

**EXPLORING THE U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND  
A NEW STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH AFRICA**

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**HEARING**  
BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS  
OF THE  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
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# **EXPLORING THE U.S. AFRICA COMMAND AND A NEW STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP WITH AFRICA**

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 1, 2007

U.S. SENATE,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Russ Feingold (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Feingold, Nelson, Webb, and Lugar.

## **OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR FROM WISCONSIN**

Senator FEINGOLD. Good morning. Welcome. Thank you all for joining me and my esteemed colleague, the ranking member of the full committee, Senator Lugar, for this hearing to explore the U.S. Africa Command and a new strategic relationship with Africa.

As many of you know, I have supported the idea of a United States Armed Forces Regional Combatant Command for Africa for a long time. Last June, I introduced legislation mandating a Pentagon study on the feasibility and desirability of establishing an Africa Command, and asked the Defense Department to report to Congress on the potential pros and cons of such a command, and to provide an estimate of the resources it would require.

Plans for the new Africa Command—now commonly called AFRICOM—have proceeded swiftly since then. I'm glad that the administration has recognized Africa's increasing strategic importance and has pledged to adopt a more comprehensive approach toward the challenges and opportunities presented by this diverse continent.

While I welcome the President's announcement of the creation of an AFRICOM, I am aware that the Combatant Command, which still exists only at the planning stage, has been the subject of much scrutiny and debate within the policy community here in Washington as well as by friends abroad and in the media. In addition, since AFRICOM's inception there have been, in my opinion, far too few conversations between the planning team and those of us on Capitol Hill who are focused on Africa.

I hope that today's hearing will address some of the concerns that have been raised while allowing full discussion of the decisions that have already been made and those that are still forthcoming.

With the formation of this command, we are at a significant turning point in our relationship with Africa, and we must ensure our actions are aligned with our objectives.

Africa presents a number of security-related challenges, including violent conflicts with far-reaching spillover effects, significant displaced populations, maritime insecurity, large-scale corruption, and the misappropriations and exploitation of natural resources. The question, however, is not whether the United States needs to work aggressively and cooperatively to address these concerns, but how we should do so in order to be as effective as possible.

There is no doubt that our Nation's military expertise is one of our greatest assets, but meaningful and sustainable contributions to security and development in Africa must address the underlying causes of these security challenges throughout the continent. Many of these challenges are not military at their core, but instead require significant improvement in the capacity of local governments, with an emphasis on the rule of law, economic development, democratization, and, of course, anticorruption measures. Furthermore, many threats throughout the African Continent are not confined by national borders, which poses additional obstacles and requires extensive collaboration and coordination between African governments if they are to be effectively combated. The United States must pursue a seamless and adaptable policy on the continent that will enhance and expand national and regional capacity in Africa.

I understand that these objectives are in line with those espoused by the AFRICOM planning team and I am prepared to fully support a unified interagency United States approach that creates a military command with the primary mission of supporting our policies toward Africa and ensuring continued diplomatic, development, humanitarian assistance, and regional initiatives led by the Department of State, USAID, and other key stakeholders—including national and international NGOs, other bilateral and multilateral development bodies, and of course, African political and military leaders. If designed, deployed, and equipped with these goals in mind, this command will contribute to broader United States Government efforts throughout the continent, and will help provide an additional platform for regional thinking, strategizing, and activity that will advance the strategic interests of our country throughout Africa.

It is abundantly clear that the United States national security, international stability, and the ability of African countries to achieve their full growth and development potential depend upon improving and expanding governance and accountability so that legitimate grievances are addressed and extremism cannot take root. This will require strengthening national and regional commitment and capacity to provide physical security while also protecting human rights and democratic freedoms.

And now, let me introduce our two distinguished panels. On our first panel, we have three witnesses from the U.S. Government. We have the State Department's Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Dr. Jendayi Frazer; the Defense Department's Ms. Theresa Whelan; and Mr. Michael Hess, the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau of Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance at the U.S. Agency for International Development. We asked each of

them to address the planning and expectations for AFRICOM, key challenges, resource requirements, and the interagency process, thus far. To the extent possible, I'd like to avoid generalities, and hope this can be a frank and detailed conversation. We're very glad that you are here today. I will introduce the second panel at the appropriate time.

Now, I'm delighted to turn to our ranking member of the full committee, who's extremely active in African affairs throughout his distinguished career here, Senator Lugar.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, U.S. SENATOR  
FROM INDIANA**

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It's great to be a teammate with you again today in this important hearing.

I want to veer away from AFRICOM, for just a moment, to commend the United Nations for acting on Darfur yesterday by authorizing 26,000 peacekeeping troops. And it was a red-letter day, because the Senate approved Resolution 276, which asks the Bush administration to urgently request the necessary funding to cover our portion of the costs of that vital mission. We state, in the resolution, that failure of the international community to take all steps necessary to generate, deploy, and maintain United Nations/African Union hybrid peacekeeping forces will result in the continued loss of life and further degradation of humanitarian infrastructure in Darfur. History has shown that peacekeeping success depends on size, resources, mandate, mobility, and command structure of the force, and the mission must be accompanied by a peacekeeping process among the parties in the conflict. We strongly urge our Government, as well as others, to act swiftly and robustly.

Let me just say, with the creation of a new Defense Department Combatant Command for Africa with a State Department component, it's an issue that interests this committee, from a number of different perspectives. What might be the advantages of such a new command? A new command would bring new focus and attention to a continent that has been roiled by conflict, most often by internal strife that spills over borders, creating tragic refugee flows and new conflicts in neighboring states. We would benefit as a nation if our military can develop a more sophisticated understanding of a region that is ever changing and highly complex. A Combatant Command for Africa would not be distracted by problems in the Balkans, or wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, or problems in other areas of the world, as is the case now, as three Combatant Commands divide parts of Africa into regionally mixed portfolios. Instead, an Africa Command could focus on building regional and subregional African peacekeeping capability and strengthening the ability of partner nations to counter terrorists on their own soil.

Concerns that the region could provide havens for terrorists are justified. The bombings of U.S. Embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 demonstrated the lethal impact that even small bands of violent extremists in Africa have when they target U.S. interests. Somalia has been a known haven for terrorists and a primary preparation and transit area for past terror attacks.

With the proposed creation of this new command, however, it is time to come to grips with the appropriate roles of the Department of State and the Department of Defense in deciding which countries are best prepared to receive American security assistance, and how that security assistance would be used.

With greater expertise created within a new regional command, our hope is that there would be few disagreements between the two Departments on the appropriateness of security assistance to specific African nations. But, undoubtedly, some differences of opinion will occur. It is my view that it is only the Secretary of State who has the balanced overview of the full range of U.S. foreign policy interests in a country or in a region. Determination as to which countries should receive U.S. military equipment and training, and the extent and type of such training, are fundamentally foreign policy decisions. Judgments on whether a potential recipient has the human rights and due process protections in place to warrant a strengthening of the security sector should be the Secretary of State's call. Likewise, whether a stronger military in one country will upset a balance in the subregion or cause neighbors to feel threatened is also a foreign policy, and not a military judgment, and it belongs to the Secretary of State.

It is crucial that ambassadors on the ground provide strong leadership, steady oversight, and a firm hand on the component parts of all counterterrorism activities in their countries of assignment. This includes the authority to challenge and override directives from combatant commanders or other DOD personnel to their resident or temporary staffs in the embassy.

This hearing provides an opportunity to raise a number of related issues. To what extent are the State Department and USAID involved in planning for the proposed new command? It is important to have the civilian agencies weigh in, especially when making the strategic decision as to whether the value of creating such a command outweighs the potentially negative impact. Robust Secretary of State involvement can minimize the dangers that critics envision. A disproportionately military emphasis in our African policy, and a message that such a command presages a disposition for military intervention in Africa, would be undesirable.

How would the new combatant commander relate to ambassadors? Are more formal mechanisms needed to lay out roles and responsibilities? For example, are memoranda of understanding—MOUs—necessary?

I understand that there is consideration being given to having a State Department official serve as one of the two deputies in the command. This is a new configuration. In the past, combatant commanders have had political advisors from the State Department. Would the new State Department deputy have his or her own staff? And would the deputy report to State Department or the Department of Defense? What would be the relationship of the deputy to the African Bureau at the Department? What is the expectation on the part of Department of Defense as to its role in Africa? Does it intend to go well beyond working to strengthen counterterrorism and peacekeeping capacity in the region? Would there be efforts to have our military also involved in humanitarian economic develop-



ment and nation-building activities throughout the continent, as it is in the Horn of Africa?

I appreciate the opportunity to explore all of these issues with distinguished witnesses. We look forward to your testimony and your responses to our questions.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator Lugar, for your comments and your excellent questions.

I'm happy to see Senator Webb here. One of the first things he did when he came to the Senate was come talk to me about his interest in Africa. I ask if he has any comments at this time.

Senator WEBB. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's just a pleasure to be here. I'm new on this subcommittee, as you know. I've got a long history of different types of relationships with the Department of Defense, however, and I'm very curious to hear exactly how this Africa Command is going to work, which is the reason I'm here. I'm looking forward to the testimony.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator. We will now begin with the first panel.

Secretary Frazer.

**STATEMENT OF HON. JENDAYI E. FRAZER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC**

Ambassador FRAZER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, for inviting me to testify here today on a topic that will be a true innovation in our Africa engagement by providing a new vehicle for addressing security issues in Africa.

I must say, first of all, that we in the State Department, and especially in the Bureau of African Affairs and the Bureau of Political Military Affairs, strongly support the creation of the U.S. Africa Command, AFRICOM. We believe AFRICOM will be an important asset in our overall African policy, and we welcome the Department of Defense's greater commitment of resources and participation in African issues. The military has long been involved in African affairs through the U.S. European, Central, and Pacific Commands, each of which has had responsibility for a portion of the continent, but now, with the creation of AFRICOM, Africa will be addressed in its own right as the unique and separate part of the world that it really is, with all areas of the continent, except Egypt, under a single unified command. And Egypt, despite its vital historical role in the Middle Eastern affairs, will not be ignored, but will be considered as a country of special concern for AFRICOM. All of Africa finally will get the full attention of one of our highest ranking and most experienced senior military leaders, supported by a staff uniquely structured to meet the challenges of this part of the world.

We in the State Department are pleased to see the nomination of General William Ward as AFRICOM's first commander. He has the background and experience to lead this initiative, and we look forward to working closely with him if he is confirmed by the Senate.

From the inception of AFRICOM, the State Department has been closely involved in the planning process, beginning last fall, when the Department of Defense established its AFRICOM Implementation Planning Team. Both the Bureau of African Affairs and the Bureau of Political Military Affairs assigned senior officers to this planning team, working with Department of Defense officials full time for many weeks. Several other State Department bureaus also had officers participating, bringing functional expertise to key portions of the planning process. This process has largely occurred in an atmosphere of cooperation and collaboration.

It is important to note that, throughout this process, we have seen no need to alter the current authorities that govern State/Defense collaboration in the field or in Washington. The Department of State will continue to exercise full foreign policy primacy and authority in Africa, and I am confident that no one in the Department of Defense disagrees with this. The Assistant Secretary for African Affairs will continue to be the lead policymaker in the U.S. Government on African issues, including regional security policy. Each chief of mission in the field in Africa will continue to act as the President's personal representative in the country to which he or she is accredited, and to exercise full authority over all of the United States Government's peacetime activities.

State, therefore, will continue to provide leadership for the exercise of authority over State's 47 embassies, which can be considered diplomatic interagency bases on the continent. In the AFRICOM area of responsibility, State Department will have its personnel, on assignments of 2 to 3 years, whose responsibility it is to understand that host-country government and people, and to influence the implementation of our foreign policy.

The Department of Defense and the U.S. military will continue to support the Department of State in the pursuit of U.S. foreign policy goals, while we at the Department of State will continue to fully support the military in its efforts to promote the security and safety of the United States. We will work together to promote security and stability in Africa. We all know that Africa cannot fully develop economically, politically, or socially where there is violence, the threat of terrorism, or fear about the security of legitimate governments and the people they represent. The continued violence in eastern Congo, at present, offers an example of where AFRICOM can play an important role in building security, perhaps by providing training and material assistance to the legitimate military of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

We are not at war in Africa, nor do we expect to be at war in Africa. Our embassies and AFRICOM will work in concert to keep it that way. We expect the largely civil-military activities of AFRICOM to help states strengthen regional security policies and their implementation. AFRICOM will draw upon our embassies in the field for most of the information it will use to guide its security cooperation programs and its overall interaction with Africa.

Throughout the process of creating AFRICOM, we have carefully considered the views and reactions of our regional friends and those from outside the region who have significant interest in Africa. A delegation of senior officials from the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for Inter-

national Development have already completed two extensive trips to Africa to consult with many African states on AFRICOM, and have found a generally positive reaction in sub-Saharan Africa. We expect to conduct additional consultations with African officials and with our allies who have strong interests in Africa in the near future.

Consultations are also ongoing with various international organizations and nongovernmental agencies on AFRICOM. As one would expect with a subject of this importance and scope, the reactions have been varied and diverse.

There has been much written and rumored about AFRICOM over the past several months: Where it will be located; how it will be structured; degree to which there will be State Department and interagency participation. I want to make it clear that no final decisions have been made about the location of AFRICOM's headquarters in Africa, although it is AFRICOM's plan to establish an initial headquarters presence on the continent by October 2008. Until then, it will be located in Stuttgart, Germany, not far from the European Command.

The current thinking is there will be a subordinate office in several other places on the African Continent as well. But this decision has not yet been taken, and those locations have not yet been determined.

State will also provide officers to work in AFRICOM, including one of the two deputy commanders working for General Ward, if he is confirmed. A senior State officer will be the deputy to the commander in charge of civil-military affairs, coordinating those activities in AFRICOM with our policymakers in Washington and our embassies in Africa. The other deputy commander, a uniformed military officer, will be in charge of the purely military aspects of AFRICOM. The State Department will also provide another senior officer, who will serve as the political advisor to the combatant commander.

So, we will be well represented on the AFRICOM leadership team. State and other civilian agencies also will provide a number of other officers to work in leadership, management, and functional positions as AFRICOM staff, in addition to traditional advisors.

In addition, we expect to add staff in the Bureau of African Affairs who will assist in the interface with AFRICOM and its various elements.

The Department of State views the creation of AFRICOM as a major advancement in our comprehensive Africa policy and engagement strategy. It is the beginning of a long and fruitful collaboration. It is, in many ways, the marriage of State's expertise and authorities with the military's resources and its security experience, and we are excited about it.

I would be glad to take any questions that the committee might have.

Thank you very much.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Secretary.

I'd ask witnesses generally to limit your remarks to 5 minutes; put their full statement in the record. I did want to hear the full statement, of course, from our Assistant Secretary.

But, please, Ms. Whelan, proceed.

**STATEMENT OF THERESA WHELAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC**

Ms. WHELAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I thank you for the opportunity to provide DOD's perspective on Africa Command.

Africa has long been seen as a problem to be solved, a continent of failed states, faltering economies, regional conflicts, and corrupt leadership. This image, though, is a far cry from the Africa of today. With the support of international partners, Africans are slowly but surely instituting democracy and good governance across the continent.

Our security cooperation with Africa is one aspect of our collaboration with Africa, but it is a small part of our overall relationship. The United States spends approximately \$9 billion a year in Africa, funding programs in such areas as health, development, trade and trade promotion, and good governance. In contrast, security-related programs receive only about \$250 million a year. This security assistance includes such things as peacekeeping training programs, border and coastal security capacity development programs, logistics and airlift support to peacekeeping operations, and joint training exercises with African militaries throughout the continent. A great deal of our training is focused on improving the level of professionalization and technical proficiency in African militaries. We do our best to convey, through this training, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the proper role of a civilian-controlled military in a democracy.

