S. Hrg. 109-838 EXAMINING DOJ'S INVESTIGATION OF JOURNALISTS WHO PUBLISH CLASSIFIED INFORMATION: LESSONS FROM THE JACK ANDERSON CASE ======================================================================= HEARING before the COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ JUNE 6, 2006 __________ Serial No. J-109-81 __________ Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 33-835 PDF WASHINGTON : 2007 --------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202)512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts JON KYL, Arizona JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware MIKE DeWINE, Ohio HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JOHN CORNYN, Texas CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois TOM COBURN, Oklahoma Michael O'Neill, Chief Counsel and Staff Director Bruce A. Cohen, Democratic Chief Counsel and Staff Director C O N T E N T S ---------- STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS Page Feingold, Hon. Russell D., a U.S. Senator from the State of Wisconsin...................................................... 13 Grassley, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the Stae of Iowa, prepared statement............................................. 139 Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont, prepared statement............................................. 141 Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the State of Pennsylvania................................................... 1 WITNESSES Anderson, Kevin, Fabian and Clendenin, Salt Lake City, Utah...... 18 Feldstein, Mark, Director of Journalism Program, and Associate Professor of Media and Public Affairs, School of Media and Public Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.. 26 Friedrich, Matthew W., Chief of Staff and Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C....................................... 3 Schoenfeld, Gabriel, Senior Editor, Commentary, New York, New York........................................................... 23 Smolla, Rodney, Dean, University of Richmond School of Law, Richmond, Virginia............................................. 21 QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS Responses of Kevin Anderson to questions submitted by Senator Specter........................................................ 39 Responses of Mark Feldstein to questions submitted by Senator Specter........................................................ 45 Responses of Matthew Friedrich to questions submitted by Senators Specter and Leahy.............................................. 49 Responses of Gabriel Schoenfeld to questions submitted by Senator Specter........................................................ 68 Responses of Rodney Smolla to questions submitted by Senator Specter........................................................ 76 SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD Anderson, Kevin, Fabian and Clendenin, Salt Lake City, Utah, statement and attachment....................................... 81 Associated Press, Mark Sherman, Washington, D.C., April 18, 2006, article........................................................ 90 Baltimore Sun: April 20, 2006, editorial.................................... 92 April 22, 2006, article...................................... 93 CBS News, Washington, D.C., April 19, 2006, article.............. 95 CBS Worldwide Inc., Washington, D.C., April 19, 2006, article.... 97 Chicago Tribune, April 23, 2006, article......................... 99 CNN, Washington, D.C., April 20, 2006, transcript................ 101 Editor & Publisher, New York, New York, article.................. 106 Feldstein, Mark, Director of Journalism Program, and Associate Professor of Media and Public Affairs, School of Media and Public Affairs, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., prepared statement............................................. 107 Frankel, Max, New York, New York, letter and attachment.......... 116 Friedrich, Matthew W., Chief of Staff and Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., prepared statement.................. 135 Guardian, April 21, 2006, article................................ 140 Los Angeles Times, Nick Timiraos, April 19, 2006, article........ 143 Miami Herald: April 24, 2006............................................... 144 May 2, 2006.................................................. 145 New York Times, April 19, 2006, article.......................... 147 National Public Radio (NPR), Washington, D.C.: April 19, 2006, transcript................................... 149 April 23, 2006, transcript................................... 151 Presstime, Arlington, Virginia, May 2006, article................ 152 Red Bluff Daily News, April 22, 2006, editorial.................. 158 Salt Lake Tribune, Salt Lake, Utah, article...................... 159 San Francisco Chronicle, April 25, 2006, article................. 161 Schoenfeld, Gabriel, Senior Editor, Commentary, New York, New York, statement and attachments................................ 163 Seattle Post-Intelligencer, April 20, 2006, article.............. 204 Smolla, Rodney, Dean, University of Richmond School of Law, Richmond, Virginia, statement.................................. 205 Star-Ledger, Newark, New Jersey, April, 22, 2006, article........ 221 TPM Muckraker.com, April 19, 2006, article....................... 222 Times-Tribune, Scranton, Pennsylvania, April 20, 2006, article... 224 Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2006, article..................... 225 Washington Post: April 19, 2006, article...................................... 226 April 20, 2006, editorial.................................... 227 April 25, 2006, article...................................... 228 April 29, 2006, commentary................................... 229 EXAMINING DOJ'S INVESTIGATION OF JOURNALISTS WHO PUBLISH CLASSIFIED INFORMATION: LESSONS FROM THE JACK ANDERSON CASE ---------- TUESDAY, JUNE 6, 2006 U.S. Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, D.C. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in room SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Arlen Specter, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. Present: Senators Specter, Grassley, Kyl, Leahy, and Feingold. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA Chairman Specter. It is 9:30, so the Judiciary Committee will proceed with this hearing on the subject of examining the efforts by the Department of Justice to control leaks by newspapers involving classified information. We know that leaks are a fact of life in Washington, D.C., and really virtually everywhere. There is an old adage that the ship of state leaks at the top, and we saw recently that it was true with the President of the United States making a disclosure. There are very important national security interests involved in maintaining the sanctity of classified information. At the same time, there is a tradition of ferreting out governmental wrongdoing--waste, corruption, inefficiency--by disclosures to the press, which function as the guardians of the public in many, many cases. Leaks are made for a variety of reasons, and while they have a very important social purpose, they also have the potential for harmful, deleterious effects on national security. This hearing will be looking into one aspect of expanding Executive authority, which we have seen in recent times with the warrantless national surveillance, with the signing statements where the President chooses which parts of legislation he likes and which parts he does not like, with the search and seizure on Capitol Hill, and a growing concern that the Congress of the United States has not exercised its constitutional responsibilities on oversight. There have been a series of activities which give cause for concern. In April of this year, a CIA employee was fired for allegedly disclosing the existence of secret CIA facilities in Eastern Europe. A Washington Post reporter conducted an expose based on that information and won a Pulitzer Prize. We have seen an investigation into the disclosure of the identity of CIA agent Valerie Plame, leading to the jailing of New York Times reporter Judith Miller for some 85 days. In response, Senator Lugar introduced legislation, which was modified by the Committee and introduced again, which would grant protection to newspaper reporters on a shield. The proposed legislation is very carefully crafted to provide an exception if national security is involved. But it has to be genuine national security. The Valerie Plame investigation started off with a national security purpose but shifted at one point to an investigation as to whether there had been perjury or obstruction of justice before a grand jury. And while those are serious charges, they do not rise to the level of a national security interest which would warrant incarcerating a reporter. That ought to be in our society the very, very last report. So the overtone of that statute will be in issue as well. There has recently been the suggestion that newspapers and newspaper reporters can be prosecuted under a criminal statute which prohibits the disclosure of classified information. Highly doubtful in my mind that that was ever the intent of Congress, but those are the words which can be construed in a way to warrant such prosecution, different from another statute which provides for prosecution in the event that there is an assist to an enemy of the United States. In the famous Pentagon Papers case, United States v. New York Times, in a dictum Justice White said, concurred in by Justice Stewart, that the statute would not provide for injunctive relief to stop a newspaper from publishing material, but would provide the basis for a criminal prosecution against a newspaper. So these are very, very serious issues which we are looking at today, especially in the context of expanding Executive power in many, many directions. We have as our first witness today Matthew Friedrich, who is the Chief of Staff of the Criminal Division, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General. Mr. Friedrich received his law degree from the University of Texas, bachelor's from the University of Virginia. He clerked with Judge Royal Ferguson in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. In 1995, he joined the Tax Division of the Department of Justice. In 1998, he returned to Texas as an Assistant U.S. Attorney. In 2001, he became an Assistant U.S. Attorney in the Eastern District of Virginia, and now he holds the position, as noted, of Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General. Thank you for coming in today, Mr. Friedrich. I would appreciate it if you would stand to take the oath. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before the Judiciary Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. Friedrich. I do. Chairman Specter. Thank you. You may be seated, and we look forward to your testimony. STATEMENT OF MATTHEW W. FRIEDRICH, CHIEF OF STAFF AND PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, CRIMINAL DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. Mr. Friedrich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss with you today the difficult issue of unauthorized disclosures of classified information, sometimes referred to as ``leaks.'' I intend to explain the position of the Department of Justice with respect to the scope of the relevant statutes as they relate to the press and the willful dissemination of classified information. In doing so, I cannot comment on any pending case or investigation. In response to a recent series of leaks of classified information, President Bush has stated that such leaks have damaged our National security, hurt our ability to pursue terrorists, and put our citizens at risk. Porter Goss, then- Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, stated in February of this year that leaks have alerted our enemies to intelligence-collection technologies and operational tactics and ``cost America hundreds of millions of dollars'' to repair the damage caused by leaks. The WMD Commission made similar findings in its report. Members of Congress in both the Senate and the House have repeatedly acknowledged the damage caused by leaks, particularly in this post-September 11th environment. The Department of Justice is committed to investigating and prosecuting leaks of classified information, and Congress has given the Department the statutory tools to do so. Several statutes prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of certain categories of classified information, the broadest of which is Section 793 of Title 18, which prohibits the disclosure of information ``relating to national defense.'' Also, Section 798 of Title 18 prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of information relating to communications intelligence activities. On May 21, 2006, Attorney General Gonzales was asked about the possibility of prosecuting members of the press for publishing classified information, and he stated, in part, as follows: ``There are some statutes on the books which, if you read the language carefully, would seem to indicate that that is a possibility.'' There has been considerable attention paid to the Attorney General's remarks. It is critical to note, however, that the Attorney General is not the first one to recognize the possibility that reporters are not immune from potential prosecution under these statutes. Many judges and commentators have reached the same conclusion. For example, as I believe you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, in the Pentagon Papers case, there may be such a precedent there. In that case, obviously, the United States sought to restrain the New York Times from publishing classified documents relating to the Vietnam War. While the Supreme Court did not decide the question of whether the First Amendment immunizes the press from prosecution for publishing national defense information given to them by a leaker, five concurring Justices questioned the existence of such blanket immunity. In his concurring opinion, Justice White stated: ``[F]rom the face of [the statute] and from the context of the Act of which it was a part, it seems undeniable that a newspaper, as well as others unconnected with the Government, are vulnerable to prosecution under 793(e) if they communicate or withhold materials covered by that section.'' Further, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has affirmed that the First Amendment does not prevent prosecutions under 793 for unauthorized disclosures of classified information and did so over the objection of various news organizations that appeared in the case as amici to support the defendant's First Amendment arguments. Likewise, it is the conclusion of legal commentators with respect to