[Congressional Record: October 17, 2007 (House)]
[Page H11645-H11655]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:cr17oc07-90]                         



 
     PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 3773, RESTORE ACT OF 2007

  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee 
on Rules, I call up House Resolution 746 and ask for its immediate 
consideration.
  The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

                              H. Res. 746

       Resolved, That upon the adoption of this resolution it 
     shall be in order to consider in the House the bill (H.R. 
     3773) to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 to establish a procedure for authorizing certain 
     acquisitions of foreign intelligence, and for other purposes. 
     All points of order against consideration of the bill are 
     waived except those arising under clause 9 or 10 of rule XXI. 
     In lieu of the amendments recommended by the Committee on the 
     Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence 
     now printed in the bill, the amendment in the nature of a 
     substitute printed in part A of the report of the Committee 
     on Rules accompanying this resolution, modified by the 
     amendment printed in part B of such report, shall be 
     considered as adopted. The bill, as amended, shall be 
     considered as read. All points of order against provisions of 
     the bill, as amended, are waived. The previous question shall 
     be considered as ordered on the bill, as amended, to final 
     passage without intervening motion except: (1) one hour and 
     30 minutes of debate, with one hour equally divided and 
     controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the 
     Committee on the Judiciary and 30 minutes equally divided and 
     controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence; and (2) one 
     motion to recommit with or without instructions.
       Sec. 2.  During consideration of H.R. 3773 pursuant to this 
     resolution, notwithstanding the operation of the previous 
     question, the Chair may postpone further consideration of the 
     bill to such time as may be designated by the Speaker.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Snyder). The gentleman from Florida is 
recognized for 1 hour.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, 
I yield the customary 30 minutes to my namesake and good friend, the 
gentleman from Washington (Mr. Hastings). All time yielded during 
consideration of the rule is for debate only.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.


                             General Leave

  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that 
all Members may have 5 legislative days within which to revise and 
extend their remarks and include extraneous material on the matter 
under consideration.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Florida?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 746 provides 
for consideration of H.R. 3773, the RESTORE Act of 2007, under a closed 
rule. The rule provides 90 minutes of debate. Sixty minutes will be 
equally divided and controlled by the chairman and

[[Page H11646]]

ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary. Thirty 
minutes will be equally divided and controlled by the chairman and 
ranking minority member of the House Permanent Select Committee on 
Intelligence.
  Mr. Speaker, with the resurgence of al Qaeda and an increasing global 
threat from weapons of mass destruction in places such as Iran, every 
single person in this body wants to ensure that our intelligence 
professionals have the proper resources they need to protect our 
Nation. As vice chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, I assure 
you that every one of us on that panel and others, Republican or 
Democrat, are working tirelessly and often together to do just that. 
But the government is not exempt from the rule of law, as our 
Constitution confers certain unalienable rights and civil liberties to 
each of us.
  After the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Bush administration 
upset that balance by ignoring the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, commonly referred to as the FISA law, establishing a secret 
wiretapping program and refusing to work with Congress to make the 
program lawful. Democratic members of the Intelligence Committee, led 
by the distinguished chairperson, Sylvestre Reyes, have been trying to 
learn about the Bush administration's FISA program for years. But the 
administration, which has been anything but forthcoming, has done 
everything it can to stop us from doing our job and helping them to do 
theirs better.
  A footnote right there, Mr. Speaker. In today's Washington Post, it 
is reflected as late as now, when the RESTORE Act is on the floor, the 
administration has agreed to give certain information to the Senate and 
still not to the House.
  When the administration finally came to Congress to modify the law, 
it came with the flawed proposal to allow sweeping authority to 
eavesdrop on Americans' communications, while doing almost nothing to 
protect their rights. The RESTORE Act, true to its name, restores the 
checks and balances on the executive branch, enhancing our security and 
preserving our liberty. It rejects the false statement that we must 
sacrifice liberty to be secure. It does not go as far as I would want 
it to go. It does not go as far as some people would like for it to go, 
but it does protect our liberty and secures this Nation.
  The legislation provides our intelligence community with the tools it 
needs to identify and disrupt terrorist attacks with speed and agility.
  Yet another footnote, Mr. Speaker. While we concentrate on 
surveillance as it pertains to wire, I would have people know that the 
terrorists by now have been pretty well educated about these matters 
and may very well be using other methodologies totally unrelated to the 
telephone.
  I remind people when it was leaked to the media that Osama bin Laden 
was using a certain kind of wire, he hasn't been heard from in that 
forum since. So let's be very cautious to not put all our eggs in the 
surveillance basket. There are other methodologies that might be 
employed that I assure you the intelligence community is mindful of and 
right on as it pertains to discovering them.

                              {time}  1045

  It provides additional resources to the Department of Justice, the 
National Security Agency and the FISA Court to assist in auditing and 
streamlining the FISA application process while preventing the backlog 
of critical intelligence gathering.
  The RESTORE Act prohibits the warrantless electronic surveillance of 
Americans in the United States, including their medical records, homes 
and offices. And it requires the government to establish a 
recordkeeping system to track instances where information identifying 
U.S. citizens is disseminated.
  This bill preserves the role of the FISA Court as an independent 
check on the government to prevent it from infringing on the rights of 
Americans. It rejects the administration's belief that the court should 
be a rubber stamp.
  Finally, the bill sunsets in 2009. This is a critical provision 
because it requires the constant oversight and regular evaluation of 
our FISA laws, actions which were largely neglected during the last 6 
years of Republican rule.
  Mr. Speaker, all the American people have to do is pick up a 
newspaper to read about what happens when this government has 
unfettered access to warrantless electronic surveillance. According to 
a letter to Congress from a company executive, Verizon alone has 
fielded almost 240,000 phone record requests from the FBI since 2005. 
Nearly 64,000 of these requests, or over one-quarter of them, were made 
without a warrant.
  This is almost 100 phone record requests per day by our government to 
Verizon seeking private information about our citizens, without a 
warrant. Realize, we are just talking about requests made to Verizon by 
the FBI. And these are just the requests that Verizon told Congress 
about this week because the Bush administration has consistently 
refused to answer our questions about the President's program.
  Even more, it doesn't factor in the hundreds of thousands of requests 
that were made to other phone companies during the same time that we 
don't know about.
  Mr. Speaker, if we have learned anything since the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, it is that the balance between security and civil 
liberties is not only difficult, but absolutely critical.
  The RESTORE Act does absolutely nothing to block or hinder the 
efforts of our intelligence community. And Member after Member on the 
other side of the aisle are going to come down here and comment that it 
is hampering our intelligence efforts. Quite the contrary. It enhances 
their ability to do their jobs effectively and ensures the integrity of 
their efforts. I urge my colleagues to support this rule and the 
underlying legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my good 
friend and namesake, Mr. Hastings, for yielding me the customary 30 
minutes, and I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. HASTINGS of Washington asked and was given permission to revise 
and extend his remarks.)
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, yesterday the Rules 
Committee held a hearing to consider a rule for H.R. 3773, the RESTORE 
Act. At the outset of the hearing, the chairwoman of the Rules 
Committee did something that Republicans would not have even 
contemplated when we were in the majority.
  Before Members of Congress even had an opportunity to testify before 
the Rules Committee, the chairwoman announced that the rule would be 
closed. She further went on to say no notice was sent out seeking 
amendments from Members, yet at least 27 amendments on a bipartisan 
basis were submitted to the committee. I guess, Mr. Speaker, we know 
now that no amendment announcement is code for no opportunity for 
meaningful, open debate. While surprising, this action is, 
unfortunately, not unprecedented for this Democrat-controlled Rules 
Committee.
  I would like to thank all Members for submitting their thoughtful 
amendments on behalf of those they represent. And I especially would 
like to thank the Members who chose to stay and testify despite 
learning from the very start that their amendments would not be made in 
order.
  It is sad that yesterday the minds and ears of the Democrat members 
of the Rules Committee were closed to even allowing for the 
consideration of amendments and alternatives to legislation, important 
legislation aimed at closing loopholes and strengthening our national 
intelligence capabilities.
  Mr. Speaker, in 1978 Congress enacted the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, or FISA, to establish a procedure for electronic 
surveillance of international communications. As enacted into law, FISA 
had two principle purposes: First, to protect the civil liberties of 
Americans by requiring the government to first obtain a court order 
before collecting electronic intelligence on U.S. citizens in our 
country. Second, the law specified how intelligence officials, working 
to protect our national security, could collect information on foreign 
persons in foreign places without having to get a warrant.
  The intent of the original FISA law was to enhance American security 
while at the same time protecting American privacy. Recognizing that no

[[Page H11647]]

responsibility of the Federal Government is more important than 
providing for the defense and security of the American people, Congress 
should be doing all it can to ensure that FISA continues to reflect the 
intent of the original law.
  In the nearly 30 years since FISA became law, we have seen tremendous 
advances in communication technology such as the Internet, cell phones 
and e-mail. However, under the original FISA law, our intelligence 
officials are not free to monitor foreign terrorists in foreign 
countries without a court order because of advances in communication 
technology. It is clear that our FISA laws are outdated and must be 
modernized to reflect changes in communication technology over the past 
three decades.
  In August, Congress in a bipartisan manner took an important first 
step forward to close our Nation's intelligence gap; but, 
unfortunately, only for a 6-month period. The Protect America Act 
passed only after repeated attempts by Republicans to give our Nation's 
intelligence professionals the tools and the authority they need to 
protect our homeland. This action was long overdue and this law marked 
a significant step towards improving our security.
  Now Congress must act again to renew this law by early next year 
before it expires or our national security will once again be at risk. 
Unfortunately, the legislation before us today, the RESTORE Act, does 
not provide the security we need to protect our troops and our Nation 
from a potential future terrorist attack. The bill also weakens 
Americans' privacy protections and fails to permanently close our 
Nation's intelligence gap.
  Specifically, Mr. Speaker, the RESTORE Act does not go far enough to 
reform outdated FISA regulations that burden our troops in the 
battlefield. It contains no provision for third parties to challenge 
FISA court orders. The bill also creates a centralized database that 
could actually increase the risk of privacy violations. Another major 
concern is that the RESTORE Act contains yet another sunset provision 
that forces the bill to expire on December 31, 2009, unnecessarily 
leaving our intelligence officials without the tools they need to 
protect Americans.
  It is alarming to me that this rule brings a bill to the House floor 
that goes so far as to weaken American privacy provisions while at the 
same time strengthening protections of our enemies in times of war.
  Mr. Speaker, as I mentioned earlier, nearly 30 amendments were 
submitted by Members on both sides of the aisle to address these and 
other concerns with the Democrat majority's failed attempt to update 
our current FISA laws. However, none of these amendments, which ranged 
from permanently strengthening our FISA laws to acquiring 
communications of foreign terrorists in foreign countries without a 
FISA court order, were allowed to be considered on the House floor 
today under this rule.
  Mr. Speaker, it is truly disappointing to me that every Member of 
this House is prohibited from offering changes to this bill that could 
make it more effective in our constant battle to prevent a future 
terrorist attack against our Nation. After all, if we cannot come 
together and work in a bipartisan manner on issues as important as 
improving our national security, then what can we work together on.
  Sadly, because the Democrat majority has chosen to consider the 
RESTORE Act under this closed process, working together in a bipartisan 
manner will not be possible. Instead, if this rule is adopted, Members 
will only have a choice to vote for or against a seriously flawed bill 
that threatens, not improves, our national security. Sadly, this closed 
process shuts out all American voices from being heard and, ultimately, 
every American could suffer consequences if this rule and bill are 
adopted. Therefore, I urge my colleagues to vote against the rule.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, before I yield, I would like to 
assist my colleague from Washington, who is my good friend and was in 
the majority last year when the Wilson bill, H.R. 5825, the Electronic 
Surveillance Modernization Act, was considered by the House. It was 
considered under a closed rule, H. Res. 1052, which self-executed an 
amendment in the nature of a substitute in lieu of amendments 
recommended by the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees. I think that 
is the precedent.
  Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the 
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Pascrell), my very good friend who 
serves on the Ways and Means Committee and the Homeland Security 
Committee.
  Mr. PASCRELL. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Florida, and I rise 
this morning to speak in favor of the rule on the RESTORE Act, H.R. 
3773. I believe this is an appropriate rule given the large number of 
amendments that were considered in both the House Judiciary and 
Intelligence Committees.
  I want to highlight some of the most important provisions in the bill 
provided through this rule and steps that I believe can be taken to 
strengthen the intent of the legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, section 5 of the current legislation requires quarterly 
audits by the Justice Department Inspector General on communications 
collected under this legislation, which would then be provided to the 
FISA Court and to Congress. In the end, the issue is that without 
outside oversight, such as the FISA Court, you put a huge amount of 
authority in the hands of a very small number of people and leave an 
awful lot to their individual judgment in dealing with very sensitive 
issues of personal privacy.
  I hope that under this section the Justice Department Inspector 
General would also be inclined to include statistical information, as 
is possible, relating to the sex, race, ethnicity, religion and age of 
U.S. persons identified in intelligence reports obtained pursuant to 
the legislation. This data will help our intelligence agencies, the 
FISA Court and the Congress to gain a clear overview of intelligence 
collection on Americans swept up through these types of investigations 
and would create the necessary oversight to judge whether a pattern of 
profiling is occurring.
  I want to draw attention to the Schakowsky amendment which was 
approved by the Intelligence Committee. This would require that the 
FISA Court approve guidelines to ensure that an individual FISA court 
order is sought when the significant purpose of an acquisition is to 
acquire the communications of a specific U.S. person reasonably 
believed to be located in the United States.

                              {time}  1100

  This is a vital provision to the bill that makes clear that no 
American can be the target of surveillance under this bill unless an 
individual warrant is obtained from the FISA Court.
  Under this provision, I hope we will also make clear the sensitivity 
surrounding communications between Americans and family members who may 
live abroad. We need to make certain that no American, regardless of 
their foreign family connections, can be the target of surveillance 
without an individual warrant being obtained from the FISA Court.
  We're not trying to protect foreigners. We're trying to protect 
Americans and safeguarding the Constitution.
  I thank the Speaker for the time. I want to thank you, and I hope 
that the Members will approve the appropriate rule on the RESTORE Act. 
I thank my friend.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, how much time is there on 
both sides?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Washington (Mr. Hastings) 
has 23 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) 
has 19 minutes remaining.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 4 
minutes to the distinguished ranking member of the Rules Committee, Mr. 
Dreier of California.
  (Mr. DREIER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. DREIER. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Pasco for yielding 
and congratulate the Hastings cousins for their management of this 
very, very important measure.
  Mr. Speaker, yesterday afternoon eight of our colleagues sat before 
the dais of the Rules Committee with 27 different proposed amendments 
that

[[Page H11648]]