We are now taking this relationship a step further. In February 2007, the President announced his decision to create a unified command for Africa, United States Africa Command, or AFRICOM. Although the structure is new, the nature of our military engagement on the African Continent will not change. It will remain primarily focused on conducting theater security cooperation to build partnership capacities in areas such as peacekeeping, maritime security, border security, and counterterrorism skills, and, as appropriate, supporting U.S. Government agencies in implementing other programs that promote regional stability.

For many years, our military relationships on the continent have been implemented by three separate commands: U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, and the U.S. Pacific Command. While these commands executed their missions well, AFRICOM presents an opportunity to eliminate the bureaucratic divisions and operational seams created by this organizational structure. We hope that AFRICOM will allow DOD civilian and military leaders to take a more holistic and operationally efficient approach to the opportunities and challenges that lay ahead as Africa's multilateral institutions, such as the African Union and the regional economic communities, figure more prominently in African security affairs. Consolidation under one command has the potential to better support the development of these important regional mechanisms and relationships.

In many ways, the creation of this command is a historic opportunity to catch up to Africa's quickly evolving continental and regional security structures and their increasing capacities, to syner-

gize African efforts in both the governmental and nongovernmental spheres, and to address the significant security challenges on the continent. AFRICOM represents an opportunity to strengthen and expand United States and African relationships in such a way that our combined efforts can help generate more indigenous, and, therefore, more sustainable, peace and security on the continent.

AFRICOM is an innovative command in several ways. First, AFRICOM will include a significant number of representatives from other U.S. agencies within its staff, including officers from the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development. These interagency officers will contribute their knowledge and expertise to the command so that AFRICOM will be more effective as it works to build peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and disaster response capacity in Africa. It will also help AFRICOM identify ways that DOD can support other U.S. Government Departments and Agencies and their initiatives in Africa.

Second, the commander will have both a military and civilian deputy. The Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs, or DCMA, will be a senior Foreign Service officer from the Department of State. This civilian deputy will be responsible for the planning and oversight of the majority of AFRICOM's security assistance work. In particular, the DCMA will work with the State Department and the African Union on developing ways in which AFRICOM can provide effective training, advisory, and technical support to the development of an African standby force. State Department leadership at this senior level will also enhance AFRICOM's ability to support such State Department-funded endeavors as the African contingency operations training and assistance program, a mainstay of the United States effort to build peace support operations capacity in Africa.

Third, AFRICOM will depart from the traditional J-code structure, recognizing that AFRICOM's focus is on war prevention, rather than warfighting. We are reorganizing the inner workings of the command to best position it for theater security cooperation activities and to prevent problems from becoming crises, and crises from becoming catastrophes or conflicts.

There are many misconceptions about what AFRICOM will look like and what it will do. I would like to address a couple of these misconceptions and concerns here.

First, some people believe that we are establishing AFRICOM solely to fight terrorism or to secure oil resources or to discourage China. This is not true. Violent extremism is a cause for concern, and needs to be addressed, but this is not AFRICOM's singular mission. Natural resources represent Africa's current and future wealth, but in an open-market environment, many benefit. Ironically, the United States, China, and other countries share a common interest, that of a secure environment in Africa, and that's AFRICOM's objective. AFRICOM is about helping Africans build greater capacity to assure their own security.

Some have also raised the concern that AFRICOM will take control of security issues on the continent. Our intent is quite the contrary. The purpose of AFRICOM is to encourage and support African leadership and initiative, not to compete with it or to discourage it. United States security is enhanced when African na-

tions themselves endeavor successfully to address and resolve emerging security issues before they become so serious that they require considerable international resources and intervention to resolve.

Finally, there are fears that AFRICOM represents a militarization of United States foreign policy in Africa, and that AFRICOM will somehow become the lead U.S. Government interlocutor with Africa. This fear is unfounded. AFRICOM will support, not shape, U.S. foreign policy on the continent. The Secretary of State will remain the chief foreign policy advisor to the President, and the Secretary of Defense will remain his chief advisor on defense. The creation of a single United States DOD point of contact for Africa will simply allow DOD to better coordinate its own efforts, in support of State Department leadership, to better build security capacity in Africa. The intent is not for DOD, generally, or for AFRICOM, at the operational level, to assume the lead in areas where State and/or the USAID has clear lines of authority, as well as the comparative advantages to lead. DOD will seek to provide support, as appropriate and as necessary, to help the broader U.S. Government national security goals and objectives to succeed.

Thank you very much for this opportunity. I'll look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Whelan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THERESA WHELAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC

#### INTRODUCTION

Africa has long been seen as a problem to be solved—a continent of failed states, faltering economies, regional conflicts, and corrupt leadership. This image is far cry from the Africa of today. This is a year in which we celebrate the half century of the historic independence of Ghana, and where the economic growth rate of the continent has averaged 5 percent for the past 3 years. In November 2005, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was democratically elected to replace Charles Taylor, who is now at The Hague to stand trial for the brutality he unleashed in the region in the early 1990s. She is the second elected black woman head of state in the world.

The credit for this progress goes to the African people. With the support of international partners, Africans are slowly but surely instituting democracy and good governance across the continent, enabling more and more people to build their lives and pursue their livelihoods in a context of security and freedom, choice and opportunity.

Challenges do remain. Poverty, disease, and conflict persist. Corruption flourishes where the rule of law is weak. Gaps in infrastructure, technology, and legal protections discourage local and foreign investment. We in the United States are in a position to help African nations develop the capacity to address these challenges.

The United States spends approximately \$9 billion a year in Africa, funding programs in support of a wide range of areas. The U.S. is helping to train health care professionals and provide desperately needed hospital equipment, train teachers and provide educational materials, prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS through various awareness programs, train prosecutors in support of the legal reforms and the promotion of independent judiciaries, train police forces consistent with important human rights norms, and to train customs and border control officers to increase capacities to thwart illicit trafficking of weapons, narcotics, and even children across national borders.

We are looking for ways to increase capital and trade flows, the means by which mutual prosperity is built. The African Growth and Opportunity Act, for example, grants African economies preferential access to our markets. The Millennium Challenge Account offers countries that have met standards of responsible and accountable governance to develop and propose extensive projects that target development goals that they themselves have identified.

All of these activities are undertaken in partnership with African governments, African institutions, and African organizations.

#### STRENGTHENING OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH AFRICANS

Our security cooperation with Africa is one aspect of our collaboration with Africa—but it is a small part of our overall relationship.

This security assistance includes joint training exercises with African militaries throughout the continent. We provide a great deal of training to improve the level of professionalization and technical proficiency in African militaries. We do our best to convey through this training respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the proper role of a civilian-controlled military in a democracy. We provide equipment—in some cases granting the funds to do so—to meet African defense and security needs. We established the Africa Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, DC, to promote a continuous dialogue between African military and civilian leaders and their U.S. counterparts on important security issues. In Nairobi, we instituted the Regional Disaster Management Center of Excellence. We engage on a daily basis with African military chains of command through our embassy-based Defense Attachés and Defense Cooperation Chiefs. Every step of the way, we consult with our African partners and listen to what they have to say.

We are now taking this relationship a step further. In February 2007, the President announced his decision to create a Unified Command for Africa—U.S. Africa Command, or “AFRICOM.”

Although this structure is new, our military engagement on the African Continent will remain primarily focused on building partnership capacities, conducting theater security cooperation, building important counterterrorism skills and, as appropriate, supporting U.S. Government agencies in implementing other programs that promote regional stability. For many years our military relationships on the continent have been implemented by three separate commands: U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command and U.S. Pacific Command. While these commands executed their missions well, AFRICOM presents an opportunity to eliminate the bureaucratic divisions and operational seams created by this organizational structure. We hope that AFRICOM will allow DOD civilian and military leaders to take a more holistic and operationally efficient approach to the opportunities and challenges that lay ahead as Africa’s multilateral institutions, such as the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities, figure more prominently in African security affairs. Consolidation under one command has the potential to better support the development of these important regional mechanisms and relationships.

#### RATIONALE FOR AFRICOM’S CREATION

Stability and prosperity in Africa are important to the long-term interests of the United States. A stable, healthy, and more prosperous Africa will contribute to global security and a stronger world economy.

Many of Africa’s security challenges are not limited by country boundaries but are transnational and regional in nature. African governments and institutions are using new approaches to address these challenges, and our engagement with Africa needs to reflect these African institutional innovations at the regional level.

In many ways, the creation of this command is a historic opportunity to “catch up” to Africa’s quickly evolving continental and regional security structures, and their increasing capacities to synergize African efforts in both the governmental and nongovernmental spheres to address the significant security challenges on the continent. AFRICOM represents an opportunity to strengthen and expand U.S. and African relationships in such a way that our combined efforts can help generate a more indigenous and, therefore, more sustainable peace and security on the continent. AFRICOM also is a manifestation of how DOD is innovating to transform its ability, institutionally, to meet the challenges of the new global security environment.

#### AFRICOM’S INNOVATIONS

AFRICOM is an innovative command in several ways. First, unlike a traditional Unified Command, it will focus on building African regional security and crisis response capacity. AFRICOM will promote greater security ties between the United States and Africa, providing new opportunities to enhance our bilateral military relationships, and strengthen the capacities of Africa’s regional and subregional organizations.

Second, AFRICOM will include a significant number of representatives from other U.S. agencies within its staff, including officers from the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). A variety of agencies have

existing bilateral relationships with African governments—from collaborating to promote aviation safety to working with local NGOs to develop conflict mediation programs targeted at youth. These interagency officers will contribute their knowledge and expertise to the command so that AFRICOM will be more effective as it works to build peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and disaster response capacity in Africa. They will also help AFRICOM identify ways that DOD can support other U.S. Government Departments and Agencies' initiatives in Africa.

Third, the Commander will have both a military and civilian deputy. The Deputy to the Commander for Civil-Military Affairs (DCMA) will be a Senior Foreign Service officer from the Department of State. This civilian deputy will be responsible for the planning and oversight of the majority of AFRICOM's security assistance work. In particular, the DCMA will work with the State Department and the African Union on developing ways in which AFRICOM can provide effective training, advisory and technical support to the development of the African Standby Force. State Department leadership at this senior level will also enhance AFRICOM's ability to support such State Department funded endeavors as the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program, a mainstay of the U.S. effort to build peace-support operations capacity in Africa.

Fourth, AFRICOM will depart from the traditional J-code organization structure. Originating in the Napoleon age, this has proven to be an extremely effective method of organizing a command for war-fighting. Recognizing that AFRICOM's focus is on war-prevention rather than war-fighting, we are reorganizing the inner workings of the command to best position it for theatre security cooperation activities and preventing problems before they become crises and preventing crises before they become catastrophes.

#### AFRICOM MYTHS VERSUS REALITY

There are many misconceptions about what AFRICOM will look like and what it will do. I would like to address these misperceptions and concerns here.

First, some people believe that we are establishing AFRICOM solely to fight terrorism, or to secure oil resources, or to discourage China. This is not true. Violent extremism is cause for concern, and needs to be addressed, but this is not AFRICOM's singular mission. Natural resources represent Africa's current and future wealth, but in a fair market environment, many benefit. Ironically, the U.S., China and other countries share a common interest—that of a secure environment. AFRICOM is about helping Africans build greater capacity to assure their own security.

Second, some have raised the concern that AFRICOM will take control of security issues on the continent. Our intent is quite the contrary. DOD recognizes and applauds the leadership role that individual African nations and multilateral African organizations are taking in the promotion of peace, security, and stability on the continent. For example, AFRICOM can provide effective training, advisory and technical support to the development of the African Standby Force. This is exactly the type of initiative and leadership needed to address the diverse and unpredictable global security challenges the world currently faces. The purpose of AFRICOM is to encourage and support such African leadership and initiative, not to compete with it or to discourage it. U.S. security is enhanced when African nations themselves endeavor to successfully address and resolve emergent security issues before they become so serious that they require considerable international resources and intervention to resolve.

Finally, there are fears that AFRICOM represents a militarization of U.S. foreign policy in Africa and that AFRICOM will somehow become the lead U.S. Government interlocutor with Africa. This fear is unfounded. AFRICOM will support, not shape, U.S. foreign policy on the continent. The Secretary of State will remain the chief foreign policy advisor to the President, and the Secretary of Defense will remain his chief advisor on defense and security matters. The creation of a single U.S. DOD point of contact for Africa will simply allow DOD to better coordinate its own efforts, in support of State Department leadership, to better build security capacity in Africa. The intent is not for DOD generally, or for AFRICOM at the operational-level, to assume the lead in areas where State and/or USAID has clear lines of authority as well as the comparative advantages to lead. DOD will seek to provide support, as appropriate and as necessary, to help the broader U.S. Government national security goals and objectives succeed.

#### STANDING UP AFRICOM

We are moving quickly to stand up AFRICOM through a Transition Team, which includes officers from the Department of State and USAID, that is located in Stutt-



gart, Germany. It is coordinating the planning for the Command, including the location of the headquarters and organizational structure, with U.S. European Command to ensure an effective transition. AFRICOM will be stood up as a subunified command under European Command by October 1, 2007, and is scheduled to be fully operational no later than October 1, 2008.

The establishment of AFRICOM—and the participation of State, USAID, and other U.S. agencies—demonstrates the importance the U.S. Government places on strengthening ties with Africa. With AFRICOM, the United States will be working in partnership with Africans to foster an environment of security and peace—an environment that will enable Africans themselves to further strengthen their democracies, institutionalize respect for human rights, pursue economic prosperity, and build effective regional institutions. A more stable Africa serves the goal of helping to foster a more stable global environment.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Ms. Whelan.  
Mr. Hess.

**STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL HESS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. HESS. Thank you, Chairman Feingold, Ranking Member Lugar, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is an honor to appear before you today to discuss USAID's involvement in the establishment of the United States Africa Command.

I will briefly review USAID's history in cooperation with the military, explain our role, both in the initial planning for AFRICOM and our continued engagement with the command, and detail the resources we expect to contribute to it.

Since the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, USAID has been the principal U.S. Government agency providing assistance to countries recovering from disasters, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms.

With regard to our disaster assistance and development portfolios, we have had many occasions to cooperate with the military over the years. Our most obvious collaborations are in the area of emergency humanitarian assistance at both natural disasters and complex emergencies. During Operation Provide Comfort in 1991, for example, our disaster assistance response teams worked closely with coalition forces to facilitate the safe return of Kurdish civilians to northern Iraq. At the time, I was serving as a U.S. Army lieutenant colonel in civil affairs, and Operation Provide Comfort was my first operational experience with USAID's humanitarian assistance work, and where I met Fred Cuny.

USAID also has experience collaborating with the military in peacetime civic action projects. For example, USAID's missions in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya have worked on educational projects with Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa, in which the military builds or refurbishes schools and the USAID furnishes schoolbooks and supports teacher training.

This long record of collaboration with the military suggests that the cooperative relationship that is envisioned by AFRICOM is not entirely new, yet experience has also taught us that when we work with the military, maintaining the essential humanitarian and development character of USAID is vital. USAID coordination with DOD should not be perceived as contribution to specific military objectives, but, rather, as contributing to broad foreign policy goals.

USAID has been involved in the operational planning for AFRICOM from the beginning. In November 2006, we sent staff to participate on the implementing planning teams which developed the initial conceptual framework for AFRICOM. We have also participated in the AFRICOM Transition Team since February 2007, when it was established at headquarters, U.S. European Command, in Stuttgart, Germany.

