109th Congress Report
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
1st Session 109-101
======================================================================
INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006
_______
June 2, 2005.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the
State of the Union and ordered to be printed
_______
Mr. Hoekstra, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
submitted the following
R E P O R T
together with
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[To accompany H.R. 2475]
[Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]
The Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, to whom was
referred the bill (H.R. 2475) to authorize appropriations for
fiscal year 2006 for intelligence and intelligence-related
activities of the United States Government, the Community
Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency
Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes,
having considered the same, report favorably thereon with an
amendment and recommend that the bill as amended do pass.
CONTENTS
Page
Purpose.......................................................... 6
Classified Annex and Committee Intent............................ 6
Scope of Committee Review........................................ 7
Committee Statement and Views.................................... 8
Committee Consideration and Rollcall Votes....................... 23
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of Amendment......... 24
Title I--Intelligence Activities:
Section 101--Authorization of Appropriations................. 24
Section 102--Classified Schedule of Authorizations........... 24
Section 103--Personnel Ceiling Adjustments................... 24
Section 104-Intelligence Community Management Account........ 25
Title II--Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability
System:
Section 201--Authorization of Appropriations................. 25
Title III--General Provisions:
Section 301--Increase in Employee Compensation and Benefits
Authorized by Law.......................................... 25
Section 302--Restriction on Conduct of Intelligence
Activities................................................. 25
Section 303--Authority of the Director of National
Intelligence to assign individuals to U.S. missions in
foreign countries to coordinate and direct intelligence and
intelligence-related activities conducted in that country.. 25
Section 304--Clarification of delegation of transfer or
reprogramming authority.................................... 25
Section 305--Approval of personnel transfer for new national
intelligence center........................................ 25
Section 306--Additional Duties for the Director of Science
and Technology............................................. 26
Section 307--Comprehensive inventory of special access
programs................................................... 26
Section 308--Sense of Congress on budget execution authority
procedures................................................. 26
Section 309--Sense of Congress with respect to multi-level
security clearances........................................ 26
Title IV--Central Intelligence Agency:
Section 401--Clarification of role of the Director of Central
Intelligence Agency as head of human intelligence
collection................................................. 26
Oversight Findings and Recommendations........................... 26
General Performance Goals and Objectives......................... 27
Constitutional Authority Statement............................... 27
Unfunded Mandate Statement....................................... 27
Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate... 27
Changes to Existing Law.......................................... 28
Additional Views................................................. 32
The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents of this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Sec. 101. Authorization of appropriations.
Sec. 102. Classified Schedule of Authorizations.
Sec. 103. Personnel ceiling adjustments.
Sec. 104. Intelligence Community Management Account.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Sec. 201. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 301. Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Sec. 302. Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities.
Sec. 303. Authority of the Director of National Intelligence to assign
individuals to United States missions in foreign countries to
coordinate and direct intelligence and intelligence-related activities
conducted in that country.
Sec. 304. Clarification of delegation of transfer or reprogramming
authority.
Sec. 305. Approval of personnel transfer for new national intelligence
centers.
Sec. 306. Additional duties for the Director of Science and Technology.
Sec. 307. Comprehensive inventory of special access programs.
Sec. 308. Sense of Congress on budget execution authority procedures.
Sec. 309. Sense of Congress with respect to multi-level security
clearances.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 401. Clarification of role of the Director of Central Intelligence
Agency as head of human intelligence collection.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
SEC. 101. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2006
for the conduct of the intelligence and intelligence-related activities
of the following elements of the United States Government:
(1) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
(2) The Central Intelligence Agency.
(3) The Department of Defense.
(4) The Defense Intelligence Agency.
(5) The National Security Agency.
(6) The Department of the Army, the Department of the Navy,
and the Department of the Air Force.
(7) The Department of State.
(8) The Department of the Treasury.
(9) The Department of Energy.
(10) The Department of Justice.
(11) The Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(12) The National Reconnaissance Office.
(13) The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
(14) The Coast Guard.
(15) The Department of Homeland Security.
SEC. 102. CLASSIFIED SCHEDULE OF AUTHORIZATIONS.
(a) Specifications of Amounts and Personnel Ceilings.--The amounts
authorized to be appropriated under section 101, and the authorized
personnel ceilings as of September 30, 2006, for the conduct of the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the elements listed
in such section, are those specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations prepared to accompany the bill H.R. 2475 of the One
Hundred Ninth Congress.
(b) Availability of Classified Schedule of Authorizations.--The
Schedule of Authorizations shall be made available to the Committees on
Appropriations of the Senate and House of Representatives and to the
President. The President shall provide for suitable distribution of the
Schedule, or of appropriate portions of the Schedule, within the
executive branch.
SEC. 103. PERSONNEL CEILING ADJUSTMENTS.
(a) Authority for Adjustments.--With the approval of the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of National
Intelligence may authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess
of the number authorized for fiscal year 2006 under section 102 when
the Director of National Intelligence determines that such action is
necessary to the performance of important intelligence functions.
(b) Notice to Intelligence Committees.--The Director of National
Intelligence shall notify promptly the Select Committee on Intelligence
of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the
House of Representatives whenever the Director exercises the authority
granted by this section.
SEC. 104. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT ACCOUNT.
(a) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be
appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management Account of the
Director of National Intelligence for fiscal year 2006 the sum of
$446,144,000. Within such amount, funds identified in the classified
Schedule of Authorizations referred to in section 102(a) for advanced
research and development shall remain available until September 30,
2007.
(b) Authorized Personnel Levels.--The elements within the
Intelligence Community Management Account of the Director of National
Intelligence are authorized 817 full-time personnel as of September 30,
2006. Personnel serving in such elements may be permanent employees of
the Intelligence Community Management Account or personnel detailed
from other elements of the United States Government.
(c) Classified Authorizations.--
(1) Authorization of appropriations.--In addition to amounts
authorized to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community
Management Account by subsection (a), there are also authorized
to be appropriated for the Intelligence Community Management
Account for fiscal year 2006 such additional amounts as are
specified in the classified Schedule of Authorizations referred
to in section 102(a). Such additional amounts for advanced
research and development shall remain available until September
30, 2007.
(2) Authorization of personnel.--In addition to the personnel
authorized by subsection (b) for elements of the Intelligence
Community Management Account as of September 30, 2006, there
are also authorized such additional personnel for such elements
as of that date as are specified in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations.
(d) Reimbursement.--Except as provided in section 113 of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 404h), during fiscal year 2006 any
officer or employee of the United States or a member of the Armed
Forces who is detailed to the staff of the Intelligence Community
Management Account from another element of the United States Government
shall be detailed on a reimbursable basis, except that any such
officer, employee, or member may be detailed on a nonreimbursable basis
for a period of less than one year for the performance of temporary
functions as required by the Director of National Intelligence.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
SEC. 201. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
There is authorized to be appropriated for the Central Intelligence
Agency Retirement and Disability Fund for fiscal year 2006 the sum of
$244,600,000.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 301. INCREASE IN EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS AUTHORIZED BY
LAW.
Appropriations authorized by this Act for salary, pay, retirement,
and other benefits for Federal employees may be increased by such
additional or supplemental amounts as may be necessary for increases in
such compensation or benefits authorized by law.
SEC. 302. RESTRICTION ON CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.
The authorization of appropriations by this Act shall not be deemed
to constitute authority for the conduct of any intelligence activity
which is not otherwise authorized by the Constitution or the laws of
the United States.
SEC. 303. AUTHORITY OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE TO ASSIGN
INDIVIDUALS TO UNITED STATES MISSIONS IN FOREIGN
COUNTRIES TO COORDINATE AND DIRECT INTELLIGENCE AND
INTELLIGENCE-RELATED ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN THAT
COUNTRY.
Subsection (k) of section 102A of the National Security Act of 1947
(50 U.S.C. 403-4a), as added by section 1011(a) of the National
Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-
458; 118 Stat. 3643), is amended--
(1) by striking ``Under'' and inserting ``(1) Under''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2)(A) The Director may assign an individual to be a representative
of the Director at a United States mission in a foreign country. Any
such individual shall oversee and manage all intelligence and
intelligence-related activities conducted in that country by personnel
of any element of the intelligence community.
``(B)(i) Subparagraph (A) shall not be construed to supersede the
authority of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency described
in clause (ii), such authority being subject to general oversight by
the Director of National Intelligence under paragraph (1).
``(ii) The authority referred to in clause (i) is the authority under
section 104A(f) to coordinate relationships between elements of the
intelligence community and the intelligence or security services of
foreign governments or international organizations generally and the
authority under section 104A(d)(3) to provide overall direction for and
coordination of the collection of human intelligence outside the United
States.''.
SEC. 304. CLARIFICATION OF DELEGATION OF TRANSFER OR REPROGRAMMING
AUTHORITY.
Paragraph (5)(B) of section 102A(d) of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1(d)), as added by section 1011(a) of the National
Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-
458; 118 Stat. 3643), is amended by striking ``or agency involved'' in
the second sentence and inserting ``involved or the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence
Agency)''.
SEC. 305. APPROVAL OF PERSONNEL TRANSFER FOR NEW NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
CENTERS.
Section 102A(e)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C.
