109th Congress S. Prt.
COMMITTEE PRINT
2d Session 109-73
_______________________________________________________________________
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
``GIVING VOICE TO THE PEOPLE''
__________
A Report to Members
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
Richard G. Lugar, Chairman
One Hundred Ninth Congress
Second Session
December 22, 2006
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
31-506 WASHINGTON : 2006
_____________________________________________________________________________
For Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512?091800
Fax: (202) 512?092250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402?090001
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee BARBARA BOXER, California
JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire BILL NELSON, Florida
LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska BARACK OBAMA, Illinois
MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Staff Director
Antony J. Blinken, Democratic Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Letter of Transmittal............................................ v
The Problem...................................................... 1
Guiding Principles............................................... 2
Regional Overviews and Recommendations........................... 3
Africa....................................................... 3
Asia......................................................... 4
Central Europe............................................... 5
Latin America................................................ 6
Appendixes
Appendix I. Complete List of Meetings............................ 9
Appendix II. Democracy Survey.................................... 19
Appendix III. Regional Notes..................................... 25
Appendix IV. National Endowment for Democracy (NED) Report
Entitled ``The Backlash Against Democracy Assistance''......... 45
Appendix V. Idea to Reality: A Brief History of the National
Endowment for Democracy (NED).................................. 110
(iii)
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC, December 22, 2006.
Dear Colleagues: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
recently sent Carl Meacham, Keith Luse, Jay Branegan, Paul
Foldi, and Michael Phelan of the professional staff to selected
countries in Africa, Asia, Central Europe, and Latin America to
examine the state of democracy, with particular emphasis on
programs supported with United States Government (USG) funding,
either directly through the National Endowment for Democracy
(NED), or other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
Increasingly, governments around the world have tightened
their controls on foreign NGOs by passing laws to restrict
their ability to work independently from government approval.
In extreme cases, democracy promoters are being harassed by
authorities. In some nations governments have been able to
persuade their citizens that the work of NGOs and the financial
assistance provided to them by the USG, is a form of American
interventionism. Thus, in some countries opposition to
prodemocracy NGOs is cast as a reaffirmation of sovereignty.
I am pleased to share with you this very timely report. I
believe it provides significant insight and a number of
important recommendations on how NGOs can operate effectively
abroad--while respecting the laws and customs of the host
countries--to strengthen civil society and promote democracy
under challenging conditions.
I hope you find this helpful as the Committee on Foreign
Relations considers its continued support for democracy
promotion programs funded by the U.S. Congress. We look forward
to working with you on these issues and welcome any comments
you may have on this report.
Sincerely,
Richard G. Lugar,
Chairman.
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
``GIVING VOICE TO THE PEOPLE''
Between October and November, 2006, members of the
professional staff of the United States Senate's Committee on
Foreign Relations traveled to 16\1\ countries on four
continents to assess the state of democracy promotion as
practiced by American-supported NGOs. During these trips staff
visited with government officials of host countries, relevant
U.S. Embassy officials and United States Agency for
International Development (USAID) officials, members of civil
society \2\, as well as other independent, voluntary, nonprofit
actors (See Appendix I for complete list of meetings). In
addition to many organizations, Human Rights Watch (HRW) lent
invaluable assistance through their thorough in-country contact
base in suggesting and coordinating various meetings. In some
of the countries visited, staff used a survey provided mostly
to host country NGOs, which was developed with the assistance
of the International Republican Institute (IRI), to assess the
environment in which NGOs operate (See Appendix II for
``Democracy Survey'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Cambodia, Thailand, Sri Lanka,
Indonesia, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Moldova, Chile,
Peru, and Venezuela.
\2\ Civil society can be defined as the area of legally protected,
nongovernmental, self-organizing associative activities, institutions,
and groups outside the realms of family, private for-profit sector, and
the state in modern societies. Thus the concept civil society itself
lies in the intersection of several spheres including the social,
historical, legal, political, economic, ideological, and cultural.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the request of the Chairman, the purpose of the trip
was to examine:
The challenges that U.S.-funded NGOs face in
implementing democracy promotion projects;
The effectiveness of indirect USG support for
democracy promotion projects; and
The degree to which host governments allow for the
development of independent civil society organizations.
From these findings, staff has developed a series of
principles and recommendations for Congress, executive branch
policymakers, and NGOs to guide the design, funding, and
implementation of America's democracy-promotion programs.
The Problem
Support for democratic, grassroots organizations has become
a centerpiece of America's international outreach. The American
people see this most clearly in USG efforts to lay the
foundation for democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan. Less well-
known is our nation's broader push for democracy around the
globe. Within the past 3 years, the so-called Rose Revolution
in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, and the Tulip
Revolution in Kyrgyzstan have opened new space for democracy in
those nations, thanks primarily to the efforts of civil society
members and organizations.
Unfortunately, the success of these generally peaceful
``color revolutions'' has prompted a counteroffensive by some
governments against prodemocracy groups. A June 8, 2006, report
by the NED [see appendix V for the history of the NED],
commissioned by Chairman Lugar, notes: ``Representatives of
democracy assistance NGOs have been harassed, offices closed,
and staff expelled. Even more vulnerable are local grantees and
project partners who have been threatened, assaulted,
prosecuted, imprisoned, and even killed.'' (See Appendix IV for
NED report entitled ``The Backlash against Democracy
Assistance.'') The implications of the report were examined in
a June 8, 2006, hearing chaired by Senator Lugar to examine the
role of NGOs in the promotion of democracy.
A number of governments are passing laws to constrain
democracy assistance. In January 2006, Russian President
Vladimir Putin signed a controversial new law imposing
heightened controls on local and foreign NGOs operating in
Russia. Outside the former Soviet states, USG-funded NGOs
operating in Thailand reported instances of harassment,
including surveillance by authorities, during the tenure of
former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatara, who was ousted in a
military coup in September. In Latin America, the Congress in
Peru passed, and its counterpart in Venezuela proposed, laws
imposing heavy restrictions on the work of NGOs. And in Africa,
the work of NGOs is severely limited by a series of factors,
chiefly the lack of resources.
Staff set out to develop guiding principles for relevant
USG agencies that fund NGOs implementing democracy promotion
projects, recognizing that situations vary considerably from
region to region and country to country. These general
recommendations are aimed at protecting and improving the NGOs'
effectiveness. In devising these principles, the staff was
guided by information gathered from visits abroad and counsel
from groups that focus on democracy issues, particularly the
staff of the American Center for International Labor
Solidarity. These recommendations are based on the principle
that United States policy should encourage legitimate
activities that improve the ability of citizens to exercise
their will over their communities and the actions of their
Government.
Guiding Principles
Democracy backsliding anywhere is a threat to democracy
promotion everywhere: Failure to check democracy backsliding in
any given country harms democracy promotion efforts worldwide.
Because democracy underpins global political stability,
economic growth and international security, lack of will to
challenge instances of the erosion of democracy sends mixed
signals to our partners abroad who share our goals. In
repressive and backsliding systems, the importance of democracy
programs is magnified. They serve as a needed counterweight to
forces of repression, corruption, and disenfranchisement.
Democracy promotion is a long-term process: Because
democratic transitions are rooted in people and movements,
sustainable democracy programs cannot be delivered in a top-
down, one-off, short-term manner. To achieve sustainable
change, democracy promotion must be a long-range exercise. Rule
of law programs are a prime example; it takes years for legal
precedents to take root and legal systems to change in a
sustainable way.
Democracy promotion must be seen in a regional, cross-
border context: Because no country or political development or
movement takes place in isolation, democracy promotion must be
pursued in a cross-border, regional, and even cross-regional
context.
Economic factors affect democracy promotion: Globalization
and its economic effects impact significantly the ability of
civil society and government institutions to respond to the
needs of citizens. The impact of macroeconomic policy and
global trade, particularly where they lead to increased
inequality, can impede the success of democracy promotion and
impair society's ability to address corruption, rule of law,
and accountability. The economic marginalization or exclusion
of vast segments of populations provides political space for
authoritarian and nondemocratic forces to capture the public
dialogue and weaken democratic development.
Democracy promotion is as much about what happens before
and after elections, as the elections themselves: Without the
creation of at least the beginnings of independent civil
society prior to an election, the elections themselves may
bring about no real or lasting change. If a vibrant civil
society is to help establish the foundation for any future
political change, it needs to be fostered and promoted after
and between election cycles. Civic education, informed citizen
participation, transparency, and accountability are key
determinants as to whether an elected government will actually
survive and govern justly in response to its constituents.
Democracy promotion is about aiming for high standards, but
having realistic expectations: The combination of corruption,
disregard for human rights, suppression of media freedoms, and
regulation of independent civil society, along with a weak or
nonexistent rule of law, unenforceable labor standards, and the
absence of corporate accountability can all hamper democracy
promotion efforts and create an unstable environment in which
to implement projects. These factors must be considered when
setting expectations and benchmarks for success.
Regional Overviews and Recommendations
(See Appendix III for region specific notes.)
africa
Staff visited Chad, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Nigeria. Although
each country is labeled a democracy, they differ regarding the
level and strength of democratic institutions, and the quality
of electoral processes. The ability of nongovernmental
organizations in each country to work on democracy and
governance issues is determined by a number of factors:
Restrictions and regulations on such programs in
each country
Institutional capacity and willingness to enable
such development
Resources available within each country, including
effective media and organizations or structures to
disseminate information
Willingness of bilateral donors and international
organizations to provide resources for such programs
(including the World Bank, United Nations, African
Development Bank, African Union, European Union)
In reality, a free, liberal democracy remains a distant
goal for all the countries visited, but more effective
governance is both achievable and important to their
populations. The violence, political instability, and poverty
endemic to much of the continent hobble each country's
individual efforts at democratic development or reform. In
Chad, for instance, the government can conveniently ignore
internal and international calls for reform while it
``confronts'' the internal battles of its own political actors
and the external threat of its neighbor, Sudan. In Kenya,
counterterrorism measures encouraged by the international
community have been criticized for encroaching upon civil
liberties and democratic rights. In Ethiopia, the government
cites the crisis in neighboring Somalia, as well as the
standing tensions with Eritrea, as a rationale to delay
progress toward pluralism. In Nigeria, corruption, crime and
political violence imperil the Presidential elections scheduled
for 2007. Nonetheless, each of these countries, if not the
specific governing administrations, could well weather such
internal and external crises more capably with well established
and functioning democratic institutions.
Africa region recommendations
1. U.S.-funded NGOs must ensure that their presence is
legal prior to their deployment. Such NGOs' ties to local
actors must also be independent and transparent.
2. To the greatest extent possible, foreign NGOs should
work with organizations across the political spectrum and
ensure primarily local control.
3. Because poverty and corruption are often the over-riding
facts of political life in most African countries, democracy
promotion programs in Africa should place special emphasis in
building local capacity to scrutinize government spending and
programs.
4. USG funding for democracy promotion must be steady and
long term. A fickle commitment will lead to missed
opportunities and disappointment.
5. USG efforts in democracy promotion must be politically
and culturally sensitive to host country complexities.
Democratization will succeed only if it reflects the
expectations of the society in which it develops.
6. Democracy exchanges should be increased. Exchanges and
visits of parliamentarians and other government officials to
the United States provide an incomparable education on the
nature of democratic institutions.
7. The professionalization of police forces rather than
military forces should be made a priority in order to minimize
human rights abuses and corruption that is at the root of
popular discontent with the government.
ASIA
Staff visited Cambodia, Thailand, Sri Lanka and Indonesia.
In Thailand, conditions in which NGOs operate have improved
since the ouster of the Thaksin Shinawatara government by the
Thai military in September, 2006. However, the full limits of
freedom in operation will not be fully known until martial law
is lifted.
In Cambodia, still in the early stages of nominal democracy
carefully guided by Prime Minister Hun Sen, NGOs are positioned
to assist in building important foundations which will lead to
a more democratic and responsive government. While Cambodia has
the benefit of a large number of NGOs operating on a wide range
of prodemocracy and good governance issues, there are questions
about the degree of coordination among the NGOs and whether the
full scope and effectiveness of the massive NGO presence in
Cambodia has been evaluated.
Although Sri Lanka weathers an ongoing insurgency by the
Tamil Tigers, or LTTE, the country has managed to maintain
democratic institutions and an environment conducive to free
and open political activity. However, as the country may be
edging closer to outright civil war, it is not possible to
determine if NGOs promoting democracy and good governance will
continue to be provided space to operate by the Sri Lankan
civilian and military leaders.
The people of Indonesia embrace democracy and an open
electoral process. Given the relatively young Indonesian
democracy, and the diversity of the 17,000 island archipelago,
construction of democratic institutions is proceeding with
remarkable speed. While the Government of Indonesia often
embraces the presence of U.S.-funded NGOs promoting good
governance issues, there are occasional pockets of resistance.
However, overall receptivity to NGO activity is good.
Asia region recommendations
1. U.S.-funded NGOs in Thailand should work with
prodemocracy leaders across party lines to assess how
democratic institutions may be strengthened to ensure stronger
checks and balances within the Thai government and political
system.
2. In Indonesia, the U.S. Government should increase
funding levels for NGOs working on building political parties
and election preparation issues.
3. U.S.-funded democracy promotion efforts should continue
to focus on building democratic institutions and avoid the
occasional perception of targeting or promoting political
personalities.
4. The United States Ambassador to Cambodia has been
encouraged to conduct a historical and current review of the
scope and effectiveness of U.S.-funded NGO work, pertaining to
democracy and good governance issues.
5. USG officials should recognize that effective promotion
of democracy and good governance in Asia requires
acknowledgement of cultural and national sensitivities.
Definitions of democracy may vary.
CENTRAL EUROPE
In order to gain an appreciation of past U.S. efforts at
democracy promotion, staff visited the so-call ``Visegrad
Four'' countries of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and
Hungary, and also visited Moldova. Each of the V4 is a member
of NATO and well on its way to cementing democratic and
pluralistic governmental traditions in spite of recent internal
political difficulties. While staff met with no one who
expected or could even contemplate these polities sliding back
to Soviet-style single party rule, genuine concern abounds
regarding the pace and scope of their democratization. But, as
one interlocutor told staff regarding the current political
turmoil in his country, ``Having just held our breaths while we
completed a marathon [by suppressing interparty squabbling in
order to join the EU in 2004], we need a little time to
exhale.'' Now is indeed the time for consolidation of the
democratic reforms made since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and
the administration must keep a vigilant eye on each of the four
to prevent any backsliding and ensure forward movement.
To gain a different perspective, staff had intended to
visit Belarus, labeled by Secretary of State Rice in 2005 as
the ``last dictatorship in the center of Europe.'' And so it
remains in 2006. Apparently afraid of outside attention to its
affairs, Belarus denied staff a visa--the only visa denied in
the entire scope of the committee's project. Such actions only
reinforce the conclusions that have been drawn regarding
Alexander Lukashenko's iron-fisted regime. Much more fruitful
was a trip to Moldova, where a Communist Party candidate,
freely elected in 2001, won re-election in 2005.
