its responsibilities to the Nation.

OVERALL MANAGEMENT

Question. Do you believe that there are any organizational structure issues in the NNSA that should be addressed to improve management and operations of the Office of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, or that you would address if confirmed? If so, how would you address these issues, if confirmed?

Answer. Constant improvement requires innovative thinking and fresh ideas. I do not believe in changing just for the sake of change, but if confirmed, I will assess the organizational structure and make recommendations to the Administrator and Principal Deputy Administrator. I will seek their thoughts on potentially improved ways of doing business—if changes will be beneficial, cost effective, and streamline the management.

Question. Do you believe that the expertise of DOE personnel serving outside the NNSA can be helpful to you if confirmed?

Answer. I strongly believe this to be true and very beneficial. If confirmed, I will work with the entire DOE and make full use of the resources available within and outside of NNSA. Not only is it required that we cooperate in many areas with other parts of the Department, but I know there are many personnel that can provide assistance and advise helpful to Defense Programs.

Question. If so, what expertise do you believe would be helpful and how would you utilize this expertise if you are confirmed?

Answer. If confirmed, I will make it a high priority to understand the full scope of the DOE’s available resources. I understand that Defense Programs works closely with many offices, such as the Office of Engineering and Construction Management; the Office of Health, Safety and Security; the Chief Financial Officer; the Office of Environmental Management; and DOE’s Chief Information Officer. These offices, and others within the Department, have expertise that can contribute to the success of the missions of the Office of Defense Programs and NNSA.

Question. Are you aware of any limitations on the authority of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs to draw on that expertise?

Answer. There are no limits that I am aware of to drawing on the expertise of other offices in the DOE. I view these other offices, such as the Office of Engineering and Construction Management and the Office of Health, Safety and Security, as in-
valuable assets to the NNSA and Defense Programs. For example, both of these Offices provide valuable external reviews and recommendations regarding our activities and facilities.

**Question.** What is your view of the extent to which the NNSA is bound by the existing rules, regulations, and directives of the DOE and what flexibility, if any, do you believe you would have in implementing such rules, regulations, and directives that would pertain to the Office of the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs?

**Answer.** My understanding is that NNSA must comply with rules, regulations, and directives issued by the Secretary of Energy and the Deputy Secretary. The NNSA Administrator is responsible for ensuring that NNSA and its contractors comply with these requirements, and that responsibility flows down to the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs. Some rules and regulations provide specific exemptions that NNSA can invoke if the NNSA Administrator concludes an exemption is warranted. In addition, the DOE Departmental Directives Program Manual provides a general exemption procedure that allows NNSA to deviate from DOE directives. This manual also permits Departmental elements, including NNSA, to issue “supplemental directives” that may be used to implement requirements in directives, assign responsibilities and establish procedures within a particular Departmental element. Finally, under the NNSA Act, the NNSA Administrator has authority to issue NNSA-specific policies, “unless disapproved by the Secretary.”

**Question.** NNSA, in large measure, was created in response to security lapses at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). However, security lapses, particularly at Los Alamos, have continued to occur. Section 3212(b)(10) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 provides that “the Administrator has authority over, and is responsible for all programs and activities of the Administration, including administration of contracts, including the management and operations of the nuclear weapons production facilities and the national security laboratories.” If confirmed, how would you plan to assist the Administrator of the NNSA to make sure that security lapses do not occur at the NNSA facilities?

**Answer.** Security of nuclear weapons, nuclear material and design information is an extremely important challenge of paramount importance to national security. I have extensive experience in this area, from the early days of my career as a Minuteman missile system crew member, instructor and evaluator, to my command assignments, and most recently as the Commander of the Air Force District of Washington. My knowledge and emphasis on nuclear security will help the Administrator, the Chief of Defense Nuclear Security, the Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security, and the Site Office Managers focus appropriately on the importance of security at our sites and while nuclear material is on the road in the control of the Office of Secure Transportation. Any breach in security could bring grave consequences to our Nation, and if confirmed, I will do everything in my power to ensure that the complex remains safe and secure, and we will take immediate actions to remedy any marginal system. Practically speaking, some initiatives such as leveraging technology to the fullest extent possible and consolidating nuclear materials to fewer locations will take time and funding. I will be a strong advocate for creating the most secure nuclear weapons complex possible. We need to change the culture at our national laboratories, and I understand that NNSA and the Secretary have made great progress in this by holding the current and former contractors at LANL accountable for this lapse and by improving Federal oversight of cyber security and the protection of classified information, integrity, responsibility, and accountability are key aspects of a successful security program and I will do everything possible to continue the efforts currently underway.

**Question.** The Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs is responsible for activities occurring at NNSA laboratories and production sites across the country. What are your views on the appropriate roles and responsibilities of field managers relative to those of Defense Programs Headquarters managers?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I look forward to gaining a thorough understanding about the perspectives of both field and Headquarters managers. There is a close cooperation between field and headquarters managers in defense programs, but generally headquarters sets expectations through a number of program and contract mechanisms. Field managers provide daily oversight of the contractors, since they are closest to the work being performed. I realize there are formal delegations of responsibilities between the field and Headquarters, especially since the Assistant Deputy Administrators and Site Office Managers all report to the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs. There needs to be a high degree of integration of efforts and constant communication. As a senior military commander, I am familiar with the normal friction that often exists between field and headquarters. Trust and communications are vital to success and essential to productivity and smooth operations.
What is your view of Defense Programs' organizational structure?

Answer. My understanding of the Defense Programs organizational structure is that it works reasonably well, especially considering the scope of the mission. I do not see any major disconnects, duplication of effort or insurmountable barriers to communication. If confirmed, I would soon take a hard look at the structure and look for potential improvements. I think it very important that I understand why and how the current structure operates and what potential improvements might be cost effective before recommending any change.

Question. In your view, is there a well-delineated and consistent chain of command and reporting structure from the field staff to headquarters staff and from the contractors to Federal officials?

Answer. From what I have learned to date, I believe there is an established chain of command and reporting structure in place at NNSA, but to remain strong and effective with new personnel, it needs to be constantly utilized and reinforced. Based on my Air Force experience, I am comfortable with the chain of command and I know the consequences of deviating from the prescribed path. Everyone must know and learn their roles. If confirmed, I will emphasize the necessity of using the chain of command for passing information and formal guidance in both directions.

Question. If confirmed, what specific steps would you take to retain critical nuclear weapons expertise in both the NNSA and the contractor workforce?

Answer. If confirmed, working to retain and develop critical nuclear weapons expertise in both the NNSA and the contractor workforce will be a high priority of mine. When I was in charge of the Air Force nuclear program I had very similar concerns and our office reinstituted a fellowship program with five DOE laboratories to provide 10 young officers each year with specialized nuclear experience while working at the labs. Simply put, the most advanced experimental and computational facilities are not worth much without the right people to use them. As the Nation’s “brain trust,” NNSA must continue to strive to make itself and its contractors “Employers of Choice.” I am impressed with NNSA’s Future Leaders Program, and want to do everything in my power to support it. My personal experience in identifying development opportunities for officers within the Air Force nuclear program showed me the value in identifying critical personnel and taking positive steps to retain them. I also like efforts such as mentoring young weapon designers, many of whom have never participated in a nuclear test, with real work such as the RRW program. I also appreciate the fact that NNSA realizes it faces a real challenge with a large retirement-eligible portion of the Federal and contractor workforce and is taking steps to address it.

Question. Do you support retaining the capability to re-manufacture every component expected to be found in the stockpile in the near-term?

Answer. First and foremost, I support maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. This often requires the remanufacture of components, but sometimes that is not the most prudent approach. Stockpile and Complex Transformation are trying to eliminate the need to retain the capability to remanufacture every component expected to be found in the present stockpile. In fact, many components cannot be reproduced because the materials are no longer available due to prohibitions on their use by regulation or to loss of the technologies that preceded them. Several existing components are problematic to make or involve hazardous materials that NNSA wants to eliminate. If RRW proves to be a viable alternative, this would also help in eliminating the need to remanufacture each and every component.

Question. What do you see as the most pressing remanufacturing needs?

Answer. In discussions with Defense Programs staff, the most pressing remanufacturing needs appear to involve secondaries made at the Y–12 National Security Complex and plutonium pits. These are extremely intricate nuclear components that cannot be made today in quantities high enough to satisfy the projected need, especially if a problem develops in the stockpile. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about these and related issues and contributing to a solution.

The Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) has successfully supported the annual nuclear weapons certification effort for the last 15 years. Other than the National Ignition Facility, in your view, what other capabilities, if any, would be needed to ensure that the stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable without nuclear weapons testing?
Answer. In my view, the SSP has been successful and is on an appropriate path for continued success. Due to the highly integrated nature of the SSP and constrained budgets, Defense Programs has not planned for much redundancy in capabilities in the future. The National Ignition Facility and other high profile facilities and capabilities each play a complementary role in the SSP and the transformed nuclear weapons complex; confidence in the safety, security and reliability of the stockpile could be adversely affected if parts of the program are not seen to completion. This confidence is subjective and not “pass/fail.” I trust the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the people who make up the SSP will meet the challenge to continue to support the stockpile, and if confirmed, I will work to provide the most appropriate tools for them to do so.

Question. In your view is the SSP fully coordinated with the DOD, and if not what would you plan to do if confirmed to improve the coordination?

Answer. In my view, the SSP appears to be well coordinated with the DOD. There is constant communication between the DOE and DOD at many levels, ranging from routine tasks such as warhead maintenance and surveillance to more policy-oriented issues such as stockpile and complex transformation. I know, from my experience as the Air Force Director of Nuclear and Counterproliferation, that open communication is key to mutual DOE/DOD success, and if confirmed, I will make every effort to foster good communications between the Departments.

Question. The NNSA is in the early stages of an effort to develop a new nuclear warhead to be a replacement for an existing warhead, without nuclear weapons testing. This effort is the RRW program.

Answer. I believe that the SSP is capable of meeting the challenge of transforming the nuclear weapons stockpile through a RRW strategy in the coming years. The RRW strategy appears to hold great promise for many reasons. The top three in my view are: (1) an opportunity to reduce the numbers of currently stockpiled weapons with RRWs that are less sensitive to aging effects or manufacturing variability; (2) incorporating advanced safety and security features to maintain positive assurances against theft, loss, and/or misuse of these replacement warheads; and (3) improved confidence in the reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile, through increased performance margins and reduced uncertainties, allowing these weapons to be certified without conducting an underground test, through the use of the advanced Stockpile Stewardship tools. There are a multitude of other good aspects to RRW that show it to be an idea with great merit.

Question. If you are confirmed, and if during your tenure NNSA concludes it is not possible to develop or deploy an RRW without full scale nuclear weapons testing, would you recommend cancellation of the RRW program?

Answer. I understand that a fundamental tenant of the RRW strategy is to certify and field the warheads without the need to conduct nuclear testing. If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about RRW and the relationship of performance margins versus uncertainties. Determining RRWs viability from the standpoint of the required science is a valuable endeavor. The decision to proceed to production, with or without testing, would be a matter for debate at the highest levels and involve a value judgment relative to a policy decision. If an RRW design leads to a recommendation to conduct a full scale nuclear test, there is certainly the option to do a modification to the design rather than a cancellation of the RRW program. The prudent course of action, in my view, requires us to know the full range of alternatives and only then choose a way ahead based on a critical analysis that considers our national security needs. The premise of RRW is sound, if the U.S. is to maintain a long-term safe, secure and reliable nuclear deterrent; it may need adjustments rather than cancellation.

Question. If confirmed you will play a key role in the steps to modernize and downsize the nuclear weapons complex. This is a needed but difficult process. If confirmed, would you review whether an external commission such as a Base Realignment and Closure-type process would be helpful or is needed to accomplish such downsizing and modernization?

Answer. If confirmed, Complex Transformation will be a key initiative that I will pursue as a Deputy Administrator. As part of that process, I understand that external commissions such as a Base Realignment and Closure-type process have been considered but not thought to be appropriate for this situation. While I am not yet in an informed enough position to challenge that position, I will discuss the issue carefully with those who came to that conclusion. I also understand that NNSA is fol-
lowing the well-established National Environmental Policy Act process for informing its decisions on Complex Transformation, and there will be opportunities for comment by the public and other interested stakeholders.

THIRD-PARTY FINANCING

Question. If confirmed, would you agree to carefully review all proposals for third-party financing and ensure that before implementation the proposal will be cost-effective and consistent with all DOE, Office of Management and Budget, and General Services Administration rules and regulations as appropriate?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would carefully review all proposals for third-party financing of Defense Programs facilities to ensure that before implementation, the proposal is cost-effective and consistent with all applicable rules and regulations.

FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE

Question. The Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program was established to address long-deferred maintenance backlogs in the nuclear weapons complex, particularly at the manufacturing facilities. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that surplus buildings are torn down or transferred so that they will not need long-term maintenance?

Answer. If confirmed, Complex Transformation will be a key initiative that I will pursue as Deputy Administrator. A central part of Complex Transformation is ensuring that surplus buildings are torn down so that they will not need long-term maintenance or transferred to other programs that are committed to their proper maintenance. I expect to work closely with the Offices of Infrastructure and Environment within the NNSA and EM in DOE (and other organizations) to achieve these objectives. I understand that both of these Offices have well-established programs for dealing with excess facilities. If confirmed, I will work with them to ensure that surplus buildings are torn down or transferred so that they will not need long-term maintenance funded by the Weapons Activities account. During the course of my military career, I served as a base commander on at least three occasions. While the governing directives are not exactly the same, I am familiar with issues like this and I will make every effort to pay close attention to these concerns.

Question. Would you support including the cost of tearing down those buildings that are being replaced within the total project cost of any new construction?

Answer. If confirmed, I would support steps to minimize financial liabilities on the Weapons Activities account, including the cost of tearing down those buildings that are being replaced within the total project cost of any new construction. To portray the full scope of projects, we must present the full scope and cost of new construction, to include demolition of old buildings.

Question. What is your understanding of the schedule for tearing down the old administration building at LANL?

Answer. I understand that the Nuclear Security and Science Building project at LANL was completed on schedule and approximately $5 million under budget in 2006. Once the remaining personnel have been relocated from the old administration building in early fiscal year 2008, NNSA’s plan is to close the entire facility and prepare it for completion of Decontamination and Demolition (D&D). NNSA’s current strategy is to empty the facility by the close of fiscal year 2008 and complete D&D by fiscal year 2011.

Question. DOE and NNSA often build one of a kind or first of a kind buildings. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that NNSA construction projects are managed to be completed within budget and on time?

Answer. If confirmed, one of my highest priorities will be to demand accountability across the nuclear weapons complex, in both the Federal and contractor workforce. We must keep commitments, to include meeting key milestones for cost and schedule on construction projects. I understand that improving project management is one of the six “Focus Areas” that is already being emphasized by NNSA. I will quickly learn more about this and the other focus areas, and ask fundamental questions such as: 1) do we have the right people in place to do the job; 2) are we using all available resources, within NNSA, within DOE, and even outside DOE; and 3) are the commitments we have made still reasonable (have circumstances or requirements changed)? I will work with the Federal Project Directors within NNSA and look for help from all available sources. Recognizing the importance of project management, in addition to my usual “courtesy calls” as the nominee, I have met with staff from the Office of Facility and Infrastructure Acquisition and Operations and the Office of Infrastructure and Environment to discuss both general project management within NNSA and to review progress on specific high-profile projects.
Question. What additional costing, project management and design skills do you believe are needed in the Federal staff of the Office of Defense Programs or in the NNSA?

Answer. I am not yet in a position to say what additional costing, project management and design skills are needed in the Federal staff of defense programs or NNSA, but I do understand this is an area of emphasis within NNSA. Because this is such an important area to the success of Complex Transformation and the very future of the nuclear weapons complex, I will ensure that good project management within defense programs remains a high priority and I will make every effort for the Federal and contractor staff to obtain the skills that are necessary for success. I also believe there needs to be a forum where all parties can bring suggestions forward to both arrive at the right conclusion, and to ensure the needed buy-in and cooperation that will garner broad support.

Question. At what point in the Critical Decision timeline do you believe an independent cost estimate should be performed for a construction project, and why?

Answer. Based on my understanding of the Critical Decision timeline, I believe an Independent Cost Estimate should be performed for complex and high cost projects prior to setting the project baseline at Critical Decision 2 (Approve Performance Baseline). This is early enough in the process to make an impact and correct issues, but far enough along that there is appropriate fidelity in the estimated project design, scope, and schedule.

Question. If confirmed, will you work to ensure that all design issues impacting operational safety requirements are fully resolved before Critical Decision 3?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that all design issues impacting operational safety requirements are fully resolved before Critical Decision 3 (Approve Start of Construction). Due to the importance of operational safety requirements, they should be resolved as soon as possible in the design process, and certainly before construction begins. This is also consistent with the Department’s draft standard, Integration of Safety into Nuclear Facility Design.

Question. If confirmed, will you work to ensure that all design issues impacting operational safety requirements are fully resolved before Critical Decision 3?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to have defense programs follow the Department’s standard, Integration of Safety into Nuclear Facility Design, once it is final. I understand that NNSA has been complying with the draft of the new standard and will operate in full compliance with the final version when implemented. This new standard requires early identification of Safety Class systems and other safety related requirements early in the project life cycle, just after approval of Mission Need. These measures ensure that all safety requirements are articulated, validated, and understood early in the project life cycle.

Question. If confirmed, you will be responsible for managing the life extension programs (LEPs) for existing nuclear warheads. What is your general assessment of the effectiveness of the ongoing and planned life extension programs?

Answer. I believe the LEPs are highly effective for extending the near-term life of warheads in the nuclear weapons stockpile, but I also strongly support transitioning the stockpile based on a RRW strategy. Based on my Air Force experience, I am intimately familiar with the LEPs for the W87 (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile warhead) and the B61-7/11 (strategic bombs). I understand there are production challenges with restarting a unique component needed for the W76 (submarine Launched Ballistic Missile warhead) LEP, but that is being appropriately addressed. I understand that more and more aging defects are being discovered in the legacy stockpile so refurbishment schedules will need to be closely coordinated and distributed with the military service if an RRW strategy is not pursued. With smaller numbers in the existing stockpile inventory, the ability to substitute is almost not at option. Therefore the need for flexibility becomes increasingly important.

Question. How well, in your view, does the nuclear weapons complex—encompassing the laboratories and the production sites—function as an integrated complex and, externally, with the DOD in executing the LEPs?

Answer. My impression is that the nuclear weapons complex, including all the sites, works relatively well together and with the DOD. In learning more about defense programs, I have been struck at how often I hear about the integrated complex succeeding together. I understand that there is a strong emphasis on complexwide milestones and that even performance fees at each of the sites are inter-related. That is an extremely strong motivator for integrated success, and one that I
would plan to continue, if confirmed. Thanks to the vision of the current leadership in DOE and NNSA, I see an even stronger partnership with the Air Force than when I was Director of Nuclear and Counterproliferation.

Question. Do you believe the efficiency with which NNSA manages the execution of the LEPs can be improved, and if so, how?
Answer. I am not yet aware of a specific way to improve the management of the LEP, but because of their importance to Defense Programs and the continued health of the nuclear weapons stockpile, I expect to personally review the execution of the LEPs, if confirmed. My fresh perspective, coming from the outside of NNSA and as a former DOD "customer" may allow me to identify areas for improvement.

NOTIFICATION OF CONGRESS

Question. If confirmed, would you commit to promptly notifying Congress of any significant issues in the safety, security or reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I would promptly notify Congress of any issues affecting the nuclear weapons stockpile and nuclear weapons complex. I understand that the officials in the Office of Defense Programs often brief congressional members and their staffs about the state of the stockpile and complex. I would continue that practice, both when there are emerging issues and even if there are not. Continuous communication is to everyone’s advantage. Having served in the Air Force congressional liaison offices of the Senate and the House, I am a strong believer in open dialogue. I pledge to make myself and/or a knowledgeable staff member available at any time to address any issues of concern.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

NUCLEAR MISSILES TRANSPORTATION

1. Senator Akaka. General Smolen, last month, six nuclear-armed advanced cruise missiles were flown from Minot Air Force Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana where they sat on the tarmac for 10 hours undetected. Much of the media attention on this incident seems to have missed the key issue: how did six nuclear cruise missiles get lost? Lost seems to be the appropriate characterization here because the Air Force did not appear to know where the missiles were.

General Smolen. This event was very disturbing. Since I retired, effective August 1, 2007, and I am not yet confirmed, my knowledge of the specific events surrounding this issue is limited to what I read in the media and second hand information from friends. Since I have not been a party to the facts, it is inappropriate for me to comment further at this time. Please be assured, however, that if confirmed, I will ensure our personnel in National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) re-
view the circumstances as they become available and we will apply any lessons we can learn.

2. Senator AKAKA. General Smolen, it is my understanding that there is a strict chain of custody for all nuclear weapons, and that the handling of these weapons is covered in great detail in Air Force procedures and regulations. This fact makes it even harder to believe that a mistake of this magnitude could happen. Every person who orders the movement of these weapons, or handles them, would have had to sign off on the movement. One does not just quickly move a 1-ton cruise missile, or six of them for that matter, and then “forget about them.”

Obviously, we need to know how six nuclear cruise missiles got out of their bunkers and onto a combat aircraft without being noticed by the wing commander, squadron commander, munitions maintenance squadron, the bomber's crew chief and command pilot, and moved onto another Air Force base without being noticed by the receiving base’s staff for 10 hours.

Secretary Gates has appropriately ordered an independent investigation of the incident, in addition to the Air Force’s own inquiry.

Does it seem credible to you that this many people would simultaneously make a mistake of this magnitude and lose track of six nuclear missiles? If so, how do you think this could have happened?

General SMOLEN. Any comments I make without having the factual information would be pure speculation. NNSA focuses completely on nuclear weapons and thus there should be no diversion of attention on any other aspect of our mission. Again, without more specifics on what really contributed to the Minot incident, we can only review in general terms our own procedures and emphasize continued strict adherence to checklists and procedures.

3. Senator AKAKA. General Smolen, in your opinion, how does this incident relate to concern for reliability of control over nuclear weapons and nuclear materials in other countries, such as Russia and Pakistan?

General SMOLEN. Human error and the chance of human error must be eliminated by every extent possible. The very fact that something of this nature happened highlights our need to always be vigilant and work cooperatively with every country that possesses nuclear weapons and materials. We have been very successful in building bonds of trust and confidence and reducing nuclear weapons and dangerous materials. Those efforts are centered in NNSA's Defense Nuclear Non-proliferation (DNN) programs and if confirmed, I will personally offer any assistance that will further my colleague Will Tobey's, Deputy Administrator for DNN, leadership efforts for progress in these critical areas. NNSA's Defense Programs and DNN organizations share many common interests and have a synergy.

4. Senator AKAKA. General Smolen, in your opinion, if this were an accident, do you have concerns about the readiness of our military personnel when they are making critical mistakes with our nuclear arsenal? If so, how do we best address this?

General SMOLEN. I was honored to serve as a senior military leader for a number of years and I can assure you America's sons and daughters are the most dedicated, patriotic, and responsible young men and women in our Nation. I am fully and equally confident that senior leadership in the Department of Defense will take every step necessary to ensure that whatever contributed to this error is corrected. NNSA will review every aspect of how we do business to ensure no elements exist that could lead to any similar event with weapons and materials under our control. I'm certain the USAF will correct whatever went wrong. As recently reported, they will also hold accountable everyone who may have failed to follow required directives, or provide the required oversight and leadership. Because the overall bomber emphasis is now far more centered on conventional missions, some of the historically intense focus attributed to the nuclear missions may have eroded. If that is a factor, it most certainly will be addressed. In that regard, organization, training, experience, and oversight must all be considered. We can and will learn from this. I'm confident it will serve to eliminate any complacency that may have existed while simultaneously emphasizing the critical importance of the need for constant vigilance and focus-traits demanded of all personnel handling nuclear weapons.

5. Senator AKAKA. General Smolen, I find it somewhat disturbing that Barksdale is an operational bomber base that is also a staging area for Middle Eastern operations. In your opinion, are there legitimate, non-war related, operational, or logistical reasons for shipping nuclear missiles to Barksdale at this time? If so, what are some of the possible reasons?
General Smolen. Based on my previous military service, I can tell you that virtually every military base in our Nation plays some role in the deployment supporting the global war on terror. Our aircraft and personnel deploy to a variety of overseas locations. With a limited number of bases, combat platforms, people, and storage areas, it is quite common to see multiple missions at a variety of locations. Training, maintenance, and logistical support are a matter of routine and conducted regularly and professionally. The important aspect is to uncover the fact or series of circumstances that led to what happened and put in place ironclad procedures to ensure it cannot happen anywhere again.


NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
Robert L. Smolen, of Pennsylvania, to be Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration, vice Thomas P. D’Agostino.

[The biographical sketch of Maj. Gen. Robert L. Smolen, USAF, (Ret.), which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF ROBERT L. SMOLEN

Major General (Ret.) Robert L. Smolen was nominated by the President on July 31, 2007 to serve, pending confirmation by the United States Senate, as the Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs at the National Nuclear Security Administration. From 1974 to 2007, he served his country with honor in the United States Air Force (USAF).

Prior to being nominated, Smolen served as Commander for the Air Force District of Washington (AFDW) located at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, DC. The Air Force District of Washington provides the single Air Force voice and component to the Joint Forces Headquarters-National Capital Region, as well as organizes, trains and equips combat forces for the aerospace expeditionary forces, homeland operations, civil support, national special security events and ceremonial events. In addition, AFDW serves as the Uniform Code of Military Justice authority for more than 40,000 personnel and provides major command-level support for more than 24,000 personnel assigned worldwide.

Smolen entered the Air Force in 1974 as a distinguished graduate of the Air Force ROTC program at Allegheny College in Meadville, PA. He has operational experience in both ground and airborne nuclear missile command and control. He served on the staff of the Secretary of Defense and was the Director of Mampower and Personnel on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He twice served in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force in the Office of Congressional Legislative Liaison on Capitol Hill, first in the House of Representatives and later as the Chief of the Senate office. He was both the Deputy and later the Director of the Air Force Office of Nuclear and Counterproliferation, Headquarters U.S. Air Force. Smolen held positions on the staff at Headquarters North American Aerospace Defense Command and Headquarters Air Training Command.

He has commanded units at the squadron, group, wing, and Major Command levels at Air Force Space Command, Pacific Air Forces, Air Force Materiel Command, and Headquarters USAF. He recently served as the Director, Strategic Capabilities Policy, Executive Office of the President, where he was responsible for the development, coordination, and implementation of national security policies to support the President and the National Security Council. In this capacity he also served as the senior ranking military officer on the White House complex.

Smolen holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in communications from Allegheny College located in Meadville, PA. He also holds graduate degrees in public administration from the University of Oklahoma, and international relations from Auburn University. He attended the Air War College located at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. In addition, he was a fellow at both in the Seminar XXI Program, Foreign Policy...
and the National Interest, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Na-
tional and International Security Program at the John F. Kennedy School of Gov-
ernment at Harvard University. He has also completed several seminars at Johns
Hopkins University in national security decisionmaking.
Smolen presently resides in Springfield, VA, with his wife Adriane. They have
been married for over 33 years and have three adult children.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nomi-
nated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the
advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details
the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee.
The form executed by Maj. Gen. Robert L. Smolen, USAF, (Ret.) in
connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF
nominees

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more
space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the ques-
tion number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part
of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior
to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made
available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
   Robert Lee Smolen, (Bob).

2. Position to which nominated:
   Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Adminis-
   tration, Department of Energy.

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee's executive
   files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
   February 9, 1952; San Diego, CA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband's name.)
   Married to Adriane Renee Andree.

7. Names and ages of children:
   Amanda, 30; Robert, 27; Emily, 24.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended,
   degree received, and date degree granted.
   Allegheny College, Meadville, PA — Bachelor of Arts, 1974.
   University of Oklahoma, Norman, OK — Master of Public Administration, 1976.
   Auburn University, Montgomery, AL — Master of Political Science, 1985.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years,
   whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location
   of work, and dates of employment.

10. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.
   None.

11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
   None.

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
   - Member, Board of Directors, National Capitol Council, Boy Scouts of America
   - Member, Pi Sigma Alpha, National Political Science Honor Society
   - Lifetime Member of the Board of Regents, National Eagle Scout Association
   - Lifetime Member of the American Legion
   - Lifetime Member of the Veterans of Foreign Wars
   - Lifetime Member of the Air Force Association
   - Lifetime Member of the Military Officers Association
   - Member, Former Governors Association, American Red Cross

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**
   (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
      None.
   (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
      None.
   (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
      None.

14. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
   - Air Force Distinguished Service Medal (2)
   - Defense Superior Service Medal (2)
   - Legion of Merit
   - Defense Meritorious Service Medal
   - Meritorious Service Medal (4)
   - Joint Service Commendation Medal
   - Air Force Commendation Medal (2)
   - Joint Service Achievement Medal
   - Air Force Achievement Medal
   - Combat Readiness Medal
   - National Defense Service Medal (3)
   - Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
   - Korea Defense Service Medal
   - Distinguished Eagle Scout Award

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.
    None.
16. **Speeches:** Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

Attached are the following speeches:

[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee's executive files.]


17. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

_____

**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

ROBERT L. SMOLEN.

This 11th day of September, 2007.

[The nomination of Maj. Gen. Robert L. Smolen, USAF, (Ret.), was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on November 15, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on November 16, 2007.]
TO CONSIDER CERTAIN PENDING CIVILIAN
AND MILITARY NOMINATIONS

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2007

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:56 a.m. in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Daniel J. Cox, Jr., professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; William M. Caniano, professional staff member; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; Sean G. Stackley, professional staff member; Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Fletcher L. Cork, Jessica L. Kingston, and Benjamin L. Rubin.

Committee members’ assistants present: Jay Maroney, assistant to Senator Kennedy; James Tuite, assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed; Bonni Berge, assistant to Senator Akaka; M. Bradford Foley, assistant to Senator Pryor; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Stephen C. Hedger, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Anthony J. Lazarски, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Mark J. Winter, assistant to Senator Collins; Matthew R. Rimkunas, assistant to Senator Graham; and Brian W. Walsh, assistant to Senator Martinez.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. I would now ask the committee to consider 3 civilian nominations and a list of 135 pending military nominations.

First, ask the committee to consider the nomination of John Young, Jr., to be Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. His nomination has been before the commit-
tee the required length of time. Is there a motion to favorably report the nomination of Secretary Young?
Senator WARNER. So moved.
Chairman LEVIN. It has been moved. Is there a second?
Senator REED. I second.
Chairman LEVIN. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
All opposed, nay. [No response.]
The motion carries.
Second, I would ask the committee to consider the nomination of Douglas Brook to be Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Financial Management and Comptroller. His nomination has been before the committee the required length of time. Is there a motion to favorably report that nomination?
Senator WARNER. So moved.
Senator REED. Second.
Chairman LEVIN. Seconded. All in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
The motion carries.
Next, I ask the committee to consider the nomination of Robert Smolen to be Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration. Is there a motion to favorably report that nomination?
Senator WARNER. So moved.
Chairman LEVIN. Is there a second?
Senator COLLINS. Second.
Chairman LEVIN. All those in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
The motion carries.
Finally, I ask the committee to consider a list of 135 pending military nominations. All of these nominations have been before the committee the required length of time. Is there a motion to favorably report?
Senator WARNER. So moved.
Chairman LEVIN. Second?
Senator INHOFE. Second.
Chairman LEVIN. All those in favor, say aye. [A chorus of ayes.]
Nays? [No response.]
The ayes have it. The motion carries. Thank you very much.
[The nomination reference of John J. Young, Jr., follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
John J. Young, Jr., of Virginia, to be Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, vice Kenneth J. Krieg.

[The nomination reference of Douglas A. Brook follows:]
NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
Douglas A. Brook, of California, to be an Assistant Secretary of the Navy, vice Richard Greco, Jr., resigned.

[The nomination reference of Robert L. Smolen follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
Robert L. Smolen, of Pennsylvania, to be Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration, vice Thomas P. D’Agostino.

[The list of nominations considered and approved by the committee follows:]


1. Lt. Gen. Carrol H. Chandler, USAF, to be general and Commander, Pacific Air Forces; Air Component Commander for United States Pacific Command; and Executive Director, Pacific Air Combat Operations Staff (Reference No. 477).
2. COL Donald L. Rutherford, USA, to be brigadier general (Reference No. 997).
3. In the Army, there are three appointments to the grade of brigadier general (list begins with Joseph Caravalho, Jr.) (Reference No. 998).
4. LTG Thomas F. Metz, USA, to be lieutenant general and Director, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (Reference No. 1016).
5. In the Air Force, there is one appointment to the grade of captain (Michael V. Siebert) (Reference No. 1017).
6. In the Air Force, there are three appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Brian D. Oneil) (Reference No. 1018).
7. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Anthony Barber) (Reference No. 1019).
8. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Tim C. Lawson) (Reference No. 1020).
9. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (Richard D. Fox II) (Reference No. 1021).
10. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (John G. Goulet) (Reference No. 1022).
11. In the Army Reserve, there is one appointment to the grade of colonel (David L. Patten) (Reference No. 1023).
12. In the Army, there are 51 appointments to the grade of lieutenant colonel and below (list begins with Mark J. Benedict) (Reference No. 1024).
13. In the Marine Corps, there is one appointment to the grade of lieutenant colonel (Melvin L. Chuttman) (Reference No. 1025).
14. In the Marine Corps, there are seven appointments to the grade of major (list begins with Dana R. Brown) (Reference No. 1026).
15. In the Navy, there are 60 appointments to the grade of lieutenant commander (list begins with Julian D. Arellano) (Reference No. 1027).
16. MG Jeffrey A. Sorenson, USA, to be lieutenant general and Chief Information Officer/G–2, Office of the Secretary of the Army (Reference No. 1038).
Total: 135.

[Whereupon, at 9:58 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
NOMINATIONS OF MARY BETH LONG TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; JAMES SHINN TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS; CRAIG W. DUEHRING TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS; AND JOHN H. GIBSON TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding.


Other Senators present: Senator Norm Coleman.

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.

Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Evelyn N. Farkas, professional staff member; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Michael J. McCord, professional staff member; and William G.P. Monahan, counsel.

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, Republican staff director; David G. Collins, research assistant; Derek J. Maurer, minority counsel; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member; Kristine L. Svinicki, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member.

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Ali Z. Pasha, and Benjamin L. Rubin.

Committee members’ assistants present: Jay Maroney, assistant to Senator Kennedy; Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed;
Richard Kessler, assistant to Senator Akaka; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Warner; Todd Stiefler, assistant to Senator Sessions; Brian Polley, assistant to Senator Cornyn; and Stuart C. Mallory, assistant to Senator Thune.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody.

Today the Senate Armed Services Committee considers the nomination of Mary Beth Long to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; James Shinn to be Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs; Craig Duehring to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs; and John Gibson to be Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Financial Management.

We welcome our nominees and their families to today's hearing. We know of the long hours which senior Department of Defense (DOD) officials put in every day, we appreciate the sacrifices our nominees are willing to make to serve our Nation, but we also know that they're not alone in making these sacrifices. So we thank in advance the family members of our nominees for the support and assistance that they will be providing.

In the last 2 years, Ms. Long has served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and, if confirmed, she will be responsible for helping formulate DOD policy in the Middle East, Europe, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Africa. Foremost of these challenges will be the situation in Iraq, where there is no indication that Iraq's political leaders are taking advantage of the breathing space created by a reduction in violence to make the political compromises necessary for reconciliation, and in Afghanistan, where we continue to try to persuade our NATO allies to step up and provide the troops, equipment, and trainers needed for the success of our mission, and where NATO's reputation is on the line.