403-1(e)(1)), as added by section 1011(a) of the National Security
Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of Public Law 108-458; 118
Stat. 3643), is amended--
(1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``shall promptly provide
notice'' and all that follows through ``paragraph to--'' and
inserting ``may not transfer personnel under subparagraph (A)
unless the Director has provided notice of any transfer of
personnel to be made pursuant to this paragraph and received a
response from--''; and
(2) by striking subparagraph (C) and inserting the following:
``(C) The Director shall include in any notice under subparagraph
(B)--
``(i) an explanation of the nature of the transfer and how it
satisfies the requirements of this subsection;
``(ii) the number of personnel transferred; and
``(iii) the individual skills and capabilities of the
personnel involved.''.
SEC. 306. ADDITIONAL DUTIES FOR THE DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY.
(a) Coordination and Prioritization of Research Conducted by Elements
of the Intelligence Community.--Subsection (d) of section 103E of the
National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-3e), as added by section
1011(a) of the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title
I of Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643), is amended--
(1) by inserting ``and prioritize'' after ``coordinate'' in
paragraph (3)(A); and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall identify
basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be carried out by
elements of the intelligence community.''.
(b) Development of Technology Goals.--Section 103E of such Act (50
U.S.C. 403-3e), as so added, is amended--
(1) in subsection (c)--
(A) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (4);
(B) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6);
and
(C) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following
new paragraph:
``(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the
elements of the intelligence community to meet the technology
needs of the community; and''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(e) Goals for Technology Needs of the Intelligence Community.--In
carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director of Science and Technology
shall--
``(1) perform systematic identification and assessment of the
most significant intelligence challenges that require technical
solutions; and
``(2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of
research and design programs to meet the requirements of the
intelligence community for timely support.''.
(c) Report.--Not later than June 30, 2006, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to Congress a report containing a strategy
for the development and use of technology in the intelligence community
through 2021. Such report may be submitted in classified form and shall
include--
(1) an assessment of the highest priority intelligence gaps
across the intelligence community that may be resolved by the
use of technology;
(2) goals for advanced research and development and a
strategy to achieve such goals;
(3) an explanation of how each advanced research and
development project funded under the National Intelligence
Program addresses an identified intelligence gap;
(4) a list of all current and projected research and
development projects by research type (basic, advanced, or
applied) with estimated funding levels, estimated initiation
dates, and estimated completion dates; and
(5) a plan to incorporate technology from research and
development projects into National Intelligence Program
acquisition programs.
SEC. 307. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORY OF SPECIAL ACCESS PROGRAMS.
Not later than January 15, 2006, the Director of National
Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees
(as defined in section 3(7) of the National Security Act of 1947 (50
U.S.C. 401a(7))) a classified report providing a comprehensive
inventory of all special access programs under the National
Intelligence Program (as defined in section 3(6) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 401a(6))).
SEC. 308. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON BUDGET EXECUTION AUTHORITY PROCEDURES.
It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National
Intelligence should expeditiously establish the necessary budgetary
processes and procedures with the heads of the departments containing
agencies or organizations within the intelligence community, and the
heads of such agencies and organizations, in order to--
(1) implement the budget execution authorities provided
under, and submit the reports to Congress required by,
subsection (c) of section 102A of the National Security Act of
1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-1), as amended by section 1011(a) of the
National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of
Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643); and
(2) carry out the duties and authorities of the Director of
National Intelligence with respect to the transfer and
reprogramming of funds under the National Intelligence Program
under subsection (d) of such section, as so amended.
SEC. 309. SENSE OF CONGRESS WITH RESPECT TO MULTI-LEVEL SECURITY
CLEARANCES.
It is the sense of Congress that the Director of National
Intelligence should promptly establish and oversee the implementation
of a multi-level security clearance system across the intelligence
community to leverage the cultural and linguistic skills of subject
matter experts and individuals proficient in foreign languages critical
to national security.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SEC. 401. CLARIFICATION OF ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY AS HEAD OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.
(a) In General.--Subsection (d)(3) of section 104A of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403-4a), as added by section 1011(a) of
the National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004 (title I of
Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3643), is amended by striking ``provide
overall direction'' and all that follows through ``elements of the
intelligence community'' and inserting ``subject to subsection (h),
provide overall direction for and coordination of the collection of
human intelligence outside the United States by any department, agency,
or element of the United States Government''.
(b) Clarification of Roles of DNI and DCIA With Respect to Human
Intelligence Collection.--Such section is further amended by adding at
the end the following new subsection:
``(h) Clarification of Roles of DNI and DCIA With Respect to Human
Intelligence Collection.--(1) In carrying out subsection (d)(3), the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall develop a process for
the coordination of the collection of human intelligence outside of the
United States. Such process shall be subject to the approval of the
Director of National Intelligence.
``(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall determine which
human intelligence collection activities shall be subject to the
process developed under paragraph (1).''.
Purpose
The purpose of H.R. 2475 is to authorize the intelligence
and intelligence-related activities of the United States
Government for Fiscal Year 2006 in order to enhance the
national security of the United States, to support and assist
the armed forces of the United States, and to support the
President in the execution of the foreign policy of the United
States. The bill also clarifies certain authorities of the
Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Classified Annex and Committee Intent
The classified annex to this report includes the classified
Schedule of Authorizations and its associated explanatory
language. The Committee views the classified annex as an
integral part of this legislation. The classified annex
contains a thorough discussion of the issues considered by the
Committee underlying the funding authorizations found in the
classified Schedule of Authorizations. The Committee intends
that all intelligence programs discussed in the classified
annex to this report be conducted in accordance with the
guidance and limitations set forth as associated language
therein. The classified Schedule of Authorizations is
incorporated directly into this legislation by virtue of
section 102 of the bill. The classified annex is available for
review by all Members of the House of Representatives, subject
to the requirements of clause 13 of rule XXIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, and rule 14 of the Rules of
Procedure for the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence.
Scope of Committee Review
The bill authorizes U.S. intelligence and intelligence-
related activities under the jurisdiction of the Committee,
including the National Intelligence Program (NIP), the Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA), and the Joint
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP).
The NIP consists of all activities of the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence, as well as those national
foreign intelligence, intelligence-related, and/or
counterintelligence activities conducted by: (1) the Central
Intelligence Agency; (2) the Department of Defense; (3) the
Defense Intelligence Agency; (4) the National Security Agency;
(5) the National Reconnaissance Office; (6) the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; (7) the Departments of the
Army, Navy, and Air Force; (8) the Department of State; (9) the
Department of the Treasury; (10) the Department of Energy; (11)
the Department of Justice; (12) the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; (13) the Department of Homeland Security; and
(14) the U.S. Coast Guard. The Committee has exclusive
legislative, authorizing and oversight jurisdiction of these
programs.
The Department of Defense TIARA programs are a diverse
array of reconnaissance and target acquisition capabilities
that provide direct information support to military operations
within the basic military force structure. TIARA, as defined by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense, include
those military intelligence activities outside the General
Defense Intelligence Program that respond to the needs of
military commanders for operational support information, as
well as to national command, control, and intelligence
requirements. The Committee on Armed Services in the House of
Representatives shares oversight and authorizing jurisdiction
of the programs comprising TIARA with the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence.
The JMIP provides integrated program management of defense
intelligence elements that support defense-wide or theater-
level consumers. Included within the JMIP are aggregations of
similar activities, either in intelligence discipline (e.g.,
Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)),
or function (e.g., satellite support, aerial reconnaissance).
The following aggregations are included in the JMIP: (1) the
Defense Cryptologic Program (DCP); (2) the Defense Geospatial-
Intelligence Program (DGIP); and (3) the Defense General
Intelligence Applications Program (DGIAP). The DGIAP includes
(a) the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Program (DARP), (b) the
Defense Intelligence Tactical Program (DITP), (c) the Defense
Intelligence Special Technologies Program (DISTP), (d) the
Defense Intelligence Counterdrug Program (DICP), and (e) the
Defense Space Reconnaissance Program (DSRP). As with TIARA
programs, the Committee on Armed Services in the House of
Representatives shares oversight and authorizing jurisdiction
of the programs comprising the JMIP with the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence.
Committee Statement and Views
A. BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR LEGISLATION
The legislation is the product of the Committee's
comprehensive review of the President's fiscal year 2006 budget
request, carrying out its annual responsibility to prepare an
authorization based on close examination of the U.S.
government's intelligence programs and proposed expenditures.
The Committee and, in some cases, its component subcommittees,
held ten budget-related hearings and hundreds of briefings for
Members and Staff covering all major intelligence programs
within the National Intelligence Program, the Joint Military
Intelligence Program, and the Tactical Intelligence and Related
Activities accounts. This review also covered all functional
capabilities, such as human intelligence, signals intelligence,
imagery intelligence, analysis, counterintelligence,
counternarcotics, and counterterrorism.
As always, the Committee's legislative and budgetary
actions are based on more than these budget-specific hearings
and briefings. The actions taken in this bill are the result of
the Committee's ongoing, rigorous oversight of the U.S.
Intelligence Community. This oversight activity includes the
scores of Committee and subcommittee hearings and briefings,
site visits, and fact-finding trips, and studies of
intelligence capabilities, strategies, plans, and challenges
conducted throughout the year.
Of particular note is the time and attention the Committee
has devoted to the creation of an Intelligence Community for
the 21st Century. Over the past year, the Congress has passed
sweeping legislation to reform the U.S. Intelligence Community.
