Congressional Record: April 26, 2006 (House)
Page H1774-H1785]
{time} 1245
PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 5020, INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION
ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007
Mr. PUTNAM. Madam Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I
call up House Resolution 774 and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:
H. Res. 774
Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this
resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 2(b) of rule
XVIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the
Whole House on the state of the Union for consideration of
the bill (H.R. 5020) to authorize appropriations for fiscal
year 2007 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes. The
first reading of the bill shall be dispensed with. All points
of order against consideration of the bill are waived.
General debate shall be confined to the bill and shall not
exceed one hour equally divided and controlled by the
chairman and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. After general debate the bill
shall be considered for amendment under the five-minute rule.
It shall be in order to consider as an original bill for the
purpose of amendment under the five-minute rule the amendment
in the nature of a substitute recommended by the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence now printed in the bill. The
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be
considered as read. All points of order against the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute are waived.
Notwithstanding clause 11 of rule XVIII, no amendment to the
committee amendment in the nature of a substitute shall be in
order except those printed in the report of the Committee on
Rules accompanying this resolution. Each such amendment may
be offered only in the order printed in the report, may be
offered only by a Member designated in the report, shall be
considered as read, shall be debatable for the time specified
in the report equally divided and controlled by the proponent
and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall
not be subject to a demand for division of the question in
the House or in the Committee of the Whole. All points of
order against such amendments are waived. At the conclusion
of consideration of the bill for amendment the Committee
shall rise and report the bill to the House with such
amendments as may have been adopted. Any Member may demand a
separate vote in the
[[Page H1775]]
House on any amendment adopted in the Committee of the Whole
to the bill or to the committee amendment in the nature of a
substitute. The previous question shall be considered as
ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final passage
without intervening motion except one motion to recommit with
or without instructions.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mrs. Emerson). The gentleman from Florida
(Mr. Putnam) is recognized for 1 hour.
Mr. PUTNAM. Madam Speaker, for the purpose of debate only, I yield
the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr.
McGovern), pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.
During consideration of this resolution, all time yielded is for the
purpose of debate only.
(Mr. PUTNAM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. PUTNAM. Madam Speaker, House Resolution 774 is a structured rule
that provides for consideration of H.R. 5020, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007. Madam Speaker, I am pleased to
bring this resolution to the floor for its consideration. This is the
fifth intelligence authorization bill that this House has considered
since the tragic events of September 11, which changed this
institution's outlook on intelligence. It has certainly changed our
intelligence community's approach to collection and analysis.
H.R. 5020 is the first intelligence authorization that is based on a
budget request fully determined by our new Director of National
Intelligence, again reflecting the changes, reflecting the evolution,
the progress of our approach to keeping America secure, protecting our
citizens, protecting our forces abroad through an ever-changing
architecture.
The DNI, created in H.R. 10, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, created this new Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, a responsible authority that would oversee and
orchestrate a coordinated effort by the entire intelligence community
composed of 15 different intelligence agencies. This legislation today
continues the sustained effort and long-term strategy to achieve
optimum performance in human intelligence, signals intelligence,
imagery intelligence, open-source intelligence, analysis,
counterintelligence, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism.
This bill authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2007 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System. In addition to
funding these agency activities, the legislation contains other
noncontroversial intelligence community housekeeping matters that will
help create a more efficient and effective intelligence community. The
legislation reflects recent administrative action and formally includes
the Drug Enforcement Administration in the intelligence community and
authorizes its activities conducted within the National Intelligence
Program. It also requires the DNI, the Director of National
Intelligence, to conduct a regular strategic review of intelligence
capabilities against threats, similar to the Quadrennial Defense
Review, and limits the DNI's authority to hire civilian personnel in
excess of the specifically authorized numbers to no more than 2 percent
of the authorized amount of employees.
To more formally increase oversight, the bill specifically provides
that reporting requirements contained in the classified annex will be
considered as required by the underlying law. Additionally, it requires
a comprehensive inventory of special access programs conducted within
the National Intelligence Program to be provided to the committee in
classified format. This provision was included in the House-passed bill
for fiscal year 2006 as well.
The underlying bill also contains language offered by the ranking
member, Ms. Harman, that expresses the sense of the Congress that the
DNI should promptly examine the need for establishing and overseeing
the implementation of a multilevel security clearance system across the
intelligence community to leverage the cultural and linguistic skills
of subject matter experts and individuals proficient in foreign
languages that are deemed critical to our Nation's security.
I am pleased with the efforts of the House Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence. Chairman Hoekstra and his ranking member, Ms. Harman,
have done yeoman's work, with the assistance of their committee, on a
bipartisan basis to produce this bill. It is a perfect example of how
Congress can achieve a bipartisan product that meets the needs of our
Nation. I commend them for their hard work.
I urge the Members to support the rule and the underlying bill.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. McGOVERN. Madam Speaker, I want to thank the gentleman from
Florida for yielding me the customary 30 minutes, and I yield myself 7
minutes.
(Mr. McGOVERN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. McGOVERN. Madam Speaker, H.R. 5020, the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, deals with one of the most
important aspects of our national security: our ability to gather and
analyze intelligence effectively so that our policies are based on
fact, not fantasy or obsessive desire, so that our Federal law
enforcement agencies can defend us from the threat of attack, and so
that our allies can rely on our resources for timely, coordinated
operations in defense of freedom abroad.
I want to commend Chairman Hoekstra and Ranking Member Harman and
members of the Intelligence Committee for authorizing 100 percent of
the funding required for our counterterrorism operations. Regrettably,
President Bush only included 78 percent of this funding in his budget
request; so I thank the committee for correcting this dangerous
shortfall.
The Intelligence Authorization Act traditionally receives strong
bipartisan support and will likely receive that same support this year.
But despite its many attributes, this bill could have and should have
been better. This bill could have and should have required a dedicated
funding line for the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. When
Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act in
December 2004 in response to the findings and recommendations of the 9/
11 Commission report, it created this board to serve as a civil
liberties watchdog on the potential erosion of the basic constitutional
rights of the American people in a post-9/11 world.
Now, 15 months later, we find our concerns about basic civil rights
to have been well founded, but the oversight board is barely up and
running. The President did not nominate the members of the board for 9
months. The Senate took 5 months to confirm the chair and vice chair.
And, once again, the President's budget failed to include a single
penny for the board's operation in fiscal year 2007.
This could have and should have been fixed in committee. Congressmen
Hastings, Reyes, and Holt offered an amendment to provide $3 million in
dedicated funding for the oversight board, an amendment that should
have had bipartisan support. But the majority chose to reject this
funding and abandon their promise to the American people to safeguard
their most basic freedoms and rights. And last night in the Rules
Committee, the Republican leadership compounded this mistake by denying
Congressman Reyes the right to offer this same amendment for debate on
the House floor.
And then we have the issue of the National Security Agency's spying
on U.S. citizens. In committee, Representative Eshoo offered a
carefully crafted amendment to withhold 20 percent of the NSA's budget
until the executive branch provided the Intelligence Committee with the
total cost of its surveillance program. That is all: just inform the
committee of this one number. The Eshoo amendment was not looking for
more operational details. It was not passing judgment on whether the
NSA's domestic spying program is legal or not, even though that is a
controversial matter in this House. All it was looking for is how many
of our tax dollars are being spent on this surveillance program.
This is a question that should concern every single Member of this
body on both sides of the aisle. But with just one exception, the
Republican majority found it too much to ask and rejected the Eshoo
amendment.
[[Page H1776]]
Yesterday in the Rules Committee, the Republican leadership went even
further. The Republican Rules Committee denied Representatives Schiff,
Flake, Harman, and Inglis the right to offer their bipartisan amendment
for debate. This amendment would have required a classified disclosure
to the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees, the two committees with
jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities over the NSA and the FISA
process, on which U.S. citizens have been the subject of NSA electronic
surveillance, and what criteria was used to target them. Such a
classified report would allow Congress to understand the program and
whether any current laws need to be amended to grant the President the
authority he needs to carry out this program more effectively or make
any changes to safeguard against abuse. In short, these two committees
need this information in order to do their jobs, in order to carry out
their oversight responsibilities.
This bipartisan amendment should have received bipartisan support
from the Rules Committee, but it did not; not from the Republican
majority on this Rules Committee and certainly not from the Republican
leadership of this House.
It is outrageous, Madam Speaker. Many of us believe that when the
President authorized the NSA surveillance of Americans, he broke the
law, plain and simple. And when the Attorney General says that Congress
somehow granted the authority for this program after September 11, he
is just wrong.
We are talking about the most basic fundamental civil liberties that
protect the American people, and the Republican leadership will not
even let us debate it. What are they afraid of?
I would ask my Republican friends to re-read their Constitution.
Congress was not designed to be a rubber stamp for the President.
Congress was not designed to protect Members from difficult votes on
controversial issues. Congress was not designed to protect the
President's political rear end. But under this leadership that is
exactly what Congress has become.
If my friends on the other side of the aisle believe that this
President should have the ability to spy on Americans without a warrant
and without going to the FISA court, then they should write that bill
and bring it to the floor. They should at least show that level of
respect for this House and for this Constitution.
I am willing to bet that the majority of my colleagues on both sides
of the aisle believe that what the President is doing is wrong. But
either way, the very least we could do is have a debate and a vote.
Madam Speaker, 25 amendments were brought to the Rules Committee last
night. They dealt with issues ranging from how the NSA carries out
surveillance of American citizens to how the Intelligence Committee and
other relevant committees are briefed about weapons of mass destruction
or the situations in Iran, North Korea, Iraq, and other hot spots. They
dealt with how information is classified or reclassified, how national
security whistle-blowers are protected or punished, and whether and how
the amount of funds requested and appropriated for various
intelligence-related activities are reported to Congress.
{time} 1300
These are not trivial matters, Madam Speaker. Yet only five
amendments, five amendments, Madam Speaker, plus the manager's
amendment, were made in order under this highly restrictive rule.
Why is the Republican leadership so afraid to debate these issues?
Why is it so afraid to debate, period? After nearly 4 months of a
lackluster Congress, are we suddenly on some tight time clock so there
is no time to debate matters affecting national security? Do we need to
get out of town by Thursday afternoon? I am happy to stay in town on
Friday if it means we can get a full debate on the Intelligence
Authorization Act.
I am tired of restrictive rules. I am tired of stifling debate. I am
tired of ignoring or running away from the big issues. I urge my
colleagues to vote ``no'' on this restrictive rule and to support an
open debate on important issues facing our national security and
intelligence agencies.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. PUTNAM. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, I am glad that the gentleman acknowledged in the
beginning of his remarks that this is a bipartisan bill that enjoyed
unanimous support coming out of committee. As we move forward on the
other issues of contention, we certainly look forward to that debate.
Madam Speaker, I am pleased to yield 5 minutes to one of this
institution's experts on national security, a member of the
Intelligence Committee, the distinguished gentlewoman from New Mexico
(Mrs. Wilson), a graduate of one of America's fine service academies.
Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for
the time.
Madam Speaker, we have had the good fortune in this country for the
last 4\1/2\ years to have not had another terrorist attack on our soil,
and it is not because they haven't tried. The reason for that success
boils down to two things: the courage of our soldiers and the quality
of our intelligence. Exceptional intelligence is the first line of
defense for America in the long war on terrorism.
I intend to support this rule today, and I intend to support this
bill. I think it is a good bill. It is one that moves us forward to
restore our Nation's intelligence capabilities across the board, HUMINT
intelligence, technical and tactical intelligence, and strengthens our
global understanding and awareness and analysis of what is going on in
the world. I intend to support it. I also think this rule is a pretty
good rule, and I have to disagree on a couple of points with my
colleague from Massachusetts.
My colleague from Massachusetts has said we should debate here an
amendment that was debated in our committee offered by Ms. Eshoo, one
that I was a Republican Member who supported. It asked for the cost of
the program that the President has acknowledged exists, the terrorist
surveillance program.
I believe that whenever a member of an oversight committee asks for
the cost of a program, we should get that answer. That answer has now
been provided to the committee in a classified letter that is available
in the Intelligence Committee spaces.
The reason that we didn't need to debate Ms. Eshoo's amendment on the
floor today is because we have already gotten the answer to her
question, and it doesn't make sense to me to continue to have that
debate here on the floor, even though I supported that amendment in
committee. So I think we have gone beyond that, and I don't think we
have to have that debate and discussion here today on the floor.
The second thing that he talks about is having a debate here on the
floor on the Flake proposal with some of his colleagues from the
Democratic side of the aisle on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act. The question here for this body is how do we move forward with
effective oversight of the National Security Agency program that the
President has acknowledged exists.
Now, I believe that the President and the Congress share the same
goal: we want to keep America safe and free. We have different
responsibilities under our Constitution. The President has the
responsibility for conducting our foreign affairs. He is the Commander
in Chief. He makes sure that agencies follow the law and execute the
programs which we have authorized.
The Congress appropriates funds. We establish agencies. We authorize
programs, and we oversee implementation of those programs. We spy on
our enemies. But we also oversee these programs to ensure that those
very powerful tools are used within the constraints of our Constitution
and the Bill of Rights. That is why I stood up and demanded that this
Congress and our committees on intelligence conduct oversight of this
program. That oversight is now under way.
I think as a responsible body we have to start out by getting the
facts. That means hard work that is done largely in secret in the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. That oversight is under
way, and, for the most part, the National Security Agency has been very
forthcoming.
[[Page H1777]]
We have to understand this program in its details before we make
recommendations to this body about any changes in statute or continuing
mechanisms for oversight. It would be premature to legislate today on
changing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.
The reality is that technology is changing. The Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act was put in place in 1978, the same year that I
graduated from high school. I was one of the last classes at the Air
Force Academy to get issued a slide rule. In 1978, the words ``cell
phone'' and ``Internet'' were not even in the dictionary.
We may need to make some changes to the laws to continue to keep this
country both safe and free, but we are not ready today to make those
changes effectively. That debate on the floor today would be uninformed
and premature.
I would ask this House to support this rule today and to also support
the work, the continuing work, of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence as we do our duty under the Constitution to oversee these
vital programs.
Mr. McGOVERN. Madam Speaker, I yield myself 30 seconds.
Madam Speaker, I want to respond to the gentlewoman from New Mexico,
whom I have a lot of respect for.
First of all, the cost of the program that we were debating was only
given to members of the committee that the President chose, not all
members of the committee.
Secondly, I find it scandalous, quite frankly, that this Congress is
abdicating its responsibility to put in place checks and balances on
the President's domestic spying program. When you talk about enforcing
and abiding by the Constitution of the United States, that is one of
our responsibilities. I think what the President is doing is illegal.
We should have a debate on this. The White House should be more
forthcoming. Quite frankly, it is an outrage.
Madam Speaker, I yield 4 minutes to the ranking Democrat on the House
Intelligence Committee, the gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman).
(Ms. HARMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend her
remarks.)
Ms. HARMAN. Madam Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Madam Speaker, Americans awoke today to deadly terrorist bombings in
Egypt and a threatening new tape from al-Zarqawi, and today is our
chance to debate a bill that authorizes funds and sets new directions
in the fight to protect America. But this rule stifles debate about
critical issues and I strongly oppose it.
Members of our committee offered responsible amendments to strengthen
this bill, and we were shut out by the Rules Committee. As a result,
Madam Speaker, there will be no amendments today about the unlawful
eavesdropping on American citizens, the overhyping of Iran intelligence
without adequate basis, and the double standard this administration
applies to leaks.
Two amendments were filed that dealt with the President's NSA
program. Congresswoman Eshoo's amendment, which is different from her
request in committee that the budget for the program be disclosed to
our committee, would have expressed the sense of Congress that all
electronic surveillance, all eavesdropping of U.S. persons inside the
U.S., must comply with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and
the fourth amendment.
A bipartisan amendment offered by Representatives Flake, Schiff,
English and me states that FISA is the exclusive way to conduct
surveillance of Americans on U.S. soil. FISA has been our policy since
1978, until this NSA program was implemented by the White House.
The American people want our government to track the communications
of al Qaeda. Surely I do. But they also want our President to follow
the law and the Constitution.
I have been briefed on the President's NSA program several times, and
no one has convinced me why FISA cannot cover the entire program. The
two amendments, the Eshoo amendment and the Flake-Schiff amendment,
should have been made in order.
I am particularly outraged that Congressman Boswell's amendment to
require quarterly classified assessments of Iran's nuclear program was
rejected. What do we want to do in Iran? Do we want to repeat the
mistakes of Iraq? Do we want to have intelligence that is totally wrong
and base our national policy on totally wrong intelligence? I don't
think so.
Chairman Hoekstra, chairman of our committee, said just this weekend,
``As decisions are being made on Iran, we don't have all the
information that we would like to have.'' So why is it a bad idea to
require our Intelligence community to update Congress every three
months with accurate information so that at least Congress has
information on which to base responsible decisions? The Rules Committee
apparently thinks that is not a good idea.
Congressman Reyes submitted an amendment to provide dedicated fund
for the Privacy and Civil Liberties Board, which we will all recall was
a key part of the intelligence reform bill that we passed almost two
years ago.
Sure we want enhanced security, but we also want respect for American
values and our Constitution. The whole idea was we would have this
Board helping craft careful policy that enhanced security and also
protected civil liberties. Well, that Board now has two confirmed
members and no money, and in this bill we unfortunately do nothing
about providing any money.
Finally, Congressman Holt submitted an amendment to ensure that we
don't have a double standard on leaks. None of us condones leaks of
classified information. That is wrong. But why is it that people are
prosecuted for leaks, unless you work in the White House, in which case
the President or the Vice President can authorize you to leak
classified information to favored reporters in order to discredit
political enemies? A double standard is wrong.
This rule is inadequate. Sadly, this bill is inadequate. I ask for a
no vote on the rule.
Mr. PUTNAM. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, I would like to address three of the points that the
distinguished ranking member made, and I would point out that we
appreciate her bipartisan efforts in crafting this bill, the underlying
bill that the rule addresses, that came out of the committee on a voice
vote.
First, the program that she categorized, that has been categorized, I
apologize, Madam Speaker, the program that has been categorized as an
``illegal eavesdropping program'' had in a previous press release been
characterized in this way: ``As the ranking member on the House
Intelligence Committee, I have been briefed since 2003 on a highly
classified NSA foreign collection program that targeted al Qaeda. I
believe the program is essential to U.S. national security and that its
disclosure has damaged critical intelligence capabilities.''
That was the statement of the ranking member of the House
Intelligence Committee as it relates to what has now been characterized
by saying it is illegal eavesdropping.
Secondly, this question of Iran reports, the Iran crisis scares the
dickens out of me. It is a very serious issue for this entire Chamber,
for this entire Nation. It is a country that is not only engaged in
what could be a speculative threat against its neighbors and the United
States and the world as a whole, but are bringing in cameras to show
that they are breaking IAEA seals, along with their red-hot rhetoric
coming out of their President calling for the destruction of our ally,
bragging about the uranium enrichment capabilities, talking about the
difference between P-1 and P-2 centrifuges.
It is a very serious issue, one that all Members of Congress should
make themselves aware of. As chairman of the policy committee, I was
joined by my Energy Subcommittee in going to New York on Monday to
receive such a briefing, the kind of briefing that every Member of
Congress is entitled to. As members of the House Intelligence
Committee, they are entitled to even higher-level briefings on the
Iranian situation at their request.
So, the requirement, the responsibility, for us to engage the
administration, to engage the Intelligence Community, to engage the
appropriate persons who are tracking this crisis is on us. And it is
not a mere every-90-day
[[Page H1778]]
exercise. It should be an ongoing exercise as developments come in
through the media and through other open sources that call on us to
further update our awareness of what is a very dangerous situation.
Thirdly, this idea of zero funding for the Civil Liberties Protection
Board, that is an issue within the White House budget. It is not
germane to the intelligence authorization bill, it is not an issue that
we can fund, and it was ruled out of order for that reason. It is a
matter for the appropriators who are dealing with the White House
budget line, not for the Intelligence Community's overall budget.
{time} 1315
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. McGOVERN. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Iowa (Mr. Boswell) who is a member of the committee.
(Mr. BOSWELL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BOSWELL. Madam Speaker, today we will authorize the largest
intelligence budget in our history. I am pleased to be part of this
authorization, because I believe we have no higher purpose than to
support the brave soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and the civilian
intelligence officers of the front lines of our national security.
However, I am sad to say this. There is a lingering threat, spoken to
by Ms. Harman, that we have not addressed, which we should have. Last
night the Rules Committee dealt a blow to our ability to gather
intelligence on Iran's nuclear and missile capability by denying an
amendment that I had offered.
Now, if somebody else would like to offer that amendment, it is okay
with me. We have got to do what is right. I would ask you, Mr.
Chairman, if you are listening, that you might even think about doing
that. But it would require the Director of National Intelligence to
provide us quarterly written reports.
You know, people do best what we check. And if we were checking this,
and they were coming to us in our committee, and it is a classified
environment, it is safe, they could come there and we would have a
chance to see if they are actually doing the job. We should have done
that.
So it appears to me, and I am very disappointed to say this, that it
appears to me that it was pure politics that my amendment was denied.
And I am disappointed. When I joined this committee 5 years ago, I was
under the impression that politics would not interfere with our
intelligence work. But, apparently, not so.
If I might quote from the President's bipartisan, if you will, WMC
Commission, cochaired by Judge Lawrence Silverman and former Senator
Charles Robb: ``Across the board, the Intelligence Community knows
disturbingly little about the nuclear programs of many of the world's
most dangerous actors. In some cases it knows less now than 5 or 10
years ago.''
I just came across this thing from the Washington Times that our
chairman was quoted as: We really do not know. We really do not know
the status of Iran's nukes. We are getting lots of different messages
from their leadership.
Well, maybe I should just rest my case there, but we may have lost
the chance to offer this amendment. But I cannot overstate the
seriousness of this threat to global security, which could come from a
nuclear armed Iran. I wish we would have been able to address this
issue in the bill, and I hope my colleagues will support my efforts to
do so in the future.
Maybe somebody over there would like to offer the amendment. I do not
care. It needs to be done. It should. We in Congress must be a better
consumer of intelligence. It is a lesson we learned the hard way with
regard to Iraq. It is a sham that this amendment was denied. It is a
good bill, but it could have been better.
Madam Speaker, I urge my colleagues to vote ``no'' on the previous
question.
Mr. PUTNAM. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Madam Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman's comments on the concern
about Iran. As I said earlier, it is a huge issue and a major
international crisis for all of us to be tracking on a very routine
basis, especially those members of the Intelligence Committee who have
access to a higher level of information than the rest of us.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. McGOVERN. Madam Speaker, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Ohio (Mr. Kucinich).
Mr. KUCINICH. Madam Speaker, I want to thank all of those who served
in gathering intelligence to protect the American people. It is
regrettable that intelligence is often reshaped to fit doctrine instead
of doctrine being reshaped in the face of the facts of intelligence.
This rule blocks several important amendments that the House should
have had the opportunity to debate. I sponsored one of those amendments
that would have resolved the concerns of media leaks by intelligence
community agents.
Several high-profile classified leaks to the media have emerged in
the last few years. These leaks have led to considerable release of
information about secret programs related to our intelligence agencies.
From these media leaks, we became aware of the efforts to manipulate
intelligence, to falsify a cause for war against Iraq.
We became aware of the illegal NSA domestic wiretapping program
without a court order. We became aware of the rumored CIA detention
centers in Eastern Europe, and the CIA's extraordinary rendition
program, used to transport suspects to other nations with less
restrictive torture policies.
The House Intelligence Committee report for this bill states that
leaks to the media damage our national security. In response, the CIA
fired an agent who had unapproved contacts with reporters last week. I
understand the concerns raised when intelligence leaks are reported in
the media.
However, if this House had conducted effective oversight, we would
not have been there in the first place. Our democracy was bolstered by
these leaks, and the world is a safer place as a result. Absent these
leaks, the current administration would see no limit to its dangerous
policies and continue to inflict its failed war on terrorism without
limitation.
To resolve this conflict I proposed an amendment that would remove
barriers to intelligence agency employees communicating with certain
committees of Congress. The purpose was to provide intelligence
employees a more appropriate outlet than the media and give Congress
better oversight capability.
This amendment provided an obstacle-free path for intelligence
employees to report to key Members of Congress their concerns. By
providing this outlet, the employees would not feel any need to leak
information to the media. So we need to do everything we can to protect
these who serve in intelligence who want to get information out to the
American people.
They should do it through the Congress, but there is no provision for
that in this bill. We need to protect this Nation, but we need to
protect it with the truth, not with manipulated intelligence.
Mr. PUTNAM. Madam Speaker, I yield myself such time as I might
consume.
Madam Speaker, I want to address this issue of leaks briefly. Before
presenting this rule to the House, I took it upon myself to read the
bill. And because of the nature of the bill, it is only available in
Intelligence Committee space. And all Members have the opportunity to
review the material that we are going to be voting on later today.
In the context of this discussion about leaks, I was reminded that at
the beginning of every Congress, upon our election, we, all Members of
this House, have to sign something saying that we recognize that House
rules prevent us from disclosing classified information.
In addition, when you go to read the bill that we are here today to
consider, you sign another form reaffirming that you have taken this
oath, this obligation to not disclose classified information. That is
what Members of Congress have to do.
When you join the CIA, you sign a standard secrecy agreement that
says that you are going to keep the things that you are working on
secret to protect the interests of our Nation. You
[[Page H1779]]
are not going to go writing books about it, you are not going to make a
movie about it, you are not going to cash in on this Nation's security.
When you have access to sensitive compartmented information, you sign
yet another nondisclosure agreement, again to drive home the point to
the employees who are guarding the very secrets that keep us safe and
free that you cannot capitalize on America's secrets.
This was very clear to the leaker. This was made very clear to
Members of Congress. There is no double standard. What the individual
did was against the law, was a complete breach of the secrecy agreement
that that individual signed upon becoming an employee and then having
progressively higher levels of access to more and more sensitive
information. It is abundantly clear that what she did was wrong.
Mr. KUCINICH. Madam Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. PUTNAM. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. KUCINICH. Madam Speaker, I would ask my good friend from Florida
a simple question, that is, what happens when Congress is given false
information in these briefings, having signed something that then they
cannot disclose what they are told?
See, this is the problem here. I just wanted to respectfully share
that with you. Thank you.
Mr. PUTNAM. Madam Speaker, reclaiming my time, I respect the
gentleman's perspective.
That is why this bill is so important, number one; and number two, it
is why it is so vitally important that our representatives on that
committee, that our House Members on both sides of the aisle on the
House Permanent Select Subcommittee on Intelligence, ask the correct
questions, are given the proper orientation, dig into these issues,
make this committee a priority, because they are the rest of this
House's eyes and ears on those very sensitive issues.
Madam Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. McGOVERN. Madam Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Frank).
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Madam Speaker, that last discussion
actually interested me. The question would be, what penalty would a
Member of Congress face if, having left a classified briefing, that
Member disclosed information that turned out to be false?
You know, in libel, truth is a defense. Perhaps when it comes to
disclosing classified information that comes from this administration,
falsity would be a defense on the grounds that if it was not true, who
is going to be hurt?
