S. Hrg. 110-452
NOMINATION OF DR. DONALD M. KERR
TO BE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
AUGUST 1, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER BOND, Missouri, Vice Chairman
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California JOHN WARNER, Virginia
RON WYDEN, Oregon CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
EVAN BAYH, Indiana SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
BILL NELSON, Florida RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky, Ex Officio
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Ex Officio
JOHN McCAIN, Arizona, Ex Officio
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Andrew W. Johnson, Staff Director
Louis B. Tucker, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
CONTENTS
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August 1, 2007
Page
Hearing held in Washington, DC, August 1, 2007
Statement of:
Bond, Hon. Christopher S., Vice Chairman, a U.S. Senator from
Missouri................................................... 1
Mikulski, Hon. Barbara, a U.S. Senator from Maryland......... 20
Bingaman, Hon. Jeff, a U.S. Senator from New Mexico.......... 2
Warner, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from Virginia.............. 4
Kerr, Dr. Donald M., Nominee for the position of Principal
Deputy Director for National Intelligence.................. 6
Supplemental Material:
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Questionnaire for
completion by Presidential Nominees........................ 28
Pre-Hearing Questions for Donald M. Kerr..................... 54
Glynn, Marilyn L.; General Counsel, Office of Government
Ethics Leter to The Honorable John D. Rockefeller, IV...... 96
Financial Disclosure Report of Donald M. Kerr................ 101
Letter to Robert Cusick, Director, Office of Government
Ethics from Corin R. Stone, Principal Deputy General
Counsel, Office of the Director of National Intelligence... 97
Letter to Corin R. Stone, Designated Agency Ethnics Official,
Office of the Director of National Intelligence from Donald
M. Kerr.................................................... 100
NOMINATION OF DR. DONALD M. KERR TO BE
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
----------
AUGUST 1, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable
Christopher Bond (Vice Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Bond, Mikulski, Feingold, Nelson of
Florida, Whitehouse, Chambliss, Snowe, and Warner.
Also present: Senator Bingaman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, VICE CHAIRMAN, A
U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI
Vice Chairman Bond. This hearing will come to order.
Chairman Rockefeller regrettably is unable to be here today due
to an unavoidable conflict and he has asked me to preside over
the hearing, pursuant to the Committee rules and practice.
I ask unanimous consent that any opening statements that
Members may have or that the witness may have may be included
in the record in full. Hearing no objection, it is so ordered.
Dr. Kerr, I welcome you today for the Committee's hearing
on your nomination to be the next Principal Deputy Director of
National Intelligence. I appreciate having an opportunity to
meet your wife Alison and welcome her and other family members.
As we know, in May 2006, General Hayden resigned this
position to become Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
and since then, in spite of the importance of this Principal
Deputy position for the IC, there had not been an urgency to
fill this vacancy permanently. Earlier this year the Committee
held a hearing on the nomination of Admiral Mike McConnell to
be DNI. At that time we asked if he would make finding a new
Principal Deputy a priority. We were assured it would be, and
Director McConnell has been good to his word. I'm pleased we're
finally able to consider Dr. Kerr to fill this key post.
While a lot of focus is necessarily placed on the DNI, the
role of Principal Deputy is no less essential to the success of
the intelligence community and to its continued transformation.
I expect that, should Dr. Kerr be confirmed by the Senate, his
background in technology and science can be extremely useful.
He comes before the Committee having spent most of his
professional career in Government service. He has served in
various positions at Los Alamos National Laboratory and at the
Department of Energy. More recently, he was Assistant Director
of the Laboratory Division at the FBI, and then the Deputy
Director for Science and Technology at the CIA. For the past 2
years, he has served as Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office, which unfortunately is one of the more troubled and
poorly performing agencies within the intelligence community.
In addition to his Government service, Dr. Kerr has held
several executive management positions in the private sector.
These experiences collectively and separately give Dr. Kerr
a unique perspective in assessing the technology and science
challenges lying ahead for the intel community.
I would say that one of the most important things he can do
is use the best science and technology to engineer an effective
structure in the intelligence community. We gave a massive
charge to the DNI and did not give him the tools to accomplish
that task. So we look to the new Principal Deputy and the
Director to give us a road map for next year on how we can
assure that the community operates as we expected but
regrettably did not give it the tools to do.
There are going to be some questions about programmatic
decisions Dr. Kerr made as a Director of the NRO, some we
consider missteps at the NRO prior to his tenure. That
testimony will have to be taken in closed session. But I must
say in open forum that there had been a disturbing lack of
accountability at the NRO for actions that have resulted in the
loss to the taxpayers of, inappropriately enough, an
astronomical amount of dollars. The Committee and the full
Senate will have to understand the reasons for this lack of
accountability, and we look forward to pursuing this in closed
session.
Before concluding, I add a very special word of thanks for
Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, who has filled in as the
Acting Principal Deputy for much of the past year. We are
grateful for his service and applaud his continued dedication
to the intelligence community.
With that, we are pleased to be joined by two distinguished
Members of the Senate who are at the table with Dr. Kerr, I
assume for the purposes of commenting about Dr. Kerr. And I
start over here with a Member of the Committee, Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that we extend
a courtesy to our distinguished colleague so that he can
proceed since I will join you for the balance of the hearing?
So I'm going to stay.
Vice Chairman Bond. Senator Bingaman, equally distinguished
Senator from New Mexico.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF BINGAMAN, U.S. SENATOR
FROM NEW MEXICO
Senator Bingaman. Thank you very much, Chairman Bond. It's
a pleasure to be here to introduce to the Committee and to
endorse the nomination of Don Kerr for this important position.
I became acquainted with Don when I first was elected to
the U.S. Senate and he was the Director of Los Alamos National
Laboratory, and he remained in that position until 1985. While
there, he established a very distinguished record of service.
He established a variety of innovative programs, one of which
I'll just mention to the Committee--the Laboratory-Directed
Research and Development Program, which was and continues to be
a mechanism at the laboratory that has allowed for some of the
very best of the research that is done at not only Los Alamos
but all of our national laboratories to occur.
So I admired his work as head of Los Alamos, and I've
admired his service to the country in many capacities since
then. You went through that list of positions that he has held,
some in the private sector, some in the public sector.
But I feel strongly that he is extremely well-qualified for
this important position. I know that the Committee has a much
clearer view than I do as to all the responsibilities that
attach to this position that he has been nominated for, but I'm
confident that you'll not find anybody who's better qualified
by experience or training or capability to do the work.
So I would recommend that Don Kerr be approved and
recommended to the full Senate for confirmation.
Vice Chairman Bond. Well, thank you very much, Senator
Bingaman. We will, of course, give your comments and support
great weight and we appreciate your taking the time to be with
us.
Senator Bingaman. Thank you.
Vice Chairman Bond. Now I will turn to a fellow Member of
our Committee, the other distinguished Senator at the table,
Senator Warner from Virginia.
Senator Warner. Thank you. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I
wonder if you would invite the nominee to introduce his family.
Vice Chairman Bond. Please, Dr. Kerr.
Dr. Kerr. Well, it will be a very short and brief
introduction. My wife, Alison, with whom I've been living,
working and doing everything else one can do for the past 46
years, is here behind me. Here she is.
Vice Chairman Bond. Welcome, Mrs. Kerr.
Senator Warner. That was brief.
Dr. Kerr. I'm sorry I couldn't do better, sir.
[Laughter.]
Senator Warner. Well, my brief sheet says that there's a
daughter, Margo, and she's not with us today.
Dr. Kerr. Well, we do have a daughter, Margo. She's a
practicing veterinarian in Denver and was here just a week or
so ago with the two little girls she and her husband are
adopting. But now she has to help support them.
Senator Warner. I think it's important that the record
reflect that family.
Mr. Chairman, you've given a very complete briefing on the
nominee's distinguished background, as supplemented by our
colleague Senator Bingaman. So I just want to add a few words
and put my statement into the record.
Vice Chairman Bond. Please.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Warner. I always like to start with the law, and
that is the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 established the office of the Director of National
Intelligence, and the law served as the most dramatic reform of
our Nation's intelligence capabilities since Harry S. Truman
signed the National Security Act of 1947. The 2004 law provides
that the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence--
the nominee now before us--shall assist the Director in
carrying out these duties. Together they are the principal
advisers to the President of the United States and the National
Security Council and the Homeland Security Council for
intelligence matters related to national security and the head
of the United States intelligence community and overseeing and
directing the national intelligence program of our Nation.