This included the creation of a Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) to oversee all aspects of the community. The
Committee is committed to supporting all efforts that will make
the DNI successful in better integrating the disparate members
of the Intelligence Community and creating the best possible
intelligence capabilities for America. Further, the Committee
has been focused on, and will continue to commit a great deal
of effort to, overseeing the implementation of the reform
legislation provisions as well as ensuring that specific
intelligence efforts in support of the Global War on Terrorism
(GWOT) are conducted in accordance with established and
approved procedures. The tangible results of these efforts are
just being seen, as the first DNI has recently been sworn in,
and specific reform activities are beginning to take place.
The Committee has conducted its oversight responsibilities,
the Members and the Staff have had the opportunity to meet and
work with intelligence professionals throughout the community
and around the world. The Committee holds in highest regard the
work accomplished by these dedicated U.S. Intelligence
Community personnel. At great sacrifice, often under extreme
and intense conditions, and at great personal risk, the men and
women of the Intelligence Community continue to perform their
missions with great energy, and enormous devotion to duty. The
Committee commends these patriots for their professionalism,
integrity and perseverance. These honorable people form the
first line of our national defense, and the freedom and
security of our country relies on their success.
The U.S. intelligence community--a need for change
In recent years, U.S. intelligence efforts have been
criticized by some for specific ``intelligence failures.'' The
Committee's view is that, more rightly, the Intelligence
Community's efforts should be recognized as a critical weapon,
particularly in the Global War on Terrorism. The many reviews
of the nation's intelligence efforts, including the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11
Commission) and the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities
of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD
Commission) have in the past several years been harshly but, in
many respects, constructively critical of the Intelligence
Community's management, operations, and products. It is these
reviews that helped spur the reform legislation that President
Bush signed into law, as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004.
The Committee agrees with many of the recommendations of
these reviews. The demands and the resources expended for the
U.S. Intelligence Community have increased dramatically since
the attacks of September 11, 2001. These increases were
critically necessary, particularly when viewed against the
historical underinvestment and lack of support in the years
preceding the attacks on America. Yet, these increases demand
results--results in the form of better intelligence support to
keep the nation safe. Many of the reviews provided specific and
logical recommendations that the Community as a whole has
historically resisted. The Committee agrees with the general
premise that the Intelligence Community must be more receptive
to change. Organizational, operational, and philosophical
changes are critical to the future of the Community.
Unfortunately the bureaucratic resistance to change is a
cultural problem that will take time and focused effort to
correct. Over the past number of years the Committee has
repeatedly made recommendations for correcting known problems.
Many of these recommendations have been found correct and/or
reinforced by the President's WMD Commission findings. Some of
the specific Committee recommendations have included:
1. The Intelligence Community must have sufficient
numbers of human intelligence officers and analysts
whose skills are specifically designed to respond
aggressively to the full range of modern threats. This
includes a robust cadre of case officers capable of
entering the most austere of environments and acquiring
much needed information. The diverse set of analytic
problems requires an equally robust cadre of expert
analysts that can sift through the massive volumes of
information to find the obscure references, and mine
the critical information nuggets that lead to
actionable intelligence. Although much can be achieved
through technological collection means, the
Intelligence Community still requires highly trained
personnel who bring the cognitive skills to bear that
allow the understanding of information nuances, foreign
cultures and who can speak the languages of the various
intelligence targets. Year after year, this Committee
has insisted that the Intelligence Community recruit a
more culturally diverse cadre of analysts and officers,
especially seeking individuals proficient in critical
languages such as Arabic, Chinese, and, the much less
well known languages including Pashtu and Urdu. The
Committee is heartened by the President's call to
increase, significantly, the number of human
intelligence andanalytic officers in the Intelligence
Community. Before this Administration call though, and on a bipartisan
basis, the Committee had repeatedly increased funding to enhance human
collection and analysis capabilities by funding language proficiency
training, ``cultural immersion,'' and tradecraft. But only now is the
Community witnessing the beginnings of modest change in these diverse
areas.
2. The Intelligence Community's technical collection
architecture has, for a number of years, been in need
of a coherent strategic plan. There is no question that
technical collection programs are critical to the
nation's intelligence gathering capabilities. Satellite
systems, airborne reconnaissance aircraft, ships and
land-based technical collection systems form a system
of systems to collect imagery, signals, and other
technical information not necessarily accessible by
human sources. However, such technical collection
systems satisfy only a part of the overall information
needs, and must be backed up by world-class human
intelligence collection and analysis. Unfortunately,
the Committee finds that the funding levels of effort
in the budget request are weighted far too heavily
toward expensive technical systems. The Committee has
repeatedly called for a rationalized technical
architecture that appropriately balances the depth and
breadth of these systems with both the human collection
and analysis requirements and their funding across the
Community. Again, the Community has resisted
terminating even badly flawed major systems
acquisitions and investing the resulting savings in
human capabilities. The Committee's position in this
year's authorization makes a number of recommendations
to significantly reposition funding from technical
programs to human intelligence and analysis. The
Committee recognizes these are significant changes, but
believes strongly that these major decisions must be
made.
3. Recognizing the need for better and more
productive intelligence on terrorist financing, in the
fiscal Year 2004 Intelligence Authorization Act, the
Committee established a Treasury Department Office of
Intelligence and Analysis. Interrupting the flow of
money to terrorists and proliferators is a self-evident
first response to the threats of the 21st Century. Yet,
the response to this direction was slow, and only now
is this office being created.
4. The Committee has been deeply concerned since at
least the mid-1990s about the security at the National
Laboratories. The labs are the site of some of the
nation's most sensitive research. The Committee's
security and counterintelligence concerns have
repeatedly been given short shrift, and important
safety precautions have gone under-funded or even
unfunded. This clearly needs to be corrected.
These are just examples of a large number of problems the
Committee has repeatedly identified. These problems can be
solved, but only with great effort. That effort will
necessarily require the Intelligence Community's leadership to
develop, implement, and maintain a strategic plan that is long-
term in nature, but that is also flexible enough to accommodate
and react to temporal change in the world's threat environment.
The Committee specifically addresses in the general provisions
section of this report several issues with respect to strategic
planning.
Finally, the Committee notes that with the passage of the
Intelligence Reform bill the Federal Bureau of Investigation's
importance to the overall security of the nation will grow
dramatically. The Committee believes strongly that the FBI must
be fully integrated into the Intelligence Community if its
information and resources are to be fully applied to efforts to
combat terrorism and protect the homeland. To ensure this is a
successful effort, the FBI must clearly define its intelligence
activities and conduct them in a manner consistent with other
national intelligence activities, including full coordination
with the Director of National Intelligence and enhanced
reporting to Congressional intelligence committees. The
Committee will also carefully review the recommendations of the
President's Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction that a
single National Security division be created within the
Department of Justice.
Understanding the threat
Unquestionably, those entrusted with the nation's security
must have the best possible intelligence information. That
information--from its many sources--must be fully integrated to
form the clearest possible picture of the myriad day-to-day
``tactical'' threats, as well as the longer-term ``strategic''
threats facing America. To that end, on December 17, 2004, the
President signed into law the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act, the first major reorganization of the
Intelligence Community since 1949. The purpose of this landmark
legislation is to promote an integrated Intelligence Community
capable of responding to the complex range of threats that the
United States now faces.
The collapse of the Soviet Union did not usher in an era of
peace and stability as many had expected. Rather, the end of
the Cold War actually set the stage for many ideological,
political, and military upheavals that even now continue to
unfold into conflicts or armed threats--threats to America and
its allies everywhere. As the Intelligence Community looks to
the future, it finds potential threats that include: new global
and regional powers who may be anxious to test the boundaries
of the existing balances of power; elements that may not
recognize the legitimacy of their local governing authorities
and therefore attack it; and other non-governmental entities,
including terrorist organizations that may attempt to acquire
and use weapons that cause indiscriminate death and violence.
It is a future where scientific and technological breakthroughs
may produce rapid shifts in the power structure, and where
shortages of basic resources (energy, water, arable land) could
cause nations to rethink their commitment to the rule of law.
In this new environment, threats such as terrorism and the risk
of attack with weapons of mass destruction have assumed a much
more lethal and immediate reality.
As the international community continues to ``globalize,''
there will be nations that are ``winners'' and those that are
``losers.'' The National Intelligence Council points to India
and China, Brazil, and Indonesia, as states with potential to
emerge as global powers. The combination of economic growth,
sustained military spending, and a strong sense of national
identity point toward an increasingly prominent global role for
such emerging powers. It will be the Intelligence Community's
responsibility to provide the accurate forecasts to enable the
nation's political leaders to know whether these emerging
powers are friends or potentialadversaries. These leaders must
also know whether former foes have truly become lasting partners. In
addition, the Intelligence Community must recognize the threats and
opportunities posed by obvious potential enemies, as well as any other
adversary that may emerge. In sum, the United States must have an
accurate understanding of the capabilities and intentions of the
nations with whom we interact. This is the task of the Intelligence
Community. This task will require a proper balance between long-range
intelligence analysis for the policymaker and the more ``tactical''
analysis for the employed ``warfighter.''
While focusing on nation-states is crucial, the Community
must at the same time remain vigilant about the threat posed by
emerging non-nation state actors. As is made abundantly clear
in the
9/11 and WMD Commission reports, our enemies are varied,
intelligent, dedicated and determined. Terrorists have
demonstrated the ability to strike within the United States,
and the threat of terrorist attack will remain for the long-
term foreseeable future. The worldwide drug trade and the
emergence of global criminal networks will continue to pose a
fundamental threat to the United States. The willingness of
criminal organizations and others to traffic in human beings,
materials of all sorts, and possibly even dual-use components
associated with weapons of mass destruction increases the
likelihood that chemical, biological or radiological weapons
could become weapons of terror inside America. In the face of
such wide-ranging non-traditional threats, our Intelligence
Community must be able to predict and respond with increasing
agility. The Committee addresses this issue specifically in
other parts of this report.
