HR 770 IH

To prohibit the use of funds to carry out any covert action for the purpose of causing regime change in Iran or to carry out any military action against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat, in accordance with international law and constitutional and statutory requirements for congressional authorization.

January 31, 2007

Ms. LEE (for herself, Ms. WOOLSEY, Mr. KUCINICH, Mr. CONYERS, and Ms. WATERS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Armed Services and Select Intelligence (Permanent Select), for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

To prohibit the use of funds to carry out any covert action for the purpose of causing regime change in Iran or to carry out any military action against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat, in accordance with international law and constitutional and statutory requirements for congressional authorization.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

This Act may be cited as the `Iran Nuclear Nonproliferation Act'.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

Congress finds the following:

(1) Numerous bi-partisan commissions and study groups, including the Iraq Study Group co-chaired by James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, a 2004 working group established under the Council on Foreign Relations and co-chaired by Robert Gates and Zbigniew Brzezinski, and a 2001 Atlantic Council of the United States Working Group, co-chaired by Lee H. Hamilton, James Schlesinger, and Brent Scowcroft have called for various forms of dialogue and engagement with Iran in order to achieve United States strategic interests in the Middle East region.

(2) Implementing effective strategies to deflect or deter Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, or pursuing the development of nuclear weapons capabilities, is an important United States strategic interest.

(3) Establishing a diplomatic dialogue with the Government of Iran and deepening relationships with the Iranian people would help foster greater understanding between the people of Iran and the people of the United States and would enhance the stability and security of the Persian Gulf region, including by reducing the threat of the proliferation or use of nuclear weapons in the region, while advancing other United States foreign policy objectives in that region.

(4) The Iraq Study Group Report states `Iran's interests would not be served by a failure of U.S. policy that led to chaos and the territorial disintegration of the Iraqi state', and therefore, the Government of the United States should build upon this mutual interest to develop a diplomatic dialogue with the Government of Iran concerning deteriorating conditions in Iraq, which can become a basis of broader future United States-Iranian engagement.

(5) Given the dispersal of Iran's nuclear program at sites throughout the country and their proximity to urban centers, the use of military force against Iran would be extraordinarily difficult and probably ineffective, the immediate consequences and loss of life would be drastic, and the long-term instability generated would be against long-term United States interests in the region.

(6) Any military action designed to eliminate Iran's capacity to produce nuclear weapons would run the significant risk of reinforcing and accelerating the desire of the Government of Iran to acquire a nuclear deterrent and compounding nationalist passions in defense of that very course, and would most likely also generate hostile Iranian initiatives in Iraq and Afghanistan.

(7) Together, the ongoing efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) along with corresponding multilateral sanctions recently adopted by the United Nations Security Council offer a viable path for steering Iran's nuclear efforts along peaceful lines, provided that there is close multilateral coordination and steadfastness in the adherence to the sanctions and firm United States leadership in support of the multilateral effort.

(8) According to the most definitive United States intelligence reports, Iran is likely a decade away from acquiring the know-how and material to have an option to build a nuclear weapon, and even the most pessimistic analysis by outside experts puts the timeline at least three years away, assuming Iran suffers no setbacks during development, which would be unprecedented.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that--

(1) full diplomatic, political, and economic relations between the United States and Iran cannot be normalized unless and until enforceable safeguards are put in place to prevent weaponization of Iran's nuclear program and the Government of Iran ends its support for international terrorist groups, but the attainment of these policy objectives should not constitute preconditions for any diplomatic dialogue; and

(2) no congressional authorization for the use of military force in any Act of Congress enacted before the date of the enactment of this Act constitutes, either implicitly or explicitly, an authorization for the use of military force against Iran or its nuclear program.

SEC. 4. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

It is the policy of the United States not to enter into a preemptive war against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat, and then only in accordance with international law and constitutional and statutory requirements for congressional authorization.

SEC. 5. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.

No funds appropriated or otherwise made available to the Department of Defense or any other department or agency of the Government of the United States may be used to carry out any covert action for the purpose of causing regime change in Iran or to carry out any military action against Iran in the absence of an imminent threat, in accordance with international law and constitutional and statutory requirements for congressional authorization.

END