Now, despite what I have to say and what others have to
say, the most important endorsement, I think, of this nominee,
next to that of the President in selecting him, is that the
Director of National Intelligence, Admiral McConnell, has
complete confidence in this nominee's abilities to serve as his
Principal Deputy.
We've all seen Admiral McConnell in action, and yesterday
was a clear example of his extraordinary abilities as he
appeared here in the Senate on some very important matters. And
I can only add to this, Mr. Chairman, that--I added it up here
quickly--38 years ago I walked into the Pentagon, in the Navy
Under Secretary's office. And I've been dealing with
intelligence matters for 38 years. And I don't know that I've
ever seen a more qualified individual than Don Kerr to entrust
our Nation's intelligence to.
Good luck to you.
Dr. Kerr. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John Warner, U.S. Senator from Virginia
Vice Chairman Bond and distinguished colleagues; it is my pleasure
to introduce to you today an outstanding intelligence professional,
public servant and Virginian--Dr. Donald M. Kerr--who has been
nominated to serve as our second Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence.
family
I would like to recognize Don's wife, Alison, who is in attendance
today, and to thank her, along with their daughter Margot, for their
steadfast support and sacrifice not only in support of Don, but also
our nation.
role and importance of the dni
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
established the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. This
law serves as the most dramatic reform of our nation's intelligence
capabilities since President Harry S. Truman signed the National
Security Act of 1947, and provides that the Principal Deputy Director
of National Intelligence shall assist the Director of National
Intelligence in carrying out his duties as:
The principal advisor to the President of the United
States, the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council
for intelligence matters related to national security and the head of
the of the United States Intelligence Community.
And in overseeing and directing the national intelligence
program of the United States.
Director of National Intelligence McConnell has confidence in Don's
abilities to serve as his Principal Deputy.
career highlights
The 2004 Act also requires that any individual nominated as
Principal Deputy shall have extensive national security and management
experience. Don has just that, having served in four agencies with
intelligence responsibilities, including as:
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Energy Technology and the
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs at the Department of
Energy.
Federal Bureau of Investigation's Assistant Director in
Charge, Laboratory Division.
Deputy Director for Science and Technology at the Central
Intelligence Agency.
Director of the National Reconnaissance Office, where he
currently serves.
Don began his government career at the Los Alamos National Lab in
1966 and worked his way up through the Lab and the Department of
Energy, eventually becoming Director of Los Alamos in 1979.
private sector service
Don has been equally successful in more than a decade of experience
in private sector leadership and management as:
President and Director of EG&G.
Corporate Executive Vice President of Science
Applications International Corporation (SAIC) in Virginia.
Executive Vice President of Information Systems
Laboratories, Inc.
awards and recognition
In addition to earning numerous awards throughout his career for
meritorious service, Don was awarded the impressive Director's Award
from the Director of Central Intelligence in 2004 and the CIA
Distinguished Intelligence Medal in 2005.
academic credentials
Don earned his undergraduate degree in electrical engineering and
advanced degrees in microwave electronics and plasma physics from
Cornell University.
summary
In short, Dr. Donald Kerr has a long and distinguished record of
service to the intelligence mission of this country, and I am very
pleased to introduce him to the Committee today.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Senator Warner. We
appreciate very much our distinguished colleagues joining us.
And now, before I ask the witness some questions, I want to
add, for my colleagues, following up on what Senator Warner
just described, we have an urgent request before not just this
Committee but the entire Congress.
We haven't been able to act on the DNI's initial proposal 3
months ago to modernize the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act. But the threats are mounting, and we cannot leave the
intelligence community blind or, you might say, deaf in some
significant areas.
I've been excluded from much of the negotiations that the
majority has had with the Administration on this issue, but I
am now involved in the issue and have talked with the DNI, as I
believe it should be at the table. And I urge my colleagues to
consider a revised proposal that the DNI is making that he says
will keep the country safe.
I'd be interested if Dr. Kerr has any comments on
modernizing FISA. If you were already the Principal Deputy,
then you would be spending your days and nights tending the
shop while the DNI has been camped out on the Hill on this
urgent matter, and as Senator Warner said, doing an excellent
job.
There are a series of questions that are standard
procedure, and let me ask you those.
First, as the nominee to be the Principal Deputy Director
of National Intelligence, Dr. Kerr, do you agree to appear
before the Committee here or in other venues when requested?
Dr. Kerr. Yes, I do.
Vice Chairman Bond. Do you agree to send officials from the
ODNI or the intelligence community to appear before the
Committee and designated staff when requested?
Dr. Kerr. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Vice Chairman Bond. Do you agree to provide documents and
any material requested by the Committee in order for it to
carry out its oversight and legislative responsibilities?
Dr. Kerr. Yes, subject only to the caveat, when restricted
by law.
Vice Chairman Bond. Will you ensure that the ODNI and the
intelligence community provide such material to the Committee
when requested?
Dr. Kerr. Yes.
Vice Chairman Bond. All right. Well, thank you very much,
Dr. Kerr.
Now if you would like to offer your opening statement, we
would be happy to receive that.
STATEMENT OF DR. DONALD M. KERR, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE-DESIGNATE
Dr. Kerr. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank
you, and with particular thanks to Senator Warner and Senator
Bingaman for introducing me.
I'm pleased to appear before you to discuss my credentials
as the nominee for Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence. Indeed, it is an honor to have been selected by
the President and Director McConnell, and if I'm confirmed it
will be a privilege to serve.
Based on the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act, and the intelligence community Directive No. 1, as has
been pointed out, the duties and responsibilities of the Deputy
are substantially the same as for the DNI. However, the DNI, I
think, will serve, as he has been, as principal adviser to the
President and other senior officials. So I expect the Principal
Deputy will be focused as much as possible on coordinating and
integrating the activities and products of the 16 organizations
that comprise the intelligence community.
Over a 40-year career, I have held a number of senior level
public and private sector positions and have learned a few
things along the way. In five areas, I think I can bring
strength and experience to this job, such as an ability to
identify and deal effectively with troubled components, which I
have done in at least two Government agencies to this point; a
strong technical and management background; coalition-building
skills; the ability to drive organizational change; and a
strongly held belief that an effective planning system, coupled
with strong financial management, can achieve superior results.
While I learned this latter lesson in the private sector, I've
applied the model to all my subsequent Government jobs.
I've been both personally and professionally committed to
national security throughout my career. I've had direct
responsibility for intelligence and defense activities in four
different Government agencies--the Department of Energy, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, CIA, and the NRO--and I have
supported intelligence programs in private industry and as a
staff member and later as Director of the Los Alamos National
Laboratory.
This has provided me opportunities to work on a wide
variety of intelligence issues, including nuclear
proliferation, treaty monitoring, nuclear test detection and
analysis, and development of future air and space
reconnaissance systems.
I'm particularly proud of the programs I have led to bring
technical solutions to intelligence and law enforcement
challenges. My commitment to countering terrorism began with
activities in 1978 and 1979 when I was the Department of Energy
member of the NSC Executive Committee on Terrorism.
This commitment was substantially reinforced by direct
responsibilities investigating the East African embassy
bombings of 1998 and the attack on the USS COLE in 2000, and
certainly refocused tremendously by 9/11 and the efforts of the
past 6 years.
I'd like to take a minute to talk about my vision for the
intelligence community, as well as several goals I believe are
critical for more effectively focusing the community in the
challenging post-9/11 environment. I'd also like to share my
philosophy about the role of intelligence in our national
security construct.
A popularly held contention is that the role of
intelligence is to protect the Nation from all harm. Well, this
is a succinct way to talk about an ultimate goal. I think the
situation is substantially more complicated than that. One
academic I think got it about right, describing the role of
intelligence as extracting certainty from uncertainty, and
facilitating coherent decisionmaking in an incoherent
environment.
These are not activities that lend themselves to guarantees
or perfect scores as we would like, but they reflect the
reality in which we operate. If I were to state what I believe
the essence of national intelligence is, I would say that the
primary goal is to reduce the risks our Nation faces today and
in the future.