The task of the Intelligence Community is made even more
complicated by the need to identify mass political movements
that could negatively affect U.S. interests. Population
changes, the rising cost of raw materials, and technological
advances all continue to deepen the divide between the
``haves'' and the ``have nots'', our political leaders need
information that distinguishes legitimate social reform from
the movements that give rise to the next Usama bin Laden or
Fidel Castro.
Clearly, the 21st Century is likely to include far greater
risks than this nation has ever faced. The task of the Director
of National Intelligence is to adapt the Intelligence Community
to those challenges, and the challenges as yet unanticipated.
Responding to the threat
As stated, the Intelligence Community must fully understand
the nature--both depth and breadth--of the threats to the
nation. Once these threats are understood, the Community must
then be well-postured to collect, analyze, and produce accurate
information and estimates on those threats. Our capabilities
must be tailored to those threats. The Community must
understand what its current and projected capabilities are to
provide needed information, and, perhaps more importantly, what
they are not. Only armed with that knowledge, can informed
decisions be made with respect to overall community-wide
funding allocations. This is the strategic approach the
Committee used to evaluate and respond to the fiscal year 2006
budget request, and this is a strategic approach that the
Committee hopes the new Director of National Intelligence will
provide to the Intelligence Community.
As the United States grapples with the myriad threats posed
to national security through both state and non-state actors
that wish to inflict harm, it is the Intelligence Community's
responsibility to optimize its full range of intelligence
capabilities to provide policy makers, lawmakers and other key
customers the quality intelligence they need to proactively
make national security decisions. The Committee notes that the
creation of the position of the Director of National
Intelligence was meant to provide an Intelligence Community
``Chief Executive Officer'' whose responsibilities include
making the intelligence agencies to work collectively to
leverage all collection, analysis and dissemination
capabilities to develop the most effective intelligence
capabilities possible. The Committee fully intends that this
individual will lead and manage the Community with complete
support from each Intelligence Community agency and department
head. As stated previously, it is the Committee's position that
it will fully support the DNI in his efforts to coordinate the
Intelligence Community's efforts to provide quality information
to the various U.S. government users.
Looking at the Community as a whole today, the Committee
finds continuing gaps in capabilities and fundamental flaws in
the management of resources and personnel that should
ultimately remedy those gaps. To the extent that these concerns
may be outlined in an unclassified manner, the Committee has,
in part, addressed them in the ``Areas of Special Interest/
General Provisions'' section immediately following. A complete
discussion of the Committee's specific oversight findings and
recommendations is contained in the classified annex to this
report. This legislation, along with its accompanying report
and classified annex, contains the Committee's specific
recommendations as to where the U.S. Intelligence Community
should be heading, how it can posture itself for strategic
superiority, and how the fiscal year 2006 intelligence budget
should be invested.
B. LEGISLATION
The bill and accompanying classified schedule of
authorizations includes the Committee's recommended
authorizations for the President's Fiscal Year 2006 budget
request. This includes an authorization for the intelligence
portion of the expected Fiscal Year 2006 supplemental funding
requirement for the world-wide effort against terrorism and
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Committee views these
funds as an integral part of the fiscal year 2006 budget and
has decided to specifically authorize these activities for the
full year in this legislation.
The Committee applauds the President for requesting, in the
base budget request, a large portion of the surge funding that
is expected for the Global War on Terrorism for fiscal year
2006. The Committee understands that this does not obviate the
total funding need, but notes that this is a major step toward
ending the practice--begun in earlier administrations--of
funding critical operational intelligence and military
requirements via supplemental appropriations. Funding by
supplemental is a practice the Committee has addressed in great
detail in past reports, and one that it believes should end.
H.R. 2475 provides strategic and substantial enhancements
in funding for critical world-wide intelligence capabilities.
As stated, the Committee believes there is an urgent need to
betterbalance funding for human capabilities and technical
collection systems. For a number of reasons fully explained in the
classified annex, the Committee has made some specific and major
recommendations to realign funding. These changes include:
Increased investment in U.S. human intelligence
(HUMINT) activities, including training,
infrastructure, and global capabilities;
Improvements to intelligence analysis: training,
coverage and depth;
Reductions or eliminations of funding for redundant
or unjustified technical collection systems;
Improvements to the structure and management of the
disparate elements of the intelligence community's
information technology systems; and
Increases to U.S. counterintelligence resources and
capabilities.
In addition to authorization for intelligence and
intelligence-related activities, the bill includes provisions
intended to clarify certain authorities of the Director of
National Intelligence and of the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency. These provisions are intended to further
refine and strengthen the authorities provided to the DNI in
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
with the goal of ensuring that the Director has full authority
to oversee, coordinate, and manage the activities of the
Intelligence Community.
The Committee reported this legislation favorably to carry
out the results of its intensive research into the many
functions, operations, and acquisition programs of the
Intelligence Community. These actions are, in many respects, a
departure from the norm as they are neither minimalistic nor
timid ``nibbling at the edges.'' The recommendations made by
the Committee are bold and decisive and are intended to begin a
process of fundamental change for the Intelligence Community.
Although the Committee expects some discomfort within the
Intelligence Community with respect to some of the provisions,
it agrees with numerous outside observers that the Intelligence
Community requires external assistance to affect meaningful
change. The Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006
is intended to provide such assistance.
C. ENHANCED CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
The Committee's legislative recommendations are only part
of its responsibility for overseeing the nation's intelligence
efforts. The reforms recommended by the 9/11 and WMD
Commissions were intended to improve the intelligence
capabilities of the nation--regardless of branch of government.
Based on that intent, the Committee has taken a number of steps
to improve overall Community management and congressional
oversight.
Recommendations for change, for example, also included
congressional oversight. To improve its ability to more
effectively oversee the Intelligence Community, the Committee
has created a Subcommittee on Oversight. The Oversight
Subcommittee is tasked with general oversight of the activities
of the Intelligence Community, and will place special emphasis
on overseeing the implementation of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. The Subcommittee is also
focused on ensuring the IC properly aligns collection,
analysis, and dissemination efforts against known and expected
future threats. The Subcommittee aims to assist in transforming
the IC into a collaborative and effective community, in the
truest sense.
The Subcommittee has also begun to review issues that
suggest the possibility of pervasive problems that require
review or discrete recommendations for resolution. One such
example is information sharing. The Committee believes that
methods and procedures must be put into place to properly share
and assure access to information for the people who need it,
regardless of the specific agency to which they belong.
Information ``ownership'' must be a concept of the past, not
the future.
The Committee believes that a way to effectively ensure the
necessary reforms discussed here is through a strategic
planning process developed by the DNI for the entire community.
Elsewhere in this report, the Committee recommends that the
Director of National Intelligence create a formalized,
periodic, structured review process for the Intelligence
Community, much like the Department of Defense's Quadrennial
Review Process.
D. AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST/GENERAL PROVISIONS
In this section, the Committee highlights areas of concern
that it believes must be addressed with a high priority by the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI), as the leader of the
Intelligence Community, if intelligence sufficient to protect
our national security is to be obtained and provided to policy
makers. The Committee places particular emphasis on issues that
impact the Intelligence Community as a whole or that involve
several programs.
Strategic planning process
The Committee believes that achieving the necessary reforms
of the Intelligence Community will only occur through a
strategic planning process. The Committee notes that a
formalized, periodic, and structured review, much like the
Quadrennial Defense Review process used by the Department of
Defense, could be a model for the Intelligence Community. Such
a strategic review, and the resulting forward-looking strategy,
could identify the breadth and depth of the threats, the
capabilities existing and needed to combat those threats, and
better identify the alignment of resources, authorities, and
personnel needed to support those required capabilities. Such a
review could enable the Intelligence Community to more readily
make and accept change, infuse flexibility into its management
and operational structures, and would enable the Director of
National Intelligence to gain insight over the intelligence and
intelligence-related resources throughout the United States
government.
Therefore, the Committee recommends that the Director of
National Intelligence develop a process for a Quadrennial
Intelligence Review by the end of fiscal year 2008. The
Committee requests the DNI provide the Intelligence Committees
of the House and Senate a plan for initiating and conducting
this review. With the help of this review, the DNI should
develop and periodically adjust a National Intelligence
Strategy that would inform the types of informationneeded to
support national priorities and objectives. Determination could then be
made about which intelligence discipline, or disciplines, can best
provide the required information. Those decisions could in turn flow
down to the development and tasking of specific capabilities. Once this
is completed, the DNI would be better postured to allocate the funding
for the various capabilities needed and to project future budget
resources required by the various intelligence disciplines.
Comprehensive inventory of Department of Defense intelligence programs
The Committee notes and appreciates that the Department of
Defense is working with the Committee and the Intelligence
Community to provide greater visibility into those
intelligence-related programs funded within the Department. The
Committee understands that Department has initiatives underway
to develop a Military Intelligence Program (MIP) that will
provide greater visibility for congressional committees with
oversight responsibility. Unfortunately, the Committee believes
that it does not have full visibility over some defense
intelligence programs that do not clearly fall into the Joint
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP) or under Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) categories.
