[Congressional Record: October 17, 2007 (House)] [Page H11645-H11655] From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:cr17oc07-90] PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 3773, RESTORE ACT OF 2007 Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 746 and ask for its immediate consideration. The Clerk read the resolution, as follows: H. Res. 746 Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it shall be in order to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 3773) to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to establish a procedure for authorizing certain acquisitions of foreign intelligence, and for other purposes. All points of order against consideration of the bill are waived except those arising under clause 9 or 10 of rule XXI. In lieu of the amendments recommended by the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill, the amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in part A of the report of the Committee on Rules accompanying this resolution, modified by the amendment printed in part B of such report, shall be considered as adopted. The bill, as amended, shall be considered as read. All points of order against provisions of the bill, as amended, are waived. The previous question shall be considered as ordered on the bill, as amended, to final passage without intervening motion except: (1) one hour and 30 minutes of debate, with one hour equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary and 30 minutes equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; and (2) one motion to recommit with or without instructions. Sec. 2. During consideration of H.R. 3773 pursuant to this resolution, notwithstanding the operation of the previous question, the Chair may postpone further consideration of the bill to such time as may be designated by the Speaker. The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Snyder). The gentleman from Florida is recognized for 1 hour. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to my namesake and good friend, the gentleman from Washington (Mr. Hastings). All time yielded during consideration of the rule is for debate only. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. General Leave Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the matter under consideration. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida? There was no objection. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 746 provides for consideration of H.R. 3773, the RESTORE Act of 2007, under a closed rule. The rule provides 90 minutes of debate. Sixty minutes will be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and [[Page H11646]] ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary. Thirty minutes will be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Mr. Speaker, with the resurgence of al Qaeda and an increasing global threat from weapons of mass destruction in places such as Iran, every single person in this body wants to ensure that our intelligence professionals have the proper resources they need to protect our Nation. As vice chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, I assure you that every one of us on that panel and others, Republican or Democrat, are working tirelessly and often together to do just that. But the government is not exempt from the rule of law, as our Constitution confers certain unalienable rights and civil liberties to each of us. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Bush administration upset that balance by ignoring the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, commonly referred to as the FISA law, establishing a secret wiretapping program and refusing to work with Congress to make the program lawful. Democratic members of the Intelligence Committee, led by the distinguished chairperson, Sylvestre Reyes, have been trying to learn about the Bush administration's FISA program for years. But the administration, which has been anything but forthcoming, has done everything it can to stop us from doing our job and helping them to do theirs better. A footnote right there, Mr. Speaker. In today's Washington Post, it is reflected as late as now, when the RESTORE Act is on the floor, the administration has agreed to give certain information to the Senate and still not to the House. When the administration finally came to Congress to modify the law, it came with the flawed proposal to allow sweeping authority to eavesdrop on Americans' communications, while doing almost nothing to protect their rights. The RESTORE Act, true to its name, restores the checks and balances on the executive branch, enhancing our security and preserving our liberty. It rejects the false statement that we must sacrifice liberty to be secure. It does not go as far as I would want it to go. It does not go as far as some people would like for it to go, but it does protect our liberty and secures this Nation. The legislation provides our intelligence community with the tools it needs to identify and disrupt terrorist attacks with speed and agility. Yet another footnote, Mr. Speaker. While we concentrate on surveillance as it pertains to wire, I would have people know that the terrorists by now have been pretty well educated about these matters and may very well be using other methodologies totally unrelated to the telephone. I remind people when it was leaked to the media that Osama bin Laden was using a certain kind of wire, he hasn't been heard from in that forum since. So let's be very cautious to not put all our eggs in the surveillance basket. There are other methodologies that might be employed that I assure you the intelligence community is mindful of and right on as it pertains to discovering them. {time} 1045 It provides additional resources to the Department of Justice, the National Security Agency and the FISA Court to assist in auditing and streamlining the FISA application process while preventing the backlog of critical intelligence gathering. The RESTORE Act prohibits the warrantless electronic surveillance of Americans in the United States, including their medical records, homes and offices. And it requires the government to establish a recordkeeping system to track instances where information identifying U.S. citizens is disseminated. This bill preserves the role of the FISA Court as an independent check on the government to prevent it from infringing on the rights of Americans. It rejects the administration's belief that the court should be a rubber stamp. Finally, the bill sunsets in 2009. This is a critical provision because it requires the constant oversight and regular evaluation of our FISA laws, actions which were largely neglected during the last 6 years of Republican rule. Mr. Speaker, all the American people have to do is pick up a newspaper to read about what happens when this government has unfettered access to warrantless electronic surveillance. According to a letter to Congress from a company executive, Verizon alone has fielded almost 240,000 phone record requests from the FBI since 2005. Nearly 64,000 of these requests, or over one-quarter of them, were made without a warrant. This is almost 100 phone record requests per day by our government to Verizon seeking private information about our citizens, without a warrant. Realize, we are just talking about requests made to Verizon by the FBI. And these are just the requests that Verizon told Congress about this week because the Bush administration has consistently refused to answer our questions about the President's program. Even more, it doesn't factor in the hundreds of thousands of requests that were made to other phone companies during the same time that we don't know about. Mr. Speaker, if we have learned anything since the terrorist attacks of September 11, it is that the balance between security and civil liberties is not only difficult, but absolutely critical. The RESTORE Act does absolutely nothing to block or hinder the efforts of our intelligence community. And Member after Member on the other side of the aisle are going to come down here and comment that it is hampering our intelligence efforts. Quite the contrary. It enhances their ability to do their jobs effectively and ensures the integrity of their efforts. I urge my colleagues to support this rule and the underlying legislation. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my good friend and namesake, Mr. Hastings, for yielding me the customary 30 minutes, and I yield myself such time as I may consume. (Mr. HASTINGS of Washington asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, yesterday the Rules Committee held a hearing to consider a rule for H.R. 3773, the RESTORE Act. At the outset of the hearing, the chairwoman of the Rules Committee did something that Republicans would not have even contemplated when we were in the majority. Before Members of Congress even had an opportunity to testify before the Rules Committee, the chairwoman announced that the rule would be closed. She further went on to say no notice was sent out seeking amendments from Members, yet at least 27 amendments on a bipartisan basis were submitted to the committee. I guess, Mr. Speaker, we know now that no amendment announcement is code for no opportunity for meaningful, open debate. While surprising, this action is, unfortunately, not unprecedented for this Democrat-controlled Rules Committee. I would like to thank all Members for submitting their thoughtful amendments on behalf of those they represent. And I especially would like to thank the Members who chose to stay and testify despite learning from the very start that their amendments would not be made in order. It is sad that yesterday the minds and ears of the Democrat members of the Rules Committee were closed to even allowing for the consideration of amendments and alternatives to legislation, important legislation aimed at closing loopholes and strengthening our national intelligence capabilities. Mr. Speaker, in 1978 Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, to establish a procedure for electronic surveillance of international communications. As enacted into law, FISA had two principle purposes: First, to protect the civil liberties of Americans by requiring the government to first obtain a court order before collecting electronic intelligence on U.S. citizens in our country. Second, the law specified how intelligence officials, working to protect our national security, could collect information on foreign persons in foreign places without having to get a warrant. The intent of the original FISA law was to enhance American security while at the same time protecting American privacy. Recognizing that no [[Page H11647]] responsibility of the Federal Government is more important than providing for the defense and security of the American people, Congress should be doing all it can to ensure that FISA continues to reflect the intent of the original law. In the nearly 30 years since FISA became law, we have seen tremendous advances in communication technology such as the Internet, cell phones and e-mail. However, under the original FISA law, our intelligence officials are not free to monitor foreign terrorists in foreign countries without a court order because of advances in communication technology. It is clear that our FISA laws are outdated and must be modernized to reflect changes in communication technology over the past three decades. In August, Congress in a bipartisan manner took an important first step forward to close our Nation's intelligence gap; but, unfortunately, only for a 6-month period. The Protect America Act passed only after repeated attempts by Republicans to give our Nation's intelligence professionals the tools and the authority they need to protect our homeland. This action was long overdue and this law marked a significant step towards improving our security. Now Congress must act again to renew this law by early next year before it expires or our national security will once again be at risk. Unfortunately, the legislation before us today, the RESTORE Act, does not provide the security we need to protect our troops and our Nation from a potential future terrorist attack. The bill also weakens Americans' privacy protections and fails to permanently close our Nation's intelligence gap. Specifically, Mr. Speaker, the RESTORE Act does not go far enough to reform outdated FISA regulations that burden our troops in the battlefield. It contains no provision for third parties to challenge FISA court orders. The bill also creates a centralized database that could actually increase the risk of privacy violations. Another major concern is that the RESTORE Act contains yet another sunset provision that forces the bill to expire on December 31, 2009, unnecessarily leaving our intelligence officials without the tools they need to protect Americans. It is alarming to me that this rule brings a bill to the House floor that goes so far as to weaken American privacy provisions while at the same time strengthening protections of our enemies in times of war. Mr. Speaker, as I mentioned earlier, nearly 30 amendments were submitted by Members on both sides of the aisle to address these and other concerns with the Democrat majority's failed attempt to update our current FISA laws. However, none of these amendments, which ranged from permanently strengthening our FISA laws to acquiring communications of foreign terrorists in foreign countries without a FISA court order, were allowed to be considered on the House floor today under this rule. Mr. Speaker, it is truly disappointing to me that every Member of this House is prohibited from offering changes to this bill that could make it more effective in our constant battle to prevent a future terrorist attack against our Nation. After all, if we cannot come together and work in a bipartisan manner on issues as important as improving our national security, then what can we work together on. Sadly, because the Democrat majority has chosen to consider the RESTORE Act under this closed process, working together in a bipartisan manner will not be possible. Instead, if this rule is adopted, Members will only have a choice to vote for or against a seriously flawed bill that threatens, not improves, our national security. Sadly, this closed process shuts out all American voices from being heard and, ultimately, every American could suffer consequences if this rule and bill are adopted. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to vote against the rule. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, before I yield, I would like to assist my colleague from Washington, who is my good friend and was in the majority last year when the Wilson bill, H.R. 5825, the Electronic Surveillance Modernization Act, was considered by the House. It was considered under a closed rule, H. Res. 1052, which self-executed an amendment in the nature of a substitute in lieu of amendments recommended by the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees. I think that is the precedent. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pascrell), my very good friend who serves on the Ways and Means Committee and the Homeland Security Committee. Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Florida, and I rise this morning to speak in favor of the rule on the RESTORE Act, H.R. 3773. I believe this is an appropriate rule given the large number of amendments that were considered in both the House Judiciary and Intelligence Committees. I want to highlight some of the most important provisions in the bill provided through this rule and steps that I believe can be taken to strengthen the intent of the legislation. Mr. Speaker, section 5 of the current legislation requires quarterly audits by the Justice Department Inspector General on communications collected under this legislation, which would then be provided to the FISA Court and to Congress. In the end, the issue is that without outside oversight, such as the FISA Court, you put a huge amount of authority in the hands of a very small number of people and leave an awful lot to their individual judgment in dealing with very sensitive issues of personal privacy. I hope that under this section the Justice Department Inspector General would also be inclined to include statistical information, as is possible, relating to the sex, race, ethnicity, religion and age of U.S. persons identified in intelligence reports obtained pursuant to the legislation. This data will help our intelligence agencies, the FISA Court and the Congress to gain a clear overview of intelligence collection on Americans swept up through these types of investigations and would create the necessary oversight to judge whether a pattern of profiling is occurring. I want to draw attention to the Schakowsky amendment which was approved by the Intelligence Committee. This would require that the FISA Court approve guidelines to ensure that an individual FISA court order is sought when the significant purpose of an acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific U.S. person reasonably believed to be located in the United States. {time} 1100 This is a vital provision to the bill that makes clear that no American can be the target of surveillance under this bill unless an individual warrant is obtained from the FISA Court. Under this provision, I hope we will also make clear the sensitivity surrounding communications between Americans and family members who may live abroad. We need to make certain that no American, regardless of their foreign family connections, can be the target of surveillance without an individual warrant being obtained from the FISA Court. We're not trying to protect foreigners. We're trying to protect Americans and safeguarding the Constitution. I thank the Speaker for the time. I want to thank you, and I hope that the Members will approve the appropriate rule on the RESTORE Act. I thank my friend. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, how much time is there on both sides? The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Washington (Mr. Hastings) has 23 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) has 19 minutes remaining. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 4 minutes to the distinguished ranking member of the Rules Committee, Mr. Dreier of California. (Mr. DREIER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Pasco for yielding and congratulate the Hastings cousins for their management of this very, very important measure. Mr. Speaker, yesterday afternoon eight of our colleagues sat before the dais of the Rules Committee with 27 different proposed amendments that [[Page H11648]] they wanted to offer to improve this very important measure, to work in a bipartisan way to improve it. Before they were able to utter their first words, they were told in response to a question that came from our friend from Pasco, Mr. Hastings, that this was going to be a closed rule. Now, Mr. Speaker, a closed rule means that no amendment is offered. No alternative proposal is allowed at all. We simply get the measure that is before us, and that is it. Now, that's when there were 27 different amendments that were proposed and, as I said, eight Members waiting to offer and discuss their ideas. They were completely shut out from that. Now, Mr. Speaker, it saddens me to report to this House that we, today, have achieved something that is not great for this institution. As of today, Mr. Speaker, in the 110th Congress, we have had more closed rules in a single session of the United States House of Representatives than we have in the 218-year history of this great institution. The sad thing about that, Mr. Speaker, is the fact that we were promised something much different, and this bill is critically important for our Nation's security. One of the very thoughtful proposals to come forward made great sense. It's the idea of saying that when the government asked the private sector to help us work to interdict those communications taking place among people who are trying to kill us, terrorists who are trying to kill us, we should allow them to do that. We should allow them to have immunity from the threat of prosecution if that, in fact, is being utilized. But unfortunately, our colleagues on the other side of the aisle have failed to allow that proposal, for those people who were asked by the government to help us win the global war on terror, to make sure that Osama bin Laden and other terrorists do not have the potential to kill us. And now what we've been told, and I heard countless Democrats say, oh, these people in the telecommunications industry, they've got enough money, they're making enough money, let them stand on their own. Well, Mr. Speaker, that is just plain wrong, and we, unfortunately, with this rule, are not even allowed a chance to debate that, which, to me, is absolutely outrageous. What we have before us, Mr. Speaker, is a closed rule on a bad bill that can't become law. Tragically, that's a pattern that we have been facing for a while. The exact same thing has happened on the bill that we're going to be voting after it was sent here 2 weeks ago on SCHIP legislation. We're going to be voting on that tomorrow. So, Mr. Speaker, let me just say again, this is a closed rule on a bad bill that can't become law. We've got to defeat this rule. We've got to make sure that those people who are working to keep this country safe have all the tools necessary to make that happen. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I make one reference to the Computer and Communications Industry Association which writes in support of the House Judiciary Committee's approach to retroactive immunity, contrary to what the previous speaker, my good friend, the ranking member, just said regarding that matter. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey, a distinguished member of the Intelligence Committee, my good friend Rush Holt, who is also Chair of the Special Intelligence Oversight Committee. Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman. The RESTORE Act, which its well-meaning authors believe will both help protect our liberties and our security, does the latter but, unfortunately, does not fully do the former. If I had more time, I would talk about the good features of this bill, but in the time I have, I would like to point to the one thing that it needs most, that it lacks, which is ironclad language that maintains the fourth amendment's individual warrant requirement when Americans' property or communications are searched and seized by the government. The RESTORE Act would allow the government to collect the communications of innocent Americans. The executive branch assurances that the rights of Americans will be protected through administrative procedures are no substitute for judicial protections. In recent weeks and months, we've seen too many abuses of administrative warrants to find any reassurance or to even find these assurances believable. Yes, I voted ``yes'' in committee to bring this to the floor, with the assurances that we would work to get it better. I regret to say that I've seen no effort to resolve this point. It could be fixed easily to the safety of Americans, because Americans will be safer when agencies have to demonstrate to a court that they know what they are doing. We get better intelligence, just as we get better law enforcement, when you do it by the rules. In fact, my own leadership I believe would deny me time to speak on this issue to try to strengthen this bill, but for the sake of the security of Americans, I implore the leadership to make these improvements. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Frelinghuysen). (Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me time. I rise in strong opposition to this rule and the underlying legislation. I stand before the House as a member of Mr. Holt's new House Special Intelligence Oversight Panel and as a lifelong resident of New Jersey, a State which is still feeling the heartrending damage of September 11, 2001. We will never forget what happened that day, and I work each and every day to prevent another such attack. I recognize that achieving the proper balance between our national security and our civil liberties is a real challenge, but we must also recognize that our war against violent international extremists is the first conflict of the information age. With our technical assets and expertise, the United States is far better at gathering information at this point in history than our enemies. This is an advantage we must exploit to better protect the American people from those who would do us harm. Then why are we on the floor debating a rule on legislation that essentially amounts to unilateral disarmament on our part? Last August, Congress enacted the Protect America Act, legislation that sought to modernize the old Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, FISA, and closed dangerous loopholes that prevented our intelligence community from monitoring overseas communications between al Qaeda members and other terrorist groups plotting and planning their next attack on U.S. citizens and our interests at home and abroad. These were not conversations involving Americans. These were communications between foreign targets overseas. Director of National Intelligence McConnell asked Congress to ``make clear that court orders are not necessary to effectively collect foreign intelligence about foreign targets overseas.'' I repeat, ``foreign intelligence about foreign targets overseas.'' But this new proposed legislation would not only undo the progress made by the Protect America Act, but it would do further damage to our collection efforts. Since it was enacted in 1978, FISA never required our government to acquire court orders for foreign communications of persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States. This bill would require such a court order, thus gutting 30 years of foreign intelligence collection. Once again, Mr. Speaker, I understand that achieving the proper balance between our national security and our civil liberties is a challenging task. I believe the Protect America Act achieved this goal. The bill required a warrant to target a person in the United States but allowed U.S. intelligence agencies to listen to foreign persons in foreign countries. Why is this important? Because speed matters in a war on terrorism, where terrorists are using our communications networks, not theirs, in order to try to harm us. This is not about politics. It's about ensuring that we give our security personnel the tools they need to help protect our families from future terrorist attacks. Mr. Speaker, unfortunately, I fear the RESTORE Act will live up to its [[Page H11649]] name. It will restore our intelligence community to the days when their hands were tied and they could not monitor the communications of al Qaeda members and other terrorists overseas without lengthy legalistic procedural delays. Terrorism is an international threat that requires (international) technology to solve. I urge my colleagues to restore our intelligence community's hard- earned technological advantage over al Qaeda and their murderous comrades. Protect America. I urge defeat of this rule and rejection of the underlying legislation. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished chairperson of the Intelligence Committee, Silvestre Reyes. Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Speaker, due to an administrative error, the following cosponsors were left off the list of cosponsors for this bill, H.R. 3773: Representative Anna Eshoo from California; Representative Dutch Ruppersberger from Maryland; Representative Dennis Moore from Kansas; Representative Ciro Rodriguez from Texas; Representative Earl Pomeroy from North Dakota; Representative Leonard Boswell from Iowa; Representative Baron Hill from Indiana; and Representative Patrick Murphy from Pennsylvania. I would like to thank them for their cosponsorship and ask that they be recognized as such, and I would finish up by saying this is a good rule. This is also a good bill that balances the ability to protect our country with the ability to protect the civil rights of its citizens. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce), a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman. I'm rising to oppose the rule. For the first time, this bill would stop intelligence professionals from conducting surveillance of foreign persons in foreign countries unless they can read the mind of their terrorist targets and guarantee that they would not call the United States or one of their people in the United States. This is more protection than Americans get under court-ordered warrants in mob and other criminal cases. So the issue we're debating today is very important. It is a matter of life and death essentially. I serve as ranking member of the Terrorism and Nonproliferation Subcommittee. That there has not been a terrorist attack on our soil since 9/11 is due to the improved surveillance in real-time that we're able to conduct against foreign terrorists. That good record, though, in no way should lead us to discount the jihadists, because the image of Osama bin Laden's allies operating in some remote terrain somewhere may give the impression that our foes are isolated. They are not isolated. We are confronting a virtual caliphate. Radical jihadists are physically dispersed, but they're united through the Internet, and they use that tool to recruit and plot their terrorist attacks. They use electronic communications for just such a purpose, and they're very sophisticated in that use. So how has the West attempted to confront that? Well, the British use electronic surveillance in real-time, and they used it last year to stop the attack on 10 transatlantic flights. They prevented that attack in August of last year by wiretapping. The French authorities used wiretaps to lure jihadists basically into custody and prevented a bomb attack. Given this threat, it is unfathomable that we'd weaken our most effective preventative tool, and that's exactly what this bill does. Before we passed the Protect America Act in August, the Director of National Intelligence told Congress that we are losing up to two-thirds of our intelligence on terrorist targets. Admiral McConnell went on to testify, ``We're actually missing a significant portion of what we should be getting.'' Though Admiral McConnell has served both Democrat and Republican administrations with distinction, now his credibility has been attacked. I'd ask those so distrustful: Go ahead, discount his estimate, cut them in half, say we'd lose one-third of our intelligence by passing this bill. Isn't that too much to give up? I don't want to lose a single percent of our intelligence on terrorist communications. With nuclear and biological material floating around this globe, we don't have that margin of error. We've heard the ACLU concerns, but before we unilaterally disarm, before we hobble our ability to listen in real-time to the very real terrorists who are attacking our troops in Iraq every day, shouldn't we have something of an accounting of the supposed civil liberties price we're paying? Frankly, I don't see the troubling cases. What I do see is the very misguided concern for the civil liberties of foreigners having conversations with terrorists. This bill grants privacy protection to foreigners, those believed to be terrorists, by requiring the intelligence community to seek court orders to collect foreign intelligence on foreign targets. {time} 1115 This process in the past has clogged the FISA Court, it has wasted untold intelligence hours, it has pulled Arabic and Urdu and Farsi speakers off of listening to terrorist cases and put them on filing hundreds of pages of paperwork. FISA restrictions hindered the search for kidnapped Americans in Iraq. My colleagues, it has come down to this: Are we interested in best protecting American lives, or giving away privacy rights to foreigners involved in conversations with terrorists? Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield to my distinguished friend and colleague from Texas, Sheila Jackson-Lee, 1 minute. But before I do, I would like to have Mr. Royce understand that he is entitled to his opinion but he is not entitled to his facts. And the facts as he recited them with reference to what Director O'Connell said occurred under the old FISA law, not this one. And I might add, that old FISA law was good enough to participate in bringing down the German possible terrorists. With that in mind, I would like to yield 1 minute to the distinguished gentlelady from Houston, Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee). (Ms. JACKSON-LEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.) Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Let me thank the distinguished gentleman from Florida, a former jurist, and let me acknowledge that the RESTORE Act is the right balance between national security and the protection of our civil liberties. I beg to differ with my good friend from California because in fact there are elements of this bill that clearly provide the parameters for foreign-to-foreign surveillance. The only difference is the fact that we protect an American citizen who may be targeted inappropriately as the court intervenes in providing a warrant. My friends, we are moving forward to secure America. I support this rule and I support the rule in its present form, because we need to now substitute a real bill that secures America supported by the language of Director McConnell and as well provides the civil liberties that all Americans deserve. I look forward to the debate on the floor. The RESTORE Act is what it is says, protecting us and providing the right surveillance and ensuring that terrorists do not attack America. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support H. Res. 746, the rule governing debate on H.R. 3773, the RESTORE Act. I thank the gentlemen for yielding and wish to use my time to discuss an important improvement in the bill that was adopted in the full Judiciary Committee markup. The Jackson-Lee Amendment added during the markup makes a constructive contribution to this important legislation that already is superior to the misnamed ``Protect America Act'' by orders of magnitude. It does this simply by laying down a clear, objective criterion for the Administration to follow and the FISA court to enforce in preventing reverse targeting. ``Reverse targeting,'' a concept well known to members of this Committee but not so well understood by those less steeped in the arcana of electronic surveillance, is the practice where the government targets foreigners without a warrant while its actual purpose is to collect information on certain U.S. persons. One of the major concerns that libertarians and classical conservatives, as well as progressives and civil liberties organizations, have with the PAA is that the understandable temptation of national security agencies to engage in reverse targeting may be difficult to [[Page H11650]] resist in the absence of strong safeguards in the PAA to prevent it. My amendment reduces even further any such temptation to resort to reverse targeting by requiring the Administration to obtain a regular, individualized FISA warrant whenever the ``real'' target of the surveillance is a person in the United States. The amendment achieves this objective by requiring the Administration to obtain a regular FISA warrant whenever a ``significant purpose of an acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific person reasonably believed to be located in the United States.'' The current language in the bill provides that a warrant be obtained only when the Government ``seeks to conduct electronic surveillance'' of a person reasonably believed to be located in the United States. It was far from clear how the operative language ``seeks to'' is to be interpreted. In contrast, the language used in my amendment, ``significant purpose,'' is a term of art that has long been a staple of FISA jurisprudence and thus is well known and readily applied by the agencies, legal practitioners, and the FISA Court. Thus, the Jackson Lee Amendment provides a clearer, more objective, criterion for the Administration to follow and the FISA court to enforce to prevent the practice of reverse targeting without a warrant, which all of us can agree should not be permitted. I hasten to add, Mr. Speaker, that nothing in the bill or in my amendment will requires the Government to obtain a FISA order for every overseas target on the off chance that they might pick up a call into or from the United States. Rather, the bill requires, as our amendment makes clear, a FISA order only where there is a particular, known person in the United States at the other end of the foreign target's calls in whom the Government has a significant interest such that a significant purpose of the surveillance has become to acquire that person's communications. This will usually happen over time and the Government will have the time to get an order while continuing its surveillance. And it is the national security interest to require it to obtain an order at that point, so that it can lawfully acquire all of the target person's communications rather than continuing to listen to only some of them. In short, my amendment gives the Government precisely what Director of National Intelligence McConnell asked for when he testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee: ``It is very important to me; it is very important to members of this Committee. We should be required--we should be required in all cases to have a warrant anytime there is surveillance of a US [sic] person located in the United States.'' In short, my amendment makes a good bill even better. For these reasons, I am happy to support the rule and urge all members to do likewise. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Tiahrt), a member of the Intelligence Committee. Mr. TIAHRT. I thank the gentleman from Washington. I rise in strong opposition to this bill. I am extremely concerned about our national security and I am deeply troubled that our intelligence community will be prevented from doing the job they need to do to protect Americans by this bill. For that reason, I strongly oppose the RESTORE Act as it will only further tie the hands of our intelligence community. If this bill passes, Congress would depart from the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission by making it more difficult and cumbersome to gather intelligence on Islamic terrorists. Our most important job here is to provide the tools to those charged with protecting our Nation and keeping us safe from those threats. In the last 6 years we have been kept safe in this country because we have had a sharp edge on the tools that we have been using to peel back the layers of secrecy on terrorists and terrorist organizations. This bill requires a court order to gather communications when a foreign terrorist in a foreign country tries to contact somebody in the United States. Since 1978, from President Carter to President Clinton, there was never a concern. Yet now, after we have had attacks on our U.S. soil and are well aware there are terrorist cells in our homeland, the Democrats want to prevent the intelligence community from intercepting communications of foreign terrorists. To my knowledge, no violation of civil rights has occurred in the FISA process. However, as this bill is written, the Democrats have opened the door for alarming violations of civil liberties by requiring the intelligence community to compile a database of reports on the identities of U.S. citizens that have inadvertently been accumulated in the process of gathering information. As the Washington Times noted this morning, apparently pandering to the left-wing blogosphere and the ACLU is a higher priority than the safety of Americans and even American GIs fighting al Qaeda. Normally, under current guidelines, the intelligence community blacks out all these names and they never get distributed anywhere. They are just simply eliminated from the database. But now, under this bill, we see the Democrats requiring a list be sent to Congress. And we all know that we have had leaks here in Congress. You would think the ACLU would be opposed not only to compiling such a list but distributing it to Congress. We have had leaks related to the way we collect information on individuals through electronic conversations, we have had leaks about how we have e-mails that have been reviewed on terrorist Web sites, we have had leaks that caused our allies in Europe to no longer cooperate when it comes to tracking terrorist financing. For us to give this type of information to Congress would almost certainly guarantee a leak and a violation of the civil liberties of those individuals who it inadvertently picked up in the process of trying to find terrorists working within our country trying to do harm. This is a bad bill. It goes back and dulls the tools, this edge that we have been using to keep the country safe. If it is passed and it becomes law, I would fear for the safety of this country because dulling the tools that have kept us safe for 6 years would put us in a much more vulnerable position than we are today. Over 2 months ago, the DNI, Mike McConnell, the man charged with overseeing the intelligence community, urged us to modernize the FISA law. But this does not do it. This sets us backwards. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, how much time remains on each side? The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida controls 15 minutes. The gentleman from Washington controls 9\1/2\ minutes. Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am prepared to reserve my time. And as a matter of courtesy to my good friend from Washington and to you, Mr. Speaker, I would like to indicate that I will be replaced in managing the time, although not required under the rules, by my distinguished colleague from New York, Michael Arcuri. I reserve my time. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to another member of the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Rogers of Michigan. Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I want to commend Mr. Hastings. We have worked on many issues of which we have agreed strongly in the betterment of national security. I couldn't more strongly disagree with this bill and where we are going today. As one of the very few people on this floor that has actually gone out and developed sources and developed the leads that you possibly need to develop probable cause as a former FBI agent to either bug or intercept phones, offices, or other privileges communications between Americans, I can tell you the long and arduous process it takes to develop that, to go to the judge and say, Your Honor, I do believe that these people are engaged in criminal activities and here is why. And it takes months and months and months. So let me tell you what this bill does today that is so disturbing. Non-United States citizens who are insurgents in Iraq building IEDs that our troops are trying to intercept electronically are now given more rights to privacy than we do for gamblers, degenerate gambling operations developed under the criminal code in the United States of America. That, my friends, is true. Incidental communications, you don't have to go back to the judge, you continue to listen. But what we have done is we have set a standard that every time they want to go overseas and intercept these folks, the standard of the bar is set so high they have to go get a court order. They have to get a warrant. And it takes months. This isn't about Hollywood. This isn't about Jack Bauer. This is about [[Page H11651]] real people having to develop probable cause in accordance with the law of the United States. And what you said is that insurgent in Iraq has more privacy rights than any criminal, any United States citizen under the criminal code of the United States of America. That is what you have done with this bill. Oh, yes, sir, it is. Read the language and understand what it takes for them to go through the process to develop probable cause. This is the confusion that led to the delay that may have cost the lives of United States soldiers. We all know the example of which we are talking about. This bill encourages that confusion and that standard to give foreign terrorists in a foreign land more privacy rights than United States citizens under the criminal code here. It's wrong. We often say, listen to the intelligence community, listen to our commanders on the ground. I implore you to do just that. They oppose this bill because it makes it harder for them to go after foreign terrorists in foreign lands plotting to kill either U.S. soldiers or even attacks against our homeland or our allies. This bill does all of those things. I don't ever doubt the intention of my friends, but words matter in the legal code. And when you stand before that judge, believe me, there is no agent that believes they are Jack Bauer and are going to fudge a little bit on what the Constitution asks and tells them they must do. They are going to err on the side of the United States Constitution every time. And for those who don't, they deserve to go to jail, and we do prosecute those occasionally. But what you are saying is we are going to create this whole system for foreign terrorists to give them more rights than the privacy of United States citizens. I strongly urge the rejection of this bill. Let's go back to the table and protect our United States citizens. Mr. ARCURI. I thank my colleague, and as a former prosecutor for 13 years, I have stood before a judge many times and made application for warrants on a number of different occasions. And, frankly, I certainly respect his position; but he is just not correct on this. This legislation not only gives our country the ability to do what needs to be done to protect us, but more importantly and equally as important certainly it protects our civil rights. So it does both things: It protects our civil rights and gives us the ability to keep our country safe. I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, once again, how much time is remaining on both sides? The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Washington controls 6\1/ 2\ minutes; the gentleman from New York controls 14\1/2\. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, at this time I am pleased to yield 2 minutes to a member of the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Gohmert of Texas. Mr. GOHMERT. Mr. Speaker, once again we have heard from across the aisle, this is not true that we are saying you will have to get warrants for foreign-to-foreign, because the bill says in section 2(a), gee, you don't have to get a court order if it is between persons not U.S. citizens not located within the United States. The problem is, when you look at 2(b) and 3 and section 4, it says: If you can't be sure and you are risking a felony if you are not, if you can't be sure that they may not call somewhere in the United States, you have got to get a court order. That is the bottom line. That is what Admiral McConnell testified. I realize some people on the other side may think he is suspect because he was the National Security Adviser under the Clinton administration for several years, but I think he is a very credible source. As a former judge and chief justice, I realize we have got lawyers in here, but I am telling you, when the language says if there may be a call to the United States or to an American, you have got to get a court order, then you are going to have to get them in virtually every time. But we keep hearing no, no, all that is covered. Once again, we are told something is covered when again it is nothing but a hospital gown coverage. You are exposed in areas you don't want exposed. And that is what the country is looking at. Now, it also requires the DNI and the AG to jointly petition. Oh, and there is great comfort in this bill. It says the judge, once they finally get the papers filed, will have to rule in 15 days. If we get a soldier kidnapped, we have some sensitive situation, and maybe it is an emergency, maybe it is not, but you can't take a chance of being guilty of a felony, you are going to have to follow through and get a court order. That is what the DNI says and that is what needs to be done. Now, the main protection here is not for American citizens in general, it is for foreign terrorists. The bottom line is, tell your American friends who are getting calls from foreign terrorists in foreign countries not to call them. Use some other way to communicate, and then your friends are covered. Mr. ARCURI. It is sad that my colleague attempts to change the actual meaning of what this statute does. It gives no protection to terrorists. It gives protections only to Americans, and it keeps us safe and it gives us the protections that are guaranteed us under the Constitution. I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield at this time 2\1/2\ minutes to a member of the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Franks of Arizona. Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Speaker, the bill here at issue, the so-called RESTORE Act, undermines the existing structure that we put in place to reform FISA only 3 months ago. In the midst of a war, any changes to the way that our intelligence community operates should be understood as a somber and delicate undertaking that requires great care. Our national security hangs in the balance. We cannot afford to get this wrong, Mr. Speaker. My amendment aimed to deal with the seriously flawed provision of the RESTORE Act that will do great damage to the civil liberties of the protections of Americans. {time} 1130 My amendment would have stricken section 11 of the bill that directs the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General to jointly maintain a recordkeeping system of U.S. persons whose communications are intercepted. Mr. Speaker, this would amount to a big government database that would have individuals' identity attached in every practical way. There is simply no way to have a database like this that does not attach individual identities to verify the process. The Democrats maintain that the identity is not attached. But this is an impractical rebuttal. Mr. Speaker, the proposal's not only misguided, it attempts ostensibly to protect Americans' civil liberties and only undermines them further. And we have to understand that these identities would be attached, even if they have no connection to spying or terrorism. And the bottom line is this, Mr. Speaker, this war on terrorism is ultimately fought in the area of intelligence. If we knew where every terrorist was tonight, in 60 days this war would be over. And if we tie those people's hands who are fighting to protect this country with this RESTORE Act by the majority, I believe that we will some day revisit this issue, Mr. Speaker, because when a terrible tragedy comes on this country, it will transform this debate in the most profound way, and we need to be very, very careful. We need to understand that what we're doing here is of vital importance to future generations. Mr. ARCURI. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve my time. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I know my friend has more time than I have, and I have more requests for time than I have time for. And so, Mr. Speaker, I would ask unanimous consent that each side get an additional 5 minutes so I can accommodate the requests on my side. Mr. ARCURI. Mr. Speaker, I would object to that. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I wonder then if I could inquire of my friend, since he has more time, if maybe he would yield me at least enough time so I can close on my [[Page H11652]] side, and I'd ask my friend from New York if he would do that for me. Mr. ARCURI. Well, we are waiting on one more speaker, so at this time I would not yield any additional time. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield for a unanimous consent request to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mack). (Mr. MACK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.) Mr. MACK. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this rule. Mr. Speaker, I rise today, once again, in defense of liberty and to tell my colleagues they should vote against this Rule. While I find it honorable that several of my colleagues have attempted to work to find a compromise in this legislation, I have concluded it still does not often enough protections for the rights of our citizens. It is the duty of Congress to strike the appropriate balance of freedom and liberty with the assurances of security and stability. But, we must constantly ask ourselves, are we going too far in one direction? And I have always maintained that if a threat is imminent and known, the administration should be given the temporary powers needed to keep our homeland secure and Congress should exercise its inherent power of oversight over that authority. I advocated this throughout the PATRIOT Act reauthorization and maintain it is the correct stance for us to take in times of crisis. While I am encouraged by the inclusion of sunsets in this proposal and additional roles for the FISA Court, this legislation still does not bring us back to where we were earlier this summer--the administration needing a clarification on foreign-to-foreign and foreign-to-domestic communications. Instead of taking the simple tenets of the Constitution and applying it to this debate, we in Congress like to overcomplicate the issue. We all agree these are important issues that deserve our time and attention but we need look no further than the Constitution for the right answers. Mr. Speaker, the proper route we should have taken in crafting the answer to the FISA problems is H.R. 11--The NSA Oversight Act. This bipartisan bill has the answers, in very clear terms, to what the administration has sought Congress to address. It allows for emergency surveillance and doesn't overly impede the work of intelligence officers; It places the FISA Court in a more proper role for reviews of the tactics used and warrants needed; And it ensures Congress conducts vigorous and smart oversight of these activities, all while protecting the individual freedom of Americans. And that is the goal we should be aiming for, Mr. Speaker: the protection of our rights and the upholding of our Constitution. If we fail to adhere to the Constitution and ``sacrifice our liberty,'' then we will have lost this great experiment we began over 220 years ago and the terrorists will have accomplished the very thing they set out to do on that morning in September seven years ago. We should vote down this Rule, go back to the table and report back a bill that preserves liberty and strikes a more proper balance between freedom and security for Americans. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have left, and how much time does the other side have? The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Washington controls 2\1/ 4\ minutes, and the gentleman from New York controls 14 minutes. Mr. ARCURI. Mr. Speaker, I'll continue to reserve my time. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I ask the gentleman from New York if he has any more speakers. Mr. ARCURI. We are waiting on one more speaker. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I'll reserve my time. Mr. ARCURI. Mr. Speaker, we have heard so much today from the other side about the fear that they have that this provision will somehow put Americans at risk. And I think it's very clear that what this FISA bill does is protect America, give our Intelligence Community ability to do the kind of things that it needs to do, while, at the same time, protecting our civil rights. I think it was Benjamin Franklin who once said that any country who gives up its liberty for its security deserves neither and will end up losing both. And I think clearly this bill takes that into consideration. This bill clearly provides for security for our country. It clearly provides our Intelligence Community with the ability to obtain information that it needs and use that and analyze it in a way that keeps America safe to prevent another 9/11 activity. At the same time, this bill also protects Americans' rights and gives us the ability to prevent wiretapping of Americans here in this country. We're not talking about foreign-to-foreign. They can do that. They have done that in the past, and they will continue to do that. This clearly deals with protecting Americans. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes). Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, there are a number of issues that have been brought up by the other side regarding this bill. First of all, it's important to keep in mind that what we're trying to do with this legislation is to carefully balance providing the tools to the intelligence professionals that are charged with keeping us safe in this country, and this legislation does that, regardless of what comments the other side has made. Second, and most important, we have to balance it with protecting the civil rights of our citizens. As we talk about protecting this country, we have to keep in mind that this country was founded on the principle of the rule of law. The rule of law protects its citizens. Under the Protect America Act, as we have seen over the course of the last few weeks, many, many concerns have been raised about the authorities that have been given to the government, authorities that would render our citizens not being able to protect and be secure in our homes and in our possessions. The Protect America Act has given so many authorities that people are not safe and secure in their own homes. The government can go in there and search their computers, search their residences, and search literally every possession that Americans have. This legislation corrects those deficiencies. This legislation is a careful balance in keeping our country safe, as well as securing the rights of Americans in their homes. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. I would inquire of my friend from New York if they have any additional speakers. Mr. ARCURI. I have one more speaker. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. How much time do I have on my side? The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman continues to have 2\1/4\ minutes. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance of the time. Today, Mr. Speaker, I will be asking my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the previous question so that I can amend the rule to allow for a substitute amendment to be offered by Mr. Hoekstra of Michigan or Mr. Smith of Texas. This will give the House an opportunity to consider additional views that were denied with this closed rule in the Rules Committee last night. And, Mr. Speaker, September 28, 2006, we had a debate on this issue last year, and I'd like to quote a Member and what he said on the House floor. And I quote: ``You beat with rulemaking that which you know you cannot beat with reason.'' And he goes on to say, ``I know what you say: Do as you say, not as we do. For today, in the people's House democracy has been eviscerated by those who recommend it to others. I have said it before. The way the majority runs the House is shameful. It is undemocratic. It happens every single day that we have a closed rule.'' The speaker was my good friend from Florida (Mr. Hastings). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to have the text of the amendment and extraneous material inserted into the Record prior to the vote on the previous question. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington? There was no objection. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose the previous question and the closed rule. I yield back the balance of my time. Mr. ARCURI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished Speaker of the House, the gentlewoman from California, Nancy Pelosi. Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding and commend him for his excellent management of this rule affording us the opportunity to bring this important legislation to the floor. I commend Chairman Reyes and Chairman Conyers for their leadership [[Page H11653]] in protecting and defending the American people by putting forth the best way to collect intelligence under the law. Mr. Speaker, as we say over and over again here, and each one of us who comes to serve in this body, indeed, everyone who serves our country takes an oath of office to protect and defend the Constitution of the United States. It's a thrill to take that oath of office. As we protect and defend the American people in the preamble, it says to form a more perfect Union, Mr. Jackson has been a champion on that, to provide for the common defense. In that preamble, that's a high priority for us. We have a responsibility to protect the American people; that makes everything else possible in our community and in our society. But as we protect and defend the American people, our oath of office calls upon us to protect and defend the Constitution and our civil liberties. The legislation before us today does just that. It's about protecting the American people from terrorism and other national security threats. I, for a long time, have served on the Intelligence Committee, both as a member, as the ranking member, and also ex officio as leader and now as Speaker. I believe very firmly in the role that intelligence gathering plays in protecting the American people. We want to prevent war. We want to prevent harm to our forces. Force protection is a very, very high priority for us. Protection of our forces. And we must now meet this horrible challenge of fighting terrorism in the world. It has been a challenge for some time. In order to do that, we have to have the laws in place in order to collect that intelligence under the law, and that is what this legislation does. First, it helps us defend our country against terrorism and other threats. Secondly, it protects the privacy of the American people, which is important to them and a responsibility for us. And third, this legislation restores a system of checks and balances and how we protect and defend our country and provides for rigorous oversight by Congress of this collection. In the 1970s, when the FISA law was passed, it was conceded that Congress had a role in determining how intelligence was conducted, how the executive branch conducted the collection of intelligence, the executive branch, Congress, making laws to govern that, two Houses, two branches of government. And in the FISA bill that was passed at that time, the role of the third branch of government was defined, the FISA Courts. That system of checks and balances has served our country well. With the advance of technology, additional challenges arose, and this legislation meets those challenges. Any suggestions to the contrary are simply not factual. What the Director of National Intelligence has asked for in terms of collection he has received in this legislation, and he has received it under the law. The legislation restores checks and balances in other ways. It rejects groundless claims of inherent executive authority. Under that, we might as well just crown the President king and just say he has access to any information in our country, and he may collect that outside the law. And this legislation reiterates that the law enacted by Congress, FISA, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, is the exclusive means for conducting electronic surveillance to gather foreign intelligence. The principle of exclusivity is a very, very important principle, and it is enshrined in this legislation. {time} 1145 The bill also sunsets by December 31, 2009, at the same time the PATRIOT Act sunsets, so the next administration and another Congress can review whether the new program appropriately meets national security and civil liberty objectives. This bill does not provide immunity to telecommunications companies that participated in the President's warrantless surveillance program. As I have said many times, you can't even consider such relief unless we know what people are asking for immunity from. Congress is not a rubber stamp; we are a coequal branch of government. We have a right to know what conduct the administration wants us to immunize against. Working side by side, the Intelligence Committee and the Judiciary Committee have produced an excellent bill. It has been heralded so by those organizations whose organized purpose is to protect our civil liberties in light of our responsibility to our national security. It has been heralded by those who follow and hold as a value the privacy of the American people. It has been heralded by those who understand that one of our first responsibilities is to provide for the common defense. Our Founders understood it well, the balance that needed to be struck between