These challenges not only require our ongoing dedication
and commitment to the national intelligence mission but, more
importantly, new and innovative approaches to the work we do,
the operations we plan and carry out, the collection assets we
design, build and operate, the analyses we produce, and the
strategic partnerships we make across traditional and
nontraditional boundaries.
Each era has its seemingly impossible challenges. We all
know the future is unpredictable, and trends hard to predict.
The elements that could significantly transform the
geopolitical landscape include nuclear and biological weapons
proliferation, catastrophic terrorism, and even pandemic
disease.
The intelligence enterprise must think ahead to ensure that
the capabilities needed to deal with these challenging and
ofttimes explosive issues are available to the analyst,
policymaker, operations officer and warfighter when they are
needed.
This is all the more difficult, because the threat is no
longer predictable and confined to specific geographic areas.
It is mobile, dispersed, dynamic and distributed. Intelligence
problems are also developing at a much more rapid pace than
ever before. We need to posture ourselves to deal in that
environment.
And so a few of the things I think most important are our
need to seek global situational awareness to the degree we can.
We need to be able to deliver critical information to support
timely decisionmaking by both policymakers and our military
leadership. We need to be able to anticipate strategic threats,
although that may be the hardest thing of all to do.
Importantly, as a consequence of intelligence reform, we have
to learn to operate as a unified, integrated yet distributed
enterprise. We need to adopt technologies and concepts of
operations that leverage U.S. advantage. And, finally, we need
to maintain appropriate investment levels for future
capabilities.
To do this, I think three elements need to be in place.
First of all, we have the duty to gather critical intelligence,
but to do so in a way that complies with the constitutional and
other legal requirements that protect the freedoms and
liberties of the American people. There must be proper training
and oversight mechanisms for the intelligence community to
ensure that there are clear rules for their activities.
Second, given the non-public nature of most of the
intelligence community's work, the DNI and the principal deputy
must also ensure that Congress is kept appropriately informed
of IC activities to enable Congress to perform its oversight
responsibilities. To exercise such oversight, the Committees
must understand the intelligence process, its organizations,
policies, funding, and activities. The DNI and other members of
the community must communicate on a regular and continuing
basis to keep the oversight committees fully and currently
informed, consistent with the protection of sources and
methods.
Third, the intelligence community must deliver intelligence
information to decisionmakers without bias or prejudice.
Intelligence analysis must be held to the highest standards of
integrity and objectivity. It must also be rigorous, timely,
and independent from political considerations.
To position ourselves to meet the analytic challenges of
today and tomorrow, we must go beyond simply doing our current
jobs better. We must transform the way our analysts do their
work. We must more effectively leverage new and emerging
technologies and reach out to expertise wherever it resides.
Effectively inspiring the expertise and experience of our
talented intelligence professionals requires strong and focused
leadership. If confirmed, I would bring particular emphasis to
a number of areas. I would focus on effective financial
management, including reducing the indirect cost burden on
mission wherever possible. This effort speaks to Director
McConnell's goal of modernizing business practices and
developing verifiable metrics. The real challenge is developing
the right balance between tighter controls and mission
effectiveness, and making financial reporting more useful to
those who manage our programs. I believe that continuous
improvement in financial management should be an intelligence
community priority.
If confirmed, I will assist the DNI in moving the
intelligence community forward from today's uneven but
improving financial management environment to one characterized
by common business processes and integrated systems that adhere
to recognized best business practices across industry and
Government.
Accountability is critically important in ensuring that
officials are responsible for their actions. Within the
intelligence community, accountability ultimately rests with
the DNI and the Principal Deputy. However, in a Government
based upon checks and balances and collective decisionmaking,
determining individual accountability is often very difficult.
It has been my experience that most Government employees,
regardless of whether they reside in the executive,
legislative, or judicial branches, are simply trying to do what
is right for the taxpayer. However, there are occasionally
egregious exceptions, and when they occur swift and decisive
action must be taken. Each and every member of the community is
responsible for using the resources entrusted to them
judiciously. Additionally, all Government employees are
expected to ensure their performance is consistent with the
highest standards of professionalism and integrity. One of the
first items on my agenda, if confirmed, would be to ensure that
each member of the IC is as fully aware of what is expected and
required as practical.
There has been significant discussion about the role of
contractors in the intelligence community lately. There are
compelling reasons why we use contractors to perform critical
functions within the intelligence community. At the NRO, our
industry partners design and build our satellite systems as
well as provide 24 by 7 operational and maintenance support. We
also rely on contractors to provide the basic services that we
generally take for granted in the course of our day. These are
services that are more economically outsourced and include
everything from network maintenance to janitorial support.
There are also certain exigencies that justify an
intelligence agency's use of contractors. For example, if an
agency has a short- term project or mission that exceeds the
capability of its current staff, it is sometimes more
appropriate for that agency to use contractors to meet that
temporary need than to hire and train permanent Federal
civilian employees to perform the work. We also employ
contractors or employees of federally funded research and
development centers to provide specialized capabilities that we
do not find within the Government workforce.
My general philosophy is no contractor should perform
inherently Government work, under no circumstances should a
contractor make policy or investment decisions on behalf of the
Government, and the use of contractors must be more cost
effective than using Government resources. If confirmed, I will
continue to examine the appropriate use of contractors within
the intelligence community.
I believe that the importance of a highly trained workforce
cannot be overstated, either for the NRO or the intelligence
community as a whole. While at the NRO I've taken a number of
steps to work on that problem, starting with a statement of
intent that I signed with the Air Force Chief of Staff more
than a year ago that made it very clear that the Air Force and
the NRO would work closely together to improve the career
development of our shared workforce. We've also teamed with Air
Force Space Command to train space professionals across the
Government in the new National Security Space Institute at
Colorado Springs. I'm working on similar initiatives with the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Currently, the NRO's Acquisition Center of Excellence is
helping our acquisition professionals complete education
requirements leading to advanced degrees in public management
and engineering administration. We've also partnered with
Virginia Tech to provide an engineering administration Master's
degree program onsite at the NRO, and we tried to pull together
all of the rest of our training in a virtual university
construct to benefit all of our employees and our contractors.
If confirmed, I look forward to supporting Director
McConnell in his efforts to more closely integrate the
intelligence community. During my tenure, the NRO has been
working toward an integrated mix of overhead and ground-based
capabilities tailored to the geographically dispersed and
dynamic nature of the current and projected intelligence
problems, as well as the diverse needs of our many users.
Integration is not only a watchword for technical
collection and operations, but it is imperative that we
integrate intelligence collection and analysis more
effectively. They are symbiotic disciplines. We can only
achieve our goals and objectives by coming unified in our
commitment to the intelligence community's contribution to the
strongest defense possible for our Nation and our people.
Thank you for the opportunity to share with the Committee
my background and, if confirmed, my vision for my new role and
responsibilities. I look forward to answering any questions you
may have. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kerr follows:]
Prepared Statement for Dr. Donald M. Kerr, Director, National
Reconnaissance Office and Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence-Designate
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, I am pleased to appear
before you to discuss my credentials as the nominee for Principal
Deputy Director of National Intelligence--the PDDNI. Indeed, it is an
honor to be asked, and if confirmed it will be a privilege to serve. In
discussions with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)--
McConnell, we agree that the role of the PDDNI is analogous to that of
the chief operating officer of a public company. While the DNI is chief
executive officer for the Intelligence Community (IC)--and principal
intelligence adviser to the President and other senior leaders, the
PDDNI should be focused on coordinating and integrating the day-to-day
efforts of the 16 elements that comprise the IC. Before addressing my
vision for the IC, allow me to highlight my background that uniquely
qualifies me to serve as the PDDNI.
Over a 40-year career, I have held a number of senior-level public
and private sector positions, and have obtained a number of critical
skills and lessons learned. In considering the challenges facing the
IC, as well as the responsibilities of the PDDNI, I would ask you to
consider five key areas of strength and experience that are applicable
to this position: an ability to identify and deal effectively with
troubled components; a strong technical background; coalition-building
skills; the ability to drive organizational cultural change; and a
strongly held belief that an effective planning system coupled with
strong financial management can achieve superior results. While I
learned this latter lesson in private industry, I have applied this
model in all my subsequent Government assignments. I have also learned
that the tools and techniques, used to integrate acquired companies,
can be effectively applied in the Government environment.