Section 798 that reporters are not exempt from the reach of this statute if the elements of the statute are otherwise met. I would emphasize, however, that there is more to consider here beyond the mere question of the reach of the laws as written. The Department recognizes that freedom of the press is both vital to our Nation and protected by the First Amendment. The Department has never in its history prosecuted a member of the press under Section 793, 798, or other sections of the Espionage Act of 1917 for the publication of classified information, even while recognizing that such a prosecution could be possible under the law. As a policy matter, the Department has taken significant steps to protect, as much as possible, the role of the press in our society. This policy is embodied in Section 50.10 of Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which requires that the Attorney General approve not only prosecutions of members of the press but also investigative steps aimed at the press, even in cases where the press is not itself the target of the investigation. This policy--voluntarily adopted by the Department--ensures that any decision to proceed against the press in a criminal proceeding is made at the very highest levels of the Department. In a press conference last week, the Attorney General stated that the Department's ``primary focus'' is on the leakers of classified information, as opposed to the press. The strong preference of the Department is to work with the press not to run stories containing classified information, as opposed to other alternatives. The Attorney General has made consistently clear that he believes that our country's national security interests and First Amendment interests are not mutually exclusive and can both be accommodated. I appreciate very much the opportunity to appear before you and would be happy to answer your questions. [The prepared state of Mr. Friedrich appears as a submission for the record.] Chairman Specter. We have been joined by Senator Grassley. Senator Grassley, would you care to make an opening statement? Senator Grassley. I think I will put the statement in the record. It is a very short statement. I just think I will put it in the record. [The prepared statement of Senator Grassley appears as a submission for the record.] Chairman Specter. Mr. Friedrich, you say--I believe your words--that it is undeniable that the Department of Justice has the authority to prosecute a newspaper and a reporter for disclosure of classified information? Mr. Friedrich. I believe I was quoting one of the concurring opinions in the Pentagon Papers in using that word. Chairman Specter. Well, aside from the concurring opinion of Justice White, joined in by Justice Stewart, is it the position of the Department of Justice today that Section 793 would warrant--would authorize the prosecution of a newspaper and a reporter for publishing classified information? Mr. Friedrich. I think the answer to that, Senator, is that the Department has consistently interpreted that statute so as to read it as to apply to anyone to whom the elements of the statute-- Chairman Specter. You are giving me a yes answer? Mr. Friedrich. I am, sir. Chairman Specter. And is it the position of the Department of Justice that under Section 798 a newspaper and a reporter can be prosecuted criminally for the disclosure of classified information? Mr. Friedrich. I would provide the same answer there, Senator. Chairman Specter. The answer is yes? Mr. Friedrich. Yes. Chairman Specter. So you are saying that the New York Times and its reporter, James Risen, are subject to prosecution for the disclosures last December 17th about the surveillance program without warrants? Mr. Friedrich. Obviously, Senator, I can't comment as to any particular case or any specific matter. As a general policy proposition, I think the Department has consistently taken the position with respect to those particular statutes that it does not--they do not exempt a class of professionals, any class of professionals, including reporters, from their reach. I think it is important at the same time to bear in mind what the Attorney General said recently, which is that our primary focus is on the leakers themselves, as opposed to members of the media. Chairman Specter. I understood what you said about primary focus, but primary focus leaves latitude for a secondary focus. Mr. Friedrich. It would. Chairman Specter. Has the Department of Justice considered the prosecution of any newspaper or any newspaper reporter for the disclosure of classified information? Mr. Friedrich. Again, Senator, you know, I don't think it would be appropriate for me to comment as to whether or not-- Chairman Specter. I am not asking you about a specific case. I did and you declined to answer, and I might have pressed it but I am not. But I am asking you whether there is any case, without specifying the case, where the Department of Justice has considered prosecuting a newspaper or a reporter for the disclosure of classified information. Mr. Friedrich. With respect, Senator, I think that I have to decline to answer that question as well. I don't think it would be appropriate for me to give an indication one way or another, and I hope people don't read anything into my answer one way or another. Chairman Specter. Well, I disagree with you, Mr. Friedrich. I understand your point in not talking about a specific case. I do not agree with it, but I understand it. But I do not even understand your point in declining to answer whether the Department of Justice has ever considered it. The answer to that would lead to some other questions as to--go ahead. I see you want to speak. Mr. Friedrich. Just to clarify, I heard you initially ask me is it being considered now. I heard you a moment ago ask has it ever been considered. My understanding is there are historical examples. I think some of the later panelists may be able to comment more cogently than I can about historical examples in which that possibility-- Chairman Specter. I am not interested in history this morning. I am interested in current events. I am interested to know whether this Department of Justice, say the Ashcroft Department or the Gonzales Department, has ever considered the prosecution of a newspaper or a reporter for disclosure of classified information. Mr. Friedrich. With respect, Senator, I believe I have to decline to answer that question. Chairman Specter. The Lugar bill, which has been significantly modified in Committee, provides for a reporter's shield but has an exception if there is a matter of national security, and it essentially calls upon the court to undertake a weighing of the public interest in the disclosure of the information to ferret out wrongdoing or the press' traditionally historic role in disclosing wrongdoing contrasted with the national security interest involved. Do you think that that is an appropriate standard for weighing newspaper privilege contrasted with the interest of national security? Mr. Friedrich. As to the general matter of whether such a privilege should be codified, I believe that the Department has consistently taken the position that such legislation is not needed and that the procedures and policies that the Department has in place with respect to the circumstances in which compulsory process should be issued against reporters are themselves a sufficient safeguard. Chairman Specter. Well, the red light went on, and I do not usually transgress, but with Senator Grassley's acquiescence, I am going to ask an important followup question. Do I have your consent, Senator? Senator Grassley. You do. Chairman Specter. I appreciate that you do not think legislation is necessary, and I am not surprised. The administration does not think legislation is necessary to deal with unauthorized surveillance. The administration as yet has not provided an answer to this Committee on legislation, which has been pending for weeks, which would give jurisdiction of that program to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to determine constitutionality. Every time the Congress asserts some oversight authority, the administration pulls back. When there was a pressure applied to have the Intelligence Committees informed about the warrantless searches, the administration declined, even though the National Security Act of 1947 mandates it for committees. When this Committee, when the Judiciary Committee became active, the administration relented and conceded to allow a Subcommittee of the Intelligence Committee, seven Senators, to know. And the House at first resisted a Subcommittee and then finally acquiesced on an 11-person subcommittee, and then only in the face of the Hayden nomination was the administration dragged kicking and screaming into complying with the National Security Act of 1947 to inform the Intelligence Committees. So I am not surprised that the administration does not think that legislation is necessary. But my question was not whether the administration thought legislation was necessary. My question is whether you think that if there is legislation, it is appropriate to have a balancing test where a court would have the authority to weigh the public policy importance of the national security interest contrasted with the public policy importance of the disclosure. Mr. Friedrich. Senator, I think the best way to answer that is in the context--I know that Deputy Attorney General Comey at the time provided a statement with respect to the media shield legislation. This panel also heard from U.S. Attorney Chuck Rosenberg, who discussed in detail the Department's position at the time with respect to media shield. I think the overall objection would be that the media shield legislation would shift from the executive branch to the courts the decision as to whether a subpoena is needed, what the competing interests are, how fast it needs to be issued, whether or not it is essential to the case. We feel that those--in terms of the Department's exercise of its responsibility in this area, I think as to confidential source subpoenas, something like only 13 have been issued in the last 15 years. That would be on the average something of one a year or less. I think the historical record would be that the Department has responsibly exercised its authority in this area and that, you know, there are going to be occasions when we need to move quickly. I accept that the balance you pose is an important one. I think that the--I would like to think the record of the Department is that it has exercised its judgment in this area responsibly. And let's not forget, I mean, there are occasions when it may be important to move very quickly in terms of the issuance of compulsory process. I think that the example that Deputy Attorney General Comey gave-- Chairman Specter. Just a second. Mr. Friedrich. I am sorry, sir. Chairman Specter. Go ahead. Mr. Friedrich. I think, sir, the example that Deputy Attorney General Comey gave in a prepared statement that he rendered was an occasion that came up on the afternoon of September 11th when the U.S. Attorney's Office in San Francisco wanted to issue a subpoena to a news organization which had received information, I understand, from some type of source indicating that bad things would happen on that day. I do not have any factual knowledge of that situation, but that was the example that Deputy Attorney General Comey gave, and I think it certainly highlights the fact that there may be a need to move quickly, and this legislation I think might compromise that. Chairman Specter. Well, I will pick up on your point about shifting the decision from the executive branch to the judicial branch, which is exactly what I think our Constitution requires. Senator Leahy, would you mind yielding to Senator Grassley? I intruded on his time, and he has a 10 o'clock-- Senator Leahy. No, I have no objection. I came in late as it was. Chairman Specter. Senator Grassley? Senator Grassley. Thank you, Senator Leahy. When Director Mueller was before this Committee just a few weeks ago, I asked him about the Bureau's attempt to obtain Jack Anderson's papers by convincing the 79-year-old widow to sign a consent form that she says she did not fully understand. I wanted to know at that time whether that was an appropriate investigative technique, but Director Mueller said at that time that he did not know enough about the circumstances to answer my questions. In preparing to testify here today, I would hope that you have taken some time to learn the details of what the agents did in this case and why they did it. So I ask you, Did the agents who went back and contacted Olivia Anderson without her family's permission act appropriately? Mr. Friedrich. Senator Grassley, I think that that is a question that I am not going to be able to shed light on, but I want to carefully explain the reasons why I cannot. First of all, there is a pending trial in the Eastern District of Virginia called the Rosen and Weissman case, and in that case, the defense in that case has filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for prosecutorial misconduct based upon the actions taken in the Anderson matter. My understanding is that the district judge denied that particular motion but that that case remains pending. And since it is a part of pending litigation or relevant to a part of pending litigation, I don't think that it is something that I can comment on. My understanding, however, Senator, is that the Bureau is following up on the questions you asked and that they intend to submit some type of response to you. And I don't want to interpose myself in the middle of that. Senator Grassley. And your view is that the circumstances in the Anderson questioning could influence that case, that other case? Mr. Friedrich. That was the position--yes, sir. The position that the defense has taken is that there is a factual link between the action in the Anderson matter and the pending investigation that has resulted in a trial in the Eastern District of Virginia. And since that is the circumstance, I simply just can't comment on that matter. Senator Grassley. According to Kevin Anderson, he informed the FBI that he was acting as his mother's attorney, and he authorized the first meeting between the mother and the FBI. However, he says he did not authorize and was unaware of the second meeting where the FBI got her to sign a consent form. Can you explain the Justice Department's policy on contacting a witness who was known to be represented by counsel? And assuming that the Anderson family is correct with what happened, did the actions of the agency in this case violate that policy? Mr. Friedrich. Certainly, Senator, speaking generically--as a general matter--there are very specific policies that the Department has with respect to contact with represented parties. There are