Almost as challenging is our policy towards Iran, where a new National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) found that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003, but it also found that Iran could resume that program very easily and therefore, given its bellicose rhetoric and support for terrorists, remains a major threat.

Over the last 4 years, Dr. Shinn has served first as National Intelligence Officer for East Asia on the National Intelligence Council and more recently as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. If confirmed, Dr. Shinn will be responsible for DOD policy in an area that encompasses more than half the world's population. The challenges that he faces will include the use of Pakistani territory as a haven by al Qaeda and the Taliban, the unstable situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan themselves, and managing the U.S. relationship with the growing economic and military power of China.

Mr. Duehring has served the DOD as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. If confirmed, he will face the challenge of managing the downsizing of the Active Duty Air
Force without sacrificing the ability of the Department to accomplish its national security mission.

Mr. Gibson has served the DOD as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Management Reform and Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Financial Management and, if confirmed, he will face the challenge of modernizing the Air Force’s business systems so that they can provide the timely, accurate, and reliable financial information needed to manage the Department.

We wish our nominees well as they take on these challenges. We'll ask you later on as you make your opening comments to introduce your families if they are with you. Now I’ll call on Senator Warner.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I had the privilege yesterday of having an extensive opportunity to visit with each of these nominees and my first observation is as citizens we’re very fortunate that four very, very capable individuals are stepping up to serve once again another chapter in their already distinguished public service careers.

At this point in time in any administration, lots of folks are thinking of how they can best plan their next chapter, usually in the private sector. But each of these individuals have served with distinction in the DOD and now are willing to accept another level of promotion and finish out presumably this term of the presidency of George Bush. So we’re fortunate in that context.

I’ve also had the opportunity to meet the families and at the appropriate time I’d be delighted to have you introduce them, because families are a very essential part of your ability to perform these tasks. Having served in the Department myself for many years a long time ago, I know the long hours, the separation from family that’s occasioned by these arduous challenges that you’re going to accept, and without that support you simply cannot perform your duties as ably as you must.

So with that, Mr. Chairman, let us proceed. Thank you.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Senator Warner.

Let me now ask each of you the standard questions which we ask of all nominees that appear before this committee, and you can answer it all at once. First, have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

Ms. LONG. Yes, sir.

Mr. SHINN. Yes, sir.

Mr. DUEHRING. Yes, sir.

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, sir.

Chairman LEVIN. Have you assumed any duties or undertaken any actions which would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

Ms. LONG. No.

Mr. SHINN. No.

Mr. DUEHRING. No.

Mr. GIBSON. No.

Chairman LEVIN. Will you ensure your staff complies with deadlines established for requested communications, including questions for the record in hearings?
Chairman Levin. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Ms. Long. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Duehring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gibson. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Will those witnesses be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Ms. Long. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Duehring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gibson. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before this committee?
Ms. Long. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Duehring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gibson. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Ms. Long. Yes, sir.
Mr. Shinn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Duehring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gibson. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Let me start with you, Ms. Long. Will you give us your opening comments and introduce anybody you might wish to introduce to us?

STATEMENT OF MARY BETH LONG, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

Ms. Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to come here today for this confirmation hearing. I'm deeply honored that President Bush and Secretary Gates nominated me for the position of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the committee, with the United States Senate, and with your colleagues in the House of Representatives in a spirit of true bipartisanship to advance the security of the United States.

I'd like at this time to introduce and to thank my Pennsylvania family: my mother, Betsy Long, and my father, Ken Long, who are sitting behind me; my brother-in-law, Dan Herman; as well as my Alexandria family who are here to support me.

There are some issues that are so vital to our Nation that we cannot be effective in meeting these challenges unless Congress and the President work together. So I look forward, if I am con-
firmed, to working with this committee to meet those challenges. In my time thus far in the Department I have been privileged to work with this committee and its staff on a number of issues and I look forward to doing so in the future, if confirmed.

Thank you,
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Ms. Long.
Mr. Shinn?

STATEMENT OF JAMES SHINN, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ASIAN AND PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS

Mr. Shinn. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator Warner, other members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I'm grateful to President Bush for his confidence in putting forward this nomination and to Secretary Gates for his support. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this committee and other Members of Congress on Asian affairs.

I'd like to, if I may, acknowledge my wife, Masako, who's not here. She's with my daughter in school today. We've been married for more than 25 years and I'd like to acknowledge her for her love and support in this job.

Chairman Levin. We thank you for that. Okay, thank you.
Senator Coleman, are you ready to make an introduction?

STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MINNESOTA

Senator Coleman. I am ready, Mr. Chairman, and it comes, I believe, at an opportune time. I thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Warner, for the opportunity to be with you today, and it's my great honor to come before you today to introduce Craig Duehring from our home State of Minnesota. Mr. Duehring is the embodiment of the old saying, "Make service your first priority and success will follow." His service began in 1968, shortly after completing his studies at Minnesota State University at Mankato in southern Minnesota. Within a year he had deployed to Vietnam, where he completed over 800 missions during the Vietnam War as a forward air controller. Throughout his 28 years in the Air Force, Mr. Duehring flew more than a dozen types of aircraft, amassing over 1,200 hours in the A-10 Thunderbolt II.

His military awards and decorations include the Silver Star, the Defense Superior Service Medal, 2 Distinguished Flying Crosses, three Meritorious Service Medals, 27 Air Medals, 2 Air Force Commendation Medals, the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry Individual Award, and the Vietnamese Staff Service Honor Medal First Class. You must have a strong chest to carry those medals.

Mr. Duehring is also a recipient of the Air Force's highest individual award for leadership in the senior officer category, the Lance P. Sijan Award.

Mr. Duehring's service since retiring from the Air Force has been equally impressive. Prior to his current assignment, Mr. Duehring served 6 years as a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. He performed the duties of Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs in the absence of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, including an ex-
tended period during and following the attacks on September 11, 2001.

Throughout these assignments Mr. Duehring has continued his connections to the North Star State. He has an excellent working relationship with the Adjutant General of the Minnesota National Guard, Larry Shellito, along with the entire Minnesota Guard organization.

In the spring of 2005, I had the pleasure of touring Minnesota with Mr. Duehring to thank Minnesota’s National Guardsmen and reservists for their service and to solicit their input on the challenges facing our citizen-soldiers and their families. When we stopped in Rochester, Minnesota, we had the chance to visit with Terry Wermagger and Linda Hauten, volunteers with the Family Readiness Group (FRG) in Austin, MN. The FRG serves the soldiers and families of Bravo Company, 434th Main Support Battalion, Minnesota National Guard, which was deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom at the time. The company included both Terry’s and Linda’s husbands.

Mr. Duehring took the time to listen to concerns of those families and to find new ways to support their efforts with their FRG. He heard the story about the FRG raising more than $10,000 to assist local military families through the sale of 3,000 yellow ribbon shirts and other items and he applauded the families for encouraging the community of Austin, MN, to set aside the 11th day of each month to recognize and support their soldiers and families.

The point, Mr. Chairman, is that Mr. Duehring knows the personal impact of the work the Office of Reserve Affairs does every day. He knows what it means for the families who are dealing with their loved ones being overseas. He knows the value of reintegration for our troops returning home to civilian life and he knows how to make a positive impact on these families at a Federal level.

Mr. Chairman, I am confident that Mr. Duehring will continue his excellent record of service in the position of Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs and I look forward to and fully support his confirmation.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Senator Coleman, and we know you have to leave because you have a hectic schedule, as always. But we thank you very much.

Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Duehring?

STATEMENT OF CRAIG W. DUEHRING, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE AFFAIRS

Mr. DUEHRING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and distinguished members of the committee. A special thank you to Senator Coleman for taking time out of his busy schedule to come and help a fellow Minnesotan along in a very important occasion.

I would like to first introduce my wife, Terry Duehring, who’s here with me today, as she always is and has been for 26-plus years, going on 27 years. I’d also like to mention my father-in-law, Chief Master Sergeant Richard Blevins, Retired, United States Air Force. He joined the Air Force in 1947 when it became a separate service and retired in 1977. So this year is his 60th anniversary,
just as it is for the United States Air Force. Dad, as you know him, has been an inspiration to me, a role model, and a mentor. He's here and his good wishes and his prayers will sustain me today.

I'm honored to appear before you today as the President's nominee to become the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. I'm also grateful to the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force for choosing me as their candidate for this important position. In June of this year the President appointed me to fill an existing vacancy as the acting Assistant Secretary, so I have had nearly 6 months learning the ropes and doing what I could to learn the issues that most affect the Air Force today, and to work with my colleagues to implement changes to policy within the limits of my appointment.

One of my first goals was to get out and listen to the airmen and to their families, who will express their concerns in their own words. To that end, I visited 11 bases and 4 major headquarters in slightly over 2 months. My normal means of communication is a townhall format, where anyone can ask any question and make any statement. It is the fastest, most effective way I knew to take the pulse of what was happening in our Air Force today.

When I answered the questions sent over last week by the committee, I identified four areas of concern which are a compilation of what I learned on those visits and what the Department has set as goals. Briefly, they were: one, continuing to fight the global war on terrorism; two, reduce the stress on our airmen and families; three, provide the best possible treatment for our wounded warriors; and four, recapitalize and prepare for the next war.

Mr. Chairman, I have done what I could as a senior staff officer, but as an acting, my authority is limited. During the 6 years that I was the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, I appeared before congressional committees and panels nine times. During that same period, members of this committee and other congressional committees in concert with the DOD passed 168 separate legislative items that enhanced the effectiveness of and provided for the members of the Reserve component.

I have never found anyone who recalls so much being done for our servicemembers in such a short period of time. It is an astounding achievement, a tribute to the teamwork that exists today. If confirmed, I will be able to take my place as a full member of that team and we will set even more records.

I look forward to your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Duehring.

Mr. Gibson?

STATEMENT OF JOHN H. GIBSON, TO BE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

Mr. GIBSON. Mr. Chairman, Senator Warner, and distinguished members of this committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear today before this committee to be considered for the position of Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Financial Management. I would like to recognize several family members with me today, without whose support none of this would be possible. My wife, Lauris, and my youngest son, Davis, are with me today. Unfortunately, my oldest son, Holden, could not be with us. However, as
any parent of a teenager will empathize, when he professed his
need to be in school I did not argue the point. I want to publicy
thank them all for their tremendous sacrifice that they have made
to allow me the chance to serve my country. Life in Texas was
happy, productive, and stable, but they were willing, although not
always enthusiastic, to join me in my quest to serve, and for this
I owe them so very much.

It is an honor to be nominated by the President and supported
by Secretary Gates, Secretary England, and Secretary Wynne to
serve in this position, and if confirmed, it will be a tremendous and
challenging opportunity to serve in an organization of dedicated
men and women in both the uniformed and the civilian forces who
are consummate and dedicated professionals. This opportunity also
has a very special personal meaning, as I will be joining the service
of my father.

If confirmed, it is my plan to work with these professionals to ad-
dress the budgetary and financial management issues facing the
Air Force, with the goal of maximizing the budgetary resources to
meet the mission demands, and continuing to advance business op-
erations, financial processes, and systems to improve Air Force fi-
nancial management.

Accountability, transparency, and communication are all fun-
damental philosophies of mine and if I am fortunate enough to be
confirmed, I look forward to working closely with you, Mr. Chair-
man, this committee, and Congress on Air Force financial manage-
ment issues.

Thank you again for your consideration today and I look forward
to your questions.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Mr. Gibson.

Let me start with you, Ms. Long. The purpose of the surge of
U.S. troops into Iraq at the beginning of the year was to reduce the
violence in order to give the Iraqi political leaders the breathing
space to make political compromises necessary for reconciliation.
Prime Minister Maliki set out a series of legislative benchmarks—
laws on de-Baathification, hydrocarbons, amnesty, disarmament—
in September 2006. They were reaffirmed by the presidency council
in October 2006. They were supposed to have been completed long
ago.

How many of the legislative benchmarks which the Iraqi govern-
ment set for themselves have been achieved?

Ms. LONG. Senator, none of those benchmarks have been
achieved.

Chairman LEVIN. On a scale of A to F, what grade would you
give the Maliki government?

Ms. LONG. Senator, at this time I would give the Maliki govern-
ment an F.

Chairman LEVIN. By the way, it's an 8-minute round. I think
that will work for all of us.

What are the mechanisms available to us to pressure the Maliki
Government to work out these differences, to work out the political
compromises which are essential to win the conflict? Without those
political compromises, there's not going to be an end to the conflict.
What are the pressure points that we can apply?
Ms. LONG. Senator, I share your concern that the national government chaired by Prime Minister Maliki has not performed in an exemplary manner by passing key legislative reform, and if confirmed, I will work with you and your committee to use all of those leverages that we have available to us to encourage the national government to move forward.

I think there are a number of leverage points. Working with Congress, both General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker serve as facilitators in working with the various blocs within the national government of Iraq in order to persuade them and to encourage them of the importance of the legislation.

Of course, the presence of our troops in Iraq provides us a certain amount of leverage and influence in order to persuade the Iraqis of the need for legislative reform in order to secure the gains that we've already gained through the increased stability.

Senator, we're also working with Iraq's neighbors to help the neighbors of Iraq influence that government, provide it with the security and confidence that it will be a stable presence in the region. Then of course, we work through the multinational and multilateral organizations to encourage them to help the Iraqis come to reconciliation and to pass these key legislative reforms.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Relative to our Iran policy, the recent NIE states that one of the Intelligence Community's key judgments is that in the fall of 2003 Teheran halted its nuclear weapons program. Are there any changes in our policy that result from this NIE?

Ms. LONG. Senator, I agree that the NIE is a watershed moment in our posture vis-a-vis Iran and that, if confirmed, I will work, again with your staff, to explore all the possibilities presented by the new intelligence. Probably the most significant opportunity is the Intelligence Community's more strongly held position that Iran did have hidden an illegal weapons program, and I think that the world, Iran, and the United States are all reassessing what the meaning of that more strongly held view is as an opportunity for Iran to come clean regarding the program. It also serves as an opportunity for the international community to understand the influence that it had exerted against Iran up until 2003, which led to this decision, was the right kind of influence. Furthermore, it is an opportunity to increase that in order to further Iran's transparency and its turn away from a nuclear program.

Chairman LEVIN. So that the NIE presents opportunities, if it's accurate?

Ms. LONG. I think it does present opportunities, yes, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. You describe it as a watershed moment.

Ms. LONG. I think it's a watershed moment, Senator, in that for the first time the Intelligence Community from a moderate to a high confidence standard does believe and affirmed its earlier position that Iran had an illegal weapons program.

Chairman LEVIN. Is there significance to their finding that that was suspended in 2003?

Ms. LONG. I think it is significant, Senator, in that it shows that the international pressure that was put on Iran up until that time had its effect and persuaded the Iranians to put aside the nuclear weapons program, at least at that time.
Chairman LEVIN. If, in fact, they had suspended it, is that a significant fact?

Ms. LONG. If, in fact, they have suspended it, I believe that is a significant fact in that it shows that the pressure applied had an impact, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Is that the only significance to it?

Ms. LONG. No, Senator, I think there are a number of other significances, as I alluded.

Chairman LEVIN. All right.

Dr. Shinn, let me ask you about China. The Quadrennial Defense Review identifies China as a likely competitor. Is it a foregone conclusion that China and the United States will be at odds over security in the Pacific?

Mr. SHINN. I think that's probably the most important question that we face, Senator, going forward. I don't think it's a foregone conclusion by any means that we're bound to be competitors because of China's military buildup. But it could turn out that way.

Chairman LEVIN. What actions should be taken to try to avoid an unhealthy competition?

Mr. SHINN. Senator, I think the combination of engagement with the Chinese, military-to-military engagement in particular, can help remove the possibility for accidents, for example, and misunderstandings. On the other hand, I think equally important is for us to maintain our forces in readiness in the Pacific, to signal to the Chinese that we're serious about our defense commitments in the region.

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Duehring, let me ask you just one question and then I'll turn it over to Senator Warner. The Boston Globe in a recent paper reported that the administration has proposed a new regulation that would require the military Services to coordinate with the politically appointed general counsels before any member of the Judge Advocate General Corps could be promoted. Are you familiar with that?

Mr. DUEHRING. Sir, the first time I heard of that was when somebody pointed out that very article yesterday afternoon. I honestly have no other information on that.

Chairman LEVIN. We are going to be asking the administration if that is accurate, because this would effectively give civilian lawyers who are political appointees a veto over the recommendations of promotion boards. If that article is true, would you agree that that might be an inappropriate interference with the promotion board process?

Mr. DUEHRING. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to look at it a little bit further, because I don't know if all the information is in that report. Sometimes that happens. It may be taken out of context, and I'd like to be able to prepare a decent statement perhaps at a later time.

Chairman LEVIN. If you could give us your answer for the record after checking that out, we would appreciate that.

Mr. DUEHRING. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

Although I had seen the article from the Boston Globe, this matter has not yet formally come to my attention as it is currently in staffing to the Services. I am advised that it was not language developed by the Air Force, and that the Depart-
ment of Defense is deleting that language from the draft instruction. That language will not be in the final version of the instruction.

In summary, the language has been removed which should put the immediate issue to rest. Additionally, on a personal level, I believe that the ability of the Judge Advocate to provide independent advice should not be impaired. As I stated in testimony, there is no place in the promotion process for inappropriate political influence.

Chairman Levin. My time is up. After Senator Warner, Senator Webb has kindly agreed that he will take over the gavel for a little while until I return. Thank you very much, Senator Webb. He'll be recognized after Senator Warner.

Senator Warner.

Senator Warner. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. Long, I'd like to return to the chairman's opening question, a very important one, about Iraq and how our President designed this policy, together with the regional military commanders, notably General Petraeus and Admiral Fallon, of the surge concept. Militarily, the surge has achieved its goal, namely to reduce the level of casualties, not only of the United States and other coalition forces, but of the civilians.

One of the perhaps unintended consequences has been the proliferation of a lot of reconciliation at the bottom. It had been taking place in certain areas, particularly those sectors where the Marines had been operating for some time. But it seemed to flourish as the surge proceeded. Will that constitute some leverage on the central government which, as you very succinctly agreed with the chairman, has just not performed the responsibilities of a government of a sovereign nation to exercise the levers of sovereignty to the greater benefit of its citizens? It has failed to do that in many ways.

So could you describe your understanding of what is taking place in terms of the bits and pieces of reconciliation that appear to be taking place in a number of provinces?

Ms. Long. Thank you for your question, Senator. Absolutely, that one of the benefits of the surge, as well as the combined strategic emphasis on the counterinsurgency strategy that General Petraeus and Admiral Fallon instituted, is this grassroots development, which we now call the Concerned Local Citizens. There are over 60,000 of these groups that are now operating in Iraq.

Senator Warner. 60,000 groups?

Ms. Long. 60,000 individuals. Excuse me.

Senator Warner. Individuals, I see.

Ms. Long. Yes, that are either parts of tribes or other local groups, neighborhood groups. It started, as the Senator correctly pointed out, in al-Anbar under the auspices of the Marine Corps and now we are working to spread that to other provinces.

These groups have sworn their cooperation with coalition and U.S. forces and are cooperating with us and the Iraqi forces against al Qaeda and the foreign fighters in Iraq. In addition to that, these groups are working with local governments and are strengthening at a grassroots level the reconciliation efforts that the Senator referred to.

From a national level, there are reconciliation efforts that are in place, that have not met the key legislative benchmarks that Senator Levin was referring to, but have been effective in furthering
some of the Maliki government’s goals. For example, while there isn’t a formal revenue-sharing plan, revenue has been distributed to the various provinces and is being pushed out beyond Baghdad.

On the area of reconciliation as well, Senator, there was recently passed a pension reform law that for the first time treated former Baathists similarly to——

Senator WARNER. There’s been some modest action by the Maliki Government, but it is not in any way measurable as it relates to the goals set out in January of this year when the President announced the surge policy——

Ms. LONG. That’s correct, Senator.

Senator WARNER.—that surge to provide a security blanket of types to enable the government to fully exercise its sovereignty. But I draw your attention again to the question I had: were these proliferation of small reconciliations at the bottom a means to leverage this government to wake up and begin to do more at the top, or has the government tried to frustrate in any way the development of these reconciliations at the lower level?

Ms. LONG. They are indeed a leverage, Senator.

Senator WARNER. They are leverage?

Ms. LONG. Yes.

Senator WARNER. Has the government tried to encourage it? I’ve read reports it’s tried to frustrate it in some ways.

Ms. LONG. Senator, my understanding is Prime Minister Maliki has met with representatives of some of the Sunni tribal groups. The national government is now going through the process of deciding or determining to what level it will support various groups. Some of the groups, individuals will be integrated into the normal security apparatus and some will not. It’s very much in flux at this point.

Senator WARNER. So Maliki then has given some tacit recognition to this taking place and in some ways, as you say, cash is flowing down, although whoever opened the spigot could close it overnight, that cash flow. So that’s in place.

Ms. LONG. That’s correct, Senator.

Senator WARNER. I hope that we can take some modest encouragement. But do you see any evidence that would lead you to the conclusion that in the near-term future, say the next 90 days, there’s likely to be any actions taken by the Maliki Government on the main ones—deBaathification, and the allowing of the provinces to have free elections, et cetera?

Ms. LONG. Senator, we’re very concerned that the Maliki government act. I do understand that the government plans after the period of the haj to take on as its first priority effort passage of the Iraqi budget, which will have significant impact on some of these efforts, and then quickly to turn to deBaathification. So I am aware that that is the priority effort of the Maliki Government within the next 90 to 120 days, sir.

Senator WARNER. If you had to diagnose the problem of why the Maliki government hasn’t performed, is it rooted in the time, historic corruption that exists, the hatred and mistrust that exist between the Sunnis and the Shia? Are those still the fundamental basic causes that preclude these human beings elected by their own people, or parties as the case may be in this government, and not
by the President of the United States? We didn't select these people, but we have to, as we say, deal with the cards that were dealt us? Is that still the basic reason they can't come together?

Ms. LONG. Senator, I would agree that those are the basic reasons. I would allude to what Ambassador Crocker has alluded to, which is, even beyond getting these groups together for the first time, these are individuals who don't have a lot of government experience, do not have a lot of organizational experience, and a very, very young government institutional apparatus.

Senator WARNER. While our losses of life and limb have gone down, we're still sustaining loss of life as a consequence of the inaction of the central government. If they were to act responsibly and do as prescribed by their constitution and charter, I personally think there would be far fewer casualties today, both of the coalition forces, of our military, and the civilians. Do you agree with that?

Ms. LONG. I agree. Every casualty is one casualty too many, sir.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Shinn, as to Turkey, we read this morning this report to the effect that there's going to be some active military action initiated by the Turkish government against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) factions. Could you bring us up to date on that and what are the implications on our ability to try and keep as much tranquility in that region of Iraq as possible?

Mr. SHINN. Senator, I agree that's a pretty important point. I would have to defer to Ms. Long, within whose area Turkey and Iraq principally fall.

Ms. LONG. As the Senator is aware, we share the concern regarding the turbulence in northern Iraq and we are working with the Turkish government and the Iraqi government, as well as the regional Kurdish government, all of whom have openly declared the PKK to be a terrorist organization, to make sure that to the extent possible the conflict and the instability in northern Iraq is minimized.

As this committee is aware, General Petraeus, as well as the Vice Chairman, are working personally with Chief of Staff Segun in Turkey in order to further diplomatic and other non-kinetic solutions to this problem, sir.

Senator WARNER. This is my last question here, to Mr. Shinn on the question of the Navy and the denial of our ships to make those port calls. Having had some experience myself in the Navy secretariat, I know full well that those port calls are planned well in advance, with full notification and I assume recognition in writing of the acceptance of the ship to dock and stay there for a period of time.

What's your best analysis of what happened? It caused great hardship to the crew and families of our carrier, so how can that be precluded in the future?

Mr. SHINN. You're right, Senator, it was a big hardship on the members, the family members of the crew, as well as the crew themselves of the carrier, as well as the other vessels who were denied access to Hong Kong in the same period of time.
We’ve heard various explanations, both official and unofficial, from the Chinese government as to what happened. Frankly, we’re still baffled. They don’t completely add up. There have been several explanations, none of which are satisfactory, and we look forward to a plausible and full official explanation from the Chinese government of what happened.

Senator WARNER. More importantly is that you have a procedure by which it cannot happen again.

Mr. SHINN. Absolutely.

Senator WARNER. I pointed out to you the value of the Incidents at Sea Agreement which was negotiated many, many years ago between the United States and the Soviet Union, that is still in effect, and it obviates many of these types of situations.

Mr. SHINN. That was a good model, and in fact I understand from Admiral Fallon when he was at Pacific Command that the Sea Agreement that you negotiated with the Russians was an inspiration for the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement, which was designed to help avoid these kind of misunderstandings.

Senator WARNER. By the way, I had the privilege of discussing both of you with Admiral Fallon and he’s very favorably impressed with your professional services, both Ms. Long and you, Mr. Shinn.

Thank you, Senator Webb, for your indulgence.

Senator WEBB [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Warner, my senior Senator.

I’d like to thank all of you for your willingness to continue to serve. I have 5 years in the Pentagon, 1 as an Active Duty marine and then-Secretary Warner’s staff actually, my last year in the Marine Corps, and then 4 as a defense executive. It’s a great place to work, and to get motivated every day by the people who wear the uniform.

I also grew up in the Air Force. I think both of you gentlemen know what that means. Anybody who’s seen the movie “The Great Santini,” that was the way I grew up. I can still remember standing at parade rest in front of my chest of drawers on Saturday morning, waiting for the old man to come in and inspect my room.

I have some questions for all of you. If my time runs out, I’ll come back. I’d like to give you the opportunity to clarify this for the record, Mr. Duehring, on these political promotions. It’s an extremely serious impingement for anyone who has spent time around the career military. It was one of the central issues in the Tailhook scandal, frankly, when this committee was insisting on doing a secondary evaluation of the fitness reports of people who had already passed through the promotion boards. I spoke strongly about that well before I ever thought I would run.

I would assume you agree that, other than in the form of a fitness report of a civilian superior or reporting officer, that there should be no political input in the military promotion process?

Mr. DUEHRING. Senator, there should definitely be no political input in the military promotion process. There’s no difficulty with that. My concern was when I got the question, I didn’t really understand what the article was reporting. So any answer that I gave would be sheer conjecture on my part and I thought, since I just heard about it, it would be better just to take it for the record.
Senator Webb. But as a guiding principle, I think we should all agree that there should be no political input in the promotion process other than through the forms of fitness reports. Wouldn’t you agree with that?

Mr. Duehring. No political input, that’s correct, sir.

Senator Webb. Can you explain what the functions of the Patrick Henry Center for Individual Liberty are?

Mr. Duehring. It was a conservative organization, one of many here in the Washington area, that is headquartered here. It was built around its founder, Gary Aldrich, who had been an FBI agent and retired, and promoted conservative causes. At the time I had just moved back to Washington, DC, and needed to get involved in something to keep my mind going until I found out what I was really going to be able to do to serve my country.

Senator Webb. Could you explain the mission statement of the 501(c)(3)?

Mr. Duehring. Generic?

Senator Webb. Yes.

Mr. Duehring. Yes, sir.

Senator Webb. What was the mission statement of the organization?

Mr. Duehring. It was called the Patrick Henry Center for Individual Liberty. People came to him to talk about if they thought that they were being prosecuted or persecuted for what they might have said, that he would give advice because of his background.

Senator Webb. Former government officials?

Mr. Duehring. I don’t recall any government officials.

Senator Webb. Or former Federal employees? Basically former Federal employees who believed that they had been improperly treated?

Mr. Duehring. I would say it was like a counseling service. So he didn’t actually go out and do something on their behalf except talk to them directly. It was a very, very small group.

Senator Webb. Thank you.

Ms. Long, I’d like to ask you a question just as a follow-on to the question with respect to Iran and the NIE. What is your view of the motivation of Iran in its cooperation with the multinational effort that resulted in the formation of the Karzai Government in Afghanistan?

Ms. Long. Senator, the cooperation of Iran in the early stages of the Afghan government, I don’t have the details on that. I do understand that there was some cooperation provided, particularly support to or acknowledgment of U.S. military activities in order to deconflict and provide safety so that none of our actions were misinterpreted.

Senator Webb. But it did actively participate in a multinational effort preceding the comments of the administration that marked them as members of the axis of evil. Would you have any thoughts on what their motivation would have been?

Ms. Long. No, I would not, Senator Webb. Unfortunately, Afghanistan falls in Mr. Shinn’s area of responsibility. However, I am responsible for the area of Iran and I do not have any insights as to Iranian motivations at that time.
Senator WEBB. But this does impact on the question of Iran's motivation in taking certain actions. On the one hand, you were indicating that in your view that Iran would have terminated, let's just say, its alleged nuclear program. But let's assume for the conversation that it exists, and that they terminated that simply as a result of international pressure. But they did step forward in the Afghan situation, preceding our labeling them a member of the axis of evil, in a way that assisted the formation of the Karzai government.

That would seem to me to be an indicator at some level that they operate from practicality, rather than simply from external pressure.

Ms. LONG. Senator, I would agree with you. I think Iran from a practical standpoint often does a risk versus gain analysis of particularly its standing in the international community. At the same time, it cooperated on the formation of the Karzai government, however, it was continuing to fund and to support Hezbollah and other terrorist activity worldwide.

Most recently, I believe Karzai has been fairly clear in that he finds Iran to be a destabilizing influence in Kabul, as well as a new source or at least a newly discovered source of support to insurgent activity and Taliban along Afghanistan's border. So it's very difficult to gauge the motivations of Iran. On the one hand, they are very concerned about their international standing; on the other hand, not concerned enough to cease their international activities in support of terrorism.

Senator WEBB. There were opportunities that this administration had that were arguably overlooked that could have affected Iran's conduct in a different way. That's the point.

Mr. Shinn, you have long experience in East Asia. I've been concerned for many years about Chinese military activities in the South China Sea and beyond. Actually, I wrote a piece in the New York Times 9 years ago about the Spratlys and the Paracels, and here we see it popping up again. There were demonstrations in Hanoi that coincided with the military visit there.

I'm wondering about your take on Chinese intentions and activities in the Spratlys and the Paracels.

Mr. SHINN. That's a good question, Senator, and I'm afraid I don't have any good answer to the question. I have observed and studied Chinese military activities in the South China Sea and, even beyond that, their expansion of the People's Liberation Army, air force, and navy. The problem we have is divining their intent. They have this great capability, but the intent remains fairly opaque, whether it's in the South China Sea or across the straits in Taiwan.

That's one of the reasons for, I think, the great care and vigilance with which we have to deal with the Chinese military.

Senator WEBB. So you're involved in this area now in your present job?

Mr. SHINN. Yes, sir.

Senator WEBB. Have you seen any indications in the time that you've been in this job that the Chinese have increased their interest in sovereignty issues in the Paracels and the Spratlys?

Mr. SHINN. We have certainly seen a greater level of military activity in the region. There are some ships and some aircraft that
are outside what I take to be some of their historic patterns. Whether they intend to use that to advance their sovereignty claims in the South China Sea, I'm not sure. But the risk is always there, Senator.

Senator WEBB. The activities have increased, is your comment?
Mr. SHINN. Yes, sir.
Senator WEBB. Thank you.
Senator Thune.
Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all very much for your service to our country and your willingness to take on new and additional responsibilities and work on behalf of the people of this country in maintaining our national security. So thank you very much for being here today and for your willingness to accept those responsibilities and respond to questions that some of us have regarding those.

I’d like to direct a couple questions if I might to Mr. Gibson. First off, the Air Force Financial Service Center opened earlier this year at Ellsworth Air Force Base. The Air Force is leading the way when it comes to financial transformation to serve our Nation’s airmen, and I’m very proud that this effort is taking place in my home State.

My question is, are you familiar with that Air Force Financial Service Center and do you support the Air Force financial service transformation efforts that are being undertaken at Ellsworth?

Mr. GIBSON. Senator, your question addresses a very important aspect of financial management and that is continuous improvement of the business operations. I am not familiar with a lot of the details and analysis that went into that movement and consolidation at Ellsworth. However, if I’m confirmed I would believe it would be my responsibility to be a champion and be a leader in the area of continuing to improve business operations in the Air Force and I would make it a priority to get up to speed on that and once again support and continue that effort.

Senator THUNE. I would welcome the opportunity to host you at Ellsworth and show you the work that’s underway out there. But like I said, we’ve been very pleased that Ellsworth was chosen for that mission. We think it’s an important one. We think that the transformation that’s being undertaken by the Air Force is important and might be something that is replicated in some of the other Services. But I would hope that we could count on you to be able to continue to support that important mission and its location at Ellsworth Air Force Base.

Mr. GIBSON. Senator, as I mentioned, it’s a priority of mine and it would be a pleasure to come out and see that operation and what’s being done there.

Senator THUNE. You served in previous positions, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Under Secretary of Defense, the Comptroller, Acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Financial Management. Based on that experience, could you provide some examples of the types of challenges that the Air Force faces in managing its resources because of a lack of predictability in funding and the failure to get the necessary bridge funding that would come with a global war on terror supplemental? What types of issues do you
deal with when you don’t have the kind of reliability and predictable funding stream that you need?

Mr. GIBSON. Senator, I am familiar with that concept. However, budget execution has not been in my portfolio. I would hesitate to comment on some of the ramifications associated with execution of the base bill and the supplemental bill and the appropriate actions it might have on operations. Again, I would hesitate to comment on that.

Senator THUNE. That’s probably a very safe answer for you right now.

One other question. Earlier this year, the Air Force released its long-range strike white paper, which states that the procurement spike for the next generation long-range strike platform is expected to begin in 2011. If confirmed, one of your responsibilities along with the Director of the Air Force budget will be making program and budget decisions and preparing the program objective memorandum (POM) in the Future Years Defense Program.

Given this, as the Air Force builds the fiscal years 2010 through 2015 POM, will you support the proposed 2011 funding spike for the next generation long-range strike platform?

Mr. GIBSON. Senator, I’m not familiar with all the details relating to that program. If I’m confirmed, Senator, my understanding is that my role would be to work with Air Force leadership, the programming area, the program budget folks, to take the budgetary resources that we have and match them as best we can to the priorities of the missions.

Senator THUNE. Period?

Mr. GIBSON. Period.

Senator THUNE. I was waiting for the next part of that answer.

Let me address one other, if I might, issue in which I have a great deal of interest, and that’s the area of aviation fuel expenditures. In fiscal year 2006, the Air Force, according to the numbers I have, consumed 2.6 billion gallons of aviation fuel at a cost of approximately $5.7 billion. That breaks down to approximately 7.1 million gallons per day is used. To make matters worse, every time the price for a barrel of oil goes up by $10 the Air Force faces another $610 million increase in fuel costs.

These costs need to be reprogrammed from existing accounts or accounted for in an appropriations supplemental. To address that problem, the Air Force has set a goal of obtaining 50 percent of its fuel needs from domestic sources by 2016. One of those sources is a 50–50 synthetic fuel blend used in the successful 2007 flight test of a B–52. It’s also slated for testing in the engines of the C–17 and the B–1 bomber. If confirmed, would you support further funding of research and purchase of synthetic fuels for use by the Air Force and will you work to program funds for synthetic fuels for the next Future Years Defense Program for fiscal years 2010 to 2015?