Central Europe region recommendations
1. The USG should work with Central European NGOs to
provide technical assistance regarding alternative funding
sources readily available. As one example, few of the NGOs were
aware of, or had thought to apply to the $43 million United
Nations Democracy Fund, to which the United States has donated
some $18 million to date.
2. The USG should promote more productive working
relationships between NGOs and Central European governments by
facilitating greater interactions between the two, whether at
official embassy functions or, better yet, through the State
Department's excellent International Visitor Program. Such
programs, geared toward interactions with our own NGOs and
government, will aid in cementing this critical relationship in
these countries.
3. Lawmakers and the administration need to recognize that
the ``War of Ideas'' was not won with the fall of the Berlin
Wall. Rather, only one chapter was closed as the world still
confronts dangerous ideologies antagonistic to free, democratic
and open societies and economies. In order to foster the growth
of these ideas, we must revisit the concept of U.S. government-
staffed libraries and centers. In the view of staff, the
current American Corners and Information Resource Centers fail
to assist sufficiently in this effort.
LATIN AMERICA
Staff visited Chile, Peru, and Venezuela. These three
countries vary considerably regarding the strength of
democratic institutions, separation of powers between branches
of government and the approach taken by their governments to
encourage or discourage the independent development of an
active civil society.
Since the return to democratic rule in 1990, Chile has made
significant progress toward rebuilding the institutions of
democratic government, but more is possible. In particular,
Chile's legislature lacks the capacity and resources to
represent fully the interests of its people. Currently, elected
officials rely heavily on think tanks and foundations for
technical and political advice. Development of civil society
and independent organizations is hampered by a law which
requires that 30 percent of a private donation go to a
government common fund, and not the intended recipient. This
law has had the effect of discouraging private donations to
nonprofit organizations.
In Peru, civil society is threatened through a law passed
in December, 2006, to strengthen government regulation of civil
society groups. Despite public statements by President Alan
Garcia that the NGO law would be ``improved,'' Garcia approved
the law without significant changes only two days after
congressional passage. The passage of this law could damage
perceptions of Garcia's commitment to democratic progress in
Peru. In the U.S. Congress, it could affect the fate of the
pending Free Trade Agreement (FTA).
But most disturbing are problems in Venezuela, which has
taken a turn for the worse under the leadership of President
Hugo Chavez, particularly regarding the separation of powers
between the legislative, judicial, and executive branches.
Pending legislation by the Venezuelan National Assembly to
regulate and control the ability and work of NGOs is worrisome.
Under Chavez, who was re-elected December 3, 2006, Venezuela
has demonstrated a blatant disregard for independent civil
society actors, any form of political dissent, and frowns on
even the limited participation of civil society groups through
organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS).
In all three countries to varying degrees, political
parties are somewhat distant from the people they represent.
Throughout Latin America, the executive dominates over all
other branches of government. In this regard, especially, NGOs
would benefit from working together across borders on
strengthening the ability of citizens to influence local
governments and the legislative branch. This inability to
adequately convert constituents' concerns into responsive laws
and policies is one important factor driving the poor and the
politically marginalized toward leaders who promise popular but
often shortsighted solutions.
While stronger and more active NGOs will not replace the
need for purposeful and concerned political parties, it is
important to encourage a climate of strong independent civic
activism, which could force party activists toward more
effective objectives and practices.
Latin America region recommendations
1. The OAS should establish a separate channel for
accredited civil society organizations to present issues of
grave concern directly to the Permanent Council. A simple
majority should be required to approve introduction by those
accredited NGOs of any topic into the agenda of the Permanent
Council.
2. USAID and the NED should give greater emphasis to
working in partnership with Latin American NGOs, European
governments, and international organizations, especially as it
relates to developing cross-border agreements and coordination
between Latin American NGOs.
3. Staff strongly encourages the Department of State and
USAID to develop a mechanism for periodically evaluating
democracy promotion projects in key Latin countries. Given the
very real efforts by some governments in the region to persuade
their citizens that the assistance provided to them by USG-
funded NGOS is a form of American interventionism, policies
toward these countries must be continually evaluated.
APPENDIX I
----------
Complete List of Meetings
AFRICA
CHAD
U.S. Embassy:
Ambassador Marc Wall
John O'Neil--Political Officer
USAID Les McBride, Contractor
Chad Officials and Opposition:
Saindidi Mahamat, Secretary General of the National Assembly
and ruling MPS party Nassingar Rimtebaye--Permanent
Petroleum Committee
Yoronjar N'Njarlugy Kodji, Action Front for the Republic,
Opposition Leader
Journalist and other Chadians:
Nguemadji Djimasngar, Reporter and Editor, Notre Temps
Delphine Djiraibe, National Coordinator, Committee for Peace
and National Reconciliation
U.S. NGOs:
No presence due to lack of NGO interest rather than U.S.
Government emphasis which is focused on education and
grassroots efforts as well as support for international
community efforts in political and institutional capacity
building.
World Bank:
Marie Francoise Marie-Nelly, Sr. Program Manager, Chad-Cameroon
Pipeline Cluster, DC
Mamadou Deme, Sr. Public Sector Specialist, Governance Unit,
Chad
ETHIOPIA
U.S. Embassy:
Charge d'Affaires--Amb. Vicki Huddleston
Kevin Sullivan--Pol-Econ Officer
Anthony Fisher--Public Affairs
USAID Kevin Rushing, Deputy Mission Director
USAID John Graham, Senior Policy Advisor
USAID Mike McCord, Project Development Officer
Ethiopian Executive Branch:
Prime Minister Meles
Ato Bereket Simon--Senior Advisor to President Meles with rank
of Minister
Ambassador to the U.S. Samuel Asseffa
Ethiopian opposition political officials included:
Merera Gudina, MP, UEDF Vice-Chairperson
Temesgen Zewdie, MP, CUD Whip
Ayele Chamisso, Addis Ababa City Council, CUDP
Bulcha Demeska, MP, OFDM Chairperson
Lidetu Ayalew, MP UEDP Secretary General
Journalists and other Ethiopians:
Three Ethiopian journalists
A University professor
A World Bank representative
US NGOs:
NDI and IRI and IFES were expelled from the country last
year, thus unavailable and environment very dangerous for such
work.
KENYA
U.S. Embassy:
Ambassador Michael Ranneberger
Deputy Political Counselor Craig White
USAID Stephen Haykin, Mission Director
USAID Jaidev ``Jay'' Singh, Sr. Regional Conflict, Democracy
and Governance Advisor
Kenyan Officials and Opposition:
Unavailable
Journalists:
2 locally based foreign correspondents
Kenyan Community Leaders:
Mohamed ``D'' and Juma Khamis, Mombasa youth leaders
Hussein Khalid Muhuri, Muslims For Human Rights (MuHuRi)
Mary Kavoo, MuHuRi, Finance and Administration Officer
Murad Saad and Taib Abdul Rahman, Drug Rehabilitation Reach Out
Trust
Khalid Shapi, Managing Director, Muslim Education Welfare
Association
Fr. Wilbert Lagho, Islamic Scholar (Vatican trained)
Kaari Murungi, Director, Urgent Action Fund for Women's Human
Rights
U.S. NGOs:
Peter Meechem, Director, IRI
Sioghan Guiney, Resident Program Officer, IRI, Parliamentary
Strengthening and Reform
Moses Owuor, IFES, Program Officer--Capacity building programs
with the Electoral Commission
Fred Matiangi, Country Director, State University of New York,
Parliamentary Strengthening and Reform
NIGERIA
U.S. Embassy:
Russell Hanks--Political Counselor
NGOs:
Two U.S.-based democracy promotion groups
ASIA
Following are U.S. officials interviewed, and
nongovernmental organizations whose representatives were either
interviewed, or received a survey for this project.
CAMBODIA
U.S. Embassy:
Ambassador Joseph Mussomeli
Margaret McKean, First Secretary,
USAID Reed J. Aeschliman, Director, Office of General
Development
NGOs:
American Center for International Labor Solidarity
American Institute for Research/World Education
Development Alternatives, Inc.
Documentation Center of Cambodia
East West Management Institute
International Justice Mission
International Republican Institute
International Labor Organization
NATHAN--MSI Group
National Democratic Institute
PACT Cambodia
Research Triangle Institute
The Asia Foundation
WildAid
Economic Institute of Cambodia
AMARA
Village Support Group
Community Economic Development
Community Legal Education Center
Women and Children's Rights Action Committee
Cambodia Human Rights and Development Association
Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights
Human Rights Organization for Transparency and Peace
Legal Aid of Cambodia
Legal Support for Children and Women
Cambodia Center for Human Rights
Cambodian Women's Crisis Center
Major General Chap Pheakday, 911 Brigade Commander
SRI LANKA
U.S. Embassy:
Deputy Chief of Mission James Moore
Michael R. DeTar, First Secretary, Political Section
Helaena W. Rathore, Political Officer
Sri Lankan Government Officials:
Chrishanthe de Silva, Brigadier
Geeta DeSilva, Ministry of Foreign Affairs official
NGOs:
Amnesty International
Foundation for Co-Existence
Human Rights Watch
The Asia Foundation
The Halo Trust
RONCO Consulting Corporation
Academy for Educational Development
National Peace Council
National Anti War Front
Bandaranaike Center for International Studies
Associates in Rural Development
Transparency International
Lawyers for Human Rights and Development
Free Media Movement
Institute of Policy Studies
INDONESIA
U.S. Embassy:
Ambassador Lynn Pascoe
Deputy Chief of Mission John A. Heffern
Eric Kneedler, Political Officer,
USAID William M. Frej, Mission Director
USAID Larry Meserve, Director, Office of Democratic and
Decentralized Governance
USAID Kelley Strickland, Deputy Director, Office of Democratic
and Decentralized Governance
Indonesian Government Officials:
Dino Djalal, Spokesperson to the President of Indonesia
NGOs:
American Center for International Labor Solidarity
International Republican Institute
National Democratic Institute Human Rights Watch
The Asia Foundation
Triangle Institute
PERUDEM
Pusat Studi Hukum & Kebijakan Indonesia
The Indonesian Institute Center for Public Policy Research
Yappika--Civil Society and Ethnic Relations
Bandung Institute of Governance Studies
Lembaga Studi Advokasi Masyarakat--Criminal Code/Human Rights
Indonesia Corruption Watch
Institute for Rural Empowerment
Yayasan Visi Anak Bangsa--Media/Press Freedom
Thailand
For the purpose of protection from possible reprisal, no
names of persons/organizations contacted in Thailand will be
provided.
CENTRAL EUROPE
POLAND
U.S. Embassy:
Ambassador Victor Ashe
Polish Government Officials:
Krzysztof Wieckiewicz, Director of the Department of Public
Gain in the Ministry of Social Policy
NGOs:
Justyna Janiszewska, Program Coordinator, Education for
Democracy Foundation
Maciej Tanski, Director, Partners Poland
Tomasz Schimanek, Director, Polish Charity Organization
Krzysztof Filcek, Deputy Director, Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation
Foundations (PAUCI)
Jakub Michalowski, Jan Kecik and Ignacy Niemczycki, Members
Free Belarus
Eugeniusz Smolar, President of the Center for International
Relations
CZECH REPUBLIC
U.S Embassy:
Ambassador Richard Graber
Deputy Chief of Mission Cameron Munter
Jim Davison--former Peace Corps official
Political, Public Affairs and Consular Officers
Czech Officials:
Vaclav Bartuska, Czech Ambassador on Energy Security
Gabriela Dlouha, Director of MFA's Transition Cooperation Unit
(TRANS)
Petr Fleischmann, staffer of Senate Foreign Relations Committee
NGOs:
Tomas Kraus, Executive Director Federation of Jewish
Communities
Tomas Habart, Program Manager of PartnersCzech
Jan Marian, Consultant, Prague Security Studies Institute
Jiri Kozak, Project Manager of CEVRO-Liberal Conservative
Academy
Assistant Professor Lubomir Lizal, Director of CERGE-EI
Assistant Professor Libor Dusek, Deputy Director for
Development and Public Relations
Beth Portale, Chief of Staff of RFE/RL
David Stulnik, Senior Program Director for Eastern Europe,
People in Need (PIN)
Nikola Horejs, Program Director for Cuba, PIN
Megan King, Senior Program Director for Middle East, PIN
SLOVAKIA
U.S. Embassy:
Deputy Chief of Mission Lawrence R. Silverman
Economic, Political, and Public Diplomacy Officers
Public Affairs and Consular Officers
U.S. NGOs:
Jan Surotchak, Resident Director, International Republican
Institute
Patrick Egan, Director Regional Program for Central and Eastern
Europe
NGOs:
Boris Strecansky, Ekopolis
Lota Pufflerova, Citizens and Democracy
Dusan Ondrusek, Partners for Democratic Change
Alena Panikova, Open Society Foundation
Journalists and other Slovaks:
Pavol Demes, German Marshall Fund
Ms. Emilia Beblava, President, Transparency International
Slovakia
HUNGARY
U.S. Embassy:
Ambassador April Foley
Deputy Chief Phil Reeker
USAID Regional Director Ray Kirkland
Political, Public Affairs and Consular Officers
NGOs:
Anita Orban, International Center for Democratic Transition
Peter Akos Bod, Hungarian-American Enterprise Fund
Annamaria Kekesi, Executive Director, Foundation for
Development of Democratic Rights
Katerina Hadzi-Miceva, Legal Advisor at European Center for Not
for Profit Law
Kristie Evenson, Director, Freedom House Europe
Balazs Kovacs, Program Director of Freedom House
MOLDOVA
U.S. Embassy:
Ambassador Michael Kirby
Deputy Chief of Mission Kelly Keiderling
USAID, Peace Corps, PAO, CONS, ECON, RLA, POL, Officers
U.S. NGOs:
Michael Getto, Country Project Manager, International
Republican Institute
Alex Grigorievs, Country Project Manager, National Democracy
Initiative
NGOs:
Roman Purici, Information Resource Center Director
Viorel Margineanu, Director, IMPACT
Ala Mindicanu, Professor of Journalism, ULIM
Olga Manole, Promo-Lex
Vitalie Nagacevschi, Lawyers for Human Rights
Igor Botan, Director, Association for Participatory Democracy
(ADEPT)
Paul Strutescu, Executive Director, League for Defense of Human
Rights in Moldova (LADOM)
Stefan Uritu, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights
Sorin Mereacre, Country Director, Eurasia Foundation
Ludmila Bilevschi, Director, Alumni Resource Center USG
Journalists and other Moldavians:
Petru Macovei, Executive Director, Independent Newspaper
Association (API)
Petru Macovei, Executive Director, Independent Newspaper
Association
Dumitru Ciorici, Director, Young Journalist Center
Corina Cepoi, Executive Director, Independent Journalism Center
(IJC)
Nicole Negru, Media Analyst, Independent Journalism Center
Cornelia Cozonac, Director, Investigative Journalism Center
Alexandru Dorogan, Director, Association of Electronic Media
LATIN AMERICA
CHILE
U.S. Embassy:
Ambassador Craig A. Kelly
Deputy Chief of Mission Emi Yamauchi
Juan Alsace--Econ-Pol Counselor
Harry Kamian--Econ-Pol Officer
Vince Campos--Consular Officer
Jeremiah Knight--Consular Officer
Tim Strater--Information Officer
Michael Orlansky, Cultural Affairs Officer
Monica Alcalde
Jessica Patterson
Chilean Officials:
Minister Alejandro Foxley, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Marcos Robledo, International Affairs Advisor to President
Michelle Bachelet
Francisco Estevez, Director, Division of Social Organizations,
Ministry Secretary General of the Government
Diputado Marcelo Forni Union Democrata Independiente (UDI),
Member of the House of Representatives, Foreign
Relations Committee
Sergio Bitar, President of Partido Por La democracia (PPD)
Party
Carlos Larrain, President, Renovacion Nacional (RN) Party
Sebastian Pinera, Renovacion Nacional (RN) Party
Carlos Tudela, Christian Democrat International Relations
Committee (DC)
Esteban Tomic, Christian Democrat International Relations
Committee (DC)
Fancisco Cruz, Christian Democrat International Relations
Committee (DC)
NGOs:
Jose Antonio Viera Gallo, President, Corporacion Proyectamerica
Ricardo Brodsky, Executive Secretary, Corporacion
Proyectamerica
Claudio Store, Head of Program, ``Joevenes al Servicio de
Chile,'' Fundacion Jaime Guzman
Batrice Corbo, Public Policy Advisor, ``Joevenes al Servicio de
Chile,'' Fundacion Jaime Guzman
Nicolas Figari, Legislative Advisor, ``Joevenes al Servicio de
Chile,'' Fundacion Jaime Guzman
Martita Fresno Mackenna, Public Relations, ``Joevenes al
Servicio de Chile,'' Fundacion Jaime Guzman
Maria de los Angeles Fernandez, Acting Director, Fundacion 21
Gonzalo Vargas, General Manager, Fundacion Paz Ciudadana
Andrea Sanhueza, Executive Director, Participa
Silavana Lauzan, Project Coordinator
Acting Director of the Center of Strategic Leadership,
University
Juan Enrique Vargas, Center for Justice Studies of the Americas
(CEJA)
Other Chileans:
Lecture to 30-40 young leaders, who were identified as the 100
Top Young Leaders in Chile. Adolfo Ibanez University
Fifteen Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLASCO)-
affiliated analysts; political scientists; and two
congressional staffers.
