[Congressional Record: May 10, 2007 (House)]
[Page H4779-H4786]
PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 2082, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee
on Rules, I call up House Resolution 388 and ask for its immediate
consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
H. Res. 388
Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this
resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule
XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of
the bill (H.R. 2082) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2008 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. The
first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. All points
of order against consideration of the bill are waived except
those arising under clause 9 of rule XXI. General debate
shall be confined to the bill and shall not exceed one hour
equally divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking
minority member of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence. After general debate the bill shall be
considered for amendment under the five-minute rule. It shall
be in order to consider as an original bill for the purpose
of amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment in the
nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill. The
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be
considered as read. All points of order against the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute are waived except
those arising under clause 9 of rule XXI. Notwithstanding
clause 11 of rule XVIII, no amendment to the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be in order
except those printed in the report of the Committee on Rules
accompanying this resolution. Each such amendment may be
offered only in the order printed in the report, may be
offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall be
considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified
in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent
and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall
not be subject to a demand for division of the question in
the House or in the Committee of the Whole. All points of
order against such amendments are waived except those arising
under clause 9 or 10 of rule XXI. At the conclusion of
consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee shall
rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as
may have been adopted. Any Member may demand a separate vote
in the House on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the
Whole to the bill or to the committee amendment in the nature
of a substitute. The previous question shall be considered as
ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage
without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with
or without instructions.
Sec. 2. During consideration in the House of H.R. 2082
pursuant to this resolution, notwithstanding the operation of
the previous question, the Chair may postpone further
consideration of the bill to such time as may be designated
by the Speaker.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida (Mr. Hastings) is
recognized for 1 hour.
{time} 1330
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, for the purpose of debate only,
I yield the customary 30 minutes to my friend from Washington (Mr.
Hastings). All time yielded during consideration of the rule is for
debate only.
[[Page H4780]]
General Leave
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that
all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend
their remarks and insert extraneous materials into the Record.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Florida?
There was no objection.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
Mr. Speaker, as the Clerk just read, House Resolution 388 provides
for consideration of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008 under a structured rule.
The rule makes in order a total of ten amendments, almost half of
which will be offered by Members of the minority, including one which
will be offered by the ranking member of the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Representative Hoekstra.
The rule also makes in order an amendment that I offered, along with
my colleague on the Intelligence Committee, Representative Rogers of
Michigan, and our bipartisan amendment is a commonsense solution to
holding the Office of National Director of intelligence accountable for
its actions.
The House will have a chance to debate our amendment later today, and
I hope my colleagues will support it.
I would like to point out that Members who wish to do so, as the
Chair of the Intelligence Committee has pointed out previously, can go
to the Intelligence Committee office to examine the classified schedule
of authorizations for the programs and activities of the intelligence
and intelligence-related activities of the national and military
intelligence programs.
The importance of the intelligence community touches all Americans as
our Nation's first line of defense against increasing world threats.
Effective intelligence is the first method to protect our citizens and
prevent debacles like the war in Iraq.
The underlying legislation authorizes funding for all United States
intelligence agencies, including the national and military intelligence
programs. It is the largest intelligence authorization bill ever
considered by the House and takes significant steps to eliminate
duplication and ineffectiveness in our intelligence agencies.
The bill increases funding to improve human intelligence, training
and send additional intelligence analysts overseas to maximize their
abilities. It also requires additional intelligence reports on North
Korea and Iranian efforts to become nuclear capable. We also take
significant steps to improve the collecting, deciphering and
understanding of intelligence.
The effectiveness of our intelligence community is significantly
jeopardized when the diversity of the intelligence community does not
reflect the diverse world in which we live. Women and minorities
continue to be disproportionately underrepresented in the senior ranks
and the core mission areas of analysis, human intelligence collection,
and science and technology.
Simply put, we still do not have an intelligence community that looks
like our country or the world. Minorities make up 37 percent of the
American population, yet only 21 percent of the intelligence community,
and the numbers for African-Americans and Latinos is woefully below
that number. This is a problem that is addressed in the underlying
bill, which requires the development of a strategic plan to increase
diversity within the intelligence community and mandates increased
diversity among the rank and file of the community.
I am fond of saying in the Intelligence Committee hearings that it
doesn't take more degrees than the thermometer to be a spy, but
somebody back there decided that that must have been the case.
Another significant concern exacerbated by this lack of diversity is
a deficiency of linguist abilities in the intelligence community. There
are countless stories of intelligence tapes that had piled up in the
months leading up to September 11 when the terrorist attacks occurred
here. That was done because we didn't have anyone to translate them.
Experts and administrators lament the fact that we don't have enough
Arabic, Farsi, Urdu or Dari speakers, and we always go in that
direction, but we don't have enough Asian language speakers, either, in
the intelligence community and the military.
How can we expect to completely correct that course without
thoroughly modernizing the recruitment, selection and security
clearance processes to quickly bring on board people with these
critical skills? The underlying bill provides for the commonsense
modernization of our security clearance procedures to address this
growing problem, requiring that the system make more efficient use of
those who are proficient in foreign languages or with cultural,
linguistic or other subject matter expertise that is critical to
national security. We must make these necessary modernizations to adapt
to the ever-changing threats around us.
Finally, following the recommendations of 11 three- and four-star
generals, the bill requests that the National Intelligence Council
produce a National Intelligence Estimate on the national security
impact of global climate change. Some of my colleagues on the other
side of the aisle have expressed discontent with this provision,
because they believe that enough research is currently under way about
climate change. In doing so, in my judgment, they failed to recognize
that climate change is impacting global security.
Just look at the Middle East, the battle for scarce resources among
those who have been displaced, particularly in Iraq, has the potential
to generate sociopolitical environments that foster the creation of
terrorist cells. If we can't even agree on the implications of climate
change, it is obvious that more research is necessary, especially
observing the impact of climate change on the movement of people and
resources, and how that connects to terrorism.
Footnote right there, I pointed out in the Rules Committee that Iraq
would be the classic example of what I am talking about. There are 2
million refugees, and it is almost like it is kind of hidden, that are
displaced from their homes in Iraq. There are 400,000 to 500,000
internally displaced in Iraq. Yet, what we find is they are being
pushed into Syria, Jordan and Egypt where there are already significant
water resource problems. Someone tell me how that doesn't equate to an
environment where terrorists will be produced.
If we can't agree on this, I can assure you that we are going to have
significant problems in the future. Even the National Defense
University has recognized these implications by prioritizing response
to large-scale national disasters in some of its most recent training
simulations. As scientists explore the connection between such
disasters and climate change, it is imperative that the national
security implications of such events be thoroughly understood.
I am glad that our committee addresses this issue in the bill. If we
have learned anything from the failures of the war in Iraq, it is that
reliable intelligence is critical to ensuring America's national
security.
I am pleased to support this rule and urge my colleagues to do the
same.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. I want to thank the gentleman from
Florida (Mr. Hastings) for yielding me the customary 30 minutes, and I
yield myself as much time as I may consume.
(Mr. HASTINGS of Washington asked and was given permission to revise
and extend his remarks.)
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I rise today in opposition
to this restrictive rule.
The Intelligence Authorization Act generally receives strong
bipartisan support. But let me be clear that the underlying bill does
contain bipartisan provisions that are important to protecting our
national security, make no bones about that.
However, the bill also contains a number of provisions that are of
concern and could weaken our national security and intelligence
capabilities by providing less than adequate resources and placing
restrictions on our intelligence operations.
I am concerned that the Democratic leadership chose to include
section 407 in the underlying bill. My friend from Florida talked at
length about that provision, which would require our Nation's
intelligence community to direct
[[Page H4781]]
its limited resources to a National Intelligence Estimate on global
climate change.
I have to ask, what message are we sending to our allies and our
enemies when Congress instructs our intelligence experts to stop what
they are doing on issues that threaten American lives and, instead,
focus on theoretical risks from global warming.
Furthermore, earlier this year, this House created a new Select
Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming to focus on the
risks of global warming. This is in addition to several Federal
agencies that are already analyzing climate change. Congress should let
this panel that was created, and existing Federal agencies, focus on
climate change so that our intelligence analysts can focus on materials
of classified information and work to prevent threats against American
lives.
But I am pleased, I have to say, with the Rules Committee last night
because they made in order an amendment to be offered by the ranking
member, Mr. Hoekstra, of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, that will strike section 407 and allow our spies to be
spies. I think we can have a very good debate on that. I think we ought
to have that debate. I am pleased that the Rules Committee made that
amendment in order.
However, the Democratic leadership did deny several thoughtful
amendments offered by Mr. Castle, Mr. Flake, Mr. Rogers of Michigan and
Mrs. Wilson of New Mexico.
I urge my colleagues to oppose this restrictive rule, which only
allows 10 out of 433 Members of the House to offer their ideas on how
to better strengthen our intelligence community.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
{time} 1345
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. At this time, I am very pleased to yield 2
minutes to the distinguished chairman of the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence, my good friend from Texas (Mr. Reyes).
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleague and good friend from
Florida for yielding me time on this very important rule.
I rise in support of this rule. The terrorist plot that was recently
uncovered in New Jersey this past week shows that we cannot let our
guard down in the effort to learn the plans and intentions of people
who would do us grave harm.
The underlying bill, H.R. 2082, provides funding for the brave women
and men of our intelligence community. I have visited with them in
every corner of the world, and I am constantly amazed by their
patriotism, their dedication to mission, and their commitment to doing
our Nation's most sensitive and dangerous business, often without
public acknowledgement or recognition.
Today, the United States faces a dynamic set of threats, challenges,
and opportunities. We are at war in Iraq and Afghanistan. We face a
growing terrorist threat. Countries like Iran and North Korea are
working towards a nuclear bomb. And we face a number of other key
challenges in Africa, Latin America, and from rising powers like Russia
and China. These major challenges require a major effort by our
government to collect, to analyze, and to disseminate intelligence, and
to do so within the legal bounds of our Constitution and our national
values.
This bill invests in human intelligence. It invests in analysis and
analysts. It funds key counterterrorism operations and sensitive
collection programs. And it improves critical oversight in key areas
such as the overuse of contractors and the lack of qualified linguists
in the intelligence business.
This bill was developed on a bipartisan basis. And although there may
not be agreement on every single point, there is agreement on all the
major points. This rule will allow a full debate on many of the key
issues before us, and I, along with my colleagues, should welcome this
debate. So I urge my colleagues to vote ``yes'' on the rule.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 6
minutes to the gentlelady from New Mexico, a member of the Intelligence
Committee, Mrs. Wilson.
(Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico asked and was given permission to revise
and extend her remarks.)
Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Mr. Speaker, I am here to urge my
colleagues to oppose the rule and to oppose the previous question on
the rule for the Intelligence authorization bill today.
I offered an amendment in the Rules Committee that was similar to one
that I offered in the Intelligence Committee that would modernize our
foreign intelligence surveillance laws so that we can listen to the
terrorists trying to kill us, while protecting Americans' civil
liberties.
Every member of the House Intelligence Committee knows that the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is not working, and so does the
Speaker of the House. In fact, she has been briefed on this earlier
than any of us have, since shortly after 9/11.
Last week, in unclassified session in front of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, Admiral Mike McConnell, the Director of
National Intelligence, urged the Congress to modernize our intelligence
surveillance laws. He told us and the world, ``We are actually missing
a significant portion of what we should be getting.'' We are missing a
significant portion of what we should be getting.
In January of this year, the Attorney General of the United States
wrote to the Congress and said there were new Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court orders that were innovative, that would put the
President's terrorist surveillance program underneath the auspices of a
judge in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. They are
innovative, because the court is stretching the law like a twin sheet
over a king-sized bed. And every member of the Intelligence Committee
knows just how fragile the legal framework is in this arrangement. Yet,
a single judge in a nonadversarial secret setting has said it is okay
to go forward on this basis because it is important to the country, and
the Congress has failed to act. Will the next judge go along?
Every one of us knows there is a problem. Here is the problem:
In 1978, almost all local calls were on wire and almost all long
distance calls were transmitted by microwave over the air. The FISA law
distinguishes between collection over a wire and collection over the
air. You don't need a FISA warrant to collect signals over the air. And
that is where long-haul communications were in 1978.
Now, in 21st-century communications, the situation is completely
reversed. Most long-haul communications are on wire and most local
calls are over the air. 230 million Americans have cell phones, but the
FISA law we operate under is stuck in the 1970s, while we are trying to
protect this country from terrorists who are exploiting the 21st-
century technology that was invented by this great country. We are
tying the hands of our intelligence agencies while our enemies are
using these communication systems to plot to kill Americans.
But the rule is even worse than that. The committee has ruled in
order an amendment by Mr. Flake and Mr. Schiff that insists, insists
that our intelligence agencies must use this outdated 1978 law. What do
you think the FISA judges are going to think when they see that pass
the House of Representatives?
We are actually missing a significant portion of what we should be
getting. What did we miss today? What are the terrorists plotting
today? What are they talking about that is flowing over the wires that
America built today? Who is going to die tomorrow because you won't let
our Intelligence Committees listen to the foreign communications on a
wire and you will not allow a debate on this floor on this very
important issue?
I pray to God that we don't need another 9/11 Commission to look at
what our failures were in intelligence. Because if we have to look at
failures, if we have to look at whether we should have done something
when we had a chance, then mark this vote on this day in history, when
the Democrat majority in this House chose to tie our hands in the face
of a determined enemy.
If we defeat the previous question on this rule, we will offer the
amendment to modernize our intelligence surveillance laws to update
them for 21st-century technology. A vote in favor of the
[[Page H4782]]
previous question on this rule is a vote to keep the FISA law frozen in
time in 1978, while our enemies use 21st-century communications to plot
to kill Americans.
I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the previous question and
``no'' on the rule.
Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to oppose the Rule for debate and
the previous question on the Intelligence Authorization Bill today.
This vote is more important than most procedural things we do around
here.
I offered an amendment in the Rules Committee that would modernize
our Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Laws so that we can listen to the
terrorists trying to kill us and protect the civil liberties of
Americans.
Every member of the House Intelligence Committee knows that the FISA
law is not working, and so does the Speaker of the House. She has been
briefed on these matters since shortly after 9/11--long before any of
us were.
Last week, in unclassified session in front of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, Admiral Mike McConnell, the Director of
National Intelligence urged the Congress to modernize this law. He told
us and the world, ``We are actually missing a significant portion of
what we should be getting.''
In classified session, the details of the problems are even worse.
On January 17, 2007 the Attorney General told the Congress that there
were new Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court orders that are
``innovative''.
They are ``innovative'' because the court is stretching the law like
a twin sized sheet to cover a king sized bed.
And every member of the Intelligence Committee knows just how fragile
this legal arrangement is.
Yet, a single judge in a non-adversarial secret session allowed it is
important to the security of the country and because the Congress has
failed to act.
Will the next judge continue to stretch the law?
The Problem
In 1978 almost all local calls were on wire and almost all long-haul
calls were over the air.
The FISA law distinguishes between collection on a wire and
collection out of the air.
You don't need a FISA warrant to collect foreign intelligence over
the air.
Now, in 21st century communications, the situation is completely
reverse.
Most long-haul communications are on a wire and local calls are in
the air.
But the calls we want, for foreign intelligence information, are on
the wires and fiber optic cables.
The FISA law we operate under is stuck in the 1970s while we are
trying to protect this country from enemies that use 21st century
communications.
We're tying the hands of our intelligence agencies while our enemies
are using the communications systems we built to plot to kill us.
But It Gets Worse
But the rule is even worse than that.
The committee has ruled in order an amendment by Mr. Flake and Mr.
Schiff that says our agencies must use this outdated 1978 law.
The Democrat leadership will insist that we turn our backs on 21st
century terrorists, using 21st century communications and pretend we
can be frozen in a 1978 world.
``We are actually missing a significant portion of what we should be
getting,'' said our Director of National Intelligence.
What did we miss today?
What are the terrorists plotting today?
Who is going to die tomorrow because you won't let our intelligence
agencies listen to foreign communications on a wire?
I pray to God we never need another ``9/11 Commission'' that looks at
how we failed to protect ourselves when we could have done something.
If we do, mark this vote, this day in history, when the Democrat
majority in this House chose to tie our hands in the face of a
determined enemy.
A vote in favor of the previous question on this rule is a vote to
keep the FISA law frozen in time in 1978 while our enemies use 21st
century communications to plot to kill Americans.
I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the previous question and
``no'' on the rule.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased to yield 5
minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from California, my friend Ms.
Harman, who is the previous ranking member of the Select Committee on
Intelligence, and is a member of the newly appointed Special
Intelligence Oversight Panel.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I thank Mr. Hastings for yielding to me and
commend him for his continued service both on the Intelligence
Committee and on the Rules Committee.
As you heard, I served the past 8 years on the Intelligence
Committee, the last 4 as ranking member. I loved that opportunity, and
I remain passionate about the issues. I believe that there is nothing
more central to our roles in Congress than to keep our country safe.
And that committee has crucial jurisdiction.
I would respectfully disagree with the comments of the last speaker,
Mrs. Wilson. I have been briefed longer than she has on how the so-
called NSA program operates. I believed then and I believe now that it
can and must fully comply with FISA, a law that has been modernized 12
times since 9/11 through changes we have made which I supported in the
PATRIOT Act.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the rule and of H.R. 2082. In my
current role as Chair of the Homeland Security Intelligence Information
Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment Subcommittee, I continue to
review intelligence reports and to talk to our key security
professionals. And, Mr. Speaker, I am concerned. We have surged our
intelligence resources into Iraq, where they are necessarily focused on
the tactical needs of warfighters. Meanwhile, al Qaeda has gained
strength and is inspiring new cells worldwide. We have taken our eye
off the ball. That ball is al Qaeda.
Mr. Speaker, we should all be worried that terrorist cells are here
in the United States, right now, waiting for the right moment to
strike. We have yet to develop a truly effective system for sharing
time-sensitive intelligence about terror plots with first responders,
whom I would like to believe could be first preventers.
Even at the Federal level, a variety of data bases, classifications,
and pseudo-classification systems could still, 5\1/2\ years after 9/11,
prevent us from connecting the dots. We have yet to develop an adequate
strategy to counter radicalization in our prisons and in our
communities. The events at Cherry Hill, New Jersey, earlier this week
are the latest example. And we have not yet broken into the inner
circle of the senior al Qaeda leadership even though we have been at
this for more than 5 years. These problems are urgent as we could be
attacked at any time.
I recently reviewed the classified annex to this bill and continue to
pay special attention to our technical satellite programs. Changes to
these programs cannot be discussed in an unclassified setting such as
this; but I want to reiterate my long-held view that the women and men
who build these systems constitute a major strategic asset of the
United States. Rocket scientists do not grow on trees, and we must keep
them highly trained and highly motivated. Without their help, we could
literally lose our ability to see, hear, and communicate.
Finally, I strongly support the effort to develop a National
Intelligence Estimate on climate change. Changes in our climate will
affect critical resources such as water, food, and arable land, as we
are seeing now in Darfur and in many parts of Africa. Droughts affect
the stability of governments, and the stability of governments is one
of the key things we need to know about through our intelligence. This
isn't bugs and bunnies, or even Bugs Bunny. It is survival or
destruction. And if we make responsible moves now, our grandchildren
will benefit.
Mr. Speaker, by supporting this legislation, the Congress stands with
the extraordinary women and men of our intelligence community who often
serve in austere locations on unaccompanied assignments. I am one of
the few here who know these people and know where they serve. I say to
them, our Nation owes you our gratitude; hopefully, this bill provides
the support and tools you need as well as honors your sacrifice.
I urge support of the rule. I urge support of the underlying
legislation, and I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3
minutes to the gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Castle).
Mr. CASTLE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to H. Res. 388, the rule for
consideration of the fiscal year 2008 Intelligence Authorization Act.
[[Page H4783]]
As a former member of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, I
strongly believe we must enact all of the 9/11 Commission's
intelligence recommendations, even those that apply to our own
congressional committees.
In its final report, the 9/11 Commission concluded that: ``Of all our
recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be among the
most difficult and important. So long as oversight is governed by the
current congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American
people will not get the security they want and need.''
The bipartisan 9/11 Commission Report and the subsequent 9/11 Public
Disclosure Project recommended three alternatives for reforming
congressional oversight of intelligence. These options include: one,
establishing a Joint Committee on Intelligence modeled after the old
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy; two, establishing House and Senate
Committees on Intelligence with authorizing and appropriating
authority; or, three, establishes a new Appropriations Subcommittee on
Intelligence.
{time} 1400
In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 2001, Congress enacted a
large majority of the Commission's recommendations. However, as it
turns out, it has been those recommendations that apply directly to the
tangled rules and procedures here in the United States Congress that
have been left unfinished.
Earlier this year the Democratic leadership attempted to apply a
Band-Aid to this problem by creating a powerless Intelligence Oversight
Panel that has very little control over actual funding decisions. This
is clearly not what the 9/11 Commission recommended. In fact, its
report plainly states that, ``tinkering with the existing committee
structure is not sufficient.''
This week I offered a simple amendment to the bill before us, calling
for a sense of Congress that this House should act to implement these
crucial 9/11 recommendations, but it was denied under this rule.
Mr. Speaker, the American people have insisted that we implement all
of these important recommendations, even those that are difficult. We
will be doing this country a disservice until we put in place an
effective committee structure capable of giving our national
intelligence agencies the oversight, support and leadership they need.
I urge the defeat of the rule.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, would you be so kind as to
inform each side of the remaining amount of time?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Florida has 14\1/2\
minutes, and the gentleman from Washington has 19 minutes.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I am very pleased at this time
to yield 4 minutes to my good friend from New Jersey, with whom I serve
on the Select Committee on Intelligence, and he is the Chair of the
Special Intelligence Oversight Panel, Mr. Holt.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend and colleague from Florida.
It is indeed a pleasure and an education to serve with him on the
Intelligence Committee.
And I rise today in support of this rule and the underlying bill.
Although this bill is not the full reform that I think is needed, it
does contain many features that, if enacted, will improve the operation
and oversight of the intelligence community.
I'd like to address one amendment that has been made in order, and I
thank the Rules Committee for accepting for consideration an amendment
that I offer that seeks to address an issue that's been one of the
highest concerns for both this committee and the Congress, and that is,
protecting the security and the cover of intelligence officers.
This grows out, in part, of the well publicized outing of a former
CIA officer. For nearly 4 years, I have led the effort within the
committee and in this body to determine the facts surrounding this
case, as well as its consequences for the security of our Nation.
In previous Congresses, on eight separate occasions, in committee and
on this floor, the then majority voted down every effort to obtain
information on the matter. As I repeatedly noted at the time, Mr.
Fitzgerald's criminal inquiry could never address some of the key
questions that we sought to have answers for.
For example, how and why did Ms. Plame's cover status become known to
those with no legitimate need to know?
How much damage was done to our intelligence collection efforts as a
result of the outing of Ms. Plame?
What measures has the CIA and has the now Director of National
Intelligence taken to prevent similar compromises in the future?
We still need answers to these and other questions. The amendment I
am offering today that I will offer, would require the President,
through the Director of National Intelligence, to report annually to
the Congress on the need for any modification to the Intelligence
Identities Protection Act to improve the legal protections for covert
agents. This report, along with other oversight that the committee will
undertake, and that I hope to undertake through the Select Intelligence
Oversight Panel, will help us establish exactly what measures need to
be taken to minimize the chances of such compromises of the identities
of covert operatives in the future.
These men and women take enormous risks on our behalf. We owe it to
them to ensure their identities are protected from the exposure, both
from hostile intelligence services but even from those within our own
government who would seek to retaliate against them for speaking truth
to power.
This reporting requirement would be an amended version of what the
President is already required to do, but has failed to do every year.
We seek to have the President show more diligence in protecting the
cover of these employees.
Let me reiterate that this amendment represents only one step in the
process. The chairman of the committee has assured me that there will
be oversight and legislative action on this issue in addition to that
which we are taking today.
I would also like to comment that it is astonishing in the debates
leading up to this in committee and here on the floor today that there
would be so much attention being paid to the request for a national
intelligence estimate on climate change. A preliminary assessment is
already in the works. We should want the intelligence community to be
considering everything that affects our national security, be it
demographics or climate or droughts. I am astonished that there would
be any resistance to having such a national intelligence estimate. So I
am pleased that the committee has put that in this bill, and I look
forward to its passage.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 3
minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. Weldon).
Mr. WELDON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
yielding.
I rise to commend the majority for including, under the rule, the
amendment that will be offered later by Mr. Hoekstra, the ranking
minority member, former chairman of the committee, to strike section
407 of the bill. This is the section of the bill that so many people
have commented on so far today that will now task our national
intelligence resources to start looking at the issue of climate change.
To me there is a great irony in this happening here today because for
many years we have heard criticism from Democrats over and over again
on the so-called inefficiencies, inadequacies of our national
intelligence capabilities, specially as it related to WMD in Iraq and
their failure to get an accurate picture of that. And now we see today
an expansion of their duties and responsibilities.
I believe most Americans look for our intelligence agencies not to be
engaged on the issue of climate change but more directly to be involved
in the business of protecting American safety and security, protecting
our national assets, protecting the American people.
Furthermore, one of the other things that strikes me as greatly
ironic about this is, we have an extensive array of Federal agencies
currently studying this issue. We have NOAA, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, which has a wide array of satellites and
scientists that are constantly studying both short-term and
[[Page H4784]]
long-term implications of climate change.
We have, additionally, NASA engaged on this issue, with three major
Earth-observing satellites on orbit studying the issue of the Earth's
climate.
And as well, there are multiple programs run by the National Science
Foundation; they have the Geosciences Directorate (GEO), the Office of
Polar Programs (OPP), the Atmospheric Science Subactivity, the ATM.
And, ladies and gentlemen, I haven't even touched on the EPA and all
the work that they are doing on this issue.
To me, this issue is controversial. There is a sizeable number of
Americans who feel that the severity of the problem of climate change
does not justify some of the extreme actions that many people in the
radical environmental community are trying to propose today, and I just
can't help but feel this is a political issue to try to hijack our
intelligence assets to get them on the global warming bandwagon so we
could have draconian changes in American policy that could adversely
affect our economy and our Nation.
So I thank the majority for putting the Hoekstra amendment in order.
Mr. Hoekstra, the former chairman, now ranking member, is very
knowledgeable on intelligence policy.
I intend on supporting the Hoekstra amendment. I encourage all my
colleagues to listen carefully to that debate.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I now yield 2\1/2\ minutes to
the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. Blumenauer).
Mr. BLUMENAUER. I appreciate the gentleman's courtesy in extending
time.
I, too, am perplexed by the debate that is being advanced in terms of
being able to focus on the national security implications of the threat
of global warming. I sat on the committee, the Special Committee on
Global Warming and Energy Independence, as we listened to three and
four star admirals and generals, as we listened to the former head of
the CIA talking about the defense implications for the United States of
Global Warming.
These men were not radical environmentalists. These are respected
experts who have led a lifetime of service to protecting the integrity,
the defense, the security of the United States. They are deeply
concerned that our dependence on foreign oil from unstable areas of the
world. The overwhelming scientific consensus that climate change,
global warming is a reality, led them to argue in the most strong terms
that we need to be serious about it. Item after item, about the
strategic implications, about what happens to defenses of the United
States, to instability around the world of water-stressed areas, to new
disease patterns, these are not arcane, philosophical issues. This
isn't environmental fringe. This is the nuts, and bolts of the future,
of our country.
It has already been made clear that we already have a great deal of
work that is underway. What this would require is assembling it under
the guise and guidance of people who are experts in national security
to put it in the national security context.
Other major countries around the world are grappling with this. I
think the Rules Committee was entirely appropriate to put what I think
is a misguided amendment on the floor because I think it is time for
people who care about the future of the country, who are looking at the
evidence, to have an honest and thoughtful debate.
But to somehow dismiss this as the province of radical
environmentalism or a detraction from the hard work of planning for
America's security future is, I think, sadly misplaced.
I appreciate what the Rules Committee has done. I support the rule
and look forward to the debate later.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5
minutes to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Flake).
Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, we have a process here with regard to
legislation and how it moves through the Congress. In particular, the
rules were changed in January, some very welcome changes to the rules
with regard to earmarks.
We said that if you are going to have an earmark in a bill, or in a
report, that you need to state that you do not have a financial
interest in that earmark, and then you need to submit that earmark, or
it has to be submitted with the report so that Members can actually see
that and see that there is no financial interest, see if it has merit
or warrant.
This process is not being followed here. We were told initially that
there were no earmarks in the bill, and then those of us who went up to
view the classified annex did not see a list. There was no list
available there. We were told later that it was with the Clerk's
Office. Then with the Parliamentarians.
It turned out that we finally did get the list, and here it is, 26
earmarks in the bill. But the list was not made public. It was not
given to us until 5 hours after the deadline that the Rules Committee
had established to submit your amendments.
So somebody who wanted to amend the bill or actually challenge or to
highlight or to discuss the earmarks that are mentioned here and listed
here did not have an opportunity to craft an amendment.
Again, this list was received, it was made public 5 hours after the
Rules Committee already shut down the amendment process. This rule
cannot go forward like this. We cannot continue to do business like
this.
{time} 1415
We all know the problems that we have had with the appropriations
process with the earmarking, the scandals that have gone on. The
earmarking process is secretive enough, it seems, in the Congress
without adding the layer of the Intelligence Committee. Then there are
things that you can't even discuss on the floor, that we can't discuss
openly; so it makes it even more difficult.
Members need not be reminded that Duke Cunningham now sits in prison
because of earmarks he largely got in the intelligence process, in the
Intelligence Committee. We cannot allow that to happen again. We have
to have a process that makes sure that that cannot happen. And that
process is not happening right now, when you don't get lists until long
after the process, when you can't challenge them on the floor. And then
we have the problem here in open session where you can't even challenge
the earmark and talk about what the earmark is actually about because
you are in open session and you might be talking about classified
things.