Mr. GIBSON. Senator, I’m aware of the ongoing efforts to improve, maximize what we get from our fuel dollars. This includes a number of initiatives, both reaching economies and also alternative fuels such as the synfuels. I’m not familiar with the specifics with regard to the Air Force budget in this matter. However, if confirmed, if this effort truly supports maximizing what we do with
our budgetary resources and helps achieve the mission, then I would fully support it.

Senator THUNE. I appreciate your responses and I know that in a setting like this, my questions are somewhat specific and your answers probably by necessity have to be somewhat general. But once you are confirmed, I would love to sit down with you and perhaps drill down a little bit with some of these issues that I've raised.

Mr. GIBSON. Senator, if I'm confirmed, it would be my pleasure.

Senator THUNE. Thank you very much.

Chairman LEVIN [presiding]. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In your absence we've continued under the leadership of Senator Webb a very good series of questions. I'm going to wrap up with one for Mr. Duehring.

First, the issue of annual enrollment fees for the retirees eligible for TRICARE is an issue of great concern to the Department and Congress. I understand that a DOD task force is calling for urgent action to increase TRICARE fees for retirees, including a fee for TRICARE For Life. TRICARE is something that this committee can take great pride in. We did the basic legislation on that some years ago.

What are your views about the cost of TRICARE and whether a means needs to be developed to change the enrollment fee structure?

Mr. DUEHRING. Senator Warner, as a retiree, I am very interested in what happens to TRICARE and the fees, if they have to be increased or what have you. Our office right now has not been involved in that discussion. I do know there is a discussion at the DOD level. It has not come down to the Services yet. We're all aware of the fact that the TRICARE budget is increasing.

What I will do, if confirmed, I will take the interests of the committee, and of course, as I mentioned before——

Senator WARNER. Would you find the opportunity to reply to the record on this very quickly, the best you can?

Mr. DUEHRING. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

The Department of Defense has evaluated the cost of TRICARE and changes to the enrollment fee structure as recommended by the Task Force on the Future of Military Health Care. The Task Force was mandated by the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (section 711 of P.L. 109–364) to assess and recommend changes that would help sustain military health care services for airmen, retirees, and their families.

I will review the Task Force findings and evaluate their recommendations to help contain an increasing TRICARE budget while still sustaining military health care services for airmen, retirees, and their families.

Increasing enrollment fees should not be the only driver of change; we must also balance this with improving health care business and management practices to ensure we maintain our Air Force readiness posture along with taking care of our airmen, retirees, and their families.

Senator WARNER. Again, Mr. Shinn—and I also address this to Mrs. Long because you have jurisdiction over NATO. NATO is the military force now operating in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is in Mr. Shinn's AOR. The New York Times reported on December 16 the following:
“Deeply concerned about the prospect of failure in Afghanistan, the Bush administration and NATO have begun three top-to-bottom reviews of the entire mission, from security and counterterrorism to political consolidation and economic development, according to American and alliance officials. The reviews are an acknowledgment of the need for greater coordination in fighting the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, halting the rising opium production and trafficking that finances the insurgency, and helping the Kabul government extend its legitimacy and control.”

The article is very well written and it goes on.

I think we want in our record this morning your perspectives on the current situation and the future situation in Afghanistan, and if you would lead off, and then I would invite Ms. Long to make a contribution with respect to NATO.

Mr. SHINN. Thank you, Senator. With regard to the strategic planning exercise that was mentioned in the newspaper, I’m aware of at least two such reviews: one that Secretary Gates discussed last week with the NATO allies in Scotland, where the idea was for us to have a joint vision for the 3- to 5-year horizon, with appropriate milestones for Afghanistan that everybody could sign up to at the Bucharest summit. I would defer to Ms. Long in a moment to talk more about that.

The other review was undertaken again by Admiral Fallon, known to you and to me in my previous job; when he took over the Central Command (CENTCOM) job, as is his bent, drilled down very deeply into the fundamental strategy in Afghanistan, and continues to work that with the mission in Kabul, in particular how to integrate the economic with the military part of the counterinsurgency.

With regard to the overall situation in Afghanistan, I also had a chance to discuss this with Senator Levin when I called on him yesterday.

Senator WARNER. We also discussed it when you visited with me yesterday.

Mr. SHINN. Yes.

Senator WARNER. I have a very, very high regard for Admiral Fallon. I’m quite interested in what steps he is taking on this. Is one of these reports being prepared by CENTCOM?

Mr. SHINN. By CENTCOM in collaboration with the embassy, yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. With the embassy?

Mr. SHINN. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. There are three of them. So that would account for one. The other one, is that originated by Secretary Gates?

Mr. SHINN. Yes, the one working with the NATO allies was initiated by Secretary Gates. I’m not familiar with what the third one might be.

Senator WARNER. We going to come to grapple with the question of narcotics, which is a very serious question because it’s generating so much cash. What cash is beginning to infiltrate back to finance the operations of the Taliban?
Mr. SHINN. That’s absolutely right and that’s one of the more alarming aspects of the conflict in Afghanistan, with no easy answers. The export of opium from Afghanistan was in excess of 8,000 metric tons last year. It’s a big increase from the year before. Even though we have, we and our allies and the Afghan government, a 5-part strategy to deal with this, the results have not been very encouraging.

Senator WARNER. If anything, discouraging, because of the increase of production this past season over the previous year.

Now, Ms. Long, to the NATO aspect of it, because NATO is a full partner in the situation. Recently, the Secretary of Defense, in I thought very stern terms, talked to NATO about their role and what must be done to strengthen our operating forces. I presume part of that report and discussion bordered on the question of narcotics, which is the banker for the Taliban.

Ms. LONG. It did, Senator. The only thing I would add to what Dr. Shinn said is to explain that the 3- to 5-year vision is exactly what the Senator alluded to. It’s a mechanism for focusing and enhancing NATO’s efforts in Afghanistan, to include the narcotics effort. Narcotics and the counternarcotics activity of NATO in conjunction with the Afghan government was one of the subjects that was raised most recently at the meeting in the United Kingdom of contributing nations that are participating in the regional command.

Senator WARNER. Bottom line, each of these problems is contributing to the loss of American life, and the loss of American limb. We have an obligation to do everything we can, an obligation to those in uniform and their families back home, to get a firmer grip on this situation.

My last question would be related to Russia, which again is in your portfolio, Ms. Long. I wonder how you sleep at night. You have all the problems one can possibly imagine.

Obviously, the relationships have somewhat deteriorated here in the last perhaps 18 months, partially because Russia now is feeling the benefit of the revenues from its sale of petroleum. Its coffers are now somewhat filled as compared to several years ago. How do we propose to try and improve those relationships? Because we are relatively the two powerful nations that border those areas in Central Europe.

Ms. LONG. Thank you, Senator. I share your concern regarding our dealing with Russia, and there has been a recent shift in Russia’s relationship not only with the United States, but with the international community. Probably the most obvious evidence of that is its recent suspension of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and most recently not to provide the data information that is required under that agreement on December 15.

On the one hand, we remain strict with our principles of democracy in dealing with Russia in terms of its development and its responsible role as an international player. On the other hand, in terms of things like missile defense, we are reaching out to Russia in order to garner its support and its participation, where we can encourage it to do so, to play a constructive role in regional security by either exchanging data with it regarding the missile defense
issue or even inviting it to participate by visiting some of our missile defense structures here in the United States.

So it is a balancing act, Senator. But we know that we need to move forward in order to deal with Russia in today's context.

Senator WARNER. Is Russia beginning to reinvest and refurbish its military to a measurable increase?

Ms. LONG. There are some indications that Russia is reinvesting in portions of its military, yes.

Senator WARNER. Which portions are receiving that benefit?

Ms. LONG. I'd rather have that conversation in closed session, Senator.

Senator WARNER. All right.

Ms. LONG. I apologize. I'm not sure how much of it is open.

Senator WARNER. Clearly, the figures show that they're pumping some of these new revenues back into refurbishing their military?

Ms. LONG. Russia has not abandoned development of its military, no, Senator.

Senator WARNER. I thank the witnesses. I wish you well. You have my support. I do hope, Mr. Chairman, we can act on these nominations with the usual dispatch that you use.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Ms. Long, let me pick up on the NATO question that you were asked. The Secretary was quoted or reported to have said something about toning down U.S. appeals to NATO allies for more troops, equipment, and trainers for the NATO-led effort in Afghanistan. Is it your understanding that Secretary Gates intends to pull back from pressing our allies to do more?

Ms. LONG. Senator, I believe the newspaper article quoted the Secretary as saying that he would no longer hammer NATO allies. I think that is open to misinterpretation. If confirmed, I do believe I will be working with the Secretary to continue putting pressure on NATO in order for it to fulfill its commitments in Afghanistan. What I believe the Secretary was referring to was looking for more creative ways, including this visionary statement, in order to continue enhancing NATO's efforts in Afghanistan.

Chairman LEVIN. You made reference in the answers to your pre-hearing questions about the CFE Treaty and indicated that if outstanding problems can be solved, the present treaty can and should be replaced by the adapted treaty to reflect post-Cold War realities. Can you just expand on that a bit here?

Ms. LONG. Thank you, Senator. I think one of the criticisms of the CFE is, for example, the bloc-to-bloc structure that that treaty envisioned or actually is based upon. I believe that basis was appropriate at the time that the treaty was formed because it dealt with an east-west configuration that has changed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

My understanding is that one of the provisions of the treaty that may be addressed by the the Adapted CFE Treaty, if it is passed by the countries, is to dissolve the bloc-to-bloc treatment and deal with the equipment and forces from a national perspective. That would be one of the issues, Senator.

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Duehring, the National Defense Authorization Act which we just passed authorizes an active Air Force end
strength of 329,000. Is there any reason why we should not expect the President's request for fiscal year 2009 to include those numbers that you know of? There was a reference to a lower number that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force made. Do you know what the intent is or what the Air Force's request is in that regard? Is there any reason to believe it's not going to be the 329,000?

Mr. DUEHRING. The last information I had was from before the time that that act was passed. So I have a little bit of a history of intentions, but what I'd like to do is study that a little bit more. We're all concerned about the decreasing numbers and the impact it has on our ability to carry out the war. I'll be happy to take that.

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Let us know anything that you're able and willing to tell us about that for the record, would you?

[The information referred to follows:]

Active Duty end strength is currently programmed to go from 328,600 in fiscal year 2008 to 316,600 by the end of fiscal year 2009. However, the Air Force will submit as a follow on to the President's fiscal year 2009 budget a report on the Air Force's Total Force end strength requirements to include new and emerging missions as directed by the fiscal year 2008 House Conference Committee report.

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Duehring, a recent CBS News investigation found that the suicide rate among veterans is twice that of civilians and it's clear that some military personnel returning from Iraq and Afghanistan are struggling with those experiences. Do you know what the Air Force is doing to assess the mental health situation of our servicemembers and to aid that situation of those members who are returning from Iraq and Afghanistan? Do you know what efforts are underway there?

Mr. DUEHRING. Mr. Chairman, I know that the Air Force actually started some work in this area around 1997 when it created a program to try to stem the rising tide of suicides which was occurring even at that time. I was looking at the charts that we prepared for this briefing and there's a noticeable dropoff. I know that our suicide rates run very, very closely to the statistical average for the United States. Of course, any suicide is bad. It's part of our ongoing program of assessments that we do when people return from overseas, and if confirmed, I will make this one of my very highest priorities.

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Gibson, given your experience in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, under the Comptroller as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Management Reform, and you also have some previous experience in the Comptroller's organization as a financial management official, would you give us your assessment as to how the DOD management systems and business processes measure up to private sector standards?

Mr. GIBSON. Senator, your comments and your question are about a significant issue in the Department with regard to financial management. Ultimately, our goal is to generate timely, accurate, and reliable information. One aspect of this is improving our business processes. But another is modernizing our financial systems. This is a significant undertaking and through the creation of the Business Transformation Agency, we are working this at the enterprise level, with tiered accountability.

It is hard for me to compare the systems at the Department, being that the complexity and size—we are the largest corporation
in the world. But I can tell you that we are working this issue through the enterprise transition plan, and if I am confirmed, it would be a top priority of mine to support the enterprise transition plan and its compliance in the Air Force.

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Gibson, every couple years the Government Accountability Office (GAO) puts together a high-risk list of management problems in the Federal Government. The DOD routinely accounts for more than half of the items on the GAO high-risk list. Are you familiar with that GAO high-risk list?

Mr. GIBSON. Yes, sir, I am.

Chairman LEVIN. Are you going to be able to make progress in that area? How confident are you, given the history of either failed efforts or lack of efforts, in this area? How confident are you that the Air Force will look different in terms of management a year or 2 years or 3 years from now than it does, that it'll look different?

Mr. GIBSON. Senator, two key areas that relate to financial management associated with the GAO high-risk are performance and governance of our business systems and financial management weaknesses related to providing timely, accurate, and reliable data. If confirmed, I intend to make progress towards an unqualified audit opinion a high priority. Improving financial processes and modernizing systems via the financial improvement and audit readiness plan and the enterprise transition plan will be a significant aspect.

Additionally, if confirmed, providing governance and oversight of business systems will be a priority and GAO will be a valuable third party partner, and I will continue to work with them on these issues.

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you.

Mr. Gibson, Mr. Duehring, Mr. Shinn, and Ms. Long, thank you all for your testimony, for your willingness to serve. We again thank your families for their support.

We will stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 11:24 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to Mary Beth Long by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DEFENSE REFORMS

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Answer. No. I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act at this time.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act at this time.
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA)?

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense on international security strategy and policy issues of the Department of Defense (DOD) interest that relate to the nations and international organizations of Europe (including the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)), the Middle East, and Africa, their governments and defense establishments, and for oversight of security cooperation programs and foreign military sales programs in these regions.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and functions do you anticipate that Secretary Gates would prescribe for you?

Answer. If confirmed, I believe that the Secretary would ask me to manage the day-to-day, multilateral, regional, and bilateral defense relations with the governments in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. He also would ask me to develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of policy related to NATO and other institutions with a security dimension. He would likely ask that I represent the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Secretary of Defense in interagency policy deliberations and international negotiations dealing with these assigned areas of responsibility, when appropriate. Finally, I would likely be asked to monitor and provide policy recommendations related to the conduct of U.S. military operations in the countries and regions under the areas of my responsibility, as well as on the participation of those countries and organizations in security or defense operations elsewhere that have an impact on U.S. defense considerations.

Question. What impact has the reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy had on the functions and duties of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs?

Answer. Prior to the reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA had responsibility for bilateral and regional policy issues globally, except for in Europe and Eurasia. ISA also had responsibility for the conduct of Prisoners of War/Missing in Action (POW/MIA) affairs, coalition management, activities related to support to public diplomacy, and oversight of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.

The reorganization of policy aligned the policy regional offices more closely to the combatant commands. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA retained responsibility for Africa and the Middle East, European, Eurasian, and NATO matters were added to the ISA portfolio. The Office of Asian Affairs, including matters pertaining to Afghanistan (except for NATO operations in Afghanistan), now falls under the new Office of the Assistant Secretary for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. The Western Hemisphere Office also moved; it now falls under the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.

The new policy organization gathers functional responsibilities under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) and Interdependent Capabilities and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs. Coalition management issues, POW/MIA affairs, and oversight of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency are now housed under the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Global Security Affairs. Personnel working public diplomacy issues now report to the Support for Public Diplomacy Directorate.

Question. What challenges has the reorganization created for carrying out those functions and duties, and what steps would you take to address those challenges?

Answer. The reorganization of policy created a more effectively balanced organization with a greater ability to address post-Cold War, crosscutting issues. It also made the policy organization more flexible and adaptive to evolving policy challenges and leadership priorities. This resulted in offices with a broader expertise in the different facets of a single issue. This is a benefit rather than a challenge, but it does require close coordination across the portfolios of the various Assistant Secretaries. The Office of the Under Secretary must continue to ensure that it remains true to the spirit of the reorganization—to remain flexible and adaptive as the security challenges we face constantly change, and to adjust priorities and allocation of resources accordingly.

Question. How do you see the civilian role, as opposed to the military role, in the formulation of strategy and contingency planning?

Answer. From the briefings I have received, I understand that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy’s office initiates the biennial contingency planning cycle on behalf of the Secretary through the Contingency Planning Guidance. Following the guidance in this document, which the President approves, combatant command-
ers develop operation plans for prescribed scenarios. As they are being developed, the Secretary of Defense periodically reviews the most important of these plans with the responsible combatant commander. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy follows the development of this body of plans and assists the Secretary in a formal review of the plans, which are then submitted for his approval.

Question. Will the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary for ISA include responsibility for dealing with NATO nuclear matters?

Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA serves as the Chair of the NATO High Level Group, the advisory body to NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA performs this duty in very close coordination with the Assistant Secretary for SO/LIC, who has responsibility for strategic capabilities, including nuclear forces.

Question. Will the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary for ISA include any responsibility for formulating strategic nuclear policy?

Answer. No. These duties belong to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC and Interdependent Capabilities.

QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

Answer. I believe I am qualified for this position by a combination of the over 15 years of government experience in the intelligence and policy arenas, my experience dealing with international issues and foreign officials, and by the skills I have developed as an attorney and manager.

I have served in the DOD since 2004 and have held the position as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA since August 2005. In this capacity, I have been called upon to perform many of the duties and roles of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, particularly since the departure of Assistant Secretary Peter Rodman in March 2007. In the 27 months as the Principal Deputy in ISA, I have become steeped in the issues that the Assistant Secretary must confront and have represented ISA within the interagency and with senior foreign defense counterparts. In addition, I have testified before, and have regular interaction with, Congress on ISA issues. I also have established effective working relationships with my DOD counterparts, as well as with my interagency and foreign colleagues.

Prior to my current assignment in the Department, I served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics for over a year, beginning that appointment in May 2004. As the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics, I worked extensively with ISA and related Department, interagency, and foreign colleagues, as well as with Congress. Much of my work in that office focused on building capacity in Afghanistan and transnational threats.

Before coming to the DOD, I served with the Central Intelligence Agency from 1986–1999. While there, I developed experience working with many issues related to the ISA portfolio and gained significant experience dealing with the interagency and foreign government officials. In particular, I worked closely with the Departments of State and Defense on terrorism, nuclear issues, and other transnational threats, even serving as the Embassy “Principal (Anti-) Money Laundering Officer” and representative to multilateral organizations, including those on conventional weapons and weapons transfer issues.

From 1999 to May 2004, I practiced law with Williams & Connolly LLP. In that capacity, I developed many of the skills necessary to successful performance as an Assistant Secretary, including critical thinking, creative problem-solving, and the conduct of complex negotiations.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA to the following officials:

The Secretary of Defense;
The Deputy Secretary of Defense;
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;
The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence;
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
The Secretaries of the Military Departments;
The Chiefs of Staff of the Services;
The combatant commanders, in particular Central Command, European Command (EUCOM), and Africa Command (AFRICOM);
The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs;
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs; and
The Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC and Interdependent Capabilities.

Answer. If confirmed, I will report to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I will work closely with the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. I also expect to develop and maintain close working relationships with the Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries across the Department, the General Counsel of DOD, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with combatant commanders.

The position requires close coordination with the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense within OSD Policy, as appropriate. Examples of this coordination would include working with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs on the role of NATO in Afghanistan; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC and Interdependent Capabilities on counterterrorism, particularly in Iraq, and on nuclear matters; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts in my area of responsibility; and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs on Counternarcotics, and coalition affairs, proliferation, and security assistance matters.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA? Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

Answer. A number of the major challenges that the next Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA will confront are related to how best to support the U.S. warfighter deployed in the regions under the jurisdiction of the Office of the Assistant Secretary for ISA. In the areas under ISA responsibility, there are currently significant numbers of U.S. forces deployed—many of them in combat or combat support roles—including over 150,000 in Iraq. In the next year, there will be many political and other transitions that significantly impact these forces as governments of coalition partners face elections and mandate renewals, as the Iraqi and Afghan governments mature, and as U.S. forces adjust in number and mandate. Should I be confirmed, I will commit myself to working in close partnership with Congress, the military departments and other agencies, our coalition partners, and the Iraqi and Afghan Governments, to properly support our deployed warfighters.

IRAQ

Question. The President has said that the purpose of the surge over the last year was to give Iraqi politicians the breathing space to effect reconciliation. Would you agree that reconciliation has not been achieved and, consequently, the surge has not met its stated purpose?

Answer. The President’s New Way Forward, announced in January 2007, increased the number of U.S. troops in Iraq in order to facilitate political progress and to give Iraq the time and assistance needed to build the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces and government capacity.

As General Petraeus has indicated, the increase in troop strength combined with a tactical focus on counterinsurgency have been successful in bringing violence down to levels comparable to the spring of 2005—thus allowing political progress to take place, particularly at a local level. While this political progress has taken place, it has not been in the way we originally expected. Bottom-up reconciliation has occurred at the local and provincial level with Iraqi citizens rejecting al Qaeda in Iraq and forming Concerned Local Citizen groups. Provincial governments are also functioning more effectively. At the national level, political developments have been less encouraging. National reconciliation is still a work in progress, but economic development is occurring and efforts to advance significant legislation, such as the deBaathification legislation, are underway.

A significant challenge for the next months will be supporting, in consultation with Congress, the Government of Iraq’s ability to capitalize on local gains, to pass key legislation, and to promote national reconciliation, including by capitalizing on the momentum of bottom-up progress to meet enhanced top-down efforts.

Question. What leverage do you believe the United States has to induce Iraqi politicians to effect reconciliation?

Answer. Surely our presence in Iraq, our active involvement with the Iraqi Government leaders, our relationships with Iraq’s neighbors, and our engagement in support of Iraq in multinational force provide us with significant leverage. As Am-
Bassador Crocker stated, a crucial question is whether Iraq’s collective national leadership is ready to prioritize the interests of the Government of Iraq over sectarian and community interests. Ambassador Crocker believes Iraq’s leaders have the will to tackle these problems.

An important aspect of U.S. leverage is our ability to serve as a facilitator for enabling the Iraqis to make the hard decisions necessary in order to determine their own destiny. We appeal to Iraqi national interest and observe that Iraq will prosper if the interests of all elements of society are accommodated.

Finally, we have significant leverage through our relationships with allies neighboring Iraq. For example, the Neighbors Ministerial meetings have been helpful in addressing issues such as border security, refugees, and energy, and we have worked hard to support Iraq as it leads this process.

**Question.** How quickly do you believe U.S. troop levels could and should be reduced in Iraq? On what do you base this?

**Answer.** In close and continuing dialogue with Congress, I believe the assessment should be based on the recommendation of the commander on the ground. When General Petraeus testified before Congress in September, he stated that he believed we would be able to reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams by the summer of 2008 without jeopardizing hard-fought security gains. Thus far, the trend looks favorable.

This coming spring, General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker will return to report to Congress and the American people on the status of developments in Iraq. At that time, he will address how quickly he believes U.S. troop levels can be reduced. It is our hope that he will report that the reductions currently contemplated can be executed and will provide his advice on further reductions.

**Question.** What level of U.S. force presence do you foresee in Iraq over the long term? What missions do you see those forces performing? How long do you believe that period will be?

**Answer.** We are working closely with our Iraqi partners to determine what our presence will look like beyond the summer of 2008; however, as General Petraeus stated in his testimony last September, “our experience in Iraq has repeatedly shown that projecting too far into the future is not just difficult, it can be misleading and even hazardous.” Determining the final nature and level of that presence depends upon what the Iraqis desire as well as what we believe we should provide, and should be determined in close coordination with Congress.

Most likely, the relationship will build upon the Declaration of Principles signed by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki on November 26. This declaration commits the Governments of the United States and Iraq to agree to a long-term security agreement to regulate our security relationship by July 31, 2008.

As the President stated, the United States envisions the creation of an enduring relationship that is in the best interest of both the United States and Iraq, which would include security cooperation to help provide for Iraqi stability and to prosecute the war on terror. Troop levels would be governed by the conditions on the ground. Specifically, it is envisioned that U.S. troops might be required to deter external aggression, support Iraq in its effort to combat terrorist groups, and to train and equip the Iraqi security forces.

The United States does not seek permanent bases in Iraq. In the next months, it will be engaging the Iraqis in discussion on the nature of our continued presence, including the protection of our forces (to include Status of Forces-like protections) and the support required for our long-term relationship with them. It is likely that we may seek agreements with the Iraqis to provide access to facilities to support our activities.

**IRAQ LESSONS LEARNED**

**Question.** What do you believe to be the major lessons learned from the Iraq invasion and the ongoing effort to stabilize the country?

**Answer.** As Secretary Gates recently said to an audience at Kansas State University, “One of the most important lessons from our experience in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere has been the decisive role reconstruction, development, and governance plays in any meaningful, long-term success.” Essential ingredients for stabilization include economic development, institution building, internal reconciliation, governance, basic services, the training and equipping the indigenous military and police forces, and strategic communications.

Our experience in Iraq has also taught us the importance of deploying civilian expertise. Provincial Reconstruction Teams are designed to employ civilians experienced in agriculture, governance, and other aspects of development—to work with and alongside the military to improve the lives of the local population, a key tenet
of any counterinsurgency effort. Where they are on the ground—even in small numbers—we see tangible and often dramatic improvements.

Another lesson deserving of highlighting is the importance of enabling and empowering our partners to defend and govern themselves. The standing up and mentoring of indigenous army and police—one of Special Forces—is now a key mission for the military as a whole and a key to our success in Iraq.

IRAQ REFUGEES

Question. The United Nations estimates that over 4 million Iraqis have been displaced by violence, and over 2.3 million have vacated their homes for safer areas within Iraq. Further, 1.5 million are now living in Syria, and over 1 million refugees inhabit Jordan, Iran, Egypt, Lebanon, Yemen, and Turkey. Most of these Iraqis are determined to be resettled to North America or Europe, and few consider return to Iraq a viable option.

What do you believe should be the role of the DOD with regard to managing the return of refugees to Iraq?

Answer. DOD’s role is to support the State Department and other U.S. agencies that work with international organizations responsible for assisting refugees, or internally displaced persons, and promoting their safe return. Another key role is to help the government of Iraq to provide its citizens with a secure environment in which to resume their lives.

MIDDLE EAST ARMS PACKAGE

Question. The administration’s recently proposed $30 billion arms package was presented to Congress as a critical means by which U.S. allies in the Middle East could deter Iranian influence in the region.

In light of the recent National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran, do you believe the scope of this arms package should or should not be reconsidered?

Answer. As Secretary Gates said recently in Manama (on December 8, 2007), the Gulf Security Dialogue (GSD) is a joint State Department-DOD initiative oriented toward developing a strategic framework to enhance and strengthen regional security. The proposed sales associated with the GSD should help maintain the balance of power in the region by assisting countries to counter conventional as well as unconventional, asymmetric, and terrorist threats, including threats posed by ballistic missiles. The weapons systems associated with the GSD are primarily defensive in nature and are designed to help our friends deter and defend against such threats, including those from Iran.

IRAN

Question. Do you support a diplomatic approach for engaging directly with Iran regarding stability and security in Iraq?

Answer. Yes. The Department supports the effort led by Ambassador Crocker in dialogue with the Iranians regarding all of our concerns related to Iraqi stability and security. We are seeking to convince Iran that it is to its benefit that Iraq becomes a neighbor that is stable, secure, and prosperous.

Question. From a policy perspective, what impact does the recent NIE on Iran have on the Department’s thinking about Iran as a regional threat and a threat to the United States?

Answer. As the President has stated, our thinking on Iran has not changed. Further, as Secretary Gates emphasized in Manama, the report expresses with greater confidence than ever that Iran did have a nuclear weapons program—developed secretly, kept hidden for years, and in violation of its international obligations. As the Secretary said in his Manama speech, the Iranians do have the mechanisms still in place to restart their program at any time. Importantly, the estimate did not identify impediments to Iran restarting the program.

LIBYA

Question. Over the past few years, the United States’ relationship with Libya has changed dramatically.

From a policy perspective, in your assessment, what should be the nature of our military-to-military cooperation with Libya?

Answer. Any military-to-military relationship with Libya needs to be developed and conducted within the overall context of a coordinated U.S. Government policy framework and in close consultation with Congress. Such a relationship should be supportive of Libya’s continuing transformation to a responsible form of government and sustained normalization of its relationship with the international community.
**Question.** How should DOD engage with other countries removed from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List?

**Answer.** DOD should proceed deliberately, on a case-by-case basis, and in close consultation with Congress. It would be important to develop military-to-military relations and conduct DOD activities within a well-coordinated U.S. Government policy framework and in a way that reinforces respect for human rights and international law.

**SYRIA**

**Question.** Do you believe it is in the United States’ interest to engage Syria in a direct dialogue regarding stability and security in Iraq?

**Answer.** There are opportunities for Syria to engage in constructive dialogue on this issue, and I welcome Syria to take advantage of these opportunities—through our Embassy in Damascus, opportunities such as the recent Annapolis dialogue, through multinational fora to include the U.N., or indirectly, perhaps through the Iraqis or others. For engagement to be productive, Syria must stop destabilizing behavior in the region, including permitting terrorist networks to move suicide bombs into Iraq, harboring former Iraqi Baathist regime leaders and regional terrorist groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Governing Command, enabling the flow of weapons to Hizballah in Lebanon, and working against Lebanon’s democratic institutions.

**NATO FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN**

**Question.** General John Craddock, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, has said that the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is short on maneuver battalions; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; helicopters; lift; and operational mentoring and liaison teams (OMLTs) for training the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF).

What do you believe can and should be done to persuade NATO members to provide the additional troops and equipment to meet the Afghanistan mission requirements?

**Answer.** We should continue to engage NATO at all levels and at all opportunities. We also should continue to engage NATO members bilaterally to encourage their support in filling NATO shortfalls. In addition, Secretary Gates and others should continue to engage NATO members and others in meetings like the U.K.-hosted meeting of the eight Allied Defense Ministers contributing forces and capabilities to ISAF Regional Command-South held earlier this month. As Secretary Gates mentioned recently before Congress, our goal is for allies to agree to a strategic concept that outlines where we want to be in 3 to 5 years in Afghanistan, where we hope the Afghan Government will be, the ways in which we intend to get there, and ways in which we can measure progress. It is our belief that such a strategy will help increase support among allied legislatures and electorates for the Afghan mission and therefore assist in generating the force, resources, and flexibility required for ISAF to succeed.

**Question.** Should NATO put more emphasis on training the ANSF to take on a greater role in providing security throughout Afghanistan, including by providing more OMLTs? What do you believe are the benefits and risks of such an approach?

**Answer.** Yes; NATO should put more emphasis on training the ANSF, particularly by providing more, and more capable, OMLTs. Although NATO is not in a position to take over the ANSF training mission, allies can contribute significantly by overcoming the existing and projected shortfall in the number and capabilities of OMLTs.

**Question.** What do you believe should be done to induce NATO members to remove national restrictions on the use of their troops in Afghanistan?

**Answer.** As indicated above, we will engage at all opportunities to stress the need for allies to lift national caveats that hamper employment of their forces by the ISAF commander. Additionally, by developing and implementing a strategic concept with benchmarks and agreed-upon goals, we may increase support among legislatures and electorates so allied governments are willing to lift national caveats on how their forces are used.

**MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE**

**Question.** The United States has proposed deploying a long-range missile defense system in Europe that is intended to provide protection for the United States and most, but not all, of NATO Europe against ballistic missiles. Since this proposed system would not cover all of NATO Europe, it has caused concern within NATO
because of the critical principle of the indivisibility of security of all of NATO's nations.

Do you support the principle of the indivisibility of security of all NATO nations and, if confirmed, would you work to ensure that any missile defense system (or system-of-systems) to protect NATO Europe is consistent with this critical principle?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will reinforce the message conveyed by the Under Secretary of Defense and others before the North Atlantic Council, the NATO-Russia Council, partner nations, and others to assure them that we will work to ensure that any missile defense system to protect NATO is consistent with the important principle of indivisibility of alliance security.

Question. The United States is proposing to pay for the deployment of a missile defense system to provide protection for the United States and most of NATO Europe, but is not proposing to pay for missile defense protection of the rest of NATO Europe, nor to seek NATO funding for the proposed deployment.

What is your view on how the costs of missile defense of Europe should be paid, and what responsibility the various NATO nations should have in paying for such defense?

Answer. In Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC and Interdependent Capabilities has primary responsibility for much of the deployment and functional aspects of the missile defense system we propose. That said, the U.S. elements we are proposing to field in Europe would represent a substantial U.S. contribution to the defense of NATO territory. It would be premature to discuss possible funding arrangements for any defenses in addition to those the United States is proposing. I note, however, that NATO is already funding the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense program to defend deployed NATO forces. It is possible that this existing program could be expanded so that, in concert with short-range missile defenses being developed and acquired by several NATO allies, these elements might provide an integrated defense for those allies not covered by the U.S. system.

Question. Do you believe the United States should be willing to pay for missile defense protection of the portions of NATO Europe not covered by the proposed European deployment, or that other NATO nations should be willing to pay for portions of the proposed deployment?

Answer. My previous answer applies equally well to this question. The proposed U.S. system would represent a substantial U.S. contribution to the defense of allied territory. Since the architecture of the complementary short- to medium-range system has not been determined, it is premature to discuss possible funding arrangements. However, the active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense NATO is already acquiring could be used as the command and control backbone for missile defenses being developed and acquired by several NATO allies that could be employed to cover the remainder of NATO territory. If confirmed, I will work with Congress to ensure appropriate transparency and coordination as we move forward on this effort.

Question. The Commander of EUCOM is the combatant commander responsible for the EUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR), including defense against ballistic missile attack. It is unclear what role EUCOM will play in missile defense in Europe, since the long-range system proposed for deployment in Europe is expected to be controlled by U.S. Northern Command from the United States.

What role do you believe would be appropriate for EUCOM in missile defense of its AOR, and what role do you believe EUCOM should have in coordinating and operating missile defenses with NATO for defense of Europe?

Answer. In Policy, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC and Interdependent Capabilities is the lead for the technical and implementation considerations of the proposed deployment. That said, development of the command and control arrangements for missile defenses in Europe, which will ultimately include both short- and long-range defenses, is undoubtedly a complex matter. If confirmed, as we develop the appropriate command and control and other arrangements, I will consult closely with allies, the relevant combatant commanders, and Congress on this issue.

KOSOVO

Question. Nearly 16,000 NATO troops currently participate in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) providing security and stabilization assistance.

What changes, if any, do you anticipate in the role or requirements of KFOR, and for U.S. forces in particular, after the “troika”—the European Union, Russia, and the United States—report to U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon later this month regarding Kosovo’s future status?
Answer. If confirmed, I will endeavor to support the Department’s position that, at least in the short-term, KFOR’s role should remain the same—to establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, providing assistance to the U.N. Mission in Kosovo and monitoring, verifying, and when necessary, enforcing compliance with the conditions related to the cessation of hostilities in 1999. I do not foresee KFOR taking on additional tasks normally performed by police forces or customs officials.

Now that the troika has reported to U.N. Secretary General Ban that the talks were not successful, the next step is for the International Community to decide whether the comprehensive settlement package put forward by U.N. Special Representative Ahtisaari should serve as a basis for a new political framework in Kosovo. If that decision is made, I would expect KFOR to continue its current mission through a transition period to a new supervisory regime.