Specifically, the Committee notes that individual services may
have intelligence or intelligence-related programs such as
science and technology projects or information operations
programs related to defense intelligence that are embedded in
other service budget line items, precluding sufficient
visibility for program oversight. Greater transparency into
these programs and projects will enhance congressional
oversight and permit identification of potentially duplicative
programs in other services.
The Committee directs the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, where
appropriate, to provide to the armed services and intelligence
committees a comprehensive inventory of Department of Defense
intelligence and intelligence-related programs and projects. It
is not intended that this inventory encompass military
operations or military activities. This inventory shall abide
by existing procedures for the handling of special access
programs referenced in Section 119 of title 10, United States
Code and applicable Department of Defense directives.
This report will be delivered to the congressional
committees within 180 days of the enactment of this bill.
Budget execution authority
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 gave the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
significant new budgetary responsibilities and authorities,
particularly in relation to budget execution. The DNI is now
responsible for the effective execution of the annual
intelligence budget. The legislation gave the DNI a number of
budgetary tools to accomplish this through the funding process.
For example, The Director of Management and Budget apportions
the appropriations for the annual National Intelligence Program
(NIP) at the exclusive direction of the DNI. The DNI has the
legal authority to direct the allocation and allotment of NIP
funding to each intelligence organization through the
departmental secretaries. Each departmental comptroller
provides funds to the individual intelligence organizations
based on the DNI's direction in an ``expeditious manner.'' Once
the funds are transferred to an intelligence organization, it
is the responsibility of the DNI to monitor the implementation
and execution of that budget. And, finally, the DNI is required
by law to notify Congress each time he discovers that a
departmental comptroller has not followed his explicit
direction.
Finally, the Committee recognizes that the DNI has just
recently been sworn in and taken on the responsibilities of the
new position, but believes that he should begin immediately to
establish the budgetary processes and procedures, in
consultation with the department secretaries and each
intelligence organization, to carry out these budgetary
oversight responsibilities and authorities. These authorities
will be one of the DNI's most important management tools with
which to drive reform across the Intelligence Community. In the
Committee's view, it is essential that the DNI begin exercising
these authorities as soon as possible. There remains some
concern that there will be resistance on the part of some to
develop the necessary processes to instantiate these statutory
responsibilities. The Committee urges the departments and
Intelligence Community agencies to move quickly to develop the
procedures and processes the DNI needs to effectively exercise
his budget authorities. The Committee requests that copies of
departmental and agency procedures developed to respond to DNI
budgetary process requirements be delivered to the intelligence
authorization committees as soon as they become available.
The Committee recognizes that the DNI is in the midst of
establishing the Office of the DNI and that he will need to
increase the number of staff with Intelligence Community budget
execution expertise. The Committee believes that the Office of
Management and Budget should assist the DNI in establishing
this functional component within the Office of the DNI.
Integrated intelligence enterprise
The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the
United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD
Commission) recommended the creation of an ``integrated
collection enterprise'' to ensure that the decentralized
Intelligence Community collection capabilities could be managed
in a coordinated way so as to address the many intelligence
priorities. According to the report, such integration would
occur only by managing the Intelligence Community ``above the
stovepipes'' using ``mission managers.'' These mission managers
would develop cross-discipline collection and analysis
strategies. Such strategies would require that individual
agencies fully share information across the intelligence
enterprise and that ``information ownership'' becomes a concept
of the past.
The Committee agrees with the WMD Commission that the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) should focus on
integrating the Intelligence Community so that it acts as a
single enterprise with unity of action against the highest
priority intelligence issues. The WMD Commission's report, the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and
the confirmation of the DNI present a unique opportunity for
this necessary reform to proceed.
The Committee also agrees that the concept of mission
managers appears to be sound and that this should build on the
excellent work done by the Associate Director of Central
Intelligence for Collection (ADCI/C) and the Collection Concept
Development Center. From the Committee's perspective, the ADCI/
C did not have sufficient funding or personnel to truly drive
collection across all the top priority targets, despite that
fact he consistently worked to developan Intelligence Community
collection strategy for the most important targets. The ADCI/C's
efforts resulted in some success to conduct collection in an integrated
fashion and to develop new strategies that included highly innovative
collection techniques. The ADCI/C's efforts were, however, limited with
respect to incorporating the Department of Defense's Joint Military
Intelligence Program and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities
programs and capabilities by the extent to which the DoD was willing to
participate. The Committee believes that all components of the
Intelligence Community must be responsive to the Collection Concept
Development Center, and that the DNI should build on the
ADCI/C's previous integration efforts by creating mission managers for
each priority intelligence target.
The WMD Commission envisioned the mission managers
cataloging what the Intelligence Community knows about a
target, what the Intelligence Community needs to know about a
target, and what collection capabilities can potentially do
against a target, including sensitive collection capabilities.
The Committee believes creation of mission managers could allow
for the chairing of a ``target development board'' consisting
of target experts, both analysts and representatives from each
of the collection disciplines, who would create strategies to
conduct rationalized collection by the appropriate application
of HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, Open Source, and MASINT capabilities.
Such a strategic approach could assign collection
responsibility to the capabilities that best provide the needed
information. If none of the existing ``stovepiped''
capabilities could address the need, then the mission manager
and board would develop/propose new processes and methods to
address collection of the needed information.
The strategies developed by mission managers should be end-
to-end, focusing on analyst-driven collection through
information dissemination, allocating analytic responsibility
so that all aspects of priority intelligence issues are
addressed. The mission managers could also develop the analytic
standards and strategies for the mission, identifying the
skills and experience that are necessary for the analysts and
drive their training and career development. Allocation of
analytic responsibility should also factor in the need for
independent analysis and unique departmental analytic
requirements. The Committee is convinced that mission managers
and coordinated target development are important pieces of the
overall integration of the Intelligence Community.
Finally, the Committee believes that the DNI and the
mission managers must facilitate analysts' access to all
necessary information. The DNI should establish a community-
wide information access approval process to enable full access
based on mission roles and defined security methodologies.
Access to information should be based on roles and mission, not
the agency for which a particular analyst works. Again, data
ownership within the Intelligence Community must become a
concept of the past. Access should be subject to the DNI's
determination, balancing the need to protect sources and
methods with the analysts need to access relevant data. For
extremely sensitive collection capabilities, the Committee
believes that the DNI should develop specific methods for
ensuring necessary data is available to the analyst cadre, but
that such restrictions should balance security with the
accomplishment of mission. Collected intelligence belongs to
the U.S. Government, not to individual collection agencies.
Simply stated, the DNI must empower the Intelligence Community,
through firm policies and directives, to increase information
integration.
Therefore, the Committee believes the DNI should establish
mission managers for priority intelligence targets, some of
which will be transitory in nature and eliminated as missions
change. The Committee agrees with the various commission
reports that better integration of the disparate agencies and
entities within the Intelligence Community is the most
important challenge facing the DNI. Finally, to ensure the most
optimum intelligence capabilities for the future, the DNI and
the Secretary of Defense must ensure that the intelligence and
intelligence-related activities within the Department of
Defense are seamlessly integrated into the DNI's processes.
Intelligence analysis
One of the most important emphasis areas on which the
Committee has focused is analysis. The Committee feels strongly
that analysis must be the keystone of the Intelligence
Community. Because effective intelligence production requires
putting together puzzles without all the pieces, and the
collection of intelligence is an imperfect art rather than a
science, it is imperative that the data collected through the
nation's various collection capabilities be analyzed in a
timely, accurate manner. The needs of the analytic corps and
the production of substantive finished intelligence reports
must drive collection efforts and associated funding. Decision
makers rely on analysis to enable strategic responses to
threats as well as tactical efforts to preempt attacks. Indeed,
analysis must identify threats and enemies, inform about the
specific intentions of those enemies, and equip the nation to
better combat these identified threats.
U.S. Intelligence Community analysts are the best in the
world, but the analysis they produce is not always as good as
is needed. A number of shortcomings continue to limit the
Intelligence Community's ability to give our national decision
makers sufficient insight into complex issues and warning of
over-the-horizon threats. No one can reasonably expect perfect
knowledge, but the Committee expects the DNI, using authorities
provided by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004, to address shortcomings that prevent analysis from
playing a more central role in Community activities. The
Committee applauds the creation of a Deputy DNI for Analysis
(DDNI/A) position within the DNI's office as this indicates the
priority that will be given to this issue.
Notwithstanding the positive steps already taken, the
Committee believes that there are a number of additional steps
the DNI should take to improve Community analytic quality:
(1) Demand more strategic analysis of medium and
long-term threats. The DNI should encourage analysts to
identify critical factors and potential variables for
their consumers, possible outcomes, potential
``leverage points'' and information gaps related to
problems under analysis. The Director also should make
sure that the analytic community is not ``short
changing'' support mid-level and junior consumers.
(2) Develop a well-trained, experienced analytic
corps that is large enough to drive the rest of the
Intelligence Community's actions. The DNI must create
new recruitment and utilization strategies that make
best use of the highly-transitory 21st Century
workforce and strengthen retention to the maximum
extent possible by creating incentives for career
analysts tobecome substantive experts. The CIA's Senior
Analytic Service encourages strategic intelligence, rewards sound
tradecraft, and recognizes in-depth expertise; the Deputy DNI for
Analysis should look into creating a Community-wide program modeled on
it. Moreover, the workforce must be large enough to allow analysts to
develop expertise on a particular issue, instead of being ``surged''
from one crisis to the next.
(3) Ensure that analysts have training and related
resources to prepare them for their responsibilities.