So for that reason I am announcing now that I will offer a motion to
move into secret session after these votes are concluded.
Let me just remind the Members, if you want a process where you know
what is going on, we have to move into secret session. If you vote
against the motion to go into secret session, you are, in essence,
saying let's just let it go; I don't care what is in there.
I would challenge those who want to see what is going on to go up and
view the classified annex. You may or may not be able to find out what
these earmarks are about. But with this process, the way it is, we will
never know, and we can't continue this.
I applauded the majority's move to new earmark rules in January. They
were, I felt, stronger than what we did when we were in the majority. I
think they should have been stronger, but they were better than what we
did, and I said so. But we aren't following those rules.
We have already highlighted a few times that if the majority submits
a list of earmarks, incomplete or complete, or simply states there are
no earmarks in a bill, there is no parliamentary recourse for the
minority or for anyone on the floor. We have to accept at face value
that there are no earmarks or that the list is complete. That is wrong.
That is something that has to change.
But when we are dealing with the Intelligence Committee on something
this important, we can't let this process go forward without adopting
some of the reforms that we have said that we are going to adopt.
So for that reason I will offer a motion for a secret session at the
appropriate time, and I would urge a vote against this rule.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I say through the Chair to my
friend from Washington that I thought that we were having our last
speakers
[[Page H4785]]
but I didn't know the nature and substance of his last speaker's
remarks toward that end.
Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes now to the distinguished Chair of the
Select Committee on Intelligence, who has comments regarding Mr.
Flake's comments.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
I just wanted to assure my friend and colleague from Arizona that,
being sensitive to the issues that he mentioned about one of our former
colleagues that, regrettably, now sits in prison, the Intelligence
Committee worked very closely with the Parliamentarians, the Committee
on Standards and Official Conduct, and other committees of the House on
earmark disclosures.
I am at a loss as to who informed the gentleman that there would be
no earmarks, but I think the gentleman now knows that the Government
Printing Office made an error in omitting the earmarks and that is why
the delay in putting them up on their Web site.
Be that as it may, this committee followed the requirements of the
House for each Member receiving an earmark to certify that neither he
or she nor his or her spouse would benefit financially from any kind of
action. We complied with all the requirements, all the rules, and all
the regulations.
As I said, we did this in a very transparent and bipartisan way
because we did not want to leave any impressions that things were not
done according to the rules that had been set out. Everything that we
did with this process followed the rules and the process. Where the
glitch came was where the printing was done. There was an error
committed by the Government Printing Office, and that is why there was
a delay in posting the earmarks.
Again, I am at a loss as to who informed the gentleman that there
were no earmarks, because it certainly wasn't anyone from the committee
that I am aware of.
Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. REYES. I would be glad to yield to the gentleman.
Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, I believe the requirement in the House rules
is that the report be filed 72 hours before it is brought up. Actually,
those of us who went up to view the classified annex, I asked for the
list, if there was a list of earmarks, and I was told there was none.
Mr. REYES. Reclaiming my time just to explain to you that our process
in the committee is that you would be provided support from the
Republican staff.
If they misinformed the gentleman about the issue of earmarks, I
don't know why they would do that because clearly staff on both sides
knew that there were earmarks.
I will continue to yield.
Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Yes, I reviewed and asked during that time if there were. I would say
if it is the case that a computer glitch led to no printing of the
list, then you would think that the Rules Committee would say, okay,
maybe we should move the process back and allow Members to offer
amendments on specific earmarks.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, reclaiming my time, it is my understanding
that the gentleman was offered an opportunity to do that and rejected
it.
Mr. FLAKE. An unspecified opportunity. If the gentleman will continue
to yield, Mr. Speaker, I actually offered an amendment that was
rejected by the Rules Committee just encompassing all earmarks that
might be in the bill because I wasn't given a list. I had no idea if
there were any earmarks. And that was rejected.
The problem we have here in open session and the reason I will be
calling to move into secret session is that in open session it is
difficult to actually discuss what the earmark might be about.
Mr. REYES. I am being again reassured by staff, reclaiming my time,
Mr. Speaker, that the gentleman was offered, less than an hour ago,
unanimous consent to allow him to have an amendment.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the
gentleman from Arizona.
Mr. FLAKE. Mr. Speaker, what I was offered about 30 minutes ago was
an opportunity to offer perhaps a few amendments with regard to
specific earmarks. It was never clear how many amendments I would be
allowed to offer or on which of these earmarks. Until that is
clarified, there is no reason to move forward.
And, also, let me point out again unless you are in secret session,
you can't discuss exactly what the earmark might be about; so you might
run afoul of any statements that you have signed or any confidentiality
agreements that we are under in terms of classified information. And
when I actually went up with the list to look at the classified annex
again and pointed at certain earmarks, I was told that we are not sure
what that was about. That was requested by a Member who is not on the
committee. We don't know. And until we can have that Member actually
stand up and be able to say what that earmark is about, whether it goes
to a private company, whether it goes to an agency, we just don't know.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. FLAKE. Yes.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, let me again reassure the gentleman that
every single earmark here followed the House rules. Every Member that
has an earmark certified, like every Member is required to in the
House, that they had no specific interest, that the spouse had no
specific interest with the company or companies where the money was
going.
Mr. FLAKE. I don't sit on the Intelligence Committee; so there may be
some disagreement there about whether the ranking member was informed
or not, and I think that will probably come to light later.
But in this case, if we had followed the rules, we would have had the
list before the Rules Committee shut down the amendment process because
you need to be able to offer amendments on specific earmarks. And in
this case, unless a Member can go up and view the classified annex and
come away with an assurance or some kind of comfort level that the
earmark under question is for the intended purpose or it should be in
the intelligence bill, then we are at a loss when we come to vote. I
think our constituents expect us to be informed, and when we can't even
go up and view the classified annex and be informed, then there is a
problem.
Mr. REYES. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. FLAKE. Yes, I will yield.
Mr. REYES. Once again, Mr. Speaker, let me reassure my good friend
and colleague from Arizona that the report, along with all the listing
of earmarks, was filed appropriately, timely with the Rules Committee.
Where the glitch occurred was in the printing.
But be that as it may, I want to tell you again, reassure you, that
we did not handle the process in the Intelligence Committee any
different than any other committee in the House, and I would hope the
gentleman would understand that.
Mr. FLAKE. My office has a timeline, actually, if anyone is
interested, and when we requested the list of earmarks, when we finally
got it, what we were told by which office, and I can tell you this is
no way to run a process, particularly given the recent history of
problems that we have had in this regard. And that is why I am
concerned, and that is why I feel we can't do that in an open session
like this. We have to go to secret session.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. FLAKE. Yes, I will.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, does the gentleman have now an
amendment prepared that he is ready to offer?
Perhaps it would be that we could ask unanimous consent that your
amendment be allowed to go forward.
Mr. FLAKE. Reclaiming my time, I would not, given that I cannot
discuss some of what I need to discuss in open session, given what has
transpired. I don't think that we can. That is why we need a closed
session.
I will offer the motion, and if you don't feel that we need to go
into closed session, then you can vote against it.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my
time.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the balance
of my time.
Mr. Speaker, I will be asking for a ``no'' vote on the previous
question so
[[Page H4786]]
that I can amend this rule to allow the House to consider an amendment
offered by Representative Heather Wilson of New Mexico and provide the
appropriate waivers for that amendment.
The Wilson amendment would modernize the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act to enhance the ability of our Nation to protect itself
in times of war and elevated national security threats. And I think
that point was made very, very eloquently by the gentlewoman from New
Mexico.
Yesterday, the Rules Committee met and rejected on a party-line vote
the Wilson amendment.
Mr. Speaker, I want to advise my friend from Florida that I just got
a request for time here, and that is being discussed right now, that I
was not aware of.
Mr. Speaker, how much time do I have remaining?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Washington has 7\1/2\
minutes remaining. The gentleman from Florida has 4 minutes remaining.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I continue to reserve the
balance of my time.
[Congressional Record: May 10, 2007 (House)]
[Page H4787-H4794]
[[Page H4787]]
House of Representatives
PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 2082, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008--Continued
{time} 1430
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Let me say, then, Mr. Speaker, I will be
asking for my colleagues to defeat the previous question so we will
have an opportunity to vote on the merits of this amendment.
Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to insert the text of the
amendment and extraneous material immediately prior to the vote on the
previous question.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Washington?
There was no objection.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 6
minutes to the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee (Mr.
Hoekstra).
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Speaker, I just need to clarify that the process that was used
for the earmarks on this bill did not follow all of the rules that we
had agreed upon in the committee and perhaps inconsistent with the
Rules of the House. But I do know that they were inconsistent with the
agreement that we have in the Intelligence Committee, which is that on
a bipartisan basis the chairman and the ranking member would review
earmarks, their content, the Member, and would sign off on the
appropriateness of each of those earmarks.
With the filing of the bill to the Rules Committee, there was at
least one earmark that was never brought to my attention and for which
I never received a copy of the request from the Member identifying the
earmark or a statement from the Member indicating that there was no
financial interest along with the earmark. Now, that does not say the
earmark is bad. It does not say it was wrong. It is just a process foul
in terms of what we had agreed to.
Mr. REYES. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield to the chairman.
Mr. REYES. I thank you for yielding, because one of the fundamental
points I want to make is that we wanted to err on the side of
transparency. Staff tells me that the issue of that particular earmark,
weeks before we marked up the bill, was fully discussed on a bipartisan
basis. I know it was discussed when we marked it up because there were
a number of amendments that were brought to the markup.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. It is clear that there may be some confusion as to
exactly what was or what was not discussed, but the process between
staff, the process that is outlined in the committee is clearly that
the chairman and the ranking member will go through and review those
items that are identified as earmarks, and we will agree on them, and
we will agree upon their inclusion in the bill.
The bill that was submitted and filed with Rules had at least one, I
don't know about the full details, but had at least one earmark that
the chairman and myself never discussed and also that, as a ranking
member, I had never received what would have been identified as the
paperwork that went along with it. The chairman knows that that
particular earmark was one that was not discussed as an earmark. I
don't think the inclusion and the identification of it as being an
earmark in committee when we debated this specific provision was
brought up.
And so it is a cause of concern. And building on what happened with
my colleague from Arizona (Mr. Flake), where the Rules Committee did
not identify the earmarks that were part of that bill until 5 hours
after the deadline for the Rules Committee, for Members to submit
amendments.
Mr. REYES. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I will yield.
Mr. REYES. Those are two different issues. The time was an issue of
Government Printing Office error. That is a different issue.
I would just hope that my good friend and colleague and ranking
member would agree that we sat down and agreed to bring transparency so
that the issues that came up when the gentleman was the chair of the
committee would not recur.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. That is exactly the point, that whatever abuses,
whatever we wanted transparency, these were guidelines and rules that
we agreed upon in the previous Congress, where I am glad that they were
carried over into this Congress. I am disappointed that they were not
followed the way that they were outlined in the committee process.
Mr. REYES. If the gentleman would yield.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I will yield.
Mr. REYES. I would just again take issue with that point because we
followed the process. Staff consulted on a bipartisan basis.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Reclaiming my time.
Mr. Chairman, no, that does not follow. The measure that we had, you
and I sat in a conference room; we went through the list with staff
discussing specifically each and every earmark. And that earmark was
not part of that process. When we got the report that accompanied this
bill to the Rules Committee, all of a sudden there was a new earmark
that you and I had not gone through. You can talk to staff and those
types of things. I was never aware and neither were they that it was an
earmark.
Mr. HASTINGS of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I am going to once again
urge
[[Page H4788]]
my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the previous question so the House can
consider the amendment that I submitted from Heather Wilson of New
Mexico.
Mr. Speaker, with that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself the remaining
portion of my time.
I am fascinated by my colleagues' arguments on the other side. We did
have a Rules Committee hearing on this matter, and there are four
members of the Rules Committee on the minority, none of whom raised any
of the issues that we have heard here today on the floor; understanding
full well that Mr. Flake comes now and says that we should have a
special session.
I also know that here on the floor I offered to Mr. Flake an
opportunity, by unanimous consent, to offer any amendment he may have,
and he didn't have an amendment at that time. I assume his argument is
that we would need to be in what he says a ``secret session.''
But one thing I do know, being one of the few Members that does serve
on the Rules Committee and on the Intelligence Committee, and that is
that everyone knew the funding level of the issue that is being
discussed. Mr. Flake may not have, but I can assure you that the
remaining Members on the Intelligence Committee knew that the mark was
included in our draft and the Community Management Account making that
minority staff certainly aware at the time between the chairman and Mr.
Hoekstra.
Now, today more than ever, we must make the creation of a strong and
flexible intelligence apparatus one of the highest, highest priorities
of this body. The terrorist attacks of September 11, combined with the
continuing threat of further attacks, underscore the importance of this
legislation.
When the American people elected Democrats to the majority, they sent
a very clear message that ``business as usual'' is no longer accepted.
They said to all of us, Republican and Democrat alike, that there are
problems in the way we operate, and we need to change how we do
business. We must, in my opinion, congratulate our intelligence
community for its successes, but we also must hold them accountable for
their failures. Rubber-stamping the administration's every action is
not acceptable. Democrats are working every day, as are Republicans, to
make America a safer place for all.
I genuinely urge my colleagues to support this measure.
I heard arguments about the climate change requirements put forward
for there to be a national intelligence estimate in that regard. And
there are arguments against it. I do not quite understand those
arguments. We made it clear that much of the information is collectable
by analysts at this time and that it would help prevent future
terrorist developments. And the way the argument has been couched on
the minority is as if this largest ever intelligence budget, largest in
the history of the Congress, is not doing everything that is needed to
be done because someone requested that there be a national intelligence
estimate with reference to climate change. One day, some people in this
body are going to get their head out of the sand and understand that
something is changing in this climate of ours, in this world and that
we all owe it as much as we can afford to make sure that we pass on a
safe environment to all our children.
With that, Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support the rule. I
urge a ``yes'' vote on the previous question.
The material previously referred to by Mr. Hastings of Washington is
as follows:
Amendment to H. Res. 388
Offered by Rep. Hastings of Washington
At the end of the resolution, add the following:
Sec. 3. Notwithstanding any other provision of this
resolution, the amendment printed in section 4 shall be in
order as though printed as the last amendment in the report
of the Committee on Rules if offered by Representative Wilson
of New Mexico or a designee. That amendment shall be
debatable for 30 minutes equally divided and controlled by
the proponent and an opponent.
Sec. 4. The amendment referred to in section 3 is as
follows:
At the end of the bill, add the following new title:
TITLE VI--ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MODERNIZATION
SEC. 601. SHORT TITLE.
This title may be cited as the ``Electronic Surveillance
Modernization Act''.
SEC. 602. FISA DEFINITIONS.
(a) Agent of a Foreign Power.--Subsection (b)(1) of section
101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1801) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``; or'' and inserting
``;''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(D) is reasonably expected to possess, control, transmit,
or receive foreign intelligence information while such person
is in the United States, provided that the official making
the certification required by section 104(a)(7) deems such
foreign intelligence information to be significant; or''.
(b) Electronic Surveillance.--Subsection (f) of such
section is amended to read as follows:
``(f) `Electronic surveillance' means--
``(1) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical,
or other surveillance device for acquiring information by
intentionally directing surveillance at a particular known
person who is reasonably believed to be in the United States
under circumstances in which that person has a reasonable
expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for
law enforcement purposes; or
``(2) the intentional acquisition of the contents of any
communication under circumstances in which a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be
required for law enforcement purposes, if both the sender and
all intended recipients are reasonably believed to be located
within the United States.''.
(c) Minimization Procedures.--Subsection (h) of such
section is amended--
(1) in paragraph (2), by striking ``importance;'' and
inserting ``importance; and'';
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking ``; and'' and inserting
``.''; and
(3) by striking paragraph (4).
(d) Wire Communication and Surveillance Device.--Subsection
(l) of such section is amended to read as follows:
``(l) `Surveillance device' is a device that allows
surveillance by the Federal Government, but excludes any
device that extracts or analyzes information from data that
has already been acquired by the Federal Government by lawful
means.''.
(e) Contents.--Subsection (n) of such section is amended to
read as follows:
``(n) `Contents', when used with respect to a
communication, includes any information concerning the
substance, purport, or meaning of that communication.''.
SEC. 603. AUTHORIZATION FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND OTHER
ACQUISITIONS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES.
(a) In General.--The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is further amended by
striking section 102 and inserting the following:
``AUTHORIZATION FOR ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
PURPOSES
``Sec. 102. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other
law, the President, acting through the Attorney General, may
authorize electronic surveillance without a court order under
this title to acquire foreign intelligence information for
periods of up to one year if the Attorney General certifies
in writing under oath that--
``(1) the electronic surveillance is directed at--
``(A) the acquisition of the contents of communications of
foreign powers, as defined in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of
section 101(a), or an agent of a foreign power, as defined in
subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 101(b)(1); or
``(B) the acquisition of technical intelligence, other than
the spoken communications of individuals, from property or
premises under the open and exclusive control of a foreign
power, as defined in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of section
101(a); and
``(2) the proposed minimization procedures with respect to
such surveillance meet the definition of minimization
procedures under section 101(h);
if the Attorney General reports such minimization procedures
and any changes thereto to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate at least 30 days
prior to the effective date of such minimization procedures,
unless the Attorney General determines immediate action is
required and notifies the committees immediately of such
minimization procedures and the reason for their becoming
effective immediately.
``(b) Minimization Procedures.--An electronic surveillance
authorized by this subsection may be conducted only in
accordance with the Attorney General's certification and the
minimization procedures. The Attorney General shall assess
compliance with such procedures and shall report such
assessments to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate under the provisions of section
108(a).
``(c) Submission of Certification.--The Attorney General
shall immediately transmit under seal to the court
established under section 103(a) a copy of his certification.
Such certification shall be maintained under security
measures established by the Chief Justice with the
concurrence of the Attorney General, in consultation with the
Director of National Intelligence, and shall remain sealed
unless--
[[Page H4789]]
``(1) an application for a court order with respect to the
surveillance is made under section 104; or
``(2) the certification is necessary to determine the
legality of the surveillance under section 106(f).
``AUTHORIZATION FOR ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
``Sec. 102A. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other
law, the President, acting through the Attorney General may,
for periods of up to one year, authorize the acquisition of
foreign intelligence information concerning a person
reasonably believed to be outside the United States if the
Attorney General certifies in writing under oath that--
``(1) the acquisition does not constitute electronic
surveillance;
``(2) the acquisition involves obtaining the foreign
intelligence information from or with the assistance of a
wire or electronic communications service provider,
custodian, or other person (including any officer, employee,
agent, or other specified person of such service provider,
custodian, or other person) who has access to wire or
electronic communications, either as they are transmitted or
while they are stored, or equipment that is being or may be
used to transmit or store such communications;
``(3) a significant purpose of the acquisition is to obtain
foreign intelligence information; and
``(4) the proposed minimization procedures with respect to
such acquisition activity meet the definition of minimization
procedures under section 101(h).
``(b) Specific Place Not Required.--A certification under
subsection (a) is not required to identify the specific
facilities, places, premises, or property at which the
acquisition of foreign intelligence information will be
directed.
``(c) Submission of Certification.--The Attorney General
shall immediately transmit under seal to the court
established under section 103(a) a copy of a certification
made under subsection (a). Such certification shall be
maintained under security measures established by the Chief
Justice of the United States and the Attorney General, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, and
shall remain sealed unless the certification is necessary to
determine the legality of the acquisition under section 102B.
``(d) Minimization Procedures.--An acquisition under this
section may be conducted only in accordance with the
certification of the Attorney General and the minimization
procedures adopted by the Attorney General. The Attorney
General shall assess compliance with such procedures and
shall report such assessments to the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate under
section 108(a).
``DIRECTIVES RELATING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND OTHER ACQUISITIONS
OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
``Sec. 102B. (a) Directive.--With respect to an
authorization of electronic surveillance under section 102 or
an authorization of an acquisition under section 102A, the
Attorney General may direct a person to--
``(1) immediately provide the Government with all
information, facilities, and assistance necessary to
accomplish the acquisition of foreign intelligence
information in such a manner as will protect the secrecy of
the electronic surveillance or acquisition and produce a
minimum of interference with the services that such person is
providing to the target; and
``(2) maintain under security procedures approved by the
Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence
any records concerning the electronic surveillance or
acquisition or the aid furnished that such person wishes to
maintain.
``(b) Compensation.--The Government shall compensate, at
the prevailing rate, a person for providing information,
facilities, or assistance pursuant to subsection (a).
``(c) Failure to Comply.--In the case of a failure to
comply with a directive issued pursuant to subsection (a),
the Attorney General may petition the court established under
section 103(a) to compel compliance with the directive. The
court shall issue an order requiring the person or entity to
comply with the directive if it finds that the directive was
issued in accordance with section 102(a) or 102A(a) and is
otherwise lawful. Failure to obey an order of the court may
be punished by the court as contempt of court. Any process
under this section may be served in any judicial district in
which the person or entity may be found.
``(d) Review of Petitions.--(1) In General.--(A)
Challenge.--A person receiving a directive issued pursuant to
subsection (a) may challenge the legality of that directive
by filing a petition with the pool established under section
103(e)(1).
``(B) Assignment of Judge.--The presiding judge designated
pursuant to section 103(b) shall assign a petition filed
under subparagraph (A) to one of the judges serving in the
pool established by section 103(e)(1). Not later than 24
hours after the assignment of such petition, the assigned
judge shall conduct an initial review of the directive. If
the assigned judge determines that the petition is frivolous,
the assigned judge shall deny the petition and affirm the
directive or any part of the directive that is the subject of
the petition. If the assigned judge determines the petition
is not frivolous, the assigned judge shall, within 72 hours,
consider the petition in accordance with the procedures
established under section 103(e)(2) and provide a written
statement for the record of the reasons for any determination
under this subsection.
``(2) Standard of Review.--A judge considering a petition
to modify or set aside a directive may grant such petition
only if the judge finds that such directive does not meet the
requirements of this section or is otherwise unlawful. If the
judge does not modify or set aside the directive, the judge
shall affirm such directive, and order the recipient to
comply with such directive.
``(3) Directives Not Modified.--Any directive not
explicitly modified or set aside under this subsection shall
remain in full effect.
``(e) Appeals.--The Government or a person receiving a
directive reviewed pursuant to subsection (d) may file a
petition with the court of review established under section
103(b) for review of the decision issued pursuant to
subsection (d) not later than 7 days after the issuance of
such decision. Such court of review shall have jurisdiction
to consider such petitions and shall provide for the record a
written statement of the reasons for its decision. On
petition by the Government or any person receiving such
directive for a writ of certiorari, the record shall be
transmitted under seal to the Supreme Court, which shall have
jurisdiction to review such decision.
``(f) Proceedings.--Judicial proceedings under this section
shall be concluded as expeditiously as possible. The record
of proceedings, including petitions filed, orders granted,
and statements of reasons for decision, shall be maintained
under security measures established by the Chief Justice of
the United States, in consultation with the Attorney General
and the Director of National Intelligence.
``(g) Sealed Petitions.--All petitions under this section
shall be filed under seal. In any proceedings under this
section, the court shall, upon request of the Government,
review ex parte and in camera any Government submission, or
portions of a submission, which may include classified
information.
``(h) Liability.--No cause of action shall lie in any court
against any person for providing any information, facilities,
or assistance in accordance with a directive under this
section.
``(i) Use of Information.--Information acquired pursuant to
a directive by the Attorney General under this section
concerning any United States person may be used and disclosed
by Federal officers and employees without the consent of the
United States person only in accordance with the minimization
procedures required by section 102(a) or 102A(a). No
otherwise privileged communication obtained in accordance
with, or in violation of, the provisions of this section
shall lose its privileged character. No information from an
electronic surveillance under section 102 or an acquisition
pursuant to section 102A may be used or disclosed by Federal
officers or employees except for lawful purposes.
``(j) Use in Law Enforcement.--No information acquired
pursuant to this section shall be disclosed for law
enforcement purposes unless such disclosure is accompanied by
a statement that such information, or any information derived
from such information, may only be used in a criminal
proceeding with the advance authorization of the Attorney
General.
``(k) Disclosure in Trial.--If the Government intends to
enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose in any
trial, hearing, or other proceeding in or before any court,
department, officer, agency, regulatory body, or other
authority of the United States, against an aggrieved person,
any information obtained or derived from an electronic
surveillance conducted under section 102 or an acquisition
authorized pursuant to section 102A, the Government shall,
prior to the trial, hearing, or other proceeding or at a
reasonable time prior to an effort to disclose or use that
information or submit it in evidence, notify the aggrieved
person and the court or other authority in which the
information is to be disclosed or used that the Government
intends to disclose or use such information.
``(l) Disclosure in State Trials.--If a State or political
subdivision of a State intends to enter into evidence or
otherwise use or disclose in any trial, hearing, or other
proceeding in or before any court, department, officer,
agency, regulatory body, or other authority of a State or a
political subdivision of a State, against an aggrieved
person, any information obtained or derived from an
electronic surveillance authorized pursuant to section 102 or
an acquisition authorized pursuant to section 102A, the State
or political subdivision of such State shall notify the
aggrieved person, the court, or other authority in which the
information is to be disclosed or used and the Attorney
General that the State or political subdivision intends to
disclose or use such information.
``(m) Motion to Exclude Evidence.--(1) In General.--Any
person against whom evidence obtained or derived from an
electronic surveillance authorized pursuant to section 102 or
an acquisition authorized pursuant to section 102A is to be,
or has been, used or disclosed in any trial, hearing, or
other proceeding in or before any court, department, officer,
agency, regulatory body, or other authority of the United
States, a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may move
to
[[Page H4790]]
suppress the evidence obtained or derived from such
electronic surveillance or such acquisition on the grounds
that--
``(A) the information was unlawfully acquired; or
``(B) the electronic surveillance or acquisition was not
properly made in conformity with an authorization under
section 102(a) or 102A(a).
``(2) Timing.--A person moving to suppress evidence under
paragraph (1) shall make the motion to suppress the evidence
before the trial, hearing, or other proceeding unless there
was no opportunity to make such a motion or the person was
not aware of the grounds of the motion.
``(n) Review of Motions.--If a court or other authority is
notified pursuant to subsection (k) or (l), a motion is made
pursuant to subsection (m), or a motion or request is made by
an aggrieved person pursuant to any other statute or rule of
the United States or any State before any court or other
authority of the United States or any State--
``(1) to discover or obtain an Attorney General directive
or other materials relating to an electronic surveillance
authorized pursuant to section 102 or an acquisition
authorized pursuant to section 102A, or
``(2) to discover, obtain, or suppress evidence or
information obtained or derived from an electronic
surveillance authorized pursuant to section 102 or an
acquisition authorized pursuant to section 102A,
the United States district court or, where the motion is made
before another authority, the United States district court in
the same district as the authority, shall, notwithstanding
any other law, if the Attorney General files an affidavit
under oath that disclosure or an adversary hearing would harm
the national security of the United States, review in camera
and ex parte the application, order, and such other materials
relating to such electronic surveillance or such acquisition
as may be necessary to determine whether such electronic
surveillance or such acquisition authorized under this
section was lawfully authorized and conducted. In making this
determination, the court may disclose to the aggrieved
person, under appropriate security procedures and protective
orders, portions of the directive or other materials relating
to the acquisition only where such disclosure is necessary to
make an accurate determination of the legality of the
acquisition.
``(o) Determinations.--If, pursuant to subsection (n), a
United States district court determines that the acquisition
authorized under this section was not lawfully authorized or
conducted, it shall, in accordance with the requirements of
law, suppress the evidence which was unlawfully obtained or
derived or otherwise grant the motion of the aggrieved
person. If the court determines that such acquisition was
lawfully authorized and conducted, it shall deny the motion
of the aggrieved person except to the extent that due process
requires discovery or disclosure.
``(p) Binding Orders.--Orders granting motions or requests
under subsection (m), decisions under this section that an
electronic surveillance or an acquisition was not lawfully
authorized or conducted, and orders of the United States
district court requiring review or granting disclosure of
directives, orders, or other materials relating to such
acquisition shall be final orders and binding upon all courts
of the United States and the several States except a United
States court of appeals and the Supreme Court.
``(q) Coordination.--(1) In General.--Federal officers who
acquire foreign intelligence information may consult with
Federal law enforcement officers or law enforcement personnel
of a State or political subdivision of a State, including the
chief executive officer of that State or political
subdivision who has the authority to appoint or direct the
chief law enforcement officer of that State or political
subdivision, to coordinate efforts to investigate or protect
against--
``(A) actual or potential attack or other grave hostile
acts of a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;
``(B) sabotage, international terrorism, or the development
or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power; or
``(C) clandestine intelligence activities by an
intelligence service or network of a foreign power or by an
agent of a foreign power.
``(2) Certification Required.--Coordination authorized
under paragraph (1) shall not preclude the certification
required by section 102(a) or 102A(a).
``(r) Retention of Directives and Orders.--A directive made
or an order granted under this section shall be retained for
a period of not less than 10 years from the date on which
such directive or such order is made.''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents in the first
section of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is amended by inserting after the
item relating to section 102 the following:
``102A. Authorization for acquisition of foreign intelligence
information.
``102B. Directives relating to electronic surveillance and other
acquisitions of foreign intelligence information.''.
SEC. 604. JURISDICTION OF FISA COURT.