USAID has two full-time staff people there today, representing both the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance and the Bureau for Africa. They are intimately involved in all the operational details required to help AFRICOM achieve initial operating capability on time. In addition to the collaboration in Stuttgart, here in Washington we are in close and continual consultations with our colleagues at the Departments of State and Defense that have responsibility for AFRICOM.

We envision that USAID will play a constructive role in the structure and operations of AFRICOM when the command becomes operational. As a first step, we intend to send a senior development advisor to AFRICOM to help the commander make strategic choices with regard to development issues within his area of responsibility. The SDA will be a senior Foreign Service officer with extensive experience in USAID development work. The person will most likely have previously served as a mission director, and will bring to AFRICOM command group the invaluable perspective of an experienced development professional with significant African experience.

There are other opportunities for us to participate in the structure and the operations of AFRICOM. There are a number of leadership positions within the proposed organizational structure which are currently under development. At the moment, it is premature to say which, if any, would be appropriately staffed by USAID personnel. However, we will continue to work on the evolution of AFRICOM's structure to determine which positions might best be served by the expertise that USAID has to offer.

The most important resource that USAID will contribute to AFRICOM will be our people. USAID staff members have hundreds of years of experience engaging in humanitarian and development work in Africa. This accumulated wisdom will be of enormous benefit to the command as it performs its mission of supporting the interagency efforts of the U.S. Government to assist local populations and deter extremism on the continent.

We do not envision transferring any funds to the Department of Defense for the conduct of its civilian assistance activities. We will work to ensure that USAID's and AFRICOM's programs are coordinated to avoid duplication of effort and use our resources effectively.

USAID is a proud partner with our colleagues from the State Department and the Department of Defense in the creation of AFRICOM. As AFRICOM develops, we will continue to collaborate with our colleagues in the Government and work closely with our NGO partners to ensure that any concerns they may have are addressed.

Thank you very much for your time today. I look forward to keeping Congress informed regarding our involvement in AFRICOM, and would be pleased to answer any of your questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Hess follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL E. HESS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT, AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC

#### INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today to discuss USAID's involvement in the establishment of the United States Africa Command, or AFRICOM. We believe that AFRICOM can significantly advance the "Three D" concept, and facilitate the coordination of defense, diplomacy, and development to advance American foreign policy interests on the continent of Africa.

In the course of my testimony today, I will address USAID's role in the development of AFRICOM by outlining four important issues:

- Summary of USAID's cooperation with the U.S. military;
- USAID's participation in the initial planning for AFRICOM;
- USAID's intended role in AFRICOM after it reaches Initial Operating Capability (IOC) on October 1, 2007; and
- Resources that USAID will continue to contribute to AFRICOM after it achieves Full Operating Capability (FOC) on October 1, 2008.

#### USAID AND CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

Since the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, USAID has been the principal U.S. Government agency providing assistance to countries recovering from disasters, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in democratic reforms. With regard to our disaster assistance and development portfolios, we have had many occasions to cooperate with the military over the years.

Our most obvious collaborations have been in the area of emergency humanitarian assistance. When the magnitude of a natural disaster overwhelms our normal response mechanisms, we have successfully enlisted the aid of our military partners to meet the needs of civilians at risk. During the 2004 Asian Tsunami crisis, for example, USAID Disaster Assistance Response Teams (known as DARTs) worked closely with U.S. Navy units from Combined Support Force 536 to deliver relief supplies and potable water to affected areas. Similarly, DARTs collaborated with U.S. military units in 2005 in the aftermath of the Pakistan earthquake to identify isolated populations in stricken areas, evacuate victims for medical treatment, and set up emergency shelters to protect survivors against the harsh winter elements. As recently as December 2006, USAID worked with aviation assets from the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in Djibouti to air drop supplies to the Somali refugee camps in northeastern Kenya which had been cut off from overland routes by extensive flooding.

USAID also has extensive experience working with the military to meet the humanitarian and economic needs of civilian populations affected by armed conflict. During Operation PROVIDE COMFORT in 1991, our DARTs worked closely with the U.S. Army to facilitate the safe return of Kurdish civilians who had fled into the Zargos Mountains to escape attacks from Saddam Hussein's genocidal forces. I should note that as a U.S. Army Civil Affairs lieutenant colonel working in northern Iraq at the time, PROVIDE COMFORT was my first operational experience with USAID's humanitarian assistance work. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) operating in Afghanistan and Iraq offer the most integrated model of USAID-U.S. military collaboration to date. In both countries, USAID staff work closely with personnel from the U.S. military and a variety of other U.S. Government agencies to provide essential services to local populations in support of our national security objectives.

Beyond humanitarian assistance in response to natural disasters and armed conflicts, USAID also has experience collaborating with the military in peacetime civic action projects. For example, USAID missions have worked with U.S. military units performing medical, dental, and veterinary missions for civilian populations in Latin America and Africa, most recently in Kenya and Uganda. In addition, USAID missions in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya have worked on educational projects with CJTF-HOA in which the military builds or refurbishes school buildings and USAID furnishes school books and supports teacher training.

This long record of collaboration with the military across countries and across contexts suggests that the cooperative relationship that is envisioned by AFRICOM is not entirely new. USAID has learned that the military's logistical capabilities can be invaluable assets in emergency humanitarian assistance. Likewise, we have demonstrated that USAID's unique skills in addressing a range of essential human needs for civilian populations in both peace and war is of substantial strategic benefit to the foreign policy of the United States. Thus, USAID's coordination with the military's civic action programs can lead to important synergies of effort, resources and expertise for the benefit of our beneficiaries and in support of our interests.

Yet experience has also taught us of the importance of maintaining the essential humanitarian and development character of USAID when we work with the military. While we represent the same government as our military colleagues, the methods by which we work and the sectors in which we work are quite different. Preserving the development and humanitarian role of USAID, even as we work closely with the military in the field, is vital to the successful operation of our programs, to the preservation of our partnerships with nongovernmental organizations, and to our credibility in the eyes of our beneficiaries. In large part this will be ensured by AFRICOM's focus on the security sector, while supporting USAID in mutually agreed upon activities.

We remain ever mindful of our humanitarian principles and development principles as we contribute to the development of AFRICOM. We also remain mindful that the increasing presence and role of the Department of Defense in Africa provides opportunities and challenges. DOD can support national security objectives in ways that USAID cannot. DOD can help professionalize African militaries; strengthen the African regional security architecture, including African Standby Force; mitigate HIV/AIDS and other public health threats in the security sector; and provide disaster response capacity if others cannot. USAID participation in such efforts seeks to maximize effectiveness in ways that broadly support development and humanitarian objectives.

Although there has been increasing recognition of development as part of the national security strategy, growing DOD presence in Africa has the potential of blurring the lines between diplomacy, defense, and development. These lines were never perfect. Increasing levels of DOD programming in Africa puts it in closer proximity to USAID programs. Some of these DOD activities include wells, schools, clinics, and veterinarian services. The result can be confusion and misperceptions. USAID coordination with the DOD should not be perceived as contributing to specific military objectives, but rather as contributing to broader foreign policy goals.

#### USAID AND INITIAL PLANNING FOR AFRICOM

USAID has been involved in the operational planning for AFRICOM from the beginning. In November 2006 we sent staff to participate in the Implementation Planning Team which developed the initial conceptual framework for AFRICOM. We have also participated in the AFRICOM Transition Team (TT) since February 2007 when it was established at the headquarters for U.S. European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart, Germany. USAID has two full-time staff people there, representing both the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, which I lead, and the Bureau for Africa. They are intimately involved in all of the operational details required to help AFRICOM achieve IOC on time, including the shape of the command structure, outreach, staffing patterns, and legal authorities among others issues. In addition to the collaboration in Stuttgart, here in Washington we are in close and continual consultations with our colleagues at the Departments of State and Defense that have responsibility for AFRICOM.

#### USAID'S ROLE IN AFRICOM POST-IOC

We envision that USAID will play a constructive role in the structure and operations of AFRICOM when the command becomes operational. USAID currently has over \$3 billion of programs across the continent planned this fiscal year alone, making it a U.S. Government agency with one of the largest financial commitment to Africa. Given AFRICOM's mission to support other agencies in implementing U.S. security policies and strategies on the continent, we expect that there will be many areas in which we might usefully collaborate.

As a first step, we intend to send a Senior Development Advisor (SDA) to AFRICOM to help the Commander make strategic choices with regard to development issues within his AOR. Modeled after Political Advisors, or POLADs, which the State Department sends to each of the geographic combatant commands, the SDA will be a senior Foreign Service officer with extensive experience in USAID development work. The person will most likely have previously served as a mission

director at least once, and will bring to the command group of AFRICOM the invaluable perspective of an experienced development professional with significant Africa experience. I should note that USAID already has SDAs at two combatant commands, EUCOM and the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and we are committed to sending SDAs to each of the geographic combatant commands.

We believe that there may be other opportunities for us to participate in the structure and operations of AFRICOM. There are a number of leadership positions within the proposed organizational structure which are currently under development. At the moment, it is premature to say which, if any, would be appropriately staffed by USAID personnel. However, we will continue to observe the evolution of the AFRICOM's structure to determine which positions might best be served by the expertise that USAID has to offer.

#### USAID RESOURCES FOR AFRICOM

The most important resource that USAID will contribute to AFRICOM will be our people. USAID staff members have hundreds of years of experience engaging in humanitarian and development work in Africa. This accumulated wisdom will be of enormous benefit to the command as it performs its mission of supporting the inter-agency efforts of the U.S. Government to assist local populations and deter extremism on the continent. To this end, USAID is committed to providing staff for the position I mentioned above. We will also consider providing additional staff for the AFRICOM headquarters as requested. Finally, we will work to ensure that AFRICOM's activities are closely coordinated with USAID programs managed by our missions across the continent.

We do not envision transferring any funds to the Department of Defense for the conduct of its civilian assistance activities. We will, however, work to ensure that our programmatic expenditures are coordinated with those of AFRICOM to avoid needless overlap or mutually exclusive activities.

#### CONCLUSION

USAID is a proud partner with our colleagues in the State Department and the Pentagon in the creation of AFRICOM. It will be a substantial step in our effort to integrate further the elements of defense, diplomacy, and development in the execution of our foreign policy. In my judgment, it will also represent an improvement in the delivery of services to our beneficiaries by greater synergies in the distribution of U.S. Government resources across Africa.

As AFRICOM continues to develop, we will continue to collaborate with our colleagues in the government and will work closely with our NGO partners to ensure that any concerns they may have are addressed.

Thank you very much for your time today. I look forward to keeping Congress informed regarding our involvement in AFRICOM, and I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you all.

We'll begin with 7-minute rounds. There is a vote anticipated at around 10:30, so ideally we'll all get a round in, and then take a brief recess before we start panel 2.

Let me begin with you, Secretary Frazer. I presume that the administration is saying the same things about AFRICOM to our friends in Africa and elsewhere that this subcommittee just heard from this panel. Could you give me a sense of what responses you've received from African political and military leaders?

Ambassador FRAZER. I can, but I would also turn to my colleague from DOD who has been on the tours. But, in my visits with African officials, they've had questions about "Why?" "Why now?" And we've answered that it's consistent with the significant engagement of the Bush administration, that it has been a long time in coming. As an academic over the last decade, I've called for bringing Africa under a single command, so it's not a new idea. And we've also responded that there is a clear need. Many African countries are participating in peacekeeping across the continent and globally. There is clearly a threat of extremism across the Sahel, down the eastern

coast of Africa. And the move toward democratization also involves professionalization of the militaries. We've had six wars that have ended, so that obviously there is a need for security sector reform and post-conflict reconstruction.

So, we've gotten mainly, "Why now?" and "What will the mission of this AFRICOM be?" And, as Ms. Whelan said, questions about "Is it to compete with other regional or global powers, like China?" Obviously, we've answered that. It has no intention of trying to compete with anyone else, and that it is, in fact, to rationalize our engagement with Africa under one command, rather than under three separate ones.

Senator FEINGOLD. If you characterized the tone of the responses from the African countries' leaders, would it be excited, nervous, wary? How would you describe it?

Ambassador FRAZER. Largely positive. Some extremely positive, very interested in having their countries be the area where headquarters would be located. I would characterize a minority as not positive. I would say, maybe, one in the not-positive category. And I would characterize a few as wary.

Senator FEINGOLD. OK.

Secretary, one of the goals of the new command is to enhance the security services of African nations. In its relations with foreign militaries, the United States often faces the dilemma of whether to support a military regime that may enhance stability in the short term, but, of course, potentially undermine stability in long run by compromising democratic institutions and popular support. As the United States enhances its military-to-military relations on the African Continent, are you prepared to make short-term tradeoffs to support long-term security?

Ambassador FRAZER. Well, we've had this issue come before us with Mauritania, which had a coup d'etat, but yet was an extremely important partner to us in pushing back extremism in our efforts to counter terrorism. And we, in fact, cut off the majority of our security cooperation with the Mauritanian Government until it returned to democracy. And we think that a democratic government, a legitimate government, is most important for long-term stability. And so, I think the interagency has already faced a scenario that you're describing, and we've made a judgment that is for long-term stability.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Secretary.

Ms. Whelan, could you outline for me the basic parameters of when and where the United States can use lethal force in non-combatant zones? Do such operations require prior Presidential approval? Do they require the signoff of the relevant ambassador?

Ms. WHELAN. Thank you, Senator.

Yes; the United States, prior to use of lethal force, or actually force of any kind in a noncombatant zone, requires an execute order that has been authorized by the President, and it is also coordinated with the ambassador, either, if it is in a specific country, in that country, or, if it cuts across regional lines, with the ambassadors in the region.

Senator FEINGOLD. Coordinated or signed off?

Ms. WHELAN. In an execute order provided to a combatant commander, the President signs off on that execute order through the

national command authority chain of command, but the ambassador is involved in that process, vis-a-vis the State Department, and also, on the ground, the ambassador is kept informed.

Senator FEINGOLD. So, no separate signoff from the ambassador.

Ms. WHELAN. That's correct, Senator.

Senator FEINGOLD. On the issue of civil-military balance, Secretary Whelan, Navy Rear Admiral Robert Moeller, executive director of the U.S. Africa Command Implementation Planning Team said, recently in an interview, that AFRICOM will focus mainly on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief and crisis response missions. How will you ensure that AFRICOM maintains a balance in its civil-military duties and does not override the existing structures that are set up for this purpose such as those in the USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance?

Ms. WHELAN. AFRICOM's intent is to be a supporting element of the United States foreign policy structure in Africa, not a supported structure. So, AFRICOM will respond to the requirements identified by the U.S. Government, by the U.S. State Department, in terms of humanitarian needs or responses to disaster relief and those sorts of missions. AFRICOM will not be initiating any missions or any activities that have not been previously coordinated with, and approved by, the State Department in a noncombat context. Traditional lines of authority will not change, nor will the presence of interagency personnel in AFRICOM dilute or undermine the independence of their home agencies. None of those command authorities are going to be changing.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you.

Mr. Hess, in your opinion, is there a risk that U.S. military counterterrorism operations and programs could conflict with the security and stability operations assistance components in AFRICOM's mandate? And, if so, how would you address that risk?