**FUTURE OF NATO**

**Question.** What are the greatest opportunities and challenges that you foresee for NATO over the next 5 years?

Answer. NATO has the opportunity to complete its transformation from a static military alliance, focused on territorial defense, to an alliance that can deliver security wherever allies’ common security interests are threatened around the globe. As a part of this, NATO has the opportunity to professionalize, transform, and develop the forces of its new members. NATO also has the opportunity to enhance interoperability and NATO’s overall capabilities—through initiatives such as enhancing alliance strategic airlift, improving Alliance Special Operations Forces capabilities, and adapting the NATO Command Structure.

The primary and continuing challenge is to get allies to devote the resources needed to continue transforming their military forces to succeed in expeditionary operations such as Afghanistan. In that operation, generating the needed forces and capabilities has been difficult due to budget shortfalls and a shortage of capable and interoperable expeditionary forces.

**Question.** Do you support further enlargement of NATO within the next 5 years?

Answer. I believe that NATO’s door should be open to new members as long as they meet NATO’s performance-based standards. It is my belief that enlargement will promote a Europe free, whole, and at peace, and I support NATO’s efforts to prepare aspirants for the responsibilities and obligations of membership.

**Question.** What more can the United States do to encourage NATO member nations to spend more on defense, transform their militaries, acquire advanced capabilities, and enhance their interoperability with the United States and other NATO member nations?

Answer. The United States can help by demonstrating its political commitment to the alliance, working through NATO to address today’s complex global security challenges, and by making it clear to allies that we expect them to bear an equitable share of the burden of alliance security.

The United States must also lead by example, continuing to field expeditionary and state-of-the-art forces and capabilities, and employing them in a NATO context, so allied nations can see first-hand the benefits of military transformation and the requirements for allied interoperability.

**EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY**

**Question.** The European Union’s (EU) European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) reflects the EU’s intention to create a capability to conduct military operations in response to international crises in cases where “NATO as a whole is not engaged.” Concerns have been raised that the ESDP could compete with, rather than complement, the NATO alliance.

Do you believe that the United States and its European allies have taken sufficient steps to ensure that ESDP is implemented in a way that complements and strengthens NATO?

Answer. The administration supports ESDP on the understanding it would increase our allies’ and partners’ military capabilities, would conduct missions where NATO was not engaged, and would do so in a manner cooperative with NATO. The United States and most allies have worked hard to strengthen NATO–EU cooperation. Much has been accomplished, in policy consultations and on real-world missions like in Bosnia. Still, we expect continuing U.S. and allied efforts to maintain and bolster this cooperation. If confirmed, I will work with allies in consultation with Congress to ensure that the ESDP is implemented in a manner that ensures it complements, and does not duplicate or detract from, NATO.
ENGAGEMENT POLICY

Question. One of the central pillars of our recent national security strategy has been military engagement as a means of building relationships around the world. Military-to-military contacts, Joint Combined Exchange Training exercises, combatant commander exercises, and humanitarian de-mining operations, have been used to achieve this goal.

Do you believe that these activities contribute positively to U.S. national security?

Answer. Yes. The challenges we face today—defeating terrorist networks, defending the Homelands of ourselves and our allies, shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads, and preventing hostile states from acquiring or using weapons of mass destruction—cannot be accomplished by one country alone, no matter how powerful. Military engagement helps build the capacity of friendly and allied militaries, enabling them to contribute to our mutual security, including to the fight against terrorism. These activities also facilitate international cooperation and interoperability.

Question. If confirmed, would you support continued engagement activities of the U.S. military?

Answer. Yes, for the reasons noted above.

Question. What improvements, if any, would you suggest to the interagency process for implementing these authorities?

Answer. DOD works closely with the State Department to plan and implement security cooperation globally. As the Secretary of Defense said recently in his Landon Lecture series remarks at Kansas State University, new threats require our government to operate differently—to act with unity, agility, and creativity. As the Secretary stated, these new threats will require that we devote considerably more resources to America’s non-military instruments of power. I believe these instruments of power include regular military engagement.

RUSSIA

Question. U.S.-Russian relations have experienced increased tensions over the past several months, including as a result of Russian reactions to the U.S. proposal for a missile defense site in Europe.

What is your vision for U.S.-Russia relations in promoting security in Europe and globally?

Answer. If confirmed, I will seek constructive cooperation with Russia to promote European and global security—of course, while remaining true to our principles. We have a robust bilateral annual work plan with the Russians, consisting of over 100 planned events that are mainly focused on exchanges and developing interoperability. These include numerous exercises, both sea-based and on the ground. Moreover, we are engaged in discussions with Russia to try to find how we can cooperate in the area of missile defense to counter the growing ballistic missile threat, as well as to assuage Russian concerns about the proposed missile defense program. For example, over the last months, we have had numerous exchanges with the Russians on the “expert level” concerning the proposed missile defense sites, as well as high-level engagements, including by Secretary Gates, with Russian interlocutors.

At the same time, we must defend our interests and advance our values. The Cold War is long over and the United States and Russia are no longer strategic competitors, but we are concerned about the apparent “enemy image” many Russians have of the United States and NATO, their suspension of the CFE Treaty, their opposition to missile defense plans which are not a threat to their security, and Russian arms sales to countries of concern.

Question. Does support for ratification of the Adapted CFE remain in the interest of the United States and its NATO allies?

Answer. I believe that the CFE regime remains in our interest, and that if outstanding problems can be solved, the present Treaty can and should be replaced by the Adapted Treaty to reflect post-Cold war realities (for example, by eliminating the current Treaty’s bloc-to-bloc structure).

Question. What do you believe would be the impact of Russian suspension of the CFE Treaty on security in Europe?

Answer. The impact on security will depend on future Russian actions. Russian officials have said they will not be bound by CFE equipment limitations, but that they have no plans to build up their forces as long as other states do not do so.

The transparency provided by CFE notifications and inspections have contributed greatly to where we are today, including the increased confidence of the states in the region. It appears that those notifications and inspections will not occur during suspension and this may decrease the confidence among the states party to the treaty over time.
Question. Is it in the U.S. interest to engage with Russia to persuade them to adhere to their obligations under the CFE Treaty?
Answer. The CFE Treaty and other treaties have contributed greatly to where we are today—for example, by leading to reductions in over 69,000 items of military equipment and establishing current limits that contribute to stability in Europe. The Under Secretary for Policy and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for ISA has been fully engaged in support of efforts led by the Department of State Assistant Secretary Dan Fried and others in encouraging the Russians to reverse their decision to suspend. Indeed, we have participated in meetings and co-chaired exchanges with the Russians in an attempt to resolve Russian concerns related to the treaty. If confirmed, I will continue our activities to encourage Russia to reverse its decision on suspension and to engage with us to resolve outstanding problems.

Question. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) will expire in December 2009. In your view, what measures of this treaty should be extended or modified?
Answer. If confirmed, I would be responsible for the Department’s overall relationship with Russia. Specific issues related to strategic nuclear arms, however, fall under the responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SOLIC and Interdependent Capabilities, Mr. Vickers. That said, I recognize that START was invaluable in reducing strategic forces at the end of the Cold War and providing us with the security posture we now enjoy. The context of our strategic relationship with Russia has changed since the Cold War, however, and discussions on this and related issues should reflect the current security contexts in which we now find ourselves. While we are not allies with Russia, we do need to cooperate with it on a range of issues, including counter-WMD and counterterrorism. If confirmed, I will work closely with Assistant Secretary Vickers and the Department of State to further our national security interests, including in this area. It is my understanding that efforts are underway in the interagency to address this issue and that those efforts include limited dialogue with the Russians on post-START.

Question. Do you believe that the international arms control legal framework with Russia and other former Soviet states, including the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the START, and the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT), continue to promote security and stability in Europe and globally?
Answer. As I noted in my previous answer, I recognize that START was invaluable in reducing strategic forces at the end of the Cold War and providing us with the security posture we now enjoy. They also contributed significantly to the confidence of many of our allies. The context of our strategic relationship with Russia has changed since the Cold War, however, and discussions with the Russians should reflect the current security contexts in which we now find ourselves. While we are not allies with Russia, we do need to cooperate with it on a range of issues. If confirmed, I will continue the senior-level engagement, as well as the transparency and confidence building measures, for building trust with the Russians, as well as for providing insight and understanding of their concerns.

Question. In your view does continuing the presence of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe serve any national security purpose, and if so, what is that purpose?
Answer. Yes; the U.S. nuclear forces committed to NATO and based in Europe are one of the most tangible signs of our commitment to the indivisibility of security to all NATO nations, as well as to extended deterrence. In addition, they are a critical political and military link between the United States and its European allies. By maintaining our commitment to extended deterrence and sizing our force posture at the appropriate level, we support our allies and reduce the incentive for others to develop independent nuclear capabilities. Moreover, the weapons provide a very real capability to respond to aggression and, as such, serve as an important deterrent to such aggression.

Question. If these tactical nuclear weapons were to be removed from Europe, could there be any political or other benefits as a result?
Answer. Removal of those weapons would undermine a visible aspect of alliance solidarity and eliminate a capability that, by its very existence, helps reduce the incentive for others to develop independent nuclear capabilities, and helps deter emerging threats.

Question. In general, what are your views on continuing to maintain U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe? Is there a point in time or a set of circumstances at which or under which you would support removing these tactical nuclear weapons?
Answer. NATO’s nuclear forces are of critical political-military importance. These forces provide unique capabilities that cannot be met by conventional weapons; support the basic NATO precepts of shared risks and responsibilities and widespread participation; and strengthen the link between North American and European members of the alliance. It is my view, as well as that of the current administration and of the NATO alliance, that U.S. nuclear weapons should remain in Europe as tan-
gible evidence of our commitment to the indivisibility of security to all NATO nations.

Question. If confirmed, what responsibilities would you have with respect to non-proliferation programs, such as the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, in Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union and in making any decisions about where and when geographic expansion of the CTR programs should occur?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant Secretary for Global Security Affairs, who is responsible for the management of nonproliferation programs for the DOD, to ensure that policy decisions regarding the direction of CTR programs take into account regional and political-military implications.

AFRICOM COMMAND

Question. Full Operational Capability (FOC) for AFRICOM is scheduled for October 1, 2009, and there remains a significant amount of work to be completed, including standing up a staff, an adequate headquarters, and a forward deployed capability.

In your assessment, is the DOD moving too quickly to make fully operational a major geographic combatant command or is the current schedule manageable?

Answer. The timelines we have developed for AFRICOM's establishment as a fully operational unified command are aggressive; however, I believe we can achieve them through continued concerted efforts within the Department, with our interagency partners, and with the support of Congress. AFRICOM reached initial operational capacity this past October and is progressing steadily toward FOC in October 2008. Although FOC is a significant milestone, the command will continue to evolve and improve as we incorporate lessons learned and best practices. If confirmed, I will continue to dialogue with Congress in establishing the command.

Question. AFRICOM is contemplated as playing a larger role in development activities than have other combatant commands. On the African continent, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) currently has more than 20 bilateral field missions and three regional missions.

What is your understanding of the role AFRICOM will play in the area of development activities?

Answer. I fully recognize the unique role and significant capabilities of USAID as the primary U.S. agency providing development and disaster relief assistance abroad. AFRICOM will play a supporting role in development activities when necessary and appropriate. USAID staff within the command will help ensure that such responses when appropriate and necessary are well-planned, well-coordinated, and well-executed, to include their integration with other USAID efforts in the region.

Question. From a policy perspective, what do you believe to be the appropriate role of the DOD in delivering development and humanitarian services?

Answer. DOD, and therefore the command, plays a supporting role in delivering development and humanitarian services, as required. The U.S. military is not an instrument of first resort in providing humanitarian assistance but supports civilian relief agencies. I recognize that USAID is the principal agency extending assistance to countries recovering from disaster or authorized to receive development assistance.

U.S. MILITARY BASING IN EUROPE

Question. On August 16, 2004, the President announced an Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS) touted as the most comprehensive restructuring of U.S. military forces overseas since the end of the Korean War. As part of force transformation efforts which also included a domestic base realignment and closure round, hundreds of military bases and facilities at overseas locations would be closed and roughly 70,000 personnel would return from Europe and Asia to bases in the United States. Recently the Secretary of Defense has indicated that the number of U.S. military personnel to be returned from Europe may potentially be reduced, and some bases originally scheduled for closure might remain open for an unspecified period of time.

Do you support the goals of the IGPBS which would reduce the number of installations and the force posture of U.S. forces stationed overseas, specifically in Germany?

Answer. Yes. While I defer to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC and Interdependent Capabilities, if confirmed, I will support the decision supporting the current posture plan for Europe to transform Cold War legacy forces and bases into a more relevant and flexible network of capabilities for dealing with post-September 11 security challenges. It is my understanding that since the IGPBS was signed in 2004, for various reasons, General Craddock has requested that the Sec-
Secretary reconsider the number of forces that will remain in Germany, at least for the short term. If confirmed, I look forward to working closely with Congress on this issue.

Question. What is your understanding of the reasons for the Secretary of Defense to reassess the original goals of the IGPBS?

Answer. As stated above, the Department is considering retaining some force posture in theater longer than originally anticipated to address a number of issues, including the near-term security cooperation needs with European partners. This potential change may also help ensure the quality of life for soldiers and families as part of the Army's plans for stationing new "Grow the Force" units. If confirmed, I will work closely with Congress on this issue.

Question. In your assessment, does DOD need to propose to the President an update to the IGPBS strategy due to new trends or emerging threats?

Answer. The Department continually reassesses and refines its posture plans to address changes in the strategic environment.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Secretary of Defense?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

KOSOVO

1. Senator McCain. Ms. Long, it is expected that in the coming weeks Kosovo will declare its independence and that declaration will be supported by the United States and the European Union (EU). Serbia and Russia oppose a unilateral declaration of Kosovo independence creating the potential for instability and violence in that volatile region. Is the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) prepared for this situation and for the potential for increased violence in and around Kosovo?

Ms. Long. NATO's KFOR is prepared to deal with potential increased violence in Kosovo. Since mid-2006, KFOR has conducted a series of planning exercises and rehearsals to prepare for all likely contingencies. These planning sessions and exercises often include members of the local and United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo police, as well as representatives from the many international and non-governmental organizations operating in Kosovo. KFOR has also increased its operational tempo, visible presence, and intelligence gathering activities.

Through the Joint Implementation Commission, KFOR maintains contact with the Armed Forces of Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, and Macedonia to ensure transparency and reduce tension.

Over the past few years, NATO has succeeded in removing nearly all caveats that troop contributing nations have placed on the use of their forces. The KFOR commander now has the authority to move his forces anywhere they are needed. KFOR routinely moves units from their habitual sectors to other parts of Kosovo to familiarize them with the terrain and local situation.

The KFOR commander can also call on a series of local and over the horizon Reserve Forces. These units rehearse deploying to Kosovo and operating throughout
Although KFOR is only authorized to operate in Kosovo, NATO maintains small headquarters in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia, and Belgrade. If necessary, NATO can deploy its over the horizon Reserves to Bosnia-Herzegovina to reinforce the EU's peacekeeping force.

2. Senator McCain. Ms. Long, what do you foresee as the worst case scenario for which KFOR must be prepared?

Ms. Long. Since Serbia’s President, Foreign and Defense Ministers, and Chief of General Staff have stated that Belgrade will not intervene in Kosovo militarily, the worst case scenario for which KFOR must be prepared is a Kosovar Serb rejection of Pristina’s declaration of independence. Serbs comprise the vast majority of people living in northern Kosovo—an area that shares a contiguous border with Serbia. A declaration and recognition of independence could spark inter-ethnic violence, cause Kosovar Serbs living in southern Kosovo to leave their homes, and cause northern Serbs to challenge KFOR’s authority. A Kosovar Serb rejection of independence could also result in a de facto partition. NATO and the international community have developed contingency plans for this and other scenarios.

If the leadership in Belgrade does decide to intervene militarily in Kosovo, NATO has the authority under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244 and a 1999 North Atlantic Council decision to engage in combat operations.

3. Senator McCain. Ms. Long, what steps are being taken diplomatically to lessen the possibility that serious and sustained violence will result?

Ms. Long. We and our State Department colleagues have been working closely with allies, countries in the region, NATO, the EU, the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, and other international organizations to lessen the probability that sustained and serious violence will occur in Kosovo.

We worked diligently to develop and solidify international consensus to resolve Kosovo’s political status and asked Ambassador Frank Wisner to represent the United States during the recent EU/Russia/U.S. Troika discussion.

We support the EU’s decision to plan for an International Civilian Office and deploy a police and justice mission and we have asked nations that provide troops to KFOR to keep their forces in Kosovo regardless of the outcome of the status process.

Finally, we maintain constant contact with officials in Belgrade and Pristina to reinforce our expectation that those countries refrain from provocative acts and actively discourage violence of any kind. The EU and other partners have taken similar action. We have also conveyed our expectations to all the relevant communities in Serbia and Kosovo and seek to keep open lines of communication with them.

AFRICA COMMAND

4. Senator McCain. Ms. Long, establishment of the new U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) continues to be a work in progress as both the structure of the organization and its mission are continually being refined. Recent briefings to committee staff have suggested that together, the military services could provide up to 1,000 personnel to the AFRICOM headquarters staff. Where would this large number of service personnel dedicated to AFRICOM be stationed?

Ms. Long. The headquarters for AFRICOM is currently at Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany. This will be the interim location while the headquarters staff is assembled and refined during a multi-year process. The Kelley Barracks site makes use of existing facilities that have housed U.S. military administrative offices and headquarters staff for over 60 years. This location is a few kilometers from the U.S. European Command at Patch Barracks, Vaihingen, Germany. This allows for specialists and administrative staff to closely coordinate during the transition.

Possible locations for future AFRICOM presence are still under discussion. We believe AFRICOM will be more effective if some members of the headquarters staff are physically living and working on the African continent. This will allow them to continuously interact face-to-face with their counterparts in African governments and with nongovernmental organizations. Site-selection criteria for future AFRICOM sites have been developed in coordination with the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Some of the criteria include political stability, security, access to regional and intercontinental transportation, and availability of acceptable infrastructure. Other criteria also under consideration include quality of life, proximity to the African Union and regional organizations, proximity to U.S. Government hubs, and adequate Status of Forces Agreements. We have also discussed possible sites with potential host governments and
a decision will be made in close coordination with State, USAID, embassies, Congress, and host governments.

5. Senator McCain. Ms. Long, what exactly would they be charged with doing?
Ms. Long. AFRICOM is a unified combatant command that has geographic responsibilities for all U.S. military functions and activities for the continent of Africa. Its focus will be on prevention, presence, and preparation, instead of reaction and response. Day-to-day tasks will include planning for and conducting security assistance, building partnership capacities, encouraging security sector reform, and enhancing the professionalism of African militaries.

As with all combatant commands, AFRICOM will also be responsible for the functions of command over assigned military forces. These functions include organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations. Other functions include conducting joint training and providing the logistics necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Command authority will be exercised through subordinate military organizations, normally through Joint Force Commanders and Service component commanders.

The guiding principle for AFRICOM’s headquarters staff will be to ensure close coordination of its activities with other U.S. Government departments and agencies and as appropriate with foreign governmental, international, non-governmental, private, and nonprofit organizations. The purpose will be to enhance and synchronize security assistance activities in Africa as much as possible. To enable this coordination, AFRICOM will have an integrated staff of permanently assigned DOD (military and civilian) and non-DOD U.S. Government personnel from organizations such as the State Department and the USAID. In addition, we hope to include liaison officers and staff from foreign military and other non-U.S. civilian organizations in the AFRICOM headquarters, with corresponding AFRICOM liaison personnel assigned duty at selected external organizations.

6. Senator McCain. Ms. Long, considering that this command will not have dedicated military forces assigned to it, do you think the headquarters staff currently envisaged is larger than needed for a command whose focus is more on theater engagement than on military operations?
Ms. Long. The size of the headquarters staff was developed based on an analytic process that links assigned missions and requirements to necessary functions and tasks. Personnel requirements, descriptions, and skills were then developed to appropriately perform these functions.

Unlike traditional unified combatant commands, AFRICOM will focus principally on war prevention rather than warfighting. However, as a regional combatant command, it is possible that AFRICOM could be assigned command military forces to conduct military operations to deter aggression and respond to crises. Therefore, the size of the headquarters staff has been designed to appropriately perform both prevention and response functions.

[The nomination reference of Mary Beth Long follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

As In Executive Session,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
Mary Beth Long, of Virginia, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense, vice Peter W. Rodman, resigned.

[The biographical sketch of Mary Beth Long, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MARY BETH LONG

CURRENT ASSIGNMENTS

Mary Beth Long became Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in August 2005. In this capacity, she serves as the principal assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA), who is the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense on the formulation and coordination of international security strategy and policy for the Middle East and Persian Gulf; Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; and Africa. Since March 2007, Ms. Long has represented ISA in the Assistant Secretary’s absence.

Prior to her current position, Ms. Long was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics on May 19, 2004. She oversaw the Department’s counternarcotics efforts in the United States and abroad. In addition to developing the Department’s counternarcotics policy worldwide, including for Afghanistan and Colombia, Ms. Long managed over 100 programs supporting domestic and international law enforcement, and oversaw funds in excess of $900 million.

PAST EXPERIENCES

Ms. Long worked for the Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Operations, from 1986 to 1999. Her CIA experience includes operations targeting narcotics, WMD, and terrorism targets. From May to September 1996, she served as Deputy and Acting Chief for the Haiti Task Force. She was co-chair of a joint priority CIA–DEA counternarcotics targeting team. She has worked extensively with the DEA and FBI. While at the CIA, Ms. Long also worked extensively with the State Department and served separately as an Embassy Principal Money Laundering Officer and an Embassy representative to multilateral negotiations on weapons issues. During her time at the Agency, Ms. Long successfully completed the Clandestine Operations in Dangerous Areas (CODA) course and paramilitary training. She received several CIA awards, including some for her work in covert action. From 1999 until May 2004, Ms. Long practiced law with Williams & Connolly LLP, where she specialized in civil litigation matters.

EDUCATION

Ms. Long is a graduate (cum laude) of Washington and Lee University School of Law and a University Scholar and Honors Graduate from the Pennsylvania State University (cum laude), where she received a Bachelor of Arts in Communications Studies. Ms. Long also attended the Taiwan National University and the Fu Ren Catholic University (Taiwan). She is fluent in Spanish and has some familiarity with Chinese and Arabic.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Mary Beth Long in connection with his nomination follows:]
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
Mary Beth Long.

2. Position to which nominated:
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

3. Date of nomination:
November 9, 2007.

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
[Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. Date and place of birth:
August 20, 1963; Clearfield, PA.

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)

7. Names and ages of children:
None.

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
Taiwan National University (1983).
Fu Ren Catholic University, Taiwan (1983).

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
Department of Defense, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (2005–current), Pentagon.
Department of Defense, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counter-narcotics (2004–2005), Pentagon.
Williams & Connolly LLP, associate lawyer (1999–2004), Washington, DC.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.
None.

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
Penn State University Schreyer Honors College, External Board Member.
12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.

- American Bar Association, member.
- Virginia Bar Association, inactive member.
- Penn State University Schreyer Honors College, External Board Member.
- Phi Beta Kappa, member.
- Omicron Delta Kappa, member.
- Save the Bay, member.
- Penn State Alumni Association, member.
- Washington and Lee School of Law Alumni, member.
- Republican Party National Membership Association, member.

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.

None.

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.

None.

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

- Friends of the Eighth District (date: 2003) $250 (funds returned).

14. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.

**Academic or associated with schools:**

- University Scholars Program, Honors Graduate, Penn State (1985), cum laude.
- Phi Beta Kappa (1986–current) (leadership/academic achievement).
- Best Oral Advocate, Moot Court (1997).
- Golden Key Honor Society (1980).

**Professional:**


15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.

None.

16. **Speeches:** Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

The nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee's executive files.

17. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee's executive files.]

**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

**Mary Beth Long.**
1236

This 19th day of November, 2007.

[The nomination of Mary Beth Long was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on December 18, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 19, 2007.]

[Prepared questions submitted to James Shinn by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

Question. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the Services and the combatant commanders, among other things, in joint training and education and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Answer. I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

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Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

Answer. I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Question. If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

Answer. I do not see any need to modify the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

DUTIES

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs (ASD/APSA)?

Answer. It is my understanding that the ASD/APSA, a newly created position in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), is the civilian advisor to the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on national security matters in the Asian and Pacific region. The ASD/APSA is responsible for developing regional security and defense strategy; formulating and coordinating regional defense policies in support of the Secretary’s objectives; overseeing operational execution of the Secretary’s approved policies for the region; and fostering bilateral and multilateral security relationships in the region. The ASD/APSA is the focal point for Asia policy within the Department of Defense (DOD) for the DOD components, the United States Pacific Command, United States Central Command, and for the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. The ASD/APSA represents the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) in interagency policy deliberations and international negotiations related to the Asian and Pacific region.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

Answer. I believe that I am qualified to perform these duties, if confirmed, by a combination of regional expertise, management training, and experience in several U.S. Government agencies.

In terms of regional expertise, I have spent a good deal of my adult life working on Asia problems, as a businessman, as a scholar, and as a U.S. Government official. I have worked or traveled in every country in the area of responsibility (AOR) (with a few notable exceptions such as North Korea) and lived in the region for about 7 years. As a business executive, I set up and subsequently helped manage subsidiary corporations in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and India. As a scholar I wrote several publications and books on the region, which in retrospect have pretty well stood the test of time.

In terms of management skills, I am a professional manager by trade, with a good track record of setting goals and achieving results. I have built and managed organizations ranging from 30 to 3,000 employees, with both line and staff experience on the enterprise level, in various positions with prime responsibility for production operations, research and development, sales and marketing, finance and audit, and corporate governance.

In terms of government experience, I have worked in the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the DOD—principally on Asian security and economic problems, and closely involved in the interagency policy process.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the ASD/APSA?

Answer. Given the breadth of the responsibilities of this position and the complexity of the region, I have a great deal to learn. If confirmed, I intend to focus on three areas in particular: a better understanding of the title 10 authorities applicable to the DOD and the military departments, how the DOD trains and equips forces for use in the region, especially with regard to the force and base realignments in Asia; a better grasp of how decisions are made and operationally executed for force allocation and deployment in the region generally, and for Afghanistan in particular; more insight on congressional process, policy concerns, and preferences in Asia, especially for budget formulation and conditionality on security cooperation in the region.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the ASD(APSA) to the following officials:

- The Secretary of Defense;
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense;
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;
- The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence;
- The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
- The Secretaries of the Military Departments;
- The Chiefs of Staff of the Services;
- The Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command;
- The Commander, U.S. Pacific Command;
- The Commander, U.S. Central Command;
- The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy;
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities;
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs;
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs;
- The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs.

Answer. If confirmed, I will report to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense through the USD(P). I will work closely with the Principal Deputy USD(P). I expect to develop and maintain a close working relationship with under secretaries and assistant secretaries across the Department, the General Counsel of the DOD, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and with combatant commanders. As appropriate, if confirmed, I would also work closely with and coordinate with the other Assistant Secretaries of Defense within OSD Policy; a lot of policy challenges in Asia involve resources and expertise that are distributed across the functional portfolios of OSD. Examples of this coordination include working with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs on the role of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Afghanistan; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities on counterterrorism and Pakistan; the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas Security Affairs on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts in Asia; and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs on counternarcotics, nuclear, and security assistance matters.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the next ASD/APSA?

Answer. I believe there are six major challenges in Asia and the Pacific that the next ASD(APSA) will face. First, in Afghanistan, the Afghan Government needs support to counter and defeat the insurgency. Second, North Korea’s conventional military threat, weapons of mass destruction, and proliferation activities are a threat to regional security. Third, China’s military buildup may be tipping the stability balance in the Taiwan Strait and poses an unknown risk to the region at large. Fourth, there are a lot of challenges that could slow down or derail the alliance transformation and strengthening of our important security alliances with Japan and South Korea. Fifth, a conventional or even nuclear confrontation between Pakistan and India would be a disaster. Finally, in Southeast Asia we face challenges in sustaining defense reforms and democratic consolidation, as well as maintaining effective counterterrorism cooperation.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?
Answer. Strategies for dealing with these challenges are largely in place at the
Pentagon, among the U.S. interagency, and in agreements with our partners in the
region. If confirmed, I see the challenge as principally one of careful, sustained exe-
cution of these strategies rather than devising new initiatives. In Afghanistan, my
principal focus would be on supporting coalition efforts to train and equip Afghan
security forces, as well as integrate both the military and governance elements of
the counterinsurgency. This also includes working with Pakistan to eliminate
safehavens in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Regarding North
Korea, I would work with the Department of State and regional partners to press
North Korea to meet its commitments—including denuclearization—as agreed to
during the Six-Party Talks, while maintaining the capability to deter potential
North Korea military threats and countering proliferation activities. With regard to
China, the strategy is one of careful, measured military engagement with the Gov-
ernment of China and the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA), pressing for transparency
while also sustaining our military capabilities to fulfill our defense commitments in
the region. In order to sustain the realignment and transformation processes al-
ready underway, we need to review progress constantly and resolve challenges in
the bilateral relations with both Tokyo and Seoul: these are complex, multi-stage
projects that require sustained political and budgetary support on both sides of the
Pacific. In South Asia, I would work with the Department of State to promote con-
fidence building measures between India and Pakistan while continuing to develop
our bilateral security relations with both nations. Finally, in Southeast Asia I would
sustain and expand our relations with regional militaries (Burma notably not in-
cluded) to promote regional security, defense reforms, and respect for human rights.

GLOBAL DEFENSE POSTURE REVIEW

Question. Perhaps more than in any other combatant command, military exigen-
cies in the U.S. Pacific Command are subject to the "tyranny of distance" in getting
forces to points of conflict.

In your view, how important is the forward basing strategy to the ability of U.S.
Pacific Command to execute its operational contingencies, and did the Global Pos-
ture Review appropriately take this into account?

Answer. Forward basing remains a key element of United States security strategy
in the Pacific. This was borne out in the Department of Defense comprehensive re-
view of U.S. global defense posture from 2003–04, which took into account the con-
tingency and steady-state needs of our forces regionally and globally. This review
examined operational needs within and across the theater, and emphasized trans-
forming our host-nation relationships, as well as changing the footprint of facilities
and forces in the region to deal with future security challenges more effectively.

Question. What do you see as the implications of the proposed global force struc-
ture changes with respect to the Asia-Pacific, particularly in Korea and Japan?

Answer. I believe our posture changes in Korea and Japan are strengthening our
alliances and better positioning U.S. forces. By relocating U.S. personnel, we will
remove longstanding host-nation concerns such as noise and encroachment without
compromising their missions. We will also improve and enhance our mutual defense
infrastructure in the region, incorporating and executing several large investment
projects from the governments of South Korea and Japan.

Question. What impact, if any, do you expect the proposed changes in posture will
have on our ability to defend South Korea and Japan, and to react to a crisis in
the Taiwan Strait?

Answer. These posture changes increase our flexibility to respond when and
where U.S. forces are needed, and strengthen our overall capacity to deter coercive
and aggressive action in the Asia-Pacific region.

Planned posture changes in the region will strengthen deterrent and strike capa-
bilities (i.e., U.S. maritime, air, and deployable ground forces) forward in the Pacific
as well as strategic mobility and command and control (C2) support from the United
States—all of which are relevant to supporting our allied commitments for self-de-
fense in contingencies. The United States has global responsibilities, and the
changes to our force posture are a reflection of these responsibilities. These posture
changes are not directed against a particular country or contingency. Rather, we be-
lieve that by being clear about our interests and supporting our allies and partners,
conflict can be avoided.

Question. The Army is planning to add 65,000 personnel to its permanent force
structure over the course of the Future Years Defense Program, including the cre-
ation of six additional Active-Duty combat brigades. The Marine Corps is proposing
to add 27,000 personnel over the same period.
Do you believe that any of these additional personnel and units should be assigned to commands located in Pacific Command's AOR in order to meet Pacific Command's requirements?

Answer. The proposals to expand the Army and Marine Corps would allow us to reexamine our basing options and ensure that we have the optimum mix of forces to execute the National Military Strategy and its Asian components. If confirmed, I would work closely with the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command and others in the Department of Defense to determine if and where additional forward deployed forces in Asia might make sense. Before I would provide my recommendation to Department of Defense leadership, we would also want to consult closely with our allies and regional partners, given the complexity of the existing alliance agreements and the challenging roadmap for long-term execution of the realignment plans.

Question. If so, to what extent do you believe these additional forces should be forward-deployed, as in Korea or Japan, or deployed in the United States, such as Hawaii or Alaska?

Answer. If confirmed, I would need to review specific proposals before making a recommendation. In general, I believe that these deployment decisions should be driven principally by the evolving and potential threats in Asia, as well as by the Department of Defense contingency plans and their training requirements. Currently, I believe that U.S. force levels in Korea and Japan—as agreed to under our ongoing alliance transformation discussions—represent an appropriate posture for U.S. defense needs. Going forward, we should continually evaluate other options—including stationing those forces elsewhere in the world, or in the United States and its territories.

NORTH KOREA

Question. North Korea represents one of the greatest near-term threats to U.S. national security interests in Asia.

What is your assessment of the current security situation on the Korean peninsula and the diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea to verifiably dismantle its nuclear weapons program?

Answer. Even as the North and South negotiate with each other to reduce tensions, the DMZ remains heavily fortified, and two of the world's largest conventional military forces face each other across that line. The United States also has 28,000 troops on the Peninsula and is committed to the defense of the South in case of an attack by the North.

The Department of State is the lead on the Six-Party Talks mechanism, and it appears that some progress has been made. The proof is in the implementation, however; and the next major milestone is North Korea's full declaration of all its nuclear facilities, materials, and programs by the end of this year.

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed to the United States and its allies by North Korea's ballistic missile and WMD capabilities and the export of those capabilities?

Answer. North Korea is a serious threat to the United States and to the rest of Asia. The North's missile capabilities allow it to strike all of its neighbors and the United States. North Korea exports missiles to the rest of the world. North Korea now has a demonstrated nuclear capability and has made veiled threats of proliferating nuclear capabilities.

Question. Do you believe that Kim Jong Il would be willing to give up North Korea's nuclear weapons and facilities? If so, under what conditions?

Answer. I do not know whether, or if so under what conditions, Kim Jong Il and the North Koreans would be willing to give up their nuclear weapons, programs, and facilities.

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH KOREA (ROK)

Question. Since the end of World War II, the U.S.-ROK alliance has been a key pillar of security in the Asia Pacific region. This relationship is currently undergoing significant change.

Please describe the state of the current U.S. security relationship with South Korea.

Answer. Our alliance is over a half-century old and it remains strong, reflecting the common values and aspirations of our peoples. The North Korean nuclear and conventional threat remains the focal point of our alliance's deterrent and defense posture. I believe the Republic of Korea's troop deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan have made significant contributions to the global war against terrorism. Korea has also made peacekeeping contributions to the U.N. Mission in Lebanon. South Ko-
rea's commitment to reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan reflects our shared concern for freedom in other parts of the world.

**Question.** If confirmed, what measures, if any, would you take to improve the U.S.-South Korean security relationship?

**Answer.** First, we must complete the realignment of U.S. forces on the peninsula. Execution of this complex task will alleviate much of the friction between U.S. forces and Korean citizens, while still providing the necessary levels of deterrence and defense readiness and posture. Our Korean partner is committed to this task and is on track so far. Second, we must complete the historic transition of operational command in 2012, when Republic of Korea Forces will assume the lead role in the defense of their nation, backed up fully by the supporting role of United States forces. The ROK Armed Forces and USFK are engaged in the complex investments of equipment, training, and facilities to prepare for this transition; so far, this process too is on track. Third, we must continue to assess the mutual benefits of this alliance and explain those benefits (and their costs) to our publics on both sides of the alliance.