Section 103 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(g) Applications for a court order under this title are
authorized if the President has, by written authorization,
empowered the Attorney General to approve applications to the
court having jurisdiction under this section, and a judge to
whom an application is made may, notwithstanding any other
law, grant an order, in conformity with section 105,
approving electronic surveillance of a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power for the purpose of obtaining foreign
intelligence information.''.
SEC. 605. APPLICATIONS FOR COURT ORDERS.
Section 104 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1804) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) in paragraph (6), by striking ``detailed description''
and inserting ``summary description'';
(B) in paragraph (7)--
(i) in the matter preceding subparagraph (A), by striking
``or officials designated'' and all that follows through
``consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``designated by the
President to authorize electronic surveillance for foreign
intelligence purposes'';
(ii) in subparagraph (C), by striking ``techniques;'' and
inserting ``techniques; and'';
(iii) by striking subparagraph (D); and
(iv) by redesignating subparagraph (E) as subparagraph (D);
(C) in paragraph (8), by striking ``a statement of the
means'' and inserting ``a summary statement of the means'';
(D) in paragraph (9)--
(i) by striking ``a statement'' and inserting ``a summary
statement''; and
(ii) by striking ``application;'' and inserting
``application; and'';
(E) in paragraph (10), by striking ``thereafter; and'' and
inserting ``thereafter.''; and
(F) by striking paragraph (11).
(2) by striking subsection (b);
(3) by redesignating subsections (c) through (e) as
subsections (b) through (d), respectively; and
(4) in paragraph (1)(A) of subsection (d), as redesignated
by paragraph (3), by striking ``or the Director of National
Intelligence'' and inserting ``the Director of National
Intelligence, or the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency''.
SEC. 606. ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER.
Section 105 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) by striking paragraph (1); and
(B) by redesignating paragraphs (2) through (5) as
paragraphs (1) through (4), respectively;
(2) in subsection (c)(1)--
(A) in subparagraph (D), by striking ``surveillance;'' and
inserting ``surveillance; and'';
(B) in subparagraph (E), by striking ``approved; and'' and
inserting ``approved.''; and
(C) by striking subparagraph (F);
(3) by striking subsection (d);
(4) by redesignating subsections (e) through (i) as
subsections (d) through (h), respectively;
(5) in subsection (d), as redesignated by paragraph (4), by
amending paragraph (2) to read as follows:
``(2) Extensions of an order issued under this title may be
granted on the same basis as an original order upon an
application for an extension and new findings made in the
same manner as required for an original order and may be for
a period not to exceed one year.'';
(6) in subsection (e), as redesignated by paragraph (4), to
read as follows:
``(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title,
the Attorney General may authorize the emergency employment
of electronic surveillance if the Attorney General--
``(1) determines that an emergency situation exists with
respect to the employment of electronic surveillance to
obtain foreign intelligence information before an order
authorizing such surveillance can with due diligence be
obtained;
``(2) determines that the factual basis for issuance of an
order under this title to approve such electronic
surveillance exists;
``(3) informs a judge having jurisdiction under section 103
at the time of such authorization that the decision has been
made to employ emergency electronic surveillance; and
``(4) makes an application in accordance with this title to
a judge having jurisdiction under section 103 as soon as
practicable, but not more than 168 hours after the Attorney
General authorizes such surveillance.
If the Attorney General authorizes such emergency employment
of electronic surveillance, the Attorney General shall
require that the minimization procedures required by this
title for the issuance of a judicial order be followed. In
the absence of a judicial order approving such electronic
surveillance, the surveillance shall terminate when the
information sought is obtained, when the application for the
order is denied, or after the expiration of 168 hours from
the time of authorization by the Attorney General, whichever
is earliest. In the event that such application for approval
is denied, or in any other case where the electronic
surveillance is terminated and no order is issued approving
the surveillance, no information obtained or evidence derived
from such surveillance shall be received in evidence or
otherwise disclosed in any trial, hearing, or other
proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, department,
[[Page H4791]]
office, agency, regulatory body, legislative committee, or
other authority of the United States, a State, or political
subdivision thereof, and no information concerning any United
States person acquired from such surveillance shall
subsequently be used or disclosed in any other manner by
Federal officers or employees without the consent of such
person, except with the approval of the Attorney General if
the information indicates a threat of death or serious bodily
harm to any person. A denial of the application made under
this subsection may be reviewed as provided in section
103.'';
(7) in subsection (h), as redesignated by paragraph (4)--
(A) by striking ``a wire or'' and inserting ``an''; and
(B) by striking ``physical search'' and inserting
``physical search or in response to a certification by the
Attorney General or a designee of the Attorney General
seeking information, facilities, or technical assistance from
such person under section 102B''; and
(8) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(i) In any case in which the Government makes an
application to a judge under this title to conduct electronic
surveillance involving communications and the judge grants
such application, the judge shall also authorize the
installation and use of pen registers and trap and trace
devices to acquire dialing, routing, addressing, and
signaling information related to such communications and such
dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information shall
not be subject to minimization procedures.''.
SEC. 607. USE OF INFORMATION.
Section 106(i) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1806(i)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``radio communication'' and inserting
``communication''; and
(2) by striking ``contents indicates'' and inserting
``contents contain significant foreign intelligence
information or indicate''.
SEC. 608. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT.
(a) Electronic Surveillance Under FISA.--Section 108 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C.
1808) is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)(2)--
(A) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) in subparagraph (C), by striking the period and
inserting ``; and''; and
(C) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(D) the authority under which the electronic surveillance
is conducted.''; and
(2) by striking subsection (b) and inserting the following:
``(b) On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General
additionally shall fully inform the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate on
electronic surveillance conducted without a court order.''.
(b) Intelligence Activities.--The National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 501 (50 U.S.C. 413)--
(A) by redesignating subsection (f) as subsection (g); and
(B) by inserting after subsection (e) the following new
subsection:
``(f) The Chair of each of the congressional intelligence
committees, in consultation with the ranking member of the
committee for which the person is Chair, may inform--
``(1) on a bipartisan basis, all members or any individual
members of such committee, and
``(2) any essential staff of such committee,
of a report submitted under subsection (a)(1) or subsection
(b) as such Chair considers necessary.'';
(2) in section 502 (50 U.S.C. 414), by adding at the end
the following new subsection:
``(d) Informing of Committee Members.--The Chair of each of
the congressional intelligence committees, in consultation
with the ranking member of the committee for which the person
is Chair, may inform--
``(1) on a bipartisan basis, all members or any individual
members of such committee, and
``(2) any essential staff of such committee,
of a report submitted under subsection (a) as such Chair
considers necessary.''; and
(3) in section 503 (50 U.S.C. 415), by adding at the end
the following new subsection:
``(g) The Chair of each of the congressional intelligence
committees, in consultation with the ranking member of the
committee for which the person is Chair, may inform--
``(1) on a bipartisan basis, all members or any individual
members of such committee, and
``(2) any essential staff of such committee,
of a report submitted under subsection (b), (c), or (d) as
such Chair considers necessary.''.
SEC. 609. INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT OF TARGETS.
(a) Electronic Surveillance.--Section 105(d) of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(d)), as
redesignated by section 606(4), is amended by adding at the
end the following new paragraph:
``(4) An order issued under this section shall remain in
force during the authorized period of surveillance
notwithstanding the absence of the target from the United
States, unless the Government files a motion to extinguish
the order and the court grants the motion.''.
(b) Physical Search.--Section 304(d) of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1824(d)) is
amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) An order issued under this section shall remain in
force during the authorized period of surveillance
notwithstanding the absence of the target from the United
States, unless the Government files a motion to extinguish
the order and the court grants the motion.''.
SEC. 610. COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS AND ANTITERRORISM
PROGRAMS.
(a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, and in addition to the immunities, privileges, and
defenses provided by any other provision of law, no action,
claim, or proceeding shall lie or be maintained in any court,
and no penalty, sanction, or other form of remedy or relief
shall be imposed by any court or any other body, against any
person for an activity arising from or relating to the
provision to an element of the intelligence community of any
information (including records or other information
pertaining to a customer), facilities, or assistance during
the period of time beginning on September 11, 2001, and
ending on the date that is 60 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, in connection with any alleged
communications intelligence program that the Attorney General
or a designee of the Attorney General certifies, in a manner
consistent with the protection of State secrets, is, was, or
would be intended to protect the United States from a
terrorist attack. This section shall apply to all actions,
claims, or proceedings pending on or after the effective date
of this Act.
(b) Jurisdiction.--Any action, claim, or proceeding
described in subsection (a) that is brought in a State court
shall be deemed to arise under the Constitution and laws of
the United States and shall be removable pursuant to section
1441 of title 28, United States Code.
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
(2) Person.--The term ``person'' has the meaning given the
term in section 2510(6) of title 18, United States Code.
SEC. 611. REPORT ON MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES.
(a) Report.--Not later than two years after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until December
31, 2012, the Director of the National Security Agency, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and
the Attorney General, shall submit to the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report
on the effectiveness and use of minimization procedures
applied to information concerning United States persons
acquired during the course of a communications activity
conducted by the National Security Agency.
(b) Requirements.--A report submitted under subsection (a)
shall include--
(1) a description of the implementation, during the course
of communications intelligence activities conducted by the
National Security Agency, of procedures established to
minimize the acquisition, retention, and dissemination of
nonpublicly available information concerning United States
persons;
(2) the number of significant violations, if any, of such
minimization procedures during the 18 months following the
effective date of this Act; and
(3) summary descriptions of such violations.
(c) Retention of Information.--Information concerning
United States persons shall not be retained solely for the
purpose of complying with the reporting requirements of this
section.
SEC. 612. AUTHORIZATION OF ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE DUE TO
IMMINENT THREAT.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is further amended--
(1) by adding at the end of title I the following new
section:
``AUTHORIZATION DUE TO IMMINENT THREAT
``Sec. 113. (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, but subject to the provisions of this
section, the President, acting through the Attorney General,
may authorize electronic surveillance without an order under
this title to acquire foreign intelligence information for a
period not to exceed 90 days if the President submits to the
congressional leadership, the congressional intelligence
committees, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court a
written notification that the President has determined that
there exists an imminent threat of attack likely to cause
death, serious injury, or substantial economic damage to the
United States. Such notification--
``(1) shall be submitted as soon as practicable, but in no
case later than 5 days after the date on which the President
authorizes electronic surveillance under this section;
``(2) shall specify the entity responsible for the threat
and any affiliates of the entity;
``(3) shall state the reason to believe that the threat of
imminent attack exists;
``(4) shall state the reason the President needs broader
authority to conduct electronic surveillance in the United
States as a result of the threat of imminent attack;
``(5) shall include a description of the foreign
intelligence information that will be collected and the means
that will be used to
[[Page H4792]]
collect such foreign intelligence information; and
``(6) may be submitted in classified form.
``(b) Subsequent Certifications.--At the end of the 90-day
period described in subsection (a), and every 90 days
thereafter, the President may submit a subsequent written
notification to the congressional leadership, the
congressional intelligence committees, the other relevant
committees, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
that the circumstances of the threat for which the President
submitted a written notification under subsection (a) require
the President to continue the authorization of electronic
surveillance under this section for an additional 90 days.
The President shall be authorized to conduct electronic
surveillance under this section for an additional 90 days
after each such subsequent written notification.
``(c) Electronic Surveillance of Individuals.--The
President, or an official designated by the President to
authorize electronic surveillance, may only conduct
electronic surveillance of a person under this section if the
President or such official determines that--
``(1) there is a reasonable belief that such person is
communicating with an entity or an affiliate of an entity
that is reasonably believed to be responsible for imminent
threat of attack; and
``(2) the information obtained from the electronic
surveillance may be foreign intelligence information.
``(d) Minimization Procedures.--The President may not
authorize electronic surveillance under this section until
the Attorney General approves minimization procedures for
electronic surveillance conducted under this section.
``(e) United States Persons.--Notwithstanding subsections
(a) and (b), the President may not authorize electronic
surveillance of a United States person under this section
without an order under this title for a period of more than
60 days unless the President, acting through the Attorney
General, submits a certification to the congressional
intelligence committees that--
``(1) the continued electronic surveillance of the United
States person is vital to the national security of the United
States;
``(2) describes the circumstances that have prevented the
Attorney General from obtaining an order under this title for
continued surveillance;
``(3) describes the reasons for believing the United States
person is affiliated with or in communication with an entity
or an affiliate of an entity that is reasonably believed to
be responsible for imminent threat of attack; and
``(4) describes the foreign intelligence information
derived from the electronic surveillance conducted under this
section.
``(f) Use of Information.--Information obtained pursuant to
electronic surveillance under this subsection may be used to
obtain an order authorizing subsequent electronic
surveillance under this title.
``(g) Definitions.--In this section:
``(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
`congressional intelligence committees' means the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate.
``(2) Congressional leadership.--The term `congressional
leadership' means the Speaker and minority leader of the
House of Representatives and the majority leader and minority
leader of the Senate.
``(3) Foreign intelligence surveillance court.--The term
`Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court' means the court
established under section 103(a).
``(4) Other relevant committees.--The term `other relevant
committees' means the Committees on Appropriations, the
Committees on Armed Services, and the Committees on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Senate.'';
and
(2) in the table of contents in the first section, by
inserting after the item relating to section 111 the
following new item:
``Sec. 112. Authorization due to imminent threat.''.
SEC. 613. TECHNICAL AND CONFORMING AMENDMENTS.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) is further amended--
(1) in section 105(a)(4), as redesignated by section
606(1)(B)--
(A) by striking ``104(a)(7)(E)'' and inserting
``104(a)(7)(D)''; and
(B) by striking ``104(d)'' and inserting ``104(c)'';
(2) in section 106(j), in the matter preceding paragraph
(1), by striking ``105(e)'' and inserting ``105(d)''; and
(3) in section 108(a)(2)(C), by striking ``105(f)'' and
inserting ``105(e)''.
(The information contained herein was provided by
Democratic Minority on multiple occasions throughout the
109th Congress.)
The Vote on the Previous Question: What It Really Means
This vote, the vote on whether to order the previous
question on a special rule, is not merely a procedural vote.
A vote against ordering the previous question is a vote
against the Democratic majority agenda and a vote to allow
the opposition, at least for the moment, to offer an
alternative plan. It is a vote about what the House should be
debating.
Mr. Clarence Cannon's Precedents of the House of
Representatives, (VI, 308-311) describes the vote on the
previous question on the rule as ``a motion to direct or
control the consideration of the subject before the House
being made by the Member in charge.'' To defeat the previous
question is to give the opposition a chance to decide the
subject before the House. Cannon cites the Speaker's ruling
of January 13, 1920, to the effect that ``the refusal of the
House to sustain the demand for the previous question passes
the control of the resolution to the opposition'' in order to
offer an amendment. On March 15, 1909, a member of the
majority party offered a rule resolution. The House defeated
the previous question and a member of the opposition rose to
a parliamentary inquiry, asking who was entitled to
recognition. Speaker Joseph G. Cannon (R-Illinois) said:
``The previous question having been refused, the gentleman
from New York, Mr. Fitzgerald, who had asked the gentleman to
yield to him for an amendment, is entitled to the first
recognition.''
Because the vote today may look bad for the Democratic
majority they will say ``the vote on the previous question is
simply a vote on whether to proceed to an immediate vote on
adopting the resolution . . . [and] has no substantive
legislative or policy implications whatsoever.'' But that is
not what they have always said. Listen to the definition of
the previous question used in the Floor Procedures Manual
published by the Rules Committee in the 109th Congress, (page
56). Here's how the Rules Committee described the rule using
information from Congressional Quarterly's ``American
Congressional Dictionary'': ``If the previous question is
defeated, control of debate shifts to the leading opposition
member (usually the minority Floor Manager) who then manages
an hour of debate and may offer a germane amendment to the
pending business.''
Deschler's Procedure in the U.S. House of Representatives,
the subchapter titled ``Amending Special Rules'' states: ``a
refusal to order the previous question on such a rule [a
special rule reported from the Committee on Rules] opens the
resolution to amendment and further debate.'' (Chapter 21,
section 21.2) Section 21.3 continues: Upon rejection of the
motion for the previous question on a resolution reported
from the Committee on Rules, control shifts to the Member
leading the opposition to the previous question, who may
offer a proper amendment or motion and who controls the time
for debate thereon.''
Clearly, the vote on the previous question on a rule does
have substantive policy implications. It is one of the only
available tools for those who oppose the Democratic
majority's agenda and allows those with alternative views the
opportunity to offer an alternative plan.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my
time, and I move the previous question on the resolution.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on ordering the previous
question.
The question was taken, and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the
ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a
quorum is not present.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
Pursuant to clause 8 and clause 9 of rule XX, this 15-minute vote on
ordering the previous question will be followed by 5-minute votes on
adopting House Resolution 388, if ordered; ordering the previous
question on House Resolution 387; and adopting House Resolution 387, if
ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 223,
nays 199, not voting 10, as follows:
[Roll No. 324]
YEAS--223
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Braley (IA)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson
Castor
Chandler
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Lincoln
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly
Doyle
Edwards
Ellison
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Filner
Giffords
Gillibrand
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth Sandlin
Higgins
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
[[Page H4793]]
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Klein (FL)
Kucinich
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lynch
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Perlmutter
Peterson (MN)
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Reyes
Rodriguez
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shuler
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Space
Spratt
Stark
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Wexler
Wilson (OH)
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
NAYS--199
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Barrow
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Ehlers
Emerson
English (PA)
Everett
Fallin
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Hall (TX)
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hulshof
Hunter
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Jindal
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jordan
Keller
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Lamborn
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy, Tim
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Nunes
Paul
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Sali
Saxton
Schmidt
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Stearns
Sullivan
Tancredo
Terry
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walberg
Walden (OR)
Walsh (NY)
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--10
Brady (PA)
Engel
Fattah
Frank (MA)
McCrery
McMorris Rodgers
Rangel
Souder
Waters
Watson
{time} 1506
Mrs. CUBIN changed her vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
Mr. CONYERS and Mr. RUSH changed their vote from ``nay'' to ``yea.''
So the previous question was ordered.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the resolution.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 226,
noes 198, not voting 8, as follows:
[Roll No. 325]
AYES--226
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Braley (IA)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson
Castor
Chandler
Clarke
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Cohen
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Lincoln
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly
Doyle
Edwards
Ellison
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Filner
Frank (MA)
Giffords
Gillibrand
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth Sandlin
Higgins
Hill
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Klein (FL)
Kucinich
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lynch
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Perlmutter
Peterson (MN)
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shuler
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Space
Spratt
Stark
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Wexler
Wilson (OH)
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
NOES--198
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Ehlers
Emerson
English (PA)
Everett
Fallin
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Hall (TX)
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hulshof
Hunter
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Jindal
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jordan
Keller
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Lamborn
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy, Tim
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Nunes
Paul
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Sali
Saxton
Schmidt
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Stearns
Sullivan
Tancredo
Terry
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walberg
Walden (OR)
Walsh (NY)
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
[[Page H4794]]
NOT VOTING--8
Brady (PA)
Engel
Fattah
McMorris Rodgers
Sensenbrenner
Souder
Waters
Watson
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised 2
minutes remain in this vote.
{time} 1518
So the resolution was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________
[Congressional Record: May 10, 2007 (House)]
[Page H4881-H4910]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2008
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 388 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 2082.
{time} 2156
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 2082) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2008 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, with Mrs. Tauscher in the chair.
Mr. McHENRY. Madam Chair, I raise a question of consideration against
the legislation before us.
The CHAIRMAN. The question of consideration is not available in the
Committee of the Whole.
Mr. McHENRY. I thank the Chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the
first time.
The gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes) and the gentleman from Michigan
(Mr. Hoekstra) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
{time} 2200
Mr. REYES. Madam Chairwoman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Intelligence is our Nation's first line of defense. In a world of
asymmetrical threats, it is critical that we detect and disrupt the
plans and intentions of those who would do us harm. And it is critical
that we conduct intelligence operations in a way that conforms to our
laws and to our values as a Nation.
This bill was the product of bipartisan work, and I am pleased that
the ranking member, Mr. Hoekstra, worked with me over the past several
weeks and months to draft this bill. We do not agree on every provision
in this bill, but we agree on the larger points, and we agree that
intelligence officers in the field deserve our support.
Let me address up front one area where I think there has been some
confusion, and that is section 407 of the bill, which asks for a
national intelligence estimate on the national security impact of
climate change.
We heeded the advice of 11 former 3- and 4-star admirals and generals
who have studied this issue and specifically recommended an NIE. They
believe that significant changes in global climate may act as a
``threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile
regions of our world.''
The ranking member has argued that this work should not divert
resources from higher priority items. Our committee staff has spoken
with senior Intelligence Community leaders in the administration, and
we have been assured that this will not, I repeat, will not divert
resources.
The data needed is already available. The administration is already
drafting a community assessment on this very issue. And I want to
assure the ranking member that we will work with the administration to
ensure that nothing will divert resources away from higher priority
efforts.
But I also want to be clear; targeted discussion on this topic is a
distraction from the key points of this bill. This bill provides
funding for the men and women in the field. Opposition to this bill
sends the wrong signal to them.
We are at war, and we face many threats over the horizon. This bill
contains robust funding for critical intelligence programs to penetrate
the hard targets, such as terrorist networks and countries developing
WMD capabilities.
We add funds to both CIA and military elements for human intelligence
training. We invest in language training for collectors and analysts
and in language translation capabilities. We add funding for sending
additional analysts overseas, and we strengthen counterintelligence
field operations.
We have added funds to broaden our view so that we are spending, not
just on Iraq, but on some of the other global challenges that we face,
such as Iran, Russia, East Africa, Latin America and countries in Asia.
We have several provisions that enhance critical oversight. We
require quarterly intelligence reports to Congress on the nuclear
weapons programs of Iran and North Korea.
We also require that the CIA Inspector General conduct an audit of
covert activities no less than once every 3 years. And we require the
administration to provide the Intelligence Committees with a full list
of all special access programs.
We also require detailed reports to Congress on the use of
contractors in the Intelligence Community because their use has grown
without adequate oversight, both by Congress and even by the executive
branch.
We also require a strategy for implementing a multi-level security
clearance system. This will allow patriotic Americans with much needed
foreign language skills to serve as translators or linguists in the
Intelligence Community.
And we also promote diversity in the Intelligence Community by
requiring a strategic plan for implementing the recommendations of a
highly regarded diversity panel.
I am of the strong view that diversity is a major strategic asset of
the United States, and we have to leverage that asset to our full
advantage.
In sum, Madam Chairman, this bill strengthens U.S. intelligence
capabilities. This bill, if passed and signed into law, will help the
courageous women and men of our Intelligence Community accomplish their
mission. They are counting on our support, and tonight I hope we
respond.
I urge all my colleagues to support this critical legislation.
With that, Madam Chairwoman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairwoman, I would like to yield myself 4
minutes.
I would like to begin by thanking my colleague, Chairman Reyes, for
the cooperative working relationship that we have had as we have gone
through this process and as we have developed and built this bill.
There are a number of
[[Page H4882]]
things in this piece of legislation that I do support, so I appreciate
the cooperative working relationship we have had. I appreciate the hard
work by the committee on both staffs.
You know, it is absolutely important that we provide the Intelligence
Community with the information or with the resources, the commitment
and the framework with which they can be the tip of the spear to keep
us free. We all owe the men and women of the community a deep sense of
gratitude for the work that they do each and every day, as they risk
their lives to keep us safe.
As they well know, let me quote, ``we are in a state of war. And if
we have not yet realized that we are in a state of war, when will we
realize that''?
Some folks may say, well, Pete, what's new? You have been saying that
for a long period of time.
Actually, I don't believe that, and I don't like to use the term
``war.'' We shouldn't elevate the people that pose this threat to the
United States as being soldiers or representing a nation-state. They
are thugs. They are murderers, and they are terrorists.
These are the words of Ayman al-Zawahiri from an interview that he
just gave last week, a video. Those are the words that he says. He says
that they are at war. We need to recognize that that is how they view
the U.S. and how they view the West.
We have continued a number of initiatives that were begun in the last
Congress. I feel good about that. Building global collection
capabilities, rebuilding HUMINT capabilities, working on the overhaul
of the Intelligence Community.
But I think we do need to affect and address the weaknesses in this
bill. This bill significantly cuts from the President's budget request
in a very important area, human intelligence at the Central
Intelligence Agency, and cuts that directly affect our efforts in Iraq.
I agree with the chairman. Passing the wrong bill sends exactly the
wrong message to our troops. Just like saying we are going to pull out
of Iraq on a definite date sends the wrong message, sending a bill that
cuts the funding for our Intelligence Community in Iraq sends exactly
the wrong message.
And telling the community that we want to move their priorities from
radical Islam, North Korea, Syria, Iran, restructuring the community,
rebuilding HUMINT to focusing on a national intelligence estimate on
climate change sends exactly the wrong message. As a matter of fact,
what the community will tell you is this hearkens back to the exact
things that they experienced in the 1990s, a very depressing decade for
the Intelligence Community, a dark decade, a decade where budgets were
cut, where human intelligence was cut, where we changed rules for human
intelligence and said, we are only going to have good-guy spies. It was
known as the ``Deutsch doctrine.'' It said, if we have people on the
payroll or we are working with people who have human rights records,
criminal violations, we are not going to work with them anymore.
And the other thing that we did is we did the politically correct
thing, is we moved resources to spy on the environment. George Tenet
mentions it in his book. He refers to it as those were the days that
the community said we were focused on bugs and bunnies. And we are
going right back to that. We are doing the politically correct
priorities. We are cutting HUMINT, and we are cutting the resources
that are directly supporting our efforts in Iraq against a very deadly
and a very dangerous enemy. That is the message that we are sending to
the agency that says, we are going back to the 1990s.
The community doesn't want to go back to the 1990s. They recognize
what had happened at that time.
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, it is my privilege to yield to the
chairman of the Armed Services Committee, the gentleman from Missouri
(Mr. Skelton), 3 minutes.
Mr. SKELTON. Madam Chairman, this evening I rise in strong support of
H.R. 2082, the Intelligence Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2008. Let
me take this opportunity to thank and congratulate the chairman, the
gentleman from Texas, Silver Reyes, on the work that he does.
It is especially important, Madam Chairman, that he is a member of
the Armed Services Committee, and he is the chairman of the
Intelligence Committee, and it is one of those rare moments where the
two very important committees are glued together, and he does that. And
from our perspective, it is a good, good piece of evidence that he is
the chairman and is doing such an excellent job in both respects.
Every day American men and women are deployed into harm's way and
depend on the military intelligence capabilities authorized by this
bill. It is important for them to achieve their missions. And this
legislation assures continued delivery of our intelligence to our
warfighters. It will lead to important improvements in the future.
I am also pleased to report that this bill reflects a new more
cooperative relationship, as I mentioned, between the Intelligence
Committee and the Armed Services Committee in guiding and overseeing
the Nation's military intelligence program.
Chairman Reyes and I have been working together to craft common
approaches on key issues by our shared jurisdiction. For example, both
this bill and the National Defense Authorization bill that we marked up
late last night in committee contain provisions requiring reports on
the national security implications of global warming. And that is no
small thing.
And the committees, we are working together on significant changes in
key space programs to ensure that both the intelligence analysts and
the warfighter receive critical information in a timely manner, and
that is so important.
Again, let me take this opportunity to congratulate Chairman Reyes
for bringing this to the floor. Intelligence is the key to so many
areas, in particular the military and security forums of our country.
So I congratulate the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 3
minutes to a senior member of the committee, Mr. Everett.
Mr. EVERETT. Madam Chairman, I thank my ranking member, and I thank
the chairman for the work they have done on this bill. And for many
years, the chairman of the committee and I have worked closely
together.
But, regretfully, I rise today in opposition to the Intelligence
Authorization bill for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 2082. Actions taken in
the bill regarding human operations, the irresponsible use of our
intelligence professionals and the short-sighted steps to critical
space systems justify a ``no'' vote on this legislation.
{time} 2215
The bill slashes funding to HUMINT, or Human Operations, one of our
most important intelligence collection functions in the global war on
terrorism. Regardless of your position on the war, we cannot cut a
primary intelligence function that is critical to protecting our troops
in combat.
Like many, I have visited the front line, and we owe our brave
American military the support they need to be successful in Iraq and
Afghanistan. I also note that the Under Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence has stated that HUMINT is his number one priority.
Remarkably, rather than focus on national security, this bill places
an emphasis on global warming. In the middle of a war which has our
intelligence community overloaded with real-world intelligence
missions, this intelligence authorization bill carves out scarce
intelligence resources for an environmental matter that should be the
purview of another committee.
Madam Chairman, we have already had 13 Federal agencies looking at
the effects of climate change. The administration has requested nearly
$7.4 billion this year for climate change-related activities. Since
2001 the Federal Government has devoted $37 billion for climate change-
related activities. We are in the middle of a war against radical
jihadists, and the terrorist plot of the radical Islamists at Fort Dix
earlier this week should be a sobering reminder for all of us. It is
wrong and misguided for Congress to overburden our highly skilled
intelligence professionals by shouldering them with this unnecessary
science project.
Lastly, this measure gives our strategic threat little attention.
While engaging in the global war on terror, the strategic threat has
grown. Having the
[[Page H4883]]
ability to peer into areas that would cause us harm is vital to
advanced warning, known as ``Persistent Stare.'' We need to pay more
attention to the architecture of ``stare'' and ``persistence''; yet
this bill provides inadequate resources.
For example, substantial funds have been added to a space-based
infrared program, SBIRS, that cannot be wisely used. In fact, if these
additional funds were obligated, the program would be sent into
procurement before it is ready, likely to cause schedule delays and
cost overruns. This funding add was poorly conceived and would cause
the Defense Department to literally bite off more than it can chew.
I urge a ``no'' vote on the bill.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, it is now my pleasure to yield 3 minutes to
the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Cramer), one of our subcommittee
Chairs.