security and liberty. They spoke eloquently to it in their speeches. They enshrined it in the Constitution. Let us protect the American people under the law. Please, my colleagues, support this very important legislation. Mr. ARCURI. Mr. Speaker, I would just like to thank the gentlewoman from California for her very strong leadership on this issue and, over the years, for her many years of strong leadership in this area. I would also like to thank Chairmen Conyers and Reyes for their strong leadership in bringing this bill to the floor. Having said that, I urge a ``yes'' vote on the previous question and on the rule. The material previously referred to by Mr. Hastings of Washington is as follows: Amendment to H. Res. 746 Offered by Representative Hastings, WA In section 1, strike ``and (2)'', and insert ``(2) a further amendment to be offered by Representative Hoekstra or Representative Smith of Texas, or their designee, which shall be in order without intervention of any point of order or demand for division of the question and shall be separately debatable for one hour equally divided and controlled by the proponent and an opponent; and (3)''. ____ (The information contained herein was provided by Democratic Minority on multiple occasions throughout the 109th Congress.) The Vote on the Previous Question: What It Really Means This vote, the vote on whether to order the previous question on a special rule, is not merely a procedural vote. A vote against ordering the previous question is a vote against the Democratic majority agenda and a vote to allow the opposition, at least for the moment, to offer an alternative plan. It is a vote about what the House should be debating. Mr. Clarence Cannon's Precedents of the House of Representatives, (VI, 308-311), describes the vote on the previous question on the rule as ``a motion to direct or control the consideration of the subject before the House being made by the Member in charge.'' To defeat the previous question is to give the opposition a chance to decide the subject before the House. Cannon cites the Speaker's ruling of January 13, 1920, to the effect that ``the refusal of the House to sustain the demand for the previous question passes the control of the resolution to the opposition'' in order to offer an amendment. On March 15, 1909, a member of the majority party offered a rule resolution. The House defeated the previous question and a member of the opposition rose to a parliamentary inquiry, asking who was entitled to recognition. Speaker Joseph G. Cannon (R-Illinois) said: ``The previous question having been refused, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Fitzgerald, who had asked the gentleman to yield to him for an amendment, is entitled to the first recognition.'' Because the vote today may look bad for the Democratic majority they will say ``the vote on the previous question is simply a vote on whether to proceed to an immediate vote on adopting the resolution . . . [and] has no substantive legislative or policy implications whatsoever.'' But that is not what they have always said. Listen to the definition of the previous question used in the Floor Procedures Manual published by the Rules Committee in the 109th Congress (page 56). Here's how the Rules Committee described the rule using information from Congressional Quarterly's ``American Congressional Dictionary'': ``If the previous question is defeated, control of debate shifts to the leading opposition member (usually the minority Floor Manager) who then manages an hour of debate and may offer a germane amendment to the pending business.'' Deschler's Procedure in the U.S. House of Representatives, the subchapter titled ``Amending Special Rules'' states: ``a refusal to order the previous question on such a rule [a special rule reported from the Committee on Rules] opens the resolution to amendment and further debate.'' (Chapter 21, section 21.2) Section 21.3 continues: Upon rejection of the motion for the previous question on a resolution reported from the Committee on Rules, control shifts to the Member leading the opposition to the previous question, who may offer a proper amendment or motion and who controls the time for debate thereon.'' Clearly, the vote on the previous question on a rule does have substantive policy implications. It is one of the only available tools [[Page H11654]] for those who oppose the Democratic majority's agenda and allows those with alternative views the opportunity to offer an alternative plan. Mr. ARCURI. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I move the previous question on the resolution. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on ordering the previous question. The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays. The yeas and nays were ordered. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 and clause 9 of rule XX, this 15-minute vote on ordering the previous question will be followed by 5-minute votes on adoption of H. Res. 746, if ordered; and suspending the rules on H. Res. 549. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 221, nays 199, not voting 11, as follows: [Roll No. 974] YEAS--221 Abercrombie Ackerman Allen Altmire Andrews Arcuri Baca Baird Baldwin Bean Becerra Berkley Berman Berry Bishop (GA) Bishop (NY) Blumenauer Boren Boswell Boucher Boyd (FL) Boyda (KS) Brady (PA) Braley (IA) Brown, Corrine Butterfield Capps Capuano Cardoza Carnahan Carney Chandler Clarke Clay Cleaver Clyburn Cohen Conyers Cooper Costa Costello Courtney Cramer Crowley Cuellar Cummings Davis (AL) Davis (CA) Davis (IL) Davis, Lincoln DeFazio DeGette Delahunt DeLauro Dicks Dingell Doggett Donnelly Doyle Edwards Ellison Ellsworth Emanuel Engel Eshoo Etheridge Farr Fattah Filner Frank (MA) Giffords Gillibrand Gonzalez Gordon Green, Al Green, Gene Grijalva Gutierrez Hall (NY) Hare Harman Hastings (FL) Herseth Sandlin Higgins Hinchey Hinojosa Hirono Hodes Holden Honda Hooley Hoyer Inslee Israel Jackson (IL) Jackson-Lee (TX) Jefferson Johnson (GA) Jones (OH) Kagen Kanjorski Kaptur Kennedy Kildee Kilpatrick Kind Klein (FL) Kucinich Langevin Lantos Larsen (WA) Larson (CT) Lee Levin Lewis (GA) Lipinski Loebsack Lofgren, Zoe Lowey Lynch Mahoney (FL) Maloney (NY) Markey Marshall Matheson Matsui McCarthy (NY) McCollum (MN) McDermott McGovern McIntyre McNerney McNulty Meeks (NY) Melancon Michaud Miller (NC) Miller, George Mitchell Mollohan Moore (KS) Moran (VA) Murphy (CT) Murphy, Patrick Murtha Nadler Napolitano Neal (MA) Oberstar Obey Olver Ortiz Pallone Pascrell Pastor Payne Perlmutter Peterson (MN) Pomeroy Price (NC) Rahall Rangel Reyes Richardson Rodriguez Ross Rothman Roybal-Allard Ruppersberger Rush Ryan (OH) Salazar Sanchez, Linda T. Sanchez, Loretta Sarbanes Schakowsky Schiff Schwartz Scott (GA) Scott (VA) Serrano Sestak Shea-Porter Sherman Shuler Sires Skelton Slaughter Smith (WA) Snyder Solis Space Spratt Stark Stupak Sutton Tanner Tauscher Taylor Thompson (CA) Thompson (MS) Tierney Towns Udall (CO) Udall (NM) Van Hollen Velazquez Visclosky Walz (MN) Wasserman Schultz Waters Watson Watt Waxman Weiner Welch (VT) Wexler Woolsey Wu Wynn Yarmuth NAYS--199 Aderholt Akin Alexander Bachmann Bachus Baker Barrett (SC) Barrow Bartlett (MD) Barton (TX) Biggert Bilbray Bilirakis Bishop (UT) Blackburn Blunt Boehner Bonner Bono Boozman Boustany Brady (TX) Broun (GA) Brown (SC) Brown-Waite, Ginny Buchanan Burgess Burton (IN) Buyer Calvert Camp (MI) Campbell (CA) Cannon Cantor Capito Carter Castle Chabot Coble Cole (OK) Conaway Crenshaw Cubin Culberson Davis (KY) Davis, David Davis, Tom Deal (GA) Dent Diaz-Balart, L. Diaz-Balart, M. Doolittle Drake Dreier Duncan Ehlers Emerson English (PA) Everett Fallin Feeney Ferguson Flake Forbes Fortenberry Fossella Foxx Franks (AZ) Frelinghuysen Gallegly Garrett (NJ) Gerlach Gilchrest Gingrey Gohmert Goode Goodlatte Granger Graves Hall (TX) Hastert Hastings (WA) Hayes Heller Hensarling Herger Hill Hobson Hoekstra Hulshof Hunter Inglis (SC) Issa Johnson (IL) Johnson, Sam Jones (NC) Jordan Keller King (IA) King (NY) Kingston Kirk Kline (MN) Knollenberg Kuhl (NY) LaHood Lamborn Lampson Latham LaTourette Lewis (CA) Lewis (KY) Linder LoBiondo Lucas Lungren, Daniel E. Mack Manzullo Marchant McCarthy (CA) McCaul (TX) McCotter McCrery McHenry McHugh McMorris Rodgers Mica Miller (FL) Miller (MI) Miller, Gary Moran (KS) Murphy, Tim Musgrave Myrick Neugebauer Nunes Paul Pearce Pence Peterson (PA) Petri Pickering Pitts Platts Poe Porter Price (GA) Pryce (OH) Putnam Radanovich Ramstad Regula Rehberg Reichert Renzi Reynolds Rogers (AL) Rogers (KY) Rogers (MI) Rohrabacher Ros-Lehtinen Roskam Royce Ryan (WI) Sali Saxton Schmidt Sensenbrenner Sessions Shadegg Shays Shimkus Shuster Simpson Smith (NE) Smith (NJ) Smith (TX) Souder Stearns Sullivan Terry Thornberry Tiahrt Tiberi Turner Upton Walberg Walden (OR) Walsh (NY) Wamp Weldon (FL) Weller Westmoreland Whitfield Wicker Wilson (NM) Wilson (SC) Wolf Young (FL) NOT VOTING--11 Carson Castor Holt Jindal Johnson, E. B. McKeon Meek (FL) Moore (WI) Tancredo Wilson (OH) Young (AK) Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). There are 90 seconds left on the vote. {time} 1211 Mr. ISSA, Mrs. CAPITO and Mr. McCAUL of Texas changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.'' So the previous question was ordered. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution. The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that the ayes appeared to have it. Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays. The yeas and nays were ordered. The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote. The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 223, nays 196, not voting 12, as follows: [Roll No. 975] YEAS--223 Abercrombie Ackerman Allen Altmire Andrews Arcuri Baca Baird Baldwin Barrow Bean Becerra Berkley Berman Berry Bishop (GA) Bishop (NY) Blumenauer Boren Boswell Boucher Boyd (FL) Boyda (KS) Brady (PA) Braley (IA) Brown, Corrine Butterfield Capps Capuano Cardoza Carnahan Carney Chandler Clarke Clay Cleaver Clyburn Cohen Conyers Cooper Costa Costello Courtney Cramer Crowley Cuellar Cummings Davis (AL) Davis (CA) Davis (IL) Davis, Lincoln DeFazio DeGette DeLauro Dicks Dingell Doggett Donnelly Doyle Edwards Ellison Ellsworth Emanuel Engel Eshoo Etheridge Farr Fattah Filner Frank (MA) Giffords Gillibrand Gonzalez Gordon Green, Al Green, Gene Grijalva Gutierrez Hall (NY) Hare Harman Hastings (FL) Herseth Sandlin Higgins Hinchey Hinojosa Hirono Hodes Holden Honda Hooley Hoyer Inslee Israel Jackson (IL) Jackson-Lee (TX) Jefferson Johnson (GA) Jones (OH) Kagen Kanjorski Kaptur Kennedy Kildee Kilpatrick Kind Klein (FL) Kucinich Langevin Lantos Larsen (WA) Larson (CT) Lee Levin Lewis (GA) Lipinski Loebsack Lofgren, Zoe Lowey Lynch Mahoney (FL) Maloney (NY) Markey Marshall Matheson Matsui McCarthy (NY) McCollum (MN) McDermott McGovern McIntyre McNerney McNulty Meek (FL) Meeks (NY) Melancon Michaud Miller (NC) Miller, George Mitchell Mollohan Moore (KS) Moore (WI) Moran (VA) Murphy (CT) Murphy, Patrick Murtha Musgrave Nadler Napolitano Neal (MA) Oberstar Obey Olver Ortiz Pallone Pascrell Pastor Payne Perlmutter Peterson (MN) Pomeroy Price (NC) Rahall Rangel Reyes Richardson Rodriguez Ross Rothman Roybal-Allard Ruppersberger Rush Ryan (OH) Salazar Sanchez, Linda T. Sanchez, Loretta Sarbanes Schakowsky Schiff Schwartz Scott (GA) Scott (VA) Serrano Sestak Shea-Porter Sherman Sires Skelton Slaughter Smith (WA) Snyder Solis Space Spratt Stark Stupak Sutton Tanner Tauscher Taylor Thompson (CA) Thompson (MS) Tierney Towns [[Page H11655]] Udall (CO) Udall (NM) Van Hollen Velazquez Visclosky Walz (MN) Wasserman Schultz Waters Watson Watt Waxman Weiner Welch (VT) Wexler Woolsey Wu Wynn Yarmuth NAYS--196 Aderholt Akin Alexander Bachmann Bachus Baker Barrett (SC) Bartlett (MD) Barton (TX) Biggert Bilbray Bilirakis Bishop (UT) Blackburn Blunt Boehner Bonner Bono Boozman Boustany Brady (TX) Broun (GA) Brown (SC) Brown-Waite, Ginny Buchanan Burgess Burton (IN) Buyer Calvert Camp (MI) Campbell (CA) Cannon Cantor Capito Carter Castle Chabot Coble Cole (OK) Conaway Crenshaw Cubin Culberson Davis (KY) Davis, David Davis, Tom Deal (GA) Dent Diaz-Balart, L. Diaz-Balart, M. Doolittle Drake Dreier Duncan Ehlers Emerson English (PA) Everett Fallin Feeney Ferguson Flake Forbes Fortenberry Fossella Foxx Franks (AZ) Frelinghuysen Gallegly Garrett (NJ) Gerlach Gilchrest Gingrey Gohmert Goode Goodlatte Granger Graves Hall (TX) Hastert Hastings (WA) Hayes Heller Hensarling Herger Hill Hobson Hoekstra Hulshof Hunter Inglis (SC) Issa Johnson (IL) Johnson, Sam Jones (NC) Jordan Keller King (IA) King (NY) Kingston Kline (MN) Knollenberg Kuhl (NY) LaHood Lamborn Lampson Latham LaTourette Lewis (CA) Lewis (KY) Linder LoBiondo Lucas Lungren, Daniel E. Mack Manzullo McCarthy (CA) McCaul (TX) McCotter McCrery McHenry McHugh McMorris Rodgers Mica Miller (FL) Miller (MI) Miller, Gary Moran (KS) Murphy, Tim Myrick Neugebauer Nunes Paul Pearce Pence Peterson (PA) Petri Pickering Pitts Platts Poe Porter Price (GA) Pryce (OH) Putnam Radanovich Ramstad Regula Rehberg Reichert Renzi Reynolds Rogers (AL) Rogers (KY) Rogers (MI) Rohrabacher Ros-Lehtinen Roskam Royce Ryan (WI) Sali Saxton Schmidt Sensenbrenner Sessions Shadegg Shays Shimkus Shuler Shuster Simpson Smith (NE) Smith (NJ) Smith (TX) Souder Stearns Sullivan Terry Thornberry Tiahrt Tiberi Turner Upton Walberg Walden (OR) Walsh (NY) Wamp Weldon (FL) Weller Westmoreland Whitfield Wicker Wilson (NM) Wilson (SC) Wolf Young (FL) NOT VOTING--12 Carson Castor Delahunt Holt Jindal Johnson, E. B. Kirk Marchant McKeon Tancredo Wilson (OH) Young (AK) Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised there are 2 minutes remaining in this vote. {time} 1218 So the resolution was agreed to. The result of the vote was announced as above recorded. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table. Stated against: Mrs. MUSGRAVE. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 975, I inadvertently voted ``yea'' and intended to vote ``nay.'' ____________________ [Congressional Record: October 17, 2007 (House)] [Page H11656-H11666] RESTORE ACT OF 2007 Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 746, I call up the bill (H.R. 3773) to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to establish a procedure for authorizing certain acquisitions of foreign intelligence, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration. The Clerk read the title of the bill. The text of the bill is as follows: H.R. 3773 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Responsible Electronic Surveillance That is Overseen, Reviewed, and Effective Act of 2007'' or ``RESTORE Act of 2007''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United States persons outside the United States. Sec. 3. Procedure for authorizing acquisitions of communications of non-United States persons located outside the United States. Sec. 4. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications of non-United States persons located outside the United States. Sec. 5. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of non-United States persons located outside of the United States. Sec. 6. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court en banc. Sec. 7. Audit of warrantless surveillance programs. Sec. 8. Record-keeping system on acquisition of communications of United States persons. Sec. 9. Authorization for increased resources relating to foreign intelligence surveillance. Sec. 10. Reiteration of FISA as the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance may be conducted for gathering foreign intelligence information. Sec. 11. Technical and conforming amendments. Sec. 12. Sunset; transition procedures. SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON- UNITED STATES PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES. Section 105A of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as follows: ``CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES ``Sec. 105A. (a) Foreign to Foreign Communications.-- Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, a court order is not required for the acquisition of the contents of any communication between persons that are not United States persons and are not located within the United States for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information, without respect to whether the communication passes through the United States or the surveillance device is located within the United States. ``(b) Communications of Non-United States Persons Outside of the United States.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act other than subsection (a), electronic surveillance that is directed at the acquisition of the communications of a person that is reasonably believed to be located outside the United States and not a United States person for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by targeting that person shall be conducted pursuant to-- ``(1) an order approved in accordance with section 105 or 105B; or ``(2) an emergency authorization in accordance with section 105 or 105C.''. SEC. 3. PROCEDURE FOR AUTHORIZING ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES. Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as follows: ``PROCEDURE FOR AUTHORIZING ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON- UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES ``Sec. 105B. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General may jointly apply to a judge of the court established under section 103(a) for an ex parte order, or the extension of an order, authorizing for a period of up to one year the acquisition of communications of persons that are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States and not United States persons for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by targeting those persons. ``(b) Application Inclusions.--An application under subsection (a) shall include-- ``(1) a certification by the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General that-- ``(A) the targets of the acquisition of foreign intelligence information under this section are persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States; ``(B) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably believed to be persons that are not United States persons; ``(C) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a communications service provider or custodian, or an officer, employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who has authorized access to the communications to be acquired, either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store such communications; and ``(D) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)); and ``(2) a description of-- ``(A) the procedures that will be used by the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General during the duration of the order to determine that there is a reasonable belief that the targets of the acquisition are persons that are located outside the United States and not United States persons; ``(B) the nature of the information sought, including the identity of any foreign power against whom the acquisition will be directed; ``(C) minimization procedures that meet the definition of minimization procedures under section 101(h) to be used with respect to such acquisition; and ``(D) the guidelines that will be used to ensure that an application is filed under section 104, if otherwise required by this Act, when the Federal Government seeks to conduct electronic surveillance of a person reasonably believed to be located in the United States. ``(c) Specific Place Not Required.--An application under subsection (a) is not required to identify the specific facilities, places, premises, or property at which the acquisition of foreign intelligence information will be directed. ``(d) Review of Application.--Not later than 15 days after a judge receives an application under subsection (a), the judge shall review such application and shall approve the application if the judge finds that-- ``(1) the proposed procedures referred to in subsection (b)(2)(A) are reasonably designed to determine whether the targets of the acquisition are located outside the United States and not United States persons; ``(2) the proposed minimization procedures referred to in subsection (b)(2)(C) meet the definition of minimization procedures under section 101(h); and ``(3) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D) are reasonably designed to ensure that an application is filed under section 104, if otherwise required by this Act, when the Federal Government seeks to conduct electronic surveillance of a person reasonably believed to be located in the United States. ``(e) Order.-- ``(1) In general.--A judge approving an application under subsection (d) shall issue an order-- ``(A) authorizing the acquisition of the contents of the communications as requested, or as modified by the judge; ``(B) requiring the communications service provider or custodian, or officer, employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who has authorized access to the information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition to provide such information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the [[Page H11657]] acquisition and to produce a minimum of interference with the services that provider, custodian, officer, employee, or agent is providing the target of the acquisition; ``(C) requiring such communications service provider, custodian, officer, employee, or agent, upon the request of the applicant, to maintain under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the aid furnished; ``(D) directing the Federal Government to-- ``(i) compensate, at the prevailing rate, a person for providing information, facilities, or assistance pursuant to such order; and ``(ii) provide a copy of the portion of the order directing the person to comply with the order to such person; and ``(E) directing the applicant to follow-- ``(i) the procedures referred to in subsection (b)(2)(A) as proposed or as modified by the judge; ``(ii) the minimization procedures referred to in subsection (b)(2)(C) as proposed or as modified by the judge; and ``(iii) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D) as proposed or as modified by the judge. ``(2) Failure to comply.