**Question.** Do you support expanding the number of personnel assigned to Korea for 2 or 3 years of duty and the number of military and civilian personnel authorized to be accompanied by their dependents for these longer tours of duty?

**Answer.** General Bell, the Commander of the U.S. Forces in Korea, has explained the merits of this proposal, and as far as I understand, it is consistent with the policy goals of the force realignment and our alliance with the Republic of Korea. Having said that, I believe the Department of Defense will also need to study the proposal to ensure that we have adequate resources to support the expansion.

**JAPAN**

**Question.** How would you characterize the U.S. security relationship with Japan?

**Answer.** Japan is a valued ally and anchor of democracy and prosperity in Asia. Our alliance has held fast through the turbulence of the post-Cold War, political turnover in Japan, and some contentious trade disputes. The United States and Japan are in the middle of a complicated force transformation process that requires a lot of effort, money, and time. That process is still on track. On the other hand, Japan has been slow in expanding the role and missions of its Self-Defense Force. We have also had problems with the proper handling of classified information in Japan and are working together to prevent this in the future. If confirmed, I would work to keep the transformation process on track and seek to expand our cooperation in additional areas of mutual concern, such as missile defense.

**Question.** What is your view of Japan's current level of contribution to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)?

**Answer.** Japan is wresting with a fundamental re-evaluation of how to use its very capable self defense forces in international security missions. The overall trend has been forward, but slow. However, the decision to suspend support to OEF was a backward step, and a disappointment to members of the coalition and to many in Japan itself. Japan’s refueling efforts in the Indian Ocean and Japanese participation in OEF were important both to the war on terror and to demonstrate Japan’s contributions to the region’s future. Security and reconstruction operations are continuing, and we are working to mitigate the loss of Japan’s refueling support. In terms of Japan’s support for Iraq, Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Forces served in Iraq from February 2004 to July 2006. Its Air Self-Defense Forces continue to provide C–130 airlift support. Japan has also been a major financial contributor in support of efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.

**Question.** If confirmed, what if anything, would you do to encourage greater Japanese participation in these operations?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would urge the Japanese government to implement a new legal basis for continued participation in OEF that is consistent with the needs of the coalition.

**Question.** What steps, if any, do you believe Japan ought to take to become a more active partner in security activities with the United States and in the international security arena?

**Answer.** The security environment in Asia is changing and we need a more capable alliance with Japan to deal with those challenges, with greater interoperability between our Armed Forces at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. If confirmed, I would work to encourage Japan’s increasing contributions to the alliance, both regionally and globally. Cooperation should range from missile defense to increased joint training opportunities—in Guam for example.
Question. In the interest of increased security cooperation among Asian democracies, what steps, if any, should Japan take to address outstanding grievances with its neighbors?

Answer. I believe it is important for Japan to cultivate constructive relations with all of its neighbors. By moving forward, Japan and other East Asian nations can increase their security cooperation. By working with other U.S. allies and friends in the region, Japan can increase its contribution to peace, security, and prosperity throughout Asia and globally.

CHINA—RELATIONSHIP

Question. Many observers believe that one of the key national security challenges of this century is how to manage China’s emergence as a major regional and global economic and military power. How would you characterize the U.S. relationship with China?

Answer. I would characterize the U.S.-China security relationship as complex, with some elements of cooperation and others of potential competition. The military aspect of the relationship is embedded within an even more complex set of political and economic relationships between Washington and Beijing, and fundamentally colors our security relationships with Japan, South Korea, the Southeast Asian nations, and Taiwan. Our task at the Department of Defense is to expand the cooperative aspects of the military relationship where it builds confidence and avoids misunderstandings, while also preparing to deter or counter points of security competition.

Question. What is your assessment of the current state of U.S.-China military-to-military relations, and do you favor increased military-to-military contacts with China?

Answer. I would assess current U.S.-China military-to-military relations as generally positive, with some signs of progress, sometimes lacking in transparency, and marred by incidents such as the ASAT shot in January 2007, the broaching of a Song-class submarine near the U.S.S. Kitty Hawk in October 2006, and the Kitty Hawk port denial in November 2007. I understand and support the statutory limitations on U.S.-China military exchanges provided for in section 1201 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.

Question. How do you assess the current cross-Strait relationship, and how can we help to prevent miscalculation by either side?

Answer. I assess the current cross-Strait relationship between China and Taiwan as tense but relatively stable. In order to help prevent miscalculation by either side, I support U.S. policy of being committed to a peaceful resolution of the China-Taiwan problem in a manner acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. I support the President’s stated policy of one China, based upon the three communiques and the Taiwan Relations Act. If confirmed, I would oppose any unilateral acts by China or Taiwan to change the status quo, as we define it.

From a defense perspective, I believe the best way to prevent miscalculation by either side is to remain firm in our commitments to Taiwan, while maintaining a candid, constructive relationship with the PRC. A strong Taiwan is more capable of engaging in political dialogue with the PRC and resisting coercion.

Question. China recently denied permission to U.S. military ships for port visits to Hong Kong and for U.S. vessels to take refuge in Chinese ports or waters during inclement weather. What is your view of the causes of these Chinese denials, and what, if anything, can be done to ensure that this does not happen in the future?

Answer. We raised our concerns with the Chinese, and have not received a coherent official explanation, as far as I know. This was an unfortunate decision by China and ran counter to well-established norms of maritime behavior.

Better communications with the Government of China and with the PLA, such as by implementing the long-delayed direct Defense Telephone Link, and more substantive bilateral exchanges—especially under the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement—may help to avoid such problems in the future, but they certainly cannot ensure they don’t happen again.

Question. On April 1, 2001, a Chinese jet collided in mid-air with a U.S. Navy EP-3 aircraft endangering the U.S. personnel and resulting in the death of the Chinese pilot. Describe the steps that have been taken to prevent incidents of this nature in the future. What additional efforts, if any, do you believe may be necessary?

Answer. During the most recent round of U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement talks, both sides agreed to conduct a joint maritime search and rescue exercise, which was completed in November 2006. The value of this type of ex-
change is that it creates a forum in which each side can gain a better understanding of how the other would respond in the event of a disaster at sea. These types of events can also help to improve the safety of sailors and airmen operating in close proximity to each other by promoting within the Chinese armed forces patterns of behavior that favor safety and adherence to international norms.

**Question.** In your view, is there the potential for similar dangerous incidents with China to occur at sea or elsewhere?

**Answer.** This could happen again. Aggressive navigational practices by Chinese vessels and aircraft cause concern for the safety of air and maritime forces operating in proximity of each other. If confirmed, I would continue efforts already underway to send a clear and consistent message to China that such aggressive practices are dangerous and that China should respect the freedoms and rights guaranteed to all states under international law for the use of sea and airspace.

**Question.** If confirmed, what policy direction, if any, would you recommend to the Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command to prevent such incidents?

**Answer.** It is essential that all Department of Defense components, including U.S. Pacific Command, continue to conduct crisis management training to ensure communication and coordination mechanisms are in place. We will continue to use the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement to stress the importance of maritime safety with China. We have also engaged in what I call “fire drill” training in OSD in order to better cope with such an EP–3 type incident should it occur again.

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**CHINA—MILITARY MODERNIZATION**

**Question.** China’s economy is growing by as much as 10 percent per year, and China is using that economic growth to fund a substantial military modernization. In your view, what is China’s intent in pursuing such a rapid military modernization?

**Answer.** I am deeply concerned about China’s military buildup—I prefer “build-up” to the term “modernization.” China’s publicly announced defense budgets continue to grow at rates that exceed growth of the overall economy, reaching over $46 billion in 2007. Actual expenditures in 2007 could be as much as $85 billion to $125 billion. China continues to invest heavily in strategic weapons, power projection, area denial, and asymmetric warfare. China appears focused in the near-term on generating capabilities for potential Taiwan contingencies, including those that would involve U.S. intervention. Over the long-term, China’s military buildup suggests it is building capabilities to deal with a broader variety of contingencies in the region. We have very limited insight into China’s intent behind this build-up of capability.

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**CHINA—ANTI-SATELLITE TEST**

**Question.** On January 11, 2007, China used a ground-based missile to hit and destroy one of its weather satellites in an anti-satellite test creating considerable space debris and raising serious concerns in the international community. What is your view of China’s purpose in conducting this test?

**Answer.** We do not know what China’s purpose was in conducting this test. In the absence of explanations by the PLA or the Government of China, we must view the January 2007 ASAT test in the context of China’s broader military build-up, which includes enhanced capabilities for anti-access and area denial. This could be part of a strategy to develop a full range of ASAT capabilities, including ground-based lasers and jammers.

**Question.** What do you see as the implications of this test for the U.S. military, for U.S. national security, and for U.S. interests in space?

**Answer.** If deployed, China’s direct-ascent ASAT could hold U.S. satellites in low earth orbit at risk and eventually satellites in higher orbits, including the Global Positioning System and other warning systems. The test was inconsistent with the spirit of cooperation in space exploration and raises concerns about the credibility of China’s declaratory statements against the weaponization of space. The United States reserves the right to defend and protect its space systems. A broad range of diplomatic and military options are required to meet the challenges posed by China’s counterspace capabilities—including its ASAT systems.

**Question.** What are your views regarding the potential weaponization of space?

**Answer.** I support U.S. longstanding national policies of supporting the right of all nations to use outer space for peaceful purposes, the right of free passage through space, and the right to prevent those that would do us harm from using space for hostile purposes.
U.S.-CHINA PROPOSED DIALOGUE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Question. A delegation led by USD(P) Edelman proposed in recent talks with officers of China’s People’s Liberation Army to begin a “dialogue” on nuclear weapons and strategy. According to Pentagon spokesmen, the Department has not defined the exact scope or desired objectives of such a dialogue.

Do you believe such a dialogue can be carried out in a manner consistent with the requirements of section 1201 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, which prohibits any military-to-military exchange or contact with representatives of the People’s Liberation Army of the People’s Republic of China in 12 specific areas including, specifically, nuclear operations?

Answer. I believe that such a dialogue, if appropriately constructed and effectively managed, can—and must—remain within the statutory limitations on U.S.-China military-to-military exchanges, as provided for in section 1201 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.

TAIWAN

Question. What are the priorities, in your view, for U.S. military assistance to Taiwan?

Answer. I believe priority areas include: hardening of critical infrastructure; ensuring increased munitions are available to counter the threat; and an advanced integrated air and missile defense. The United States and Taiwan will continue to work together to review defensive needs considering the current and projected PRC threat.

Question. What is your view of the relationship between the type of assistance we offer Taiwan and regional stability?

Answer. The United States is closely monitoring the shifting balance in the Taiwan Strait and Taiwan’s defense needs, and we are well aware of the increasing capability of the PRC military. Regional stability depends on a strong Taiwan. Taiwan must be able to deter PRC coercion, and the best deterrent available to Taiwan is a strong defensive military.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Question. What is your view of the current state of U.S.-Philippines military-to-military relations?

Answer. The Philippines is one of the United States’ five treaty allies in East Asia and is a committed bilateral and regional partner in combating terrorism. Our alliance remains strong and the Philippines remains crucial to the United States and to regional stability in general. I believe our top two priorities with the Philippines are counterterrorism cooperation and defense reform.

Question. What is your view of the effectiveness of the Special Operation Forces assistance being provided to the Philippines military in its fight against terrorist groups?

Answer. The Philippines faces terrorist threats from Abu Sayaf Group, Jemaah Islamiyah, and the Communist New People’s Army. The Joint Special Operations Task Force is working effectively by, through, and with the armed forces of the Philippines to provide assistance in an indirect manner that is consistent with Philippine constitutional restrictions on foreign forces.

Question. What policy guidelines, if any, would you establish, if confirmed, to ensure that U.S. personnel do not become involved in combat in the Republic of the Philippines?

Answer. The established current policy guidelines are clear: the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement guide our bilateral policy with the Republic of Philippines. The Philippine constitution prevents foreign forces from conducting combat operations in the Philippines.

INDONESIA

Question. Indonesia is a key Asian power, and is the largest Muslim country in the world. Consequently, it is important to build on opportunities to improve and expand U.S. relations with Indonesia where possible.

What is your understanding of the extent to which the Indonesian Government is cooperating with the United States in the global war on terrorism?

Answer. Although I would defer to Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy and Interdependent Capabilities on this question, I believe that the Government of Indonesia has cooperated closely and effectively with the United States and our allies in tracking and combating global terrorist networks in the region, particularly against the Jema’a Islamiyah wing of the jihadi threat.
**Question.** Is it your understanding that the Indonesian Government is cooperating in the investigation into the murder of two American school teachers and one Indonesian school teacher in an ambush in Papua in August 2002?

**Answer.** Yes. Secretary of State Rice reported to Congress in February 2005 that the Indonesian Government and Armed Forces were cooperating with the FBI’s investigation into the Timika murders. In 2006, suspects in the case turned themselves in to the FBI and were subsequently put on trial in Indonesia. The defendants were found guilty of the murders in November 2006, and the lead defendant was sentenced to death.

**Question.** What is your view of the current state of military-to-military contacts with Indonesia?

**Answer.** Current military-to-military contacts with Indonesia are positive and expanding. If confirmed, I would work for the continued normalization of our defense relationship with Indonesia. I believe that enhanced military contacts with the Indonesian military can help cement the recent progress we have seen on human rights, particularly in conflict areas such as Aceh and Papua, maritime security, and military reforms. I also appreciate Indonesia’s contribution to peacekeeping operations—indeed an important contribution. Going forward, I would like to see our military-to-military contacts with Indonesia deepen through a series of regular, predictable exercises and engagements.

**Question.** Do you favor increased U.S.-Indonesian military-to-military contacts? If so, under what conditions? Why?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would support increased military-to-military contacts, in close consultation with Congress and the Department of State.

**Question.** What is your view of the commitment of the Indonesian military leadership to professionalization of its armed forces, adhering to human rights standards, improving military justice, and cooperating with law enforcement efforts to investigate and prosecute those military personnel accused of human rights abuses?

**Answer.** The pace of military reform remains slow but steady. Some of the “less difficult” reforms—separation of the police from the military, eliminating formal political roles for the TNI, increasing accountability, and human rights training—have already taken place. The orderly TNI withdrawal from Aceh and progress on the planned divestiture of TNI businesses by the end of 2007 are evidence of ongoing reform. The 2002 Defense Law and the 2004 TNI Law formally codified the roles and responsibilities of the TNI as a mechanism to support, not replace, civilian government. Continued “hard” reforms that we must continue to push for include full accountability for past human rights abuses, strengthening civilian control, putting the TNI fully “on budget”, and continued professionalization of the TNI officer corps.

**Question.** If confirmed, what would you do to encourage respect for human rights and accountability in the Indonesian military?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would sustain our efforts of encouraging professionalism within the military in terms of both human rights respect and accountability, through bilateral security discussions, joint training, military assistance, and military training programs.

**INDIA**

**Question.** What is your view of the current state of the U.S.-India military-to-military relationship?

**Answer.** The U.S.-India military-to-military relationship is positive and getting stronger, based on a perceived confluence of strategic interests on both sides. In the past 6 years, our defense ties have become increasingly robust, with frequent bilateral exchanges and dialogue, a slate of increasingly sophisticated annual military exercises, and potential for expanded defense trade. We anticipate that India will continue to promote security in the Indian Ocean region and beyond through its disaster response, maritime security, and peacekeeping efforts.

**Question.** If confirmed, what specific priorities would you establish for this relationship?

**Answer.** If confirmed, there are a number of areas I would like to build on in the relationship with India. First, we would like to work with India to strengthen our mutual capabilities to fight terrorism. Second, we would like to strengthen our maritime cooperation with India, to promote our mutual objectives in coping with disaster response, piracy, proliferation, terrorism, and energy security. The United States and India also have a common goal of ensuring the free flow of commerce through key sea lanes. The third priority should be to build our defense trade relationship with India. The United States is a new entrant into the Indian defense market and we see defense sales as a way to promote interoperability, promote people-to-people contacts, and strengthen the strategic relationship. Our fourth area of emphasis will...
be to deepen our already robust military-to-military relationship with more sophisticated exercises. Finally, we would like to move our cooperation forward on missile defense by engaging the Government of India in policy discussions and joint collaboration on technical projects.

Question. What relationship, if any, do you believe exists between the armed groups conducting terrorist attacks in India, and the armed groups conducting attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan?

Answer. I believe these armed groups share some common objectives and ideology, as well as drawing from a similar (though not identical) pool of recruits and receiving support from similar (though not identical) sources.

Question. What, in your view, is the effect, if any, of the fact that there is currently no civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India?

Answer. It doesn't help our security relationship that the cooperation agreement appears currently stalled. But we do not believe that defense cooperation with India depends on the outcome of the civil nuclear agreement.

INTERNATIONAL COORDINATOR FOR AFGHANISTAN

Question. In September, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer urged that an “international coordinator” be appointed to oversee and coordinate the efforts of the international community in Afghanistan. Do you agree that there is a need for greater coordination of the efforts of the international community in Afghanistan?

Answer. Yes, I agree that there is a need for greater coordination of the international community efforts in Afghanistan. Some 72 countries and international organizations are currently working in Afghanistan to help the government and the Afghan people, so coordination is a challenge.

Economic, governance, and security assistance must be thoroughly integrated and support the long-term national development strategy of the Government of Afghanistan.

Question. Would you support the appointment of an international coordinator to oversee and coordinate these efforts?

Answer. Yes; a senior international coordinator, if chosen properly, would be helpful in ensuring complementary efforts within the international community and that our efforts are supportive of the Afghan government. An international coordinator could play an important role in identifying requirements and raising awareness about the needs of Afghanistan.

SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN

Question. An August 2007 United Nations report found that the security situation in Afghanistan has “deteriorated at a constant rate through 2007.” At the same time, there continue to be shortfalls among NATO members in meeting the mission requirements for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, particularly in maneuver battalions, helicopters, and the operational mentoring and liaison teams for training the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF).

What is your assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan? Do you agree that the situation has deteriorated through 2007?

Answer. The security situation in Afghanistan remains challenging. I am not sure that the overall security situation has deteriorated through 2007. It is not clear whether the increased number of violent incidents is due to a stronger insurgency, or more aggressive and comprehensive actions taken by the ANSF and ISAF.

Still, ISAF and the Government of Afghanistan have been unable to hold some areas that they have cleared with military operations. Therefore, ISAF and more importantly the Government of Afghanistan have not capitalized consistently on initial successes by extending governance and delivering services that would transform the political environment and lead to long-term success. In the long run, the Government of Afghanistan must offer greater prospects for sustained security and livelihood than the insurgency; military operations are providing a window for expanded governance.

Question. What do you believe can and should be done to induce ISAF countries to provide the additional forces, training teams, and equipment needed to meet mission requirements in Afghanistan?

Answer. If confirmed, I would work with my colleagues in OSD/ISA to press ISAF and other coalition members to provide additional forces and equipment for Afghanistan. It is an exercise in persuasion: the legislatures and publics in ISAF contributing nations must be made aware of how victory in Afghanistan is a common, vital interest. Responsibility for this persuasion rests primarily with the Government of Afghanistan and by the governments of our coalition partners. We can play a sup-
porting role. Secretary Gates made this point to our NATO allies in November at the Noordwijk Ministerial and again last week in Edinburgh.

Question. Are there changes to our strategy in Afghanistan that you would recommend to improve the security situation?

Answer. I believe we have the right strategy in Afghanistan for long-term success, focusing on enabling the government of Afghanistan to provide governance and security as the insurgency is put down. If confirmed, I would focus on the execution of this strategy, making sure that we and our ISAF allies and other international partners provide sufficient resources in a timely, appropriate, and coordinated manner.

AFGHANISTAN—RECONSTRUCTION

Question. What is your assessment of the relationship between reconstruction and development in Afghanistan and achieving the U.S. objective of a stable, self-governing democratic Afghanistan?

Answer. I believe that reconstruction and development are absolutely critical to achieving our strategic goals in Afghanistan. For Afghanistan to be stable and self-governing, it must attract the loyalty of its citizens by providing economic opportunity; to sustain its provision of core government services, especially the security services, the Government of Afghanistan needs tax revenues from a thriving economy.

Since 2001, the U.S. Government as a whole has provided over $7.6 billion in reconstruction and development assistance to Afghanistan. We will provide over $2.3 billion in fiscal year 2008. About 40 percent of this aid has been devoted to infrastructure projects, primarily roads, and power.

AFGHANISTAN—COUNTERDRUG EFFORTS

Question. What is your assessment of international and U.S. counterdrug efforts in Afghanistan? Do you believe that NATO and the United States military are doing enough to help the Afghan government to tackle this problem? If not, what do you believe we should do?

Answer. Overall poppy planting and opium production are way up in 2007, about 193,000 hectares and 8,000 tons respectively according to UN estimates, despite counternarcotics efforts by the Government of Afghanistan and the international community. I believe the current five-pillared strategy for counternarcotics in Afghanistan (interdiction, eradication, public information, justice reform, and alternative development) is the right approach, when all of the pillars are implemented comprehensively. I agree with the conclusions of the August 2007 review of our counternarcotics strategy, which recommended that the United States should increase alternative development assistance and amplify the scope and intensity of interdiction and eradication operations; integrate drug interdiction operations into counterinsurgency (COIN) missions through a single planning and command and control structure; and develop greater political will for the counternarcotics effort among the Government of Afghanistan, allies, and international organizations.

PAKISTAN

Question. Do you believe that the Government of Pakistan is doing enough to eliminate safe havens for the Taliban, al Qaeda, and other extremists in the FATAs?

Answer. No; Pakistan can do more to eliminate these safe havens in the FATAs, and we must help them build the COIN capacity and the sustained political will to do so. We should remember that Pakistan has deployed 100,000 troops in the FATAs and Northwest Frontier Province, has suffered more than 1,000 combat deaths in support of OEF objectives, and has captured and turned over more senior Al Qaeda and Taliban operatives than any other coalition partner. That said, Pakistan should end the state of emergency as President Musharraf has promised and conduct free, fair, transparent, and credible national elections in January. As long as the attention of the Pakistan military is diverted by internal security duties in support of the state of emergency, it is less able to focus time and energy on rooting out terrorist safe havens in the western border region.

Question. To what extent, if any, should U.S. military assistance to Pakistan be conditioned on the Government of Pakistan’s progress in combating terrorism and on reinstating democratic government and abiding by democratic principles?

Answer. I agree with former Secretary of Defense Perry who once observed that such conditionality are a “blunt instrument” that do not increase our influence or leverage with Pakistan, and may reduce it. Legislating conditionality sends a message that is contrary to the long-term partnership that we have worked hard to communicate to the Pakistanis.
Coalition support funds are not assistance, but a mechanism for reimbursements to a number of coalition countries for their actual logistical, military, and other expenses incurred in supporting U.S. military operations.

Section 1206 authority is a vital tool that allows DOD and the Department of State to train and equip coalition partners for urgent missions. Using 1206 and other capacity building authorities to train and equip the Pakistan Army and Frontier Corps supports our strategy of rooting out safe havens for the Taliban and violent extremists.

Foreign military financing (FMF) is also an important instrument in our bilateral relationship, one that is supportive of our counterterrorism objectives. FMF to Pakistan has supported its efforts to acquire weapons and equipment that have played a direct role in its efforts against Taliban and al Qaeda forces in the border region. FMF has also supported Pakistan’s legitimate regional security requirements.

International military education and training (IMET) allows mid-level Pakistani officers to be exposed to U.S. military education and culture, as well as to form relationships with counterpart U.S. officers. With the role that the Pakistan Army plays in its society, such relationships are critical to maintaining an open line of communication at times of crisis. IMET contributes to abiding by democratic principles by exposing Pakistani military officers to U.S. professional military education, including service under civilian authority and the role of the military in a democracy.

**PRISONERS OF WAR (POW) /MISSING IN ACTION (MIA) ACCOUNTING EFFORTS**

**Question.** The Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command, U.S. Pacific Command, is critical to the recovery and identification of remains of missing military members. Recovery of remains of U.S. servicemembers from World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam war continue to be a very high priority. In 2005, DOD suspended U.S. cooperation with North Korea on recovery and identification of the remains of U.S. personnel, citing concern for the security of U.S. personnel in North Korea.

In your view is there any reason why we should not now resume cooperation with North Korea to recover the remains of U.S. personnel?

**Answer.** I agree that recovery of remains of our servicemembers is a high priority. I believe that resuming joint recovery operations in North Korea hinges principally on progress toward denuclearization and normalization. Once North Korea has met these conditions, DOD would need to work with North Korea to ensure the security of our recovery personnel, gain access to sites that are of interest, and agree on appropriate costs of DPRK operations.

**Question.** If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to enhance POW/MIA recovery efforts in the AOR of the U.S. Pacific Command?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would seek to reinforce the DOD commitment to investigating, recovering, repatriating, and identifying the remains of missing Americans from all conflicts in all theaters of operations in Asia.

**Question.** If confirmed, what steps would you take, if any, specifically with regard to recovery efforts in North Korea?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I will work closely with senior leadership within DOD, the Department of State, and other U.S. Government departments to support every reasonable effort to resume operations once the DPRK has established acceptable conditions.

**FOREIGN LANGUAGE POLICY**

**Question.** In February 2005, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz approved the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap to improve the Department’s foreign language capability and regional area expertise. Since then, the Department has been working toward implementing that roadmap.

To your knowledge, how many Mandarin and/or Cantonese speakers does DOD have in intelligence analyst positions? Is this number sufficient to ensure good intelligence assessments for use by the Office of Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?

**Answer.** I have been told that information regarding the number of DOD intelligence analysts who speak Mandarin and/or Cantonese is classified; however, DOD is able to provide this information to Congress in a classified forum. At the unclassified level, I can tell you that there are over 5,800 military personnel (officers and enlisted) with at least a basic capability in Mandarin and/or Cantonese. Of those, over 1,000 are considered proficient in Mandarin. I would like to see these numbers grow by increasing our investment in Chinese language skills for both civilians and military personnel.

**Question.** In your view, how should the Federal Government expand the foreign language skills of civilian and military personnel in order to improve the quality of
intelligence input to, and policy output by, the Office of Asian and Pacific Security Affairs?

Answer. If confirmed, I would strongly support all efforts by the Federal Government to expand the language skills of both civilian and military personnel, including expanded language training, better use of "legacy" speakers, and higher expectations of language competency in key foreign assignments. As a Japanese speaker myself, I know how many years it takes to become competent in "hard" languages. Countries in the APSA AOR use 7 of the DOD "top 10 strategic languages," including Chinese, Korean, Russian, Hindi, Indonesian, Dari, Japanese, and Arabic. Within the DOD, we should encourage our Service Academies and ROTC students to learn languages. We should also continue the process of inventorying both civilian and military legacy speakers. I support the idea of expanding financial incentives for civilians and military personnel to learn and maintain their language skills. DOD's Foreign Language Proficiency Pay for civilians and Foreign Language Proficiency Bonuses for military personnel are a step in the right direction.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as ASD/APSA?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

CHINA

1. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Shinn, in your answers to pre-hearing policy questions, you wrote, "China's military buildup may be tipping the stability balance in the Taiwan Strait and poses an unknown risk to the region at large." Why do we not know "for sure" whether China is tipping the balance?

Dr. SHINN. China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) is embarked on an ambitious, long-term military buildup. The Department of Defense Annual Report to Congress on Military Power of the People's Republic of China has documented these changes and has found that the military balance across the Taiwan Strait has been shifting in the mainland's favor. At the same time, Taiwan can still take steps to mitigate and even reverse this trend. Although the United States has a fairly clear understanding of China's growing capabilities, the lack of transparency surrounding the PLA's buildup has left it to the United States to infer China's intent. Without knowing China's intent, we cannot be sure whether China will use its growing military capability to alter the balance in the region.

2. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Shinn, what do we need in terms of intelligence or information in order to be able to know this?

Dr. SHINN. An accurate assessment of the military balance in the Taiwan Strait depends on our ability to assess the current and projected future military capabilities of both China and Taiwan. With respect to Taiwan, I believe the United States through the American Institute in Taiwan should continue to work with the Taiwan Armed Forces so that we have a common understanding of Taiwan's defense needs and the strategies and resources required to provide for them. With respect to main-
land China, where the lack of transparency is a problem, we should seek to clarify China’s military and security strategies as well as its approach to the use of force.

3. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, what do you mean by an "unknown risk?"

Dr. Shinn. The degree of risk is a function of both the impact and probability of China’s military buildup. Regarding impact, China’s military buildup is increasing Beijing’s options for military coercion, press diplomatic advantage, advance interests, or resolve disputes. Regarding probability, the lack of transparency surrounding China’s buildup leads us to question China’s intent.

4. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, is the possibility of "unknown risk" as great as the possibility of no "unknown risk?"

Dr. Shinn. The U.S. Department of Defense has a fairly sophisticated understanding of China’s growing military capabilities, but we lack insight into China’s intent because China’s military buildup is occurring in the absence of transparency. Without greater transparency, the United States and other Asian nations cannot fully determine the degree and type of risk that China’s buildup poses.

CHINA—MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS

5. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, what is your opinion regarding the utility of military-to-military cooperation with China?

Dr. Shinn. I believe that military-to-military exchanges between the United States and China can provide useful forums for our two countries to share views. All exchanges must be consistent with the congressional guidelines articulated in Section 1201 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106–05).

6. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, if confirmed, would you maintain or continue to increase ties with them as a means of fostering transparency and potentially gaining leverage over their actions?

Dr. Shinn. I believe the future level and frequency of U.S.-China military-to-military contacts should depend on whether the PLA improves the transparency and reciprocity of our exchanges. If confirmed, I would support increasing those exchanges that improve air and maritime safety, as well as those that encourage China to act responsibly on the regional and global scene. I would ensure that all contacts are consistent with the guidelines found in section 1201 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public Law 106–05).

7. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, how can we use our engagement with China to ensure that our ships—especially those in duress—are given safe haven, and that we have predictability when dealing with the Chinese government?

Dr. Shinn. I believe that senior U.S. officials should continue to raise the issue of maritime safety during meetings with Chinese counterparts. I agree with the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Tim Keating, who has expressed his strong dissatisfaction with China’s decision to deny safe harbor to U.S. vessels seeking shelter during a storm.

CHINESE ANTIMISSILE SYSTEMS

8. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, in your answers to pre-hearing questions dealing with China’s test in January of an antisatellite (ASAT) capability, you indicate that “a broad range of diplomatic and military options are required to meet the challenges posed by China’s counterspace capabilities—including its ASAT system.” Would you support starting an international dialogue on space rules of the road as part of the diplomatic options? If not, what diplomatic options would you support?

Dr. Shinn. On matters of space policy, I would defer to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Capabilities, who advises the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space/Space and Interdependent Capabilities, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Secretary of Defense on these matters. If confirmed, I would support both bilateral and multilateral diplomatic initiatives to promote the safe and responsible use of space, consistent with our national space policy.

9. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, what military options do you envision as needed to meet Chinese counterspace capabilities?

Dr. Shinn. I believe that the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategic Capabilities is in the best position to elaborate on military options re-
I understand that our space policy is designed to ensure the United States retains the ability to deny an adversary access to space capabilities that it can use for purposes hostile to U.S. national interests.

AFGHANISTAN-Pakistan

10. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, do you believe that Secretary Gates will continue to put pressure on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to send more troops and equipment, and to eliminate the restrictions on their employment?

Dr. Shinn. Yes. As Secretary Gates has said, it is a continuing effort to get our NATO allies to increase their contributions to coalition efforts in Afghanistan. I believe this is an exercise in persuasion and that the Secretary will continue to press on both of these points. The Combined Joint Statement of Requirements for forces and equipment in Afghanistan still has shortfalls, and meeting these shortfalls demands greater contributions from all NATO members. For example, Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams are critical to building an effective Afghan National Army. There is a growing need for more of these teams. Additionally, we cannot have a two-tier NATO alliance—those who fight and those who do not. The Secretary strongly believes, as do I, that countries offering resources to NATO operations should give the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander the flexibility to use those resources as he deems necessary to accomplish the mission most effectively. Geographic and operational limitations on employment of forces minimize the ISAF Commander’s ability to shape operations in Afghanistan.

11. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, do you believe that the Government of Pakistan is doing enough to eliminate safe havens for terrorists in Pakistan?

Dr. Shinn. No, I believe Pakistan can and should do more to eliminate safe havens for terrorists in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA) of Pakistan. At the same time, we should remember that Pakistan has deployed 100,000 troops in the FATA and Northwest Frontier Province, has suffered more than 1,000 combat deaths in support of Operation Enduring Freedom objectives, and has captured and turned over more senior al Qaeda and Taliban operatives than any other coalition partner. If confirmed, I would support efforts to help Pakistan improve the counterinsurgency capability of the Pakistan Army and paramilitary forces by providing more training, equipment, and shared intelligence.

12. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, do you believe that we can just keep doing what we are doing right now?

Dr. Shinn. In Afghanistan, I believe that we have the right strategy for long-term success, but we need to improve our execution. I support an Afghanistan strategy that focuses on strengthening the government, improving security, countering narcotics, and supporting reconstruction and economic development. If confirmed, I would strive to improve our implementation in Afghanistan by encouraging our international allies to do more, pressing to eliminate caveats on employing forces already deployed, and supporting the appointment of a senior envoy who will work to improve coordination of reconstruction and development efforts.

In Pakistan, we also need to make more progress. We are in the early stages of a 5-year, multi-phase plan to improve the counterinsurgency capability of the Pakistan Army and the paramilitary Frontier Corps, which will make both much more effective in eliminating the terrorist safe havens in the FATA of Pakistan. If confirmed, I would support efforts to help Pakistani forces develop greater capacity through training and equipment assistance. I would also support programs to enhance Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabilities.

13. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, if confirmed, what if any, additional changes would you advocate to deal with the Afghan-Pakistan terrorism issue?

Dr. Shinn. I agree with Assistant Secretary of Defense for SO/LIC and Interdependent Capabilities (ASD/JO/LIC&IC) Mike Vickers, who has advocated working closely with Pakistan and Afghanistan to strengthen existing mechanisms for intelligence-sharing, military-to-military dialogue and political discourse, and support to Pakistan’s efforts to eliminate terrorist sanctuaries in the FATA. If confirmed, I would work closely with the ASD/JO/LIC&IC to ensure that U.S. defense policy—including our training and equipping initiatives—supports our counterterrorism objectives for both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
PHILIPPINES

14. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, if confirmed, what will you do to ensure that the likelihood of U.S. servicemembers being involved in combat in the Philippines remains low?

Dr. Shinn. The legal and policy guidelines are clear on the issue of avoiding the involvement of U.S. forces in combat operations in the Philippines. The Philippine Constitution prevents foreign forces from conducting combat operations in the Philippines. The United States must respect Philippine sovereignty and will not violate Philippine Law. The Mutual Defense Treaty and the Visiting Forces Agreement guide our bilateral policy with the Republic of Philippines. DOD has also promulgated Rules of Engagement (ROE) for deployed U.S. forces that outlines the limited circumstances under which deadly force may be used. If confirmed, I would work to ensure we adhere to these guidelines.

15. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, will you inform the committee in advance of any changes in the nature and scope of U.S. military assistance to the Philippines?