As this Committee knows from first-hand experience, I have been
both personally and professionally committed to national security
throughout my career. I have had direct responsibility for intelligence
and defense activities in four different government agencies: the
Department of Energy, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, and have
supported intelligence programs in private industry, and as a staff
member and later as director of a national laboratory. I have had
opportunities to work on a wide variety of intelligence issues,
including nuclear proliferation, arms control monitoring, nuclear test
detection, and the development of future air and space reconnaissance
systems. I am particularly proud of the programs I have led to bring
technical solutions to intelligence and law enforcement challenges. My
commitment to countering terrorism began with activities in 1978-79 as
a member of the NSC Executive Committee on Terrorism. This commitment
was substantially reinforced by direct responsibilities investigating
the East African embassy bombings in 1998 and the attack on the USS
Cole in 2000, and refocused by 9/11 and the efforts of the past 5
years.
I would like to share my personal vision for the IC, as well as
several goals that I believe are critical for more effectively focusing
the Community in the challenging, post-9/11 environment. I would also
like to share my philosophy about the role of intelligence in our
national security construct. A popularly held contention is that the
role of intelligence is to protect the Nation from all harm. While this
is a succinct way to state the ultimate goal, I think the situation is
more complicated than that. One academic described the role of
intelligence as extracting certainty from uncertainty and facilitating
coherent decisionmaking in an incoherent environment. These are not
activities that lend themselves to guarantees or perfect scores as we
would like, but they reflect the reality in which we operate. If I were
to state what I believe is the essence of national intelligence, I
would say that its primary goal is to reduce the risk our Nation faces
today and tomorrow. The National Intelligence Estimate, ``The Terrorist
Threat to the US Homeland,'' makes clear that we will face a persistent
and evolving terrorist threat over the next several years--a threat
that will challenge our current defensive efforts and tools we use to
detect and disrupt plots.
My ``philosophy'' is not meant to minimize the critical role each
and every one of our intelligence professionals nor the Intelligence
Community, as a whole--plays in warning about current and future
threats. The challenges we face not only demand our ongoing dedication
and commitment to the national intelligence mission, but more
importantly new and innovative approaches to the work we do; the
operations we plan and carry out; the collection assets we design,
build and operate; the analyses we produce; and the strategic
partnerships we make across traditional and non-traditional boundaries.
Every era has its seemingly impossible challenges. The future is
fraught with unpredictable elements and trends. The elements that could
significantly transform the geopolitical landscape include nuclear
proliferation, catastrophic terrorism and even a pandemic disease. The
intelligence enterprise must think ahead to ensure that the
capabilities needed to deal with these challenging and oft times
explosive issues are available to the analyst, policymaker, operations
officer, and warfighter when they are needed. This is all the more
difficult, because the threat is no longer predictable and confined to
specific geographic areas. It is mobile, dispersed, dynamic, and
distributed. Intelligence problems are also developing at a much more
rapid pace than ever before. We must posture ourselves to adapt and
respond quickly, in an integrated fashion, to evolving problems. To
that end, I believe there are a number of goals that capture what we
need to excel as a Community in order to grow our comparative advantage
and reduce the myriad risks to our nation:
Seek global situational awareness
Deliver critical information to support timely
decisionmaking
Anticipate strategic threats and
Operate as a unified, integrated--but distributed--
enterprise
Adopt technologies and concepts of operation that cause
adversaries to react in ways that give the US advantage
Maintain appropriate investment levels for future
capabilities
In order to set the Intelligence Community on a path toward
achieving these goals, there are three elements that need to be in
place to support the Community. First, the IC has a solemn duty to
gather critical intelligence, but to do so in a way that complies with
the constitutional and other legal requirements that protect the
freedoms and liberties of the American people. There must be proper
training and oversight mechanisms for the IC to ensure that there are
clear legal rules for IC personnel operating in this critical area.
Given the non-public nature of much of the IC's work, the DNI must also
ensure that Congress is kept appropriately informed of IC activities to
enable Congress to perform its oversight responsibilities.
Second, we have a responsibility to provide timely information to
Congress to support effective oversight. Congressional oversight plays
a key role in ensuring that the Intelligence Community is performing as
envisioned. To exercise such oversight responsibilities, the Committees
must understand the intelligence process, its organizations, policies,
funding, and activities. The DNI and other members of the Community
must communicate on a regular and continuing basis to keep the
oversight committees fully and currently informed, consistent with the
protection of sources and methods.
Third, the Intelligence Community must deliver intelligence
information to decisionmakers without bias or prejudice. Intelligence
analysis must be held to the highest standards of integrity and
objectivity. It must also be rigorous, timely and independent from
political consideration. To position ourselves to meet the analytic
challenges of today and tomorrow, we must go beyond simply doing our
current jobs better. We must transform the way our analysts do their
work. We must more effectively leverage new and emerging technologies
and reach out to expertise wherever it resides. If confirmed, I will
strongly support the Intelligence Community's efforts to measure and,
track progress in implementing these analytic standards, including the
use of alternative analysis.
Effectively inspiring the expertise and experience of our talented
intelligence professionals requires strong and focused leadership. If
confirmed, I would bring particular emphasis to a number of areas. I
would look to focus on effective financial management, including
reducing the indirect cost burden wherever possible. This effort speaks
to Director McConnell's goal of modernizing business practices and
developing verifiable metrics. My experience at the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)
is that accountability for funds is effective. Although there are
always improvements that can be made, the real challenge is developing
the right balance between tighter controls and mission effectiveness
and making financial reporting more useful to those who manage our
programs. I believe that continuous improvement in financial management
should be an Intelligence Community priority.
While at the NRO, I have seen first-hand the added-value in
establishing more effective financial management processes, procedures
and management controls to put us on a path toward an unqualified audit
opinion. The DNI recently developed a unified financial management plan
for the IC as part of his 100 day plan to modernize business processes.
If confirmed, 'I will assist the DNI in moving the Intelligence
Community forward from today's uneven, but improving, financial
management environment to one characterized by common business
processes and integrated systems that adhere to recognized best
business practices across industry and government. I strongly support
Director McConnell's emphasis in this area.
Accountability is critically important in ensuring that officials
are responsible for their actions. Within the IC, accountability
ultimately rests with the DNI and the PDDNI. However, in a government
based upon checks-and-balances and collective decisionmaking,
determining individual accountability is often very difficult. It has
been my experience that most government employees, regardless of
whether they reside in the executive, legislative or judicial branches,
are simply trying to do what is right for the taxpayer. However, there
are occasionally egregious exceptions, and when they occur, swift and
decisive action must be taken. Each and every member of the
Intelligence Community is responsible for using the resources entrusted
to them judiciously. Additionally, all government employees are
expected to ensure their performance is consistent with the highest
standards of professionalism and integrity. One of the first items on
my agenda, if confirmed, would be to ensure that each member of the IC
is fully aware of what is expected and required. I will take decisive
action wherever and whenever necessary.
There has been much discussion recently about the role of
contractors in the Intelligence Community. There are compelling reasons
we use contractors to perform critical functions within the IC. In the
NRO construct, our industry partners design and build our satellite
systems, as well as provide 24/7 operational and maintenance support.
We also rely on contractors to provide the basic services that we
generally take for granted in the course of our day. These are services
that are more economically outsourced and include everything from
network maintenance to janitorial support. There are also certain
exigencies that justify an intelligence agency's use of contractors.
For example, if an agency has a short term project or mission that
exceeds the capacity of its current staff, it is sometimes more
appropriate for that agency to use contractors to meet that temporary
need than to hire and train permanent Federal civilian employees to
perform the work. We also employ contractors to provide specialized,
niche capabilities that we may not be able to perform with government
personnel. In each of these areas, contractors must be used
judiciously, with full oversight from the government to ensure that
they provide the services we need but do not perform work that is
inherently governmental. If confirmed, I will continue to examine the
appropriate use of contractors within the Intelligence Community. The
key to successful partnership with the contractor community is to view
the management of the relationship as an inherently government
function.