--If a person fails to comply with an order issued under paragraph (1), the Attorney General may invoke the aid of the court established under section 103(a) to compel compliance with the order. Failure to obey an order of the court may be punished by the court as contempt of court. Any process under this section may be served in any judicial district in which the person may be found. ``(3) Liability of order.--Notwithstanding any other law, no cause of action shall lie in any court against any person for providing any information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with an order issued under this subsection. ``(4) Retention of order.--The Director of National Intelligence and the court established under subsection 103(a) shall retain an order issued under this section for a period of not less than 10 years from the date on which such order is issued. ``(5) Assessment of compliance with minimization procedures.--At or before the end of the period of time for which an acquisition is approved by an order or an extension under this section, the judge may assess compliance with the minimization procedures referred to in paragraph (1)(E)(ii) and the guidelines referred to in paragraph (1)(E)(iii) by reviewing the circumstances under which information concerning United States persons was acquired, retained, or disseminated.''. SEC. 4. EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES. Section 105C of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as follows: ``EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON- UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES ``Sec. 105C. (a) Application After Emergency Authorization.--As soon as is practicable, but not more than 7 days after the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General authorize an acquisition under this section, an application for an order authorizing the acquisition in accordance with section 105B shall be submitted to the judge referred to in subsection (b)(2) of this section for approval of the acquisition in accordance with section 105B. ``(b) Emergency Authorization.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General may jointly authorize the emergency acquisition of foreign intelligence information for a period of not more than 45 days if-- ``(1) the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General jointly determine that-- ``(A) an emergency situation exists with respect to an authorization for an acquisition under section 105B before an order approving the acquisition under such section can with due diligence be obtained; ``(B) the targets of the acquisition of foreign intelligence information under this section are persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States; ``(C) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably believed to be persons that are not United States persons; ``(D) there are reasonable procedures in place for determining that the acquisition of foreign intelligence information under this section will be acquired by targeting only persons that are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States and not United States persons; ``(E) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a communications service provider or custodian, or an officer, employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who has authorized access to the communications to be acquired, either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store such communications; ``(F) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)); ``(G) minimization procedures to be used with respect to such acquisition activity meet the definition of minimization procedures under section 101(h); and ``(H) there are guidelines that will be used to ensure that an application is filed under section 104, if otherwise required by this Act, when the Federal Government seeks to conduct electronic surveillance of a person reasonably believed to be located in the United States; and ``(2) the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General, or their designees, inform a judge having jurisdiction to approve an acquisition under section 105B at the time of the authorization under this section that the decision has been made to acquire foreign intelligence information. ``(c) Information, Facilities, and Technical Assistance.-- Pursuant to an authorization of an acquisition under this section, the Attorney General may direct a communications service provider, custodian, or an officer, employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who has the lawful authority to access the information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish such acquisition to-- ``(1) furnish the Attorney General forthwith with such information, facilities, or technical assistance in a manner that will protect the secrecy of the acquisition and produce a minimum of interference with the services that provider, custodian, officer, employee, or agent is providing the target of the acquisition; and ``(2) maintain under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the aid furnished.''. SEC. 5. OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON- UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 105C the following new section: ``OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES ``Sec. 105D. (a) Application; Procedures; Orders.--Not later than 7 days after an application is submitted under section 105B(a) or an order is issued under section 105B(e), the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress-- ``(1) in the case of an application, a copy of the application, including the certification made under section 105B(b)(1); and ``(2) in the case of an order, a copy of the order, including the procedures and guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E). ``(b) Quarterly Audits.-- ``(1) Audit.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this section, and every 120 days thereafter until the expiration of all orders issued under section 105B, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall complete an audit on the implementation of and compliance with the procedures and guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E) and shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress, the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, and the court established under section 103(a) the results of such audit, including, for each order authorizing the acquisition of foreign intelligence under section 105B-- ``(A) the number of targets of an acquisition under such order that were later determined to be located in the United States; ``(B) the number of persons located in the United States whose communications have been acquired under such order; ``(C) the number and nature of reports disseminated containing information on a United States person that was collected under such order; and ``(D) the number of applications submitted for approval of electronic surveillance under section 104 for targets whose communications were acquired under such order. ``(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the completion of an audit under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the court established under section 103(a) a report containing the results of such audit. ``(c) Compliance Reports.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this section, and every 120 days thereafter until the expiration of all orders issued under section 105B, the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the court established under section 103(a) a report concerning acquisitions under section 105B during the previous 120-day period. Each report submitted under this section shall include a description of any incidents of non- compliance with an order issued under section 105B(e), including incidents of non-compliance by-- ``(1) an element of the intelligence community with minimization procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(i); ``(2) an element of the intelligence community with procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(ii); ``(3) an element of the intelligence community with guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(iii); and ``(4) a person directed to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance under such order. [[Page H11658]] ``(d) Report on Emergency Authority.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall annually submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing the number of emergency authorizations of acquisitions under section 105C and a description of any incidents of non-compliance with an emergency authorization under such section. ``(e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term `appropriate committees of Congress' means-- ``(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; ``(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and ``(3) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate.''. SEC. 6. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT EN BANC. Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(g) In any case where the court established under subsection (a) or a judge of such court is required to review a matter under this Act, the court may, at the discretion of the court, sit en banc to review such matter and issue any orders related to such matter.''. SEC. 7. AUDIT OF WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS. (a) Audit.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall complete an audit of all programs of the Federal Government involving the acquisition of communications conducted without a court order on or after September 11, 2001, including the Terrorist Surveillance Program referred to by the President in a radio address on December 17, 2005. Such audit shall include acquiring all documents relevant to such programs, including memoranda concerning the legal authority of a program, authorizations of a program, certifications to telecommunications carriers, and court orders. (b) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the completion of the audit under subsection (a), the Inspector General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report containing the results of such audit, including all documents acquired pursuant to conducting such audit. (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (c) Expedited Security Clearance.--The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the process for the investigation and adjudication of an application by the Inspector General or the appropriate staff of the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Justice for a security clearance necessary for the conduct of the audit under subsection (a) is conducted as expeditiously as possible. SEC. 8. RECORD-KEEPING SYSTEM ON ACQUISITION OF COMMUNICATIONS OF UNITED STATES PERSONS. (a) Record-Keeping System.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall jointly develop and maintain a record-keeping system that will keep track of-- (1) the instances where the identity of a United States person whose communications were acquired was disclosed by an element of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) that collected the communications to other departments or agencies of the United States; and (2) the departments and agencies of the Federal Government and persons to whom such identity information was disclosed. (b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall annually submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the record-keeping system created under subsection (a), including the number of instances referred to in paragraph (1). SEC. 9. AUTHORIZATION FOR INCREASED RESOURCES RELATING TO FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE. There are authorized to be appropriated the Department of Justice, for the activities of the Office of the Inspector General, the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, and other appropriate elements of the National Security Division, and the National Security Agency such sums as may be necessary to meet the personnel and information technology demands to ensure the timely and efficient processing of-- (1) applications and other submissions to the court established under section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)); (2) the audit and reporting requirements under-- (A) section 105D of such Act; and (B) section 7; and (3) the record-keeping system and reporting requirements under section 8. SEC. 10. REITERATION OF FISA AS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS BY WHICH ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MAY BE CONDUCTED FOR GATHERING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. (a) Exclusive Means.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance may be conducted for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information. (b) Specific Authorization Required for Exception.-- Subsection (a) shall apply until specific statutory authorization for electronic surveillance, other than as an amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), is enacted. Such specific statutory authorization shall be the only exception to subsection (a). SEC. 11. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS. (a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by striking the items relating to sections 105A, 105B, and 105C and inserting the following new items: ``Sec. 105A. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United States persons outside the United States. ``Sec. 105B. Procedure for authorizing acquisitions of communications of non-United States persons located outside the United States. ``Sec. 105C. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications of non-United States persons located outside the United States. ``Sec. 105D. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of persons located outside of the United States.''. (b) Section 103(e) of FISA.--Section 103(e) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(e)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``105B(h) or''; and (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``105B(h) or''. (c) Repeal of Certain Provisions of the Protect America Act.--Sections 4 and 6 of the Protect America Act (Public Law 110-55) are hereby repealed. SEC. 12. SUNSET; TRANSITION PROCEDURES. (a) Sunset of New Provisions.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), effective on December 31, 2009-- (A) sections 105A, 105B, 105C, and 105D of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) are hereby repealed; and (B) the table of contents in the first section of such Act is amended by striking the items relating to sections 105A, 105B, 105C, and 105D. (2) Acquisitions authorized prior to sunset.--Any authorization or order issued under section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by this Act, in effect on December 31, 2009, shall continue in effect until the date of the expiration of such authorization or order. (b) Acquisitions Authorized Prior to Enactment.-- (1) Effect.--Notwithstanding the amendments made by this Act, an authorization of the acquisition of foreign intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) made before the date of the enactment of this Act shall remain in effect until the date of the expiration of such authorization or the date that is 180 days after such date of enactment, whichever is earlier. (2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the expiration of all authorizations of acquisition of foreign intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (as added by Public Law 110-55) made before the date of the enactment of this Act in accordance with paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on such authorizations, including-- (A) the number of targets of an acquisition under section 105B of such Act (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act) that were later determined to be located in the United States; (B) the number of persons located in the United States whose communications have been acquired under such section; (C) the number of reports disseminated containing information on a United States person that was collected under such section; (D) the number of applications submitted for approval of electronic surveillance under section 104 of such Act based upon information collected pursuant to an acquisition authorized under section 105B of such Act (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act); and (E) a description of any incidents of non-compliance with an authorization under such section, including incidents of non-compliance by-- (i) an element of the intelligence community with procedures referred to in subsection (a)(1) of such section; (ii) an element of the intelligence community with minimization procedures referred to in subsection (a)(5) of such section; and [[Page H11659]] (iii) a person directed to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance under subsection (e) of such section. (3) Intelligence community defined.--In this subsection, the term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 746, in lieu of the amendments recommended by the Committee on the Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence printed in the bill, the amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in part A of House Report 110-385, modified by the amendment printed in part B of the report, is adopted and the bill, as amended, is considered read. The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows: H.R. 3773 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the following: SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Responsible Electronic Surveillance That is Overseen, Reviewed, and Effective Act of 2007'' or ``RESTORE Act of 2007''. (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as follows: Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents. Sec. 2. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United States persons outside the United States. Sec. 3. Additional authorization of acquisitions of communications of non-United States persons located outside the United States who may be communicating with persons inside the United States. Sec. 4. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications of non-United States persons located outside the United States who may be communicating with persons inside the United States. Sec. 5. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of non-United States persons located outside of the United States who may be communicating with persons inside the United States. Sec. 6. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court en banc. Sec. 7. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court matters. Sec. 8. Reiteration of FISA as the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance may be conducted for gathering foreign intelligence information. Sec. 9. Enhancement of electronic surveillance authority in wartime and other collection. Sec. 10. Audit of warrantless surveillance programs. Sec. 11. Record-keeping system on acquisition of communications of United States persons. Sec. 12. Authorization for increased resources relating to foreign intelligence surveillance. Sec. 13. Document management system for applications for orders approving electronic surveillance. Sec. 14. Training of intelligence community personnel in foreign intelligence collection matters. Sec. 15. Information for Congress on the terrorist surveillance program and similar programs. Sec. 16. Technical and conforming amendments. Sec. 17. Sunset; transition procedures. SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON- UNITED STATES PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES. Section 105A of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as follows: ``CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES ``Sec. 105A. (a) Foreign to Foreign Communications.-- ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, a court order is not required for electronic surveillance directed at the acquisition of the contents of any communication between persons that are not known to be United States persons and are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information, without respect to whether the communication passes through the United States or the surveillance device is located within the United States. ``(2) Treatment of inadvertent interceptions.--If electronic surveillance referred to in paragraph (1) inadvertently collects a communication in which at least one party to the communication is located inside the United States or is a United States person, the contents of such communication shall be handled in accordance with minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General that require that no contents of any communication to which a United States person is a party shall be disclosed, disseminated, or used for any purpose or retained for longer than 7 days unless a court order under section 105 is obtained or unless the Attorney General determines that the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily harm to any person. ``(b) Communications of Non-United States Persons Outside of the United States.