Jorge Schaulson
General Juan Emilio Cheyre (Retired)
Raul Sohr
Felipe Edwards
Christian Maquiera
PERU
U.S. Embassy:
Ambassador J. Curtis Struble
Deputy Chief of Mission Phyllis Powers
Alexis Ludwig--Political Officer
David Boyle--Political Officer
Kenny Jackman, Political Officer
Adam Shub--Economic Officer
Dan Martinez--Public Affairs
Garace Reynard--Narcotics Affairs Section
Commander Dominic Dixon--Military Assistance and Advisory
Mission
USAID Paul Weisenfeld, Director
USAID Susan Brems, Deputy Director
USAID Larry Sacks, Control Officer
Catie Lott
Claudia Rohrhirsh
Sobeida Gonzales
Peruvian Officials:
Luis Giampietri, First Vice-President
Ambassador Nestor Popolizio, Under Secretary of the Americas,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Maria Euguenia Chiozza, Director General, North America
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Carols Briceno, First Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Beatriz Merino
Juan Carlos Eguren
Jorge Avendano
Rosa Urbina
Juan Manuel Chau
NGOs:
Ambassador Jorge Valdez, Institute for Liberty and Democracy
Dr. Jose Miguel Morales, President, Confederacion Nacional de
Instituciones Empresariales Privadas (CONFIEP)
Ricardo Vega Llona, former President, CONFIEP
Wilson Gomez Barrios, Securities Expert
Pepi Patron, President, Asociacion Civil Transparencia
Hans Landolt, Director, Instituto de Defensa Legal (IDL)
Ernesto de la Jara, Director, Justicia Viva
David Lovaton, Project Director, IDL
Sofia Macher, Responsible for Governance and Human Rights area,
IDL
Alfredo Villavicencio, Coordinator, Justicia Viva
Ana Maria Tamayo, Responsible for Defense and Military Reform
area
Thomas K. Reilly, Chief of Project, Pro-Decentralization
Program (PRODES)
Elena Conterno, Institutional Strengthening Expert, PRODES
Pablo Valdez, PRODES
Percy Medina, General Secretariat, Asociacion Civil
Transparencia
Kristen Simple, Program Officer for the Andean Region, IDEA
International
Diego Garcia Sayan, General Director, Comision Andina de
Juristas (CAJ)
Enrique Bernales, Executive Director, CAJ
Journalists and other Peruvians:
Enrique Zileri, Director, Carteras magazine
Bernardo Roca Rey, Director, El Comercio
Bruno Rivas, Internacional Reporter, El Comercio
Dr. Lourdes Flores Nano, Dr. Lourdes Flores Nano (Law firm
Dianne Vazquez)
VENEZUELA
U.S. Embassy:
Ambassador William Brownfield
Deputy Chief of Mission Kevin Whitaker
Ben Ziff--Public Affairs
Brian Penn--Public Affairs
Robert Downes--Political Officer
Dan Lawton--Political Officer
Adam Center--Political Officer
Melissa Rhodes--Political Officer
Andy Bowen--Economic Officer
Colonel Passmore--U.S. Military Group
Colonel Bauer--Defense Attache Officer
USAID Miguel Reabold
Venezuelan Officials:
Jorge Valero, Vice Foreign Minister for North America
Saul Ortega, Deputy of the National Assembly (meeting requested
and confirmed)
NGOs:
Humberto Prado, Observatorio Venezolano de Prisiones
Carlos Correa, Espacio Publico
Ewald Sharfenerg, Instituto Prensa y Sociedad
Maria Corina Machado, SUMATE
Marino Alvarado, El Programa Venezolano de Educacion-Accion en
Derechos Humanos (PROVEA)
Liliana Ortega, COFAVIC
Journalist and other Venezuelans
Pedro Pablo Penaloza, El Universal
Maria Gabriela Ponce, Universidad Catolica Andres Bello
APPENDIX II
----------
Democracy Survey
APPENDIX III
----------
Regional Notes
AFRICA
The Republic of Chad: Chad gained its independence from
France in 1960 but then suffered three decades of civil warfare
as well as invasions by Libya before finally achieving a
measure of peace in 1990. Following the drafting of a
democratic constitution, Chad held flawed Presidential
elections in 1996 and 2001, both won by Lieutenant General
Idriss Deby. In 1998, a rebellion broke out in northern Chad,
which sporadically flares up despite several peace agreements
between the government and the rebels. But a more serious
threat to the governing regime now emanates from the east.
Following Chadian support for Sudanese rebels in the Darfur
region of Sudan, new rebel groups emerged to threaten President
Deby in 2005 and continue to threaten his tenure. For instance,
rebels launched an assault on the capital, N'djamena, in the
weeks prior to the May 2006 Presidential election. France, as a
former colonial power, exerts considerable influence and is
reported to sustain the Deby regime with the rationale that
there is no better alternative available.
The President was elected to serve a 5-year term in an
election held May 3, 2006, after getting term limits removed
from the constitution. Deby was reelected President with 64.7
percent of the vote against no true opposition due to a boycott
by most major opposition parties. The opposition rejects the
result, raising the prospect of future instability. A largely
powerless legislature is only partially constituted: The
National Assembly, whose 155 members are elected by popular
vote to serve 4-year terms, most recently held an election in
2002, with another scheduled for 2007, but the Senate has yet
to be created.
There are more than 200 ethnic groups among Chad's 9
million people, with those in the north and east being
primarily Muslim, and southerners comprising the majority of
animist and Christians. There has been a long religious and
commercial relationship with Chad's northern and eastern
neighbors bringing an Arabized culture to Chad's eastern and
central regions where Arabic is spoken and the people engage in
many other Arab cultural practices. The French colonial
influence is felt most in the south and continues to ebb.
Beyond the rebellions and wars, refugees and poverty, Chad
suffers from the common malaise of resource-rich African
countries: Incredible potential without optimism. Chad is
manipulated by its own repressive leadership, which is in full
control of its vast mineral wealth. The international community
is not, in Chad's case, a bystander. The World Bank supervised
the financing of the Chad-Cameroon pipeline, which carries oil
from Chad's land-locked fields to the sea, to try to ensure
that the economic gain would flow toward development. Instead,
once the oil began to flow, President Deby began to dismantle
the international revenue agreement. Civil society
representatives expressed great frustration with the lack of
development in Chad--slipping from 8th to 3rd to last in
poverty--despite the proceeds from oil since 2003.
Such a problematic landscape makes it difficult to pursue
genuine civil society capacity-building and democratic reforms.
Since USAID departed the country in 1995, the United States has
limited development assistance. Most U.S. assistance today is
humanitarian and goes to assist over 200,000 refugees of the
Darfur crisis in eastern Chad. Additional U.S. assistance is
being directed toward counterterrorism efforts through training
and equipping Chadian forces. The only USAID effort now
consists of an individual contractor, well informed and
experienced, working to harmonize limited resources in a very
unsettled situation.
U.S. NGOs concentrating on democracy building overseas have
not prioritized Chad nor pursued US government resources to
support programming there. Nonetheless, the Embassy country
team has tried to sustain what small efforts are possible given
available resources. The emphasis has been on democracy skills
at the village level and human rights. For example, the passage
of legislation critical of female genital mutilation was an
instructive exercise in the democratic process. Education is
also considered an effective arena. Funding is available for
textbooks, which enables training and builds some measure of
trust at the grass roots.
Embassy personnel report that there is limited civil
society and parliamentary training due to the limited
resources, but, that the government of Chad does not appear
averse to greater democracy capacity-building. The French are
perceived as ambivalent to reform in Chad; in fact, they have
publicly scolded independent media, which has further alienated
the local population. The United States continues to seek
opportunities but has not devoted the resources to effect much
positive change. There is a risk, however, that the emphasis
now being placed on military training and an increased U.S.
military presence will gradually diminish current popular
support for the United States in Chad.
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia: In 1991, the Derg
military junta, ruling Ethiopia as a socialist state, was
toppled by a coalition of rebel forces, the Ethiopian People's
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). A constitution was
adopted in 1994, and Ethiopia's first multiparty elections were
held in 1995. A border war with Eritrea late in the 1990's
ended with a peace treaty in December 2000, though final
demarcation of the boundary is currently on hold due to
Ethiopian objections to an international commission's finding
requiring it to surrender sensitive territory and Eritrea's
refusal to negotiate further.
Following the adoption of its constitution in 1994,
Ethiopia is ostensibly a democracy. It is ruled by a Prime
Minister, Meles Zenawi, who is selected by the party in power
following legislative elections. The most recent elections
occurred in May 2005 and were marked by an encouraging early
phase, only to devolve into violent protest during which
security forces used excessive force to quell demonstrations.
Further, Prime Minister Meles has influenced the
``independent'' commission looking into the violence, and has
imprisoned many of the opposition without due process and with
little concern over international discontent.
The bicameral Parliament consists of the House of
Federation (Upper Chamber) with 108 seats whose members are
chosen by state assemblies to 5-year terms and the House of
People's Representatives (lower chamber) with 547 seats and
whose members are directly elected by popular vote to 5-year
terms. The next election is to be held in 2010. In the most
recent election, the ruling EPRDF won 327 seats to the CUD with
109. This was a dramatic increase for the opposition from the
previous election. Nonetheless, irregularities and subsequent
violent assaults by security forces and arrests by the
government have tainted the outcome.
Opposition parties had been split on whether to contest the
election and subsequently those that did win seats in the
National Assembly rejected taking their seats to protest the
alleged massive fraud by Meles' government. This was compounded
by the violent response taken by security forces against
protesters supporting the opposition. Many opposition
candidates wound up in jail amidst reports of abuse and one
elected member was killed in the violence. Violence erupted in
June and again in November 2005. A supposedly independent
Commission of Inquiry looking into the election violence
identified triple the number of fatalities originally reported
to have been inflicted by police and military forces.
U.S. democracy programs in Ethiopia are rather new thanks
to a shift in focus from emergency humanitarian relief to root
causes and strategic interests. The needs are daunting: Free
media, political party finance which is nonexistent,
parliamentary law which is very slow to develop, as well as
electoral board reform and strengthening. It is also seen as
essential that some points of mediation are settled upon so
that the recent confrontation does not lead to civil war. The
Meles government also has its own internal enemies to contend
with, some due to the marginalization of segments of the
population by the ruling minority Tigray ethnic group. The
northern border tension with Eritrea has political overtones
and ethnic undertones as well.
Prior to the May, 2005, election, three U.S. NGOs working
on democracy and governance were ordered out of the country and
have not been allowed back. This expulsion was apparently
legally based. Although the NGOs were tolerated and permitted
to operate for several months, none had received appropriate
registration to work in Ethiopia, due to a reported lack of
responsiveness by the Ethiopian bureaucracy. Nonetheless the
expulsions were suspect, coming immediately prior to the
elections. According to one group, this was the first-ever
expulsion of these organizations under such circumstances.
Though not saying so explicitly, the government has implied
that one of the three was working too closely with an
opposition party. When the Meles regime felt that particular
group had gone too far, all three organizations were expelled.
The incident places a more difficult burden on the USAID
mission in Addis Ababa to work with others in a constrained
environment.
Ethiopia presents a typical set of diplomatic difficulties.
It has proven to be a reliable partner in the Global War on
Terror, yet the last election cycle showed that the country
does not appear prepared to continue moving toward democracy.
U.S. foreign policy must grapple with this apparent
contradiction.
The Republic of Kenya: The President is elected by popular
vote for a 5-year term and is eligible for a second term. The
Presidential candidate must win 25 percent or more of the vote
in at least five of Kenya's seven provinces and one area to
avoid a runoff as well as receiving the largest number of votes
in absolute terms. The Vice President is appointed by the
President. The last election was held December 2002. President
Mwai Kibaki was elected in 2002 with 63 percent of the vote
while his prime challenger Uhuru Kenyatta received 30 percent.
The legislative branch consists of a unicameral National
Assembly or Bunge with 224 seats--210 members are elected by
popular vote to serve 5-year terms, while 12 ``nominated''
members are appointed by the President (but selected by the
parties in proportion to their parliamentary vote totals), and
2 ex-officio members. The last elections were held in December
2002.