Mr. HESS. There is always the possibility that they could conflict with it, and that's why it's important to have a good coordination mechanism, like AFRICOM, to ensure that we have a unified approach on how we conduct these operations. And I think we've worked very closely. We have some good examples on the Trans-Sahel counterterrorism program, where all three agencies have worked very closely together to ensure that we don't cross those lines. If we don't know those coordination mechanisms, and we don't have those conversations, then there is that potential. But I think the cooperation is there. We're working very closely on that.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to follow up on many of the questions the chairman asked, but just to try to weigh—once again, how the State Department, USAID, have weighed in, in the discussion of the Combatant Command. And Ms. Whelan has mentioned specific chain of command there, with the President signing off, and the military then proceeding. But let me just raise a very practical question. We've had testimony before this committee on Sudan and Darfur. Many very, very able people, some with experience in the administration now, some in previous administrations. Now, I was struck by the fact that, by the time the hearing was over, some of our witnesses

were advocating United States military action in Sudan. They were discussing, specifically, bombing of airports, the disruption of aircraft, a good number of aspects, and they gave the feeling that, after all, nothing short of U.S. military force was likely to make a difference.

I took the occasion, in my opening statement, to compliment the United Nations on the African Command that has been proposed, because I think that's very important. But these are not hypothetical situations. Even as AFRICOM is being worked out, we have conflicts on the ground, presently, in which there are distinguished Americans with very strong points of view. This is why I get back, fundamentally to the question, Where does the Secretary of State fit into this? In other words, before we begin getting into combatant operations or antiterrorism operations or any other way in which the Combatant Command is involved, is the Secretary of State the major influence, or those who are such as yourselves, who are somehow involved in the chain of command with her? Can you, Secretary Frazer, enlighten me further about the consideration, the arguments, the debate, about what is proceeding as this very important new organization is founded?

Ambassador FRAZER. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

I think that in any of these areas of conflict and policy considerations, the Secretary of State has the primary lead as the President's foreign policy advisor. And most of these discussions, practically, take place at the PCC, the Policy Coordination Committee, and the DC and the Principals Committee, with all of the agencies sitting around the table. And so, before any significant, major policy decision would be made on what the military engagement would be in a place like Sudan, we're sitting there looking at all of our options, and the Secretary is right at that table, deciding—obviously looking at the range of foreign policy tools, whether it's Treasury and whether it would be more effective to pressure the government using Treasury, how our diplomacy can be coordinated, and certainly if there are any areas in which the military can be of benefit, for instance, NATO airlifting in the African Union forces, rotating them in. I think it is a coordinated policy process, and I would expect the same in all areas of conflict, whether it's Somalia or any future conflicts that we might see in the Sahel—there would be an interagency process, with the Secretary as the lead.

I haven't felt that there's been any weakening of State Department's position as the primary foreign policy actor.

Senator LUGAR. Would you agree that this planning on our part, in the formation of this, ought to be made as explicitly clear as possible to all the African nations so that they have some idea of what our debate, what our arguments, what our resolutions have been? I ask this, because you have assured us that, generally, African countries have expressed opinions about this development, and have been positive, maybe a negative here or there. My own, sort of, reading of the literature on this is somewhat less sanguine. I feel that a good number of African countries, without having the briefing we're having today, or maybe the briefings that you and the ambassador can give them, are less happy about the whole prospect; although understanding that the United States is a world



superpower, and that we go wherever we want. But in order for this to be welcomed as a command that really does offer potential humanitarian resources, cohesion, stability, which is our intent as you have described, the approach of this really is very, very important. I know you know all of this, but we take this hearing to try to emphasize it.

Now, I just wanted to follow through with one more aspect, because we've also had hearings in this committee with regard to other continents and the role of our ambassadors in various countries. These issues are not new to you, but staff members from this committee have visited several embassies and have issued a formal published report about their findings, in which we found that our ambassadors sometimes were, not the last to know about Department of Defense activities in their countries, but, at the same time, it was almost an afterthought. Those involved in the activities felt that the pursuit of terrorists, or whatever might be involved, was so critical, so timely, that, in due course, they might inform the embassy and the ambassador, but, first things first. And sometimes, large contingents of Americans were in countries without the knowledge of our ambassadors, or certainly the participation of those persons in any such ideas.

Now, I think that has been mitigated by the kind of hearings we've had here, and the report of our staffs and so forth. But this is a reason to raise it at the outset here, because, in fact, events do happen, and if there is not a general policy that our State Department and our ambassadors are involved, really, from the outset, then I fear we're going to be back to square one again, sending staff members down to interview the ambassadors. Do you have any comment about this issue?

Ambassador FRAZER. Yes, Senator. I agree with you. We absolutely believe that the chief of mission will continue to have that authority and should exercise that authority as well. We're hoping that by placing military liaison elements within the embassies, it will help to assist with the coordination. I suspect, in those cases, having served as an ambassador, where someone's in-country without the knowledge of the ambassador, that somebody at that embassy knew they were in-country, and didn't inform the ambassador—somebody that was part of their country team, because I don't think that our military's just running around the continent without the clearances. And so, it's a matter of making sure that our coordination is effective, and that those country teams are communicating with the ambassador, the chief of mission.

But I take your point. There's a bigger structural point, which is that State Department doesn't have the resources and the personnel that our DOD colleagues have. That, I think, is a more fundamental structural issue. But, in terms of coordination and collaboration, I think that we have the authorities necessary.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Senator Lugar.

I just feel compelled to put on the record that the conversations we've had have indicated a more negative response from the African countries on AFRICOM. Obviously, you've had your conversa-

tions, others have had theirs, but this is something that we need to continue to explore and examine.

I want to welcome Senator Nelson, who's been very involved on this subcommittee. And he's kind enough to defer to Senator Webb for his questions.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary Frazer, I assume this question would be for you, but, if not, whoever would be most appropriate to answer it. Could you give us a better idea of the decisional process through which we're going to figure out where this command is going to be headquartered?

Ambassador FRAZER. Yes; I can. I would also turn to my colleague, Theresa Whelan, to answer the question as well.

Certainly, there's a planning team, right now, making recommendations. And I know that the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Defense are in informal conversations throughout this process with Deputy Secretary Negroponte and Secretary Rice. And so, I think there's already been informal discussion between the agencies.

Senator WEBB. How about among other countries in Africa?

Ambassador FRAZER. There are certain countries that have made it known that they would like AFRICOM to be based in their countries.

Senator WEBB. Are you free to share that information with us?

Ambassador FRAZER. Well, I could certainly share one because the President of the country wrote an op-ed in the newspaper. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has certainly asked that AFRICOM be headquartered in Liberia. Others, I would be more discrete about at this point. There is a planning process, with criteria, looking at it, and that's where I think Theresa Whelan might be better able to answer the question.

Ms. WHELAN. Senator, we have gone through a very deliberate planning process to narrow down potential sites, and we have also, of course, included the fact that there are several countries that have actually issued explicit invitations. Despite reports in the press, we have not held discussions, or even raised the issue of location, with any of the countries that we have talked to bilaterally, or even in any multilateral fora.

We have a site selection criteria that we developed, in coordination with the Department of State. The transition team has used that criteria to narrow down potential sites. And those potential sites have been briefed to the Department of State informally, and we've begun an informal dialogue on the pluses and minuses of those sites, based on the initial cut. They will be briefed to the Secretary of Defense on the eighth of August, and we will continue the dialogue with Department of State to determine how we want to move forward, in terms of selecting the location or the country that we would wish to approach first.

Senator WEBB. This is going to be among the list that has already indicated they would be amenable to this, I assume. It's not like going forward with an offer. This is more like going forward with an acceptance, should we say?

Ms. WHELAN. In some cases. I mean, some of the potential sites that have been identified are commensurate with countries that

have indicated a specific interest. We are certainly not interested in going someplace, or even attempting to go someplace, where we are clearly not wanted. So, any country that has either publicly or privately indicated that they would not be interested, able, capable, or whatever, or hosting a staff element of AFRICOM would not be considered.

Senator WEBB. But there may be others that could be approached that haven't, at this point, said they would be amenable? Is that—

Ms. WHELAN. That's correct.

Senator WEBB. All right. Now, does the establishment of this command, is it anticipated that it is going to affect the nature, the size, or the operational parameters of the United States military in Africa?

Ms. WHELAN. Yes; it will obviously affect the size of the United States military presence in Africa. Currently, our military presence is limited to our forward operating site in Djibouti, CJTF-HOA, which is roughly 1,500 U.S. military members.

Senator WEBB. So, are we anticipating that we will be in Africa, in an operational sense, as a result of the establishment of this command?

Ms. WHELAN. No, sir, we are anticipating that we will have staff elements present on the continent, but we will not have operational elements. And we have made very clear, to many African countries who have asked the question, that we have no intention of basing any troops or military forces on the continent. The only presence would be headquarters staff personnel.

Senator WEBB. How about in a strengthening of bilateral military ties that would foresee operational exercises, as, for instance, we do in Thailand with Cobra Gold?

Ms. WHELAN. Well, we currently conduct a number of exercises on the continent, and have for a number of years, including our small Joint Combined Exchange Training, JCET, exercises, using 12-man teams to conduct training in various nations.

Senator WEBB. Right. Well, would you foresee an expansion of those sorts of activities as a result of the creation of this command?

Ms. WHELAN. I would anticipate that there would probably be an increase in the amount of exercises we conduct, and other types of military-to-military cooperation activity, because we would have a command focused on Africa.

Senator WEBB. Are there countries that would be high on the list in Africa right now, in terms of that sort of potential cooperation?

Ms. WHELAN. I think all of our current mil-to-mil partners would be potential partners for potentially increased mil-to-mil cooperation.

Senator WEBB. So, is there a country that you would say—or a couple of countries—that you would say, in the future, would be our strongest supporters and allies as a result of the creation of the command?

Ms. WHELAN. In terms of the creation of the command, there are clearly countries out there, as Assistant Secretary Frazer said, that are very forward-leaning and very supportive, and we expect them to continue to be in that position.

Senator WEBB. Who would be among those?

Ms. WHELAN. Well, Secretary Frazer mentioned, of course, Liberia. President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has been very vocal. Other countries that have been positive are some of our long-term military partners that we have had military relationships with for decades now. Countries like Botswana, Senegal have been very supportive, and Djibouti has been very supportive. We anticipate those countries to continue to be supportive of our military-to-military relationships. We have other relationships throughout the continent that we expect to maintain, and hopefully have the opportunity to strengthen and deepen, as we will have a four-star commander focused on the continent, and not distracted by issues going on in Europe or the Middle East or Asia.

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you.

Senator Nelson.

Senator BILL NELSON. By the way, Ms. Frazer, what did the President of Liberia say in the op-ed, that they wanted it in Liberia?

Ambassador FRAZER. The President has made known that she feels that there's a special relationship between the United States and Liberia, that she wants to deepen that relationship. She acknowledged the role that our diplomats and Marines played in ending the 14-year civil war in Liberia. And she also sees the positive benefits, from a development perspective, that would come to Liberia if AFRICOM was headquartered there.

Senator BILL NELSON. Ms. Whelan, I've been to a lot of the combatant commanders' headquarters, and I'd like to know: What is your thinking of how AFRICOM's interagency coordination process is going to be different from the existing Combatant Commands?

Ms. WHELAN. We think that the interagency coordination process will be different, partly because Africa Command will have the benefit of having interagency knowledge and expertise embedded in the command. It will not have authority, but the people that we hope will be detailed to the command, on a reimbursable basis from the interagency, will be provide the command the expertise to understand the issue areas in which coordination in advanced planning and cooperation are required. So, we hope that this will improve the level of coordination in an operational level with the interagency counterparts in Africa.

At the strategic level in Washington, the interagency coordination will continue, as it has, through the interagency process, through PCCs, DCs, et cetera. But, at the operational level, we hope that having people with this knowledge embedded in AFRICOM will facilitate greater interaction and communication and transparency.

Senator BILL NELSON. Isn't that pretty much what Admiral Stavridis does in U.S. Southern Command now?

Ms. WHELAN. Admiral Stavridis is actually moving in that direction. In fact, U.S. Southern Command has been involved in some of the discussions we've had on Africa Command, and on where we want to go with Africa Command, in terms of integrating the interagency. Currently, U.S. South Command is using a J-9 concept to integrate the interagency—essentially a through component of the command that sits separately from, but is part of, the SOUTHCOM

structure. The difference within AFRICOM is that, while there will be a component of the command responsible for managing what we call outreach and interface, the members of the interagency will not simply be confined to that part of the command, but they will be working, not as liaison officers, but as staff personnel within and throughout all other parts of the command. The depth of integration is what is different than the current SOUTHCOM plan that Admiral Stavridis is working. But Admiral Stavridis is very interested in what we're doing in Africa Command. And if that proves to be effective, it may be exported to some of the other commands.

Senator BILL NELSON. Would you consider doing the two simultaneously?

Ms. WHELAN. I'm sorry, Senator, "the two simultaneously"?

Senator BILL NELSON. Yes. You're setting up Africa Command with this concept. Stavridis is moving in that direction. So, you do both commands the same.

Ms. WHELAN. Well, sir, I can't quite speak to SOUTHCOM. It's not my area. It certainly, I suppose, would be possible, if Admiral Stavridis were so inclined to move that direction. I think the challenge for Admiral Stavridis is, he has an existing command organizational architecture that he has to work within and change. We have a bit of an advantage on the Africa Command side, because we are starting from zero, and we are in the process of building—an organizational architecture that is somewhat new and different than the traditional J-code structure that Admiral Stavridis has inherited.

Senator BILL NELSON. How do you envision this new African Command taking on certain subjects that are peculiar to that particular command, for example, child soldiers or countering the role of civil militias. What are you going to do about that in Africa Command?

Ms. WHELAN. I think our hope would be that, as Africa Command allows us to work more closely in a more sustained and focused manner with our African partners on building up their capacity to deal with security challenges that they face, that issues of militia forces popping up in countries, because, essentially, there is no competent security force to be able to deal with them, will be mitigated. Child soldiers are usually recruited by these popup militias, as their instant armies. We aim to help create capacity for individual countries to manage their security appropriately and, especially, professionally. This is one of the problems we've had, certainly, in many internal conflicts in Africa, the failure of African forces to behave professionally, and therefore, they exacerbate the problem, as opposed to helping solve the problem. But if our capacity-building can lead to more professional security responses, we believe that the problems of civil militias and/or recruitment of child soldiers will actually be mitigated over time.

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, I'd like you to respond further, reflect on that question, and see if you can give me a little more definitive answer of the peculiarities of the African Command. How would you, in the setting up of this new command, identify and then, through this multiagency coordination, approach problems that are peculiar to that command?

Senator BILL NELSON. I know we have a vote, Mr. Chairman.

Senator FEINGOLD. Well, thank you, Senator.

We're in the middle of the first of two votes, so we will briefly recess. I'll get back as fast as I can, and we will begin the second panel.

[Recess.]

Senator FEINGOLD. I call the committee back to order. We, as always, apologize for the unpredictability of the Senate schedule. I'm sorry you had to wait that long.

Our second panel features individuals who are extremely well qualified to speak on the unique challenges of establishing an Africa Command, and the potential obstacles and impact such a command may have both on the continent itself and within the broader security realm. We are privileged to welcome back Dr. Steve Morrison, the executive director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies' Africa Program. We've asked Dr. Morrison to speak to AFRICOM related developments within the broader security realm, and we hope he'll articulate the challenges and requirements that need to be addressed for effective planning and implementation.

Mr. Mark Malan is the peace-building program officer with Refugees International where he conducts advocacy regarding international peacekeeping efforts and provides leadership for the Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping. He's one of the leading experts in the world on peacebuilding in Africa, and we've asked him specifically to address the humanitarian aspects of this command as well as the impact on regional and local capacity.

Finally, we have MG Jonathan Gration, the former director, strategy, policy, and assessments, at U.S. European Command. In this capacity, he was responsible for formulation and staff direction of the execution of basic military and political policy, as well as planning for command activities involving relations with other U.S. unified commands, allied military, and international military organizations, and subordinate commands. We've asked him to speak on how AFRICOM fits into the broader security perspective, and, based on his military experience, how this unique command can be stood up and deployed.