The gentleman from Florida talked about oaths. I want to talk about
one that I took, to uphold the Constitution of the United States,
because the Rules Committee is interfering with my ability to do that.
We have one of the most serious constitutional issues facing this
country now that we have faced in a very long time: the assertion by
the President of the United States that because of terrorism, he
basically is freed from restraints.
He has announced by the way, remember, it is not directly relevant to
this bill, but he has announced that as President he may order the
imprisonment for an indefinite period of time of an American citizen,
and that citizen has no recourse to any tribunal to disprove any
charges against him, and there may not be any charges lodged.
That is one of the things he said. In that same breathtaking
assertion of untrammeled power, he says he can order the wiretapping of
any American citizen; and it has gone beyond, as was brought out in the
questions by the Judiciary Committee of the Attorney General, even
within America. I think that is a dangerous abuse of power.
I believe we are able to protect ourselves against terrorists, and we
should protect ourselves against these murderous fanatics, but I
believe we are able to do that while still observing the Constitution.
And I want to be very clear. I want to give law enforcement power. I
believe law enforcement, they are the good guys, but they are not the
perfect guys.
You give the good guys power, but you give it to them in a series of
balances and restraints. You do not give them untrammeled power. The
President has announced that he has carried out a program of
wiretapping invasion of the most private moments of any American, with
nobody else given any involvement, no warrants.
Now the gentleman from California (Mr. Schiff) presented to the Rules
Committee a very thoughtful amendment that would reaffirm that we want
to go by the law of 1978, that would repudiate one of the most
outrageous and, I am going to use the technical term here,
``cockamamie'' arguments I have ever heard; namely, that when all of us
voted to justify, to authorize the force against the Taliban in
Afghanistan, we were somehow authorizing warrantless wiretapping.
You know, I want to say to the people who say that, follow one of my
rules. In a political debate, no matter how convenient it seems to you,
please do not say anything that no one believes. It will not be
helpful. No one believes that. But we now this have situation where the
bill that includes some of the money that carries out the warrantless
wiretapping is before us.
People may think warrantless wiretapping is fine. I think it is a
violation of the Constitution. But they should not be controversial.
Should not this House of Representative be able to vote on that
subject?
The gentleman from California presented a bipartisan amendment
dealing with wireless wiretapping, reaffirming what some of us think;
that there should be restraint, repudiating the outrageous argument
that the Afghan resolution okayed it. And you have, Madam Speaker, and
your party, refused to allow the House to vote on it. That is the
disgrace. That is the abuse of the Constitution.
We are not even going to be allowed to vote on an amendment that
would deal with this central constitutional question. And I would just
say in closing, we are now in the process of instructing the people of
Iraq about how to ruin parliamentary democracy.
As they see you deny us the right to vote on this central
constitutional question, I say again what I have said before: if
anybody from the Iraqi Parliament is watching our procedures, please do
not try this at home.
Mr. PUTNAM. Madam Speaker, the cultural differences in this House are
intriguing. Hailing from the South, we would label ``cockamamie'' a
theory where the President would conspire to break the law and invite
Members of the other party in on the deal. We would call that a pretty
cockamamie theory.
And so when the President, in an effort to keep America safe and to
monitor members of al Qaeda who are communicating with people inside
our borders, probably not checking the weather, probably not seeing how
the Yankees or the Mets are doing, but plotting very dangerous, tragic,
consequential events to destroy our way of life, to cause mayhem, to
cause loss of life, we want to know what they are up to.
And the President, under this cockamamie theory, conspired to protect
us, in the gentleman's words illegally protect us; but he did so in a
way that brought in a team of lawyers, reviewed the program every 45
days, and invited members of leadership from both parties, from both
Houses of the legislative branch, to be in on that discussion.
{time} 1330
That is a cockamamie theory that he was conspiring to break the law
in that regard. He was fulfilling his oath to protect this Nation.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. PUTNAM. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. First, I guess I didn't know we would get
in great detail about what was cockamamier than what; but when I used
that phrase, I was referring specifically only to one argument: the
argument that the Afghanistan force resolution authorizes. That is all
I said.
I repeat, anybody who makes that argument is, let's use a Southern
expression, had too much moonshine. Beyond that, I understand the
gentleman thinks it is okay for warrantless wiretapping. The question
is not wiretapping, but warrantless.
But my question is this: Why can't the House of Representatives vote
on it? By what right does the Rules Committee arrogate to itself the
right to
[[Page H1780]]
extinguish debate? I expect that there will be differences.
Mr. PUTNAM. Reclaiming my time, I recognize that the gentleman's use
of ``cockamamie'' was directed at another aspect of this debate. But I
stand by my comment that the President of the United States did not
conspire to engage in any illegal, inappropriate activity by, first,
calling a team of lawyers and, second, calling the leadership of the
opposite party.
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas (Mr. Thornberry), another member of the House Intelligence
Committee, another leader on national security issues for us.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the gentleman from Florida
for yielding his time and his handling of this rule.
Actually, there were a number of statements made by my colleague from
Massachusetts with which I fully agree. As a matter of fact, one of the
challenges, I think, of bringing this bill to the floor is that we are
all, in an age of terrorism, attempting to find the right place where
we are effective against the terrorists who are trying to kill as many
of us as possible, but also not lose sight of our Constitution and our
freedoms and the fundamental nature of this society.
One of the key elements in trying to get that right is a whole area
of government activity which we cannot talk about, and which the
Intelligence Committee is charged with overseeing and helping shape.
And so every year, our challenge is to bring a bill that oversees and
helps shape those activities to this floor in a very public forum.
A number of the issues that we talk about have been reported
extensively in various newspaper articles. And we know that some of it
is right and some of it is wrong, and yet you can't come here and
correct the factual misstatements and the improper impressions which
people have.
I think it is important to affirm two things. Number one is that
there is much in this bill which is largely agreed upon. Now, the
nature of coming to the floor with this kind of bill is that we are
going to spend most of our time talking about differences, or at least
making up differences to talk about, when they didn't exist maybe a
week or two ago. But the central direction, and most of the provisions
of this bill, for the people who have taken the time to go read it, are
largely agreed upon by both sides of the aisle.
The second thing that I think it is important to emphasize is that
the members of the Intelligence Committee take their responsibilities
very seriously. If you have any doubt about that, just listen again to
the comments, for example, of the gentlewoman from New Mexico who was,
one, standing up to insist upon a much greater role by this Congress in
oversight of the terrorist surveillance program.
That oversight is under way. As she said, it is very important for us
to understand the details and the procedures and the process and the
specifics of this program before we come to the floor and decide about
how various laws ought to be changed in different ways. But that is
just one example.
There are many, many issues before the Intelligence Committee on
which we attempt to exercise our oversight in a very serious and
responsible way. We may not agree on all the details or where things
ought to go, but this committee is not a rubber stamp for any
administration, or any President, and at the same time we take very
seriously the recommendations which were in the Commission on Weapons
of Mass Destruction that our oversight needs to be strategic; not just
following the headlines of the day hither and yon as reporters may
write stories, but to follow strategic oversight in a way that makes
this country safer. That is always going to be our goal.
Of course, any rule which brings an intelligence authorization bill
to the floor has got to be somewhat restrictive, because there is so
much that we simply cannot talk about on the floor without damaging the
country's security.
I think this is a good rule. It frames debate on key issues. I think
it should be supported as well as the bill.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
New Jersey (Mr. Holt) who was also shut out of being able to offer an
amendment in the Rules Committee last night.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman. I rise in opposition to
this rule. A number of amendments were denied to some very responsible
Members of this body. One amendment would have required the President
or the Vice President, if they intend to declassify intelligence
documents, to inform the congressional Intelligence Committees and the
originating agencies ahead of time.
As we have learned in the last month through court filings, the
President, without informing, much less consulting our committee,
elected to secretly and selectively declassify portions of the 2002
national intelligence assessment about Iraq's weapons of mass
destruction. Now, by sworn statement, we know that this was done to
rebut critics of the administration who questioned the rationale for
the war.
The American people deserve to have the full facts. This amendment
that I offered but we were denied the opportunity to debate on the
floor would have ensured that any future classification efforts would
have been disclosed. It would have exposed what the ranking member of
our committee called the double standard of leaks.
Another amendment that I would have offered would have required any
inquiries about intelligence employees or contractors made by
nonintelligence community government officials, such as the President,
the Vice President, the White House staff, would be reported to the
congressional Intelligence Committees together, so that the propriety
of such an inquiry could be considered. Had my amendment passed, it
would have given Congress the opportunity to say clearly whether outing
a career intelligence officer for gratuitous reasons would be
tolerated.
Now, the gentleman from Florida said with regard to this bill before
us, all Members will have the opportunity to review the material before
us. No, not so. Even the cost of the unwarranted surveillance program
will be provided only to a few Members.
The gentlewoman from New Mexico said that she has been informed, but
I can tell you 425 other Members of this body have not been informed
even about the cost of this program. And they cannot and they will not
be informed, yet they are asked to vote on what is one of the most
significant changes in intelligence collection in American history.
The checks and balances spelled out in this document, which I refer
to my friend from Florida, known as the Constitution of these United
States, this hallowed document, those checks and balances, are eroded.
The debate here, allowed by the Rules Committee, or the lack of it,
makes a mockery of this hallowed document.
Amendments by Representatives Boswell, Reyes, Eshoo, Harman, Flake,
Frank, Kucinich, Maloney, Schiff, Shays and others have been denied. We
have been denied the opportunity to debate significant issues on the
floor.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The gentleman from New Jersey is a very capable member of the
Intelligence Committee, and surely he is not suggesting that covert
actions of the United States Government should be made available to
every single Member of Congress. Surely the gentleman is not suggesting
that every classified program that this United States is engaged in
should be available to every single Member.
I would invite the gentleman to respond. Would the Manhattan Project
have been available to every single Member who asked about its cost,
the number of employees, where the activity was going on, how many
people were involved? Would the gentleman have suggested that every
Member of Congress would have been clued in on that, even when the Vice
President wasn't?
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. PUTNAM. I yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, I think it certainly would not be asking too
much that every member of the Intelligence Committee had access to this
and far from it, if I may complete the answer, just as the President
has decided he can pick and choose which laws apply to him.
[[Page H1781]]
These are significant issues that need to be debated here on the
floor.
Mr. PUTNAM. Reclaiming my time, I think the gentleman, by his answer,
has answered the question that clearly we have an Intelligence
Committee specifically for the purpose of being our eyes and ears,
because we do not empower every single Senator and every single House
Member with every single detail of every activity going on in the
intelligence community, and there are very strong reasons for that. So,
clearly, that would not be the proper course of action.
Under longstanding committee tradition, the chair and the ranking
member of both Houses were brought into a different level of awareness
on certain activities that were going on. Under Democratic and
Republican control, that was the case.
As a result of the terrorist surveillance program, the Senate created
an entire new subcommittee to deal with the issue, and the House
expanded access to that information to 11 Members, an unprecedented
number of Members going beyond the historical, under the Democratic
model, four Members who had been given access to those types of
programs and activities.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will further yield, the
gentleman says unprecedented number. Yes, an unprecedentedly small
number.
We on the Intelligence Committee have a responsibility to review
these issues on behalf of all 435 Members of the House of
Representatives. I am not for a moment suggesting that all things need
to be discussed here on the floor or in open. Of course, it is
necessary so that we preserve national secrets.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, relaiming my time, the gentleman had
suggested that the other 420 Members of the House had not had access to
the information, and that is precisely how it is set up, that they
would not have access to that information. That is why we have talented
Members like yourself on the committee, and that is why we have
expanded access to information about that program to more members of
the committee than ever before.
Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from
New York (Mrs. Maloney), who also was shut off being able to offer an
amendment.
Mrs. MALONEY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding and for
his leadership on the Rules Committee.
As we can tell by the debate, there were a number of critical issues,
the warrantless wiretaps and many others, that were denied by this
restrictive rule.
It has become clear to me that the Republican leadership of this
House simply does not care about protecting the civil liberties of the
American people.
Last night, in a bipartisan effort, Congressman Shays and I went
before the Rules Committee for the fifth time, seeking the opportunity
to debate an amendment that would create the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Board as envisioned by the 9/11 Commission. This morning, we
learned for the fifth time in a row that the Rules Committee has denied
this House even the opportunity to debate this important amendment that
is supported unanimously by the 9/11 Commission and by the 9/11
families.
This is just the latest in a series of actions by the Republican
House leadership to deny us the opportunity to have a full debate on
the protection of our civil liberties, and I want to make sure that
people listening know the track record of this House.
When we were considering the intelligence reform bill that enacted
many of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, it was this House that
refused to include a committee-approved, bipartisan amendment to create
this board in any legislation passed by the House of Representatives.
It was this House that stripped the Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board's subpoena power, bipartisan makeup, and qualifications
requirements during conference negotiations. All of these provisions
had passed the Senate, a vote of 96-2, but the House of Representatives
struck it out.
{time} 1345
It is this House that has refused amendments by members of the
Intelligence Committee to require a budget line for this board and the
authorization we are voting on today backing up the President's action
to defund the board in his budget. And it is this House that denies our
repeated attempt to even debate an amendment that would give the board
the power and authority that it needs to do the job. I hope the
American people are watching, because this House refuses to do anything
to protect the civil liberties of the American people.
And I would like to quote from the 9/11 Commission report where they
said, ``If our liberties are curtailed, we lose the values that we are
struggling so hard to defend.''
Again, they have spoken out many times in support of this Civil
Liberties and Privacy Board that would provide balance and restraint to
the National Intelligence Reform Act, and I urge my colleagues to have
a strong ``no'' vote on this restrictive rule.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, setting aside the fact that the amendment
the gentlewoman refers to is not germane to this bill, I point out to
the gentlewoman that the amendment that she refers to creates a
commission that, A, already exists; and, B, the chair and vice chair
have already been confirmed by the Senate, and the members have been
appointed.
Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to yield 2\1/2\ minutes to another member
of the House Intelligence Committee, the gentleman from Arizona (Mr.
Renzi).
Mr. RENZI. I thank the gentleman.
I want to help clear up a couple of confusing issues here. First of
all, when we talk about the resolution of force that was passed by the
House of Representatives, both Republicans and Democrats, we were
talking about our response to the attacks on this country after 9/11.
We were talking about morphing the force; being able to have liquidity
and being able to take the capability of this country and go after
terrorists, who don't confine themselves to the border of one country.
You talk about the resolution of force, and you mention the country
of Afghanistan as if it was only limited to the boundaries of
Afghanistan. It is a falsehood to say so to the American people. It is
not right. It is wrong. We took the resolution of force and said, you,
the President, you have got to manage the intelligence, you have got to
manage the Armed Forces, you have got to go after terrorists all around
the world like a cancer that metastasizes itself. You have to go where
they are. You have to be able to listen to them calling into the United
States. You have to break up their terrorist cells. The American people
expect you to do so.
There has been a lot of talk and a lot of rhetoric of people on this
committee about a point that we debated ad nauseam in committee, which
is that the President somehow didn't inform the committee. That is a
falsehood. The President fully informed the committee to the letter of
the law. The 1947 Intelligence Act established that the President shall
inform the committee, but the establishment language of the act says
that the President and the Congress shall establish the procedures.
So what were the procedures established under Truman? That it was
okay for the President to inform the Gang of Eight, the House and the
Senate, and limit it to four on each side. It is okay to do that. And
Truman did it, and Carter did it, and Reagan, and Clinton, and this
President did it, and he abided by the law. And to say so otherwise is
to ill inform the American people. It is misguided, and it is false.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, let me, before I introduce our next
speaker, let me just respond by saying what has the American people
concerned is that we have a set of procedures in place, the so-called
FISA procedures, which allow the President to put anybody under
surveillance here in the United States providing that he gets a
warrant. And he can even get a warrant after he puts somebody under
surveillance. The question is why can't he follow the procedures in
place? In my opinion, he is breaking the law.
And I would also say that the other question is, why in the world,
given the controversy on this issue, can't this Congress have an up-or-
down vote on this issue? If the majority thinks that the President
should be able to put anybody under surveillance he wants
[[Page H1782]]
without a warrant, fine. Then write the bill and bring it to the floor,
let us debate it and pass it up or down.
I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Conyers).
Mr. CONYERS. I thank my friend on the Rules Committee, ranking
member, for allowing me to interject in this discussion at this point,
because I am stunned to hear now that there are people still defending
the President's right to have illegal spying on Americans when actually
we didn't know about it until the leaks occurred. He wasn't telling
everybody regularly about it. What we are dealing with now is some
spurious claims. And I am interested that the authorization for the use
of military force was supposed to allow domestic wiretapping on
Americans.
Ladies and gentlemen, we already have a couple of systems dealing
with terrorism surveillance. One is called the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act. There is plenty of room here for us to survey spying.
If we want to take care of spying, let us do that, but we are talking
about spying on Americans where there is no connection with foreign
intelligence. No question about it at all.
And so Sandra Day O'Connor declared to that kind of an argument that
in the case of combatants captured in the battlefield, it is clear that
a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to
the rights of the Nation's citizens. So what we debate on the rule here
today is whether or not there should have been an allowance for the
Schiff amendment, and all we are saying is that there should have been.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, may I inquire as to the remaining time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Rehberg). Both sides have 2\1/2\
minutes.
Mr. PUTNAM. I have no further speakers, Mr. Speaker, and I reserve
the balance of my time.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I will be asking Members to vote ``no'' on
the previous question. If the previous question is defeated, I will
amend the rule to allow the House to consider the Boswell amendment on
Iran nuclear programs. This amendment was offered in the Rules
Committee last night, but was defeated on a straight party-line vote.
It is yet another example of what I believe is the abuse of power by
the Republican-dominated Rules Committee.
Mr. Speaker, this amendment requires the Director of National
Intelligence to submit reports to Congress on Iran's weapons of mass
destruction every 90 days. It requires these reports to include an
assessment of Iran's nuclear programs, an evaluation of intelligence
sources, a summary of new intelligence for any information that would
increase confidence in overall assessment.
Mr. Speaker, we are deeply concerned over the ominous situation in
Iran with regard to the potential for nuclear weapons in that country,
and I think most Members of this body would agree that it is absolutely
critical that we continue to monitor the situation very closely and
receive frequent updates on Iran. We need to have constant and accurate
updates on this very serious situation. There is too much at stake here
for us to do less.
Have we learned nothing from what we experienced with regard to the
misleading intelligence and the false intelligence on Iraq? Have we
learned nothing from the fact that this Congress did not do its job;
did not take its oversight responsibility seriously; did not ask the
questions; did not hold the administration accountable?
Mr. Speaker, this should not be a controversial issue. Chairman
Hoekstra and Ranking Member Harman have worked in a bipartisan way.
This should have been worked out in a bipartisan way. I cannot imagine
why anybody would be opposed to this amendment.
Members should be aware that a ``no'' vote will not prevent
consideration of the intelligence bill and will not affect any of the
amendments that are in order under this rule, but a ``no'' vote will
allow us to add this important amendment that seeks to fully understand
the depth of the nuclear situation in Iran.
I would again urge my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to vote
for this. This should be a bipartisan vote. There is no reason, there
is no reason to vote this down unless somehow you do not want to hear
the information; unless somehow you do not want to demand this
administration be accountable and inform the Members of this Congress.
On the issue of nuclear weapons in Iran, it should be every Member of
this Congress, quite frankly, who should have access to relevant
material. We need to learn our lesson. We are in a mess right now in
Iraq. We are involved in a quagmire that has cost over 2,500 lives,
hundreds of billions of dollars, and we know the intelligence was
wrong. Let us do it right this time. Let us not rush into a war
unnecessarily. Let us demand from this administration some
accountability and some truth.
Vote ``no'' on the previous question.
Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to insert the text of the
amendment and extraneous materials immediately prior to the vote on the
previous question.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Massachusetts?
There was no objection.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, my friend from Massachusetts had me with
Iran and lost me with Iraq. Everything that he said regarding the
seriousness of the threat from Iran, a nuclear-capable Iran, is
unacceptable to our interests. Everything he said is absolutely
correct.
And I can save him the vote on the previous question by asking him to
turn to page 22 of the public version of the intelligence authorization
bill, where it says, under the subheading Reporting Regarding Iran and
North Korea, ``The committee has conducted regular and ongoing
oversight of these efforts and expects the DNI to ensure that the
Intelligence Community continues to provide timely, detailed, and
frequent reporting on the current intentions and capabilities on Iran
and North Korea's nuclear, chemical, biological, radiological, and
missile programs, as well as the Intelligence Community's capabilities
to understand and evaluate these programs. In particular, the committee
is interested in receiving, on an ongoing basis current assessments of
Iran and North Korea's nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, and
missile programs; information on new intelligence developed, including
intelligence collected from both open and clandestine sources; and full
discussion of any gaps in knowledge, dissents, caveats, and other
information that would tend to reduce confidence in the overall
assessment. The committee believes these reports will provide timely
information to help better inform Congress as it is asked to make
decisions regarding U.S. policy towards Iran and North Korea.''
The reporting requirement is in the bill. Mr. Speaker, this is a very
important issue. I urge the gentleman, I urge the Congress to support
the rule, support the underlying bill, and support the hardworking men
and women.
The material previously referred to by Mr. McGovern is as follows:
Previous Question for H. Res. 774--Rule on H.R. 5020, Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007
At the end of the resolution, add the following:
Sec. 2. Notwithstanding any other provision of this
resolution the amendment specified in section 3 shall be in
order as though printed after the amendment numbered 6 in the
report of the Committee on Rules if offered by Representative
Boswell of Iowa or a designee. That amendment shall be
debatable for 30 minutes equally divided and controlled by
the proponent and an opponent.
Sec. 3. The amendment referred to in section 2 is as
follows:
Amendment to H.R. 5020, as Reported
Offered by Mr. Boswell of Iowa
At the end of title III (page 16, after line 10), insert
the following new section:
SEC. 308. IRAN INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Iran
Intelligence Oversight Act''.
(b) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The development of nuclear weapons and the long-range
missiles capable of delivering them by the Islamic Republic
of Iran threatens the national security of the United States
and its allies.
(2) Denying these capabilities to Iran is among the most
important national security interests of the United States.
(3) Iran's avowed hostility towards the United States and
Israel, Iran's stated commitment to develop all elements of
the nuclear fuel cycle, Iran's continued defiance of
international efforts to account for its nuclear program,
Iran's development of long-range ballistic missile
technology, and Iran's
[[Page H1783]]
three decades of support for international terrorist
organizations raise grave suspicions about the purpose of its
nuclear and missile programs.
(4) The United States Government's current intelligence on
Iran may not be sufficient to assess the capabilities and
intentions of Iran with a high degree of certainty.
(5) The bipartisan Commission on the Intelligence
Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass
Destruction, co-chaired by Judge Lawrence Silberman and
former Senator Charles S. Robb, reported in 2005 that
``across the board, the Intelligence Community knows
disturbingly little about the nuclear programs of many of the
world's most dangerous actors. In some cases, it knows less
now than it did five or ten years ago''. This statement aptly
describes the challenge faced by policy-makers in the United
States with regard to Iran's weapons ambitions.
(6) If the President and Congress are to develop an
effective policy to counter the weapons programs of Iran,
such a policy must be based on accurate and timely
intelligence to the extent that it is possible to collect
such intelligence.
(7) Under section 502(a)(2) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 413a(a)(2)), the intelligence community must
``furnish the congressional intelligence committees any
information or material concerning intelligence activities .
. . which is within their custody or control''.
(8) Regular reports to Congress on the intentions and
capabilities of Iran with regard to Iran's nuclear program,
in addition to the continuing requirement to ensure that the
congressional intelligence committees are kept fully and
currently informed of all intelligence activities, will
assist Congress in the development of effective policy to
counter the weapons programs of Iran.
(c) Quarterly Intelligence Briefings to Congress on Iran.--
(1) Report.--Not later than 30 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, and at least every 90 days thereafter,
the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
relevant committees a report, in classified form, on the
current intentions and capabilities of the Islamic Republic
of Iran with regard to the nuclear program of Iran,
including--
(A) an assessment of nuclear weapons programs;
(B) an evaluation, consistent with existing reporting
standards and practices, of the sources upon which the
intelligence is based, including the number of sources and
the reliability of each source;
(C) a summary of any new intelligence gathered or developed
since the previous report, including intelligence collected
from both open and clandestine sources; and
(D) a discussion of any dissents, caveats, gaps in
knowledge, or other information that would reduce confidence
in the overall assessment.
(2) Access to report.--Each report submitted under
paragraph (1) shall be made available to all members of the
relevant committees and to all staff of the relevant
committees with appropriate security clearance. Other members
of the Senate or the House of Representatives may review the
reports by following security procedures established by each
of the relevant committees.
(3) Relevant committees.--In this section, the term
``relevant committees'' means the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
____
The Vote on the Previous Question: What It Really Means
This vote, the vote on whether to order the previous
question on a special rule, is not merely a procedural vote.
A vote against ordering the previous question is a vote
against the Republican majority agenda and a vote to allow
the opposition, at least for the moment, to offer an
alternative plan. It is a vote about what the House should be
debating.
Mr. Clarence Cannon's Precedents of the House of
Representatives, (VI, 308-311) describes the vote on the
previous question on the rule as ``a motion to direct or
control the consideration of the subject before the House
being made by the Member in charge.'' To defeat the previous
question is to give the opposition a chance to decide the
subject before the House. Cannon cites the Speaker's ruling
of January 13, 1920, to the effect that ``the refusal of the
House to sustain the demand for the previous question passes
the control of the resolution to the opposition'' in order to
offer an amendment. On March 15, 1909, a member of the
majority party offered a rule resolution. The House defeated
the previous question and a member of the opposition rose to
a parliamentary inquiry, asking who was entitled to
recognition. Speaker Joseph G. Cannon (R-Illinois) said:
``The previous question having been refused, the gentleman
from New York, Mr. Fitzgerald, who had asked the gentleman to
yield to him for an amendment, is entitled to the first
recognition.''
Because the vote today may look bad for the Republican
majority they will say ``the vote on the previous question is
simply a vote on whether to proceed to an immediate vote on
adopting the resolution * * * [and] has no substantive
legislative or policy implications whatsoever.'' But that is
not what they have always said. Listen to the Republican
Leadership Manual on the Legislative Process in the United
States House of Representatives, (6th edition, page 135).
Here's how the Republicans describe the previous question
vote in their own manual: Although it is generally not
possible to amend the rule because the majority Member
controlling the time will not yield for the purpose of
offering an amendment, the same result may be achieved by
voting down the previous question on the rule * * * When the
motion for the previous question is defeated, control of the
time passes to the Member who led the opposition to ordering
the previous question. That Member, because he then controls
the time, may offer an amendment to the rule, or yield for
the purpose of amendment.''
Deschler's Procedure in the U.S. House of Representatives,
the subchapter titled ``Amending Special Rules'' states: ``a
refusal to order the previous question on such a rule [a
special rule reported from the Committee on Rules] opens the
resolution to amendment and further debate.'' (Chapter 21,
section 21.2) Section 21.3 continues: Upon rejection of the
motion for the previous question on a resolution reported
from the Committee on Rules, control shifts to the Member
leading the opposition to the previous question, who may
offer a proper amendment or motion and who controls the time
for debate thereon.''