Kenya is one of the most democratically developed countries
in Africa and certainly the most democratic of the four African
countries discussed here. It has shown the ability to establish
institutions run by civilians and conduct national elections
that are considered relatively free and fair by the
international community. A recent poll initiated by the
International Republican Institute (IRI) indicated that the
majority of Kenyans (67 percent) polled expressed approval of
their government's performance. On the other hand when queried
about their confidence in the Parliament they were split at 49
percent approving \3\. Democracy NGOs are prevalent and are not
hampered significantly by government regulation or
restrictions. Local and national media is apparently open and
free, and has proved an effective tool in exposing graft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ International Republican Institute poll conducted on behalf of
IRI by Strategic Public Relations and Research, a survey firm based in
Nairobi, Kenya. From November 3-7, 2006, 3,008 people were interviewed
in all regions of Kenya. The margin of error does not exceed +/- 2
percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The real measure of Kenya's continued success in democratic
reform and good governance will be its ability to curtail
rampant corruption, both in government ministries and in day-
to-day interactions of the police and other civil servants. A
Kenyan reported that ``the most feared and loathed threat to
civilians is the police force, whose harassment and extortion
abuses the people at every opportunity.'' The same November
IRI-sponsored poll showed ``a majority of respondents (56.8
percent) believed that corruption had increased or remained the
same since the 2002 elections, yet a slight majority, 52.1
percent, believes that the government is committed to the fight
against corruption.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The President, Mwai Kibake, sets the tone in Kenya, given
the very strong position granted by the constitution. Kibake
won election over the hand-picked successor to former
President, Daniel Arap Moi, in 2002, to a great extent by
promising reform of systemic corrupt practices. With his
election in 2002, the expectations for reform were significant
but President Kibake has proven unable or unwilling to sustain
sufficient pressure to build anticorruption momentum.
The majority of U.S.-funded democracy efforts are
coordinated through the USAID office in Nairobi. They are
considered by local media and other observers to be part of a
coherent overall program that has shown more success than those
of other donors. USAID ensures their partners work with
multiple organizations and is consistent across them. They are
also well coordinated with the many other international
efforts. U.S. programs partner with local organizations, which
also lends a positive perception of independence. Political
regression or back-sliding has been avoided by democracy
advocates by ensuring clear and practical association with
Kenyans in control of the programs.
Civil society in Kenya appears to be a viable, if still
underdeveloped, means by which the people can identify and hold
accountable their government officials. Although Kenya appears
to be in transition, the advance toward sustainable democracy
could go either way. Each election, Kenyans are more inclined
to ``throw the bums out,'' all of them.\5\ Thus, efforts at
reform must be sustained with each new crop of parliamentarians
who have not yet realized their responsibility to the
constituencies from which they hail. Exchanges of officials and
visits to the United States have been of considerable value in
the effort to educate and build a broader institutional
understanding. Broadening exchanges to include parliamentary
staff and political party representatives was thought to be of
value by those interviewed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Upward of 60 percent of all incumbents are replaced each
election according to local reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. democracy promotion programs work to a great degree in
building political party capacity. Within the political party
realm, ethnic coalitions rather than ideological conviction
appear to dominate. Rather than highlighting and competing
between ethnic groups, the embassy team tries to build
confidence in broader platforms and then to translate such
policy positions into effective communication to the
constituency. There is a notable lack of legislative activity
to support such platforms, however: There are only three or
four bills introduced per session of Parliament.
Embassy efforts are focused on capacity building in the
capital, Nairobi. Limited efforts to ensure that democracy and
governance programs reach populations further a field are now
being pursued. Such programming appears essential for the coast
region of Kenya, a primarily Muslim area. Coast region believes
itself marginalized despite its important economic role as the
location of the key East Africa trading port of Mombasa. This
small city has also been the target of terror attacks in recent
years and is just down the coast from Somalia's chaotic
southern regions. Several NGOs in Mombasa complained that ``MPs
do not work with local communities, they consider the state
money as their own to use as they see fit.'' In fact, they
point out that in one study, fully 95 percent of coast funds
that were monitored did not end up being used as originally
intended. Efforts to effectively engage all Kenyan groups in
U.S. Government democracy-building will better ensure
sustainability and support for U.S. efforts in Kenya and the
region.
Nigeria: Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa
(with a population of about 140 million, one in five Africans
is Nigerian), about evenly split between Muslim and non-Muslim,
giving it the largest Muslim population of any country outside
Asia. It is a major oil producer and one of the most important
oil suppliers to the United States. Despite its oil wealth,
Nigeria has a per capita GDP of less than $2 a day, and the
country has suffered the classic ``resource curse''--per capita
income today is a quarter what it was 30 years ago,
infrastructure and social services have collapsed since the
1980s, and corruption and crime are rampant. Much of the
economic collapse can be laid at the feet of the authoritarian,
usually military, governments that have run the country for
much of its post-independence history. The most notorious
recent example was Gen. Sani Abacha, who after his ill-
explained death in 1998, reportedly by heart attack, was
accused of looting some $4 billion from government coffers.
Since 1999, the country has been led by Olusegun Obasanjo,
a former general and one-time coup leader who became a reformer
and the first democratically elected President in 16 years. He
was re-elected in 2003, in an election marred by violence and
numerous irregularities, and this year he was blocked in an
attempt to change the constitution so he could run for a third
term. Although he is viewed by many outsiders as a leading
African statesman, thanks to his efforts at promoting democracy
and peacekeeping through the African Union and economic
progress through ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African
States), within Nigeria he has come to be regarded as
ineffectual and unable to combat corruption, and his popularity
is low. While Obasanjo has improved human rights and democratic
institutions, democracy's roots are considered shallow, and in
light of persistent ethnic, communal and political violence in
various regions of the country, few observers are convinced
that elections will take place as scheduled next spring.
Representatives of two U.S.-based NGOs who have been
operating in the country since the restoration of democracy
agreed that in general the country has a relatively free press,
relatively open political debate, and that their work is openly
embraced and encouraged by the elected members of the
legislative branch, the National Assembly. They could point to
examples of where legislative hearings have been held as a
result of NGO efforts, where NGO representatives have been
invited to attend important political, cultural and social
events, and where NGOs have received awards from the National
Assembly. At the same time, both said their relationship with
the bureaucracy is more strained, and while neither feels they
are being targeted specifically, both are being harassed by the
government for infractions of regulations, which in one case
could result in the bank account of the organization being
closed. Details below.
Nigeria is a generally pro-American country, and the
representatives said work of the NGOs is welcomed by the public
and by civil society organizations. ``We're not seen as an
irritant,'' one said. ``The National Assembly seeks our
imprimatur.'' The other added, ``Being American is not a
problem, often it's a positive. Most Nigerians look at the
United States with admiration.'' Both groups work to build the
capacity of all the political parties, including Obasanjo's
People's Democratic Party, and unlike in some countries, are
not seen as working with opposition groups against the ruling
party. ``The ruling party has always been part and parcel of
our program,'' one said. At the same time, they do feel the
scrutiny of the Independent National Electoral Commission,
which runs the elections (and not always well, according to
outside observers) and does not have a good relationship with
the political parties. Despite its name, INEC has been accused
of being too close to the executive branch. One group
characterized INEC's hostility as typical of ``a part of the
government that has something to hide.'' They also said that
they've been the subject of disparaging comments from the
Nigerian diasporas in the States, members of which have written
letters to the INEC. Both representatives said that many of
their training sessions are monitored by agents of the State
Security Service (SSS). But they've faced no direct
interference from the security forces, and the greatest
obstacle to doing their work is simply the widespread crime
that makes it dangerous to travel anywhere in the country, and
the frequent roadblocks that are used to harass everyone in
Nigeria.
Both said their organizations generally work well with
local civil society groups. The United States NGOs have been
criticized, however, for taking money away from indigenous
prodemocracy groups. This is especially true in some of the
northern Muslim areas. ``They say, `Why is the U.S. Government
funding these U.S. groups if you're trying to build Nigerian
democracy?' '' one said. By the same token, they have found
that they cannot push an aggressive branding strategy as some
in the U.S. aid community would like. ``In some of our work in
democracy promotion, it just doesn't work to advertise, `This
law brought to you by the United States.' We don't want to
claim U.S. ownership; we want to promote Nigerian ownership.'
''
Ultimately, the two groups' effectiveness, and their
ability to operate freely, turns on whether Nigeria is truly a
nascent democracy, or instead an essentially authoritarian
regime seeking to gain legitimacy through a democratic facade,
what the recent NED report prepared for Chairman Lugar called a
``hybrid regime.'' One of the representatives who had read the
report said, ``I don't think Nigeria is a hybrid regime.'' The
other representative was slightly more skeptical: ``I'd say it
is more a democracy with an asterisk.''
However, in sharp contrast to this generally rosy picture
of a relatively benign working environment, both
representatives said their organizations are currently in some
kind of trouble with the government. In the more serious case,
the organization is in danger of having its bank account closed
down because it is in violation of the registration laws. The
case is complex, but in a nutshell, as it was understood by
staff, thanks to a bank consolidation and a tightening of laws
for antimoney-laundering purposes, the organization is in
danger of losing the resident permit it needs to maintain a
bank account because it does not have an independent local
board, as the law requires. Apparently, this organization's
policy is not to have independent local boards. The
representative reluctantly agreed that technically speaking,
they were therefore in violation of the law. (Later, the
Embassy political counselor said that he expected that this
problem would quietly go away in a few months, as things often
do in Nigeria, and that it appeared to be an instance of low-
level harassment). When asked whether he felt this was simply
the bureaucratic machinery at work, or whether his organization
was being specifically targeted, he said he did not feel that
the registration law was being misused to block the work of the
NGO, nor did he say that he felt they were being specifically
targeted because of their prodemocracy work. (SFRC staff is
skeptical). The other organization had a more arcane--and more
easily fixed--problem: Some words in its name are not permitted
for general use in Nigeria because they have specific meanings
in public life for which they are not appropriate in this
context. He expects the solution will be simply to use the
group's acronym as the official name, and call themselves XXXX-
Nigeria. He believes they are not being targeted.
ASIA
Thailand: Thailand is a constitutional monarchy with a
parliamentary form of government. The King is Chief of State,
and the Prime Minister serves as head of government. King
Bhumipol commands enormous respect and loyalty from the Thai
people, and continues to influence Thai politics.
Now that the democratically elected government of Thaksin
Shinawatara has been overthrown by the September 2006, Thai
military coup, (with the reported acquiescence of the King),
U.S.-funded NGOs promoting democracy are once again able to
operate freely and without intimidation or harassment. However,
the full limits of freedom in operation may not be fully
actualized until martial law is lifted. Challenges to the work
of NGOs are bureaucratic, as opposed to the interim (military-
installed) government seeking to subvert or impede their work.
One U.S.-funded NGO representative informed staff that his
colleagues' phones were tapped, and that they were ``under
constant surveillance by Thai police authorities,'' under the
Thaksin regime. Another NGO official stated that his staff was
followed by police, and phones tapped as well during the
Thaksin administration.
As the Congressional Research Service (CRS) reported, the
coup followed 8 months of political turmoil. Widespread
protests against Thaksin, (mostly focused on the tax-free sale
of his family's telecommunications firm to a Singaporean
government holding company), led the Prime Minister to call for
a new round of parliamentary elections in April of this year.
After a less-than-convincing victory by his Thai Rak Thai
party, Thaksin resigned; however he quickly assumed the
position of ``caretaker'' Prime Minister. (The opposition
boycotted the election). After King Bhumipol asked that the
courts resolve the crisis, the Constitutional Court ruled the
elections invalid. New elections were set for this November. In
the months leading up to the coup, the uncertainty of the
future of Thai politics impacted the confidence of foreign
investors and raised doubts about the durability of Thailand's
democratic institutions. Military leaders took special notice
as the Prime Minister reportedly considered intervening with
the selection of persons for key military positions.
According to Human Rights Watch, a ``steady erosion of
respect for human rights . . . characterized the administration
. . .'' of the former Prime Minister. In a letter to Mr.
Thaksin, which summarizes some of the key concerns on the part
of many human rights advocates and organizations, Human Rights
Watch Executive Director Brad Adams wrote,
Since your government assumed power, Thai security
forces have increasingly used excessive force and
operated with impunity, particularly in southern
Thailand. There has been no accountability for over two
thousand extrajudicial executions carried out by
security forces in the ``war on drugs'' launched by
your government; there has been no accountability for
the unnecessary use of lethal force by security forces
who killed some 110 militants armed only with machetes,
most aged between 15 and 20, in Kruesi Mosque in
southern Thailand; and there has been no accountability
for the March 18 ``disappearance'' of Somchai
Neelapajit, a prominent human rights lawyer
representing two Thai Muslims facing terrorism charges,
who is strongly suspected of having been abducted and
killed by security forces.
Amnesty International reports that ``almost 20 (human
rights defenders), were killed or disappeared,'' during the
Thaksin administration, and ``the authorities have not properly
investigated these abuses.''
According to the CRS, ``During Thaksin's rule, detractors
consistently voiced concern that his strongman style threatened
Thailand's democratic institutions. Charges of cronyism and
creeping authoritarianism grew increasingly louder as his
political power strengthened. Previously independent watchdog
agencies reportedly weakened under his watch, and some
commentators alleged that Thaksin undermined anticorruption
agencies by installing political loyalists to protect the
business interests of his family and members of his cabinet--
sometimes one and the same, as Thaksin has a record of
appointing relatives and friends to prominent posts.''
The military coup and suspension of U.S. military aid may
impact the traditionally strong bilateral relationship with
Thailand. During staff's visit with Lieutenant General Naraset
Israngkura, Deputy Director General for the Office of Planning
and Development, Ministry of Defense, in Bangkok, staff
questioned the General as to the timetable for lifting martial
law, and stressed that members of the Foreign Relations
Committee were looking for positive benchmarks from the
military, toward restoration of democracy in Thailand.
Thai military officials have committed to a process that
will produce a new constitution for the country. There is
concern that the final product may be drafted with intent to
exclude certain persons or parties from being eligible or
qualified to participate in the future political process in
Thailand.
U.S. officials in Bangkok report that the political party
processes continue to be reasonably strong in Thailand. One
official stated, ``When the coup leaders took over, they issued
a proclamation that the law on political parties remains in
effect, although political party activities were also
restricted by martial law and associated measures. There is
widespread expectation that political parties will be able to
resume regular activities soon. There's also a definite
expectation that parties will play the leading role when the
next round of elections are held.''
The interim government is allowing for the development and
preservation of independent civil society actors.
Cambodia: A constitutional monarchy, Cambodia's
Constitution provides for a multiparty democracy. The executive
branch includes the King, as head of state, an appointed Prime
Minister, dozens of Deputy Prime Ministers, senior Ministers
and Ministers, as well as numerous ``Secretaries of State and
Under Secretaries of State.''
