S. Hrg. 109-724
CURRENT AND PROJECTED NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FEBRUARY 2, 2006
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
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SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.]
PAT ROBERTS, Kansas, Chairman
JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia, Vice Chairman
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah CARL LEVIN, Michigan
MIKE DeWINE, Ohio DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri RON WYDEN, Oregon
TRENT LOTT, Mississippi EVAN BAYH, Indiana
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BILL FRIST, Tennessee, Ex Officio
HARRY REID, Nevada, Ex Officio
JOHN W. WARNER, Virginia, Ex Officio
----------
Bill Duhnke, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Andrew W. Johnson, Minority Staff Director
Kathleen P. McGhee, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
FEBRUARY 2, 2006
OPENING STATEMENTS
Roberts, Hon. Pat, Chairman, a U.S. Senator from the State of
Kansas..................................................... 1
Rockefeller, Hon. John D. IV, Vice Chairman, a U.S. from the
State of West Virginia..................................... 5
WITNESSES
Negroponte, Hon. John D., Director of National Intelligence...... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 26
HEARING ON CURRENT AND PROJECTED
NATIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES
----------
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 2006
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, the Honorable Pat
Roberts (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Roberts, Hatch, DeWine, Bond, Lott,
Snowe, Hagel, Chambliss, Warner, Rockefeller, Levin, Feinstein,
Wyden, Bayh, Mikulski, and Feingold.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PAT ROBERTS, CHAIRMAN,
A U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS
Chairman Roberts. The Committee will come to order. The
first order of business is to welcome Senator Feingold as a new
Member of the Committee. Senator Feingold is a very
conscientious Member, very hard-working Member, and we're very
pleased to have him. And I would yield to him at this time, if
he would like to make a very short statement.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll just say
what an honor it is to be on this Committee at any time, but
particularly in this time in our history with the challenges
that we face. And I thank you and everybody for their
courtesies in getting me used to the practices of the
Committee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. I thank the Senator.
Today the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence meets in
open session to conduct its annual worldwide threat hearing.
The Committee always begins the legislative year with an open
hearing--it's a tradition--so that the public will have the
benefit of knowing the intelligence community's best
assessments of the current and projected national security
threats to the United States.
Our witness is Mr. John Negroponte, the director of
national intelligence. Mr. Director, thank you for taking your
valuable time to come here today. It's a pleasure to have you
here.
To assist in fielding the Committee's questions, the
director is joined at the witness table by: General Michael
Hayden, the Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence;
Mr. Robert Mueller, the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; Mr. Porter Goss, the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency; and Lieutenant General Michael Maples, the
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Mr. Charles
Allen--no stranger to the Committee--the Chief Intelligence
Officer for the Department of Homeland Security; and Ms. Carol
Rodley, the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for
Intelligence and Research.
And on behalf of the Committee, we thank all of you for
being here today. Thank you for your perseverance and thank you
for the job that you're doing.
Mr. Director, this is your first appearance at the
Committee's worldwide threat hearing as the head of the U.S.
intelligence community. I look forward, as do the rest of the
Members, to your presentation on the community's views
concerning the many threats our Nation must confront. The
threat of terrorism is my most immediate concern, as I know it
is yours.
The Nation does remain at war with Islamic terrorists who,
as we all know, on September 11, 2001, murdered 3,000 innocent
people here on American soil. We must never forget that fact.
Thankfully, since that day, we have not suffered another
major attack on our soil. That is due at least in some part--I
think large part--to the brave and very dedicated men and women
of our intelligence community, the armed forces and our law
enforcement agencies who are executing an aggressive and
forward-leaning counterterrorism policy.
We should not, however, be lulled in to a false sense of
security. The terrorists are a patient and determined enemy. As
Usama bin Ladin's recent audiotape demonstrates, he and his
terrorist network, while damaged, are still a very real threat
to America. So when Usama bin Ladin or his No. 2, Zawahiri, or
Zarqawi in Iraq, does issue a threat, I take it seriously, as
should we all.
These are terrorists who have a track record for following
through on threats no matter how long it takes. Remember, the
first attack on the World Trade Center was 1993. Eight years
later came 9/11. Had the terrorists put the bombs that were put
in the World Trade Center back in 1993 where the grid was,
6,000 people wouldn't have come out suffering from smoke
inhalation; they would have not actually have come out.
So, they do have patience. Our enemies are continually
probing our defenses and adjusting their tactics in an attempt
to launch a successful mass casualty attack. We continually see
the evidence of the training and the commitment and the sheer
brutality of al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups. Every
American should understand our terrorist adversaries. They
think of us--everybody in this room, all of the people who are
going to testify, all of the Committee Members--as dust. Now,
think about that. In their extremist absolutism, our lives and
the lives of those we hold dear have no value.
Ladies and gentlemen, to counter this evil, we must remain
vigilant and forward leaning as we prosecute this war. That
means we must not only use every lawful means at our disposal
to protect the American people from another attack, we must
support the men and women sitting before us here today as they
lead their respective agencies in a conflict which is often
fought in the shadows of some of the most dangerous places on
Earth.
Along with terrorism, our Nation faces a variety of other
threats. Last year, I identified North Korea and Iran and
Communist China and proliferation as primary threats worthy of
Committee attention. The threat of proliferation and the
threats posed by Iran and North Korea really go hand in hand.
The intelligence community assesses that North Korea already
has nuclear weapons, and Iran, if it continues on its current
path--and we hope we could see some action by the Security
Council and others working on this, but they will likely have
the capability to produce a nuclear weapon within the next
decade. In addition, there are indications that both Iran and
North Korea are continuing work on numerous weapon programs,
including long--range ballistic missiles and advanced
conventional weapon systems.
On our side of the world, Latin America continues to
present a number of challenges, including a trend toward
socialist anti-American governments, including, most notably,
Venezuela.
I'm going to deviate from my remarks, and I apologize to my
membership, but there are 360 million people in 31 nations that
comprise the Southern Command, and I must say it is not
neglect, but maybe benign neglect and in terms of the fact that
we're stretched so thin. Other than energy, other than
immigration, other than trade, other than drugs, that part of
the world really has no affect on the United States, and so
consequently, I think we must refocus, at least to some degree,
on the threats that are really threats in the Southern Command.
For our part, the Committee will continue to examine the
intelligence community's capabilities against Iran, North Korea
and other areas of interest. We try to challenge the community
to think of new ways to penetrate those hard collection
targets, and they try as well.
I do not believe the intelligence community is where it
needs to be. I think most of the people at the table will agree
with that, but we have made impressive strides in the past few
years. The threat from communist China is also one which we
must closely monitor. China has not so quietly emerged as a
regional power both militarily and also economically. China's
not the next big thing. They are the big thing.
While the United States, in general, enjoys good relations
with China--and we must do that; we must endeavor to do that--
we and our regional allies are given pause by China's often-
aggressive statements in regards to Taiwan, its very dramatic
investment in offensive military capabilities in a blue-water
Navy and its questionable counterproliferation record.
Additionally, China maintains a determined espionage effort
within the United States, which is aimed at stealing our most
sensitive weapons' secrets. Harsh words, I intend them to be.
China's increasing influence in our global affairs is
undeniable. It is my hope that Beijing will use this increasing
influence to actually promote stability, curb the nuclear
ambitions of North Korea and provide greater support to
counterproliferation and counterterrorism initiatives.
Now, Mr. Director, I look forward to hearing from you about
these and the many other threats which face us across the
globe. I also look forward to the input of the Intelligence
Agency directors during the question and answer period.
Once again, it is important to remember that the Nation is
at war. It is a war which requires aggressive intelligence
collection and close combat with the enemy. The success of the
latter often depends entirely on the success of the former.
Our witnesses today and the men and women whom they lead
are on the front lines of that war. Unlike us, they are doing
the fighting and the dying, and they do so to keep us and our
families safe.
Although we will never be able to repay them the debt we
owe, it seems to me that we must provide them with every
possible advantage, which includes not only adequate resources,
but also the capabilities and the authorities that they
require.
It is also our responsibility to conduct oversight, and the
Committee meets that responsibility in a number of different
ways. We receive briefings, we conduct hearings at a rate far
exceeding any other previous Congress. As a Member of this
Committee, we will tell you we are very demanding of their
time. We read and review intelligence reporting and analysis.
We interview intelligence officials. We travel around the
world. We meet with people on the front lines in what is truly
a global conflict. We also, when the Committee so decides,
conduct investigations and inquiries into specific matters.
For example, we are presently engaged in the final stages--
let me repeat, the final stages--of our examination of issues
that are related to prewar intelligence on Iraq. And I hope we
have that concluded at the earliest possible date. My hope is
to complete that effort as soon as practical.
There has also been a great deal of discussion in regard to
the issue of terrorist surveillance. Senator Rockefeller and I
have been intimately involved with this issue since we assumed
our respective positions. We have been conducting oversight
over this critical capability for almost 3 years now.
Nonetheless, the minority Members and some in the majority of
this Committee have requested an opportunity to meet and
discuss whether the Vice Chairman and my efforts on their
behalf have been sufficient. I have scheduled such a business
meeting for February 16. I have assured the Vice Chairman twice
that the Committee will have an opportunity to express its will
on this matter, and we will.
Yesterday, Members had the opportunity to meet with various
officials of the Justice Department to discuss the legal issues
associated with terrorist surveillance. I've also scheduled a
hearing for February 9--I want all Members to note that--when
we will meet in executive session to hear from Attorney General
Gonzales and also General Hayden. I hope my actions and my
words are sufficient to assuage any lingering concerns about
what we may or may not be doing.
If any Member wishes to discuss further the Committee
activities, I'm happy to make arrangements to do so at an
appropriate time. For now, the Committee turns its attention to
our annual worldwide threat hearing. Our witnesses are some of
the Nation's premiere experts on national security matters.
During this open hearing, I am hopeful that Members will take
the opportunity to engage this uniquely qualified panel in a
manner which will educate the American people to the maximum
extent possible on the global threats faced by our Nation.
I ask that Members do reserve questions for the closed
session that will require a discussion of classified or
sensitive material.
Before I turn to our Director, I recognize the
distinguished Vice Chairman for any remarks that he may wish to
make.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. ROCKELLER IV,
VICE CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM WEST VIRGINIA
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Director Negroponte. This is not just your first
visit at a world threat meeting, but it's your first visit with
the Committee, and we're happy to see you here, and everybody
else.
Americans are presented with sobering information about the
threats facing our country on a daily basis. They are
continually reminded that the passage of time since the attacks
of 9/11 has done little to lower the security threat both here
and abroad. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, America moved
swiftly and decisively against al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan and the
surrounding region.
However, at the same time, we were destroying the terrorist
safe haven in Afghanistan. Our military invasion of Iraq, in
turn, created a dangerous terrorist environment that did not
exist prior to the war--a place where Islam's jihadists can
train on the front line and carry out attacks against American
and allied troops.
Our military action in Afghanistan forced bin Ladin and the
al- Qa'ida leadership to run and hide. We isolated them and
disrupted their terrorist networks and plots. By invading Iraq,
however, we gave them not only a target-rich terrorist
environment, but an effective propaganda tool for fostering
anti-American, anti-Western sentiment throughout the Muslim
world. As a result, we are now faced with the disturbing trend
of autonomous terrorist organizations and groups with little or
no operational or organizational link to al-Qa'ida carrying out
murderous attacks against civilians in Spain, Britain,
Southeast Asia and elsewhere.
I'm afraid that the gains in Afghanistan have been offset
by the unintended consequences of our actions in Iraq. We now
face a more decentralized, but equally lethal terrorist threat
which cannot be decapitated by the capture of a single
individual or any specific target. This metastasized threat
presents a number of operational and political challenges to
our counterterrorist program, and I'd like to take a moment
just to speak about one of them.
The 2004 intelligence reform bill creating the Director of
National Intelligence position requires the Director to be
responsible for providing national intelligence to the
Congress. That's the law. The law requires that the
intelligence provided by the Director should be timely, should
be objective and independent of political consideration.
Now, many of us on this Committee fought hard for the
inclusion of that phrase ``independent of political
consideration,'' to have that in the law, because we were
troubled by what we had found in the Committee's investigation
into the handling of intelligence on Iraq prior to the war. Of
specific concern to me was the disturbing pattern by the
Administration of selectively releasing or declassifying
intelligence that supported the case to go to war, while
dismissing or downplaying or simply not acknowledging
intelligence that undercut claims that Iraq had an active
nuclear weapons program, that Iraq was assisting al-Qa'ida with
chemical and biological weapons, or, as the Vice President
continued publicly assert, that Iraq had a role in the 9/11
attacks against America.
To be blunt, Director Negroponte, I have these same
concerns today.
I am deeply troubled by what I see as the Administration's
continued effort to selectively release intelligence
information that supports its policy or political agenda while
withholding equally pertinent information that does not do
that. The question I am wrestling with is whether the very
independence of the U.S. Intelligence Community has been co-
opted, to be quite honest about it, by the strong, controlling
hand of the White House.
Now, let me be specific. The recent revelation that the
National Security Agency, at the direction of the President,
has been intercepting phone calls and e-mails within the United
States without a warrant and in contravention of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act for the past 4 years has led
Members of this Committee to ask some difficult but, frankly,
necessary questions about the program.
As you know, this Committee, as the body that oversees and
annually authorizes our nation's intelligence programs, is
entrusted with the most sensitive secrets. There are statutory
requirements placed on you and the heads of the intelligence
agencies to keep our Committee Members fully informed on these
matters and activities, including efforts taken to counter the
terrorist threat facing our nation.
And yet the White House has laid down the edict to you and
your principal deputy, Director Negroponte and former NSA
Director General Hayden, that no one on this Committee other
than the Chairman and myself can be briefed on the NSA domestic
spying program. The reasons, we are told, is that the 13 other
Members of this Committee cannot be trusted to know the details
of the program.
This rationale for withholding information from Congress is
flat-out unacceptable and nothing more than political smoke, in
this Senator's view. As you, sir, and General Hayden know well,
every Member of this Committee is given access to operational
details about each and every signals intelligence collection
program carried out by the NSA against targets overseas. We're
all getting it. Much of the staff gets it. We are briefed in
closed session about ultra-sensitive NSA programs that produce
unique and invaluable intelligence and, if divulged, literally
could get people killed. The NSA briefs the Committee on these
programs not just because the law requires them to do so, but
because we, as the authorizers of the intelligence budget, need
to understand the value and risk of what we do to keep America
safe.
How can this Committee reconcile this ongoing intimate
understanding and evaluation of the NSA's overseas activities
with the wall that the White House has constructed around the
NSA's warrantless collection of phone calls and e-mails inside
of the United States? What is unique about this one particular
program among all the other sensitive NSA programs that
justifies keeping Congress in the dark?
It certainly is not that the program is cloaked in heavy
secrecy. On the contrary, it's become one of the more public
programs. Since the existence of this program was leaked to the
press in a most unfortunate fashion in mid-December, the
President has not only confirmed the existence of the program,
but has spoken at length about it, repeatedly, characterizing
not only the target of the intelligence collection, but the
method employed to collect that information.
In recent weeks, every senior Administration official, from
the Vice President to the White House press secretary, has
voluntarily approached the cameras and microphones to talk
about this NSA domestic surveillance program. I assume that
they were not only authorized to discuss the details of this
classified program, but were in fact directed to do so.
Last week, the White House carried out a 4-day press
strategy to saturate the media with speeches and events
designed to sway public opinions, in my judgment, in support of
the spying program.
The second act of this 4-day White House push was a speech
given by General Hayden before the National Press Club on
January 23rd, so that he could, in his own words, ``Tell the
American people what NSA has done and why, and perhaps more
importantly, what it has not been doing.''
The General's unusual appearance before the press corps and
other related public statements give the disturbing impression
to some that the intelligence community has become a public
relations arm of the White House in recent weeks on this
matter.
Even more troubling are the actions of the intelligence
community to sidestep our Committee--this is something about
which we feel very strongly on--with the matter of the NSA
program. To paraphrase General Hayden's statement before the
National Press Club, why he has not been before our Committee
to tell all Members what NSA has been doing and why, I just
can't justify, balance, or even understand this rationale.
The NSA's domestic surveillance program is the most openly
discussed program in the agency's history. Administration
officials have publicly described in unprecedented fashion and
detail the scope of the program, who is targeted by the
program, what type of communications are intercepted, and how
the information collected has allegedly been used to foil
plots.
Director Negroponte, consider this fact. The only NSA
program the White House has authorized senior intelligence
officials to discuss publicly is the only NSA program all
Members of the congressional Intelligence Committees are
prohibited from knowing about.
I hope you are struck by this paradox and troubled by its
implication. You in the intelligence community serve the
President, to be sure, but Congress, according to the law, is
an important customer of the intelligence community as well.
The expectation is that you and all officials of the
intelligence community are to carry out your duties in a manner
that is independent of political influences from either end of
Pennsylvania Avenue. The selective declassification of
intelligence reform, which has undeniably occurred in recent
weeks in support of the Administration's defense of the NSA
programs, hark in fact to the troubling runup to the war in
Iraq.
A decision has been made by the White House to overly
restrict congressional access to key information about the NSA
program, while at the same time it opens the floodgates of this
public relations campaign to the American people in support of
the program.
I have heard that hundreds, if not thousands, of people at
NSA, the White House, the Department of Justice and the CIA
have a working knowledge of the NSA domestic surveillance
program. And yet the White House position is that if sharing
the details about the program is carried out with 40 Members of
the Senate and the House Intelligence Committees, that that's
an unacceptable risk. I'm sorry, I can't buy into that.
So, Mr. Director, you don't need to answer now, but do you
believe that this is so? Do you, General Hayden? A White House
P.R. campaign is not a substitute for the legal requirement--
legal requirement--to keep the Members of our Committee fully
informed of intelligence activities.
Director Negroponte, during the question and answer period
of this hearing, I want to pursue this matter further with you.
I will ask for the record who specifically has prohibited you,
General Hayden, and the NSA Director, General Keith Alexander,
from appearing before our Committee in closed session and
providing testimony on the factual aspects of the NSA domestic
surveillance program, and whether you agree with the basis for
withholding this information from Congress. I also want to find
out which person or office describes what aspects of the NSA
domestic surveillance that can be declassified and released to
the public.
In closing, it may be that some Members of Congress, of
this Committee would indeed support the program if they were
apprised of its scope and its operational successes. Others
might oppose it. Either way, Committee Members cannot be put in
the untenable position of passing judgment on a program that
they are prevented from understanding. As both a customer of
intelligence and the body that annually authorizes the
important programs carried out by you gentlemen and ladies, we
have a solemn responsibility to make sure that the activities
that we fund are not only justified but lawful.
As of today, we cannot make such a determination about the
NSA domestic surveillance program authorized by the President.
So, in conclusion, Director Negroponte, we will be
addressing the threats facing America in your testimony--you
will be doing that. What is being done to combat these threats
is a concern shared by all of us. I hope you appreciate why it
is important for Members of this Committee to fully understand
the efforts being brought to bear to combat the terrorist
threat to our Nation, including, but not limited to, action
taken within our borders.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. Mr. Director, I am now going to turn to
you. But let me say that, as I said in my opening statement,
the Committee will have ample opportunity to discuss this issue
in full at two business meetings and obviously will conclude
with the wishes of the Committee.
And let me say also that my primary concern in this regard,
this particular issue, is not losing this capability and going
blind and not being able to continue to prevent attacks on the
United States and guarantee the safety of the American people.
Mr. Director.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. NEGROPONTE, DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, ACCOMPANIED BY GENERAL
MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE; HON. ROBERT S. MUELLER, III,
DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION; HON.
PORTER GOSS, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; LIEUTENANT
GENERAL MICHAEL D. MAPLES (USA),
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; DR. CHARLES
ALLEN, CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY; AND HON. CAROL RODLEY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
Director Negroponte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman
Rockefeller, members of the Committee. Thank you for the
invitation to offer my assessment of the threats, challenges
and opportunities for the United States in today's world. I am
honored to be the first Director of National Intelligence to
offer you such an assessment. And I am pleased to note that
following my oral testimony, I will answer your questions with
the assistance of those who accompany me here at the witness
table.
Let me begin with a straightforward statement of
preoccupation shared by all of us sitting here before you.
Terrorism is the preeminent threat to our citizens, to our
homeland and to our interests abroad. The war on terror is our
first priority and driving concern as we press ahead with a
major transformation of the intelligence community that we
represent.
We live in a world that is full of conflict, contradictions
and accelerating change. Viewed from the perspective of the
Director of National Intelligence, the most dramatic change of
all is the exponential increase in the number of targets we
must identify, track and analyze. Today, in addition to hostile
nation-states, we are focusing on terrorist groups,
proliferation networks, alienated communities, charismatic
individuals, narcotraffickers and microscopic influenza.
The 21st century is less dangerous than the 20th century in
certain respects, but more dangerous in others. Globalization,
particularly of technologies that can be used to produce
weapons of mass destruction, political instability around the
world, the rise of emerging powers like China, the spread of
the jihadist movement, and, of course, the horrific events of
September 11, 2001, demand heightened vigilance from our
intelligence community.
This morning, I will discuss, first, global jihadists,
their fanatical ideology, and the civilized world's efforts to
disrupt, dismantle and destroy their networks; next, the
struggle of the Iraqi and Afghan people to assert their
sovereignty over insurgency, terror, and extremism; next, WMD-
related proliferation and two States of particular concern,
Iran and North Korea. Then I will discuss issues of political
instability and governance in all regions of the world that
affect our ability to protect and advance our interests; and
last, globalization, emerging powers, and such transnational
challenges as the geopolitics of energy, narcotrafficking, and
possible pandemics.
In assessing these themes, we must all be mindful of the
old dictum, ``forewarned is forearmed.'' Our policymakers,
warfighters and law enforcement officers need the best
intelligence and analytic insight humanly and technically
possible to help them peer into the onrushing shadow of the
future and make decisions that will protect American lives and
interests.
This has never been more true than now, with United States
and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, the citizens and
fledgling governments they help to protect under attack.
