[Congressional Record: June 19, 2006 (Senate)]
[Page S6063-S6064]
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. REID (for himself, Mr. Biden, Mr. Levin, and Mr. Durbin):
S. 3536. A bill to ensure oversight of intelligence on Iran, and for
other purposes; to the Select Committee on Intelligence.
Mr. REID. Mr. President, we live in a dangerous time, and that is an
understatement. The threats to our freedom are many. They range from
terrorist attacks such as those that hit our shores on 9/11 to rogue
nations with nuclear ambitions such as North Korea and Iran.
It is important that we, as a country, address each of these threats.
Recent history is rife with examples of what happens if we fail to do
so. The threats don't go away; they only get worse.
This is a fact we can see in today's headlines about North Korea's
new missile tests--they have not fired a missile since 1998; and from
all reports we have been able to pick up on the news, they are now
fueling another missile just prior to launch--and also in Iran, where
efforts to halt the country's nuclear program have been delayed and
complicated by the administration's, I believe, failures in Iraq.
This weekend, the Washington Post reported that top Bush
administration officials ignored an offer from Iran in 2003, when
American leverage in the region was at its height. The offer from Iran
was to curtail its nuclear activities. This is very troubling.
Paul Pillar, the former head of Middle East analysis for the
intelligence community, said that the U.S. position regarding Iran is
``inherently weaker now'' because of Iraq, and that ``there have been a
lot of lost opportunities.'' One expert analyst said the
administration's mismanagement ``strengthened the hands of those in
Iran who believe the only way to compel the United States to talk or
deal with Iran is not by sending peace offers but by being a
nuisance.''
Today, I am introducing legislation which would improve Congress's
oversight of the administration's efforts on Iran--the Iran
Intelligence Oversight Act. The legislation will ensure that Congress
is fully engaged in the Iran debate, and it will also push the Bush
White House to develop and implement the right policy for dealing with
Iran.
All of us are painfully aware of this Congress's unwillingness to
hold this administration accountable for its mistakes and misjudgments.
There has been virtually no oversight on anything.
I have said before that there has been a lack of a legislative branch
of Government. The executive exists, the judicial branch exists, but
the Founding Fathers' view to have three separate but equal branches of
Government has not been in existence for the last 5\1/2\ years. The
reason the President has not had to veto a single bill is he has gotten
anything he wants from this Republican Congress.
The Senate Intelligence Committee has led the way in terms of
stonewalling and rubber-stamping the Bush administration. Nearly 3
years into its investigation of the White House's politicization of
Iraq intelligence, we still don't have a report.
Unfortunately, the committee record on Iran is not any better.
U.S. News and World Report had a quote earlier this spring from the
committee's chairman, saying:
[W]e have not made the progress on our oversight of Iran
intelligence, which is critical.
U.S. News further said the panel had done only piecemeal scrutiny of
the spy agencies' work on Iran, quoting a Republican staffer as saying:
There is no organized committee staff effort to look at
Iran right now. . . . It's all sort of on hold.
That is really too bad.
Perhaps Tehran will be kind enough to wait for them, but the Senate
should not. The Senate must be engaged as we move our diplomacy forward
with Iran. We must take seriously our responsibility to insist on a
thorough review of the facts, a full debate of the threat, and full
consultation as events move forward.
The legislation I am introducing today would put in place the
rigorous oversight necessary to hold the administration accountable for
its rhetoric and its all too frequent tendency to spin and distort the
facts.
The act requires the administration to give Congress and the American
people solid answers to three questions.
First, what is the judgment of the Government's professional
intelligence analysts about the threat of Iran, and what tools are most
likely to influence the Iranians to change their ways?
Second, what are the President's policy objectives with Iran, and
what is his strategy for achieving these objectives?
Currently, we are only left to guess.
To the best of my knowledge, Congress has not yet been briefed on any
of the key details of the deal offered to Iran a few weeks ago. The
Iranians have been briefed, the Europeans have been briefed, the
Russians have been briefed, the Chinese have been briefed--but not the
U.S. Senate.
Congress needs to be in on the takeoff, not asked to board the plane
for the crash landing.
Third, this legislation asks the question: What is the process for
making sure that senior administration officials do not publicly
mischaracterize the evidence and the challenge of Iran?
Much of what we heard from the administration in the run-up to Iraq
about mushroom clouds, yellow cake, and aluminum tubes turned out to be
overstated or based on intelligence that was known to be very, very
suspect.
I am told that the most famous of the Vice President's speeches on
Iraq--the August 2002 VFW speech that set the rush to war and
dramatically overstated the threat from Iraq--was never even cleared by
the intelligence community.