Political parties remain very weak, despite years of effort
by IRI and NDI toward capacity-building
Political activists and parties work in an environment
permeated by corruption at various levels of government and
society. However, as one NGO leader commented, ``. . . as the
middle class is developed; people will expect more from their
government.'' The good news is that U.S.-funded NGOs are
working a variety of projects to empower Cambodian citizens at
the grassroots level. From utilization of radio broadcasts, to
developing women's multiparty leadership caucus, to encouraging
citizen participation at the village level, a comprehensive
approach of promoting democracy and good governance is clearly
underway.
NGO survey responses are mixed on the points as to whether
the government allows NGOs to participate freely in society and
whether NGOs face many bureaucratic obstacles that deliberately
prevent NGOs from functioning. Government officials have been
discussing the possibility of legislation to regulate NGOs.
While NGOs do not object to registering with the government,
the possibility of a law has raised concerns.
The majority of survey respondents agreed that corruption
is not taken seriously as an issue in government, and that
citizens are afraid to report corrupt businessmen, government
officials and politicians.
The sustainability of the present level of U.S. funding for
NGOs in Cambodia is unknown. It is also unclear that other
donors would match U.S. contributions in the event the U.S.
funding level is diminished in the future. One U.S. official
stated that in the event the U.S. Government withdrew a large
share of its funding, a ``consolidation of NGOs'' and
``shrinking of civil society'' might occur.
Indonesia: Containing the world's largest Muslim
population, Indonesia continues down the relatively new road to
democracy. The President and Vice President were elected by
popular vote for the first time in 2004.
The U.S. funds a wide array of democracy promotion and
democracy support/good governance projects, including
antitrafficking in persons; justice sector reforms; legislative
strengthening; mitigation of conflict and support for peace;
local reform and good governance support; and media
development.
U.S.-funded NGOs promoting democracy report they face few
or no obstacles with their work, and often operate with full
support of the Indonesian Government. One U.S. official noted,
however, ``When we've worked on some sensitive issues, such as
human rights or special autonomy for Aceh or Papua, some parts
of the Government of Indonesia always seem to have suspicions,
but such work has usually been done through local NGOs.''
Others report that, ``the government has clearly indicated
particular areas which it considers to be `out of bounds,' for
attention by international NGOs. The frequent use of libel
suits reduces options available for many organizations
conducting anticorruption campaigns in both the public and
private sectors.'' There is also ``occasional harassment by
local police who continue to enforce old regulations no longer
on the books, which until eight years ago required obtaining
local police permission for all organizational meetings.''
IRI and NDI are able to register under the USAID umbrella
rather than filing individually, which would subject the NGOs
to financial disclosure requirements, including salary levels
of all domestic/foreign staff.
The Government of Indonesia takes an active role in
soliciting assistance and facilitating some NGO programs. As
one example, an NGO official reports that the National Chief of
Police recently hosted a dinner, to which he gathered all main
international donors to police reform efforts, thanked the
donors for their assistance, and presented an outline of what
all the police needed and how they can further integrate
international development assistance into the police reform
program.
It is often more effective for the U.S. Government to work
indirectly in Indonesia. As one NGO official stated, ``. . .
unfortunately in the current environment, direct U.S.
assistance is sometimes viewed through a lens of concern
related to a range of international affairs issues of immense
concern to Indonesians. Indonesian recipients are pragmatic in
that they know and acknowledge the source of funding, for
example, but prefer the intense programmatic interaction,
planning and implementation, to be with familiar and
nonpolitical organizations and NGOs. Then there is the question
of aid effectiveness, and from my perspective, it appears much
easier for the USG to administer programs via U.S.-funded NGO
partners, as opposed to their own bureaucracy.''
Increased anti-American sentiment is now being realized in
Indonesia. As one U.S. official noted, ``. . . more recently,
one almost gets the sense that the amount of anti-American
sentiment among some Indonesian officials has increased, which
seems related to Middle East issues. Local civil society
partners, political parties and government institutions, do not
want to openly acknowledge U.S. Government assistance.''
In addition to U.S. funding of NGOs promoting democracy/
good governance, it should be noted that the U.S. Government
provides approximately $3 million in assistance to the DPR. The
United States is also working with the DPR to identify future
opportunities for further assistance. For example, DPR Members
insist they need more staff and research assistance.
Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka's multiparty democracy has been
largely stable despite high levels of violence; however, the
ongoing conflict between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) and the Sri Lankan Government is now a situation on the
verge of civil war.
As the State Department reports, Sri Lanka's two major
political parties--the UNP and the SFLP--``embrace democratic
values, international nonalignment, and encouragement of
Sinhalese culture. Past differences between the two on foreign
and economic policy have narrowed.''
A U.S. official working in Sri Lanka noted, ``Political
parties are well-entrenched, have adequate bureaucratic
capacity, and engage in a variety of activities without undue
obstacles. There is strong awareness of the role of a robust
opposition party in parliament. Most major elections in Sri
Lanka have been broadly free and fair, with wide participation
by political parties with freedom to campaign. Parliament
encompasses a broad spectrum of opinions, from Sinhalese
nationalists and Muslim parties, to Tamil Tiger sympathizers.''
The LTTE continues to engage in terrorist activity,
intended to destabilize Sri Lanka. While staff was meeting with
a U.S.-funded NGO representative, a Tamil Member of Parliament
was assassinated a few miles from the meeting location. Weeks
earlier, he had met with the President to express concern about
abductions and extrajudicial killings, some of which fall under
the category of political assassinations. Some insist that the
Government of Sri Lanka, through elements of the military, is
engaging in acts of state terrorism against Tamil and other
representatives of the population; and that the government is
sponsoring paramilitary operations. Abductions of persons are
increasing. Some are killed.
If the overall human rights situation continues to
deteriorate, and pressure mounts on media freedom, ``these
trends . . . will eventually have an impact on political
parties' ability to organize and express themselves freely.''
according to a U.S. official.
NGOs surveyed were not in agreement that the Sri Lankan
Government provides ample space in which they can operate
within the country. In addition, there was not shared consensus
that ``Watchdog organizations fear being coerced politically,
economically, or physically.'' There was agreement that the
government does not take corruption seriously as an issue.
Central Europe
Visegrad Four: Most of the USG funding for democracy
promotion in the countries of Poland, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, and Hungary (the ``Visegrad Four''--V4) has, rightly
and understandably, been shifted to more pressing U.S.
priorities in the Caucuses, Central Asia, and the Middle East.
However, while there has not been the same backlash against
civil society NGOs as is currently ongoing in Russia, it is
clear that the governments of Central Europe remain skeptical
regarding the positive role such NGOs provide democracies. This
tradition, long since deeply rooted in our political
consciousness, has yet to take hold in ``new Europe.'' NGOs are
viewed either, at best, as nuisances to be tolerated because of
current or past U.S./EU support or, at worst, as single-issue
campaigns conducted by disgruntled and marginalized
malcontents.
In addition to trying to solidify their role in society,
NGOs in Central Europe must also expend tremendous energy and
hours on funding. Having graduated from USAID assistance [Czech
Republic (1997), Hungary (1999), Poland (2000) and Slovakia
(2000)], self-sustainability is now one of their most pressing
concerns. While the European Union has filled in somewhat on
this issue, NGOs reported to staff that EU funding regulations,
restrictions and effectiveness are such that most NGO staff
encountered longed for the ``good old days'' of USAID
assistance. EU funding is generally only provided for the first
25 percent of any grant, with the remaining 75 percent to be
remitted once costs have been vouchered back by the NGO to EU
headquarters. Thus many NGOs now find themselves having to
borrow to cover costs until repaid by the European Union,
turning NGOs, in essence though not fact, into for-profit
operations in order to cover these borrowing and interest
costs. While financial transparency must remain one of the
cornerstones of any NGO-donor relationship, these EU funding
mechanisms are burdensome and time-consuming, sucking resources
away from core operations and objectives.
It is in our own interest to assist many of these NGOs in
their quests for funding as they not only seek to promote like-
minded civil society goals in their own countries, but often do
so in third countries as well. Staff met with numerous
dedicated V4 NGOs who conduct significant work in countries
where we are neither welcome nor often able to conduct much
activity beyond our Embassy compounds. Such countries include
Belarus, Burma, and Cuba. Activities vary from raising money
for dissidents forcibly dismissed by governments for their
prodemocracy activities to providing activists with
organizational and information dissemination advice and
equipment.
V4 NGOs not only help move those societies closer to
joining the world's democracies, they provide perspectives that
U.S.-based NGOs cannot. Having survived themselves for years
under repressive and undemocratic rule and then been integral
to the transformation of their governments to democracy, they
have a historical perspective and moral voice that gives them
added credibility. As one V4 NGO representative told staff,
``When we bring people from these dictatorships to our country,
they can't believe the transformation, especially those who
visited Central Europe during the 1980s. Mind you, because they
have been fed so many lies by their leaders, they still think
of us in those terms--that our societies and our economies
haven't progressed since the end of the cold war. Then, when
they get here, they can't believe the changes, and I'm not just
talking about the types of cars we can now drive, but the
political and press freedoms that we enjoy, as well.''
The passion for freedom and democracy these dedicated NGOs
bring to democracy promotion deserve greater USG support.
Clearly, such support must be calculated so as not to draw too
much attention as in some circumstances this would greatly
decrease their effectiveness. Nonetheless, the additional
leverage they provide to our own foreign policy efforts in
these countries should be recognized, particularly in their
home countries. Such appreciation, recognition, thanks and
respect for their efforts would provide easy public diplomacy
opportunities in countries that have traditionally been
supportive of the United States, but who in recent times have
begun to gravitate more and more to the European Union.
Moldova: Moldova remains on the front line of Russian
attempts to return to the days of the Soviet Empire, of which
Moldova was once a part, particularly through its meddling in
the eastern region of Transnestria where a vocal Russian
minority has cowed and coerced the rest of the Romanian and
Moldovan population into adopting a resolution calling for
independence and union with Russia. Given this and Moldova's
status as the poorest nation in Europe, the decision to cut
U.S. assistance this year by some 10 percent from the previous
year (FY06 $17.82M; FY07 $16) is troubling. Any reduction in
assistance will only likely contribute to the worsening of her
economic situation.
Moldova's high poverty rate is the single biggest
contributing factor to the country's human trafficking crisis.
Staff heard from trafficking officials that many villages are
over-run with children whose grandparents attempt to provide a
stable home environment when their fathers leave for
construction jobs in Western Europe and whose mothers are lured
away by bogus offers of domestic employment overseas. These
victims are trafficked throughout Europe and the Middle East,
increasingly to Turkey, Israel, the U.A.E., and Russia.
Additionally, this reduction in U.S. aid sends the signal
that we are abandoning Moldova to Russia and its desire to
recreate its spheres of influence through outright aggression
and intimidation via its agents in Transnestria, or through its
economic embargoing of Moldovan wine (the country's single
largest export) and other agricultural products.
Some argue the Millennium Challenge Corporation's (MCC)
recent award of some $25M to Moldova will more than make up for
this shortfall. However, this funding is targeted at supporting
anticorruption activities in order to make Moldova fully
eligible for inclusion in the Millennium Challenge Account
Compact, not to improve the economic situation. While possible
future funding offered by the MCC would provide long-term
benefits to the country, there is a more immediate need for
economic assistance through USAID.
Likewise, the announcement of the anticorruption funding
award was met with much skepticism inside the country and must
be carefully monitored in order to ensure it is transparently
apportioned. The administration would clearly gain easy public
diplomacy credits for maximizing the exposure involved in the
auditing and overseeing of the expenditure of these funds, and
would demonstrate to the average citizen that the United States
remains committed to Moldova's future and to her eventual full
integration into Europe.
That said, Moldova and the rest of the GUAM nations
(Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Moldova) are clearly eager for
EU membership and the concomitant economic and political
benefits. However, recent statements by the European Union that
further expansion is ``on hold'' sends a dangerous message to
these fledgling democracies and will only slow the pace of
further democratic and economic reform in them. Without the
hope of EU accession, GUAM governments will be under little
pressure both from within their own societies and from Western
democracies to continue down the democratic road. The
administration needs to pressure EU member states to reverse
this ``closed door'' policy.
Latin America
Chile: NGOs agree that progress has been made regarding
developing stronger institutions of democracy since the return
to democracy (1990). While the Government of Chile (GOC) is
seeking to broaden citizen input, NGO leaders feel the effort
is too top-down, without sufficient dialogue with civil
society. Many argue that the Chilean Congress's over-reliance
on party-affiliated foundations and think tanks limits Members'
ability to respond to constituent wishes (Congressmen and
Senators have few advisors and personal staff). Moreover,
donations to nonprofit organizations have been on the decline
since a new law that increased government's role in
distributing charitable contributions (30 percent of a tax
deductible donation goes to a government-controlled common fund
that is distributed to other charities.)
A former Senator from Chile's center left government
coalition (Concertacion\6\) who now heads an NGO said that NGOs
function freely in Chile. While there are some conflicts
between the government and environmental NGOs, there is no
persecution of NGOs that hold views different from those of the
government. The former Senator acknowledged that many think
tanks and foundations have ties to political parties, but this
support is not automatic and that such NGOs do criticize the
government. It was also noted that NGOs can register as
nonprofit ``foundations'' or ``corporations'' and receive tax
exempt status. The most pressing issue for many NGOs is
financing, in part because there is no culture of philanthropy
in Chile.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The Concertacion de Partidos por la Democracia (Spanish
``Coalition of Parties for Democracy'') is an alliance of center-left
political parties in Chile. The coalition (in various forms) has held
the Chilean Presidency since military rule ended in 1990; the elected
Presidents have been Patricio Aylwin, Eduardo Frei, and Ricardo Lagos.
Michelle Bachelet from the PS/PPD was the candidate for the 2005
Presidential election.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many NGOs depend on foreign funding or private
contributions. Following the end of the government of Augusto
Pinochet, millions of dollars in funding from the United States
and Europe dried up. The former Senator explained that many
NGOs also rely on government contracts to provide products or
services.
This former Senator argued that despite broad participation
in civic organizations and volunteer groups, civil society is
weak because of the excessive reliance on a strong executive
branch, the Catholic Church and private companies. ``NGOs are
an Anglo-Saxon phenomenon,'' he said.
Representatives from a think tank on the right expressed
concerns about the independence of NGOs affiliated with the
ruling Concertacion government. The two representatives stated
that NGOs on the left are well organized and receive financing
from Europe, notably France and Belgium, and to a lesser extent
Mexico. They noted that Members of the Chilean Congress have
limited staff, which has increased their reliance on party-
affiliated think tanks and foundations for information and
analyses. They claim that while Concertacion-affiliated NGOs
are often invited to comment on the GOC's legislation at
Congressional hearings, think tanks and foundations from the
right are not.
While there is more transparency than 10 years ago,
representatives cautioned that there is a perception of
widespread corruption, as demonstrated by the recent government
scandals in which administrators allegedly funneled funds to
Concertacion electoral campaigns. They likewise expressed
disappointment over the new Donations Law, with its 30-percent
cut for the government, which has hurt private giving and in
their view affects more NGOs on the right than the left.