Clearly, the vote on the previous question on a rule does
have substantive policy implications. It is one of the only
available tools for those who oppose the Republican
majority's agenda to offer an alternative plan.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time, and I
move the previous question on the resolution.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on ordering the previous
question.
Parliamentary Inquiry
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, parliamentary inquiry.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman will state his parliamentary
inquiry.
Mr. McGOVERN. My parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker, is: Isn't it
accurate that the language that the gentleman just referred to in the
bill is discretionary, whereas what we are talking about is statutory
language that would require reporting every 90 days so that we don't
make the same mistake we did in Iraq?
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Chair cannot respond to that inquiry. It
is not the province of the Chair to interpret the substance of the
bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a
quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not
present.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Evidently a quorum is not present.
The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 8 and clause 9 of rule
XX, this 15-minute vote on ordering the previous question on House
Resolution 774 will be followed by 5-minute votes on adopting House
Resolution 774, if ordered; suspending the rules and adopting House
Concurrent Resolution 365; and suspending the rules and passing H.R.
282.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 228,
nays 194, not voting 10, as follows:
[Roll No. 102]
YEAS--228
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boustany
Bradley (NH)
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Chocola
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeLay
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Ehlers
Emerson
English (PA)
Eshoo
Everett
Feeney
Ferguson
Fitzpatrick (PA)
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Gutknecht
Hall
Harris
Hart
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hostettler
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Istook
Jenkins
Jindal
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
[[Page H1784]]
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
McMorris
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nunes
Nussle
Otter
Oxley
Paul
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Pombo
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Saxton
Schmidt
Schwarz (MI)
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherwood
Shimkus
Simmons
Simpson
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Sodrel
Souder
Stearns
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NAYS--194
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (OH)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carson
Case
Chandler
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (TN)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle
Edwards
Emanuel
Engel
Etheridge
Farr
Filner
Ford
Frank (MA)
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Harman
Herseth
Higgins
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick (MI)
Kind
Kucinich
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lynch
Maloney
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sabo
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz (PA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sherman
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Spratt
Stark
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Wexler
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
NOT VOTING--10
Baca
Evans
Fattah
Hastings (FL)
Millender-McDonald
Moore (WI)
Osborne
Ros-Lehtinen
Scott (GA)
Shuster
{time} 1419
Mr. COOPER and Mr. RANGEL changed their vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
So the previous question was ordered.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
Stated against:
Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 102, I inadvertently cast a
``yea'' vote when I intended to cast a ``nay'' vote.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Rehberg). The question is on the
resolution.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Mr. McGOVERN. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.
The yeas and nays were ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--yeas 227,
nays 198, not voting 7, as follows:
[Roll No. 103]
YEAS--227
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Boozman
Boustany
Bradley (NH)
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Chocola
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeLay
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Ehlers
Emerson
English (PA)
Everett
Feeney
Ferguson
Fitzpatrick (PA)
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Gutknecht
Hall
Harris
Hart
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hostettler
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Inglis (SC)
Issa
Istook
Jenkins
Jindal
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
McMorris
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nunes
Nussle
Otter
Oxley
Paul
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Pombo
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Saxton
Schmidt
Schwarz (MI)
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Sodrel
Souder
Stearns
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NAYS--198
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Barrow
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (OH)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carson
Case
Chandler
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Conyers
Cooper
Costa
Costello
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (TN)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle
Edwards
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Ford
Frank (MA)
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Harman
Herseth
Higgins
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hoyer
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick (MI)
Kind
Kucinich
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lynch
Maloney
Markey
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Miller, George
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sabo
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz (PA)
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sherman
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Solis
Spratt
Stark
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Wexler
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
NOT VOTING--7
Bono
Evans
Hastings (FL)
Millender-McDonald
Moore (WI)
Osborne
Ros-Lehtinen
{time} 1432
Ms. WATERS changed her vote from ``yea'' to ``nay.''
[[Page H1785]]
So the resolution was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
____________________
[Congressional Record: April 26, 2006 (House)]
[Page H1786-H1812]
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 774 and rule
XVIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill, H.R. 5020.
{time} 1453
In the Committee of the Whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 5020) to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2007 for
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other
purposes, with Mr. Rehberg in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered read the
first time.
The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) and the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Harman) each will control 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, I first wish to announce that, subsequent to reporting
the bill, the committee has modified the classified annex to the bill
with respect to the authorized level of funding for certain programs
with bipartisan agreement between myself and the ranking member.
The classified annex containing the modified schedule of
authorizations is and was available for review by all Members of the
House, subject to the rules of the House and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence under the procedures described in my
announcement to the House on April 6, 2006.
Mr. Chairman, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
has a reputation for conducting its business in a bipartisan manner.
With the intelligence authorization legislation before us today, I can
say that we have clearly hit that mark again. I look across the aisle
to my colleague and friend, the committee's ranking Democrat member,
Ms. Harman, and say thank you for once again helping to craft a very
good bipartisan piece of legislation that will allow the talented,
dedicated and patriotic men and women of our Nation's intelligence
community, our first line of defense, to protect America, its people
and our friends around the world.
Mr. Chairman, this bill is all about national security. It is about
authorizing the intelligence resources, capabilities and operations
necessary for us to know about foreign threats and to defend ourselves
in an increasingly dangerous world. It is about rebuilding, reshaping
and indeed fixing a community that was decimated by the budget cuts of
the 1990s.
Because of these cuts, on September 11, 2001, we were without a
robust human intelligence capability and without a robust analytic
capability that may have helped prevent or minimize these attacks on
the United States. This bill continues a many-year effort to transform,
build up and recreate an intelligence community that can know and
respond to threats.
There will be those here today who will not share our concerns about
the many threats against which our intelligence community must operate.
There will be those who do not agree with the necessary activities of
our intelligence community. There will be even be those who actually
accuse our dedicated intelligence professionals of violating, if not
the law, then the spirit of American values. This as they go about a
business to protect you and me.
To those who would and will take such positions, I say: you are
wrong. The threats are real. The professional
[[Page H1787]]
dedication, the discipline, the expertise and the extraordinary respect
for the civil liberties of all Americans that the honorable men and
women of our intelligence community exhibit is real. To them we owe a
great debt. To them we must make our best collaborative efforts to
provide the resources and authorities that H.R. 5020 authorizes.
Finally, because of them, we have the responsibility to rise above
any partisan politics in order to come together and pass this national
security bill.
This is the first intelligence budget request that was fully
determined by the new Director of National Intelligence, or the DNI.
Although the Office of the DNI is still in its formative stages, I am
pleased that the promise of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2040, the legislation that created the DNI, is
beginning to bear fruit, and that incremental but real improvements
have been made since the standup.
It was our intent to better unify the disparate pieces of the
intelligence community; to create a more cohesive whole that is greater
than the sum of the parts. That goal is a work in progress, and we will
continue to support the DNI's efforts to create a more effective
intelligence community.
We will support that effort, but we also provide the necessary
oversight, and this bill provides some mechanisms to make sure that we
get the intelligence community that the ranking member and I envisioned
when we worked so hard at passing that legislation.
Mr. Chairman, as you also know, much of this legislation is
classified and can't be discussed here on the floor. We must be very
careful to ensure that today's debate does not involve classified
information. That said, I do want to discuss, at an unclassified level,
some specific items contained in the authorization bill before us.
The first is our continuing support for an effective Director of
National Intelligence that can, as I mentioned earlier, bring together
all of the agencies of the intelligence community. We need an effective
and efficient DNI that fully coordinates and sets the direction for the
high-fidelity capabilities of the intelligence community.
In this legislation we are sending a strong signal that the vision of
the 2004 intelligence reform legislation was about building a
qualitatively better intelligence establishment and not building a
bureaucracy.
This bill continues to pursue improvements to our core intelligence
for human intelligence, intelligence analysis, infrastructure and
counterintelligence capabilities. Improvements in these areas are
absolutely critical to gaining the upper hand in the war against
worldwide terrorism. We have, for example, made recommendations for
improved HUMINT training and associated support. We have recommended
additional funding for analytical tools. And we have put a great deal
of emphasis on increasing counterintelligence programs and personnel,
because, in case you have not been looking, there are many nations and
nonstate actors actively trying to steal America's secrets.
This bill also puts a renewed and continued emphasis on overhead
imagery architecture. As many know, last year there were some decisions
that were made that included terminating a part of the Future Imagery
Architecture program. This was a tough decision. It had its positive
aspects. It also had its negative downside. We are now in a late-to-
need race to ensure we do not have future capabilities gaps. I am
concerned that the current approach has not adequately addressed this
problem. So this legislation vigorously pursues one of a very limited
number of options.
Finally, I would like to also address a provision that was mentioned
in one of the amendments that was proposed by the minority for today. I
want to reinforce to my colleagues on the intelligence committee that
we remain very, very committed to active oversight and reporting by the
intelligence community on the progress that they are making in Iran. We
have provisions in the bill for Iraq. We have got some of that language
for Iran and other hot spots around the world. But as the ranking
member and I have discussed, as the rule was being debated, the spirit
of the amendment is one that we embrace. We may have some technical or
drafting differences, but the intent of that amendment is one that we
will stay focused on. We believe it is inherently important for us to
focus on those kinds of issues and to do this in a bipartisan basis.
{time} 1500
The issues and the threats that we are facing, al Qaeda, radical
Islam, Iran, North Korea, as well as future threats that are on the
horizon that we are only beginning to think about, require us to
continue to work in a bipartisan basis.
I recognize that we had some disagreements on the bill. We have got
disagreements between Republicans and Democrats. We have got
disagreements within each side of the aisle. But the important thing is
that we continue to focus on working in a bipartisan basis to keep
America safe. That is the request that our colleagues on both sides of
the aisle have placed to us, and I hope that we will continue in
working in that direction.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, in my 12 years in Congress, in my 8 on the Intelligence
Committee, I have always supported intelligence authorization bills,
but never in my 12 years and never in my nearly 4 decades involved in
public policy have I been as concerned as I now am about our Nation's
security.
Just this week bin Laden and Zarqawi issued new threats against the
United States and our allies, yet we do not know what they are
plotting. We do not even know where they are. Despite 4\1/2\ years of
effort and the expenditure of tens of billions of taxpayer dollars, we
still do not have a handle on al Qaeda, a threat that is metastasizing
and growing ever more dangerous.
We are losing soldiers in Iraq, in part because we never had
intelligence dominance. We still do not have it. The so-called war on
terror outside Iraq is essentially an intelligence war, but we did not
know that home-grown terrorists were going to blow themselves up on
London's subways. We did not know about Madrid, Bali, Casablanca,
Istanbul or Dahab, Egypt. We do not know if America will be hit
tomorrow or where.
Iran is making noisy threats, but we do not know if Ahmadinejad poses
a real danger or if he is bluffing, because our intelligence on Iran is
weak. And again we are hearing the drumbeat for war, without a clear
idea of where the targets are, whether we can hit them effectively, or
what would happen the day after.
We have taken our eye off over-the-horizon threats, the networks of
Muslim extremists growing in Europe, Africa and Latin America, the
threat of loose nukes from the former Soviet Union and the rising power
of China.
Here at home our intelligence reorganization is a slow start-up, and
the CIA is in free fall. The Director of National Intelligence, a
position Congress created to integrate the activities of the entire
Intelligence Community after 9/11, has not taken command yet of that
community. Meanwhile at CIA, our premier intelligence organization, 300
years of experience have either been pushed out or left in frustration,
and morale is dangerously low.
The DNI is giving away authority to the Pentagon, which is happy to
receive it, as it expands its own role in intelligence-gathering abroad
and here at home. The efforts to integrate homeland intelligence
between the FBI and DHS is still uneven.
And our borders, airports, seaports remain vulnerable. As we speak,
the House Homeland Security Committee on which I serve is trying to
report a strong port security bill. I hope that effort succeeds. We
surely need it.
Given all this, what does this bill do, and as important, what does
it not do? It funds an NSA program that in my view violates a clear
statute passed by Congress. It fails to require that the program be
fully briefed to Members of the Intelligence Committee.
I surely support, and I have said this over and over again, the
capability to monitor al Quaeda. I want to know what their plans are so
we can disrupt them before they harm us. But I do not support violating
the law or the Constitution. Enhanced security without respect for law
gives away the very values we are fighting to defend, and I believe
that the program I am talking
[[Page H1788]]
about can and must fully comply with the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act and with our Constitution.
The bill also fails to give clarity to the issue of leaks. Leaks of
classified information are wrong, but it is also wrong to have a double
standard. When career professionals blow the whistle on controversial
activities, it is illegal, a firing offense, but when the President and
Vice President authorize the selective leaking of classified
information to discredit criticism, it is defended as a prerogative of
the Presidency, part of the President's inherent authority.
This bill includes a provision that gives arrest powers to the
protective officers at CIA and NSA in order to help them protect agency
officials. This provision, in my view, has been somewhat misconstrued
in the press as granting new warrantless surveillance powers to these
agencies. It does not. It simply gives these protective details the
same authority that the Capitol Police, the Secret Service and other
Federal authorities have. But, like all new powers, they are
susceptible to abuse without strong oversight, and so it would be my
hope that we will include more safeguards before this provision becomes
law.
I do want to say to the chairman of the committee that I appreciate
the bipartisanship which the majority has shown in accepting some
initiatives raised over many years by committee Democrats. For 2 years
committee Democrats have registered strong opposition to the practice
of funding counterterrorism through supplemental budgets. We fought
this reckless practice in committee and on the floor.
This year, again, the President's budget provided 22 percent less
than what is needed for counterterrorism operations. On a bipartisan
basis we are now authorizing 100 percent of the Intelligence
Committee's counterterrorism funding needs for 2007 in this base bill,
and that is something the majority agreed to, and I applaud them for
that.
Second, for years our Intelligence Community has been denied the
service of many patriotic Americans from versus ethnic backgrounds,
Iraqi Americans, Iranian Americans, who want to serve, but who cannot
get security clearances. Committee Democrats offered an amendment to
last year's bill to require a multitier system of clearances so that
these Americans, despite the fact that they may have relatives in these
countries, can get clearances up to a certain level to help us with
language and cultural issues. That language is in this bill, and I
commend the majority for including it.
On a personal level, Chairman Hoekstra and I have made a major effort
to work together to put America first. I am grateful for that and for
him. I appreciate your kind words, Peter, and I thank you. We will
continue to try to do our best to get the best possible legislation
enacted.
Mr. Chairman, this bill, in my view, misses an enormous opportunity
to send a message to the White House, and that message is that
surveillance of Americans must comply with our law and our
Constitution; that intelligence on Iran is not good enough; that
protection of privacy and civil liberties must be part of our effort to
improve intelligence gathering, not an afterthought; and that we will
not tolerate a double standard on leaks of classified information.
I hope this debate, Mr. Chairman, will assure me that this bill is
adequate. The dedicated women and men of the Intelligence Community not
only deserve our full support, but our best effort to enact funding
legislation that truly upholds America's values and America's
principles.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman
from Texas (Mr. Thornberry), who is the chairman of the oversight
subcommittee assigned with the responsibility of making sure that the
reshaping and the rebuilding of the intelligence community under the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence is a successful launch
and does rebuild the community into what we need after what we
inherited in the 1990s.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman Hoekstra for all of
his work in this area.
Mr. Chairman, there is no perfect bill that comes across this floor.
And particularly in the area of intelligence, there is no perfect
amount of information that tells us everything that we want to know.
But rather than use this bill to send a message to the White House, I
think that the committee generally has come together to try to fashion
a bill that makes our country safer.
It is not perfect, it does not do everything that I would like it to
do, but the members of this committee on both sides of the aisle take
their job very seriously, and realize how much is at stake, and have
generally avoided the kinds of partisan rhetoric that we sometimes see.
The chairman and ranking member have assigned the oversight
subcommittee with strategic oversight. That means we are not to follow
the headlines of the day, but the distinguished gentlemen from Alabama
(Mr. Cramer) and I have worked very well together, I think, to try to
find those strategic issues, focusing on them. That really make a
difference in the long run.
As the chairman mentioned, one of our areas of focus is to make sure
that this new DNI office gets started on the right foot; is not just
another bureaucracy, but truly brings the intelligence community
together so there is not the duplication, not the stovepipes, not the
gaps that we have seen in the past.
And it is important for folks to know that we did not just pass a
bill, the intelligence reform bill, and walk away from it. We are
engaged day after day in trying to work with the administration and
with the agencies to make sure that it is a success.
This bill includes a requirement for a strategic planning process
that is a part of that effort to make it a success. In addition to
that, the oversight subcommittee has focused on reducing unnecessary
paperwork burdens, reports and studies that often require many
manhours, many dollars to prepare, but then come to nothing, where no
one up here reads them.
Rather, we are trying to focus on information exchanges that matter,
and particularly in the area of metrics, so that, for example, when we
talk about Iran, we can quantify the quality differences, the quantity
differences that come from sustained efforts in human and technical
intelligence.
I think this bill does help make the country safer, and I suggest
that Members support it.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that sending messages to the
White House is not all we should do here, but there are very few ways
to send those messages.
I yield 2 minutes to a senior member of our committee, also a member
of the Armed Services Committee, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Reyes).
Mr. REYES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the ranking member for yielding me
time on this important issue.
I agree with my colleague from Texas that very few pieces of
legislation are perfect. It is not that we are looking for perfection,
we are looking for an effort that gives us the cooperation, an effort
that gives us the ability to hold people accountable for doing their
jobs.
Earlier today we heard that one of the amendments, the amendment that
has been proposed by my colleague, the gentleman from Iowa (Mr.
Boswell), had been ruled out of order, and that amendment required a
quarterly report to Congress on the nuclear program of Iran. The report
would be submitted every 90 days and would include an assessment of
nuclear weapons programs; an evaluation on the sources upon which the
intelligence is based; a summary of any new intelligence that had been
gathered since the previous report; and a discussion of any dissents,
caveats, gaps in knowledge, or other information that would reduce the
confidence in the overall assessment.
People may wonder why would we want to include an amendment like
that. Well, the reason goes back to why we are in Iraq today. The
reason goes back to our lack of oversight and the issues of WMD,
weapons of mass destruction.
The reason is because we have not done our job as a Congress in
holding the administration accountable in WMD, in the issue of Abu
Ghraib, and the issue of the leaking of the Valerie Plame outing, and
many other different issues.
{time} 1515
Our Founding Fathers had the idea that the best democracy, the best
form
[[Page H1789]]
of government, would be one that would be a balanced approach. We
haven't done our job in balancing that by oversight.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to my distinguished
colleague from New York (Mr. McHugh) who in the past year has sat
through seven briefings on Iran in the Intelligence Committee.
Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the distinguished chairman of the
Intelligence Committee for his work, his effort, and all Members', to
bring this product to the floor here today.
I certainly associate myself with the comments of previous speakers
about perfection. I am one of the newer members of the committee, I
have to be very frank. As a long-term member of the Armed Services
Committee, I was shocked at the condition, or lack of positive
condition of our intelligence resources coming out of the 1990s. Let us
be honest about it. Congress, particularly the administration, did a
terrible job in maintaining the kind of infrastructure programs and
resources necessary to do adequate intelligence.
The good news is I think this bill continues the recent efforts,
particularly since post-9/11, to try to rebuild those communities. It
has not been an easy job, and it has been a bipartisan one, and I can
hope that will continue.
With respect to this bill, I would say that it does, indeed, help
meet the President's goal of growing our analytic cadre by 50 percent.
It continues efforts that were begun with the Intelligence Reform Act
to rebuild the community.
As I said, after it was literally devastated by what I would
categorize as irresponsible budget cuts in the 1980s, the passage of
this bill would provide the DNI with the necessary resources to best
identify practices for analysis, and will fund use of experts from
across the spectrum, academia, the private sector, to supplement the
intelligence community expertise.
More than that, it will support fundamental assessment of the
community's analytic resources, and that can serve as the ``yellow
pages'' for intelligence community analysts, and it will serve as well
to illustrate what skills and expertise the community still needs as we
continue that very, very important challenge. In addition, H.R. 5020
provides our intelligence community with resources and authorities
necessary to win the war on terror.
It shakes off the last vestiges of the Deutsch doctrine, which tied
our hands for all intelligence officers. It is a long road back. This
bill takes us a long way down that path and I strongly support its
passage.
Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Chairman, I now yield 3\1/2\ minutes to the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Eshoo), a member of the committee.
Ms. ESHOO. Mr. Chairman, I thank our distinguished colleague for
yielding.
Mr. Chairman, this bill provides the brave men and women of our
intelligence community with the tools they need to conduct their
constant silent struggle to guarantee our national security. They
deserve it. They place their lives on the line every day, and they
should have these resources provided to them.
What I am deeply disappointed about in this bill is that we are not
using this opportunity to crack down on the administration's reckless
and unlawful abuses in the field of intelligence gathering.
For the first time in our Nation's history, we are living under an
administration that asserts it has the right, without statutory or
judicial review, to eavesdrop on the electronic communications of
American citizens. The NSA wiretapping program, revealed last December
and acknowledged by the President himself, represents for the first
time ever the completely warrantless surveillance of U.S. citizens, an
unheard of breach of our rights guaranteed under the Constitution.
We have learned from news reports that the Counter-Intelligence Field
Activity, CIFA, part of the Department of Defense, has illegally
collected and retained information on Americans, including several in
my district in California. Worse, they did this on the basis of
protected first amendment activity, notably the exercise of free speech
about military recruiting at the University of California at Santa
Cruz.
When I learned of this, I was able to investigate and learn that the
reports had been improperly entered into and retained in a Department
of Defense database. I objected, and the DOD has promised in writing to
correct the situation and issue guidance to employees to prevent future
abuses. I am pleased with their attention to the problem, and I hope
that we have turned the corner with CIFA.
This has not been the case with the President's NSA wiretapping
program. Not only does the program fall outside the statutory
guidelines of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, but the
President continues, in my view, to violate the law by failing to brief
the full Intelligence Committee about the program.
Our Nation was founded on the premise of three coequal branches of
government, providing checks and balances on the abuse of power by any
one body. Yet this administration continues to act without regard for
congressional or judicial guidelines. This is not only un-American, it
is dangerous, and we have a responsibility to put an end to it.
I offered an amendment to this bill in committee which sought only to
determine the cost of the President's program. It was a reasonable and
measured attempt at meaningful oversight. It didn't seek operational
details or names of targets, but just the most basic oversight
questions, what is in the budget. It was defeated. When the vote is
cast on this, Members are voting in the dark.
I offered another amendment last night which was rejected by the
Rules Committee. That was even more benign. It simply expressed the
sense of Congress that all electronic surveillance must comply with the
Constitution and FISA.
This bill has shortcomings, Mr. Chairman, and I regret that it does
because I think that it is not good for our country.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to our
distinguished colleague from New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson) who has
responsibility as chairwoman of the Tactical and Technical
Subcommittee.
Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the
bill we hope to pass this afternoon, because it continues to rebuild
America's global intelligence capability and implemented intelligence
reform.
I think we have to be honest with ourselves and the American people
that the intelligence challenge that we face today is much more
difficult than the challenge that we faced during the Cold War. The
Soviet Union was powerful but predictable. They were knowable,
understandable. Al Qaeda is deadly but amorphous, adaptive, parasitic,
and suicidal.
The intelligence challenge, the bar, is much higher than it used to
be. This bill helps us move forward to meet that challenge.
In the area of technical and tactical intelligence, this bill raises
the standards for program planning. In the area of broad missions like
ballistic missile technical collection, we require agencies to work
together to come up with a comprehensive plan to gather the information
needed and not duplicate programs.
We require agencies to plan not only for a technical program, but for
the life cycle of that program: the tasking, the processing, the
exploitation and dissemination, the training of personnel, and those
kinds of efforts that have to be put in place.
Thirdly, we know we have serious deficiencies in some technical
programs in our technical architecture. There is one essential program
that has not been successful, and the way forward is fraught with risk.
We put the resources and authorize them in this bill to develop long-
term comprehensive solutions to the technical architectures we need to
keep this country safe.
I ask my colleagues to support this legislation.
Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Maryland (Mr. Ruppersberger).
Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the 2007
Intelligence Authorization Act. I believe that good intelligence is the
best defense against terrorism. As we continue to fight this war on
terror, I believe we must give the intelligence community the resources
it needs to
[[Page H1790]]
keep our families and communities safe.
As a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
I support this legislation because I believe that it provides
intelligence officials with key resources as they work to protect our
country.
The bill improves the U.S. human intelligence activities, boosts U.S.
counterintelligence programs and personnel, and increases funding for
counterterrorism programs by 22 percent to achieve full funding,
something the President's budget did not do.
But I do have some reservations about this bill as well. This
legislation, supported by the Bush administration, moves a large number
of intelligence agents and analysts from the FBI's new national
security branch, currently under the authority of the Director of
National Intelligence, to the Department of Justice. I do not believe
this move is good for our country's security.
The agents in this new FBI branch specialize in collecting and
analyzing domestic intelligence. They work to penetrate terrorist cells
currently operating in the United States to thwart another attack on
our soil.
After the horrific attacks of 9/11, Congress created the Director of
National Intelligence, known as the DNI, to ensure better coordination
and communication between the 15 intelligence agencies. The DNI was
created to connect the dots, something that did not happen before 9/11.
It is the Department of Justice's job to investigate and indict
criminals for breaking our laws.
I fear that shifting a large number of agents and analysts from the
DNI to the Department of Justice will keep the status quo. If we want
to change the culture, change the system that failed us before 9/11,
and effectively break up terrorist cells in our country, the FBI's new
security branch must stay under the DNI, the Director of National
Intelligence.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the gentlewoman
from Virginia (Mrs. Jo Ann Davis), our distinguished colleague who is
the chair of our subcommittee responsible for rebuilding human
intelligence capabilities.
Mrs. JO ANN DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support
of H.R. 5020, the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2007, and I applaud
Chairman Hoekstra for presenting a bill that addresses the funding
needs for the global war on terrorism and ongoing intelligence
operations in Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, as chair of the Terrorism, Human Intelligence, Analysis
and Counterintelligence Subcommittee, I have been directed to ensure
that the intelligence community has the resources necessary to complete
the thousands upon thousands of intelligence operations conducted each
year in direct support of our Nation's diplomatic and military efforts
worldwide, all during a time of war.
Although the risks involved in intelligence operations are inherently
high, they are significantly greater when conducted against blood-
thirsty insurgents and radical extremists, both of which accept that
the mass murder of innocent men, women and children is justifiable.
When faced with an enemy that is so brutal and remorseless, we must
ensure that the intelligence community has the personnel and the
operational tools needed to collect, analyze, and disseminate the type
of intelligence that allows us to disrupt the activities of such an
enemy. H.R. 5020 does this as it provides the resources needed to
increase human intelligence operations, enhance analytical
capabilities, and sustain intelligence collection platforms.
Insightful, accurate and timely intelligence has always been the key
to understanding the plans and intentions of our adversaries. It is not
a secret that some of these adversaries have little respect for human
rights or the internationally accepted rule of law. They are determined
to destroy growing democracies and strip their citizens of the
liberties we as Americans often take for granted.