also bar rules that apply as well. I would say, you know, the general rule as to contact with represented parties is that, as an attorney, you are not supposed to do it. There are exceptions to that under certain circumstances, but certainly as to Department lawyers, those policies exist. Senator Grassley. Well, then, did the actions of the agents in this case violate that policy? Mr. Friedrich. Again, Senator Grassley, with respect to this specific factual circumstances, I don't have a specific comment on that for the reasons that I had mentioned earlier. I will tell you as a general matter there are some distinctions between the contact with represented parties rules as they apply to Department lawyers versus FBI agents. There are some differences between the ways in which those standards apply. Lawyers are bound by certain sources of law and policies; whereas, agents, depending on the circumstance, may not be bound by the same authorities. Senator Grassley. Well, then, let's go to the issue of classified information. There is some disagreement whether these papers contained classified information, and I would think the family would know more about that than the FBI. The family has said that the files probably do not contain classified documents, and the FBI claimed that Professor Feldstein confirmed it. However, Professor Feldstein denies that he told the FBI that and says that he has seen no classified material in the documents. So which is it? Does the FBI have a solid reason to think that there is classified information in the files that would be harmful to the national security if the FBI did not remove them? Mr. Friedrich. There again, Senator Grassley, I don't believe I can comment on the Anderson matter specifically for the reasons that I had mentioned earlier, and hopefully the Bureau will be submitting some type of factual submission to you on that. Senator Grassley. Well, has the FBI taken time to get a subpoena or search warrant to force that issue? Mr. Friedrich. Again, with respect, I cannot comment specifically with respect to the Anderson matter, Senator. Senator Grassley. Well, Mr. Chairman, I am very disappointed. We asked some of these questions of Director Mueller. I will bet that has been more than a month ago, and we do not have any more answers. And I would think that the Department would send somebody here to testify that could answer our questions if they have any respect for this Committee whatsoever. I yield. Senator Leahy. I think that answers the question. They do not have any respect for this Committee. Why in heaven's name were you sent up here if all you are going to do is take the Fifth Amendment. Chairman Specter. I would like to recognize you, Senator Leahy. Senator Leahy? [Laughter.] Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I mean, you are basically taking what could be called a testifying Fifth Amendment. You should be ashamed of yourself, or your superiors should be ashamed of themselves. Why in heaven's name were you sent up here? I mean, you have been asked by friendly Republicans, no matter what questions you are asked, ``Oh, I don't think I can answer. I don't think I can answer.'' Why were you the one picked to come up here? Mr. Friedrich. Senator, I can tell you my understanding, that on a staff-to-staff level as between our legislative staff and the staff of the Chairman, that it was made clear before I came up here that I would not be able to talk about the Anderson-- Senator Leahy. Well, this is what happens no matter what, from the Department of Justice or the FBI or anything else. Anytime you ask anything where there might have been a screw-up by this administration, ``I don't think I can answer that. I am not really taking the Fifth. I just won't answer.'' It is very, very frustrating. There is this arrogance in this administration against any kind of oversight, probably because they basically have--except possibly for this Committee--a rubber stamp Republican leadership that allows them to do anything they want. But that is what you are doing. Let me ask you this: Is there any truth to the fact that some of these papers were looked at because it goes into the personal life of J. Edgar Hoover? Mr. Friedrich. Senator, again, with respect to the Anderson matter, I am not able to comment on that matter at all. Senator Leahy. So what you are doing, you are sent up here to be a punching bag. Is that it? Mr. Friedrich. Senator, again-- Senator Leahy. You don't have to answer. I realize that. It is like the Attorney General. Is there any questions you guys are allowed to answer other than your title, the time of day? I mean, is this sort of like a prisoner-of-war kind of thing? Mr. Friedrich. Senator, I can tell you that, again, my understanding in coming up here was on a staff-to-staff level that I was--I was led to believe that the Chairman's staff was informed that I would not be able to answer questions about the Anderson case, precisely for the reasons that I discussed. I am prepared, and if you will note the statement that I gave specifically relates to the law relating to the applicability of the Espionage Act and other statutes that go to the disclosure of classified information, that-- Senator Leahy. Well, let me ask you a little bit about that then. We have the Espionage Act. We talk about how that can be used. It can also be used, if need be, to chill dissent. This administration has spent billions of dollars--that is billions with a ``b''--to classify far more material than any administration in history, including the administration during World War II or World War I when we had real reason to do it. We found that in 2004 the Government made 15.6 million classification decisions. Sometimes they classified something that had been on a Government website for months or even years. People had downloaded it thousands of times. Suddenly they say it is classified. We know some of this intelligence information was classified simply to cover up mistakes made by this administration. In fact, many, many, many, many times things were classified to cover up mistakes by the administration. If there was improper classification of intelligence information, would that be a proper defense to criminal charges brought under the Espionage Act? Mr. Friedrich. I think that that would--I think improper classification might be a defense to certain statutes. Senator Leahy. The Espionage Act? Mr. Friedrich. That one I would have to check in particular. I am not certain. Senator Leahy. For a moment there, I actually thought I was getting an answer and I was about to applaud you. It would be so unprecedented. And I hate to even highlight it because I do not want you to get fired for breaking precedence with the Department of Justice. But, you know, if Daniel Ellsberg had not leaked the Pentagon Papers to the New York Times and the Washington Post, we may never have known about the official misconduct during the Vietnam War. If Special Agent Coleen Rowley had not publicly revealed problems with the FBI's counterterrorism investigation, we may never have known how this administration screwed up before 9/11 and failed to connect the dots. Should Government be able to use the threat of criminal prosecution to shield the public from revealing its own mistakes? Mr. Friedrich. I think the answer to that, Senator, is that there is the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Act of 1998 that is set up for that specific purpose. If a member of the intelligence community has concerns about the legality, has an urgent concern about something that they are working on, believes it may not be legal, there is a specific process that is in place that is set up so that they can bring that to the attention of the Inspector General of their agency and the matter can be taken up from there all the way to the Hill Intelligence Committees, if necessary. So I think that-- Senator Leahy. I am talking about people at the Department of Justice. Mr. Friedrich. I am sorry? Senator Leahy. What about with people within the Department of Justice? Senator Grassley, he and I and others have worked very hard on whistleblower legislature. But it seems anytime anybody uses Whistleblower, it is a career ender. They get shunted aside. They get put into non-work situations. Certain administrations--and this is something that probably reflects most administrations--will come down on them like a ton of bricks if they use it. But you think that is the only protection, the whistleblower statutes? Mr. Friedrich. What I was answering, Senator, is some have suggested simply that because there have been some leaks of classified information in the past that some have deemed to have important policy or historical value, you know, that that simply should make the wholesale leaking of classified information OK whenever someone feels like publishing it, because there have been occasions when such leaks have revealed even illegal conduct. And my response to that is that that is a false dilemma because there are procedures in place like the Intelligence Community Whistleblower Act that would allow those concerns to be handled in a classified environment, all the way up to the Hill Intelligence Committees. Senator Leahy. Well, let's go into the other stuff, though, when somebody does give information out to the press, the subject of this hearing. I will put my full statement in the record and not take my time for that. But let me ask you this, you mention in your statement the Department's official policy with regard to the issuance of subpoenas to members of the news media. It requires the Attorney General to approve not only prosecutions of members of the press, but investigative steps aimed at the press, even in cases where the press itself is not the subject of an investigation. So my three questions are fairly easy. First, did Attorney General Gonzales expressly authorize the FBI's attempt to rummage through Mr. Anderson's papers? If not, who did? Second, has the FBI made any attempt to obtain the information from alternative non-media sources, which, as you testified, is part of the procedures? And, third, does the important public policy against Government intimidation or harassment of the press become obsolete if a journalist has died? Mr. Friedrich. Taking the first two questions, Senator, again, as I said before, I can't comment on the Anderson matter specifically, but what I can tell you is that the procedures that are in place are geared toward the issuance of compulsory process, such as a subpoena. If there is a circumstance in which information is simply requested as a generic matter-- Senator Leahy. But if you go to an elderly widow shortly after her husband has died and have FBI agents show up and say, ``We want these papers,'' you don't have to get any authorization for that? Mr. Friedrich. What I can tell you, Senator, as a general matter is that those procedures are geared toward the issuance of compulsory process. You will notice that in other parts of the policy, it asks questions like, Have we attempted to obtain cooperation? Have we attempted to obtain the information from other means? So that would seem to suggest that the general policy would be to try to get voluntary compliance as opposed to issuing compulsory process. Senator Leahy. And it is totally voluntary if an elderly widow is faced with FBI agents flashing badges and saying, ``We want these papers.'' Mr. Friedrich. Again, Senator, I cannot comment on the Anderson case. Senator Leahy. And the rest of my question I assume you are not going to answer, so-- Mr. Friedrich. I would be happy to try to answer any additional questions you have. Senator Leahy. No, no. The rest of that question. It is a three-part question. I mean, I asked-- Mr. Friedrich. Would you mind restating, sir, your third question? Senator Leahy. Did the FBI make any attempt to obtain the information from alternative non-media sources? And you give the same non-answer to that. Is that correct? Mr. Friedrich. I believe that your third question was something different, but I may be mistaken. Senator Leahy. The second part, did they make any other attempt. The third part was, does the important public policy against Government intimidation or harassment of the press become obsolete once a journalist dies? Mr. Friedrich. Senator, I think that--let me separate that question, if I could, into the issue of deceased reporters versus deceased sources. As to the applicability of that policy toward deceased members of the media, you know, I doubt that that is something that has come up often. But in preparation for this hearing and having talked to others in the Department about it, I think that this is, frankly, an area that the Department should take a look at. What I can tell you in the interim is as we are taking a look at it, if a case comes up which involves--where the Department is considering the issuance of compulsory process to the estate of a deceased reporter, even though these policies might not on their face apply, I will give you an assurance on behalf of the Department that they will be followed until we can followup and give you an answer on that. Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Specter. Thank you, Senator Leahy, and your full statement will be made a part of the record. [The prepared statement of Senator Leahy appears as a submission for the record.] Chairman Specter. Before turning to Senator Feingold, I have just a brief comment. As you have noted, there is a certain level of concern between the Congress exercising oversight and the responses of the Executive, and we fully appreciate the inherent constitutional authority the President has under Article II and the statutes which involve the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and questions whether there is inherent power for the electronic surveillance program, and sometimes the discussions get a little heated. Senator Leahy and I have been able to maintain a pretty cool atmosphere. I don't really think anybody thinks you ought to be ashamed of yourself. You are carrying out the instructions from the Department of Justice, and we understand that. And we will pressure you for information to the extent we can in a respectful manner, and we will not use you as a punching bag. And when we question you, to the extent we can, we have also to question the Attorney General. He is going to be back before this Committee later this month, and we understand that you work for him and work for the Department. Senator Feingold? STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF WISCONSIN Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a brief statement. Thank you for holding the hearing. A free society cannot long survive without a robust free press, and that is why I have expressed concern before about the chilling effect of high-profile contempt prosecutions of journalists. It is also why I support a Federal reporter's shield law to join the reporter's privilege that is already recognized in 49 States plus the District of Columbia. It is also why I am deeply worried about possible prosecution of journalists under the Espionage Act of 1917 for publishing classified information. As we all know by now, the Attorney General a few weeks ago was asked about this possibility. He responded that, ``There are some statutes on the books which, if you read the language carefully, would seem to indicate that that is a possibility.'' That may not sound like it, but it was a very dramatic statement. The Espionage Act has never before been used to prosecute journalists for publishing classified information, and there are serious questions about whether Congress intended it to apply to journalists. It also poses very serious First Amendment questions that I know some of the witnesses will be addressing and have addressed. Mr. Chairman, of course, we must take the leaks of classified information very seriously, but we have other tools at our disposal. Individuals who have security clearances and have made a commitment to the United States Government to keep it secret should be prosecuted if they violate the law by leaking classified information. That is where our Government's enforcement focus has always been, and I think that is where it should be. We can be tough on leakers without going after journalists and creating a very significant chilling effect. But I am grateful that you are having this hearing, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate the opportunity to make a brief statement. Chairman Specter. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold. Mr. Friedrich, going back to your opening statement, I had asked you about the legislation introduced by Senator Lugar, and since modified in the Committee, about establishing a balancing on a shield or a reporter's privilege in terms of weighing the public policy interests of the First Amendment and public disclosure contrasted with the national security interest involved. And you responded to that that your Department was opposed to that on the ground of transferring responsibility from the executive branch to the judicial branch. And my question really turns on the preference of having the judiciary make a determination as opposed to the executive branch. In the section that you refer to, 50.10, the standard as set forth on the Department of Justice decision to conduct an investigation--to move into the area where there are news- gathering interests is to ``strike the proper balance between the public's interest in the free dissemination of ideas and information and the public's interest in effective law enforcement and the fair administration of justice.'' Well, in a case where you have a constitutional issue of freedom of the press and you have the weighty considerations involved in that kind of a balancing, isn't it the traditional standard in this country in case of a contest to have a matter decided by the courts instead of by the executive branch, which has a unique interest in the prosecution? Mr. Friedrich. Let me make two points there, Senator. First of all, as a practical matter, once a subpoena or once compulsory process is cut, you know, if the newspaper opposes that, they would file a motion to quash, which would take that matter into the courts at that point, and the courts would be able to make whatever determination they want. So far as a constitutional balancing, obviously the Branzburg case has held as a constitutional matter that there is not a right of reporters to appear not to testify under--the First Amendment does not create a bar to that regardless of any pledge that a reporter may have made to his or her sources. So I think so far as the constitutional issue in terms of the issuance of process, I believe that the Court has answered that question. There is still an open question as to whether or not there may be a privilege at common law, but I think as to the constitutional question, I believe that that question has been answered. Chairman Specter. Well, whether there is a privilege in common law is not determinative if Congress decides to create a privilege. There is no newsman's privilege at common law. There is a husband and wife privilege. There is a client-attorney privilege, although there is some reason to doubt whether there is anymore an attorney-client privilege with what the Department of Justice is doing today, with the coercive activities to get lawyers and clients to waive the attorney- client privilege. But moving aside from the common law privilege issue, which is not relevant here, isn't it desirable to have the Congress make a determination as to what the considerations are as opposed to, as you say, have the judge do whatever he or she wants? Mr. Friedrich. There, Senator, again, I think that the position of the Department--and I know you have heard testimony as to that issue from a number of representatives from the Department--has consistently been that that legislation in creating a media shield is not needed, that it would slow down the effective administration of justice, that-- Chairman Specter. Slow down the effective administration of justice to have Congress establish standards for what the privilege is, on a constitutional issue? Mr. Friedrich. If that would mean creating a media shield law under which the Department in every case in which it wanted to issue a subpoena would have to go to court to do so before it could be issued, yes, I think that would slow the process down. I know even in the case of litigating privilege matters in the grand jury context sometimes-- Chairman Specter. Well, our legislation does not require the Department of Justice to go to court before issuing a subpoena, and our legislation provides for a statutory privilege and establishes legislative standards as to what the courts should consider in determining whether the privilege is valid. Mr. Friedrich. Senator, I will be happy to have folks at the Department take a closer look at that bill and submit to you a more detailed response as to what the position of the Department is. Chairman Specter. Well, the red light went on when you started your answer, but if you can get a more detailed response from the Department of Justice, more power to you. Thank you. Senator Leahy? Senator Leahy. I was kind of chuckling at that myself. If you know how to get questions answered in DOJ, I have got several letters that have gone unanswered for years, both when I was Chairman and as Ranking Member of this Committee. So you have a magic touch that nobody else seems to have, including the Attorney General. In fact, some of these even Senator Specter and I have asked him in the Oval Office of the President with the Attorney General standing there, and we still do not get the answers. But let me ask you one thing you could answer, and it has nothing to do with this. In January, we learned that the Justice Department issued subpoenas to three major Internet companies. They wanted information about what millions--I assume most of these millions Americans are law-abiding--were searching for on the Internet. Now we hear they have asked Microsoft, AOL, Google, and other Internet companies to retain records on their customers' web-browsing activities. My question is this: What sorts of records does the Department ask these companies to retain? For how long? What were the companies' responses? And should we be expecting a proposal from the Department for legislation in this area? Mr. Friedrich. Senator, as I sit here, I don't know the answer to that in terms of what was requested or the circumstances under which it was requested. I don't know that I will be able to respond, but I am happy to look into it, and if we can give you a response, we will. Senator Leahy. Well, will you do this: respond either way. If you can't respond, let me know that, because then I will know whether to ask somebody else. Mr. Friedrich. All right. Senator Leahy. Thank you. And as I said, and following up on what Senator Specter said, I did not want you to be here as a punching bag. I just felt some of the people in your Department maybe set you up that way. Mr. Friedrich. I will have a much happier walk back down Pennsylvania Avenue knowing that, Senator. [Laughter.] Senator Leahy. It is a lovely day. I was out walking about 5:30 this morning. I hope it is still just as nice. And that is a nice walk. We are fortunate, both you and I, to be able to work in a city this beautiful and this historical. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Specter. Senator Kyl, would you care to question? Senator Kyl. No. Thank you. Chairman Specter. Just another comment or two, and then we will move to the next panel. Mr. Friedrich, when you go back to get a response from the Department of Justice on the shield law, the balancing which we have discussed here, I wish you would take with you, although we have called this to the attention of the Attorney General and the administration at very high levels, the concerns that some of us have about Congressional oversight. And when we talk about shifting the decision from the executive branch to the judicial branch, I would suggest to you that that is really the tradition of the administration of justice. I know that the Department of Justice believes, as the inscription is over your building, the Department wins whenever justice is done. And I was a prosecutor, and a prosecutor has a quasi-judicial function to see that justice is done. But there is still a big advocate's role--a big, big, advocate's role in the prosecutor. So that when you have these questions, they are really traditionally decided in our system by the courts, not by the prosecutor, even though the prosecutor is quasi- judicial. And when you seek an answer on the legislation as to reporter's shield, see if you can get one on the legislation which is pending to turn over to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court the determination of constitutionality of the administration's surveillance program. And I will not ask you whether you think--or maybe I will. Don't you agree that it is the tradition in our system on these questions of disagreement between the executive and legislative branch, Article I and Article II officials, to have them decided by the courts. And isn't the tradition, before there is an invasion of privacy or a search, search and seizure, that there is the imposition of the impartial magistrate between the citizen and the Government? Mr. Friedrich. I certainly agree with you, Senator, that that is the procedure in search warrant cases and that, you know, the courts have spoken at some length about the different role of the executive and legislative branches and where the appropriate power lies between. I believe in the context of media shield legislation, certainly with respect to some of the proposals that have been put forth--and I do not claim to have familiarity with all of them. Some of them would seek to have the Government essentially get prior approval from the judicial branch before even issuing a subpoena, and that is what I was alluding to earlier. Chairman Specter. Well, I appreciate your answer, and we are seeking a way to accommodate the interests of the executive branch and maintaining the secrecy of the surveillance program. We have the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court which has an unblemished record for maintaining confidentiality and secrecy, and they have the expertise to make the decision. And we are trying to find some way to have an accommodation with the Department of Justice, and this Committee has a different function than the Intelligence Committee. Our job is to have Congressional oversight on constitutional issues. And we are right in the middle of a constitutional issue on the electronic surveillance program, and we are right in the middle of a constitutional issue on freedom of speech and reporter's shield and the potential for prosecution under Sections 793 and 798. But we appreciate your categorical answer that the Department of Justice thinks it has the authority to prosecute criminally because I believe that is an invitation to the Congress to legislate on the subject, because we do decide where the criminal prosecutions will be brought. That is clearly our authority, and we are now on notice as to what we need to consider. Mr. Friedrich. If I may, Senator? Chairman Specter. Sure. Mr. Friedrich. Simply in terms of a categorical answer, again, I just want to clarify that I am speaking, as I believe the Attorney General was speaking, as to the potential reach of the law. I just want to again emphasize that, you know, the Attorney General has also said that our primary focus is on prosecuting the leakers as opposed to other options, and that our primary--that our much preferred path would be to attempt to work with reporters voluntarily to convince them not to publish classified information which could lead to the compromise of our most sensitive technologies, harm our young men and women who serve in the service of this country, and cause damage. Chairman Specter. Well, I appreciate your addendum, and I started off by saying that the national security interests are enormous--enormous--and they have to be balanced with the constitutional rights. But where you have a criminal statute where you can send people to jail and have a chilling effect on newspapers, it is really the Congressional role to define it and to establish standards. And I think clearly the ball is in our court. You have some balls in your court, and we have some in our court. I have just been notified that we have a vote on, so we will go vote, and we will be back promptly to take up the second panel. Thank you all. [Recess 10:28 a.m. to 10:54 a.m.] Chairman Specter. Would you gentlemen stand for the administration of the oath? Do each of you solemnly swear that the evidence you give before this Committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? Mr. Anderson. I do. Mr. Smolla. I do. Mr. Schoenfeld. I do. Mr. Feldstein. I do. Chairman Specter. May the record who that each has answered in the affirmative. Thank you very much for coming in, gentlemen. We turn to our first witness, who is Mr. Kevin Anderson, a partner in the law firm of Fabian and Clendenin, Salt Lake City, Utah; bachelor's degree from the University of Utah; law degree from Georgetown. He acted as an assistant to his journalist father, Mr. Jack Anderson, in the 1970s. Thank you very much for coming in today, Mr. Anderson, and we look forward to your testimony. STATEMENT OF KEVIN N. ANDERSON, FABIAN AND CLENDENIN, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH Mr. Anderson. Thank you, Chairman Specter and members of the Committee. I appreciate this opportunity. I