Mr. CRAMER. Madam Chair, I rise today in strong support of H.R. 2082,
and I want to compliment the chairman of the Intelligence Committee,
the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, and my colleagues on
both sides of the aisle that I have worked with for a number of years
to make sure that we give the intelligence agencies the resources and
the balance that they need to do the job that we want them to do.
I am sorry that my colleagues from across the aisle can't support
this bill.
I am proud to represent an area of the country that has given much to
the defense of this country including to the intelligence agencies. My
district is the home of the Missile and Space Intelligence Center,
known as MSIC, and MSIC is a key DIA facility that helps our country
understand and prepare against the threat from missiles from foreign
nations.
Now, this bill today, H.R. 2082, is a well-crafted bill. It
strengthens our national security by authorizing the largest amount of
funding ever for the intelligence community. Let me say that again.
This bill authorizes the largest amount ever for the intelligence
community.
But it is not just the amount that is important. We have got to make
sure that we perform oversight of the agencies that we give these
resources to, make sure that the distribution is balanced between the
needs to be addressed today and the needs that will be faced in the
future.
Specifically, this bill provides our intelligence professionals with
the resources to deal with the immediate threats that we face in Iraq
and Afghanistan, as well as the emerging challenges from dangerous
regimes around the world, particularly in Iran and North Korea.
I also support this bill because it recognizes that simply giving the
intelligence community considerable resources and hoping for the best
is not enough. Congress must conduct effective oversight, and this bill
accomplishes that.
Now, Chairman Reyes, as you know, we have worked hard to make sure
that we continue the bipartisan approach that this committee has a
history of being the best at, and I think this bill is a product of a
bipartisan effort to fund our intelligence priorities and strengthen
our oversight.
To the ranking member, in the last Congress, we established, I
believe, set up, the Oversight Subcommittee that Mr. Thornberry chaired
and I was the ranking member of. I think that subcommittee did an
excellent job, drafting reports, holding informal hearings, making
visits out in the field both in this country and out of this country,
to make sure that together we got off to a better start of performing
oversight. And I think this bill today continues with that effort.
We drafted a report on the standup of the DNI in the last Congress.
We made sure that we let them know that we were there to give them the
resources that they needed but to hold them accountable for what they
did as well, and I think this bill strikes that appropriate balance
between strengthening national security and performing effective
oversight.
I urge support of the bill.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 3
minutes to the gentlewoman from New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson).
Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Madam Chair, I would agree with my
colleague Mr. Cramer that much of this bill was developed in a
bipartisan way. And one of the reasons that I like the Intelligence
Committee is we don't have the C-SPAN effect. The cameras are off, and
we get down to doing some very serious and important business on behalf
of the country.
While we fixed a lot of things in the initial draft of the bill in
committee, particularly with respect to technical intelligence and
overhead systems, there are two very serious concerns that I still have
that cause me to stand here today and oppose the bill.
The first is that there is a significant reduction in human
intelligence in some very important special accounts, and they are
reductions that are marked and serious and will impact our ability to
conduct human intelligence in an area of the world where it is
absolutely critical, not only for current operations but for our long-
term security in the region.
We can't cut human intelligence. That was one of the number one
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. We have to strengthen human
intelligence after a decade of neglect.
The second problem is that this bill fails to address in any way one
of the most important problems that we face in the intelligence
community, and that is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The
Director of National Intelligence came to the committee with written
recommendations on how we need to update and modernize the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, and this bill does nothing. He said to
us we are actually missing a significant portion of what we should be
getting. Because of the way the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
is written, we are not collecting critical intelligence important to
this country.
We should have addressed that in this bill. The DNI asked us to
address that in this bill because we were operating with one hand tied
behind our back. That is dangerous for this country and causes me to
oppose this bill.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, I would remind the gentlewoman that we
will be having hearings and addressing the issue of FISA in regular
order, which is the proper way to handle very serious issues that the
American people want us to handle.
Madam Chairman, I now yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from
California, Ms. Anna Eshoo, who chairs our Subcommittee on Intelligence
Community Management.
Ms. ESHOO. Madam Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman of the
House Intelligence Committee for yielding.
I rise in support of H.R. 2082.
First, I want to make a comment about a requirement that is in the
bill that has been made fun of, made fun of by our friends on the other
side of the aisle, and that is that the bill requires a National
Intelligence Estimate on the national security implications of global
climate change. I take issue with their diminishment of this issue.
The American people are ahead of us on this and so are people in the
intelligence community, including three and four star admirals and
generals who recently issued a report on the national security impacts
of global climate change. I will submit their names for the Record.
* General Gordon R. Sullivan, USA (Ret.)
* Admiral Frank ``Skip'' Bowman, USN (Ret.)
* Lieutenant General Lawrence P. Farrell Jr., USAF (Ret.)
* Vice Admiral Paul G. Gaffney II, USN (Ret.)
* General Paul J. Kern, USA (Ret.)
* Admiral T. Joseph Lopez, USN (Ret.)
* Admiral Donald L. ``Don'' Pilling, USN (Ret.)
* Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, USN (Ret.)
* Vice Admiral Richard H. Truly, USN (Ret.)
* General Charles F. ``Chuck'' Wald, USAF (Ret.)
* General Anthony C. ``Tony'' Zinni, USMC (Ret.)
As they noted, the geopolitical effects of global warming are likely
to intensify instability in some of the most volatile regions of the
world as people fight over access to water and food, creating
humanitarian disasters and failed states that facilitate the
establishment of terrorist safe havens.
The intelligence community agrees, and they are already preparing an
assessment on how our enemies could use global climate change to
degrade our security interests. This NIE will not divert collection
assets from other priorities. That's hogwash.
[[Page H4884]]
I would also like to note that we have a growing crisis in our
overhead architecture. Over the past several years, the intelligence
community has chosen to take more risk in its management structures
that have failed. The consequences of these failures are extremely
serious, threatening our overhead capability and wreaking havoc on the
industrial base. Some of these risky decisions were made without the
appropriate congressional notification, and now we have to clean up the
mess.
Finally, last September the President acknowledged that the
intelligence community had kept prisoners in undisclosed detention
sites and reserved the right to do so in the future. I, as one Member
of Congress, strongly object to any policy which does so. Generations
of people, Americans, have come to this Nation to escape regimes that
make people disappear. We have commitments under the Geneva
Conventions, international laws and treaties. If we don't live up to
these standards, we weaken protections for U.S. citizens abroad. I
think our Nation stands for a higher standard of treatment, and I don't
think we should ever engage in such practices.
I am proud to support this bill, Madam Chairman. This is the largest
single intelligence authorization in the history of our country. And
for anyone to say that we are shortchanging the people that are working
so hard to protect our national security is simply and plainly wrong.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, at this time I would like to yield 3
minutes to a gentleman on the committee, Mr. Thornberry from Texas.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Madam Chairman, I thank the ranking member for
yielding.
Madam Chairman, there are many good provisions of this bill, and I
appreciate the hard work of the staff and the sincerity of the Members
in attempting to tackle complex, vital issues before this committee.
And yet I also have concerns with this bill.
Last July the Oversight Subcommittee of the Intelligence Committee
issued a unanimous report about the progress of implementing the
Intelligence Reform Act so far. And what we found was that there was
some good, there were some disappointments, but yet there was overall a
lack of a sense of appropriate urgency in doing the things that needed
to be done to reform intelligence and to make this country safer.
And that is kind of the sense I get from this bill. There is a lot of
good in it. There are some significant disappointments. But I worry
about a lack of urgency in a sense because as 9/11 drifts further in
the past, we have to face up to these very serious threats that are
before us. And yet in this bill certain efforts and resources are
diverted from higher priorities to lower priorities.
And I might point out in the case of one particular lower priority
that the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo) mentioned, there has
never been a hearing or, as I understand it, even a question at a
hearing about intelligence implications of global climate change. And
yet it is so important, it is a mandatory item in this bill for the
intelligence community.
This bill takes significant efforts that the intelligence community
is making and cuts back or places restriction on them, and yet it
delays making reforms in essential areas as Mrs. Wilson was talking
about. So I worry that we are on a path where we will return to
mistakes of the past and do so at a time when we face a ruthless,
determined, adaptable adversary.
{time} 2230
I would like to make one other point. In many respects, I think it is
a test for Congress as an institution whether we can pass an
intelligence authorization bill.
The Intelligence Committees of both Houses were set up in the 1970s
as the oversight entities for the broad Intelligence Community. The
fact is, if we don't do it in these two committees in the House and the
Senate, it will not get done. No one else has insight into the
programs. No other committees have the time and resources and expertise
to delve down into the many, many activities that the Intelligence
Community performs that are essential to our country's security.
And yet, if we use these intelligence authorization bills to promote
a political agenda, I think it makes the effectiveness of that
oversight less so, and particularly if it results in their failure to
be a bill. I think we can do better, and I hope we do.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, I now yield 3 minutes to the gentleman
from Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger), who serves as our chairman on the
Subcommittee on Technical and Tactical Intelligence.
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Madam Chairwoman, I want to first say that I rise
in support of H.R. 2082, the Intelligence Authorization Act.
Our Nation is at war. We are fighting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and we
are battling terrorists worldwide. We are also witnessing the rise of
nuclear powers in Iran and North Korea. We are facing major challenges
from China and Russia, who want to gain a technological edge on the
United States.
America has to stay on the offensive, and the way to do that is with
stronger technology. This bill will strengthen our intelligence
capabilities and invest much needed resources in new research and
development.
I am the chairman of the Technical and Tactical Subcommittee, which
is responsible for overseeing technical intelligence assets, including
the National Security Agency. The subcommittee has been working hard to
ensure that this bill provides the necessary resources so that the
Intelligence Community has the latest cutting-edge research and
technology. This is the foundation for good intelligence.
Other countries are gaining the ability to take out intelligence
assets, such as orbiting satellites. Al Qaeda is finding innovative
ways to communicate over the internet to plan attacks.
We need to develop smarter tools to collect this information about
threats to the U.S. and our allies. This bill refocuses the
Intelligence Community on these new and emerging threats. The number
one priority is preserving our technical workforce. This bill invests
in our scientists and engineers.
This bill also addresses the future of research and development
across the Intelligence Community. Let me emphasize; we must invest
more heavily in research and development. The committee is looking to
the Director of National Intelligence to establish an aggressive R&D
investment strategy that promotes cooperation among various agencies
while allowing each agency to conduct research that fulfills its
specific needs. During this time of growth, we need to maintain the
good working relationships the Intelligence Community has with our
Nation's research centers.
In closing, we need to maintain our technology. We should vote for
this bill.
I have been on the Intelligence Committee for 4 years. I feel very
strongly that this committee should be USA first. What we have to deal
with is very important. I am very distressed and concerned that the
minority at this point, who I have worked with and are excellent
friends and I respect, the first bill that we have coming out of as a
majority are voting ``no.''
We need to bring consensus together. We need to work as a team. There
are some things that we have and some that we don't, but I hope that we
will be able to work together in the future and go beyond this tonight.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. At this time, I would like to yield 3 minutes to
another member of the committee, Mr. McHugh of New York.
Mr. McHUGH. I thank the distinguished ranking member for yielding to
me.
Madam Chair, I would say that I want to begin by expressing my deep
appreciation and great respect to the bipartisan leadership of the
committee. To the distinguished ranking member who has provided such a
steady hand and, certainly during his time as chair, for great guidance
and leadership. And a particular tip of the hat, Madam Chair, to the
current chairman. Chairman Reyes I consider to be a personal friend,
and he is a man of a good heart and great leadership. I would suggest
respectfully through that good heart and great leadership, this bill
certainly has some positive aspects. It increases needed
counterintelligence assets to protect our Nation's military secrets. As
well, it initiates the movement of
[[Page H4885]]
supplemental funding to the base budget for the better use and planning
of those funds. And it establishes the requirement to develop an
integrated space-based collection architect.
In addition, it places limitation on the termination of the U-2
program. It also gives added emphasis on language training and
additional accountability on intelligence contracting. As I said, Madam
Chair, these are all very positive steps in improving our intelligence
capabilities, and I commend the chairman and Members on both sides of
the aisle for working together to make that happen.
I have to say, regretfully, however, there is much that distresses me
in this bill. Let me just cite a few examples.
I am very, very concerned that the legislation before us begins to
retrace the failed policies of the 1990s that were based on
underfunding and overtasking of our limited intelligence resources. It
inadvertently, or not, establishes politically correct restrictions on
intelligence operations.
Additionally, at least in my judgment, the bill does not adequately
support key Intelligence Community activities that directly protect our
national security. It calls for cuts to human intelligence programs
which is counter to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. It
fails to support the Intelligence Community and our national defense by
rejecting an amendment that our side offered to include important
legislation to modernize the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
even though this identical language, Madam Chair, was passed
unanimously by a bipartisan vote previously last year in the House.
There is no question that our Nation is locked in a struggle with
radical jihadists and facing continued uncertainty and threats around
the globe. As well, there is no question that before us lie critical
questions. And we know what is needed right now is a well-trained,
well-equipped and capable Intelligence Community. Instead, this bill
unnecessarily, again in my judgment, diverts the resources of the
Intelligence Community, as we have heard, to produce unnecessary
legislation and initiatives.
I would hope we could go back, reject this bill and begin anew to
work together on a bipartisan basis to produce a better product.
Mr. REYES. Could I inquire of the Chair how much time is remaining on
both sides?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas has 13 minutes; the gentleman
from Michigan has 15 minutes.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, it is my pleasure now to yield 3 minutes
to the gentleman from California (Mr. Thompson), who is the chairman of
our Subcommittee on Terrorism, Human Intelligence Analysis and
Counterintelligence.
Mr. THOMPSON of California. I thank the chairman for yielding.
Madam Chairman, I am pleased to stand in strong support of this
authorization bill tonight. I believe that this bill strengthens our
capabilities to recognize and counter threats to the United States,
both terrorist threats from groups like al Qaeda and the strategic
challenges present in regions all over the world, including the Middle
East, Asia and Latin America. This bill ensures that U.S. troops in
Iraq and Afghanistan will continue to receive the intelligence support
they need to conduct their missions.
The bill authorizes the largest intelligence budget ever. It also
provides full funding for the intelligence programs related to
Afghanistan and for U.S. efforts to counter terrorist threats.
Madam Chairman, terrorism and the war in Iraq are critical issues,
and they have required intelligence agencies to divert resources away
from other strategic challenges. This bill funds initiatives to collect
better intelligence on those that pose threats to our country. It also
adds funds to enhance coverage of other challenges, such as emerging
threats in Africa and Latin America, and to ensure that America is not
caught by surprise in the future.
The bill makes significant investments to improve the quality of
intelligence analysts. It provides resources to send more analysts
overseas so they can gain the real world experiences in the countries
that they study. It provides funds for expanded foreign language
training that we all agree is needed, and the development of advanced
technical tools so both analysts and collectors can better do their
jobs.
The bill makes us safer by adding resources for counterintelligence
investigations, and these provisions will help mitigate efforts by our
adversaries to steal classified information and advanced technologies,
keeping the U.S. policy options open and preserving our military edge.
Despite these additions, the bill promotes efficiency and
accountability by cutting programs that lack clear objectives and
measurable results. It also requires the CIA Inspector General to audit
covert action programs, ensuring regular oversight.
Madam Chair, this legislation helps us fight terrorists; it supports
our troops; and it enhances U.S. intelligence capabilities throughout
the world.
I support this bill, and I strongly recommend that our colleagues do
as well.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, at this time I would like to yield 3
minutes to the gentleman from Kansas (Mr. Tiahrt), a member of the
committee.
Mr. TIAHRT. I thank the gentleman from Michigan.
Madam Chairman, this bill reduces our human intelligence
capabilities. Human intelligence is one of the primary tools used to
keep us informed about the plans and intentions of our adversaries.
Human intelligence keeps our families and our military personnel safe.
Today, we are faced by many threats around the world, from radical
jihadists to the emerging threat from rogue nations. One of our primary
ways to combat these threats is with human intelligence, but this bill
distracts us from that. And we have been in this predicament before. It
is entirely probable that the downsizing of our Intelligence Community,
and specifically the Central Intelligence Agency, during the decade of
the 1990s contributed to the intelligence breakdown often associated
with 9/11. We should have learned that lesson, but instead of putting
more resources into human intelligence, this bill redirects resources
to a new top priority.
The bill requires that the Intelligence Community determine the
impacts of global warming. How could we have overlooked this? I thought
the enemy was al Qaeda, who claimed responsibility for September 11,
2001. I thought it was Iran, who calls us ``the Great Satan'' and is
actively pursuing nuclear weapons. I thought it was the Islamic
terrorists that are attacking our young men and women every day. Now we
find out it is global warming.
Now, I know that the world is warming. Kansas used to be covered by a
sheet of ice 14,000 years ago; now it's not. But for the record, I
would like to point out that the United States has 13 Federal agencies
currently studying the effects of climate change. In fact, the
President's 2008 budget request has nearly $7.4 billion associated with
studying climate change. And according to the Congressional Research
Service, since 2001, the Federal Government has devoted $37 billion to
study climate change activities.
Why is this an intelligence priority? Is it really responsible to
shift our resources, currently focused on North Korea and Iran and
other threats, to the impacts of global warming?
Madam Chairman, this bill is not the right approach, and it does not
provide the tools to protect our Nation's security. Intelligence is the
first line of defense. Now is not the time to let down our guard.
I urge my colleagues to vote against H.R. 2082.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, it is now my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to a
gentleman from Iowa, an American hero, fellow Vietnam veteran (Mr.
Boswell), a member of the committee.
(Mr. BOSWELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BOSWELL. Madam Chairman, I rise in support of this bill. I feel
it is a step in the right direction. I have to take note that there is
almost a self-righteousness of those that have been in charge for all
these years and want to criticize, you have only had the driving of
this ship for 4 months. You're doing a good job. Keep your head up and
keep going forward and the country will be safer.
[[Page H4886]]
This bill does a number of things. One thing for sure that we
recognize, all of us that have served in this capacity, that the people
that go out there and gather intelligence, they put it on the line. The
things they do, if the Nation understood the risks they take, the
things they will do to try to make us safe, they would be very
appreciative.
{time} 2245
This bill also recognizes something that we have been overlooking now
for several years, that there is a need to increase the gathering of
information or opportunities for people to learn languages. Around the
world, this world we live in, there is much need to have innovative
ways to explore new language opportunities. The need is there. This
bill will require that, and that is a good step forward at least.
It also recognizes the need to take an aggressive approach to the
gaps in our knowledge about Korea and Iran and around the world. We
know there is a threat there and we are going to have to do more about
it. We have tried before; we are trying again. This bill will do it and
require the DNI to report back to us on a quarterly basis so we can
assess and give oversight and do a better job of recognizing this need.
So, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your hard work. Keep it up. Support
the bill.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to my colleague from the
great State of Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I want to congratulate the
chairman on mostly good work. And a big budget doesn't necessarily mean
a good budget. We have had some great discussions. There are some
really good things in this bill. But there are some serious departures
on the direction in which we take intelligence that I think are so
important that we need to stand up and oppose this bill.
This bill jeopardizes our ability to listen to terrorists. It puts it
at risk. This bill cuts very specific human intelligence programs. They
will get less money this year than they got last year.
I just want to talk for a minute about global climate change. As
mentioned earlier, the President's budget proposes over $7 billion for
climate change activities. This bill should be about securing America.
Instead, it is being used to secure a political agenda on these items.
Climate change is an important issue, and it should be taken
seriously. Thankfully it is. Fourteen Federal agencies already have
active climate change programs. Let me go through them: Agriculture,
Commerce, State, Health and Human Services, Interior, Transportation,
EPA, NASA, NSF, Defense, Treasury, USAID, the Smithsonian, the Army,
the Navy, the Air Force, DARPA and NASA all have active research,
development, testing and evaluation programs. NASA's program already
makes satellite images available to government researchers.
This legislation assigns intelligence agencies that have limited
experience in this area the job of researching climate change. We are
going to take analysts away from looking for Osama bin Laden and we are
going to put them on the ``March of the Penguins.''
This bill requires intelligence agencies to use intelligence
satellites to monitor environmental issues. Many of my colleagues have
been in the field. You know that imagery is so important and so high in
demand. This is the wrong direction for their mission accomplishment.
If you want to break the spirits of our intelligence agencies, if you
want to destroy their morale, go ahead and give them this assignment.
Tell them they should spend their day watching the grass grow, and see
how it works. George Tenet referred to these kinds of assignments as
``bugs and bunnies assignments.''
We are making a mockery of the seriousness of climate change and a
mockery of the important work our intelligence agencies do. If you
liked building the rain forest in Iowa, you are going to love the
Department of Environmental Espionage.
Vote against this legislation. The stakes are too high. The people in
the field mean too much to us. Their mission is too crucial to have it
diverted for a political agenda.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, sometimes I feel like we are living in a
parallel universe here, when I hear the Members of the minority quote
the ``slam-dunk expert.''
Madam Chairman, it is my privilege to yield 2 minutes to the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt), a member of our committee who
serves as the chairman of the Select Intelligence Oversight Panel.
Mr. HOLT. Madam Chairman, although the bill before us today does not
produce the overhaul of intelligence I seek, it does address a number
of critical deficiencies in the operation and oversight of the
intelligence community, and I support this important legislation.
I commend the committee staff. They do excellent work without help
from outside. And I commend the Chair, the gentleman from Texas, for
his sensible, considerate approach to his work as Chair.
There are several specific provisions in this bill that I would like
to highlight. For example, the bill requires the compilation of a
comprehensive inventory of special access programs, as well as measures
to improve the contracting accountability. These provisions will give
the committee additional tools to hold the intelligence community
accountable for its actions and the use or misuse of taxpayer funds.
Again this year we demand more attention to the foreign language
facility of employees in the intelligence community.
Of course, we would want the intelligence community to look at
international and global issues that affect our national security. And
who could oppose the attention to climate change?
There are a number of areas where we have had added or reduced
resources. Overall, the agencies have ample support, the largest budget
ever. By the way, I would say to my colleague from Kansas, there is no
reduction in human intelligence collectors. This legislation adds
resources for their training, it adds analytic capability, it adds
technologies to help them do their job.
Let me close by thanking the chairman again for the admirable manner
that he shows in running this committee. I support this legislation,
and I urge my colleagues to do so.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to my colleague, the
gentleman from California (Mr. Issa).
Mr. ISSA. Madam Chairman, I thank the ranking member, and I thank the
chairman for what we were able to accomplish during the markup. But I
come to the House floor knowing that in fact in a few short minutes, an
hour or so, our Members will vote not knowing what is in this bill. Oh,
they will hear us talking in unclassified terms about the fact that
HUMINT, contrary to the last speaker, is being cut in absolute dollars.
The eyes and ears of human beings is being cut in this bill.
Certainly, with inflation, other things are going up. But as everyone
knows that has read the Iraq Study Report or the 9/11 report, it is the
absence of the human resources that we have been investing in that led
to our vulnerability on 9/11. And I will say that if the people on the
other side of the aisle want to say we are losing this war, then they
have to be willing to make a much greater commitment in the diplomatic
and especially in the human resources and the above-sky resources that
allow us to know what our enemy is thinking and planning before he
attacks.
This bill doesn't do it. This bill does, as many of the speakers have
said, deal with ``bugs and bunnies.'' Now, I happen to be an advocate
for global warming research. I happen to believe that the Earth is
warming, and I happen to believe that CO2 is something we
have to address. I serve on a committee that has overseen it, that has
looked at it, that has costed it; and I will continue to do so.
But I am beyond words, furious, that with no new funding we are
diverting resources from finding out what bad people want to do to us,
to a vague, beyond vague, an open-ended statement of over the next 30
years what is global warming maybe going to do.
It is a worst case, all-possible-negatives study. It will cost ten or
hundreds of millions of dollars to begin with. It will cause us to
divert satellites to do the research. To be honest, the CIA doesn't
just throw together a report, especially when it is this vague.
We urged in committee that in fact they put reasonable amendments to
[[Page H4887]]
this. We asked something simple: task them with the U.N.'s finding on
global warming. Any committee, any group's finding. It is an open-ended
go-study report. It is going to cost a lot of money, and it is going to
cost American lives.
But last but not least, there are unconscionable earmarks in this
bill which I three times participated and voted for going to closed
session so the Members would understand that pork and ``unfounded''
earmarks are in this bill; that American lives will be lost because we
divert needed moneys from the human resources we need to invest in to
pork projects and special interests of Members of the majority.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, so we move from a parallel universe to the
Twilight Zone.
Madam Chairman, I would like to yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman
from Illinois (Ms. Schakowsky), a member of our committee.
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. Madam Chairman, I rise today to address two matters
in the intelligence authorization bill.
For too long, the intelligence community has been increasing its use
of contractors without internal or congressional oversight. For the
first time, the Director of National Intelligence has conducted a
contractor survey to begin to get a handle on the situation. A simple
survey, however, is not sufficient to understand how we are using
contractors and whether the use of such contractors is appropriate.
This bill takes an important step towards understanding the use of
contractors. It requires the DNI Inspector General to report on
intelligence contractors committing waste, fraud or abuse. It also
requires a report on contractor accountability and their effect on the
workforce, all positive steps toward better oversight.
But there is one issue this bill does not address that I firmly
believe raises a fundamental question as to who we are as a Nation. The
President has acknowledged that the intelligence community kept
prisoners in undisclosed detention sites and has reserved the right to
do so in the future. We should reject this policy.
In Nazi Germany, millions of people were sent to camps, never to be
heard from again. During the Cold War, thousands of people disappeared
into gulags. Saddam Hussein's secret prisons still strike fear into the
hearts of Iraqis. Each time, our Nation stood as a beacon of human
rights and strongly objected to those practices. If we endorse any
policy that allows undisclosed detention, we undermine our moral
authority to stand against such atrocities in the future.
The United States should be beyond reproach in its treatment of
detainees. In the first Gulf War, the International Committee of the
Red Cross called U.S. compliance with the Geneva Conventions the best
of any nation in any conflict in the history of the convention.
If we lower that standard for how we treat prisoners, we weaken our
ability to insist on the highest standards of treatment for our own
military personnel and civilians abroad, thus endangering their safety
and undermining our standing in the world. More importantly, we
sacrifice the principles on which this country is based.
I want to thank the chairman for considering all these important
matters in the intelligence bill and for his leadership on this good
bill.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I yield 1 minute to my colleague and
classmate from the State of Maryland, Mr. Roscoe Bartlett.
Mr. BARTLETT of Maryland. Madam Chairman, I hold here a major study
done by the Center for Naval Analysis entitled ``National Security and
the Threat of Climate Change.'' Their Military Advisory Board contains
five admirals and four generals, including Sullivan, Lopez and Zinni.
In their recommendations, ``Recommendation No. 1,'' they say the
national security consequences of climate change should be fully
integrated with national security and national defense strategies. Two
of the specifics of this have been included in the National Defense
Authorization Act, including the National Security Strategy, the
National Defense Strategy and the Quadrennial Defense Review, all of
which, they say, should consider climate change. A specific related to
the intelligence community should incorporate climate consequences into
its National Intelligence Estimate.
A letter from the chairman of this board said that ``we made that
call because we are concerned that climate change may affect our
military.''
This conservative Republican proudly joined Mr. Markey in requesting
that this become a part of the base bill; and thank you, Mr. Chairman,
for making it so.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I yield 1 minute to my colleague from
the State of Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I just want to quickly
respond to my colleague, who I have the greatest amount of respect for.
Climate change is an important issue, and I think the point we are
trying to make here is that there are 14 agencies, $7 billion already
being spent on it. The time to train an analyst and a case officer to
their optimum performance level is between 5 and 7 years. Five and 7
years. That is an incredible investment. And I want them looking for
Osama bin Laden, for the next nuclear program that we don't know about
around the world. It takes a tremendous amount of effort to get them
where they need to be. This is the wrong direction for it.
We have, I am going to read them again, the Army, Navy, Air Force,
DARPA, NASA, EPA, NSF, Defense, Treasury, USAID, the Smithsonian,
Transportation, Interior, HHS, State, Energy, Commerce and Agriculture
all looking at climate change. Don't waste these very precious
resources.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, it is my pleasure to yield 2 minutes to
the gentleman from Rhode Island (Mr. Langevin), a member of our
committee.
(Mr. LANGEVIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
{time} 2300
Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Madam Chair, I rise in strong support of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for FY 2008. I particularly want to commend Chairman
Reyes for his outstanding leadership, vision and work on this bill and
getting us to where we are today. Equally important, I want to
recognize the staff for their hard work as well.
Madam Chair, I have always believed that good intelligence is the
pointy tip of the spear. This bill provides intelligence support for
troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and strengthens information-sharing
among Federal, State and local agencies. Most importantly, it enhances
the full range of intelligence collection capabilities, tactical and
strategic, near term and long term.
The United States relies heavily on satellites to gather
intelligence. Our intelligence agencies, working with industry, have
developed extraordinary capabilities that build upon proven
technologies. And to ensure that we maintain our technological edge,
this bill refocuses the Intelligence Community on evolving satellite
technology while ensuring that our industrial base also remains strong.
And because nothing beats having eyes on the ground, this bill
strengthens human intelligence collection capabilities by adding funds
to both CIA and military collectors to receive training and operational
skills in critical foreign languages while providing advanced
technological tools that support intelligence collection.
This measure further strengthens intelligence analysis by investing
in the people of the Intelligence Community. By establishing
challenging career paths for intelligence professionals at FBI and DHS,
it rewards good work and encourages America's best and brightest to
serve. Many of these Americans, because of their personal backgrounds,
possess a wealth of expertise on foreign cultures, societies and
languages. But for the Intelligence Community to harness their
potential, its staff must reflect the myriad experiences, talents and
perspectives of the American people.