they wanted to offer to improve this very important measure, to work in 
a bipartisan way to improve it. Before they were able to utter their 
first words, they were told in response to a question that came from 
our friend from Pasco, Mr. Hastings, that this was going to be a closed 
rule.
  Now, Mr. Speaker, a closed rule means that no amendment is offered. 
No alternative proposal is allowed at all. We simply get the measure 
that is before us, and that is it. Now, that's when there were 27 
different amendments that were proposed and, as I said, eight Members 
waiting to offer and discuss their ideas. They were completely shut out 
from that.
  Now, Mr. Speaker, it saddens me to report to this House that we, 
today, have achieved something that is not great for this institution. 
As of today, Mr. Speaker, in the 110th Congress, we have had more 
closed rules in a single session of the United States House of 
Representatives than we have in the 218-year history of this great 
institution. The sad thing about that, Mr. Speaker, is the fact that we 
were promised something much different, and this bill is critically 
important for our Nation's security.
  One of the very thoughtful proposals to come forward made great 
sense. It's the idea of saying that when the government asked the 
private sector to help us work to interdict those communications taking 
place among people who are trying to kill us, terrorists who are trying 
to kill us, we should allow them to do that. We should allow them to 
have immunity from the threat of prosecution if that, in fact, is being 
utilized. But unfortunately, our colleagues on the other side of the 
aisle have failed to allow that proposal, for those people who were 
asked by the government to help us win the global war on terror, to 
make sure that Osama bin Laden and other terrorists do not have the 
potential to kill us.
  And now what we've been told, and I heard countless Democrats say, 
oh, these people in the telecommunications industry, they've got enough 
money, they're making enough money, let them stand on their own. Well, 
Mr. Speaker, that is just plain wrong, and we, unfortunately, with this 
rule, are not even allowed a chance to debate that, which, to me, is 
absolutely outrageous.
  What we have before us, Mr. Speaker, is a closed rule on a bad bill 
that can't become law. Tragically, that's a pattern that we have been 
facing for a while. The exact same thing has happened on the bill that 
we're going to be voting after it was sent here 2 weeks ago on SCHIP 
legislation. We're going to be voting on that tomorrow.
  So, Mr. Speaker, let me just say again, this is a closed rule on a 
bad bill that can't become law. We've got to defeat this rule. We've 
got to make sure that those people who are working to keep this country 
safe have all the tools necessary to make that happen.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I make one reference to the 
Computer and Communications Industry Association which writes in 
support of the House Judiciary Committee's approach to retroactive 
immunity, contrary to what the previous speaker, my good friend, the 
ranking member, just said regarding that matter.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey, 
a distinguished member of the Intelligence Committee, my good friend 
Rush Holt, who is also Chair of the Special Intelligence Oversight 
Committee.
  Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman.
  The RESTORE Act, which its well-meaning authors believe will both 
help protect our liberties and our security, does the latter but, 
unfortunately, does not fully do the former. If I had more time, I 
would talk about the good features of this bill, but in the time I 
have, I would like to point to the one thing that it needs most, that 
it lacks, which is ironclad language that maintains the fourth 
amendment's individual warrant requirement when Americans' property or 
communications are searched and seized by the government.
  The RESTORE Act would allow the government to collect the 
communications of innocent Americans. The executive branch assurances 
that the rights of Americans will be protected through administrative 
procedures are no substitute for judicial protections. In recent weeks 
and months, we've seen too many abuses of administrative warrants to 
find any reassurance or to even find these assurances believable.
  Yes, I voted ``yes'' in committee to bring this to the floor, with 
the assurances that we would work to get it better. I regret to say 
that I've seen no effort to resolve this point. It could be fixed 
easily to the safety of Americans, because Americans will be safer when 
agencies have to demonstrate to a court that they know what they are 
doing. We get better intelligence, just as we get better law 
enforcement, when you do it by the rules.
  In fact, my own leadership I believe would deny me time to speak on 
this issue to try to strengthen this bill, but for the sake of the 
security of Americans, I implore the leadership to make these 
improvements.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 3 
minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Frelinghuysen).
  (Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN asked and was given permission to revise and 
extend his remarks.)
  Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding me 
time.
  I rise in strong opposition to this rule and the underlying 
legislation.
  I stand before the House as a member of Mr. Holt's new House Special 
Intelligence Oversight Panel and as a lifelong resident of New Jersey, 
a State which is still feeling the heartrending damage of September 11, 
2001. We will never forget what happened that day, and I work each and 
every day to prevent another such attack.
  I recognize that achieving the proper balance between our national 
security and our civil liberties is a real challenge, but we must also 
recognize that our war against violent international extremists is the 
first conflict of the information age.
  With our technical assets and expertise, the United States is far 
better at gathering information at this point in history than our 
enemies. This is an advantage we must exploit to better protect the 
American people from those who would do us harm.
  Then why are we on the floor debating a rule on legislation that 
essentially amounts to unilateral disarmament on our part?
  Last August, Congress enacted the Protect America Act, legislation 
that sought to modernize the old Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 
FISA, and closed dangerous loopholes that prevented our intelligence 
community from monitoring overseas communications between al Qaeda 
members and other terrorist groups plotting and planning their next 
attack on U.S. citizens and our interests at home and abroad. These 
were not conversations involving Americans. These were communications 
between foreign targets overseas.
  Director of National Intelligence McConnell asked Congress to ``make 
clear that court orders are not necessary to effectively collect 
foreign intelligence about foreign targets overseas.'' I repeat, 
``foreign intelligence about foreign targets overseas.''
  But this new proposed legislation would not only undo the progress 
made by the Protect America Act, but it would do further damage to our 
collection efforts.
  Since it was enacted in 1978, FISA never required our government to 
acquire court orders for foreign communications of persons reasonably 
believed to be outside the United States. This bill would require such 
a court order, thus gutting 30 years of foreign intelligence 
collection.
  Once again, Mr. Speaker, I understand that achieving the proper 
balance between our national security and our civil liberties is a 
challenging task. I believe the Protect America Act achieved this goal. 
The bill required a warrant to target a person in the United States but 
allowed U.S. intelligence agencies to listen to foreign persons in 
foreign countries.
  Why is this important? Because speed matters in a war on terrorism, 
where terrorists are using our communications networks, not theirs, in 
order to try to harm us. This is not about politics. It's about 
ensuring that we give our security personnel the tools they need to 
help protect our families from future terrorist attacks.
  Mr. Speaker, unfortunately, I fear the RESTORE Act will live up to 
its

[[Page H11649]]

name. It will restore our intelligence community to the days when their 
hands were tied and they could not monitor the communications of al 
Qaeda members and other terrorists overseas without lengthy legalistic 
procedural delays.
  Terrorism is an international threat that requires (international) 
technology to solve.
  I urge my colleagues to restore our intelligence community's hard-
earned technological advantage over al Qaeda and their murderous 
comrades. Protect America.
  I urge defeat of this rule and rejection of the underlying 
legislation.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the 
distinguished chairperson of the Intelligence Committee, Silvestre 
Reyes.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, due to an administrative error, the following cosponsors 
were left off the list of cosponsors for this bill, H.R. 3773: 
Representative Anna Eshoo from California; Representative Dutch 
Ruppersberger from Maryland; Representative Dennis Moore from Kansas; 
Representative Ciro Rodriguez from Texas; Representative Earl Pomeroy 
from North Dakota; Representative Leonard Boswell from Iowa; 
Representative Baron Hill from Indiana; and Representative Patrick 
Murphy from Pennsylvania.
  I would like to thank them for their cosponsorship and ask that they 
be recognized as such, and I would finish up by saying this is a good 
rule. This is also a good bill that balances the ability to protect our 
country with the ability to protect the civil rights of its citizens.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I'm pleased to yield 4 
minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. Royce), a member of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee.
  Mr. ROYCE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman. I'm rising to oppose 
the rule.
  For the first time, this bill would stop intelligence professionals 
from conducting surveillance of foreign persons in foreign countries 
unless they can read the mind of their terrorist targets and guarantee 
that they would not call the United States or one of their people in 
the United States. This is more protection than Americans get under 
court-ordered warrants in mob and other criminal cases.
  So the issue we're debating today is very important. It is a matter 
of life and death essentially.
  I serve as ranking member of the Terrorism and Nonproliferation 
Subcommittee. That there has not been a terrorist attack on our soil 
since 9/11 is due to the improved surveillance in real-time that we're 
able to conduct against foreign terrorists.
  That good record, though, in no way should lead us to discount the 
jihadists, because the image of Osama bin Laden's allies operating in 
some remote terrain somewhere may give the impression that our foes are 
isolated. They are not isolated.
  We are confronting a virtual caliphate. Radical jihadists are 
physically dispersed, but they're united through the Internet, and they 
use that tool to recruit and plot their terrorist attacks. They use 
electronic communications for just such a purpose, and they're very 
sophisticated in that use.
  So how has the West attempted to confront that? Well, the British use 
electronic surveillance in real-time, and they used it last year to 
stop the attack on 10 transatlantic flights. They prevented that attack 
in August of last year by wiretapping.
  The French authorities used wiretaps to lure jihadists basically into 
custody and prevented a bomb attack.
  Given this threat, it is unfathomable that we'd weaken our most 
effective preventative tool, and that's exactly what this bill does.
  Before we passed the Protect America Act in August, the Director of 
National Intelligence told Congress that we are losing up to two-thirds 
of our intelligence on terrorist targets. Admiral McConnell went on to 
testify, ``We're actually missing a significant portion of what we 
should be getting.''
  Though Admiral McConnell has served both Democrat and Republican 
administrations with distinction, now his credibility has been 
attacked. I'd ask those so distrustful: Go ahead, discount his 
estimate, cut them in half, say we'd lose one-third of our intelligence 
by passing this bill. Isn't that too much to give up? I don't want to 
lose a single percent of our intelligence on terrorist communications. 
With nuclear and biological material floating around this globe, we 
don't have that margin of error.
  We've heard the ACLU concerns, but before we unilaterally disarm, 
before we hobble our ability to listen in real-time to the very real 
terrorists who are attacking our troops in Iraq every day, shouldn't we 
have something of an accounting of the supposed civil liberties price 
we're paying? Frankly, I don't see the troubling cases.
  What I do see is the very misguided concern for the civil liberties 
of foreigners having conversations with terrorists.
  This bill grants privacy protection to foreigners, those believed to 
be terrorists, by requiring the intelligence community to seek court 
orders to collect foreign intelligence on foreign targets.

                              {time}  1115

  This process in the past has clogged the FISA Court, it has wasted 
untold intelligence hours, it has pulled Arabic and Urdu and Farsi 
speakers off of listening to terrorist cases and put them on filing 
hundreds of pages of paperwork. FISA restrictions hindered the search 
for kidnapped Americans in Iraq.
  My colleagues, it has come down to this: Are we interested in best 
protecting American lives, or giving away privacy rights to foreigners 
involved in conversations with terrorists?
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield to my distinguished 
friend and colleague from Texas, Sheila Jackson-Lee, 1 minute. But 
before I do, I would like to have Mr. Royce understand that he is 
entitled to his opinion but he is not entitled to his facts. And the 
facts as he recited them with reference to what Director O'Connell said 
occurred under the old FISA law, not this one. And I might add, that 
old FISA law was good enough to participate in bringing down the German 
possible terrorists.
  With that in mind, I would like to yield 1 minute to the 
distinguished gentlelady from Houston, Texas (Ms. Jackson-Lee).
  (Ms. JACKSON-LEE asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
her remarks.)
  Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Let me thank the distinguished gentleman 
from Florida, a former jurist, and let me acknowledge that the RESTORE 
Act is the right balance between national security and the protection 
of our civil liberties.
  I beg to differ with my good friend from California because in fact 
there are elements of this bill that clearly provide the parameters for 
foreign-to-foreign surveillance. The only difference is the fact that 
we protect an American citizen who may be targeted inappropriately as 
the court intervenes in providing a warrant.
  My friends, we are moving forward to secure America. I support this 
rule and I support the rule in its present form, because we need to now 
substitute a real bill that secures America supported by the language 
of Director McConnell and as well provides the civil liberties that all 
Americans deserve. I look forward to the debate on the floor. The 
RESTORE Act is what it is says, protecting us and providing the right 
surveillance and ensuring that terrorists do not attack America.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise in support H. Res. 746, the rule governing debate 
on H.R. 3773, the RESTORE Act. I thank the gentlemen for yielding and 
wish to use my time to discuss an important improvement in the bill 
that was adopted in the full Judiciary Committee markup.
  The Jackson-Lee Amendment added during the markup makes a 
constructive contribution to this important legislation that already is 
superior to the misnamed ``Protect America Act'' by orders of 
magnitude. It does this simply by laying down a clear, objective 
criterion for the Administration to follow and the FISA court to 
enforce in preventing reverse targeting.
  ``Reverse targeting,'' a concept well known to members of this 
Committee but not so well understood by those less steeped in the 
arcana of electronic surveillance, is the practice where the government 
targets foreigners without a warrant while its actual purpose is to 
collect information on certain U.S. persons.
  One of the major concerns that libertarians and classical 
conservatives, as well as progressives and civil liberties 
organizations, have with the PAA is that the understandable temptation 
of national security agencies to engage in reverse targeting may be 
difficult to

[[Page H11650]]

resist in the absence of strong safeguards in the PAA to prevent it.
  My amendment reduces even further any such temptation to resort to 
reverse targeting by requiring the Administration to obtain a regular, 
individualized FISA warrant whenever the ``real'' target of the 
surveillance is a person in the United States.
  The amendment achieves this objective by requiring the Administration 
to obtain a regular FISA warrant whenever a ``significant purpose of an 
acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific person 
reasonably believed to be located in the United States.'' The current 
language in the bill provides that a warrant be obtained only when the 
Government ``seeks to conduct electronic surveillance'' of a person 
reasonably believed to be located in the United States.

  It was far from clear how the operative language ``seeks to'' is to 
be interpreted. In contrast, the language used in my amendment, 
``significant purpose,'' is a term of art that has long been a staple 
of FISA jurisprudence and thus is well known and readily applied by the 
agencies, legal practitioners, and the FISA Court. Thus, the Jackson 
Lee Amendment provides a clearer, more objective, criterion for the 
Administration to follow and the FISA court to enforce to prevent the 
practice of reverse targeting without a warrant, which all of us can 
agree should not be permitted.
  I hasten to add, Mr. Speaker, that nothing in the bill or in my 
amendment will requires the Government to obtain a FISA order for every 
overseas target on the off chance that they might pick up a call into 
or from the United States. Rather, the bill requires, as our amendment 
makes clear, a FISA order only where there is a particular, known 
person in the United States at the other end of the foreign target's 
calls in whom the Government has a significant interest such that a 
significant purpose of the surveillance has become to acquire that 
person's communications.
  This will usually happen over time and the Government will have the 
time to get an order while continuing its surveillance. And it is the 
national security interest to require it to obtain an order at that 
point, so that it can lawfully acquire all of the target person's 
communications rather than continuing to listen to only some of them.
  In short, my amendment gives the Government precisely what Director 
of National Intelligence McConnell asked for when he testified before 
the Senate Judiciary Committee:
  ``It is very important to me; it is very important to members of this 
Committee. We should be required--we should be required in all cases to 
have a warrant anytime there is surveillance of a US [sic] person 
located in the United States.''
  In short, my amendment makes a good bill even better. For these 
reasons, I am happy to support the rule and urge all members to do 
likewise.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the 
gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Tiahrt), a member of the Intelligence 
Committee.
  Mr. TIAHRT. I thank the gentleman from Washington.
  I rise in strong opposition to this bill. I am extremely concerned 
about our national security and I am deeply troubled that our 
intelligence community will be prevented from doing the job they need 
to do to protect Americans by this bill. For that reason, I strongly 
oppose the RESTORE Act as it will only further tie the hands of our 
intelligence community.
  If this bill passes, Congress would depart from the recommendations 
of the 9/11 Commission by making it more difficult and cumbersome to 
gather intelligence on Islamic terrorists. Our most important job here 
is to provide the tools to those charged with protecting our Nation and 
keeping us safe from those threats. In the last 6 years we have been 
kept safe in this country because we have had a sharp edge on the tools 
that we have been using to peel back the layers of secrecy on 
terrorists and terrorist organizations.
  This bill requires a court order to gather communications when a 
foreign terrorist in a foreign country tries to contact somebody in the 
United States. Since 1978, from President Carter to President Clinton, 
there was never a concern. Yet now, after we have had attacks on our 
U.S. soil and are well aware there are terrorist cells in our homeland, 
the Democrats want to prevent the intelligence community from 
intercepting communications of foreign terrorists.
  To my knowledge, no violation of civil rights has occurred in the 
FISA process. However, as this bill is written, the Democrats have 
opened the door for alarming violations of civil liberties by requiring 
the intelligence community to compile a database of reports on the 
identities of U.S. citizens that have inadvertently been accumulated in 
the process of gathering information. As the Washington Times noted 
this morning, apparently pandering to the left-wing blogosphere and the 
ACLU is a higher priority than the safety of Americans and even 
American GIs fighting al Qaeda.
  Normally, under current guidelines, the intelligence community blacks 
out all these names and they never get distributed anywhere. They are 
just simply eliminated from the database. But now, under this bill, we 
see the Democrats requiring a list be sent to Congress. And we all know 
that we have had leaks here in Congress. You would think the ACLU would 
be opposed not only to compiling such a list but distributing it to 
Congress. We have had leaks related to the way we collect information 
on individuals through electronic conversations, we have had leaks 
about how we have e-mails that have been reviewed on terrorist Web 
sites, we have had leaks that caused our allies in Europe to no longer 
cooperate when it comes to tracking terrorist financing. For us to give 
this type of information to Congress would almost certainly guarantee a 
leak and a violation of the civil liberties of those individuals who it 
inadvertently picked up in the process of trying to find terrorists 
working within our country trying to do harm.
  This is a bad bill. It goes back and dulls the tools, this edge that 
we have been using to keep the country safe. If it is passed and it 
becomes law, I would fear for the safety of this country because 
dulling the tools that have kept us safe for 6 years would put us in a 
much more vulnerable position than we are today.
  Over 2 months ago, the DNI, Mike McConnell, the man charged with 
overseeing the intelligence community, urged us to modernize the FISA 
law. But this does not do it. This sets us backwards.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, how much time remains on each 
side?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida controls 15 
minutes. The gentleman from Washington controls 9\1/2\ minutes.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am prepared to reserve my 
time. And as a matter of courtesy to my good friend from Washington and 
to you, Mr. Speaker, I would like to indicate that I will be replaced 
in managing the time, although not required under the rules, by my 
distinguished colleague from New York, Michael Arcuri.
  I reserve my time.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3 
minutes to another member of the Intelligence Committee, Mr. Rogers of 
Michigan.
  Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I want to commend Mr. Hastings. We have 
worked on many issues of which we have agreed strongly in the 
betterment of national security. I couldn't more strongly disagree with 
this bill and where we are going today.
  As one of the very few people on this floor that has actually gone 
out and developed sources and developed the leads that you possibly 
need to develop probable cause as a former FBI agent to either bug or 
intercept phones, offices, or other privileges communications between 
Americans, I can tell you the long and arduous process it takes to 
develop that, to go to the judge and say, Your Honor, I do believe that 
these people are engaged in criminal activities and here is why. And it 
takes months and months and months. So let me tell you what this bill 
does today that is so disturbing.
  Non-United States citizens who are insurgents in Iraq building IEDs 
that our troops are trying to intercept electronically are now given 
more rights to privacy than we do for gamblers, degenerate gambling 
operations developed under the criminal code in the United States of 
America. That, my friends, is true. Incidental communications, you 
don't have to go back to the judge, you continue to listen. But what we 
have done is we have set a standard that every time they want to go 
overseas and intercept these folks, the standard of the bar is set so 
high they have to go get a court order. They have to get a warrant. And 
it takes months.
  This isn't about Hollywood. This isn't about Jack Bauer. This is 
about