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act other than subsection (a), electronic surveillance that is directed at the acquisition of the communications of a person that is reasonably believed to be located outside the United States and not a United States person for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by targeting that person shall be conducted pursuant to-- ``(1) an order approved in accordance with section 105 or 105B; or ``(2) an emergency authorization in accordance with section 105 or 105C.''. SEC. 3. ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES. Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as follows: ``ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON- UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES ``Sec. 105B. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General may jointly apply to a judge of the court established under section 103(a) for an ex parte order, or the extension of an order, authorizing for a period of up to one year the acquisition of communications of persons that are reasonably believed to be located outside the United States and not United States persons for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by targeting those persons. ``(b) Application Inclusions.--An application under subsection (a) shall include-- ``(1) a certification by the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General that-- ``(A) the targets of the acquisition of foreign intelligence information under this section are persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States who may be communicating with persons inside the United States; ``(B) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably believed to be persons that are not United States persons; ``(C) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a communications service provider or custodian, or an officer, employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who has authorized access to the communications to be acquired, either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store such communications; and ``(D) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)); and ``(2) a description of-- ``(A) the procedures that will be used by the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General during the duration of the order to determine that there is a reasonable belief that the persons that are the targets of the acquisition are located outside the United States and not United States persons; ``(B) the nature of the information sought, including the identity of any foreign power against whom the acquisition will be directed; ``(C) minimization procedures that meet the definition of minimization procedures under section 101(h) to be used with respect to such acquisition; and ``(D) the guidelines that will be used to ensure that an application is filed under section 104, if otherwise required by this Act, when a significant purpose of an acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific United States person reasonably believed to be located in the United States. ``(c) Specific Place Not Required.--An application under subsection (a) is not required to identify the specific facilities, places, premises, or property at which the acquisition of foreign intelligence information will be directed. ``(d) Review of ``Application; Appeals.-- ``(1) Review of application.--Not later than 15 days after a judge receives an application under subsection (a), the judge shall review such application and shall approve the application if the judge finds that-- ``(A) the proposed procedures referred to in subsection (b)(2)(A) are reasonably designed to determine whether the targets of the acquisition are located outside the United States and not United States persons; ``(B) the proposed minimization procedures referred to in subsection (b)(2)(C) meet the definition of minimization procedures under section 101(h); and ``(C) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D) are reasonably designed to ensure that an application is filed under section 104, if otherwise required by this Act, when a significant purpose of an acquisition [[Page H11660]] is to acquire the communications of a specific United States person reasonably believed to be located in the United States. ``(2) Temporary order; appeals.-- ``(A) Temporary order.--A judge denying an application under paragraph (1) may, at the application of the United States, issue a temporary order to authorize an acquisition under section 105B in accordance with the application submitted under subsection (a) during the pendency of any appeal of the denial of such application. ``(B) Appeals.--The United States may appeal the denial of an application for an order under paragraph (1) or a temporary order under subparagraph (A) in accordance with section 103. ``(e) Order.-- ``(1) In general.--A judge approving an application under subsection (d) shall issue an order-- ``(A) authorizing the acquisition of the contents of the communications as requested, or as modified by the judge; ``(B) requiring the communications service provider or custodian, or officer, employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who has authorized access to the information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition to provide such information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition and to produce a minimum of interference with the services that provider, custodian, officer, employee, or agent is providing the target of the acquisition; ``(C) requiring such communications service provider, custodian, officer, employee, or agent, upon the request of the applicant, to maintain under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the aid furnished; ``(D) directing the Federal Government to-- ``(i) compensate, at the prevailing rate, a person for providing information, facilities, or assistance pursuant to such order; ``(ii) provide a copy of the portion of the order directing the person to comply with the order to such person; and ``(iii) a certification stating that the acquisition is authorized under this section and that all requirements of this section have been met; and''. ``(E) directing the applicant to follow-- ``(i) the procedures referred to in subsection (b)(2)(A) as proposed or as modified by the judge; ``(ii) the minimization procedures referred to in subsection (b)(2)(C) as proposed or as modified by the judge; and ``(iii) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D) as proposed or as modified by the judge. ``(2) Failure to comply.--If a person fails to comply with an order issued under paragraph (1), the Attorney General may invoke the aid of the court established under section 103(a) to compel compliance with the order. Failure to obey an order of the court may be punished by the court as contempt of court. Any process under this section may be served in any judicial district in which the person may be found. ``(3) Liability of order.--Notwithstanding any other law, no cause of action shall lie in any court against any person for providing any information, facilities, or assistance in accordance with an order issued under this subsection. ``(4) Retention of order.--The Director of National Intelligence and the court established under subsection 103(a) shall retain an order issued under this section for a period of not less than 10 years from the date on which such order is issued. ``(5) Assessment of compliance with court order.--At or before the end of the period of time for which an acquisition is approved by an order or an extension under this section, the court established under section 103(a) shall, not less frequently than once each quarter, assess compliance with the procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph (1)(E) and review the circumstances under which information concerning United States persons was acquired, retained, or disseminated.''. SEC. 4. EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES. Section 105C of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as follows: ``EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON- UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES ``Sec. 105C. (a) Application After Emergency Authorization.--As soon as is practicable, but not more than 7 days after the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General authorize an acquisition under this section, an application for an order authorizing the acquisition in accordance with section 105B shall be submitted to the judge referred to in subsection (b)(2) of this section for approval of the acquisition in accordance with section 105B. ``(b) Emergency Authorization.--Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General may jointly authorize the emergency acquisition of foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) for a period of not more than 45 days if-- ``(1) the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General jointly determine that-- ``(A) an emergency situation exists with respect to an authorization for an acquisition under section 105B before an order approving the acquisition under such section can with due diligence be obtained; ``(B) the targets of the acquisition of foreign intelligence information under this section are persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States who may be communicating with persons inside the United States; ``(C) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably believed to be persons that are not United States persons; ``(D) there are procedures in place that will be used by the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General during the duration of the authorization to determine if there is a reasonable belief that the persons that are the targets of the acquisition are located outside the United States and not United States persons; ``(E) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a communications service provider or custodian, or an officer, employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who has authorized access to the communications to be acquired, either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store such communications; ``(F) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)); ``(G) minimization procedures to be used with respect to such acquisition activity meet the definition of minimization procedures under section 101(h); and ``(H) there are guidelines that will be used to ensure that an application is filed under section 104, if otherwise required by this Act, when a significant purpose of an acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific United States person reasonably believed to be located in the United States; and ``(2) the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General, or their designees, inform a judge having jurisdiction to approve an acquisition under section 105B at the time of the authorization under this section that the decision has been made to acquire foreign intelligence information. ``(c) Information, Facilities, and Technical Assistance.-- ``(1) Directive.--Pursuant to an authorization of an acquisition under this section, the Attorney General may direct a communications service provider, custodian, or an officer, employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who has the lawful authority to access the information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish such acquisition to-- ``(A) furnish the Attorney General forthwith with such information, facilities, or technical assistance in a manner that will protect the secrecy of the acquisition and produce a minimum of interference with the services that provider, custodian, officer, employee, or agent is providing the target of the acquisition; and ``(B) maintain under security procedures approved by the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the aid furnished. ``(2) Parameters; certifications.--The Attorney General shall provide to any person directed to provide assistance under paragraph (1) with-- ``(A) a document setting forth the parameters of the directive; ``(B) a certification stating that-- ``(i) the emergency authorization has been issued pursuant to this section; ``(ii) all requirements of this section have been met; ``(iii) a judge has been informed of the emergency authorization in accordance with subsection (b)(2); and ``(iv) an application will be submitted in accordance with subsection (a); and ``(C) a certification that the recipient of the directive shall be compensated, at the prevailing rate, for providing information, facilities, or assistance pursuant to such directive.''. SEC. 5. OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON- UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 105C the following new section: ``OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES ``Sec. 105D. (a) Application; Procedures; Orders.--Not later than 7 days after an application is submitted under section 105B(a) or an order is issued under section 105B(e), the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress-- ``(1) in the case of an application-- ``(A) a copy of the application, including the certification made under section 105B(b)(1); and [[Page H11661]] ``(B) a description of the primary purpose of the acquisition for which the application is submitted; and ``(2) in the case of an order, a copy of the order, including the procedures and guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E). ``(b) Regular Audits.-- ``(1) Audit.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this section, and every 120 days thereafter until the expiration of all orders issued under section 105B, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall complete an audit on the implementation of and compliance with the procedures and guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E) and shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress, the Attorney General, the Director of National Intelligence, and the court established under section 103(a) the results of such audit, including, for each order authorizing the acquisition of foreign intelligence under section 105B-- ``(A) the number of targets of an acquisition under such order that were later determined to be located in the United States; ``(B) the number of persons located in the United States whose communications have been acquired under such order; ``(C) the number and nature of reports disseminated containing information on a United States person that was collected under such order; and ``(D) the number of applications submitted for approval of electronic surveillance under section 104 for targets whose communications were acquired under such order. ``(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the completion of an audit under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the court established under section 103(a) a report containing the results of such audit. ``(c) Compliance Reports.--Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this section, and every 120 days thereafter until the expiration of all orders issued under section 105B, the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the court established under section 103(a) a report concerning acquisitions under section 105B during the previous period. Each report submitted under this section shall include a description of any incidents of non- compliance with an order issued under section 105B(e), including incidents of non-compliance by-- ``(1) an element of the intelligence community with procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(i); ``(2) an element of the intelligence community with minimization procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(ii); ``(3) an element of the intelligence community with guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(iii); and ``(4) a person directed to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance under such order. ``(d) Report on Emergency Authority.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall annually submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report containing the number of emergency authorizations of acquisitions under section 105C and a description of any incidents of non-compliance with an emergency authorization under such section. ``(e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this section, the term `appropriate committees of Congress' means-- ``(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; ``(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and ``(3) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate.''. SEC. 6. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT EN BANC. Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(g) In any case where the court established under subsection (a) or a judge of such court is required to review a matter under this Act, the court may, at the discretion of the court, sit en banc to review such matter and issue any orders related to such matter.''. SEC. 7. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT MATTERS. (a) Authority for Additional Judges.--Section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)) is amended-- (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)''; (2) in paragraph (1) (as so designated)-- (A) by striking ``11'' and inserting ``15''; and (B) by inserting ``at least'' before ``seven of the United States judicial circuits''; and (3) by designating the second sentence as paragraph (3) and indenting such paragraph, as so designated, two ems from the left margin. (b) Consideration of Emergency Applications.--Such section is further amended by inserting after paragraph (1) (as designated by subsection (a)(1)) the following new paragraph: ``(2) A judge of the court shall make a determination to approve, deny, or modify an application submitted pursuant to section 105(f), section 304(e), or section 403 not later than 24 hours after the receipt of such application by the court.''. SEC. 8. REITERATION OF FISA AS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS BY WHICH ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MAY BE CONDUCTED FOR GATHERING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION. (a) Exclusive Means.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance may be conducted for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information. (b) Specific Authorization Required for Exception.-- Subsection (a) shall apply until specific statutory authorization for electronic surveillance, other than as an amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), is enacted. Such specific statutory authorization shall be the only exception to subsection (a). SEC. 9. ENHANCEMENT OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY IN WARTIME AND OTHER COLLECTION. Sections 111, 309, and 404 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1811, 1829, and 1844) are amended by striking ``Congress'' and inserting ``Congress or an authorization for the use of military force described in section 2(c)(2) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1541(c)(2)) if such authorization contains a specific authorization for foreign intelligence collection under this section, or if the Congress is unable to convene because of an attack upon the United States.''. SEC. 10. AUDIT OF WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS. (a) Audit.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall complete an audit of all programs of the Federal Government involving the acquisition of communications conducted without a court order on or after September 11, 2001, including the Terrorist Surveillance Program referred to by the President in a radio address on December 17, 2005. Such audit shall include acquiring all documents relevant to such programs, including memoranda concerning the legal authority of a program, authorizations of a program, certifications to telecommunications carriers, and court orders. (b) Report.-- (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the completion of the audit under subsection (a), the Inspector General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report containing the results of such audit, including all documents acquired pursuant to conducting such audit. (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (c) Expedited Security Clearance.--The Director of National Intelligence shall ensure that the process for the investigation and adjudication of an application by the Inspector General or the appropriate staff of the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Justice for a security clearance necessary for the conduct of the audit under subsection (a) is conducted as expeditiously as possible. SEC. 11. RECORD-KEEPING SYSTEM ON ACQUISITION OF COMMUNICATIONS OF UNITED STATES PERSONS. (a) Record-Keeping System.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall jointly develop and maintain a record-keeping system that will keep track of-- (1) the instances where the identity of a United States person whose communications were acquired was disclosed by an element of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) that collected the communications to other departments or agencies of the United States; and (2) the departments and agencies of the Federal Government and persons to whom such identity information was disclosed. (b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall annually submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on the record-keeping system created under subsection (a), including the number of instances referred to in paragraph (1). SEC. 12. AUTHORIZATION FOR INCREASED RESOURCES RELATING TO FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE. (a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated the Department of Justice, for the activities of the Office of the Inspector General, the appropriate elements of the National Security Division, and the National Security Agency such sums as may be necessary to meet the personnel and information technology demands to ensure the timely and efficient processing of-- (1) applications and other submissions to the court established under section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)); (2) the audit and reporting requirements under-- (A) section 105D of such Act; and (B) section 10; and (3) the record-keeping system and reporting requirements under section 11. (b) Additional Personnel for Preparation and Consideration of Applications for Orders Approving Electronic Surveillance and Physical Search.