So, thank you all for being here, and again for your patience. We'll begin with Dr. Morrison.

**STATEMENT OF DR. J. STEPHEN MORRISON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, HIV/AIDS TASK FORCE AND DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC**

Dr. MORRISON. Senator Feingold, thank you so much for the opportunity to be here today to speak on this important subject, and thank you for your leadership on these matters.

I will offer some brief introductory comments and ask that my testimony be submitted into the record.

I do know that General Ward's nomination, now, to become the first commander in chief is an active matter before the Senate. I think the absence of an empowered senior AFRICOM leader has been a big constraint in this last period, and I think—as we look forward in the future, I think, once he is in place, his leadership

and his ability to clarify a mandate for AFRICOM, and to bring across a better vision and better form of communication, will bring us forward from where we are today.

I do believe that, as we look at AFRICOM and standing it up over the next couple of years, it's going to be—it will remain difficult. It will require a sustained effort over several years.

There is strong fear and apprehension within Africa, within the United States, in Europe, and elsewhere, that AFRICOM signals the militarization of United States engagement in Africa, at the expense of developmental and diplomatic interests. The legitimacy and sustainability and credibility of AFRICOM is something that's going to have to be earned, I believe, in moving against that skepticism, and that's going to require a much-improved strategic communications by AFRICOM, a high-level reaffirmation of what the mandate is, and how the interagency will work, and how the civil and military relations will be linked.

The opinion climate within Africa, at this point, about AFRICOM, is very mixed and very delicate. It's something that's going to have to be managed very deftly in this next phase. Part of what is needed, in addition to a better effort at addressing the fears, the legitimate fears and apprehensions that exist within Africa, is to answer the question of, What is the value-added going to be, programmatically and materially, and in terms of the presence of AFRICOM? We know that the U.S. Government has slowly and quietly and incrementally put in place a number of security programs over the last few years that are quite promising, and that have built up partnerships in an ad hoc and scattered way around the continent, but these are partnerships that have not had to be defended in a very conspicuous and overt fashion against critics or skeptics in media or among opposition parties or NGOs or the like. We're now at a point of transition, where they have to begin to defend that, and they need greater assurance that, in fact, it will be truly a civilian-driven process, and that there will be significant payout, significant value-added, programmatically, in the presence in Africa. And, so far, that has not been defined.

The other major point that I've tried to bring across here is that U.S. civilian agencies—State Department, USAID, most notably—have had, in the last decade, a significant decline, a hollowing out of their capacities. If you create a unified command within Africa, inevitably there will be fears and allegations that AFRICOM will dominate and be able to call the shots against the civilian leadership. We should not be blaming AFRICOM for that reality, the asymmetry that exists between our civilian and our security agencies. We should be—as we look forward, we should be putting much greater focus on: How are we going to make the State Department and the USAID policy leadership and programmatic implementation on Africa stronger, better-led, better-resourced, and better able to, sort of, carry forward its mission?

I talked about the fact that there's been a steady proliferation of worthy U.S. security programs. This has been a low-key process. It's one that's quiet and incremental, and involves modest levels of funding, but are achieving very important results. We're now talking about shifting into very overt and potentially much higher levels of engagement, and we're also shifting in a moment in which

you have active terrorist threats, particularly in north Africa and in the Horn, and you have active U.S. engagement in those areas.

I do believe that the opinion climate in Africa in the last several months, partly triggered by the visits—the high-level visits to Africa, led by Deputy Secretary for Policy, Ryan Henry—that the critics in government and media have made significant headway in shaping the environment, in a negative fashion, about AFRICOM, and that this needs to be—this needs to be acknowledged, and a better strategic communications approach taken, that better address what the political risks and fears are of these—of the actors that we’re looking for.

The most recent Pew study of worldwide opinion does show that, in Africa, 8 of the top 10 countries that have held firm in their support for the United States are in Africa. I do believe that the investments made—PEPFAR, MCC, security assistance—that there is a stronger base, a disposition—a positive disposition. But, for all of the reasons that I’ve enumerated up to now, very skeptical media and NGO community, an ability to call upon the historical legacy of U.S. engagement, particularly in the cold war, which is seen as damaging and inconsistent and unsustainable, and, now, the threat that you’re going to see the importation of active counterterrorism operations. All of those factors play in the opinion climate and require a strong and very sophisticated support in order to build the partnerships and get the kinds of state buy-in from Africa that we require.

We do not—we’ve heard no mention around China’s role. China has—is actively normatively and operationally competing with us now in Africa. They are making big commitments on peacekeeping, including in Darfur. We’ve had no dialog or coordination effort with them. One thing that the Senate and others could do would be to try to reduce the constraints on having a dialog along security lines in Africa with the Chinese.

Senator FEINGOLD. Doctor, I’d ask you to summarize, at this point.

Dr. MORRISON. My final points are: AFRICOM needs to reaffirm its core values, clarify its mandate; the senior-level deputy from the State Department should be a very respected and known entity; we need to align our approach to those security threats that Africa leaders find most compelling; we need to systematically enlarge our programs now in order to make them marketable. I haven’t talked at all about the maritime program; that’s an area where there’s considerable promise. And we need to multilateralize in tying the way that AFRICOM operates to U.N. peace operations, African Union, and the regional bodies. And we need to strengthen our civilian agencies, which are very weak, and which will remain weak unless there’s a concentrated effort.

Thank you so much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Morrison follows:]



PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. J. STEPHEN MORRISON, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, HIV/AIDS TASK FORCE AND DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, WASHINGTON, DC

#### INTRODUCTION

Senators Feingold and Sununu, I am grateful to you both for the opportunity to address the important and timely subject of AFRICOM and the United States emerging strategic relationship with Africa. I wish also to thank you for your leadership on these and other Africa policy matters.

CSIS has taken a strong interest in AFRICOM over the past year, and had the good fortune to discuss AFRICOM's rationale and implementation plans with General Craddock in late 2006, as he was heading to Stuttgart to assume his duties as Commander in Chief of U. S. Forces Europe and Supreme Commander of NATO. In May of this year, CSIS also hosted General "Kip" Ward, EUCOM's Deputy Commander in Chief and the current nominee to be the first Commander in Chief of AFRICOM.

Since the Command was first announced by President Bush on February 6, 2007, the absence of an empowered senior AFRICOM leader has been a serious constraint and accounts in part for the often ineffective communication of AFRICOM's mandate and vision. Once General Ward is in place, his leadership will be an invaluable asset in moving AFRICOM forward.

Achieving a successful launch of AFRICOM will not be easy or simple, and will take a determined, sustained effort over several years. Skeptics here in the United States, and in Africa and elsewhere abroad, will continue to raise tough issues that will have to be answered more effectively than has been the case up to now.

Most significant will be overcoming the widespread fear that AFRICOM signals the militarization of U.S. engagement in Africa, at the expense of developmental and diplomatic interests.

Achieving balance and legitimacy requires improved strategic communications by AFRICOM: High-level reaffirmation, backed by action, that AFRICOM is pursuing a genuinely balanced civil-military approach that is answerable to civilian U.S. policy oversight, that is responsive to African perceptions of which security threats matter most, and that cements support within Africa from a range of stable, well-governed states and their citizenry. At the end of the day, the test of AFRICOM's sustainability will be whether it establishes durable and mutually advantageous partnerships with African interests, both governmental and nongovernmental. Today it is not clear whether that condition will be met.

Success also requires a detailed action plan that spells out in concrete terms what the value-added will be from creating a unified Africa command. Today, it is not clear whether the creation of this new entity will result in significant gains over existing U.S. security programs in Africa.

Success, both at home and in Africa, also reaches beyond AFRICOM's vision, structure, and leadership. No less important, it requires getting serious about strengthening chronically weak U.S. civilian agencies, most importantly the State Department's Africa Bureau, USAID's Africa Bureau, and U.S. missions in Africa.

AFRICOM aspires to be a new type of interagency command, which presumes a robust and functioning interagency process. For that to happen, however, requires a systematic effort to reverse the decline of the U.S. civilian agencies responsible for policies and programs in Africa: to make them better led, better staffed and resourced, and more coherently organized. For a very long time, the administration and Congress have been complacent, as U.S. Africa policy capacities have been steadily hollowed out.

So long as the State Department and other civilian agencies are exceptionally weak, an emerging AFRICOM will inevitably be seen as domineering. AFRICOM should not be blamed for this phenomenon, and its progress should not be held back on account of weak civilian agencies. Rather, simultaneous action is needed on two fronts: To correct structural weaknesses in our civilian agencies, at the same time that priority is given to strengthening AFRICOM's strategic outreach and action plan.

I will concentrate my remarks on three key issues: What is at stake for the United States in the creation of AFRICOM; the difficulties in selling AFRICOM internally within the U.S. Government and within Africa; and practical suggestions on the way forward from here.

#### *1. AFRICOM is a potentially valuable instrument for advancing U.S. global interests*

In the last decade, and especially in recent years, U.S. national interests in Africa have risen significantly.

For a long time, we have recognized the importance to U.S. values and norms of responding to Africa's humanitarian needs and assisting in ending Africa's chronic conflicts and overcoming poverty. We have recognized how vital it is to support the continent's transition to multiparty democracies, greater respect for human liberties, improved management of national economies, stronger curbs on corruption, and greater integration of Africa into global markets.

What is new in recent years is the rise of strategic interests that are global in nature.

These include energy, where we today rely on West Africa for approximately 22 percent of U.S. oil imports, and where in the near future we will cross the 25-percent mark.

They include counterterrorism, concentrated but not confined to the Horn of Africa and West Africa.

And they include accelerated competition for influence with China and other Asian countries which have swiftly expanded their engagement in Africa.

In line with these rising interests, we have seen a steady proliferation of worthy U.S. security programs in Africa, some traditional, other nontraditional. In an organic and ad hoc fashion, the United States has created multiple partnerships with willing African counterparts that meet new, emerging needs.

The United States has invested in Africa's peacekeeping capacity-building (ACOTA, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Program), in officer training (International Military Education and Training, MET, and programs at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies); and in HIV/AIDS programs (in close partnership with the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, PEPFAR). It has concluded multiple access agreements, launched an important and promising effort to bolster maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, and introduced key counterterrorism programs. In East Africa, most notable is the Djibouti-based Combined Joint Task Force/Horn of Africa (CFJT-HOA) and the related East Africa Counter-Terrorism Initiative. In West Africa is the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative.

So why the need for AFRICOM?

We have reached a tipping point. Africa matters increasingly to U.S. national interests. Security programs that require careful management have grown in number. U.S. officials responsible for these programs increasingly need to approach them as a top priority—day-in and day-out—and not a second- or third-tier concern. That requires a unity of effort that transcends the present artificial geographic “seams” that separate Africa into a U.S. EUCOM zone separate from the Horn of Africa that is the responsibility of the U.S. Central Command. (The U.S. Pacific Command is responsible for Africa's Indian Ocean island nations.) It requires stronger leadership, coherence and integration of programs, and more effective management. And it requires confidence that the resources and commitments needed over the long term will be there, and that Congress and the American people will be supportive. These are the accumulating concerns that AFRICOM is intended to address.

No less important, AFRICOM provides the important opportunity to experiment and do things differently. It is a command that can place capacity-building in Africa at the center of its mandate, that holds the promise of creating innovative, integrated civilian-military approaches, and that can try out new structural arrangements that feature regional centers.

*2. AFRICOM's launch has moved quickly, but has also generated hard lessons that now need heightened attention.*

AFRICOM is less than 1 year in the making. President Bush made the decision to move ahead with AFRICOM only last November and officially launched the effort in early February of this year. The startup team led by ADM Robert Moeller moved rapidly to devise a launch plan. Deputy Secretary of Defense for Policy Ryan Henry led two U.S. delegations to Africa and Europe, in April and June, and the White House nominated General Kip Ward just this month to be AFRICOM's first Commander in Chief.

Considerable progress has been achieved, in a compressed period of time, reliant on the intense efforts of many dedicated officials such as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Theresa Whalen, a gifted expert on Africa security who has been indefatigable in developing AFRICOM.

But things have lately not gone well, in Africa and Europe, and internally within the U.S. Government.

Across Africa, and in Europe as well, critics in governments and media alike have made headway in casting AFRICOM as the triumph of militarism, in which U.S. engagement in Africa will now be dominated by energy security and the global war on terror, along with fending off China's competition. According to this view, the

shift from scattered U.S. security programs to a single U.S. command is a sharp turn to a cold-war-type competition. As in that earlier period, the United States will disregard the long-term negative consequences of its engagement in places like Somalia, Ethiopia, and West Africa, show no real interest in an integrated civilian-military approach, and make no long-term sustained commitments to build African capacities.

To counter this critique, AFRICOM's leadership needs to better address the political risks and fears felt by African leadership, and better define what the value-added will be for African partners. These issues are especially acute for the candidate countries in Africa where AFRICOM might in the future have a physical presence.

Africa's political leaders have up to now been willing and able to strike new partnerships with the U.S. military on security cooperation without confronting much domestic political opposition. The impending creation of a unified, conspicuous Africa Command fundamentally changes the context and invites intensified scrutiny. Controversy over the U.S. invasion of Iraq and its aftermath have fueled skepticism of U.S. security engagement in Africa and the larger concern with the Department of Defense's expanding dominance of U.S. foreign policy and expanded assistance authorities. As a consequence of these factors, many African leaders face rising pressure from within their own ranks and from skeptical media and non-governmental groups to justify security relationships with the United States.

Selling U.S. capacity-building activities in Africa is made no easier by live terrorist threats and in some cases active U.S. counterterror operations. This problem is most pronounced in the Horn (especially Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan), North Africa, and East Africa's Swahili Coast (especially Kenya and Tanzania).

Within north African countries, where al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (formerly the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) seeks to leverage internal radical Islamist sentiments and has had recent success in carrying out terror bombings in many major urban centers, there are obvious risks of identifying with AFRICOM.

In Horn of Africa countries, witness to the disturbing events unfolding in Somalia, the U.S. association with the Ethiopian intervention there, and the subsequent rendition of prisoners from Kenya to Ethiopia, there is an understandable wariness of the creation of a strong, unified U.S. Africa command. Countries such as Sudan and Eritrea see AFRICOM as a direct threat. Other established security partners with the United States, such as Kenya and Ethiopia, fear domestic reactions and violent targeting of a U.S. presence.

To offset apprehension and risk requires spelling out the concrete benefits that will accrue from the launch of AFRICOM, beyond existing programs. This has yet to happen. In the meantime, China has dramatically expanded its military training and provision of equipment, and tied that enlarged security relationship to a broader south-south political alliance. Normatively and operationally, China actively vies with the United States for influence and access.

Within the State Department and USAID, there is widespread apprehension that AFRICOM will overwhelm civilian-led policy leadership and the interagency process. Accordingly, commitments from the State Department and USAID to join AFRICOM ranks have been ambivalent and desultory.

### *3. Suggestions for a way forward.*

There are a few key steps that can strengthen AFRICOM's approach and prospects for success.

First, AFRICOM's leadership and its champions in the White House and elsewhere should overtly reaffirm its core values and clarify its mandate. That should involve outlining how operationally AFRICOM's work will be answerable to civilian policymakers in Washington, how the interagency process will actually operate, how AFRICOM's transparency will be guaranteed, and how it will advance democratic governance, respect for human rights, and poverty alleviation. A special effort should be made to appoint, as the first Deputy Commander of AFRICOM responsible for civil-military activities, a known and respected senior State Department official.