This bill takes important steps to enhance diversity in the
Intelligence Community. For example, it requires the DNI to implement a
multi-level security clearance system to ensure that Americans who are
ineligible for the highest clearances because they have
[[Page H4888]]
relatives overseas and cannot be investigated, for instance, can still
offer expertise in their roles.
It is a good bill, and I urge its passage.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to a former ranking
member of this committee, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman).
Ms. HARMAN. Madam Chair, I thank the gentleman for yielding and
commend him for his leadership as chairman of the committee.
Madam Chair, I spoke earlier during the rule about the specifics in
this bill, a bill I strongly support. But as the debate closes, I
thought I might offer just two thoughts from my vantage point as
someone who has served on this committee for so long and who
passionately cares about the issues.
The first is I believe al Qaeda is here and waiting to attack us. I
believe America is in danger, and if we don't get our intelligence
right both internationally and domestically, we will be attacked. We
will fail to prevent or disrupt the harm that is coming our way. That
is why it is so critical that we pass the best bill that we can.
My second point is that I have never seen, and I have sat through
these debates for many years, the kind of partisanship we are now
seeing in debate on the intelligence authorization bill. It breaks my
heart.
And if there is someone out there in an austere, unaccompanied post
watching C-SPAN, if C-SPAN is available, and looking at this debate,
that person must wonder: Why can't Congress come together and protect
America at a time of urgent need? And I have to say, I am wondering,
too. It is very disappointing to see the partisanship. It is very
disappointing to hear that members I served with are going to oppose
this bill. I hope they will reconsider. It is very important to reach
consensus and pass the strongest bill possible.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Madam Chair, I have a great deal of respect for my colleague, but I
believe last year, and she can correct me if I'm wrong, but I believe
she voted against the bill on the floor. And to characterize our
disagreement with this bill as partisan, and to, I assume perhaps in
another way, characterize her vote against our base bill last year as
something else, her vote as something else, is disappointing.
We had a good partnership when I was chairman and you were ranking
member. I am disappointed by that. I believe this is a well-founded
difference of opinion on the content of this bill. There are clear
differences in priorities. As the gentlelady said and others have said,
we are a Nation that faces a great threat.
We saw earlier this week that threat may have evolved and found its
way once again to our shores, in New Jersey. We believe we need to
strengthen HUMINT and face the threats that are out there. We believe
that we can't be working in the politically correct environment.
The message that people are looking for in the field is, what
direction is this new majority going to take our Intelligence
Community? They are seeing cuts in key activities that support the war,
the effort against the threat that we face from radical jihadists, and
not applying the resources that we need against targets that we don't
know enough about.
I think we would all agree on a bipartisan basis, we don't know
enough about al Qaeda and how it works and where it is and what its
resources are and what its plans and intentions are. We don't know
enough about Iran, Syria, North Korea and the people that are
proliferating and making this world a much more dangerous place.
We will see amendments later on from both sides of the aisle that
acknowledge that we are not where we want to be with the reorganization
of the Intelligence Community. We have lots of questions about where
the DNI, the office of the DNI is headed and whether this structure is
going to work the way that some of us worked in a very bipartisan way
to reform it with a certain expectation and hope, and what we would get
as a result of that: An enhanced Intelligence Community that would be
quicker, more nimble and more effective than the threats that we face
today. And we need to rebuild HUMINT.
And at the same time, we see in this bill a commitment that says we
are going to task the Intelligence Community, and the question that has
not been answered is what specific skills does the Intelligence
Community add to the study of climate change when we are already
spending $7 billion projected for the next fiscal year on climate
change? What secrets are we going to steal? What are we going to task
our HUMINT folks for? What are we going to task our limited resources
with spy satellites to do? To assess the political, social,
agricultural and economic risk during the 30-year period beginning on
date of enactment? And don't say it is not going to take resources.
This is a massive undertaking. It is not a throw-away. This is Congress
coming and saying the most important national intelligence assessment
that the community can complete next year, and you need to do it in 180
days; 180 days with no input from the community on whether they have
the resources, the capabilities to carry out this task. We are saying
that it needs to be done in 180 days. You need to do it on a global
basis, and you need to do it over 30 years, and you need to cover all
of these different areas. And by the way, we are not going to give you
a benchmark from where to start.
Are you going to take the U.N.'s assessment of what may be happening
with climate change? Are you going to take a university's assessment on
climate change? Where do you start?
This is a massive undertaking. It will shift resources because when
you tell the Director of National Intelligence Congress wants this
done, and Congress we know has been dissatisfied with the national
intelligence estimates that we have been given on Iraq and Iran and on
a number of other issues, they know they need to get this one right or
it better be a very, very good piece of work. They will take this very,
very seriously. They will divert resources to get this done, and they
will divert resources from the things that we need them to be doing.
This bill sends the wrong message to our men and women in the field.
I ask my colleagues to vote ``no.''
Mr. REYES. Madam Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Madam Chair, I am very proud of this bill, and I am proud of the work
we all put into it. I realize there are some political differences. You
have heard the minority go from characterizing bugs and bunnies. Well,
I think bogeyman politics doesn't work with the American people. It
doesn't work with the challenge that we are facing in Iraq, and it is
not going to fly with what we are doing with this intelligence bill.
This bill does not make cuts. It adds funds to both CIA and military
elements for human intelligence training. It adds funding for sending
additional analysts overseas.
Yes, I agree with the former ranking member, we should be concerned
about al Qaeda. The ranking member mentioned the potential attacks
against Fort Dix last week. So this is serious business. We know it is.
This is an important piece of legislation that I hope everyone knows
it is imperative that they support. The men and women of the
Intelligence Community don't care about mischaracterizations. They
don't care about talking about slam dunking and bugs and bunnies and
all of these other rhetorical phrases that the minority likes to engage
in. They care about support from Congress.
This bill gives the Intelligence Community the support that they
need. All you have to do is travel around the world and listen to them.
I am proud of this legislation.
By strengthening our Nation's Intelligence Community, we will be able
to detect and disrupt the plans of those that are threatening our
national security. I urge my colleagues to support this critical piece
of legislation.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Madam Chairman, I rise in strong support of
H.R. 2082, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2007. H.R. 2082
authorizes the largest amount for intelligence ever considered in a
single bill, which just goes to show you how important intelligence has
become to our national security and how serious the new Democratic
majority is about protecting the homeland and defending the nation.
H.R. 2082 promotes responsible budgeting and oversight by shifting
resources from the supplemental to the base budget--allowing officers
in the field to plan their operations properly, particularly in the
counterterrorism arena, and allowing Congress to review funding
requests.
[[Page H4889]]
The bill makes key investments to strengthen intelligence by adding
funds to both CIA and military elements for Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
training. We increase our investments in language training for
collectors and analysts and in language translation capabilities. We
also add funding for sending additional analysts overseas. The bill
also strengthens counterintelligence field operations.
Madam Chairman, H.R. 2082 promotes efficiency and effectiveness of
intelligence programs by streamlining acquisition, trimming the fat
from ineffective programs, eliminating redundant activities, requiring
greater strategic focus in some key areas.
Madam Chairman, this bill does not, as some claim, make deep cuts in
any intelligence programs. In one area, related to supplemental funding
for Iraq, the bill reflects bipartisan concerns about excessive
spending on programs that lack a strategy or metrics for evaluating its
effectiveness. These funds are shifted to enhance coverage of other
global challenges, such as Iran, Russia, East Africa, and Asia.
The bill promotes accountability by requiring quarterly intelligence
updates to Congress on nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea. And it
requires the CIA Inspector General to conduct an audit of each covert
action program not less than once every three years.
Finally, Madam, Chairman, H.R. 2082 requires reports to Congress on
the use of contractors in the Intelligence Community. It requires a
strategy for implementing a multi-level security clearance system--to
allow patriotic Americans to serve as translators or linguists in the
intelligence community. I think it important also that H.R. 2082
promotes diversity in the intelligence community by requiring a
strategic plan for implementing the recommendations of a key diversity
panel.
Last, the H.R. 2082 follows the recommendations of several former
military commanders in requesting that the National Intelligence
Council produce a National Intelligence Estimate on national security
impact of global climate change.
Madam Chairman, I strongly support H.R. 2082 and the rule.
Mr. LARSON of Connecticut. Madam Chairman, I rise in strong
opposition to the amendment offered by Mr. Hoekstra that would strike
language requesting an assessment of the national security challenges
posed by global warming. As a member of the House Select Committee on
Energy Independence and Global Warming and an original cosponsor to
H.R. 1961, the Global Climate Change Security Oversight Act, I support
the inclusion of this language in the Intelligence Authorization bill.
There are serious political, social, economic and national security
risks associated with climate change. It is only appropriate that our
nation have a National Intelligence Estimate assessing its global
warming threat. The National Intelligence Council is already a
producing a community assessment on this issue, this provision would
simply require that assessment be elevated to a formal National
Intelligence Estimate.
This type of review is supported by a group of 11 retired three-star
and four-star generals and admirals, who on April 16, 2007, issued a
report entitled, ``National Security and the Threat of Climate
Change.'' This report concludes that global warming presents
significant national security challenges the United States. The effects
of climate change are projected to have grave consequences for some of
the poorest areas of the world--already volatile areas, the instability
of these regions would be multiplied. Projected climate change will
seriously exacerbate already marginal living standards in many Asian,
African, and Middle Eastern nations, causing widespread political
instability and the likelihood of failed states. As retired U.S.
General Gordon R. Sullivan described before the Select Global Warming
Committee, the potential national security threat of global warming in
certain regions of the world could potentially be a Petri dish for
terror.
Climate change is yet another front in the war on terror and now is
the time for the United States to fully understand the implications it
has on our national security. I urge my colleagues to join me in
opposing this amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute
printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill for the
purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered
read.
The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as
follows:
H.R. 2082
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Incorporation of reporting requirements.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 202. Technical amendment to mandatory retirement provision.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Clarification of definition of intelligence community under
the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 304. Extension to the intelligence community of authority to
delete information about receipt and disposition of
foreign gifts.
Sec. 305. Modification of requirements for reprogramming of funds for
intelligence activities.
Sec. 306. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for
intelligence collection personnel.
Sec. 307. Report on proposed pay for performance intelligence community
personnel management system.
Sec. 308. Plan to increase diversity in the intelligence community.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 401. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 402. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the
Transportation Security Oversight Board.
Sec. 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology
of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 404. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials.
Sec. 405. Eligibility for incentive awards of personnel assigned to the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 406. Multi-level security clearances.
Sec. 407. National intelligence estimate on global climate change.
Sec. 408. Plan to implement recommendations of the data center
efficiency reports.
Sec. 409. Comprehensive inventory of special access programs.
Sec. 410. Quarterly intelligence reports to Congress on Iran and North
Korea.
Sec. 411. Accountability in intelligence contracting.
Sec. 412. Annual report on foreign language proficiency in the
intelligence community.
Sec. 413. Intelligence community reports on foreign language
proficiency.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Sec. 421. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 422. General authorities of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 423. Review of covert action programs by Inspector General of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 424. Report on audited financial statements progress.
Subtitle C--Other Elements
Sec. 431. Clarifying amendments relating to Section 105 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
Sec. 432. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the
National Counterintelligence Executive.
Sec. 433. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug
Enforcement Administration elements in the intelligence
community.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters
Sec. 501. Aerial reconnaissance platforms.
Sec. 502. Extension of National Commission for Review of Research and
Development Programs of the United States Intelligence
Community.
Subtitle B--Technical Amendments
Sec. 511. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National
Intelligence Program.
Sec. 512. Technical clarification of certain references to Joint
Military Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence
and Related Activities.
Sec. 513. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 514. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004.
Sec. 515. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule.
[[Page H4890]]
Sec. 516. Technical amendments relating to titles of Central
Intelligence Agency positions.
Sec. 517. Technical amendments relating to redesignation of the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Congressional intelligence committees.--The term
``congressional intelligence committees'' means--
(A) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives; and
(B) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2008 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Coast Guard.
(8) The Department of State.
(9) The Department of the Treasury.
(10) The Department of Energy.
(11) The Department of Justice.
(12) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(13) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
(14) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(15) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(16) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and
the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2008,
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the elements listed in such section, are those
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 2082 of the One Hundred
Tenth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and House of Representatives and to the President. The
President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within
the executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director
of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian
personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year
2008 under section 102 when the Director of National
Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the
performance of important intelligence functions, except that
the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of
civilian personnel authorized under such section for such
element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall promptly notify the congressional
intelligence committees whenever the Director exercises the
authority granted by this section.
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2008 the sum of $737,876,000. Within such amount, funds
identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2009.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of
National Intelligence are authorized 1035 full-time personnel
as of September 30, 2008. Personnel serving in such elements
may be permanent employees of the Intelligence Community
Management Account or personnel detailed from other elements
of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are
also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account for fiscal year 2008 such
additional amounts as are specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
Such additional amounts for advanced research and development
shall remain available until September 30, 2009.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30,
2008, there are also authorized such additional personnel for
such elements as of that date as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during
fiscal year 2008 any officer or employee of the United States
or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff
of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another
element of the United States Government shall be detailed on
a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee,
or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a
period of less than one year for the performance of temporary
functions as required by the Director of National
Intelligence.
(e) National Drug Intelligence Center.--
(1) In general.--Of the amount authorized to be
appropriated in subsection (a), $39,000,000 shall be
available for the National Drug Intelligence Center. Within
such amount, funds provided for research, development,
testing, and evaluation purposes shall remain available until
September 30, 2009, and funds provided for procurement
purposes shall remain available until September 30, 2010.
(2) Transfer of funds.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall transfer to the Attorney General funds
available for the National Drug Intelligence Center under
paragraph (1). The Attorney General shall utilize funds so
transferred for the activities of the National Drug
Intelligence Center.
(3) Limitation.--Amounts available for the National Drug
Intelligence Center may not be used for purposes of
exercising police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or
internal security functions.
(4) Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the Attorney General shall retain full authority over the
operations of the National Drug Intelligence Center.
SEC. 105. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
Each requirement to submit a report to the congressional
intelligence committees that is included in the joint
explanatory statement to accompany the conference report on
the bill H.R. 2082 of the One Hundred Tenth Congress, or in
the classified annex to this Act, is hereby incorporated into
this Act, and is hereby made a requirement in law.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2008 the sum of $262,500,000.
SEC. 202. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT
PROVISION.
Section 235(b)(1)(A) of the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2055(b)(1)(A)) is amended to read
as follows:
``(A) upon reaching age 65, in the case of a participant in
the system serving in a position with a Senior Intelligence
Service rank of level 4 or above;''.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 303. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF
1947.
Subparagraph (L) of section 3(4) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended by striking
``other'' the second place it appears.
SEC. 304. EXTENSION TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OF
AUTHORITY TO DELETE INFORMATION ABOUT RECEIPT
AND DISPOSITION OF FOREIGN GIFTS.
Section 7342(f)(4) of title 5, United States Code, is
amended to read as follows:
``(4) In transmitting such listings for an element of the
intelligence community (as such term is defined in section
3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
401a(4))), the head of such element of the intelligence
community may delete the information described in
subparagraphs (A) and (C) of paragraphs (2) and (3) if the
head of such element of the intelligence community certifies
in writing to the Secretary of State that the publication of
such information could adversely affect United States
intelligence sources or methods.''.
SEC. 305. MODIFICATION OF REQUIREMENTS FOR REPROGRAMMING OF
FUNDS FOR INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
Section 504(a)(3)(B) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 414(a)(3)(B)) is amended to read as follows:
``(B) the activity to be funded supports an emergent need,
improves program effectiveness, or increases efficiency;
and''.
SEC. 306. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR TRAVEL ON COMMON
CARRIERS FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL.
(a) Delegation of Authority.--Section 116(b) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is
amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The Director'';
(2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``may only delegate'' and
all that follows and inserting
[[Page H4891]]
``may delegate the authority in subsection (a) to the head of
any other element of the intelligence community.''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community
to whom the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant
to paragraph (1) may further delegate such authority to such
senior officials of such element as are specified in
guidelines prescribed by the Director of National
Intelligence for purposes of this paragraph.''.
(b) Submission of Guidelines to Congress.--Not later than
six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe and submit
to the congressional intelligence committees the guidelines
referred to in paragraph (2) of section 116(b) of the
National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).
SEC. 307. REPORT ON PROPOSED PAY FOR PERFORMANCE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM.
(a) Prohibition on Pay for Performance Until Report.--The
Director of National Intelligence and the head of each
element of the intelligence community may not implement a
plan that provides compensation to personnel of an element of
the intelligence community based on performance until the
date that is 45 days after the date on which the Director of
National Intelligence submits a report under subsection (b).
(b) Report.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report
on performance-based compensation for the intelligence
community, including--
(1) an implementation time line, by phase and by element of
the intelligence community, which includes target dates for
completion of--
(A) the development of performance appraisal plans;
(B) establishment of oversight and appeal mechanisms;
(C) deployment of information technology systems;
(D) management training;
(E) employee training;
(F) compensation transition; and
(G) full operational capacity;
(2) an estimated budget, by phase of implementation and
element of the intelligence community, for the implementation
of the performance-based compensation system;
(3) an evaluation plan to monitor the implementation of the
performance-based compensation system and to improve and
modify such system;
(4) written standards for measuring the performance of
employees;
(5) a description of the performance-based compensation
system, including budget oversight mechanisms to ensure
sufficient funds to pay employees for bonuses;
(6) a description of internal and external accountability
mechanisms to ensure the fair treatment of employees;
(7) a plan for initial and ongoing training for senior
executives, managers, and employees;
(8) a description of the role of any advisory committee or
other mechanism designed to gather the input of employees
relating to the creation and implementation of the system;
and
(9) an assessment of the impact of the performance-based
compensation system on women, minorities, persons with
disabilities, and veterans.
SEC. 308. PLAN TO INCREASE DIVERSITY IN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY.
(a) Strategic Plan Required.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a plan to increase diversity across the
intelligence community. Such plan shall include--
(1) a description of the long term and short term goals for
the intelligence community;
(2) a description of how the plan will be implemented by
each element of the intelligence community, taking into
account the unique nature of individual elements of the
intelligence community;
(3) training and education programs for senior officials
and managers; and
(4) performance metrics.
(b) Restriction on Community Management Funds Until
Submission of Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence
may only obligate or expend 80 percent of the funds
appropriated to the Intelligence Community Management Account
pursuant to section 104(a) until the date on which the report
required under subsection (a) is submitted.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON CO-LOCATION OF THE
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE.
Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-3(e)) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``With'' and inserting ``of
Headquarters With Headquarters of'' ;
(2) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``the
Office''; and
(3) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``any other
element''.
SEC. 402. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ON THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD.
Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United
States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the
Director's designee.''.
SEC. 403. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Coordination and Prioritization of Research Conducted
by Elements of Intelligence Community.--Subsection (d) of
section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-3e) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (3)(A), by inserting ``and prioritize''
after ``coordinate''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall
identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be
executed by elements of the intelligence community.''.
(b) Development of Technology Goals.--Such section is
further amended--
(1) in subsection (c)--
(A) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new
paragraph:
``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the
elements of the intelligence community to meet the technology
needs of the intelligence community; and''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(e) Goals for Technology Needs of Intelligence
Community.--In carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director
of Science and Technology shall--
``(1) systematically identify and assess the most
significant intelligence challenges that require technical
solutions;
``(2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of
research programs; and
``(3) ensure that programs are designed to meet the
technical requirements of the intelligence community.''.
(c) Report.--(1) Not later than June 30, 2008, the Director
of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report
containing a strategy for the development and use of
technology in the intelligence community through 2018.
(2) The report shall include--
(A) an assessment of the highest priority intelligence gaps
across the intelligence community that may be resolved by the
use of technology;
(B) goals for basic, advanced, and applied research and
development and a strategy to achieve such goals;
(C) an explanation of how each advanced research and
development project funded under the National Intelligence
Program addresses an identified intelligence gap;
(D) a list of all current and projected research and
development projects by research type (basic, advanced, or
applied) with estimated funding levels, estimated initiation
dates, and estimated completion dates; and
(E) a plan to transition technology from research and
development projects into National Intelligence Program
acquisition programs.
(3) The report may be submitted in classified form.
SEC. 404. LEADERSHIP AND LOCATION OF CERTAIN OFFICES AND
OFFICIALS.
(a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is
amended--
(1) by striking ``Establishment.--Not later than 18 months
after the date of the enactment of the National Security
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting ``(1)
Establishment.--The''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter
Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the National
Counter Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the
Director of National Intelligence.
``(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center
shall be located within the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.''.
(b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-
3(c)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (13); and
(2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new
paragraphs:
``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the intelligence
community.
``(10) The Inspector General of the intelligence community.
``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center.
``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation
Center.''.
SEC. 405. ELIGIBILITY FOR INCENTIVE AWARDS OF PERSONNEL
ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 402 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 (50
U.S.C. 403e-1) is amended to read as follows:
``(a) Authority for Payment of Awards.--(1) The Director of
National Intelligence may exercise the authority granted in
section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, with respect to
Federal employees and members of the Armed Forces detailed or
assigned to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence in the same manner as such authority may be
exercised with respect to personnel of the Office.
``(2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may
exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5,
United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and
members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the
Central Intelligence Agency in the same manner as such
authority may be exercised with respect to personnel of the
Agency.''.
(b) Repeal of Obsolete Authority.--Such section is further
amended--
(1) by striking subsection (c); and
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).
[[Page H4892]]
(c) Conforming Amendments.--Such section is further
amended--
(1) in subsection (b), by striking ``to the Central
Intelligence Agency or to the Intelligence Community Staff''
and inserting ``to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence or to the Central Intelligence Agency''; and
(2) in subsection (c), as redesignated by subsection (b)(2)
of this section, by striking ``Director of Central
Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence or Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency''.
(d) Technical and Stylistic Amendments.--That section is
further amended--
(1) in subsection (b)--
(A) by inserting ``Personnel Eligible for Awards.--'' after
``(b)'';
(B) by striking ``subsection (a) of this section'' and
inserting ``subsection (a)''; and
(C) by striking ``a date five years before the date of
enactment of this section'' and inserting ``December 9,
1978''; and
(2) in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by inserting
``Payment and Acceptance of Awards.--'' after ``(c)''.
SEC. 406. MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY CLEARANCES.
(a) In General.--Section 102A of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1) is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(s) Multi-Level Security Clearances.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall establish a multi-level security
clearance system for the intelligence community to enable the
intelligence community to more efficiently make use of
persons proficient in foreign languages or with cultural,
linguistic, or other subject matter expertise that is
critical to national security.''.
(b) Establishment Date.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall establish a multi-level security clearance
system under section 102A(s) of the National Security Act of
1947, as added by subsection (a), not later than 180 days
after the date of the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 407. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE.
(a) National Intelligence Estimate.--Not later than 270
days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a national
intelligence estimate on the anticipated geopolitical effects
of global climate change and the implications of such effects
on the national security of the United States.
(b) Content.--In preparing the national intelligence
estimate required by this section, the Director of National
Intelligence shall--
(1) assess the political, social, agricultural, and
economic risks during the 30-year period beginning on the
date of enactment of this Act posed by global climate change
for countries or regions that are--
(A) of strategic national security importance to the United
States and at risk of significant impact due to global
climate change; or
(B) at significant risk of large-scale humanitarian
suffering with cross-border implications as predicted on the
basis of the assessments;
(2) assess the capabilities of the countries or regions
described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) to
respond to adverse national security impacts caused by global
climate change;
(3) assess the strategic challenges and opportunities posed
to the United States by the risks described in paragraph (1);
and
(4) assess the impact of global climate change on the
activities of the United States intelligence community
throughout the world.
(c) Coordination.--In preparing the national intelligence
estimate under this section, the Director of National
Intelligence shall consult with representatives of the
scientific community, and, as appropriate, multilateral
institutions and allies of the United States that have
conducted significant research on global climate change.
(d) Form.--The national intelligence estimate required by
this section (including key judgments) shall be submitted in
unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 408. PLAN TO IMPLEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE DATA
CENTER EFFICIENCY REPORTS.
(a) Plan.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
develop a plan to implement the recommendations of the report
submitted to Congress under section 1 of the Act entitled
``An Act to study and promote the use of energy efficient
computer servers in the United States'' (Public Law 109-431;
120 Stat. 2920) across the intelligence community.
(b) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later then February 1, 2008, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a
report containing the plan developed under subsection (a).
(2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex.
SEC. 409. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORY OF SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS.
Not later than January 15, 2008, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a classified report providing a comprehensive
inventory of all special access programs under the National
Intelligence Program (as defined in section 3(6) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(6))).
SEC. 410. QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON IRAN
AND NORTH KOREA.
(a) In General.--
(1) Report.--Title V of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the
following new section:
``QUARTERLY INTELLIGENCE REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON IRAN AND NORTH KOREA
``Sec. 508. (a) Report.--
``(1) In general.--On a quarterly basis, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on the current intentions
and capabilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran and
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) with
regard to the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea,
respectively, including--
``(A) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs;
``(B) an evaluation, consistent with existing reporting
standards and practices, of the sources upon which the
intelligence is based, including the number of sources and
the reliability of each source;
``(C) a summary of any new intelligence gathered or
developed since the previous report, including intelligence
collected from both open and clandestine sources; and
``(D) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in
knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence
in the overall assessment.
``(2) Form.--Each report submitted under paragraph (1) may
be submitted in classified form.
``(b) Access to Report.--Each report submitted under
subsection (a)(1) shall be made available to all members of
the congressional intelligence committees and to all staff of
the congressional intelligence committees with appropriate
security clearance. Other members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives may review the reports in accordance with
security procedures established by each of the congressional
intelligence committees.''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the
first section of such Act is amended by inserting after the
item relating to section 507 the following new item:
``Sec. 508. Quarterly intelligence reports to Congress on Iran and
North Korea.''.
(b) Effective Date.--The first report required to be
submitted under section 508(a)(1) of the National Security
Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a)(1), shall be
submitted not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
SEC. 411. ACCOUNTABILITY IN INTELLIGENCE CONTRACTING.
(a) Oversight Report on IC Contractors.--
(1) Report.--
(A) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is further amended by adding at
the end the following new section:
``REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY CONTRACTORS
``Sec. 509. Not later each year than the date provided in
section 507, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report
on contractors funded under the National Intelligence
Program. Such report shall include--
``(1) a list of all contractors that--
``(A) have been the subject of an investigation completed
by the Inspector General of any element of the intelligence
community during the preceding fiscal year,
``(B) are the subject of an investigation by such an
Inspector General during the current fiscal year, or
``(C) will be the subject of an investigation that may
affect the ability of the contractor to deliver contracted
services to the intelligence community by such an Inspector
General during the current fiscal year,
either as a corporate entity or an individual employee, for
financial waste, fraud, abuse of government resources,
failure to perform a contract, or criminal violations; and
``(2) the number of contractors performing services for
each element of the intelligence community.''.
(B) Report date.--Section 507(a)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C.
415b(a)(1)) is amended by--
(i) redesignating subparagraph (N) as subparagraph (J);
(ii) adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
``(K) The annual report on intelligence community
contractors required by section 509.''.
(2) Conforming amendment.--The table of contents in the
first section of such Act is further amended by inserting
after the item relating to section 508, as added by section
410, the following new item:
``Sec. 509. Report on intelligence community contractors.''.
(b) Report on Regulations and Accountability Mechanisms
Governing Intelligence Community Contractors.--
(1) Report requirement.--Not later than February 1, 2008,
the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on
accountability mechanisms that govern the ongoing performance
of contractors for personal services contracts under the
National Intelligence Program.
(2) Matters covered.--The report submitted under paragraph
(1) shall include--
(A) a list of statutes and regulations that govern the
ongoing performance of contractors for services contracts
entered into by each element of the intelligence community;
(B) an analysis of accountability mechanisms within
services contracts awarded for intelligence activities by
each element of the intelligence community during fiscal
years 2006 and 2007;
(C) an analysis of procedures in use in the intelligence
community for conducting oversight of contractors to ensure
identification and prosecution of criminal violations,
financial waste, fraud, or other abuses committed by
contractors or contract personnel; and
(D) an identification of best practices of accountability
mechanisms within services contracts.
(3) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex.
(c) Impact of Contractors on the Intelligence Community
Workforce.--
[[Page H4893]]
(1) Report requirement.--Not later than March 1, 2008, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees a report on the impact
of contractors on the intelligence community workforce under
the National Intelligence Program.
(2) Matters covered.--The report submitted under paragraph
(1) shall include--
(A) an identification of contracts where the contractor is
providing a substantially similar functions to a government
employee;
(B) a comparison of the compensation of contract employees
and government employees performing substantially similar
functions;
(C) an analysis of the attrition of government personnel
for contractor positions that provide substantially similar
functions; and
(D) an estimate of the value of the infrastructure provided
to contract employees for government furnished equipment,
facilities, or other support, by agency and expenditure
center.
SEC. 412. ANNUAL REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Report.--
(1) In general.--Title V of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is further amended by adding at
the end the following new section:
``REPORT ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
``Sec. 510. Not later each year than the date provided in
section 507, the Director of National Intelligence shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report
on the foreign language proficiency of each element of the
intelligence community, including--
``(1) the number of positions authorized for such element
that require foreign language proficiency and the level of
proficiency required;
``(2) the number of positions authorized for such element
that require foreign language proficiency that are filled
by--
``(A) military personnel; and
``(B) civilian personnel;
``(3) the number of applicants for positions in such
element in the previous fiscal year that indicated foreign
language proficiency, including the foreign language
indicated and the proficiency level;
``(4) the number of persons hired by such element with
foreign language proficiency, including the foreign language
and proficiency level;
``(5) the number of personnel of such element currently
attending foreign language training, including the provider
of such training;
``(6) a description of such element's efforts to recruit,
hire, train, and retain personnel that are proficient in a
foreign language; and
``(7) an assessment of methods and models for basic,
advanced, and intensive foreign language training.''.