Dr. Shinn. Yes, I will keep Congress informed regarding significant changes in the nature and scope of U.S. forces that are advising and assisting the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Further, I will consult closely with Congress on all matters related to U.S. military assistance to the Philippines. Congress plays a key role by appropriating grant assistance, especially International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds. The IMET and FMF programs in the Philippines are critical components of the integrated approach we are taking to build capacity in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

KOREA

16. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, what is your view on the best approach to the threat posed by North Korea?

Dr. Shinn. I support the current U.S. strategy for North Korea, which is centered on maintaining peace through deterrence while pursuing diplomacy to achieve denuclearization of the North. With regards to deterrence, the U.S. alliances with both the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan remain strong. Regarding diplomacy, the United States is working closely with our allies, our Six-Party Talks partners, and the international community to urge North Korea to fulfill its commitments as reflected in the September 19, 2005, joint statement. Going forward, we must judge the intent of North Korea by its actions, especially its nuclear denuclearization. If confirmed, I would work with the Department of State and regional partners to press North Korea to meet its commitments while maintaining the capability to deter potential North Korea military threats and countering proliferation activities.

17. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, do you believe that our current diplomatic approach will succeed in denuclearizing the Korean peninsula?

Dr. Shinn. I agree with the assessment of President Bush and Secretary Rice that the Six-Party Talks have delivered measurable results, but that much hard work still remains. The disabling of the plutonium production facilities at Yongbyon is an important step, but North Korea must still fulfill all of the commitments it made in the September 2005 Joint Statement. I believe the next important step is for North Korea to provide a complete and correct declaration that includes all of its nuclear programs, including its nuclear weapons programs and nuclear weapons, and proliferation activities.

NORTH KOREA—POW/MIA RECOVERY EFFORTS

18. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, in 2005 Secretary Rumsfeld suddenly ceased cooperation with North Korea on recovery and identification of U.S. servicemembers. Up until that point, recovery efforts were continuing, regardless of the breakdown in relations on the nuclear and missile issues.

Your answers to pre-hearing policy questions state that “resuming joint recovery operations in North Korea hinges principally on progress toward denuclearization and normalization.” This implies that you would continue to link the POW–MIA efforts politically with other issues. Yet, Ambassador Charles Ray, the Deputy Assistant Secretary responsible for POW–MIA recovery, told committee staff that he didn’t want the recovery efforts politicized. Is there any way that you can foresee that we might resume recovery efforts with North Korea, independent of what might happen in the Six-Party Talks?
Dr. Shin. I agree with Ambassador Ray that we should not politicize our POW/MIA recovery efforts in North Korea. Ambassador Ray and I also agree that denuclearizing the Korean peninsula is not a political issue, but rather it is a security issue. Once the United States has seen sufficient verifiable progress towards denuclearization, we should consider resuming recovery operations. If confirmed, I would work with Ambassador Ray to seek to resume recovery operations once North Korea meets its obligations. The next step in this process is for North Korea to declare all its nuclear programs completely and accurately. We would also need to ensure that conditions for recovery operations in North Korea limit the risk posed to U.S. personnel and advance Korean War personnel accounting.

JAPAN

19. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, how reliable an ally is Japan?
Dr. Shin. Japan is a reliable ally, and we are strengthening our alliance further through ongoing transformation efforts. Although there have been some disappointments, such as the temporary termination of at-sea-refueling in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, the overall trend in the security relationship has been very positive. If confirmed, I would encourage Japan to further its contribution to the alliance by expanding the role and missions of its Self-Defense Force.

20. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, if confirmed, will you work to get the Japanese to contribute more forces in Afghanistan—a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) for example?
Dr. Shin. If confirmed, I would continue working toward that end. A key objective of U.S. policy is to encourage Japan to increase both its security and development-related contributions to Afghanistan. Although I recognize Japan’s contributions, and that Japan has certain constitutional and policy limitations, I believe that Japan has tremendous capability to do more in Afghanistan—whether by means of reconstruction assistance or by providing military capability, mentoring, or civilian expertise in the PRTs. If confirmed, I would continue to convey Afghanistan’s needs to Japan.

INDIA-PAKISTAN

21. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, what impact do you believe the failure to establish a U.S.-India civilian nuclear cooperation agreement would have on relations between India and Pakistan?
Dr. Shin. I do not believe that the U.S.-India civilian nuclear cooperation agreement has had a significant impact on Indo-Pakistani relations. I am encouraged on other fronts—such as the ongoing Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan—and am hopeful that this dialogue will lead to improved relations between the two countries.

22. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, if confirmed, what, if anything, would you do to foster good Indo-Pakistani relations to bring stability to Afghanistan?
Dr. Shin. I agree with Secretary Gates, who has called for all Asian countries—including India and Pakistan—to play a larger role in promoting Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development. If confirmed, I would also advocate the continuation of ongoing confidence building measures between India and Pakistan as a means of promoting regional stability. I would encourage India to be transparent in its efforts to mitigate Pakistani concerns. I also view the Pakistani redeployment of certain forces from the Indian border to the FATA as a positive step.

INDONESIA

23. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, in your written answers to pre-hearing questions, you advocate increased military-to-military cooperation with Indonesia. If confirmed, will you ensure that Indonesians are cooperating to the fullest extent possible with us in the investigation of the 2002 murder of Americans in Papua, and that we do not work with units or individuals involved in past human rights violations?
Dr. Shin. I agree with Secretary Gates, who has called for all Asian countries—including India and Pakistan—to play a larger role in promoting Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development. If confirmed, I would also advocate the continuation of ongoing confidence building measures between India and Pakistan as a means of promoting regional stability. I would encourage India to be transparent in its efforts to mitigate Pakistani concerns. I also view the Pakistani redeployment of certain forces from the Indian border to the FATA as a positive step.
In accordance with U.S. laws, all foreign security force personnel and units receiving U.S. military training and assistance are vetted for credible allegations of involvement in past gross violations of human rights. Known human rights violators are not provided such training. In the past 3 years, we have denied more than 120 Indonesian applications for training after finding allegations of past human rights abuses. In implementing our military-to-military programs, I will ensure we continue to comply with applicable laws.

PROLIFERATION

24. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, in your answers to our pre-hearing policy questions you mention proliferation prevention programs as important to many of the problems in the region. In the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, new authority is provided to the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program to expand programs outside of the former Soviet Union. Do you see areas of opportunity for the CTR program in your area of responsibility?

Dr. Shinn. I am familiar with the success story of Kazakhstan, which became a non-nuclear weapons state in 1995 with the assistance of the CTR program. I have also been briefed on some of the other CTR programs the Defense Threat Reduction Agency operates. If confirmed, I would work with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs (OASD/GSA) to identify and advocate possible uses of this new authority within the rest of the Asian and the Pacific area of responsibility.

25. Senator Levin. Dr. Shinn, how would you work with the CTR program office in developing such programs?

Dr. Shinn. If confirmed, I would work with the OASD/GSA to develop a prioritized list of Asian and Pacific countries that might benefit from the new congressional authority. Once we have identified and developed specific programs, I would support OASD/GSA throughout the process of advocating and implementing the programs with the individual Asian and Pacific countries.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

PAKISTAN

26. Senator McCain. Dr. Shinn, Pakistan is a country of tremendous importance to our strategic interests currently undergoing severe political instability. The Taliban continue to operate out of the border area and pose a continuing threat to Afghanistan’s security and stability. Extremists also pose a threat internal to Pakistan, and this is particularly troubling in light of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. In retrospect, do you believe U.S. policy toward Pakistan has been too focused and dependent on the current leader of Pakistan?

Dr. Shinn. I believe the shared interests of the United States and Pakistan transcend the personality of any particular leader. As President Bush has said, the United States and Pakistan have a shared interest in building stable and sustainable democracy and in promoting peace and security, stability, prosperity, and democracy in South Asia and across the globe. Our relationship is with the people and government of Pakistan, not with President Musharraf or any other particular leader that may follow him in the future. Now that President Musharraf has stepped down as Chief of Army Staff, we expect to have a similarly close relationship with his successor in that position, General Ashfaq Kiyani. As Pakistan prepares to conduct a general election, I share the hope of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher that upcoming parliamentary elections in Pakistan will lead to the formation of a civilian-led government, under a civilian president for the first time since 1999.

27. Senator McCain. Dr. Shinn, what is the United States doing to enhance its military cooperation with Pakistan and to ensure that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship will remain strong even if there is a change in leadership there?

Dr. Shinn. The U.S.-Pakistan defense relationship is more robust now than at any time in the past. As Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher recently testified, since 2002 the United States has provided security assistance to Pakistan totaling $1.9 billion. From the DOD, this has included $1.2 billion in Foreign Military Financing, $87 million in counter-narcotics funding, and $37.2 million in Section 1206 counterterrorism funding. In addition, we have provided $5.3 billion in Coalition Support Funds to reimburse Pakistan for expenses incurred in the war on ter-
ror. One way we can help sustain our defense cooperation in the face of potential leadership changes is through our military-to-military interactions. Today, more than 100 Pakistani students annually attend military courses in U.S. professional military educational institutions, and an additional 50 or more attend courses conducted under the Counterterrorism Fellowship program. If confirmed, I would work with my counterparts at the Department of State and with Congress to ensure that we maintain this momentum and sustain our military cooperation with Pakistan.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN THUNE

NORTH KOREA-BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

28. Senator Thune. Dr. Shinn, last year during the Pacific Command-U.S. Forces Korea status hearing I questioned General Bell, commander of U.S. Forces in Korea, about his testimony in which he requested that Congress fully fund the Airborne Laser (ABL) program. To me, General Bell’s testimony carries a great deal of credibility because his troops face a real ballistic missile threat on a daily basis. General Bell described a situation where the ABL is important because it is designed to kill ballistic missiles in the boost phase. A terminal intercept, General Bell explained, could have consequences because of the fallout associated with intercepting a missile over a small, densely populated area like South Korea or Japan. He further stressed his point by pointing out that the July 4, 2006 missile test by North Korea resulted in six successful ballistic launches and one failure. What is your current understanding of North Korea’s ballistic missile program and the threat it poses to the Pacific theater?

Dr. Shinn. I would defer to the Missile Defense Agency to assess the technical merits of specific missile defense systems or programs. However, if confirmed, I would encourage U.S. friends and allies to expand their cooperation with the United States to improve our Asian missile defense architecture.

29. Senator Thune. Dr. Shinn, do you share General Bell’s conclusion that Congress needs to continue funding and supporting boost phase ballistic missile programs?

Dr. Shinn. If confirmed, I would actively advocate expanding our ballistic missile defense (BMD) cooperation with U.S. allies and friends in Asia and the Pacific. The threat of ballistic missiles continues to grow, and the participation by our Asian partners in cooperative missile defense efforts reduces the costs to the United States and allows our partners to contribute technology and capabilities that are difficult for the United States to achieve by itself. Some nations can contribute powerful land-based radars. Others can provide additional sea-based missile capabilities. Others can provide technology to support the production process.

Japan is the United States’ most significant international partner for BMD. Both nations remain deeply committed to strengthening BMD cooperation. Significant recent developments include the U.S. deployment of a forward-based missile defense radar in northern Japan, the deployment of multiple BMD-capable Aegis ships, and the deployment of a PAC-3 battalion in Okinawa. Japan accelerated plans to modify four Aegis destroyers equipped with SM-3 interceptors. The first of these Aegis ships successfully completed its first SM-3 flight test in December 2007. Japan is also upgrading its Patriot system to PAC-3 capability, and has already fielded its first upgraded fire unit. Japan and the United States are engaged in a number of cooperative efforts on BMD, including the development of the SM-3 Blk II interceptor.

If confirmed, I would work with our Japanese allies to strengthen our operational cooperation and coordination. Alliance BMD capabilities contribute to the alliance’s overall deterrence posture, and it is important that U.S. and Japanese systems can operate together effectively.

30. Senator Thune. Dr. Shinn, if confirmed, what steps will you take to work with our allies, specifically Japan, in addressing the ballistic missile threat in the Asian theater?

Dr. Shinn. I would defer to the Missile Defense Agency to assess the technical merits of specific missile defense systems or programs. However, if confirmed, I would encourage U.S. friends and allies to expand their cooperation with the United States to improve our Asian missile defense architecture.

31. Senator Thune. Dr. Shinn, if confirmed, will you support direct energy technology as a method for intercepting ballistic missiles in the boost phase?
Dr. SHINN, I would defer to the Missile Defense Agency to assess the technical merits of specific missile defense systems or programs. However, if confirmed, I would encourage U.S. friends and allies to expand their cooperation with the United States to improve our Asian missile defense architecture.

[The nomination reference of James Shinn follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:
James Shinn, of New Jersey, to be an Assistant Secretary of Defense. (New position.)

[The biographical sketch of James Shinn, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF JAMES J. SHINN

CURRENT ASSIGNMENT

As the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), Mr. Shinn is the civilian advisor to the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on national security matters in the Asian and Pacific region. He is responsible for developing regional security and defense strategy; formulating and coordinating regional defense policies in support of the Secretary’s objectives; overseeing operational execution of the Secretary’s approved policies for the region; and fostering bilateral and multilateral defense and military relationships in the region. Mr. Shinn is the focal point for Secretary of Defense policies of interest within the Office of the USD(P) and with the DOD components and the interagency for United States Pacific Command, United States Central Command, and for the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. Mr. Shinn also represents the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense in interagency policy deliberations and international negotiations related to the Asian and Pacific region.

PAST EXPERIENCE

Before coming to the Pentagon, James Shinn was the National Intelligence Officer for East Asia on the National Intelligence Council, first at the Central Intelligence Agency and then the newly-created Office of the Director of National Intelligence, from 2003–2006. After working for Chase Manhattan Bank in New York and Tokyo, Mr. Shinn served in the East Asia Bureau of the U.S. Department of State from 1976–79. He then spent 15 years in high technology firms in Silicon Valley and Asia, first at Advanced Micro Devices, an integrated circuit firm, and at Dialogic, a voice processing software firm, which he co-founded. Dialogic did an initial public offering in 1992, and then was acquired by the Intel Corporation. After Dialogic, he worked with several high tech and financial services firms, as an investor and outside director. Mr. Shinn was the Senior Fellow for Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York from 1993–96, where he wrote or edited several task force reports and two books, including Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement With China (1996), and Fires Across the Water: Transnational Problems in Asia (1998), both published by the Council on Foreign Relations Press. From 2002 to 2003 he taught courses on technical innovation and technology and foreign policy, at Princeton University’s Department of Electrical Engineering and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public Affairs, and at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. In 2002, he was nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate as Public Delegate to the United Nations General Assembly. He co-authored with Peter Gourevitch, Political Power and Corporate Control: the New Global Politics of Corporate Governance, published by Princeton University Press (2005).

EDUCATION AND FAMILY

Mr. Shinn has a BA from Princeton (1973), an MBA from Harvard (1981), and a Ph.D. from Princeton (2001). He once spoke good Japanese, passable French, and
functional German, but no more. Mr. Shinn lives with his wife and three children in Washington, DC, and New York City.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by James Shinn in connection with his nomination follows:]
Visiting Professor, School of Foreign Service; Georgetown University; Washington DC; 8/02–12/06.
(Adjunct after 11/03)
Lecturer, Department of Electrical Engineering and Woodrow Wilson School; Princeton University; Princeton, NJ; 9/01–6/02.
Ph.D. candidate, Woodrow Wilson School; Princeton University; Princeton, NJ; 09/97–6/01.
Senior Fellow for Asia; Council on Foreign Relations; New York, NY; 10/93–6/97.

10. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary, or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.
Analyst, Bureau of East Asian Affairs; U.S. Department of State; Washington DC; 04/77–04/79.
Public Delegate, General Assembly, U.S. Mission to the United Nations; U.S. Department of State; New York, NY; 09/02–05/03.

11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.
None.

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
Princeton Brooke Foundation (501c non-profit charitable foundation); Trustee.
Pacific Forum/CSIS (501c non-profit think tank); Advisory Board.
Princeton Scholars in the Nation’s Service (non-profit educational board); Advisory Board.
Ophthalmology Department, Columbia University Hospital (non-profit medical research); Advisory Board (1998–2002).
Council on Foreign Relations (non-profit think tank); Member.
Harvard Club of New York; Member.
Kenwood Country Club; Member.

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**
(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
None.
(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
None.
(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.
Republican National Committee, 09/03, $25,000.
Republican Leadership Council, 06/03, $25,000.

14. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.
None.

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.
“How Shareholder Reforms Pay Foreign Policy Dividends” (with Peter Gourevitch); CFR-Brookings Press; 2002.
“Red-Teaming the Data Gap” (with Jan Lodal); CFR-Brookings Press; 2002.

16. **Speeches:** Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

17. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

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**Commitment to testify before Senate committees:**

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes.

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**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

JAMES J. SHINN.

This 30th day of October, 2007.

[The nomination of James Shinn was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on December 18, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 19, 2007.]

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**Questions and Responses**

**Defense Reforms**

*Question.* The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and clearly delineated the operational chain of command and the responsibilities and authorities of the combatant commanders, and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have also clarified the responsibility of the military departments to recruit, organize, train, equip, and maintain forces for assignment to the combatant commanders.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

*Answer.* No, not at this time. We've just implemented the most dramatic change to Joint Officer Management in the Joint Qualification System (JQS) on October 2007, as a result of changes mandated by the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. However, we can address this issue again when the CNGR report is presented.

*Question.* If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

*Answer.* Truly believe these modifications are exactly what were needed to ensure that we adapt to how we fight today ... and build the inventory we need to fight tomorrow. I support this new system fully.

**Duties**

*Question.* Section 8016 of title 10, U.S.C., provides that the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs shall have the principal duty of “overall supervision of manpower and Reserve component affairs of the Department of the Air Force.”

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties do you expect that Secretary Wynne will assign to you?

*Answer.* The principle duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force are to support the tasks assigned by the Secretary of the Air Force. These duties include providing guidance, direction, and oversight for Air Force military and civilian manpower/personnel programs; medical readiness and health care; plus Reserve compo-
ent affairs. The Assistant Secretary is also responsible for oversight of the operation of the Air Force Personnel Council and its component boards—the Air Force Civilian Appellate Review Office and the Air Force Board for the Correction of Military Records.

RELATIONSHIPS

**Question.** If confirmed, what will be your relationship with:

- The Secretary of the Air Force.
  Answer. As my direct supervisor, I will continue to meet with the Secretary of the Air Force on a regular and as required basis. I will provide him with my honest assessment and advice.

- The Under Secretary of the Air Force.
  Answer. I will take direction from the Under Secretary of the Air Force in the absence of the Secretary. During other periods, I will work closely with him in areas of common interest.

- The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (PDASD/RA).
  Answer. I have already established an excellent working relationship with Dr. Chu and his entire staff. I am confident that I will be able to articulate Air Force interests and positions with all of them.

- The Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.
  Answer. In my earlier capacity as PDASD/RA, I established a relationship of mutual respect between myself and Mr. Dominguez. I expect that relationship to continue.

- The General Counsel of the Air Force.
  Answer. The Air Force General Counsel has a significant role to play in virtually all policy decisions in the Air Force. In my capacity as acting ASAF/M&RA I have already established a strong relationship with the General Counsel and the members of her staff.

- The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs (ASD/RA).
  Answer. I performed the duties of the ASD/RA for 15 months during the opening days of this administration, to include the tumultuous events surrounding the attacks of September 11. Beginning in October 2002, when the current ASD/RA was confirmed by the Senate and sworn in, I was his principal deputy and, as such, was very involved in every aspect of operations conducted by that office. To this day, we have retained both a personal and professional relationship which I believe can only enhance our mutual responsibilities to make certain that the members of the National Guard and Reserve components continue to receive the tools they need to protect our Nation.

- The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs.
  Answer. The effects of the global war on terror highlighted the need for change in the medical support that our airmen receive. Beyond that, our efforts also directly affect the quality and timeliness of treatment that all of our brave servicemembers
receive, especially when it involves the medevac system. If I am confirmed, I will continue to work closely with Lieutenant General Roudebush and his staff to meet the changing needs of our medical system.

*Question.* The Chief, National Guard Bureau.

*Answer.* I have known Lieutenant General Blum professionally for over 6½ years. We have traveled together numerous times in Europe, the southwest U.S.-Mexican border, and to numerous other locations throughout the country to gather information and make absolutely certain that our National Guard soldiers and airmen meet the requirements of their Governors and the missions that they have shouldered in title 10 and title 32 status. If I am confirmed, I will continue to work with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and his staff to continue our support for his people and to implement any changes in responsibility that he may face as the result of congressional direction.

*Question.* The Director, Air National Guard.

*Answer.* Lieutenant General McKinley and I have a close working relationship that permits us both to meet the challenges brought about by the global war on terrorism, base realignment and closure, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and myriad of other programs that affect both operations and personnel in the Air National Guard (ANG). In my current status, we meet regularly to make certain that our actions are open and transparent to one another. I know the ANG programs as well as anyone at my level. If confirmed, I will be able to be more proactive in proposing solutions to and even anticipate problems that will require congressional support.

*Question.* The Chief, Air Force Reserve.

*Answer.* My relationship with Lieutenant General Bradley is virtually identical as that with the Director of the ANG. His challenges and solutions differ somewhat because his organization has a national scope only. We meet regularly for the same reasons that I meet with Lieutenant General McKinley. Often, we all meet together to discuss our common areas of concern. If confirmed, my ability to bring about change that they need will increase dramatically.

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*Question.* Airmen and their families.

*Answer.* Our Air Force family is the most important asset we have. If confirmed, I will devote all of my energies to improving processes, programs, and procedures used by our people to carry out their mission of protecting the citizens of the United States. I look forward to working with Congress to continuously seek out new solutions to both old and new challenges. I pride myself as being a good listener and I tend to travel extensively. I will keep in touch with our airmen and their families by seeking them out on their turf.

**QUALIFICATIONS**

*Question.* What background and experience do you have that you believe qualifies you for this position?

*Answer.* First, I spent 28 years as an officer in the United States Air Force. As a pilot, I have flown over 800 combat missions and earned a Silver Star and 2 Distinguished Flying Crosses. I was a commander during a very turbulent period in my squadron’s history. During that tour, I was awarded the Air Force’s highest individual award for Leadership—the Lance P. Sijan Award. Second, I spent 6 rewarding years as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs covering the activities of all seven Reserve components beginning 50 days before September 11, 2001, and continuing until June 29, 2007, when the President appointed me as the acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. Since that appointment, I have immersed myself in the responsibilities associated with this job. Finally, my father-in-law, CMSgt (Ret.) Richard D. Blevins, who is a hero to me, retired from the Air Force after 30 years of service. In our house, we are truly an Air Force family.

*Question.* Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs?

*Answer.* I most certainly do. While I know much about the National Guard and Reserves as well as many of the benefits programs that are common to all Services, I intend to learn as much as possible about the other aspects of my job that are unique to the Air Force. While I have begun this task within the confines of the headquarters already, if I am confirmed, I will be able to work more closely with Congress and the committee staff personnel to become more proactive in programs and issues that affect our people.
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges and problems confronting the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs?
Answer. There are several. First, there is the continuing challenge of providing qualified personnel to continue to fight in the global war on terrorism. Second, we must reduce the stress on airmen and their families who are shouldering the burden of repeated operational rotations. Third, we must make absolutely certain that our wounded warriors receive the finest possible treatment available. Fourth, we must plan for the next war and support the Secretary of the Air Force’s initiatives to recapitalize the fleet.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?
Answer. The Air Force relies upon volunteers to meet our commitments around the world. Recruiting, retention, training, and planning are essential elements of our plans. If we meet the needs of our people, our people will meet the needs of the Air Force. Second, my visits with airmen and their families lead me to believe that we can sustain a volunteer rotation cycle indefinitely if we establish a reasonable dwell ratio. The burden needs to be shared by all. Third, I am extremely proud of the men and women who make up our medevac mission—the first step on the road to recovery for all wounded warriors from this war. We need to partner with the rest of the department as well as the Department of Veterans Affairs as we seek to improve the care that these heroes receive once they return. Finally, there are threats in this world that are potentially even greater than the terrorist threats we face today. I share the Secretary’s deep concern that, if we are to meet the threats of the future, we must recapitalize our hardware and develop new capabilities in the cyber world. People remain at the center of all these challenges.

AIR FORCE ACTIVE-DUTY END STRENGTH REDUCTIONS

Question. Following the QDR, the Air Force began a process to reduce the size of its total force by 40,000 airmen. Last year, the Air Force cut 23,000 personnel, and under the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2008, the Air Force plans to cut another 5,600 active airmen. Planning for fiscal year 2009 contemplates additional reductions that would result in an Active-Duty end strength of 316,000 airmen by the end of that fiscal year. How will the Air Force achieve these planned force reductions, and what is your understanding of the probable effects they will have on readiness, quality of life, and retention?
Answer. The PBD 720 FYDP reductions have already been programmed. Preserving readiness, sustaining deployment and contingency missions while managing risk to home stations missions were all factors taken into consideration when determining where the cuts should take place. As a result of these reductions individuals/organizations face increased/intense steady-state mission demands and may deploy more frequently.

Question. The Air Force is currently developing a strategy to achieve the force reductions needed in fiscal year 2009. No final decisions have been made at this point, but we expect to fully use the tools available in law—voluntary first, then involuntary. The authorities include voluntary separation pay, reductions in force, selective early retirements, and force shaping of probationary officers (less than 4 years of commissioned service). We will also take advantage of waivers from time-in-grade and commissioned service requirements for retirement.

What is your understanding of military service leaders' views about whether an end strength of 316,000 will be sufficient for the Air Force to achieve its assigned missions in the future?
Answer. 316,500 Active-Duty end strength is only sufficient for a 78 combat wing equivalent force structure, while the most current Air Force vision to support combatant commanders requires manpower associated with an 86 wing equivalent structure, requiring Active-Duty end strength to grow to 330,000+. The DCS/Personnel staff is chartered to prepare a Congressional Reporting Requirement on a Review of Total Air Force End Strength Requirements, specifically the capabilities the current force structure provides, any shortfalls for new and emerging missions, and an explanation on how the Air Force could balance the budgetary demands necessary to implement any corrective policy action within its own budget. This report is due to Congress on 5 February 2008.

Question. In your view, will an end strength of 316,000 allow the Air Force to perform and accomplish its assigned missions?
Answer. No. This is a similar question to the previous question. Currently the proposed end strength supports a 78 combat wing structure. As the combatant com-
mand requirements increase, our need for additional manpower will increase to fulfill that mission.

**Question.** If the Air Force Special Operations Command requires additional end strength, do you believe that the Air Force will be able to support this requirement?

**Answer.** Air Force will continue to provide the active military end strength as long as SOCOM provides the dollars to buy the end strength.

**Question.** To what extent does the Air Force plan to rely on military-to-civilian conversions to achieve reductions in end strength while continuing to perform its missions, and what is your understanding of the availability of funding for civilian salaries, and the amount of time needed to achieve significant reductions using this means?

**Answer.** The Air Force does not plan on using military-to-civilian conversion to achieve significant reductions. The Air Force has instituted an active military floor of 316,500 during the fiscal year 2009 Program Budget Review. Per fiscal year 2010 POM Preparation Instruction, military end strength may not be “cashed in” as savings or as an offset to pay shortfalls in other areas without the consent of DCS/Personnel. No military-to-civilian conversion were programmed in the fiscal year 2009 PB given the 316,500 active military floor nor has the plan in the past or the future been to use military-to-civilian conversions as a means to achieve reductions in end strength. Fiscal year 2004 and fiscal year 2005 military-to-civilian conversions focused on reducing stress; civilian positions were added and military realigned to stressed career fields (non-military end strength reductions). Fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2007 military-to-civilian conversions focused on converting non-military essential positions to civilian; military personnel funding transferred to civilian O&M to fund conversions (military end strength reduced).

**Question.** A recent Air Force Times article quotes Air Force Secretary Wynne as concluding that the draw-down, which in his words was intended to maximize the resources that could be applied to recapitalization, was not having the intended effect and has only slowed—not reversed—the aging of the fleet.

What is your assessment of whether the ongoing Air Force personnel reductions will significantly affect achievement of recapitalization?

**Answer.** The personnel cuts were specifically programmed to help with the recapitalization of our force and the personnel savings have specifically been reprogrammed for meeting that requirement.

**Question.** How will the increased number of Army and Marine Corps ground forces affect Air Force personnel requirements?

**Answer.** As the U.S. Army and Marines are targeted for significant increases to bolster combat capability, there will be a commensurate requirement for an increase in Air Force manpower to ensure the effectiveness of the interdependent, joint team. Our Air Mobility units are intrinsically tied to supporting our Army and Marine team with logistical reach to go and be supplied anywhere in the world. Our weather teams, tactical air control, and other forces are imbedded with or closely tied with the ground forces. Air Force provides the full range of air assets as part of the interdependent joint fight, including increased Special Forces and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance requirements. Failure to recognize and fund the increase in capabilities provided by the Air Force via aforementioned Congressional Report on Total Air Force Active Military End Strength Requirements will impact the Air Force’s flexibility to support the expanded ground forces.

**AIR NATIONAL GUARD AND AIR FORCE RESERVE END STRENGTH REDUCTIONS**

**Question.** Under the President’s 2008 budget request, the Air Force plans to cut 7,700 part-time end strength positions from the ANG and Air Force Reserve (AFR) over the next year.

What is your understanding of how the ANG and AFR will absorb these reductions in end strength over the FYDP given the missions they have been assigned worldwide?

**Answer.** The ANG chose not to take a reduction in their end strength. They funded the manpower positions through internal rebalancing. The AFR focused on maintaining combat capability when making PBD 720 reductions and focused the majority of its PBD 720 reductions on the Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMAs) force. IMA reductions minimized the operational risk to the Air Force by retaining needed experience by re-rolling IMAs to the participating Individual Ready Reserve where the Air Force still has access to their capabilities.

**Question.** What is your understanding of the current status of coordination about the impact of these reductions with the National Guard Bureau and the State National Guard units affected?

**Answer.** The ANG is not part of the 7,700 person reduction.
Question. What missions currently assigned to the ANG and AFR would be changed or eliminated in order to meet end strength reductions?

Answer. There are mission changes underway in the Reserve component. As part of the Total Force Integration the Air Force is reviewing which component is best suited to support Air Force missions.

OFFICER MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Question. If confirmed as Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, what role would you expect to play, if any, in the officer management and promotion system, including policies affecting general officers?

Answer. The Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs enjoys a close working relationship with DCS/Personnel. As the policy owner for officer management and promotions, I expect that to continue. I feel very comfortable that, if confirmed, I could continue to provide the Secretary of the Air Force the appropriate guidance in these policy areas, to include policies affecting general officers.

EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY SPOUSES

Question. In your view, what progress has the Air Force made, and what actions need to be taken to provide increased employment opportunities for military spouses?

Answer. Today, more and more spouses seek the personal fulfillment of a career. When this is coupled with the fact that many families need two incomes to maintain their quality of life, spouse employment opportunities become crucial to recruitment and retention. Air Force, through the Airman and Family Readiness Centers, has developed employment assistance services to meet the challenges spouses face in training or finding suitable positions and, as they relocate, continuing and progressing in their chosen career fields. Baseline services at all centers include classes and individual consultation on career planning and personal development. Resource centers provide guided access to computers, laser printers, internet information on careers, and the development of job search skills, as well as local and long distance job listings. Individual career counseling and planning, assessment instruments, and interpretation of results are available. Air Force partners with the Air Force Aid Society and grants are offered every year to fund special programs at selected installations that train spouses in portable skills such as medical transcription and operating a home- or virtual-business. Recently Air Force has partnered with OSD and DOL in a pilot program that offers up to $3,000 per spouse to train or become licensed/certified in transportable careers. This Military Spouse Career Advancement Account pilot focuses on preparing spouses to work in high-growth, high-demand industries and occupations such as health care, information technology, early childhood education, and information technology. The pilot is currently available at six Air Force bases as well as other Services’ installations. Air Force will work in conjunction with the other partners to ensure that the opportunity is expanded to other installations. In addition, A&FR staff constantly network with local employers and human resource managers to promote the military spouse as a prime candidate for employment and partner with schools, non-profits, and other community organizations to offer career fairs and other employment resource opportunities.

MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICES (SES)

Question. The Air Force initiated a senior leader management model to enhance and improve management, development, and assignment of SES executives and general officers.

What is your assessment of how the Air Force program is working?

Answer. This is working well. Senior civilian leaders are managed from a total force perspective with the intention of developing and utilizing executive resources consistent with requirements of the Air Force.

What is your vision of the approach the Air Force should take to further improve the management, development, and assignment of SES members, especially in the critically important areas of acquisition, logistics, financial, personnel, and contract management?

Answer. The current system that is in place is working well. I would continue to endorse the Air Force-level assessment board of senior executives to determine leadership potential necessary for our future. Not to be confused with a promotion board, the assessment board is designed to assist in preparing development and utilization plans to place Senior Executives in the right jobs, with the right training, at the right time to best meet corporate requirements. Results of this board often
reflect, or result in, the interchangeability of our senior executive workforce with their uniformed, General Officer counterparts.

JOINT ASSIGNMENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

**Question.** The QDR of February 2006 calls for reorienting defense capabilities in support of joint operations, to include joint air, joint mobility, and joint command and control.

What is your assessment of the opportunities currently available for joint training and assignment today for both military and civilian personnel in the Department of the Air Force?

**Answer.** The Air Force has adequate opportunities for joint training and assignment. Let me explain.

Given the inherent “jointness” of how we are currently operating for global war on terrorism, we have seen significant improvement in how we prepare our people for joint operations and an increase in assignments that require a significant amount of joint understanding. At the same time, we have an eye on requirements. Along that line, the Air Force recently reviewed its ability to prepare officers for joint assignments by convening a panel of experts—internal and external. We concluded that opportunities exist, but our efforts should be more coordinated to ensure we grow military leaders who are steeped in joint as well as military leaders who have been exposed to joint matters. Up to now, our efforts have focused on ensuring military leaders have been exposed to joint experience. We plan to make this shift through guidance to our developmental teams. In addition, we plan on capitalizing on the legislative changes that established a non-billet-based, career-long, multi-level JQS, which allows for many more opportunities to gain, credit, and collect joint capabilities to an expansive pool of airmen.

The Air Force also remains concerned about preparing civilian leaders for joint operations. In fact, the Air Force is the executive agent to five of the nine combatant commands which means employees of these combatant commands are Air Force employees which facilitates movement of Air Force civilian employees in and out of joint organizations. Since the Air Force employs a strong career programs construct in which development of employees for Air Force corporately managed positions, including joint positions, is a primary goal. Therefore there are ongoing efforts to ensure we’ve developed and/or recruited the talent needed to fill these key positions. Moreover, as the Department moves to emphasize joint matters for civilian employees the Air Force seeks innovative ways to provide more senior civilian leaders with joint opportunities. Recently, the Air Force has been using developmental positions to ensure up-and-coming civilian leaders can have joint assignments (for example in the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense staff, non-Air Force serviced combatant commands). In future spirals of the JQS, we will also be looking at capturing experience of our civilian workforce and how to optimize opportunities to increase our joint-capable inventory.