Addressing threats to their safety and providing the critical
intelligence of a myriad of tactical and strategic issues must
be--and is--a top priority for our intelligence community.
But in discussing all the many dangers the 21st century
poses, it should be emphasized that they do not befall America
alone. The issues we consider today confront responsible
leaders everywhere. That is the true nature of the 21st
century--accelerating change affecting and challenging us all.
Now I turn to the global jihadist threat. Collaboration
with our friends and allies around the world has helped us
achieve some notable successes against the global jihadist
threat.
In fact, most of al-Qa'ida's setbacks last year were the
results of our allies' efforts, either independently or with
our assistance. And since 9/11, examples of the high level of
counterterrorism efforts around the world are many. Pakistan's
commitment has enabled some of the most important captures to
date. Saudi Arabia's resolve to counter the spread of terrorism
has increased. Our relationship with Spain has strengthened
since the March 2004 Madrid train bombings. The British have
long been our closest counterterrorism partners--the seamless
cooperation in the aftermath of the July attacks in London
reflect that commitment--while Australia, Canada, France and
many other nations remain stout allies.
Nonetheless, much remains to be done; the battle is far
from over. Jihadists seek to overthrow regimes they regard as
``apostate'' and to eliminate United States influence in the
Muslim world. They attack Americans when they can, but most of
their targets and victims are fellow Muslims.
Nonetheless, the slow pace of economic, social, and
political change in most Muslim-majority nations continues to
fuel a global jihadist movement. The movement is diffuse and
subsumes three quite different types of groups and individuals:
First and foremost, al-Qa'ida, a battered but resourceful
organization; second, other Sunni jihadist groups, some
affiliated with al-Qa'ida, some not; third, networks and cells
that are the self-generating progeny of al-Qa'ida.
Al-Qa'ida remains our top concern. We have eliminated much
of the leadership that presided over al-Qa'ida in 2001, and
U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts in 2005 continue to disrupt
its operation, take out its leaders and deplete its cadre.
But the organization's core elements still plot and make
preparations for terrorist strikes against the homeland and
other targets from bases in Pakistan-Afghanistan border area.
They also have gained added reach through their merger with the
Iraq-based network of Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi, which has
broadened al-Qa'ida's appeal within the jihadist community and
potentially put new resources at its disposal.
Thanks to effective intelligence operations, we know a
great deal about al-Qa'ida's vision. Zawahiri, al-Qa'ida's No.
2, is candid in his July 2005 letter to Zarqawi. He portrays
the jihad in Iraq as a stepping-stone in the march toward a
global caliphate, with the focus on Egypt, Syria, Jordan,
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States and Israel. Zawahiri
stresses the importance of having a secure base in Iraq from
which to launch attacks elsewhere, including the United States
homeland.
In bin Ladin's recent audiotape, al-Qa'ida's top leader
reaffirms the group's commitment to attack our homeland and
attempts to reassure supporters by claiming that the reason
there has been no attack on the United States since 2001 is
that he chose not to do so.
This week's statement by Zawahiri is another indication
that the group's leadership is not completely cutoff and can
continue to get its message out to followers. The quick
turnaround time and the frequency of Zawahiri statements in the
past year underscore the high priority al-Qa'ida places on
propaganda from its most senior leaders.
Attacking the U.S. homeland, U.S. interests overseas, and
U.S. allies--in that order--are al-Qa'ida's top operational
priorities. The group will attempt high-impact attacks for as
long as its central command structure is functioning and
affiliated groups are capable of furthering its interests,
because even modest operational capabilities can yield a deadly
and damaging attack. Although an attack using conventional
explosives continues to be the most probable scenario, al-
Qa'ida remains interested in acquiring chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear materials or weapons to attack the
United States, U.S. troops and U.S. interests worldwide.
Indeed, today we are more likely to see an attack from
terrorists using weapons or agents of mass destruction than
States, although terrorists' capabilities would be much more
limited. In fact, intelligence reporting indicates that nearly
40 terrorist organizations, insurgencies or cults have used,
possessed, or expressed an interest in chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear agents or weapons. Many are capable of
conducting simple, small-scale attacks, such as poisonings or
using improvised chemical devices.
Al-Qa'ida inspires other Sunni jihadists. The global
jihadist movement also subsumes other Sunni extremist
organizations allied with or inspired by al-Qa'ida's global
anti-Western agenda. These groups pose less danger to the U.S.
homeland than does al-Qa'ida, but they increasingly threaten
our allies and interests abroad and are working to expand their
reach and capabilities to conduct multiple and/or mass-
casualty attacks outside their traditional areas of operation.
Jemaah Islamiyah is a well-organized group responsible for
dozens of attacks killing hundreds of people in Southeast Asia.
The threat of a JI attack against U.S. interests is greatest in
Southeast Asia, but we assess that the group is committed to
helping al- Qa'ida with attacks outside the region.
The Islamic Jihad Union, the IJU, which has allied itself
with al-Qa'ida, operates in Central Asia and was responsible
for the July 2004 attacks against the United States and Israeli
embassies in Uzbekistan.
The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, LIFG, was formed to
establish an Islamic State in Libya, but since the late 1990s
it has expanded its goal to include anti-Western jihad
alongside al-Qa'ida. LIFG has called on Muslims everywhere to
fight the United States in Iraq.
Pakistani militant groups, primarily focused on the Kashmir
conflict, represent a persistent threat to regional stability
and U.S. interests in South Asia and the Near East. They also
pose a potential threat to our interests worldwide. Extremists
convicted in Virginia in 2003 of providing material support to
terrorism trained with a Pakistani group, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba,
before 9/11.
New jihadist networks and cells. An important part of al-
Qa'ida's strategy is to encourage a grassroots uprising of
Muslims against the West. Emerging new networks and cells, the
third element of the global jihadist threat, reflect aggressive
jihadist efforts to exploit feelings of frustration and
powerlessness in some Muslim communities and to fuel the
perception that the United States is anti-Islamic. Their
rationale for using terrorism against the United States and
establishing strict Islamic practices resonates with a small
subset of Muslims.
This has led to the emergence of a decentralized and
diffused movement with minimal centralized guidance or control
and numerous individuals and small cells--like those who
conducted the May 2003 bombing in Morocco, the March 2004
bombings in Spain, and the July 2005 bombings in the United
Kingdom. Members of these groups have drawn inspiration from
al-Qa'ida, but appear to operate on their own.
Such unaffiliated individuals, groups and cells represent a
different threat than that of a defined organization. They are
harder to spot, and represent a serious intelligence challenge.
Regrettably, we are not immune from the threat of such
homegrown jihadist cells. A network of Islamic extremists in
Lodi, California, for example, maintained connections with
Pakistani militant groups, recruited U.S. citizens for training
at radical Karachi madrassas, sponsored Pakistani citizens for
travel to the United States to work at mosques and madrassas,
and, according to FBI information, allegedly raised funds for
international jihadist groups.
In addition, prisons continue to be fertile recruitment
ground for extremists who try to exploit converts to Islam.
Now, I wish to turn to the impact of Iraq on the global
jihad. Should the Iraqi people prevail in establishing a stable
political and security environment, the jihadists will be
perceived to have failed and fewer jihadists will leave Iraq
determined to carry on the fight elsewhere. But we assess that
should the jihadists thwart the Iraqi efforts to establish a
stable political and security environment, they could secure an
operational base in Iraq and inspire sympathizers elsewhere to
move beyond rhetoric to attempt attacks against neighboring
Middle Eastern nations, against Europe, and even the United
States.
The same dynamic pertains to al-Zarqawi. His capture would
deprive the movement of a notorious leader, whereas his
continued acts of terror could enable him to expand his
following beyond his organization in Iraq much as bin Ladin
expanded al-Qa'ida in the 1990s.
The debate between Muslim extremists and moderates also
will influence the future terrorist environment, the domestic
stability of key U.S. partners, and the foreign policies of
governments throughout the Muslim world. The violent actions of
global jihadists are adding urgency to the debate within Islam
over how religion should shape government. Growing internal
demands for reform in many Muslim countries further stimulate
this debate.
In general, Muslims are becoming more aware of their
Islamic identity, leading to growing political activism; but
this does not necessarily signal a trend toward radicalization.
Most Muslims reject the extremist message and violent agendas
of the global jihadists. Indeed, as Muslims endorse democratic
principles of freedom, equality, and the rule of law and a role
for their religious beliefs in building better futures for
their communities, there will be growing opportunities for
countering a jihadist movement that authoritarianism, isolation
and economic stagnation.
Let me turn to the issue of extremism and challenges to
effective governance and legitimacy in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The threat from extremism and anti-Western militancy is
especially acute in Iraq and Afghanistan. In discussing Iraq,
I'd like to offer, if you will, a balance sheet to give a sense
of where I see things today and what I see as the trends in
2006.
Bold, inclusive leadership will be the critical factor in
establishing an Iraqi constitutional democracy that is both
viable as a nation-state and responsive to the diversity of
Iraq's regions and people.
Let me begin with some of these encouraging developments
before turning to the challenges.
The insurgents have not been able to establish any lasting
territorial control. They were unable to disrupt either of the
two national elections held this year or the constitutional
referendum. They have not developed a political strategy to
attract popular support beyond their Sunni Arab base. And they
have not shown the ability to coordinate nationwide operations.
Iraqi security forces are taking on more demanding
missions, making incremental progress toward operational
independence, and becoming more capable of providing the kind
of stability Iraqis deserve and the economy needs in order to
grow.
Signs of open conflict between extreme Sunni jihadists and
Sunni nationalist elements of the insurgency, while thus far
still localized, are encouraging and exploitable. The
jihadists' heavy-handed activities in Sunni areas in western
Iraq have caused tribal and nationalist elements in the
insurgency to reach out to the Baghdad government for support.
Large-scale Sunni participation in the last elections has
provided a first step toward diminishing Sunni support for the
insurgency. There appears to be a strong desire among Sunnis to
explore the potential benefits of political participation.
But numerous challenges remain. Iraqi Sunni Arab
disaffection is the primary enabler of the insurgency and is
likely to remain high in 2006. Even if a broad, inclusive
national government emerges, there almost certainly will be a
lag time before we see a dampening effect on the insurgency.
Insurgents continue to demonstrate the ability to recruit,
supply, and attack coalition and security forces, and their
leaders continue to exploit Islamic themes, nationalism, and
personal grievances to fuel opposition to the government and to
recruit more fighters.
The most extreme Sunni jihadists, such as those fighting
with Zarqawi, will remain unreconciled and continue to attack
Iraqis and coalition forces. These extreme Sunni jihadist
elements, a subset of which are foreign fighters, constitute a
small minority of the overall insurgency, but their use of
high-profile suicide attacks gives them a disproportionate
impact. The insurgents' use of increasingly lethal improvised
explosive devices, and the IED-makers' adaptiveness to
coalition countermeasures, remain the most significant day-to-
day threat to coalition forces and a complex challenge for the
intelligence community.
Iraqi security forces require better command and control
mechanisms to improve their effectiveness, and are experiencing
difficulty in managing ethnic and sectarian divides among their
units and personnel.
A key to establishing effective governance and security
over the next 3 to 5 years is enhanced Sunni Arab political
participation and a growing perception among Sunnis that the
political process is addressing their interests.
Sunnis will be focused on obtaining what they consider
their demographically appropriate share of leadership positions
in the new government, especially on the Constitutional Review
Commission. Debates over federalism, central versus local
control, and division of resources are likely to be complex.
Success in satisfactorily resolving them will be key to
advancing stability and prospects for a unified country.
Although the Kurds and Shi'a have been accommodating to the
under-represented Sunnis in 2005, their desire to protect core
interests, such as regional autonomy and de-Ba'athification,
could make further compromise more difficult.
In the aftermath of the December elections, virtually all
of the Iraq parties are seeking to create a broad-based
government, but all want it to be formed on their terms. The
Shi'a and the Kurds will be the foundation of any governing
coalition, but it is not yet clear to us whether they will
include the main Sunni factions, particularly the Iraqi
Consensus Front, or other smaller and politically weaker
secular groups, such as former Prime Minister Allawi's Iraqi
National List.
The Sunni parties have significant expectations for
concessions from the Shi'a and Kurds in order to justify their
participation and avoid provoking more insurgent violence
directed against Sunni political leaders.
During the coming year, Iraq's newly elected leadership
will face a daunting set of governance tasks. The creation of a
new, permanent government and the review of the constitution by
early summer will offer opportunities to find common ground and
improve the effectiveness and legitimacy of the central
government. There is a danger, however, that political
negotiations and deal-making will prove divisive. This could
obstruct efforts to improve government performance, extend
Baghdad's reach throughout the country and build confidence in
the democratic political process.
Let me focus on one of those tasks--the economy.
Restoration of basic services and the creation of jobs are
critical to the well-being of Iraqi citizens, the legitimacy of
the new government, and, indirectly, to eroding support for the
insurgency. At this point, prospects for economic development
in 2006 are constrained by the unstable security situation,
insufficient commitment to economic reform, and to corruption.
Iraq is dependent on oil revenues to fund the government, so
insurgents continue to disrupt oil infrastructure, despite the
fielding of new Iraqi forces to protect it. Insurgents also are
targeting trade and transportation. Intelligence has a key role
to play in combating threats to pipelines, to electric power
grids, and personal safety.
Turning now to Afghanistan, like Iraq, Afghanistan is a
fragile new democracy struggling to overcome deep-seated social
divisions, decades of repression, and acts of terrorism
directed against ordinary citizens, officials, foreign aid
workers, and coalition forces. These and other threats to the
Karzai government also threaten important American interests
ranging from the defeat of terrorists who find haven along the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border to the suppression of opium
production.
Afghan leaders face four critical challenges: Containing
the insurgency, building central government capacity and
extending its authority, further containing warlordism, and
confronting pervasive drug criminality. Intelligence is needed
to assist, monitor, and protect Afghan, coalition, and NATO
efforts in all four endeavors. The volume and geographic scope
of attacks increased last year, but the Taliban and other
militants have not been able to stop the democratic process or
expand their support base beyond Pashtun areas of the South and
East. Nevertheless, the insurgent threat will impede the
expansion of Kabul's writ, it will slow economic development,
and limit progress in counternarcotics efforts.
Ultimately, defeating the insurgency will depend heavily on
continued international aid; on effective coalition, NATO, and
Afghan government security operations to prevent the insurgency
from gaining a stronger foothold in some Pashtun areas; and on
the success of the government's reconciliation initiatives.
I would like now to turn to the issue of weapons of mass
destruction and States of key concern, Iran and North Korea.
The ongoing development of dangerous weapons and delivery
systems constitutes the second major threat to the safety of
our Nation, our deployed troops, and to our allies. We are most
concerned about the threat and destabilizing effect of nuclear
proliferation. We are also concerned about the threat from
biological agents or even chemical agents, which would have
psychological and possibly political effects far greater than
their actual magnitude. Use by nation-states can still be
constrained by the logic of deterrence and international
control regimes, but these constraints may be of little utility
in preventing the use of mass effect weapons by rogue regimes
or terrorist groups.
The time when a few states had monopolies over the most
dangerous technologies has been over for many years. Moreover,
our adversaries have more access to acquire and more
opportunities to deliver such weapons than in the past.
Technologies, often dual-use, move freely in our globalized
economy, as do the scientific personnel who design them. So it
is more difficult for us to track efforts to acquire those
components and production technologies that are so widely
available.
The potential dangers of proliferation are so grave that we
must do everything possible to discover and disrupt attempts by
those who seek to acquire materials and weapons.
We assess that some of the countries that are still
pursuing WMD programs will continue to try to improve their
capabilities and level of self-sufficiency over the next
decade. We also are focused on the potential acquisition of
such nuclear, chemical and/or biological weapons, or the
production technologies and materials necessary to produce them
by states that do not now have such programs, terrorist
organizations like al-Qa'ida and by criminal organizations,
either alone or through middlemen.
We are working with other elements of the U.S. Government
regarding the safety and security of nuclear weapons and
fissile material, pathogens, and chemical weapons in select
countries.
Our concerns about Iran are shared by many nations, by the
International Atomic Energy Agency and, of course, Iran's
neighbors. Iran conducted a clandestine uranium enrichment
program for nearly two decades in violation of its IAEA
safeguards agreement and, despite its claim to the contrary, we
assess that Iran seeks nuclear weapons. We judge that Tehran
probably does not yet have a nuclear weapon and probably has
not yet produced or acquired the necessary fissile material.
Nevertheless, the danger that it will acquire a nuclear
weapon and the ability to integrate it with ballistic missiles
Iran already possesses is a reason for immediate concern. Iran
already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the
Middle East, and Tehran views its ballistic missiles as an
integral part of its strategy to deter--and if necessary
retaliate against--forces in the region, including U.S. forces.
As you are aware, Iran is located at the center of a vital
and volatile region. It has strained relations with its
neighbors and is hostile to the United States, to our friends,
and to our values. President Ahmadinejad has made numerous
unacceptable statements since his election, hard-liners have
control of all the major branches and institutions of
government, and the government has become more effective and
efficient at repressing the nascent shoots of personal freedom
that had emerged in the late 1990s and earlier in the decade.
Indeed, the regime today is more confident and assertive than
it has been since the early days of the Islamic Republic.
Several factors work in favor of the clerical regime's
continued hold on power. Record oil and other revenue is
permitting generous public spending, fueling strong economic
growth and swelling financial reserves. At the same time, Iran
is diversifying its foreign trading partners. Asia's share of
Iran's trade has jumped to nearly match Europe's 40 percent
share. Tehran sees diversification as a buffer against external
efforts to isolate it.
Although regime-threatening instability is unlikely,
ingredients for political volatility remain, and Iran is wary
of the political progress occurring in neighboring Iraq and
Afghanistan. Ahmadinejad's rhetorical recklessness and his
inexperience on the national and international stage also
increase the risk of a misstep that could spur popular
opposition, especially if more experienced conservatives cannot
rein in his excesses. Over time, Ahmadinejad's populist
economic policies could, if enacted, deplete the government's
financial resources and weaken a structurally flawed economy.
For now, however, Supreme Leader Khamenei is keeping
conservative fissures in check by balancing the various
factions in government.
Iranian policy toward Iraq and its activities there
represent a particular concern. Iran seeks a Shi'a-dominated
and unified Iraq, but also wants the United States to
experience continued setbacks in our efforts to promote
democracy and stability. Accordingly, Iran provides guidance
and training to select Iraqi Shi'a political groups, and
weapons and training to Shi'a militant groups to enable anti-
coalition attacks. Tehran has been responsible for at least
some of the increasing lethality of anti-coalition attacks by
providing Shi'a militants with the capability to build
improvised explosive devices with explosively formed
projectiles similar to those developed by Iran and Lebanese
Hezbollah.
Tehran's intentions to inflict pain on the United States in
Iraq has been constrained by its caution to avoid giving
Washington an excuse to attack it, also the clerical
leadership's general satisfaction with trends in Iraq, and
Iran's desire to avoid chaos on its border.
Iranian conventional military power constitutes the
greatest potential threat to Persian Gulf States and a
challenge to U.S. interests. Iran is enhancing its ability to
project its military power in order to threaten to disrupt the
operations and reinforcement of U.S. forces based in the
region, potentially intimidating regional allies into
withholding support for U.S. policy toward Iran and raising the
costs of our regional presence for the United States--for us
and our allies.
Tehran also continues to support a number of terrorist
groups, viewing this capability as a critical regime safeguard
by deterring U.S. and Israeli attacks, by distracting and
weakening Israel, and enhancing Iran's regional influence
through intimidation. Lebanese Hezbollah is Iran's main
terrorist ally, which, although focused on its agenda in
Lebanon and supporting anti-Israeli Palestinian terrorists, has
a worldwide support network and is capable of attacks against
U.S. interests if it feels its Iranian patron is threatened.
Tehran also supports Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other
groups in the Persian Gulf, Central and South Asia, and
elsewhere.
Now, turning to North Korea, North Korea claims to have
nuclear weapons, a claim that we assess is probably true, and
it has threatened to proliferate these weapons abroad. Thus,
like Iran, North Korea threatens international security and is
located in a historically volatile region. Its aggressive
deployment posture threatens our allies in South Korea and U.S.
troops on the peninsula.
Pyongyang sells conventional weapons to Africa, Asia and
the Middle East, and has sold ballistic missiles to several
Middle Eastern countries, further destabilizing regions already
embroiled in conflict. And it produces and smuggles abroad
counterfeit U.S. currency, as well as narcotics and other
contraband.
Pyongyang sees nuclear weapons as the best way to deter
superior U.S. and South Korean forces, to ensure regime
security, as a lever for economic gain and as a source of
prestige. Accordingly, the North remains a major challenge to
the global nuclear nonproliferation regimes.
We do not know the conditions under which North Korea might
be willing to fully relinquish its nuclear weapons and its
weapons program. Nor do we see signs of organized opposition to
the regime among North Korea's political or military elite.
Now let me turn to the issue of governance, political
instability and democratization. Good governance and, over the
long term, progress toward democratization are crucial factors
in navigating through the period of international turmoil and
transition that commenced with the end of the cold war and that
will continue well into the future. In the absence of effective
governance and reform, political instability often compromises
our security interests while threatening new democracies and
pushing flailing states into failure.
I will now review those States of greatest concern to the
United States, framing my discussion within the context of
trends and developments in their respective regions.
First the Middle East. The tensions between autocratic
regimes, extremism, and democratic forces extends well beyond
our earlier discussion about Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan to
other countries in the Middle East. Emerging political
competition and the energizing of public debate on the role of
democracy and Islam in the region could lead to the opening of
political systems and development of civic institutions,
providing a possible bulwark against extremism. But the path to
change is far from assured. Forces for change are vulnerable to
fragmentation and long-standing regimes are increasingly adept
at using both repression and limited reforms to moderate
political pressures to assure their survival.