(2) Report date.--Section 507(a)(1) of such Act (50 U.S.C.
415b(a)(1)) is further amended by adding at the end the
following new subparagraph:
``(L) The annual report on foreign language proficiency in
the intelligence community required by section 510.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the
first section of such Act is further amended by inserting
after the item relating to section 509, as added by section
411, the following new item:
``Sec. 510. Report on foreign language proficiency in the intelligence
community.''.
SEC. 413. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY REPORTS ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE
PROFICIENCY.
(a) Annual Reports.--
(1) In general.--Title I of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
``ANNUAL REPORTS ON FOREIGN LANGUAGE PROFICIENCY
``Sec. 120. (a) In General.--The head of each element of
the intelligence community shall annually submit to the
Director of National Intelligence a report on the foreign
language proficiency of the personnel of such element.
``(b) Contents.--
``(1) In general.--Each report submitted under subsection
(a) shall include, for each foreign language and, where
appropriate, dialect of a foreign language--
``(A) the number of positions of such element that require
proficiency in the foreign language or dialect;
``(B) the number of personnel of such element that are
serving in a position that--
``(i) requires proficiency in the foreign language or
dialect to perform the primary duty of the position; and
``(ii) does not require proficiency in the foreign language
or dialect to perform the primary duty of the position;
``(C) the number of personnel that are proficient in the
foreign language or dialect that--
``(i) are authorized for the element of the intelligence
community for which the report is submitted; and
``(ii) the head of such element considers necessary for
such element for each of the five years following the date of
the submission of the report;
``(D) the number of personnel of such element rated at each
level of proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable;
``(E) whether the number of personnel at each level of
proficiency of the Interagency Language Roundtable meets the
requirements of such element;
``(F) the number of personnel serving or hired to serve as
linguists for such element that are not qualified as
linguists under the standards of the Interagency Language
Roundtable;
``(G) the number of personnel hired to serve as linguists
for such element during the preceding calendar year;
``(H) the number of personnel serving as linguists that
discontinued serving such element during the preceding
calendar year;
``(I) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills
that is fulfilled by an ally of the United States;
``(J) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills
that is fulfilled by contractors; and
``(K) the percentage of work requiring linguistic skills
that is fulfilled by members of the Armed Forces.
``(2) Military personnel.--Except as provided in paragraph
(1)(K), a report submitted under subsection (a) shall not
include personnel that are members of the Armed Forces on
active duty assigned to the element for which the report is
submitted.
``(c) DNI Report to Congress.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall annually submit to the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Defense of
the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and
the Subcommittee on Defense of the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate a report containing--
``(1) each report submitted to the Director of National
Intelligence for a year under subsection (a);
``(2) an assessment of the foreign language capacity and
capabilities of the intelligence community as a whole; and
``(3) recommendations for eliminating required reports
relating to foreign-language proficiency that the Director of
National Intelligence considers outdated or no longer
relevant.''.
(2) Table of contents.--Such Act is further amended in the
table of contents in the first section by inserting after the
item relating to section 119B the following new item:
``Sec. 120. Annual reports on foreign language proficiency.''.
(b) Effective Date.--
(1) Report by heads of elements of the intelligence
community.--The first report required to be submitted by the
head of each element of the intelligence community under
section 120(a) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added
by subsection (a)(1), shall be submitted not later than 180
days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
(2) Report by dni.--The first report required to be
submitted by the Director of National Intelligence under
section 120(c) of the National Security Act of 1947, as added
by subsection (a)(1), shall be submitted not later than 240
days after the date of the enactment of this Act.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
SEC. 421. DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Establishment and Duties of the Position of Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence Agency.--(1) Title I of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 402 et seq.) is
amended by inserting after section 104A the following new
section:
``DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
``Sec. 104B. (a) Deputy Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency.--There is a Deputy Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency who shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
``(b) Duties.--The Deputy Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall--
``(1) assist the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency in carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the
Director; and
``(2) act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency during the absence or
disability of the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency, or during a vacancy in the position of Director of
the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
(2) Conforming Amendment.--The table of contents in the
first section of such Act is amended by inserting after the
item relating to section 104A the following new item:
``Sec. 104B. Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
(b) Executive Schedule Level III.--Section 5314 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating
to the Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence and inserting
the following new item:
``Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
SEC. 422. GENERAL AUTHORITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY.
Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking ``any of
the functions or activities authorized under paragraphs (2)
and (3) of section 102(a), subsections (c)(7) and (d) of
section 103, subsections (a) and (g) of section 104, and
section 303 of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7), (d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405),''
and inserting ``any functions or activities authorized by law
to be conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency''.
SEC. 423. REVIEW OF COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS BY INSPECTOR
GENERAL OF THE CIA.
(a) In General.--Section 503 of the National Security Act
of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413b) is amended by--
(1) redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (g) and
transferring such subsection to the end;
(2) by inserting after subsection (d) the following new
subsection:
``(e) Inspector General Audits of Covert Actions.--
``(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), the Inspector
General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall conduct an
audit of each covert action at least every three years.
``(2) Terminated, suspended programs.--The Inspector
General of the Central Intelligence Agency is not required to
conduct an audit under paragraph (1) of a covert action
[[Page H4894]]
that has been terminated or suspended if such covert action
was terminated or suspend prior to the last audit of such
covert action conducted by the Inspector General and has not
been restarted after the date on which such audit was
completed.
``(3) Report.--Not later than 60 days after the completion
of an audit conducted pursuant to paragraph (1), the
Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall
submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report
containing the results of such audit.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--Title V of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.) is amended--
(1) in section 501(f) (50 U.S.C. 413(f)), by striking
``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)'';
(2) in section 502(a)(1) (50 U.S.C. 413b(a)(1)), by
striking ``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''; and
(3) in section 504(c) (50 U.S.C. 414(c)), by striking
``503(e)'' and inserting ``503(g)''.
SEC. 424. REPORT ON AUDITED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS PROGRESS.
Section 114A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 404i-1) is amended by striking ``the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency,''.
Subtitle C--Other Elements
SEC. 431. CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SECTION 105 OF
THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2004.
Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31
U.S.C. 311 note) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and
inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
(2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after
``subsection (a)),''.
SEC. 432. REPEAL OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE
OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
EXECUTIVE.
(a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of
Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended--
(1) by striking subsections (d), (h), (i), and (j);
(2) in subsection (g), by striking paragraphs (3) and (4);
and
(3) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (g), (k), (l),
and (m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (i),
respectively.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--That section is further
amended--
(1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2)
of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it
appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection
(e)''; and
(2) in subsection (e)(2), as so redesignated, by striking
``subsection (e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''.
SEC. 433. CLARIFICATION OF INCLUSION OF COAST GUARD AND DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION ELEMENTS IN THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (H)--
(A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the Marine
Corps,''; and
(B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement Administration,''
after ``the Federal Bureau of Investigation,''; and
(2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the
Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
Subtitle A--General Intelligence Matters
SEC. 501. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE PLATFORMS.
(a) Limitation on Termination of U-2 Aircraft Program.--The
Secretary of Defense may not begin the process to terminate
the U-2 aircraft program until the Secretary certifies in
accordance with subsection (b) that there would be no loss of
national or Department of Defense intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in transitioning from
the U-2 aircraft program to the Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned
aerial vehicle platform.
(b) Report and Certification.--
(1) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study
of aerial reconnaissance platforms to determine whether the
Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial vehicle has reached mission
capability and has attained collection capabilities on a par
with the collection capabilities of the U-2 Block 20 aircraft
program as of April 1, 2006.
(2) Report.--The Secretary shall submit to the
congressional committees specified in subsection (c) a report
containing the results of the study. The Secretary shall
include in the report the Secretary's determination as to
whether the Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial vehicle--
(A) has reached mission capability; and
(B) has attained collection capabilities on a par with the
collection capabilities of the U-2 Block 20 aircraft program
as of April 1, 2006.
(3) Certification.--The Secretary shall include with the
report the Secretary's certification, based on the results of
the study, as to whether or not there would be a loss of
national or Department of Defense intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance capabilities with a transition from the U-
2 aircraft program to the Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial
vehicle platform.
(c) Specified Committees.--The congressional committees
specified in this subsection are the following:
(1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
SEC. 502. EXTENSION OF NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR REVIEW OF
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS OF THE UNITED
STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Extension.--
(1) In general.--Section 1007(a) of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306;
50 U.S.C. 401 note) is amended by striking ``September 1,
2004'' and inserting ``September 1, 2008''.
(2) Effective date.--The amendment made by subsection
(a)(1) shall take effect as if included in the enactment of
section 1007 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2003.
(b) Funding.--
(1) In general.--Of the amounts authorized to be
appropriated by this Act for the Intelligence Community
Management Account, the Director of National Intelligence
shall make $2,000,000 available to the National Commission
for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of
the United States Intelligence Community (in this subsection
referred to as the ``Commission'') established under section
1002(a) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2003 (Public Law 107-306; 116 Stat. 2438; 50 U.S.C. 401 note)
to carry out title X of such Act.
(2) Availability.--Amounts made available to the Commission
under paragraph (1) shall remain available until expended.
Subtitle B--Technical Amendments
SEC. 511. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE MULTIYEAR
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50
U.S.C. 404b) is amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Foreign''; and
(2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears.
(b) Responsibility of DNI.--That section is further
amended--
(1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of
Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence''; and
(2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National
Intelligence'' after ``Director''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of that section is
amended to read as follows:
``SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.''.
SEC. 512. TECHNICAL CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN REFERENCES TO
JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES.
Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-1) is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets
for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual
budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor
program or programs''; and
(2) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military
Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence
Program or any successor program or programs''.
SEC. 513. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
OF 1947.
The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.)
is amended--
(1) in section 102A (50 U.S.C. 403-1)--
(A) in subsection (c)(7)(A), by striking ``section'' and
inserting ``subsection'';
(B) in subsection (d)--
(i) in paragraph (3), by striking ``subparagraph (A)'' in
the matter preceding subparagraph (A) and inserting
``paragraph (1)(A)''; and
(ii) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking ``or personnel'' in
the matter preceding clause (i);
(C) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' and
inserting ``paragraph''; and
(D) in the heading of subsection (n), by striking
``Acquisition Authorities'' and inserting ``Acquisition and
Other Authorities''; and
(2) in section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by
striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''.
SEC. 514. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND
TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004.
(a) Amendments to National Security Intelligence Reform Act
of 2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of
2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458) is amended as follows:
(1) In section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 485(e)(10)(B)), by
striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and
inserting ``Department of Justice''.
(2) In section 1061 (5 U.S.C. 601 note)--
(A) in subsection (d)(4)(A), by striking ``National
Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence''; and
(B) in subsection (h), by striking ``National Intelligence
Director'' and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence''.
(3) In section 1071(e), by striking ``(1)''.
(4) In section 1072(b), by inserting ``Agency'' after
``Intelligence''.
(b) Other Amendments to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458) is
amended as follows:
(1) In section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)--
(A) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``of'' before ``an
institutional culture'';
(B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National
Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with section
112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of National
Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable law'';
and
(C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the matter
preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''.
(2) In section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and
inserting ``Federal''; and
(B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' and
inserting ``specific''.
[[Page H4895]]
SEC. 515. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.
(a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating
to the Director of Central Intelligence and inserting the
following new item:
``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
(b) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating
to the General Counsel of the Office of the National
Intelligence Director and inserting the following new item:
``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.''.
SEC. 516. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO TITLES OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY POSITIONS.
Section 17(d)(3)(B)(ii) of the Central Intelligence Agency
Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403q(d)(3)(B)(ii)) is amended--
(1) in subclause (I), by striking ``Executive Director''
and inserting ``Associate Deputy Director'';
(2) in subclause (II), by striking ``Deputy Director for
Operations'' and inserting ``Director of the National
Clandestine Service''; and
(3) in subclause (IV), by striking ``Deputy Director for
Administration'' and inserting ``Director for Support''.
SEC. 517. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO REDESIGNATION OF
THE NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY AS THE
NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Title 5, United States Code.--(1) Title 5, United
States Code, is amended by striking ``National Imagery and
Mapping Agency'' each place it appears in a provision as
follows and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency'':
(A) Section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii).
(B) Section 3132(a)(1)(B).
(C) Section 4301(1) (in clause (ii)).
(D) Section 4701(a)(1)(B).
(E) Section 5102(a)(1) (in clause (x)).
(F) Section 5342(a)(1)(K).
(G) Section 6339(a)(1)(E).
(H) Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i)(XIII).
(2) Section 6339(a)(2)(E) of such title is amended by
striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Director
of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting
``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Director of
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
(b) Title 44, United States Code.--(1)(A) Section 1336 of
title 44, United States Code, is amended by striking
``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' both places it
appears and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency''.
(B) The heading of such section is amended to read as
follows:
``Sec. 1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special
publications''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 13 of
such title is amended by striking the item relating to
section 1336 and inserting the following new item:
``1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special
publications.''.
(c) Homeland Security Act of 2002.--Section 201(f)(2)(E) of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(f)(2)(E)) is
amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency''
and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
(d) Inspector General Act of 1978.--Section 8H of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by
striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place
it appears and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency''.
(e) Ethics in Government Act of 1978.--Section 105(a)(1) of
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is
amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency''
and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
(f) Other Acts.--(1) Section 7(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Employee
Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (29 U.S.C. 2006(b)(2)(A)(i))
is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping
Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency''.
(2) Section 207(a)(2)(B) of the Legislative Branch
Appropriations Act, 1993 (44 U.S.C. 501 note) is amended by
striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and
inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
The CHAIRMAN. No amendment to the committee amendment is in order
except the amendments printed in House Report 110-144. Each amendment
may be offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member
designated in the report, shall be considered read, shall be debatable
for the time specified in the report, equally divided and controlled by
the proponent and an opponent of the amendment, shall not be subject to
amendment and shall not be subject to a demand for division of the
question.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 1 printed in House
Report 110-144.
Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Hoekstra
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed
in House Report 110-144.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 2 offered by Mr. Hoekstra:
Strike section 407 (page 24, line 17 through page 26, line
8).
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield myself 2 minutes.
As we have already talked about a number of times in general debate,
the base bill includes a provision that directs the Director of
National Intelligence to complete a national intelligence estimate on
climate change where they shall assess the political, social,
agricultural and economic risk during the 30-year period beginning at
the date of enactment of this act posed by global climate change.
This is a global study, 30 years, and it is very clear what we want
to do with this amendment. We want to make sure that the Intelligence
Community stays focused on its priorities which is the threat from
radical jihadists, the proliferation and the threats posed by Iran,
Syria, North Korea and other countries that over this 30-year period
may participate in proliferation, the restructuring of the Intelligence
Community, and the rebuilding of HUMINT.
These are the key priorities that the Intelligence Community and the
Intelligence Committees have been focused on over the last number of
years. We need to continue that focus rebuilding this community,
rebuilding the resources and the capabilities while, as it was
discussed, the information that is going to be used is public
information. The direction in the bill says it will be a public report,
so the real question comes: What specific value does the Intelligence
Community add to this process that makes it so important that we will
divert resources from other key priorities to climate change?
{time} 2315
Why can't this be done in other areas of the government where it is
already being done, areas that have already been allocated and been
spending dollars in these areas over a number of years in what is
projected to be over $7 billion of expenditure in these areas in 2008?
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. ESHOO. I rise to claim the time in opposition to the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman from California is recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. ESHOO. Madam Chairman, as I said when I was speaking a little bit
ago, and I am going to make some comments about this amendment, I want
to set something else down which I think is really important, and that
is, that it's not debatable that this is the largest single
intelligence authorization in the history of our country.
Now, we are hearing a lot from the other side, hearing a lot from the
other side, not enough money, not enough money, not enough money. When
did you make any amendments to increase anything in this authorization,
with the exception of an earmark with three States specified? That's
what you offered, and that's the only thing that you offered.
So I think it's important for the people of our country to know
what's going on.
Now, on this amendment that Mr. Hoekstra offers, this is not a study
of climate change. This is a directive to the intelligence community to
assess the impacts of climate change; and most frankly, I would go with
the former Army chief of staff, Retired General Gordon Sullivan, who
said the national security consequences of global climate change should
be fully integrated into the national security and national defense
strategies, including a National Intelligence Estimate. Climate change
is a national security issue.
Madam Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the distinguished
gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Markey).
Mr. MARKEY. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentlelady for her leadership
on this issue.
As the Chairman of the Select Committee on Global Warming, I
conducted
[[Page H4896]]
a hearing 3 weeks ago in which Retired General Gordon Sullivan,
speaking for eleven senior retired three- and four-star admirals and
generals, released and testified on a report entitled ``National
Security and the Threat of Climate Change,'' which called for global
warming to be fully integrated into the military and defense planning.
Here's what General Sullivan testified to. He said that he was the
Army chief of staff when we lost 19 men in Mogadishu. He testified
before the Select Committee on Global Warming that with more drought we
will see more disasters such as Black Hawk Down. Drought caused famine,
famine caused food relief, food relief caused warlords to fight over
it, the warlords fighting caused the U.S. to intervene, and 19 U.S.
fighting men were killed. He added, and I quote, that the same thing is
what is driving Darfur and there has to be some recognition that these
issues are at the heart environmentally related.
These are men who have dedicated their lives to protecting our
country. They are asking us to do a National Intelligence Estimate
about what the impact is of climate leading to drought, leading to
famine, leading to conflicts, leading to the American military or other
of our allies having been dedicated to preserving the peace. That is no
small request from 11 retired three-star generals and admirals.
Ms. ESHOO. Madam Chairman, I believe our time has expired?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman has 1\1/2\ minutes remaining.
Ms. ESHOO. Madam Chairwoman, let me just close out this very
important debate, and it is important to have a debate. It's very
important to have a debate.
In listening to it, I see two things: one, a rearview mirror, looking
to the past, people that are sincere, but nonetheless I think are
sticking their heads in the sand. When we see whole populations,
massive movement of populations, moving across borders because of
drought, moving across borders because of disruption, they cause
national security issues. We know that.
This debate is about the future, and I understand why some have
trouble seeing the future and even embracing it, much less harnessing
it.
Mr. MARKEY. Madam Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. ESHOO. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. MARKEY. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentlelady for yielding.
It is not inappropriate for the CIA to tell us how the increasing
scarcity of water could exacerbate the very failed state conditions
which breed terrorism. It is not politically correct to want the
military services to know how polar ice melt could alter the patrols of
our submarines or how rising sea levels could threaten not only our
naval facilities but also our crucial shipbuilding infrastructure.
It is not pre-9/11 mindset that wants to study how our ability to
project power from the Pacific would be damaged if our crucial air base
at Diego Garcia, average elevation 4 feet above sea level, changes from
a land-based stationary aircraft carrier to a sub-sea ruin.
That is in the interest of the national security of our country.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
I think as you listen to the discussion, the question almost answers
itself because the primary question hasn't been answered: Exactly what
are we going to task our spy satellites to do? Exactly what are we
going to task our human collectors to do?
The statistics are very, very obvious in terms of climate change, and
there's lots of different, competing ones. Exactly what secrets, with
limited resources, are we going to task the intelligence community to
go out and collect? And precious analysts that are taking a look at
northern Africa and trying to determine exactly what the footprint is
of al Qaeda in Algeria and Morocco, Nigeria, other parts of Africa, are
we going to ask the CIA stations in those areas to take their time and
dedicate it to studying climate change for the next 6 months? It's a
totally new task.
We have a community that at this point is not even a global
community. So we are going to dedicate precious resources instead of
expanding the reach of our intelligence community into places where we
are not at today, the bigger emphasis is going to be giving them a
totally new and different assignment?
Instead of tasking our satellites to take a look at exactly what the
proliferation capabilities are in China or North Korea, we are going to
task them to look somewhere else even though that same kind of
capabilities may be available from commercial imagery? Exactly what
information does the intelligence community, I mean, it's our business
to steal secrets, to find out what the plans and intentions are of
those who want to attack the United States. This is information.
There are hundreds and probably thousands of people that are very
skilled at investigating climate change, predicting what may happen in
certain regions of the country and certain regions of the planet, and
they are not in the intelligence community. These people have their
plate full. The threats are real. We should not diminish the threats.
The information is in the public. These are two missions that do not
come together.
Studying climate change can be done by other government agencies.
Stealing the secrets of al Qaeda and North Korea, Iran, other parts of
the world, that is the job of the intelligence community. Let them
focus on the job that we need them to do. Support this amendment and
strike this National Intelligence Estimate.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra).
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan will be
postponed.
Amendment No. 3 Offered by Mr. Holt
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 printed
in House Report 110-144.
Mr. HOLT. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 3 offered by Mr. Holt:
At the end of title III (page 16, after line 25), add the
following new section:
SEC. 309. MODIFICATIONS TO ANNUAL REPORT ON PROTECTION OF
INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES.
The first sentence of section 603(a) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 423(a)) is amended by
inserting ``, including an assessment of the need for any
modification of this title for the purpose of improving legal
protections for covert agents'' after ``measures to protect
the identities of covert agents''.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentleman from
New Jersey (Mr. Holt) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey.
Mr. HOLT. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The amendment I am offering would require the President, through the
Director of National Intelligence, to report annually to Congress on
the need for any modification to the Intelligence Identity Protection
Act to improve legal protection for covert agents. This report, along
with other oversight work the committee will undertake, will help us
establish what measures need to be taken to minimize the chances in the
future of compromising the identities of covert operatives.
These men and women take enormous risks on our behalf. Their covers
are their only protection when they are working overseas. We owe them
everything we can do to ensure that their identities are protected from
exposure both from hostile intelligence services or even from exposure
within our own government by those who would seek to retaliate against
them for speaking truth to power.
This grew out of my consideration, trying to draw lessons from what
has become a well-publicized example of the outing of a former CIA
officer. In previous Congresses, on eight separate occasions in
committees and on this floor, the then-majority voted down every effort
to obtain information on this matter; and as I repeatedly noted at
those times, Mr. Fitzgerald's criminal inquiry could never address some
of the key questions that we sought answers to: How and why did Ms.
Valerie
[[Page H4897]]
Plame's cover status come to be known to those with no legitimate need
to know? How much damage was done to our intelligence collection
efforts as a result of the outing of Ms. Plame? What measures has the
Central Intelligence Agency and now the Director of National
Intelligence taken to prevent similar compromises in the future?
It appears that nothing has changed. So this sort of thing could
happen again. It's important that we take steps to protect, as I say,
the only protection that these covert agents have if they are in
dangerous positions overseas.
So that is the point of this amendment, and I seek the approval of
the House.
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent to claim
the 5 minutes in opposition to this amendment, although I will not
oppose the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Michigan is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, as I indicated, I agree with the
gentleman's amendment, and I will vote for his amendment. However, I
wish that as we were talking about leaks that we were discussing this
in a much broader context.
The issue of leaks has been something that has been plaguing the
community for an extended period of time, so we were not just talking
about the leaks of personal identities. We would be talking about the
leaks of programs and tactics and strategies that were being used by
the intelligence community and used effectively to keep America safe.
We have had far too many leaks of highly classified information, and
some of us would believe that as you take a look at some of these
leaks, some would say that they perhaps have been made for political
purposes.
The gentleman's focus on the identities of covert CIA officers is
commendable, but should include the loss of capabilities because of
other leaks as well.
{time} 2330
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOLT. Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
I support the gentleman's amendment. I am glad that we are able to
work through this one. I am hoping that, as we move forward into the
rest of this year, we will be able to develop a process that will
enable us to more effectively go after all of the different kinds of
leaks that the community and the country have suffered from over the
last number of years.
Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Holt).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Thompson of California
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed
in House Report 110-144.
Mr. THOMPSON of California. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 4 offered by Mr. Thompson of California:
At the end of subtitle A of title IV (page 39, after line
16), add the following new section:
SEC. 414. REPORT ON PERSONNEL OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees a report containing--
(1) the number of intelligence collectors and analysts
employed or contracted by each element of the intelligence
community; and
(2) a plan to maximize the number of intelligence
collectors employed or contracted by the intelligence
community.
(b) Limitation on Personnel.--
(1) Limitation.--Subject to paragraph (2), but
notwithstanding any other provision of this Act (including
the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred to in
section 102(a)), the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence is authorized not more than--
(A) the number of personnel employed or contracted by such
Office as of May 9, 2007; and
(B) an additional 15 percent of such number of personnel
employed or contracted by such Office as of May 9, 2007.
(2) Termination of limitation.--The limitation on the
number of personnel authorized for the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence under paragraph (1) shall no longer
apply on or after the date on which the report required under
subsection (a) is submitted.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Thompson) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. THOMPSON of California. Madam Chairman, I yield myself as much
time as I may consume.
This Congress created the Director of National Intelligence so he and
a core staff could manage the activities of the different intelligence
agencies. Congress did not intend to create a new bureaucracy.
Nevertheless, the office has expanded in size. Many members of the
Intelligence Committee, myself included, as well as other colleagues in
the House, are concerned that this growth will complicate, rather than
streamline, the activities of the intelligence communities. Some
Members have proposed limiting the number of people who can work for
the DNI in order to stem this growth.
But I believe that such a measure, while satisfying on the surface,
would have harmful consequences. It would eliminate a large number of
analysts and planners, the experts who actually perform the core
intelligence functions, not middle managers and bureaucrats.
The harshest impact would fall on DNI elements like the National
Counterterrorism Center, which analyzes terrorism information and plans
counterterrorism operations. This would happen because there are plans
in play to shift personnel to this specific task. If this other
amendment were to pass, it would truncate these very important efforts.
These are the people who play critical roles in our efforts to combat
terrorism, and our operators around the world cannot do their jobs
without this critical backstopping. Preventing the DNI from adding
staff to these missions would gut key counterterrorism capabilities.
The real issue, though, is not simply the number of people who appear
on the DNI's balance sheet, the challenge is to have fewer people
sitting behind desks in Washington and to place more intelligence
officers in the field. This is a goal that I think we all share, even
those with a competing amendment. They need to be in the field where
they can collect needed intelligence and where they can catch
terrorists.
The Intelligence Authorization Act will fund increases in the number
of intelligence collectors at many agencies, but there is still not
enough. To push the Intelligence Committee to get its staff out of the
office and into the field, the amendment that I am offering would
freeze the number of people working for the DNI at the level specified
in the fiscal year 2007 Intelligence Authorization Act that was passed
by this House.
The freeze wouldn't be lifted until the Director of National
Intelligence provides the committee, the Intelligence Committees, one,
a report on the number of analysts and collectors in each element of
the Intelligence Community, and two, a plan to maximize the number of
collectors across the community. This plan must be provided within 120
days of enactment.
With this information, the Intelligence Committee will be able to
work with the DNI to ensure that he has the right mix of collectors,
analysts, technical experts and other staff, and we will be able to
press the DNI and the individual intelligence agencies to accelerate
the recruitment, the training and the deployment of core collectors.
This amendment will enhance congressional oversight of intelligence
activities and result in improvements to the Intelligence Community's
ability to collect critical intelligence.
I am willing to work with, and we have worked with my colleague and
friend from the committee on this issue. I believe that this amendment
is the one that will allow us to best collect the information so we
can, in fact, put together the best policy for America.
[[Page H4898]]
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I claim the time in
opposition.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I
may consume.
I have the utmost respect for the gentleman. We have had long
conversations or at least short interrupted conversations over the past
several days and in committee. I thought we had a fairly spirited
debate in the Intelligence Committee about this very issue.
The good thing is we agree this thing has exponentially grown, not
the direction Congress intended. It was supposed to be a small,
efficient organization that was coordinating and not inhibiting
agencies from doing their work.
I reluctantly, as we talked earlier, oppose this amendment, because
really all it does is say give me another report, and you can grow as
much as you want in 2008. This is what the staggering number is here.
The number itself is classified, but it is over 37 percent growth from
where they are right now to 2008, in headquarters.
Now, they are not catching one spy. They are not recruiting one
asset. They are not out analyzing any particular image from the sky.
They are getting more in boxes. They are getting more in computers.
They are getting more bureaucracies and personnel staff and all of the
other things that go along with growing your headquarters. That is all
happening.
When you travel around the world, the folks who are out there at the
front end of this store, the analysts and the case officers, will tell
you, please, enough already, because they took all of those analysts
out of that community.
Remember, it takes 5 to 7 years to get somebody to where they are
really effective in this community. It's very difficult work.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Would my colleague yield?
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. I would gladly yield.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. I thank you, and I have enormous respect for
a colleague who has offered an amendment where it appears we are
competing.
But I agree our amendment, after his, does, I believe, what is
necessary, and that is to answer the question that a lot of us have
with reference to the efficiency and effectiveness of the National
Director of Intelligence.
If I could just share one brief anecdote. When the war on poverty
began in the area that I live in, I was the attorney and original
scrivener of the development of the program. When that program came
into existence, within a year they had seven employees. They were
extremely effective.
They grew in 6 years to 1,500 employees, and they became much less
effective, totally disrespected and in disarray. I am fearful that the
same thing will happen here.
I thank my colleague for yielding.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Reclaiming my time. I don't know if I can say
it any better. I hope to work with the gentleman in committee. I wish
you would consider this.
One point I think it is very important to make, this does not cut one
analyst. They didn't even make all the hires they requested in 2007.