[[Page H11651]]

real people having to develop probable cause in accordance with the law 
of the United States. And what you said is that insurgent in Iraq has 
more privacy rights than any criminal, any United States citizen under 
the criminal code of the United States of America. That is what you 
have done with this bill. Oh, yes, sir, it is. Read the language and 
understand what it takes for them to go through the process to develop 
probable cause.
  This is the confusion that led to the delay that may have cost the 
lives of United States soldiers. We all know the example of which we 
are talking about.
  This bill encourages that confusion and that standard to give foreign 
terrorists in a foreign land more privacy rights than United States 
citizens under the criminal code here. It's wrong.
  We often say, listen to the intelligence community, listen to our 
commanders on the ground. I implore you to do just that. They oppose 
this bill because it makes it harder for them to go after foreign 
terrorists in foreign lands plotting to kill either U.S. soldiers or 
even attacks against our homeland or our allies. This bill does all of 
those things.
  I don't ever doubt the intention of my friends, but words matter in 
the legal code. And when you stand before that judge, believe me, there 
is no agent that believes they are Jack Bauer and are going to fudge a 
little bit on what the Constitution asks and tells them they must do. 
They are going to err on the side of the United States Constitution 
every time. And for those who don't, they deserve to go to jail, and we 
do prosecute those occasionally. But what you are saying is we are 
going to create this whole system for foreign terrorists to give them 
more rights than the privacy of United States citizens. I strongly urge 
the rejection of this bill. Let's go back to the table and protect our 
United States citizens.
  Mr. ARCURI. I thank my colleague, and as a former prosecutor for 13 
years, I have stood before a judge many times and made application for 
warrants on a number of different occasions. And, frankly, I certainly 
respect his position; but he is just not correct on this.
  This legislation not only gives our country the ability to do what 
needs to be done to protect us, but more importantly and equally as 
important certainly it protects our civil rights. So it does both 
things: It protects our civil rights and gives us the ability to keep 
our country safe.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, once again, how much time is 
remaining on both sides?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Washington controls 6\1/
2\ minutes; the gentleman from New York controls 14\1/2\.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, at this time I am pleased to 
yield 2 minutes to a member of the Judiciary Committee, Mr. Gohmert of 
Texas.
  Mr. GOHMERT. Mr. Speaker, once again we have heard from across the 
aisle, this is not true that we are saying you will have to get 
warrants for foreign-to-foreign, because the bill says in section 2(a), 
gee, you don't have to get a court order if it is between persons not 
U.S. citizens not located within the United States.
  The problem is, when you look at 2(b) and 3 and section 4, it says: 
If you can't be sure and you are risking a felony if you are not, if 
you can't be sure that they may not call somewhere in the United 
States, you have got to get a court order. That is the bottom line. 
That is what Admiral McConnell testified.
  I realize some people on the other side may think he is suspect 
because he was the National Security Adviser under the Clinton 
administration for several years, but I think he is a very credible 
source.
  As a former judge and chief justice, I realize we have got lawyers in 
here, but I am telling you, when the language says if there may be a 
call to the United States or to an American, you have got to get a 
court order, then you are going to have to get them in virtually every 
time.
  But we keep hearing no, no, all that is covered. Once again, we are 
told something is covered when again it is nothing but a hospital gown 
coverage. You are exposed in areas you don't want exposed. And that is 
what the country is looking at.
  Now, it also requires the DNI and the AG to jointly petition. Oh, and 
there is great comfort in this bill. It says the judge, once they 
finally get the papers filed, will have to rule in 15 days. If we get a 
soldier kidnapped, we have some sensitive situation, and maybe it is an 
emergency, maybe it is not, but you can't take a chance of being guilty 
of a felony, you are going to have to follow through and get a court 
order. That is what the DNI says and that is what needs to be done.
  Now, the main protection here is not for American citizens in 
general, it is for foreign terrorists. The bottom line is, tell your 
American friends who are getting calls from foreign terrorists in 
foreign countries not to call them. Use some other way to communicate, 
and then your friends are covered.
  Mr. ARCURI. It is sad that my colleague attempts to change the actual 
meaning of what this statute does. It gives no protection to 
terrorists. It gives protections only to Americans, and it keeps us 
safe and it gives us the protections that are guaranteed us under the 
Constitution.
  I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield at 
this time 2\1/2\ minutes to a member of the Judiciary Committee, Mr. 
Franks of Arizona.
  Mr. FRANKS of Arizona. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. Speaker, the bill here at issue, the so-called RESTORE Act, 
undermines the existing structure that we put in place to reform FISA 
only 3 months ago.
  In the midst of a war, any changes to the way that our intelligence 
community operates should be understood as a somber and delicate 
undertaking that requires great care. Our national security hangs in 
the balance. We cannot afford to get this wrong, Mr. Speaker.
  My amendment aimed to deal with the seriously flawed provision of the 
RESTORE Act that will do great damage to the civil liberties of the 
protections of Americans.

                              {time}  1130

  My amendment would have stricken section 11 of the bill that directs 
the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney General to 
jointly maintain a recordkeeping system of U.S. persons whose 
communications are intercepted.
  Mr. Speaker, this would amount to a big government database that 
would have individuals' identity attached in every practical way. There 
is simply no way to have a database like this that does not attach 
individual identities to verify the process. The Democrats maintain 
that the identity is not attached. But this is an impractical rebuttal.
  Mr. Speaker, the proposal's not only misguided, it attempts 
ostensibly to protect Americans' civil liberties and only undermines 
them further. And we have to understand that these identities would be 
attached, even if they have no connection to spying or terrorism.
  And the bottom line is this, Mr. Speaker, this war on terrorism is 
ultimately fought in the area of intelligence. If we knew where every 
terrorist was tonight, in 60 days this war would be over. And if we tie 
those people's hands who are fighting to protect this country with this 
RESTORE Act by the majority, I believe that we will some day revisit 
this issue, Mr. Speaker, because when a terrible tragedy comes on this 
country, it will transform this debate in the most profound way, and we 
need to be very, very careful. We need to understand that what we're 
doing here is of vital importance to future generations.
  Mr. ARCURI. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve my time.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I know my friend has more 
time than I have, and I have more requests for time than I have time 
for. And so, Mr. Speaker, I would ask unanimous consent that each side 
get an additional 5 minutes so I can accommodate the requests on my 
side.
  Mr. ARCURI. Mr. Speaker, I would object to that.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I wonder then if I could 
inquire of my friend, since he has more time, if maybe he would yield 
me at least enough time so I can close on my

[[Page H11652]]

side, and I'd ask my friend from New York if he would do that for me.
  Mr. ARCURI. Well, we are waiting on one more speaker, so at this time 
I would not yield any additional time.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield for a unanimous 
consent request to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Mack).
  (Mr. MACK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. MACK. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this rule.
  Mr. Speaker, I rise today, once again, in defense of liberty and to 
tell my colleagues they should vote against this Rule.
  While I find it honorable that several of my colleagues have 
attempted to work to find a compromise in this legislation, I have 
concluded it still does not often enough protections for the rights of 
our citizens.
  It is the duty of Congress to strike the appropriate balance of 
freedom and liberty with the assurances of security and stability. But, 
we must constantly ask ourselves, are we going too far in one 
direction?
  And I have always maintained that if a threat is imminent and known, 
the administration should be given the temporary powers needed to keep 
our homeland secure and Congress should exercise its inherent power of 
oversight over that authority.
  I advocated this throughout the PATRIOT Act reauthorization and 
maintain it is the correct stance for us to take in times of crisis.
  While I am encouraged by the inclusion of sunsets in this proposal 
and additional roles for the FISA Court, this legislation still does 
not bring us back to where we were earlier this summer--the 
administration needing a clarification on foreign-to-foreign and 
foreign-to-domestic communications.
  Instead of taking the simple tenets of the Constitution and applying 
it to this debate, we in Congress like to overcomplicate the issue. We 
all agree these are important issues that deserve our time and 
attention but we need look no further than the Constitution for the 
right answers.
  Mr. Speaker, the proper route we should have taken in crafting the 
answer to the FISA problems is H.R. 11--The NSA Oversight Act. This 
bipartisan bill has the answers, in very clear terms, to what the 
administration has sought Congress to address.
  It allows for emergency surveillance and doesn't overly impede the 
work of intelligence officers;
  It places the FISA Court in a more proper role for reviews of the 
tactics used and warrants needed;
  And it ensures Congress conducts vigorous and smart oversight of 
these activities, all while protecting the individual freedom of 
Americans.
  And that is the goal we should be aiming for, Mr. Speaker: the 
protection of our rights and the upholding of our Constitution.
  If we fail to adhere to the Constitution and ``sacrifice our 
liberty,'' then we will have lost this great experiment we began over 
220 years ago and the terrorists will have accomplished the very thing 
they set out to do on that morning in September seven years ago.
  We should vote down this Rule, go back to the table and report back a 
bill that preserves liberty and strikes a more proper balance between 
freedom and security for Americans.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have 
left, and how much time does the other side have?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Washington controls 2\1/
4\ minutes, and the gentleman from New York controls 14 minutes.
  Mr. ARCURI. Mr. Speaker, I'll continue to reserve my time.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I ask the gentleman from New 
York if he has any more speakers.
  Mr. ARCURI. We are waiting on one more speaker.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I'll reserve my time.
  Mr. ARCURI. Mr. Speaker, we have heard so much today from the other 
side about the fear that they have that this provision will somehow put 
Americans at risk. And I think it's very clear that what this FISA bill 
does is protect America, give our Intelligence Community ability to do 
the kind of things that it needs to do, while, at the same time, 
protecting our civil rights.
  I think it was Benjamin Franklin who once said that any country who 
gives up its liberty for its security deserves neither and will end up 
losing both. And I think clearly this bill takes that into 
consideration.
  This bill clearly provides for security for our country. It clearly 
provides our Intelligence Community with the ability to obtain 
information that it needs and use that and analyze it in a way that 
keeps America safe to prevent another 9/11 activity.
  At the same time, this bill also protects Americans' rights and gives 
us the ability to prevent wiretapping of Americans here in this 
country.
  We're not talking about foreign-to-foreign. They can do that. They 
have done that in the past, and they will continue to do that. This 
clearly deals with protecting Americans.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. 
Reyes).
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, there are a number of issues that have been 
brought up by the other side regarding this bill. First of all, it's 
important to keep in mind that what we're trying to do with this 
legislation is to carefully balance providing the tools to the 
intelligence professionals that are charged with keeping us safe in 
this country, and this legislation does that, regardless of what 
comments the other side has made.
  Second, and most important, we have to balance it with protecting the 
civil rights of our citizens. As we talk about protecting this country, 
we have to keep in mind that this country was founded on the principle 
of the rule of law. The rule of law protects its citizens.
  Under the Protect America Act, as we have seen over the course of the 
last few weeks, many, many concerns have been raised about the 
authorities that have been given to the government, authorities that 
would render our citizens not being able to protect and be secure in 
our homes and in our possessions.
  The Protect America Act has given so many authorities that people are 
not safe and secure in their own homes. The government can go in there 
and search their computers, search their residences, and search 
literally every possession that Americans have. This legislation 
corrects those deficiencies. This legislation is a careful balance in 
keeping our country safe, as well as securing the rights of Americans 
in their homes.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. I would inquire of my friend from New 
York if they have any additional speakers.
  Mr. ARCURI. I have one more speaker.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. How much time do I have on my side?
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman continues to have 2\1/4\ 
minutes.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance 
of the time.
  Today, Mr. Speaker, I will be asking my colleagues to vote ``no'' on 
the previous question so that I can amend the rule to allow for a 
substitute amendment to be offered by Mr. Hoekstra of Michigan or Mr. 
Smith of Texas. This will give the House an opportunity to consider 
additional views that were denied with this closed rule in the Rules 
Committee last night.
  And, Mr. Speaker, September 28, 2006, we had a debate on this issue 
last year, and I'd like to quote a Member and what he said on the House 
floor. And I quote: ``You beat with rulemaking that which you know you 
cannot beat with reason.''
  And he goes on to say, ``I know what you say: Do as you say, not as 
we do. For today, in the people's House democracy has been eviscerated 
by those who recommend it to others. I have said it before. The way the 
majority runs the House is shameful. It is undemocratic. It happens 
every single day that we have a closed rule.''
  The speaker was my good friend from Florida (Mr. Hastings).
  Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to have the text of the 
amendment and extraneous material inserted into the Record prior to the 
vote on the previous question.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Washington?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to 
oppose the previous question and the closed rule.
  I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. ARCURI. Mr. Speaker, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished 
Speaker of the House, the gentlewoman from California, Nancy Pelosi.
  Ms. PELOSI. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding and 
commend him for his excellent management of this rule affording us the 
opportunity to bring this important legislation to the floor.
  I commend Chairman Reyes and Chairman Conyers for their leadership

[[Page H11653]]

in protecting and defending the American people by putting forth the 
best way to collect intelligence under the law.
  Mr. Speaker, as we say over and over again here, and each one of us 
who comes to serve in this body, indeed, everyone who serves our 
country takes an oath of office to protect and defend the Constitution 
of the United States. It's a thrill to take that oath of office.
  As we protect and defend the American people in the preamble, it says 
to form a more perfect Union, Mr. Jackson has been a champion on that, 
to provide for the common defense. In that preamble, that's a high 
priority for us. We have a responsibility to protect the American 
people; that makes everything else possible in our community and in our 
society.
  But as we protect and defend the American people, our oath of office 
calls upon us to protect and defend the Constitution and our civil 
liberties. The legislation before us today does just that. It's about 
protecting the American people from terrorism and other national 
security threats.
  I, for a long time, have served on the Intelligence Committee, both 
as a member, as the ranking member, and also ex officio as leader and 
now as Speaker. I believe very firmly in the role that intelligence 
gathering plays in protecting the American people. We want to prevent 
war. We want to prevent harm to our forces. Force protection is a very, 
very high priority for us. Protection of our forces. And we must now 
meet this horrible challenge of fighting terrorism in the world. It has 
been a challenge for some time. In order to do that, we have to have 
the laws in place in order to collect that intelligence under the law, 
and that is what this legislation does. First, it helps us defend our 
country against terrorism and other threats. Secondly, it protects the 
privacy of the American people, which is important to them and a 
responsibility for us. And third, this legislation restores a system of 
checks and balances and how we protect and defend our country and 
provides for rigorous oversight by Congress of this collection.
  In the 1970s, when the FISA law was passed, it was conceded that 
Congress had a role in determining how intelligence was conducted, how 
the executive branch conducted the collection of intelligence, the 
executive branch, Congress, making laws to govern that, two Houses, two 
branches of government. And in the FISA bill that was passed at that 
time, the role of the third branch of government was defined, the FISA 
Courts. That system of checks and balances has served our country well. 
With the advance of technology, additional challenges arose, and this 
legislation meets those challenges. Any suggestions to the contrary are 
simply not factual. What the Director of National Intelligence has 
asked for in terms of collection he has received in this legislation, 
and he has received it under the law.
  The legislation restores checks and balances in other ways. It 
rejects groundless claims of inherent executive authority. Under that, 
we might as well just crown the President king and just say he has 
access to any information in our country, and he may collect that 
outside the law.
  And this legislation reiterates that the law enacted by Congress, 
FISA, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, is the exclusive means for 
conducting electronic surveillance to gather foreign intelligence. The 
principle of exclusivity is a very, very important principle, and it is 
enshrined in this legislation.

                              {time}  1145

  The bill also sunsets by December 31, 2009, at the same time the 
PATRIOT Act sunsets, so the next administration and another Congress 
can review whether the new program appropriately meets national 
security and civil liberty objectives.
  This bill does not provide immunity to telecommunications companies 
that participated in the President's warrantless surveillance program. 
As I have said many times, you can't even consider such relief unless 
we know what people are asking for immunity from. Congress is not a 
rubber stamp; we are a coequal branch of government. We have a right to 
know what conduct the administration wants us to immunize against.
  Working side by side, the Intelligence Committee and the Judiciary 
Committee have produced an excellent bill. It has been heralded so by 
those organizations whose organized purpose is to protect our civil 
liberties in light of our responsibility to our national security. It 
has been heralded by those who follow and hold as a value the privacy 
of the American people. It has been heralded by those who understand 
that one of our first responsibilities is to provide for the common 
defense. Our Founders understood it well, the balance that needed to be 
struck between security and liberty. They spoke eloquently to it in 
their speeches. They enshrined it in the Constitution. Let us protect 
the American people under the law.
  Please, my colleagues, support this very important legislation.
  Mr. ARCURI. Mr. Speaker, I would just like to thank the gentlewoman 
from California for her very strong leadership on this issue and, over 
the years, for her many years of strong leadership in this area. I 
would also like to thank Chairmen Conyers and Reyes for their strong 
leadership in bringing this bill to the floor.
  Having said that, I urge a ``yes'' vote on the previous question and 
on the rule.
  The material previously referred to by Mr. Hastings of Washington is 
as follows:

    Amendment to H. Res. 746 Offered by Representative Hastings, WA

       In section 1, strike ``and (2)'', and insert ``(2) a 
     further amendment to be offered by Representative Hoekstra or 
     Representative Smith of Texas, or their designee, which shall 
     be in order without intervention of any point of order or 
     demand for division of the question and shall be separately 
     debatable for one hour equally divided and controlled by the 
     proponent and an opponent; and (3)''.
                                  ____

       (The information contained herein was provided by 
     Democratic Minority on multiple occasions throughout the 
     109th Congress.)