They are committed to bringing the war back to the homeland, where
our families and friends might be subjected to similar horrors as were
experienced on 9/11. We cannot and we will not let this happen. We
cannot appear irresolute in our goal to ensure our political and
military leaders have the best intelligence possible while we are
waging this war.
It is our duty to ensure that the Nation is protected, and H.R. 5020
strives to guarantee that the right type of intelligence is provided to
our leaders so that they may protect our Nation. It is also our duty to
provide resources to improve the ability of our servicemembers and
intelligence officers as they confront terrorism worldwide and combat
insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Authorizing any amount less than the full funding requested for the
global war on terrorism or operations in Iraq would place members of
our armed services and our intelligence community under greater peril
than they are today. Not authorizing the full amount would be
tantamount to compromising our national security.
I urge my colleagues to support this legislation, and, once again, I
congratulate my chairman on his outstanding effort.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, how much time remains on each side?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) has 12\1/2\
minutes remaining. The gentlewoman from California (Ms. Harman) has 14
minutes remaining.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Alabama (Mr. Cramer), who is ranking member on our new Oversight
Subcommittee, on which Mr. Thornberry is doing, I think, a superb job
attempting to oversee activities of our intelligence.
{time} 1530
Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman from California,
and I want to congratulate you on your leadership in this committee,
along with the chairman as well. I have been on this committee for
several terms now, and as the chairman stated and the ranking member
stated, we bend over backwards to work in a bipartisan way. This hasn't
been easy, and this hasn't been an easy year. And I say to both of you,
congratulations for trying to help us work through this very difficult
year.
This is not a perfect bill, and I am disappointed that several of the
amendments were not allowed in order. I think the chairman is, too. I
think there are some of the issues that were ruled out, particularly
Mr. Boswell's issue, that we can work through together, and so I look
forward to the chairman and ranking member's leadership.
I do stand in support of H.R. 5020. This bill does address many of
the issues surrounding the way in which the intelligence community is
being restructured. I say to my friend, the gentleman from Texas (Mr.
Thornberry), thank you for the leadership you have enjoyed with me and
with this full committee over the Oversight Subcommittee. We haven't
always had an Oversight Subcommittee, and this makes sense that we now
have the opportunity, particularly as we have stood up the DNI, to
engage the new people at the DNI, the new leaders at the DNI that we
are looking to to lead this country into a new era of intelligence
management that we haven't had. This is our opportunity to hold their
feet to the fire.
The stand-up of the DNI has been slow, and it has been frustrating,
but we have been working together, Mr. Thornberry and I, to bring
information back to the full committee from the DNI and the relevant
agencies. We have taken on the tough issues, interrogation, detention
operations, information sharing, overall management structure of the
DNI, and we have done this in ways that the committee hasn't worked
before. We have done it by having briefings; we have done it by going
to their turf, their sites, sitting with their personnel, leaving the
country, talking to our people in sensitive parts of the world that are
doing brave and noble things for this country, and then we have brought
that information back into the subcommittee and into the full committee
as well. This is the way I enjoy working.
Also in this bill there is an investment in an analytical initiative
that draws on the expertise resident at three centers, the Missile and
Space Intelligence Center, which just happens to be in Huntsville,
Alabama, my home district; the National Air and Space Intelligence
Center in Dayton, Ohio; and at the National Ground Intelligence Center
in Charlottesville, Virginia. These centers collaborate and they
[[Page H1791]]
work to analyze weapons that we bring back that could be threats to
this country and to our aircraft and to our personnel as well. So those
people in those locations get a reinvestment in their work through this
bill.
All in all, I think this is a good bill, and I urge my colleagues to
support it.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to my colleague
from the great State of Michigan (Mr. Rogers), who chairs our policy
committee on the Intelligence Committee, responsible for identifying
and understanding the threats that we face as a Nation.
Mr. ROGERS of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to compliment
you, your staff, and that of both the ranking member and the majority
on a job well done on this bill.
The challenges that we face came from the 1990s, and many of the
problems the ranking member even pointed out were a different direction
set, a different policy set from where they wanted our intelligence
services to go. They went so far as to say back then that we don't even
want you to talk to somebody who is a bad character or may be an
embarrassment to the United States. So they did the honorable thing;
they shut down their human operations. They followed the law and the
policies of the United States. If you would have asked an intelligence
official back then, they would have told you it was a bad idea. We
shouldn't have done it.
Today, through the leadership of this committee and this chairman,
and the folks who are out in the field today trying to rebuild our
human intelligence, it is nothing short of miraculous. These people are
incredibly talented, and I think we miss that sometimes. We miss it in
the halls here and in the debates in committee. And by the way, we have
debated ad nauseam many of the issues brought up today on these things,
as we should in that context. But these are great people who could do a
myriad of other things: make more money. A lot of them came to the CIA,
and they took pay cuts because they believe in what they are doing. And
they are risking their lives today for this country and for our safety.
I had the great privilege to reenlist a young soldier in a very
remote part of the world in a small, dinky little room with all the
windows taped up and with a small American flag hanging behind us
because that is all we could find, because he believed. He said, yeah,
this is hardship, but I believe in my country more than I believe in
anything.
So when we talk about the problems of intelligence and the policies
of the past, let us not forget one thing: when you bump into somebody
whose morale is low, it isn't because of the work that they are doing.
They are off the charts excited about making a difference for their
country. It is because policymakers back here use words like ``illegal
wiretap,'' even though they have never been briefed into the program at
all and have no concept of what it is; because they say ``Abu Ghraib''
like it paints everybody who has ever been involved in an interrogation
as doing something wrong and breaking the law.
Shame on us if we allow this to continue to happen and affect the
morale of people who are risking their lives on work that is so
precious to our safety, security and liberty. We ought to applaud them
today, and this bill, I think, does that.
Mr. Chairman, again I want to applaud you and thank you for your
work. And I want to caution all the Members of this Chamber: we
shouldn't be more worried about winning in November than we should be
about winning the war on terror. We should stand with these people,
tell them we are proud of them, tell them we are proud of the work they
are doing, and thank you for signing up to defend the greatest Nation
on the face of the Earth.
Let this squabbling go by. We know that the folks who have come down
on this floor, and it has shocked me today, Mr. Chairman, that some
would even come out here after getting the full brief and describe a
program in terms that they didn't describe it in the privacy and the
security and with the confidence of previous briefings. This is the
wrong time to do that.
Let us continue to work together. We have done it so well in those
committees. I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, and I
look forward to standing up for the very people who risk their lives
today defending this great country and going after probably the
toughest enemy we have ever seen.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would just say to my friend Mr. Rogers
that all of us on this committee put America first, though we may
disagree about precisely what this bill should include.
It is now my pleasure to yield to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr.
Holt), the ranking member on our policy committee, 3\1/2\ minutes.
Mr. HOLT. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague, the ranking member, the
gentlewoman from California, for affording me a few minutes to comment
on this bill.
I agree with many of my colleagues that there are some very important
and positive features of this bill. The dedicated and often brave
members of the intelligence agencies have earned and deserve our
support, but this bill weakens our freedoms.
There are a number of points, and I hardly know where to begin, but
the basic point is that the bill fails to address what I believe are
some of the core oversight challenges facing our committee and this
body. There are under way some of the greatest changes in intelligence
collection in American history, and it deserves our careful oversight.
This bill turns a blind eye, really, to misuses of executive power
that threaten our liberties and the constitutional balance of powers
which we are sworn to protect. And I say this advisedly. I don't mean
to overstate the matter.
The bill does not provide funding for privacy and civil liberties
oversight. There has been some mention of that. The bill also does not
address this really important issue of domestic spying. Make no
mistake, all of us in Congress support intercepting communications of
terrorists set on doing us harm, doing Americans harm anywhere in the
world, but there are multiple examples of how innocent people are
ensnared.
The Muslim American lawyer Brandon Mayfield, we have spoken about him
on the floor; Christian peace activists; others who have been falsely
labeled as terrorist coconspirators and domestic security threats based
on their political beliefs or simple mistaken erroneous information.
This is what happens when there are no checks and balances.
To date, there has been no independent audit of the NSA program, the
domestic spying surveillance program, to determine whether similar
abuses have occurred. That is our role, but we have been stonewalled in
our efforts. Eavesdropping on Americans must comply with FISA, that is
what I maintain. If the other side disagrees, let us have it out here
on the floor. At least let us have it out in committee.
The President says FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
doesn't apply to him. However, the President doesn't get to pick and
choose which laws he will follow and which ones he won't.
The administration still refuses to brief all members of the
Intelligence Committee on this program. The National Security Act
requires him to do that. The failure to brief the full committee
compromises our oversight responsibility, violates the law, I think,
and makes a mockery of the checks and balances that we are sworn to
protect.
In another case, the Iraq NIE, the National Intelligence Estimate,
the information that was leaked, we now know for purely political
purposes to try to discredit a public servant. We are talking about the
protection of intelligence for its proper use. Classified information
should never be misused as a political weapon through selective
declassification and leaking to attack opponents a particular point of
view. No, I am not flogging a dead horse, I am talking about the
principles that we are supposed to protect.
Mr. Chairman, the bill also provides no meaningful protections for
national security whistleblowers. Members of the national intelligence
community can sometimes be discouraged or even intimidated from raising
concerns within their agencies.
Mr. Chairman, I recommend that we vote against this bill.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to a great member of the
committee, someone who understands that the Civil Liberties and Privacy
Board is funded out of the budget of the Executive Office of the
President and does
[[Page H1792]]
not come out of the Intelligence Committee authorization bill, the
gentleman from Alabama (Mr. Everett).
(Mr. EVERETT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Michigan, and I
do rise in support of the intelligence authorization bill for fiscal
year 2007. Chairman Hoekstra is to be congratulated and commended for
his efforts in drafting this important legislation to meet the
intelligence needs of the country.
There are many great things in this bill for the warfighter and for
the intelligence community; however, I would like to focus on a very
important reconnaissance and surveillance program, the U-2. Recently, a
program budget decision was released by the Air Force to retire the U-2
by 2011. This transition flight plan would replace the U-2 with the
Global Hawk UAV that is not yet capable of taking on this mission. This
plan is premature, and after further review it appears that the Air
Force now shares my concerns. The bill before us prevents the
retirement of the U-2 unless the Secretary of Defense can certify that
there will be no loss of intelligence collection capabilities.
Just to make a point, I am associated with the U-2 all the way back
to the 1950s when it made its first flight. It has been upgraded
continuously over the years with a large variety of mature intelligence
collection sensors. The U-2 is, in fact, the force behind our long-
range stand-off intelligence capabilities today.
The last U-2 left the production line in 1989. Its airframe is
engineered for 75,000 hours. The U-2 provides critical multisensor
intelligence through all phases of conflict, including peacetime, the
war on terror, low-intensity conflict, and high-scale hostilities. The
U-2 has even provided photographs to FEMA in support of the Hurricane
Katrina and other national disasters. The U-2's modular payload design
allows the aircraft to be reconfigured to perform various missions and
can perform them until 2050 at the rate we are now using them.
Mr. Chairman, intelligence is the first line of defense and necessary
for the security of the Nation. Our warfighters, to be successful on
the battlefield, have to have this intelligence. I urge all my
colleagues to support this bill, and again I congratulate the chairman
and our ranking member for us being able to get this bill to the floor.
In particular, I'd like to focus on a very important Reconnaissance
and Surveillance Program: the U-2.
Recently, a Program Budget Decision was released by the Air Force to
retire the U-2 by 2011. This ``transition flight plan'' would replace
the U-2 with the Global Hawk UAV that is not yet capable of taking on
this mission. This plan is premature, and after further review, it
appears the Air Force now shares some of my concerns. The bill before
us prevents the retirement of the U-2 unless the Secretary of Defense
can certify that there will be no loss of intelligence collection
capabilities.
Just to make a point about the capability of the U-2, although the
origins of the aircraft go back to the 1950s, it has been upgraded
continuously over the years with a large variety of mature intelligence
collection sensors. The U-2 is, in fact, the force behind our long-
range, stand-off intelligence capabilities today.
The last U-2 left the production line only in 1989. Its airframe is
engineered for 75,000 hours, yet our fleet of operational aircraft
averages only 10,000 hours. The U-2 provides critical multi-sensor
intelligence through all phases of conflict, including peacetime, the
war on terror, low-intensity conflict and large-scale hostilities. The
U-2 has even provided photographs to FEMA in support of Hurricane
Katrina and other natural disasters. The U-2's modular payload design
allows the aircraft to be reconfigured to perform various missions, and
can perform them until 2050 at the rate we are using them today.
The Bill rightly directs that the Secretary of Defense must certify
that there will be no loss of intelligence capabilities in
transitioning from the U-2 to the Global Hawk, and that the collection
capabilities reach parity, before a final decision is made. This will
help ensure that the ``persistent stare'' goal in the Quadrennial
Defense Review is met.
Mr. Chairman, intelligence ``is'' the first line of defense and
necessary for the security of this Nation, and for our war fighters to
be successful on the battlefield. I urge my colleagues to vote in favor
of this legislation.
{time} 1545
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Massachusetts (Mr. Tierney).
Mr. TIERNEY. Mr. Chairman, the intelligence authorization bill before
us today is a bit of a mixed bag. It does, on the positive side, direct
the Director of National Intelligence to better conform to the
committee's intent that the Director of National Intelligence be a
coordinator of intelligence, that it not create an additional layer of
bureaucracy, and that it strengthen the community's capability to
penetrate hard targets.
It does, at the Democrats' insistence, provide full funding for
counterterrorism programs instead of going along with the President's
22 percent cut. It does contain report language requiring that the
Department of Defense inspector general audit the controversial
activities of the Department of Defense Counterintelligence Field
Activities, or CIFA.
But there are concerns that remain unanswered, and among these
concerns are the continued insistence of this administration to limit
access to information about the President's domestic surveillance
program. After weeks of debate, the program remains limited to only a
select group of the already select Intelligence Committee. We should
not expect members charged with the oversight to write a blank check to
the President to conduct intelligence activities under a shroud of
secrecy from the very group that was established on behalf of this
Congress to do oversight. Members of this full House look to the
members of the Select Committee on Intelligence for advice, and in this
case the President has limited that committee in full from being able
to get the information necessary to be able to advise and lead on these
issues.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
established the Director of National Intelligence with strong statutory
budget authorities to enable that office to reach across the whole
community and to reallocate resources and personnel to respond to
emerging threats. The administration appears to be on a path to
dismantle this critical budgetary authority, piece by piece.
The 2007 budget request of the President moves significant resources
and personnel permanently out of the management and control of the
Director of National Intelligence. Most of those transfers move
intelligence assets to the control of the Secretary of Defense and the
Attorney General.
We should keep in mind over the last 2 years the military
intelligence program has grown by 25 percent while the national
intelligence program has actually shrunk by almost 1 percent. Both
press reports and the Quadrennial Defense Review evidence the
Pentagon's intention to expand special operations activities worldwide
to engage in operations traditionally reserved for the Central
Intelligence Agency and the State Department.
In the committee I proposed an amendment that would protect the
authorities of the Director of National Intelligence, at least pending
a Federal review and some answers from the administration with respect
to its intentions in this regard. That failed, but I understand that
the Senate is believed to have this issue in its sights, under
consideration, and I should hope it is for the purposes of being in
line with my amendment.
Allowing the Department of Defense to creep into the intelligence
areas, especially when the result would be to avoid oversight, is
problematical in the least. I have strong reservations about this bill,
and I ask Members to consider these before they vote on this measure.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Arizona (Mr. Renzi), a distinguished member of the committee.
Mr. RENZI. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your work and the ranking
member's work on this bill.
I want to also go back to some things that were said earlier
concerning civil liberties and the Republican Party, in its effort to
try to balance civil liberties post-September 11. It is unfair and
unwise to enter into the Congressional Record the misleading
information that this is the first time in history that terrorist
surveillance was conducted outside of FISA. Every one of you over there
knows that President Clinton conducted terrorist surveillance outside
of FISA, and he was justified in doing so by Jamie Gorelich at
[[Page H1793]]
the Justice Department based on an argument of Article II of the
Constitution. It is not the first time in history outside of FISA it
has been conducted.
This legislation also, as the gentlewoman from New Mexico talked
about, goes to restore and rebuild our capabilities that were very much
slashed during the 1990s. It was a time when our intelligence officers
declined by 30 percent. It was a time when a number of CIA sources
worldwide were cut by 40 percent. The number of intelligence reports
that our intelligence community was able to produce was cut in half.
If you remember back during the Reagan administration when President
Reagan had to rebuild our military, this is very much like how our
history stands right now in trying to restore and rebuild our
intelligence capability. There was a time when our intelligence
officers were hamstrung by the Deutsch guidelines, when poor management
and a lack of urgency at the top did not allow our intelligence agents
to function properly in the field. That has changed.
This intelligence authorization bill allows us to gather more
information globally at more locations than we had in the recent past.
When famine strikes in Africa, when the saber-rattling in Venezuela is
conducted, when the narcoterrorists along the Mexican border begin
control, this intelligence bill acts.
I want to once again thank the chairman. As a Member from Arizona, we
need the kind of increases that our agents are asking for, particularly
on our Mexican border.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
Mr. Chairman, I am the longest-serving member currently on this
committee. I love this committee; I love the issues we consider. My
district is the place where most of our intelligence satellites are
made. It is the location of the Air Force Space and Missiles Command,
which just opened a state-of-the-art complex and develops and fields
our satellite and missile capabilities.
I was there in El Segundo 2 days ago, and I am immensely proud of the
work of SMC and the people who do the work, both in uniform and
civilians.
Mr. Chairman, I have traveled the corners of the earth with our
committee members. They are my friends. I am very fond of them on a
bipartisan basis and I have been very moved by some of the comments
made about this bill. A lot of what they say I truly and sincerely
agree with. I think this bill is a lot better than it would have been
because there has been bipartisan cooperation. I appreciate that. And I
appreciate the personal effort that Chairman Hoekstra made to work with
me and work with the minority.
What has upset me today, and I do not think anyone has missed it, is
what I view as callous, partisan behavior by the Committee on Rules at
a level that I have not felt and experienced, at least with respect to
the Intelligence Committee. Members on our side offered responsible
amendments. All of them were shown to the majority; and in one case,
the Boswell amendment, the majority collaborated with us on adjusting
the language so it was mutually acceptable. Then at the last minute,
for no good reason other than pure partisanship, the Boswell amendment
was made out of order.
That experience has prompted me to revisit some of the things that
still bother me. The NSA program bothers me. It is not that I do not
support the capability; surely I do. I have made that clear. But I do
not support any part of that program being outside of FISA, because I
believe, based on information that I have, that it can fully comply
with FISA. There is no reason to exempt that program.
Mr. Renzi was just talking about the actions of President Clinton
that he claimed were outside of FISA. My understanding is that at the
time, physical searches were not covered by FISA, and later FISA was
amended to cover it. That is the right way to go, and that is what I
would hope our committee would end up doing.
Mr. Chairman, it is a tough call whether to support the bill at this
stage. I hope and expect that I will support the conference report. I
think the conference report will be better than the bill we pass in
this House, because I think that the other body and the conference will
consider and make decisions about some of these issues we have not
addressed adequately here.
In closing, it is always on my mind that dedicated men and women are
serving overseas taking tough risks for our freedom. I love them and I
have been there to tell them that. This bill has to honor them, which
means this has to be the best bill we can field. I do not think it is
the best bill we can pass. I will make a decision about my vote later
in this debate. I know that some members on our committee will support
it and some will oppose it and I respect their views, as I do the views
of the majority.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent at this point to
include for the Record an exchange of letters with other committees of
jurisdiction and the executive branch with respect to this legislation.
I appreciate the willingness of those committees to work with us on
this legislation.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's request to insert matter at this point
is already covered by his request for general leave in the House.
House of Representatives,
Committee on Government Reform,
Washington, DC, April 25, 2006.
Hon. Peter Hoekstra,
Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: On April 6, 2006, the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence reported H.R. 5020, the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.'' As
you know, the bill includes provisions within the
jurisdiction of the Committee on Government Reform.
In the interests of moving this important legislation
forward, I agreed to waive sequential consideration of this
bill by the Committee on Government Reform. However, I did so
only with the understanding that this procedural route would
not be construed to prejudice the Committee on Government
Reform's jurisdictional interest and prerogatives on this
bill or any other similar legislation and will not be
considered as precedent for consideration of matters of
jurisdictional interest to my Committee in the future.
I respectfully request your support for the appointment of
outside conferees from the Committee on Government Reform
should this bill or a similar bill be considered in a
conference with the Senate. Finally, I request that you
include this letter and your response in the Congressional
Record during consideration of the legislation on the House
floor.
Thank you for your attention to these matters.
Sincerely,
Tom Davis.
____
House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence,
Washington, DC, April 25, 2006.
Hon. Tom Davis,
Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter regarding the
Committee on Government Reform's jurisdictional interest in
H.R. 5020, the ``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2007,'' and your willingness to forego consideration of
H.R. 5020 by the Government Reform Committee.
I agree that the Government Reform Committee has a valid
jurisdictional interest in certain provisions of H.R. 5020
and that the Committee's jurisdiction will not be adversely
affected by your decision to not request a sequential
referral of H.R. 5020. As you have requested, I will support
your request for an appropriate appointment of outside
conferees from your Committee in the event of a House-Senate
conference on this or similar legislation should such a
conference be convened.
Finally, I will include a copy of your letter and this
response in the Congressional Record during the floor
consideration of this bill. Thank you again for your
cooperation.
Sincerely,
Peter Hoekstra,
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC, April 26, 2006.
Hon. Peter Hoekstra,
Chairman, House Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Chairman Hoekstra: I write to confirm our mutual
understanding regarding H.R. 5020, the ``Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.'' This legislation
contains subject matter within the jurisdiction of the
Committee on the Judiciary. However, in order to expedite
floor consideration of this important legislation, the
Committee waives consideration of the bill. The Committee on
the Judiciary takes this action with the understanding that
the Committee's jurisdictional interests over this and
similar legislation are in no way diminished or altered. I
also wish to confirm our
[[Page H1794]]
mutual agreement that the authorization of the Drug
Enforcement Agency's (DEA) Office of National Security
Intelligence within the National Intelligence Program in no
way impairs or affects the Committee on the Judiciary's
jurisdiction over law enforcement and information sharing
activities of all components of the DEA, including those
carried out by this Office.
The Committee also reserves the right to seek appointment
to any House-Senate conference on this legislation and
requests your support if such a request is made. Finally, I
would appreciate your including this letter in the
Congressional Record during consideration of H.R. 5020 on the
House floor. Thank you for your attention to these matters.
Sincerely,
F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
Chairman.
____
House of Representatives, Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence,
Washington, DC, April 26, 2006.
Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Thank you for your letter of April 26,
2006, regarding H.R. 5020, the Intelligence Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2007. As you noted, elements of the bill as
reported fall within the jurisdiction of the Committee on the
Judiciary. I will support the request of the Committee on the
Judiciary for conferees on these provisions.
In addition, the bill reflects action on the part of the
Administration to include specified elements of the Drug
Enforcement Administration within the Intelligence Community.
As you know, I intend to offer a manager's amendment to the
bill to clarify that the DEA's membership in the Intelligence
Community is specifically limited to the DEA's Office of
National Security Intelligence, the authorization for which
has been requested within the National Intelligence Program,
the program for which we have jurisdiction. I will be glad to
work with you on a continuing basis to ensure that this
designation is not construed in any way to limit the conduct
of oversight by the Committee on the Judiciary with respect
to law enforcement and information sharing activities of all
components of the DEA, which I fully recognize are within the
jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary.
I appreciate your willingness to forego consideration of
the bill in the interest of expediting this legislation for
floor consideration. I acknowledge that by agreeing to waive
consideration of the bill, the Committee on the Judiciary
does not waive any jurisdiction it may have over provisions
of the bill or any matters under your jurisdiction.
Finally, I will include a copy of your letter and this
response in the Congressional Record during consideration of
the legislation on the House floor. Thank you for your
assistance in this matter.
Sincerely,
Peter Hoekstra,
Chairman.
______
Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration,
Office of Congressional Affairs,
Washington, DC, April 25, 2006.
Hon. Peter Hoekstra,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington. DC.
Dear Chairman Hoekstra: Thank you for supporting a portion
of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) joining the
Intelligence Community (IC). This is in response to your
staff inquiry regarding the organizational relationship
between the Office of National Security Intelligence and the
Central Tasking Management System (CTMS).
As you know, DBA has created the Office of National
Security Intelligence at DEA headquarters to oversee and
coordinate the three major functions necessary for the Office
of National Security Intelligence integration into the IC:
all-source analysis, a Central Tasking Management System, and
liaison with IC members. All-source analysis of drug
trafficking investigative and other information will enhance
the intelligence available to policy makers in the law
enforcement and intelligence communities. The CTMS will allow
DBA to notify IC partners of pertinent drug information
related to national security.
We appreciate your interest in the organizational structure
of the Office of National Security Intelligence. Please
contact us again if you have additional questions, or need
additional information.
Sincerely,
Eric J. Akers,
Chief, Office of Congressional Affairs.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
In closing, I appreciate again the work of the ranking member, my
colleagues on both sides of the aisle, and the staff on both sides of
the aisle, to pull together a bill which I think addresses the
priorities that we established at this committee really beginning a
year and a half ago: that we were going to stay focused on rebuilding
an intelligence capability to match the threats that America faces
today.
This legislation puts in the necessary fences that will ensure that
this committee has the oversight over the standup of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence. We all want this process to work. We
would all like it to go faster because of the significant threats that
we face as a Nation. But standing up the Office of the DNI will be the
responsibility of monitoring, and that will be the responsibility of
our oversight subcommittee.
Our policy committee is going to continue to monitor and evaluate the
threats that we face as a Nation. Whether it is al Qaeda, radical
Islam, the affiliated groups to al Qaeda, Iran, Iraq, North Korea,
China, we want to make sure that we as a committee have a good grasp of
making sure that the intelligence community is structured to go after
these threats and provide us as policymakers with the information that
we need to be successful.
The third thing that we are going to do is to make sure that we
thoroughly take a look at what we can accomplish to stop leaks, the
devastating leaks from within the community and outside of the
community that damage our capabilities and give those who want to
attack us insight as to what our plans, intentions and capabilities
are.
And then for my colleagues who have talked about the TSA program and
other activities, it is the responsibility of this committee, it is the
responsibility of the members of this committee to make sure that we do
effective oversight, to make sure that the executive branch operates
within the parameters that we have established, the legal parameters
that we have established for it to operate within.
Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from
Kansas (Mr. Tiahrt) to close the general debate on our side.
Mr. TIAHRT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Michigan (Mr.
Hoekstra) for yielding me this time, and I apologize for being late.
Mr. Chairman, this legislation before us provides funding resources
and authorization to support our intelligence community, and I think it
is coming at a very important time so we can protect our Nation from
attack.
Following September 11, 2001, our economy suffered a $2 trillion
loss. That does not really address the nearly 3,000 lives lost as a by-
product of the terrorist attacks. Certainly that carries greater
weight.