Then they came back and asked for a significant increase in 2008,
didn't even hire all the people from 2007. So the notion that they put
forward that this somehow cuts the analyst doing counterterrorism work
is wrong.
It scares me more that this bureaucracy is so hell bent on protecting
itself that it would make that claim. That's why I think we need to
send this message, work with them to make this right sized, so we
provide value added to the people risking their lives around the world.
Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. THOMPSON of California. Madam Chairman, again, I just want to
reiterate the fact that we all share the same goal, and that's to get
these folks out from behind the desk and into the field. I have
tremendous respect for my colleague and friend, Mr. Rogers. He actually
has real time in the field doing this work. He knows how important that
is to have folks out in the field.
As he and my other good friend and colleague, Mr. Hastings, has said,
we all have the same goal, it's just, how do we get there?
We believe that by putting this freeze in place, requiring this
information be provided to the committee, will allow us to best analyze
this, know where these folks are and force the DNI to put them in the
right spots.
The only other thing I would like to add is that it's important to
note that the majority of this growth consists of transferring
personnel who already work or should work for the DNI on to their books
for better management and oversight.
I ask for your support of this amendment.
Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Thompson).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed
in House Report 110-144.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 5 offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan:
Page 5, line 19, strike ``The amounts'' and insert
``Subject to section 106, the amounts''.
Page 6, line 9, strike ``With the approval'' and insert
``Subject to section 106, with the approval''.
Page 7, line 11, strike ``The elements'' and insert
``Subject to section 106, the elements''.
Page 8, line 5, strike ``In addition'' and insert ``Subject
to section 106, in addition''.
At the end of title I (page 10, after line 2), add the
following new section:
SEC. 106. LIMITATION ON NUMBER OF PERSONNEL OF THE OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence is authorized only
the number of personnel as were serving in such Office on May
1, 2007.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Rogers) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time I
may consume.
I want to thank Mr. Hastings for working with me on this amendment.
We have watched this thing for 3 years, and we have watched it pretty
closely. We all want it to succeed. There are some really dedicated and
committed people really trying to make this thing work.
But one thing I have learned here in watching it in Washington, D.C.,
and going out to the field, where these case officers, the young ones,
the middle-ranged ones and the older ones in the field, you can get a
lot of insight about what happens between the difference of between
there and back here.
We have seen, I thought, a very poor performance. I have had this
conversation with many of my colleagues here about their briefings,
about this increase, and what they really performed, and what their
mission set was. There are some things that they do and do well and are
value-added.
But this exponential growth, at the expense of analysts and officers
in the field, I think is the wrong direction. I think it's so important
that we make this statement to them that enough is enough.
They brought in, remember, everyone of those analysts came from an
agency that's doing targeted work, the counterterrorism center at the
CIA. They were doing real work, targeting bad guys, identifying,
putting them on lists, trying to get our guys to bring them to justice.
What happened then is they disrupted some of those operations,
brought those people in, and started tasking back to the people in the
field. That's not value-added; it's just not.
We can live with this if we can work out the kinks. As a matter of
fact, Senator McConnell said, he thought the thing was getting a little
bit too big. He didn't really influence this budget, 37 percent
increase. We must do better
[[Page H4899]]
by the people in the field, 5 to 7 years to train a case analyst and an
officer.
Madam Chairman, I yield to my good friend from Florida (Mr.
Hastings).
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. I thank my friend from Michigan and am
pleased to sponsor this amendment with him.
Madam Chairman, when Congress established the National Director of
Intelligence, it fulfilled one of the 9/11 Commission recommendations
to centralize and concentrate the filtering of intelligence. Since its
inception, however, the Office of the Director never realized its
potential, growing in size with indication of limited long-term
planning. As a result, many of us who are familiar with the office
question its efficiency and effectiveness.
Capping the size of the ONDI is a responsible manner by which
Congress can and should go about holding the administration accountable
for its decisions and actions. This is not, as some might suggest, an
anti-NDI amendment.
On the contrary, my friend, Mr. Rogers, and my amendment, is the
much-needed solution for Congress to reassert its oversight authority
over the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. For too long,
Congress has abdicated its oversight authority and responsibility when
it comes to American intelligence.
This amendment says to the administration that, while we support your
efforts, we will not give you a blank check with which you could
continue to grow a new bureaucracy before we know what you are doing
with what you already have. A bigger bureaucracy does not make better
intelligence.
I ask my colleagues for their support of the Rogers-Hastings
amendment and ask them to join us in holding America's Intelligence
Community accountable for its work.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Reclaiming my time, I just thank the
gentleman for his work and effort on this, and kind of us coming
together on this conclusion over the past 3 years watching this
process. Again, this is not anti-DNI. We think it serves a valuable
purpose, but it is getting too big too fast.
Again, this does not cut one analyst from doing work in this country,
not one. They couldn't even fill the slots we have for 2007 before they
came back and said we have to get even bigger next year.
I reserve the balance of my time.
{time} 2345
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I claim the time in opposition to this
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I have tremendous respect for both of my
colleagues, and they know that they have my commitment that we will
continue to do aggressive oversight, because I do understand the
concerns that they have about Office of the DNI and the way that it has
grown and become too large. And while I support the goal of the
amendment, I don't necessarily think this is the best way to proceed.
The amendment, I believe, will have unintended consequences. For
example, though the intent of this amendment is to limit the layers of
unnecessary bureaucracy, this cap would actually eliminate large
numbers of analysts and planners, with the harshest impact falling on
the National Counterterrorism Center, which analyzes terrorism
information and plans counterterrorism operations. It would also have
the unintended consequence that it would eliminate personnel from the
National Counterproliferation Center and the Office of Privacy and
Civil Liberties.
In addition, this amendment would force the DNI to fire anyone hired
between May 1 and the date of the enactment of this bill, preventing
the DNI from increasing capacity in priority areas.
It is important, I believe, to note that this amendment would not cap
the number of billets; it would cap the total number of people. Any
currently unfilled billets would have to remain unfilled. This could
negatively impact the DNI's ability to perform vital functions.
Finally, I would ask my colleagues to consider that we do have, as
Mr. Rogers said, a new DNI, and he deserves an opportunity to do the
kinds of things that he has articulated to our committee. He is
reorganizing his office, and I believe that we need to give him the
flexibility needed to make those changes, while at the same time
aggressively pursuing the oversight that is the responsibility of our
committee.
So, for those reasons, I reluctantly would oppose this amendment.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. Madam Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. REYES. I yield to the gentleman from Florida.
Mr. HASTINGS of Florida. I know the chairman knows of my immense
respect for his perspective, and I appreciate very much what you have
said with regard to how you would carry forth the intent of mine and
Mr. Rogers' amendment, as well as Mr. Thompson's, in capping this.
What I say to you, Mr. Chairman, is I don't know in all of my
experience of any bureaucrat, I respect the new DNI director, but I
don't know of any bureaucrat that has ever said, I don't need no more
people. And I also know for a fact that, in this particular case, in
the standing up of this particular directorate what has happened is it
has impacted already the infrastructure by virtue of the persons that
have already moved to that agency. The now-CIA Director came from NSA
to that deputy position. And I could go on and on and on without giving
forth that. And that is what we are trying to stop.
What you do when you want to cut bureaucracy is you say to them, stop
right where you are. Now, they will be back, and we will then do the
oversight necessary in order to give them an opportunity to grow the
way that they should rather than the way that they have been
exponentially.
Mr. REYES. I thank my good friend and colleague. And reclaiming my
time, again, we want to accomplish the same goal. We just have a
difference of opinion on how we are going to do it. But it will get
done, and it will get done by this committee this year. So, again, I
have deep respect and admiration for both my colleagues.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chair, I just want to clarify again,
there is no one to be cut, with all due respect to my chairman. What
they are talking about is what they have future planned, which would be
pulled from the community as it stands now. It would actually allow the
DNI to reprioritize the folks that he has in that shop. And many of my
colleagues will remember that the number that the DNI gave was lower
than the number that is even in Mr. Hastings' and my amendment. He
thinks it is too big.
So there won't be any cuts, there won't be any jeopardizing of
security, there won't be any analysts that get home once they are
employed and fully engaged. They may go back to doing counterterrorism
work, but they will not be sent home.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Rogers).
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have it.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Madam Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan will be
postponed.
Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Fossella
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed
in House Report 110-144.
Mr. FOSSELLA. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 6 offered by Mr. Fossella:
At the end of the bill, add the following new title:
TITLE VI--COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING TERRORIST THREATS
SEC. 601. IDENTIFICATION OF BEST PRATICES.
(a) Study.--The Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Director of National Intelligence shall conduct jointly, or
contract with an entity to conduct, a study of the operations
of Federal, State, and local government entities to identify
best practices for the communication of information
concerning a terrorist threat.
(b) Contents.--
(1) Identification of best practices.--The study conducted
under this section shall be focused on an analysis and
identification of the best practices of the information
sharing processes of the following government entities:
[[Page H4900]]
(A) Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which are operated by the
Federal Bureau of Investigations with the participation of
local law enforcement agencies.
(B) State Homeland Security Fusion Centers, which are
established by a State and share information with Federal
departments.
(C) The Homeland Security Operations Center, which is
operated by the Department of Homeland Security for the
purposes of coordinating information.
(D) State and local law enforcement agencies that collect,
utilize, and disseminate information on potential terrorist
attacks.
(E) The appropriate elements of the intelligence community
(as defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4))) involved in the sharing of counter-
terrorism information.
(F) The Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group at
the National Counterterrorism Center.
(2) Coordination of government entities.--The study
conducted under this section shall include an examination of
methods for coordinating the activities of Federal, State,
and local entities in responding to a terrorist threat, and
specifically the communication to the general public of
information concerning the threat. The study shall not
include an examination of the sources and methods used in the
collection of the information.
(c) Obtaining Official Data.--In conducting the study, the
Secretary, in conjunction with the Director, with due regard
for the protection of classified information, may secure
directly from any department or agency of the United States
information necessary to enable the Secretary to carry out
this section. Classified information shall be handled through
established methods for controlling such information.
(d) Temporary Duty of Federal Personnel.--The Secretary, in
conjunction with the Director, may request the head of any
department or agency of the United States to detail to
temporary duty personnel within the administrative
jurisdiction of the head of the department or agency that the
Secretary may need to carry out this section, each detail to
be without loss of seniority, pay, or other employee status.
(e) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 6 months after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in conjunction with the
Director, shall submit to Congress a report that contains--
(A) a detailed statement of the findings and conclusions of
the study, including identification of the best practices for
the processing, analysis, and dissemination of information
between the government entities referred to in subsection
(b)(1); and
(B) recommendations for a formalized process of
consultation, communication, and confidentiality between
Federal, State, and local governments, incorporating the best
practices of the various entities studied, to facilitate
communication and help prevent the unauthorized dissemination
of information and criticism of decisions concerning
terrorist threats.
(2) Classified information.--To the extent determined
appropriate by the Secretary, in conjunction with the
Director, the Secretary may submit a portion of the report in
classified form.
(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated to carry out this section $5,000,000 for
fiscal year 2008.
SEC. 602. CENTERS OF BEST PRACTICES.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence,
shall make grants for the establishment and operation of 3
centers to implement the best practices, identified by the
study conducted under section 601, for the processing,
analysis, and dissemination of information concerning a
terrorist threat (in this section, each referred to as a
``Center'').
(b) Location of Centers.--In carrying out subsection (a),
the Secretary, in consultation with the Director, shall make
grants to--
(1) the State of New York for the establishment of a Center
to be located in New York City;
(2) the State of Michigan for the establishment of a Center
to be located in Detroit; and
(3) the State of California for the establishment of a
Center to be located in Los Angeles.
(c) Purpose of Centers.--Each Center shall--
(1) implement the best practices, identified by the study
conducted under section 601, for information sharing
concerning a terrorist threat;
(2) coordinate the communication of these best practices
with other metropolitan areas;
(3) coordinate with the Secretary and the Director to
develop a training curriculum to implement these best
practices;
(4) provide funding and technical assistance to other
metropolitan areas to assist the metropolitan areas in the
implementation of the curriculum developed under paragraph
(3); and
(5) coordinate with the Secretary and the Director to
establish a method to advertise and disseminate these best
practices.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for making grants under this section--
(1) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2008 for the establishment
of the Centers; and
(2) $3,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2009 through 2013
for the operation of the Centers.
(e) Report to Congress.--Not later than March 31, 2010, the
Secretary, in consultation with the Director, shall submit to
Congress a report evaluating the operations of the Centers
and making recommendations for future funding.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Fossella) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
Mr. FOSSELLA. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
On October 6, 2005, New York City was once again the site of a
potential terrorist attack, an apparent plot to hide bombs in baby
strollers, briefcases, and packages and set them off in the city's
subways. Unfortunately, New Yorkers who tuned in to the news that day
for information received conflicting messages.
On one hand, local officials announced that a credible threat was
aimed at the city's subway system; on the other hand, Federal officials
downplayed the severity of the threat, even describing it as ``specific
yet noncredible.''
The incident in New York was not isolated. Just weeks later, Federal
officials responded to a bomb threat in the I-95 tunnel in the
Baltimore Harbor, a threat that local officials learned about from the
news media. The information was either credible or not credible, but it
certainly wasn't both.
I strongly support efforts by antiterrorism forces at the Federal,
State, and local levels; but it disturbed me, and I am sure others, to
watch the confusion that unfolded in these situations.
Where improvement is needed is how different levels of government
interact with each other when terrorist threats are elevated. Everyone
needs to be on the same page and, when credible threats occur, the
public needs to be informed in a coordinated manner. In short, what is
needed is a 911 call center for first responders.
To achieve that, my amendment works as follows: authorizing a study
to be conducted by the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Director
of National Intelligence to identify the problems and the successes of
terrorist threat information sharing among the different levels of
government;
Recommends a formalized process for that sharing;
And authorizes centers of best practices spread throughout the
country, and would allow local governments, State and others, to
interact and to share that information.
Because not every city, as we know, can dedicate resources to
developing advanced techniques to fight terrorism, the Centers for Best
Practices would be on the front lines providing advice to every city
and State in our Nation on the most effective strategies to protect
their citizens from new attacks.
This amendment would ensure an enhanced level of coordination on
communicating terrorist threats to the public. But while it comes to
matters of national security, our government must speak with one voice,
a knowledgeable voice that can provide accurate information to the
American people. Government cannot send conflicting messages at such
critical times.
Last year during debate of this bill, the House approved this
amendment by voice vote; and I notice the gentlelady from California
who is here, Ms. Harman, said it probably best. She said at the time,
We not only need to share information better horizontally, a point we
have been making in this committee and one of the reasons we set up the
Director of National Intelligence, but we need to share it better
vertically. Some of the best ideas are in our hometowns and some of the
best people to try to keep us safe are in our hometowns.
I support the Fossella amendment. It will help us through the
establishment of Centers of Excellence to develop best practices to
share information horizontally and vertically, and give best
information to those in our hometowns trying to protect us.
Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from New York.
The amendment was agreed to.
[[Page H4901]]
Amendment No. 7 Offered by Ms. Lee
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 7 printed
in House Report 110-144.
Ms. LEE. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 7 offered by Ms. Lee:
At the end of subtitle A of title V (page 48, after line
5), add the following new section:
SEC. 503. REPORT ON AUTHORIZATION TO OVERTHROW DEMOCRATICALLY
ELECTED GOVERNMENTS.
Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the President shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report describing any authorization
granted during the 10-year period ending on the date of the
enactment of this Act to engage in intelligence activities
related to the overthrow of a democratically elected
government.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Lee) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. LEE. Madam Chair, first let me thank the Chair of the
Intelligence Committee and my friend from my hometown of El Paso, Texas
(Mr. Reyes) for his support of this amendment and also for his
tremendous leadership as Chair of this committee. And I know the hour
is late, so I will keep this short.
Madam Chair, this amendment is simple and noncontroversial. It merely
requires the President to submit a report to the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees describing any authorization granted over the
last 10 years to engage in intelligence activities related to the
overthrow of democratically elected governments.
We all recognize that democracy promotion is at the top of this
administration's agenda; and I believe that there is no question that
supporting democracy is and should be a nonpartisan issue that we all
can agree on. It is, quite simply, fundamental to who we are as a
people and what we stand for as a Nation.
But we must be vigilant and safeguard against any actions that would
undermine or threaten our abilities to really practice what we preach,
and it is clear that actions that undermine democracies also undermine
our credibility in the world. Furthermore, it affects our ability to be
viewed as a serious and legitimate agent of democracy.
So if the support of people seeking democratic governance and
democracy is to really remain a critical pillar of our foreign policy,
we must ensure that we do not interfere with democratically elected
governments. Who will believe us if our actions are inconsistent with
our words? And how successful will we be as a Nation in achieving our
goals?
So tonight I offer this amendment to support and protect our efforts
in upholding democracy and to help ensure that our actions are really
consistent with our values.
Madam Chair, I want to conclude by thanking you again for your
support, and I want to strongly urge all of my colleagues here today to
continue to stand up for democracy and for transparency by supporting
this amendment.
Madam Chair, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, while I will not oppose the amendment, I
ask unanimous consent to control the 5 minutes in opposition to the
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Michigan is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chair, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I would like to thank my colleague Ms. Lee for working over the last
couple of years to get to the point where we have got an amendment that
I still have a little bit of unease with, but I will not oppose the
amendment, and look forward to continuing to work with her and my
colleagues on the other side of the aisle as we do the oversight
necessary of what goes on in the intelligence community.
Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. LEE. Madam Chair, I yield to the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
Reyes).
Mr. REYES. Madam Chair, I just want to thank the gentlelady for
offering this amendment and offer my support. I think it is an
important amendment.
Ms. LEE. Madam Chair, if there are no additional speakers, I close by
once again thanking all of our leadership on both sides of the aisle.
And I want to especially thank Congresswoman Harman for her past
leadership and support of these efforts to make sure that we were able
to get to this point today.
Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 8 Offered by Mr. Price of North Carolina
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 8 printed
in House Report 110-144.
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 8 offered by Mr. Price of North Carolina:
Page 33, after line 13 insert the following new
subsections:
(d) Use of Contractors for Intelligence Activities.--
(1) Report.--Not later than April 1, 2008, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional
intelligence committees a report on personal services
activities performed by contractors under the National
Intelligence Program and, at the discretion of the Director
of National Intelligence, the Military Intelligence Program.
Such report shall include--
(A) an inventory of the types of functions and activities
performed by contractors in fulfillment of contracts for each
element of the intelligence community;
(B) a description of any relevant regulations or guidance
issued by the Director of National Intelligence or the head
of an element of the intelligence community relating to
minimum standards required regarding the hiring, training,
security clearance, and assignment of contract personnel;
(C) an assessment of costs incurred or savings achieved by
awarding contracts for the performance of such functions
referred to in subparagraph (A) instead of using full-time
employees of the elements of the intelligence community to
perform such functions;
(D) a description of the types of functions or activities
that the Director of National Intelligence considers
appropriate to be carried out by contractors;
(E) a description of the types of functions or activities
that the Director of National Intelligence considers
inappropriate to be carried out by contractors;
(F) an assessment of the appropriateness of using
contractors to perform the activities described in paragraph
(2); and
(G) an estimate of the number of contracts, and the number
of personnel working under such contracts, related to the
performance of activities described in paragraph (2).
(2) Activities.--Activities described in this paragraph are
the following:
(A) Intelligence collection.
(B) Intelligence analysis.
(C) Covert actions.
(D) Interrogation of a person detained, imprisoned, or
otherwise held in the custody or under the control of the
United States Government.
(E) Support for the detention, imprisonment, or holding of
a person under the custody or control of the United States
Government, including activities relating to the detention,
transfer, or transportation of such person across
international borders.
(F) Conduct of electronic or physical surveillance or
monitoring of United States citizens in the United States.
(3) Form.--The report required under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentleman from
North Carolina (Mr. Price) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina.
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Madam Chair, I rise to offer an
amendment on behalf of Ms. Schakowsky and myself that would complement
the provisions already in this bill related to the use of private
contractors by intelligence agencies.
I applaud Chairman Reyes for his leadership in addressing many key
questions associated with the use of contractors. Last year, I stood at
this podium and proposed an amendment that would have required an
extensive look at these questions: How extensively are contractors
being used? What types of activities are appropriate for contractors?
How are they held accountable? Are they achieving savings for the
American people? And
[[Page H4902]]
what are the impacts of contracting on the intelligence workforce?
My amendment passed the House, but the other body did not act on the
bill. This year, Chairman Reyes has included language in his bill that
addresses many of these questions, and I am grateful for his
leadership.
I also want to acknowledge the efforts of the new Director of
National Intelligence, Michael McConnell, who has begun an examination
of the questions raised by my amendments last year. He and his staff
have just completed a community-wide survey of contracting and are
reportedly working on a strategic workforce plan. These efforts are
important first steps.
Our amendment today focuses on additional aspects of this situation
that have not yet been addressed, aspects that are absolutely critical.
{time} 0000
There's a legitimate debate in the Intelligence Community about how
contractors should be used. Our amendment simply asks the Intelligence
Community to respond to three basic questions underlying this debate.
First, what functions may contractors appropriately perform for the
intelligence communities, and what tasks should be viewed as inherently
governmental? For example, should they be involved in intelligence
collection? Should they be involved in analysis? What about
interrogation? What about covert operations? Are there some activities
that are so sensitive that they should only be performed by highly
trained Intelligence Community professionals?
Secondly, how should contractors be vetted and trained?
And thirdly, how can we ensure that contractors are as accountable
for their actions as Federal intelligence professionals are?
Madam Chairman, service contracts, in some instances, represent an
acceptable and efficient use of taxpayer dollars. But a decision to use
contractors should be made deliberately based on a careful analysis of
the issues raised by this amendment. This is true for any use of
private contractors. But it is particularly necessary in the context of
sensitive Intelligence Community activities.
I urge my colleagues to support our amendment.
Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my colleague from Illinois (Ms.
Schakowsky).
Ms. SCHAKOWSKY. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me, and I thank
him for his leadership on this important amendment.
After the Cold War, the use of contractors began to grow, and their
use exploded after September 11, 2001. Contractors now do more than
just build military equipment and satellites. They also provide
security, collect and analyze intelligence, provide technical support,
and even perform planning and management tasks.
Mr. Price's amendment requires a review of what contractors are doing
and, importantly, whether contractors are performing inherently
governmental functions. There are some activities so sensitive that, if
and when they are done, we must determine whether or not it is
appropriate to contract these activities out.
In some cases, U.S. contractors' actions have caused great
controversy. The Lincoln Group's contract to plant positive news
stories in Iraq raised questions about manipulation of the Iraqi media.
Dave Passaro, a CIA contractor was convicted of four counts of
assaulting an Afghan detainee who later died. Contractors were
implicated in the detainee abuse cases at Abu Ghraib.
These activities are controversial enough on their own, and if the
U.S. engages in them, we should do so while accepting full
responsibility and not hide behind contractors.
The Price-Schakowsky amendment would ask the DNI to review whether it
is appropriate for contractors to engage in intelligence collection,
analysis, covert actions, interrogations, detentions, rendition or
electronic surveillance.
This is an important amendment, and I urge its adoption.
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Madam Chairman, I thank my colleague for
her leadership on this amendment and on this issue. For a long time now
she has helped this House focus on the use of private contractors.
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of our time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I claim the time in opposition to the
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I reluctantly rise in opposition to the amendment,
recognizing that it's very similar to an amendment that we actually
accepted last year. And the reason we reluctantly accepted it last
year, we had a high degree of confidence that if we got into a
conference, we would be able to work with the author of the amendment
to take a look at it and to make sure that what was finally in a
conference report in a bill that we were looking forward to sending to
the President would make sure that we took care of some the
redundancies and some of the burdensome elements of the amendment. And
without necessarily having that same assurance this year, I reluctantly
oppose the amendment.
I think that it is absolutely critical that we do measure the
accountability and the performance of our contractors, but much like
last year, we are concerned about the redundancy, the bureaucracy that
may result if this amendment becomes law in its present form. It could
add significant cost to the contractors as they serve and provide
services to the Intelligence Community.
So I hope as we go through this process that we will be able to make
sure that we work on a bipartisan basis, that we work with the
community, that we work with the ODNI to structure this in such a way
that both of the requirements are met, that we see and get the
performance and, at the same time, that we don't burden contractors or
the ODNI with additional bureaucracy.
With that, I'll yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Madam Chairman, as a matter of fact,
this amendment is drafted very carefully to avoid redundancy. It's
crafted to deal with a separate area, a different area from those areas
covered in the bill itself. And it mandates a reporting requirement,
not to add work to the Executive Branch; to ensure that we get the
information we need to do our job. Surely, no one would argue that
Congress shouldn't be able to assess whether our approach to
intelligence is effective or to conduct oversight on the way billions
of dollars in taxpayer funds are expended each year. We're not
establishing new regulations. We are simply requiring contractors to
report on their activity.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Price).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 9 Offered by Ms. Berkley
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 9 printed
in House Report 110-144.
Ms. BERKLEY. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 9 offered by Ms. Berkley:
At the end of subtitle A of title IV (page 39, after line
16), add the following new section:
SEC. 414. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REPORT ON
RETIREMENT BENEFITS FOR FORMER EMPLOYEES OF AIR
AMERICA.
(a) In General.--Not later than 120 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report on the
advisability of providing Federal retirement benefits to
United States citizens for the service of such citizens
before 1977 as employees of Air America or an associated
company while such company was owned or controlled by the
United States Government and operated or managed by the
Central Intelligence Agency.
(b) Report Elements.--
(1) In general.--The report required by subsection (a)
shall include the following:
(A) The history of Air America and associated companies
before 1977, including a description of--
(i) the relationship between such companies and the Central
Intelligence Agency and other elements of the United States
Government;
(ii) the workforce of such companies;
(iii) the missions performed by such companies and their
employees for the United States; and
(iv) the casualties suffered by employees of such companies
in the course of their employment with such companies.
[[Page H4903]]
(B) A description of the retirement benefits contracted for
or promised to the employees of such companies before 1977,
the contributions made by such employees for such benefits,
the retirement benefits actually paid such employees, the
entitlement of such employees to the payment of future
retirement benefits, and the likelihood that former employees
of such companies will receive any future retirement
benefits.
(C) An assessment of the difference between--
(i) the retirement benefits that former employees of such
companies have received or will receive by virtue of their
employment with such companies; and
(ii) the retirement benefits that such employees would have
received and in the future receive if such employees had
been, or would now be, treated as employees of the United
States whose services while in the employ of such companies
had been or would now be credited as Federal service for the
purpose of Federal retirement benefits.
(D) The recommendations of the Director regarding the
advisability of legislative action to treat employment at
such companies as Federal service for the purpose of Federal
retirement benefits in light of the relationship between such
companies and the United States Government and the services
and sacrifices of such employees to and for the United
States, and if legislative action is considered advisable, a
proposal for such action and an assessment of its costs.
(2) Views of dcia.--The Director of National Intelligence
shall include in the report any views of the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency on the matters covered by the
report that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
considers appropriate.
(c) Assistance of Comptroller General.--The Comptroller
General shall, upon the request of the Director of National
Intelligence and in a manner consistent with the protection
of classified information, assist the Director in the
preparation of the report required by subsection (a).
(d) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) shall be
submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified
annex.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Air america.--The term ``Air America'' means Air
America, Incorporated.
(2) Associated company.--The term ``associated company''
means any company associated with or subsidiary to Air
America, including Air Asia Company Limited and the Pacific
Division of Southern Air Transport, Incorporated.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentlewoman from
Nevada (Ms. Berkley) and a Member opposed will each control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from Nevada.
Ms. BERKLEY. Good morning, Madam Chairman.
I rise today in support of an amendment that would require the CIA to
issue a report on providing retirement benefits to former employees of
Air America.
From 1950 to 1976, employees of Air America faithfully served their
country doing their part to help win the Cold War. Air America was a
government corporation covertly owned and operated by the Central
Intelligence Agency. Under the guise of a civilian airline, these
pilots conducted flight operations in various countries, including
China, Laos, Korea and Vietnam on behalf of the Department of Defense
and the CIA.
Unfortunately, since it was a closely held secret that Air America
was a government-owned corporation, these men and women have never been
credited for their government service. That means they can not receive
government benefits, retirement benefits for their efforts.
The amendment I am offering today would require the Director of
National Intelligence to submit a report to Congress on advisability of
providing Federal retirement benefits to U.S. citizens employed by Air
America while it was covertly owned and operated by the CIA. These
brave men and women should receive the long denied benefits they earned
for their service to their country.
I urge you to support this amendment that will bring attention to the
overlooked dilemma of Air America employees.
Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I thank the chairman of the
Intelligence Committee, Mr. Reyes.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to claim the
time in opposition to the amendment, although I will not oppose the
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, the gentleman from Michigan is
recognized for 5 minutes.
There was no objection.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, I will yield myself as much time as I
shall consume.
There's no doubt that the Air America's personnel deserve the
recognition for the service that they provided during these critical
times in our country in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam war.
But it's very interesting to me that, at this time, as we're
considering other amendments, and much of the debate that I hear about
contractors and our use of contractors today, contractors are getting
hammered each and every day. And then we step back and say, well, you
know, we ought to take a look at the contractors of 50 years ago, and
we maybe now ought to provide them with government benefits.
And I just wonder whether, in 50 years, we'll look back at the
service that is being provided by contractors today that in many
different areas is not being very well received, and whether we will
then recognize the service that they're providing. I hope that we do.
But, under this, under the terms of Air America, legally these
individuals did not qualify for government benefits. We need to make
sure that we deal in a way that is fair, especially to the people that
are serving as contractors today. And we need to make sure that we have
a consistent pattern of how we deal with contractors in this way,
recognizing that their pay comes from a private sector entity, and be
very careful about when and where we are going to involve the Federal
Government in picking up responsibilities of private corporations.