Second, AFRICOM's leadership should reaffirm, doctrinally and in the development of new programs, its commitment to working with African partners to address the full spectrum of evolving security challenges in Africa: Terrorist threats in North Africa, the Horn, the Swahili Coast; internal and cross-border wars; degradation of the environment; public health; weak and failed states; and crime, including grand scale oil theft schemes, piracy and plundering of fisheries.

Third, AFRICOM should spell out in detail how its creation will systematically enlarge the foundation of existing programs and increase the ability to sustain these programs into the future. It should set targets for steady incremental progress in

the areas where the Department of Defense has its greatest comparative advantage: e.g. the expansion of ACOTA, IMET, military-to-military health programs, and maritime programs in the Gulf of Guinea. Where possible, it should link AFRICOM to the reconstruction of Liberia (specifically Monrovia harbor) and the work of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (e.g. renovation of Benin port).

Fourth, AFRICOM's plan of action should set targets for strengthening U.N. peace operations, the African Union, and Africa's regional bodies. It should set similar targets for incorporating indigenous nongovernmental groups into civil-military initiatives.

Fifth, the administration should devise a multiyear plan for strengthening U.S. civilian policy and program capacities, especially at the Department of State and USAID. Its strategy should emphasize the exceptional needs in these areas, that now warrant special career incentives, new expertise in areas such as public health, and accelerated recruitment and training. A robust staff plan should be devised for the next 5–10 year period.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Doctor.

Mr. Malan.

If we could try to stick to 5 minutes, I'd appreciate it.

**STATEMENT OF MARK MALAN, PEACEBUILDING PROGRAM  
OFFICER, REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL, WASHINGTON, DC**

Mr. MALAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold, for the honor of testifying before this very timely hearing.

I'm totally new to Washington, DC, and the humanitarian community, having joined Refugees International in May of this year, but I have 31 years of experience in working in Africa, 20 as a soldier and 11 as a civilian, trying to build African peacekeeping capacity. So, I have two concerns, or areas of concern, to raise before you today, and one is the perspectives, the concerns of the Washington, DC, based NGO community, and the other is African perspectives, some fears that have been voiced rather loudly recently.

In your letter of invitation, Senator Feingold, you asked me if I think there's any chance that AFRICOM could be perceived as a threat or somehow undermine United States interests in Africa. If we look at the African press, the answer would be an unambiguous yes. Recent articles appearing, with titles like "African States Oppose U.S. Presence," "SACD Shuns Spectre of U.S. AFRICOM's Plans," "Global Cop USA Seeks More Presence in Africa," "The Americans Have Landed," and, "The Scramble for Africa's Oil," to name but a few.

When the United States defines or markets a combatant military command, in terms of development and humanitarianism, Africans inevitably suspect that the true story is being kept from them, much what Dr. Steve Morrison was saying, yet, the DOD and the marketing have persisted with emphasizing the role that AFRICOM will play in humanitarian and developmental efforts. This kind of messaging, rather than allying African concerns that the United States military will, indeed, hunt terrorist networks—we expect that, we welcome that—but creating the impression that the Pentagon is taking charge of United States development policy and humanitarian assistance in Africa. Africans see much sense in the argument for interagency cooperation; what they find strange is that this is linked to a combatant command. According to one of Africa's leading security analysts—I quote from him—"The much vaunted interagency staff to be included in AFRICOM should be seen for what it is, the further cooption and subjugation of U.S. foreign and development policy to a near-colonial agenda which is in-

imical to Africa and, ironically, to the U.S. itself." Please don't shoot the messenger on that.

As far as local operational NGOs are concerned, the primary concern is that AFRICOM will increase the trend toward the militarization of humanitarian action. This is more than concerns about the militarization of U.S. foreign policy. The humanitarians are purists. To them, humanitarian action is more than building schools and digging wells. It should be motivated by humanitarianism, which is an assertion of the universal sanctity and dignity of human life, as manifested in the commitment to provide protection to civilians on all sides of an armed conflict, the good guys and the bad guys. It's underpinned by the principles of humanity, impartiality, and independence. And upholding these three principles demands constant vigilance on the part of the NGOs against cooption of the language of humanitarianism by political and military actors, including those who are marketing AFRICOM.

There can, in my opinion, at best, be good liaison and perhaps coordination between humanitarian, developmental, and military actors, but not integration. Even within United Nations peace operations, which are reliant on relatively weak voluntary troop contributions, there has been stiff resistance from humanitarians to the concept of integrated missions in the field. Yet, AFRICOM is marketed as an integrated command, time and time again.

At a practical level, a level the NGOs can note, that it's evident that neither USAID nor State have the funds or the personnel to fill the significant number of civilian posts which are supposedly envisaged for AFRICOM, and they fear that a military lens will dominate any nonmilitary tasks assigned to AFRICOM.

Let me turn to, perhaps, a positive role, a support role for AFRICOM that does not blur civil-military lines and encroach on humanitarian terrain. I think that, beyond a legitimate military counterterrorism priority, AFRICOM should focus on two primary and unashamedly military support roles; mainly, defense sector reform, including civil-military relations, and really entrenching the democratic principle of civilian supremacy over the military, and (b) support to building African peacekeeping and standby force capacity. These roles are, indeed, envisaged by the DOD, but they are not writ large in the marketing pitch at this point.

Get beyond civil-military relations and defense-sector transformation, which we know is both a preconflict or conflict prevention, unopposed conflict reconstruction task on the peacekeeping side—and I'll be quick, I'm aware time is running out—we see 55,000 uniformed U.N. peacekeepers deployed in Africa today. Only 17,000 of these are African. Most of the rest of the contingents come from Asia. The demand in the immediate future with—Senator Lugar referred to the resolution on establishing the African Union U.N. mission in Darfur with a force level of an extra 20,000 troops. If Somalia comes online, the U.N. contingency planners are talking about a figure of 20,000 for Somalia, and the AU, if stood up by 2010, as the ideal is, for Africa to have a standby force capable of intervening to prevent or stop genocide and ethnic cleansing will require further 20,000 peacekeepers. We're looking at a shortfall of 60,000.

It's clear that ACRI, ACOTA, and GPOI, over the last decade, have not produced a viable and credible independent African peace operations capability, nor has it produced a sufficient ready reserve of African U.N. peacekeepers. AFRICOM, indeed, holds the promise of joining up current U.S. military capacity-building programs, such as GPOI, ACOTA, and IMET, and of evaluating and upgrading them to ensure their relevance and effectiveness in delivering more and better African peacekeepers.

On the African standby force, it's not just about the troops. The African Union lacks strategic management capacity, has no effective mechanisms for operational-level mission management, it has insufficient logistics support and ability to manage logistics, it lacks communication capacity, information systems, and it is totally dependent on external partners for technical advice and support. There's a huge role for AFRICOM to play here, but the marketing pitch needs to emphasize that AFRICOM is aware of the policy framework document for the African standby force, and the procedure, the roadmap toward establishing this capability toward 2010.

In conclusion, Senator, the establishment of AFRICOM holds great promise for a more joined-up approach to U.S. military engagement with the continent. And I quote from Mr. Ryan Henry in one of his briefings to the foreign media. He put it this way, "Instead of having three commanders that deal with Africa as a third or fourth priority, we will have a single commander that deals with it, day in and day out, as his first and only priority."

That is the main reason for the standup of AFRICOM, and we should leave a full stop after that. This is the main reason why Africans should embrace the new command. Informed, persistent, and coherent engagement is far better than ad hoc United States military engagement or retrenchment in Africa. Better coordination of United States defense, diplomatic, and development initiatives and improved cooperation in the field should also be welcomed by Africans and humanitarians, but they first need to see that 3D works in D.C. Until such time as the ability to coordinate and cooperate is demonstrated in Washington, the DOD would do well to expand upon AFRICOM military role and let State and AID speak to the issues of diplomacy and development.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Malan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARK MALAN, PEACEBUILDING PROGRAM OFFICER,  
REFUGEES INTERNATIONAL, WASHINGTON, DC

#### INTRODUCTION

I want to thank Senator Feingold most sincerely for inviting me to testify before this important and timely hearing. This is my first appearance before you, so please allow me a brief introduction. I am new to Washington, DC, and the USA, having joined Refugees International as head of their peacekeeping program this May. I shall do my best to convey to you the concerns about AFRICOM of RI and the broader humanitarian NGO community. However, as an African (I am a South African citizen) who has spent 20 years in the military and the last 11 years as a civilian working on African security and peacekeeping capacity-building issues, I shall first highlight some of the real concerns about AFRICOM that have been voiced rather loudly in Africa.

## AFRICAN CONCERNS

Senator Feingold, you asked, in my letter of invitation, if I think there is any chance that AFRICOM could be perceived as a threat or somehow undermine U.S. interests in Africa? The answer (to both parts of this question) is “yes.” A quick glance at the titles of recent articles on AFRICOM in the African press indicates that the Command is indeed perceived as a threat: “African States Oppose U.S. Presence”; “North Africa Reluctant To Host U.S. Command”; “SADC Shuns Spectre of U.S. Africom Plans”; “Global Cop USA Seeks More Presence in Africa”; “AFRICOM Struggles To Improve Image of U.S.”; “The Americans Have Landed”; “The Scramble for Africa’s Oil”; “Africa Rebukes Bush on African Command”; etc.

In some parts of the world, like Iraq and Afghanistan, the face of U.S. foreign policy is clearly a military one. In Africa, the DOD appears to be putting a civilian mask on the face of a combatant command, with its marketing pitch for AFRICOM. This disingenuous strategy is not working. The veneer of the mask is simply too thin, and attempts to patch the holes that have emerged—by telling us “what AFRICOM is not about” and reemphasizing a humanitarian and developmental role for the U.S. military in Africa—simply make the face of U.S. foreign policy much shadier.

The notion of a benign U.S. combatant command is an enigma to those who clearly understand (and accept) the need for the U.S. to secure access to Africa’s natural resources, especially oil; and to establish bases from which to destroy networks linked to al-Qaeda. When the U.S. promotes a combatant military command in terms of development and humanitarianism, Africans will inevitably suspect that the true story is being kept from them.

According to its draft mission statement: “U.S. Africa Command promotes U.S. National Security objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the AOR. U.S. Africa Command leads the in-theater DOD response to support other USG agencies in implementing USG security policies and strategies. In concert with other U.S. Government and international partners, U.S. Africa Command conducts theater security cooperation activities to assist in building security capacity and improve accountable governance. As directed, U.S. Africa Command conducts military operations to deter aggression and respond to crises.”

This is a clear, unambiguous, and legitimate mission; one that should be understood and accepted by African leaders. Yet DOD officials continue to emphasize the nonmilitary roles of AFRICOM. At a June 22 briefing, for example, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Ryan Henry, confirmed that AFRICOM’s primary missions include humanitarian assistance, civic action, and response to natural disasters. This kind of “messaging” has amplified African concerns, creating the impression that the Pentagon is taking charge of U.S. development policy and humanitarian assistance in Africa.

There is much sense in the argument for interagency cooperation; what does not make sense is linking this to a combatant command. According to one of Africa’s leading security analysts, AFRICOM should be orientated to an appropriate and clearly delineated role, with nonmilitary issues kept outside of its grasp: “The much-vaunted interagency staff to be included in AFRICOM should be seen for what it is—the further cooption and subjugation of U.S. foreign and development policy to a neocolonial agenda which is inimical to Africa and ironically, to the U.S. itself.”

## NGO CONCERNS

The main concern of operational NGOs is that AFRICOM will increase the trend toward the militarization of humanitarian action, which raises fundamental concerns about the purpose of such assistance. Security objectives envisioned in the short term can run at cross purposes to the longer term vision of creating stable and sustainable institutions that are accountable and responsive to the needs and aspirations of all segments of the population. Such concerns are amplified by the way AFRICOM is being presented as a tool for integrating U.S. military, political, and humanitarian objectives under a unified military command. For example, Ryan Henry has emphasized that: “[T]he deputy for the command . . . will be a senior civilian from the State Department so that we can integrate with the diplomatic aspects. . . . [we] will also have a large percentage of civilians from different parts of the U.S. Government integrated into the command, because our engagement on the continent is one of diplomacy, of development and where we can be of assistance to Africans. And having an integrated staff will help us to do a better job in integrating with those other parts of the U.S. Government’s engagement.”

The specter of integration is unnerving for humanitarians; they cannot be supportive of the new command as long as AFRICOM portends to be a humanitarian

actor and promises to subsume humanitarianism within the ambit of military strategy. Humanitarian action is more than the act of restoring basic living standards to individuals and communities who have been deprived of them by circumstance. It should be motivated by humanitarianism; a powerful assertion of the universal sanctity and dignity of human life, and a practical manifestation of the need to provide protection to civilians in times of crisis and conflict. It is underpinned by the principles of Humanity, Impartiality, and Independence—the observance of which is essential to maintaining the trust of all sides of a given conflict, and to maintaining access to victims. Strict observance of these “core principles” is an essential guard against the use of humanitarian assistance to induce compliance with political demands, and upholding the principles demands constant vigilance against cooptation of the language of humanitarianism by political and military actors.

On the other hand, in Africa, mass displacement, hunger and disease is often the humanitarian fallout of political failures. In order to effectively address these challenges, there may well be a need for military strength and political direction, as well as humanitarian action; and few would contest the need for these three elements to collaborate in the field. Nevertheless, differences in philosophy and operational priorities mean that these three types of response do not naturally coexist. There can at best be good liaison and perhaps coordination between humanitarian, developmental and military actors—but not integration. Even within United Nations peace operations, which are reliant on relatively weak voluntary troop contributions, there has been stiff resistance from humanitarians to the concept of “integrated missions” in the field.

There are military rationales for soldiers to engage in limited projects that involve humanitarian or development-type activities. These are generally linked to issues of force protection and intelligence-gathering, and the general military aim of “winning hearts and minds.” The efficacy of such “humanitarian” efforts is questionable, and should be debated from the standpoints of the military’s own objectives and with respect to concerns of the development and humanitarian community. There are obvious compelling practical, as well as moral, reasons for civilian institutions and civil society to undertake the vast majority of such work. Agencies such as USAID as well as many large operational NGOs have far more experience than the military in implementing development and humanitarian programs. And they can do so at far lower cost than the military. Where the military is the only agency with the capacity to provide humanitarian and development assistance, the solution should lie in allocating adequate resources to USAID, rather than reinforcing and expanding the military’s role in this sphere.

On the other hand, the U.S. military is seen as an active or indirect belligerent in some contexts in Africa—for example, in the Horn of Africa. In such cases, militarization of development and humanitarian assistance can do grave damage by undermining respect for the impartiality and nonpartisanship of the humanitarian mission. Moreover, although there has been some discussion, and even some agreement, about operational guidelines for interaction between civilian agencies and the U.S. military in contexts such as Iraq and Afghanistan, there has been little progress in addressing the underlying policy questions about appropriate division of roles between U.S. Armed Forces and humanitarian and development agencies.

The proposed integrated relationship between U.S. foreign policy and U.S. military strategy, emphasized in the AFRICOM briefs and concretized in the intention to appoint a civilian (State Department) deputy to General Ward, has raised eyebrows within the Washington-based NGO community. There is concern about the uncooperative relationship between State and DOD and the fact that there is little substantive interagency collaboration. And there is deep suspicion that the \$750 million in separate funding that the DOD is seeking under the Building Global Partnerships Act is motivated partly by a desire for independence from Title 22 funding controlled by State (e.g. for IMET, FMF, and ACOTA). As demonstrated by the experiences of the U.K., Canada, France, Germany, and Sweden (as well as those of the USA), there are always tensions inherent in aligning security, diplomatic, and development efforts. Unlike most of these countries, however—where resources allocated to the Departments of Defense, Foreign Affairs, and to International Development Agency are not grossly unequal—the resources of the U.S. DOD dwarf those of the State Department and USAID. As with people, where tensions exist between organizations, the priorities of the stronger entity will overwhelm those of the weaker; thus the real fear that AFRICOM will marginalize and/or subordinate long-term development goals to short-term political and security imperatives.