We have held hearings, appointed commissions and watched
documentaries about this tragedy. It is clear during the 1990s, our
government reduced the human intelligence capabilities and let our
infrastructure fall into disrepair. This bill, which is so important,
continues to rebuild our intelligence community.
First, it provides full funding for the global war on terror instead
of piecemealing in increments through supplementals and emergency
bills.
Second, the legislation provides much-needed new buildings and
rehabilitates other capital investments that deteriorated during the
1990s under the last administration.
And finally, it begins a long process of training agents, recruiting
recourses, and hiring the support personnel needed to achieve the human
intelligence capability that we need to protect ourselves, our
families, and our economy.
Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge my fellow colleagues to support this
bill. I would like to say this is an important step in the right
direction to allow our new Director of National Intelligence to have
the voice that he needs to coordinate our activities, to break down the
stovepipes and to continue the process of doing an excellent job of
protecting this Nation, as they have done since September 11, 2001.
Mr. MORAN of Virginia. Mr. Chairman, almost 2 years ago, the 9/11
Commission reported that our intelligence community failed our Nation
because of its aversion to share information, lack of oversight and
limited imagination in how to deal with emerging sources of
information. Since that final report was issued, Congress has
authorized an overhaul of intelligence agencies, but progress has not
met with our expectations. We all experienced what can happen with
inadequate intelligence on 9/11, so the path that is being taken should
serve as a brilliant warning sign that much more needs to be done.
When the House of Representatives votes on this year's Intelligence
Authorization, I will vote against the bill. In doing so, my opposition
is not because Congress shouldn't fund intelligence activities, but
rather I believe that
[[Page H1795]]
it is disingenuous for this body to act as if the intelligence
community is not the source of great concern. The resistance to change,
the absence of leadership and partisan politics have tempered positive
evolution and hurt our Nation. Indeed, in the place of real progress,
the intelligence community has been a source of a number of
controversial and classified programs that the public has since learned
about. Last year, we were made aware that:
The President initiated an illegal program to secretly intercept
international phone calls, including intercepting calls of American
citizens, without fully briefing the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees. This new spy program subverts the congressionally approved
standard and no one comprehends the full scope of the program;
The United States government operated a secretive program known as
``extraordinary rendition'' that shipped accused terrorist suspect to
other countries for imprisonment and interrogation, all to avoid U.S.
laws prescribing due process and prohibiting torture;
The White House selectively declassified information and offered it
to preferred reporters to discredit political adversaries;
Intelligence officials sat on a report contradicting the
Administration's claim that mobile laboratories in Iraq were developing
weapons, while the President announced to the Nation that ``we have
found the weapons of mass destruction''; and
Last week the CIA fired lifelong federal employee Mary McCarthy for
disclosure, offering the misimpression she was fired for a leak she
never knew anything about.
These instances are only the most grievous, but they highlight this
administration's contempt for accountability and put the unassailable
standing of our civil liberties in doubt. And when given the
opportunity, the White House has dragged its feet to appoint the staff,
fund and begin the work of the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight
Board which is intended to safeguard our citizens from unnecessary
government intrusion. .
I understand the formidable challenge that is being undertaken and I
applaud the many brave and good hearted people who work to secure our
nation every day. Unfortunately, the White House and the leadership of
these agencies are undercutting reform by failing to deliver greater
communication, transparency and accountability. We are reminded
repeatedly with reports that the CIA is losing key personnel because of
the politicization of the agency, or when the 9/11 Commission gives
``D'' grades to government-wide information sharing and intelligence
oversight reform.
The American public looks to Congress to safeguard our civil
liberties, and to ensure that intelligence is good and intelligence
reform is meaningful. I'm afraid that in the last year there has been
increasing evidence that this institution has failed to do its job. Mr.
Chairman, instead of passing a reauthorization bill today that does
little to address the nation's concern we should reexamine what we can
do to ensure our intelligence agencies can do their job and instill our
constituent's faith in our intelligence community.
Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 5020,
the Intelligence Authorization Act for fiscal year 2007.
In supporting this bill, I want to emphasize to Chairman Hoekstra
that the Defense Appropriation Subcommittee will do what it can to work
with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in the weeks
and months ahead. We intend to follow through with a fiscal year 2007
Department of Defense Appropriations bill that supports the major areas
of emphasis addressed in the authorization bill now before us.
I intend to work closely with Chairman Hoekstra and the HPSCI to
provide the funds necessary to strengthen U.S. intelligence collection
and analysis, improve the technical means that support the Intelligence
Community, and strengthen the organization of the Intelligence
Community. I also stand ready to work with his Committee as we
carefully scrutinize the fiscal year 2007 budget request to ensure that
funding is used as effectively and as efficiently as possible to obtain
the best return for the American taxpayer.
While I support this measure, I must also advise that some areas of
difference between the Authorization and Appropriations bills may
arise. Of course, we intend to try to minimize any such issues.
However, the committees have different institutional roles,
responsibilities, and processes, and while I fully respect the role of
the Chairman of the authorizing committee, I know he appreciates my
role as well.
In an increasingly constrained spending environment, the
Appropriations Committee may find it necessary to reduce the overall
funding available for the Department of Defense Appropriations bill. We
will have to make hard choices on how best to address those
constraints.
I offer my congratulations to Chairman Hoekstra for his work on this
legislation, and my support for final passage.
{time} 1600
The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the amendment in the nature of a substitute
printed in the bill shall be considered as an original bill for the
purpose of amendment under the 5-minute rule and shall be considered
read.
The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as
follows:
H.R. 5020
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the
``Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
Sec. 105. Incorporation of reporting requirements.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence Activities.
Sec. 303. Clarification of definition of Intelligence Community under
the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 304. Delegation of authority for travel on common carriers for
intelligence collection personnel.
Sec. 305. Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to Elements of the
Intelligence Community.
Sec. 306. Availability of funds for travel and transportation of
personal effects, household goods, and automobiles.
Sec. 307. Purchases by elements of the intelligence community of
products of federal prison industries.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
Sec. 401. Clarification of delegation of transfer or reprogramming
authority.
Sec. 402. Clarification of limitation on co-location of the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 403. Additional duties of the Director of Science and Technology
of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 404. Appointment and title of Chief Information Officer of the
Intelligence Community.
Sec. 405. Leadership and location of certain offices and officials.
Sec. 406. Eligibility for incentive awards of personnel assigned to the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
Sec. 407. Repeal of certain authorities relating to the Office of the
national counterintelligence Executive.
Sec. 408. Membership of the Director of National Intelligence on the
transportation security oversight Board.
Sec. 409. Temporary inapplicability to the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence of certain financial reporting
requirements.
Sec. 410. Comprehensive inventory of special access programs.
Sec. 411. Sense of Congress on multi-level security clearances.
Sec. 412. Access to information by staff and members of the
congressional intelligence committees.
Sec. 413. Study on revoking pensions of persons who commit unauthorized
disclosures of classified information.
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
Sec. 421. Enhanced protection of Central Intelligence Agency
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized
disclosure.
Sec. 422. Additional exception to foreign language proficiency
requirement for certain senior level positions in the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Sec. 423. Additional functions and authorities for protective personnel
of the central intelligence agency.
Sec. 424. Protective services for former officials of the intelligence
community.
Sec. 425. Strategic review process.
Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components
Sec. 431. Enhancements of National Security Agency training Program.
Sec. 432. Codification of authorities of national security agency
protective personnel.
Subtitle D--Other Elements
Sec. 441. Clarification of inclusion of Coast Guard and Drug
Enforcement Administration elements in the Intelligence
Community.
[[Page H1796]]
Sec. 442. Clarifying amendments relating to Section 105 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
Sec. 501. Aerial reconnaissance platforms.
Sec. 502. Elimination of certain reporting requirements.
Sec. 503. Technical amendments to the National Security Act of 1947.
Sec. 504. Technical clarification of certain references to joint
military intelligence Program and tactical intelligence
and related Activities.
Sec. 505. Technical amendments to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004.
Sec. 506. Technical amendment to the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949.
Sec. 507. Technical amendments relating to the multiyear National
Intelligence Program.
Sec. 508. Technical amendments to the Executive Schedule.
Sec. 509. Technical amendments relating to redesignation of the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the national
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal
year 2007 for the conduct of the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the following elements of
the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Department of State.
(8) The Department of the Treasury.
(9) The Department of Energy.
(10) The Department of Justice.
(11) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(12) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(13) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(14) The Coast Guard.
(15) The Department of Homeland Security.
(16) The Drug Enforcement Administration.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The
amounts authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and
the authorized personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2007,
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the elements listed in such section, are those
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
prepared to accompany the conference report on the bill H.R.
5020 of the One Hundred Ninth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of
Authorizations.--The Schedule of Authorizations shall be made
available to the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and House of Representatives and to the President. The
President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within
the executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director
of National Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian
personnel in excess of the number authorized for fiscal year
2007 under section 102 when the Director of National
Intelligence determines that such action is necessary to the
performance of important intelligence functions, except that
the number of personnel employed in excess of the number
authorized under such section may not, for any element of the
intelligence community, exceed 2 percent of the number of
civilian personnel authorized under such section for such
element.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of
National Intelligence shall promptly notify the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority
granted by this section.
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account of the Director of National Intelligence for fiscal
year 2007 the sum of $990,000,000. Within such amount, funds
identified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations
referred to in section 102(a) for advanced research and
development shall remain available until September 30, 2008.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of
National Intelligence are authorized 1,539 full-time
personnel as of September 30, 2007. Personnel serving in such
elements may be permanent employees of the Intelligence
Community Management Account or personnel detailed from other
elements of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to
amounts authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account by subsection (a), there are
also authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence
Community Management Account for fiscal year 2007 such
additional amounts as are specified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a).
Such additional amounts for research and development shall
remain available until September 30, 2007.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the
personnel authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the
Intelligence Community Management Account as of September 30,
2007, there are also authorized such additional personnel for
such elements as of that date as are specified in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during
fiscal year 2007 any officer or employee of the United States
or a member of the Armed Forces who is detailed to the staff
of the Intelligence Community Management Account from another
element of the United States Government shall be detailed on
a reimbursable basis, except that any such officer, employee,
or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis for a
period of less than one year as the Director of National
Intelligence considers necessary.
SEC. 105. INCORPORATION OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) In General.--Each requirement to submit a report to the
congressional intelligence committees that is included in the
joint explanatory statement to accompany the conference
report on the bill H.R. 5020 of the One Hundred Ninth
Congress, or in the classified annex to this Act, is hereby
incorporated into this Act, and is hereby made a requirement
in law.
(b) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``congressional intelligence committees''
means--
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal
year 2007 the sum of $256,400,000.
TITLE III--INTELLIGENCE AND GENERAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MATTERS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
AUTHORIZED BY LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay,
retirement, and other benefits for Federal employees may be
increased by such additional or supplemental amounts as may
be necessary for increases in such compensation or benefits
authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not
be deemed to constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity which is not otherwise authorized by
the Constitution or the laws of the United States.
SEC. 303. CLARIFICATION OF DEFINITION OF INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY UNDER THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF
1947.
Subparagraph (L) of section 3(4) of the National Security
Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended by striking
``other'' the second place it appears.
SEC. 304. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY FOR TRAVEL ON COMMON
CARRIERS FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION PERSONNEL.
(a) Delegation of Authority.--Section 116(b) of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404k(b)) is
amended--
(1) by inserting ``(1)'' before ``The Director'';
(2) in paragraph (1), by striking ``may only delegate'' and
all that follows and inserting ``may delegate the authority
in subsection (a) to the head of any other element of the
intelligence community.''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) The head of an element of the intelligence community
to whom the authority in subsection (a) is delegated pursuant
to paragraph (1) may further delegate such authority to such
senior officials of such element as are specified in
guidelines prescribed by the Director of National
Intelligence for purposes of this paragraph.''.
(b) Submittal of Guidelines to Congress.--Not later than
six months after the date of the enactment of this Act, the
Director of National Intelligence shall prescribe and submit
to the congressional intelligence committees the guidelines
referred to in paragraph (2) of section 116(b) of the
National Security Act of 1947, as added by subsection (a).
(c) Congressional Intelligence Committees Defined.--In this
section, the term ``congressional intelligence committees''
means--
(1) the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate; and
(2) the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives.
SEC. 305. RETENTION AND USE OF AMOUNTS PAID AS DEBTS TO
ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Title XI of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 442 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end
the following new section:
``Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to Elements of the
Intelligence Community
``Sec. 1103. (a) Authority to Retain Amounts Paid.--
Notwithstanding section 3302 of title 31, United States Code,
or any other provision of law, the head of an element of the
intelligence community may retain amounts paid or reimbursed
to the United States, including amounts paid by an employee
of the Federal
[[Page H1797]]
Government from personal funds, for repayment of a debt owed
to the element of the intelligence community.
``(b) Crediting of Amounts Retained.--(1) Amounts retained
under subsection (a) shall be credited to the current
appropriation or account from which such funds were derived
or whose expenditure formed the basis for the underlying
activity from which the debt concerned arose.
``(2) Amounts credited to an appropriation or account under
paragraph (1) shall be merged with amounts in such
appropriation or account, and shall be available in
accordance with subsection (c).
``(c) Availability of Amounts.--Amounts credited to an
appropriation or account under subsection (b) with respect to
a debt owed to an element of the intelligence community shall
be available to the head of such element, for such time as is
applicable to amounts in such appropriation or account, or
such longer time as may be provided by law, for purposes as
follows:
``(1) In the case of a debt arising from lost or damaged
property of such element, the repair of such property or the
replacement of such property with alternative property that
will perform the same or similar functions as such property.
``(2) The funding of any other activities authorized to be
funded by such appropriation or account.
``(d) Debt Owed to an Element of the Intelligence Community
Defined.--In this section, the term `debt owed to an element
of the intelligence community' means any of the following:
``(1) A debt owed to an element of the intelligence
community by an employee or former employee of such element
for the negligent or willful loss of or damage to property of
such element that was procured by such element using
appropriated funds.
``(2) A debt owed to an element of the intelligence
community by an employee or former employee of such element
as repayment for default on the terms and conditions
associated with a scholarship, fellowship, or other
educational assistance provided to such individual by such
element, whether in exchange for future services or
otherwise, using appropriated funds.
``(3) Any other debt or repayment owed to an element of the
intelligence community by a private person or entity by
reason of the negligent or willful action of such person or
entity, as determined by a court of competent jurisdiction or
in a lawful administrative proceeding.''.
(b) Clerical Amendment.--The table of contents in the first
section of that Act is amended by adding at the end the
following new item:
``Sec. 1103. Retention and use of amounts paid as debts to elements of
the intelligence community.''.
SEC. 306. AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR TRAVEL AND TRANSPORTATION
OF PERSONAL EFFECTS, HOUSEHOLD GOODS, AND
AUTOMOBILES.
(a) Funds of Office of Director of National Intelligence.--
Funds appropriated to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence and available for travel and transportation
expenses shall be available for such expenses when any part
of the travel or transportation concerned begins in a fiscal
year pursuant to travel orders issued in such fiscal year,
notwithstanding that such travel or transportation is or may
not be completed during such fiscal year.
(b) Funds of Central Intelligence Agency.--Funds
appropriated to the Central Intelligence Agency and available
for travel and transportation expenses shall be available for
such expenses when any part of the travel or transportation
concerned begins in a fiscal year pursuant to travel orders
issued in such fiscal year, notwithstanding that such travel
or transportation is or may not be completed during such
fiscal year.
(c) Travel and Transportation Expenses Defined.--In this
section, the term ``travel and transportation expenses''
means the following:
(1) Expenses in connection with travel of personnel,
including travel of dependents.
(2) Expenses in connection with transportation of personal
effects, household goods, or automobiles of personnel.
SEC. 307. PURCHASES BY ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
OF PRODUCTS OF FEDERAL PRISON INDUSTRIES.
Section 404 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2632) is
amended--
(1) by striking ``by the Central Intelligence Agency'' and
inserting ``by an element of the intelligence community (as
defined in section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 401a(4)))''; and
(2) by striking ``the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency determines that the product or service'' and inserting
``the head of that element determines that the product or
service (including a surveying or mapping service)''.
TITLE IV--MATTERS RELATING TO ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Subtitle A--Office of the Director of National Intelligence
SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF DELEGATION OF TRANSFER OR
REPROGRAMMING AUTHORITY.
Section 102A(d)(5)(B) of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 403-1(d)(5)(B)), as added by section 1011(a) of
the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title
I of Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643), is amended in the
second sentence by striking ``or agency involved'' and
inserting ``involved or the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence
Agency)''.
SEC. 402. CLARIFICATION OF LIMITATION ON CO-LOCATION OF THE
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE.
Section 103(e) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-3(e)) is amended--
(1) in the heading, by striking ``With'' and inserting ``of
Headquarters With Headquarters Of'' ;
(2) by inserting ``the headquarters of'' before ``the
Office''; and
(3) by striking ``any other element'' and inserting ``the
headquarters of any other element''.
SEC. 403. ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY OF THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) Coordination and Prioritization of Research Conducted
by Elements of Intelligence Community.--Subsection (d) of
section 103E of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-3e) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (3)(A), by inserting ``and prioritize''
after ``coordinate''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall
identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be
carried out by elements of the intelligence community.''.
(b) Development of Technology Goals.--Such section is
further amended--
(1) in subsection (c)--
(A) in paragraph (4), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(B) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following new
paragraph:
``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the
elements of the intelligence community to meet the technology
needs of the intelligence community; and''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(e) Goals for Technology Needs of Intelligence
Community.--In carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director
of Science and Technology shall--
``(1) systematically identify and assess the most
significant intelligence challenges that require technical
solutions; and
``(2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of
research and design programs of elements of the intelligence
community to meet the requirements of the intelligence
community for timely support.''.
(c) Report.--(1) Not later than June 30, 2007, the Director
of National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report
containing a strategy for the development and use of
technology in the intelligence community through 2021.
(2) The report shall include--
(A) an assessment of the highest priority intelligence gaps
across the intelligence community that may be resolved by the
use of technology;
(B) goals for advanced research and development and a
strategy to achieve such goals;
(C) an explanation of how each advanced research and
development project funded under the National Intelligence
Program addresses an identified intelligence gap;
(D) a list of all current and projected research and
development projects by research type (basic, advanced, or
applied) with estimated funding levels, estimated initiation
dates, and estimated completion dates; and
(E) a plan to incorporate technology from research and
development projects into National Intelligence Program
acquisition programs.
(3) The report may be submitted in classified form.
SEC. 404. APPOINTMENT AND TITLE OF CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER
OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) Appointment.--
(1) In general.--Subsection (a) of section 103G of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3g) is amended
by striking ``the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate'' and inserting ``the Director of
National Intelligence''.
(2) Applicability.--The amendment made by paragraph (1)
shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act,
and shall apply with respect to any nomination of an
individual as Chief Information Officer of the Intelligence
Community that is made on or after that date.
(b) Title.--Such section is further amended--
(1) in subsection (a), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
(2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer'';
(3) in subsection (c), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''; and
(4) in subsection (d), by inserting ``of the Intelligence
Community'' after ``Chief Information Officer''.
SEC. 405. LEADERSHIP AND LOCATION OF CERTAIN OFFICES AND
OFFICIALS.
(a) National Counter Proliferation Center.--Section 119A(a)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404o-1(a)) is
amended--
(1) by striking ``Establishment.--Not later than 18 months
after the date of the enactment of the National Security
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, the'' and inserting ``(1)
Establishment.--The''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(2) Director.--The head of the National Counter
Proliferation Center shall be the Director of the National
Counter Proliferation Center, who shall be appointed by the
Director of National Intelligence.
``(3) Location.--The National Counter Proliferation Center
shall be located within the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.''.
(b) Officers.--Section 103(c) of that Act (50 U.S.C. 403-
3(c)) is amended--
(1) by redesignating paragraph (9) as paragraph (13); and
[[Page H1798]]
(2) by inserting after paragraph (8) the following new
paragraphs:
``(9) The Chief Information Officer of the intelligence
community.
``(10) The Inspector General of the intelligence community.
``(11) The Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center.
``(12) The Director of the National Counter Proliferation
Center.''.
SEC. 406. ELIGIBILITY FOR INCENTIVE AWARDS OF PERSONNEL
ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE.
(a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 402 of the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984 (50
U.S.C. 403e-1) is amended to read as follows:
``(a) Authority for Payment of Awards.--(1) The Director of
National Intelligence may exercise the authority granted in
section 4503 of title 5, United States Code, with respect to
Federal employees and members of the Armed Forces detailed or
assigned to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence in the same manner as such authority may be
exercised with respect to personnel of the Office.
``(2) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may
exercise the authority granted in section 4503 of title 5,
United States Code, with respect to Federal employees and
members of the Armed Forces detailed or assigned to the
Central Intelligence Agency in the same manner as such
authority may be exercised with respect to personnel of the
Agency.''.
(b) Repeal of Obsolete Authority.--Such section is further
amended--
(1) by striking subsection (c); and
(2) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (c).
(c) Conforming Amendments.--Such section is further
amended--
(1) in subsection (b), by striking ``to the Central
Intelligence Agency or to the Intelligence Community Staff''
and inserting ``to the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence or to the Central Intelligence Agency''; and
(2) in subsection (c), as redesignated by subsection (b)(2)
of this section, by striking ``Director of Central
Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence or Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency''.
(d) Technical and Stylistic Amendments.--That section is
further amended--
(1) in subsection (b)--
(A) by inserting ``Personnel Eligible for Awards.--'' after
``(b)'';
(B) by striking ``subsection (a) of this section'' and
inserting ``subsection (a)''; and
(C) by striking ``a date five years before the date of
enactment of this section'' and inserting ``December 9,
1978''; and
(2) in subsection (c), as so redesignated, by inserting
``Payment and Acceptance of Awards.--'' after ``(c)''.
SEC. 407. REPEAL OF CERTAIN AUTHORITIES RELATING TO THE
OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
EXECUTIVE.
(a) Repeal of Certain Authorities.--Section 904 of the
Counterintelligence Enhancement Act of 2002 (title IX of
Public Law 107-306; 50 U.S.C. 402c) is amended--
(1) by striking subsections (d), (g), (h), (i), and (j);
and
(2) by redesignating subsections (e), (f), (k), (l), and
(m) as subsections (d), (e), (f), (g), and (h), respectively.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--That section is further
amended--
(1) in subsection (d), as redesignated by subsection (a)(2)
of this section, by striking ``subsection (f)'' each place it
appears in paragraphs (1) and (2) and inserting ``subsection
(e)''; and
(2) in subsection (e)(2), as so redesignated, by striking
``subsection (e)(2)'' and inserting ``subsection (d)(2)''.
SEC. 408. MEMBERSHIP OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
ON THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT BOARD.
Subparagraph (F) of section 115(b)(1) of title 49, United
States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(F) The Director of National Intelligence, or the
Director's designee.''.
SEC. 409. TEMPORARY INAPPLICABILITY TO THE OFFICE OF THE
DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OF CERTAIN
FINANCIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
The Director of National Intelligence shall not be required
to submit an audited financial statement under section 3515
of title 31, United States Code, for the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence with respect to fiscal year
2005 or 2006.
SEC. 410. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORY OF SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS.
Not later than January 15, 2007, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence
committees (as defined in section 3(7) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(7))) a classified report
providing a comprehensive inventory of all special access
programs under the National Intelligence Program (as defined
in section 3(6) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a(6))).
SEC. 411. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY
CLEARANCES.
It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National
Intelligence should promptly establish and oversee the
implementation of a multi-level security clearance system
across the intelligence community to leverage the cultural
and linguistic skills of subject matter experts and
individuals proficient in foreign languages critical to
national security.
SEC. 412. ACCESS TO INFORMATION BY STAFF AND MEMBERS OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall provide
to the members and staff of the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate accounts for and
access to the Intelink System (or any successor system)
through the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications
System (or any successor system). Such access shall include
access up to and including the level of sensitive
compartmented information and shall be provided in the
sensitive compartmented information facilities of each
Committee.
SEC. 413. STUDY ON REVOKING PENSIONS OF PERSONS WHO COMMIT
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION.
(a) Study.--The Director of National Intelligence shall
conduct a study on the feasibility of revoking the pensions
of personnel in the intelligence community (as defined in
section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
401a(4))) who commit unauthorized disclosures of classified
information, including whether revoking such pensions is
feasible under existing law or under the administrative
authority of the Director of National Intelligence or any
other head of an element of the intelligence community.
(b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence
shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report containing
the results of the study conducted under subsection (a).
Subtitle B--Central Intelligence Agency
SEC. 421. ENHANCED PROTECTION OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS FROM
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE.
(a) Responsibility of Director of Central Intelligence
Agency Under National Security Act of 1947.--Subsection (d)
of section 104A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-4a) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (3), by striking ``and'' at the end;
(2) by redesignating paragraph (4) as paragraph (5); and
(3) by inserting after paragraph (3) the following new
paragraph:
``(4) protect intelligence sources and methods of the
Central Intelligence Agency from unauthorized disclosure,
consistent with any direction issued by the President or the
Director of National Intelligence; and''.
(b) Protection Under Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949.--Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403g) is amended by striking ``section
102A(i)'' and all that follows through ``unauthorized
disclosure'' and inserting ``sections 102A(i) and 104A(d)(4)
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(i),
403-4a(d)(4))''.
(c) Construction With Exemption From Requirement for
Disclosure of Information to Public.--Section 104A(d)(4) of
the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by subsection
(a), and section 6 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949, as amended by subsection (b), shall be treated as
statutes that specifically exempt from disclosure the matters
specified in such sections for purposes of section 552(b)(3)
of title 5, United States Code.
(d) Technical Amendments to Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement Act.--Section 201(c) of the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement Act (50 U.S.C. 2011(c)) is amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``of DCI'';
(2) by striking ``section 102A(i)'' and inserting
``sections 102A(i) and 104A(d)(4)'';
(3) by striking ``of National Intelligence''; and
(4) by inserting ``of the Central Intelligence Agency''
after ``methods''.
SEC. 422. ADDITIONAL EXCEPTION TO FOREIGN LANGUAGE
PROFICIENCY REQUIREMENT FOR CERTAIN SENIOR
LEVEL POSITIONS IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY.
(a) Additional Exception.--Subsection (g) of section 104A
of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a) is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``paragraph (2)'' and
inserting ``paragraphs (2) and (3)'';
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``position or category of
positions'' each place it appears and inserting ``individual,
individuals, position, or category of positions''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any individual in
the Directorate of Intelligence or the Directorate of
Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency who is serving
in a Senior Intelligence Service position as of December 23,
2005, regardless of whether such individual is a member of
the Senior Intelligence Service.''.
(b) Report on Waivers.--Section 611(c) of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-487;
118 Stat. 3955) is amended--
(1) in the first sentence, by inserting ``individuals or''
before ``positions''; and
(2) in the second sentence, by striking ``position or
category of positions'' and inserting ``individual,
individuals, position, or category of positions''.
SEC. 423. ADDITIONAL FUNCTIONS AND AUTHORITIES FOR PROTECTIVE
PERSONNEL OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY.