Finally, not only does the Air Force train military and civilian members based on joint assignment requirements, but we also provide many joint education opportunities. In fact, 100 percent of our majors and 100 percent of our Air Force civilians starting with Pay Band 2 can complete Air Command and Staff College by correspondence which provides Joint Professional Military Education level I (JPME–I) certification. In addition, we send almost 450 majors and Pay Band 2 civilians to in-residence JPME–1 schools each year. We also send over 275 lieutenant colonels, colonels, and civilian equivalents to in-residence Joint Professional Military Education level II (JPME–II) certifying schools each year. Based on joint assignments and deployment requirements, we also send approximately 320 officers each year to the Joint and Combined Warfighting School at Joint Forces Staff College where they also receive JPME–II certification. The Air Force believes in educating our military and our civilians as we prepare them for higher-level jobs that support the joint fight.

**Question.** If confirmed, how would you assess the adequacy of the Air Force civilian workforce—in terms of training, experience, and numbers of government personnel—to support the Air Force mission?

**Answer.** If confirmed, I would continue to use the developmental boards that determine how many and which civilians need what level of training.

**Question.** What steps would you take, if confirmed, to move closer to the goal of reorienting Air Force personnel in support of joint operations?

**Answer.** The Air Force goal always is to organize, train, and equip forces to provide air, space, and cyberspace power in support of national defense goals. This by definition means we’ll continue to focus on providing trained personnel to support joint operations. Steps we’ll take would be those already underway—understand the
air, space, and cyberspace capabilities required by the joint world, inventory the personnel we have available to meet those requirements, and implement plans to close any gaps that exist.

MEDICAL PERSONNEL SHORTAGES

*Question.* The military medical corps of all three departments are facing unprecedented challenges in the recruitment and retention of medical and dental personnel needed to support DOD’s medical mission.

*Answer.* The Air Force is no different than the other Services. Significant challenges exist in the recruiting and retention of medical personnel due to lucrative, private sector salaries, which are continuing to rise. Currently, the Air Force’s medical, dental, and nurse corps have significant manning challenges that are directly attributable to the recruiting and retention of these personnel. As the cost of recruiting individuals to the medical specialties has increased, the Air Force’s ability to retain experienced personnel has declined—compounding the problem. Without doubt, substantial challenges remain for the Air Force in order to compete with the private medical sector.

*Question.* What steps would you take, if confirmed, to address recruitment and retention challenges in the Air Force Medical Services as well as the AFR?

*Answer.* If confirmed, I would use the Air Force Recruiting and Retention Investment Strategy Council inputs to determine the right strategy—what pays and at what level.

The Reserves are facing the same challenges as the Active Duty. We have an active “Continuum of Service” program at headquarters, U.S. Air Force, to address gaps that need closing to make the Total Force even more effective as we move forward to operationalize the Reserve Forces.

*Question.* Are you confident that the Department has sufficient tools to achieve goals for recruitment and retention of highly skilled health care personnel? If not, what additional tools might be worthy of consideration in the future?

*Answer.* Yes, the Air Force has received multiple authorities over the past 18 months, including the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007 authorization to pay accession bonuses to fully qualified physicians. We now have 23 different pay types for the 4 Air Force Medical Service Corps—Medical, Dental, Biomedical Sciences, and Nurse Corps. We also received authorization to increase the maximum amount of these pays, generating special pays and bonuses that contribute to a rewarding Air Force career. In addition to tools for attracting qualified candidates for the uniformed Air Force, we have direct hiring authority for civilian health care professions in selected specialties. This authority significantly decreases the processes and time required for hiring. These authorities are vital in helping the Air Force successfully compete with the private sector for highly qualified and motivated health care professionals.

PERSONNEL AND HEALTH CARE COSTS

*Question.* Senior military leaders have testified in favor of the administration’s proposals to significantly increase health care fees for military retirees as a result of the growing portion of the DOD budget devoted to personnel and benefit costs. Do you share the view that future operational readiness of the armed forces is threatened by the increasing costs of personnel benefits?

*Answer.* The balance between operational needs and personnel benefits requires hard decisions but I do not see personnel benefits as posing a threat to the operational readiness of the Air Force. Within Air Force, our corporate structure judiciously balances operational requirements against personnel requirements and compensation. It is our people who enable the Air Force to accomplish its mission. Attracting capable personnel to the Air Force at times requires special bonuses. Retaining trained and experienced personnel likewise requires bonuses and special pays to make Air Force compensation competitive with that offered by the private sector or other Federal and State agencies. On the operational side, our personnel require equipment, planes, weapons, and systems to accomplish the mission. Air Force will continue to follow a planned approach that balances personnel compensation and benefits with operational requirements.

*Question.* What efficiencies and personnel benefit changes do you believe warrant consideration to ensure a viable and affordable force?

*Answer.* Before efficiencies or changes are made to personnel benefits, the Air Force evaluates the effectiveness of existing benefits in attracting and retaining personnel. Programs are updated based on what we learn from our airmen and civilian employees. Within Air Force, a lean work force of highly trained and motivated air-
men and civilian employees utilize the newest technologies to accomplish the mission. The Active Duty, Reserve and Guard members, and civilian employees who compose our Total Force are highly trained and motivated, and use the newest technologies to create a seamless, integrated force that is properly shaped and organized to meet all challenges. Air Force will continue to evaluate the effectiveness of benefits in recruiting and retaining a productive work force, update or modify those programs based on the needs and priorities of our personnel, and balance personnel requirements with operational requirements. We will also continue to train and educate our Total Force, as well as use technology to maintain efficiency and effectiveness.

NATIONAL SECURITY PERSONNEL SYSTEM

Question. The Department is phasing in a pay-for-performance system under the National Security Personnel System (NSPS).

Answer. Air Force has successfully converted over 39,000 employees. This represents all nonbargaining general schedule civilian employees. The small number that have not yet converted are title 5 ANG employees who will convert with their title 32 counterparts, currently scheduled for March 2008. A robust training program delivered in advance of NSPS implementation was key to Air Force’s success. The purpose of the training was to teach skills and behaviors to implement and sustain NSPS and to educate employees about NSPS.

Air Force made available a blended approach of e-Learning courses using the Air Force portal and classroom training to address critical employee behavior, such as effective communications, problem solving, change-readiness, and leadership, under NSPS. Over 109,000 training occurrences for such courses were recorded to date in the Air Force.

Air Force funded train-the-trainer training for a large cadre of trainers from both management and personnel. This prepared our bases and commands with the capability to deliver NSPS technical courses to the workforce, including military managers, prior to NSPS deployment. Over 72,000 training occurrences for such courses have been recorded to date in Air Force.

Question. What are the most critical features of NSPS for the Air Force?

Answer. The most critical feature of NSPS for the Air Force is the performance management system that is foundational to NSPS because it is a significant change from the two-tier system in place for the remainder of the workforce. Increased management responsibility for compensation is another critical feature.

Question. If confirmed, how would you monitor the acceptance of the new system by the Air Force civilian workforce, and how would you intervene if acceptance of the system fell below expected levels?

Answer. I plan to monitor acceptance using the Annual Status of Forces Survey of DOD Civilian Employees, administered for the DOD by the Defense Manpower Data Center. The survey assesses leadership and management practices that contribute to agency performance; and employee satisfaction with leadership policies and practices, work environment, rewards and recognition for professional accomplishment and personal contributions to achieving organizational mission, opportunity for professional development and growth, and opportunity to contribute to achieving organizational mission. We recently received the results of the 2007 survey and are reviewing those results to determine the questions that serve as bellwether(s) for NSPS acceptance as well as the level of change that would warrant intervention and the method of intervention.

AIR FORCE FAMILY SUPPORT

Question. What are the key characteristics needed to ensure adequate support for Active and Reserve component families, particularly those who live great distances from military installations?

Answer. The key characteristics are timely support for the family members and accessibility regardless of the Air Force component. Air Force supports families, both Active and Reserve components, through a variety of programs and services such as Extended Duty Child Care, Air Force Stay Connected deployment kits, Airman and Family Readiness Centers, and Reserve Family Readiness Programs.

Question. How do you perceive the relationship between quality of life improvements and your own top priorities for military recruitment and retention?

Answer. We are very aware of the fact that we recruit the airman but retain the family. Quality of life programs that complement our monetary programs are critically important and very well aligned with my top priorities for recruitment and re-
tention. However, the pace of deployments is taking a toll on our families. Airmen love to contribute to the global war on terrorism, and we take exceptional care of the families left behind, but the pace of absenteeism from the homefront has an impact that quality of life sometimes cannot alleviate.

**Question.** If confirmed, what further enhancements to military quality of life would you make a priority, and how do you envision working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, family advocacy groups, and Congress to achieve them?

**Answer.** We have multiple programs to enhance the quality of life. As I go out and talk to the airman around the world I will ask for their feedback.

**GENERAL AND FLAG OFFICER NOMINATIONS**

**Question.** Under section 506 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the Services must provide substantiated adverse information to promotion selection boards selecting officers for promotion to the grades of O7 and above.

What is your understanding of the status of the Air Force’s implementation of this requirement?

**Answer.** The Air Force has provided substantiated adverse information to general officer selection boards in the form of Senior Officer Unfavorable Information Files (SOUIFs) for at least the last 10 years. A SOUIF contains the following: substantiated adverse information collected by the Inspector General, any action taken by the commander, and the officer’s comment or response to the SOUIF, if any.

If adverse information is not substantiated in time for review by a promotion selection board, that information will be presented to a promotion review board before the Secretary of the Air Force decides whether to support the officer for appointment to the next higher grade.

**Question.** What guidance is currently being provided by the Secretary of the Air Force to promotion selection board members about the manner in which such adverse information should be considered?

**Answer.** In his Memorandum of Instructions to each general officer selection board, the Secretary of the Air Force addresses adverse information when discussing SOUIFs and Exemplary Conduct provisions. In particular, he describes what is contained in a SOUIF—adverse information collected by the Inspector General and command action, in addition to the officer’s comment or response, if any. He also instructs the board to “first make the judgment in each case whether the matter described in the SOUIF has served as a learning experience or is symptomatic of carelessness or character flaw, and then consider whether the incident should be a bar to promotion.” The Secretary of the Air Force also outlines the exemplary conduct provisions as set forth in title 10, U.S.C., section 8583. Finally, by signing the board report, all board members certify to the Secretary of the Air Force that “the officers recommended for promotion, including those who had adverse information furnished to the board, are in the opinion of the majority of the members of the board fully qualified and best qualified for promotion to meet the needs of the Air Force consistent with the exemplary conduct requirements of section 8583, of title 10, U.S.C.”

**INTERSERVICE TRANSFERS**

**Question.** At the same time that the Army and Marine Corps are working harder than ever to achieve recruiting and retention goals, the Air Force has implemented force reductions affecting junior officers and is planning for additional significant reductions in Active-Duty and Reserve military personnel. While a bonus for interservice transfer has been authorized, additional incentives may be necessary to encourage “blue to green” (BtG) transfers in order to retain airmen with valuable military training, skills, and experience.

What is your assessment of the adequacy of existing incentives for interservice transfers by Air Force personnel facing involuntary separation?

**Answer.** The Air Force has targeted its drawdown on officers and enlisted in over-age career fields and over-age year groups to shape the force as we achieve authorized end strength. By incorporating the BtG program with other voluntary force shaping initiatives, we maximize the options for our officers and enlisted who might otherwise face possible involuntary separation. Increasing the Army’s interservice transfer incentive from $2,500 to $10,000 has had a positive effect.

**Question.** If confirmed, what steps, if any, would you take to enhance the number of BtG interservice transfers?

**Answer.** Continue to highlight the opportunities for Air Force officers and enlisted facing further drawdown that they can continue their military careers and retain
the attractive benefits of Active Duty service by transferring to the Army. Some examples that the Air Force is already doing to enhance the program:

- Air Force provided FSB/RIF eligible list information to Army so they could send out over 2,500 BtG mailers.
- Air Force waived recoupment of unearned portions of most bonuses for those going BtG.
- Posted announcements of BtG program on LESs.
- Force Shaping messages contain BtG transfer information.
- Advertises the program via the Force Shaping website.
- Briefs BtG during all transition seminars.

WOUNDED WARRIORS AND DISABILITY EVALUATION

Question. What do you consider to be the most critical changes that are needed in the current disability evaluation system?

Answer. To the servicemember, the Disability Evaluation System (DES) is overly bureaucratic, complex, and frustrating ... and takes many months to complete. The DOD and Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) are proactively addressing the issues raised by Congress, Review Groups, and Commissions regarding the DES. Two major concerns involve the differences among the Services and between DOD and DVA regarding how disability ratings are determined, as well as the duplicative physical exam requirements of the Services and DVA. DOD and DVA are working jointly to integrate the activities of both Departments to simplify the process, foster consistency, and provide a smooth post-separation transition for veterans and their families.

Regarding the two major concerns, on November 26, 2007, DOD and DVA initiated a joint DES pilot program in the National Capital Region to streamline the DES process, as well as implement other process improvements. Members referred into the DES pilot will undergo a single, comprehensive DVA physical examination, eliminating the other physical exam required by each Service. Additionally, the DVA has the responsibility for determining disability ratings for all Service-connected conditions, unfitting or not. The Services will decide whether a servicemember with an unfitting condition will be separated or retired based on this DVA-determined rating(s)—this will simplify the physical determination and foster consistency of decisions among the Services and between DOD and DVA.

The DES pilot also will test enhanced non-clinical care and administrative activities, such as case management, benefits education, and the counseling requirements associated with disability case processing. The goal of the DES pilot is to shorten the time required to transition servicemembers to veteran status and provide them with their VA benefits and compensation.

Overall, our objective is to improve the timeliness, effectiveness, and transparency of the DES process, as well as case management practices for our servicemembers.

DIVERSITY IN THE AIR FORCE

Question. In its policies and practices, the Air Force is committed to the principles of equal opportunity with the goal of promoting equity, eliminating unlawful discrimination, and building teamwork and readiness.

Answer. Where and when appropriate, the Air Force uses and should continue to use affirmative action plans and measures aimed at achieving and nurturing diversity. For example, the Air Force has active programs to support the reemployment and accommodation of service disabled veterans and people with targeted disabilities. Through such programs as the Disabled Veterans Affirmative Action Program and the Air Force Wounded Warrior Program, disabled veterans are both valued and sought after in the Air Force. They currently represent almost 12 percent of the permanent workforce. In fact, the Air Force was recently recognized by DOD as the best military department for its employment of people with targeted disabilities.

Question. What is your view of the proper use of affirmative action plans and measures aimed at achieving or nurturing diversity in the Armed Forces?

Answer. The Air Force has already incorporated appropriate DOD policy on diversity into guidance provided to promotion selection boards.

In accordance with DOD Promotion Board Guidance, “To remain competitive, the Department must have members from the entire spectrum of qualified talent available in the United States. Accordingly, DOD needs to make every effort to encourage service by individuals from all backgrounds by providing for the equal treatment and equitable consideration of all personnel considered for promotion.” I fully endorse this guidance.
Question. In your opinion, how, if at all, should considerations relating to gender and minority status with respect to race, ethnicity, and nationality be addressed in the guidance provided by the Secretary to promotion selection boards?

Answer. The Air Force has already incorporated appropriate DOD policy on diversity into guidance provided to promotion selection boards. In accordance with DOD Promotion Board Guidance, “To remain competitive, the Department must have members from the entire spectrum of qualified talent available in the United States. Accordingly, DOD needs to make every effort to encourage service by individuals from all backgrounds by providing for the equal treatment and equitable consideration of all personnel considered for promotion.” I fully endorse this guidance.

Question. What is your understanding of the manner in which considerations relating to gender and race, ethnicity, and nationality are used in cadet selection policies at the U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA)?

Answer. The Air Force welcomes and supports diversity at our USAFA. We are convinced that diversity significantly enhances the quality of higher education. We encourage everyone who believes that he or she may qualify to apply for admissions. USAFA is committed to consider all applications lawfully, individually, and fairly. That means that selection decisions are made without regard to religion, race, ethnicity, nationality, or gender. The exception to this is that we have a strong international cadet program where cadets are nominated by their home nations.

Question. Do you agree with the USAFA’s approach with respect to the selection of applicants?

Answer. First, we have a process today that results in a Cadet Wing full of great cadets. The current selection process is lawful, and is being administered fairly. Selection decisions are made without regard to religion, race, ethnicity, nationality, or gender. In the past 2 years the Academy has accepted the highest number of women cadets ever, and of African American cadets in recent history. However, we are absolutely committed to achieving greater diversity. The way to continue to improve is through recruiting a more diverse applicant pool. The Academy is developing a very robust diversity plan to achieve that end. We are also working through our Board of Visitors to improve the congressional nomination submission rate. In addition, we are beginning to look at diversity as a broader composition of individual characteristics then just race, ethnicity, or gender. In order to expose all cadets to the broadest possible range of ideas and experiences, USAFA considers such things as life’s experiences, socioeconomic background, whether an individual is a first generation college student, language abilities, and more. This approach will broaden the aperture for recruiting, and we believe will result in ever a richer educational experience for future cadets.

SEXUAL ASSAULT

Question. On February 25, 2004, the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Personnel conducted a hearing on policies and programs of the DOD for preventing and responding to incidents of sexual assault in the Armed Forces at which the service vice chiefs endorsed a “zero tolerance” standard. Subsequently, in response to congressional direction, the Department developed a comprehensive set of policies and procedures aimed at improving prevention of and response to incidents of sexual assaults, including appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault.

Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on confidential reporting, to be effective?

Answer. Yes, I do. Sexual assault is a complex problem. The decision to allow victims the opportunity to make a restricted report, thereby providing her or him time to receive medical assistance and counseling, the ability to provide forensic evidence, and the time to regain control of the decisions impacting their lives is an important factor in helping the victim to begin to heal. We want victims to report this crime so that we can hold offenders accountable but we know that this is the most under reported crime in America and we need to provide a venue where victims who are reluctant to report can receive care.

Question. What is your understanding of the manner in which the new policies have been implemented in the Air Force?

Answer. My understanding is that the Air Force has taken a very aggressive approach to addressing sexual assault. As a result of an Air Force-wide Assessment of U.S. Air Force Sexual Assault Prevention and Response in 2004, coupled with the DOD Task Force Report on Care for Victims of Sexual Assault, the Air Force implemented an aggressive prevention and response program. Full-time Sexual Assault Response Coordinators (SARCs) are in place at Air Force installations working di-
rectly for the Vice Wing Commander. The majority are GS–12 civilian employees. A portion of the SARCs are Active-Duty military so that there are a sufficient number of trained SARCs for deployment. Volunteer victim advocates (military and DOD civilian employees) are screened by the SARCS and trained to assist victims. SARCs and Victim Advocates receive 40 hours of initial training in subjects such as victimology, critical advocacy skills, knowledge of the military, victim reporting preferences, criminal investigative processes, military judicial and evidentiary requirements, and health care management of sexual assault and medical resources/treatment options. With the assistance of subject matter experts, the Air Education and Training Command developed and is deploying educational modules at all levels of basic, intermediate, professional military education levels, and for pre-deployment.

The Air Force is currently developing a Bystander Intervention program to address other methods of prevention.

**Question.** If confirmed, what oversight role would you expect to play in implementing DOD policies on sexual assault throughout the Air Force, including Active and Reserve components?

**Answer.** I believe the Air Force has made significant progress in victim assistance and prevention but the complexity of this issue and its pervasiveness throughout all society require that we continue to monitor policies and procedures and their effectiveness. I would work closely with OSD Personnel and Readiness and the various Air Force functional communities who are vital to our access to support and making policy corrections where necessary. While the portfolio of the Assistant Secretary contains policy oversight responsibility for some of the key first responders (personnel, health care providers, Guard and Reserve) I would work closely with all first responders to maintain a proactive and vital Air Force team ... with the goal of eliminating the crime but assuring that where there is a victim, she or he receives the best care we can provide.

**UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY**

**Question.** In 2003, in response to complaints of sexual assaults and harassment of female cadets at the USAFA, the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff initiated the "Agenda for Change" (AfC), which introduced numerous changes at the Academy aimed at preventing and responding to incidents of sexual assault.

**What elements of the AfC have been most effective and which have been modified or dropped, and why?**

**Answer.** The AfC called for a strong focus on development of the character that is expected from a commissioned Air Force officer—the honor and integrity that reflect the core values of the Air Force. That means developing cadets so that their loyalty to these values and to the institution is above loyalty to their peers or anyone who betrays these values. Much of what appears in the AfC is designed to achieve that singular purpose. The extensive policies, training, and procedures to prevent and respond to sexual assault are prime examples of that focus. It was this refocusing on developing officers of character that has been most effective because it drove a positive change in the cadet culture.

While the intent of the AfC is being met, we have backed off on some individual directives. For example, we made some organizational changes—such as changing to Vice Superintendent to a Director of Staff, or having the Director of Athletics report to the Commandant of Cadets, that over time proved not to be ideal organizational constructs, therefore, we reverted to the original structure.

**Question.** What is your assessment of the reforms included in the AfC, and what is your understanding of the current equal opportunity climate at the USAFA?

**Answer.** The AfC was the initial catalyst that started moving the Academy in the right direction. Combined with the many recommendations we received from reviews, surveys, and reports such as the Fowler Panel Report we have made great progress. As we continue to move forward, we need to ensure we don’t lose sight of the underlying AfC principles—developing officers of character motivated to lead in the Air Force.

The equal opportunity climate at the USAFA is, overall, very positive.

**Question.** The reviews, focused on the status and problems experienced by female cadets at the USAFA in 2003, demonstrated the importance of focused, informed oversight by service civilian and military senior leaders of conditions for female cadets and midshipmen. The Service Academy 2006 Sexual Harassment and Assault Survey found that even with the implementation of corrective measures sexual assault and harassment continue to be factors negatively affecting female cadets at the military academies.

**What is your evaluation of the conclusions and recommendations of the Service Academy 2006 Sexual Harassment and Assault Survey and the Report of the De-
fense Task Force on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies?  
Answer. We examined each of the conclusions and recommendations made available to us through the various reviews, reports, and surveys, and they have been instrumental in the development of our policies and programs. Specifically, the Service Academy 2006 Gender Relations Survey provided considerable insight into the status of unwanted, gender related behaviors. It showed we still have work to do in addressing these complex social issues. However, it also showed significant progress in our training programs and overall improvement in female perceptions of USAFA leadership and cadet culture. These were very positive trends. It was also one of the only reports we have seen that provided some context to this issue by sighting the prevalence of these crimes in civilian institutions.

The Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment and Violence at the Military Service Academies primarily addressed the United States Military Academy and Naval Academies because the Fowler Panel had previously completed a very detailed review of the USAFA. In fact, by the time the report was released the USAFA was already in compliance or acting on 41 of the report’s 44 primary recommendations. This was largely due to the fact that we had taken decisive action on the Fowler Panel recommendations—addressing all 21 recommendations spanning accountability, oversight, organizational culture, intervention, and response to sexual assault.

Question. What actions would you expect to take, if confirmed, to address the problems of sexual assault and sexual harassment at the USAFA and with respect to the Air Force’s programs in this regard?

Answer. First, I would like to emphasize the significant attention, resources, and deep commitment that has been put forth on these issues by leaders in Congress, OSD, the Air Force, and the Academy over the last several years. We have made progress. The recently released Annual Report on Sexual Harassment and Violence at U.S. Military Service Academies for Academic Year 2006–2007 conducted by the DOD Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Officer highlights that progress. It states, “The USAFA leadership has clearly demonstrated commitment to their Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program through sustained and dedicated efforts. USAFA has done an outstanding job developing and continuously improving policies, procedures, and processes designed to prevent and respond to sexual violence in accordance with DOD policies.” It goes on to state that, “Appropriate mechanisms are in place both at Headquarters Air Force (HAF) and USAFA to ensure oversight of the effectiveness of the sexual assault prevention and response program at USAFA.”

Now is the time for dedicated, persistent oversight. I will ensure we stay focused on providing the best possible education and training, the best prevention and response programs, and continue to improve the cadet culture. One sexual assault is too many, so we simply cannot let up on continuously improving on what we have started here.

RELIGIOUS PRACTICES IN THE AIR FORCE

Question. What is your assessment of corrective measures taken at the USAFA to ensure religious tolerance and respect, and of Air Force guidelines regarding religious tolerance that were promulgated in August 2005?

Answer. USAFA has made great strides in enhancing their religious respect program. Initially, HAF helped them in developing and implementing an extensive training program based on respecting individual values that reached every cadet and every member of the faculty, staff, and permanent party. That type of training has now been incorporated into initial recurring training. It is important to note that the steps taken at the USAFA to ensure religious tolerance and respect are directly in line with the religious respect guidelines for the greater Air Force. It is critical that we have one consistent set of guidelines that are fair to everyone and applied equally across the board because the USAFA is not an institution unto itself but part of the larger Air Force.

The task of providing for free exercise of religion, while not appearing to establish a religion, is complex enough in any government setting. Arguably, it is even more complex in a military environment, and yet again more challenging in a university military setting. The Revised Interim Guidelines Concerning Free Exercise of Religion in the Air Force, dated February 9, 2006, represents a thoughtful effort to strike the right balance on this issue. The guidelines remain interim because we need to be absolutely sure we have this right, and living with the guidelines for an extended period of time is the best way to understand their full impact.
Question. What additional steps, if any, do you think need to be taken with respect to the role of military chaplains in performing their duties in ministering to airmen?

Answer. I don’t anticipate making any significant changes to the interim guidelines until we have more experience with them. The guidelines task HQ Air Education and Training Command with developing a plan for incorporating the guidelines in all venues of formal training and education for officers, enlisted, and civilian personnel where Air Force Core Values and professional standards are addressed. In addition, we are developing a computer-based training program for all Air Force members. We are well on our way to creating a climate founded on respect. Dedicated and determined oversight is what is needed now to ensure we remain focused on that outcome.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRANSFORMATION ROADMAP

Question. A Foreign Language Transformation Roadmap announced by the Department on March 30, 2005, directed a series of actions aimed at transforming the Department’s foreign language capabilities, to include revision of policy and doctrine, building a capabilities-based requirements process, and enhancing foreign language capability for both military and civilian personnel. What is your understanding of the status of the actions identified in the Defense Language Transformation roadmap?

Answer. As the acting Under Secretary, I’ve kept abreast of the Defense Language Transformation Roadmap, and I can tell you with certainty that the Air Force is fully committed to increasing language and cultural capabilities amongst our airmen. As of June 2007, the Air Force achieved Full Operational Capability with respect to the 10 specific tasks assigned to the Services. In addition, Joe McDade, the Air Force’s Senior Language Authority, is actively engaged in the Defense Language Steering Committee in facilitating achievement of the remaining 12 tasks to be completed under the Roadmap.

The Air Force’s specific initiatives have established a strong foundation for embedding language and cultural competencies within our force. As a matter of fact, our institutional competencies embrace language and culture as part of airman development throughout a career. I look forward to continued coordination with Dr. Chu as the DOD continues along the path of Defense Language Transformation to meet irregular warfare and stability, security, and transition missions.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to identify foreign language requirements, and to design military and civilian personnel policies and programs to fill those gaps?

Answer. The changing nature of warfare, and the advent of stability and security operations as the norm, have highlighted the need for Air Force personnel to be able to operate in diverse regions with diverse cultures. The nature of our mobile force also demonstrates our airmen’s adaptability to diverse cultures, which enables operational effectiveness. I will continue to champion Air Force efforts to identify language requirements and cultural skill sets and focus on deliberately developing language capabilities based on validated requirements.

Question. The Air Force works with the USD (Policy) in publishing the Department of Defense Strategic Language List, which reflects regions and languages the DOD anticipates engagement in over the next 15 years. Additionally, the Air Force Senior Language Authority supplements that list based on unique Air Force missions. Upon confirmation, I will continue to ensure Air Force coordination with the combatant commands and defense agencies to fully identify foreign language requirements.

Question. What is your assessment of an appropriate time frame within which results can be realized in this critical area?

Answer. The Air Force is continuing to target airman for development . . . the right airman, at the right place, at the right time. Since implementation of the Language Transformation Roadmap, there have already been results in developing a foundational and surge capability within the Air Force. Our airmen deploying overseas are provided language familiarization kits while airman supporting the rebuilding of the Iraqi and Afghani Air Forces are receiving language training from Defense Language Institute mobile training teams. I also realize that learning a language is not an overnight endeavor. In the summer of 2010, the Air Force will be commissioning the first cohort of Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets on foreign language scholarships and seeing the benefits of increased summer immersion tours and study abroad opportunities. The path has been laid and I believe if we fly the course we will continue to see the benefits.
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Question. Do you believe that Air Force language proficiency incentives for personnel are appropriate and effective—that is, that they encourage personnel to learn foreign languages? If not, why, and what would you do to address this issue, if confirmed?

Answer. The increases in foreign language proficiency pay (FLPP) in June 2006 may have incentivized some who were already familiar with one of the strategic languages. However, it takes the average person several years to achieve fluency in a nonromance language at a level that qualifies for FLPP. If confirmed, I will ensure the appropriate emphasis is continued to be placed on foreign language skills, to include an increased focus on sustaining and enhancing capabilities.

Question. What is your view regarding whether Air Force Special Operators should be “SOF for life” from the perspective of language and cultural awareness training and retention?

Answer. I support the Air Force premise of the right airmen, at the right place, at the right time. In terms of SOF airmen with a specific mission enhanced by language, cultural and regional awareness, I view retention in line with Air Force requirements. I will continue to ensure training and education opportunities are targeted to the right airmen to ensure Air Force support of the SOCOM mission is met.

Question. For over 10 years, U.S. Transportation Command and its subordinate command, Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, have worked to improve the process of moving servicemembers' household goods. Implementation of the new system—“Families First”—will use a “best value” approach to contracting with movers that will focus on quality of performance, web-based scheduling, member counseling, and tracking of shipments using the new Defense Personnel Property System (DPS), encouragement of door-to-door moves, and full replacement value for damaged household goods. Implementation of Families First and DPS is now taking place, but the support of the military Services is critical to its success.

What is your understanding of the progress being made in the Air Force, including adequate funding, in implementing the Families First program, and what challenges remain?

Answer. Based on the recently authorized $100 million (PBD) to cover anticipated increased costs associated with Families First implementation and Full Replacement Value protection for loss and damage to household goods shipments, we understand there is sufficient funding within the Air Force.

Question. If confirmed, what role would you and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel expect to play in ensuring that Families First is fully explained to airmen and women and that customer satisfaction surveys are submitted in order to ensure the system works as intended to measure the performance of movers?

Answer. Our role is one of support to A4 who has responsibility for household goods transportation activities within the Air Force. At the time of assignment notification, military members are advised to contact their location Transportation Office to arrange household goods movement. USTRANSCOM developed a robust customer satisfaction survey process, tracks progress, and provides feedback to A4.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information. Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?

Answer. Yes.
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

1. Senator Levin. Mr. Duehring, a draft DOD Instruction currently circulating within the Pentagon would provide that: “The appointment of a judge advocate (or for the Marine Corps, an officer designated as a judge advocate) requires the coordination of the General Counsel of the Military Department concerned for appointment of officers to grades O–6 and below, and requires the coordination of the General Counsel of the Department of Defense for officers appointed to grades above O–6.”

In your view, would such a requirement, if adopted: effectively give civilian lawyers—political appointees—a veto over the recommendations of promotion boards?

Mr. DUEHRING. Although I had seen the article from the Boston Globe, this matter has not yet formally come to my attention as it is currently in staffing to the Services. I am advised that it was not language developed by the Air Force, and that DOD is deleting that language from the draft instruction.

2. Senator Levin. In your view, would such a requirement, if adopted: constitute an improper interference of political appointees in the promotion board process?

Mr. DUEHRING. That language will not be in the final version of the instruction.

3. Senator Levin. In your view, would such a requirement, if adopted: have a potentially chilling effect on legal advice furnished by JAG attorneys to military commanders, and by JAG to the Chiefs of Staff?

Mr. DUEHRING. That language will not be in the final version of the instruction.

4. Senator Levin. In your view, would such a requirement, if adopted: call into question the neutrality and impartiality of legal advice furnished by military lawyers?

Mr. DUEHRING. That language will not be in the final version of the instruction.

In summary, the language has been removed which should put the immediate issue to rest. Additionally, on a personal level, I believe that the ability of the JAG to provide independent advice should not be impaired. As I state in testimony, there is no place in the promotion process for inappropriate political influence.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

TRICARE FOR RESERVES

5. Senator McCain. Mr. Duehring, the readiness of the Reserve component for military operations, particularly physical fitness and readiness, has been a major concern, resulting in a number of initiatives, including authorization of TRICARE benefits for Reserves. Based on your experience within the Department, has the health status of Reserve components improved measurably since 2001, or is medical and dental readiness a continuing problem? If so, why?

Mr. DUEHRING. The medical readiness and physical fitness of Air Reserve Component (ARC) servicemembers continue to improve steadily. Tracking of the six individual readiness metrics mandated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), i.e. dental readiness, periodic health assessments, immunization status, laboratory tests, no deployment limiting conditions, and individual medical equipment and fitness readiness allows the Services to focus their efforts for improving these areas. These improvements result from command emphasis, medical squadron diligence, focused contractual support, and individual servicemember effort.

The ARC funds a Reserve Health Readiness Program contract that has increased dental readiness by providing additional dental exams for its members. OSD funds a Post Deployment Health Reassessment contract that provides increased screening services, thereby increasing the members’ continuum of care following deployments. Qualifying National Guard and Reserve members and their families may purchase the TRICARE Reserve Select health care and/or the TRICARE Dental Program. Reservists ordered to Active Duty for a period of more than 30 consecutive days have the same medical and dental TRICARE coverage as Active-Duty servicemembers.

Network adequacy for TRICARE-eligible reservists varies by region. We continue to investigate this issue and work with our managed care support contractors to increase TRICARE participation within the network by health care providers.
We continually review, research, and implement programs and legislation that will improve the medical readiness and physical fitness of the Reserve components.

6. Senator M. McCain. Mr. Duehring, if confirmed, how would you recommend better monitoring and improving the health status of Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard personnel?

Mr. Duehring. Accelerating the electronic health record portion of AHLTA would facilitate access to VA medical records belonging to ARC personnel, enabling DOD to better monitor and ultimately improve the health status of those personnel. Currently, DOD relies on episodic screening for medical readiness examinations and self-reporting by the servicemember. Gaps in the available medical data and elective disclosure or nondisclosure by the servicemember may adversely impact readiness decisions made on the servicemember’s behalf. Thus access to a servicemember’s VA medical record will increase the validity of the assessment of a servicemember’s medical readiness.

We must continue to encourage increased participation in the TRICARE Reserve Select healthcare program and TRICARE Dental program. In those regional areas lacking complete coverage we must continue to seek ways to make the coverage robust for all TRICARE-eligible Reserve members.

New accessions to the ARC often have extensive dental requirements and basic and technical training schedules do not allow for time to address more than basic dental needs. Providing a dental benefit after completion of basic military training, technical school, or deployments, similar to the Transitional Assistance Management Program for medical care, would help alleviate this problem.

ROLE OF CIVILIANS IN EXPEDITIONARY MISSIONS

7. Senator M. McCain. Mr. Duehring, one of the issues that this committee will have to address in this and future conflicts is the utilization of Federal civilian employees in support of expeditionary missions. What are your views on the incentives needed to promote civilian service, including support of contingency operations?

Mr. Duehring. Federal civilians do currently deploy in support of expeditionary missions. In fact, many are hired with the expectation they will deploy into combat theaters. DOD has aggressively pursued incentives. The current program covers needs of the individual as evidenced by our success in recruiting civilian employees for nontraditional jobs such as the joint OSD/State Department Provisional Reconstruction Team mission in Iraq just last year.