Government officials noted that President Bachelet wants to
expand the participation of civil society in decisionmaking--
one of her top campaign promises. As part of this effort,
officials highlighted a $1.8 million fund for strengthening
social development organizations. The GOC assigns sums of money
to NGOs involved in development projects based on a competitive
bid process.
Government officials cautioned that reforms aimed at
increasing citizen participation take time and are difficult to
implement and stated that Chile has a strong executive with a
top-down framework emanating from Pinochet's 1980 Constitution.
Compared to other countries, Chile is behind in revising its
Constitution, the official said. The official said Chileans do
not have the right to hold plebiscites or referendums, and
there is no ombudsman, but this could change under the Bachelet
administration.
With regard to declining donations to nonprofit
organizations, Concertacion officials defended the government's
new law on donations. They argued that it is not fair, for
example, that a company makes a tax-deduction donation that
benefits only one entity when there are more needy recipients.
The 30-percent allocation to a common fund and distribution by
the government is more beneficial to society, they claimed. The
majority of think tanks and foundations, on both the left and
the right, criticized the new Donation Law, arguing it hurts
well-known organizations such as Chile's Municipal Theatre and
the Catholic Church-affiliated NGO ``Hogar de Cristo'' \7\.
Most NGO representatives supported the idea that donors should
be able to provide full funding to the NGO of their choice
without government direction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Hogar de Cristo is the largest nongovernmental, nonprofit
social organization, working with over 4,000 volunteers to serve 70,000
people throughout Chile. They are dedicated to serving and caring for
``the poorest of the poor'' with dignity and compassion. They have many
sites throughout Santiago (and the rest of the country) with numerous
programs. Possibilities for projects are endless. It is easiest to
imagine students integrating themselves into the direct services of the
sites and complementing the services with educational workshops and
activities. Other alternatives, including needs assessment and program
planning or evaluation, tend to be developed when the possibility of
carrying them out becomes a reality.
Peru: Peru is a multiparty republic that recently emerged
from more than a decade of authoritarian rule and is undergoing
a process of economic and democratic transformation.
Over the last decade, the Government transformed a heavily
regulated economy into a market-oriented one. The country's
population was approximately 27 million. Gross domestic product
grew 4.8 percent during the year, compared with only 0.2
percent growth in 2001. Inflation, which was 0.1 percent in
2001, stayed under 1.5 percent during the year. Major exports
include copper, gold, and other minerals, fishmeal, textiles,
and agricultural products. Close to 54 percent of the
population lives in poverty, earning less than $1.25 per day;
about 15 percent of the population lives in extreme poverty,
unable to meet the most basic food, shelter, and clothing
requirements.
The government of President Alan Garcia is perceived as
respectful of the human rights of its citizens; however, in the
past there were serious problems in some areas, particularly
regarding allegations of unlawful or unwarranted killings by
police.
Staff's visit was heavily focused on proposed legislation
that would give the Government of Peru (GOP) authority to
control NGO activity, particularly those working on human
rights issues and receiving international assistance.
The law would force nongovernmental organizations and their
international donors to register with Peru's Agency for
International Cooperation (known for its acronym in Spanish,
APCI \8\), the state watchdog, and give details of their
funding and activities. APCI would also have responsibility for
``harmonizing'' the groups' activities ``in line with national
development policy and the public interest.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Agencia Peruana de Corporacion Internacional.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More than 3,000 NGOs operate in Peru, with a total annual
income estimated at $500m for the sector.
APCI--whose board of directors is presided over by the
Prime Minister and includes the Foreign and Finance Ministers--
would be able to punish groups it judges to have acted not in
the national interest.
The proposed NGO law has generated an enormous amount of
controversy, with front-page articles and a host of almost
unanimously critical editorials. Peruvian NGOs have threatened
to take the matter to the Constitutional Tribunal. Peru's
Ombudsman called into question the law's constitutionality. The
overwhelming response highlights the strength of Peru's
democracy, particularly the civil society sector.
In a late October 2006 vote, the Peruvian Congress voted in
favor of the legislation, which needs to be approved in a
second congressional vote before being sent to the President
for consideration (which had not occurred at the time of staff
travel to Peru). In many of the meetings NGO representatives
focused on proposed legislation which would give the government
authority to, in effect, direct foreign assistance. NGO
representatives worried that the government was attempting to
exert greater control over civil society and to curtail freedom
of expression.
There was widespread speculation as to hidden motives
behind the proposed legislation. Some suspected an alliance of
expediency between the APRA (the government party) and
Fujimorista parties, arguing that the law sought to curtail
NGOs that were seeking the extradition of former President
Alberto Fujimori from Chile and that also hounded President
Garcia for alleged human rights violations during his first
term. Others saw an effort to limit the activities of groups
that are critical of the operations of Peru's powerful mining
and gas interests and to target environmental NGOs suspected of
deliberately exacerbating mining conflicts.
The GOP defended the proposed law. In addition to assuring
transparency, officials argued, the proposed legislation
targets illicit groups, such as narco-traffickers and terrorist
organizations. One official claimed the bill was not put
forward by the government party (APRA), but said it sought to
ensure the activities of NGOs in Peru did not harm national
interests.
Venezuela: Venezuela has between 4,000 and 5,000 NGOs,
including President Chavez' own partisan support groups. All
foreign donations are disclosed on annual tax statements to the
Government of Venezuela (GOV). Though aware of all activities,
personnel and funding sources, the GOV claims that NGOs which
receive American financial assistance have a clandestine
purpose to advance the interests of the USG. Government efforts
to interfere with NGO donations or limit their freedom to
communicate or receive funding hurts the NGOs' ability to
educate voters, promote balanced, nonpartisan institutions and
services, conduct advocacy for special-interest groups, and
enrich public discourse.
In today's Venezuela, media outlets self-censor to keep
their licenses from being revoked. Meanwhile, a rubber-stamp
National Assembly bows to Chavez's wishes.
Staff visit was heavily focused on deep concern regarding
the proposed International Cooperation Law and harassment
facing certain NGOs.
The proposed law could increase existing regulation of
NGOs, both local and international. Civil society would be
subject to considerable restrictions, with government allowed
to interfere in their activities and funding sources.
While the GOV has the right to regulate institutions
operating within its country, the text of the proposed bill is
ambiguous, leaving ample room for further restrictions at the
government's discretion.
An alarming aspect of the bill is the proposal for a Fund
for International Cooperation and Assistance. It is unclear
whether funds received by civil society would end up being
managed by the government through this fund. The bill also
requires all organizations to register with the government, and
its scope would be defined directly by the Presidency under a
regulation outside of legislative procedure.
In meetings with human rights NGOs, staff primarily
discussed the obstacles the proposed International Cooperation
Law would present to the NGOs' continued operation. The
proposed international cooperation agency, whose ostensible
purpose would be to catalog foreign investment in NGO
operations, would, in fact, be able to regulate and exercise
decisionmaking authority, staff was told. One NGO
representative said that most NGOs would not be opposed in
principle to some sort of government clearinghouse requiring
disclosure of finances. What was objectionable was the concept
of having to reregister with the GOV as a civil society entity
and be subjected to programmatic scrutiny. Efforts to force
NGOs to ``reregister'' their existence would likely lead to GOV
stalling tactics, forcing extant NGOs to operate underground.
This eventuality would provide the GOV a pretext to say certain
NGOs are operating illegally, since they were not properly
registered.
Regarding foreign assistance, NGO representatives stated
that the current regime has made receiving any assistance very
difficult. ``They either physically harass you or accuse you of
treason.'' Representatives agreed that the best form of
assistance would be to help push other diplomatic missions to
become more involved. One representative emphasized that a
regional (Latin America wide) effort was needed.
In meetings with an academic who is in the spotlight due to
opposition to many government policy initiatives, notably
changes to the law on higher education, staff learned that the
original impetus for the NGO law was the elimination of
electoral NGO Sumate, the election watchdog which led an
unsuccessful recall drive against Chavez. He has called the
group's leaders ``conspirators, coup plotters and lackeys of
the U.S. Government.'' The professor said, ``With Chavez, if
one NGO is bad, all are bad. There is no gray, everything is
black or white.'' When staff asked NGO representatives to
describe their current standing in front of the Chavez
administration, one representative answered, ``endangered'';
another replied, ``threatened.''
Another prominent human rights NGO representative told
staff about the ongoing personal harassment members of his
organization face at the hands of the GOV, including threats of
bodily harm. He explained that the GOV is accusing them of
fabricating the threats and is trying to get Venezuelan courts
to overturn the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(IACHR) ruling that the GOV must provide protective detail for
them.
Staff was scheduled to meet with the Movimiento Quinta
Revolucion (MVR) \9\ National Assembly Deputy Saul Ortega,
Chair of the Assembly's Foreign Relations Committee, to discuss
the proposed ``international cooperation'' law. Ortega arrived
late for the meeting due to traffic issues, just as staff and
Ambassador were departing. In the interim, staff had a
productive discussion with senior National Assembly staffers
involved in the drafting and floor management of the draft law.
The Assembly staffers indicated that the bill would not be
passed until after the December 3 Presidential elections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Movimiento Quinta Republica (MVR--Fifth Republic Movement) is
the political party founded by President Chavez.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ortega's staff said that the government was concerned that
it did not know what NGOs were doing and emphasized the need
for the government to ``control and monitor'' NGO activities.
They indicated the law was modeled after a Spanish NGO law and
was intended to improve international cooperation, not to
attack NGOs.
The Ortega staffer claimed that elements of the bill had
been misinterpreted. One of the bill's articles (article 10),
creating a government fund to aid cooperation that
organizations could contribute to, would not, as the press had
reported, require all funds to pass through it, he said. Ortega
staff again emphasized the importance of having a registry so
that NGOs can be tracked and monitored. The government would
not control the transfers of money to registered NGOs, he said,
but the process of moving money would be transparent and
reported.
APPENDIX IV
----------
APPENDIX V
----------
Idea to Reality: A Brief History of the National Endowment for
Democracy (NED)
BY DAVID LOWE (1)
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was launched in
the early 1980s, premised on the idea that American assistance
on behalf of democracy efforts abroad would be good both for
the U.S. and for those struggling around the world for freedom
and self-government. This paper offers a brief history of the
Endowment, including the events and circumstances that led to
its creation, its early legislative battles, more recent
legislative success, institutional growth and innovation, and
its efforts to help bring democracy foundations into existence
in other countries. Although the U.S. experience is undoubtedly
unique, the model of a non-governmental organization that
receives public funding to carry out democracy initiatives
should be considered by other countries that appreciate the
benefits of participating in this significant worldwide
movement.
The desire of Americans to share with other countries the
ideas that helped bring about their own successful democratic
transition dates almost as far back as the country's founding
over two centuries ago. As Seymour Martin Lipset has pointed
out, throughout American history democratic activists abroad as
diverse as Lafayette, Kossuth, Garibaldi and Sun Yat Sen have
looked to the U.S. as a source of both ideological and material
assistance. (2) Much of the pioneering work in the area of
political assistance has been carried out by the American labor
movement, which was active in international affairs before the
turn of the 20th century.
Origins
In the aftermath of World War II, faced with threats to our
democratic allies and without any mechanism to channel
political assistance, U.S. policy makers resorted to covert
means, secretly sending advisers, equipment, and funds to
support newspapers and parties under siege in Europe. When it
was revealed in the late 1960's that some American PVO's were
receiving covert funding from the CIA to wage the battle of
ideas at international forums, the Johnson Administration
concluded that such funding should cease, recommending
establishment of ``a public-private mechanism'' to fund
overseas activities openly.
On Capitol Hill, Congressman Dante Fascell (D, FL)
introduced a bill in April, 1967 to create an Institute of
International Affairs, an initiative that would authorize overt
funding for programs to promote democratic values. Although the
bill did not succeed, it helped lead to discussions within the
Administration and on Capitol Hill concerning how to develop
new approaches to the ideological competition then taking place
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
Interest in American involvement in the promotion of human
rights was intensified during the Administration of President
Jimmy Carter, who made it a central component of American
foreign policy. In the late 1970's America became committed to
the process of monitoring the Helsinki accords, especially that
``basket'' dealing with human rights. In 1978 Congressmen
Fascell and Donald Fraser (D, MN) proposed a ``QUANGO'' (i.e,
quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization) whose mission
would be the advancement of human rights. The bill they
introduced would have created an Institute for Human Rights and
Freedom to furnish technical and financial assistance to
nongovernmental organizations that promote human rights abroad.
By the late 70's, there was an important model for
democracy assistance: the German Federal Republic's party
foundations, created after World War II to help rebuild
Germany's democratic institutions destroyed a generation
earlier by the Nazis. These foundations (known as
``Stiftungen''), each aligned with one of the four German
political parties, received funding from the West German
treasury. In the 1960's they began assisting their ideological
counterparts abroad, and by the mid-70's were playing an
important role in both of the democratic transitions taking
place on the Iberian Peninsula.
Late in 1977, Washington political consultant George Agree,
citing the important work being carried out by the Stiftungen,
proposed creation of a foundation to promote communication and
understanding between the two major U.S. political parties and
other parties around the world. Headed by U.S. Trade
Representative William Brock, a former Republican National
Committee Chairman, and Charles Manatt, then serving as
Democratic National Committee Chairman, by 1980 the American
Political Foundation had established an office in Washington,
D.C. from which it provided briefings, appointments, and other
assistance to foreign party, parliamentary, and academic
visitors to the U.S.
Two years later, in one of his major foreign policy
addresses, President Reagan proposed an initiative ``to foster
the infrastructure of democracy--the system of a free press,
unions, political parties, universities--which allows a people
to choose their own way, to develop their own culture, to
reconcile their own differences through peaceful means.'' He
noted that the American Political Foundation would soon begin a
study ``to determine how the U.S. can best contribute--as a
nation--to the global campaign for democracy now gathering
force.'' Delivered to a packed Parliamentary chamber in
Britain's Westminster Palace, the Reagan speech would prove to
be one of the central contributions to the establishment of a
U.S. democracy foundation.
The American Political Foundation's study was funded by a
$300,000 grant from the Agency for International
Development(AID) and it became known as ``The Democracy
Program.'' Its executive board consisted of a broad cross-
section of participants in American politics and foreign policy
making. The Democracy Program recommended establishment of a
bipartisan, private, non-profit corporation to be known as the
National Endowment for Democracy (NED). The Endowment, though
non-governmental, would be funded primarily through annual
appropriations and subject to congressional oversight. NED, in
turn, would act as a grant-making foundation, distributing
funds to private organizations for the purpose of promoting
democracy abroad. These private organizations would include
those created by the two political parties and the business
community, which would join the regional international
institutes of the labor movement already in existence.