(a) Protection of Certain Persons.--Section 5(a)(4) of the
Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
403f(a)(4)) is amended--
(1) by striking ``and the protection'' and inserting ``the
protection''; and
(2) by striking the semicolon and inserting ``, and the
protection of the Director of National Intelligence and such
personnel of the Office of
[[Page H1799]]
the Director of National Intelligence as the Director of
National Intelligence may designate;''.
(b) Authority to Arrest.--
(1) Chapter 203 of title 18, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end the following:
``Sec. 3065. Powers of authorized personnel in the Central
Intelligence Agency
``(a) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency may
issue regulations to allow personnel designated to carry out
protective functions for the Central Intelligence Agency
under section 5(a)(4) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act
of 1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f) to, while engaged in such protective
functions, make arrests without a warrant for any offense
against the United States committed in the presence of such
personnel, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the
United States, if such personnel have probable cause to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is
committing that felony offense.
``(b) The powers granted under subsection (a) may be
exercised only in accordance with guidelines approved by the
Attorney General.''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 203
of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
end the following:
``3065. Powers of authorized personnel in the Central Intelligence
Agency.''.
SEC. 424. PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR FORMER OFFICIALS OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
(a) In General.--Title III of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 409a et seq.) is amended by inserting after
section 303 the following new section:
``Protective services for former officials of the intelligence
community
``Sec. 304. (a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), the
head of an element of the intelligence community may not
provide personnel for the protection of a former official of
an element of the intelligence community unless--
``(1) there is a specific and credible threat to such
former official arising from the service of such former
official to the United States; and
``(2) such head of an element of the intelligence community
submits to the Director of National Intelligence notice of
the intention to provide such personnel and an assessment
of--
``(A) the threat to such former official; and
``(B) the level of protective services necessary to protect
such former official based on such threat.
``(b) Exception for Recent Termination of Employment.--The
head of an element of the intelligence community may provide
personnel for the protection of a former official of an
element of the intelligence community without a specific and
credible threat to such former official for not more than one
year after the termination of the employment of such former
official if such former official requests such protection.
``(c) Threat Assessment Updates.--Not later than 180 days
after the date on which the head of an element of the
intelligence community begins providing personnel for the
protection of a former official of an element of the
intelligence community, and at least every 180 days
thereafter until such head of an element of the intelligence
community determines that there is no longer a threat to such
former official, such head of an element of the intelligence
community shall submit to the Director of National
Intelligence an updated assessment of the threat to such
former official and the level of protective services
necessary to protect such former official based on such
threat.
``(d) Termination of Protective Services.--If the head of
an element of the intelligence community that is providing
personnel for the protection of a former official of an
element of the intelligence community pursuant to subsection
(a) determines that there is no longer a threat to such
former official, such head of an element of the intelligence
community shall cease providing personnel for the protection
of such former official not later than 30 days after
determining such threat no longer exists.
``(e) Report.--Not later than 7 days after the date on
which the head of an element of the intelligence community
begins providing personnel for the protection of a former
official of an element of the intelligence community, the
Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
congressional intelligence committees notice of the provision
of personnel for the protection of such former official.''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of such Act
is amended by--
(1) striking the second item relating to section 301;
(2) striking the second item relating to section 302;
(3) striking the items relating to sections 304, 305, and
306; and
(4) inserting after the item relating to section 303 the
following new item:
``Sec. 304. Protective services for former officials of the
intelligence community.''.
SEC. 425. STRATEGIC REVIEW PROCESS.
Section 102A(f) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-1(f)) is amended by adding at the end the
following new paragraph:
``(9) Not later than September 30, 2007, and every four
years thereafter, the Director of National Intelligence
shall, in consultation with the heads of the elements of the
intelligence community, manage and oversee the conduct of a
strategic review of the intelligence community to develop
intelligence capabilities required to address threats to
national security. Such review shall analyze near-term, mid-
term, and future threats to national security and shall
include estimates of the allocation of resources and
structural change that should be reflected in future budget
requests.''.
Subtitle C--Defense Intelligence Components
SEC. 431. ENHANCEMENTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY TRAINING
PROGRAM.
(a) Termination of Employees.--Subsection (d)(1)(C) of
section 16 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (50
U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by striking ``terminated either
by'' and all that follows and inserting ``terminated--
``(i) by the Agency due to misconduct by the employee;
``(ii) by the employee voluntarily; or
``(iii) by the Agency for the failure of the employee to
maintain such level of academic standing in the educational
course of training as the Director of the National Security
Agency shall have specified in the agreement of the employee
under this subsection; and''.
(b) Authority to Withhold Disclosure of Affiliation With
NSA.--Subsection (e) of such section is amended by striking
``(1) When an employee'' and all that follows through ``(2)
Agency efforts'' and inserting ``Agency efforts''.
SEC. 432. CODIFICATION OF AUTHORITIES OF NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY PROTECTIVE PERSONNEL.
(a) Protection of Certain Persons.--The National Security
Agency Act of 1959 (50 U.S.C. 402 note) is amended by adding
at the end the following new section:
``Sec. 20. (a) The Director is authorized to designate
personnel of the Agency to perform protective functions for
the Director and for any personnel of the Agency designated
by the Director.
``(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to impair
or otherwise affect any authority under any other provision
of law relating to the performance of protective
functions.''.
(b) Authority to Arrest.--
(1) Chapter 203 of title 18, United States Code, as amended
by section 423 of this Act, is amended by adding at the end
the following:
``Sec. 3066. Powers of authorized personnel in the National
Security Agency
``(a) The Director of the National Security Agency may
issue regulations to allow personnel designated to carry out
protective functions for the Agency to--
``(1) carry firearms; and
``(2) make arrests without warrant for any offense against
the United States committed in the presence of such
personnel, or for any felony cognizable under the laws of the
United States, if such personnel have probable cause to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is
committing that felony offense.
``(b) The powers granted under subsection (a) may be
exercised only in accordance with guidelines approved by the
Attorney General.''.
(2) Clerical amendment.--The table of sections at the
beginning of chapter 203 of title 18, United States Code, as
amended by section 423 of this Act, is amended by adding at
the end the following:
``3066. Powers of authorized personnel in the National Security
Agency.''.
Subtitle D--Other Elements
SEC. 441. CLARIFICATION OF INCLUSION OF COAST GUARD AND DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION ELEMENTS IN THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
Section 3(4) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a(4)) is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (H)--
(A) by inserting ``the Coast Guard,'' after ``the Marine
Corps,''; and
(B) by inserting ``the Drug Enforcement Administration,''
after ``the Federal Bureau of Investigation,''; and
(2) in subparagraph (K), by striking ``, including the
Office of Intelligence of the Coast Guard''.
SEC. 442. CLARIFYING AMENDMENTS RELATING TO SECTION 105 OF
THE INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL
YEAR 2004.
Section 105(b) of the Intelligence Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2004 (Public Law 108-177; 117 Stat. 2603; 31
U.S.C. 311 note) is amended--
(1) by striking ``Director of Central Intelligence'' and
inserting ``Director of National Intelligence''; and
(2) by inserting ``or in section 313 of such title,'' after
``subsection (a)),''.
TITLE V--OTHER MATTERS
SEC. 501. AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE PLATFORMS.
(a) Limitation on Termination of U-2 Aircraft Program.--The
Secretary of Defense may not begin the process to terminate
the U-2 aircraft program until the Secretary certifies in
accordance with subsection (b) that there would be no loss of
national or Department of Defense intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in transitioning from
the U-2 aircraft program to the Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned
aerial vehicle platform.
(b) Report and Certification.--
(1) Study.--The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a study
of aerial reconnaissance platforms to determine whether the
Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial vehicle has reached mission
capability and has attained collection capabilities on a par
with the collection capabilities of the U-2 Block 20 aircraft
program as of April 1, 2006.
(2) Report.--The Secretary shall submit to the
congressional committees specified in subsection (c) a report
containing the results of the study. The Secretary shall
include in the report the Secretary's determination as to
whether the Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial vehicle--
(A) has reached mission capability; and
(B) has attained collection capabilities on a par with the
collection capabilities of the U-2 Block 20 aircraft program
as of April 1, 2006.
(3) Certification.--The Secretary shall include with the
report the Secretary's certification, based on the results of
the study, as to whether or not there would be a loss of
national or Department of Defense intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance capabilities with a transition from the U-
2 aircraft program to the
[[Page H1800]]
Global Hawk RQ-4 unmanned aerial vehicle platform.
(c) Specified Committees.--The congressional committees
specified in this subsection are the following:
(1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives.
SEC. 502. ELIMINATION OF CERTAIN REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.
(a) Intelligence Sharing With UN.--Section 112 of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404g) is amended by
striking subsection (b).
(b) Improvement of Financial Statements for Auditing
Purposes.--The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401
et seq.) is amended--
(1) by striking section 114A; and
(2) in the table of contents in the first section, by
striking the item relating to section 114A.
(c) Financial Intelligence on Terrorist Assets.--The
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.) is
amended--
(1) by striking section 118; and
(2) in the table of contents in the first section, by
striking the item relating to section 118.
(d) Counterdrug Intelligence.--The Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-306)
is amended--
(1) by striking section 826; and
(2) in the table of contents in section 1(b), by striking
the item relating to section 826.
SEC. 503. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
OF 1947.
The National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401 et seq.)
is amended as follows:
(1) In section 102A (50 U.S.C. 403-1)--
(A) in subsection (c)(7)(A), by striking ``section'' and
inserting ``subsection'';
(B) in subsection (d)--
(i) in paragraph (3), by striking ``subparagraph (A)'' in
the matter preceding subparagraph (A) and inserting
``paragraph (1)(A)''; and
(ii) in paragraph (5)(A), by striking ``or personnel'' in
the matter preceding clause (i); and
(C) in subsection (l)(2)(B), by striking ``section'' and
inserting ``paragraph''.
(2) In section 119(c)(2)(B) (50 U.S.C. 404o(c)(2)(B)), by
striking ``subsection (h)'' and inserting ``subsection (i)''.
SEC. 504. TECHNICAL CLARIFICATION OF CERTAIN REFERENCES TO
JOINT MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES.
Section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 403-1) is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)(3)(A), by striking ``annual budgets
for the Joint Military Intelligence Program and for Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities'' and inserting ``annual
budget for the Military Intelligence Program or any successor
program or programs''; and
(2) in subsection (d)(1)(B), by striking ``Joint Military
Intelligence Program'' and inserting ``Military Intelligence
Program or any successor program or programs''.
SEC. 505. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE INTELLIGENCE REFORM AND
TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004.
(a) Amendments to National Security Intelligence Reform Act
of 2004.--The National Security Intelligence Reform Act of
2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458) is amended as follows:
(1) In section 1016(e)(10)(B) (6 U.S.C. 458(e)(10)(B)), by
striking ``Attorney General'' the second place it appears and
inserting ``Department of Justice''.
(2) In section 1061 (5 U.S.C. 601 note)--
(A) in subsection (d)(4)(A), by striking ``National
Intelligence Director'' and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence''; and
(B) in subsection (h), by striking ``National Intelligence
Director'' and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence''.
(3) In section 1071(e), by striking ``(1)''.
(4) In section 1072(b), by inserting ``Agency'' after
``Intelligence''.
(b) Other Amendments to Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004.--The Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458) is
amended as follows:
(1) In section 2001 (28 U.S.C. 532 note)--
(A) in subsection (c)(1), by inserting ``of'' before ``an
institutional culture'';
(B) in subsection (e)(2), by striking ``the National
Intelligence Director in a manner consistent with section
112(e)'' and inserting ``the Director of National
Intelligence in a manner consistent with applicable law'';
and
(C) in subsection (f), by striking ``shall,'' in the matter
preceding paragraph (1) and inserting ``shall''.
(2) In section 2006 (28 U.S.C. 509 note)--
(A) in paragraph (2), by striking ``the Federal'' and
inserting ``Federal''; and
(B) in paragraph (3), by striking ``the specific'' and
inserting ``specific''.
SEC. 506. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY ACT OF 1949.
Section 5(a)(1) of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949 (50 U.S.C. 403f(a)(1)) is amended by striking
``authorized under paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 102(a),
subsections (c)(7) and (d) of section 103, subsections (a)
and (g) of section 104, and section 303 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403(a)(2), (3), 403-3(c)(7),
(d), 403-4(a), (g), and 405)'' and inserting ``authorized
under subsections (c), (d), (e), and (f) of section 104A of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a)''.
SEC. 507. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS RELATING TO THE MULTIYEAR
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.
(a) In General.--Subsection (a) of section 1403 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991 (50
U.S.C. 404b) is amended--
(1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Foreign''; and
(2) by striking ``foreign'' each place it appears.
(b) Responsibility of DNI.--That section is further
amended--
(1) in subsections (a) and (c), by striking ``Director of
Central Intelligence'' and inserting ``Director of National
Intelligence''; and
(2) in subsection (b), by inserting ``of National
Intelligence'' after ``Director''.
(c) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of that section is
amended to read as follows:
``SEC. 1403. MULTIYEAR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM.''.
SEC. 508. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO THE EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE.
(a) Executive Schedule Level II.--Section 5313 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating
to the Director of Central Intelligence and inserting the
following new item:
``Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.''.
(b) Executive Schedule Level IV.--Section 5315 of title 5,
United States Code, is amended by striking the item relating
to the General Counsel of the Office of the National
Intelligence Director and inserting the following new item:
``General Counsel of the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.''.
Sec. 509. Technical amendments relating to redesignation of
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency as the national
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
(a) Title 5, United States Code.--(1) Title 5, United
States Code, is amended by striking ``National Imagery and
Mapping Agency'' each place it appears in a provision as
follows and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency'':
(A) Section 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii).
(B) Section 3132(a)(1)(B).
(C) Section 4301(1) (in clause (ii)).
(D) Section 4701(a)(1)(B).
(E) Section 5102(a)(1) (in clause (x)).
(F) Section 5342(a)(1) (in clause (K)).
(G) Section 6339(a)(1)(E).
(H) Section 7323(b)(2)(B)(i)(XIII).
(2) Section 6339(a)(2)(E) of such title is amended by
striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency, the Director
of the National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and inserting
``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the Director of
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
(b) Title 44, United States Code.--(1)(A) Section 1336 of
title 44, United States Code, is amended by striking
``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' both places it
appears and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency''.
(B) The heading of such section is amended to read as
follows:
``Sec. 1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special
publications''.
(2) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 13 of
such title is amended by striking the item relating to
section 1336 and inserting the following new item:
``1336. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency: special
publications.''.
(c) Homeland Security Act of 2002.--Section 201(f)(2)(E) of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 121(f)(2)(E)) is
amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency''
and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
(d) Inspector General Act of 1978.--Section 8H of the
Inspector General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is amended by
striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' each place
it appears and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency''.
(e) Ethics in Government Act of 1978.--Section 105(a)(1) of
the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App.) is
amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency''
and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
(f) Other Acts.--(1) Section 7(b)(2)(A)(i) of the Employee
Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (29 U.S.C. 2006(b)(2)(A)(i))
is amended by striking ``National Imagery and Mapping
Agency'' and inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency''.
(2) Section 207(a)(2)(B) of the Legislative Branch
Appropriations Act, 1993 (44 U.S.C. 501 note) is amended by
striking ``National Imagery and Mapping Agency'' and
inserting ``National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency''.
The CHAIRMAN. No amendment to the committee amendment is in order
except those printed in House Report 109-438. Each amendment may be
offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated
in the report, shall be considered read, shall be debatable for the
time specified in the report, equally divided and controlled by the
proponent and an opponent, shall not be subject to amendment, and shall
not be subject to a demand for division of the question.
Amendment No. 1 Offered by Mr. Hoekstra
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 1 printed in House Report 109-438 offered by
Mr. Hoekstra:
In section 421, strike subsection (c) (page 29, lines 15
through 23).
Page 29, line 24, redesignate subsection (d) as subsection
(c).
[[Page H1801]]
Amend paragraph (1) of section 441 (page 39, line 8) to
read as follows:
(1) in subparagraph (H), by inserting ``the Coast Guard''
after ``the Marine Corps'';
Page 39, line 15, strike the final period and insert a
semicolon.
Page 39, after line 15, insert the following new
paragraphs:
(3) by redesignating subparagraph (L) as subparagraph (M);
and
(4) by inserting after subparagraph (K) the following new
subparagraph:
``(L) The Office of National Security Intelligence of the
Drug Enforcement Administration.''.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 774, the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself as much time as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, this is the manager's amendment to the bill. It
contains two provisions. The first strikes the provision of the
committee's amendment relating to the Freedom of Information Act at the
request of the Committee on Government Reform. The second specifically
clarifies that the new membership of the Drug Enforcement
Administration in the intelligence community is limited to the DEA's
Office of National Security Intelligence. This clarification was
requested by the Department of Justice and the DEA. I do not believe
that either of these changes are controversial. I urge Members to
support the amendment.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I will support this amendment, but I rise
to note that the chairman has agreed to modify a provision, and I
appreciate the modification that he has made, and that relates to the
CIA Director's responsibility under the Freedom of Information Act. The
minority felt that the provisions were restricting FOIA requests, and
the majority agreed to accommodate us and struck the language, and I
would like our colleagues to know that that accommodation has been
made. It makes the manager's amendment a better amendment, and I
support the manager's amendment.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. If the gentlewoman has no additional speakers, I will
yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. All time for debate has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from
Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 2 Offered by Mr. Fossella
Mr. FOSSELLA. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 2 printed in House Report 109-438 offered by
Mr. Fossella:
At the end of the bill, add the following (and conform the
table of contents accordingly):
TITLE VI--COMMUNICATION OF INFORMATION CONCERNING TERRORIST THREATS
SEC. 601. IDENTIFICATION OF BEST PRATICES.
(a) Study.--The Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Director of National Intelligence shall conduct jointly, or
contract with an entity to conduct, a study of the operations
of Federal, State, and local government entities to identify
best practices for the communication of information
concerning a terrorist threat.
(b) Contents.--
(1) Identification of best practices.--The study conducted
under this section shall be focused on an analysis and
identification of the best practices of the information
sharing processes of the following government entities:
(A) Joint Terrorism Task Forces, which are operated by the
Federal Bureau of Investigations with the participation of
local law enforcement agencies.
(B) State Homeland Security Fusion Centers, which are
established by a State and share information with Federal
departments.
(C) The Homeland Security Operations Center, which is
operated by the Department of Homeland Security for the
purposes of coordinating information.
(D) State and local law enforcement agencies that collect,
utilize, and disseminate information on potential terrorist
attacks.
(E) The appropriate elements of the intelligence community,
as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 401a), involved in the sharing of counter-
terrorism information.
(2) Coordination of government entities.--The study
conducted under this section shall include an examination of
methods for coordinating the activities of Federal, State,
and local entities in responding to a terrorist threat, and
specifically the communication to the general public of
information concerning the threat. The study shall not
include an examination of the sources and methods used in the
collection of the information.
(c) Obtaining Official Data.--In conducting the study, the
Secretary, in conjunction with the Director, with due regard
for the protection of classified information, may secure
directly from any department or agency of the United States
information necessary to enable the Secretary to carry out
this section. Classified information shall be handled through
established methods for controlling such information.
(d) Temporary Duty of Federal Personnel.--The Secretary, in
conjunction with the Director, may request the head of any
department or agency of the United States to detail to
temporary duty personnel within the administrative
jurisdiction of the head of the department or agency that the
Secretary may need to carry out this section, each detail to
be without loss of seniority, pay, or other employee status.
(e) Report.--
(1) In general.--Not later than 6 months after the date of
enactment of this Act, the Secretary, in conjunction with the
Director, shall submit to Congress a report that contains--
(A) a detailed statement of the findings and conclusions of
the study, including identification of the best practices for
the processing, analysis, and dissemination of information
between the government entities referred to in subsection
(b)(1); and
(B) recommendations for a formalized process of
consultation, communication, and confidentiality between
Federal, State, and local governments, incorporating the best
practices of the various entities studied, to facilitate
communication and help prevent the unauthorized dissemination
of information and criticism of decisions concerning
terrorist threats.
(2) Classified information.--To the extent determined
appropriate by the Secretary, in conjunction with the
Director, the Secretary may submit a portion of the report in
classified form.
(f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated to carry out this section $5,000,000 for
fiscal year 2007.
SEC. 602. CENTERS OF BEST PRACTICES.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence,
shall make grants for the establishment and operation of 3
centers to implement the best practices, identified by the
study conducted under section 601, for the processing,
analysis, and dissemination of information concerning a
terrorist threat (in this section, each referred to as a
``Center'').
(b) Location of Centers.--In carrying out subsection (a),
the Secretary, in consultation with the Director, shall make
grants to--
(1) the State of New York for the establishment of a Center
to be located in New York City;
(2) the State of Michigan for the establishment of a Center
to be located in Detroit; and
(3) the State of California for the establishment of a
Center to be located in Los Angeles.
(c) Purpose of Centers.--Each Center shall--
(1) implement the best practices, identified by the study
conducted under section 601, for information sharing
concerning a terrorist threat;
(2) coordinate the communication of these best practices
with other metropolitan areas;
(3) coordinate with the Secretary and the Director to
develop a training curriculum to implement these best
practices;
(4) provide funding and technical assistance to other
metropolitan areas to assist the metropolitan areas in the
implementation of the curriculum developed under paragraph
(3); and
(5) coordinate with the Secretary and the Director to
establish a method to advertise and disseminate these best
practices.
(d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized
to be appropriated for making grants under this section--
(1) $10,000,000 for fiscal year 2007 for the establishment
of the Centers; and
(2) $3,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2008 through 2012
for the operation of the Centers.
(e) Report to Congress.--Not later than March 31, 2010, the
Secretary, in consultation with the Director, shall submit to
Congress a report evaluating the operations of the Centers
and making recommendations for future funding.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 774, the gentleman from
New York (Mr. Fossella) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York.
Mr. FOSSELLA. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
consume.
First, let me thank the chairman and the ranking member for allowing
me to bring this amendment forward in the Rules Committee.
One of the essential elements of government responsibility is to
communicate effectively to the American people, especially in time of a
potential terrorist attack or a natural disaster.
[[Page H1802]]
On October 6 of 2005, New York City was made aware of several reports
that terrorists were planning a large-scale attack on the subway
systems. That evening, as New Yorkers watched the news, they had to
struggle with two conflicting messages about the day's events. City
officials, led by the mayor and the police commissioner, announced that
a credible threat was aimed at New York City subway system, and stated
that the threat was specific enough to warrant an immediate and
overwhelming response.
However, the news also reported that officials in Washington were
down
playing the severity of the threat. A spokesman for the Department of
Homeland Security described it as ``specific, yet noncredible.'' Other
antiterrorism officials stated that the information gathered about the
plot was not verifiable.
New York officials first learned of the threat earlier in the week.
The information gained from a reliable informant indicated that the
people in Iraq were plotting with people in the United States to hide
bombs in baby strollers, briefcases and packages and set them off in
the city's subways.
But the Department of Homeland Security had a different take. They
released to law enforcement agencies an unclassified bulletin on the
threat to the subway system, indicating that the FBI and Department of
Homeland Security had doubts about the credibility of that threat. Yet
the document also stated that a team of operatives, ``some of whom may
travel to or who may be in the New York City area,'' might attempt an
attack on or about October 9, 3 days after this warning. It also said
that the terrorists might use remote-controlled or timed explosives
hidden inside or underneath baby carriages and briefcases or suitcases.
Vetting and verifying information is one thing. Having our government
sending out conflicting messages to the American people when conflict
can be avoided is another.
I have always and will continue to be supportive of all efforts by
antiterrorism forces at the Federal, State and local levels, but it
pained me, and I am sure many others, to watch the confusion that
unfolded that October.
The trend continued weeks later in Maryland. Officials responded to a
bomb threat in the I-95 tunnel under Baltimore Harbor, which the
closing of resulted in stopping of thousands of cars for hours along a
major transportation corridor. However, Baltimore's mayor and police
commissioner said they learned of the tunnel closure and the bomb
threat from the news media. This is not the way the system should work.
Bear in mind, since 9/11, law enforcement at all levels has responded
to a variety of threats every day such as a misplaced bag, a suspicious
package or unknown substance. In general, these agencies and the men
and women who work for these agencies are dedicated, responsible,
diligent, and respond very well to these potentially dangerous
situations.
But what clearly needs to be done and to be improved is how different
levels of government interact with each other when these threats are
elevated. We need to get everyone on the same page and, when a credible
threat occurs, inform the public in a coordinated way. In short, what
is needed is a 911 call center for first responders. To achieve that,
my amendment works in the following ways:
It authorizes a study to be conducted by the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Director of National Intelligence to identify the
problems and the success of terrorist threat information sharing
between the Federal, State and local levels of government.
Number 2, in addition to identifying the best practices, it will
recommend a formalized process between the Federal, State and local
levels of government for communicating threats to the public in a
coordinated way.
Once complete, the study will be made available to all Federal, State
and local government entities involved in terrorist intelligence
gathering.
Finally, based on the results of the study, three centers of best
practices will be created; staffs of the centers tasked with developing
techniques to teach State and local governments how to improve their
information sharing and planning techniques in conjunction with the
Federal Government.
The center's staff will ensure the results of the study are
incorporated in the daily workings of homeland security preparedness
and responsive activities through all levels of government.
And finally, let me just say it is a fact that not every city can
dedicate resources to terrorism. On the one hand, we have New York City
where more than 1,000, about 1 in every 40, police officers in New York
City are dedicated to antiterrorism duties. The reality is New York
City faces a threat every single day. New York can be Exhibit A. But
for other municipalities developing advanced techniques on fighting the
war on terrorism, it is not so important. They don't have the
resources, the manpower to dedicate. This amendment is not limited to
just New York. The other centers of best practices, a suggestion would
be in Detroit and Los Angeles, and can disseminate and share their
techniques with other cities, whether it be Topeka or Peoria.
The sad fact is that the same terrorist scenarios, if they occurred
in five different States, there could be five different sets of
responses to the American people. We need, at a minimum, a level of
coordination on communicating threats to the public. This amendment, I
believe, will achieve that goal. The American people deserve it.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I move to strike the last word, and rise in
support of the Fossella amendment. I think it is an excellent
amendment, and I think the explanation by Mr. Fossella was excellent.
We had meltdowns, as he well describes, both in New York and
Baltimore recently. I think local officials acted responsibly. The
information they had showed direct threats to their municipalities, so
they had no choice.
We can improve this. We not only need to share information better
horizontally, a point we have been making in this committee and one of
the reasons we set up the Director of National Intelligence, but we
need to share it better vertically. Some of the best ideas are in our
hometowns, and some of the best people trying to keep us safe are in
our hometowns. I think the Fossella amendment will help us, through the
establishment of centers of excellence, develop best practices to share
information horizontally and vertically and get best information to
those in our hometowns who are trying to protect us.
This is a great idea. I am kind of embarrassed we didn't have it in
the base bill. It shows that when this House works together, we bring
good information to the floor, and we improve legislation. I only wish
that we had been able to bring some other good amendments to the floor
to improve this legislation. I say to Mr. Fossella, I strongly support
you.
Mr. FOSSELLA. Would the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. HARMAN. Yes, I would be happy to yield to the gentleman.