Analysts and their supervisors should also be taught to
use structured analysis, and should be given a thorough
understanding of intelligence collection methods,
procedures and systems.
(4) Create a corporate enterprise of analysts across
the Intelligence Community. Analysts need information
technology tools to help them collaborate and share
information virtually, but more importantly they need
to be taught that their counterparts at other agencies
are not rivals. The DNI should initiate activities to
strengthen ties among analysts across the Intelligence
Community. These activities could include regular
roundtables--both physical and virtual--where analysts
covering specific issues can meet one another and
exchange ideas, the creation of analytic community-of-
interest mailing lists, Intelligence Community-wide
seminars and lectures, and off-site retreats where
analysts from across the Community can build
professional networks. The Committee also expects the
DNI to develop and enforce Intelligence Community-wide
standards for analytic tradecraft and training.
(5) Break down the walls between analysts and
collectors. The DNI should develop Mission Managers
and/or Centers of analysts and collectors from across
the Intelligence Community to direct intelligence
collection to best meet the highest priority
requirements and fill analytic gaps.
(6) Enable the Intelligence Community to better
harness open source information and outside expertise
to complement and enhance clandestine sources of
information. In addition to spurring the development of
technology tools to drive use of open sources, the DNI
needs to push the Intelligence Community to
reinvigorate its libraries, hire researchers to help
analysts sort wheat from chaff, and train analysts on
the value and use of available alternative resources.
The DNI should also review security policies and legal
restrictions across the Intelligence Community with the
aim of enabling analyst interaction with outside
peers--particularly scientists and engineers who could
help assess the significance of technology information
and programs.
The DNI and the DDNI/A are inheriting a talented analytic
corps. However, several key recommendations regarding analysis
must be implemented. The Committee has recommended additional
funds for the Intelligence Community in fiscal year 2006 to
hire more analysts, develop analytic tradecraft and tools, and
evaluate its training capacity. The Committee expects the DNI
to use these funds to act decisively to correct the Community's
analytic problems and hopes to see progress before the next
fiscal year. The Committee will fully support the DNI in the
pursuit of this goal.
Improper disclosures of classified information
The Committee is concerned about continuing instances of
improper disclosure of classified information and shares the
conclusion of the President's Commission on the Intelligence
Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass
Destruction that ``a persistent inability to protect human and
technical collection sources and methods has substantially
damaged U.S. intelligence capabilities.'' As the Commission
noted and discussed in greater detail in the classified version
of its report, authorized and unauthorized disclosures have
compromised critical signals interception and satellite imagery
programs, as well as hard-earned human intelligence sources.
The Committee is also concerned about several recent such
incidents not discussed in the Commission's report.
The Committee will continue to focus careful attention on
this issue, and it encourages the Department of Justice to
place a higher priority on investigating and prosecuting
illegal disclosures of classified information. As the
Commission noted, hundreds of ``leaks'' have been reported to
the Department over the past ten years, without a single
indictment or prosecution. The Committee also will seek to
ensure that the DNI and individual agencies within the
intelligence community are aggressively pursuing whatever
administrative remedies may be available to them to deal with
unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
Protecting analytic integrity
As stated previously, consumers of intelligence must be
confident that the intelligence assessments on which they rely
reflect the best judgments of knowledgeable analysts. The
Committee notes that Section 1020 of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requires the Director of
National Intelligence to identify an individual within the
Office of the DNI who shall be available to analysts with
respect to issues relating to analytic tradecraft and the
objectivity of intelligence analysis. The section also requires
a report to Congress on the implementation of this provision
within 270 days after the effective date of the Act. Although
this report is not yet due for submission, the Committee
stresses its continuing interest in the DNI's implementation of
Section 1020.
Increased use of open source intelligence
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 noted the critical value of open source intelligence
(OSINT) and stated Congress's belief that all elements of the
Intelligence Community should make extensive use of open source
information. The Act recommended that the DNI explore the
possible establishment of a center for the purpose of
collecting, analyzing, producing, and disseminating open source
intelligence. The President's Commission on the Intelligence
Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass
Destruction echoed these sentiments, adding that the
Intelligence Community must make use of new technologies that
can retrieve, store, translate, search, prioritize, and
otherwise exploit the vast amounts of open source information
available.
The DNI has expressed to the Committee his view that OSINT
is important for the future of intelligence and that he intends
to determine how best to pursue the best use of
unclassifieddata. The Committee notes its continued interest in this
issue and in receiving additional information with respect to the DNI's
plans to more fully collect and utilize OSINT.
Accountability reviews
The Committee notes its continued interest in two matters
related to potential accountability issues within the
Intelligence Community. The first is the CIA's ongoing review
relating to the accountability, if warranted, of any
individuals who may have failed to meet professional standards
related to the identification, prevention, or disruption of
terrorist attacks, including the 9/11 attacks. The second is
the recommendation of the President's Commission on the
Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding
Weapons of Mass Destruction with respect to accountability. The
Committee expects the Intelligence Community to provide a
timely response to its inquiries with respect to these matters,
as it does with all Committee inquiries.
El Paso Intelligence Center
The Committee believes that one of the key responsibilities
of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) is to improve
the quality of intelligence related to the security of the
homeland. The DNI will have to ensure that intelligence and law
enforcement agencies go in and produce reliable and actionable
information regarding a wide variety of threats, including the
trafficking of narcotics, humans, and weapons--activities that
may support terrorist actions, undermine the social fabric, or
attack the economic vitality of our nation.
The Committee notes the important role that the El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC) plays in providing information on
such threats to the Intelligence Community and to Federal,
State, and local law enforcement agencies. EPIC's operations-
oriented intelligence initiatives support the interdiction and
disruption of illicit activities along the nation's southwest
border, thereby playing a critical role in countering possible
acts of terrorism and mitigating other threats to the homeland.
The role of the Intelligence Community in focusing more
attention to the Central and South American areas is addressed
extensively elsewhere in this report.
Although authorization for the activities at EPIC is not
within the Committee's jurisdiction, the Committee recommends
that the DNI leverage EPIC's expertise, endorse greater
information-sharing between EPIC and the Intelligence
Community, and encourage a closer and more collaborative
working relationship between EPIC and members of the
Intelligence Community.
Committee Consideration and Rollcall Votes
On May 24, 2004, the Committee met in open and closed
session and ordered the bill H.R. 2475 favorably reported, as
amended.
OPEN SESSION
In open session, the Committee considered the text of the
bill H.R. 2475.
Chairman Hoekstra offered an amendment in the nature of a
substitute to H.R. 2475, which was adopted by voice vote after
consideration of the following amendments to the amendment in
the nature of a substitute. The contents of the amendment in
the nature of a substitute are described in the Section-by-
Section analysis and the Explanation of Amendment.
Ms. Harman offered an amendment to strike Section 305 of
the amendment in the nature of a substitute, which clarifies
existing language requiring personnel transfers for new
National Intelligence Centers to be conducted ``in consultation
with'' the committees of jurisdiction.
A recorded vote on this amendment was taken, and the
Members present recorded their votes as follows: Mr. Hoekstra
(Chairman)--no; Mr. LaHood--no; Mr. Cunningham--no; Mr.
Everett--no; Mr. Gallegly--no; Ms. Wilson--no; Ms. Davis--no;
Mr. Thornberry--no; Mr. McHugh--no; Mr. Tiahrt--no; Mr.
Rogers--no; Mr. Renzi--no; Ms. Harman--aye; Mr. Hastings--aye;
Mr. Reyes--aye; Mr. Boswell--aye; Mr. Cramer--aye; Ms. Eshoo--
aye; Mr. Holt--aye; Mr. Ruppersberger--aye; Mr. Tierney--aye.
Therefore, on a vote of 9 ayes and 12 noes, the amendment was
rejected.
Ms. Eshoo offered and, after debate, received unanimous
consent to withdraw an amendment to establish an Inspector
General hotline.
Mr. Ruppersberger offered and, after debate, received
unanimous consent to withdraw an amendment relating to the
security clearance process for state and local officials.
CLOSED SESSION
Ms. Harman then moved that the Committee close the meeting
on the ground that public discussion of the classified portions
of the bill could endanger national security.
A recorded vote was taken, and the Members present recorded
their votes as follows: Mr. Hoekstra (Chairman)--aye; Mr.
Everett--aye; Mr. Gallegly--aye; Ms. Wilson--aye; Ms. Davis--
aye; Mr. Thornberry--aye; Mr. McHugh--aye; Mr. Rogers--aye; Ms.
Harman--aye; Mr. Boswell--aye; Mr. Cramer--aye; Ms. Eshoo--aye;
Mr. Ruppersberger--aye. Therefore, on a vote of 13 ayes and 0
noes, the meeting was closed.
Mr. Reyes offered an amendment to modify the funding level
for a program contained in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations that was adopted by voice vote.
Mr. Everett offered and, after debate, received unanimous
consent to withdraw an amendment to modify the funding level
for a program contained in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations.
Ms. Harman offered and, after debate, received unanimous
consent to withdraw an amendment to modify the funding level
for a program contained in the classified Schedule of
Authorizations.
The Committee then adopted the classified Schedule of
Authorizations, as amended, by voice vote.
OPEN SESSION
By unanimous consent, the Committee returned to open
session. By voice vote, the Committee adopted a motion by the
Chairman to favorably report the bill H.R. 2475 to the House as
amended with an amendment in the nature of a substitute.
Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of Amendment
The provisions of the Substitute are as follows:
Section 1--Short Title and Table of Contents
Section 1 contains the short title for the bill and the
Table of Contents.
TITLE I--INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Section 101--Authorization of Appropriations
Section 101 of the bill authorizes appropriations for the
intelligence and intelligence-related activities of these
elements of the United States Government: The Office of the
Director of National Intelligence (including the National
Counterterrorism Center), the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Department of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the
National Security Agency, the Departments of the Army, Navy and
Air Force, the Department of State, the Department of the
Treasury, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National
Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the Coast Guard, and the
Department of Homeland Security.
Section 102--Classified Schedule of Authorizations
Section 102 provides that the amounts and personnel
ceilings authorized under Section 101 shall be specified in the
accompanying classified Schedule of Authorizations, which shall
be made available to the Committee on Appropriations and to the
President.
Section 103--Personnel Ceiling Adjustments
Section 103 permits the Director of National Intelligence
to authorize employment of civilian personnel in excess of the
authorized number when the DNI determines that it is necessary
to the performance of important intelligence functions and
promptly notifies the congressional intelligence committees.
Section 104--Intelligence community management account
Section 104 authorizes specified funds, as well as
classified amounts, for the Intelligence Community Management
Account and provides that personnel detailed to that staff from
other agencies are detailed on a reimbursable basis.
TITLE II--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY SYSTEM
Section 201--Authorization of appropriations
Section 201 authorizes funds for the CIA Retirement and
Disability System.
TITLE III--GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 301--Increase in employee compensation and benefits authorized
by law
Section 301 permits the authorized amounts to be increased
to provide increases in compensation and benefits authorized by
law.
Section 302--Restriction on conduct of intelligence activities
Section 302 provides that the authorization of funds in
this act does not constitute authority for the conduct of any
intelligence activity not otherwise authorized by the
Constitution or laws of the United States.
Section 303--Authority of the DNI to appoint overseas representatives
Section 303 authorizes the Director of National
Intelligence to assign an individual to be a representative of
the DNI to support each Chief of Mission in a foreign country.
The DNI's representative shall oversee and manage all
intelligence and intelligence-related activities in that
country. Section 303 also clarifies that this authority does
not supercede the authority of the CIA Director to coordinate
human intelligence collection overseas, but that the CIA
Director's authority to do so is subject to the DNI's broader
coordination, oversight and management authority.
Section 304--Clarification of delegation of transfer or reprogramming
authority
Section 304 provides a technical clarification that the
authority to concur in DNI reprogramming of funds in excess of
the statutory limitations may only be made by the head of an
executive department or (in the case of the CIA only) by the
Director of the CIA.
Section 305--Approval of personnel transfer for new National
Intelligence Center
Section 305 clarifies that the DNI's authority to transfer
personnel in conjunction with establishment of a new National
Intelligence Center is subject to a response from the
congressional committees of jurisdiction with respect to
notification. This provision is intended to clarify existing
language requiring such transfers to be conducted ``in
consultation with'' the committees of jurisdiction. The
provision does not apply to the DNI's general personnel
transfer authorities.
Section 306--Additional duties for the DNI Director of Science and
Technology
Section 306 provides that the DNI Science and Technology
Committee shall prioritize research and development related to
intelligence (in addition to coordinating such research and
development), including identification of basic, applied, and
advanced research programs to be carried out by the
intelligence community. The DNI's Director of Science and
Technology is also directed to assist the DNI in establishing
goals for the elements of the intelligence community to meet
its technology needs. Section 306 further provides for a report
to Congress by the DNI containing a strategy for the
development and use of technology in the intelligence community
through 2021.
Section 307--Comprehensive inventory of special access programs
Section 307 requires the DNI to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees by January 15, 2006, a classified
comprehensive inventory of special access programs conducted
within the National Intelligence Program.
Section 308--Sense of Congress on budget execution procedures
Section 308 expresses the Sense of Congress that the DNI
should expeditiously establish the necessary processes and
procedures with the heads of executive departments and agencies
to carry out the budgetary execution authorities in the
National Security Intelligence Reform Act of 2004.
Section 309--Sense of Congress with respect to multi-level security
clearances
Section 309 expresses the Sense of Congress that the DNI
should promptly establish and oversee the implementation of a
multi-level security clearance system across the intelligence
community to leverage skills of individuals proficient in
foreign languages.
TITLE IV--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Section 401--CIA coordination of human intelligence
Section 401 provides two clarifications with respect to the
authority of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to
coordinate intelligence overseas. First, it clarifies that the
authority extends to all human intelligence collected overseas
by any department, agency, or element of the United States
Government. Second, it clarifies that the Director of the CIA
shall develop a process for such coordination, subject to the
approval of the DNI. The DNI also may determine which
activities will be subject to the process.
Oversight Findings and Recommendations
With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, the Committee held 10 hearings
and briefings on the classified budgetary issues raised by H.R.
2475. Testimony was taken from senior officials of the Central
Intelligence Agency; the Community Management Staff; the
Department of Defense; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the
National Security Agency; the National Reconnaissance Office;
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency; the Departments of
the Army, Navy, and Air Force; the Department of State; the
Department of Treasury; the Department of Energy; the Federal
Bureau of Investigation; the Department of Homeland Security;
and the U.S. Coast Guard. Such testimony related to the
activities and plans of the Intelligence Community covered by
the provisions and authorizations, both classified and
unclassified, of the `Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2006.' The bill, as reported by the Committee, reflects
conclusions reached by the Committee in light of this oversight
activity.
General Performance Goals and Objectives
In accordance with Clause (3)(c) of House rule XIII, the
Committee's performance goals and objectives are reflected in
the descriptive portions of this report.
Constitutional Authority Statement
The intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the
United States government are carried out to support the
national security interests of the United States, to support
and assist the armed forces of the United States, and to
support the President in the execution of the foreign policy of
the United States.
Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution of the United
States provides, in pertinent part, that `Congress shall have
power * * * to pay the debts and provide for the common defense
and general welfare of the United States; * * *'; `to raise and
support Armies, * * *' `to provide and maintain a Navy; * * *'
and `to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution * * * all other powers vested by this
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof.'
Unfunded Mandate Statement
Section 423 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act (as amended by Section 101(a)(2) of the Unfunded
Mandates Reform Act, P.L. 104-4) requires a statement of
whether the provisions of the reported bill include unfunded
mandates. In compliance with this requirement, the Committee
has received a letter from the Congressional Budget Office
included herein.
Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate
With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule
XIII of the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the
Congressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect to
requirements of 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the House of
Representatives and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act
of 1974, the Committee has received the following cost estimate
for H.R. 2475 from the Director of the Congressional Budget
Office:
U.S. Congress,
Congressional Budget Office,
Washington, DC, May 31, 2005.
Hon. Peter Hoekstra,
Chairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has
prepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 2475, the
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006.
If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be
pleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jason
Wheelock.
Sincerely,
Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director.
Enclosure.
H.R. 2475--Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006
H.R. 2475 would authorize appropriations for fiscal year
2006 for intelligence activities of the U.S. government, the
Intelligence Community Management Account, and the Central
Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System (CIARDS).
This estimate addresses only the unclassified portion of
the bill. CBO cannot obtain the necessary information to
estimate the costs for the entire bill because some parts are
classified at a level above clearances held by CBO employees.
For purposes of this estimate, CBO assumes that the bill will
be enacted by October 1, 2005, and that the necessary amounts
will be appropriated for fiscal year 2006. Estimated outlays
are based on historical spending patterns. The costs of this
legislation fall within budget function 050 (national defense).
Section 104 would authorize the appropriation of $446
million for the Intelligence Community Management Account,
which provides the principal source of funding for the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence and provides resources
for coordination of programs, budget oversight, and management
of the intelligence agencies. CBO estimates that implementing
this provision would cost $268 million in 2006 and $442 million
over the 2005-2010 period, assuming appropriation of the
specified amounts.
Section 201 would authorize the appropriation of $245
million for CIARDS to cover retirement costs attributable to
military service and various unfunded liabilities. The
appropriation to CIARDS is considered mandatory, and the
authorization under this bill would be the same as assumed in
the CBO baseline. Thus, this estimate does not ascribe any
additional cost to that provision. The bill would not affect
revenues.
H.R. 2475 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector
mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and
would not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal
governments.
The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Jason Wheelock.
This estimate was approved by Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy
Assistant Director for Budget Analysis.
Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported
In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of
the House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by
the bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law
proposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new
matter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is
proposed is shown in roman):
NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947
* * * * * * *
TITLE I--COORDINATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
* * * * * * *
RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Sec. 102A. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Role of Director of National Intelligence in Transfer and
Reprogramming of Funds.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(5)(A) * * *
(B) A transfer or reprogramming may be made without regard to
a limitation set forth in clause (iv) or (v) of subparagraph
(A) if the transfer has the concurrence of the head of the
department involved or the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (in the case of the Central Intelligence Agency). The
authority to provide such concurrence may only be delegated by
the head of the department [or agency involved] involved or the
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (in the case of the
Central Intelligence Agency) to the deputy of such officer.
* * * * * * *
(e) Transfer of Personnel.--(1)(A) In addition to any other
authorities available under law for such purposes, in the first
twelve months after establishment of a new national
intelligence center, the Director of National Intelligence,
with the approval of the Director of the Office of Management
and Budget and in consultation with the congressional
committees of jurisdiction referred to in subparagraph (B), may
transfer not more than 100 personnel authorized for elements of
the intelligence community to such center.
