[Congressional Record: February 8, 2007 (Senate)] [Page S1732-S1733] SAUDI ARABIA AND COUNTERTERRORISM Mr. WYDEN. Mr. President, as a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, I wish to talk a bit this morning about the all- important war against terrorism and particularly the sources of funding that allow the terrorists to obtain the resources with which they conduct this war. It is impossible to talk about funding terrorism without mentioning Saudi Arabia. With its extraordinary oil wealth, the Saudis have a tremendous economy which is home to many strains of extremist Islamist thought. Over the years, the combination of wealth and extremism has proved to be a volatile combination. A few years ago, a telethon in Saudi Arabia raised more than $100 million for the families of ``Palestinian martyrs,'' a group which reportedly included suicide bombers. According to public news reports, Saudi Arabia's ruler, King Fahd, ordered the fundraising drive as a way to channel public anger in the kingdom against the United States and Israel. Just because the Saudis are no longer holding telethons for terrorists does not mean that they aren't providing substantial funding for terrorism in other ways. A number of Government agencies have noted that Saudi Arabia is a source of funding for hate-filled extremist ideologies, but Saudi-based support for terrorism does not stop there. In fact, it may be a part, a small part of what we face in this war against terrorism. According to the State Department, Saudi donors and unregulated charities have been a major source of funding and support, not just for groups that preach radical ideologies but for actual terrorist organizations. I wish to cite now some specific examples. An examination of the public record reveals clear connections with some of the world's most infamous organizations, such as al-Qaida. The staff of the 9/11 Commission, for example, noted that the intelligence community identified Saudi Arabia as the ``primary source of money for al-Qaida both before and after the September 11th attacks.'' They went on to say ``fundraisers and facilitators throughout Saudi Arabia and the Gulf raised money for al-Qaida from witting and unwitting donors and divert[ed] funds from Islamic charities and mosques.'' The Iraq Study Group, to look at another effort to examine these issues, stated that ``Funding for the Sunni insurgency in Iraq comes from private donors in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states,'' and Iraqi officials have reportedly asked the Saudi Government to do more to limit the support that these donors provide to Iraqi insurgents. The State Department has reported that private Saudi donors are a primary source of funding for Hamas. Early last year, Ambassador Crumpton, the State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism, told a House subcommittee that the Saudi Government, ``had made a bit of progress in reducing the flow of funds from Saudi Arabia to Hamas and other Palestinian rejection groups, but conceded that the money funding these terrorists is still going on.'' Other governments have gone even further in their statements with respect to the funding of terrorism. In the fall of 2005, Israeli officials announced they arrested an individual, who they claimed was acting as a courier between Hamas members in the Palestinian territories and Hamas members in Saudi Arabia. No other governments have confirmed this, but if it is correct, it certainly raises a host of troubling questions. Clearly, one can see that the threat posed by these donors goes beyond the spread of religious intolerance and extremely dogmatic forms of Islam. Rather, money is flowing from Saudi Arabia to support insurgent groups in Iraq; money is flowing from Saudi Arabia to Palestinian terrorist groups such as Hamas; money is flowing from Saudi Arabia to al-Qaida. Under Secretary of the Treasury Stewart Levey summed up this situation pretty clearly. He said: Is money leaving Saudi Arabia to fund terrorism abroad? Yes. Undoubtedly some of that money is going to Iraq, it's going to Southeast Asia, and it's going to other places where there are terrorists. There is money leaving Saudi Arabia. I think it is also appropriate to put this in the context of what it means to folks this Pennsylvania and Oregon and everywhere else, and in effect what happens when you pull up at a gas station in Pennsylvania and Oregon is you are paying a terror tax. A portion of what you pay for gasoline in Pennsylvania or Oregon or elsewhere, in effect, finds its way eventually to the Government of Saudi Arabia, and then we see that the Saudis end up back-dooring it to various kinds of terrorist organizations. The Government Accountability Office describes this problem very succinctly, stating it this way: Saudi Arabia's multibillion-dollar petroleum industry, although largely owned by the government, has fostered the creation of large private fortunes, enabling many wealthy Saudis to sponsor charities and educational foundations whose operations extend to many countries. Government and other expert reports have linked some Saudi donations to the global propagation of religious intolerance, hatred of Western values, and support to terrorist activities. So that is what we are talking about when we talk about this terror tax which literally is paid every time an American pulls up in Pennsylvania, Oregon, or anywhere else and fills their tank with gasoline. The former Director of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, summed it up pretty well just recently. He said: We live in a world where Saudi Arabia earns about $160 billion from exporting oil and a big share of that, several billion dollars, goes to the Wahabbi sect for their worldwide work, which is to set up madrassas in Pakistan and other places. And the ideology that is taught in those madrassas is for all practical purposes the same as al-Qaida's. As the GAO report notes, this problem appears to go beyond the funding of an ``al-Qaida ideology''--it appears to be funding terrorist activities. So let me now turn for a few minutes to the question of the Saudi Government's role in all of this. When you look at all the evidence, it is pretty clear there is a serious problem, and the question is, What has the Saudi Arabian Government been doing about all of this? Are they part of the problem? Are they doing anything to address it? Let me review the history. First, there appears to be no question that in the first couple of years after the 9/11 attacks, Saudi Arabia was directly involved in supporting terrorism. The telethon that raised money for families of suicide bombers was sponsored by the Saudi King. In many ways, the Saudis' position changed when terrorism hit home in the aftermath of the horrible terrorist bombings that [[Page S1733]] hit Riyadh in mid-2003. Since then, there seems to be broad agreement throughout the U.S. Government that the Saudi Government's