We continue to watch closely events in Syria, a pivotal--
but generally unhelpful--player in a troubled region. Despite
the Syrian military withdrawal from Lebanon last year, Damascus
still meddles in its internal affairs, seeks to undercut
prospects for Arab-Israeli peace, and has failed to crackdown
consistently on militant infiltration into Iraq. By aligning
itself with Iran, the Bashar al-Asad regime is signaling its
rejection of the Western world. Over the coming year, the
Syrian regime could face internal challenges as various
pressures--especially the fallout of the United Nation
investigation into the assassination of the former Lebanese
prime minister--raise questions about President Bashar al-
Asad's judgment and leadership capacity.
Syria's exit from Lebanon has created political
opportunities in Beirut, but sectarian tensions--especially the
sense among Shi'a that they are underrepresented in the
government--and Damascus's meddling persist. Bombings since
March targeting anti-Syria politicians and journalists have
fueled sectarian animosities.
Egypt held Presidential and legislative elections for the
first time with multiple Presidential candidates in response to
internal and external pressures for democratization. The
Egyptian public, however, remains discontented by economic
conditions, the Arab-Israeli problem, the U.S. presence in
Iraq, and insufficient political freedoms.
Saudi Arabia's crackdown on al-Qa'ida has prevented major
terrorist attacks in the Kingdom for more than a year and
degraded the remnants of the terror network's Saudi-based
leadership, manpower, access to weapons and operational
capability. These developments, the Kingdom's smooth leadership
transition, and high oil prices have eased, but not eliminated,
concerns about stability.
Hamas' performance in last week's election ushered in a
period of great uncertainty as President Abbas, the Israelis,
and the rest of the world determine how to deal with a majority
party in the Palestinian Legislative Council that conducts and
supports terrorism and refuses to recognize or negotiate with
Israel. The election, however, does not necessarily mean that
the search for peace between Israel and the Palestinians is
halted irrevocably. The vote garnered by Hamas may have been
cast more against the Fatah than for the Hamas program of
rejecting Israel. In any case, Hamas must now contend with the
Palestinian public opinion that has over the years has
supported the two-state solution.
Let me turn now to South Asia.
Many of our most important interests intersect in Pakistan.
The nation is a frontline partner in the war on terror, having
captured several al-Qa'ida leaders, but also remains a major
source of extremism that poses a threat to Musharraf, to the
United States, and to neighboring India and Afghanistan.
Musharraf faces few political challenges in his dual role
as President and chief of the Army Staff, but has made only
limited progress moving his country toward democracy. Pakistan
retains a nuclear force outside the Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons and not subject to full-
scope IAEA safeguards, and has been both recipient and source--
via A.Q. Khan's proliferation activities--of nuclear weapons-
related technologies. Pakistan's national elections scheduled
for 2007 will be a key benchmark to determine whether the
country is continuing to make progress in its democratic
transition.
Since India and Pakistan approached the brink of war in
2002, their peace process has lessened tensions, and both
appear committed to improving the bilateral relationship. A
number of confidence-building measures, including new
transportation links, have helped sustain the momentum. Still,
the fact that both have nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver
them entails obvious and dangerous risks of escalation.
Turning now to Eurasia, in Russia, President Putin's drive
to centralize power and assert control over civil society,
growing state control over strategic sectors of the economy,
and the persistence of widespread corruption raise questions
about the country's direction. Russia could become a more
inward-looking and difficult interlocutor for the United States
over the next several years. High profits from exports of oil
and gas and perceived policy successes at home and abroad have
bolstered Moscow's confidence.
Russia probably will work with the United States on shared
interests such as counterterrorism, counternarcotics and
counterproliferation; however, growing suspicions about Western
intentions and Moscow's desire to demonstrate its independence
and defend its own interests may make it harder to cooperate
with Russia on areas of concern to the United States.
Now, let me briefly examine the rest of post-Soviet
Eurasia, where the results in the past year have been mixed.
Many of the former Soviet republics are led by autocratic,
corrupt, clan-based regimes whose political stability is based
on different levels of repression; yet, at the same time, we
have seen in Georgia, in Ukraine, and in Kyrgyzstan the
emergence of grassroots forces for change.
Central Asia remains plagued by political stagnation and
repression, rampant corruption, widespread poverty and widening
socio- economic inequalities, and other problems that nurture
nascent radical sentiment and terrorism. In the worst, but not
implausible case, central authority in one or more of these
States could evaporate as rival clans or regions vie for power,
opening the door to an expansion of terrorist and criminal
activity on the model of failed states like Somalia and, when
it was under Taliban rule, Afghanistan.
Turning now to Latin America, a gradual consolidation and
improvement of democratic institutions is the dominant trend in
much of Latin America. By the year's end, 10 countries will
have held Presidential elections and none is more important to
U.S. interests than the contest in Mexico in July. Mexico has
taken advantage of the NAFTA and its economy has become
increasingly integrated with the United States and Canada.
Committed democrats in countries like Brazil and Chile are
promoting economic growth and poverty alleviation. And, despite
battling persistent insurgent and paramilitary forces with
considerable success, Colombia remains committed to keeping on
a democratic path. Nonetheless, radical populist figures in
some countries advocate statist economic policies and show
little respect for democratic institutions.
In Venezuela, President Chavez, if he wins reelection later
this year, appears ready to use his control of the legislature
and other institutions to continue to stifle the opposition, to
reduce press freedom, and entrench himself through measures
that are technically legal, but which nonetheless constrict
democracy. We expect Chavez to deepen his relationship with
Castro. He also is seeking closer economic, military, and
diplomatic ties with Iran and North Korea. Chavez has scaled
back counternarcotics cooperation with the United States.
Increased oil revenues have allowed Chavez to embark on an
activist foreign policy in Latin America that includes
providing oil at favorable repayment rates to gain allies,
using newly created media outlets to generate support for his
Bolivarian goals, and meddling in the internal affairs of his
neighbors by backing particular candidates for elective office.
In Bolivia, South America's poorest country with the
hemisphere's highest proportion of indigenous people, the
victory of Evo Morales reflects the public's lack of faith in
traditional political parties and institutions. Since his
election, he appears to have moderated his earlier promises to
nationalize the hydrocarbons industry and cease coca
eradication. But his Administration continues to send mixed
signals regarding its intentions.
Haiti's interim government is the weakest in the
hemisphere, and the security climate could continue to
deteriorate due to slum gang violence. A failure to renew the
United Nations mandate would greatly increase the risk of a
complete nationwide breakdown of public order, intensifying
migration pressures. The perception among would-be migrants
that the U.S. immigration policy is tough is the most important
factor in deterring Haitians from fleeing their country.
Turning now to Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia includes
vibrant, diverse, and emerging democracies looking to the
United States as a source of stability, wealth and leadership.
But it is also home to terrorism, separatist aspirations,
crushing poverty, ethnic violence, and religious divisions.
Burma remains a dictatorship, and Cambodia is retreating from
progress on democracy and human rights that it made in the
1990s. The region is particularly at risk from avian flu, which
I will discuss at greater length in a moment. Al-Qa'ida-
affiliated and other extremist groups are present in many
countries, although effective government policies have limited
their growth and input.
The prospects for democratic consolidation are relatively
bright in Indonesia, the country with the world's largest
Muslim population. President Yudhoyono is moving forward to
crack down on corruption, professionalize the military, bring
peace to the long-troubled province of Aceh, and to implement
economic reforms. On the counterterrorism side, Indonesian
authorities have detained or killed significant elements of
Jemaah Islamiyah, the al-Qa'ida-linked terrorist group, but
Jemaah Islamiyah remains a tough foe.
The Philippines remain committed to democracy despite
political turbulence over alleged cheating in the 2004
elections and repeated rumors of coup plots. Meanwhile, Manila
continues to struggle with the 35-year-old Islamic and
communist rebellions, and faces growing concerns over the
presence of JI terrorists in the South.
Thailand is searching for a formula to contain violence
instigated by ethnic Malay Muslims separatist groups in the far
Southern provinces. In 2005, the separatists showed signs of
stronger organization and more lethal and brutal tactics
targeting the government and the Buddhist population in the
South.
Some good news is coming out of Africa. The continent is
enjoying real economic growth after a decade of declining per
capita income. The past decade has also witnessed a definite,
albeit gradual, trend toward greater democracy, openness and
multi-party elections.
In Liberia, the inauguration of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as
President, following a hotly contested multi-party election,
was a positive harbinger of a return to democratic rule in a
battered nation.
Yet in much of the continent, humanitarian crises,
instability and conflict persist. Overlaying these enduring
threats are the potential spread of jihadist ideology amongst
disaffected Muslim populations and the region's growing
importance as a source of energy. We are most concerned about
Sudan and Nigeria.
The signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan
last year was a major achievement, but the new Government of
National Unity is being tested by the continuing conflict in
Darfur, and the instability in Chad is spilling over into
western Sudan, further endangering humanitarian workers and
assistance supply lines. Gains in stabilizing and improving the
conditions in Darfur could be reversed if the new instability
goes unchecked.
The most important election on the African horizon will be
held in spring of 2007 in Nigeria, the continent's most
populous country and largest oil producer. The vote has the
potential to reinforce a democratic trend away from military
rule, or it could lead to major disruption in a nation
suffering frequent ethno-religious violence, criminal activity
and rampant corruption.
Speculation that President Obasanjo will try to change the
constitution so he can seek a third term in office is raising
political tension and, if proven true, threatens to unleash
major turmoil and conflict. Such chaos in Nigeria could lead to
disruption of oil supply, secessionist moves by regional
governments, major refugee flows and instability elsewhere in
Africa.
To one degree or another, all nations are affected by the
phenomenon known as globalization. I'm turning now to the issue
of globalization and rising actors. Many see the United States
as globalization's primary beneficiary, but the developments
subsumed under its rubric operate largely beyond the control of
all countries. Small, medium and large States are both gaining
and losing through technological and economic developments at a
rate of speed unheard of in human history.
Such recalibrations in regional and global standing usually
emerge in the wake of war. But globalization is not a war, even
though its underside--fierce competition for global energy
reserves, discrepancies between rich and poor, criminal
networks that create and feed black markets in drugs and even
human beings and the rapid transmission of disease--has the
look of a silent, but titanic global struggle.
One major recalibration of the global order enabled by
globalization is the shift of world economic momentum and
energy to greater Asia, led principally by the explosive
economic growth in China and the growing concentration of world
manufacturing activity in and around it. India, too, is
emerging as a new pole of greater Asia's surging economic and
political power. These two Asian giants comprise fully a third
of the world's population--a huge labor force eager for modern
work, supported by significant scientific and technological
capabilities, and an army of new claimants on the world's
natural resources and capital.
China is a rapidly rising power with steadily expanding
global reach that may become a peer competitor to the United
States at some point. Consistent high rates of economic growth,
driven by exploding foreign trade, have increased Beijing's
political influence abroad and fueled a military modernization
program that has steadily increased Beijing's force projection
capabilities.
China's foreign policy is currently focused on the
country's immediate periphery, including Southeast and Central
Asia, where Beijing hopes to make economic inroads, to increase
political influence and to prevent a backlash against its rise.
Its rhetoric toward Taiwan has been less inflammatory since
Beijing passed its ``anti-secession'' law last spring. China
has been reaching out to the opposition parties on Taiwan and
making economic overtures designed to win favor with the Taiwan
public, although Beijing still refuses to deal with the elected
leader in Taipei.
Beijing has also expanded diplomatic and economic
interaction with other major powers--especially Russia and the
European Union--and begun to increase its presence in Africa
and Latin America.
China's military is vigorously pursuing a modernization
program--a full suite of modern weapons and hardware for a
large proportion of its overall force structure; designs for a
more effective operational doctrine at tactical and theater
level; training reforms; and wide-ranging improvements in
logistics, administration, financial management, mobilization,
and other critical support functions.
Beijing's greatest challenge is to sustain growth
sufficient to keep unemployment and rural discontent from
rising to destabilizing levels and to maintain increases in
living standards.
To do this, China must solve a number of difficult economic
and legal problems. It must improve the education system,
reduce environmental degradation, and improve governance by
combating corruption. Indeed, China's rise may be hobbled by
systemic problems and the Communist Party's resistance to the
demands for political participation that economic growth
generates. Beijing's determination to repress real or perceived
challenges--from dispossessed peasants to religious
organizations--could lead to serious instability at home and
less effective policies abroad.
Turning now to India, rapid economic growth and increasing
technological competence are securing India's leading role in
South Asia, while helping India to realize its long-standing
ambition to become a global power. India's growing confidence
on the world stage as a result of its increasingly globalized
business activity will make New Delhi a more effective partner
for the United States, but also a more formidable player on
issues such as those before the World Trade Organization.
New Delhi seeks to play a key role in fostering democracy
in the region, especially in Nepal and Bangladesh, and will
continue to be a reliable ally against global terrorism, in
part because India has been a frequent target for Islamic
terrorists, mainly in Kashmir. India seeks better relations
with its two main rivals--Pakistan and China--recognizing that
its regional disputes with them are hampering its larger goals
on the world stage. Nevertheless, like China, India is using
its newfound wealth and technical capabilities to extend its
military reach.
On the economic front, as Indian multinational corporations
become more prevalent, they will offer competition and
cooperation with the United States in fields such as energy,
steel, and pharmaceuticals. New Delhi's pursuit of energy to
fuel its rapidly growing economy adds to pressures on world
prices and increases the likelihood that it will seek to
augment its programs in nuclear power, coal technologies, and
petroleum exploration. Like Pakistan, India is outside the
nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Let me turn to the issue of threats to global energy
security.
World energy markets seem certain to remain tight for the
foreseeable future. Robust global economic expansion is pushing
strong energy demand growth and, combined with instability in
several oil- producing regions, is increasing the geopolitical
leverage of key producer states such as Iran, Saudi Arabia,
Russia and Venezuela. At the same time, the pursuit of secure
energy supplies has become a much more significant driver of
foreign policy in countries where energy demand growth is
surging--particularly China and India.
The changing global oil and gas market has encouraged
Russia's assertiveness with Ukraine and Georgia, Iran's nuclear
brinksmanship, and the populist ``petro-diplomacy'' of
Venezuela's Hugo Chavez. Russia's recent but short-lived
curtailment of natural gas deliveries to the Ukraine
temporarily reduced gas supplies to much of Europe and is an
example of how energy can be used as both a political and
economic tool. The gas disruption alarmed Europeans, reminding
them of their dependence on Russian gas, and refocused debate
on alternative energy sources.
Foreign policy frictions, driven by energy security
concerns, are likely to be fed by continued global efforts of
Chinese and Indian firms to reach new oil field development
deals and to purchase stakes in foreign oil and gas properties.
Although some of these moves may incrementally increase oil-
sector investment and global supplies, others may bolster
countries, such as Iran, Syria and Sudan, that pose significant
U.S. national security risks or foreign policy challenges. For
example, in Venezuela, Chavez is attempting to diversify oil
exports away from the United States.
Let me turn now to the security threat from narcotics
trafficking.
In addition to the central U.S. national security interest
in stemming the flow of drugs to this country, there are two
international threats related to narcotics: First, the
potential threat from an intersection of narcotics and
extremism; and second, the threat from the impact of drugs on
those ineffective and unreliable nation states about which we
are so concerned.
Although the worldwide trafficking-terrorist relationship
is limited, the scope of these ties has grown modestly in
recent years. A small number of terrorist groups engage the
services of or accept donations from criminals, including
narcotics traffickers, to help raise operational funds. While
the revenue realized by extremists appears small when compared
to that of dedicated trafficking organizations, even small
amounts of income can finance destructive acts of terror.
The tie between drug trafficking and extremism is strongest
in Colombia and Afghanistan. Both of Colombia's insurgencies
and most of its paramilitary groups reap substantial benefits
from cocaine transactions. In Afghanistan, the Taliban and the
Hizb group gain at least some of their financial support from
their ties to local opiate traffickers. Ties between
trafficking and extremists elsewhere are less robust and
profitable. North African extremists involved in the 2004
Madrid bombings reportedly used drug income to buy their
explosives.
Most major international organized crime groups have kept
terrorists at arm's length, although some regional criminal
gangs have supplied fraudulent or altered travel documents,
moved illicit earnings, or provided other criminal services to
members of insurgent or terrorist groups for a fee.
Narcotics traffickers and other organized criminals
typically do not want to see governments toppled, but thrive in
States where governments are weak, vulnerable to or seeking out
corruption and unable or unwilling to consistently enforce the
rule of law. Nonetheless, a vicious cycle can develop in which
a weakened government enables criminals to dangerously undercut
the state's credibility and authority, with the consequence
that the investment climate suffers, economic growth withers,
black market activity rises, and fewer resources are available
for civil infrastructure and governance.
We are particularly concerned about this cycle in countries
on the other side of the world, such as Afghanistan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Burma, and those close to home, such as in
Haiti, Jamaica, and Mexico. About 90 percent of detected
cocaine destined for the United States was smuggled through the
Mexico-Central America corridor, nearly all Mexican heroin is
for the U.S. market, and Mexico is the primary foreign supplier
of marijuana and methamphetamine to the United States.
Let me turn now briefly to the threat from pandemics and
epidemics.
In the 21st century, our intelligence community has
expanded the definition of bio-threats to the United States
beyond weapons to naturally occurring pandemics.
The most pressing infectious disease challenge facing the
United States is the potential emergence of a new and deadly
avian influenza strain, which could cause a worldwide outbreak
or pandemic. International health experts worry that avian
influenza could become transmissible among humans, threatening
the health and lives of millions of people around the globe.
There are many unknowns about avian flu, but even the
specter of an outbreak could have significant effects on the
international community, on whole societies, military
operations, critical infrastructure and diplomatic relations.
Avian flu is not something we can fight alone. An effective
response to it is highly dependent on the openness of affected
nations in reporting outbreaks where and when they occur. But
for internal political reasons, a lack of response capability
or disinclination to regard avian influenza as a significant
threat, some countries are not forthcoming.
In close coordination with the Department of Health and
Human Services, the intelligence community therefore is
tracking a number of key countries that are or could be
especially prone to avian influenza outbreaks and where we
cannot be confident that adequate information will be available
through open sources.
The intelligence community also coordinates closely with
the Department of Homeland Security and provides input to the
National Biosurveillance Integration System at the Department
of Homeland Security.
In conclusion, each of the major intelligence challenges
that I have discussed today is affected by the accelerating
change and transnational interplay that are the hallmarks of
21st century globalization. As a direct result, collecting,
analyzing and acting on solid intelligence have become
increasingly difficult.
To meet these new and reconfigured challenges, we need to
work hand-in-hand with other responsible nations. Fortunately,
the vast majority of governments in the world are responsible
and responsive, but those that are not are neither few in
numbers nor lacking in material resources and geopolitical
influence.
The powerful critiques of this Committee, the 9/11
Commission, and the WMD Commission, framed by statute in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and
taken to heart by the dedicated professionals of our
intelligence community, have helped make us better prepared and
more vigilant than we were on that terrible day in September
2001. But from an intelligence perspective, we cannot rest. We
must transform our intelligence capabilities and cultures by
fully integrating them from law enforcement through national
authorities in Washington to combatant commanders overseas. The
more thoroughly we do that, the more clearly we will be able to
see the threats lurking in the shadow of the future and ward
them off.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And now I'd be pleased
to try and answer any questions which the Committee might have.
Chairman Roberts. Mr. Director, I asked you to make a very
comprehensive statement covering all the threats that you think
endanger our country, not only for the Committee, but for those
listening, all the citizens of the United States. You have done
that in a very comprehensive report.
It is under my understanding under the Geneva Convention,
under the heading of ``cruel and inhumane punishment'' for
congressional hearings that last for more than 2 hours, and
prior to questioning, that it would be the thing to do to
declare a 5-minute break, which we will do. And we will resume
immediately at the 5-minute mark to start our questions.
[The prepared statement of Director Negroponte follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. John D. Negroponte, Director of Intelligence
Chairman Roberts, Vice-Chairman Rockefeller, Members of the
Committee, thank you for the invitation to offer my assessment of the
threats, challenges, and opportunities for the United States in today's
world.
I am honored to be the first Director of National Intelligence to
offer you such an assessment, and am pleased to note that following my
oral testimony, I will answer your questions with the assistance of Mr.
Porter Goss, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; Lieutenant
General Michael D. Maples, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency;
Mr. Robert Mueller, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
Ms. Carol Rodley, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence
and Research; Mr. Charles E. Allen, Chief Intelligence Officer,
Department of Homeland Security; and General Michael Hayden, Principal
Deputy Director of National Intelligence.
Let me begin with a straightforward statement of preoccupation
shared by all of us sitting here before you: terrorism is the
preeminent threat to our citizens, Homeland, interests, and friends.
The War on Terror is our first priority and driving concern as we press
ahead with a major transformation of the Intelligence Community we
represent.
We live in a world that is full of conflict, contradictions, and
accelerating change. Viewed from the perspective of the Director of
National Intelligence, the most dramatic change of all is the
exponential increase in the number of targets we must identify, track,
and analyze. Today, in addition to hostile nation-states, we are
focusing on terrorist groups, proliferation networks, alienated
communities, charismatic individuals, narcotraffickers, and microscopic
influenza.
The 21st century is less dangerous than the 20th century in certain
respects, but more dangerous in others. Globalization, particularly of
technologies that can be used to produce WMD, political instability
around the world, the rise of emerging powers like China, the spread of
the jihadist movement, and of course, the horrific events of September
11, 2001, demand heightened vigilance from our Intelligence Community.
This morning, then, I will discuss:
Global jihadists, their fanatical ideology, and the
civilized world's efforts to disrupt, dismantle and destroy their
networks;
The struggle of the Iraqi and Afghan people to assert
their sovereignty over insurgency, terror, and extremism;
WMD-related proliferation and two states of particular
concern, Iran and North Korea;
Issues of political instability and governance in all
regions of the world that affect our ability to protect and advance our
interests; and
Globalization, emerging powers, and such transnational
challenges as the geopolitics of energy, narcotrafficking, and possible
pandemics.