(B) The Director of National Intelligence [shall promptly
provide notice of any transfer of personnel made pursuant to
this paragraph to--] may not transfer personnel under
subparagraph (A) unless the Director has provided notice of any
transfer of personnel to be made pursuant to this paragraph and
received a response from--
(i) the congressional intelligence committees;
(ii) the Committees on Appropriations of the Senate
and the House of Representatives;
(iii) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or
from the Department of Defense, the Committees on Armed
Services of the Senate and the House of
Representatives; and
(iv) in the case of the transfer of personnel to or
from the Department of Justice, to the Committees on
the Judiciary of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
[(C) The Director shall include in any notice under
subparagraph (B) an explanation of the nature of the transfer
and how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection.]
(C) The Director shall include in any notice under
subparagraph (B)--
(i) an explanation of the nature of the transfer and
how it satisfies the requirements of this subsection;
(ii) the number of personnel transferred; and
(iii) the individual skills and capabilities of the
personnel involved.
* * * * * * *
(k) Coordination With Foreign Governments.--(1) Under the
direction of the President and in a manner consistent with
section 207 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C.
3927), the Director of National Intelligence shall oversee the
coordination of the relationships between elements of the
intelligence community and the intelligence or security
services of foreign governments or international organizations
on all matters involving intelligence related to the national
security or involving intelligence acquired through clandestine
means.
(2)(A) The Director may assign an individual to be a
representative of the Director at a United States mission in a
foreign country. Any such individual shall oversee and manage
all intelligence and intelligence-related activities conducted
in that country by personnel of any element of the intelligence
community.
(B)(i) Subparagraph (A) shall not be construed to supersede
the authority of the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency described in clause (ii), such authority being subject
to general oversight by the Director of National Intelligence
under paragraph (1).
(ii) The authority referred to in clause (i) is the authority
under section 104A(f) to coordinate relationships between
elements of the intelligence community and the intelligence or
security services of foreign governments or international
organizations generally and the authority under section
104A(d)(3) to provide overall direction for and coordination of
the collection of human intelligence outside the United States.
* * * * * * *
DIRECTOR OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Sec. 103E. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(c) Duties.--The Director of Science and Technology shall--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(4) assist the Director on the science and technology
elements of the budget of the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence; [and]
(5) assist the Director in establishing goals for the
elements of the intelligence community to meet the
technology needs of the community; and
[(5)] (6) perform other such duties as may be
prescribed by the Director of National Intelligence or
specified by law.
(d) Director of National Intelligence Science and Technology
Committee.--(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) The Committee shall--
(A) coordinate and prioritize advances in research
and development related to intelligence; and
* * * * * * *
(4) In carrying out paragraph (3)(A), the Committee shall
identify basic, advanced, and applied research programs to be
carried out by elements of the intelligence community.
* * * * * * *
(e) Goals for Technology Needs of the Intelligence
Community.--In carrying out subsection (c)(5), the Director of
Science and Technology shall--
(1) perform systematic identification and assessment
of the most significant intelligence challenges that
require technical solutions; and
(2) examine options to enhance the responsiveness of
research and design programs to meet the requirements
of the intelligence community for timely support.
* * * * * * *
DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Sec. 104A. (a) * * *
* * * * * * *
(d) Responsibilities.--The Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency shall--
(1) * * *
* * * * * * *
(3) [provide overall direction for and coordination
of the collection of national intelligence outside the
United States through human sources by elements of the
intelligence community] subject to subsection (h),
provide overall direction for and coordination of the
collection of human intelligence outside the United
States by any department, agency, or element of the
United States Government authorized to undertake such
collection and, in coordination with other departments,
agencies, or elements of the United States Government
which are authorized to undertake such collection,
ensure that the most effective use is made of resources
and that appropriate account is taken of the risks to
the United States and those involved in such
collection; and
* * * * * * *
(h) Clarification of Roles of DNI and DCIA With Respect to
Human Intelligence Collection.--(1) In carrying out subsection
(d)(3), the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall
develop a process for the coordination of the collection of
human intelligence outside of the United States. Such process
shall be subject to the approval of the Director of National
Intelligence.
(2) The Director of National Intelligence shall determine
which human intelligence collection activities shall be subject
to the process developed under paragraph (1).
* * * * * * *
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
The Intelligence Authorization bill for FY 2006 is the
first authorization bill to be considered since the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L.
108-458) became law last December. The reforms undertaken last
year, in the aftermath of two intelligence failures, created a
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and dramatically
reshaped the Intelligence Community. This authorization bill
will therefore help define the authorities, priorities and
direction of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) and
the entire Intelligence Community.
We strongly support many aspects of this bill, which
provides the resources for the brave men and women of the
Intelligence Community who stand on the front lines in defense
of our country. We salute their courage and dedication.
This year, the President sent to Congress a budget that
again fell short in counterterrorism funding, requesting just
40% of the community's counterterrorism requirements for FY
2006. We are pleased the full Committee took the step in this
bill to authorize 100% of the Intelligence Community's
counterterrorism funding needs. This is in significant contrast
to the FY 2005 Intelligence Authorization bill which funded
only 26% of intelligence counterterrorism requirements.
Fully funding counterterrorism represents bipartisanship
and good policy. The terrorist threat is not a temporary
emergency; it is going to be with us for the foreseeable
future. It is vital that we fund operations in a way that
allows our field officers to plan ahead.
This legislation also encourages the Intelligence Community
to recruit and clear qualified personnel with the language
skills and ethnic background that will make it easier to
understand--and penetrate--the hard targets. This bill urges
the DNI to establish a multi-tier security clearance system to
help patriot Americans with relatives in foreign countries
obtain security clearances to work in the Intelligence
Community. This provision is identical to H. Res. 173, which
all nine (9) Democrats on the Committee introduced on March 17,
2005.
There are also important new investments in human
intelligence and other intelligence activities that, if
administered properly, will help us penetrate terrorist cells,
proliferation networks, and secretive regimes where our
intelligence has been deficient.
Despite these positive attributes, the legislation reported
to the House contains a few provisions with which we disagree--
one of which is so damaging to the authority of the DNI that it
threatens to undermine the very reforms passed by Congress last
year.
Under Section 305 of this bill, congressional committees,
including the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, are
given a ``pocket veto'' of the proposed personnel transfers by
the DNI. We oppose this provision.
Under the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
enacted and signed into law by the President last year, the DNI
is required to ``promptly provide notice of any transfer of
personnel'' to congressional committees of jurisdiction.
Section 305 would substantively alter this requirement to
prohibit the DNI from transferring personnel to intelligence
centers ``unless the Director has provided notice of any
transfer of personnel * * * and received a response from'' the
congressional committees of jurisdiction. Thus, ifa committee
chairman wished to block the transfer, all he or she would have to do
is withhold indefinitely a response.
This provision effectively guts a careful bipartisan
compromise struck by House and Senate--and supported by the
Chairman of this Committee--in its consideration of the
intelligence reform legislation last year. It waters down that
transfer authority to the point where it is virtually
eliminated.
This provision is opposed by the DNI. When the identical
provision was proposed as an amendment to the FY 2006 Defense
Authorization bill at the May 18 markup, a spokesman for the
DNI told the New York Times that Ambassador Negroponte's office
was ``aware of the provisions being considered, and we would be
opposed to any legislation that would restrict the DNI's
authority.''
During the intelligence authorization markup, the Ranking
Member offered an amendment to strike Section 305. Several
members of the Committee voiced strong support for this
amendment. However, the amendment was defeated on a party-line
vote. If this issue is not resolved in some other way in
advance of floor action, it is our intent to offer our
amendment on the floor--and we believe we will be successful.
To the families of the victims of 9/11, who fought so hard for
these reforms, we owe nothing less.
On a separate matter, we expressed concern regarding the
Committee's cuts to certain classified technical programs,
which cannot be discussed in this unclassified report. (The
classified transcript of the closed portion of the markup
reflects our concerns.) As a general matter, we support the
efforts to confront hard choices in technical programs.
However, we think it is unwise to make sudden, drastic cuts to
programs absent a more thorough technical review. These cuts
could cause a gap in our capabilities and diminish the
industrial base so critical to fielding the technology against
current and future threats. We intend to work with the majority
to review these cuts and arrive at a solution that protects our
intelligence capabilities.
CONCLUSION
This Committee's highest priority must be to ensure the
success of the DNI and the thousands of professionals who work
for the U.S. Intelligence Community. We support the robust
funding for the Intelligence Community provided by this bill,
and we especially support full-funding for counterterrorism.
With a combination of resources and new authorities, we have
placed the Intelligence Community on the right track to avoid
the many mistakes that occurred in the past. This progress will
be impeded if the DNI's authorities are undercut. For the sake
of our nation's security, we cannot let this happen.
Jane Harman.
Alcee L. Hastings.
Silvestre Reyes.
Leonard L. Boswell.
Bud Cramer.
Anna G. Eshoo.
Rush Holt.
C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger.
ADDITIONAL VIEWS
I concur with the minority's views regarding the need to
remove Section 305 concerning a diminution of DNI transfer
authorities and the support for full funding of
counterterrorism. While I agree with much of what those views
state concerning funding of systems, there exists some discreet
differences in degree and proposed remedy. Similarly, comments
that seem to indicate that all funds are otherwise being spent
entirely appropriately seem overbroad and cannot be supported
without clarification which is best left for any classified
section of this report.
John F. Tierney.