Madam Chairman, I will reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. BERKLEY. Madam Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentlelady
from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson-Lee.
Ms. JACKSON-LEE of Texas. Madam Chairman, I thank the sponsor of this
legislation.
Human resources and human intelligence are a key element to the
security of this Nation. Air America employees represent the human
resources aspect.
This is a thoughtful amendment that suggests that we should study the
question of whether or not these individuals in the service of their
country should be given these kinds of benefits.
From the perspective of the Department of Homeland Security and
Homeland Security Committee, human intelligence is important. And I
want to thank the Chairperson of the full committee for this very
important bill that focuses on funding intelligence and also funding
human intelligence.
Might I also say in closing, as I support the gentlelady's amendment,
I think it would also be important that we look closely at
professionals as they leave the CIA, and question whether or not tell-
all books are in the best interest of this Nation, whether language
such as ``slam dunk'' should be investigated. And I hope, as we pursue
the idea of oversight, that we'll look into the utilization of such
information in tell-all books that provide such prosperity for people
who've been in the service of this country. I hope we will investigate
that. But when we have good employees like those of Air America, we
should support them.
Ms. BERKLEY. In closing, I'd like to once again urge adoption of this
amendment, and I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Madam Chairman, just in response to my colleague, if we
investigate ``slam dunk,'' I hope we investigate the term ``bugs and
bunnies'' as well.
I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from Nevada (Ms. Berkley).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 10 Offered by Mr. Schiff
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 10 printed
in House Report 110-144.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 10 offered by Mr. Schiff:
At the end of subtitle A of title V (page 48, after line
5), add the following new section:
[[Page H4904]]
SEC. 503. REITERATION OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978 AS THE EXCLUSIVE MEANS
BY WHICH ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MAY BE
CONDUCTED FOR GATHERING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION.
(a) Exclusive Means.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which
electronic surveillance may be conducted for the purpose of
gathering foreign intelligence information.
(b) Specific Authorization Required for Exception.--
Subsection (a) shall apply until specific statutory
authorization for electronic surveillance, other than as an
amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), is enacted. Such specific
statutory authorization shall be the only exception to
subsection (a).
(c) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Electronic surveillance.--The term ``electronic
surveillance'' has the meaning given the term in section
101(f) of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
(50 U.S.C. 1801(f)).
(2) Foreign intelligence information.--The term ``foreign
intelligence information'' has the meaning given the term in
section 101(e) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1801(e)).
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 388, the gentleman from
California (Mr. Schiff) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chair, I yield myself 3 minutes.
Madam Chair, today I offer an amendment with my Republican colleague
Jeff Flake from Arizona that would respond to the President's
unilateral assertion of power with regard to the electronic
surveillance of Americans on U.S. soil and reassert that our existing
statutes govern the operation of such surveillance.
Madam Chair, the Federal Government has a duty to pursue al Qaeda and
other enemies of the United States with all available tools, including
the use of electronic surveillance, to thwart future attacks on the
United States and to destroy the enemy.
While the President possesses the inherent authority to engage in
electronic surveillance of the enemy outside the country, Congress
possesses the authority to regulate such surveillance within the United
States.
When Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, it
intended for this statute to provide the sole authority for
surveillance of Americans on American soil for the purpose of gathering
foreign intelligence information. Our amendment reiterates this
important principle.
The President has argued that the authorization for the use of
military force provided him with the authority to engage in warrantless
electronic surveillance of Americans.
{time} 0015
It is hard to believe that any of us contemplated, when we voted to
authorize the use of force to root out the terrorists who attacked us
on September 11, that we were also voting to nullify FISA. Our
amendment makes clear that in the absence of explicit statutory
authority, FISA is the exclusive authority for the conduct of domestic
electronic surveillance of Americans. While the administration appears
to have finally agreed that electronic surveillance occurring as part
of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, or TSP, should cease to operate
without the approval of the FISA court, the administration has not
conceded that it cannot conduct such electronic surveillance of
Americans unilaterally outside of FISA with no judicial oversight
either now or in the future.
While we have been told that surveillance in this program was limited
to phone calls where one of the parties is outside of the United
States, there appears to be no limiting principle to the Executive's
claim of authority provided by the military force resolution. In fact,
when we questioned the Attorney General on this point in the last
session, he would not rule out the proposition that the Executive has
the authority to wiretap purely domestic calls between two Americans
without seeking a warrant.
No one in Congress would deny the need to tap certain calls under
court order, but if the government can tap purely domestic phone calls
between Americans without court approval, there is no limit to
executive power. Congress cannot be silent in the face of this
assertion of authority.
In working to meet the real national security needs of the country,
we must also ensure that Congress does not abdicate its responsibility
to ensure that fundamental liberties are not compromised. Absent
congressional action, law-abiding U.S. citizens may continue to have
reasonable fear of being the subject of extra-judicial surveillance.
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Madam Chairman, I rise to claim the time
in opposition to the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentlewoman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time
as I may consume.
When the President acknowledged the existence of the Terrorist
Surveillance Program, he claimed the inherent authority, under article
II of the Constitution, as the Commander in Chief to be able to conduct
that surveillance. Now, whether you agree or don't agree with his
interpretation of the Constitution, this amendment, and a bill with
this amendment in it, does not change the Constitution.
I will admit to the gentleman from California I personally believe
that the legal arguments that were presented in favor of the Terrorist
Surveillance Program were not strong. They weren't strong at all. And
that is why I demanded more rigorous oversight to the program and
proposed legislation to change the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act so that we can listen to our enemies and protect the civil
liberties of Americans.
The sad thing is that the bipartisan leadership of this body,
Democrat and Republican, knew for 5 years this program was going on and
did nothing to update the laws or even propose that perhaps this was
wrong to do this this way. They remained silent. The failure is in the
Congress.
We now know that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, as it is
currently written, is not getting us critical information about our
enemies and also, frankly, not protecting the civil liberties of
Americans. It is broken and not working.
The Director of National Intelligence testified last week in the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, saying that we are missing
important information because this law is trapped in 1970s technology.
In January of this year, the Attorney General wrote to the Congress
and said that we now have innovative orders from the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court. By ``innovative'' what he really meant
is that we are on very fragile legal ground. I describe it as putting a
twin-size sheet on a king-size bed, and everybody on the Intelligence
Committee knows exactly what I mean. We have one judge, in a
nonadversarial proceeding, in secret session, who has approved some
innovative orders. He is way out on a legal limb. So what will the next
judge do? And after this amendment passes saying, by golly, we are
determined to stay in the 1970s, the Congress is happy with a 1970s law
governing 1970s technology, what is the next judge going to do? And how
does that compromise our national security? We have a problem.
In 1978 almost all local communications went over a wire and almost
all long-haul communications went over the air. The statute sets up
different regimes for what to do for over-the-wire communications that
you need a warrant for to collect foreign intelligence information.
Over the air the sky is the limit. We now, in the 21st century, have
things completely reversed. Now almost all local calls are over the
air. 230 million Americans have cell phones, and yet almost all long-
distance calls are over wires. The information that we critically need
is on the wires.
This law is outdated, and we are stuck with our heads in the sand in
1970s law. And your amendment insists that we stay there.
I will oppose this amendment and urge my colleagues to do the same.
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. SCHIFF. Madam Chairman, as my colleague from California (Ms.
Harman) points out, FISA has been amended 12 times, and, moreover, we
have proposed to amend FISA to modernize it at present, and Mr. Flake
and I propose to amend it as well.
The argument of my colleague seems to be that FISA needs to be
amended,
[[Page H4905]]
it hasn't been amended yet; so we should allow the President to simply
ignore it. That, I submit, is not constitutional and not desirable.
Madam Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to my colleague from Arizona
(Mr. Flake).
Mr. FLAKE. Madam Chairman, I thank Mr. Schiff for yielding, and I
appreciate working with him on this important amendment and on this
issue for a long time.
Madam Chairman, this amendment would reiterate that FISA is the
exclusive means by which domestic electronic surveillance can be
conducted for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence
information.
As has been stated before, we have, on the Judiciary Committee, for
years been asking the administration what can we not do within FISA, do
we need to change FISA in order to be able to conduct surveillance we
need within FISA. We have never been given compelling information or
evidence why we can't do what we need to do within FISA. As Mr. Schiff
mentioned, if we do need to change FISA to update it again, as it has
been changed and updated multiple times, then we should do it. However,
we simply can't say FISA is insufficient; so go around it, and we don't
want to know what goes on outside of it. Go ahead with the Terrorist
Surveillance Program. We will have no congressional oversight. That is
simply unacceptable. If we do need to change FISA, if we do need to
modernize it, let's modernize it again, again, and again. But let's
make sure that Congress maintains its prerogative to regulate the
surveillance that goes on to make sure that it is done with civil
liberties in mind. That is what this amendment seeks to do, and I am
pleased to work with Mr. Schiff on it.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from California's time has expired.
Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Madam Chairman, I yield myself the balance
of my time.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act has been amended since 1978
several times. But what has not changed is the basic structure of the
law, that it treats wire communications differently than it treats
over-the-air communications.
You do not need a warrant to gather foreign intelligence information
that is flowing through the air by radio waves or cell tower or
microwave or anything else. We do it. You do need it over a wire. The
law needs to be technology neutral and it is not. What you are doing by
your amendment is reaffirming that this House tonight is determined to
stay with the 1970s law and 1970s technology. And this House also
rejected an amendment that would have updated these statutes.
My colleague from Arizona says do we need to change FISA? We really
don't know.
We have a written submission from the Director of National
Intelligence telling us the changes that need to be made.
I urge my colleagues to look to the 21st-century technology to
protect this country and reject the gentleman's amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff).
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Madam Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, further proceedings
on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California will be
postponed.
Announcement by the Chairman
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 6 of rule XVIII, proceedings will
now resume on those amendments on which further proceedings were
postponed, in the following order:
Amendment No. 2 by Mr. Hoekstra of Michigan.
Amendment No. 5 by Mr. Rogers of Michigan.
Amendment No. 10 by Mr. Schiff of California.
The Chair will reduce to 2 minutes the time for any electronic vote
after the first vote in this series.
Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Hoekstra
The CHAIRMAN. The unfinished business is the demand for a recorded
vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
Hoekstra) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the
noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
Recorded Vote
The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 185,
noes 230, not voting 22, as follows:
[Roll No. 337]
AYES--185
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Barton (TX)
Bean
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boren
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carter
Chabot
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Deal (GA)
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Drake
Duncan
Emerson
English (PA)
Everett
Fallin
Feeney
Flake
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Hall (TX)
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hulshof
Hunter
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Jindal
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jordan
Keller
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Lamborn
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
Melancon
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy, Tim
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Nunes
Paul
Pearce
Pence
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Sali
Schmidt
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (TX)
Stearns
Sullivan
Tancredo
Terry
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walberg
Walden (OR)
Walsh (NY)
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOES--230
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bartlett (MD)
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Braley (IA)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Castle
Castor
Chandler
Clarke
Clay
Clyburn
Cohen
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Lincoln
Davis, Tom
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly
Doyle
Edwards
Ehlers
Ellison
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Faleomavaega
Farr
Ferguson
Filner
Frank (MA)
Giffords
Gilchrest
Gillibrand
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth Sandlin
Higgins
Hill
Hinchey
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Klein (FL)
Kucinich
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lynch
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Perlmutter
Peterson (MN)
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Saxton
[[Page H4906]]
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sestak
Shays
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shuler
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (NJ)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Space
Spratt
Stark
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Wexler
Wilson (OH)
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
NOT VOTING--22
Bordallo
Brady (PA)
Carson
Christensen
Cleaver
Conyers
Cuellar
Davis, Jo Ann
Doolittle
Dreier
Engel
Fattah
Fortuno
Grijalva
Hinojosa
Jefferson
Mahoney (FL)
McMorris Rodgers
Norton
Peterson (PA)
Radanovich
Souder
Announcement by the Chairman
The CHAIRMAN (during the vote). Members are advised 2 minutes remain
on this vote.
{time} 0046
Mrs. LOWEY and Messrs. ELLSWORTH, SHULER and JOHNSON of Illinois
changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. McHENRY changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated for:
Mr. DREIER. Madam Chairman, on rollcall No. 337 I was inadvertently
detained. Had I been present, I would have voted ``aye.''
Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan
The CHAIRMAN. The unfinished business is the demand for a recorded
vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
Rogers) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the
noes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
Recorded Vote
The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The CHAIRMAN. This will be a 2-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 297,
noes 122, not voting 18, as follows:
[Roll No. 338]
AYES--297
Ackerman
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bean
Berkley
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blumenauer
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boren
Boucher
Boustany
Boyd (FL)
Brady (TX)
Braley (IA)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carnahan
Carney
Carson
Carter
Castle
Castor
Chabot
Clarke
Clay
Clyburn
Coble
Cohen
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Conyers
Costa
Costello
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cubin
Cuellar
Culberson
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Davis, Lincoln
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeFazio
Delahunt
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dingell
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Edwards
Ehlers
Ellison
Emerson
English (PA)
Everett
Faleomavaega
Fallin
Farr
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Green, Al
Grijalva
Hall (TX)
Hare
Hastert
Hastings (FL)
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Herseth Sandlin
Hill
Hobson
Hodes
Hoekstra
Holden
Hooley
Hulshof
Hunter
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Jefferson
Jindal
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Jordan
Keller
Kildee
Kilpatrick
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Klein (FL)
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
Kucinich
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Lamborn
Latham
Lee
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Lynch
Mack
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Manzullo
Marchant
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McDermott
McGovern
McHenry
McHugh
McNerney
Meek (FL)
Melancon
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murphy, Tim
Musgrave
Myrick
Nadler
Napolitano
Neugebauer
Nunes
Obey
Paul
Payne
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Pomeroy
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Rush
Ryan (WI)
Sali
Sarbanes
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schmidt
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Solis
Space
Stark
Stearns
Stupak
Sutton
Tancredo
Tanner
Taylor
Terry
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Tierney
Towns
Turner
Udall (CO)
Upton
Van Hollen
Walberg
Walden (OR)
Walsh (NY)
Wamp
Wasserman Schultz
Watson
Watt
Weiner
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Westmoreland
Wexler
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (OH)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
Young (FL)
NOES--122
Abercrombie
Allen
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Becerra
Berman
Berry
Bishop (NY)
Boswell
Boyda (KS)
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Chandler
Cooper
Courtney
Cramer
Davis (CA)
DeGette
DeLauro
Dicks
Doggett
Donnelly
Doyle
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Filner
Frank (MA)
Giffords
Gillibrand
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Gene
Hall (NY)
Harman
Higgins
Hinchey
Hirono
Holt
Honda
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kind
Kirk
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
LaTourette
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum (MN)
McIntyre
McNulty
Meehan
Meeks (NY)
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murtha
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Perlmutter
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Schiff
Schwartz
Sestak
Shuler
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Spratt
Tauscher
Thompson (CA)
Udall (NM)
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz (MN)
Waters
Waxman
Welch (VT)
Woolsey
Young (AK)
NOT VOTING--18
Bordallo
Brady (PA)
Christensen
Cleaver
Davis (IL)
Davis, Jo Ann
Engel
Fattah
Fortuno
Gutierrez
Hinojosa
McKeon
McMorris Rodgers
Norton
Peterson (PA)
Radanovich
Souder
Sullivan
Announcement by the Chairman
The CHAIRMAN (during the vote). Members are advised 1 minute remains
on this vote.
{time} 0050
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Amendment No. 10 Offered by Mr. Schiff
The CHAIRMAN. The unfinished business is the demand for a recorded
vote on the amendment offered by the gentleman from California (Mr.
Schiff) on which further proceedings were postponed and on which the
ayes prevailed by voice vote.
The Clerk will redesignate the amendment.
The Clerk redesignated the amendment.
Recorded Vote
The CHAIRMAN. A recorded vote has been demanded.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The CHAIRMAN. This will be a 2-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 245,
noes 178, not voting 14, as follows:
[Roll No. 339]
AYES--245
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Bartlett (MD)
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Braley (IA)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson
Castor
Chandler
Clarke
Clay
Clyburn
Cohen
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, David
[[Page H4907]]
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly
Doyle
Duncan
Ehlers
Ellison
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Faleomavaega
Farr
Filner
Flake
Frank (MA)
Giffords
Gilchrest
Gillibrand
Gillmor
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth Sandlin
Higgins
Hill
Hinchey
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inglis (SC)
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Kingston
Kirk
Klein (FL)
Kucinich
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lynch
Mack
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Manzullo
Marchant
Markey
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Perlmutter
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sali
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shuler
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Space
Spratt
Stark
Stearns
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walberg
Walz (MN)
Wamp
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Wexler
Wilson (OH)
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
NOES--178
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Barrow
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, Lincoln
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Edwards
Emerson
English (PA)
Everett
Fallin
Feeney
Ferguson
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Hall (TX)
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hulshof
Hunter
Issa
Jindal
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Keller
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Lamborn
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Marshall
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
Melancon
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Murphy, Tim
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Nunes
Pearce
Pence
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Saxton
Schmidt
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Sullivan
Tancredo
Terry
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Walden (OR)
Walsh (NY)
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--14
Bordallo
Brady (PA)
Christensen
Cleaver
Davis, Jo Ann
Engel
Fattah
Fortuno
Hinojosa
McMorris Rodgers
Norton
Peterson (PA)
Radanovich
Souder
Announcement by the Chairman
The CHAIRMAN (during the vote). Members are advised 1 minute remains
on this vote.
{time} 0055
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the committee amendment in the
nature of a substitute, as amended.
The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended,
was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Weiner) having assumed the chair, Mrs. Tauscher, Chairman of the
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that
that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 2082) to
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2008 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to
House Resolution 388, she reported the bill back to the House with an
amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the amendment
reported from the Committee of the Whole? If not, the question is on
the amendment.
The amendment was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Rogers of Michigan
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. In its present form, I am.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. Rogers of Michigan moves to recommit the bill, H.R.
2082, to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence with
instructions to report the same back to the House forthwith
with the following amendments:
Page 8, line 25, strike ``$39,000,000'' and insert
``$16,000,000''.
Page 9, after line 20 insert the following new subsection:
(f) Human Intelligence Activities of the CIA.--In addition
to amounts authorized to be appropriated for the human
intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Agency
under this Act (including those specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a)),
there is also authorized to be appropriated for the human
intelligence activities of the Central Intelligence Agency
$23,000,000.
At the end of subtitle A of title V (page 48, after line
5), add the following new section:
SEC. 503. AUDIT OF THE NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER.
(a) Audit.--The Inspector General of the Department of
Justice shall conduct an audit of the effectiveness and role
of the National Drug Intelligence Center, including any
problems with duplication of effort and lack of coordination
with other intelligence providers and consumers.
(b) Requirements.--The audit conducted under subsection (a)
shall include--
(1) an examination of whether the National Drug
Intelligence Center duplicates functions carried out by the
Drug Enforcement Administration, the El Paso Intelligence
Center, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or other
components of the Department of Justice;
(2) an examination of the overall effectiveness of the
National Drug Intelligence Center;
(3) an examination of whether current activities of the
National Drug Intelligence Center dealing with international
drug intelligence are consistent with the provisions of the
General Counterdrug Intelligence Plan designating it as the
principal center for strategic domestic counterdrug
intelligence; and
(4) an examination of whether the document exploitation
functions of the National Drug Intelligence Center could
effectively be transferred to a component of the intelligence
community (as defined in section 3(4) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) or the Department of
Justice.
(c) Submission Date.--Not later than 180 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Inspector General of
the Department of Justice shall submit to the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the
Judiciary of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on the Judiciary
a report containing the results of the audit conducted under
subsection (a).
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask
unanimous consent that the motion to recommit
[[Page H4908]]
be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Michigan?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Michigan is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion to
recommit.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I know the hour is late, but
this is such an important issue. There are some good things in this
bill, and my colleagues have rightly said this is the biggest
expenditure we have ever seen in a very long time, as a matter of fact,
ever, in our intelligence bill. But bigger isn't always better, because
the priorities in the bill are what is important.
The folks who are on the front lines, our analysts, our case
officers, our soldiers who are being protected by the feed of
information that flows to them, are incredibly important. And make no
doubt about it, my friends, this is a huge shift philosophically from
where we have been in the past.
Nothing in here, nothing in here fixes the problem that we have today
in not being able to listen to certain phone calls that might lead to
an attack on the United States of America. Nothing. That lack of
urgency should scare us all.
The fact that we cut human intelligence programs in this bill, they
will get less money this year, some of them very sensitive, very
classified, specifically cut out of this bill, jeopardizes soldiers in
the field in not getting the proper assistance and information that
they need.
We also take a political bent. There are also some disturbing things,
things that we all sometimes don't like about the House that we serve
in. Sometimes it was said because we did things that way for a long
time, we should continue to do it. Those are the things that we can
change tonight. Those are the things that we can at least tell the
American people with this motion to recommit we believe in getting that
information, we believe in human intelligence. Certainly the 9/11
Commission did. We believe in regular order and the rules, so that when
earmarks go into very sensitive bills like this, and we have seen what
happens when we don't follow the rules, it can cause trouble.
Think about what we are talking about. Right before Afghanistan, we
dropped seven CIA officers in very remote places in a very difficult
neighborhood, and on their own they committed to get around with this
Northern Alliance that was together, but not really. They had tribal
problems. They had cultural problems among themselves. And their duty,
these seven CIA officers, was to pull things together. Human
intelligence got us where we needed to be.
{time} 0100
Many would say it saved thousands and thousands of lives of U.S.
soldiers because of their brave actions in the mountains of Afghanistan
in very difficult territory because we had human-on-human contact that
gave us the information and the operations that we needed to be
successful.
And in this bill, in this bill, they take away precious resources for
those kind of human collection activities. When we have soldiers in the
field, that is a philosophical departure from where we have been in the
past.
We can't stand for that. We can't stand for the fact that we may lose
our ears on terrorist activities being planned today. And we also can't
take wasteful programming in something that is this important.
You know, for a time of war, the priorities of this bill are
completely misplaced in critical areas. The motion to recommit would
readjust those priorities by increasing human intelligence funding for
the Central Intelligence Agency by $23 million. That money would come
from an earmark funding for the National Drug Intelligence Center which
a formal oversight report of the House Committee said: ``An expensive
and duplicative use of scarce Federal drug enforcement resources.'' And
the U.S. News & World Report called it a ``boondoggle.''
The motion to recommit would also direct the Department of Justice
Inspector General to conduct an audit of the National Drug Intelligence
Center to determine if this center was wasteful and duplicative.
For all of the talk about reform, the majority has blocked an audit
by a party-line vote in committee with no substantive explanation. My
amendment requiring the audit also was blocked by the Rules Committee.
It shouldn't be controversial that these funds could be put to far
better use in human intelligence. In numerous important respects, this
bill fails to provide adequate support to the Intelligence Community's
activities on the forefront of its ability to protect our national
security.
In a classified annex, the majority cuts human intelligence programs,
counter to the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission; and
significantly cuts certain specific initiatives related to American
efforts to counter radical jihadists and to support our Nation's
objectives in Iraq.
A review of just this center, and why this $23 million is so
important, it is going to human collection. A review of the NDIC, U.S.
News & World Report in 2005 concluded: ``It is a boondoggle,'' and
``rocked by scandal and subject to persistent criticism that it should
never have been created at all.''
You know, sometimes, and God love us all, we get pretty myopic on our
districts. This is the time that we need to look outward to the rest of
the country. We are United States Members of Congress. What is good for
our backyard may not be good for the rest of the country.
There is a Marine right now that is counting on human intelligence to
tell us if there is an IED on the road, if al Qaeda is around the
corner. If we don't want to stand up for this motion to recommit, we
will endorse the boondoggles of the past at the expense of our soldiers
in the field. I would urge support of the motion to recommit.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to
recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Texas is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I oppose this motion to recommit because it
would cut a program that makes valuable contributions to the war on
drugs and to homeland security, first and foremost.
This motion is also misleading because the underlying bill provides
our intelligence officers everything they need. It adds funds to the
CIA and Defense Department for human intelligence training so that our
operators can be more effective. It invests in language training for
case officers so they can operate effectively overseas.
My colleague talks about following the rules. One of the premier
rules that we have is we never mention a number in classified programs;
$23 million telegraphs our enemies what we are doing.
The motion to recommit asks for a study. This program has been
studied before. I just want to quote the White House drug czar. When
the White House drug czar toured the NDIC in 2003, he said: ``The
National Drug Intelligence Center provides us with vital information we
need to disrupt the market for illegal drugs in America.''
Also, a White House press release asserted that the drug czar's
office uses NDIC-produced intelligence to help guide its ongoing
counterdrug policy agenda as outlined in the President's national drug
control strategy. NDIC information bulletins every day warn law
enforcement officers around our country and intelligence agencies
around the world of emerging threats in drug trafficking and trends in
use.
But the motion to recommit would silence this added and vital voice,
a voice that the minority was more than happy to fund when they were in
charge of this body. The Republican-led Congress appropriated more than
$160 million for NDIC over the past 4 years. It funded the National
Drug Intelligence Center with $39 million in fiscal years 2005, 2006
and 2007, and more than $44 million in 2004.
If it was such a good idea then, if it was such a good idea back when
you were in charge, why in the heck is it such a bad idea now when we
see the trends we are seeing around the country?
Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to defeat this motion to
recommit.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is
ordered on the motion to recommit.
There was no objection.
[[Page H4909]]
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair
will reduce to 5 minutes the minimum time for any electronic vote on
the question of passing of the bill.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 181,
noes 241, not voting 10, as follows:
[Roll No. 340]
AYES--181
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Cooper
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Deal (GA)
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Ehlers
Emerson
Everett
Fallin
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Hall (TX)
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Hoekstra
Hulshof
Hunter
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Jindal
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Keller
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kirk
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Lamborn
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy, Tim
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Nunes
Paul
Pearce
Pence
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Poe
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Ramstad
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Sali
Schmidt
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Shimkus
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Stearns
Sullivan
Tancredo
Terry
Thornberry
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walberg
Walden (OR)
Walsh (NY)
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
NOES--241
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Braley (IA)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson
Castor
Chandler
Clarke
Clay
Clyburn
Cohen
Conyers
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Lincoln
Davis, Tom
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dent
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly
Doyle
Edwards
Ellison
Ellsworth
Emanuel
English (PA)
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Filner
Frank (MA)
Frelinghuysen
Gerlach
Giffords
Gilchrest
Gillibrand
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth Sandlin
Higgins
Hill
Hinchey
Hirono
Hobson
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (GA)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Kingston
Klein (FL)
Kucinich
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lynch
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Perlmutter
Peterson (MN)
Platts
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Regula
Reyes
Rodriguez
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Saxton
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shuler
Shuster
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Space
Spratt
Stark
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tiahrt
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Wexler
Wilson (OH)
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--10
Brady (PA)
Cleaver
Davis, Jo Ann
Engel
Fattah
Hinojosa
McMorris Rodgers
Peterson (PA)
Radanovich
Souder
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised there
are 2 minutes remaining.
{time} 0123
So the motion to recommit was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. REYES. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 225,
noes 197, not voting 10, as follows:
[Roll No. 341]
AYES--225
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Altmire
Andrews
Arcuri
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bartlett (MD)
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd (FL)
Boyda (KS)
Braley (IA)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carney
Carson
Castor
Chandler
Clarke
Clay
Clyburn
Cohen
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Courtney
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (IL)
Davis, Lincoln
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Donnelly
Doyle
Edwards
Ellison
Ellsworth
Emanuel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Filner
Frank (MA)
Giffords
Gilchrest
Gillibrand
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hall (NY)
Hare
Harman
Hastings (FL)
Herseth Sandlin
Higgins
Hill
Hinchey
Hirono
Hodes
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kagen
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kildee
Kilpatrick
Kind
Klein (FL)
Lampson
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Loebsack
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lynch
Mahoney (FL)
Maloney (NY)
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy (NY)
McCollum (MN)
McGovern
McIntyre
McNerney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mitchell
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moore (WI)
Moran (VA)
Murphy (CT)
Murphy, Patrick
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Perlmutter
Peterson (MN)
Pomeroy
Porter
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Rodriguez
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sarbanes
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sestak
Shea-Porter
Sherman
Shuler
Sires
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Space
Spratt
Stupak
Sutton
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walz (MN)
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Welch (VT)
Wexler
Wilson (OH)
Wu
Wynn
Yarmuth
NOES--197
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachmann
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Barton (TX)
Biggert
Bilbray
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehner
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boustany
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Buchanan
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
[[Page H4910]]
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, David
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Ehlers
Emerson
English (PA)
Everett
Fallin
Feeney
Ferguson
Flake
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Hall (TX)
Hastert
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Heller
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hulshof
Hunter
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Jindal
Johnson, Sam
Jordan
Keller
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline (MN)
Knollenberg
Kucinich
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Lamborn
Latham
LaTourette
Lee
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
McCarthy (CA)
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McDermott
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy, Tim
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Nunes
Paul
Payne
Pearce
Pence
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roskam
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Sali
Saxton
Schmidt
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shays
Shimkus
Shuster
Simpson
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Stark
Stearns
Sullivan
Tancredo
Terry
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walberg
Walden (OR)
Walsh (NY)
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Woolsey
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--10
Brady (PA)
Cleaver
Davis, Jo Ann
Engel
Fattah
Hinojosa
McMorris Rodgers
Peterson (PA)
Radanovich
Souder
Announcement by the Speaker Pro Tempore
The SPEAKER pro tempore (during the vote). Members are advised there
are 2 minutes remaining.
{time} 0130
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________