In assessing these themes, we all must be mindful of the old
dictum: forewarned is forearmed. Our policymakers, warfighters, and law
enforcement officers need the best intelligence and analytic insight
humanly and technically possible to help them peer into the onrushing
shadow of the future and make the decisions that will protect American
lives and interests. This has never been more true than now with US and
Coalition forces in Iraq and Afhanistan--and the citizens and fledgling
governments they help to protect under attack. Addressing threats to
their safety and providing the critical intelligence on a myriad of
tactical and strategic issues must be--and is--a top priority for our
Intelligence Community.
But in discussing all the many dangers the 21st century poses, it
should be emphasized that they do not befall America alone. The issues
we consider today confront responsible leaders everywhere. That is the
true nature of the 21st century: accelerating change affecting and
challenging us all.
THE GLOBAL JIHADIST THREAT
Collaboration with our friends and allies around the world has
helped us achieve some notable successes against the global jihadist
threat. In fact, most of al-Qa'ida's setbacks last year were the result
of our allies' efforts, either independently or with our assistance.
And since 9/11, examples of the high level of counterterrorism efforts
around the world are many. Pakistan's commitment has enabled some of
the most important captures to date. Saudi Arabia's resolve to counter
the spread of terrorism has increased. Our relationship with Spain has
strengthened since the March 2004 Madrid train bombings. The British
have long been our closest counterterrorism partners the seamless
cooperation in the aftermath of the July attacks in London reflected
that commitment while Australia, Canada, France and many other nations
remain stout allies. Nonetheless, much remains to be done; the battle
is far from over.
Jihadists seek to overthrow regimes they regard as ``apostate'' and
to eliminate US influence in the Muslim world. They attack Americans
when they can, but most of their targets and victims are fellow
Muslims. Nonetheless, the slow pace of economic, social, and political
change in most Muslim majority nations continues to fuel a global
jihadist movement. The movement is diffuse and subsumes three quite
different types of groups and individuals:
First and foremost, al-Qa'ida, a battered but resourceful
organization;
Second, other Sunni jihadist groups, some affiliated with
al-Qa'ida, some not;
Third, networks and cells that are the self-generating
progeny of al-Qa'ida.
Al-Qa'ida Remains Our Top Concern. We have eliminated much of the
leadership that presided over al-Qa'ida in 2001, and US-led
counterterrorism efforts in 2005 continue to disrupt its operations,
take out its leaders and deplete its cadre. But the organization's core
elements still plot and make preparations for terrorist strikes against
the Homeland and other targets from bases in the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border area; they also have gained added reach through their merger
with the Iraq-based network of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi, which has
broadened al-Qa'ida's appeal within the jihadist community and
potentially put new resources at its disposal.
Thanks to effective intelligence operations, we know a great deal
about al-Qa'ida's vision. Zawahiri, al-Qa'ida's No. 2, is candid in his
July 2005 letter to Zarqawi. He portrays the jihad in Iraq as a
stepping-stone in the march toward a global caliphate, with the focus
on Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and
Israel. Zawahiri stresses the importance of having a secure base in
Iraq from which to launch attacks elsewhere, including in the US
Homeland.
In Bin Ladin's recent audio tape, al-Qa'ida's top leader reaffirms
the group's commitment to attack our Homeland and attempts to reassure
supporters by claiming that the reason there has been no attack on the
US since 2001 is that he chose not to do so. This week's statement by
Zawahiri is another indication that the group's leadership is not
completely cutoff and can continue to get its message out to followers.
The quick turnaround time and the frequency of Zawahiri statements in
the past year underscore the high priority al-Qa'ida places on
propaganda from its most senior leaders.
Attacking the US Homeland, US interests overseas, and US allies--in
that order--are al-Qa'ida's top operational priorities. The group will
attempt high-impact attacks for as long as its central command
structure is functioning and affiliated groups are capable of
furthering its interests, because even modest operational capabilities
can yield a deadly and damaging attack. Although an attack using
conventional explosives continues to be the most probable scenario, al-
Qa'ida remains interested in acquiring chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear materials or weapons to attack the United
States, US troops, and US interests worldwide.
Indeed, today, we are more likely to see an attack from terrorists
using weapons or agents of mass destruction than states, although
terrorists' capabilities would be much more limited. In fact,
intelligence reporting indicates that nearly 40 terrorist
organizations, insurgencies, or cults have used, possessed, or
expressed an interest in chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
agents or weapons. Many are capable of conducting simple, small-scale
attacks, such as poisonings, or using improvised chemical devices.
Al-Qa'ida Inspires Other Sunni Jihadists. The global jihadist
movement also subsumes other Sunni extremist organizations, allied with
or inspired by al-Qa'ida's global anti-Western agenda. These groups
pose less danger to the US Homeland than does al-Qa'ida, but they
increasingly threaten our allies and interests abroad and are working
to expand their reach and capabilities to conduct multiple and/or mass-
casualty attacks outside their traditional areas of operation.
Jemaah Islamiya (JI) is a well organized group responsible for
dozens of attacks killing hundreds of people in Southeast Asia. The
threat of a JI attack against US interests is greatest in Southeast
Asia, but we assess that the group is committed to helping al-Qa'ida
with attacks outside the region.
The Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), which has allied itself with al-
Qa'ida, operates in Central Asia and was responsible for the July 2004
attacks against the US and Israeli Embassies in Uzbekistan.
The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was formed to establish an
Islamic state in Libya, but since the late 1990s it has expanded its
goals to include anti-Western jihad alongside al-Qa'ida. LIFG has
called on Muslims everywhere to fight the US In Iraq.
Pakistani militant groups--primarily focused on the Kashmir
conflict represent a persistent threat to regional stability and US
interests in South Asia and the Near East. They also pose a potential
threat to our interests worldwide. Extremists convicted in Virginia in
2003 of providing material support to terrorism trained with a
Pakistani group, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, before 9/11.
New Jihadist Networks and Cells. An important part of al-Qa'ida's
strategy is to encourage a grassroots uprising of Muslims against the
West. Emerging new networks and cells--the third element of the global
jihadist threat reflect aggressive jihadist efforts to exploit feelings
of frustration and powerlessness in some Muslim communities, and to
fuel the perception that the US is anti-Islamic . Their rationale for
using terrorism against the US and establishing strict Islamic
practices resonates with a small subset of Muslims. This has led to the
emergence of a decentralized and diffused movement, with minimal
centralized guidance or control and numerous individuals and small
cells--like those who conducted the May 2003 bombing in Morocco, the
March 2004 bombings in Spain, and the July 2005 bombings in the UK.
Members of these groups have drawn inspiration from al-Qa'ida but
appear to operate on their own.
Such unaffiliated individuals, groups and cells represent a
different threat than that of a defined organization. They are harder
to spot and represent a serious intelligence challenge.
Regrettably, we are not immune from the threat of such
``homegrown'' jihadist cells. A network of Islamic extremists in Lodi,
California, for example, maintained connections with Pakistani militant
groups, recruited US citizens for training at radical Karachi
madrassas, sponsored Pakistani citizens for travel to the US to work at
mosques and madrassas, and according to FBI information, allegedly
raised funds for international jihadist groups. In addition, prisons
continue to be fertile recruitment ground for extremists who try to
exploit converts to Islam.
Impact of Iraq on Global Jihad. Should the Iraqi people prevail in
establishing a stable political and security environment, the jihadists
will be perceived to have failed and fewer jihadists will leave Iraq
determined to carry on the fight elsewhere. But, we assess that should
the jihadists thwart the Iraqis' efforts to establish a stable
political and security environment, they could secure an operational
base in Iraq and inspire sympathizers elsewhere to move beyond rhetoric
to attempt attacks against neighboring Middle Eastern nations, Europe,
and even the United States. The same dynamic pertains to al-Zarqawi.
His capture would deprive the movement of a notorious leader, whereas
his continued acts of terror could enable him to expand his following
beyond his organization in Iraq much as Bin Ladin expanded al-Qa'ida in
the 1990s.
Impact of the Islamic Debate. The debate between Muslim extremists
and moderates also will influence the future terrorist environment, the
domestic stability of key US partners, and the foreign policies of
governments throughout the Muslim world. The violent actions of global
jihadists are adding urgency to the debate within Islam over how
religion should shape government. Growing internal demands for reform
in many Muslim countries further stimulate this debate. In general,
Muslims are becoming more aware of their Islamic identity, leading to
growing political activism; but this does not necessarily signal a
trend toward radicalization. Most Muslims reject the extremist message
and violent agendas of the global jihadists. Indeed, as Muslims endorse
democratic principles of freedom, equality, and the rule of law and a
role for their religious beliefs in building better futures for their
communities, there will be growing opportunities for countering a
jihadist movement that only promises more authoritarianism, isolation,
and economic stagnation.
EXTREMISM AND CHALLENGES TO EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE AND LEGITIMACY IN IRAQ
AND AFGHANISTAN
The threat from extremism and anti-Western militancy is especially
acute in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In discussing Iraq, I'd like to offer a ``balance sheet'' to give a
sense of where I see things today and what I see as the trends in 2006.
Bold, inclusive leadership will be the critical factor in establishing
an Iraqi constitutional democracy that is both viable as a nation-state
and responsive to the diversity of Iraq's regions and people.
Let me begin with some of these encouraging developments before
turning to the challenges:
The insurgents have not been able to establish any lasting
territorial control; were unable to disrupt either of the two national
elections held this year or the Constitutional referendum; have not
developed a political strategy to attract popular support beyond their
Sunni Arab base; and have not shown the ability to coordinate
nationwide operations.
Iraqi security forces are taking on more demanding
missions, making incremental progress toward operational independence,
and becoming more capable of providing the kind of stability Iraqis
deserve and the economy needs in order to grow.
Signs of open conflict between extreme Sunni jihadists and
Sunni nationalist elements of the insurgency, while so far still
localized, are encouraging and exploitable. The jihadists' heavy-handed
activities in Sunni areas in western Iraq have caused tribal and
nationalist elements in the insurgency to reach out to the Baghdad
government for support.
Large-scale Sunni participation in the last elections has
provided a first step toward diminishing Sunni support for the
insurgency. There appears to be a strong desire among Sunnis to explore
the potential benefits of political participation.
But numerous challenges remain.
The Insurgency and Iraqi Security Forces
Iraqi Sunni Arab disaffection is the primary enabler of the
insurgency and is likely to remain high in 2006. Even if a broad,
inclusive national government emerges, there almost certainly will be a
lag time before we see a dampening effect on the insurgency. Insurgents
continue to demonstrate the ability to recruit, supply, and attack
Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces, and their leaders continue to
exploit Islamic themes, nationalism, and personal grievances to fuel
opposition to the government and to recruit more fighters.
The most extreme Sunni jihadists, such as those fighting with
Zarqawi, will remain unreconciled and continue to attack Iraqis and
Coalition forces. These extreme Sunni jihadist elements, a subset of
which are foreign fighters, constitute a small minority of the overall
insurgency, but their use of high-profile suicide attacks gives them a
disproportionate impact. The insurgents' use of increasingly lethal
improvised explosive devices (LEDs), and the IED makers' adaptiveness
to Coalition countermeasures, remain the most significant day-to-day
threat to Coalition forces, and a complex challenge for the
Intelligence Community.
Iraqi Security Forces require better command and control mechanisms
to improve their effectiveness and are experiencing difficulty in
managing ethnic and sectarian divides among their units and personnel.
Sunni Political Participation
A key to establishing effective governance and security over the
next 3 to 5 years is enhanced Sunni Arab political participation and a
growing perception among Sunnis that the political process is
addressing their interests. Sunnis will be focused on obtaining what
they consider their demographically appropriate share of leadership
positions in the new government--especially on the Constitutional
Review Commission. Debates over federalism, central versus local
control, and division of resources are likely to be complex. Success in
satisfactorily resolving them will be key to advancing stability and
prospects for a unified country. Although the Kurds and Shia have been
accommodating to the underrepresented Sunnis in 2005, their desire to
protect core interests--such as regional autonomy and de-
Ba'thification--could make further compromise more difficult.
In the aftermath of the December elections, virtually all of the
Iraq parties are seeking to create a broad-based government, but all
want it to be formed on their terms. The Shia and the Kurds will be the
foundation of any governing coalition, but it is not yet clear to us
whether they will include the main Sunni factions, particularly the
Iraqi Consensus Front, or other smaller and politically weaker secular
groups, such as Ayad Allawi's Iraqi National List. The Sunni parties
have significant expectations for concessions from the Shia and Kurds
in order to justify their participation and avoid provoking more
insurgent violence directed against Sunni political leaders.
Governance and Reconstruction
During the coming year, Iraq's newly elected leadership will face a
daunting set of governance tasks. The creation of a new, permanent
government and the review of the Constitution by early summer will
offer opportunities to find common ground and improve the effectiveness
and legitimacy of the central government. There is a danger, however,
that political negotiations and dealmaking will prove divisive. This
could obstruct efforts to improve government performance, extend
Baghdad's reach throughout the country, and build confidence in the
democratic political process.
Let me focus on one of those tasks--the economy. Restoration of
basic services and the creation of jobs are critical to the well-being
of Iraqi citizens, the legitimacy of the new government, and,
indirectly, to eroding support for the insurgency. At this point,
prospects for economic development in 2006 are constrained by the
unstable security situation, insufficient commitment to economic
reform, and corruption. Iraq is dependent on oil revenues to fund the
government, so insurgents continue to disrupt oil infrastructure,
despite the fielding of new Iraqi forces to protect it. Insurgents also
are targeting trade and transportation. Intelligence has a key role to
play in combating threats to pipelines, electric power grids, and
personal safety.
Afghanistan
Like Iraq, Afghanistan is a fragile new democracy struggling to
overcome deep-seated social divisions, decades of repression, and acts
of terrorism directed against ordinary citizens, officials, foreign aid
workers, and Coalition forces. These and other threats to the Karzai
government also threaten important American interests--ranging from the
defeat of terrorists who find haven along the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border to the suppression of opium production.
Afghan leaders face four critical challenges: containing the
insurgency, building central government capacity and extending its
authority, further containing warlordism, and confronting pervasive
drug criminality.
Intelligence is needed to assist, monitor, and protect Afghan,
Coalition, and NATO efforts in all four endeavors.
The volume and geographic scope of attacks increased last year, but
the Taliban and other militants have not been able to stop the
democratic process or expand their support base beyond Pashtun areas of
the south and east. Nevertheless, the insurgent threat will impede the
expansion of Kabul's writ, slow economic development, and limit
progress in counternarcotics efforts.
Ultimately, defeating the insurgency will depend heavily on
continued international aid; effective Coalition, NATO, and Afghan
government security operations to prevent the insurgency from gaining a
stronger foothold in some Pashtun areas; and the success of the
government's reconciliation initiatives.
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND STATES OF KEY CONCERN:
IRAN AND NORTH KOREA
The ongoing development of dangerous weapons and delivery systems
constitutes the second major threat to the safety of our nation, our
deployed troops, and our allies. We are most concerned about the threat
and destabilizing effect of nuclear proliferation. We are also
concerned about the threat from biological agents--or even chemical
agents, which would have psychological and possibly political effects
far greater than their actual magnitude. Use by nation-states can still
be constrained by the logic of deterrence and international control
regimes, but these constraints may be of little utility in preventing
the use of mass effect weapons by rogue regimes or terrorist groups.
The time when a few states had monopolies over the most dangerous
technologies has been over for many years. Moreover, our adversaries
have more access to acquire and more opportunities to deliver such
weapons than in the past. Technologies, often dual-use, move freely in
our globalized economy, as do the scientific personnel who design them.
So it is more difficult for us to track efforts to acquire those
components and production technologies that are so widely available.
The potential dangers of proliferation are so grave that we must do
everything possible to discover and disrupt attempts by those who seek
to acquire materials and weapons.
We assess that some of the countries that are still pursuing WMD
programs will continue to try to improve their capabilities and level
of self-sufficiency over the next decade. We also are focused on the
potential acquisition of such nuclear, chemical, and/or biological
weapons--or the production technologies and materials necessary to
produce them by states that do not now have such programs, terrorist
organizations like al-Qa'ida and by criminal organizations, alone or
via middlemen.
We are working with other elements of the US Government regarding
the safety and security of nuclear weapons and fissile material,
pathogens, and chemical weapons in select countries.
Iran and North Korea: States of Highest Concern
Our concerns about Iran are shared by many nations, by the IAEA,
and of course, Iran's neighbors.
Iran conducted a clandestine uranium enrichment program for nearly
two decades in violation of its IAEA safeguards agreement, and despite
its claims to the contrary, we assess that Iran seeks nuclear weapons.
We judge that Tehran probably does not yet have a nuclear weapon and
probably has not yet produced or acquired the necessary fissile
material. Nevertheless, the danger that it will acquire a nuclear
weapon and the ability to integrate it with the ballistic missiles Iran
already possesses is a reason for immediate concern. Iran already has
the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and
Tehran views its ballistic missiles as an integral part of its strategy
to deter--and if necessary retaliate against forces in the region,
including US forces.
As you are aware, Iran is located at the center of a vital--and
volatile--region, has strained relations with its neighbors, and is
hostile to the United States, our friends, and our values. President
Ahmadi-Nejad has made numerous unacceptable statements since his
election, hard-liners have control of all the major branches and
institutions of government, and the government has become more
effective and efficient at repressing the nascent shoots of personal
freedom that had emerged in the late 1990s and earlier in the decade.
Indeed, the regime today is more confident and assertive than it
has been since the early days of the Islamic Republic. Several factors
work in favor of the clerical regime's continued hold on power. Record
oil and other revenue is permitting generous public spending, fueling
strong economic growth, and swelling financial reserves. At the same
time, Iran is diversifying its foreign trading partners. Asia's share
of Iran's trade has jumped to nearly match Europe's 40-percent share.
Tehran sees diversification as a buffer against external efforts to
isolate it.
Although regime-threatening instability is unlikely, ingredients
for political volatility remain, and Iran is wary of the political
progress occurring in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan. Ahmadi-Nejad's
rhetorical recklessness and his inexperience on the national and
international stage also increase the risk of a misstep that could spur
popular opposition, especially if more experienced conservatives cannot
rein in his excesses. Over time, Ahmadi-Nejad's populist economic
policies could--if enacted--deplete the government's financial
resources and weaken a structurally flawed economy. For now, however,
Supreme Leader Khamenei is keeping conservative fissures in check by
balancing the various factions in government.
Iranian policy toward Iraq and its activities there represent a
particular concern. Iran seeks a Shia-dominated and unified Iraq but
also wants the US to experience continued setbacks in our efforts to
promote democracy and stability. Accordingly, Iran provides guidance
and training to select Iraqi Shia political groups and weapons and
training to Shia militant groups to enable anti-Coalition attacks.
Tehran has been responsible for at least some of the increasing
lethality of anti-Coalition attacks by providing Shia militants with
the capability to build IEDs with explosively formed projectiles
similar to those developed by Iran and Lebanese Hizballah.
Tehran's intentions to inflict pain on the United States in Iraq
has been constrained by its caution to avoid giving Washington an
excuse to attack it, the clerical leadership's general satisfaction
with trends in Iraq, and Iran's desire to avoid chaos on its borders.
Iranian conventional military power constitutes the greatest
potential threat to Persian Gulf states and a challenge to US
interests. Iran is enhancing its ability to project its military power
in order to threaten to disrupt the operations and reinforcement of US
forces based in the region--potentially intimidating regional allies
into withholding support for US policy toward Iran--and raising the
costs of our regional presence for us and our allies.
Tehran also continues to support a number of terrorist groups,
viewing this capability as a critical regime safeguard by deterring US
and Israeli attacks, distracting and weakening Israel, and enhancing
Iran's regional influence through intimidation. Lebanese Hizballah is
Iran's main terrorist ally, which--although focused on its agenda in
Lebanon and supporting anti-Israeli Palestinian terrorists has a
worldwide support network and is capable of attacks against US
interests if it feels its Iranian patron is threatened. Tehran also
supports Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other groups in the Persian
Gulf, Central and South Asia, and elsewhere.
NORTH KOREA
North Korea claims to have nuclear weapons--a claim that we assess
is probably true--and has threatened to proliferate these weapons
abroad. Thus, like Iran, North Korea threatens international security
and is located in a historically volatile region. Its aggressive
deployment posture threatens our allies in South Korea and US troops on
the peninsula. Pyongyang sells conventional weapons to Africa, Asia,
and the Middle East, and has sold ballistic missiles to several Middle
Eastern countries, further destabilizing regions already embroiled in
conflict And it produces and smuggles abroad counterfeit US currency,
as well as narcotics, and other contraband.
Pyongyang sees nuclear weapons as the best way to deter superior US
and South Korean forces, to ensure regime security, as a lever for
economic gain, and as a source of prestige. Accordingly, the North
remains a major challenge to the global nuclear nonproliferation
regimes. We do not know the conditions under which the North would be
willing to fully relinquish its nuclear weapons and its weapons
program. Nor do we see signs of organized opposition to the regime
among North Korea's political or military elite.
GOVERNANCE, POLITICAL INSTABILITY, AND DEMOCRATIZATION
Good governance and, over the long term, progress toward
democratization are crucial factors in navigating through the period of
international turmoil and transition that commenced with the end of the
cold war and that will continue well into the future. In the absence of
effective governance and reform, political instability often
compromises our security interests while threatening new democracies
and pushing flailing states into failure.
I will now review those states of greatest concern to the United
States, framing my discussion within the context of trends and
developments in their respective regions.
MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Middle East. The tensions between autocratic regimes, extremism,
and democratic forces extend well beyond our earlier discussion about
Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan to other countries in the Middle East.
Emerging political competition and the energizing of public debate on
the role of democracy and Islam in the region could lead to the opening
of political systems and development of civic institutions, providing a
possible bulwark against extremism. But the path to change is far from
assured. Forces for change are vulnerable to fragmentation and
longstanding regimes are increasingly adept at using both repression
and limited reforms to moderate political pressures to assure their
survival.
We continue to watch closely events in Syria, a pivotal--but
generally unhelpful--player in a troubled region. Despite the Syrian
military withdrawal from Lebanon last year, Damascus still meddles in
its internal affairs, seeks to undercut prospects for an Arab-Israeli
peace, and has failed to crackdown consistently on militant
infiltration into Iraq. By aligning itself with Iran, the Bashar al-
Asad regime is signaling its rejection of the Western world. Over the
coming year, the Syrian regime could face internal challenges as
various pressures--especially the fallout of the U.N. investigation
into the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister--raise
questions about President Bashar al-Asad's judgment and leadership
capacity.