        The Vote on the Previous Question: What It Really Means

       This vote, the vote on whether to order the previous 
     question on a special rule, is not merely a procedural vote. 
     A vote against ordering the previous question is a vote 
     against the Democratic majority agenda and a vote to allow 
     the opposition, at least for the moment, to offer an 
     alternative plan. It is a vote about what the House should be 
     debating.
       Mr. Clarence Cannon's Precedents of the House of 
     Representatives, (VI, 308-311), describes the vote on the 
     previous question on the rule as ``a motion to direct or 
     control the consideration of the subject before the House 
     being made by the Member in charge.'' To defeat the previous 
     question is to give the opposition a chance to decide the 
     subject before the House. Cannon cites the Speaker's ruling 
     of January 13, 1920, to the effect that ``the refusal of the 
     House to sustain the demand for the previous question passes 
     the control of the resolution to the opposition'' in order to 
     offer an amendment. On March 15, 1909, a member of the 
     majority party offered a rule resolution. The House defeated 
     the previous question and a member of the opposition rose to 
     a parliamentary inquiry, asking who was entitled to 
     recognition. Speaker Joseph G. Cannon (R-Illinois) said: 
     ``The previous question having been refused, the gentleman 
     from New York, Mr. Fitzgerald, who had asked the gentleman to 
     yield to him for an amendment, is entitled to the first 
     recognition.''
       Because the vote today may look bad for the Democratic 
     majority they will say ``the vote on the previous question is 
     simply a vote on whether to proceed to an immediate vote on 
     adopting the resolution . . . [and] has no substantive 
     legislative or policy implications whatsoever.'' But that is 
     not what they have always said. Listen to the definition of 
     the previous question used in the Floor Procedures Manual 
     published by the Rules Committee in the 109th Congress (page 
     56). Here's how the Rules Committee described the rule using 
     information from Congressional Quarterly's ``American 
     Congressional Dictionary'': ``If the previous question is 
     defeated, control of debate shifts to the leading opposition 
     member (usually the minority Floor Manager) who then manages 
     an hour of debate and may offer a germane amendment to the 
     pending business.''
       Deschler's Procedure in the U.S. House of Representatives, 
     the subchapter titled ``Amending Special Rules'' states: ``a 
     refusal to order the previous question on such a rule [a 
     special rule reported from the Committee on Rules] opens the 
     resolution to amendment and further debate.'' (Chapter 21, 
     section 21.2) Section 21.3 continues: Upon rejection of the 
     motion for the previous question on a resolution reported 
     from the Committee on Rules, control shifts to the Member 
     leading the opposition to the previous question, who may 
     offer a proper amendment or motion and who controls the time 
     for debate thereon.''
       Clearly, the vote on the previous question on a rule does 
     have substantive policy implications. It is one of the only 
     available tools

[[Page H11654]]

     for those who oppose the Democratic majority's agenda and 
     allows those with alternative views the opportunity to offer 
     an alternative plan.

  Mr. ARCURI. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I 
move the previous question on the resolution.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on ordering the previous 
question.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas 
and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 and clause 9 of rule 
XX, this 15-minute vote on ordering the previous question will be 
followed by 5-minute votes on adoption of H. Res. 746, if ordered; and 
suspending the rules on H. Res. 549.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 221, 
nays 199, not voting 11, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 974]

                               YEAS--221

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Bean
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd (FL)
     Boyda (KS)
     Brady (PA)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Chandler
     Clarke
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Lincoln
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     Delahunt
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donnelly
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellsworth
     Emanuel
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Frank (MA)
     Giffords
     Gillibrand
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth Sandlin
     Higgins
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hodes
     Holden
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (GA)
     Jones (OH)
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     Klein (FL)
     Kucinich
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Mahoney (FL)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     McNulty
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mitchell
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murtha
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Perlmutter
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Richardson
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sestak
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Shuler
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Space
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns
     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch (VT)
     Wexler
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Yarmuth

                               NAYS--199

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Barrow
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, David
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English (PA)
     Everett
     Fallin
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gilchrest
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Hall (TX)
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hill
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Inglis (SC)
     Issa
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jordan
     Keller
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kirk
     Kline (MN)
     Knollenberg
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Lamborn
     Lampson
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Manzullo
     Marchant
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McMorris Rodgers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy, Tim
     Musgrave
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Nunes
     Paul
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Sali
     Saxton
     Schmidt
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Terry
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Upton
     Walberg
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh (NY)
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--11

     Carson
     Castor
     Holt
     Jindal
     Johnson, E. B.
     McKeon
     Meek (FL)
     Moore (WI)
     Tancredo
     Wilson (OH)
     Young (AK)


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). There are 90 seconds left 
on the vote.

                              {time}  1211

  Mr. ISSA, Mrs. CAPITO and Mr. McCAUL of Texas changed their vote from 
``yea'' to ``nay.''
  So the previous question was ordered.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.
  The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that 
the ayes appeared to have it.
  Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas 
and nays.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
  The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 223, 
nays 196, not voting 12, as follows:

                             [Roll No. 975]

                               YEAS--223

     Abercrombie
     Ackerman
     Allen
     Altmire
     Andrews
     Arcuri
     Baca
     Baird
     Baldwin
     Barrow
     Bean
     Becerra
     Berkley
     Berman
     Berry
     Bishop (GA)
     Bishop (NY)
     Blumenauer
     Boren
     Boswell
     Boucher
     Boyd (FL)
     Boyda (KS)
     Brady (PA)
     Braley (IA)
     Brown, Corrine
     Butterfield
     Capps
     Capuano
     Cardoza
     Carnahan
     Carney
     Chandler
     Clarke
     Clay
     Cleaver
     Clyburn
     Cohen
     Conyers
     Cooper
     Costa
     Costello
     Courtney
     Cramer
     Crowley
     Cuellar
     Cummings
     Davis (AL)
     Davis (CA)
     Davis (IL)
     Davis, Lincoln
     DeFazio
     DeGette
     DeLauro
     Dicks
     Dingell
     Doggett
     Donnelly
     Doyle
     Edwards
     Ellison
     Ellsworth
     Emanuel
     Engel
     Eshoo
     Etheridge
     Farr
     Fattah
     Filner
     Frank (MA)
     Giffords
     Gillibrand
     Gonzalez
     Gordon
     Green, Al
     Green, Gene
     Grijalva
     Gutierrez
     Hall (NY)
     Hare
     Harman
     Hastings (FL)
     Herseth Sandlin
     Higgins
     Hinchey
     Hinojosa
     Hirono
     Hodes
     Holden
     Honda
     Hooley
     Hoyer
     Inslee
     Israel
     Jackson (IL)
     Jackson-Lee (TX)
     Jefferson
     Johnson (GA)
     Jones (OH)
     Kagen
     Kanjorski
     Kaptur
     Kennedy
     Kildee
     Kilpatrick
     Kind
     Klein (FL)
     Kucinich
     Langevin
     Lantos
     Larsen (WA)
     Larson (CT)
     Lee
     Levin
     Lewis (GA)
     Lipinski
     Loebsack
     Lofgren, Zoe
     Lowey
     Lynch
     Mahoney (FL)
     Maloney (NY)
     Markey
     Marshall
     Matheson
     Matsui
     McCarthy (NY)
     McCollum (MN)
     McDermott
     McGovern
     McIntyre
     McNerney
     McNulty
     Meek (FL)
     Meeks (NY)
     Melancon
     Michaud
     Miller (NC)
     Miller, George
     Mitchell
     Mollohan
     Moore (KS)
     Moore (WI)
     Moran (VA)
     Murphy (CT)
     Murphy, Patrick
     Murtha
     Musgrave
     Nadler
     Napolitano
     Neal (MA)
     Oberstar
     Obey
     Olver
     Ortiz
     Pallone
     Pascrell
     Pastor
     Payne
     Perlmutter
     Peterson (MN)
     Pomeroy
     Price (NC)
     Rahall
     Rangel
     Reyes
     Richardson
     Rodriguez
     Ross
     Rothman
     Roybal-Allard
     Ruppersberger
     Rush
     Ryan (OH)
     Salazar
     Sanchez, Linda T.
     Sanchez, Loretta
     Sarbanes
     Schakowsky
     Schiff
     Schwartz
     Scott (GA)
     Scott (VA)
     Serrano
     Sestak
     Shea-Porter
     Sherman
     Sires
     Skelton
     Slaughter
     Smith (WA)
     Snyder
     Solis
     Space
     Spratt
     Stark
     Stupak
     Sutton
     Tanner
     Tauscher
     Taylor
     Thompson (CA)
     Thompson (MS)
     Tierney
     Towns

[[Page H11655]]


     Udall (CO)
     Udall (NM)
     Van Hollen
     Velazquez
     Visclosky
     Walz (MN)
     Wasserman Schultz
     Waters
     Watson
     Watt
     Waxman
     Weiner
     Welch (VT)
     Wexler
     Woolsey
     Wu
     Wynn
     Yarmuth

                               NAYS--196

     Aderholt
     Akin
     Alexander
     Bachmann
     Bachus
     Baker
     Barrett (SC)
     Bartlett (MD)
     Barton (TX)
     Biggert
     Bilbray
     Bilirakis
     Bishop (UT)
     Blackburn
     Blunt
     Boehner
     Bonner
     Bono
     Boozman
     Boustany
     Brady (TX)
     Broun (GA)
     Brown (SC)
     Brown-Waite, Ginny
     Buchanan
     Burgess
     Burton (IN)
     Buyer
     Calvert
     Camp (MI)
     Campbell (CA)
     Cannon
     Cantor
     Capito
     Carter
     Castle
     Chabot
     Coble
     Cole (OK)
     Conaway
     Crenshaw
     Cubin
     Culberson
     Davis (KY)
     Davis, David
     Davis, Tom
     Deal (GA)
     Dent
     Diaz-Balart, L.
     Diaz-Balart, M.
     Doolittle
     Drake
     Dreier
     Duncan
     Ehlers
     Emerson
     English (PA)
     Everett
     Fallin
     Feeney
     Ferguson
     Flake
     Forbes
     Fortenberry
     Fossella
     Foxx
     Franks (AZ)
     Frelinghuysen
     Gallegly
     Garrett (NJ)
     Gerlach
     Gilchrest
     Gingrey
     Gohmert
     Goode
     Goodlatte
     Granger
     Graves
     Hall (TX)
     Hastert
     Hastings (WA)
     Hayes
     Heller
     Hensarling
     Herger
     Hill
     Hobson
     Hoekstra
     Hulshof
     Hunter
     Inglis (SC)
     Issa
     Johnson (IL)
     Johnson, Sam
     Jones (NC)
     Jordan
     Keller
     King (IA)
     King (NY)
     Kingston
     Kline (MN)
     Knollenberg
     Kuhl (NY)
     LaHood
     Lamborn
     Lampson
     Latham
     LaTourette
     Lewis (CA)
     Lewis (KY)
     Linder
     LoBiondo
     Lucas
     Lungren, Daniel E.
     Mack
     Manzullo
     McCarthy (CA)
     McCaul (TX)
     McCotter
     McCrery
     McHenry
     McHugh
     McMorris Rodgers
     Mica
     Miller (FL)
     Miller (MI)
     Miller, Gary
     Moran (KS)
     Murphy, Tim
     Myrick
     Neugebauer
     Nunes
     Paul
     Pearce
     Pence
     Peterson (PA)
     Petri
     Pickering
     Pitts
     Platts
     Poe
     Porter
     Price (GA)
     Pryce (OH)
     Putnam
     Radanovich
     Ramstad
     Regula
     Rehberg
     Reichert
     Renzi
     Reynolds
     Rogers (AL)
     Rogers (KY)
     Rogers (MI)
     Rohrabacher
     Ros-Lehtinen
     Roskam
     Royce
     Ryan (WI)
     Sali
     Saxton
     Schmidt
     Sensenbrenner
     Sessions
     Shadegg
     Shays
     Shimkus
     Shuler
     Shuster
     Simpson
     Smith (NE)
     Smith (NJ)
     Smith (TX)
     Souder
     Stearns
     Sullivan
     Terry
     Thornberry
     Tiahrt
     Tiberi
     Turner
     Upton
     Walberg
     Walden (OR)
     Walsh (NY)
     Wamp
     Weldon (FL)
     Weller
     Westmoreland
     Whitfield
     Wicker
     Wilson (NM)
     Wilson (SC)
     Wolf
     Young (FL)

                             NOT VOTING--12

     Carson
     Castor
     Delahunt
     Holt
     Jindal
     Johnson, E. B.
     Kirk
     Marchant
     McKeon
     Tancredo
     Wilson (OH)
     Young (AK)


                Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised there 
are 2 minutes remaining in this vote.

                              {time}  1218

  So the resolution was agreed to.
  The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
  A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
  Stated against:
  Mrs. MUSGRAVE. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 975, I inadvertently 
voted ``yea'' and intended to vote ``nay.''

                          ____________________






[Congressional Record: October 17, 2007 (House)]
[Page H11656-H11666]
                        

 
                          RESTORE ACT OF 2007

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to House Resolution 746, I call up 
the bill (H.R. 3773) to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
of 1978 to establish a procedure for authorizing certain acquisitions 
of foreign intelligence, and for other purposes, and ask for its 
immediate consideration.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The text of the bill is as follows:

                               H.R. 3773

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Responsible Electronic Surveillance That is Overseen, 
     Reviewed, and Effective Act of 2007'' or ``RESTORE Act of 
     2007''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United States 
              persons outside the United States.
Sec. 3. Procedure for authorizing acquisitions of communications of 
              non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States.
Sec. 4. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications of 
              non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States.
Sec. 5. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of non-United 
              States persons located outside of the United States.
Sec. 6. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court en banc.
Sec. 7. Audit of warrantless surveillance programs.
Sec. 8. Record-keeping system on acquisition of communications of 
              United States persons.
Sec. 9. Authorization for increased resources relating to foreign 
              intelligence surveillance.
Sec. 10. Reiteration of FISA as the exclusive means by which electronic 
              surveillance may be conducted for gathering foreign 
              intelligence information.
Sec. 11. Technical and conforming amendments.
Sec. 12. Sunset; transition procedures.

     SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-
                   UNITED STATES PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED 
                   STATES.

       Section 105A of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as 
     follows:


``CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS 
                       OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105A.  (a) Foreign to Foreign Communications.--
     Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, a court 
     order is not required for the acquisition of the contents of 
     any communication between persons that are not United States 
     persons and are not located within the United States for the 
     purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information, 
     without respect to whether the communication passes through 
     the United States or the surveillance device is located 
     within the United States.
       ``(b) Communications of Non-United States Persons Outside 
     of the United States.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this Act other than subsection (a), electronic surveillance 
     that is directed at the acquisition of the communications of 
     a person that is reasonably believed to be located outside 
     the United States and not a United States person for the 
     purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information (as 
     defined in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by 
     targeting that person shall be conducted pursuant to--
       ``(1) an order approved in accordance with section 105 or 
     105B; or
       ``(2) an emergency authorization in accordance with section 
     105 or 105C.''.

     SEC. 3. PROCEDURE FOR AUTHORIZING ACQUISITIONS OF 
                   COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS 
                   LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

       Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as 
     follows:


   ``PROCEDURE FOR AUTHORIZING ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
        UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105B.  (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     and the Attorney General may jointly apply to a judge of the 
     court established under section 103(a) for an ex parte order, 
     or the extension of an order, authorizing for a period of up 
     to one year the acquisition of communications of persons that 
     are reasonably believed to be located outside the United 
     States and not United States persons for the purpose of 
     collecting foreign intelligence information (as defined in 
     paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by targeting those 
     persons.
       ``(b) Application Inclusions.--An application under 
     subsection (a) shall include--
       ``(1) a certification by the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Attorney General that--
       ``(A) the targets of the acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under this section are persons 
     reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;
       ``(B) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably 
     believed to be persons that are not United States persons;
       ``(C) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign 
     intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a 
     communications service provider or custodian, or an officer, 
     employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who 
     has authorized access to the communications to be acquired, 
     either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or 
     equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store 
     such communications; and
       ``(D) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain 
     foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1) 
     or (2)(A) of section 101(e)); and
       ``(2) a description of--
       ``(A) the procedures that will be used by the Director of 
     National Intelligence and the Attorney General during the 
     duration of the order to determine that there is a reasonable 
     belief that the targets of the acquisition are persons that 
     are located outside the United States and not United States 
     persons;
       ``(B) the nature of the information sought, including the 
     identity of any foreign power against whom the acquisition 
     will be directed;
       ``(C) minimization procedures that meet the definition of 
     minimization procedures under section 101(h) to be used with 
     respect to such acquisition; and
       ``(D) the guidelines that will be used to ensure that an 
     application is filed under section 104, if otherwise required 
     by this Act, when the Federal Government seeks to conduct 
     electronic surveillance of a person reasonably believed to be 
     located in the United States.
       ``(c) Specific Place Not Required.--An application under 
     subsection (a) is not required to identify the specific 
     facilities, places, premises, or property at which the 
     acquisition of foreign intelligence information will be 
     directed.
       ``(d) Review of Application.--Not later than 15 days after 
     a judge receives an application under subsection (a), the 
     judge shall review such application and shall approve the 
     application if the judge finds that--
       ``(1) the proposed procedures referred to in subsection 
     (b)(2)(A) are reasonably designed to determine whether the 
     targets of the acquisition are located outside the United 
     States and not United States persons;
       ``(2) the proposed minimization procedures referred to in 
     subsection (b)(2)(C) meet the definition of minimization 
     procedures under section 101(h); and
       ``(3) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D) 
     are reasonably designed to ensure that an application is 
     filed under section 104, if otherwise required by this Act, 
     when the Federal Government seeks to conduct electronic 
     surveillance of a person reasonably believed to be located in 
     the United States.
       ``(e) Order.--
       ``(1) In general.--A judge approving an application under 
     subsection (d) shall issue an order--
       ``(A) authorizing the acquisition of the contents of the 
     communications as requested, or as modified by the judge;
       ``(B) requiring the communications service provider or 
     custodian, or officer, employee, or agent of such service 
     provider or custodian, who has authorized access to the 
     information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to 
     accomplish the acquisition to provide such information, 
     facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish 
     the

[[Page H11657]]

     acquisition and to produce a minimum of interference with the 
     services that provider, custodian, officer, employee, or 
     agent is providing the target of the acquisition;
       ``(C) requiring such communications service provider, 
     custodian, officer, employee, or agent, upon the request of 
     the applicant, to maintain under security procedures approved 
     by the Attorney General and the Director of National 
     Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the 
     aid furnished;
       ``(D) directing the Federal Government to--
       ``(i) compensate, at the prevailing rate, a person for 
     providing information, facilities, or assistance pursuant to 
     such order; and
       ``(ii) provide a copy of the portion of the order directing 
     the person to comply with the order to such person; and
       ``(E) directing the applicant to follow--
       ``(i) the procedures referred to in subsection (b)(2)(A) as 
     proposed or as modified by the judge;
       ``(ii) the minimization procedures referred to in 
     subsection (b)(2)(C) as proposed or as modified by the judge; 
     and
       ``(iii) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D) 
     as proposed or as modified by the judge.
       ``(2) Failure to comply.--If a person fails to comply with 
     an order issued under paragraph (1), the Attorney General may 
     invoke the aid of the court established under section 103(a) 
     to compel compliance with the order. Failure to obey an order 
     of the court may be punished by the court as contempt of 
     court. Any process under this section may be served in any 
     judicial district in which the person may be found.
       ``(3) Liability of order.--Notwithstanding any other law, 
     no cause of action shall lie in any court against any person 
     for providing any information, facilities, or assistance in 
     accordance with an order issued under this subsection.
       ``(4) Retention of order.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence and the court established under subsection 
     103(a) shall retain an order issued under this section for a 
     period of not less than 10 years from the date on which such 
     order is issued.
       ``(5) Assessment of compliance with minimization 
     procedures.--At or before the end of the period of time for 
     which an acquisition is approved by an order or an extension 
     under this section, the judge may assess compliance with the 
     minimization procedures referred to in paragraph (1)(E)(ii) 
     and the guidelines referred to in paragraph (1)(E)(iii) by 
     reviewing the circumstances under which information 
     concerning United States persons was acquired, retained, or 
     disseminated.''.