There is continuing pressure for tax exempt status for deployed civilians, similar to the benefit military members receive. Since the pay/compensation structures of our military and civilian members are so different, it is difficult to make a direct comparison of benefits, but the lack of tax exemption is perceived as an inequity.

8. Senator M. McCain. Mr. Duehring, if confirmed, how would you lead the Air Force civilian service to even higher levels of training and performance?

Mr. Duehring. Air Force civilians are an increasingly large percentage of our workforce, and we rely on them as never before to deliver air, space, and cyberspace power in support of the Nation’s security.

Already the Air Force has strong programs in place to promote career-long development of our civilian workforce, including opportunities for our civilian employees to attend professional development in residence without a tax on our organizations. We also have formal developmental constructs in place and utilize development teams to assess the potential of civilian employees, vectoring those who participate toward appropriate developmental opportunities—educational, training, or experiential (e.g., reassignment).

Moreover, we have collaborated with others in DOD to implement a pay-for-performance culture by transitioning as many government service employees as possible to the National Security Personnel System and transitioning all senior civilians (e.g., members of the Senior Executive Service) to a pay-for-performance system.

My efforts after confirmation will focus on continuing the implementation of developmental programs for civilians as well as furthering the culture change required in a pay-for-performance system. Performance based management requires a shift in thinking from a task-based to a competency-based system which will enable capabilities planning.

As we increasingly compete for top talent, we will continue to focus on force management planning tools and workforce flexibilities to continue to attract, retain, and reward a high-performing workforce. The cornerstone of our strategy will be to con-
continue to develop and implement a competency-based occupational management system. We have teamed with other DOD partners already in development of broad competencies in several of our mission critical occupations. Identification of the competencies and competency gaps in these mission critical occupations will enable us to focus deliberate development and training on those occupations that have the most impact on capability.

I look forward to the opportunity to ensure our Air Force is best positioned to utilize its personnel—military and civilian—in support of our Nation’s security.

[The nomination reference of Craig W. Duehring follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
November 15, 2007.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

Craig W. Duehring, of Minnesota, to be an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, vice Michael L. Dominguez.

[The biographical sketch of Craig W. Duehring, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIographical Sketch of Craig W. Duehring

Mr. Duehring is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

As the Principal Deputy, Mr. Duehring serves as the senior deputy to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs in policy development and overall supervision of the Reserve Forces of the Armed Forces of the United States. He is the chief staff advisor to the Assistant Secretary for all functional areas and responsibilities assigned to the office.

As the acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, Mr. Duehring heads a four-division department that deals at the policy level with Air Force Manpower and Reserve Affairs issues. He is responsible for providing overall supervision of manpower, military and civilian personnel, Reserve component affairs, and readiness support for the Department of the Air Force.

Previously, Mr. Duehring served on the Bush-Cheney Transition Team and the Department of Defense Transition Team. He was the executive director of the Patrick Henry Center for Individual Liberty, a non-profit 501(c)(3) educational and charitable foundation located in Fairfax, VA. Mr. Duehring was the endorsed Republican candidate for the Minnesota 2nd Congressional District in 1998. He is a 28-year military veteran, retiring as a colonel in the U.S. Air Force in February 1996. His final military assignment was as the U.S. Air Attaché to the Republic of Indonesia.

He is a decorated combat pilot, completing over 800 missions during the Vietnam war as a Forward Air Controller. Mr. Duehring has flown more than a dozen types of aircraft, amassing over 1,200 hours in the A-10 Thunderbolt II. His military awards and decorations include the Silver Star, the Defense Superior Service Medal, 2 Distinguished Flying Crosses, 3 Meritorious Service Medals, 27 Air Medals, 2 Air Force Commendation Medals, the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry (individual award), and the Vietnamese Staff Service Honor Medal (1st Class). Mr. Duehring is also a recipient of the Air Force’s highest individual award for leadership in the senior officer category, the Lance P. Sijan (SIGH-john) Award. Mr. Duehring holds a bachelor of science in History and Sociology from Minnesota State University at Mankato, and a master of science in Counseling and Guidance from Troy State University.

He is a native of Mankato, MN.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details]
the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by Craig W. Duehring in connection with his nomination follows:

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. **Name:** (Include any former names used.)
   Craig William Duehring.

2. **Position to which nominated:**
   Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

3. **Date of nomination:**
   November 15, 2007.

4. **Address:** (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive files.]

5. **Date and place of birth:**
   April 25, 1945; Mankato, MN.

6. **Marital Status:** (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Theresa Bayne Duehring.

7. **Names and ages of children:**
   None.

8. **Education:** List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received, and date degree granted.
   Minnesota State University at Mankato, BA, December 1967.
   Troy State University, MS, June 1975.

9. **Employment record:** List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.
   Nov. 1998–Nov. 1999 (est.) unemployed.
   Nov. 1999–July 2000 (est. dates) Executive Director, Patrick Henry Center for Individual Liberty, Gary Aldridge - president, 10525 West Drive, Fairfax, VA.
   July 2000 (est.)–July 2001, I worked various volunteer positions on the Bush-Cheney campaign including the transition team.
   July 2001–present, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, (PDASD/RA), Pentagon.
   June 2007–present, PDASD/RA and Acting Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, Manpower and Reserve Affairs.
10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.

None.

11. Business relationships: List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other institution.

None.

12. Memberships: List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.

- American Legion—affiliated with China Post #1. 1975–present.
- Veterans of Foreign Wars—affiliated with Post #1648, New Ulm, MN. Life member since 1996.
- Reserve Officers Association—2002–present.
- German Historical Institute—2002–present.
- Junior Pioneers of New Ulm, MN. Life member since 1996.
- Brown County (Minnesota) Historical Society—1996–present.

13. Political affiliations and activities:

(a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.

- Republican Candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives (MN–2) 1996.
- Republican Candidate for the U.S. House of Representatives (MN–2) 1998.

(b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.

None.

(c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

- President George Bush.
- Mark Kennedy for Senate.
- Sen. Norm Coleman.
- Sen. George Allen.

14. Honors and awards: List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.

Awards and Honors:
- Silver Star
- Defense Superior Service Medal
- Distinguished Flying Cross with oak leaf cluster
- Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters
- Air Medal with 26 oak leaf clusters
- Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster
- Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross
- Republic of Vietnam Staff Service Medal (First Class)

Other Achievements:
- 1987 Lance P. Sijan Award, senior officer category

15. Published writings: List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.

Multiple speeches given as the endorsed Republican candidate for Congress in the 1996–1998 timeframe. I also wrote letters to the editor during that period. Prior to my appointment as the PDASD/RA at the Department of Defense, I often gave speeches to civic groups about my time in Southeast Asia. My current duties require quite a bit of public speaking on behalf of the Department of Defense and the U.S.
Air Force—mostly to military audiences. I have not published any books, opinion columns, and the like.

16. **Speeches:** Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

None.

17. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

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**SIGNATURE AND DATE**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

Craig W. Duehring.

This 20th day of November, 2007.

[The nomination of Craig W. Duehring was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on December 18, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 19, 2007.]

[Prepared questions submitted to John H. Gibson by Chairman Levin prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

**QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES**

**DUTIES OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE (FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT)**

**Question.** What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management)?

**Answer.** It is my understanding, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) is principally responsible for the exercise of the comptrollership functions of the Air Force, including all financial management functions. Additionally, this position is responsible for all financial management activities and operations of the Air Force and advising the Secretary of the Air Force on financial management.

**Question.** What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

**Answer.** Currently, I am serving as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Management Reform) in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)/Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). Both of these experiences have allowed me direct involvement in and exposure to many of the financial management strategies, efforts, and challenges which exist throughout the Department. Additionally, I have previously held several senior executive level management positions in the private sector in which I have been directly responsible for financial, management, operating, and strategic performance of an organization. Also, I received an undergraduate degree in Finance, and an undergraduate degree in Economics as well as a Masters in Business Administration.

**Question.** Do you believe that there are any actions that you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management)?

**Answer.** Although my current position has allowed me some insight into Air Force financial management, if confirmed, I will need to quickly become familiar with this...
area in much greater detail, including the specific challenges and issues the Air Force financial management organization is addressing, both short- and long-term.

RELATIONSHIPS

Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) and each of the following?

The Secretary of the Air Force.

Answer. It is my understanding, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) is the principal advisor to the Secretary of the Air Force on financial management matters. The Assistant Secretary (Financial Management) also performs other duties as the Secretary may prescribe.

Question. The Under Secretary of the Air Force.

Answer. It is my understanding, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) is also the principal advisor to the Under Secretary of the Air Force on financial management matters. The Assistant Secretary (Financial Management) also performs other duties as the Under Secretary may prescribe.

Question. The other Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force.

Answer. It is my understanding, the Assistant Secretary (Financial Management) works closely with the other Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force, and provides advice and input on financial matters, and provides financial management policy leadership, guidance, implementation and coordination, as appropriate.

Question. The General Counsel of the Air Force.

Answer. It is my understanding, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) would have a close working relationship with the General Counsel of the Air Force, to always include an understanding of any and all legal implications in Air Force financial matters to assure compliance with the appropriate rules and regulations.

Question. The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

Answer. Considering my current service in the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) office, it is my understanding, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) works closely with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in the development and execution of financial, budgetary, and fiscal policies as they relate to the Air Force.

Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/Chief Information Officer.

Answer. It is my understanding, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) works closely with the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation.

Question. The Director, Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation.

Answer. It is my understanding, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) would work with the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation to ensure the program priorities of the Air Force are well understood and thorough Air Force program reviews are conducted within the framework of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process and timetable. Additionally, this Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) works to convey and communicate the results to Air Force leadership, and ensures the results are in line with overall Department of Defense (DOD) strategy.

Question. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

Answer. It is my understanding, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) would work closely with the Chief of Staff to provide support required in order to execute his duties and responsibilities to achieve the overall mission of the Air Force.


Answer. It is my understanding, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) works closely with the with the Assistant Secretaries of the Army and Navy in the area of financial management in an effort to facilitate integrated and coordinated decision making at all levels and achieve the strongest cooperation between the Services possible. A cordial and productive working relationship with these colleagues is essential to successfully supporting the efforts of the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY ROLES IN THE AIR FORCE BUDGET PROCESS

Question. What is your understanding of the division of responsibility between the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) and the senior military officer (the Director, Air Force Budget) responsible for budget matters in the Air Force Financial Management office in making program and budget decisions, including the preparation of the Air Force Program Objective Memorandum, the annual budget submission, and the Future Years Defense Program?

Answer. It is my understanding, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) has the responsibility and authority for all budget matters within the Air Force, and accordingly, the Director, Air Force Budget would serve as a direct report to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) and would be responsible for the formulation, justification, and execution of the Air Force budget, including the preparation of the Air Force Program Objective Memorandum and the Future Years Defense Program.

BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION AGENCY

Question. The Department recently established the Business Transformation Agency (BTA) to strengthen management of its business systems modernization effort.

What is your understanding of the mission of this Agency and how its mission affects the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management)?

Answer. Given my current role in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and its interactions with the BTA, it is my understanding, the mission of the BTA is responsible for executing enterprise level business transformation and therefore works with the functional leaders and components to accomplish its mission. Given the BTA stated mission and the tiered accountability approach to its execution, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) will be allowed the flexibility to direct the requirements for the Air Force financial management mission, while continuously coordinating and integrating with the BTA to ensure meeting the enterprise level mission requirements as well.

Question. What is your understanding of the role of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) in providing the Air Force's views to the Agency, or participating in the decisionmaking process of the agency, on issues of concern to the Air Force?

Answer. It is my understanding, given the tiered accountability governance of the BTA's mission, the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) should continuously coordinate and integrate with the BTA to ensure the BTA is aware of the ongoing Air Force issues, as well as to understand the challenges and issues at the enterprise level.

MAJOR CHALLENGES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges that will confront the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management)?

Answer. In my opinion, the major challenges the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) will face are: significant, continuous pressure on budgetary resources and the constant challenges of meeting the Air Force's mission needs with the resources available; and continuing the significant effort to improve the Air Force's financial management through improvement in financial processes and financial systems.

Question. Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have to address these challenges?

Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Air Force leadership to develop and execute sound, logical, and workable budgets which take into account the Air Force mission objectives as well as the overall budgetary environment. Additionally, I will work with the Air Force and DOD leadership to continue, and possibly enhance, the Air Force efforts to achieve improved business processes and systems, primarily through active oversight and involvement in the Air Force's responsibilities in the FIAR and Enterprise Transition Plan (ETP) programs. Lastly, as the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management) serves in a financial management leadership role, my goal would be to provide strategic leadership and vision in areas the Air Force can benefit financially and operationally on a longer-term basis.
PRIORITIES

Question. If confirmed, what broad priorities would you establish in terms of issues which must be addressed by the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management)?

Answer. If confirmed, my priorities would be to focus on the major challenges: addressing budgetary pressures and performance; sustaining the ongoing improvement in business processes, systems, and operations; and providing strategic guidance in the financial management area.

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Question. The DOD's financial management deficiencies have been the subject of many audit reports over the past 10 or more years. Despite numerous strategies and inefficiencies, problems with financial management and data continue. What do you consider to be the top financial management issues that must be addressed by the Department of the Air Force?

Answer. As it relates to financial management issues which have been the subject of many audit reports, it is my opinion the significant financial management and data issues to be addressed are: continued improvement in business processes and operations; continued improvement in business systems; and addressing the culture to embrace and support these system and process improvements.

Question. If confirmed, how would you plan to ensure that progress is made toward improved financial management in the Air Force?

Answer. If confirmed, my initial plan to ensure financial management progress continues would be to: support the Air Force’s compliance with the FIAR and ETP programs; evaluate, support, and enhance the Air Force efforts to improve business processes and operations; support and be involved in any efforts to communicate the qualities and benefits of process and systems improvements; support efforts for training and education all across the financial management spectrum; and work with other areas of the Department to benefit from best practices, insights, and synergies as it relates to all these areas.

Question. If confirmed, what private business practices, if any, would you advocate for adoption by the DOD and the Department of the Air Force?

Answer. Although the DOD and the Department of the Air Force are unique from the private sector in their mission and in many operational aspects, there are certainly a number of financial and management practices which are similar to the private sector and could benefit from best practices being used elsewhere. If confirmed, I would encourage the sharing of best practices with not only the other Services, agencies, and departments in the Federal Government, but strongly advocate awareness and adoption of practices where there is an appropriate private sector practice the Air Force would benefit by emulating.

Question. What are the most important performance measurements you would use, if confirmed, to evaluate changes in the Air Force’s financial operations to determine if its plans and initiatives are being implemented as intended and anticipated results are being achieved?

Answer. Performance metrics play a significant role in the success of any financial operations, and if confirmed, I will work to understand and manage the current financial performance metrics the Air Force is employing and also will work with the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) to ensure the financial performance metrics the Air Force uses in the future will support the financial operations success of both the DOD and the Department of the Air Force.

Question. Over the last several years, the DOD has taken a number of steps to realign its management structure to expedite and enhance its business transformation efforts. For example, the Department has established a new Defense Business Systems Management Committee, the BTA, and the Investment Review Boards. The military departments do not appear to have taken similar organizational steps. Do you believe the organizational structure of the Department of the Air Force is properly aligned to bring about business systems modernization and improvements in the financial management of the Air Force?

Answer. In my current role in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) I am aware the Department has and is constantly evolving its management and oversight of its business transformation efforts, and recent governance changes have served to increase the oversight and inclusiveness of transformation efforts department-wide. I am not familiar with the specifics of the Air Force’s organizational structure and governance to comment on its current alignment with the overall DOD structure.
Question. If not, how do you believe the Department should be restructured to more effectively address these issues?

Answer. At this point I do not have a complete understanding of how the Air Force is structured to address this issue, however, if confirmed, I would work to fully understand this issue and be capable of addressing whether the current governance structure is adequate.

ENTERPRISE TRANSITION PLAN

Question. For the past several years, the administration has published an ETP aimed, in part, at correcting deficiencies in the DOD’s financial management and ability to receive an unqualified “clean” audit.

Answer. If confirmed, I would work to fully understand this issue and be capable of addressing whether the current governance structure is adequate.

Question. The Business Management Modernization Program advocates top-down leadership in establishing an enterprise architecture for business systems modernization. The Services, however, appear to be pursuing independent pilot programs for modernizing business systems, despite the risk that a Service-led approach could produce numerous incompatible systems.

Do you support an OSD-led approach to business modernization?

Answer. Yes. A common, integrated, and coordinated architecture is essential to the effective and efficient aggregation of financial data for reporting, thereby optimizing the information available for management decisionmaking.

GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO) RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM

Question. The Comptroller General has taken the position that the enterprise architectures of the military departments are not mature enough to responsibly guide and constrain investment in business systems. According to GAO, the Air Force has fully satisfied only 14 of 31 core framework elements of an enterprise architecture.

What is your view of this issue? If confirmed, what steps, if any, do you plan to take to address this problem?

Answer. Through my current position, I am familiar with the evolving enterprise level governance structure which has been put in place, and it is my view this structure, and the current integration and oversight of investments in modernizing business systems, is effective and continuously improving. I do not have an understanding of the military departments (and specifically the Air Force) level of maturity as it relates to the governance and status of their enterprise architecture efforts and therefore do not feel I can comment.
Question. Do you believe that we need additional controls on the expenditure of funds for business systems until such time as the required enterprise architecture is complete?

Answer. Since I do not have a full understanding of the Air Force’s business systems governance and processes, it would be premature for me to comment as to the adequacy of their internal controls. However, if confirmed, given the significant amount of taxpayer dollars being invested in these systems, and the important role the systems play in future financial management success, this would be an important area to quickly understand and become involved in.

Question. In testimony before the Readiness and Management Support Subcommittee, the Comptroller General of the United States, David M. Walker, suggested that to improve the likelihood of meaningful, broad-based financial management and related business reform at DOD, DOD should give the leaders of DOD’s functional areas, or “domains,” control of systems investments.

What is your view of this suggestion?

Answer. Since I am not familiar with the specific governance structure of “domains” which exist in the Air Force, I would not be comfortable expressing a view as it relates to the Air Force. However, in general, it is my belief the most effective and efficient use of any investment occurs with control at the local level. It should be noted, in situations where local “domains” are building blocks of enterprise level programs, a top down oversight and integration should also exist.

Question. Mr. Walker testified that the DOD should fix its financial management systems before it tries to develop auditable financial statements. He explained that: “Given the size, complexity, and deeply ingrained nature of the financial management problems facing DOD, heroic end-of-the-year efforts relied on by some agencies to develop auditable financial statement balances are not feasible at DOD. Instead, a sustained focus on the underlying problems impeding the development of reliable financial data throughout the Department will be necessary and is the best course of action.”

Do you agree with this statement?

Answer. Yes, with the general spirit of Comptroller General Walker’s statement.

Question. What steps need to be taken in the Air Force to achieve the goal stated by the Comptroller General?

Answer. I am not aware of the details of the Air Force programs and efforts to achieve the goals Comptroller General Walker is referring to, however, in general, compliance with the FIAR and ETP programs (as they relate to Air Force) are going to be significant contributors to achieve the goals Comptroller General Walker is proposing.

LEASING MAJOR WEAPON SYSTEMS

Question. The controversy surrounding the Air Force 767 tanker lease proposal raised significant concerns over leasing versus purchasing major military equipment.

What is your opinion of leasing versus buying major capital equipment?

Answer. In the private sector, both options have value, but the best choice is strictly contingent upon the financial and operational variables involved, and each situation is unique. I am not intimately familiar with the specifics or arguments of leasing versus purchase as it relates to the Federal environment, and therefore cannot comment one way or another.

Question. Is leasing a viable and cost-effective option for procuring Department of the Air Force equipment, and if so, in what situations?

Answer. I am not familiar with the specifics or arguments of the leasing versus purchase evaluation in the Federal environment, and more specifically as it might pertain to the Air Force. However, if I am confirmed, this is an area that I would quickly become familiar with, consult with the functional areas, as well as this committee to determine the financial management opinion on the option which is the highest, best, and most proper use of the taxpayer’s dollars.

SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING AND ANNUAL BUDGETING

Question. Since September 11, 2001, the DOD has paid for much of the cost of ongoing military operations through supplemental appropriations.

What are your views regarding the use of supplemental appropriations to fund the cost of ongoing military operations?

Answer. Recently, supplemental appropriations have been used as a funding mechanism for war-related military operations in a very fluid, dynamic environment, as opposed to the base budgeting process which has a longer lead time and is more rigid in nature. More recently, the global war on terror anticipated costs
have been combined with the base budget. It is my opinion that budgeting for costs associated with global war on terror can be presented in either fashion, and if confirmed, I will work with the Air Force, Department leadership, and Congress to support the presentation of the budget in which ever fashion is chosen.

AUTHORIZATION FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Question. Do you believe that an authorization pursuant to section 114 of title 10, U.S.C., is necessary before funds for operations and maintenance, procurement, research and development, and military construction may be made available for obligation by the DOD?
Answer. Yes. I do recognize situations can occur where funds have been appropriated but not authorized in the Department, and it is my understanding it is the Department's practice to work with all the oversight committees to communicate and resolve these situations. If confirmed, I will work closely with the oversight committees to achieve a resolution of the situation, if it arises, and will respect the views and rights of the committees.

INCREMENTAL FUNDING

Question. Both the executive and legislative branches have traditionally followed a policy of full funding for major capital purchases such as aircraft. However, the Department of the Air Force has used incremental funding to purchase certain satellites.
What is your view of the incremental funding of major capital investments?
Answer. I do not have a full understanding of the details or arguments of the full versus incremental funding analysis, and more specifically as it would pertain to the Air Force. However, if I am confirmed, this is an area that I would work to better understand, and consult with the functional areas, as well as this committee to determine the financial management opinion on the option which is the highest, best, and most proper use of the taxpayer's dollars.

FUNDING FOR HEALTH CARE FACILITIES

Question. The conditions identified at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in February 2007 focused considerable attention on the care, management, and transition of wounded servicemembers, as well as the condition of medical care facilities.
What is your understanding of the Secretary of the Air Force’s responsibility for the maintenance and modernization of Air Force medical facilities?
Answer. I am not familiar with the responsibilities of the Secretary of the Air Force as it relates to maintenance and modernization of Air Force medical facilities.
Question. Do you believe the current system of oversight and funding for DOD medical facilities clearly defines responsibility and authority between the military departments and the OSD?
Answer. I am not familiar with the current system of governance and funding for DOD medical facilities as it relates to the responsibilities and authorities between the military departments and the OSD.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.
Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this committee and other appropriate committees of Congress?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this committee, or designated members of this committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management)?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings, and other communications of information are provided to this committee and its staff and other appropriate committees?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree to provide documents, including copies of electronic forms of communication, in a timely manner when requested by a duly constituted committee of Congress, or to consult with the committee regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such documents?
Answer. Yes.

VerDate 11-SEP-98 16:01 May 15, 2008 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01293 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 42309.TXT SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2
[The nomination reference of John H. Gibson follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,

SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

October 26, 2007.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

John H. Gibson, of Texas, to be an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, vice Michael Montelongo, resigned.

[The biographical sketch of John H. Gibson, which was transmitted to the committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF JOHN H. GIBSON II

Jay Gibson joined the Department of Defense in February 2006 to serve as Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Management Reform) in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) with responsibilities for pursuing financial, operational, and management improvements across the Office of the Secretary of Defense as well as defense wide. Mr. Gibson also served as the acting Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Financial Management) from August 2006 to July 2007.

Prior to joining the Department of Defense, Mr. Gibson held several senior management roles in private industry. Most recently, Mr. Gibson managed a consulting organization focusing on the workout and turnaround environment providing advisory services to both borrowers and lenders. Earlier in his career, he served in senior executive roles with several different organizations in financial, operational, strategic, and policy positions.

Mr. Gibson received two undergraduate degrees (Bachelor of Business Administration-Finance, Bachelor of Arts-Economics) from the University of Texas at Austin, and his Masters in Business Administration from the University of Dallas. Mr. Gibson and his wife are from Texas, and have two sons.

[The Committee on Armed Services requires all individuals nominated from civilian life by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by John H. Gibson in connection with his nomination follows:]

UNITED STATES SENATE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Room SR–228

Washington, DC 20510–6050

(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM

BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior
to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made
available to the public.

1. **Name:** (Include any former names used.)
   John H. Gibson II.

2. **Position to which nominated:**
   Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management).

3. **Date of nomination:**
   October 26, 2007.

4. **Address:** (List current place of residence and office addresses.)
   [Nominee responded and the information is contained in the committee’s executive
   files.]

5. **Date and place of birth:**
   February 15, 1959; Flushing, NY.

6. **Marital Status:** (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)
   Married to Lauris Marie Hillard.

7. **Names and ages of children:**
   Davis Hillard Gibson, age 11.

8. **Education:** List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended,
   degree received, and date degree granted.
   Bachelor of Arts, Economics, The University of Texas at Austin, May 1981.
   Bachelor of Business Administration, Finance, The University of Texas at Austin,
   December 1981.
   Masters of Business Administration, The University of Dallas, August 1994.

9. **Employment record:** List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years,
   whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location
   of work, and dates of employment.
   Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Management Reform), Office of the Secretary
   of Defense (Comptroller), February 2006 to present.
   Managing Director, DK Consulting Group, LLC, Abilene, TX, June 1999 to January
   2006.
   Vice President/COO, Galbraith Electric Company, Abilene, TX, February 1995 to
   May 1999.

10. **Government experience:** List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other
    part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than
    those listed above.
    City of Abilene, Electrical Subcommittee (Appointed/Resigned).
    Airport Development Board, Facilities and Planning Subcommittee, Taylor County,
    TX (Appointed/Resigned).

11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director,
    trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corpora-
    tion, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational, or other
    institution.
    None.

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in profes-
    sional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations.
    St. John’s Episcopal Church, McLean, VA—Member.
    Jewel Chanty Ball, Fort Worth, TX (Charitable)—Member.
    Steeplechase Club of Fort Worth, Fort Worth, TX (Social)—Nonresident Member.
    Air Force Association—Member.

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**
    (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office
        for which you have been a candidate.
        None.
    (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political
        parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
    (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, po-
        litical party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past
        5 years.
        2002 - Texans for Senator John Cornyn - $500.
14. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.

None.

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.

None.

16. **Speeches:** Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

None.

17. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

Yes.

[The nominee responded to the questions in Parts B–F of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee’s answers to Parts B–F are contained in the committee’s executive files.]

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**Signature and Date**

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

JOHN H. GIBSON.

This 30th day of October, 2007.

[The nomination of John H. Gibson was reported to the Senate by Chairman Levin on December 18, 2007, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on December 19, 2007.]
APPENDIX

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE ON BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CIVILIAN NOMINEES

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050
(202) 224–3871

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.

1. Name: (Include any former names used.)

2. Position to which nominated:

3. Date of nomination:

4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses.)

5. Date and place of birth:

6. Marital Status: (Include maiden name of wife or husband’s name.)

7. Names and ages of children:

8. Education: List secondary and higher education institutions, dates attended, degree received and date degree granted.

9. Employment record: List all jobs held since college or in the last 10 years, whichever is less, including the title or description of job, name of employer, location of work, and dates of employment.

10. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed above.
11. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, company, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution.

12. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices currently held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations.

13. **Political affiliations and activities:**
   (a) List all offices with a political party which you have held or any public office for which you have been a candidate.
   
   (b) List all memberships and offices held in and services rendered to all political parties or election committees during the last 5 years.
   
   (c) Itemize all political contributions to any individual, campaign organization, political party, political action committee, or similar entity of $100 or more for the past 5 years.

14. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, military medals and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements.

15. **Published writings:** List the titles, publishers, and dates of books, articles, reports, or other published materials which you have written.

16. **Speeches:** Provide the committee with two copies of any formal speeches you have delivered during the last 5 years which you have copies of and are on topics relevant to the position for which you have been nominated.

17. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM**

**FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES**

**INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE:** Information furnished in Parts B through F will be retained in the committee’s executive files and will not be made available to the public unless specifically directed by the committee.

**Name:**

**PART B—FUTURE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS**

1. Will you sever all business connections with your present employers, business firms, business associations or business organizations if you are confirmed by the Senate?

2. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the government? If so, explain.

3. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements after completing government service to resume employment, affiliation or practice with your previous employer, business firm, association or organization?

4. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any capacity after you leave government service?

5. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where?

6. If confirmed, do you expect to serve out your full term or until the next Presidential election, whichever is applicable?
PART C—POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation agreements, and other continuing dealings with business associates, clients or customers.

2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.

3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial transaction which you have had during the last 10 years, whether for yourself, on behalf of a client, or acting as an agent, that could in any way constitute or result in a possible conflict of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.

4. Describe any activity during the past 10 years in which you have engaged for the purpose of directly or indirectly influencing the passage, defeat or modification of any legislation or affecting the administration and execution of law or public policy.

5. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including any that may be disclosed by your responses to the above items. (Please provide a copy of any trust or other agreements.)

6. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions provided by the General Counsel of the agency to which you are nominated and by the Attorney General's office concerning potential conflicts of interest or any legal impediments to your serving in this position?

PART D—LEGAL MATTERS

1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics for unprofessional conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to any court, administrative agency, professional association, disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, provide details.

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by any Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of any Federal, State, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance, other than a minor traffic offense? If so, provide details.

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency proceeding or civil litigation? If so, provide details.

4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo contendere) of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic offense?

5. Please advise the committee of any additional information, favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in connection with your nomination.

PART E—FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

1. Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g., employee, attorney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe such relationship.

2. If you or your spouse has ever been formally associated with a law, accounting, public relations firm or other service organization, have any of your or your spouse’s associates represented, in any capacity, with or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe such relationship.
3. During the past 10 years have you or your spouse received any compensation from, or been involved in any financial or business transactions with, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please furnish details.

4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act? If so, please furnish details.

PART F—FINANCIAL DATA
All information requested under this heading must be provided for yourself, your spouse, and your dependents.

1. Describe the terms of any beneficial trust or blind trust of which you, your spouse, or your dependents may be a beneficiary. In the case of a blind trust, provide the name of the trustee(s) and a copy of the trust agreement.

2. Provide a description of any fiduciary responsibility or power of attorney which you hold for or on behalf of any other person.

3. List sources, amounts and dates of all anticipated receipts from deferred income arrangements, stock options, executory contracts and other future benefits which you expect to derive from current or previous business relationships, professional services and firm memberships, employers, clients and customers.

4. Have you filed a Federal income tax return for each of the past 10 years? If not, please explain.

5. Have your taxes always been paid on time?

6. Were all your taxes, Federal, State, and local, current (filed and paid) as of the date of your nomination?

7. Has the Internal Revenue Service ever audited your Federal tax return? If so, what resulted from the audit?

8. Have any tax liens, either Federal, State, or local, been filed against you or against any real property or personal property which you own either individually, jointly, or in partnership?

(The committee may require that copies of your Federal income tax returns be provided to the committee. These documents will be made available only to Senators and the staff designated by the Chairman. They will not be available for public inspection.)

SIGNATURE AND DATE
I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

______________________________________________.

This ———— day of ———————————, 20———.
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES QUESTIONNAIRE ON BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF CERTAIN SENIOR MILITARY NOMINEES

UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Room SR–228
Washington, DC 20510–6050

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM
BIOGRAPHICAL AND FINANCIAL INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES FOR CERTAIN SENIOR MILITARY POSITIONS

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE:
Complete all requested information. If more space is needed use an additional sheet and cite the part of the form and the question number (i.e. A–9, B–4) to which the continuation of your answer applies.
If you have completed this form in connection with a prior military nomination, you may use the following procedure in lieu of submitting a new form. In your letter to the Chairman, add the following paragraph to the end:
‘I hereby incorporate by reference the information and commitments contained in the Senate Armed Services Committee form ‘Biographical and Financial Information Requested of Nominees for Certain Senior Military Positions,’ submitted to the Committee on [insert date or your prior form]. I agree that all such commitments apply to the position to which I have been nominated and that all such information is current except as follows: . . . .’ [If any information on your prior form needs to be updated, please cite the part of the form and the question number and set forth the updated information in your letter to the Chairman.]

PART A—BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Biographical information furnished in this part of the form will be made available in committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearings and will also be published in any hearing record as well as made available to the public.
1. Name: (Include any former names used.)
2. Position to which nominated:
3. Date of nomination:
4. Address: (List current place of residence and office addresses. Also include your office telephone number.)
5. Date and place of birth:
6. Marital Status: (Include name of husband or wife, including wife’s maiden name.)
7. Names and ages of children:
8. Government experience: List any advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the Committee by the Executive Branch.
9. **Business relationships:** List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, educational or other institution.

10. **Memberships:** List all memberships and offices held in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable and other organizations.

11. **Honors and Awards:** List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognitions for outstanding service or achievements other than those listed on the service record extract provided to the Committee by the Executive Branch.

12. **Commitment to testify before Senate committees:** Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify upon request before any duly constituted committee of the Senate?

13. **Personal views:** Do you agree, when asked before any duly constituted committee of the Congress, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

**COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES FORM**

**FINANCIAL AND OTHER INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES**

**INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE:** Information furnished in Parts B through E will be retained in the committee’s executive files and will not be made available to the public unless specifically directed by the committee.

**Name:**

**PART B—FUTURE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS**

1. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue outside employment, with or without compensation, during your military service. If so, explain.

2. Has anybody made a commitment to employ your services in any capacity after you leave military service?

**PART C—POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST**

1. Describe all financial arrangements, deferred compensation agreements, and other continuing dealings with business associates, clients or customers.

2. Indicate any investments, obligations, liabilities, or other relationships which could involve potential conflicts of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.

3. Describe any business relationship, dealing or financial transaction which you have had during the last 10 years, whether for yourself, on behalf of a client, or acting as an agent, that could in any way constitute or result in a possible conflict of interest in the position to which you have been nominated.

4. Explain how you will resolve any potential conflict of interest, including any that may be disclosed by your responses to the above items. (Please provide a copy of any trust or other agreements.)

5. Do you agree to provide to the committee any written opinions provided by the General Counsel of the agency to which you are nominated and by the Office of Government Ethics concerning potential conflicts of interest or any legal impediments to your serving in this position?

6. Is your spouse employed and, if so, where?
PART D—LEGAL MATTERS

1. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics for unprofessional conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to any court, administrative agency, professional association, disciplinary committee, or other professional group? If so, provide details.

2. Have you ever been investigated, arrested, charged or held by any Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of Federal, State, county or municipal law, regulation or ordinance, other than a minor traffic offense? If so, provide details.

3. Have you or any business of which you are or were an officer ever been involved as a party in interest in any administrative agency proceeding or litigation? If so, provide details.

4. Have you ever been convicted (including a plea of guilty or nolo contendere) of any criminal violation other than a minor traffic offense?

5. Please advise the committee of any additional information, favorable or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in connection with your nomination.

PART E—FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS

1. Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g., employee, attorney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe such relationship.

2. If you or your spouse has ever been formally associated with a law, accounting, public relations firm or other service organization, have any of your or your spouse’s associates represented, in any capacity, with or without compensation, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please fully describe such relationship.

3. During the past 10 years have you or your spouse received any compensation from, or been involved in any financial or business transactions with, a foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please furnish details.

4. Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents Registration Act? If so, please furnish details.

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed the foregoing Statement on Biographical and Financial Information and that the information provided therein is, to the best of my knowledge, current, accurate, and complete.

______________________________

This ———— day of ————————————, 20———.