Legislative Action
The House Foreign Affairs Committee included a two-year
authorization for the proposed National Endowment for Democracy
at an annual level of $31.3 million as part of the FY 84/85
State Department Authorization Act (H.R. 2915). The Reagan
Administration had originally proposed a larger ($65 million)
democracy promotion initiative to be known as ``Project
Democracy'' and coordinated directly by the United States
Information Agency (USIA). When the Foreign Affairs Committee
reported out H.R. 2915, it did not include funding for
``Project Democracy,'' making clear its preference for the non-
governmental Endowment concept. The Administration then voiced
support for the creation of NED.
The legislation, which was included in the authorization
bill for the State Department and USIA, spelled out the
following six purposes of the proposed Endowment: encouraging
democratic institutions through private sector initiatives;
facilitating exchanges between private sector groups
(particularly the four proposed Institutes) and democratic
groups abroad; promoting nongovernmental participation in
democratic training programs; strengthening democratic
electoral processes abroad in cooperation with indigenous
democratic forces; fostering cooperation between American
private sector groups and those abroad ``dedicated to the
cultural values, institutions, and organizations of democratic
pluralism''; and encouraging democratic development consistent
with the interests of both the U.S. and the groups receiving
assistance. The bill spelled out the procedures by which the
funding would flow from USIA to NED and the mechanisms for
insuring financial accountability. (3)
Included in the legislation were earmarks of $13.8 million
for the Free Trade Union Institute, an affiliate of the AFL-CIO
incorporated in 1978 that would serve as an umbrella for
labor's regional bodies operating in Africa, Asia, Latin
America, and Eastern Europe; $2.5 million for the proposed
affiliate of the National U.S. Chamber Foundation; and $5
million for each of the two proposed party institutes.
When the authorizing legislation for the Endowment reached
the floor of the House, an effort to eliminate all of its
funding as proposed by the Foreign Affairs Committee failed by
a small margin. Nonetheless, the idea of providing funding for
party entities remained a concern for many members. Congressman
Hank Brown (R, CO), who had sponsored the earlier amendment,
was able to exploit those concerns by proposing that the
section of Title VI providing earmarked funding for these party
institutes be eliminated. This amendment was passed by a vote
of 267-136.
Describing the proposed Endowment as ``an idea whose time
has come,'' the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Charles Percy (R,IL), introduced NED's authorization
on the floor of the Senate three months after the House vote.
Percy, who had participated in some of the discussions of the
``Democracy Program,'' expressed his conviction that the
legislation was ``arguably the most important single U.S.
foreign policy initiative of this generation.'' On September
22, 1983, the Senate rejected by a vote of 42-49 an amendment
by Senators Zorinsky (D, NE) and Helms (R, NC) to strike the
authorization for the Endowment. (4)
The conference report on H.R. 2915 was adopted by the House
on November 17, 1983 and the Senate the following day. On the
one major substantive issue on which the two Houses differed,
the conferees agreed to maintain the House's deletion of the
earmarks for the party institutes, but pointed out that this
was ``without prejudice to their receipt of funds from the
Endowment.''
Getting Organized
On the day the Senate approved the conference report,
articles of incorporation were filed in the District of
Columbia on behalf of the National Endowment for Democracy. The
Endowment was established as a nonprofit organization under
section 501c (3) of the Internal Revenue Service Code.
NED's original Board of Directors, limited to three three-
year terms of service, included party activists,
representatives of the U.S. labor, business and education
communities, foreign policy specialists, and two members of
Congress. Following a brief stint by Congressman Fascell as
acting chairman, the Endowment appointed as its first permanent
Chairman John Richardson, a former Assistant Secretary of State
with many years of involvement in private organizations
involved in international affairs. For President, the Board
chose Carl Gershman, previously the Senior Counselor to the
U.S. Representative to the United Nations.
NED's creation was soon followed by establishment of the
Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), the
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI),
and the National Republican Institute for International Affairs
(later renamed the International Republican Institute or
``IRI''), which joined the Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI) as
the four affiliated institutions of the Endowment. (FTUI was
later reorganized as the American Center for International
Labor Solidarity, also known as the ``Solidarity Center.'')
This structure had been recommended by the Democracy Program
for three basic reasons: first, because of the wide recognition
of the parent bodies of these new entities as national
institutions with a public character, an important asset for
this non-governmental foundation; second, because they
represent sectors of political life fundamental to any strong
democracy; and third, to insure political balance. The
Endowment would serve as the umbrella organization through
which these four groups and an expanding number of other
private sector groups would receive funding to carry out
programs abroad.
Although the original authorized level for NED was $31.3
million, its appropriation was later set well below this level
at $18 million, reflecting in part the fact that the new
institution would not be fully organized until well into the
year. As President Gershman would later point out in
congressional testimony, the Endowment devoted considerable
attention in its early months to the task of putting into place
``sound administrative, financial, and reporting procedures.''
A procedures manual that included grant guidelines and
selection criteria for grants was approved, and a Statement of
Principles and Objectives adopted. Because the Endowment had
been funded at less than 60 percent of the authorized level,
the Board decided to allocate less than the full earmarked
amounts to the labor and business Institutes. This would enable
it to fulfill that part of the NED Act mandating that grants be
made to other private sector groups as well. (5)
During the consideration of the appropriation for NED's
second year held in May, 1984, the Endowment's opponents went
on the offensive and persuaded the House to eliminate all
funding for it. (6) A similar effort failed in the Senate,
which then voted to reduce the proposed $31.3 million level by
$10 million and to explicitly prohibit the party Institutes
from receiving any of this amount. The conference committee
agreed to a funding level of $18.5 million and maintained the
ban on funding the party Institutes. NED's appropriation was
not to reach the original authorized level for another 10
years.
Reauthorization
The second NED authorization for FY 86 and 87 set a ceiling
of $18.4 million and the final version contained neither
earmarks nor prohibition on funding the party Institutes.
Additional language was added to the NED Act that: 1) codified
the Board's prohibition on the use of funds for partisan
political purposes, including funding for national party
operations; 2) mandated that NED grantees consult with the
State Department (which would continue to have no veto over
grants) prior to commencement of program activities; 3) moved
the required date of reporting to the Congress on all grants
from December 31 to February 1; 4) required that the Endowment,
despite its nongovernmental status, comply fully with the
requirements of the Freedom of Information Act; and 5) made all
financial transactions of the Endowment for each fiscal year
subject to a possible USIA audit. (This section was amended in
a subsequent authorization to require such audits.)
Since the issuing of the conference report for the second
reauthorization covering FY 86 and 87, Congress has not
included earmarks in any NED-related legislation. A provision
in the Foreign Relations Act of 1995 recommended equal funding
of the four institutes and a capping of the total amount
reserved for them at 55% of the appropriated amount. (7)
At several points in NED's budget process, legislative
report language has recognized the importance of the
Endowment's discretionary program of grants to indigenous
groups working in such areas as human rights, independent
media, civic education, and strengthening democratic culture
and values. For example, the FY87 conference report on NED's
appropriation directed that not less than 25% of the program
dollars (i.e., the total appropriation less the amount spent on
administration) be used for discretionary grants. And when
Congress appropriated a $5 million increase in FY 94,
conference report language instructed the Board to use the
increment to enhance the discretionary program. (8)
From time to time Congress has provided special
appropriations to the Endowment to carry out specific
democratic initiatives in countries of special interest,
including Poland (through the trade union Solidarity), Chile,
Nicaragua, Eastern Europe (to aid in the democratic transition
following the demise of the Soviet bloc), South Africa, Burma,
China, Tibet, North Korea and the Balkans. With the latter, NED
supported a number of civic groups, including those that played
a key role in Serbia's electoral breakthrough in the fall of
2000. More recently, following 9/11 and the NED Board's
adoption of its third strategic document, special funding has
been provided for countries with substantial Muslim populations
in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.
Although the Foreign Relations Act of 1992 declared it to
be the sense of the Congress that the Endowment supplement its
congressional appropriation with funding from the private
sector, Congress has rejected any requirement that NED's
grantees raise matching funds. It did, in the FY 93/94
authorization, ask the Administration to study the desirability
of such a requirement, a notion that was strongly rejected. The
argument made by Hank Brown (who had moved from the House to
the Senate) that NED's founders intended for its original
funding to serve as ``seed money'' that would enable it to
become fully privatized was researched by the Congressional
Research Service and found to be without any foundation. (9) In
FY93, the Endowment began compiling an annual report of cash
and in-kind contributions raised by all of its grantees to
supplement their NED funding. The report for FY 99 indicated
that for every program dollar spent from NED's congressional
appropriation, its grantees raised over $.65 in ``counterpart
resources.''
Congressional Support
NED's congressional support has grown steadily during its
first twenty years. From the early days of close and frequent
votes on its authorizing and appropriating legislation, it has
moved beyond survival to widespread bipartisan endorsement on
the Hill. In fact, identical Senate and House resolutions (S.
Con Res 66; H. Con Res 274) commending the National Endowment
for Democracy ``for its major contributions to the
strengthening of democracy around the world on the occasion of
the 20th anniversary'' of its establishment, and endeavoring
``to continue to support [its] vital work'' were passed in
October, 2003. The Senate resolution was passed by unanimous
voice vote; the House resolution sailed through on a roll call
vote of 391-1. Both resolutions had strong, bipartisan co-
sponsorship. (10) These votes were a reflection of how far the
Endowment had come over the years in establishing not only its
legitimacy but also the widespread bipartisan approval of its
work. But the road had not always been a smooth one.
Apart from the tenuous situation the Endowment faced
following the successful floor amendment by its House opponents
in 1984, its closest call came in the summer of 1993.
Responding to a recommendation of the new (Clinton)
Administration, the House Foreign Affairs Committee approved an
increase in NED's authorized level from $30 to $48 million. But
the relatively large percentage increase, combined with the
infusion of large numbers of freshmen in both parties committed
to deficit reduction, put the Endowment's supporters on the
defensive.
On June 20, 1993, an amendment to kill the authorization
sponsored by Congressman Paul Kanjorski (D, PA) succeeded by a
vote of 243-181. However, the following month the Senate voted
by a solid 74-23 margin for a somewhat scaled down increase (to
$35 million), a vote that was later affirmed by the House (259-
172), thereby reversing its earlier position.
The most recent vote on the Endowment's appropriation in
the House came in June, 1994 after the Appropriations Committee
had recommended--for budgetary reasons--a slight decrease in
NED's budget to $33 million. An amendment by Congressman Joel
Hefly (R, CO) to eliminate all funding was defeated by a vote
of 89-317. (11)
In July, 1997, the Senate overwhelmingly repudiated the
recommendation of its Appropriations Committee that NED not be
funded in FY 98. The Appropriations Committee was following the
lead of Senator Judd Gregg (R, NH), one of the early critics of
NED when he was in the House, who had ascended to the
chairmanship of the subcommittee with jurisdiction over the
Endowment at the end of 1995. On a vote of 72-27, NED
supporters overcame a number of procedural obstacles that face
any effort by supporters on the Senate floor to restore a
funding cut in committee.
Two years later, when the subcommittee tried again to
eliminate NED's funding, the action was reversed on a voice
vote on the Senate floor. This followed a spirited defense of
the Endowment's work by Senator Richard Lugar (R, IN), a member
of the NED Board, who appealed to his colleagues ``to stand up
and be counted on whether they feel passionately, as I do, and
I think many of us do, about democracy and human rights and
what can be done about it effectively.'' Prior to the vote, a
``Dear Colleague'' letter calling for a restoration of funding
had been signed by nearly half the Senate.
The vote in 1999 marked the last time the Endowment's
appropriation was debated on the Senate floor. Since 9/11,
previous critics, including Senator Gregg, have come to
understand the Endowment's work in the context of critical
national security issues, a topic that forms the basis of the
Board's third strategic plan adopted at the end of 2001. In
2003, the core appropriation exceeded $40 million for the first
time. In addition, special funding for congressionally mandated
countries and regions (see above) totaled over $10 million.
The early opposition to the Endowment on the Hill tended to
focus on four basic factors: 1) its structure; 2) its
independence; 3) its purported redundancy, and 4) its mission.
(12)
Structure
From the original congressional consideration of NED, the
Endowment's relationship with the four core groups that played
a role in its founding became a central focus of the funding
debate. Even some who favored the Endowment's program
questioned why--contrary to American political tradition--
organizations affiliated with America's two political parties
should receive federal funding. And ideological opponents of
labor and business also weighed in against the funding
arrangement. (13)
Some of the debate over NED's structure in the beginning
related to the composition of the Endowment's Board of
Directors, which originally included representatives of the
four Institutes. But this argument became moot by the beginning
of 1993, at which time an entirely new set of directors had
replaced the original Board as the result of the term limits
provision written into the Endowment's by-laws. (Because the
turnover was staggered, new Board members began taking their
seats in FY 1990.) The new group of Board members was carefully
balanced in terms of party and ideology, but they were not
representing the Institutes and, except in a few cases, were
not closely linked to any of them. Indeed, by the time Congress
amended the NED Act in 1992 to preclude anyone from serving on
the NED Board who was in the leadership of any organization
receiving more than five percent of the Endowment's program
funds, the provision no longer had any particular relevance.
Two other arguments related to the Institutes have been
advanced: first, that these are ``special interests'' that can
and should be funded privately, and second, that they receive
Endowment funding on a ``non-competitive'' basis. The first
argument tends to ignore the independence of these groups from
their better known parent organizations and the fact that, like
the Endowment itself, their work serves America's national
interest.
The charge about the lack of competitiveness is based upon
a fundamental misunderstanding about how the Endowment
operates. It is true that the Institutes are given target
allocations to help them plan a worldwide program on an annual
basis. But the criticism often overlooks the fact that the
Endowment's independent Board has to review and vote on all
Institute projects, which are subject to the same oversight
procedures as those that affect all other grantees. In fact,
the entire concept of ``competitiveness,'' as applied to NED's
relationship with the Institutes, is misguided. The Endowment
does not operate by deciding what democracy projects should be
funded and then sending out requests for proposals. Rather, it
responds to the needs of democratic groups abroad and funds
those requests that fit into its program priorities. Surely it
is difficult to quarrel with the strong track record
established by Institute programs in countries as diverse as
Poland, Peru, Bulgaria, the Philippines, Chile, South Africa,
Mexico, and the former Yugoslavia.
Independence
NED's authorizing legislation spells out its non-
governmental status, namely that ``Nothing in this title shall
be construed to make the Endowment an agency or establishment
of the United States Government.'' (14) Board members are not
selected by the President and those who are appointed to serve
in the Executive Branch relinquish their Board membership.
It is sometimes contended that without this official
status, the Endowment lacks accountability. This charge
overlooks the fact that NED is answerable to a wide array of
overseers in both the Executive and Legislative Branches. As
Senator Percy remarked when introducing the original NED
legislation in the Senate, ``The Endowment will come under
continuous and extensive scrutiny in the appropriate committees
of both Houses of Congress. The additional provisions for GAO
oversight, as well as the terms of the USIA grant agreement
under which it will function, assure a convergence of oversight
procedures virtually unique among grantees of federal funds.''