     SEC. 4. EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF 
                   COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS 
                   LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

       Section 105C of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as 
     follows:


  ``EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
        UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105C.  (a) Application After Emergency 
     Authorization.--As soon as is practicable, but not more than 
     7 days after the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General authorize an acquisition under this section, 
     an application for an order authorizing the acquisition in 
     accordance with section 105B shall be submitted to the judge 
     referred to in subsection (b)(2) of this section for approval 
     of the acquisition in accordance with section 105B.
       ``(b) Emergency Authorization.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     and the Attorney General may jointly authorize the emergency 
     acquisition of foreign intelligence information for a period 
     of not more than 45 days if--
       ``(1) the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General jointly determine that--
       ``(A) an emergency situation exists with respect to an 
     authorization for an acquisition under section 105B before an 
     order approving the acquisition under such section can with 
     due diligence be obtained;
       ``(B) the targets of the acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under this section are persons 
     reasonably believed to be located outside the United States;
       ``(C) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably 
     believed to be persons that are not United States persons;
       ``(D) there are reasonable procedures in place for 
     determining that the acquisition of foreign intelligence 
     information under this section will be acquired by targeting 
     only persons that are reasonably believed to be located 
     outside the United States and not United States persons;
       ``(E) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign 
     intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a 
     communications service provider or custodian, or an officer, 
     employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who 
     has authorized access to the communications to be acquired, 
     either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or 
     equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store 
     such communications;
       ``(F) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain 
     foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1) 
     or (2)(A) of section 101(e));
       ``(G) minimization procedures to be used with respect to 
     such acquisition activity meet the definition of minimization 
     procedures under section 101(h); and
       ``(H) there are guidelines that will be used to ensure that 
     an application is filed under section 104, if otherwise 
     required by this Act, when the Federal Government seeks to 
     conduct electronic surveillance of a person reasonably 
     believed to be located in the United States; and
       ``(2) the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General, or their designees, inform a judge having 
     jurisdiction to approve an acquisition under section 105B at 
     the time of the authorization under this section that the 
     decision has been made to acquire foreign intelligence 
     information.
       ``(c) Information, Facilities, and Technical Assistance.--
     Pursuant to an authorization of an acquisition under this 
     section, the Attorney General may direct a communications 
     service provider, custodian, or an officer, employee, or 
     agent of such service provider or custodian, who has the 
     lawful authority to access the information, facilities, or 
     technical assistance necessary to accomplish such acquisition 
     to--
       ``(1) furnish the Attorney General forthwith with such 
     information, facilities, or technical assistance in a manner 
     that will protect the secrecy of the acquisition and produce 
     a minimum of interference with the services that provider, 
     custodian, officer, employee, or agent is providing the 
     target of the acquisition; and
       ``(2) maintain under security procedures approved by the 
     Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
     any records concerning the acquisition or the aid 
     furnished.''.

     SEC. 5. OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
                   UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE 
                   UNITED STATES.

       The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 
     105C the following new section:


  ``OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES 
              PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105D.  (a) Application; Procedures; Orders.--Not 
     later than 7 days after an application is submitted under 
     section 105B(a) or an order is issued under section 105B(e), 
     the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney 
     General shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress--
       ``(1) in the case of an application, a copy of the 
     application, including the certification made under section 
     105B(b)(1); and
       ``(2) in the case of an order, a copy of the order, 
     including the procedures and guidelines referred to in 
     section 105B(e)(1)(E).
       ``(b) Quarterly Audits.--
       ``(1) Audit.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this section, and every 120 days thereafter 
     until the expiration of all orders issued under section 105B, 
     the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall 
     complete an audit on the implementation of and compliance 
     with the procedures and guidelines referred to in section 
     105B(e)(1)(E) and shall submit to the appropriate committees 
     of Congress, the Attorney General, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, and the court established under section 103(a) 
     the results of such audit, including, for each order 
     authorizing the acquisition of foreign intelligence under 
     section 105B--
       ``(A) the number of targets of an acquisition under such 
     order that were later determined to be located in the United 
     States;
       ``(B) the number of persons located in the United States 
     whose communications have been acquired under such order;
       ``(C) the number and nature of reports disseminated 
     containing information on a United States person that was 
     collected under such order; and
       ``(D) the number of applications submitted for approval of 
     electronic surveillance under section 104 for targets whose 
     communications were acquired under such order.
       ``(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the completion 
     of an audit under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall 
     submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the 
     court established under section 103(a) a report containing 
     the results of such audit.
       ``(c) Compliance Reports.--Not later than 60 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this section, and every 120 days 
     thereafter until the expiration of all orders issued under 
     section 105B, the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees 
     of Congress and the court established under section 103(a) a 
     report concerning acquisitions under section 105B during the 
     previous 120-day period. Each report submitted under this 
     section shall include a description of any incidents of non-
     compliance with an order issued under section 105B(e), 
     including incidents of non-compliance by--
       ``(1) an element of the intelligence community with 
     minimization procedures referred to in section 
     105B(e)(1)(E)(i);
       ``(2) an element of the intelligence community with 
     procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(ii);
       ``(3) an element of the intelligence community with 
     guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(iii); and
       ``(4) a person directed to provide information, facilities, 
     or technical assistance under such order.

[[Page H11658]]

       ``(d) Report on Emergency Authority.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall annually 
     submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report 
     containing the number of emergency authorizations of 
     acquisitions under section 105C and a description of any 
     incidents of non-compliance with an emergency authorization 
     under such section.
       ``(e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
     section, the term `appropriate committees of Congress' 
     means--
       ``(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives;
       ``(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; 
     and
       ``(3) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.''.

     SEC. 6. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT EN BANC.

       Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(g) In any case where the court established under 
     subsection (a) or a judge of such court is required to review 
     a matter under this Act, the court may, at the discretion of 
     the court, sit en banc to review such matter and issue any 
     orders related to such matter.''.

     SEC. 7. AUDIT OF WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS.

       (a) Audit.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the 
     Department of Justice shall complete an audit of all programs 
     of the Federal Government involving the acquisition of 
     communications conducted without a court order on or after 
     September 11, 2001, including the Terrorist Surveillance 
     Program referred to by the President in a radio address on 
     December 17, 2005. Such audit shall include acquiring all 
     documents relevant to such programs, including memoranda 
     concerning the legal authority of a program, authorizations 
     of a program, certifications to telecommunications carriers, 
     and court orders.
       (b) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the 
     completion of the audit under subsection (a), the Inspector 
     General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House 
     of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
     and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report 
     containing the results of such audit, including all documents 
     acquired pursuant to conducting such audit.
       (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (c) Expedited Security Clearance.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall ensure that the process for the 
     investigation and adjudication of an application by the 
     Inspector General or the appropriate staff of the Office of 
     the Inspector General of the Department of Justice for a 
     security clearance necessary for the conduct of the audit 
     under subsection (a) is conducted as expeditiously as 
     possible.

     SEC. 8. RECORD-KEEPING SYSTEM ON ACQUISITION OF 
                   COMMUNICATIONS OF UNITED STATES PERSONS.

       (a) Record-Keeping System.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Attorney General shall jointly develop 
     and maintain a record-keeping system that will keep track 
     of--
       (1) the instances where the identity of a United States 
     person whose communications were acquired was disclosed by an 
     element of the intelligence community (as defined in section 
     3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) 
     that collected the communications to other departments or 
     agencies of the United States; and
       (2) the departments and agencies of the Federal Government 
     and persons to whom such identity information was disclosed.
       (b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General shall annually submit to the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary 
     of the Senate a report on the record-keeping system created 
     under subsection (a), including the number of instances 
     referred to in paragraph (1).

     SEC. 9. AUTHORIZATION FOR INCREASED RESOURCES RELATING TO 
                   FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE.

       There are authorized to be appropriated the Department of 
     Justice, for the activities of the Office of the Inspector 
     General, the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, and 
     other appropriate elements of the National Security Division, 
     and the National Security Agency such sums as may be 
     necessary to meet the personnel and information technology 
     demands to ensure the timely and efficient processing of--
       (1) applications and other submissions to the court 
     established under section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a));
       (2) the audit and reporting requirements under--
       (A) section 105D of such Act; and
       (B) section 7; and
       (3) the record-keeping system and reporting requirements 
     under section 8.

     SEC. 10. REITERATION OF FISA AS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS BY WHICH 
                   ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MAY BE CONDUCTED FOR 
                   GATHERING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

       (a) Exclusive Means.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
     of law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which 
     electronic surveillance may be conducted for the purpose of 
     gathering foreign intelligence information.
       (b) Specific Authorization Required for Exception.--
     Subsection (a) shall apply until specific statutory 
     authorization for electronic surveillance, other than as an 
     amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), is enacted. Such specific 
     statutory authorization shall be the only exception to 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 11. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
     (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by striking the items 
     relating to sections 105A, 105B, and 105C and inserting the 
     following new items:

``Sec. 105A. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United 
              States persons outside the United States.
``Sec. 105B. Procedure for authorizing acquisitions of communications 
              of non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States.
``Sec. 105C. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications 
              of non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States.
``Sec. 105D. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of persons 
              located outside of the United States.''.
       (b) Section 103(e) of FISA.--Section 103(e) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(e)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``105B(h) or''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``105B(h) or''.
       (c) Repeal of Certain Provisions of the Protect America 
     Act.--Sections 4 and 6 of the Protect America Act (Public Law 
     110-55) are hereby repealed.

     SEC. 12. SUNSET; TRANSITION PROCEDURES.

       (a) Sunset of New Provisions.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
     effective on December 31, 2009--
       (A) sections 105A, 105B, 105C, and 105D of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.) are hereby repealed; and
       (B) the table of contents in the first section of such Act 
     is amended by striking the items relating to sections 105A, 
     105B, 105C, and 105D.
       (2) Acquisitions authorized prior to sunset.--Any 
     authorization or order issued under section 105B of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by 
     this Act, in effect on December 31, 2009, shall continue in 
     effect until the date of the expiration of such authorization 
     or order.
       (b) Acquisitions Authorized Prior to Enactment.--
       (1) Effect.--Notwithstanding the amendments made by this 
     Act, an authorization of the acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.) made before the date of the enactment of this Act shall 
     remain in effect until the date of the expiration of such 
     authorization or the date that is 180 days after such date of 
     enactment, whichever is earlier.
       (2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
     expiration of all authorizations of acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (as added by Public Law 
     110-55) made before the date of the enactment of this Act in 
     accordance with paragraph (1), the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
     on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the Senate a report on such authorizations, 
     including--
       (A) the number of targets of an acquisition under section 
     105B of such Act (as in effect on the day before the date of 
     the enactment of this Act) that were later determined to be 
     located in the United States;
       (B) the number of persons located in the United States 
     whose communications have been acquired under such section;
       (C) the number of reports disseminated containing 
     information on a United States person that was collected 
     under such section;
       (D) the number of applications submitted for approval of 
     electronic surveillance under section 104 of such Act based 
     upon information collected pursuant to an acquisition 
     authorized under section 105B of such Act (as in effect on 
     the day before the date of the enactment of this Act); and
       (E) a description of any incidents of non-compliance with 
     an authorization under such section, including incidents of 
     non-compliance by--
       (i) an element of the intelligence community with 
     procedures referred to in subsection (a)(1) of such section;
       (ii) an element of the intelligence community with 
     minimization procedures referred to in subsection (a)(5) of 
     such section; and

[[Page H11659]]

       (iii) a person directed to provide information, facilities, 
     or technical assistance under subsection (e) of such section.
       (3) Intelligence community defined.--In this subsection, 
     the term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401a(4)).

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 746, in lieu of 
the amendments recommended by the Committee on the Judiciary and the 
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence printed in the bill, the 
amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in part A of House 
Report 110-385, modified by the amendment printed in part B of the 
report, is adopted and the bill, as amended, is considered read.
  The text of the bill, as amended, is as follows:

                               H.R. 3773

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,
       Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the 
     following:

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

       (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the 
     ``Responsible Electronic Surveillance That is Overseen, 
     Reviewed, and Effective Act of 2007'' or ``RESTORE Act of 
     2007''.
       (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act 
     is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United States 
              persons outside the United States.
Sec. 3. Additional authorization of acquisitions of communications of 
              non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States who may be communicating with persons inside the 
              United States.
Sec. 4. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications of 
              non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States who may be communicating with persons inside the 
              United States.
Sec. 5. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of non-United 
              States persons located outside of the United States who 
              may be communicating with persons inside the United 
              States.
Sec. 6. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court en banc.
Sec. 7. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court matters.
Sec. 8. Reiteration of FISA as the exclusive means by which electronic 
              surveillance may be conducted for gathering foreign 
              intelligence information.
Sec. 9. Enhancement of electronic surveillance authority in wartime and 
              other collection.
Sec. 10. Audit of warrantless surveillance programs.
Sec. 11. Record-keeping system on acquisition of communications of 
              United States persons.
Sec. 12. Authorization for increased resources relating to foreign 
              intelligence surveillance.
Sec. 13. Document management system for applications for orders 
              approving electronic surveillance.
Sec. 14. Training of intelligence community personnel in foreign 
              intelligence collection matters.
Sec. 15. Information for Congress on the terrorist surveillance program 
              and similar programs.
Sec. 16. Technical and conforming amendments.
Sec. 17. Sunset; transition procedures.

     SEC. 2. CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-
                   UNITED STATES PERSONS OUTSIDE THE UNITED 
                   STATES.

       Section 105A of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as 
     follows:


``CLARIFICATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS 
                       OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105A. (a) Foreign to Foreign Communications.--
       ``(1) In general.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this Act, a court order is not required for electronic 
     surveillance directed at the acquisition of the contents of 
     any communication between persons that are not known to be 
     United States persons and are reasonably believed to be 
     located outside the United States for the purpose of 
     collecting foreign intelligence information, without respect 
     to whether the communication passes through the United States 
     or the surveillance device is located within the United 
     States.
       ``(2) Treatment of inadvertent interceptions.--If 
     electronic surveillance referred to in paragraph (1) 
     inadvertently collects a communication in which at least one 
     party to the communication is located inside the United 
     States or is a United States person, the contents of such 
     communication shall be handled in accordance with 
     minimization procedures adopted by the Attorney General that 
     require that no contents of any communication to which a 
     United States person is a party shall be disclosed, 
     disseminated, or used for any purpose or retained for longer 
     than 7 days unless a court order under section 105 is 
     obtained or unless the Attorney General determines that the 
     information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily 
     harm to any person.
       ``(b) Communications of Non-United States Persons Outside 
     of the United States.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
     this Act other than subsection (a), electronic surveillance 
     that is directed at the acquisition of the communications of 
     a person that is reasonably believed to be located outside 
     the United States and not a United States person for the 
     purpose of collecting foreign intelligence information (as 
     defined in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by 
     targeting that person shall be conducted pursuant to--
       ``(1) an order approved in accordance with section 105 or 
     105B; or
       ``(2) an emergency authorization in accordance with section 
     105 or 105C.''.

     SEC. 3. ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF 
                   COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS 
                   LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE 
                   COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED 
                   STATES.

       Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as 
     follows:


  ``ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
  UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE 
          COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105B.  (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     and the Attorney General may jointly apply to a judge of the 
     court established under section 103(a) for an ex parte order, 
     or the extension of an order, authorizing for a period of up 
     to one year the acquisition of communications of persons that 
     are reasonably believed to be located outside the United 
     States and not United States persons for the purpose of 
     collecting foreign intelligence information (as defined in 
     paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) by targeting those 
     persons.
       ``(b) Application Inclusions.--An application under 
     subsection (a) shall include--
       ``(1) a certification by the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Attorney General that--
       ``(A) the targets of the acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under this section are persons 
     reasonably believed to be located outside the United States 
     who may be communicating with persons inside the United 
     States;
       ``(B) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably 
     believed to be persons that are not United States persons;
       ``(C) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign 
     intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a 
     communications service provider or custodian, or an officer, 
     employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who 
     has authorized access to the communications to be acquired, 
     either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or 
     equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store 
     such communications; and
       ``(D) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain 
     foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1) 
     or (2)(A) of section 101(e)); and
       ``(2) a description of--
       ``(A) the procedures that will be used by the Director of 
     National Intelligence and the Attorney General during the 
     duration of the order to determine that there is a reasonable 
     belief that the persons that are the targets of the 
     acquisition are located outside the United States and not 
     United States persons;
       ``(B) the nature of the information sought, including the 
     identity of any foreign power against whom the acquisition 
     will be directed;
       ``(C) minimization procedures that meet the definition of 
     minimization procedures under section 101(h) to be used with 
     respect to such acquisition; and
       ``(D) the guidelines that will be used to ensure that an 
     application is filed under section 104, if otherwise required 
     by this Act, when a significant purpose of an acquisition is 
     to acquire the communications of a specific United States 
     person reasonably believed to be located in the United 
     States.
       ``(c) Specific Place Not Required.--An application under 
     subsection (a) is not required to identify the specific 
     facilities, places, premises, or property at which the 
     acquisition of foreign intelligence information will be 
     directed.
       ``(d) Review of ``Application; Appeals.--
       ``(1) Review of application.--Not later than 15 days after 
     a judge receives an application under subsection (a), the 
     judge shall review such application and shall approve the 
     application if the judge finds that--
       ``(A) the proposed procedures referred to in subsection 
     (b)(2)(A) are reasonably designed to determine whether the 
     targets of the acquisition are located outside the United 
     States and not United States persons;
       ``(B) the proposed minimization procedures referred to in 
     subsection (b)(2)(C) meet the definition of minimization 
     procedures under section 101(h); and
       ``(C) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D) 
     are reasonably designed to ensure that an application is 
     filed under section 104, if otherwise required by this Act, 
     when a significant purpose of an acquisition

[[Page H11660]]

     is to acquire the communications of a specific United States 
     person reasonably believed to be located in the United 
     States.
       ``(2) Temporary order; appeals.--
       ``(A) Temporary order.--A judge denying an application 
     under paragraph (1) may, at the application of the United 
     States, issue a temporary order to authorize an acquisition 
     under section 105B in accordance with the application 
     submitted under subsection (a) during the pendency of any 
     appeal of the denial of such application.
       ``(B) Appeals.--The United States may appeal the denial of 
     an application for an order under paragraph (1) or a 
     temporary order under subparagraph (A) in accordance with 
     section 103.
       ``(e) Order.--
       ``(1) In general.--A judge approving an application under 
     subsection (d) shall issue an order--
       ``(A) authorizing the acquisition of the contents of the 
     communications as requested, or as modified by the judge;
       ``(B) requiring the communications service provider or 
     custodian, or officer, employee, or agent of such service 
     provider or custodian, who has authorized access to the 
     information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to 
     accomplish the acquisition to provide such information, 
     facilities, or technical assistance necessary to accomplish 
     the acquisition and to produce a minimum of interference with 
     the services that provider, custodian, officer, employee, or 
     agent is providing the target of the acquisition;
       ``(C) requiring such communications service provider, 
     custodian, officer, employee, or agent, upon the request of 
     the applicant, to maintain under security procedures approved 
     by the Attorney General and the Director of National 
     Intelligence any records concerning the acquisition or the 
     aid furnished;
       ``(D) directing the Federal Government to--
       ``(i) compensate, at the prevailing rate, a person for 
     providing information, facilities, or assistance pursuant to 
     such order;
       ``(ii) provide a copy of the portion of the order directing 
     the person to comply with the order to such person; and
       ``(iii) a certification stating that the acquisition is 
     authorized under this section and that all requirements of 
     this section have been met; and''.
       ``(E) directing the applicant to follow--
       ``(i) the procedures referred to in subsection (b)(2)(A) as 
     proposed or as modified by the judge;
       ``(ii) the minimization procedures referred to in 
     subsection (b)(2)(C) as proposed or as modified by the judge; 
     and
       ``(iii) the guidelines referred to in subsection (b)(2)(D) 
     as proposed or as modified by the judge.
       ``(2) Failure to comply.--If a person fails to comply with 
     an order issued under paragraph (1), the Attorney General may 
     invoke the aid of the court established under section 103(a) 
     to compel compliance with the order. Failure to obey an order 
     of the court may be punished by the court as contempt of 
     court. Any process under this section may be served in any 
     judicial district in which the person may be found.
       ``(3) Liability of order.--Notwithstanding any other law, 
     no cause of action shall lie in any court against any person 
     for providing any information, facilities, or assistance in 
     accordance with an order issued under this subsection.
       ``(4) Retention of order.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence and the court established under subsection 
     103(a) shall retain an order issued under this section for a 
     period of not less than 10 years from the date on which such 
     order is issued.
       ``(5) Assessment of compliance with court order.--At or 
     before the end of the period of time for which an acquisition 
     is approved by an order or an extension under this section, 
     the court established under section 103(a) shall, not less 
     frequently than once each quarter, assess compliance with the 
     procedures and guidelines referred to in paragraph (1)(E) and 
     review the circumstances under which information concerning 
     United States persons was acquired, retained, or 
     disseminated.''.

     SEC. 4. EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF 
                   COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS 
                   LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE 
                   COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED 
                   STATES.

       Section 105C of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
     of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended to read as 
     follows:


  ``EMERGENCY AUTHORIZATION OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
  UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE 
          COMMUNICATING WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105C.  (a) Application After Emergency 
     Authorization.--As soon as is practicable, but not more than 
     7 days after the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General authorize an acquisition under this section, 
     an application for an order authorizing the acquisition in 
     accordance with section 105B shall be submitted to the judge 
     referred to in subsection (b)(2) of this section for approval 
     of the acquisition in accordance with section 105B.
       ``(b) Emergency Authorization.--Notwithstanding any other 
     provision of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence 
     and the Attorney General may jointly authorize the emergency 
     acquisition of foreign intelligence information (as defined 
     in paragraph (1) or (2)(A) of section 101(e)) for a period of 
     not more than 45 days if--
       ``(1) the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General jointly determine that--
       ``(A) an emergency situation exists with respect to an 
     authorization for an acquisition under section 105B before an 
     order approving the acquisition under such section can with 
     due diligence be obtained;
       ``(B) the targets of the acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under this section are persons 
     reasonably believed to be located outside the United States 
     who may be communicating with persons inside the United 
     States;
       ``(C) the targets of the acquisition are reasonably 
     believed to be persons that are not United States persons;
       ``(D) there are procedures in place that will be used by 
     the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney 
     General during the duration of the authorization to determine 
     if there is a reasonable belief that the persons that are the 
     targets of the acquisition are located outside the United 
     States and not United States persons;
       ``(E) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign 
     intelligence information from, or with the assistance of, a 
     communications service provider or custodian, or an officer, 
     employee, or agent of such service provider or custodian, who 
     has authorized access to the communications to be acquired, 
     either as they are transmitted or while they are stored, or 
     equipment that is being or may be used to transmit or store 
     such communications;
       ``(F) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain 
     foreign intelligence information (as defined in paragraph (1) 
     or (2)(A) of section 101(e));
       ``(G) minimization procedures to be used with respect to 
     such acquisition activity meet the definition of minimization 
     procedures under section 101(h); and
       ``(H) there are guidelines that will be used to ensure that 
     an application is filed under section 104, if otherwise 
     required by this Act, when a significant purpose of an 
     acquisition is to acquire the communications of a specific 
     United States person reasonably believed to be located in the 
     United States; and
       ``(2) the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General, or their designees, inform a judge having 
     jurisdiction to approve an acquisition under section 105B at 
     the time of the authorization under this section that the 
     decision has been made to acquire foreign intelligence 
     information.
       ``(c) Information, Facilities, and Technical Assistance.--
       ``(1) Directive.--Pursuant to an authorization of an 
     acquisition under this section, the Attorney General may 
     direct a communications service provider, custodian, or an 
     officer, employee, or agent of such service provider or 
     custodian, who has the lawful authority to access the 
     information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to 
     accomplish such acquisition to--
       ``(A) furnish the Attorney General forthwith with such 
     information, facilities, or technical assistance in a manner 
     that will protect the secrecy of the acquisition and produce 
     a minimum of interference with the services that provider, 
     custodian, officer, employee, or agent is providing the 
     target of the acquisition; and
       ``(B) maintain under security procedures approved by the 
     Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence 
     any records concerning the acquisition or the aid furnished.
       ``(2) Parameters; certifications.--The Attorney General 
     shall provide to any person directed to provide assistance 
     under paragraph (1) with--
       ``(A) a document setting forth the parameters of the 
     directive;
       ``(B) a certification stating that--
       ``(i) the emergency authorization has been issued pursuant 
     to this section;
       ``(ii) all requirements of this section have been met;
       ``(iii) a judge has been informed of the emergency 
     authorization in accordance with subsection (b)(2); and
       ``(iv) an application will be submitted in accordance with 
     subsection (a); and
       ``(C) a certification that the recipient of the directive 
     shall be compensated, at the prevailing rate, for providing 
     information, facilities, or assistance pursuant to such 
     directive.''.

     SEC. 5. OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-
                   UNITED STATES PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE 
                   UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE COMMUNICATING WITH 
                   PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES.

       The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 
     105C the following new section:


  ``OVERSIGHT OF ACQUISITIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS OF NON-UNITED STATES 
 PERSONS LOCATED OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES WHO MAY BE COMMUNICATING 
                 WITH PERSONS INSIDE THE UNITED STATES

       ``Sec. 105D.  (a) Application; Procedures; Orders.--Not 
     later than 7 days after an application is submitted under 
     section 105B(a) or an order is issued under section 105B(e), 
     the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney 
     General shall submit to the appropriate committees of 
     Congress--
       ``(1) in the case of an application--
       ``(A) a copy of the application, including the 
     certification made under section 105B(b)(1); and

[[Page H11661]]

       ``(B) a description of the primary purpose of the 
     acquisition for which the application is submitted; and
       ``(2) in the case of an order, a copy of the order, 
     including the procedures and guidelines referred to in 
     section 105B(e)(1)(E).
       ``(b) Regular Audits.--
       ``(1) Audit.--Not later than 120 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this section, and every 120 days thereafter 
     until the expiration of all orders issued under section 105B, 
     the Inspector General of the Department of Justice shall 
     complete an audit on the implementation of and compliance 
     with the procedures and guidelines referred to in section 
     105B(e)(1)(E) and shall submit to the appropriate committees 
     of Congress, the Attorney General, the Director of National 
     Intelligence, and the court established under section 103(a) 
     the results of such audit, including, for each order 
     authorizing the acquisition of foreign intelligence under 
     section 105B--
       ``(A) the number of targets of an acquisition under such 
     order that were later determined to be located in the United 
     States;
       ``(B) the number of persons located in the United States 
     whose communications have been acquired under such order;
       ``(C) the number and nature of reports disseminated 
     containing information on a United States person that was 
     collected under such order; and
       ``(D) the number of applications submitted for approval of 
     electronic surveillance under section 104 for targets whose 
     communications were acquired under such order.
       ``(2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the completion 
     of an audit under paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall 
     submit to the appropriate committees of Congress and the 
     court established under section 103(a) a report containing 
     the results of such audit.
       ``(c) Compliance Reports.--Not later than 60 days after the 
     date of the enactment of this section, and every 120 days 
     thereafter until the expiration of all orders issued under 
     section 105B, the Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General shall submit to the appropriate committees 
     of Congress and the court established under section 103(a) a 
     report concerning acquisitions under section 105B during the 
     previous period. Each report submitted under this section 
     shall include a description of any incidents of non-
     compliance with an order issued under section 105B(e), 
     including incidents of non-compliance by--
       ``(1) an element of the intelligence community with 
     procedures referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(i);
       ``(2) an element of the intelligence community with 
     minimization procedures referred to in section 
     105B(e)(1)(E)(ii);
       ``(3) an element of the intelligence community with 
     guidelines referred to in section 105B(e)(1)(E)(iii); and
       ``(4) a person directed to provide information, facilities, 
     or technical assistance under such order.
       ``(d) Report on Emergency Authority.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence and the Attorney General shall annually 
     submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report 
     containing the number of emergency authorizations of 
     acquisitions under section 105C and a description of any 
     incidents of non-compliance with an emergency authorization 
     under such section.
       ``(e) Appropriate Committees of Congress Defined.--In this 
     section, the term `appropriate committees of Congress' 
     means--
       ``(1) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the 
     House of Representatives;
       ``(2) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; 
     and
       ``(3) the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of 
     Representatives and the Senate.''.

     SEC. 6. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT EN BANC.

       Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the end the 
     following new subsection:
       ``(g) In any case where the court established under 
     subsection (a) or a judge of such court is required to review 
     a matter under this Act, the court may, at the discretion of 
     the court, sit en banc to review such matter and issue any 
     orders related to such matter.''.

     SEC. 7. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT MATTERS.

       (a) Authority for Additional Judges.--Section 103(a) of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1803(a)) is amended--
       (1) by inserting ``(1)'' after ``(a)'';
       (2) in paragraph (1) (as so designated)--
       (A) by striking ``11'' and inserting ``15''; and
       (B) by inserting ``at least'' before ``seven of the United 
     States judicial circuits''; and
       (3) by designating the second sentence as paragraph (3) and 
     indenting such paragraph, as so designated, two ems from the 
     left margin.
       (b) Consideration of Emergency Applications.--Such section 
     is further amended by inserting after paragraph (1) (as 
     designated by subsection (a)(1)) the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) A judge of the court shall make a determination to 
     approve, deny, or modify an application submitted pursuant to 
     section 105(f), section 304(e), or section 403 not later than 
     24 hours after the receipt of such application by the 
     court.''.

     SEC. 8. REITERATION OF FISA AS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS BY WHICH 
                   ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MAY BE CONDUCTED FOR 
                   GATHERING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

       (a) Exclusive Means.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
     of law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
     U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which 
     electronic surveillance may be conducted for the purpose of 
     gathering foreign intelligence information.
       (b) Specific Authorization Required for Exception.--
     Subsection (a) shall apply until specific statutory 
     authorization for electronic surveillance, other than as an 
     amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), is enacted. Such specific 
     statutory authorization shall be the only exception to 
     subsection (a).

     SEC. 9. ENHANCEMENT OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY IN 
                   WARTIME AND OTHER COLLECTION.

        Sections 111, 309, and 404 of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1811, 1829, and 1844) are 
     amended by striking ``Congress'' and inserting ``Congress or 
     an authorization for the use of military force described in 
     section 2(c)(2) of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 
     1541(c)(2)) if such authorization contains a specific 
     authorization for foreign intelligence collection under this 
     section, or if the Congress is unable to convene because of 
     an attack upon the United States.''.

     SEC. 10. AUDIT OF WARRANTLESS SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS.

       (a) Audit.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
     enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of the 
     Department of Justice shall complete an audit of all programs 
     of the Federal Government involving the acquisition of 
     communications conducted without a court order on or after 
     September 11, 2001, including the Terrorist Surveillance 
     Program referred to by the President in a radio address on 
     December 17, 2005. Such audit shall include acquiring all 
     documents relevant to such programs, including memoranda 
     concerning the legal authority of a program, authorizations 
     of a program, certifications to telecommunications carriers, 
     and court orders.
       (b) Report.--
       (1) In general.--Not later than 30 days after the 
     completion of the audit under subsection (a), the Inspector 
     General shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on 
     Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary of the House 
     of Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence 
     and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report 
     containing the results of such audit, including all documents 
     acquired pursuant to conducting such audit.
       (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be 
     submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
     annex.
       (c) Expedited Security Clearance.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence shall ensure that the process for the 
     investigation and adjudication of an application by the 
     Inspector General or the appropriate staff of the Office of 
     the Inspector General of the Department of Justice for a 
     security clearance necessary for the conduct of the audit 
     under subsection (a) is conducted as expeditiously as 
     possible.

     SEC. 11. RECORD-KEEPING SYSTEM ON ACQUISITION OF 
                   COMMUNICATIONS OF UNITED STATES PERSONS.

       (a) Record-Keeping System.--The Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Attorney General shall jointly develop 
     and maintain a record-keeping system that will keep track 
     of--
       (1) the instances where the identity of a United States 
     person whose communications were acquired was disclosed by an 
     element of the intelligence community (as defined in section 
     3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) 
     that collected the communications to other departments or 
     agencies of the United States; and
       (2) the departments and agencies of the Federal Government 
     and persons to whom such identity information was disclosed.
       (b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence and the 
     Attorney General shall annually submit to the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select 
     Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary 
     of the Senate a report on the record-keeping system created 
     under subsection (a), including the number of instances 
     referred to in paragraph (1).