Syria's exit from Lebanon has created political opportunities in
Beirut, but sectarian tensions--especially the sense among Shia that
they are underrepresented in the govenunent--and Damascus's meddling
persist. Bombings since March targeting anti-Syria politicians and
journalists have fueled sectarian animosities.
Egypt held Presidential and legislative elections for the first
time with multiple Presidential candidates in response to internal and
external pressures for democratization. The Egyptian public, however,
remains discontented by economic conditions, the Arab-Israeli problem,
the US presence in Iraq, and insufficient political freedoms.
Saudi Arabia's crackdown on al-Qa'ida has prevented major terrorist
attacks in the Kingdom for more than a year and degraded the remnants
of the terror network's Saudi-based leadership, manpower, access to
weapons, and operational capability. These developments, the Kingdom's
smooth leadership transition and high oil prices have eased, but not
eliminated, concerns about stability.
HAMAS' performance in last week's election ushered in a period of
great uncertainty as President Abbas, the Israelis, and the rest of the
world determine how to deal with a majority party in the Palestinian
Legislative Council that conducts and supports terrorism and refuses to
recognize or negotiate with Israel. The election, however, does not
necessarily mean that the search for peace between Israel and the
Palestinians is halted irrevocably. The vote garnered by HAMAS may have
been cast more against the Fatah government than for the HAMAS program
of rejecting Israel. In any case, HAMAS now must contend with
Palestinian public opinion that has over the years has supported the
two-state solution.
SOUTH ASIA
Many of our most important interests intersect in Pakistan. The
nation is a frontline partner in the war on terror, having captured
several al-Qa'ida leaders, but also remains a major source of extremism
that poses a threat to Musharraf, to the US, and to neighboring India
and Afghanistan. Musharraf faces few political challenges in his dual
role as President and Chief of Army Staff, but has made only limited
progress moving his country toward democracy. Pakistan retains a
nuclear force outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons and not subject to full-scope IAEA safeguards and has been both
recipient and source--via A.Q. Khan's proliferation activities--of
nuclear weapons-related technologies. Pakistan's national elections
scheduled for 2007 will be a key benchmark to determine whether the
country is continuing to make progress in its democratic transition.
Since India and Pakistan approached the brink of war in 2002, their
peace process has lessened tensions and both appear committed to
improving the bilateral relationship. A number of confidence-building
measures, including new transportation links, have helped sustain the
momentum. Still, the fact that both have nuclear weapons and missiles
to deliver them entails obvious and dangerous risks of escalation.
EURASIA
In Russia, President Putin's drive to centralize power and assert
control over civil society, growing state control over strategic
sectors of the economy, and the persistence of widespread corruption
raise questions about the country's direction. Russia could become a
more inward-looking and difficult interlocutor for the United States
over the next several years. High profits from exports of oil and gas
and perceived policy successes at home and abroad have bolstered
Moscow's confidence.
Russia probably will work with the United States on shared
interests such as counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and
counterproliferation. However, growing suspicions about Western
intentions and Moscow's desire to demonstrate its independence and
defend its own interests may make it harder to cooperate with Russia on
areas of concern to the United States.
Now, let me briefly examine the rest of post Soviet Eurasia where
the results in the past year have been mixed.
Many of the former Soviet republics are led by autocratic, corrupt,
clan-based regimes whose political stability is based on different
levels of repression; yet, at the same time, we have seen in Georgia,
Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan the emergence of grassroots forces for change.
Central Asia remains plagued by political stagnation and
repression, rampant corruption, widespread poverty and widening socio-
economic inequalities, and other problems that nurture nascent radical
sentiment and terrorism. In the worst, but not implausible case,
central authority in one or more of these states could evaporate as
rival clans or regions vie for power--opening the door to an expansion
of terrorist and criminal activity on the model of failed states like
Somalia and, when it was under Taliban rule, Afghanistan.
LATIN AMERICA
A gradual consolidation and improvement of democratic institutions
is the dominant trend in much of Latin America. By the year's end, ten
countries will have held Presidential elections and none is more
important to US interests than the contest in Mexico in July. Mexico
has taken advantage of NAFTA and its economy has become increasingly
integrated with the US and Canada. Committed democrats in countries
like Brazil and Chile are promoting economic growth and poverty
alleviation. And despite battling persistent insurgent and paramilitary
forces with considerable success, Colombia remains committed to keeping
on a democratic path. Nonetheless, radical populist figures in some
countries advocate statist economic policies and show little respect
for democratic institutions.
In Venezuela, President Chavez, if he wins reelection later this
year, appears ready to use his control of the legislature and other
institutions to continue to stifle the opposition, reduce press
freedom, and entrench himself through measures that are technically
legal, but which nonetheless constrict democracy. We expect Chavez to
deepen his relationship with Castro (Venezuela provides roughly two-
thirds of that island's oil needs on preferential credit terms). He
also is seeking closer economic, military, an d diplomatic ties with
Iran and North Korea. Chavez has scaled back counternarcotics
cooperation with the US.
Increased oil revenues have allowed Chavez to embark on an activist
foreign policy in Latin America that includes providing oil at
favorable repayment rates to gain allies, using newly created media
outlets to generate support for his Bolivarian goals, and meddling in
the internal affairs of his neighbors by backing particular candidates
for elective office.
In Bolivia, South America's poorest country with the hemisphere's
highest proportion of indigenous people, the victory of Evo Morales
reflects the public's lack of faith in traditional political parties
and institutions. Since his election he appears to have moderated his
earlier promises to nationalize the hydrocarbons industry and cease
coca eradication. But his administration continues to send mixed
signals regarding its intentions.
Haiti's interim government is the weakest in the hemisphere and the
security climate could continue to deteriorate due to slum gang
violence. A failure to renew the U.N. mandate would greatly increase
the risk of a complete nationwide breakdown of public order,
intensifying migration pressures. The perception among would-be
migrants that the US migration policy is tough is the most important
factor in deterring Haitians from fleeing their country.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
Southeast Asia includes vibrant, diverse, and emerging democracies
looking to the United States as a source of stability, wealth, and
leadership. But it is also home to terrorism, separatist aspirations,
crushing poverty, ethnic violence, and religious divisions. Burma
remains a dictatorship, and Cambodia is retreating from progress on
democracy and human rights made in the 1990s. The region is
particularly at risk from avian flu, which I will discuss at greater
length in a moment. Al-Qa'ida-affiliated and other extremist groups are
present in many countries, although effective government policies have
limited their growth and impact.
The prospects for democratic consolidation are relatively bright in
Indonesia, the country with the world's largest Muslim population.
President Yudhoyono is moving forward to crack down on corruption,
professionalize the military, bring peace to the long-troubled province
of Aceh, and implement economic reforms. On the counterterrorism side,
Indonesian authorities have detained or killed significant elements of
Jemaah Islamiya (JI), the al-Qa'ida-linked terrorist group, but JI
remains a tough foe.
The Philippines remains committed to democracy despite political
turbulence over alleged cheating in the 2004 election and repeated
rumors of coup plots. Meanwhile, Manila continues to struggle with the
thirty-five year old Islamic and Communist rebellions, and faces
growing concerns over the presence of JI terrorists in the south.
Thailand is searching for a formula to contain violence instigated
by ethnic-Malay Muslim separatist groups in the far southern provinces.
In 2005, the separatists showed signs of stronger organization and more
lethal and brutal tactics targeting the government and Buddhist
population in the south.
AFRICA
Some good news is coming out of Africa. The continent is enjoying
real economic growth after a decade of declining per capita income. The
past decade has also witnessed a definite, albeit gradual, trend toward
greater democracy, openness, and multiparty elections. In Liberia, the
inauguration of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf as President, following a hotly
contested multi-party election, was a positive harbinger of a return to
democratic rule in a battered nation.
Yet, in much of the continent, humanitarian crises, instability,
and conflict persist. Overlaying these enduring threats are the
potential spread of jihadist ideology among disaffected Muslim
populations and the region's growing importance as a source of energy.
We are most concerned about Sudan and Nigeria.
The signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan last year
was a major achievement, but the new Government of National Unity is
being tested by the continuing conflict in Darfur, and instability in
Chad is spilling over into western Sudan, further endangering
humanitarian aid workers and assistance supply lines. Gains in
stabilizing and improving the conditions in Darfur could be reversed if
the new instability goes unchecked.
The most important election on the African horizon will be held in
spring 2007 in Nigeria, the continent's most populous country and
largest oil producer. The vote has the potential to reinforce a
democratic trend away from military rule or it could lead to major
disruption in a nation suffering frequent ethno-religious violence,
criminal activity, and rampant corruption. Speculation that President
Obasanjo will try to change the constitution so he can seek a third
term in office is raising political tensions and, if proven true,
threatens to unleash major turmoil and conflict. Such chaos in Nigeria
could lead to disruption of oil supply, secessionist moves by regional
governments, major refugee flows, and instability elsewhere in West
Africa.
GLOBALIZATION AND RISING ACTORS
To one degree or another, all nations are affected by the
phenomenon known as globalization. Many see the United States as
globalization's primary beneficiary, but the developments subsumed
under its rubric operate largely beyond the control of all countries.
Small, medium, and large states are both gaining and losing through
technological and economic developments at a rate of speed unheard of
in human history.
Such recalibrations in regional and global standing usually emerge
in the wake of war. But globalization isn't a war, even though its
underside--fierce competition for global energy reserves, discrepancies
between rich and poor, criminal networks that create and feed black
markets in drugs and even human beings, and the rapid transmission of
disease--has the look of a silent but titanic global struggle.
One major recalibration of the global order enabled by
globalization is the shift of world economic momentum and energy to
greater Asia--led principally by explosive economic growth in China and
the growing concentration of world manufacturing activity in and around
it. India, too, is emerging as a new pole of greater Asia's surging
economic and political power. These two Asian giants comprise fully a
third of the world's population--a huge labor force eager for modem
work, supported by significant scientific and technological
capabilities, and an army of new claimants on the world's natural
resources and capital.
CHINA
China is a rapidly rising power with steadily expanding global
reach that may become a peer competitor to the United States at some
point. Consistent high rates of economic growth, driven by exploding
foreign trade, have increased Beijing's political influence abroad and
fueled a military modernization program that has steadily increased
Beijing's force projection capabilities.
Chinese foreign policy is currently focused on the country's
immediate periphery, including Southeast and Central Asia, where
Beijing hopes to make economic inroads, increase political influence,
and prevent a backlash against its rise. Its rhetoric toward Taiwan has
been less inflammatory since Beijing passed its ``anti-secession'' law
last spring. China has been reaching out to the opposition parties on
Taiwan and making economic overtures designed to win favor with the
Taiwan public although Beijing still refuses to deal with the elected
leader in Taipei.
Beijing also has expanded diplomatic and economic interaction with
other major powers--especially Russia and the EU--and begun to increase
its presence in Africa and Latin America.
China's military is vigorously pursuing a modernization program: a
full suite of modem weapons and hardware for a large proportion of its
overall force structure; designs for a more effective operational
doctrine at the tactical and theater level; training reforms; and wide-
ranging improvements in logistics, administration, financial
management, mobilization, and other critical support functions.
Beijing's biggest challenge is to sustain growth sufficient to keep
unemployment and rural discontent from rising to destabilizing levels
and to maintain increases in living standards. To do this, China must
solve a number of difficult economic and legal problems, improve the
education system, reduce environmental degradation, and improve
governance by combating corruption.
Indeed, China's rise may be hobbled by systemic problems and the
Communist Party's resistance to the demands for political participation
that economic growth generates. Beijing's determination to repress real
or perceived challenges--from dispossessed peasants to religious
organizations---could lead to serious instability at home and less
effective policies abroad.
INDIA
Rapid economic growth and increasing technological competence are
securing India's leading role in South Asia, while helping India to
realize its longstanding ambition to become a global power. India's
growing confidence on the world stage as a result of its increasingly
globalized business activity will make New Delhi a more effective
partner for the United States, but also a more formidable player on
issues such as those before the WTO.
New Delhi seeks to play a key role in fostering democracy in the
region, especially in Nepal and Bangladesh, and will continue to be a
reliable ally against global terrorism, in part because India has been
a frequent target for Islamic terrorists, mainly in Kashmir. India
seeks better relations with its two main rivals--Pakistan and China--
recognizing that its regional disputes with them are hampering its
larger goals on the world stage. Nevertheless, like China, India is
using its newfound wealth and technical capabilities to extend its
military reach.
On the economic front, as Indian multinationals become more
prevalent, they will offer competition and cooperation with the United
States in fields such as energy, steel, and pharmaceuticals. New
Delhi's pursuit of energy to fuel its rapidly growing economy adds to
pressure on world prices and increases the likelihood that it will seek
to augment its programs in nuclear power, coal technologies, and
petroleum exploration. Like Pakistan, India is outside the
Nonproliferation Treaty.
THREATS TO GLOBAL ENERGY SECURITY
World energy markets seem certain to remain tight for the
foreseeable future. Robust global economic expansion is pushing strong
energy demand growth and--combined with instability in several oil
producing regions--is increasing the geopolitical leverage of key
energy producer states such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia, and
Venezuela. At the same time, the pursuit of secure energy supplies has
become a much more significant driver of foreign policy in countries
where energy demand growth is surging--particularly China and India.
The changing global oil and gas market has encouraged Russia's
assertiveness with Ukraine and Georgia, Iran's nuclear brinksmanship,
and the populist ``petro-diplomacy'' of Venezuela's Hugo Chavez.
Russia's recent but short-lived curtailment of natural gas deliveries
to Ukraine temporarily reduced gas supplies to much of Europe and is an
example of how energy can be used as both a political and economic
tool. The gas disruption alarmed Europeans--reminding them of their
dependence on Russian gas--and refocused debate on alternative energy
sources.
Foreign policy frictions, driven by energy security concerns, are
likely to be fed by continued global efforts of Chinese and Indian
firms to ink new oilfield development deals and to purchase stakes in
foreign oil and gas properties. Although some of these moves may
incrementally increase oil sector investment and global supplies,
others may bolster countries such as Iran, Syria, and Sudan that pose
significant US national security risks or foreign policy challenges.
For example, in Venezuela, Chavez is attempting to diversify oil
exports away from the US.
THE SECURITY THREAT FROM NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
In addition to the central US national security interest in
stemming the flow of drugs to this country, there are two international
threats related to narcotics: first, the potential threat from an
intersection of narcotics and extremism; and second, the threat from
the impact of drugs on those ineffective and unreliable nation states
about which we are so concerned.
Although the worldwide trafficking-terrorist relationship is
limited, the scope of these ties has grown modestly in recent years. A
small number of terrorist groups engage the services of or accept
donations from criminals, including narcotics traffickers, to help
raise operational funds. While the revenue realized by extremists
appears small when compared to that of the dedicated trafficking
organizations, even small amounts of income can finance destructive
acts of terror.
The tie between drug trafficking and extremism is strongest in
Colombia and Afghanistan. Both of Colombia's insurgencies and most of
its paramilitary groups reap substantial benefits from cocaine
transactions. In Afghanistan, the Taliban and Hizb-i Islami Gulbudin
gain at least some of their financial support from their ties to local
opiates traffickers. Ties between trafficking and extremists elsewhere
are less robust and profitable. North African extremists involved in
the 2004 Madrid train bombings reportedly used drug income to buy their
explosives.
Most major international organized crime groups have kept
terrorists at arm's length, although some regional criminal gangs have
supplied fraudulent or altered travel documents, moved illicit
earnings, or provided other criminal services to members of insurgent
or terrorist groups for a fee.
Narcotics traffickers--and other organized criminals--typically do
not want to see governments toppled but thrive in states where
governments are weak, vulnerable to or seeking out corruption, and
unable--or unwilling--to consistently enforce the rule of law.
Nonetheless, a vicious cycle can develop in which a weakened government
enables criminals to dangerously undercut the state's credibility and
authority with the consequence that the investment climate suffers,
economic growth withers, black market activity rises, and fewer
resources are available for civil infrastructure and governance.
We are particularly concerned about this cycle in countries on the
other side of the world, such as Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Burma,
and those close to home, such as in Haiti, Jamaica, and Mexico. About
90 percent of detected cocaine destined for the US was smuggled through
the Mexico-Central America corridor; nearly all Mexican heroin is for
the US market; and Mexico is the primary foreign supplier of marijuana
and methamphetamine to the US.
THE THREAT FROM PANDEMICS AND EPIDEMICS
In the 21st century, our Intelligence Community has expanded the
definition of bio-threats to the US beyond weapons to naturally
occurring pandemics. The most pressing infectious disease challenge
facing the US is the potential emergence of a new and deadly avian
influenza strain, which could cause a worldwide outbreak, or pandemic.
International health experts worry that avian influenza could become
transmissible among humans, threatening the health and lives of
millions of people around the globe. There are many unknowns about
avian flu, but even the specter of an outbreak could have significant
effects on the international economy, whole societies, military
operations, critical infrastructure, and diplomatic relations.
Avian flu is not something we can fight alone. An effective
response to it is highly dependent on the openness of affected nations
in reporting outbreaks where and when they occur. But for internal
political reasons, a lack of response capability, or disinclination to
regard avian influenza as a significant threat, some countries are not
forthcoming. In close coordination with the Department of Health and
Human Services, the Intelligence Community therefore is tracking a
number of key countries that are--or could be--especially prone to
avian influenza outbreaks and where we cannot be confident that
adequate information will be available through open sources. The IC
also coordinates closely with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and provides input to the national Bio Surveillance Integration System
at DHS.
Conclusion
Each of the major intelligence challenges I have discussed today is
affected by the accelerating change and transnational interplay that
are the hallmarks of 21st century globalization. As a direct result,
collecting, analyzing, and acting on solid intelligence have become
increasingly difficult. To meet these new and reconfigured challenges,
we need to work hand-in-hand with other responsible nations.
Fortunately, the vast majority of governments in the world are
responsible and responsive, but those that are not are neither few in
numbers nor lacking in material resources and geopolitical influence.
The powerful critiques of this Committee, the 9/11 Commission, and
the WMD Commission, framed by statute in the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 and taken to heart by the dedicated
professionals of our Intelligence Community, have helped make us better
prepared and more vigilant than we were on that terrible day in
September 2001. But from an intelligence perspective, we cannot rest.
We must transform our intelligence capabilities and cultures by fully
integrating them from local law enforcement through national
authorities in Washington to combatant commanders overseas. The more
thoroughly we do that, the more clearly we will be able to see the
threats lurking in the shadow of the future and ward them off.
Thank you very much.
[Recess.]
Chairman Roberts. Each Member will be granted 5 minutes,
and we will do a second round if necessary. And we have a
closed session at 2:30.
Mr. Director, last year I asked, the Committee staff to be
very proactive in trying to examine the intelligence
community's capabilities to collect and analyze against very
hard targets--I'm talking about Iran, North Korea, China--on
the problem of terrorism and also proliferation. They are very
difficult--I don't have to tell anybody in the panel about
that--and important intelligence targets, none so more than
terrorism.
We've been engaged on these problems. But I also think as
the DNI, you are the person most responsible for assessing and
improving the IC's intelligence capabilities. I'd like to hear
briefly your impressions of our community's intelligence
capabilities to target terrorists when you became the Director
of DNI, what you've done since; more especially those hard
targets that are so hard to penetrate.
Director Negroponte. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In brief, the
hard targets that you mentioned--terrorism, proliferation, some
of the countries that I was talking about during my testimony--
Iran and North Korea--have the highest collection priority
throughout the intelligence community. We're embarked on a
vigorous plan, directed by the President a year or so ago, to
increase our analytical and collection capability at the CIA
and in other agencies. And in addition to that, upon the
recommendation of the Robb-Silberman report and the WMD
Commission, we have created mission managers for the hard
target areas.
So we now have a mission manager for North Korea; we have a
mission manager for Iran and so forth. Those intelligence
officials are empowered to bring together the entire
intelligence community and work on a collaborative basis to
give those difficult issues the attention they deserve.
Now, I don't want to leave you with the illusion that this
is any easier a problem as a result of these efforts, but I
want to assure you--reassure you--that we are working very,
very hard on this question of penetrating the hard targets, and
I'm satisfied that we're making progress.
Chairman Roberts. Especially in regards to the increase and
the reference to human intelligence?
Director Negroponte. Yes, that is a very important area of
emphasis; I would say, yes, there's been a substantial effort
in that area----
Chairman Roberts. Right.
Director Negroponte [continuing]. Both to increase the
penetration of the targets and also to increase the base of our
capabilities by increasing recruitment into our human
intelligence services.
Chairman Roberts. All right. Throwing great fear into my
staff in that I'm going to wing you a question, as opposed to
one that's prepared, Ms. Rodley, you do a great job over there
at INR. INR usually comes up with a little bit different
viewpoint. That's healthy.
Mr. Allen, you are a veteran in the intelligence community
and certain to have a great degree of expertise. You are over
at Homeland Security--the newest of the agencies--that has come
under a lot of criticism.
My question is to both of you. What are you doing in
regards to an everyday kind of situation? And I would apply
that to General Maples with the DIA and General Hayden in
regards to what you're doing unless other factors shut you
down, which I hope is not the case, and then you have the DNI
here with working groups that you're supposed to coordinate
that.
And Mr. Goss, who will be before the Committee very quickly
to go over his tenure at the CIA, and we worry about loss of
certain capabilities as well. I worry about the loss of the
capability that the former NSA director had.
And then Mr. Mueller, you--if we pass the PATRIOT Act, if
we don't re-enact these laws, I know that you want to
basically--to state it as Ronald Reagan did, you know,
``Congress tear down these walls.'' So we're going to try to do
that.
But my question is, information access, where all of you
share this information and then it is funneled into the
National Counterterrorism Threat Center so we have a better
analytical picture, if you will, of the jigsaw puzzle or, say,
connecting the dots--do you feel in terms of information access
that you are making progress? We hear it down at the center
that there's one computer on somebody's desk and then eight
others underneath somebody else's desk. Where are we on that?