My general philosophy in evaluating the appropriate use of
contractor support is: no contractor shall perform work that a
government person should be doing; under no circumstance should a
contractor make policy or investment decisions on behalf of the
government; and the use of contractors must be more cost effective than
using government resources. For example, to establish a cadre of
government network administrators would be more expensive and possibly
less effective than to contract-out with a telecommunications company
to provide the service. It is appropriate to use contractors when they
offer unique, distinct, or ``surge'' capabilities that may not be
available within the government. Most importantly, all contractors and
employees of the Federal Government must comply with the Constitution
and laws, as well as with the governing regulations of the organization
they support. If confirmed, I will continue to examine and enforce the
appropriate use of contractors within the IC.
I believe that the importance of a highly trained workforce cannot
be overstated, both for the NRO and the IC. I have taken a number of
steps in this area while at the NRO. First, I signed a Statement of
Intent with the Air Force Chief of Staff, which makes clear that the
Air Force and NRO will work together to improve the career development
of our shared workforce. The NRO has also teamed with Air Force Space
Command to train space professionals across the government at the new
National Security Space Institute in Colorado Springs. I am working on
similar initiatives with the CIA. Currently, the NRO's Acquisition
Center of Excellence is helping NRO acquisition professionals complete
education requirements leading to advanced degrees in Public Management
and Engineering Administration. We have also partnered with Virginia
Tech to provide the Engineering Administration degree program onsite at
the NRO. In addition, the NRO is also establishing a virtual University
that will provide an integrated, career-focused program that combines
specialized training provided by the NRO directorate- and office-based
schools with an NRO-wide curriculum focused on shared context, values,
informational needs, and leadership. These initiatives are in addition
to an already robust Systems Engineering Professional Development and
Certification program that last year certified 151 systems engineers.
If confirmed, I look forward to supporting Director McConnell in
his effort to more closely integrate the Intelligence Community. During
my tenure, the NRO has been working toward an integrated mix of
overhead and ground-based capabilities tailored to the geographically
dispersed and dynamic nature of current and projected intelligence
problems, as well as the diverse needs of our users. Integration is not
only a watchword for technical collection and operations, but it is
imperative that we integrate intelligence collection and analysis more
effectively--they are symbiotic disciplines.
We can only achieve our goals and objectives by becoming unified in
our commitment to the Intelligence Community's contribution to the
strongest defense possible for our Nation and our people. Thank you for
the opportunity to share with the Committee my background and--if
confirmed--my vision for my new role and responsibility. I look forward
to answering any questions you may have.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Dr. Kerr. I was
going to ask about your goals and I think you've laid them out
and the difficulty of predicting the future. I was reminded of
Yogi Berra's admonition. He said, ``Never make predictions,
particularly about the future.'' I've always thought that was a
sound piece of advice.
But there's only 1\1/2\ years left in this Administration.
Can you tell us why you took on this job?
Dr. Kerr. I thought about it very carefully and had some
extensive discussions with Director McConnell, with my wife,
and with others whose judgment I respect.
At the end of the day, in all honesty, I could not continue
to be on the outside expressing views when the proper thing to
do was to try to see if, by joining other seasoned
professionals in the leadership, both at the Department of
Defense and at the DNI--to see if we could make this thing
work.
That includes the responsibility to respond to the comment
you made, which is, the legislation in 2004 was put together,
the office of the DNI stood up; and now, with 3 years behind
us, there's the opportunity to look back and say, what needs to
be changed, either in legislation or in an Executive order,
that would make it work better?
And I think, between Secretary Gates, Under Secretary
Clapper, Director McConnell, General Hayden, and me, we have
the potential--for five people who've worked together without
friction--to try to make it work and maybe to pass it on to
others in a more institutionalized form than it is today.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you, sir.
The next thing I had mentioned, I wanted to find out if you
had any comments on the FISA modernization or if you've been
involved with the DNI's very excellent efforts to bring the
case onto the Hill. What advice you can share with us on that?
Dr. Kerr. Well, I've not been directly party to the
discussions going on between Director McConnell and the
Congress. But that said, I share his view that we do need to do
something to modernize FISA. I could speak more extensively in
closed session with you, but suffice it to say, 30 years ago
there were certain assumptions about the future and certain
realities of the context when the original legislation was
passed.
Those assumptions and realities have changed considerably
and, consequently, the legislation needs to be changed to
actually deal with the way modern telecommunications systems
work and allow the intelligence community to do the things it
needs to do to collect foreign intelligence on foreign
individuals outside of the United States without a warrant.
And, of course, at the same time we should always be in the
position of, if the target's within the United States, of
seeking a warrant to do that.
Those two things are very important, coupled with the
concern for those from which we would get information that they
not be at risk for cooperating with the Government in this very
important endeavor.
Vice Chairman Bond. Let me deal with a point of friction
for this Committee. This Committee came into possession of a
point paper prepared by the NRO relating to commercial imagery.
The paper appeared to be written in the fashion of talking
points in opposition to commercial imagery. When our staff
requested to be briefed on this document, the NRO declined. The
NRO Office of Congressional Affairs advised that you had
personally denied the Committee's staff access to the requested
information.
We could find no information in the point paper that would
appear to justify refusing to brief Congress on its content.
Are you familiar with that action and did you personally deny
this request? Or did someone on your Congressional liaison
staff misrepresent this?
Dr. Kerr. I think it may fall in the latter category. The
only paper I know about is one that my former deputy wrote as a
personal thing doing a financial analysis based on public
sources. It was not an official NRO document.
Vice Chairman Bond. No, this was definitely not--I think we
may want to explore later who had the authority to deny a
request for the information from Congress--who would, down the
line, have that authority.
Dr. Kerr. Well, I think I can help you by telling you what
I've said about this subject. Would that be helpful?
Vice Chairman Bond. Sure.
Dr. Kerr. I'll give you a quote. I recommended that the
Government purchase geospatial products and services from the
commercial remote sensing industry, as well as needed imagery
``to ensure this information has the highest flexibility and
utility for Government users and to encourage new applications
of imagery data from the private sector.'' I signed that in
October 2001 in response to tasking from the Secretary of
Defense and the then DCI, when I led the remote sensing study
panel.
Vice Chairman Bond. Well, we will explore with you later
the other paper.
Dr. Kerr. I don't know what you're referring to, sir.
Vice Chairman Bond. We will explore that later. Now for the
questions, I turn to Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In listing the
five matters that you felt you had a proficiency in, I would
like to suggest a sixth, and that is you have a good grasp of
how to work with the Congress. I've had that privilege in the
years on the Armed Services Committee where you've testified a
number of times before that Committee, and now on my second
term in the Intelligence Committee.
I'd also like to join the Ranking Member in his commentary
with regard to the contribution of General Burgess filling in
for this period of time. He's held in very high esteem here in
the Congress and we wish him well.
Going back to the definition, as I've said, under the law,
that you and Admiral McConnell have as adviser to the
President, I hope I'm not being presumptuous in saying the
following. I think that the intelligence community has got to
work with the executive branch, and most particularly the
office of the President, in more clearly defining the enemy
that faces not only the United States, but much of the free
world today.
We use the term ``war on terrorism,'' and now that seems to
be misunderstood in many parts of the world. Great Britain has
ceased to use that term; some of our colleagues in the House
have ceased. And I must say, that term is not specific. We talk
about ``radical Muslims'' or ``radical jihadists,'' and it's
difficult for the general public, which wants to be
supportive--and the general public which is deeply concerned
after 9/11 about the vulnerability not only here at home, but
of our people, hundreds of thousands of them that serve abroad,
and most notably those in uniform and members of the
intelligence community--the CIA and others, and the embassies.
So I would hope that you could provide here this morning, and
that you and the Admiral can, in working in briefings, try to
more clearly define what that enemy is.
In my judgment, it's clearly a global threat; it's not just
isolated cells. There is a measure of some coordination. But
first, what is the term that you would describe, generically,
who the enemy is? And with respect to the Muslim world, that's
a long and venerable and proud culture, and it's relatively a
small number of those that are within that culture that are
perpetrating the evil that's unfortunately spreading into
places well beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.
Dr. Kerr. I think one of the things I need to do, of
course, is immediately recognize that I'm not a political and
economic analyst steeped in studying some of these threats
around the world. That said, given the responsibility that I
may take on, I'm going to have to work very much with a very
senior analyst, named Director McConnell, who has been spending
his time trying to think about this very problem and how to
properly frame the question.