     SEC. 12. AUTHORIZATION FOR INCREASED RESOURCES RELATING TO 
                   FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE.

       (a) In General.--There are authorized to be appropriated 
     the Department of Justice, for the activities of the Office 
     of the Inspector General, the appropriate elements of the 
     National Security Division, and the National Security Agency 
     such sums as may be necessary to meet the personnel and 
     information technology demands to ensure the timely and 
     efficient processing of--
       (1) applications and other submissions to the court 
     established under section 103(a) of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a));
       (2) the audit and reporting requirements under--
       (A) section 105D of such Act; and
       (B) section 10; and
       (3) the record-keeping system and reporting requirements 
     under section 11.
       (b) Additional Personnel for Preparation and Consideration 
     of Applications for Orders Approving Electronic Surveillance 
     and Physical Search.--

[[Page H11662]]

       (1) National security division of the department of 
     justice.--
       (A) Additional personnel.--The National Security Division 
     of the Department of Justice is hereby authorized such 
     additional personnel as may be necessary to carry out the 
     prompt and timely preparation, modification, and review of 
     applications under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 
     1978 for orders under that Act for foreign intelligence 
     purposes.
       (B) Assignment.--The Attorney General shall assign 
     personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and among 
     appropriate offices of the intelligence community (as defined 
     in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401a(4))) in order that such personnel may directly 
     assist personnel of the Intelligence Community in preparing 
     applications described in that paragraph and conduct prompt 
     and effective oversight of the activities of such agencies 
     under Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders.
       (2) Director of national intelligence.--
       (A) Additional legal and other personnel.--The Director of 
     National Intelligence is hereby authorized such additional 
     legal and other personnel as may be necessary to carry out 
     the prompt and timely preparation of applications under the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 for orders 
     under that Act approving electronic surveillance for foreign 
     intelligence purposes.
       (B) Assignment.--The Director of National Intelligence 
     shall assign personnel authorized by paragraph (1) to and 
     among the intelligence community (as defined in section 3(4) 
     of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))), 
     including the field offices of the Federal Bureau of 
     Investigation, in order that such personnel may directly 
     assist personnel of the intelligence community in preparing 
     applications described in that paragraph.
       (3) Additional legal and other personnel for foreign 
     intelligence surveillance court.--There is hereby authorized 
     for the court established under section 103(a) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(a)) 
     such additional staff personnel as may be necessary to 
     facilitate the prompt and timely consideration by that court 
     of applications under such Act for orders under such Act 
     approving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence 
     purposes. Personnel authorized by this paragraph shall 
     perform such duties relating to the consideration of such 
     applications as that court shall direct.
       (4) Supplement not supplant.--The personnel authorized by 
     this section are in addition to any other personnel 
     authorized by law.

     SEC. 13. DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR APPLICATIONS FOR 
                   ORDERS APPROVING ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE.

       (a) System Required.--The Attorney General shall, in 
     consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and 
     the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, develop and 
     implement a secure, classified document management system 
     that permits the prompt preparation, modification, and review 
     by appropriate personnel of the Department of Justice, the 
     Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security 
     Agency, and other applicable elements of the United States 
     Government of applications under the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) before their 
     submission to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
       (b) Scope of System.--The document management system 
     required by subsection (a) shall--
       (1) permit and facilitate the prompt submittal of 
     applications to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
     under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; and
       (2) permit and facilitate the prompt transmittal of rulings 
     of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to personnel 
     submitting applications described in paragraph (1), and 
     provide for the secure electronic storage and retrieval of 
     all such applications and related matters with the court and 
     for their secure transmission to the National Archives and 
     Records Administration.

     SEC. 14. TRAINING OF INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSONNEL IN 
                   FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION MATTERS.

       The Director of National Intelligence shall, in 
     consultation with the Attorney General--
       (1) develop regulations to establish procedures for 
     conducting and seeking approval of electronic surveillance, 
     physical search, and the installation and use of pen 
     registers and trap and trace devices on an emergency basis, 
     and for preparing and properly submitting and receiving 
     applications and orders under the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978; and
       (2) prescribe related training on the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 and related legal matters for the 
     personnel of the applicable agencies of the intelligence 
     community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National 
     Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))).

     SEC. 15. INFORMATION FOR CONGRESS ON THE TERRORIST 
                   SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM AND SIMILAR PROGRAMS.

       As soon as practicable after the date of the enactment of 
     this Act, but not later than seven days after such date, the 
     President shall fully inform each member of the Permanent 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of 
     the Senate on the following:
       (1) The Terrorist Surveillance Program of the National 
     Security Agency.
       (2) Any program in existence from September 11, 2001, until 
     the effective date of this Act that involves, whether in part 
     or in whole, the electronic surveillance of United States 
     persons in the United States for foreign intelligence or 
     other purposes, and which is conducted by any department, 
     agency, or other element of the United States Government, or 
     by any entity at the direction of a department, agency, or 
     other element of the United States Government, without fully 
     complying with the procedures set forth in the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.) or chapter 119, 121, or 206 of title 18, United States 
     Code.

     SEC. 16. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.

       (a) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first 
     section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
     (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by striking the items 
     relating to sections 105A, 105B, and 105C and inserting the 
     following new items:

``Sec. 105A. Clarification of electronic surveillance of non-United 
              States persons outside the United States.
``Sec. 105B. Additional authorization of acquisitions of communications 
              of non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States who may be communicating with persons inside the 
              United States.
``Sec. 105C. Emergency authorization of acquisitions of communications 
              of non-United States persons located outside the United 
              States who may be communicating with persons inside the 
              United States.
``Sec. 105D. Oversight of acquisitions of communications of non-United 
              States persons located outside of the United States who 
              may be communicating with persons inside the United 
              States.''.

       (b) Section 103(e) of FISA.--Section 103(e) of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803(e)) is 
     amended--
       (1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``105B(h) or''; and
       (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``105B(h) or''.
       (c) Repeal of Certain Provisions of the Protect America Act 
     of 2007.--Sections 4 and 6 of the Protect America Act (Public 
     Law 110-55) are hereby repealed.

     SEC. 17. SUNSET; TRANSITION PROCEDURES.

       (a) Sunset of New Provisions.--
       (1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), 
     effective on December 31, 2009--
       (A) sections 105A, 105B, 105C, and 105D of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.) are hereby repealed; and
       (B) the table of contents in the first section of such Act 
     is amended by striking the items relating to sections 105A, 
     105B, 105C, and 105D.
       (2) Acquisitions authorized prior to sunset.--Any 
     authorization or order issued under section 105B of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as amended by 
     this Act, in effect on December 31, 2009, shall continue in 
     effect until the date of the expiration of such authorization 
     or order.
       (b) Acquisitions Authorized Prior to Enactment.--
       (1) Effect.--Notwithstanding the amendments made by this 
     Act, an authorization of the acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et 
     seq.) made before the date of the enactment of this Act shall 
     remain in effect until the date of the expiration of such 
     authorization or the date that is 180 days after such date of 
     enactment, whichever is earlier.
       (2) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the 
     expiration of all authorizations of acquisition of foreign 
     intelligence information under section 105B of the Foreign 
     Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (as added by Public Law 
     110-55) made before the date of the enactment of this Act in 
     accordance with paragraph (1), the Director of National 
     Intelligence and the Attorney General shall submit to the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee 
     on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the 
     Judiciary of the Senate a report on such authorizations, 
     including--
       (A) the number of targets of an acquisition under section 
     105B of such Act (as in effect on the day before the date of 
     the enactment of this Act) that were later determined to be 
     located in the United States;
       (B) the number of persons located in the United States 
     whose communications have been acquired under such section;
       (C) the number of reports disseminated containing 
     information on a United States person that was collected 
     under such section;
       (D) the number of applications submitted for approval of 
     electronic surveillance under section 104 of such Act based 
     upon information collected pursuant to an acquisition 
     authorized under section 105B of such Act (as in

[[Page H11663]]

     effect on the day before the date of the enactment of this 
     Act); and
       (E) a description of any incidents of non-compliance with 
     an authorization under such section, including incidents of 
     non-compliance by--
       (i) an element of the intelligence community with 
     procedures referred to in subsection (a)(1) of such section;
       (ii) an element of the intelligence community with 
     minimization procedures referred to in subsection (a)(5) of 
     such section; and
       (iii) a person directed to provide information, facilities, 
     or technical assistance under subsection (e) of such section.
       (3) Intelligence community defined.--In this subsection, 
     the term ``intelligence community'' has the meaning given the 
     term in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 
     U.S.C. 401a(4)).

     SEC. __. CERTIFICATION TO COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE PROVIDERS 
                   THAT ACQUISITIONS ARE AUTHORIZED UNDER FISA.

       (a) Authorization Under Section 102.--Section 102(a) of the 
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 
     1802(a)) is amended by striking ``furnishing such aid'' and 
     inserting ``furnishing such aid and shall provide such 
     carrier with a certification stating that the electronic 
     surveillance is authorized under this section and that all 
     requirements of this section have been met''.
       (b) Authorization Under Section 105.--Section 105(c)(2) of 
     such Act (50 U.S.C. 1805(c)(2)) is amended--
       (1) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``; and'' and 
     inserting ``;'';
       (2) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``aid.'' and inserting 
     ``aid; and''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
       ``(E) that the applicant provide such carrier, landlord, 
     custodian, or other person with a certification stating that 
     the electronic surveillance is authorized under this section 
     and that all requirements of this section have been met.''.

     SEC. __. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

       (a) In General.--Section 109 of the Foreign Intelligence 
     Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1809) is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new subsection:
       ``(e) Statute of Limitations.--No person shall be 
     prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense under this 
     section unless the indictment is found or the information is 
     instituted not later than 10 years after the commission of 
     the offense.''.
       (b) Application.--The amendment made by subsection (a) 
     shall apply to any offense committed before the date of the 
     enactment of this Act if the statute of limitations 
     applicable to that offense has not run as of such date.

     SEC. __. NO RIGHTS UNDER THE RESTORE ACT FOR UNLAWFUL 
                   RESIDENTS.

       Nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act 
     shall be construed to prevent lawfully conducted surveillance 
     of or grant any rights to an alien not lawfully permitted to 
     be in or remain in the United States.

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Debate shall not exceed 90 minutes, with 60 
minutes equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking 
minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary and 30 minutes 
equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority 
member of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
  The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers) and the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Smith) each will control 30 minutes and the gentleman from 
Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) each 
will control 15 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers).

                              {time}  1230


                             General Leave

  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members 
have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and 
include extraneous material for the Record on H.R. 3773.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the 
gentleman from Michigan?
  There was no objection.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, 6 years ago the administration unilaterally chose to 
engage in warrantless surveillance of American citizens without court 
review. That decision created a legal and political quagmire. To fight 
terrorism and prevent another 9/11, we need to have an effective and 
legal system of intelligence gathering. That is what we are here to do 
today.
  When that old scheme broke down, the administration then forced 
Congress to accept an equally flawed statute in August, the Protect 
America Act. The Protect America Act granted broad, new powers to 
engage in warrantless searches within the United States, including 
physical searches of our homes, computers, offices, libraries and 
medical records. There was a valiant fight against it, but we did not 
prevail.
  Mr. Speaker, at this time I want to acknowledge the great work of the 
chairman of the Intelligence Committee, Silvestre Reyes, for what he 
did, and on the Judiciary Committee I am quite proud of Jerry Nadler of 
New York, the chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee, and Sheila 
Jackson-Lee, the distinguished gentlewoman from Texas. Also the 
chairman of the Crime subcommittee, Bobby Scott of Virginia.
  The PATRIOT Act granted broad new powers to engage in warrantless 
searches within the United States. It included, as I said, physical 
searches of our homes, of our computers, offices, libraries, and even 
medical records. The law contained no meaningful oversight whatsoever 
and went around the FISA Court. It should not be made permanent. That 
is why we are here today with the RESTORE Act, to create a framework 
for legal surveillance that includes the FISA Court.
  Careful consideration by the Judiciary and by the Intelligence 
Committees addresses the need for flexibility in intelligence gathering 
and delivers the ability to deal with the modern communications 
networks. More importantly, it is consistent with the rule of law, the 
Constitution, and our democratic values.
  Let's be clear about how the RESTORE Act's ``basket'' court orders 
work. These orders are not individual warrants for Osama bin Laden or 
other terrorists. They allow surveillance of an entire terrorist group 
or other foreign power through a flexible court process. This act 
prohibits reverse targeting to engage in warrantless spying on 
Americans. In approving the order, the court must also approve the 
guidelines and procedures that will be used to protect the rights of 
Americans under the Constitution and under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act.
  When the intelligence community turns its attention to Americans at 
home, they will have to get a warrant. That isn't just good policy; 
this is the critically important fourth amendment in action. So RESTORE 
even brings the court into the emergency provisions. NSA must notify 
the court when they start emergency acquisition, and they must seek a 
court order within seven days. This is not a secret process. The court 
knows when it is started and is awaiting the application.
  Mr. Speaker, the phone company can't even turn on the switch unless 
it has a certification from the government that they are actively 
seeking that court order. If the application is turned down, the 
surveillance shuts off, unless the court specifically stays their 
ruling, pending appeal. That appeal must be resolved within 45 days. 
These emergency authorizations are not a backdoor way to avoid court 
review. In fact, the court will be looking at the emergency from the 
very first day.
  The bill also provides other critical safeguards: periodic audits by 
the inspector general; narrow scope of authority to security threats, 
not just anything. It protects privacy of Americans traveling abroad 
and, most important, sunsets the legislation in December of the year 
2009 so that we can review it one more time.
  Importantly, the bill has no retroactive immunity for 
telecommunications carriers whatsoever. Why? Because we have been 
refused the documents to determine whether retroactive immunity has any 
place or not. Interestingly enough, that was delivered to the Senate. 
They have the documents. We, begging, pleading, screaming, we don't 
have the documents. So no retroactive immunity. Until we receive these 
underlying documents, there is no way we can begin any consideration of 
that request. So the legislation before us today is a very, very 
important start-over improving the measure, the Protect America Act, 
that still exists.
  Please join with me in a careful consideration of everything in this 
measure.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself 2 minutes.
  Mr. Speaker, the Democratic leadership calls the RESTORE Act of 2007 
a compromise. Well, I agree. It compromises our national security.
  Why do Democrats want to make it more difficult to gather 
intelligence

[[Page H11664]]

about terrorists after 9/11 than before 
9/11? Since the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was enacted 30 
years ago, our terrorist fighting agencies have been able to gather 
information about terrorists without obtaining a court order. Why 
burden our intelligence agencies now? Why make it harder to find Osama 
bin Laden? Why protect terrorists?
  This bill, for the first time, requires a court order to monitor 
foreign persons outside the United States. If Osama bin Laden makes a 
call and we don't know who it is to, a court order must be obtained. 
That takes many hours and could well mean we miss an opportunity to 
stop an attack.
  The bill omits liability protection for telephone companies that 
provided the Federal Government with critical information after 9/11. 
These companies deserve our thanks, not a flurry of frivolous lawsuits.
  The bill sunsets in 4 years, yet our agencies need certainty and 
permanence so they can develop new procedures and train employees.
  Mr. Speaker, we don't need the RESTORE Act. We do need to restore the 
ability of the Federal Government to gather information about 
terrorists and to stop them.
  Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the minority whip, the gentleman 
from Missouri (Mr. Blunt).
  Mr. BLUNT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  Mr. Speaker, the law in place today, the law that we brought up to 
today's technical standards in August, is essentially the law that the 
Congress passed in 1978, a Congress that had a majority of Democrats in 
it. Jimmy Carter, President Carter, signed that bill, and it has worked 
for 30 years now.
  The way this bill is drafted, the administration would be forced to 
seek warrants, as Mr. Smith just said, for foreign targets in case they 
might call the United States. If Osama bin Laden calls the United 
States, we should know it. If Osama bin Laden calls and it turns out to 
be a call that didn't matter, there are ways to minimize that. In all 
likelihood, if Osama bin Laden called, it shouldn't be a matter that we 
shouldn't know about. If he calls to order a pizza and says ``deliver 
the pizza to cave 56 in Bora Bora,'' that is something we ought to know 
at that minute. We should not have to go to court to monitor these 
calls, just in case they call somebody in the United States.
  Granting what in essence is de facto fourth amendment constitutional 
rights to noncitizens who are not in this country makes no sense at 
all. It is not the right direction. We need a permanent fix.
  This bill does not contain, as my good friend Mr. Conyers said, 
retroactive liability. We need to have liability for those companies 
that stepped up after 9/11 and immediately helped the country begin to 
monitor the things we needed to monitor. We still don't clarify in this 
bill what our intelligence agencies do.
  This does not solve any problems. It creates problems. When you have 
a system that has worked in one way, and effectively, for 30 years, 
there is no reason to change that system. This bill makes needless, 
dangerous changes.
  I hope we vote ``no'' on this bill today, and get down, as we did in 
late July, to the reality of what we have to do to defend the country.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Speaker, 6 years after the tragic attacks of 9/11, Osama bin 
Laden remains at large. The minority whip may make light about ordering 
pizza, but the reality is we still haven't gotten Osama bin Laden and 
America faces a continuing threat from al Qaeda and other terrorist 
groups.
  Just this week, Admiral Scott Redd, Director of the National 
Counterterrorism Center, said that the Iraq war has created a giant 
recruiting tool for al Qaeda. When asked if we are safer as a result of 
our invasion of Iraq, Admiral Redd said, ``Tactically, probably not.''
  Mindful of this threat, our committees have drafted the RESTORE Act. 
I wish to thank Chairman Conyers and members of both committees for 
their great work in drafting this legislation. The RESTORE Act arms our 
intelligence community with powerful new authorities to conduct 
electronic surveillance of terrorist targets around the world, but it 
also restores essential constitutional protections for Americans that 
were sharply eroded when the President signed the Protect America Act, 
or PAA, last August.
  Some on the other side want to extend the PAA permanently. That would 
be a huge mistake. According to expert testimony we have received in 
our committee, the PAA authorizes warrantless domestic searches of 
Americans' homes, mail, computers and medical records, as the chairman 
of the Judiciary Committee observed earlier.
  Although we don't have any information at this time that the Bush 
administration is using this authority in this way, we must guard 
against the possibility of abuse in the future. Our committee heard 
testimony that the PAA even allows spying without probable cause on our 
own soldiers deployed overseas talking to their families back home. 
That, Mr. Speaker, is wrong.
  The RESTORE Act helps restore the balance between security and 
liberty. The RESTORE Act puts the FISA Court back in the business of 
protecting Americans' constitutional rights, after the President and 
Vice President put the court out of business 6 years ago.
  Some will try to portray this bill as extending rights to terrorists. 
We have heard that this morning. That is absolutely false. This bill 
does not require individual warrants for terrorists such as Osama bin 
Laden. The bill does not extend fourth amendment rights to foreigners.
  What the RESTORE Act does is allow ``block surveillance'' of 
terrorists overseas with speed and agility. And we will never go dark, 
because the bill includes an emergency provision that allows 
surveillance to continue for 45 days, even before the court approves 
the procedures to protect Americans.
  This legislation will restore accountability and oversight in all 
three branches. It restores regular audits and reports by the 
Department of Justice, which will be reviewed by the Congress. It also 
requires an audit of the President's Domestic Surveillance Program and 
other warrantless surveillance programs.
  Perhaps most importantly, it ensures that when an American is the 
target of surveillance, an individualized warrant is required.
  Some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle prefer an 
approach that would allow the administration to police itself. This 
simply is unacceptable. If we have learned anything from the past 6 
years, it is that unchecked executive power is a recipe for abuse and 
it has not made us safer.