And I'll ask the Director.
Director Negroponte. First of all, I do think that we're
all working against a common enemy here. I believe the effort
is more integrated than it was before, and I think they do know
what each other is doing in this core area of interest.
As far as the integration of information at the National
Counterterrorism Center, I think that's working apace, and one
of my significant priorities during the past year has been to
build that center up, give it a permanent leadership, grow its
staff--which we are doing--so that it can meet the
responsibilities that it has to carry out.
Now, we also have a senatorially confirmed chief
information officer, and also an information sharing executive,
and those officials are working together to improve the
information sharing environment across the intelligence
community.
But I believe, Senator, that it's better than it was
previously, and I think that the dots are being connected. Can
more be done? Yes, to be sure. But we're working on it.
Chairman Roberts. So Charlie Allen's left hand knows what
Ms. Rodley's right hand is doing?
Director Negroponte. Well, when it relates to a problem
that they're both commonly concerned with. But I'd be happy to
let them answer it.
Chairman Roberts. Well, at any rate, thank you for that
answer, and I'm glad we're making progress.
Senator Rockefeller.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Director, in Buffalo, New York, on April 20, 2004--I
would say only 2 years ago--the President of the United States
made the following statement: He said, ``Anytime you hear the
U.S. Government talking about wiretaps, it requires''--and he
paused--``a wiretap requires a court order. Nothing has
changed, by the way. When we're talking about chasing down
terrorists, we're talking about getting a court order before we
do so.'' And that was the end of that phrase.
My question to you, sir: Was that statement factually
accurate when the President made it?
Director Negroponte. Senator, as the Chairman said earlier,
there's going to be both a briefing by Judge Gonzales to the
Judiciary Committee next week, as well as a briefing in closed
session by Judge Gonzales and General Hayden to the Committee
thereafter, where I think that this question can be thoroughly
discussed.
But let me say this about the terrorist surveillance
program. This is a program that was ordered by the President of
the United States with respect to international telephone calls
to or from suspected al-Qa'ida operatives and their affiliates.
It was therefore ordered in the interest of protecting our
Nation against an ongoing terrorist threat. This was not about
domestic surveillance. It was about dealing with the
international terrorist threat in the most agile and effective
way possible. But I don't think I want to go into the question
any further than that in an open hearing.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Well, but we may have more time
to talk this afternoon, then.
And, Mr. Director, the Vice President has stated that the
NSA domestic surveillance program has saved, quote, ``Thousands
of lives.'' Do you agree with that statement? Are you prepared
to explain the basis for this claim? Or if you feel that you
cannot talk in public, would you be willing to talk in closed
session this afternoon about that?
Director Negroponte. Certainly it's been an effective and
important program in dealing with the international terrorist
threat, which, as I mentioned this morning in my testimony, is
the most important threat faced by the United States here in
the homeland and to its interests abroad.
If I may, I might ask--with your permission, Senator--
General Hayden to elaborate somewhat in reply to the question
that you have just directed to me.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. General.
General Hayden. Thank you, Senator.
I've said before that the program has been successful, that
we have learned information from this program that would not
have been available to us otherwise.
Chairman Roberts. General, if you can speak right into the
microphone. I'm sorry.
General Hayden. I'm sorry.
What I've said before is that the program has been
successful, that we have learned information from this program
that would not otherwise have been available, that this
information has helped detect and prevent terrorist attacks in
the United States and abroad.
The underlying basis of your question, though, Senator, is
to put us in a position of proving a negative--proving that if
we hadn't done this, if we hadn't had this knowledge, if these
steps hadn't been taken, if these actions had not taken place,
that something else would not have happened. That's very
difficult to prove in a strict linear sense.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. General, I don't want to
interrupt, but I only have a short time left. It was the Vice
President I was quoting, not myself.
This is to Director Mueller. And good morning to you, sir.
A January 17, New York Times article quotes former and current
FBI officials as saying that the Bureau was inundated with
leads from the NSA domestic surveillance program that required
hundreds of investigators to check out thousands of tips a
month. According to officials quoted in the article, the
information from the NSA program had uncovered no active al-
Qa'ida networks inside the United States planning attacks.
Now, the President, General Hayden and others have been
very clear in their public statements that the NSA program
collects information only against known al-Qa'ida terrorists
and their associates.
Without getting into classified specifics, can you confirm
to the Committee that the investigative leads forwarded by the
NSA to the FBI related only to known al-Qa'ida terrorists and
their associates?
Director Mueller. Yes, let me answer that part of the
question I feel I can answer, Senator, and that relates to
leads that come from the NSA. We get a number of leads from the
NSA from a number of programs, including the program that's
under discussion today. And I can say that leads from that
program have been valuable in identifying would-be terrorists
in the United States, individuals who were providing material
support to terrorists.
But we get any number of leads. Most leads that we get,
whether it be from NSA or overseas from the CIA, ultimately
turn out not to be valid or worthwhile. But in our view, any
lead from any source, any legitimate source, is a lead that has
to be pursued, and we pursue each and every one of them.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. My time is up, and I thank you.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Director, you didn't mention Vanuatu, an island nation
in the South Pacific, but you seemed to cover everywhere else.
And I welcome you.
To me, just because effective intelligence gathering
requires a high degree of secrecy, the Bush administration
can't be excused from reasonable standards of accountability.
So I have essentially two questions to start with with respect
to accountability.
When it's been determined that an American monitored under
the NSA eavesdropping program is no longer a threat, what is
done with the information collected on that U.S. person, Mr.
Director?
Director Negroponte. Sir, again, I don't think in this
context----
Senator Wyden. Well, are there restrictions, are there
restrictions on how that information is used?
Director Negroponte. Let me give you a general reply, which
I think goes to your question. Whether you're talking about one
program or another with respect to NSA, those programs are
under the strictest possible oversight.
They're reviewed legally, with the greatest of care. There
are very senior managers involved in their administration. And
as far as American persons or American individuals are
concerned, protections are taken, should their names come up in
various kinds of intelligence that is collected, to minimize
and protect their identities. This has been a standard
procedure of the NSA for the many, many years that it's been in
existence.
General Hayden may want to amplify.
Senator Wyden. Mr. Director, that answer isn't good enough
for me. That answer is, essentially, ``Trust us. The Congress
and the public just have to trust us.'' And Ronald Reagan put
it very well. He said, ``Trust, but verify.'' And we have no
way to verify that citizens are being protected the way you
have outlined it today.
Now maybe, General Hayden, you want to add to that.
General Hayden. Well, sir, I'll just add, very quickly,
this is lawfully acquired signals intelligence. And the body of
regulations under which NSA operates, day in and day out, in
terms of protecting U.S. privacy, in terms of protecting
information to, from or about a U.S. person, apply to the use,
retention and destruction of that data.
Senator Wyden. General, there are virtually no rules on
data mining. You and I have gone into this. This has been
documented by government auditors. We'll talk more about it
privately.
Mr. Director, is it correct that when John Poindexter's
program, Operation Total Information Awareness, was closed that
several of Mr. Poindexter's projects were moved to various
intelligence agencies?
Director Negroponte. I don't know the answer to that
question.
Senator Wyden. Do any of the other panel members know this?
The press has reported intelligence officials saying that those
programs run by Mr. Poindexter--I and others on this panel led
the effort to close them--we want to know if Mr. Poindexter's
programs are going on somewhere else. Can anyone answer that?
Mr. Mueller.
Director Mueller. I have no knowledge of that, sir.
Senator Wyden. Any other panel members?
General Hayden. Senator, I'd like to answer you in closed
session.
Senator Wyden. All right. I will be asking that question in
closed session.
The last question I wanted to ask on this round, Mr.
Director, deals with Iran--very obviously a serious, serious
threat.
Some frame this as a choice between either bombing the
Iranians or essentially the kind of pitter-patter that goes on
at the U.N. Some have set it up as those are the choices.
I'm wondering about whether there are other options,
particularly economic sanctions. And the one that I would be
interested in your thoughts on is the idea of freezing new
foreign investment in Iran, and whether you think freezing new
foreign investment in Iran would cutoff some of the money that
they use for their dangerous weapons capability.
Director Negroponte. Well, sir, my focus is, of course, our
focus, in the intelligence community, is on evaluating the
threat--the military threat, the political threat and so forth.
So as far as recommendations of a particular option with
respect to policy, I think the question really goes more into
the area of what policymakers might wish to do.
But what I would say is clearly Iran is a part of the
international community. It has important economic
relationships, whether it's in the oil sector or through
imports or through a reliance to a certain degree on foreign
investment, and to the extent that its behavior might
ultimately bring about some curtailment of those economic
activities, that, presumably, is one of the factors that Iran
has to consider as it goes about deciding its policy.
Senator Wyden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. We will now go to Senator Warner, with
the exception that I would say that perhaps the Members could
direct their questions to threats faced by our Nation other
than the threats that some seem to think are posed by the
members of the panel.
Senator Warner.
Senator Warner. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I'd like to commend you, Mr. Negroponte, for your
statement. It was very thorough and comprehensive, and I've had
the privilege of sitting here for many, many years listening to
statements, and I would rank yours at the very top. I think it
reflects the conscious effort that you're making to fulfill
these brand new challenges, and I hope that it is working to
your satisfaction.
Is it likely that you'll come before the Congress for any
refinements in the existing law in this session?
Director Negroponte. I don't believe so, Senator, unless
there's some technical amendment of some kind that we might
seek. But as far as more substantive ones, my view--and I
mentioned this to the Committee earlier during my confirmation
hearing--is I think I ought to deal with the law as it has been
passed, play the cards that we've been dealt, so to speak, and
see how it works out. I haven't run into any significant
roadblocks. I think we're working well together. General Hayden
has pulled together a program managers' council of all the 15
that meets twice a month. I think we're working through the
various issues that the Congress directed us to work through.
But, obviously, if we run into issues that might require
legislation in the future, I wouldn't hesitate to bring them
up.
Senator Warner. And I think you've forged a respectful and
strong working relationship with the Central Intelligence
Agency under its leadership which we all admire.
Could we put this for record? I see a lot of smiles and
bowing of heads.
Director Negroponte. You can't record smiles on the record.
No, we have an excellent relationship, Mr. Chairman, and we
meet frequently and speak over the phone even more frequently.
Senator Warner. Mr. Goss, I think you should be on the
record on that also.
Director Goss. I'm pleased to be on the record, Senator, to
echo exactly those remarks. We have a great working
relationship.
Senator Warner. Let me turn to General Maples. I've had a
great deal of respect for you personally and your distinguished
career, and now, from an intelligence standpoint, you're
primarily responsible for the security situation in Iraq and
Afghanistan and elsewhere in the world.
Just a historical reference. The actions taken by our
Government together with coalition forces in Iraq initially
were the defeat of Saddam Hussein's military forces, which was
successfully done in a very short period; there followed this
insurgency, which slowly evolved and then it became a very,
very significant situation that appears now to still be
substantial, but contained and being handled by the coalition
forces.
A third composition of problems is growing, and it's of
great concern to me, and that is the combination of the
criminal elements which are growing, the corruption, the
payoffs, the graft. All of this is just, in a sense, overlaying
the courageous work of coalition forces, together with the
Iraqi forces and the people through their elections.
It's almost like it's pushing Iraq down into a morass. And
a lot of the activities of the coalition forces, particularly
the U.S. forces now, is directly or indirectly dealing with
these situations. I've been told through my sources that if you
were to quantify it, the criminal corruption problem now
equates to the seriousness of the insurgency problem.
Would you have a view on that?
General Maples. Thank you, Senator, for your question. In
directly responding, I'm not sure that the level of criminal
engagement is at the level of the insurgency, but I think it's
a very serious problem. And I see that a great deal of the
violence that we are experiencing in Iraq today does have a
relation to a criminal element, as opposed to an insurgent
element with a political purpose. I think that we see that in
numerous attacks, particularly on contracting vehicles within
the economy. We see individuals who are being paid very low
sums of money to place, for instance, IEDs, without a political
purpose, but, because they receive remuneration for doing that,
becoming essentially a part of the insurgency.
Senator Warner. That's fine. Thank you. I want to get one
further question in.
General Maples. Yes, sir.
Senator Warner. But you've documented a response.
Mr. Ambassador, you said a key to establishing effective
government and security over the next 3 to 5 years is enhanced
Sunni Arab political participation and a growing perception
among Sunnis that the political process is addressing their
interests. In a sense, that's to try and bring about a
government of the three principal factions, and it is essential
to have that foundation in place.
We're now watching the new government begin to take the
reins. It's a little early to make any judgments. But this is a
critical time, and we have a very capable U.S. Ambassador there
functioning in many ways.
What is the leverage we can have over a sovereign nation
like Iraq to bring about this conclusion that you've put in
here, which is essential to the future success of the coalition
of nations that have expended so much life and blood and
treasure to give the Iraqi people back their nation?
Director Negroponte. First, Senator, I think with respect
to Sunni participation, I've been encouraged by recent
developments. I was particularly encouraged last fall when one
million more Sunnis registered to vote in the constitutional
referendum than had been registered for the January 30 election
last year. So that, to me, was a sign of their increased
participation. Then the fact that they didn't boycott the
election. And then, following that, the Al Anbar province,
which is the most predominantly Sunni province in the country,
had a very high degree of participation in the elections that
took place on December 15th.
So I think all of that is a sign that some Sunni, at least,
are moving away from the course of violence to achieve their
political aims and are opting for the pursuit of political
solutions and outcomes. So this is to the good, and I think now
we have to find ways--we, that is, the Iraqi government and
ourselves--have to find ways of taking advantage of it.
What's the leverage that we've got? Well, of course we're a
good supportive friend of the government of Iraq. We have
130,000 troops there, and we have a massive economic
reconstruction and assistance program. So I think that, working
in partnership with our Iraqi friends, we can dialog
effectively about their political process, although we have got
to recognize that the shape that their political process is
going to take depends, ultimately, on their own decisions.
Senator Warner. That's true. And our President, in his
State of the Union, was absolutely consistent on message about
our determination to see this through. But there has to be
limitations, and that government, as it's coming into being,
has to recognize that there are some limitations.
Director Negroponte. I agree with that.
Senator Warner. And that's got to be made clear to them.
They cannot sit there and dither away and put into those
particular ministries--Homeland Security, Defense and
otherwise--persons who really don't measure up to the
capabilities required for the functioning government that they
need.
Director Negroponte. I agree. And I think I think our
Ambassador and the commander of our forces in Iraq are both
very effective at conveying those kinds of messages.
Senator Warner. Good. Mr. Goss, do you have a view on that?
Director Goss. Senator, thank you.
I do, and I certainly agree. I will assure you that--as
much as I can say in open session--I would like to reinforce in
closed session on that point, and it's simply this: I agree
with your observation that the security elements of that
country are going to be vital to the opportunity for the
institutions of democracy and freedom to flourish, and having
good people who can work in a work in a non-politicized or non-
sectarian way is going to be essential, and I think you put
your finger on exactly a critical point.
Senator Warner. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I believe my time is up.
Chairman Roberts. That is correct.
Senator Levin.
Senator Levin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Hayden, you made a lengthy speech at the National
Press Club about the program that the President authorized in
terms that involved surveillance of communications of American
citizens. And this is what you said, one of the things you said
in your speech, that there are no communications more important
to the safety of this country than those affiliated with al-
Qa'ida with one end in the United States. And I agree with that
statement. I don't think there is anything more important than
that we know what is in those communications. It's important we
know the extent of those communications as well.
Would you agree with that?
General Hayden. Absolutely, sir.
Senator Levin. Can you give us an estimate as to the number
of such communications which were tracked by NSA last year?
Just an estimate?
Chairman Roberts. Can't do that.
General Hayden. Sorry. Sir, I'd be very uncomfortable doing
it in an open session, and I don't actually know that number.
Chairman Roberts. I think that's a question, with all due
respect, being the one of two here, Senator, who has been
briefed, that would be better answered in the closed session.
Senator Levin. Well, Mr. Chairman, the President has said
in open--very open session--the NSA program is one that listens
to a few numbers. That's what the President said. Now we want
to check on that.
Chairman Roberts. It's highly minimized, I would tell the
Senator.
Senator Levin. No, excuse me. I'd rather use these minutes,
if I could, with our witnesses here.
Chairman Roberts. I will grant you as much time as
possible. I'm just trying to be helpful in terms of a
clarification, so----
Senator Levin. Thank you. I would really prefer that the
witnesses try to clarify this. The President of the United
States----
Chairman Roberts. Well, then, I won't be helpful.
Senator Levin. May I continue, Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Roberts. Certainly.
Senator Levin. Secretary Chertoff says if you're culling
through literally thousands of phone numbers, you wind up with
a huge problem managing the amount of paper. Why is it all
right for Secretary Chertoff to talk about thousands of phone
numbers, but you can't give us or won't give us in open session
an estimate of the number of those communications?
General Hayden. Senator, as I said, I'd be uncomfortable
doing it in open session, and I don't know the precise number.
Your question was----
Senator Levin. I'm not saying ``precise number.'' I asked
for an estimate.
General Hayden. I cannot give you an estimate of the number
of communications intercepted.
Senator Levin. Is it a few or is it thousands?
General Hayden. Sir, I'd be very uncomfortable talking
about it in open session.
Senator Levin. Do you know?
General Hayden. I can't give you a precise--no, sir----
Senator Levin. I didn't ask for a precise one, General, and
you keep saying ``precise,'' and I keep saying ``estimate.''
General Maples, do you know--do you have an estimate as
to----
General Maples. Sir, I do not.
Senator Levin. Do you know, Ambassador Negroponte? Do you
have an estimate of the number of those communications?
Director Negroponte. No, sir, I do not.
Senator Levin. All right. Now do you have an estimate as to
the number of persons who are members of al-Qa'ida or agents of
al-Qa'ida or who are members of affiliated organizations to al-
Qa'ida or their agents--because that's the test--whose
communications have been intercepted, say, in the last year? Do
you have an estimate of the number of persons?
General Hayden. Yes, sir, I do know that number, but I'm
unable to give it in this kind of an environment, sir.
Senator Levin. All right. Will you give us that, then, in
closed session?
General Hayden. Sir, that's part of the briefing that I've
given to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman in great detail on
multiple occasions.
Senator Levin. Will you give us that number in closed
session, the rest of us that are on the Intelligence Committee?
General Hayden. Sir, I'm not at liberty to do that.
Senator Levin. Pardon?
General Hayden. I'm not at liberty to do that, sir.
Senator Levin. All right.
You know, I think the Administration truly wants to have
this both ways. They want to characterize the program in
public. The President says there's just a few messages that are
intercepted.
The head of Homeland Security says thousands of messages.
But we're not going to be given even an estimate in public.
These are the most important communications--in your words,
General, and I happen to agree with you. I happen to agree with
you that there are no communications more important to the
safety of this country than those affiliated with al-Qa'ida;
and yet the extent of those communications is denied this
Congress, except for the four people you've talked about, the
estimate of the number of those communications is denied to the
American people. I think that is a double standard. I think
this is another example of where the Administration wants to
characterize some underlying information but doesn't want to be
pressed to support those public characterizations. And I think
it is a denial--I think basically the Administration wants to
be unchecked, either by a court or by the Congress.
That's my statement, and I'm not going to ask for an
answer, because I've got 3 seconds left.
You gave us the estimate--the Vice President estimated that
thousands of lives have been saved by this program. General, I
just want to know, can you estimate the number of lives that
have been saved by this program?
General Hayden. I cannot personally estimate the number of
lives. Again, Senator, as I said, this is about proving a
negative. I think I mentioned in another forum that if somebody
had kicked in Mohammed Atta's door in lower Maryland in July of
2001, it would still be very difficult to estimate the number
of lives saved.
Senator Levin. I agree with you, but yet the Vice President
did that in public, and apparently there's no way to support
that estimate that I know of or that you know of. And my time
is up.
Chairman Roberts. I think that Senator Bond is next.
I think as to the number of lives that have been saved, it
might have been how many were on the Brooklyn Bridge if it had
blown up, or, for that matter, other threats that----
Senator Levin. I agree with you.
Chairman Roberts [continuing]. You know, have been
thwarted.
I take with great seriousness the questions of the
distinguished Senator, but basically, certain Members of
Congress have been informed, including the leadership. And I
realize that that does not fit the concern of the Senator and
others, and we will discuss that at two business meetings and
see where we go with that.
The other group that is not informed as to these specific
figures are members of the al-Qa'ida.
Senator Bond.
Senator Bond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Negroponte, it's good to have you here today as
the Director of National Intelligence, along with your key
leaders, to tell us about the threats worldwide. Although I
believe that the intelligence reform legislation that created
your position in 2004 was weak at best, I'm committed to
working to strengthen your position so that we have one leader
in charge of our intelligence community, who will be
accountable, responsible and have the authority to ensure that
we are far less likely to have the unfortunate intelligence
efforts that preceded the disaster of September 11.
We need a strong, active intelligence community in view of
today's threats, and we need a strong, active leader for that
intelligence community. And I have confidence that you will be
up to the task. Secretary Rumsfeld last week told a number of
us that what he needs most in support for fighting the war on
terror is good intelligence, and my colleagues and I are
committed to helping you give that to him.
Recently I traveled to two areas of the world that I
consider to be the primary fronts in the war on terror--the
Middle East and Southeast Asia. In the Philippines, Indonesia,
Thailand, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, all our intelligence
officials to whom I talked relayed to me their grave concerns
over some recent and unfortunate developments that have
significantly affected their operations.
Specifically, newspaper articles concerning the alleged
detention of individuals by intelligence officials, the debate
and new legislative restrictions concerning interrogation
techniques, and the disclosure of the NSA terrorist
surveillance program have caused our leaders in the field to
question the support that they believe they once had in
Washington to act aggressively to pursue every lead that will
defend ourselves against the next terrorist attack.