I think it's clear at this point that simply using the
terms that go with armed conflict--``war'' and others--is an
insufficient way to think about the problem. I think we're at a
juncture where we have to think about the other instruments of
American power and how they join with our incredible military
prowess to project what we as Americans want the rest of the
world to see, and for them to perhaps move away from thinking
that the solution to their problems is simply to damage
Americans or do worse.
I don't think it's restricted to people of Islamic faith.
It's been the history of this country----
Senator Warner. I didn't suggest that, clearly.
Dr. Kerr. Yes.
Senator Warner. But that seems to be a focal point of much
of our attention now in both Iraq and Afghanistan. But what
better evidence of that is our own internal bombing of Oklahoma
some years ago.
Dr. Kerr. Exactly.
I think another thing we have to pay a great deal of
attention to--and it's been in some of the estimates that you
have seen--is that set of countries where the demographics are
such that right now half of the population is male, under the
age of 15. And in 10 years, they will be in their early
twenties, unemployed, perhaps without hope and consequently
fodder, if you will, to lash out at America and America's
interests. And so I'm greatly concerned about that and what we
might be able to do as a country to influence those places in
the world and how they develop before it becomes something that
we would characterize as a conflict.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I just simply wish to first compliment you on
your statement. I thought it was very comprehensive. But back
to my question, I would suggest that I'd invite you to further
amplify your thoughts in the record because it would be of
importance to us to study precisely what those definitions
are--particularly why the term ``global war on terrorism'' is
found to be offensive to many people who have the best
intentions.
One other caution: In this world in which we live, you've
got to deal with the split-second answer in today's rapid media
and dissemination of information. So we've got to come up with
clear, precise definitions and repeat them constantly to the
public so they know more precisely. This country's making an
enormous sacrifice of life and limb and in every other way to
help not only defend ourselves, but other people across this
world who stand in fear of the threats that face us today.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Senator Warner.
You've raised a question that we've debated, both in public
and in private hearings, on learning more about the enemy,
learning the terminology. And I think I've found a helpful
tack, saying that these radicals are not jihadists, which is a
holy spiritual journey for a believing Muslim. They are
mufsidun committing hirabah and we should not glorify them by
calling them jihadists.
With that totally useful piece of information, I now turn
to Senator Nelson.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Dr. Kerr, for your public
service.
What would you do as the Deputy Director to get agencies
motivated more to invest in research and development?
Dr. Kerr. Senator Nelson, thank you for the question.
You've struck on a concern that I've had for some time, because
I've actually lived in the best of the intelligence community
for investing in the future, and I have lived in an agency
that, in fact, did it the least.
And I think part of what I might be able to contribute to
is a more general community view of what appropriate levels of
investment are needed for the future of our community and our
country. Clearly, there are agencies that require more
investment in technology to carry out their mission than
others. So it isn't a case of just picking a number across the
board, but it is appropriate to say you've got to be investing
today for your problems 3, 5, and 10 years out.
And I think we have not done that well, particularly with
the pressures of the last few years to support current
operations. I don't want to take resources from current
operations, but if there are ways we can find to manage the
resources we have better to make room for some future
investment, I sorely want to do that.
Senator Nelson. Well, what about the new Intelligence
Advanced Research Project Authority--IARPA--which is modeled
after DARPA?
Dr. Kerr. That, of course, has just stood up. We have yet
to see whether it can gain the same sort of stature and
visibility in the intelligence community that DARPA has gained
with the Department of Defense and the military services.
One of the things noteworthy about DARPA and their major
programs today is that every one of them is done in alliance
with one of the services or other Defense agencies. IARPA has
not existed long enough to build those alliances and
connections and, to succeed, it will have to.
Senator Nelson. Does the DNI support IARPA?
Dr. Kerr. Yes, he does. He's testified to that effect. And
I think my responsibility will be to work with him so that the
actual execution meets his expectations.
Senator Nelson. So what would you do to enhance its
stature?
Dr. Kerr. I think the first thing I would do would be to
improve the connections with the agencies and the programs they
already have. IARPA has been viewed with suspicion by them,
particularly in instances where it appeared that the funds for
IARPA were coming out of their normal operating budgets. That's
not the way to gain friends. And so somehow there has to be a
mechanism that they become partners rather than competitors for
the same resources.
Senator Nelson. You have been the head of the National
Reconnaissance Office. And there have been some big programs
that have been sole-sourced instead of competed. And of course,
the U.S. policy is that we compete. Can you explain the
apparent anti-competition policy?
Dr. Kerr. We're really, in some ways, dealing with a part
of the economy that is different from what I'll call the
competitive private sector. We're dealing with a protected
sector of the economy, which has dealt with companies that have
chosen to do the majority of their business with the U.S.
Government. In some cases, those companies have had substantial
investment over the years in particular capabilities that exist
only within those companies. And so unless the United States
Government is prepared to make comparable investments in
prospective competitors, they really don't get to the point of
competing in a credible way.
So what we have to do, as we look ahead, is ask which parts
of the NRO program are most amenable to competition. For
example, you might argue certain classes of sensors would be,
where you might have three or more competitors available,
whereas a certain other specialized capability would need to go
to the company that had been the beneficiary of the prior
Government investment and had the expertise to do a particular
kind of work.
Senator Nelson. So you would want to encourage competition
where there were several vendors that could do the work.
Dr. Kerr. Yes, sir.
Senator Nelson. OK. And I realize that you inherited some
huge problems when you came in as the head of NRO. This has
been a concern of this Committee's, and it's been a concern of
the Armed Service Committee as well.
There were particularly two huge classified programs within
the bosom of this Committee that were canceled, and as a result
there's been a lot of money that has gone down the drain. These
two programs represented significant new acquisitions
undertaken by the NRO and they were touted by the NRO as
examples of excellence and industry ingenuity, and both of them
failed. Who was held accountable for these failures?
Dr. Kerr. Well, let me speak to the first of them, because
when I came to the NRO, the so-called red team--the technical
review team--had just completed its work with respect to one of
those programs. I had been aware of their work, and in fact had
been briefed on it along the way. And it was in fact after
reviewing their recommendations as well as the work of the
staff at the NRO that I went to Director Negroponte and
recommended termination of that program.
The reason I recommended termination of that program was
that I felt there was little to no prospect of that part of the
program being successfully completed. We had managed to lay
requirements on top of requirements. We had managed to change
some direction enough times that we had a system that could not
be manufactured by normal human beings.
Director Negroponte took that recommendation. He spent time
considering it, but within about 3 weeks he directed me to
terminate that part of the program, which I did.
With regard to how do we protect some of the investment
made, we have in fact funded the continued reduction of
technical risk in some of the specific new technologies that
were part of that program. And they're slated for use in future
programs, which I can talk to you about in a classified
session. We think we have done about as well we can to recover
that part of the investment. That said, we couldn't recover a
significant amount of it, as you're well aware.
Vice Chairman Bond. Dr. Kerr, we will go into a classified
session, and I think Senator Nelson will and I will and others
will want to follow up.
Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Well, Mr. Chairman, the question was, in
the public session, who was held accountable?
Vice Chairman Bond. I didn't hear anybody.
Dr. Kerr. Well, I'll answer that, too.
In fact, the program manager was removed from that program,
as well as the direct reports. The senior leadership at the
prime contractor was changed. The award fees reflected the
unhappiness of the Government with their performance, and they
have subsequently been put on the contractor responsibility
watch list that the NRO has, which means that they can only bid
on new work if we grant them a waiver. And they will not come
off that list until they start delivering hardware to us. We're
not satisfied with just changes in names and particular jobs
and reorganization; we want to see the product that we've
contracted for.
Senator Nelson. Mr. Chairman, if I don't make it to the
classified session, if you would get the details of that, I
would appreciate it.
Vice Chairman Bond. You can be sure we will. Thank you very
much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And
Dr. Kerr, thank you for your service. We appreciate you very
much.
And, Mr. Chairman, let me just echo the sentiments of you
and Senator Warner relative to General Burgess. Boy, I don't
know a member of the IC community that has been more direct,
more straightforward and given us better briefings over the
years than General Burgess. I'm sure glad to see he's going to
stay with ODNI.