-- [[Page H11662]] (1) National security division of the department of justice.-- (A) Additional personnel.--The National Security Division of the Department of Justice is hereby authorized such additional personnel as may be necessary to carry out the prompt and timely preparation, modification, and review of applications under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for orders under that Act for foreign intelligence purposes. (B) Assignment.--The Attorney General shall assign personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and among appropriate offices of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))) in order that such personnel may directly assist personnel of the Intelligence Community in preparing applications described in that paragraph and conduct prompt and effective oversight of the activities of such agencies under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders. (2) Director of national intelligence.-- (A) Additional legal and other personnel.--The Director of National Intelligence is hereby authorized such additional legal and other personnel as may be necessary to carry out the prompt and timely preparation of applications under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for orders under that Act approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. (B) Assignment.--The Director of National Intelligence shall assign personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and among the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))), including the field offices of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, in order that such personnel may directly assist personnel of the intelligence community in preparing applications described in that paragraph. (3) Additional legal and other personnel for foreign intelligence surveillance court.--There is hereby authorized for the court established under section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)) such additional staff personnel as may be necessary to facilitate the prompt and timely consideration by that court of applications under such Act for orders under such Act approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. Personnel authorized by this paragraph shall perform such duties relating to the consideration of such applications as that court shall direct. (4) Supplement not supplant.--The personnel authorized by this section are in addition to any other personnel authorized by law. SEC. 13. DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR APPLICATIONS FOR ORDERS APPROVING ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE. (a) System Required.--The Attorney General shall, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, develop and implement a secure, classified document management system that permits the prompt preparation, modification, and review by appropriate personnel of the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency, and other applicable elements of the United States Government of applications under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) before their submission to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. (b) Scope of System.--The document management system required by subsection (a) shall-- (1) permit and facilitate the prompt submittal of applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; and (2) permit and facilitate the prompt transmittal of rulings of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to personnel submitting applications described in paragraph (1), and provide for the secure electronic storage and retrieval of all such applications and related matters with the court and for their secure transmission to the National Archives and Records Administration. SEC. 14. TRAINING OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL IN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION MATTERS. The Director of National Intelligence shall, in consultation with the Attorney General-- (1) develop regulations to establish procedures for conducting and seeking approval of electronic surveillance, physical search, and the installation and use of pen registers and trap and trace devices on an emergency basis, and for preparing and properly submitting and receiving applications and orders under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; and (2) prescribe related training on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and related legal matters for the personnel of the applicable agencies of the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))). SEC. 15. INFORMATION FOR CONGRESS ON THE TERRORIST SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND SIMILAR PROGRAMS. As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of this Act, but not later than seven days after such date, the President shall fully inform each member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on the following: (1) The Terrorist Surveillance Program of the National Security Agency. (2) Any program in existence from September 11, 2001, until the effective date of this Act that involves, whether in part or in whole, the electronic surveillance of United States persons in the United States for foreign intelligence or other purposes, and which is conducted by any department, agency, or other element of the United States Government, or by any entity at the direction of a department, agency, or other element of the United States Government, without fully complying with the procedures set forth in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) or chapter 119, 121, or 206 of title 18, United States Code. SEC. 16. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS. (a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by striking the items relating to sections 105A, 105B, and 105C and inserting the following new items: ``Sec. 105A. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United States persons outside the United States. ``Sec. 105B. Additional authorization of acquisitions of communications of non-United States persons located outside the United States who may be communicating with persons inside the United States. ``Sec. 105C. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications of non-United States persons located outside the United States who may be communicating with persons inside the United States. ``Sec. 105D. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of non-United States persons located outside of the United States who may be communicating with persons inside the United States.''. (b) Section 103(e) of FISA.--Section 103(e) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(e)) is amended-- (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``105B(h) or''; and (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``105B(h) or''. (c) Repeal of Certain Provisions of the Protect America Act of 2007.--Sections 4 and 6 of the Protect America Act (Public Law 110-55) are hereby repealed. SEC. 17. SUNSET; TRANSITION PROCEDURES. (a) Sunset of New Provisions.-- (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), effective on December 31, 2009-- (A) sections 105A, 105B, 105C, and 105D of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) are hereby repealed; and (B) the table of contents in the first section of such Act is amended by striking the items relating to sections 105A, 105B, 105C, and 105D. (2) Acquisitions authorized prior to sunset.--Any authorization or order issued under section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by this Act, in effect on December 31, 2009, shall continue in effect until the date of the expiration of such authorization or order. (b) Acquisitions Authorized Prior to Enactment.-- (1) Effect.--Notwithstanding the amendments made by this Act, an authorization of the acquisition of foreign intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) made before the date of the enactment of this Act shall remain in effect until the date of the expiration of such authorization or the date that is 180 days after such date of enactment, whichever is earlier. (2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the expiration of all authorizations of acquisition of foreign intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (as added by Public Law 110-55) made before the date of the enactment of this Act in accordance with paragraph (1), the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report on such authorizations, including-- (A) the number of targets of an acquisition under section 105B of such Act (as in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act) that were later determined to be located in the United States; (B) the number of persons located in the United States whose communications have been acquired under such section; (C) the number of reports disseminated containing information on a United States person that was collected under such section; (D) the number of applications submitted for approval of electronic surveillance under section 104 of such Act based upon information collected pursuant to an acquisition authorized under section 105B of such Act (as in [[Page H11663]] effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this Act); and (E) a description of any incidents of non-compliance with an authorization under such section, including incidents of non-compliance by-- (i) an element of the intelligence community with procedures referred to in subsection (a)(1) of such section; (ii) an element of the intelligence community with minimization procedures referred to in subsection (a)(5) of such section; and (iii) a person directed to provide information, facilities, or technical assistance under subsection (e) of such section. (3) Intelligence community defined.--In this subsection, the term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)). SEC. __. CERTIFICATION TO COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS THAT ACQUISITIONS ARE AUTHORIZED UNDER FISA. (a) Authorization Under Section 102.--Section 102(a) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1802(a)) is amended by striking ``furnishing such aid'' and inserting ``furnishing such aid and shall provide such carrier with a certification stating that the electronic surveillance is authorized under this section and that all requirements of this section have been met''. (b) Authorization Under Section 105.--Section 105(c)(2) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1805(c)(2)) is amended-- (1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``; and'' and inserting ``;''; (2) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``aid.'' and inserting ``aid; and''; and (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph: ``(E) that the applicant provide such carrier, landlord, custodian, or other person with a certification stating that the electronic surveillance is authorized under this section and that all requirements of this section have been met.''. SEC. __. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. (a) In General.--Section 109 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1809) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: ``(e) Statute of Limitations.--No person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense under this section unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted not later than 10 years after the commission of the offense.''. (b) Application.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall apply to any offense committed before the date of the enactment of this Act if the statute of limitations applicable to that offense has not run as of such date. SEC. __. NO RIGHTS UNDER THE RESTORE ACT FOR UNLAWFUL RESIDENTS. Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to prevent lawfully conducted surveillance of or grant any rights to an alien not lawfully permitted to be in or remain in the United States. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Debate shall not exceed 90 minutes, with 60 minutes equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary and 30 minutes equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Smith) each will control 30 minutes and the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) each will control 15 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers). {time} 1230 General Leave Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material for the Record on H.R. 3773. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Michigan? There was no objection. Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, 6 years ago the administration unilaterally chose to engage in warrantless surveillance of American citizens without court review. That decision created a legal and political quagmire. To fight terrorism and prevent another 9/11, we need to have an effective and legal system of intelligence gathering. That is what we are here to do today. When that old scheme broke down, the administration then forced Congress to accept an equally flawed statute in August, the Protect America Act. The Protect America Act granted broad, new powers to engage in warrantless searches within the United States, including physical searches of our homes, computers, offices, libraries and medical records. There was a valiant fight against it, but we did not prevail. Mr. Speaker, at this time I want to acknowledge the great work of the chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Silvestre Reyes, for what he did, and on the Judiciary Committee I am quite proud of Jerry Nadler of New York, the chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee, and Sheila Jackson-Lee, the distinguished gentlewoman from Texas. Also the chairman of the Crime subcommittee, Bobby Scott of Virginia. The PATRIOT Act granted broad new powers to engage in warrantless searches within the United States. It included, as I said, physical searches of our homes, of our computers, offices, libraries, and even medical records. The law contained no meaningful oversight whatsoever and went around the FISA Court. It should not be made permanent. That is why we are here today with the RESTORE Act, to create a framework for legal surveillance that includes the FISA Court. Careful consideration by the Judiciary and by the Intelligence Committees addresses the need for flexibility in intelligence gathering and delivers the ability to deal with the modern communications networks. More importantly, it is consistent with the rule of law, the Constitution, and our democratic values. Let's be clear about how the RESTORE Act's ``basket'' court orders work. These orders are not individual warrants for Osama bin Laden or other terrorists. They allow surveillance of an entire terrorist group or other foreign power through a flexible court process. This act prohibits reverse targeting to engage in warrantless spying on Americans. In approving the order, the court must also approve the guidelines and procedures that will be used to protect the rights of Americans under the Constitution and under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. When the intelligence community turns its attention to Americans at home, they will have to get a warrant. That isn't just good policy; this is the critically important fourth amendment in action. So RESTORE even brings the court into the emergency provisions. NSA must notify the court when they start emergency acquisition, and they must seek a court order within seven days. This is not a secret process. The court knows when it is started and is awaiting the application. Mr. Speaker, the phone company can't even turn on the switch unless it has a certification from the government that they are actively seeking that court order. If the application is turned down, the surveillance shuts off, unless the court specifically stays their ruling, pending appeal. That appeal must be resolved within 45 days. These emergency authorizations are not a backdoor way to avoid court review. In fact, the court will be looking at the emergency from the very first day. The bill also provides other critical safeguards: periodic audits by the inspector general; narrow scope of authority to security threats, not just anything. It protects privacy of Americans traveling abroad and, most important, sunsets the legislation in December of the year 2009 so that we can review it one more time. Importantly, the bill has no retroactive immunity for telecommunications carriers whatsoever. Why? Because we have been refused the documents to determine whether retroactive immunity has any place or not. Interestingly enough, that was delivered to the Senate. They have the documents. We, begging, pleading, screaming, we don't have the documents. So no retroactive immunity. Until we receive these underlying documents, there is no way we can begin any consideration of that request. So the legislation before us today is a very, very important start-over improving the measure, the Protect America Act, that still exists. Please join with me in a careful consideration of everything in this measure. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes. Mr. Speaker, the Democratic leadership calls the RESTORE Act of 2007 a compromise. Well, I agree. It compromises our national security. Why do Democrats want to make it more difficult to gather intelligence [[Page H11664]] about terrorists after 9/11 than before 9/11? Since the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was enacted 30 years ago, our terrorist fighting agencies have been able to gather information about terrorists without obtaining a court order. Why burden our intelligence agencies now? Why make it harder to find Osama bin Laden? Why protect terrorists? This bill, for the first time, requires a court order to monitor foreign persons outside the United States. If Osama bin Laden makes a call and we don't know who it is to, a court order must be obtained. That takes many hours and could well mean we miss an opportunity to stop an attack. The bill omits liability protection for telephone companies that provided the Federal Government with critical information after 9/11. These companies deserve our thanks, not a flurry of frivolous lawsuits. The bill sunsets in 4 years, yet our agencies need certainty and permanence so they can develop new procedures and train employees. Mr. Speaker, we don't need the RESTORE Act. We do need to restore the ability of the Federal Government to gather information about terrorists and to stop them. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the minority whip, the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. Blunt). Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Speaker, the law in place today, the law that we brought up to today's technical standards in August, is essentially the law that the Congress passed in 1978, a Congress that had a majority of Democrats in it. Jimmy Carter, President Carter, signed that bill, and it has worked for 30 years now. The way this bill is drafted, the administration would be forced to seek warrants, as Mr. Smith just said, for foreign targets in case they might call the United States. If Osama bin Laden calls the United States, we should know it. If Osama bin Laden calls and it turns out to be a call that didn't matter, there are ways to minimize that. In all likelihood, if Osama bin Laden called, it shouldn't be a matter that we shouldn't know about. If he calls to order a pizza and says ``deliver the pizza to cave 56 in Bora Bora,'' that is something we ought to know at that minute. We should not have to go to court to monitor these calls, just in case they call somebody in the United States. Granting what in essence is de facto fourth amendment constitutional rights to noncitizens who are not in this country makes no sense at all. It is not the right direction. We need a permanent fix. This bill does not contain, as my good friend Mr. Conyers said, retroactive liability. We need to have liability for those companies that stepped up after 9/11 and immediately helped the country begin to monitor the things we needed to monitor. We still don't clarify in this bill what our intelligence agencies do. This does not solve any problems. It creates problems. When you have a system that has worked in one way, and effectively, for 30 years, there is no reason to change that system. This bill makes needless, dangerous changes. I hope we vote ``no'' on this bill today, and get down, as we did in late July, to the reality of what we have to do to defend the country. Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, 6 years after the tragic attacks of 9/11, Osama bin Laden remains at large. The minority whip may make light about ordering pizza, but the reality is we still haven't gotten Osama bin Laden and America faces a continuing threat from al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Just this week, Admiral Scott Redd, Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, said that the Iraq war has created a giant recruiting tool for al Qaeda. When asked if we are safer as a result of our invasion of Iraq, Admiral Redd said, ``Tactically, probably not.'' Mindful of this threat, our committees have drafted the RESTORE Act. I wish to thank Chairman Conyers and members of both committees for their great work in drafting this legislation. The RESTORE Act arms our intelligence community with powerful new authorities to conduct electronic surveillance of terrorist targets around the world, but it also restores essential constitutional protections for Americans that were sharply eroded when the President signed the Protect America Act, or PAA, last August. Some on the other side want to extend the PAA permanently. That would be a huge mistake. According to expert testimony we have received in our committee, the PAA authorizes warrantless domestic searches of Americans' homes, mail, computers and medical records, as the chairman of the Judiciary Committee observed earlier. Although we don't have any information at this time that the Bush administration is using this authority in this way, we must guard against the possibility of abuse in the future. Our committee heard testimony that the PAA even allows spying without probable cause on our own soldiers deployed overseas talking to their families back home. That, Mr. Speaker, is wrong. The RESTORE Act helps restore the balance between security and liberty. The RESTORE Act puts the FISA Court back in the business of protecting Americans' constitutional rights, after the President and Vice President put the court out of business 6 years ago. Some will try to portray this bill as extending rights to terrorists. We have heard that this morning. That is absolutely false. This bill does not require individual warrants for terrorists such as Osama bin Laden. The bill does not extend fourth amendment rights to foreigners. What the RESTORE Act does is allow ``block surveillance'' of terrorists overseas with speed and agility. And we will never go dark, because the bill includes an emergency provision that allows surveillance to continue for 45 days, even before the court approves the procedures to protect Americans. This legislation will restore accountability and oversight in all three branches. It restores regular audits and reports by the Department of Justice, which will be reviewed by the Congress. It also requires an audit of the President's Domestic Surveillance Program and other warrantless surveillance programs. Perhaps most importantly, it ensures that when an American is the target of surveillance, an individualized warrant is required. Some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle prefer an approach that would allow the administration to police itself. This simply is unacceptable. If we have learned anything from the past 6 years, it is that unchecked executive power is a recipe for abuse and it has not made us safer. {time} 1245 Mr. Speaker, I have served my country as a soldier in combat in Vietnam, as a law enforcement professional on our southern border, and as a Member of Congress for the past decade. I have seen the great strength of our country; and in my view, the source of that great strength is our Constitution. The RESTORE Act provides tools to keep this Nation safe and upholds our Constitution and our laws. So I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on the RESTORE Act. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the former chairman and current ranking member of the Homeland Security Committee, the gentleman from New York (Mr. King). Mr. KING of New York. I thank the ranking member for yielding and, Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to this legislation. Mr. Speaker, the United States has been at war with Islamic terrorism since September 11, 2001. This is a war which threatens our survival as a civilization, and it is a war where it is essential that we maximize the use of electronic surveillance which is one of the strongest weapons in our arsenal. It is a weapon which should not be trivialized, nor should the struggle be trivialized by using such terms as ``spying'' and ``snooping.'' It is important we keep in mind who the real enemy is. The real enemy is al Qaeda and Islamic terrorism, not the men and women of our own government who are working so hard to protect us. Mr. Speaker, the Protect America Act, which was passed less than 3 months ago, updated FISA and struck the appropriate balance between protecting our citizens from terrorist attacks and protecting our civil liberties. [[Page H11665]] Tragically, today's bill, the RESTORE Act, marks an undeniable retreat in the war against Islamic terrorism. It limits the type of foreign intelligence information that may be acquired and actually gives foreign targets more protections than Americans get in criminal cases here at home. By sunsetting this legislation in 2 years, the RESTORE Act fails to provide permanency and guidance to the intelligence community. The RESTORE Act also fails to provide legal protection and immunity to those American companies who answered the call of this administration and also answered the call of an administration which believed that this policy was legal, and not only this administration, but high- ranking officials from previous administrations, Democrat and Republican, who believed that these policies were legal and constitutional. There was no personal gain for these companies. To allow them to be subjected to lawsuits for answering the Nation's call in time of great peril is mean-spirited, vindictive and shortsighted. Mr. Speaker, I strongly urge defeat of this misguided legislation. Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to recognize the chairman of the Crime Subcommittee, Bobby Scott of Virginia, for 3 minutes. Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding and appreciate his leadership in efforts to address warrantless surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, and for introducing a bill that corrects many of the shortcomings of the bill that passed the House last August. The RESTORE Act establishes a strong framework, much stronger than the administration's bill, to fight terrorism effectively, while providing reasonable safeguards to protect personal privacy. There are several important clarifications made in the bill. One important change draws the appropriate distinctions based on physical location and types of targets. There has never been any controversy over the fact that surveillance directed at people, all of whom are overseas, you don't need a warrant in that situation. The second is that the bill removes vague and overbroad language in the bill that passed last August that would allow wiretapping of conversations without a warrant if the communication was concerning a foreign target. That by its own wording suggests that if two citizens are in the United States talking about someone overseas, you could wiretap their communications without a warrant. The bill before us makes it clear that the persons involved in the conversation must be overseas, not just that the subject of the conversation must be overseas. Third, the RESTORE Act goes a step further than the administration's bill and only allows expanded wiretapping authority in cases involving foreign intelligence unless it relates specifically to national security, as opposed to the overexpansive nature of foreign intelligence. Foreign intelligence can include anything, a trade deal or anything of general foreign affairs activities. If you are talking about national security, let's talk about national security. Finally, the RESTORE Act was made even stronger in the committee by requiring the Department of Justice in its application to the court to specify the primary purpose of the wiretapping. Under FISA, when an agent wanted to obtain a warrant, he had to certify the purpose of the wiretap. The standard was altered in the PATRIOT Act which says it only has to be a significant purpose. We have to put this change in context because the Department of Justice has not credibly refuted the allegations that some U.S. Attorneys were fired because they failed to indict Democrats in time to affect an upcoming election. So if the Department of Justice wiretapped someone when foreign intelligence is not the primary purpose, you have to wonder what the primary purpose is. This bill would require the administration to reveal the true purpose of the wiretap. Mr. Speaker, in the fight against terrorism, we do not have to sacrifice constitutional protections or trust this administration to secretly protect the rights of Americans without public accountability. It is important to note that everything that the administration can do in its own bill it can do under this bill. We just require them to get a warrant before they do it or get a warrant after they do it if they are in a hurry, but they can wiretap and get the information. We just provide a little modicum of oversight to ensure that the laws are being obeyed. Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Forbes), the ranking member of the Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee. Mr. FORBES. Mr. Speaker, as you listen to this debate and those watching at home listen to it, the only thing that they hear are Democrats saying one thing and Republicans saying another thing. They don't know who to believe. They listen to the debate and they hear hatred of the Presidency and hatred of Republicans. But, Mr. Speaker, we just invite you today, take a moment and a breath and put all of that hatred on the shelf for just a second, and to remember that the Director of National Intelligence, not an appointee from President Bush but from President Clinton, has stated that their approach will be devastating to the intelligence-gathering capability of the United States. Mr. Speaker, here are the facts that we know. In the late 1990s, we cut intelligence. Then we had 9/11 where we had the worst terrorist attack to ever hit our shores. Since that time, regardless of who did it and deserves the credit, we have not had a major terrorist attack hit the United States, and now we are trying to repeat the cycle and cut intelligence-gathering capability again. We all know what is going to happen if, and some would say when, another terrorist attack hits. We are going to bring law enforcement in and we are going to point our finger at them and say: Why didn't you stop it? Mr. Speaker, just recently we had one of our NFL football coaches get in trouble because he was trying to steal the signals of an opposing team. Everyone argued and agreed that wasn't fair. And they were right; but that was a game. Mr. Speaker, in this particular situation it is not a game. We don't want a fair fight. We want to steal every signal we can from enemies who are trying to harm this Nation, and we want to know what they are doing before they do it so we can protect and defend this country. Mr. Speaker, I just invite us to take the hatred off the shelf, take the rhetoric off the shelf, and to exchange it for ration and reason so we can do what we need to do to gather the intelligence to keep our people safe. Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell), a fellow Vietnam veteran, a member of the House Intelligence Committee. Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Speaker, first I support this bill. It is a good bill, and it protects the Constitution. I would like to speak principally to my colleagues who, like me, are concerned about what the bill does and the fact that it does not address fully the issue of carrier liability. As you know, the administration and telecommunication companies have requested that we provide them with immunity from lawsuits or prosecutions arising out of information and assistance they may have provided to the intelligence community. Now, we don't precisely know what information they have provided. We don't know what they were told by the administration about the legality of what they were doing. I hope and believe those companies acted in good faith with patriotism. They were trying to do their part for national security, and I think they deserve our appreciation. I take seriously their concerns that they might be subject to liability. That being said, I don't believe it should be the responsibility of the telecommunications companies to prove that they provided the information in a legal way if the Federal Government fails to meet the burden of proof that the demand or request for information is brought forth in a legal manner. If that burden of proof is not met, it should be the government that should be held primarily accountable. I believe that eventually we should be able to take care of any company who acted in good faith and cooperated in the name of protecting our Nation. [[Page H11666]] No one who acted out of good faith with a desire to protect America should be punished. But we must know what brought forth their action, and under what circumstances, and what pressure, if any, they acted. As this process moves forward, I expect to get more information from the administration on their generation of the demands or requests for information. Support the bill. Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my colleague and the former district judge from Texas (Mr. Gohmert), who is also the deputy ranking member of the Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee. Mr. GOHMERT. I thank the ranking member. I appreciate Chairman Reyes' service to this country. I believe people on the other side of the aisle mean well when they say they want to protect the Constitution. The problem is this extends the Constitution beyond America to our enemies on foreign soil who cut off heads of Americans. That's just the way it is. It does that. Now, we keep hearing across the aisle: This has nothing to do with foreign-to-foreign calls; it has nothing to do with foreign terrorists on foreign soil calling foreign terrorists, and it says that in the bill. You don't have to worry about that. You don't need a warrant for that. The trouble is there is no conceivable time that an honest intelligence gatherer overseas can swear that a foreign terrorist that he wants to surveil will never under any circumstances call the United States. Since he can't swear to that and since there is a chance, especially since this law is public and the terrorists will know all they need to do is call America, order flowers, call time and temperature, they have made a call on American soil and they come within the requirement of getting a court order. It is very clear. This doesn't extend the Constitution in a way that it should be on American soil. It protects enemies. I know people on the other side, you just want to protect civil liberties, but what scares me is what will happen when a terrorist attack in the nature of 9/11 comes again. People will rush to take away civil liberties, and people will voluntarily give up civil liberties for protection, liberties that were so hard fought. So for those who are really going to be protected, I don't understand the concern. This is going to protect also Americans who get calls from foreign terrorists on foreign soil. That is what this is really going to do. I don't think it is too much in the interest of America, tell your American friends to tell their terrorist friends on foreign soil, don't call me, use some other means of communication. Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased now to recognize the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) whose experience in intelligence matters and FISA in particular are well known, and I yield to her 2\1/2\ minutes. {time} 1300 Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank Chairman Conyers for yielding to me and commend him, Chairman Reyes, and others for their work on this bill. Though I no longer serve on the Intelligence Committee, I have followed this issue with intense interest. This bill contains many provisions that I and others authored over recent years. It is a strong bill and I strongly support it. It amends FISA to permit more speed and agility in the effort to conduct surveillance of those who would do us harm, but it also provides more resources in a court-approved framework to assure that the constitutional rights of Americans are protected. I continue to follow the intelligence in my role as Chair of the Homeland Security Intelligence Subcommittee, and threats against our homeland are real. Westerners are training in al Qaeda camps in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Europe, especially Britain, may experience more attacks. Plots have recently been foiled in Denmark and Germany. We helped Britain disrupt the so-called ``liquid bomb plot'' in August of 2006, a plot that could have killed more Americans than were killed on 9/11 as they flew on U.S.-bound airlines from England. Mr. Speaker, all Members want to protect America. All Members want to protect America. So it deeply saddens me that this is yet another partisan debate. It could have been otherwise. For several weeks, Pete Hoekstra, who chaired the Intelligence Committee when I was privileged to serve as ranking member, and I tried to fashion a bipartisan bill. Our list of principles could, I believe, have garnered broad support in both caucuses and led to a veto-proof majority in this House. Americans want Congress on a bipartisan basis to assure we disrupt plots to harm us and protect our Constitution. We could do both and we must do both. This is a strong bill. It does both. Vote ``aye.'' Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to the RESTORE Act, which reauthorizes the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance program. As a Member of the Select Committee on Intelligence, I am deeply troubled that the majority has determined to handcuff the ability of the Intelligence Community (IC) to collect foreign intelligence information. Forgive me for stating the obvious, but ladies and gentleman, we are at war. We should be helping the IC in their efforts to protect Americans and fight the war on terror; this legislation needlessly ties our hands in collecting foreign intelligence information. Here are a few of the problems with this bill: No liability protection for the telecommunications companies who have responded to the IC's call for help since the 9/11 attacks; extends constitutional (4th Amendment) protections for terrorists by requiring FISA court approval to monitor individuals outside the U.S.; new and cumbersome FISA court guidelines for IC operations; Justice Department audits of IC activities and operations; onerous and duplicative reporting requirements by the DNI; and the list goes on . . . . Mr. Speaker, under this legislation, the Majority has made it clear that our Intelligence agencies should be guided by the tenants of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) when monitoring terrorist activity. This policy is reckless and I urge a ``no'' vote. Mr. BACA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to ask for support of the RESTORE Act. It provides important tools to support U.S. intelligence gathering efforts and protects against terrorists. And it does so while safeguarding Americans' civil liberties. I hope that as the legislative process plays out, the issue of carrier immunity is dealt with in a manner that will facilitate cooperation. Obtaining intelligence to protect our country against terrorists is the ultimate goal and this bill does this in a fair and balanced manner. Innocent Americans will have stronger protections and the intelligence needed to protect our country will not be compromised. Accountability is always a good thing. We will have much needed congressional oversight, compliance reports from the Attorney General and audit reports by the Inspector General of the Department of Justice. The RESTORE Act is a great balance and a positive move in the right direction. Please support this important legislation. Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Speaker, while I am pleased to stand here today and support the RESTORE Act of 2007 because I believe it is critical as part of our nation's defense, I urge us to work together in the coming weeks to end the uncertainty facing some of our corporate citizens in dealing with the threat posed by Islamic fundamentalists. Particularly, I am referring to our nation's telecommunications carriers, companies that historically have been a critical piece of our successful national security apparatus. These U.S. companies, who combined employ well over half a million Americans, should be treated with appreciation for the cooperation they display in the effort to keep our people safe. In the confusion and muddied backdrop of the debate, what has clearly been left aside is the longstanding and consistent policy of Congress and the courts that governs the way these companies may lawfully provide assistance to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. This policy is that telecommunications carriers are authorized to assist government agencies in a wide variety of circumstances; public policy encourages such cooperation; and, consistent with that policy, when a carrier cooperates in good faith with a duly authorized request for assistance, the carrier is immune from liability to third-parties. In the interest of our nation's security, these carriers should continue to have immunity when cooperating in good faith. We must work together over the coming weeks to clarify the role of carriers in this debate, and specifically offer the appropriate path to immunity when such highly sensitive matters are involved. Telecommunications carriers are nothing less than patriotic citizens fulfilling their role in our global struggle against terrorism. The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 2 of House Resolution 746, further proceedings on the bill will be postponed. ____________________