At a practical level, it is also very evident that neither USAID nor the Department of State (or any other civilian agency) has the funds or the personnel to fill the significant number of civilian posts envisioned for AFRICOM. Moreover,



AFRICOM's regional, strategic structure, is likely to predominate over the country-based, more tactical and operational structure of the USAID missions. This, together with the fact that the regional expertise of State resides in Washington, DC, not in Africa, is seen as a recipe for enabling a military lens to dominate any non-military tasks assigned to AFRICOM.

In short, the concerns of the humanitarian NGOs overlap with those of Africans—to the extent that they are both underpinned by the fear of the militarization of humanitarian and development assistance, as well as U.S. policy in Africa. An obvious way to overcome such concerns and enhance the credibility of the new combatant command, is to focus attention and effort on those noncombatant roles which are relevant, meaningful, and undeniably appropriate for the U.S. military.

A SUPPORT ROLE FOR AFRICOM THAT DOES NOT BLUR CIVIL-MILITARY LINES AND  
ENCROACH ON HUMANITARIAN TERRAIN

Beyond military counterterrorism priorities, AFRICOM should focus on two primary and unashamedly military support roles, namely (a) defense sector reform, including civil-military relations; and (b) support to building African peacekeeping and standby force capacity. These roles are indeed envisioned by the DOD, but they are not writ large at this point. The AFRICOM Transition Team Web site simply states that: "AFRICOM is a headquarters staff whose mission entails coordinating the kind of support that will enable African governments and existing regional organizations, such as the African Standby Force, to have greater capacity to provide security and respond in times of need. AFRICOM will build on the many African-U.S. security cooperation activities already underway, yet be able to better coordinate DOD support with other U.S. Government departments and agencies to make those activities even more effective."

It is silent on the challenges of Security Sector Reform in Africa, and on the precise role that the U.S. military, through AFRICOM, might play in building more professional armed forces and entrenching the democratic principle of civil supremacy over the military. Africa's principal security challenge is to mobilize sufficient resources to provide a secure, stable, and well-governed environment characterized by the rule of law, in which human rights and civil liberties are protected and promoted—and where business can thrive. All African countries face a capacity deficit in their institutions of state, and the state is too often a predator rather than a facilitator. Since the 1960s, African armies have exhibited a tendency toward rapacious behavior, and the rebellions spawned in response have caused unimaginable suffering for civilians. African governments and civil society movements should therefore embrace AFRICOM support for defense transformation—if it is made clear that the approach will be collaborative and that assistance will be sustained over a long period through the mechanism of the new Command.

In the realm of defense sector reform, the importance of sustained external mentoring and commitment is well recognized and cannot be overemphasized. The usefulness of a lead-nation rather than multinational approach has been demonstrated by the U.K. in Sierra Leone, as has the allocation of sufficient financial resources to do the job properly. On the other hand, there are many examples of perverse consequences of short-term U.S. assistance to select African armies. AFRICOM should therefore demonstrate that it understands the role of military support within the broader sphere of Security Sector Reform (which includes the police and intelligence agencies as well as the judicial sector), that it is willing to provide sustained support to defense transformation in partner countries, and that it will have a secure funding mechanism to do so.

On the peacekeeping side, years of U.S. assistance to Africa through ACRI, ACOTA, and GPOI have not produced a viable and credible independent African peace operations capability. Rather, these programs bring home the fact that real capacity-building is not a simple "train and equip" quick fix. Africa needs a demonstrable commitment by AFRICOM to provide long-term, sustainable support to developing African peacekeeping capabilities—for participating in U.N. peacekeeping, as well as African Union and regional operations.

There are 54,924 uniformed U.N. peacekeepers deployed in Africa—17,393 of them are African. The U.N. is currently looking for an additional 20,000 peacekeepers to staff the proposed UN/AU hybrid mission in Darfur (to take over from a force of some 7,000 AU troops and police). Khartoum is insisting that the additional troops come from Africa, but Africa's capacity and/or will to provide them is sadly lacking. In Somalia, 1,500 Ugandan troops have been deployed for several months in what was supposed to be an 8,000-strong AU mission in that country. They are still awaiting the arrival of an additional 6,500 troops to bring the mission up to authorized strength, while the AU is pleading with the U.N. to take over re-

sponsibility for the mission. U.N. officials, busy with contingency planning for a possible Somalia mission, are talking of a force level of 20,000. So there is an impending demand for an additional 40,000 peacekeepers in Africa, and little evidence to suggest that GPOI has created the necessary ready supply.

AFRICOM holds the promise of joining up current U.S. military capacity-building programs such as GPOI, ACOTA, and IMET; and of evaluating and updating such programs to ensure their relevance, coherence, and effectiveness in enhancing the quality and quantity of African troops who are readily available for peace operations. However, for an initiative that represents "the culmination of a 10-year thought process within the Department of Defense," there is a surprising lack of detail on how AFRICOM intends to bridge African peacekeeping capacity gaps; gaps which are enormous and growing.

Beyond critical shortages in current and planned U.N. and AU missions, there are great expectations of the African Union being able to rapidly deploy an all-African standby force for future operations. In May 2003, the African Chiefs of Defense Staff produced a draft policy framework document on the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF), which would be able to rapidly deploy when mandated to do so by the AU's Peace and Security Council. The ASF is to consist of five regionally managed brigades, located in Central, North, South, East, and West Africa. Each brigade is to be composed of police units, civilian specialists, 300–500 military observers, and 3,000–4,000 troops, bringing the proposed total standup capacity of the force to between 15,000–20,000 peacekeepers (which approximates, coincidentally, the number of troops being sought for Darfur, as well as Somalia). The ASF is supposed to be capable, by 2010, of undertaking a variety of operations, ranging from simpler observation and monitoring operations to interventions to halt ethnic cleansing or genocide.

This ideal is unlikely to be realized as long as the AU is bogged down in current, nonviable missions, and without a much higher level of concerted support to the ASF from partners such as the European Union and the USA. It is not simply troop numbers that are lacking; the AU mission in Darfur has revealed that the AU suffers from a lack of strategic management capacity; has no effective mechanisms for operational-level mission management; has insufficient logistic support and ability to manage logistics; lacks capacity in communication and information systems; and is totally dependent on external partners for technical advice and support.

AFRICOM can and should make a concerted effort to assist the AU in overcoming these critical capacity gaps. If this is indeed to be one of the major tasks of AFRICOM, then it would make sense for the Transition Team to exhibit some knowledge of the detail of the ASF Policy Framework and Implementation Roadmap, and to be actively discussing how AFRICOM may best lend support to the ASF—rather than hammering on humanitarian and developmental issues.

Moreover, it has been mentioned in DOD briefs that AFRICOM will play a "donor" coordination role. This should be regarded as a priority task, and be strongly emphasized in the emergent AFRICOM mandate. African leaders remain skeptical of donor assistance; at times, this skepticism has turned to resentment toward uncoordinated Western initiatives for enhancing African peacekeeping capabilities. In 1997, France, Britain and the USA attempted to address African sensitivities to the lack of coordination by announcing a "P3" initiative, which was supposed to coordinate ongoing and future capacity-building efforts by the three powers. To date however, there has been little evidence of effective coordination between the P3; the initiative resulted in little more than mutual noninterference, rather than harmonization.

This is a serious shortcoming, among others because the AU and the subregional organizations in Africa lack the capacity to analyze and absorb the plethora of assistance initiatives emanating from the P3, the G8, the EU, the Nordic countries and others. With a four-star general at the helm and on the continent, AFRICOM would be uniquely poised to act as a focal point for liaison and coordination between African countries and organizations and their multiple peacekeeping capacity-building "partners."

#### CONCLUSION

The establishment of AFRICOM and the transfer of geographical responsibility for Africa from EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM hold great promise for a more joined-up approach to U.S. military engagement with the continent. As Mr. Henry has put it, ". . . instead of having three commanders that deal with Africa as a third or fourth priority, we will have a single commander that deals with it day in and day out as his first and only priority . . . that is the main reason for the standup of AFRICOM." The new command should be welcomed by Africans on this

ground alone. Informed, consistent and coherent engagement is far better than ad hoc U.S. military engagement or retrenchment in Africa.

Better coordination of U.S. Defense, Diplomatic, and Development initiatives, and improved cooperation in the field should also be welcomed in Africa. Until such time as the real ability to coordinate and cooperate is demonstrated in Washington, however, the DOD would do well to expound upon AFRICOM's military role, and let State and AID speak to issues of diplomacy and development.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Malan, for your useful and candid testimony.

Major General Gratton.

**STATEMENT OF MG JONATHAN S. GRATION, USAF (RET.),  
FORMER DIRECTOR, STRATEGY, POLICY, AND ASSESS-  
MENTS, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND**

General GRATION. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar. I appreciate this opportunity to share some of my views about Africa and how they might relate to the new Africa Command.

As I explained in my written statement, I went to Africa in 1952, learned to walk there, learned to talk there; the fact is, my first sentence was in Swahili. And during the years that I spent there, to include flying with the Kenya Air Force, I became firmly convinced that the continent's security issues are directly linked to its significant stability challenges. Extreme poverty, the youth bulge, insufficient job opportunities, corruption, weak governance continue to fuel the feelings of helplessness and despair. It's this environment that is very hostile to effective security programs and limits Africa's chances of achieving its enormous human and resource potential. But it's within this context that AFRICOM must operate, and it won't be easy.

The more I've learned about Africa, the more I've learned that I need to learn, but there are a few things that I believe AFRICOM should keep in mind as it becomes operational.

First, it needs to be proactive and preventative in its programs, using all the elements of national power, because these are significantly cheaper and more effective than reactive and corrective measures. Our experiences in countries like Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan are obvious examples.

Second, I believe AFRICOM should focus on working to help Africans help Africans. We must deal with the African Union, and work with them, the five regional economic communities and individual countries, to ensure that our assistance programs mesh with their regional and national programs. United States initiatives must have the approval and support of our African hosts if they are to work; if they are to last.

Since we are guests, we must listen to our hosts and understand their views and requirements. The United States must build relationships that are based on mutual trust and respect. We must form strong partnerships based on shared understandings of security requirements and a common vision for the future. And this might require an attitude adjustment.

Finally, to the maximum extent possible, our assistance programs must be focused on sustainment, replicability, and scalability. Train-the-trainer programs should be a critical component of any initiative. And we need to work ourselves out of a job. There

needs to be a sundown clause in our individual training programs and assistance projects.

In conclusion, the DOD's theater security cooperation program must be matched by a similar interagency commitment to enhance and resource a more robust regional stability cooperation program. Increased security depends on better governance and plans for long-term stability that foster a believable hope among Africans that tomorrow will be better. This means cleaner water, adequate food, better schools, available and affordable health care, improved infrastructure, communications, and more employment opportunities, together with human rights and total gender equality. But I believe our ultimate success will stem from our attitude and our approach, style points. AFRICOM must be perceived by Africans as being a good and respectful guest, a valued partner. And, toward that end, AFRICOM truly must be about Africans helping Africans.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Gratton follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MG JONATHAN S. GRATTON, USAF (RET.), FORMER DIRECTOR, STRATEGY, POLICY, AND ASSESSMENTS, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

Thank you for this opportunity to share some of my opinions about Africa and how they might relate to the new Africa Command. As you are aware, I served as the Director of Strategy, Policy, and Assessments at the European Command and was deeply involved with U.S. military activities in Africa. But my interest in Africa goes back to 1952 when my parents moved to the Belgian Congo when I was a year old. Learning Swahili along with English, I learned quickly to communicate with Africans—they were my friends and playmates in those early years. During the turbulent years after independence, we were forced to evacuate to Uganda, then to Kenya where we lived until 1967. I returned to Kenya after college to do 3 months of humanitarian work, then again to Uganda in 1979 during the last days of Idi Amin. I later flew as an F-5 instructor pilot for 2 years with the Kenya Air Force, and served as an Africa Desk Officer in the Pentagon in the mid-80s. Throughout my entire career, I've continued to have a deep interest in humanitarian issues in Africa, especially with orphaned and disabled children.

Until recently, I served as the CEO of Millennium Villages, an organization established to help end extreme poverty in Africa and to help developing nations achieve the U.N.'s Millennium Development Goals. During my frequent visits to Africa, I became even more convinced that the continent's security issues are linked to its significant stability challenges. Extreme poverty, the youth bulge, insufficient job opportunities, corruption, and weak governance continue to fuel feelings of hopelessness and despair. This is an environment hostile to effective security programs and it limits Africa's chances of achieving its enormous human and resource potential.

Despite significant obstacles to sustained development, natural disasters and poor leadership in some countries, we must continue to meet our near-term challenges. We should try to collaborate on and compliment activities of partners with similar objectives in Africa, particularly in the context of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). We must consult and cooperate with African and international partners to resolve the situations in Darfur, Somalia, DRC, and the Western Sahara. We must help to coordinate a plan to deal with countries like Zimbabwe, especially for the post-Mugabe period. We must determine where the actions of other external players (e.g., China, Russia, and Korea) compete or conflict with our interests and take appropriate action promptly, while placing an emphasis on how we can cooperate with external powers in Africa. We must confront terrorist threats where we find them and help African countries eliminate terrorist and criminal safe havens throughout the continent.

With this as background, let me state up front that I supported establishing a separate command to deal with Africa when I was in the military and I'm delighted to see it's becoming a reality. I believe we need one unified command to coordinate and synchronize our military activities in Africa. We will get an even greater benefit when this command is truly integrated with all the other elements of U.S. power and diplomacy. With U.S. interests on this continent clearly defined and a united voice in Washington to advocate for requirement and resources, I believe we'll be able to advance America's interests in Africa better and build strong partnerships

with African Government to eliminate poverty and accelerate Africa's integration into the global economy.

Over the years, I've learned a few lessons about dealing with Africa. It might be useful for the new Africa Command to consider these lessons as it establishes its capabilities and initiates its programs.

1. Proactive and preventative programs using all the elements of national power are significantly cheaper and more effective than reactive and corrective measures. Our experiences in countries like Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan are obvious examples. We've got the Kofi Annan Center for Peacekeeping. Maybe it's time for the United States to help Africans establish the Nelson Mandela Center for Good Governance and the Julius Nyerere Center for Political Leadership.

2. I believe we should focus on helping Africans help Africans. We must work with the African Union, the five regional economic communities, and individual countries to ensure our assistance meshes with their regional and national programs. U.S. initiatives must have the approval and support of our African hosts if they are to work, if they are to last. Since we are the guests, we must listen to our hosts and understand their views and requirements. The United States must build relationships based on mutual trust and respect. We must form strong partnerships based on shared understanding of security requirements and a common vision for the future.

3. To the maximum extent possible, our assistance programs must be sustainable, replicable, and scaleable. "Train the trainer" programs should be a critical component of any initiative. We need to be working ourselves out of a job; there should be a "sun-down" clause in our training and assistance programs.

I believe Africa Command is off to a good start conceptually. I applaud DOD's efforts to use an interagency model—to include other U.S. Government departments' and agencies' inputs in its decisionmaking process. The discussion about including personnel from other agencies as permanent members of the headquarters staff is also very interesting. Our goal not only should be to put a stronger hyphen between "mil-pol" or to make it more "pol-mil." It should also be to create an organization that truly integrates the unique strengths pol, mil, econ, and development.