would like to acknowledge in the room with us today is my mother, and there are six of the nine members of my family also present. Chairman Specter. All present? Would they mind standing so we can recognize them and acknowledge them. Now, you say, Mr. Anderson, that your mother is right behind you, and the others who stood are your siblings? Mr. Anderson. Yes, that is correct. Chairman Specter. And six of the nine? Mr. Anderson. Yes, including me, are here. Chairman Specter. Well, that is a wonderful family. Congratulations to you, Mrs. Anderson, and all the Andersons. And reset the clock to 5 minutes. Mr. Anderson. Thank you, Senator. I will address the events surrounding the FBI's request to access my father's papers and my family's view of how he would have reacted to the Government's investigation of journalists who publish classified information. About 6 weeks after my father's death, FBI Agent Leslie Martell called my mother to gain access to Dad's papers. As the attorney in the family, I called her and was told that the FBI believed that there were classified documents among Dad's papers that would help the Government in a criminal investigation. I was left with the impression that the FBI's probe concerned terrorism. I was assured that no member of the family was the target of the investigation. As several members of this Committee know, Dad often cooperated with criminal investigations where it would not violate the confidentiality of his sources. I told Agent Martell that she could meet with Mom. Afterwards, Mom was excited to tell me that she thought Agent Martell might be related through her family roots in West Virginia, where Mom was born and raised. She found this more interesting than what the FBI wanted. All she remembered was that it involved something about Dad's papers from the 1970s. My Mom cooperated with the investigation. She told the FBI agents where the boxes were located. She put them in touch with Dr. Feldstein and Dr. Chambless, both of whom had reviewed some of the boxes. Dr. Chambless, with the blessing of the family, even sent a 12-page inventory of 80 of the boxes he had reviewed to the FBI. Several weeks later, the FBI asked me to confirm that the family and not the Gelman Library at George Washington University owned the papers, and I confirmed that the family did own them. And because of the family's concern, I told the agent at that time that the family would need more information about what documents the FBI wanted. Next I received a call from Dr. Feldstein at GW saying that the FBI claimed to have a consent that Mom had signed. I immediately called Agent Martell, upset that as the family attorney I had not been told about the consent and had not even seen it. To this day, I have not seen the consent. She was very apologetic and arranged a conference call. During that call, two FBI agents and one of the U.S. Attorneys General involved in the criminal case told me that the request for Dad's papers was in connection with the AIPAC investigation. The FBI said that classified materials may have been passed between Dad's office and the defendants in that case and perhaps even between Dad's office and a member of the Foreign Intelligence Service in the early 1980s. They wanted to check for fingerprints on some of the documents. I told them that I thought that the presence of those types of documents in Dad's papers was extremely unlikely. I also expressed my concern to them that the AIPAC prosecution could be viewed as a step toward prosecuting journalists. I felt Dad would have vigorously opposed such an effort. The FBI and Department of Justice representatives assured me that they were not after Dad's sources, family members, or George Washington University for possession of classified documents. We also discussed hypothetically the scope of an FBI review of Dad's papers, assuming that the family would decide to cooperate. The agents made it clear that they intended to review all of his papers, regardless of their relevance to the AIPAC case. In addition, they repeatedly stated that they would be ``duty bound'' to remove all possible classified documents, either permanently or redact them and return them. I felt this would destroy the political, historic, and cultural value of Dad's papers. I made several suggestions to limit the scope. These were rejected, including my offer to personally review the papers to locate anything related to the AIPAC case. I was told that because I did not have a security clearance, I could not review my father's papers. In early April, at a meeting with FBI's former First Amendment attorney, Michael Sullivan, and an attorney for GW, I came to the conclusion that the AIPAC investigation was nothing but a fishing expedition, at best, and at worst, a pretext for the FBI to learn what it could not discover about Dad's sources when he was alive. The family met and instructed Mr. Sullivan to formally reject the FBI's request. A copy of that letter has been provided to the Committee. The family feels that the FBI's review of Dad's papers and removal of documents would be contrary to his wishes. He taught us that the press' constitutional role was to keep an eye on those who govern us, not to be a bulldog or a lapdog, but a watchdog. He used to say that our Founding Fathers understood that Government by its nature tends to oppress. There is nothing in the Constitution about the freedom to practice law or to practice medicine, but there is something in the Constitution about the freedom of the press. Dad was fond of quoting Thomas Jefferson, who was vilified by the press more than any recent politician. ``[W]ere it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter,'' Jefferson wrote. For more than a generation, Dad and his mentor, Drew Pearson, were among the most significant journalistic checks in the Nation's capital. At a time when Members of Congress and even the White House were afraid of J. Edgar Hoover, Dad had his staff openly rifle through Hoover's trash to give the former FBI Director a taste of his own medicine. Dad often said that documents that came across his desk were classified as ``national security'' secrets, but he characterized them as really ``political security'' secrets. They showed the misdeeds and manipulations of Government employees who had abused the public trust and then tried to sweep the evidence under the secrecy stamp. Such information should not be hidden from the people. Ours is a Government of the people. Dad taught us that the people are the sovereigns. Those who work in Government are our servants. We, the people, have the right to know what our servants are doing when they act in our name. The secrecy stamp must not shield the actions of our officials from scrutiny. The press, as the watchdog, must be free to criticize and condemn, to expose and oppose the Government. Finally, concerning the reporter's shield law being considered by this committee, I believe that Dad would have insisted that the First Amendment provides the best shield. I know that my father was concerned with protecting his sources. This concern is real. After the recent publicity, I have been contacted by several sources who still fear that their identification would result in political, financial, and even physical harm. The FBI's efforts have underscored the need for protection of journalists, their families, and in this case-- excuse me, journalists, their sources, and in this case, even their families. Again, thank you for this opportunity. [The prepared statement of Mr. Anderson appears as a submission for the record.] Chairman Specter. Thank you very much, Mr. Anderson. We turn now to Dean Rodney Smolla, dean of the University of Richmond School of Law; bachelor's degree from Yale, a law degree from Duke; has taught at many law schools--College of William and Mary, Duke, University of Denver, University of Arkansas, University of Illinois, at DePaul College of Law. Quite a record, and now he is the dean at the University of Richmond School of Law. Thank you very much for coming in, and the floor is yours, Dean Smolla. STATEMENT OF RODNEY A. SMOLLA, DEAN, UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND SCHOOL OF LAW, RICHMOND, VIRGINIA Mr. Smolla. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to go right to the heart of the constitutional and public policy issues that you and others have been addressing throughout the hearing. As you have recognized and your fellow Senators have recognized, the Constitution and the First Amendment specifically absolutely have to be a vital part of this discussion. We start with the First Amendment baseline, which is a long series of cases, a venerable series of cases, in which the Supreme Court of the United States has made it clear that all citizens, including reporters, have a presumptive First Amendment right to publish truthful information that is lawfully obtained. That is sometimes described as the Daily Mail line of cases. It is important to remember that in almost every one of those cases, somebody did something wrong to give the material to the reporter--there was a leak, the material was classified, there was a restraining order on the material. Nevertheless, the reporter obtained the material and the Supreme Court sustained the First Amendment right of that journalist to publish that material. Now, that line of cases puts great pressure on that phrase ``lawfully obtained,'' and to this day, the Supreme Court has never given that phrase complete clarity. A narrow concept of it could mean that the reporter does not in some affirmative way engage in lawbreaking in obtaining the material, the reporter does not hack into the computer file or break into somebody's office. But it could also have a broader meaning. It could conceivably mean that if the reporter passively receives information that the reporter knows someone else is breaking the law in handing over to that reporter, that the reporter is in some sense tainted by the transaction and that the material is not lawfully obtained. It is clear that the Supreme Court itself does not believe this is a First Amendment question that is completely settled. For example, in one of the famous cases in this line, Florida Star v. B.J.F., the Court said--I will quote it directly: ``The Daily Mail principle does not settle the issue whether, in cases where information has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source, government may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well.'' In one of the few cases in which the Court has gotten deeply into this, a recent case, Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Supreme Court dealt with illegally intercepted cell phone conversations. None of us wants to hear our cell phone conversations broadcast on the radio or printed in a newspaper. The Supreme Court in that case held that the First Amendment protected the journalists who published and broadcast that information, even though plainly someone broke the law in intercepting it. Now, Bartnicki is a somewhat confusing and ambivalent ruling because two Justices who were necessarily the majority in that case, Justice Breyer and Justice O'Connor, took a sort of intermediate position. Justice Breyer, who wrote that concurring opinion, said, ``In this case, I believe the First Amendment protects what the reporters did, but it is important to me that what was happening is that the material that was being broadcast revealed wrongdoing, potential violence, potential lawbreakers by the speakers. And in that posture,'' he said, ``I think the First Amendment trumps,'' but he left open the possibility that this was not an absolute principle and that you could have a narrowly crafted law that would satisfy the First Amendment standards. Many of the other cases that are out there, including the Pentagon Papers case, which you have alluded to, Senator, do not give us a clear answer. We know in the Pentagon Papers case that the Supreme Court said in the context of national security that even the doctrine of prior restraint was not absolute, that there could come a situation where you would allow a prior restraint under the First Amendment. We know the Court left unresolved one of the questions you were questioning the Justice Department representative on, which is whether the Espionage Acts do or don't allow for prosecution. But one critical thing that is central to Pentagon Papers, that is part of the holding, is that it was clearly critical to a majority of the Court that the material at issue did not compromise any ongoing live operations with regard to the prosecution of the Vietnam War. It was a matter of great public interest. It unveiled wrongdoing in some respects. But it was history, and it had passed into the public domain, it seemed the Court was saying, which shows us that it must be the rule that just because something is classified does not mean that there is carte blanche for the Government to go after a journalist who traffics in it. It would overstate matters to say that the First Amendment absolutely bars making the receipt of information or the downstream publishing of the information unconstitutional. We know that cannot be the case. The Court has never said that in the Daily Mail line of cases, and we have one prominent example where the Court has held to the contrary, in the obscenity area, where the Supreme Court held originally in Stanley v. Georgia that you could not make the mere possession of obscene material--which was illegal. You could not make the mere possession of the material a crime because that was tantamount to making a thought crime. The Court said that rule did not apply later in the context of child pornography, where you could make the mere possession of the material a form of contraband. So we do know that there are times when we have interests of sufficiently high order to justify a narrowly drawn statute. The very last point I will make, Senator, is that although I think conceivably a narrowly drawn law could be crafted by Congress that would protect national security secrets with sufficient safeguards and tailoring and so on to not violate existing First Amendment doctrine, that does not mean it is a good idea. It does not mean it is wise public policy. And it certainly does not mean that we ought to interpret existing statutes as saying that, although some of the sections of existing law by their bland language would appear to encompass the mere possession or publishing of classified information. As has already been brought out powerfully in this hearing, that is not our tradition. There is very serious doubt that this Congress intended for that to be how those laws would be used, and we have not in the history of this Republic used them that way. And in light of that cultural experience, that societal understanding, and the serious First Amendment tensions that are created if we were to go there, the better interpretation of existing law is that it is too dangerous to interpret those statutes as if they empower the Government to prosecute journalists. And it would be bad public policy, in my view, Senator, if Congress were to attempt to clarify the law in a way that would empower the Government to go after journalists. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Smolla appears as a submission for the record.] Chairman Specter. We now turn to Dr. Gabriel Schoenfeld, Commentary Magazine senior editor, who has written on a wide variety of subjects--the Vietnam War, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, the cold war, anti-Semitism; published in the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, New Republic; appeared on many TV shows; a Ph.D. from Harvard's governmental department in 1989. Thank you very much for joining us, Dr. Schoenfeld, and we look forward to your testimony. STATMENT OF GABRIEL SCHOENFELD, SENIOR EDITOR, COMMENTARY, NEW YORK, NEW YORK Mr. Schoenfeld. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to be invited here to testify today. As a journalist, I know firsthand the vital role played by a free press in our great country. Just this past week, two members of the media were killed and a third was critically injured while reporting on the war in Iraq. One cannot be indifferent to the risks that journalists are taking on a daily basis to bring us the information on which we depend to keep our society free and our debate open and well informed. But the tragedy that befell Kimberly Dozier and her crew also served to underscore the fact that our country is now at war. Thousands of our young men and women are in harm's way in distant locations around the world. And on September 11, 2001, as a result of a massive intelligence failure, we found that our own homeland was also in harm's way. Three thousand Americans paid for that intelligence failure with their lives. Obviously, many different factors contributed to that intelligence lapse. One of them is the subject of today's hearing, namely, leaks of classified information. The Jack Anderson archive affair is part of an issue with broad and urgent ramifications. The 9/11 Commission report stated that in 1998 a leak to the press led al Qaeda's senior leadership to stop using a particular communications channel, which made it much more difficult for our National Security Agency to intercept Osama bin Laden's conversations. Our Government's ability to gain insight into the plans of a deadly adversary were compromised by the actions of a leaker or leakers inside of Government and by journalists willing to publish what they had learned from those leakers, no matter what the cost to our National security. The damage caused by that leak was not widely recognized at the time, and no action was taken against the leakers or the newspaper which first published the secret information. But the episode highlights the crucial importance of communications intelligence in the war on terrorism and the special vulnerability of this form of intelligence to disclosure. It was precisely because of that vulnerability that in 1950 Congress added a very clear provision to the U.S. Criminal Code dealing specifically with communications intelligence. What is now known as Section 798 of Title 18 made it a crime to publish classified information pertaining to communications intelligence. I should add that that Act was passed in the aftermath of a press leak during World War II, in the Battle of Midway, when the Chicago Tribune had disclosed that our intelligence agencies had succeeded in breaking Japanese codes, which was a very serious leak that threatened the lives of thousands of American soldiers and threatened to prolong the war. Now, Section 798 is free from all the ambiguities and constitutional problems that beset the 1917 Espionage Act. It was passed virtually without debate by Congress and won the approval at the time it was passed of, among other organizations, the American Society of Newspaper Editors. In the years since its passage, Section 798 has never been employed for the prosecution of a journalist. It is a law that was designed for special circumstances that are very dangerous but also very rare. Unfortunately, those special and rare circumstances appear to be upon us today. On September 11th, our country suffered a second and more terrible Pearl Harbor. Overnight, we were thrust into a new kind of war, a war in which intelligence is the most important front. It is also a war in which, if our intelligence fails us, we as an open society are uniquely vulnerable. If we are to defend ourselves successfully in this war and not fall victim to a third Pearl Harbor, perhaps a nuclear Pearl Harbor, it is imperative that our Government and our intelligence agencies preserve the ability to conduct counterterrorist operations in secret. I do not know what classified documents, if any, might be contained in Jack Anderson's archive. But from the press reports I have seen and from the testimony here today, they do not appear to be of recent vintage, and some of them might go back as far as the Korean War. Now, surely, if the FBI can demonstrate that there are documents in that archive the disclosure of which will damage national security or bear on criminal behavior, the FBI and the Justice Department have the statutory right to obtain a warrant to search and seize those documents. It probably would have enjoyed that right when Anderson was alive, and it certainly has them now that he is dead. Whether it should exercise that right today in the middle of the war on terrorism is another matter entirely. Unless facts come to light that alter our understanding of what is in that archive, the entire episode appears to be a misallocation of investigative resources. There are other leaks that have been far more damaging which the FBI is not pursuing with any seriousness at all, as best we can tell. Beginning last December 16th, the New York Times published a series of articles reporting that shortly after September 11, 2001, President Bush had authorized the National Security Agency to intercept electronic communications between al Qaeda operatives and individuals inside the United States and providing details about how those interceptions were being conducted. Now, the 9/11 Commission had identified the gap between our domestic and foreign intelligence-gathering capabilities as one of the primary weaknesses in protecting our country against terrorism. The NSA terrorist surveillance program aimed to cover that gap. The program, by the Times' own account of it, was one of our country's most closely guarded secrets in the war on terrorism. I am not privy to the workings of the program, but a broad range of Government officials have said that the program was vital to our security and that the New York Times disclosure inflicted critical damage on a crucial counterterrorism initiative. Compounding the direct damage caused by the compromise of the NSA program is harm of a more general sort. In waging the war on terrorism, the U.S. depends heavily on cooperation with the intelligence agencies of allied countries. When our own intelligence services, including the NSA, the most secretive branch of all, demonstrate that they are unable to keep shared information under wraps, international cooperation dries up. According to Porter Goss, his intelligence agency counterparts in other countries informed him that our Government's inability to keep secrets had led some of them to reconsider their participation in some of our country's most important counterterrorism activities. If Americans are still wondering why our intelligence has been as defective as it has been, why it has been leading us from disaster to disaster, one of the reasons is unquestionably the hemorrhaging of classified information into the press. During the run-up to the Gulf War, the United States was urgently attempting to assess the state of play of Saddam Hussein's program to acquire weapons of mass destruction. One of the key sources of information suggesting an ambitious WMD program was under way was an Iraqi defector known by the code name of Curveball, who was talking to German intelligence. The U.S. remained in the dark about Curveball's true identity, yet if we had known who he was, we would have also known that he was a serial fabricator. But the reason why German intelligence would not tell us who Curveball was, as we learned from the Silberman-Robb WMD Commission report, that they refused ``to share crucial information with the United States because of fear of leaks.'' In other words, some of the blame for our mistaken intelligence about Iraq's WMD program rests with the leakers and with those in the media who rush to publish the leaks. Now, President Bush has called the disclosure of the NSA program, the terrorist surveillance program, by the Times a ``shameful act.'' I have argued in the pages of Commentary that the decision to publish that story was also a crime, a violation of Section 798. Now, today Congress sets the laws by which we live in our democracy and oversees the way that they are carried out. If Congress, representing the American people, comes to believe that the executive branch is creating too many secrets or classifying things that should not be classified, it has ample powers to set things right by funding faster and better declassification and/or changing the declassification rules. But if, by contrast, a newspaper like the Times, a private institution, representing no one but itself, acts recklessly by publishing vital Government secrets in the middle of a perilous war, it should be prepared to accept the consequences as they have been set in law by the American people and its elected representatives. The First Amendment is not a suicide pact. Thank you very much for your attention, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Mr. Schoenfeld appears as a submission for the record.] Chairman Specter. Thank you very much, Dr. Schoenfeld. Our final witness on this panel is Mr. Mark Feldstein, Director of Journalism at George Washington University, Associate Professor of Media and Public Affairs at George Washington University; bachelor's degree from Harvard, a Ph.D. from University of North Carolina. In the 1970s he was an intern for columnist Jack Anderson. For nearly 20 years, he has been an on-air correspondent for virtually every news station-- CNN, ABC, NBC--and has a record as an investigative reporter, as his resume says, beaten up in the United States, detained and escorted by Government authorities in Egypt, and kicked out of Haiti. Quite a record, Mr. Feldstein. His book, ``Poisoning the Press: Richard Nixon, Jack Anderson, and the Rise of Washington's Scandal Culture,'' will be published next year. Thank you for joining us today, Mr. Feldstein, and the floor is yours. STATEMENT OF MARK FELDSTEIN, DIRECTOR OF JOURNALISM PROGRAM, AND ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF MEDIA AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, SCHOOL OF MEDIA AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, D.C. Mr. Feldstein. Thank you, Senator. Let me just summarize my testimony, if I might, and ask that my full statement, with some news articles and editorials about the case, be entered into the record. Chairman Specter. Without objection, they will all be made a part of the record. Mr. Feldstein. Thank you. On March 3rd, two FBI agents showed up at my home. They flashed their badges and requested 25-year-old documents I had been going through for the book I am writing about Jack Anderson. The agents told me they were investigating violations of the Espionage Act going back to the early 1980s, even though they admitted the statute of limitations had expired. It seems the Justice Department wants to prosecute people who might have leaked secrets to a reporter decades ago, a reporter who is now dead. The agents tried to get me to say we have classified documents in our archives, even though I told them I do not know of any. They seemed to view reporters' notes as the first stop in their probe rather than the last step after all others failed--the standard they are supposed to use under Justice Department guidelines. Now, of course, the FBI is filled with thousands of brave men and women who do their jobs superbly and risk their lives for their country. But this case is troubling because whistleblowing sources, the kind Senator Grassley and other members of this Committee have championed, may be scared off if the Government starts rooting through reporters' notes, even past the grave. Last month, FBI Director Mueller promised this Committee he would find out what happened here, and I think the FBI still owes the Committee an answer. Perhaps the Justice Department's Inspector General should investigate. Unfortunately, this seems to be part of a larger effort to use national security to crack down on the public's right to know. We are even hearing proposals to prosecute journalists under the Espionage Act, a law passed during the hysteria of World War I and strengthened when Joe McCarthy began his witch hunt. Prosecuting the press for espionage reeks of McCarthyite madness, the kind of tactics used in dictatorships, not democracies. Espionage? Reporters are not spies. They are patriotic. Every year, dozens of them give their lives trying to dig out the truth for the people. They are not perfect. Journalists make mistakes. They can be arrogant. They give too much attention to trivia and sensation. But history shows that genuine harm to national security caused by reporters has been minuscule to nonexistent. Far more damage to national security has been caused by Government secrecy and deceit than by media disclosures of classified information. If anything, the problem is not that the press is too aggressive in national security reporting. It is that it is too timid. Now, administrations often exaggerate the damage from reporting, invoking national security, when the real concern is political embarrassment. The fact is that leaks increase when Government abuses increase because whistleblowers turn to the press to get the truth out. This is healthy, a self-correcting mechanism in a democracy, and it is as old as the Republic itself. In 1796, a newspaper published verbatim excerpts of what George Washington told his Cabinet about secret negotiations with Britain. It created an uproar in international relations. Who leaked this National security secret? Thomas Jefferson, the Secretary of State then, was the No. 1 suspect. If you start prosecuting reporters for revealing secrets, journalists will stop telling the public about important national security misconduct. Either that, or the jails will fill up with reporters. Neither option is good. Merely threatening to prosecute the media by twisting the Espionage Act or some other law sends a chilling message. In the words of one journalist, the Government has ``already won...a victory that will bear fruit every day, whenever any reporter holds back for fear of getting into trouble, whenever a source fears to come forward lest he be exposed, whenever an editor `goes easy' for fear of government retaliation...whenever a citizen anywhere can be influenced to think of reporters as lawbreakers, the kind of people who have to be arrested.'' The journalist who said those words was Jack Anderson, writing about the Nixon administration abuses during Watergate. Unfortunately, his words appear to be equally relevant today. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Mr. Feldstein appears as a submission for the record.] Chairman Specter. Thank you very much, Mr. Feldstein. We received a letter yesterday from Mr. Max Frankel, who submitted an affidavit 35 years ago in the Pentagon Papers case, and without objection, we will make part of the record Mr. Frankel's affidavit, and also his letter to the Committee dated yesterday, June 5th. And I will read one paragraph from the letter from Mr. Frankel. ``A review of the affidavit shows that, while all the names have changed, the way Washington works has not. Neither have the principles that should govern the relationship between Government and the press. Leaks of secrets and of classified information have been and continue to be routine. For a wide variety of reasons, they are essential to what I call the `cooperative, competitive, antagonistic, and arcane relationship' between Washington reporters and American officials. The press plays a vital role in educating the public through the use of so-called secret information, much of it intentionally disclosed by honorable Government servants. They may be floating trial balloons, sending messages to foreign governments, waging internecine battles against other governmental departments, illuminating or attacking governmental policies. Their motives are as numerous as their disclosures.'' Mr. Anderson, do you know if Federal authorities ever made a request to your father for any information or documents during his lifetime? Mr. Anderson. During the span of his lifetime, I am sure that there were some requests. I was asked by someone in the media who said that an FBI representative had told them that about a year before he died, they had made a request. I don't know whether that is true, but in following up on that--my father was pretty much bedridden during that year, 24-hour-a- day care. I checked with the nurses and my sister who was tending him and my Mom, and none of them was familiar with any request. Chairman Specter. So you know of no request? Mr. Anderson. That is correct. I do not. Chairman Specter. And, similarly, you know of no disclosure by your father of any of his documents. Mr. Anderson. That is correct. He would not have and did not, to my knowledge. Chairman Specter. And you testified that the FBI told you you could not review your father's papers? Mr. Anderson. That is what they said on several occasions, actually. Chairman Specter. Has the FBI gone to any compulsory process, subpoena, to obtain your father's papers? Mr. Anderson. Not at this point. I should add that they have, you know, repeatedly asked various people questions and have the necessary information to do that. Chairman Specter. Have you--and you do not have to answer this question. You do not have to answer any of these questions. You are not under subpoena. And if you were under subpoena, you would not necessarily have to answer the questions either if you claimed the privilege. But I will ask you: Have you reviewed any of your father's papers in the face of the FBI statement to you that you are not permitted to, authorized to? Mr. Anderson. I have not in the recent past. I have not seen really any of the papers since they were--some of them were boxed up 20 years ago. Chairman Specter. Aren't you interested in what they say? Mr. Anderson. A little bit, but to be frank with you, I have been too busy to get out there and do that. I would completely disregard the FBI's direction to me and review them at will, though. Chairman Specter. And how do you describe the volume? In boxes, you said? Mr. Anderson. There are 187 boxes. Chairman Specter. How big are the boxes? Mr. Anderson. They are what I call banker's boxes, you know, just a typical document storage box. I couldn't tell you how many thousands of papers. And then, in addition, there are-- Chairman Specter. A banker's box, about 2 feet, 2\1/2\ feet, by about a foot and a half? Mr. Anderson. Yes, that would be correct. And then there are 20 file drawers of small 3-x-5 cards that my Dad used to keep to index the columns that he wrote. Chairman Specter. Do you have any idea why the FBI, after making a request, has not pursued compulsory process, a subpoena? Mr. Anderson. I understand that they would have to go to the Department of Justice, and my guess is that the Department of Justice perhaps has a different view of the importance of the documents that might be in there. Chairman Specter. Now, you say that your father and Drew Pearson went through Director J. Edgar Hoover's trash? Mr. Anderson. Yes, that is correct. He did a series of articles about what they found in there, and, in fact, I think an ABC News crew videotaped one of Dad's reporters going through the trash. Chairman Specter. Do you know if--well, I will ask you the question. I think the answer is obvious. Do you know whether any of these many boxes contain information about Director Hoover's trash? Mr. Anderson. Well, I suspect they do because they have the information--they have copies of the columns that he wrote and some of Dad's notes related to that. Chairman Specter. Mr. Feldstein, Professor Feldstein, what, again, did the FBI ask you for with respect to Mr. Anderson's files, Mr. Jack Anderson's files? Mr. Feldstein. Well, they basically wanted to go through all of them. Chairman Specter. And what did you have? Mr. Feldstein. Well, my university has nearly 200 boxes that the Anderson family donated to the collection, to our collection. Chairman Specter. Are those papers of the university available for public inspection? Mr. Feldstein. No, sir, not yet. We, as all archives do, first get them and then try to raise the money, because it is expensive to catalogue them--it usually takes months or years-- segregate out anything the family or the donor wanted segregated, love letters, source notes, what have you, and then we make it--put it on display for the public. Chairman Specter. And is it the intention of your university 1 day to make those records available to the public after being screened as you describe? Mr. Feldstein. Yes, sir. Chairman Specter. What do you think would be the consequence on other reporters if you were to give the FBI access to Mr. Jack Anderson's files that you have in possession of your university? Mr. Feldstein. Well, I think it would be troubling for both journalists and academics. For journalists, the concern would be that their source notes, confidential sources, would be revealed to law enforcement authorities and that that would produce a chilling effect, making other whistleblowers reluctant to come forward out of fear that their identities would later become known. For academics, historians are always very concerned about trying to keep historical archives in order and not have them rifled through, because often the order matters, and also may discourage people from donating their papers in the future, not just at our university but everywhere, if-- Chairman Specter. You think it would have a chilling effect? Mr. Feldstein. Yes, sir. Chairman Specter. A serious chilling effect? Mr. Feldstein. Well, how serious depends on, I suppose, how bad the rifling is that takes place and how much is confiscated. One of the problems is the FBI agents did make clear that they would be duty bound to pull out stuff that they felt should not be in there. Chairman Specter. You and your university are preserving these papers so that if the FBI should ever assert a compulsory process and have that upheld by the courts, they would be available to the FBI? Mr. Feldstein. Well, I can't speak for the university or for the Anderson family, but, yes, we are preserving it and, you know, we certainly believe in abiding by the law. And we are all good citizens, too, and we don't want anything to jeopardize national security. You know, my own concern here is, frankly, I am a little skeptical that anything that old and that long ago really is about national security. Chairman Specter. Mr. Anderson, a similar question to you. If the FBI ultimately prevails with a subpoena compulsory process, will the records be available for them to see if they are upheld in court? Mr. Anderson. Not at this point in time. The family has met and decided that we would not abide by a subpoena if one were issued by the FBI, and we would give that instruction to the George Washington University. Chairman Specter. Well, if the subpoena was upheld by the highest court in the country, would you risk a contempt citation rather than make the records available? Mr. Anderson. I would, and I have spoken with my mother, and she would as well. Chairman Specter. Well, we will not ask you for a final judgment on that today. We are far from that. But it is not an irrelevant question. Well, Dr. Schoenfeld and Professor Smolla, you pose about as sharp a conflict as you can find on this issue. Dr. Schoenfeld wants to prosecute the New York Times and Mr. Risen, and Professor Smolla does not even want us to examine the question as to what standards would be appropriate for prosecution under 798, because that would be an invitation. You have it on the books. You have heard, Dean Smolla, the testimony of a representative of the Department of Justice that the Department concludes as a legal matter that the Department has the authority to prosecute. Do you think that there are no circumstances, there is no conceivable circumstance under which a prosecution by the Federal Government of a newspaper or a newspaper reporter would be justified? Mr. Smolla. Well, Senator, let me divide it into the statutory question and the First Amendment question. I think it is very implausible that Section 798 was thought of by Congress when it passed that law in 1950 as overturning decades of cultural understanding that we had before this law was passed and that we have observed since. And it is implausible that Congress had in mind upsetting the traditional First Amendment balance that has existed. You would have to believe that Members of Congress imagined that there could be, for example, an illegal or unconstitutional communications interception program. It is conceivable that the executive branch could illegally be intercepting people's communications and that Congress meant to say that all the executive branch needs to do is say the existence of the program is classified, the very fact we are doing it is a secret; and if that is revealed and the reporter finds out about it, the reporter can be criminally prosecuted for exposing that. That is a very improbable understanding of what Congress thought it was doing when it passed this law, and-- Chairman Specter. But is Dr. Schoenfeld wrong that the statute was passed as a reaction to the disclosure by a newspaper that the Japanese code had been broken? Mr. Smolla. Well, you know, that episode took place 8 years before. As Dr. Schoenfeld has conceded, there is very little legislative history surrounding the passage of the Act. And there may be a qualitative difference between the kind of communication that reveals, in fact, how we are intercepting material, that reveals that a code has been broken, that kind of hard national security data where you can instantly see this would damage the national security of the United States if this is released, and the kind of leaks that are now being talked about, which are leaks about massive programs that don't reveal any technical secrets--the New York Times didn't explain exactly how these things were intercepted--don't even reveal the content of it. All they do is tell you that it is done without a warrant. Chairman Specter. Well, yes, but are you saying that there is no conceivable circumstance which would justify prosecuting a newspaper or a reporter? Mr. Smolla. No, I am not, and I am conceding that the First Amendment standard itself contemplates that there could be national security interests of the highest order and that a narrowly tailored statute in which the Congressional intent was clear and in which defense safeguards are built in, safeguards that require that there be proof that some ongoing or live operation-- Chairman Specter. Have you had a chance to review the Lugar-Specter bill? Mr. Smolla. I think it is generally going in the right direction, Senator. We certainly should have a shield law. Chairman Specter. Never mind going in the right direction. [Laughter.] Chairman Specter. Would you support it? Mr. Smolla. I think that the critical thing would be--and you alluded to this, Mr. Chairman--how broad or how narrow the national security exception is. But I absolutely support the idea that that should be the kind of thing placed in the hands of the neutral magistrate. Chairman Specter. Well, since you haven't said yes, would you give us suggestions as to how to-- Mr. Smolla. I would be happy to do that. I would be happy to do that, Senator, but I think-- Chairman Specter. How to perfect it so that you would support it? Mr. Smolla. I would be happy to be invited, in fact, to do that, Senator. Chairman Specter. Dr. Schoenfeld, what is your thinking or the basis for your conclusion that Congressional intent on 798 was to cover a situation like the publication by the New York Times and Mr. Risen of the surveillance program? Mr. Schoenfeld. I can't imagine a set of circumstances that more closely fit the intention of the Congress that passed that Act. Just looking at the plain language of the law, it is unambiguous. The provision says, ``Disclosure of classified information. (a) Whoever knowingly and willfully communicates, furnishes, transmits, or otherwise makes available to any unauthorized person, or publishes, or uses in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States any classified information (3) concerning the communication...activities of the United States...'' Chairman Specter. You testified that it was your thinking that the disclosure of the breaking of the Japanese code, which put many American lives at issue, at stake, was at least in part responsible for the statute? Mr. Schoenfeld. Well, there was a joint Committee right after the war, in 1945, I believe, that made a series of recommendations to the Congress about tightening security in the interest of avoiding another