Dr. Kerr, we have a mutual friend, Steve Van Cleve, who
certainly gives you a very high recommendation and sends his
best wishes.
As a Member of the House Intelligence Committee following
September 11, we did a significant investigation into the
reasons why September 11 happened. And it was pretty obvious to
us then, there's been a lot of commentary, a lot written and
said about some of the reasons why, but it comes back to one
basic reason, and that is there was a total lack of information
sharing.
Now, you've been in the IC community both at CIA, at the
FBI, and now at the NRO, and obviously you're moving into a
much different atmosphere of your intelligence employment
history here. What I want you to comment on is what you've seen
relative to information sharing, what you think may be done or
may have been done to improve that. Where do you think we still
need some improvement? And in your position as the Deputy
Director of the DNI, I want to hear what you think you might be
able to accomplish relative to continuing to help the
information sharing issue spread.
Dr. Kerr. I think this is perhaps one of the issues that's
a core issue of the intelligence reform legislation. I think
steps have been made to have improved the situation from what
it was in 2001 before 9/11. And that said, not enough has been
done.
And I can simply give you an anecdote to help explain that.
And it goes back to General Burgess, for whom we all have high
regard. He wanted to send an e-mail to all of the 16 agencies
in the community to people by name and found that that was
impossible at the present time. And so one of the key things
that we have to work on is we have to provide the
infrastructure so that information sharing can be done directly
and quickly rather than by working around awkward legacy
systems from the past.
But the infrastructure's only part of it; the attitude is
the other part of it. Now when I was at the FBI, we, in fact,
had senior CIA personnel assigned there in line jobs. They were
very effective at doing it. And there were FBI people assigned
to the Counterterrorism Center at CIA. But the simple exchange
of people isn't enough either because, the way these
organizations work, the connections have to be made not just at
the top, not just at certain mid-level functions where they
decide that swap of people makes sense, but it has to become a
way of doing the work. And I would say that the real test of
the leadership for the DNI and his deputy is going to be the
degree to which we can change some of the attitudes that don't
allow us to have that full connectivity at all levels between
the agencies to focus on very hard problems.
Senator Chambliss. Well, I think you're exactly right.
Those stovepipes that we've talked about so often unfortunately
still exist--maybe not to the degree that they did prior to
September 11, but certainly there's some still there. And
frankly, going back to what Senator Nelson asked you about, I
have an appreciation for the fact that you did step into a not-
so-good situation at NRO. You made the changes that were
necessary. I fully expect you to do the same thing here at
ODNI, and I have all great confidence that you will.
So thank you for your willingness to continue to serve your
country in this capacity, and we look forward to seeing this
confirmation concluded.
Dr. Kerr. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Mikulski--OK, she's gone.
Senator Burr is gone.
[The prepared statement of Senator Mikulski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Barbara A Mikulski, a U.S. Senator from
Maryland
It's great to welcome Dr. Kerr to this important
confirmation hearing. This position, the Deputy Director for National
Intelligence, has been vacant for too long, and DNI McConnell is
certainly in need of a permanent deputy.
Dr. Kerr, you've led a distinguished career in the
Intelligence Community, serving in a variety of places. This includes
at the Department of Energy, Los Alamos National Laboratory, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and
now, serving currently as the Director of the National Reconnaissance
Office.
There are five criteria that I use to evaluate all
executive branch nominees. They are (1) Competence, (2) Integrity, (3)
Independence, (4) Commitment to the Constitution, and (5) Commitment to
the Core Mission of the Department
First, I believe Dr. Kerr has the experience and
background for this important job. You've had success in both the
private sector and the Intelligence Community--serving in your current
position as Director of the National Reconnaissance Office since 2005.
The NRO is an important agency in the Intelligence Community. It has
had some successes, as well as a number of problems, too.
Dr. Kerr has also served as a Deputy in CIA's Science &
Technology Directorate. This also highlights his background in science
and technology, which I believe is a real plus for a DDNI to have. Our
historical technological advantage over our adversaries is eroding and
we need much stronger ties between science and technology communities
and our intelligence agencies.
Dr. Kerr, I think that you will agree with me, that we
must regain our technological edge in the world in science and
technology.
While I do not know Dr. Kerr personally, we did enjoy a
very good, and I thought, frank conversation.
Dr. Kerr is well-respected both inside and outside the
Intelligence Community and I have no reason to doubt his personal
integrity. However, as always, the proof of his integrity will be in
his actions and deeds, if he is confirmed to serve as DDNI.
For me, Integrity and Independence are closely tied. We
are in need of independent voices at the ODNI, and not cheerleaders for
the Administration. We need people at the ODNI who can speak truth to
power, no matter who is President. We also need a commitment from the
Intelligence Community leadership to provide timely and frequent
notifications to the Intelligence Committees.
As DDNI, Dr. Kerr, you will be forced to make tough
choices. This includes decisions to end controversial programs to
financing innovative acquisition projects. No matter the task, the ODNI
needs independent voices, and not rubber stamps for this
administration's policies.
I've been greatly honored to take the oath of office 9
times. Each time, I raise my right hand and swear to support and defend
the Constitution of the United States of America. We all take that
oath--no matter if you serve in Congress, the Cabinet, or wear a
uniform. That oath, however, is not to an administration, a president,
or a party. The oath is sworn to the Constitution.
The threats facing the country today are real, and
evolving. Terrorists across the globe have predatory intent and want to
harm the American people. Some programs designed to keep the American
people safe do need to remain secret. But, each and every one of these
programs must respect the Constitution and what it stands for.
The current administration only adheres to the law when
it chooses to. It doesn't take the commitment to the Constitution
seriously. So Dr Kerr, we need a real commitment from you to uphold the
Constitution. This commitment includes respecting the role of Congress
and the need for effective checks and balances.
There is no question that Dr. Kerr is committed to the
mission of the Intelligence Community. He has served the community in a
variety of roles, and is a dedicated public servant.
As DDNI, Dr. Kerr will need to help strengthen the
organization. This includes achieving the integration that the
intelligence community needs, and helping to minimize and break-down
any remaining ``stove pipes'' in the intelligence community.
There will also be occasions where Dr. Kerr will have to
serve as the Acting DNI. These are big shoes to fill, and we are all
thankful that DNI McConnell has ably handled this responsibility during
the past year.
In conclusion, this committee has many questions for you,
and I look forward to your answers. Again, I thank you for the service
you've already provided to the United States. I hope we have a candid,
frank discussion with you about the future of the DDNI and your
thoughts on how you believe the position will develop under your
direction and leadership.
Senator Whitehouse.
Senator Whitehouse. Thank you, Chairman.
Dr. Kerr, welcome. I don't want to hide the ball in any
respect. I at this point very much anticipate voting for your
nomination and supporting you, but there are a few things I'd
like to touch base with you on at this point in the public
hearing.
The first is that I'm new in my position; you're about to
be new in yours. We both have a lot of inherited baggage
between our organizations. I hope you will understand that when
this Committee seems perhaps from your point of view to be
unduly determined, unduly persnickety, unduly inquisitive about
matters that the recent history has not been very favorable and
that our desire to pursue these things and our sense of
suspicion, if you will, has been well-earned. I think it can be
earned back, a sense of trust can be earned back, but I urge
you to bend over backwards to accommodate our concerns and
questions as we do our oversight job, bearing in mind that, to
a certain extent, here the past is the future.
In that regard, the two big issues that I see are, first,
the issue of intelligence integrity. There have clearly been
episodes in which the intelligence community or elements of the
intelligence community have produced the intelligence that
principals wanted to support the path that had already been
chosen rather than what people might call speaking truth to
power. In accounting, people often talk about a plug number
that fits between--we don't want plug intelligence around here.
In that vein, you have superior scientific credentials. You
have superior management credentials. Your analytic credentials
are not as strong as your management and scientific
credentials, as you alluded to earlier. You are also the Deputy
Director, and if the Director is away, you will be the Acting
Director. A circumstance could easily emerge in which you are
representing the intelligence community with principals in the
White House at times of key decisions. What will your process
be for making sure that truth is in fact told to power and that
the real intelligence is what gets to the decisionmakers, not
just what they want to hear?