Security cooperation at the AU and national level is extremely important and the U.S. military has made great strides in this area. This effort must be matched by a similar interagency commitment to enhance and resource a more robust "stability cooperation" program. Increased security depends on better governance and plans for long-term stability that foster a believable hope among Africans that tomorrow will be better. This means cleaner water, adequate food, better schools, available and affordable health care, improved infrastructure and communications, more employment opportunities, human rights, and total gender equality.

I believe our ultimate success will stem from our attitude and approach as we have a larger presence and footprint in Africa. AFRICOM must be perceived by Africans as being a good and respectful guest, and a valued partner. AFRICOM must be about Africans helping Africans.

In my view, AFRICOM is on track to be just that type of organization—a significant improvement over the older versions of the Unified Command Plan.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, sir. Thank you all.

We'll begin with a 7-minute round.

Mr. Morrison, again, thank you for your testimony. What valuable roles do you see AFRICOM being suited for in promoting good governance and building stable states? In what situations would the military be valuable to humanitarian organizations?

Dr. MORRISON. DOD's greatest contribution, on humanitarian programs historically, are in situations of crisis, either human or natural disasters, where there's an urgent requirement for significant lift and distribution. We've seen this in many places. The Mozambique hurricane, in 2001, our military played a major role in mobilizing the movement of troops, fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter relief, and made a substantial contribution.

In terms of the longer range investment in governance and professionalization, there's a normative contribution, that Mark and Paul alluded to, which is the respect of human rights and the respect of civilian control over operations and the kinds of investments that have been made. I think the normative contribution that can be made—let's take the Gulf of Guinea maritime environ-

ment there. We derive over 20 percent of our oil from the Gulf of Guinea. There's very little capacity, brown or blue water capacity, to patrol those areas. There's rampant piracy. And the fisheries there are plundered by others who come in. A multilateral, coordinated, interoperable maritime coast guard capacity aided by the United States could be a deterrent against crime, could bring wealth and development to those states, and could demonstrate the value of coordination among those parties and our United States naval forces, Europe, have begun that process, now, for 3 years. It could be expanded, it could be carried forward and enlarged, and it would have a dramatic impact on governance, on development, on regional institutions being integrated.

Thank you.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. Those are very good examples. I appreciate them.

Mr. Malan, from your personal experience you're obviously aware that when regimes do not have strong popular support based upon representative government, they too often exert pressure on their militaries to suppress opposition groups, including peaceful opposition groups. Do you believe that training in the rule of law and civilian control of the military is a reliable safeguard against the misuse of the military in such situations?

Mr. MALAN. No, sir. Training is insufficient. And too often, addressing these problems of civilian oversight—respect for civilian supremacy over the military, a so-called apolitical defense force—is reduced to 1-week courses or seminars presented by the ACSS, African Center for Strategic Studies, small group of officers. This kind of culture, this kind of military culture, is established over a generation or two. It involves long-term engagement. It cannot be addressed through select officers attending courses as part of IMET program. It involves working alongside these militaries for 10, 20, 30, 40 years.

So, I don't believe there's a quick fix, that training equals capacity-building, or training can establish a culture, or that train-the-trainer courses are going to do this. The problems are structural. I can think of a couple of countries where the ruling party has employed beaters in military uniform and police uniforms and made instant police officers to beat the political opposition. I don't think this can be fixed by training, sir.

Senator FEINGOLD. Speaking more broadly, what are the criteria in your mind for determining when a particular military force or unit should not be entitled to aid from the United States?

Mr. MALAN. When it is used as a political tool to suppress opposition; when it is proven and reported by NGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, that that military is committing human rights abuses. That should be enough for turning off the tap, sir.

Senator FEINGOLD. Very good, thank you.

Major General, I completely agree with your comment that AFRICOM should represent innovative political/military cooperation. Based on your military experience, what will be the main bureaucratic or logistical obstacles to the success of this type of interdisciplinary interagency approach? How do you suggest we overcome them?

General GRATION. Thank you, sir. That's a tough question, because it really goes to the heart of the way we're organized here in Washington and the way we're organized in Africa. It's my belief that the State Department has to have the lead, because the issues that are the biggest issues in Africa are stability issues. We're talking about diplomacy, democracy, human rights. All those kinds of things that were brought up earlier by my colleagues have to be addressed with the State Department lead. It is true that the Defense Department has great planning capability, great logistics capability, but I believe that the State Department has to have a stronger role in making things work.

There's a couple of things that hurt us in that approach. One is the military has a regional perspective, and that a regional perspective corresponds with the way the AU is being organized, and it makes us very effective in looking at problems from a regional effect, because there is spillover, and those borders—and so many of the issues are regional—terrorism, bird flu—all that stuff is cross-border kind of stuff, and it has to be looked at, at a regional response, even humanitarian disasters.

So, I believe that we need an interagency approach that is regional. And the ambassadors still have to be empowered, and I agree, but somehow we need to restructure our State Department so that the Middle East Africa branch works together with the sub-Saharan Africa branch and in the State Department—and in the DOD, Theresa Whelan has to have—it all needs to match the Africa Union. And right now we have, in Washington, a coordination mechanism that doesn't reflect Africa, even in our schools, the ACSS, departments, and that kind of thing. So, that needs to be sorted out.

The other thing is, there's not a very strong hyphen between "pol" and "mil," and that needs to be put in there. We need to have a strong-hyphen return to "pol-mil," so that the two are working together. And the fact is, it needs to be—all the elements of national power need to have a strong hyphen between them. Africa is not producing, in accordance with its wealth, contribution to the global economy, so there needs to be a "econ" hyphen in there, and there needs to be a "development" hyphen in there. And we all need to work together. And it all comes back to figuring out what is America's interest in Africa, and how do we take all the elements of power, from the interagency down through AFRICOM and through our ambassadors, to make sure that's happening, in close coordination with the governments, with the AU, the regional economic communities? This is a tough, big problem, but somehow it needs to be put in one basket and organized. And right now, it's schizophrenic.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you very much, sir.

Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As I've listened to the testimony, and tried to think through various activities or missions, I would just recall a personal experience, from two summers ago, in which the State Department and the NSC, having heard from President Bouteflika that he would like to try to bring about the release of Moroccan prisoners from the Polisario camp, and somehow I became involved, as somebody

would go down there to the camp, ostensibly with President Bouteflika. But, after we had a long conference about this situation, which our State Department felt was important, in terms of Algerian/Moroccan relations and our relations with them, President Bouteflika decided he did not want to go. He felt I needed to go, or it would be a deal-breaker altogether. And, fortunately, General Jim Jones stepped forward. I mention this, Major, because you were heavily involved with General Jones in support of these operations.

The benefit of that was that General Jones, in addition to being a fine officer and a good friend, could produce two planes, two aircraft that could carry out 404 people. I could not have produced anything, going down there. So, we had our mission, had a good visit with the chieftains. I acquired garb, that I still have in my office from those negotiations. And the net effect was, the Moroccans were freed, they went on General Jones's plane over to Morocco, where things were not as tidy as we had hoped, in terms of the reception by the Moroccans, but this works along.

Now, I mention those countries, because, as I read the press, neither one seems to be particularly enthusiastic about AFRICOM, and I mention that, simply because this is a manifestation of how, in the best of circumstances, the military can work with the NSC, with the State Department, with President Bouteflika, with the king of Morocco, and the rest. There is a feeling on the part of—however, of many in both of those governments, that that's not the way our military works.

And I dwell on this, because the first panel, in emphasizing that there was general support, a few dissenters, and so forth, seemed to be at variance with what the chairman mentioned from his reading, and I've mentioned, and you certainly affirm. We have a very large diplomatic process, just explaining, right now, to Africans why we want to do this, what benefit this will be to them, and to us, and to others. The necessity of highlighting some of the points that you gentlemen have made as to why this could have a humanitarian benefit or support democracy or transparency, or whatever, is tremendously important, and that it might jibe somehow with the AU, so that there's coincidence there.

I accept the point made—and I'm not sure how to remedy it—that the State Department is woefully underfunded. This is the reason we get into these predicaments of who is doing what, because, expediently, the Defense Department has money, it has personnel. And so, as a result, this imbalance within our own structure will be reflected, I'm afraid, in AFRICOM initially, hopefully not perpetually. But this really does need to be addressed; who does what, and who has the money, and, therefore, who calls the shots, in some instances?

So, I just make these observations. And then, I want to mention, that the issues of oil arose, and the Chinese. These are not incidental factors. And the fact is that the United States and China, and lots of other countries, are in great competition in African states for whatever resources they have there. That is apparent in hotels in any of the major capitals, where you run into a lot of people from China and India, even some from Europe. And so, once we talk about a military organization there, some—the Chinese would



say that they have already thought about that, they try to protect whoever their oil workers are. They realize this is difficult terrain, whether it's Sudan or wherever else they might be. But it's an existential problem for them to draw back these resources, come hell or high water, leaving aside African democracy or sensitivities and so forth. And yet, in many ways, the Chinese have been fairly successful, diplomatically, in many states, because of the nature of the rulers, perhaps, or perpetuating of that type of power. I just have not heard yet, in the testimony about AFRICOM, about the realities on the ground in Africa—with regard to the Chinese, in particular, plus others, and the needs they see for their country, their foreign policies, and how these intersect with what we're attempting to do, I believe, in a very straightforward and constructive way.

So, I'd just ask you—hopefully, all of you are being consulted in the process, not only by this Committee, being asked to testify, but by others who are planning policy in the African situation. And let me just ask, first of all, Are you being consulted? Are some of the ideas that are being presented to us—are these evident in the planning, the discussion, the debate, and what have you, as you see it, in State Department, Defense Department, or elsewhere?

Dr. Morrison, do you have a view on that subject?

Dr. MORRISON. Thank you, Senator.

On the question of consultation, I believe that there's an expanding receptivity and openness to—

Senator LUGAR. Good.

Dr. MORRISON [continuing]. To hearing other people's opinions and soliciting ideas and airing some of these issues, after a period in which I think, you know, when the President signed the initial paperwork, in November, and then made the official announcement, in February, there was a huge amount of internal work that had to be done within DOD and in the interagency to move forward to the point where they could then begin, in April and June, having the consultations. This was a very inward process that did not have all that much external outreach. But I think we're in a different phase now, and I think, as General Ward steps into the leadership position—soon, presumably—I think that will grow even larger.

And the question around China, I don't think that that has figured strategically in the preparations or thinking. And that may just be that it's a sequential thing, and there needs to be time to reach that point.

The Chinese engagement, the biggest plays are in Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and Sudan, as we all know. These are areas where the United States has huge foreign policy equities, as well as—not energy stakes in Sudan, but huge stakes on multiple other levels in Sudan, and huge energy stakes in the same places that China has drawn. That would argue for closer coordination, particularly in the shared interest in having a stable and secure environment through which business can be transacted, to have stable governance, and accountable and transparent governance, and working collaboratively to try and get to that outcome.

Thank you.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Malan, do you have a thought about this?

Mr. MALAN. Yes, Senator. The—both State Department and the Department of Defense have been engaging with the NGO commu-

nity. On two occasions, Refugees International has invited them to speak at fora that we've convened. I'm aware that they are, through interaction, getting broader viewpoints and consulting with the NGO community. However, on the two occasions—and some of the press briefings that I've attended where DOD has taken the strong lead in the briefing—they've moved on from the issues you raise, sir. And if you go to the transition-team Web site, under "Frequently Asked Questions," "Let us explore some myths about AFRICOM. AFRICOM is not about counterterrorism, it's not about protecting our oil interests, and it's not about countering Chinese," and moving on, moving on, "It's all about humanitarianism." Well, that doesn't sell. There's some extremely bright people in the NGO community, and there are, surprisingly enough, some extremely bright Africans. It just doesn't wash, sir.

I tried to say, earlier on, that AFRICOM has a legitimate mission, and it's draft mission statement says that, "U.S. Africa Command promotes U.S. national security objectives by working with African states and regional organizations to help strengthen stability and security in the area of responsibility." And it goes on. This is a clear, unambiguous, and legitimate military mission. And no African or humanitarian should object to that. But don't move off those strategic questions and gloss them over and move on to some humanitarian pitch. It just doesn't sell, sir.

Senator LUGAR. General, do you have a thought?

General GRATION. First of all, I'd say that General Jones is one of those people that has really crossed the bridge in the gulf between military and—he's the epitome of a soldier statesman. And it brings up a point, that we really need to train those kind of people. You know, people like General Jones just don't "happen." I mean, he happened to have a background—they gave him a lot of cross-cultural experiences, growing up in France. But those are the kind of people that we need to promote and put in jobs, and it's going to be especially important in Africa, to be able to attract people that understand the African context, that understand how decisions are made, that understand that it may not be a PowerPoint briefing that wins the day, but it's a handshake, it's a look in the eye, and it's the trust, and it's treating people with respect and trust that's going to win.

In terms of consultation, I have not been part of this since I left the military. Obviously, I was very much for Africa Command. As you know, back in the cold war, we were spending, in the European Command, only about 5 percent of our time in Africa. Now it's increasing. In my job in the J-5, I was spending probably 60 to 70 percent of my time looking south.

And so, AFRICOM is a concept that is good, and it needs to happen, but we really have to deal with these questions that are being brought up. Is it really a military arm of U.S. policy? And should it focus on providing the logistics and the planning and the military strength, and going after those issues that have been brought up, like protecting our interests, doing noncombatant operations, holding things stable and secure while we do some long-term other kind of projects? Or should we be putting it all in one hat? And, if we put it all in one box, who's really in charge?

And I agree that, when you start mixing all that stuff together, the questions that you are asking, you're going to have to get good answers for, right up front. The command-and-control piece, you know: What is the relationship with the State Department? The individual who is in charge of civil-military affairs, What linkage do they have? And putting the right people into those jobs is going to be absolutely critical, people that have credibility in the State Department, people who can represent the State Department views, people that can advocate military views back up to other State Department. It's going to be very, very critical to get the right people, people like General Jones, that understand both sides and are able to do, not what's right for the military or what's right for the State Department and what's Republican or Democrat, but what's right for America.

And that's why it's so important to get this right, because, until you get this piece right, you can't figure out how you should react to Chinese. But if you know your own interests, and you know where you're going, it's very easy to know where you should be going the same way, same day with other people, or when you should confront them, or where you should be working in cooperation. But it comes down to having a very clear all-across inter-agency policy and then handling these threats as they come up.

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you.

Thank you, again, Mr. Chairman, for chairing this meeting and allowing us to raise these questions, which I think are important for our State Department and our Department of Defense to consider as we evolve.

Senator FEINGOLD. As we conclude, let me first thank Senator Lugar for his very insightful remarks, which I enjoyed and we all benefit from.

And let me just say how pleased I am with this panel. You know, I've been trying to help make this AFRICOM happen, and I still believe it can be a very useful thing, with the proper efforts being made that were suggested. I also think that we're getting at it at a time before it's too settled in, so this is a timely hearing, where some of the concerns, I hope, will be addressed. And I hope what we heard will be taken seriously.

There's no point in pretending, by the State Department or anyone else, that there are not serious concerns in Africa, or trying to minimize those concerns. Those concerns have to be addressed very aggressively. I came on this subcommittee 15 years ago, because I was told that this area of the world was not taken very seriously, and that I would have to do some time on the Africa subcommittee before I got the other committees. I said, "That sounds to me like a bad policy, and I'm going to spend as long as I'm in the Senate, on this committee, so we take this part of the world more seriously." That should be the spirit of AFRICOM, not something that makes Africans think that we lead with our military. We should indicate a very balanced approach, and AFRICOM should be part of that.

I hope this has been helpful, and I know that Senator Lugar and I have benefited from it.

Thank you very much. That concludes the hearing.  
[Whereupon, at 12:09 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