Pearl Harbor, and this joint Committee had made reference to the 1943 Midway Chicago Tribune case. So when Congress revisited these laws in 1950, it was taking cognizance of the joint committee's recommendations, and it explicitly rejected the joint committee's recommendation that there be very blanket secrecy rules put in effect, and it carved out this one very narrow area of communications intelligence for special protection. It didn't want to impose a blanket secrecy rule, and the newspaper industry at the time-- the New York Times, which was an active member in the American Society of Newspaper Editors--endorsed the passage of this law. Chairman Specter. Well, I know that the law was endorsed by the American Society of Newspaper Editors, but that could cut both ways. It could cut that they endorsed it because they thought they were not being prosecuted. Why do you think that their endorsement-- Mr. Schoenfeld. I think the journalists-- Chairman Specter. Excuse me. Mr. Schoenfeld. Sorry. Chairman Specter. Let me finish the question. Mr. Schoenfeld. I am sorry. Chairman Specter. What was the basis for your thinking that their endorsement was a recognition that there were some circumstances where it would be appropriate to prosecute a newspaper and a reporter? Mr. Schoenfeld. I can only conjecture, Senator, but I would think that in the climate of those years, journalists would have thought it inconceivable, except for a few perhaps on the fringes, that there would be journalists who would be eager to publish vital Government secrets in this area, especially in light of the experience in World War II and then in the early days of the cold war facing a nuclear-armed U.S.S.R. Chairman Specter. Dr. Schoenfeld, what weight, if any, would you give to the fact that there has never been a prosecution under 798? Mr. Schoenfeld. I think that should be given some weight. Prosecutions of journalists in our country have been unprecedented, and I think that is a good thing, obviously. And-- Chairman Specter. Prosecutions of journalists unprecedented? Mr. Schoenfeld. Well, not unprecedented, but very rare. Chairman Specter. Don't tell Judith Miller that. Mr. Schoenfeld. They are rare. Well, she wasn't prosecuted. She was held in contempt. But they have been historically very rare, and that is as it should be. That is right and proper. However, I think the New York Times crossed a line here. I would distinguish it also from other recent leak cases. For example, Dana Priest, a Washington Post reporter, who wrote about clandestine prisons in Eastern Europe, is probably not an easy target for prosecution. It seems to me that Section 798 is not implicated, and you are already into the very murky territory of the Espionage Act, and there I think the courts might as well find constitutional objection to prosecution for that kind of leak. Chairman Specter. Coming back to the Judith Miller case, which started off as a national security case on the identity of the CIA agent, and then shifted to an inquiry into whether there had been obstruction of justice or perjury, do you think that there is an adequate basis for jailing a reporter when you do not have a national security interest in issue? Mr. Schoenfeld. Well, since Branzburg, the courts have ruled that journalists are obliged to testify about what they know regarding criminal matters, so clearly there is no protection now for journalists. And I think that the--I read the testimony of the Justice Department officials before your Committee about the shield law, and I found it very compelling. I oppose the legislation--that I have seen, in any case--that was commented on by the Justice Department. Chairman Specter. Have you had a chance to review the Lugar-Specter bill? Mr. Schoenfeld. I am not sure that I have. I reviewed what was testified to by a Justice Department official by the name of Chuck Rosenberg, I believe, and not further. Chairman Specter. Dr. Schoenfeld, you testified that if the Congress thinks the administration is overclassifying, Congress can change that. What do you do in a situation where the Congress does not know what is being classified? You have the electronic surveillance matter, which you testified about, disclosed in the New York Times on December 16th. The administration had only informed the so-called Gang of Eight-- the leaders of both Houses and the Chairman and Ranking Member of both Houses--which had been a tradition. It did not comply with the law. As you know, the National Security Act of 1947 requires that the Intelligence Committees of both Houses be informed. In the 104th Congress, I was a member of the Gang of Eight as Chairman of the Intelligence Committee. I do not think they told us much. They did not tell the Gang of Eight much from what I saw. But, obviously, informing the Gang of Eight was not in compliance with the law. Then after the New York Times disclosure and certain activities undertaken by this Committee, the administration was willing to tell a Subcommittee of the Senate Intelligence Committee, 7 of the 15 members. And then the House of Representatives initially declined to have a Subcommittee told on the ground that that did not comply with the statute. But then they finally accepted a Subcommittee of 11. And then on the eve of the confirmation hearings of General Hayden, the administration decided to comply with the law. So now you have the two Intelligence Committees informed. But the Judiciary Committee, which has the oversight responsibility on constitutionality, is not informed, nor is the Chairman and the Ranking Member, which is what the administration sometimes does when it does not want to inform a full committee. Now, so you have 15 of 100 Senators informed, and you have a small percentage of the House informed, the Intelligence Committees. So how can Congress act to change the classification when Congress cannot find out what is being classified? Mr. Schoenfeld. Well, it appears to me, Senator, that there is a genuine clash here between the branches; however, within Congress itself, there does not seem to be an overriding clamor to change the way that Congress is being informed. In fact-- Chairman Specter. Do you think the absence of an overwhelming clamor in Congress means anything? Mr. Schoenfeld. Well, I think it does. [Laughter.] Mr. Schoenfeld. Yes, Senator, I think it does. Congress operates by majorities, and there is not clearly not a majority in Congress that is pushing hard to change the way that the Judiciary Committee is informed about executive branch programs. Chairman Specter. Let me interrupt you just long enough to state my agreement with you on that. Mr. Schoenfeld. I am sorry. Could you repeat that, Senator? Chairman Specter. No. [Laughter.] Chairman Specter. I agree with you that there is not an overwhelming clamor by Congress, but I would not say that means a whole hell of a lot, if I may use that expression publicly. But you are right, there is not a clamor. There is not a clamor. But where you have a program which violates the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which prohibits any electronic surveillance without a warrant issued by that court, and you have the interposition by the Government of Article II powers, inherent power, which trumps a statute, admittedly, but you can't make a determination as to whether there is a legitimate exercise of Article II power because it is a balancing test-- the President does not have a blank check. It is a balancing test. And you can't balance if you don't know what there is involved. What does Congress do? We could pass another law, but that one could be ignored, too, under the trumping doctrine. So what does Congress do? Mr. Schoenfeld. Well, I think in this kind of clash, ultimately it is going to be decided as a political question. If the voters are unhappy with the way that the administration is treating Congress or unhappy with the way Congress is asserting its authority, presumably they will let our elected officials know in the next election. But my sense is that the voters are not unhappy-- Chairman Specter. Wait a minute-- Mr. Schoenfeld. May I finish my statement? General Hayden, who was overseeing this so-called illegal program, and according to some who I have heard argue that he is a criminal for doing so, was just confirmed by a vote of 78-15 as CIA Director. So it suggests to me that there is quite a bit of opinion inside of Congress, and the Senate in particular, that does not regard this as an illegal program. That kind of vote is overwhelming. Chairman Specter. Well, I don't think anybody ever suggested that anybody was a criminal. To be a criminal, you have to have criminal intent, and no one has challenged General Hayden's good faith and the good faith of anybody in the administration in thinking that there are Article II powers. But if the voters decide that the Congress ought to be thrown out and a new Congress put in and Congress passes another law, the President can ignore that as well. We can throw out all the House of Representatives in November, throw out enough Senators to make an impression, but come back and pass another law. If you don't know what Article II powers are being imposed to evaluate whether they are being trumped are not, you cannot tell. Dr. Schoenfeld, what do you think of the bill which would give to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court--we had four former Foreign Intelligence Surveillance judges at this witness stand, and they examined the legislative proposal which would give to the FISA Court the program to determine constitutionality in accordance with the generalized approach that there has to be a judicial determination of constitutionality. They have a record for maintaining secrecy, and they have the expertise. What would you think of giving it to them to determine constitutionality? Mr. Schoenfeld. I think that is a perfectly reasonable suggestion, and I am surprised the administration hasn't moved with it. But it seems to me a plausible way to resolve this controversy. Chairman Specter. Well, the administration has not even said no, so we are not sure what their attitude is. But they have been asked many times, and we intend to continue to ask them more. Would you be able to answer some questions that we want to submit in writing, Dean Smolla? Mr. Smolla. Absolutely, Senator. Chairman Specter. Dr. Schoenfeld? Mr. Schoenfeld. I will do my best. Chairman Specter. Mr. Anderson? Mr. Anderson. Yes, Senator. Chairman Specter. Professor Feldstein? Mr. Feldstein. Yes. Chairman Specter. There are a lot of good questions which have been prepared by staff, and I think we have gone about as far as we can go here on the discussion. In addition to suggestions, Dean Smolla, on the Lugar- Specter bill, if you have any suggestions on 798, I would be interested in them. Mr. Smolla. I would be happy to supply them, Senator. Chairman Specter. It may be that Congress ought to leave that alone. Let me ask you, Professor Feldstein, do you think Congress ought to pick up 798 in view of what the Attorney General says, or perhaps more importantly, what Dr. Schoenfeld says and provide some standards for prosecuting newspapers and journalists? Mr. Feldstein. Well, I am not an expert in this area, and I am not an attorney. Chairman Specter. If you are not an expert, Professor Feldstein, tell me who is. [Laughter.] Mr. Feldstein. Well, maybe the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, some press groups like that. You know, it used to be that reporters felt the First Amendment gave them enough protection. To me, the idea of prosecuting journalists under the Espionage Act is outlandish. If I thought there was serious impetus to do that, then perhaps a legislative remedy would be a good thing to head that off. Chairman Specter. Don't you think there is an issue as to whether there is a serious intent to use these statutes for criminal prosecution? Mr. Feldstein. Well, I fear, based on developments recently, that that is the case, and I think that if Congress were able to narrow that in, that would be excellent. I would fear, if Congress tried and failed, that that might be inadvertently interpreted as a green light. Chairman Specter. Why inadvertently interpreted? That would be advertently interpreted. [Laughter.] Mr. Feldstein. OK. Fair enough. Chairman Specter. Mr. Anderson, do you think we ought to try to set standards for utilization of 798? Mr. Anderson. I am pretty sure that Dad would have thought that the First Amendment was the only standard that was needed. I am pretty sure that it would have been the only standard that he would have honored. I probably am more inclined to agree with Dr. Feldstein that when you start to meddle, it becomes very difficult. I have not seen and I have not heard discussed today, including the New York Times case, anything that I would consider even bordering on espionage or activities by reporters that were designed to hurt the national security of this country. But for those reports, we would not even be having this discussion. Chairman Specter. Dr. Schoenfeld, do you think we ought to try to provide some Congressional standards for 798? Mr. Schoenfeld. Well, 798 appears to me to be rather unambiguous. That is one of the interesting features about that law, as compared to Section 793 and the Espionage Act, which we are not talking about here today. I am talking about Section 798, which is an entirely different statute. Section 793 and Section 794 are riddled with ambiguities. In the words of Harold Edgar and Benno Schmidt, who wrote an exhaustive and very brilliant study of them, those statutes are, in their words, ``incomprehensible'' and there would be good reason to review them. However, the benign indeterminacy that those statutes have created have also served us well over the years. Perhaps that indeterminate, ambiguous understanding of the law is now eroding in the face of more aggressive press willingness to publish secrets, and perhaps there might be some reason to revisit those statutes as well. Chairman Specter. Dean Smolla, you have already said you are unwilling to tamper with it. Do you stand by that? Mr. Smolla. Except to clarify it is not supposed to be used. I wouldn't encourage Congress to make it easier to prosecute journalists. If there was any clarification, it would be to clarify that it was never intended to reach that. Chairman Specter. I would be interested in the specifics if you have some language. I would be interested in the specifics if anybody has some language on that subject. Thank you very much, gentlemen. We are going to give you the written questions because they are profound questions the staff has prepared. Thank you all. [Whereupon, at 12 noon, the Committee was adjourned.] [Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.] [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]