(15)
NED's non-governmental status has a number of advantages
(see below) that are recognized by those institutions that
really do carry out American foreign policy. As pointed out in
a letter signed by seven former Secretaries of State in 1995,
``We consider the non-governmental character of the NED even
more relevant than it was at NED's founding twelve years ago.''
(16)
NED frequently consults with relevant policy makers about
its work, going well beyond the level of contact required by
its authorizing legislation.
Redundancy
The charge that NED is no longer needed since the American
government has its own democracy promoting capability through
AID and other agencies ignores the reality that its work is of
a vastly different character from these official institutions.
Much of this difference stems from NED's independence, which
gives it an ability to work in situations that official bodies
(justifiably) avoid, but also its non-bureaucratic character,
which enables it to move quickly in rapidly changing
situations. A good example is the West Bank, where both
Institute and discretionary programs were on the ground shortly
following the signing of the Middle East peace accords in
Washington in 1993.
A number of studies have shown the redundancy argument to
be without merit. One was commissioned by Congress in the FY
94/95 State/USIA authorization, which requested the
Administration to conduct an inventory of democracy funded
programs and to identify areas of duplication. The resulting
report to the Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign
Affairs Committee submitted by the State Department highlighted
the comparative advantages to the different approaches and
orientations of those agencies and organizations receiving
federal funding. (17)
A similar request to GAO by members of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee in April 1992 led to a long review process
that ended in June, 1996, when the leadership of GAO concluded
that it was not necessary to make any recommendations to the
Hill vis-a-vis the current structure of democracy-funded
programs. GAO's conclusion was based in part on the results of
a study by AID and NED staff of every democracy-related grant
awarded by each institution in FY 1994. The review indicated
that the programs of NED and AID are not duplicative but
complementary, and spelled out various procedures that have
been implemented to insure that the two organizations continue
to share information about their projects. (18)
Left/Right Opposition
NED's very mission, particularly in its early days, was
challenged on ideological grounds. Opponents on the far left
believed that promoting democracy was tantamount to interfering
in the internal affairs of other countries in the service of
U.S. foreign policy interests. Although a few antagonists
continue on occasion to voice opposition, their numbers have
dwindled, particularly with changes after the Cold War in
attitudes on the left toward U.S. internationalism.
More significant opposition to the Endowment was voiced in
the early years by some elements of the human rights community,
who occasionally mischaracterized NED's natural interest in
free and fair elections as its sole focus, while arguing that
such elections do not necessarily guarantee the protection of
basic rights. NED's programmatic emphasis on long-term
democratic development, the building of civil society, and
funding indigenous human rights groups has won over many of
these early critics, and in fact has led to a substantial
coalescence of interest between NED and the human rights
community.
Within certain elements of the right, there have been
allegations from time to time that the Endowment is promoting a
``social democratic'' agenda. These are based largely upon the
prominent role played by the labor movement, as well as the
social democratic background of NED's President. (19)
Nonetheless, over the years mainstream conservative activists
and thinkers have been among the most outspoken advocates on
behalf of the Endowment. Endorsements of NED have been offered
by the leadership of such stalwart conservative organizations
as the Heritage Foundation and Empower America, and favorable
editorials have appeared in the Wall Street Journal, the
Washington Times and National Review.
Strategic Planning
A 1991 GAO report recommended that the Endowment adopt a
more systematic approach to planning program objectives and
assessing program results by identifying more specific and
measurable goals and priorities. In response, the Endowment's
Board adopted a number of new procedures, including the
development of target funding goals for each country in its
annual planning document; the hiring of an evaluation
specialist to work with grantees in drawing up evaluation plans
for each project and to commission independent evaluations by
outside experts; and the drafting of strategic plans to focus
on long range goals and objectives.
The first strategic plan, drafted by the Board in 1992, was
designed as a blueprint for program activity over the next five
years. In it the Board sought to address two key issues: first,
what role the Endowment should play in a post-Cold War world,
and second, how to address the fact that the U.S. Government,
primarily through AID, had entered the field of democracy
promotion.
The Board recommended that the Endowment play to its
strengths, i.e. take advantage of those institutional features
that set it apart from others moving into the democracy field:
its status as a non-governmental organization, its ``multi-
sectoral'' character; and its role as an organization whose
sole mission is to promote democracy. As a non-governmental
organization, it could provide political assistance to
democratic forces in repressive or other sensitive political
situations where U.S. Government support, even where channeled
through intermediary institutions that were non-governmental,
would be diplomatically or politically unfeasible. With its
special relationship with the four Institutes and its
discretionary grants, it could provide a ``full package''
response to the complex needs of emerging democracies. And as
an institution whose sole mission is to promote democracy, the
Endowment could serve as a center of democratic activity,
bridging the gap between activists and students of democracy.
(20)
The latter role had been served by a biennial global
conference of democratic activists, many of them Endowment
grantees, which was begun in 1987. It was also highlighted by
publication of the quarterly Journal of Democracy, whose first
issue appeared in January 1990. The Journal's editorial Board
consisted of the leading thinkers on democracy in the world,
and it quickly established itself as the major publication for
examining the central issues related to democratic ideas and
institutions. From the outset, the Journal's funding came
primarily from private sources.
In implementing the third pillar of the strategy document,
a subcommittee of the Board (which included both NED and
Journal Board members) proposed establishment of a forum for
bringing together scholars and practitioners on a regular basis
and for developing a data base for democratic projects around
the world. The plan received a strong endorsement from USIA as
well as approval from GAO, which noted in a ruling that the
forum idea was fully consistent with the Endowment's
authorizing legislation inasmuch as it would serve not as a
``program'' but rather an important function that would
ultimately strengthen the grants program. (21)
Since its creation in 1994, the International Forum for
Democratic Studies has become an important center for analysis
of the theory and practice of democratic development worldwide.
Although it is part of the Endowment structure and receives
some funding from the NED appropriation, most of its budget has
been provided by private foundations, which have helped fund
the Democracy Resource Center, a variety of research
conferences on democratic themes, and a small fellowship
program. The Forum also encompasses the Journal of Democracy,
now published by Johns Hopkins University Press, and has
produced a diverse array of democracy-related books based upon
Journal articles and the papers presented at the Forum's
research conferences. In 2001, the Endowment, with funds
authorized by Congress and provided by the State Department's
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, established the
Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows Program, which provides
support annually for a dozen or so democracy activists,
practitioners, scholars and journalists from around the world
to deepen their understanding of democracy and to enhance their
ability to promote democratic change.
The Endowment's Board of Directors adopted a second
strategic plan at the beginning of 1997. With its federally
funded budget dropping in FY 96 to $30 million and frozen for
the foreseeable future, the Board chose to emphasize how the
Endowment could maximize its impact during a time of fiscal
austerity: first, by expanding programs that promote cross-
border and intra-regional activity among grantees (such as the
highly successful NED-funded ``East to East'' programs in the
former Soviet Bloc); second, by integrating networks of
grantees to maximize their impact within countries such as
China and Burma, and third, by encouraging the growth of new
counterpart organizations. (22)
Counterpart Institutions
Five years after the creation of NED, the Canadian
Parliament established the International Centre for Human
Rights and Democratic Development, which became operational two
years later from its headquarters in Montreal. During the
planning phase for the new Centre, members of a Parliamentary
task force consulted with the leadership of NED.
In 1992, the Westminster Foundation was established in
Great Britain. More than the Canadian Centre, it used NED as a
model, with a portion of its grants set aside for programs
administered by party affiliated organizations. (23) But there
are differences with NED as well, since the Foundation does not
fund programs that have a business orientation (such as those
operated by the Center for International Enterprise) and has
more of a quasi-governmental character through its relationship
with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The Foundation's
grants have been heavily concentrated in Eastern Europe (where
Canada's Centre does not operate) and former Commonwealth
countries.
In report language accompanying the Endowment's FY 93
appropriation, the Appropriations Committee recognized the
existence of democracy promotion foundations in Germany,
Canada, and Great Britain and recommended that NED consider
convening a ``democracy summit'' to review issues of mutual
concern. The Endowment took up the suggestion, convening a
group of foundation representatives in February, 1993 at Airlie
House outside of Washington, D.C. The group has expanded since
that time to include foundations in other European countries
(several related to political parties) and Australia. Since the
initial meeting convened by NED, the group has met subsequently
in Germany, England, Canada, and, most recently (2003), in
France.
Working with Taiwan's Institute for National Policy
Research, with whom the International Forum co-sponsored a
research conference in 1995 on ``Consolidating the Third Wave
Democracies,'' NED convened a meeting in Taipei in October,
1997 to promote the concept of establishing new democracy
foundations. Some twenty countries were represented at the
meeting.
In November, 2002, the Endowment was invited by a
consortium of three Japanese organizations, the Committee to
Aid Democracy for Peacebuilding (ADP), the Diet League to Aid
Democracy for Peacebuilding, and the Ozaki Yukio Memorial
Foundation to participate with other democracy foundations and
local NGOs in a two-day conference seminar in the Diet on
establishing a Japanese foundation. And, in June, 2003,
following a period of consultation with NED, Taiwan launched
the Taiwan Democracy Foundation, which has the strong
endorsement of President Chen Shui Bien.
A related development that emerged from NED's efforts to
stimulate international cooperation in the promotion of
democracy has been the creation of the World Movement for
Democracy. The Movement is a ``network of networks'' that
connects and unites people and organizations around the world
who are working on a daily basis to promote democratic values
and build and strengthen democratic institutions in their
respective countries. The Movement, for which NED serves as the
secretariat, is directed by an international Steering Committee
of distinguished democratic activists and thinkers. It has held
four World Assemblies funded largely outside of NED's
congressional appropriation: New Delhi, India in 1999; Sao
Paulo, Brazil in 2000; Durban, South Africa in 2004; and
Istanbul, Turkey in April, 2006.
Conclusion
To commemorate the twentieth anniversary of NED's
establishment, the Board of Directors issued an invitation to
President George W. Bush to make a major statement about
democracy. In his address, one of the most significant of his
Presidency, he articulated his vision of a more democratic
Middle East, the one region of the world where democracy has
failed to take hold. Much of his speech echoed one of the major
themes of the Endowment's third strategy document, which calls
for promoting democratic institutions and values in the Muslim
World, while maintaining NED's global grants program.
The National Endowment for Democracy has grown from a
simple but powerful idea into a multi-faceted institution with
a wide-ranging program, solid bipartisan support, and an
ambitious agenda. In the President's 20th anniversary address,
he paused to pay tribute to the Endowment, its staff,
directors, and global program:
By spending for and standing for freedom, you've
lifted the hopes of people around the world, and you've
brought great credit to America.
Notes
1. Vice President, Government and External Relations, National
Endowment for Democracy
2. Seymour Martin Lipset, ``Democratic Linkage and American Aid,'' The
Washington Times, June 11, 1995.
3. The question of whether NED was financially accountable to USIA was
not resolved until 1985, when the GAO ruled that the agency did
have financial (but not programmatic) oversight over the
Endowment.
4. Congressional Record, September 22, 1983, pp. 12703-22.
Interestingly, a number of those Senators voting for the
amendment would eventually become strong supporters: Biden,
Domenici, Kassebaum, Murkowski, Roth, Rudman, Simpson and
Wallop.
5. The General Accounting Office, while finding this action
``understandable,'' subsequently ruled that the earmarks should
nonetheless have been followed. It recommended no retroactive
corrective measures.
6. The vote was influenced by a New York Times article published three
days before the vote reporting that some funding from the labor
institute had been used in the Presidential election in Panama.
NED's Statement of Principles and Objectives, adopted later
that year, asserts that ``No Endowment funds may be used to
finance the campaigns of candidates for public office.''
7. Although the bill was vetoed by President Clinton (for reasons
unrelated to NED) and did not become law, the Board decided to
follow its provision regarding equalization of the target
figures for the four Institutes. This policy has been
maintained since then.The proportion of funding reserved for
Institute projects is currently at the 55% maximum contained in
both the 1995 and 1997 State Department authorization bills.
8. In doing so, the committee cited the fact that some of the
Institutes had begun to receive substantial amounts of funding
from AID. See Conference Report to accompany H.R. 2519, October
14, 1996, p. 105.
9. ``National Endowment for Democracy: Policy and Funding Issues,''
Congressional Research Service, August 2, 1996, p. 5.
10. In the Senate: Frist, Daschle, Lugar, Biden, Graham, Bayh, Kyl,
Hatch, Leahy, Hagel, Levin, McCain, McConnell, and Sarbanes; In
the House: Hyde, Lantos, Cox, Payne, Berman, Bereuter, Cardin,
Chabot, Crowley, Diaz-Balart, Dreier, Engel, Gallegly, (Mark)
Green, Houghton, (Patrick) Kennedy, Kingston, Kirk, Lowey,
Meeks, Menendez, Napolitano, Pitts, Rohrabacher, Ros-Lehtinen,
Royce, (Christopher) Smith, and Ackerman.
11. A conference committee restored $1 million of the $2 million cut
from the appropriation.
12. A fifth issue that is often raised when the Endowment is debated is
the cost to the U.S. treasury. Given the modest size of the NED
budget, it is clear that this ``issue'' is used tactically by
critics to increase support among so-called ``deficit hawks''
and is not what stimulates them to take up the cause.
13. This has been mitigated somewhat on the right by the AFL-CIO's
strong anti-Communist orientation in its international work.
The other aspect of the early criticism of the Endowment's
funding of the labor institute was its disproportionate
allocation vis-a-vis the other core grantees prior to 1995.
Many of those making this criticism were unaware of the fact
that it was a congressional earmark that created the original
imbalance.
14. 22 USC 4412, Sec. 503 (c).
15. Congressional Record, September 22, 1983. P. 12714.
16. The seven were James Baker, Laurence Eagleburger, George Shultz,
Alexander Haig, Henry Kissenger, Edmund Muskie and Cyrus Vance.
17. See ``Democracy Promotion Programs Funded by the U.S. Government,''
A Report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the
House Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. Congress, as
requested in P.L. 103-236, Section 534.
18. See ``A Review of Democracy Programs Funded by the U.S. Agency for
International Development and the National Endowment for
Democracy,'' March 1, 1996.
19. See ``Paying Big Labor to Export its Agenda,'' Insight, July 12,
1992.
20. National Endowment for Democracy, ``Strategy Document,'' January
1992, pp.6-12.
21. General Accounting Office, Decision B-248111, September 9, 1992.
22. National Endowment for Democracy, ``Promoting Democracy in a Time
of Austerity: NED's Strategy for 1997 and Beyond.''
23. Before the Foundation became fully operational, NED hosted a series
of meetings for its acting Executive Director and a founding
Board member in Washington, where they were familiarized with
the Endowment's structure and procedures. The two organizations
have maintained a close relationship since that time.