Our leaders in the field relayed to me the difficulty
they've faced in assuring their intelligence sources that they
and their families would be protected, particularly in view of
the perception that has arisen that the United States is a
Nation that has little regard for classified information, and
leaks secrets with reckless abandon.
It's my belief that the recent developments have
significantly degraded our intelligence capabilities and, thus,
made America measurably less safe.
Furthermore, it is abhorrent to me that while we have men
and women putting their lives on the line in the field--my son
is a Marine intelligence officer in Iraq--that some are content
to play politics with our national security. While some are
thinking about scoring political points on matters of
intelligence or about trying to make the current Administration
look bad, I believe we should be focusing on giving the best
tools to our people in the field--to people like my son and
others--so they can do their jobs and return home safely.
I believe we can ensure humane, effective intelligence
operations consistent with our freedom-loving Americans without
having to play the blame game and overreacting to isolated
aberrant incidents, which should be and are being prosecuted
vigorously by the government, and instead, handcuffing the vast
majority of our honorable operators abroad.
I heard a lot of good things from our people in the field.
We've made tremendous progress, and Americans can be proud of
what our intelligence people have done in the field. Much of
what they've done has been classified, so I hope the public
won't get to know about all of it. But make no mistake, the
rampant leaking, and uncertainty over detainees and
intelligence techniques has shaken the confidence of our
intelligence operators in the field. They're forced to spend
more time thinking about their own professional liability
insurance and watching their backs rather than how to exploit
every possible lead.
So my question to you, Mr. Director, and to Director Goss,
is do you agree with the assessment that I've picked up in the
field? And if you do, how can we, as Members of Congress, and
how will you, as intelligence leaders in Washington, take
necessary decisive steps to support our people in the field
with the confidence that they need to lean forward in their
intelligence efforts to face the dangerous threats and not to
return to the risk-aversion that's proven so costly to us in
the past?
Director Negroponte. Thank you, Senator.
First of all, I agree with you that anytime sensitive
sources and methods are revealed in the public domain, through
press stories or otherwise, that this carries with it the grave
danger of prejudicing or adversely affecting our intelligence
operations, and in many instances lives can be directly at
stake.
And I must say that in the 9 months that I've been in this
job, one of the greatest disappointments that I personally have
had is experiencing the degree to which people are willing to
talk about classified matters to the public media. And we've
got to bring that kind of activity to a stop.
What are we doing? Well, of course, where there are
violations of security practices that take place, we're seeking
to investigate them as vigorously as possible and prosecute
them, if necessary. I'll certainly ask Mr. Goss to elaborate on
this, but I think you're right. It is an issue that affects
both our effectiveness and the morale of our people. But in
addition to investigating and penalizing those who do carry out
these kinds of leaks, I think we also have a challenge to the
leadership of the intelligence community as a whole to try and
re-instill--and we're working hard on that--a spirit of keeping
secret what has to be kept secret in our work in intelligence.
But I defer to Mr. Goss.
Director Goss. Senator, thank you very much for your
complimentary remarks about the men and women of the
intelligence community overseas. I will pass those along. And I
agree with you, they are fully deserved. I take great pride in
associating with those people.
Secondly, I would simply say that it would be inappropriate
for me to comment on motivation of leaks except as to CIA
aspects of that. And we, of course, have a vibrant
counterintelligence capability, which is--with the cooperation
of Director Mueller and others--we utilize fully.
I'm sorry to tell you that the damage has been very severe
to our capabilities to carry out our mission. I use the words
``very severe'' intentionally. That is my belief. And I think
that the evidence will show that.
When I start talking about the disruption to our plans,
things that we have under way, that are being disrupted because
of releases to the press or public discussion, when I talk
about the risks to assets, to sources and methods that are no
longer viable or usable, or less effective by a large degree,
when I talk about the erosion of confidence in our working
partners overseas, I'm stung to the quick when I get questions
from my professional counterparts saying, Mr. Goss, can't you
Americans keep a secret? That is not the kind of thing that is
helpful to building relationships, to doing some of this very
delicate, hard work that we have to do overseas.
As to what we're doing about it. I can assure you, we have
a strong internal program at the Central Intelligence Agency
under way--has been for some time--to, as the Director of
National Intelligence, Ambassador Negroponte, has said, to
remind all of our employees that we are the secret agency of
the agencies, that we are entrusted with that responsibility
uniquely, and that the men and women who come aboard are
advised of that.
So we have a program of awareness, but we also have an
investigation of finding out what leakage, if any, is coming
out of that building. And I'm afraid there is some coming out.
I also believe that there has been an erosion of the culture of
secrecy, and we're trying to re-instill that.
On the external side, I've called in the FBI, the
Department of Justice. It is my aim and it is my hope that we
will witness a grand jury investigation with reporters present
being asked to reveal who is leaking this information. I
believe the safety of this Nation and the people of this
country deserve nothing less, and I thank you for your
question.
Senator Bond. I thank you, Mr. Director.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Feingold, and welcome to the
Committee.
Senator Feingold. Chairman and Mr. Vice Chairman, again,
I'm honored to join the Committee. I sought this position for
one overriding reason. We were attacked on September 11th,
2001, by terrorists whom we must defeat. And I agree with the
Ambassador; this fight is our top national priority, and it
involves not only our military power, but also our diplomatic,
economic and intelligence capabilities.
And I have serious concerns about whether this
Administration is fighting terrorism in an effective global and
comprehensive manner. By focusing so extensively on Iraq, this
Administration seems to be pursuing a one- or two-country
strategy, when al-Qa'ida is actually operating in some 60
countries around the world.
So I am concerned about the terrorist threat in places in
Pakistan, Somalia and other parts of Africa, Southeast Asia and
elsewhere.
And I'm concerned that the President has taken the position
that he can spy on Americans without a warrant, despite a clear
statutory ban. To just respond a bit to what Senator Bond said,
I couldn't have any higher regard for the need for secrecy, and
I agree that it must be dispiriting for our people in the
intelligence community and the military to suffer from the
possibility of leaks.
But these people, who are so dedicated and so brave, also
have the right to know that there are clear rules, that we're
still operating under the rule of law, under the Bill of Rights
and the Constitution. And I bet if you asked them, they'd tell
you that they care a great deal about that as well.
Mr. Ambassador, without getting into what the specific
programs might be, can you assure us today that there are not
other intelligence collection--and I emphasize collection--
programs that you are aware of and that you are keeping from
the full Intelligence Committee?
Director Negroponte. Senator, I don't know if I can comment
on that in an open session.
Senator Feingold. Well, we'll pursue it later today.
Director Negroponte. Yes.
Senator Feingold. Let me move on to the subject that
Senator Wyden brought up and that he and I have worked on
together, this issue of data minding--data mining. I sent you a
letter on January 23rd, requesting information about the NSA's
and the intelligence community's possible use of data mining
technology to analyze telephone and computer communications
inside the United States. And as I'm sure you know, there have
been news reports that part of the NSA's domestic surveillance
program has involved large-scale data mining of domestic
communications.
Now I don't expect that you have the detailed answers to
that letter with you here today. I just want to ask if you
would commit to me today that you will respond promptly to that
letter.
Director Negroponte. Yes, I will, and I believe we have a
response in preparation, Senator. I was advised of that before
I came up to the hearing.
Senator Feingold. Thank you.
Turning to one of the areas that we were talking about or
you were talking about in your statement, in your prepared
opening statement, you included a passing reference to Somalia.
The 2004 State Department terrorism report states that al-
Qa'ida operatives there pose a ``serious threat'' to American
interests in the region and that a lack of functioning
government and a protracted state of violent instability
contributes to making Somalia a potential launching point for
terrorist operations elsewhere.
In your view, have we committed sufficient intelligence
resources to fully understanding and addressing this threat? Is
a political solution to Somalia's problems a necessary
component of our counterterrorism strategy in that region? And
if so, what are we doing to support such a solution?
Director Negroponte. On the first part of your question,
Senator, certainly Somalia is on our radar screen, not only in
the intelligence community and our diplomatic establishment,
but also in Central Command. I think it's an issue of concern,
as a place where there are international terrorists and to
which international terrorists might gravitate if they were to
suffer severe setbacks in a place like Afghanistan or Iraq.
So we're very mindful of that threat. I think we're
devoting important resources to it, although----
Senator Feingold. Are they sufficient intelligence
resources?
Director Negroponte. Well, they certainly are significant.
You can never quite do enough, but in the order of priorities
that we've got, I think we probably have it about right.
On the question of governance and whether they've got a
government, they've had sort of an absence of governance for
the past decade, though sometimes you see some emerging signs
that they might pull together some kind of a central
government. But I wouldn't hold my breath. Obviously, if they
could make improvements in their state of governance, that
might make it easier to deal with the issue of international
terrorism. That, after all, is one of the theses of my
testimony, that governance and these transnational threats can
be related to each other.
Senator Feingold. Thank you for your answers.
Chairman Roberts. Has the Senator concluded?
Senator Feingold. My time's up. I'd be happy to keep going.
Chairman Roberts. Oh, we give new Members at least, you
know, 30 seconds.
Senator Feingold. Great. I'll take another one.
The national intelligence strategy released by your office
last October states, I think quite correctly, that no nation
can build a safer, better world alone. And the strategy
involves engaging and invigorating friendly foreign
intelligence services, and you refer to that in your comments.
The strategy refers to a strategic plan for our foreign
intelligence relationships so that these relationships help us
confront national security threats. I agree, this is a
critically important task, and it involves a broad range of
policy considerations.
Is this strategy being coordinated with the State
Department? And will you work closely with Congress as you
develop this strategy?
Director Negroponte. It certainly is being coordinated with
the State Department, and we'd be pleased to inform the
Committee of the steps we've taken thus far and consult with
you on the way forward.
Whenever it comes to dealing with foreign countries and
institutions in those countries, our intelligence agencies work
closely with the United States Ambassadors there in addition to
assure the best possible coordination of this so that we don't
have a dispersion, if you will, of our effort.
One of my first acts as Director of National Intelligence
was to designate the CIA station chiefs as my representatives
in those countries so that we aren't stumbling over each other
out there, and that we have a focal point for the coordination
of intelligence relationships with foreign countries in the CIA
stations.
Senator Feingold. Thank you again.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Feinstein, welcome back.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Negroponte, I just want to associate myself with the
comments of our Ranking Member. I serve on both Judiciary as
well as Intelligence, and what we have seen in the last few
years is a defined and consistent stonewalling to prevent the
oversight responsibilities of both Committees from being
carried out. And I just want you to know that when the Ranking
Member mentioned that part of the law creating your position
also was to hold you above any political influence, I think
that that is something that we feel very strongly, and I want
personally to make that comment to you.
The National Security Act specifies that the executive
branch shall ``ensure that the congressional intelligence
Committees are kept fully and currently informed of the
intelligence activities of the United States, including any
significant anticipated intelligence activity.'' The only
statutory exemption to this is for especially sensitive covert
actions, which may be briefed to only eight Members of
Congress.
The Administration is increasing the use of these limited
briefings. My question to you is, who determines what
information will be briefed to only eight Members of Congress?
Director Negroponte. Senator, I take very seriously my
legal obligations under the National Security Act, which
requires me to keep the congressional Intelligence Committees
fully and currently informed of intelligence activities, to the
extent consistent with the protection of sensitive intelligence
sources and methods or other exceptionally sensitive matters.
Senator Feinstein. Respectfully, could you answer my
question, which was, who makes the decision?
Director Negroponte. It's the President and the Vice
President, Senator.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much. I just wanted to
know who makes the decision. Thank you.
If I could move on, the intelligence reform legislation
that created your position also set up an effort to finally
solve some of the information-sharing problems that pre-dated
September the 11th. I understand that the person appointed by
the President to lead this effort, John Russack, resigned last
week. I'm very concerned that this resignation will end any
momentum on information sharing that had been built up, and
that the State and local law enforcement will continue to lack
the information that they need to find and stop terrorists.
Will the information-sharing effort meet the statutory
timelines? And will Mr. Russack's departure mean a change in
direction for the program?
Director Negroponte. Senator, I think we're striving to the
best of our ability to meet the timelines that have been set.
Interim guidelines or an interim report was sent up to the
Senate late last year. We are taking steps to ensure that this
information-sharing program continues to have momentum, and you
can be certain that we will give it the highest attention at
the leadership of the DNI. General Hayden, my CIO and
eventually the program manager, when we get a new program
manager on board, will continue to give this issue very, very
high priority. And I would expect that--and I would hope that
progress on this front will accelerate.
Senator Feinstein. How soon do you believe you'll have
someone on board?
Director Negroponte. I've actually identified an
individual, but it's a question of clearances and just the
processes that we have to go through to be able to formally
bring that individual on board.
Senator Feinstein. And do I understand by your answer that
this will mean that the program will be carried out in the same
direction in which it was previously?
Director Negroponte. Yes. I don't think this is going to
have any policy implications with respect to the direction in
which we've been headed.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Director Negroponte. You're welcome.
Senator Feinstein. The President has stated that the NSA
warrantless electronic surveillance program has been restricted
to cases where one of the members would reasonably be suspected
to be an al-Qa'ida link or affiliate. Those were the words that
have been interchangeably used. I have two questions on this.
What does it mean to be an al-Qa'ida link or affiliate? How
is that connection to al-Qa'ida defined?
And if I've been called by Usama bin Ladin or somebody that
we know is attached to him, I presume that NSA would call that
a link to al-Qa'ida; but is anyone I then call linked to al-
Qa'ida automatically and, therefore, electronically surveilled,
and anyone they call then linked to al- Qa'ida and
electronically surveilled?
Director Negroponte. Ma'am, if I may invite General Hayden
to comment.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. That'd be fine.
General Hayden.
General Hayden. Yes, ma'am. Thank you. The criteria that
are used by the analyst--and it is done by the analysts, those
folks who are most knowledgeable about al-Qa'ida intent,
behavior, communications and so on--is that this analyst, with
all the facts available to him or her at the time, OK?--as a
prudent person would have reason to believe that this
communicant is affiliated with al-Qa'ida. That's the standard
that we use, and that's the standard that's drilled into the
individuals who make those kinds of decisions.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. The Attorney General has
asserted that the President has virtually unchecked authority
to protect Americans, regardless of a clear statutory record in
opposition. That legal position would allow the President to
issue other orders in the name of counterterrorism. Has any
intelligence agency been authorized to, or has any agency
carried out, the search of the home of any American suspected
to be linked to al-Qa'ida without a court warrant?
Director Negroponte. I think I'd have to defer to our law
enforcement authorities on this, Senator.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Mr. Mueller.
Director Mueller. Senator, I'm not aware of that happening.
Senator Feinstein. OK. Has any intelligence agency
arrested, detained, rendered or otherwise held any American
suspected to be linked to al-Qa'ida without a court warrant or
sufficient cause for criminal prosecution?
Director Mueller. I'm sorry, Senator. Can you repeat that
question for me?
Senator Feinstein. Sure. Has any intelligence agency been
authorized to or has any agency carried out an arrest,
detention, rendering, or otherwise held any American suspected
to be linked to al-Qa'ida without a court warrant or sufficient
cause for criminal prosecution?
Director Mueller. Well, I mean, I'll try a first response
to that. That's a very broad question. And looking at all the
components, there are occasions where, whether it be in the
criminal arena, the counterterrorism arena, we make arrests on
probable cause without it going through a magistrate first,
then you follow up on a complaint. And I believe in the
instances that, certainly, that I'm aware of, we followed the
procedures that are appropriate.
Senator Feinstein. May I ask for the DNI's response, since
the question had to do with intelligence agencies?
Director Negroponte. Yes, except my principal concern is
with the collection and analysis of national intelligence which
is used for the protection of the homeland. And I'm not aware
of any such instances. I really am not.
Senator Feinstein. All right. I'd like to just continue on.
Director Negroponte. Right.
Senator Feinstein. Has any intelligence agency been
authorized to or carried out the killing of anyone on U.S. soil
based on a link to al-Qa'ida?
Director Negroponte. I'm not aware of such a situation,
Senator.
Senator Feinstein. Mr. Mueller.
Director Mueller. Senator, I'm certainly not aware of such
a situation, speaking for the FBI.
Senator Feinstein. My time is up.
Chairman Roberts. In a word, yes.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. Mr. Wyden.
Senator Wyden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
In open session, Director Negroponte, I wanted to ask you
about oil, as it relates to terrorists. And here's my concern.
You go to a gas station in the United States. You pay these
huge prices. A portion of that eventually finds its way to
foreign governments, particularly Saudi Arabia. The Saudis hand
it over to charities, and the charities back-door it to
terrorists who want to kill law-abiding Americans.
What is being done to try to deal with this, and
particularly to stiffen up the Saudi effort to deal with this
problem, which I think everybody understands is going on. We're
seeing oil purchases in the United States--they're in effect
terror attacks. And I'd like to know what is going on with
respect to forcing the Saudis to crack down on how this oil
money gets to terrorists who want to kill Americans.
Director Negroponte. I think, first of all, Senator, since
some of the egregious terrorist acts that were carried out in
Saudi Arabia in recent years, I think starting with 2003
forward, I think there's a much greater awareness of the
international terrorist threat on the part of the Saudi
authorities and I think we've seen a really strengthened effort
to deal with that situation on their part. So I would say that
cooperation has increased. It's getting better. And we have a
lot of interchange at all levels--law enforcement,
intelligence, and so forth.
Senator Wyden. You no longer think this is a problem?
Director Negroponte. No, that was going to be my second
point. I believe there are private Saudi citizens who still
engage in these kinds of donations. And I think efforts must be
made and ways have to be found to discourage that kind of
activity. And I think there are also certain designated
charities and organizations we actually identify as ones to
whom monies should not be given.
So, I think it has been a problem. It's getting better. But
it continues to need work.
Senator Wyden. I'm going to ask you about that in the
private session.
One other question for you, Mr. Director. There have been
news reports this week--there was one in Newsweek Magazine--
talking about American officials being in face-to-face talks
with high-level Iraqi insurgents as part of an effort to look
at possible ways to get peace in the region.
My question is, will you confirm what was in the news
reports this week? And if you will, I particularly want to know
what is being done to address the concerns that I'm sure Shi'a
would have about any such talks.
So, first, will you confirm what's in Newsweek Magazine?
And second, if this is ongoing--and I will ask you about this
also in closed session as well--what is being done, at least
for the public record, to deal with what are certain to be
Shi'a concerns about any such talks?
Director Negroponte. Sir, I simply don't have any comment
on that story.
But as far as the question of Sunni and Shi'a relationships
in Iraq, this is a very delicate balance, if you will. I think
that any efforts to move the political process forward have got
to be based on a desire to take into account all elements--
Sunni and Shi'a included--of the Iraqi body politic.
Senator Wyden. Mr. Chairman, my colleagues didn't even get
one round, and I appreciate your giving me these extra
questions.
Chairman Roberts. Senator Rockefeller.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director, last year at this hearing, Porter Goss made the
statement--and I think this is probably the subject which is
the most scary in all of this area of intelligence and
international security--that he could not assure the American
people, you know, that there weren't unaccounted for nuclear
weapons or derivatives thereof that are housed in Russia.
Have they been stolen? Have they been sold? It wasn't
possible really to say, and I think this is a catastrophically
important matter. The U.S. Department of Energy estimated that
only 50 percent of the buildings that house fissile materials
in Russia operate under the highest security standards.
And what I really just want to know is, from either of you
gentlemen, whether you feel there has been any improvement in
that area and if we are working collaboratively, not just Nunn-
Lugar, but in other ways, to try and decrease the number
available for purchase by terrorists perhaps, probably, these
nuclear weapons or parts thereof?
Director Negroponte. If I could invite Director Goss.
Director Goss. Thank you very much, Mr. Vice Chairman.
That is correct. Last year, you asked me if I could account
for all of the unaccounted for nuclear weapons and be sure,
therefore, that the terrorists did not have access or could get
one or had one, and I could not give you that assurance and nor
can I today. But what I can tell you today is I'm a bit more
comfortable than I was a year ago. I've had a chance to focus
in on the efforts that we are making and others are making,
because this is a well-understood threat to the civilized
world, and I would dare say we're getting a good deal more
cooperation on this subject than we were before that
understanding was clear.
I would also say that this is an item that probably gets
the loudest alarm bell any time our many collectors work, so I
am completely satisfied it is attended to. I am not satisfied
that we have the answer that you and I both--that we'd all like
to have that we are 100 percent sure because we just aren't.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. But you think that the efforts
not only within our Nation and its national security apparatus,
but also other parts of the world is stronger in effecting
results toward diminishing that supply?
Director Goss. I believe that personally. You know, I
represent a capabilities organization, but just one of 15. From
my perspective, we have got a proportionate number that is
correct focused on that, and I think we are doing better. I
can't speak for the rest of the community, though.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. It's interesting, to do better
makes me feel good, but it isn't until we get the whole thing
solved, and of course, that's going to take a lot of work and a
lot of good faith and a lot of people.
Director Negroponte. If I could add quickly, Senator,--we
have created an interagency effort to collect and analyze the
whereabouts of fissile materials all over the world, and that's
ongoing on an urgent basis.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. And I'm glad to hear that.
Director, my final question will be to you, and that is, do
you agree with the statement that I made in my opening remarks
that our Committee Members and our staff are routinely given
access to the details of overseas signals intelligence programs
that are carried out by the NSA?
Director Negroponte. Yes.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Yes.
And do you believe that it's appropriate for the Committee
to have a working understanding of these programs?
Director Negroponte. I do. Yes.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Why is it that--you know, if I
had to make my guess--and this is none of my business, and I
have no proof, and so just take it for what it's worth--that
the leak which everybody is so properly concerned about
probably came out of the executive branch of government.
It surely didn't come out of Chairman Roberts or Jay
Rockefeller. And my guess would be somewhere in the Department
of Justice. But just take that for what it's worth.
Do you really believe that fully briefing the NSA matters
that we're discussing to 40 members of the Intelligence
Committees in the Congress represents some kind of an
unacceptable security risk?