                              {time}  1245

  Mr. Speaker, I have served my country as a soldier in combat in 
Vietnam, as a law enforcement professional on our southern border, and 
as a Member of Congress for the past decade. I have seen the great 
strength of our country; and in my view, the source of that great 
strength is our Constitution. The RESTORE Act provides tools to keep 
this Nation safe and upholds our Constitution and our laws. So I urge 
my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on the RESTORE Act.
  Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the former 
chairman and current ranking member of the Homeland Security Committee, 
the gentleman from New York (Mr. King).
  Mr. KING of New York. I thank the ranking member for yielding and, 
Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition to this legislation.
  Mr. Speaker, the United States has been at war with Islamic terrorism 
since September 11, 2001. This is a war which threatens our survival as 
a civilization, and it is a war where it is essential that we maximize 
the use of electronic surveillance which is one of the strongest 
weapons in our arsenal. It is a weapon which should not be trivialized, 
nor should the struggle be trivialized by using such terms as 
``spying'' and ``snooping.''
  It is important we keep in mind who the real enemy is. The real enemy 
is al Qaeda and Islamic terrorism, not the men and women of our own 
government who are working so hard to protect us.
  Mr. Speaker, the Protect America Act, which was passed less than 3 
months ago, updated FISA and struck the appropriate balance between 
protecting our citizens from terrorist attacks and protecting our civil 
liberties.

[[Page H11665]]

Tragically, today's bill, the RESTORE Act, marks an undeniable retreat 
in the war against Islamic terrorism. It limits the type of foreign 
intelligence information that may be acquired and actually gives 
foreign targets more protections than Americans get in criminal cases 
here at home.
  By sunsetting this legislation in 2 years, the RESTORE Act fails to 
provide permanency and guidance to the intelligence community. The 
RESTORE Act also fails to provide legal protection and immunity to 
those American companies who answered the call of this administration 
and also answered the call of an administration which believed that 
this policy was legal, and not only this administration, but high-
ranking officials from previous administrations, Democrat and 
Republican, who believed that these policies were legal and 
constitutional. There was no personal gain for these companies. To 
allow them to be subjected to lawsuits for answering the Nation's call 
in time of great peril is mean-spirited, vindictive and shortsighted.
  Mr. Speaker, I strongly urge defeat of this misguided legislation.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am proud to recognize the chairman of the 
Crime Subcommittee, Bobby Scott of Virginia, for 3 minutes.
  Mr. SCOTT of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for 
yielding and appreciate his leadership in efforts to address 
warrantless surveillance under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, or FISA, and for introducing a bill that corrects many of the 
shortcomings of the bill that passed the House last August.
  The RESTORE Act establishes a strong framework, much stronger than 
the administration's bill, to fight terrorism effectively, while 
providing reasonable safeguards to protect personal privacy. There are 
several important clarifications made in the bill.
  One important change draws the appropriate distinctions based on 
physical location and types of targets. There has never been any 
controversy over the fact that surveillance directed at people, all of 
whom are overseas, you don't need a warrant in that situation.
  The second is that the bill removes vague and overbroad language in 
the bill that passed last August that would allow wiretapping of 
conversations without a warrant if the communication was concerning a 
foreign target. That by its own wording suggests that if two citizens 
are in the United States talking about someone overseas, you could 
wiretap their communications without a warrant. The bill before us 
makes it clear that the persons involved in the conversation must be 
overseas, not just that the subject of the conversation must be 
overseas.
  Third, the RESTORE Act goes a step further than the administration's 
bill and only allows expanded wiretapping authority in cases involving 
foreign intelligence unless it relates specifically to national 
security, as opposed to the overexpansive nature of foreign 
intelligence. Foreign intelligence can include anything, a trade deal 
or anything of general foreign affairs activities. If you are talking 
about national security, let's talk about national security.
  Finally, the RESTORE Act was made even stronger in the committee by 
requiring the Department of Justice in its application to the court to 
specify the primary purpose of the wiretapping. Under FISA, when an 
agent wanted to obtain a warrant, he had to certify the purpose of the 
wiretap. The standard was altered in the PATRIOT Act which says it only 
has to be a significant purpose.
  We have to put this change in context because the Department of 
Justice has not credibly refuted the allegations that some U.S. 
Attorneys were fired because they failed to indict Democrats in time to 
affect an upcoming election. So if the Department of Justice wiretapped 
someone when foreign intelligence is not the primary purpose, you have 
to wonder what the primary purpose is. This bill would require the 
administration to reveal the true purpose of the wiretap.
  Mr. Speaker, in the fight against terrorism, we do not have to 
sacrifice constitutional protections or trust this administration to 
secretly protect the rights of Americans without public accountability. 
It is important to note that everything that the administration can do 
in its own bill it can do under this bill. We just require them to get 
a warrant before they do it or get a warrant after they do it if they 
are in a hurry, but they can wiretap and get the information. We just 
provide a little modicum of oversight to ensure that the laws are being 
obeyed.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman 
from Virginia (Mr. Forbes), the ranking member of the Crime, Terrorism 
and Homeland Security Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee.
  Mr. FORBES. Mr. Speaker, as you listen to this debate and those 
watching at home listen to it, the only thing that they hear are 
Democrats saying one thing and Republicans saying another thing. They 
don't know who to believe. They listen to the debate and they hear 
hatred of the Presidency and hatred of Republicans. But, Mr. Speaker, 
we just invite you today, take a moment and a breath and put all of 
that hatred on the shelf for just a second, and to remember that the 
Director of National Intelligence, not an appointee from President Bush 
but from President Clinton, has stated that their approach will be 
devastating to the intelligence-gathering capability of the United 
States.
  Mr. Speaker, here are the facts that we know. In the late 1990s, we 
cut intelligence. Then we had 9/11 where we had the worst terrorist 
attack to ever hit our shores. Since that time, regardless of who did 
it and deserves the credit, we have not had a major terrorist attack 
hit the United States, and now we are trying to repeat the cycle and 
cut intelligence-gathering capability again. We all know what is going 
to happen if, and some would say when, another terrorist attack hits. 
We are going to bring law enforcement in and we are going to point our 
finger at them and say: Why didn't you stop it?
  Mr. Speaker, just recently we had one of our NFL football coaches get 
in trouble because he was trying to steal the signals of an opposing 
team. Everyone argued and agreed that wasn't fair. And they were right; 
but that was a game. Mr. Speaker, in this particular situation it is 
not a game. We don't want a fair fight. We want to steal every signal 
we can from enemies who are trying to harm this Nation, and we want to 
know what they are doing before they do it so we can protect and defend 
this country.
  Mr. Speaker, I just invite us to take the hatred off the shelf, take 
the rhetoric off the shelf, and to exchange it for ration and reason so 
we can do what we need to do to gather the intelligence to keep our 
people safe.
  Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, it is my pleasure to yield 1\1/2\ minutes to 
the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Boswell), a fellow Vietnam veteran, a 
member of the House Intelligence Committee.
  Mr. BOSWELL. Mr. Speaker, first I support this bill. It is a good 
bill, and it protects the Constitution.
  I would like to speak principally to my colleagues who, like me, are 
concerned about what the bill does and the fact that it does not 
address fully the issue of carrier liability. As you know, the 
administration and telecommunication companies have requested that we 
provide them with immunity from lawsuits or prosecutions arising out of 
information and assistance they may have provided to the intelligence 
community.
  Now, we don't precisely know what information they have provided. We 
don't know what they were told by the administration about the legality 
of what they were doing. I hope and believe those companies acted in 
good faith with patriotism. They were trying to do their part for 
national security, and I think they deserve our appreciation. I take 
seriously their concerns that they might be subject to liability.
  That being said, I don't believe it should be the responsibility of 
the telecommunications companies to prove that they provided the 
information in a legal way if the Federal Government fails to meet the 
burden of proof that the demand or request for information is brought 
forth in a legal manner. If that burden of proof is not met, it should 
be the government that should be held primarily accountable.
  I believe that eventually we should be able to take care of any 
company who acted in good faith and cooperated in the name of 
protecting our Nation.

[[Page H11666]]

No one who acted out of good faith with a desire to protect America 
should be punished. But we must know what brought forth their action, 
and under what circumstances, and what pressure, if any, they acted. As 
this process moves forward, I expect to get more information from the 
administration on their generation of the demands or requests for 
information. Support the bill.
  Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to my colleague 
and the former district judge from Texas (Mr. Gohmert), who is also the 
deputy ranking member of the Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security 
Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee.
  Mr. GOHMERT. I thank the ranking member.
  I appreciate Chairman Reyes' service to this country. I believe 
people on the other side of the aisle mean well when they say they want 
to protect the Constitution. The problem is this extends the 
Constitution beyond America to our enemies on foreign soil who cut off 
heads of Americans. That's just the way it is. It does that.
  Now, we keep hearing across the aisle: This has nothing to do with 
foreign-to-foreign calls; it has nothing to do with foreign terrorists 
on foreign soil calling foreign terrorists, and it says that in the 
bill. You don't have to worry about that. You don't need a warrant for 
that.
  The trouble is there is no conceivable time that an honest 
intelligence gatherer overseas can swear that a foreign terrorist that 
he wants to surveil will never under any circumstances call the United 
States. Since he can't swear to that and since there is a chance, 
especially since this law is public and the terrorists will know all 
they need to do is call America, order flowers, call time and 
temperature, they have made a call on American soil and they come 
within the requirement of getting a court order. It is very clear.
  This doesn't extend the Constitution in a way that it should be on 
American soil. It protects enemies. I know people on the other side, 
you just want to protect civil liberties, but what scares me is what 
will happen when a terrorist attack in the nature of 9/11 comes again. 
People will rush to take away civil liberties, and people will 
voluntarily give up civil liberties for protection, liberties that were 
so hard fought.
  So for those who are really going to be protected, I don't understand 
the concern. This is going to protect also Americans who get calls from 
foreign terrorists on foreign soil. That is what this is really going 
to do.
  I don't think it is too much in the interest of America, tell your 
American friends to tell their terrorist friends on foreign soil, don't 
call me, use some other means of communication.
  Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased now to recognize the 
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) whose experience in 
intelligence matters and FISA in particular are well known, and I yield 
to her 2\1/2\ minutes.

                              {time}  1300

  Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank Chairman Conyers for yielding to me 
and commend him, Chairman Reyes, and others for their work on this 
bill.
  Though I no longer serve on the Intelligence Committee, I have 
followed this issue with intense interest. This bill contains many 
provisions that I and others authored over recent years. It is a strong 
bill and I strongly support it.
  It amends FISA to permit more speed and agility in the effort to 
conduct surveillance of those who would do us harm, but it also 
provides more resources in a court-approved framework to assure that 
the constitutional rights of Americans are protected.
  I continue to follow the intelligence in my role as Chair of the 
Homeland Security Intelligence Subcommittee, and threats against our 
homeland are real. Westerners are training in al Qaeda camps in the 
tribal areas of Pakistan. Europe, especially Britain, may experience 
more attacks. Plots have recently been foiled in Denmark and Germany. 
We helped Britain disrupt the so-called ``liquid bomb plot'' in August 
of 2006, a plot that could have killed more Americans than were killed 
on 9/11 as they flew on U.S.-bound airlines from England.
  Mr. Speaker, all Members want to protect America. All Members want to 
protect America. So it deeply saddens me that this is yet another 
partisan debate. It could have been otherwise.
  For several weeks, Pete Hoekstra, who chaired the Intelligence 
Committee when I was privileged to serve as ranking member, and I tried 
to fashion a bipartisan bill. Our list of principles could, I believe, 
have garnered broad support in both caucuses and led to a veto-proof 
majority in this House.
  Americans want Congress on a bipartisan basis to assure we disrupt 
plots to harm us and protect our Constitution. We could do both and we 
must do both. This is a strong bill. It does both. Vote ``aye.''
  Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in strong opposition to the 
RESTORE Act, which reauthorizes the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
program. As a Member of the Select Committee on Intelligence, I am 
deeply troubled that the majority has determined to handcuff the 
ability of the Intelligence Community (IC) to collect foreign 
intelligence information.
  Forgive me for stating the obvious, but ladies and gentleman, we are 
at war. We should be helping the IC in their efforts to protect 
Americans and fight the war on terror; this legislation needlessly ties 
our hands in collecting foreign intelligence information.
  Here are a few of the problems with this bill: No liability 
protection for the telecommunications companies who have responded to 
the IC's call for help since the 9/11 attacks; extends constitutional 
(4th Amendment) protections for terrorists by requiring FISA court 
approval to monitor individuals outside the U.S.; new and cumbersome 
FISA court guidelines for IC operations; Justice Department audits of 
IC activities and operations; onerous and duplicative reporting 
requirements by the DNI; and the list goes on . . . .
   Mr. Speaker, under this legislation, the Majority has made it clear 
that our Intelligence agencies should be guided by the tenants of the 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) when monitoring terrorist 
activity.
  This policy is reckless and I urge a ``no'' vote.
  Mr. BACA. Mr. Speaker, I rise today to ask for support of the RESTORE 
Act. It provides important tools to support U.S. intelligence gathering 
efforts and protects against terrorists. And it does so while 
safeguarding Americans' civil liberties.
  I hope that as the legislative process plays out, the issue of 
carrier immunity is dealt with in a manner that will facilitate 
cooperation. Obtaining intelligence to protect our country against 
terrorists is the ultimate goal and this bill does this in a fair and 
balanced manner. Innocent Americans will have stronger protections and 
the intelligence needed to protect our country will not be compromised. 
Accountability is always a good thing.
  We will have much needed congressional oversight, compliance reports 
from the Attorney General and audit reports by the Inspector General of 
the Department of Justice.
  The RESTORE Act is a great balance and a positive move in the right 
direction.
  Please support this important legislation.
  Mr. CHANDLER. Mr. Speaker, while I am pleased to stand here today and 
support the RESTORE Act of 2007 because I believe it is critical as 
part of our nation's defense, I urge us to work together in the coming 
weeks to end the uncertainty facing some of our corporate citizens in 
dealing with the threat posed by Islamic fundamentalists.
  Particularly, I am referring to our nation's telecommunications 
carriers, companies that historically have been a critical piece of our 
successful national security apparatus. These U.S. companies, who 
combined employ well over half a million Americans, should be treated 
with appreciation for the cooperation they display in the effort to 
keep our people safe.
  In the confusion and muddied backdrop of the debate, what has clearly 
been left aside is the longstanding and consistent policy of Congress 
and the courts that governs the way these companies may lawfully 
provide assistance to law enforcement and intelligence agencies. This 
policy is that telecommunications carriers are authorized to assist 
government agencies in a wide variety of circumstances; public policy 
encourages such cooperation; and, consistent with that policy, when a 
carrier cooperates in good faith with a duly authorized request for 
assistance, the carrier is immune from liability to third-parties. In 
the interest of our nation's security, these carriers should continue 
to have immunity when cooperating in good faith.
  We must work together over the coming weeks to clarify the role of 
carriers in this debate, and specifically offer the appropriate path to 
immunity when such highly sensitive matters are involved. 
Telecommunications carriers are nothing less than patriotic citizens 
fulfilling their role in our global struggle against terrorism.
  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to section 2 of House Resolution 
746, further proceedings on the bill will be postponed.




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