Mr. FOSSELLA. I would just like to thank the gentlewoman for her
efforts and that of your staff, especially Chairman Hoekstra, that of
Chairman Peter King and his staff and Rob O'Connor. But I thank the
gentlewoman for her comments and strong support.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Will the gentlewoman yield?
Ms. HARMAN. I would be happy to yield to the gentleman.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. I would like to thank the gentlewoman for her comments.
I don't have time on this amendment. I also would like to indicate our
side's support of this amendment. And this is something that you and I
have talked about before. And again, we have gone through this the way
it should be gone through. Appreciate your help.
Ms. HARMAN. Well, I agree. And just reclaiming my time, this is how
this House should be working. This is bipartisan collaboration at work.
It is going to make our cities safer, and it is going to send a message
to the American people of one team, one fight, which is the message
they want to hear.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. All time for debate has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New
York (Mr. Fossella).
The amendment was agreed to.
[[Page H1803]]
Amendment No. 3 Offered by Ms. Lee
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 3 printed in House Report 109-438 offered by
Ms. Lee:
At the end of the bill, add the following new section:
SEC. 510. REPORT ON AUTHORIZATION TO OVERTHROW DEMOCRATICALLY
ELECTED GOVERNMENTS.
Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, the President shall submit to the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report
describing any authorization granted during the 10-year
period ending on the date of the enactment of this Act to
engage in intelligence activities related to the overthrow of
a democratically elected government.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 774, the gentlewoman from
California (Ms. Lee) and a Member opposed each will control 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentlewoman from California.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Let me first thank our ranking member of the committee, my colleague
and friend from California, Congresswoman Jane Harman, for her support
of this amendment and for her leadership.
Mr. Chairman, this amendment is very simple and noncontroversial. It
merely requires the President to submit a report to the House and
Senate Intelligence Committees describing any authorization granted
over the last 10 years to engage in intelligence activities related to
the overthrow of a democratically elected government.
Mr. Chairman, we all know that democracy promotion is at the top of
this administration's agenda, and I believe that there is no question
that supporting democracy should be a nonpartisan issue that we all
agree on because it is at the core of our Nation's values. It is, quite
simply, fundamental to who we are as a people and what we stand for as
a Nation. That is why we must support democratic movements as they take
place across the world. Nothing less than our values are on the line if
we don't. That is why we must be vigilant and safeguard against any
actions that would undermine or threaten our ability to support
democratic efforts.
It is clear that actions that undermine democracies also undermine
our credibility in the world and, therefore, our ability to be viewed
as a serious and legitimate agent of democracy. So if promoting
democracy is to remain a critical pillar of our foreign policy, we must
ensure that our ability to be this voice for people's movements
throughout the world is not damaged by contrary actions. Who will
believe us if our actions are inconsistent with our words? How
successful will we be in achieving our goals?
So today I offer this amendment to support and protect our efforts
toward promoting democracy and to help ensure that our actions are
consistent with our values. Toward that end this amendment will help
Members of this body stay well informed about our Nation's actions
related to these types of overt or covert intelligence activities which
is especially critical at this moment. This amendment will help
increase transparency in the process by requiring a report that is
organized and comprehensive over the past 10 years. It will also help
provide this information in an organized fashion so Members do not need
to sort through voluminous records or seek information on a country-by-
country basis.
It is also critical to point out that that amendment in no way
compromises the confidential and sensitive nature of the information as
it requires the report to be delivered to the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees and for Members to review it in a confidential
and secure setting.
So, Mr. Chairman, I want to conclude by thanking again our ranking
member for her support, and want to strongly urge all my colleagues
here to stand up for democracy and to stand up for transparency by
supporting this amendment.
I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I would like to claim the time in
opposition to the amendment.
I will not oppose the amendment, but I do want to just have a couple
of clarifying comments. We should not presume and we are not presuming
by accepting the amendment that any such authorization to overthrow
democratically elected governments has ever happened or been
authorized.
{time} 1615
But we think it would be helpful to have this 10-year history to
clarify that. The reporting requirements are very much appropriate. So
with that clarification, we are inclined to accept the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the chairman for his support
and want to make sure that it is on the record that we have talked and
agreed with regard to the intent of this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from California
(Ms. Harman), ranking member of the committee.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentlewoman for yielding to me.
I commend her for her courageous voice in Congress, she knows I do, on
many important issues.
I also want to commend our chairman for saying that he will accept
this amendment. He should know, and the gentlewoman surely does know,
that we have worked together over the years to describe this issue in a
manner acceptable to many in the committee. She and I have had
conversations on the floor in past years about this issue. This year
she is offering her concerns in the form of legislation, and I think
this legislation is really very good. I think the goals of
democratization and transparency are both good goals. Our President
says he supports democratization. It surely is one of our major foreign
policy goals.
I am for, and I mince no words about this, the robust use of
intelligence to find out the plans and intentions of people who are
plotting to do us harm. I do not think this amendment in any way
compromises that, and I think the fact that the report is to be
prepared and will be delivered to our committee in a classified form
makes absolutely certain that we are not advertising to our enemies how
we deploy our resources.
So, again, I want to commend the gentlewoman for offering this
amendment and offer my strong support for it.
Ms. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.
I want to thank the gentlewoman for her leadership and for her
support. And, yes, we have talked over the years about this and wanted
to come to some bipartisan agreement and solution. So I think this is a
very modest yet very important amendment, and I want to thank again our
chairman and ranking member for their support.
Let me also thank our staffs on both sides of the aisle. Especially I
want to thank my chief of staff, Julie Nixon, for her support and
leadership, and both the minority and majority staff for, again,
helping us to figure out the appropriate language to accomplish the
goals that we want to accomplish. I thank them for their support.
Ms. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the Lee amendment, which
would require the President to submit to Congress a report describing
any authorization in the past 10 years to engage in intelligence
activities related to the overthrow of a democratically-elected
government.
In February of 2004, our government was a party to a coup d'etat that
overthrew President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the democratically-elected
President of Haiti. Former soldiers and other heavily-armed thugs took
over several Haitian cities and then marched into Haiti's capital,
while opposition groups representing Haiti's wealthy elites staged
confrontational demonstrations throughout the country. Early in the
morning on February 29, U.S. Marines and Embassy officials entered
President Aristide's home and told him to leave immediately or he and
thousands of other Haitians would be killed. President Aristide was
flown aboard a U.S. plane to the Central African Republic and left
there.
The Bush administration had been working with the wealthy Haitian
elites who hated President Aristide to force him to step down. The
International Republican Institute, which is affiliated with the
Republican Party, funneled U.S. taxpayer dollars to the Aristide-
haters; and Roger Noriega, President Bush's former Assistant Secretary
of State for Western
[[Page H1804]]
Hemisphere Affairs, conspired with sweatshop-owner Andre Apaid to
organize, train and finance the opposition.
Congress has a right to know why the Bush administration allowed a
small minority of wealthy elites and a group of heavily armed thugs to
overthrow a democratically-elected government. More importantly,
Congress has a right to know whether U.S. intelligence agencies and
operatives were directly involved in this coup d'etat.
I urge my colleagues to support the Lee amendment and demand that
Congress uncover the truth about the coup d'etat in Haiti.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentlewoman from California (Ms. Lee).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 4 Offered by Mr. Price of North Carolina
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 4 printed in House Report 109-438 offered by
Mr. Price of North Carolina:
At the end of title III, add the following new section:
SEC. 308. ACCOUNTABILITY IN INTELLIGENCE CONTRACTING.
(a) Report on Regulations Governing Intelligence Community
Contracting.--
(1) Report requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report on
regulations governing covered contracts under the National
Intelligence Program and, at the discretion of the Director
of National Intelligence, the Military Intelligence Program.
(2) Matters covered.--
(A) The report required by paragraph (1) shall include a
description of any relevant regulations prescribed by the
Director of National Intelligence or by the heads of agencies
in the intelligence community, including those relating to
the following matters:
(i) Types of functions or activities that may be
appropriately carried out by contractors.
(ii) Minimum standards regarding the hiring, training,
security clearance, and assignment of contract personnel.
(iii) Procedures for conducting oversight of covered
contracts to ensure identification and prosecution of
criminal violations; financial waste, fraud, or abuse; or
other abuses committed by contractors or contract personnel.
(B) The report also shall include a description of progress
made by the Director of National Intelligence in
standardizing the regulations described in subparagraph (A)
across the different agencies of the National Intelligence
Program to the extent practicable.
(3) Form of report.--The report required by paragraph (1)
shall be in unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex if necessary.
(b) Accountability Requirements for Contracts Awarded by
Intelligence Community Agencies.--
(1) Information on intelligence activities to be
performed.--Each covered contract in an amount greater than
$1,000,000 shall require the contractor to provide to the
contracting officer for the contract, not later than 5 days
after award of the contract, the following information
regarding intelligence activities performed under the
contract:
(A) Number of persons to be used to perform such functions.
(B) A description of how such persons are trained to carry
out tasks specified under the contract relating to such
functions.
(C) A description of each category of activity relating to
such functions required by the contract.
(2) Updates.--The information provided under paragraph (1)
shall be updated during contract performance as necessary.
(3) Information on costs.--Each covered contract shall
include the following requirements:
(A) Upon award of the contract, the contractor shall
provide to the contracting officer cost estimates of salary,
benefits, insurance, materials, logistics, administrative
costs, and other costs of carrying out intelligence
activities under the contract.
(B) Before contract closeout (other than closeout of a
firm, fixed price contract), the contractor shall provide to
the contracting officer a report on the actual costs of
carrying out intelligence activities under the contract, in
the same categories as provided under subparagraph (A).
(c) Accountability Requirements for Contracting Agencies of
the Intelligence Community.--
(1) Report requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter,
the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence of
the Senate a report containing the information described in
paragraph (2) on contracting activities in the intelligence
community.
(2) Matters covered.--The report required by paragraph (1)
shall include the following information:
(A) A list of contracts awarded for intelligence activities
by each agency in the intelligence community during the one-
year period preceding the date of submission of the report.
(B) A description of the activities to be performed by
contractors in fulfillment of each contract on the list under
subparagraph (A), including whether such activities are
classified or unclassified.
(C) The number of personnel carrying out work under each
such contract.
(D) The estimated cost of performance of the work required
by each such contract.
(d) Retention of Intelligence Community Professionals.--
(1) Report requirement.--Not later than 90 days after the
date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National
of Intelligence shall submit to the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives and
the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate a report
on hiring, promotion, and retention of intelligence community
professionals.
(2) Matters covered.-- The report required by paragraph (1)
shall include the following:
(A) Recommendations regarding any bonuses, benefits, or
other inducements that would help the intelligence community
to hire, promote, and retain its professional workforce in
order to compete effectively against the attraction of
private sector opportunities.
(B) Recommendations regarding any policy changes, including
changes to policies governing the awarding of security
clearances, that may promote hiring, promotion, and retention
of the intelligence community professional workforce.
(C) A description of any additional authority needed from
Congress to implement the recommendations under subparagraphs
(A) and (B).
(3) Form of report.--The report required by paragraph (1)
shall be in unclassified form, but may contain a classified
annex if necessary.
(e) Definitions.--In this section:
(1) Intelligence community.--The term ``intelligence
community'' has the meaning given the term in section 3(4) of
the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(4)).
(2) Covered contract.--The term ``covered contract''
means--
(A) a prime contract with any agency or office that is part
of the intelligence community;
(B) a subcontract at any tier under any prime contract with
an office or agency referred to in subparagraph (A); or
(C) a task order issued under a task or delivery order
contract entered into by an office or agency referred to in
subparagraph (A, if the work to be performed under the
contract, subcontract, or task order includes intelligence
activities to be performed either within or outside the
United States.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 774, the gentleman from
North Carolina (Mr. Price) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina.
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time
as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, since the 9/11 attacks, the budgets of U.S.
intelligence agencies and the scope of their operations have increased,
and they have increasingly turned to private sector contractors to help
do their work. Experts both within and outside the intelligence
community have warned that the expanded use of private contractors is
posing some major challenges. According to the Washington Post, the
Director of National Intelligence, Mr. Negroponte, has himself
expressed concern about this issue.
It is an important matter. About half of the intelligence community's
budget is reportedly now spent through contracts awarded to private
sector firms. So we are talking about several billion dollars in
contracts each year.
While the intelligence community has addressed some of the questions
about how private contractors are being used and how they should be
used, there needs to be a deeper examination and discussion of these
issues both in the community and in Congress. My amendment would
solicit information from the Director of National Intelligence and, I
hope, would spur such dialogue.
It would also ask the director to provide suggestions on how to help
him recruit and retain top-notch personnel, too many of whom we are now
losing to private sector opportunities. Over and over again, we see the
government invest thousands of dollars in training and obtaining top-
level security clearances for intelligence personnel, only to lose them
to lucrative jobs in the private sector. I know Representative
[[Page H1805]]
John Tierney and others have been interested in this issue, and I
appreciate their support for my amendment.
I have worked with the Intelligence Committee majority and minority
to draft this amendment in a way that will give Congress the
information it needs to conduct proper oversight without posing an
undue reporting burden on the intelligence community. I believe we have
achieved a good balance with my amendment, and, as I have indicated to
the chairman, I am happy to continue working with him and the ranking
member to further improve the language as the legislation moves
forward.
I urge my colleagues to support this amendment and help us shed some
light on an important and largely unnoticed shift in the way we gather
intelligence.
Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.
Mr. CRAMER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a point for the
benefit of the members of the committee. Mr. Thornberry and I have been
aggressively involved in standing up to DNI and we have been concerned,
the committee has been concerned, that we do not establish a new set of
regulations and reporting requirements for our intelligence agencies.
Would your amendment have that kind of impact? Could you explain that
to us?
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the question.
My amendment, in fact, does not establish new regulations for the
intelligence community nor does it prohibit contractors from carrying
out any type of work. It simply requires contractors and the
intelligence community to provide Congress with more information so we
can do our job effectively. It is not about more regulations. It is
about information, about what practices and policies are already in
effect.
As for the reporting requirements, this amendment would require
reports on private contracting. We have crafted the amendment to
minimize the additional burden on the agency. The vast majority of what
we are requesting is information that the agency either has or should
have already, but it is a matter of assembling that information and
making it available to the appropriate committees of the Congress.
Mr. CRAMER. If you would continue to yield, I think you clearly raise
issues that we need to continue to address, and this is information
that we should continue to have. I would support your amendment and
would urge my colleagues in the committee to do the same thing.
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for
his support, and I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I would like to claim time in opposition
to the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, again, I believe that with some of the
dialogue we have had before, we will not oppose the amendment, but I
just want to add some clarification.
I am very appreciative of the efforts of the gentleman from North
Carolina to work closely with the committee to perfect his original
amendment. The intent of this amendment, as I understand it, is to
improve contractor management, civilian retention, and to eliminate
fraud, waste, and abuse across the intelligence community. These are
the goals that the Intelligence Committee has embraced and we fully
support.
The amendment as written requires numerous duplicative and onerous
reports that will only increase costs in personnel overhead at the
intelligence community agencies, and particularly within the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence, an issue that the ranking member
and I and other members of the committee have been very, very concerned
about.
As Mr. Cramer has also identified, the Oversight Subcommittee has
been working in a way to try to reduce the number of reports. This
amendment, we believe, as an example, within 90 days of enactment of
the legislation, there would be a requirement for the delivery of a
report on hiring, promotion, and retention of all intelligence
community professionals. The text does not define intelligence
professional; so the amendment basically would ask for this report on
every career field within the intelligence community. This may simply
not be necessary. It would potentially be overly burdensome. Since it
also applies to parts of the Defense Department that are part of the
military intelligence program, our friends at the House Armed Services
Committee have expressed some concerns about this. But based on the
discussions that we had before the amendment came up indicating Mr.
Price's willingness to work with us on refining this amendment once we
are in conference, we are inclined to accept the amendment and to move
on.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. PRICE of North Carolina. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman and
once again assure him that we indeed do stand ready to work on refining
this language so we get the information we need in the Congress but
that we do not impose undue reporting requirements.
Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentlewoman from California
(Ms. Harman), ranking member.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
And I agree that there is more to explore about this subject in
conference. But outsourcing is a big deal, and it is probably a bigger
deal than any of us on the committee knows.
Oversight of the intelligence community in today's world means
oversight of contractors. We have outsourced more and more of the
community, and I think that more serious thought needs to go into the
impact of this.
The good thing about the Price amendment is that it does not mandate
any particular solution. It just requires the DNI to examine the
problem in a meaningful way. It essentially calls for an inventory of
contracts and of rules regarding what duties may be outsourced. And I
think giving us full information will allow better policy.
I applaud the gentleman for introducing this amendment and urge our
colleagues to support it.
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired on the proponent's side.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, again I am looking forward to working in
conference in a bipartisan way to work out any concerns or any
additional issues that may arise with this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. Price).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 5 Offered by Mr. Andrews
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 5 printed in House Report 109-438 offered by
Mr. Andrews:
At the end of the bill, add the following new section:
SEC. 510. REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO INSURGENT FORCES
IN IRAQ.
Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of
this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Director of
National Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report, in
classified form, on intelligence relating to the disposition
of insurgent forces in Iraq fighting against Coalition forces
and the forces of the Government of Iraq, including--
(1) an estimate of the number of insurgent forces;
(2) an estimate of the number of insurgent forces that
are--
(A) former members of the Ba'ath Party; and
(B) members of al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations;
(3) a description of where in Iraq the insurgent forces are
located;
(4) a description of the capability of the insurgent
forces; and
(5) a description of how the insurgent forces are funded.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 774, the gentleman from
New Jersey (Mr. Andrews) and a Member opposed each will control 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, there are many different views in the House as to how
we should prosecute the war effort in Iraq. There are many different
views as to
[[Page H1806]]
what we should do next. But I believe there is only one view about the
constitutional responsibility of this branch of government, and that is
that we have the solemn and grave responsibility of oversight.
It is our job on behalf of our constituents to ask questions about
the direction, the efficacy, and the future of American policy in Iraq.
In order to appropriately answer those questions, it is important that
certain facts be adduced and be available to the Members on a regular
basis. Because of the sensitive nature of those facts, it is important
that the facts be available on a classified basis so that those who are
prosecuting the war and the related intelligence activities are not
compromised in any way.
The purpose of my amendment is to serve the twin goals of promoting
fact-based oversight while maintaining the confidentiality and security
of sources and methods of intelligence gathering.
My amendment says this: on a quarterly basis, the relevant
intelligence authorities would be responsible for producing for the
House a classified report that would set forth the best intelligence
estimates as to the number of resistance fighters in Iraq. These
categories would be broken down according to the various sources of the
disruption and violence that we are seeing: former regime elements,
insurgents from outside of the country, groups associated with
terrorist organizations around the world, and so forth.
I am not suggesting that the only metric of the success of our policy
would be the diminution of such forces, but I am suggesting that a
critical metric of the success or failure would be the metric of that
reduction. Similarly, if we are having trouble pinpointing the number
in each category, that alone is a relevant fact that would help us
understand the nature of the problem that we face and the nature of
remedies to those problems.
So this report would produce an important metric for review by the
Members as to the progress or lack thereof with respect to defeating
the resistance in Iraq.
I want to reemphasize that this report is quarterly and it is
classified. This would be handled much in the same way that the
intelligence budget is handled, where Members who have properly
executed the proper oath would have access to the information on a
quarterly basis, would have the opportunity to review it, would be
bound by the appropriate rules of confidentiality in discussing what
they have seen, but would be able to form a more factual basis for an
evaluation of the success or lack thereof of our policies in Iraq.
{time} 1630
Again, I believe that this amendment serves the many different views
we have with the prosecution of this policy in Iraq. For those who
would call for an expeditious withdrawal, for those who would call for
staying the course, for all those in between, this would be fact-based
information that I think would enrich our debate and further advance
our constitutional responsibility of oversight.
Mr. Chairman, I would respectfully urge adoption of the amendment,
and I thank you for this opportunity to explain it.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I rise to claim the time in opposition to
the amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I will not oppose the amendment. I think this
information is very consistent with the type of information that the
Intelligence Committee receives on a regular basis, but we need to make
sure that we continue receiving it in the future.
Again, we will be inclined to accept this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. ANDREWS. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend from Michigan and my
friend from California for their cooperation, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. All time for debate has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New
Jersey (Mr. Andrews).
The amendment was agreed to.
Amendment No. 6 Offered by Mr. Renzi
Mr. RENZI. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment No. 6 printed in House Report 109-438 offered by
Mr. Renzi:
At the end of the bill, add the following new section:
SEC. 510. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE
OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) The Supreme Court has unequivocally recognized that the
Constitution vests the President with the authority to
protect national security information as head of the
Executive Branch and as Commander-in-Chief.
(2) The Supreme Court has recognized a compelling
government interest in withholding national security
information from unauthorized persons.
(3) The Supreme Court has recognized that secrecy
agreements for government employees are a reasonable means
for protecting this vital interest.
(4) The Supreme Court has noted that ``It should be obvious
that no one has a `right' to a security clearance''.
(5) Unauthorized disclosures of classified information
relating to national security are most damaging when they
have the potential to compromise intelligence sources and
methods and ongoing intelligence operations.
(6) Potential unauthorized disclosures of classified
information have impeded relationships with foreign
intelligence services and the effectiveness of the Global War
on Terrorism.
(7) Media corporations and journalists have improperly
profited financially from publishing purported unauthorized
disclosures of classified information.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the President should utilize the constitutional authority of
the President to the fullest practicable extent, where
warranted, to classify and protect national security
information relating to intelligence activities and
information and to take effective action against persons who
commit unauthorized disclosures of classified information
relating to intelligence activities and information contrary
to law and voluntary secrecy agreements.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to House Resolution 774, the gentleman from
Arizona (Mr. Renzi) and a Member opposed will each control 10 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona.
Mr. RENZI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, within our Nation's media organizations there exists a
great number of professionals who provide America with information of
substance and great importance. The media's role is vital to this
Nation. They provide checks and balances of power and oversight of our
political activity, and I want my words today to be respectful,
particularly of those true professional journalists who have a hard
time choosing in the battle to get their story and the need to protect
our Nation.
Yet amongst the journalistic profession there are a few, a small few,
who disclose our most sensitive intelligence sources and methods to our
enemies. They even boldly have justified their actions recently by
claiming themselves to be whistleblowers.
Yet it is not the role of a reporter working with a disgraced or
disgruntled politically motivated former government employee or those
who are on the verge of retirement to determine when to reveal our
national secrets.
Some reporters explain that the information that they are disclosing
is illegal. If you suspect it to be illegal, then notify the FBI or the
intelligence committees. If you feel that there will be inactivity or
political coverup, then inform both Republicans and Democrats. But do
not publish classified information for personal gain.
My amendment expresses the sense of Congress that the President ought
to use his full authority, where warranted, not to overclassify
information, but to protect national security information and take
effective action against those persons who have betrayed this Nation
during wartime by publishing current, ongoing operational disclosures
of classified information.
We all want to protect our frontline agents. It is vital to the war
on terror. It is also vital that those nations who we conduct joint
operations with are able to trust us, not to ask our agents in the
field whether or not we can even keep a secret.
[[Page H1807]]
I understand our publishers and their need to get the story, but I
also understand that it is their right that by free speech they also
safeguard this Nation and help contribute to our victory in this war on
terror.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment,
though I may not oppose it. I really rise for the purpose of entering
into a colloquy with the amendment's sponsor.
Mr. Chairman, there is much that is good in this amendment. All of
us, certainly this Member, oppose the leaks, unauthorized leaks, of
classified information. That is the wrong thing to do. All of us who
serve on the Intelligence Committee not only took the general oath as
Members of Congress, but I believe we signed a second oath as members
of the committee, and I have no reason to believe that any one of us
ever, not for a nanosecond, has compromised classified information, nor
would we. I am sure the amendment's author agrees.
I think it is important to say that the Congress wants those who leak
in an unauthorized fashion to be prosecuted. I think that is a fair
thing to say. I am also in full agreement that the President should use
the fullest extent of his power to properly classify information and to
protect classified information.
But two things are on my mind, and one of them relates to the
language here. One thing on my mind, as I stated earlier, is we should
not have a double standard. If we are against leaks of classified
information, we should be against leaks of classified information
everywhere, and I don't believe, and I am not asking the sponsor,
unless he would like to comment, that it is proper for the President or
the Vice President to use inherent power to authorize their own aides
to discuss what was classified information with selected reporters.
But the question I want to ask the sponsor is this: there is one
section of this amendment that I think is overly broad, and it is
clause (7) of the findings, where it says, ``Media corporations and
journalists have improperly profited financially from publishing
purported unauthorized disclosures of classified information.'' That
may be conjecture. I don't personally think that is true.
I would like to ask the amendment's sponsor whether he will work with
us as this bill goes to conference to modify this language so that it
can be absolutely accurate and convey on a bipartisan basis the view
that unauthorized leaks are wrong, but that our findings are completely
factual on the point.
Mr. RENZI. Mr. Chairman, if the gentlewoman will yield, I appreciate
the dialogue with the ranking member and have great respect, as she
knows, for her command of this subject matter.
In recent weeks we have almost seen a glorification, a self-
glorification, almost a self-indulgence with this issue. In my opinion,
with the rewards that have gone with the Pulitzer Prize, the money that
goes with it, the trophies, the whole idea of leaking information and
making it part of the marketplace was the motive for why I had that
language put in.
If you are asking if I am willing to work with you, absolutely. From
day one I want to work with you on it, and I would ask the chairman to
look at it as it relates to the conference. But I think we need to send
a message to the publishers in America that they have got to help us in
this war on terror, and the motivation cannot be an ambition that is
out of the realm of asking our media outlets to be reasonable. I would
just offer that to the ranking member.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I appreciate the
gentleman's sincerity. You know, I enjoy working with you, but I doubt,
and that is why I said we need more facts here, I don't think we should
allege this unless it is factually based. I doubt the motivation in
many of these cases was financial. I doubt it.
I understand that books have been written and prizes have been
garnered based on publishing classified information, but we have a
strong tradition of freedom of the press and a strong constitutional
amendment, the first amendment, that protects freedom of speech. So I
think we should be very careful in making claims like this.
What I am seeking is just a commitment that we will review this
language and make sure that we all feel it is factually based.
Mr. RENZI. Mr. Chairman, if the gentlewoman will yield further, I
appreciate the gentlewoman from California and her comments. I only
would point out that books on these are in the millions and millions of
dollars. I don't mean to limit it to just awards. But taking and
listening to your initiative, I would also ask that the chairman look
at his leadership role on this and his ideas and be able to formulate
the final opinion along with you. I appreciate that.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RENZI. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to our
chairman, the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. Hoekstra).
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague from Arizona. My
commitment is to work with the ranking member and with the gentleman
from Arizona on making sure that this language, we move it to somewhere
that we are all agreeable. I think we can find that common ground.
I just want to say I rise to support the gentleman from Arizona's
amendment today. We need to set the record straight about our national
security. Specifically, Congress must speak with a single voice, clear
and unwavering, about the value of our intelligence information and
about who makes decisions regarding its use. We need to speak now.