counterterrorism efforts have improved. It is not at all clear that the Saudi Government is going far enough to help in this fight against terrorism. Following the Riyadh bombings, the Saudi Government instituted a number of new antiterrorism laws and policies, but all the evidence indicates they have fallen short with respect to implementation of those laws. Here is an example: The Saudi Government announced that all charitable donations distributed internationally must flow through a new national commission that purportedly would ensure the money did not end up in the hands of terrorists. It has now been nearly 3 years since this announcement was made, and the commission is still not yet up and running. Even worse, our Treasury officials reported last year that the Saudi Government's brandnew, highly touted finance intelligence unit was not ``fully functioning.'' Similarly, while the Saudi Government has worked with the United States to designate particular charities as terrorist financiers, it is not always possible for our Treasury officials to independently verify that particular problem charities--the ones we are most concerned about--have actually been shut down. Certainly, there have been some individuals in the Saudi Government who have attempted to address the terrorism question. At least since 2003, Saudi leaders have made a number of public statements indicating they wish to address the problem. But these examples make clear that the reality of what is needed to win this war against terrorism still is not in line with some of the rhetoric. With respect to implementing and enforcing antiterrorism policies, the actions of the Saudi Arabian Government are questionable at best. There are two problems. The first is, as I have indicated, not all of the proposed new laws and policies have been implemented, and the second is that we have to get the Saudis to make a more aggressive commitment to enforcement. So you have to get them implemented, and then you have to get them enforced. John Negroponte, of course, the Director of National Intelligence, has been following this. At one of our open meetings of the Intelligence Committee, I asked him his assessment of the situation. Director Negroponte indicated that, in his view, the situation had improved a bit since 2003, but he made it clear, stating specifically that more work needs to be done, especially in the area of private Saudi donors, and that more is needed to crack down on their activities. This sentiment was echoed by the Congressional Research Service, which reported that no high-profile donors--none--had been subject to criminal punishment by the Saudi Government. The State Department has said publicly: Saudi Arabia should demonstrate its willingness to hold elites accountable. But, unfortunately, in Saudi Arabia, the elites hold all the cards, and the Saudi Arabian Government, as indicated by the Congressional Research Service, is not willing to go after those who are most influential--the elites--in their country. Now, some have gone even further and suggested that the Saudi Government might actually be involved in the propagation and financing of terrorism. The evidence on this point is inconclusive, but this does not rule out the possibility that lower level officials in the Saudi Government may, in fact, be involved in funding or facilitating terrorism. Given the high levels of corruption reported in Saudi Arabia, this is certainly a possibility. Moreover, as the General Accounting Office points out, the distinction between the Government's support and funding versus that provided by entities and individuals, especially in the case of Saudi charities' alleged activities, is not always clear. The Saudi Royal Family is an excellent example. The Royal Family contains several thousand family members who collect Government allowances of varying amounts. If one of these royalties took a portion of their allowance money and funneled it to al-Qaida or Hamas, Saudi officials might claim that this did not even constitute Government support for terrorism. Certainly, I and others would say that the Government still bears significant responsibility. I would also argue that just because Saudi leaders are not personally involved in financing terrorism, this should not absolve them from accountability. Most of my constituents would contend that if terrorist activities are being planned or financed inside Saudi Arabia, then the Saudi Arabian Government has a responsibility to get off the dime and stop it. As we say in our State, you are either part of the problem or you are part of the solution. The Congress has a responsibility now to investigate this issue, and there are a number of key questions that ought to be answered. First, how much money is flowing from Saudi Arabia to terrorist groups? Which groups are the major beneficiaries and to what extent is official corruption a major factor? Second, there needs to be an examination of how far the Saudi Arabian Government has gone in implementing its new antiterrorist laws. Implementation and enforcement have clearly fallen short, but where can we see concrete examples of actual followup? What major gaps still remain? Finally, there needs to be an examination of the internal situation in Saudi Arabia. Currently, the Saudi Government is run by a small group of men in their seventies and eighties. What is likely to happen when they are gone? How secure is the regime now? What sort of government would be likely to emerge if the Royal Family lost their power? It would be premature to try to offer answers to these and the other key questions. What is clear is that our Government will need to put more pressure on Saudi leaders than the current administration has applied thus far. It also seems very likely the answers will have a dramatic effect for U.S. energy policy which currently perpetuates our dependence on foreign oil. My guess is that people in Pennsylvania, like Oregonians, think that just about the most red, white, and blue thing we can do for our country is to get a new energy policy. Certainly, as we go forward to look into the activities of the Saudis, a bipartisan effort to get a new energy policy is a key factor in ensuring our ability to protect our citizens at a dangerous time. In the coming weeks and months, I plan to examine this issue as a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. I have asked our chairman, our very able chairman, Senator Rockefeller, to hold a closed hearing specifically dedicated to this topic, and one has been scheduled for this afternoon. It is time to bring to light the way in which Saudi oil money is fueling the fires of terrorism so people can actually see who is getting burned and what is necessary to protect the security and the well-being of Americans in a perilous world. Mr. President, I yield the floor, and I note the absence of a quorum. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered. ____________________