Director Negroponte. Sir, we're talking about a decision
that was made long before I arrived in this position. And what
I was trying to answer to Senator Feinstein earlier was that
there is a history and a tradition of certain, very small
number--very limited number--of select sensitive programs that
the executive branch and the President and the Vice President
over a period of 50 or 60 years have chosen to limit the
briefings to a small select group in the Congress, such as the
leadership of the Congress and the chairmanship and the vice
chairmen or ranking Members of respective Committees. And that
is what has been done in this particular instance.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. And I understand----
Director Negroponte. That was the method that was chosen to
deal with this issue. But there were extensive briefings over
the lifetime of this program, I think more than 10. And so, you
know, I think that's how best I can answer that question.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. And I understand that, and I'll
just close with this thought. The top leadership doesn't
usually go to these meetings. So you're really talking about
Chairman Roberts and myself and Chairman Hoekstra and Ranking
Member Harman. And there may be a long history of this. I'm not
aware of that. But there is no history that comports in any way
to the intensity of what's happened as a result of 9/11.
And I just want to make the statement that I think so much
could be worked out--and so many people would probably agree--
if we felt we were being talked to, as is required by law. The
Chairman, when he gave his opening statement, talked about
``lawful.'' And I just really think that the executive branch
needs to think about the fact that laws are laws, and you are
specifically placed under a certain law, and others are placed
under certain laws. And informing the Committee of jurisdiction
is one of those laws.
And it simply isn't being done, in an atmosphere where it
needs to be done, I think, more than ever, in which I would
disagree with Senator Bond, who--this is not fair, to
paraphrase him--but to say that if people are asking questions
about this, that somehow they're taking their eye off what is
deemed to be the ball--and I think part of the discussion and
the history and the future of all of this is going to be that
the executive branch and the legislative branch have to have a
working relationship that in fact fits into what the laws
require.
I think you have nothing to fear from us. You have nothing
to fear from the House. I think it's almost certain that
whatever leaks came came from the executive branch, and that's
always going to be a problem. But I just beg you to consider
what I say in deep seriousness and deep sincerity.
Chairman Roberts. I think that the Director of the FBI
would like to respond.
Director Mueller. Senator, if I might, being a component of
the Department of Justice, I want to not leave that remark go
unaddressed in terms of----
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. Yeah, I can understand that.
Director Mueller. And I'm not certain you have a basis for
pointing a finger. I'm not certain what leak you're talking
about, and I don't think it's fair to point a finger as to the
responsibility of the leak, so I did not want to let that go
unaddressed.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. I understand.
Chairman Roberts. We have Senator Feingold on the second
round.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Following up on Senator Feinstein's question, Mr.
Negroponte, and----
Chairman Roberts. Oh, sir, I beg your pardon. For some
reason, I have not recognized the first round appearance of the
sheriff of the always powerful Senate Agriculture Committee,
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It used to be powerful before you were Chairman in the
House, and we haven't recovered, but we're getting there.
[Laughter.]
Senator Chambliss. I want to follow up on what Senator
Rockefeller just said, ladies and gentlemen. This issue
relative to this leak coming out of the executive department or
the Administration, that's a pretty serious accusation, and, in
fact, the only known source of any communication from the
inside has come from an individual, as I understand it, who
used to work in the program and is not a part of the executive
branch.
But I have been very hesitant to talk about the fact--and I
assume I'm directing this to either you, Director Mueller, or
Director Goss or Director Negroponte--I've been hesitant to
talk publicly about the fact that the position of gathering
intelligence and utilizing very classified and sophisticated
intelligence has been compromised by not only the leak,
wherever it came from, but also by the continuing highlighting
of this issue in the press, and that those folks who continue
to question this program, those folks who continue to go out
front and talk in a negative way about this program may be
aiding and abetting the terrorists.
And I am extremely concerned about that.
I understand, Director Goss, that you may have addressed
this in an earlier response to a question from Senator Bond,
and I apologize for not being here. But I would like to ask you
all to comment on that, if you will, as to whether or not our
position has been compromised, if we have lost any of our
capability relative to this program as a result of the
publicity surrounding it.
Director Goss. Thank you, Senator, very much. It would only
be appropriate for me to comment about those areas that I have
accountability and responsibility for. And I was referring to
leaks that Senator Bond had referred to that went to that area,
and explained at some length how damaging they have been and
the steps we are taking to deal with that, and I hope they'll
be successful steps.
NSA is not, obviously, in our area, and so I would prefer
to yield to either Director Mueller, who has the domestic side
of the argument, or the Director of National Intelligence for
whoever he would like to appoint to deal with the NSA aspects.
Senator Chambliss. Sure.
General Hayden. Senator, it's hard for me to characterize
in open session. But I did make the comment earlier in another
environment that some people claim that somehow or another our
capabilities were immune to this kind of information going out
into the public domain. And I can tell you in a broad sense
that is certainly not true.
Senator Chambliss. The bad guys tend to get information
that comes out of Congress or out of the American press in real
time. Is that a fair statement, General Hayden?
General Hayden. We have been impressed with their ability
with various Web sites that are generally available and at how
agile they are in responding to events in this country.
Senator Chambliss. Yes.
Director Negroponte, the Secure Border Initiative was
introduced by the Department of Homeland Security in November
2005. And this is a comprehensive multi-year plan to secure
America's borders and reduce illegal immigration, which
includes increasing the number of Border Patrol agents, as well
as upgrading technology used in controlling the border,
increasing manned aerial assets, expanded use of UAVs and next-
generation detection technology.
Recent reports suggest that smugglers are either disguising
themselves as Mexican soldiers, or may actually be members of
the Mexican military. How large of a problem is protecting our
borders from infiltrators who may be receiving assistance from
corrupt Mexican authorities, and what is our intelligence
community doing to identify those collaborators?
Director Negroponte. With your permission, Senator, perhaps
I could invite Mr. Allen from the Department of Homeland
Security to respond to that question.
Senator Chambliss. Sure.
Dr. Allen. Thank you. Thank you, Ambassador Negroponte.
Senator, on the Strategic Border Initiatives, as you know,
Secretary Chertoff has a number of multi-functional ways to do
this. A number of actions are under way.
I, from an intelligence perspective, am looking at this on
how to strengthen our intelligence collection on all of our
borders, wherever they may be. Getting into specifics relating
to any reported incidents along the border, that's something
I'd prefer to talk to in a closed session. But I can say this,
that our borders are being strengthened, whether by land, sea
or air, and whether north or south, thanks to the procedures
that are being rapidly put in place under the leadership of
Secretary Chertoff. I think we can take comfort that we're well
on our way to taking the kind of measures that the American
public really wants to see.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. It would be the hope of the Chair that we
could at least allow the witnesses an hour for lunch before we
go to the closed session.
So with that in mind, on the second round I recognize
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm pleased I
went after my friend, Senator Chambliss, because what I'd like
to say is the greatest publicizing of this NSA program that
I've heard was when I sat in front of the President of the
United States the other night at the State of the Union and
heard him discussing it in front of the whole world.
In fact, this is part of a larger effort to discuss this on
a constant basis and to make it a political issue in front of
the American people. So I take it his remarks would apply to
that sort of conduct as well.
Mr. Negroponte and General Hayden, following up on Senator
Feinstein's question, have you defined ``al-Qa'ida affiliate''
for the purpose of warrantless NSA surveillance? Is it a term
of art? How are the NSA officials guided on this?
General Hayden. It's a term of science, Senator. It is a
specific list of affiliates. There is a burden of proof that
must be met before an organization is deemed to be affiliated
with al-Qa'ida. And that work is overseen by the entire
oversight structure that governs this program within NSA by the
IG, the general counsel, and by the Department of Justice.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, General.
On Pakistan, Mr. Negroponte, the most recent State
Department country reports on terrorism for 2004 state that al-
Qa'ida continues to hide in Pakistan's federally administrated
tribal areas of Pakistan. Who wields power in these regions,
and how has al-Qa'ida managed to stay there for so long? Is
this region basically a terrorist sanctuary? The report also
states the Pakistan has pursued a strategy to win the support
of tribes in the FATA with a combination of negotiations and
economic investments. Have the Pakistanis achieved any success
in this regard?
Director Negroponte. It's a tough area. It's a tough area,
Senator. And it's an area that historically has sought to
govern itself, if you will. It's not felt itself an integrated
part of any country or nation. And a lot of people up there
take the law into their own hands, I think. But I believe the
Pakistani Government has done a lot in recent times to
establish a greater presence there. They've sent their military
into the region, who operate with greater frequency and have
taken a large number of casualties, substantial casualties in
their efforts to impose the writ of the central government.
So I think the situation there is gradually shifting. But
it's proven to be a great challenge for the government of
Pakistan. But I don't doubt their commitment to fighting
against international terrorists, and we've seen ample evidence
of that over the past months and years.
Senator Feingold. On Iraq, you state in your opening
statement that Iraqi Sunni-Arab disaffection is the primary
enabler of the insurgency. Can you just say a bit more about
the range of motivations that inspire the insurgency and the
extent to which it is motivated specifically by anti-coalition
sentiment?
Director Negroponte. Well, I think the fundamental issue
for those Sunnis who are not international terrorists, who are
not part of al-Qa'ida or Zarqawi's group, has been a feeling of
having been disempowered as a result of the fall of Saddam
Hussein. So I think that probably is the most significant
motivation--the feeling on the part of many Sunnis that they no
longer have the position of prominence in the governance of
their society, of their country that they used to have, and
their desire to recuperate some of that influence.
I think what we're seeing happening in Iraq is these
different political forces and political groups finding the
right balance among themselves that will permit their society
to go forward in a peaceful manner. And I think the electoral
process and the political process that we're witnessing offers
that opportunity.
Senator Feingold. Thank you for all your answers, and thank
you, Mr. Chairman, for the additional time.
Chairman Roberts. Yes, sir.
Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Negroponte, we have heard allegations that top
officials in one of the technical intelligence agencies
explicitly warned contractors not to talk to Congress about
ongoing programs or risk losing future contract competitions. I
know this for a fact.
Are you aware of this? And does Congress have the right, do
we--in my case an appropriator, as well as an authorizer--have
the right to talk to the contractor of major technical
programs?
Director Negroponte. Senator, I'm not aware of this
particular situation, but if I may, I would like to know the
details, so that I can have a look at the matter.
Senator Feinstein. I will be happy to give you the details.
Thank you.
Last year, Admiral Loy, who was present, and I discussed
border security, particularly the increasing problem of
penetration of other than Mexicans across our borders, which
are growing in numbers, and I said at that time that I felt it
was a major gateway for terrorists to access the United States.
Do you have ongoing intelligence efforts to prevent this
from happening? And is there any evidence up to this point that
it is in fact happening?
Director Negroponte. I'm going to invite Mr. Allen to
elaborate, but one thing I would like to say, Senator, is of
course it's an issue that we're sensitive to, and second, my
impression is that perhaps our border with Canada has to some
degree been of a bit greater concern than that with Mexico.
Although, obviously, we have to watch all of our borders very,
very carefully.
But if I could ask Mr. Allen to elaborate?
Dr. Allen. Yes, Senator Feinstein, we recognize this
issue. As you know, we have found a lot of individuals other
than Mexicans attempting to cross our borders illegally, and
under Secretary Chertoff's new policy, which is catch-and-
return or deport, this is having I think a salutary effect.
Now, the Strategic Border Initiative is new, and it's only now
getting fully under way, and we're very sensitive of the fact
that people from other areas--from areas where we might expect
to find members of al-Qa'ida. We are very sensitive to that. We
work extraordinarily hard on this issue.
I think terrorists are facing an increasingly challenging
environment to enter our country, certainly by air and by sea.
We now need to secure our borders and, as Ambassador Negroponte
said, we need to work harder.
Senator Feinstein. If I might suggest to you, the numbers
in the past 2 years have tripled. They have gone from fiscal
year 2003, 49,545 to 2005, 155,000. Now these are other than
Mexicans.
Dr. Allen. These are other than Mexicans. We're aware of
those figures.
Senator Feinstein. So this indicates to me that whatever
we're doing is not working because more are coming through than
ever before.
Dr. Allen. We believe we'll see a change in that in the
coming months, because the catch-and-return policy I think it
will have salutary effects over time.
We really do have to work this issue a lot harder, and, as
it was said earlier, when I answered Senator Chambliss, we're
using significant new capabilities, including border patrolmen,
but significant new advanced technologies to try to detect
people entering our countries, particularly in Texas and
Arizona.
Senator Feinstein. Well, thank you very much for that.
Dr. Allen. Yes, ma'am.
Senator Feinstein. Mr. Negroponte, recent media reports
have spotlighted a number of activities that appear to be
related to intelligence collection or covert action, but that
well maybe outside of the official intelligence community's
channels; for example, military data bases of suspicious
activity reports called Talons by the Counterintelligence Field
Activity or CIFA, and second, a Pentagon program to secretly
pay Iraqi newspapers to run pro-American articles.
Were these activities subject to your approval and
oversight?
General Maples. Ma'am, I don't believe that either of those
activities would fall into Mr. Negroponte's area. They are
Department of Defense programs.
Senator Feinstein. Let me raise this problem, then. They
should. We appointed you to be the--we didn't appoint you, but
we created the legislation so that you were the person over all
intelligence. Now, I know how tough it is, but this gives--if
you didn't know and you didn't give a go-ahead, it indicates to
me that for 85 percent of the budget which is defense-related,
that you're not going to have the controls that you should
have. You want to comment?
Director Negroponte. Well, CIFA is within the national
intelligence program, but as far as specifically directing
those activities, that has not risen to the level of my office
and comes under the direction of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Intelligence. And my understanding, in light of the issues
that have come up and the controversy and the press attention
that has been given to CIFA, that Mr. Cambone has ordered a
complete review of that program from top down.
Senator Feinstein. Well, will you get the results of that
review?
Director Negroponte. Yes, I will get those results.
Senator Feinstein. Will you be able to play a decision-
making role in that, or does Defense control it?
Director Negroponte. Well, to the extent that I have
reporting to me a national counterintelligence executive and
have a role in counterintelligence, yes.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. Let me just say that our staff has been
briefed by the DOD and that I would encourage the Senator to
check with staff on both sides, and that we have looked at this
very carefully, and I think some of the concerns that she has
raised, which obviously should be shared by everybody, you
know, have been answered.
Let me just say this in closing. First, I want to thank you
for your patience. Second, we are going to welcome you to the
closed session. Third, I hope you at least get to eat a
sandwich.
Let me make an observation. Since the enactment of the
provision requiring the Intelligence Committees be kept fully
and currently informed, that the Committees and the
Presidents--and I use ``the President'' in plural--have always
managed the delicate process of access to information. To claim
this situation is somehow different ignores this Committee's
history and the text of our laws.
Now, I know this happened under President Carter, I know
this happened under President Reagan, I know this happened
under President Bush-one, I know this happened under President
Clinton, and I know this happened under President Bush. And
basically the law, at least in the way that I have read it,
indicates that the executive has the prerogative and also has
the responsibility of keeping the Congress informed. The
practice, however, has been that there are certain programs
that are so highly classified that they are limited to eight--
i.e., the leadership of the House and Senate and also the
Ranking Member and, in this particular case, the co-Chair and
the Chair of the Intelligence Committees.
On some occasions, if it involves the military in some kind
of a covert operation, the same thing applies to Armed Services
and the Subcommittee on Armed Services in regards to the
Subcommittee on Appropriations.
Now, I know there is a great hue and cry that we make more
people pregnant with the knowledge, and then, of course, if
they're pregnant with the knowledge, they will rock the baby,
as opposed to throwing it out with the bath water. But let me
say that we did that.
Immediately after 9/11, we thought it was our obligation on
the Intelligence Committees, under different leadership at that
particular time, to have a joint investigation, which we did.
We even had an independent staff, forcing Members to come to
the meeting and act as if they were studying for a chemistry
test during a study hall because we quite never knew what to
expect. Now, that's sort of telling tales out of school, but I
didn't think that was a very helpful operation.
It wasn't any time at all with the joint Committees--and
I'm not trying to perjure anybody or the Committees or the
intent of Congress or the integrity of Congress--before we had
a leak. Now, the leak had nothing to do with 9/11, but boy, it
sure made the headlines. And the executive made a decision at
that particular time: I'm not going to--or we are not going to
share any information or send anybody down to testify further
if we have leaks of this nature.
And so the leadership of that Committee, the Joint
Committee Investigation on 9/11, made a decision--or agreed to
the executive that there would be an FBI investigation of the
Committee. At the same time, the Committee was investigating
the FBI's role in 9/11. So here we were in a joint committee
investigating the FBI, and then the FBI investigating us and
asking every Member of the Intelligence Committees--both House
and Senate--would you take a lie detector test?
I can't think of anything more ridiculous or silly. I will
say, as Chairman of this Committee, that if somebody asked me
to do that, my answer is no.
And the result was that what we really needed in that
group--and I'm not comparing that particular group because I
was a Member of it--and then, of course, everybody said it was
staff. Members always say that it's staff. And I said that's a
lot of nonsense. What we ought to do is have Members, when they
walk out of the room, put duct tape on and have a requirement
that they at least wear the duct tape for 24 hours.
Now, that was the worry that happened under this
Administration, and previous Administrations, when these
briefings got to a larger group.
Now, I would agree with Vice Chairman Rockefeller, I don't
know of anybody on our Committee, I don't know of anybody on
the House Committee that would willingly or wittingly repeat
any information that would be so classified that it would
endanger our country.
Now, my question is, however, there's been a lot of comment
about the President, you know, talking about this, the Vice
President talking about this. It was only after the leak in The
New York Times, which contained a lot of misinformation, as far
as I'm concerned, about domestic spying, when we really have a
threat warning capability--and that's what we're talking about,
it's more of a military mission than it is any kind of a
criminal proceeding under FISA. And FISA, by the way, is
outdated in regards to its context with both the threat and the
technology. And were we to do that, we would lose not only
minutes, but hours or days when we have a threat that may
happen immediately. And it would be an amazing thing to me that
if we had another attack, the very people that are doing all
the questioning now would be having you all back up and say,
``How come you didn't know?''
Now, my question is basically to General Hayden. What
happens if you lose this capability, General?
General Hayden. It's proven to be a very valuable tool for
that which it was intended--to detect and prevent attacks
inside the United States, Senator.
And you're right about the firestorm of misinformation that
seemed to follow day after day after the original leak was
reported in The New York Times. I've spoken to this Committee--
I think it was in this room--in October of 2002, talking about
the line between liberty and security, and how that had to be
an informed debate by the American people so that we're all
comfortable about that line.
And there was so much inaccurate information,
misinformation and misunderstanding out there that what was
appearing in the press wasn't informing a debate; it was
horribly misshaping it. And I don't see how we, as a free
people, can make a decision in that way.
Chairman Roberts. Well, I really regret that situation is
happening, and I know that it is understandable, both on the
majority side and the minority side, that we have differences
of opinion. And unfortunately, the climate in the Congress
today, then, is to ascribe politics as the reason for that. I
really think people have strong differences of opinion. But
fortunately or unfortunately, in regards to the number of
people who are briefed, I think it's basically on the lack of
information, and the lack of information in regard to exactly
what this program is.
And I cannot imagine how anybody who would be receiving a
call from a terrorist cell, where we have reason to believe
that they are going to attack the United States, and that
person happened to be in the United States, that they would
think their civil liberty was being violated if some
intelligence or law enforcement person was not monitoring that
call. It would be indefensible if we did not.
And in addition, I would only point out that you really
don't have any civil liberties if you're dead.
The other thing that I would say is that I want to thank
you again, all of you, for your dedication, your perseverance,
for keeping this country safe, as opposed to some, who
obviously are more worried about you people, apparently, than
some people who--where we are at war and where we have a threat
and where we have plots against the United States and where we
have sleeper cells in the United States. And it could happen at
any moment. Thank God we have this capability.
This hearing is concluded.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. I need to respond, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Roberts. You may respond.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. And let me just ask a question
first to the Director. Is the NSA program a covert action
program, as defined by the National Security Act?
Director Negroponte. I don't believe so, sir, no.
Vice Chairman Rockefeller. And that's what we were told
yesterday by the folks from Justice, that it is not.
Now as to the horror of people wanting to do things both
rigorously, aggressively, using intelligence, in every possible
way that we can, it does not subtract, however, from two other
concepts which have kept our Nation viable for many, many, many
years. And that is that we do things under the law. We do them
under the law.
Secondly--and I've made this point many times to the
Chairman; we've talked about it--there is an instinct readily
grabbed upon by some that when we ask questions about the
largest NSA program in history, that somehow we are attacking
you gentlemen and ladies. Nothing could be further from the
truth, because the instructions or whatever come from
elsewhere. That's been stipulated.
It is simply important that in a democracy we understand
there are three branches of government. I spend an enormous
amount of my time--the Chairman's leaving--an enormous amount
of my time, well over three-quarters, working exclusively on
this subject in great depth with great intensity, do a lot of
traveling, and meet the same intelligence folks that Senator
Saxby Chambliss was talking about, and Kit Bond, I guess it
was.
But you cannot equate, and you should not equate, asking
questions where we are meant to be informed by law, as the
Intelligence Committees, and we are not, for pursuing that
effort, because to do otherwise is to say that there's no
reason for these Committees to exist, and that we should
disband the Committees, which I am not for doing.
But do not kid yourselves, gentlemen and ladies. It is
often said that the Chairman and the Ranking Member of each of
the Committees are fully briefed, and therefore, you know,
everything is fine. That's not the way it works, that's not the
way those meetings work. And General Hayden knows that. They
don't last long enough, the flip charts are extensive, and
everybody's in a hurry. The leadership usually doesn't come.
Chairman Roberts and I do come, as well as the House members; 4
people out of 535 therefore know about the most extensive and
aggressive NSA effort in the history of this country.
I am strongly for the goals. But I want it to be done under
the law. And so should you. That's what keeps our country
together.
Thank you.
Director Negroponte. If I may just--one sentence, Senator.
I know the Attorney General will address this next week. But we
believe that all these activities are being undertaken in full
compliance with our Constitution and with the laws of our
country. And that is an oath that each and every one of us at
this table have undertaken.
[Whereupon, at 1:50 p.m., the Committee adjourned.]