This amendment says the right things. We are at war. Every day our
Armed Forces and intelligence services do battle with an enemy whose
sole purpose is to kill Americans. This point sounds fairly basic. It
is. But the point bears repeating as long as some individuals here in
Washington behave as if they have forgotten that we are at war.
Our government has a vital interest in protecting sensitive national
security information during a time of war. The United States Supreme
Court has recognized this vital interest in preserving secrecy. This
interest is not merely some speculative opinion. It is the law of the
land. This amendment makes that point.
The Constitution places the responsibility and authority to protect
national security with the President of the United States. The
President does so as the head of the executive branch and Commander in
Chief. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized this fact as law. The
gentleman's amendment again makes that point.
Under our system of laws, the President must decide what sensitive
national security information can be shared with the public and what
must remain closely guarded. The President does not make these
decisions lightly. He is elected by the American people to exercise his
judgment in this regard and to make such decisions with the best
interests of the American people in mind. Ultimately he is accountable
to the people at the voting booth.
We have worked with the President and disagreed with his opinions and
directions, most recently the decision to declassify over 48,000 boxes
of documents that were obtained in Iraq. The position of the
intelligence community and the executive branch for an extended period
of time was to hold that information. After working with the executive
branch, that information is now in the process of being declassified
and released to the American people. That is a good decision.
But we went through a process. Individuals who disclose sensitive
national security information without authority undermine the rule of
law. These people substitute their judgment for that of the President,
and they exercise that authority when legally it does not even belong
to them. These individuals may act for self-determined reasons, not in
the best interests of the American people, but in their own interests.
I think that is what makes it different. Unless they are prosecuted,
they remain unaccountable to the American people for their actions.
Mr. RENZI. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the
gentleman from Texas (Mr. Thornberry).
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Arizona for
yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I support his amendment and share his concern about the
destructive consequences of unauthorized disclosures or leaks. This was
one
[[Page H1808]]
of the strategic oversight areas which the chairman and ranking member
assigned to the Oversight Subcommittee at the beginning of this
Congress.
We have held several hearings, including an open hearing, to discuss
this problem. One of the results is that we have found that there are a
limited number of tools that the agencies have to deal with those
inside the agencies who choose to violate the law and disclose
classified materials.
One of the things that is in this bill is to request information from
the Director of National Intelligence on other tools, administrative or
contractual avenues perhaps, with which we can help encourage people to
follow their oath and to obey the law.
{time} 1645
I think what is in the bill, as well as what is in the gentleman from
Arizona's amendment, work very well together to convey the seriousness
with which we take this problem.
I applaud the gentleman's amendment and support it.
Mr. RENZI. Mr. Chairman, I continue to reserve the balance of my
time.
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of the time.
Mr. Chairman, we have no further speakers and I do appreciate the
comments of the amendment's sponsor on his amendment. I do intend to
support the amendment and then to work with him and our chairman on
some modifications of that amendment in the conference.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. RENZI. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of our time.
Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate the ranking member and her
kindness on the issue. I just want to wrap up by saying that the leaks
are absolutely vital to our victory against the Islamofascists who very
much want to establish a worldwide caliphate. It is that real.
The leaks have got to stop to protect our frontline agents. They have
got to stop in order to rebuild the trust between our nations and our
allies. I would urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Arizona (Mr. Renzi).
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. RENZI. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 366,
noes 56, answered ``present'' 1, not voting 9, as follows:
[Roll No. 106]
AYES--366
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Bachus
Baird
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Barrow
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Bean
Beauprez
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boustany
Boyd
Bradley (NH)
Brady (PA)
Brady (TX)
Brown (OH)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Cardin
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carson
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Cooper
Costa
Cramer
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cubin
Cuellar
Culberson
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (KY)
Davis (TN)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeFazio
DeGette
DeLay
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Doolittle
Doyle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Edwards
Ehlers
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
English (PA)
Eshoo
Etheridge
Everett
Fattah
Feeney
Ferguson
Fitzpatrick (PA)
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gohmert
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Gutknecht
Hall
Harman
Harris
Hart
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Herseth
Higgins
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Holt
Honda
Hooley
Hostettler
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Inglis (SC)
Israel
Issa
Istook
Jackson (IL)
Jefferson
Jenkins
Jindal
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick (MI)
Kind
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
Marshall
Matheson
Matsui
McCarthy
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McIntyre
McKeon
McMorris
McNulty
Meek (FL)
Melancon
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moran (KS)
Murphy
Murtha
Musgrave
Myrick
Napolitano
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nunes
Nussle
Ortiz
Osborne
Otter
Oxley
Pallone
Pascrell
Paul
Pearce
Pelosi
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Pombo
Pomeroy
Porter
Price (GA)
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Rahall
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reyes
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Sabo
Salazar
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Saxton
Schiff
Schmidt
Schwartz (PA)
Schwarz (MI)
Scott (GA)
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherman
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skelton
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Sodrel
Souder
Spratt
Stearns
Strickland
Stupak
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Udall (CO)
Upton
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Wasserman Schultz
Waxman
Weiner
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Westmoreland
Wexler
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Wynn
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOES--56
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Baldwin
Blumenauer
Conyers
Costello
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dingell
Doggett
Farr
Filner
Frank (MA)
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Hinchey
Inslee
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Johnson, E. B.
Kucinich
Larson (CT)
Lee
Lewis (GA)
Lynch
Maloney
Markey
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McKinney
Meehan
Meeks (NY)
Moran (VA)
Nadler
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Pastor
Payne
Rangel
Sanchez, Linda T.
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Slaughter
Solis
Stark
Tierney
Towns
Udall (NM)
Waters
Watson
Watt
Woolsey
Wu
ANSWERED ``PRESENT''--1
Capuano
NOT VOTING--9
Case
Evans
Ford
Hastings (FL)
Millender-McDonald
Miller, George
Moore (WI)
Ros-Lehtinen
Schakowsky
{time} 1713
Messrs. STARK, MEEHAN, OWENS, Mrs. MALONEY, Ms. McCOLLUM of
Minnesota, Mr. LYNCH, Ms. DeLAURO, Messrs. LARSON of Connecticut, WATT,
INSLEE, RANGEL, TIERNEY, Ms. WATSON, Ms. EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON of
Texas, Mr. SCOTT of Virginia, Mr. TOWNS, Ms. SOLIS, Mr. PASTOR, Ms.
JACKSON-LEE of Texas, and Mr. COSTELLO changed their vote from ``aye''
to ``no.''
Ms. BEAN, Mr. DAVIS of Illinois and Mr. WAXMAN changed their vote
from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The CHAIRMAN. There being no other amendments, the question is on the
amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.
The amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended, was agreed
to.
The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly, the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Kuhl of New York) having assumed the chair, Mr. Rehberg, Chairman of
the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported
that that
[[Page H1809]]
Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 5020) to
authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2007 for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the
Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes, pursuant to
House Resolution 774, he reported the bill back to the House with an
amendment adopted by the Committee of the Whole.
{time} 1715
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Kuhl of New York). Under the rule, the
previous question is ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the
Whole? If not, the question is on the amendment.
The amendment was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
Motion to Recommit Offered by Mr. Schiff
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
Mr. SCHIFF. Yes, in its current form.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. Schiff moves to recommit the bill, H.R. 5020, to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence with instructions
to report the same back to the House forthwith with the
following amendment:
At the end of title III (Page 16, after line 10), add the
following new section:
SEC. 308. NSA OVERSIGHT ACT.
(a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``NSA
Oversight Act''.
(b) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
(1) On September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence
were committed against the United States and its citizens.
(2) Such acts render it both necessary and appropriate that
the United States exercise its right to self-defense by
protecting United States citizens both at home and abroad.
(3) The Federal Government has a duty to pursue al Qaeda
and other enemies of the United States with all available
tools, including the use of electronic surveillance, to
thwart future attacks on the United States and to destroy the
enemy.
(4) The President of the United States possesses the
inherent authority to engage in electronic surveillance of
the enemy outside of the United States consistent with his
authority as Commander-in-Chief under Article II of the
Constitution.
(5) Congress possesses the authority to regulate electronic
surveillance within the United States.
(6) The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees to
the American people the right ``to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures'' and provides that courts shall issue
``warrants'' to authorize searches and seizures, based upon
probable cause.
(7) The Supreme Court has consistently held for nearly 40
years that the monitoring and recording of private
conversations constitutes a ``search and seizure'' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
(8) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) and chapters 119 and 121 of title 18,
United States Code, were enacted to provide the legal
authority for the Federal Government to engage in searches of
Americans in connection with criminal investigations,
intelligence gathering, and counterintelligence.
(9) The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 and
specified provisions of the Federal criminal code, were
expressly enacted as the ``exclusive means by which
electronic surveillance . . . may be conducted'' domestically
pursuant to law (18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(f)).
(10) Warrantless electronic surveillance of Americans
inside the United States conducted without congressional
authorization may have a serious impact on the civil
liberties of citizens of the United States.
(11) United States citizens, such as journalists,
academics, and researchers studying global terrorism, who
have made international phone calls subsequent to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and are law-abiding
citizens, may have the reasonable fear of being the subject
of such surveillance.
(12) Since the nature and criteria of the National Security
Agency (NSA) program is highly classified and unknown to the
public, many other Americans who make frequent international
calls, such as Americans engaged in international business,
Americans with family overseas, and others, have a legitimate
concern they may be the inadvertent targets of eavesdropping.
(13) The President has sought and signed legislation
including the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56),
and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of
2004 (Public Law 108-458), that have expanded authorities
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.
(14) It may be necessary and desirable to amend the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 to address new
challenges in the Global War on Terrorism. The President
should submit a request for legislation to Congress to amend
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 if the
President desires that the electronic surveillance authority
provided by such Act be further modified.
(15) The Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public
Law 107-40), passed by Congress on September 14, 2001,
authorized military action against those responsible for the
attacks on September 11, 2001, but did not contain legal
authorization nor approve of domestic electronic surveillance
not authorized by chapters 119 or 121 of title 18, United
States Code, or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.).
(c) Reiteration of Chapters 119 and 121 of Title 18, United
States Code, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 as the Exclusive Means by Which Domestic Electronic
Surveillance May Be Conducted.--
(1) Exclusive means.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, chapters 119 and 121 of title 18, United States Code,
and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50
U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) shall be the exclusive means by which
electronic surveillance may be conducted.
(2) Future congressional action.--Paragraph (1) shall apply
until specific statutory authorization for electronic
surveillance, other than as an amendment to chapters 119 or
121 of title 18, United States Code, or the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et
seq.), is enacted. Such specific statutory authorization
shall be the only exception to paragraph (1).
(d) Disclosure Requirements.--Not later than 14 days after
the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall
submit to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of
Representatives and the Select Committee on Intelligence and
the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate a report in
classified form identifying the United States persons who
have been the subject of electronic surveillance not
authorized to be conducted under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.) or chapters
119 or 121 of title 18, United States Code, and the basis for
the selection of such persons for such electronic
surveillance.
(e) Electronic Surveillance Defined.--In this section, the
term ``electronic surveillance'' has the meaning given the
term in section 101(f) of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1801(f)).
Mr. SCHIFF (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent
that the motion be considered as read and printed in the Record.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from California?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
California is recognized for 5 minutes in support of the motion.
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, the motion to recommit is based on
bipartisan legislation that I introduced, along with Representatives
Flake, Harman and Inglis, dealing with the NSA surveillance program.
And the basic premise of this legislation is that the Government must
have all the tools it needs, it must have all the authority it needs to
pursue al Qaeda using every tool in the toolbox.
But the premise is also that we are a Nation of laws, and that
whereas the Commander in Chief has the authority to eavesdrop and
surveil off American shores, when it comes to the electronic
surveillance of Americans on American soil, Congress has the authority
to regulate that surveillance. And, in fact, Congress has regulated
that surveillance through title III and through the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act; and, in fact, those two laws form the
exclusive authority to surveil Americans on American soil.
Now, we have learned, both through a disclosure in The New York Times
and through the disclosures of the present administration, that there
is an NSA surveillance program that, among others things, surveils
conversations between Americans or people on U.S. soil and people
overseas who may be affiliated with al Qaeda. Other than a small number
of us, we don't know much about the contours of this program.
Recently when the Attorney General testified in the Judiciary
Committee, I asked about the limiting principle of this program: Was it
restricted only to these international calls? What if the Attorney
General decided tomorrow or
[[Page H1810]]
the administration decided tomorrow that it had the inherent authority
as Commander in Chief to tap purely domestic calls between two
Americans; did it feel it would need to go to court for that authority?
And the Attorney General said he would not rule it out. He would not
rule out having the pure authority, without going to court, to tap the
calls between two Americans on American soil.
So what is the limiting principle if this program can change from day
to day without the input of Congress? The only limiting principle is
the good faith of the executive, which when the executive shows it is
infallible might be a sufficient limiting principle. But the executive
is no more infallible than we are here in Congress, and so we have a
role to play.
And this motion to recommit says that that role is the following:
that, first, when we pass a law, like FISA and Title III, where we say
the exclusive means of domestic eavesdropping is under these provisions
with court approval, we mean what we say; that, second, the
authorization to use military force that we voted on in the immediate
aftermath of 9/11 did not create an exception to the authority to
eavesdrop on Americans on American soil; that, third, if the President
believes that FISA or existing law is insufficient to the task, he
should come to Congress through his representatives and ask us to amend
the law.
And this is what is most disturbing about what has happened so far.
When the administration did come in the context of the PATRIOT bill and
asked us to change FISA, we made changes to FISA. When one of the
Republican Senators asked the administration, do you need us to change
FISA more; is there a problem with FISA; is it not keeping pace with
the terrorists or technology? The answer from the administration was,
no, FISA is working just fine. The more truthful answer would have
been, no, because we don't feel bound by FISA. We feel we can do what
we choose to, what we feel we must, without consulting with Congress.
So this bill says, importantly, that if the administration feels that
existing law is not enough, it should come to us and ask for amendment.
And, finally, it asks the administration to report to Congress on the
extent to which Americans have been surveilled on American soil so we
can do our job as a coequal branch of government.
Mr. Speaker, I yield to my colleague, the ranking member from
California.
Ms. HARMAN. I thank the gentleman for yielding and commend him and
Messrs. Flake and Inglis for their bipartisan leadership on this issue.
Mr. Speaker, every Member of this body supports tracking the
communications of al Qaeda. That is not the issue. The issue is whether
the electronic surveillance of Americans must comply with law and the
fourth amendment. I believe it must. And as one of the few in this body
who has been briefed on the highly classified program we are talking
about, I believe it can. This program can and must comply with FISA.
That is what the amendment says. The President believes his inherent
authority trumps Article I of the Constitution, and I respectfully
disagree.
Recommitting this bill and adding this provision will make a good
bill stronger and will honor the sacrifice and dedication of those who
serve us so courageously in the field.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I am opposed to the motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I thank my colleagues on the other side of
the aisle for this motion to recommit so that we can talk about this
issue.
The language that is being used to describe the President and the
executive branch is absolutely outrageous. Today we have heard the
charges ``unlawful, reckless, abusive, infallible, without consulting
with Congress.'' For 4\1/2\ years, Republicans and Democrats have been
brought into this program.
Immediately when this program was started, to protect Americans both
here and abroad, the leadership, on a bipartisan basis, was informed on
the program. They consistently on a quarterly or a 4-month basis met
with the executive branch, met with the Vice President and the people
operating this program, and they came back united and said this program
is legal, it is limited, the safeguards are in place to protect
American civil liberties, it is effective, it is making a difference,
and it is necessary.
And only when someone leaked it to the press all of a sudden did it
become all of these other things that you have ascribed to the
President. The President has reached out. The President has worked with
Congress to make sure that we address these concerns.
America is at war. We were at war when this program started. We
continue to be at war. Bin Laden was on tapes this weekend. Zarqawi is
on a tape. We have bombings in Egypt, and troops in Iraq and
Afghanistan. This continues to be the same thing that on a bipartisan
basis people said needed to be done. It is legal, it is limited, it is
necessary, and it is making a difference.
Mr. Speaker, I yield to my colleague from New Mexico (Mrs. Wilson).
Mrs. WILSON of New Mexico. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
I have to say to my colleague from California that I really don't
understand. For over 3 years, the ranking member of the Intelligence
Committee and the minority leader of this House, Ms. Pelosi, have gone
along with this and accepted limited briefings without insisting that
the Intelligence Committee be informed and that oversight happen.
In January of this year, Ms. Harman said, ``This program is essential
to U.S. national security, and its disclosure has damaged critical
national intelligence capabilities.'' But now that effective oversight
is taking place, because I demanded it, and this committee, the
Intelligence Committee, is conducting effective oversight, you want a
report.
Mr. Schiff has proposed not a benign piece of amendment, but a
specific report on by-name targets, not only to the Intelligence
Committee, but to the Judiciary Committee, an unprecedented release of
sources and methods of intelligence that you know would compromise
ongoing operations critical and vital to the security of this country.
The oversight of this program is proceeding. This committee went to
the NSA on the 8th of April. We are going again on Friday. The Director
of National Intelligence and the Deputy Director have briefed this
committee, and continuing information comes in as we speak.
We will do our job as the Intelligence Committee, and we will also
protect the security of the United States in the process. I urge my
colleagues to oppose this motion to recommit.
Mr. HOEKSTRA. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the previous question is
ordered on the motion to recommit.
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Mr. SCHIFF. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to clause 9 of rule XX, the Chair
will reduce to 5 minutes the minimum time for any electronic vote on
the question of passage.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 195,
noes 230, not voting 7, as follows:
[Roll No. 107]
AYES--195
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Allen
Andrews
Baca
Baird
Baldwin
Bean
Becerra
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Blumenauer
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Brown (OH)
Brown, Corrine
Butterfield
Capps
Capuano
Cardin
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carson
Case
Chandler
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Conyers
Costa
Costello
Cramer
Crowley
Cuellar
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
Davis (TN)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Dicks
Dingell
Doggett
Doyle
Edwards
Emanuel
Engel
Eshoo
Etheridge
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Flake
Frank (MA)
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Harman
Herseth
Higgins
Hinchey
Hinojosa
Holden
Holt
Honda
[[Page H1811]]
Hooley
Hoyer
Inglis (SC)
Inslee
Israel
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Jefferson
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (OH)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
Kilpatrick (MI)
Kind
Kucinich
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Larson (CT)
Leach
Lee
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lofgren, Zoe
Lowey
Lynch
Maloney
Markey
Matsui
McCarthy
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McIntyre
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek (FL)
Meeks (NY)
Melancon
Michaud
Miller (NC)
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moran (VA)
Murtha
Nadler
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pallone
Pascrell
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Pelosi
Peterson (MN)
Pomeroy
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reyes
Ross
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Ruppersberger
Rush
Ryan (OH)
Sabo
Salazar
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Sanders
Schakowsky
Schiff
Schwartz (PA)
Scott (GA)
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sherman
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (WA)
Solis
Spratt
Stark
Strickland
Stupak
Tanner
Tauscher
Taylor (MS)
Thompson (CA)
Thompson (MS)
Tierney
Towns
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Van Hollen
Velazquez
Visclosky
Wasserman Schultz
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Wexler
Woolsey
Wu
Wynn
NOES--230
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Bachus
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Barrow
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Beauprez
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boustany
Bradley (NH)
Brady (TX)
Brown (SC)
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Carter
Castle
Chabot
Chocola
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Cooper
Crenshaw
Cubin
Culberson
Davis (KY)
Davis, Jo Ann
Davis, Tom
Deal (GA)
DeLay
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Doolittle
Drake
Dreier
Duncan
Ehlers
Emerson
English (PA)
Everett
Feeney
Ferguson
Fitzpatrick (PA)
Foley
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gohmert
Goode
Goodlatte
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Gutknecht
Hall
Harris
Hart
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hostettler
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Issa
Istook
Jenkins
Jindal
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Jones (NC)
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Latham
LaTourette
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
LoBiondo
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Manzullo
Marchant
Marshall
Matheson
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McKeon
McMorris
Mica
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller, Gary
Moran (KS)
Murphy
Musgrave
Myrick
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nunes
Nussle
Osborne
Otter
Oxley
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Pombo
Porter
Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Radanovich
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Royce
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Saxton
Schmidt
Schwarz (MI)
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Snyder
Sodrel
Souder
Stearns
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Upton
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOT VOTING--7
Evans
Ford
Hastings (FL)
Millender-McDonald
Miller, George
Moore (WI)
Ros-Lehtinen
{time} 1746
Mr. SKELTON changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the motion to recommit was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Kuhl of New York.) The question is on
the passage of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
Recorded Vote
Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. This will be a 5-minute vote.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 327,
noes 96, not voting 9, as follows:
[Roll No. 108]
AYES--327
Aderholt
Akin
Alexander
Allen
Baca
Bachus
Baird
Baker
Barrett (SC)
Barrow
Bartlett (MD)
Barton (TX)
Bass
Bean
Beauprez
Berkley
Berman
Berry
Biggert
Bilirakis
Bishop (GA)
Bishop (NY)
Bishop (UT)
Blackburn
Blunt
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bonner
Bono
Boozman
Boren
Boswell
Boucher
Boustany
Bradley (NH)
Brady (TX)
Brown (OH)
Brown (SC)
Brown, Corrine
Brown-Waite, Ginny
Burgess
Burton (IN)
Butterfield
Buyer
Calvert
Camp (MI)
Campbell (CA)
Cannon
Cantor
Capito
Capps
Cardin
Cardoza
Carnahan
Carson
Carter
Case
Castle
Chabot
Chandler
Chocola
Clay
Cleaver
Clyburn
Coble
Cole (OK)
Conaway
Cooper
Costa
Cramer
Crenshaw
Crowley
Cubin
Cuellar
Culberson
Cummings
Davis (AL)
Davis (KY)
Davis (TN)
Davis, Jo Ann
Deal (GA)
DeLay
Dent
Diaz-Balart, L.
Diaz-Balart, M.
Dicks
Dingell
Doolittle
Doyle
Drake
Dreier
Edwards
Ehlers
Emanuel
Emerson
Engel
English (PA)
Etheridge
Everett
Feeney
Ferguson
Fitzpatrick (PA)
Flake
Foley
Forbes
Fortenberry
Fossella
Foxx
Franks (AZ)
Frelinghuysen
Gallegly
Garrett (NJ)
Gerlach
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gingrey
Gohmert
Gonzalez
Goode
Goodlatte
Gordon
Granger
Graves
Green (WI)
Green, Al
Green, Gene
Gutknecht
Hall
Harris
Hart
Hastings (WA)
Hayes
Hayworth
Hefley
Hensarling
Herger
Herseth
Higgins
Hinojosa
Hobson
Hoekstra
Holden
Hooley
Hostettler
Hoyer
Hulshof
Hunter
Hyde
Inglis (SC)
Israel
Issa
Istook
Jefferson
Jenkins
Jindal
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (IL)
Johnson, Sam
Kanjorski
Keller
Kelly
Kennedy (MN)
Kennedy (RI)
Kildee
King (IA)
King (NY)
Kingston
Kirk
Kline
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kuhl (NY)
LaHood
Langevin
Lantos
Larsen (WA)
Latham
LaTourette
Leach
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (KY)
Linder
Lipinski
LoBiondo
Lowey
Lucas
Lungren, Daniel E.
Mack
Maloney
Manzullo
Marchant
Marshall
Matheson
McCarthy
McCaul (TX)
McCotter
McCrery
McHenry
McHugh
McIntyre
McKeon
McMorris
McNulty
Meek (FL)
Melancon
Mica
Michaud
Miller (FL)
Miller (MI)
Miller (NC)
Miller, Gary
Mollohan
Moore (KS)
Moran (KS)
Murphy
Murtha
Musgrave
Myrick
Nadler
Neugebauer
Ney
Northup
Norwood
Nunes
Nussle
Ortiz
Osborne
Otter
Oxley
Pascrell
Pearce
Pence
Peterson (MN)
Peterson (PA)
Petri
Pickering
Pitts
Platts
Poe
Pombo
Pomeroy
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Price (GA)
Pryce (OH)
Putnam
Rahall
Ramstad
Regula
Rehberg
Reichert
Renzi
Reynolds
Rogers (AL)
Rogers (KY)
Rogers (MI)
Rohrabacher
Ross
Royce
Ruppersberger
Ryan (OH)
Ryan (WI)
Ryun (KS)
Salazar
Sanders
Saxton
Schiff
Schmidt
Schwartz (PA)
Schwarz (MI)
Scott (GA)
Sensenbrenner
Sessions
Shadegg
Shaw
Shays
Sherwood
Shimkus
Shuster
Simmons
Simpson
Skelton
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Smith (WA)
Snyder
Sodrel
Souder
Spratt
Stearns
Strickland
Stupak
Sullivan
Sweeney
Tancredo
Tanner
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Terry
Thomas
Thompson (MS)
Thornberry
Tiahrt
Tiberi
Turner
Udall (CO)
Udall (NM)
Upton
Van Hollen
Walden (OR)
Walsh
Wamp
Wasserman Schultz
Weldon (FL)
Weldon (PA)
Weller
Westmoreland
Whitfield
Wicker
Wilson (NM)
Wilson (SC)
Wolf
Wu
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
NOES--96
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews
Baldwin
Becerra
Blumenauer
Boyd
Brady (PA)
Capuano
Conyers
Costello
Davis (CA)
Davis (FL)
Davis (IL)
DeFazio
DeGette
Delahunt
DeLauro
Doggett
Duncan
Eshoo
Farr
Fattah
Filner
Frank (MA)
Grijalva
Gutierrez
Harman
Hinchey
Holt
Honda
Inslee
Jackson (IL)
Jackson-Lee (TX)
Johnson, E. B.
Jones (NC)
Jones (OH)
Kaptur
Kilpatrick (MI)
Kind
Kucinich
Larson (CT)
Lee
Lewis (GA)
Lofgren, Zoe
Lynch
Markey
Matsui
McCollum (MN)
McDermott
McGovern
McKinney
Meehan
Meeks (NY)
Moran (VA)
Napolitano
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Owens
Pallone
Pastor
Paul
Payne
Pelosi
Price (NC)
Rangel
Reyes
Rothman
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanchez, Linda T.
Sanchez, Loretta
Schakowsky
Scott (VA)
Serrano
Sherman
[[Page H1812]]
Slaughter
Solis
Stark
Tauscher
Thompson (CA)
Tierney
Towns
Velazquez
Visclosky
Waters
Watson
Watt
Waxman
Weiner
Wexler
Woolsey
Wynn
NOT VOTING--9
Davis, Tom
Evans
Ford
Hastings (FL)
Millender-McDonald
Miller, George
Moore (WI)
Radanovich
Ros-Lehtinen
{time} 1758
Messrs. GUTIERREZ, WYNN and DOGGETT changed their vote from ``aye''
to ``no.''
Mr. CUMMINGS changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
Stated for:
Mr. TOM DAVIS of Virginia. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall vote No. 108,
final passage of the Intelligence Authorization Act, I am recorded as
not voting. Although I was present in the Chamber, my vote was not
recorded.
I intended to vote ``aye'' and would like to be recorded as such.
____________________