With my legislation in place, and with vigilance from Congress, we
will be one step closer to ensuring this kind of misleading information
does not happen regarding the threat posed by Iran.
I want to be clear: President Bush must take seriously the challenge
of Iran, as I know he does, but the way to success will be a policy
based on the facts. Under my legislation, the administration will be
held accountable for anything less.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the text of the bill was ordered to be
printed in the Record, as follows:
S. 3536
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
[[Page S6064]]
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Iran Intelligence Oversight
Act''.
SEC. 2. INTELLIGENCE ON IRAN.
(a) Submittal to Congress of Updated National Intelligence
Estimate on Iran.--
(1) Submittal required.--As soon as is practicable, but not
later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to
Congress an updated National Intelligence Estimate on Iran.
(2) Notice regarding submittal.--If the Director determines
that the National Intelligence Estimate required by paragraph
(1) cannot be submitted by the date specified in that
paragraph, the Director shall submit to Congress a report
setting forth--
(A) the reasons why the National Intelligence Estimate
cannot be submitted by such date; and
(B) an estimated date for the submittal of the National
Intelligence Estimate.
(3) Form.--The National Intelligence Estimate under
paragraph (1) shall be submitted in classified form.
Consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and
methods, an unclassified summary of the key judgments of the
National Intelligence Estimate should be submitted.
(4) Elements.--The National Intelligence Estimate submitted
under paragraph (1) shall address the following:
(A) The foreign policy and regime objectives of Iran.
(B) The current status of the nuclear programs of Iran,
including--
(i) an assessment of the current and projected capabilities
of Iran to design a nuclear weapon, to produce plutonium,
enriched uranium, and other weapons materials, to build a
nuclear weapon, and to deploy a nuclear weapon; and
(ii) an assessment of the intentions of Iran regarding
possible development of nuclear weapons, the motivations
underlying such intentions, and the factors that might
influence changes in such intentions.
(C) The military and defense capabilities of Iran,
including any non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction
programs and related delivery systems.
(D) The relationship of Iran with terrorist organizations,
the use by Iran of terrorist organizations in furtherance of
its foreign policy objectives, and the factors that might
cause Iran to reduce or end such relationships.
(E) The prospects for support from the international
community for various potential courses of action with
respect to Iran, including diplomacy, sanctions, and military
action.
(F) The anticipated reaction of Iran to the courses of
action set forth under subparagraph (E), including an
identification of the course or courses of action most likely
to successfully influence Iran in terminating or moderating
its policies of concern.
(G) The level of popular and elite support within Iran for
the Iran regime, and for its civil nuclear program, nuclear
weapons ambitions, and other policies, and the prospects for
reform and political change within Iran.
(H) The views among the populace and elites of Iran with
respect to the United States, including views on direct
discussions with or normalization of relations with the
United States.
(I) The views among the populace and elites of Iran with
respect to other key countries involved in nuclear diplomacy
with Iran.
(J) The likely effects and consequences of any military
action against the nuclear programs or other regime interests
of Iran.
(K) The confidence level of key judgments in the National
Intelligence Estimate, the quality of the sources of
intelligence on Iran, the nature and scope of any gaps in
intelligence on Iran, and any significant alternative views
on the matters contained in the National Intelligence
Estimate.
(b) Presidential Report on Policy Objectives and United
States Strategy Regarding Iran.--
(1) Report required.--As soon as is practicable, but not
later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report on the
following:
(A) The objectives of United States policy on Iran.
(B) The strategy for achieving such objectives.
(2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be
submitted in unclassified form with a classified annex, as
appropriate.
(3) Elements.--The report submitted under paragraph (1)
shall--
(A) address the role of diplomacy, incentives, sanctions,
other punitive measures and incentives, and other programs
and activities relating to Iran for which funds are provided
by Congress; and
(B) summarize United States contingency planning regarding
the range of possible United States military actions in
support of United States policy objectives with respect to
Iran.
(c) Director of National Intelligence Report on Process for
Vetting and Clearing Administration Officials' Statements
Drawn From Intelligence.--
(1) Report required.--As soon as is practicable, but not
later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to
Congress a report on the process for vetting and clearing
statements of Administration officials that are drawn from or
rely upon intelligence.
(2) Elements.--The report shall--
(A) describe current policies and practices of the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence and the intelligence
community for--
(i) vetting and clearing statements of senior
Administration officials that are drawn from or rely upon
intelligence; and
(ii) how significant misstatements of intelligence that may
occur in public statements of senior public officials are
identified, brought to the attention of any such officials,
and corrected;
(B) assess the sufficiency and adequacy of such policies
and practices; and
(C) include any recommendations that the Director considers
appropriate to improve such policies and practices.
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