Dr. Kerr. Well, I can tell you first of all that I
absolutely support your point that intelligence needs to be
provided to policymakers and others who need it without bias,
without political consideration, and as well-grounded in fact
as possible.
With regard to what I would do, while my technical and
management credentials are better than my analytic ones, I did,
in fact, serve on the nuclear intelligence panel and chair it
for a number of years within the community--in fact, from
roughly 1979 until 1992. And I've been a senior reviewer of
many of the Estimates over the years.
So I think what I'm really trying to express is that
Director McConnell and I are complementary in a way. He is an
analyst by training and by profession, and that's his strongest
suit. I have some other experiences that are complementary to
his, and I think between us we can make a good team.
With regard to how I would deal on the community's behalf
in advising the President and others, I've actually had that
opportunity in the past on some particular issues. I was even
able on at least one occasion to suggest to the President there
were laws he could not suspend. These were the laws of physics.
But the point is, I think I have a reputation here with the
Congress and with the Administration of being straight in what
I say and bringing integrity when I come to see you.
Senator Whitehouse. The other piece of the problem is on
the performance accountability side. In my area, we had the Big
Dig which was a tunnel project near Boston that was a huge
catastrophic disaster and provided immense news opportunities.
When something goes wrong like that in the intelligence
community, because it is covert, there are not those immense
news opportunities. People don't see how badly things have gone
off the rails. And indeed both the contractor who has failed or
fouled up the program and their Government managers have every
incentive to paper it over and have it go away so that nobody
notices. But as you know, there are fantastic, spectacular
amounts of money at stake here.
Will you be fully supportive of our efforts in oversight in
this respect, including the deployment of what we call TAG
groups into areas where we are really the only oversight that
these programs get?
Dr. Kerr. Absolutely. And in fact, in past years I have
worked with members of earlier TAG groups. Ofttimes they
include people with whom I've had professional experience in
the past. I have no problem at all expecting to do that in the
future.
Senator Whitehouse. I could not agree more with the
concerns expressed by Senator Nelson about particular programs
that we should probably discuss more in a classified setting. I
want you to know that many weeks ago I asked for an explanation
of what consequences had been applied in those circumstances. I
gather that, because of our recent conversation in our office,
I've received a classified letter for the first time this
morning. But the question that I asked weeks ago in an open
Committee hearing I've never received a response to.
So you know, once again, I hope that you--in your role--
when you walk away from a Committee hearing with questions,
somebody's actually tasked to get the answer back because this
doesn't seem to be a very difficult question. You were actually
able to answer it almost spontaneously when we met, and yet for
weeks nobody got back to me on this question. And I think this
question of performance accountability for contractors in a
covert environment where nobody knows and huge amounts of money
are being spent and it's only our oversight that provides any
check and balance in the system--it is really important that
you get back to us.
Dr. Kerr. Right. Well, I was glad that you asked me the
question. And I, in fact, am responsible for what you received.
I didn't know about the earlier request.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Senator
Whitehouse.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Kerr, again, congratulations on your nomination. If you
are confirmed you'll be coming to this position at a
particularly critical moment.
The country needs the DNI to ask hard questions about the
value, legality, and morality of our intelligence programs and
to ensure that our intelligence is accurate, candid, and free
of any politicization, and that's not an easy task at any time,
but particularly in this Administration. But that is what is
expected of the DNI and his Deputy. Of course, we also expect
you to level with the Congress, a topic that you and I
discussed yesterday.
Let me ask you, Doctor, do you agree that intelligence
activities that have implications for our foreign policy must
be briefed to the full Committee?
Dr. Kerr. Just to recall our conversation of yesterday,
Senator Feingold, you made clear your membership here as a
crossover member from Foreign Relations, and one of the points
I tried to make was that ofttimes one of the foreign policy
tools available to the United States is the intelligence
community through liaison relationships and other things. My
answer to that is I think those responsible for the oversight
of U.S. foreign policy need to understand both the front
channel and the back channel--what's going in both of them,
what's capable of being done--in order to provide proper
oversight of our foreign policy execution.
Senator Feingold. And in this context you're referring
obviously to the full Committee?
Dr. Kerr. Correct.
Senator Feingold. And so this would be particularly
relevant to covert action, wouldn't it?
Dr. Kerr. I think it would be applicable to covert action.
I think generally the full Committee needs to know about covert
action programs, and the only caveat I would add there is that
which is present in the law and really refers to those special
cases where lives are at risk or other very delicate things are
hanging in the balance and where it might be left to the so-
called Gang of Eight.
Senator Feingold. And in fact, the only provision in the
National Security Act that allows for the so-called limited
Gang of Eight notifications applies to covert action, and, as
you've indicated, that can never be license to limit
information that has implications for our foreign policy. So if
confirmed will you review covert actions or any other
intelligence activities that may have been limited to the Gang
of Eight to ensure that the provision is not being abused?
Dr. Kerr. I will.
Senator Feingold. Doctor, do you believe that the laws that
apply to elements of the intelligence community are binding and
cannot be overridden by assertions of Article II authority?
Dr. Kerr. Article II, as I understand it, refers to the
role of the President as Commander-in-Chief and the
responsibilities he has for the military services and the
Defense Department as a consequence. Some of the intelligence
agencies are not, in fact, part of the Defense Department and
so they would not fall within the ambit of the Commander-in-
Chief designation. They would, in fact, be agencies of the
Federal Government and subject to the laws and regulations that
apply.
Senator Feingold. But in any event do you believe that the
laws that apply to the elements of the intelligence community
cannot be overridden by assertions of Article II authority?
Dr. Kerr. I'm not a constitutional scholar, as I'm sure you
recognize, but I don't know of any exceptions to the law that,
in fact, any military or civilian employee of the Government is
entitled to.
Senator Feingold. So can you think of any laws that apply
to the intelligence community that you believe intrude on the
President's authorities?
Dr. Kerr. No, I don't.
Senator Feingold. No?
Dr. Kerr. I don't know of any.
Senator Feingold. Doctor, as Deputy DNI you'll be
conducting oversight of an intelligence community whose
activities under this Administration have been justified
sometimes by what I consider to be and others consider to be
outlandish legal theories on issues such as electronic
surveillance and interrogation. Even worse, Philip Zelikow, who
was counsel to the State Department until last year, has
written that those dubious legal theories have substituted for
moral and policy deliberations. In other words, what some
lawyer says the Administration can do precludes consideration
of what it should do.
In my view, the DNI, through its oversight role, can help
reverse this disastrous practice by insisting that our
intelligence activities are truly in America's interest. One
such issue is the DNI's oversight of the implementation of the
President's new Executive order on interrogations. I have
opposed the Administration's policies in this area on legal
grounds, but also because they have damaged our long-term
efforts to mobilize our friends and isolate our enemies in the
fight against al-Qa'ida. Doctor, as Deputy DNI, how will you
ensure that these strategic issues are given appropriate
weight?
Dr. Kerr. I think the fundamental commitment that DNI
McConnell and I would both bring to this is that we do
understand the responsibilities we have under the Constitution,
under the law, and, in fact, the need to secure the liberties
for our people. I would, in fact, try to be very diligent in
understanding not only the specific legal argument advanced for
a course of action, but try to understand it in a broader
context of what the likely effect would be of that course of
action.
Senator Feingold. I think that's terribly important and is
exactly what you should be doing because, again, simply because
something can be done by the executive branch, even if that's
right, does not mean it's in the best interests of this
country. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Vice Chairman Bond. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold
and Senator Whitehouse. We appreciate very much your staying
with us.
There are a number of things going on that I believe I and
other Members have to attend, so I'm going to propose that the
classified questions be submitted in classified form to the
witness and ask that he respond to them in a classified manner,
and I'd also say you've seen we have some healthy disagreements
on policy on this Committee and I would also say that I used to
be a lawyer and I don't read the President's Article II powers
as confined to the Defense Department, if that was the gist of
it. So fortunately, neither one of us is called on to be
counsel to advise either the President or this Committee, so we
will leave those subjects to perhaps people with more active
and current knowledge of the law. With that, I thank the
witness and the Members and declare this hearing adjourned.
Thank you very much, Doctor.
Dr. Kerr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
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